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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.03.24, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- A meaningless political spectacle

 

1- A meaningless political spectacle

 

How does it benefit the Palestinian people to say that Netanyahu does not have Israel's interest at heart and runs an extremist government that will collapse, when Biden continues to provide Israel with weapons and funding, stand by its side in international forums, and prevent any state from sanctioning it? Whether the killing happens Biden's way or Netanyahu's way, the Palestinian people are ultimately being killed. Therefore, the Biden administration is implicated to its ears in the genocidal war against the Palestinian people, and its current dispute with Netanyahu is nothing more than a meaningless political spectacle with no benefit to the Palestinian people--Mohammad Yaghi in Palestinian al-Ayyam

Despite the fervent efforts employing carrot-and-stick tactics and using all propaganda methods, the occupation has not – and will not – succeed in creating civilian formulas from within the Strip that agree to deal with the occupation, thereby serving as an avenue for the Zionist war government to claim that the idea of establishing alternative administrations that answer to the occupation and serve its purposes is a realistic scenario. The proof is that this option has failed despite six months of continuous killing and destruction against the people of the Strip, and despite the starvation and blockade of the long-suffering residents of the North. These policies have not managed to create an alternative reality that accepts occupation--Ahmad al-Tanani on Palestinian www.qudsn.co

The problem with the Gaza pier, its expected mode of operations, and the reasons the idea was devised stem from the change it may introduce to the geopolitical landscape and the efforts expended to effect such change. Not content with severing Gaza's military ties and controlling its internal social map, Israel has embarked on reshaping its external landscape, so as to ultimately maintain full control of all of its entry points by land, air, and sea, as a prelude to nullifying the role of the Rafah crossing or pressuring Egypt into extensive cooperation in regulating overland and underground traffic. The issue here transcends the delivery of aid and closing the security gaps that terrorists have used to infiltrate Sinai. It reaches a deeper level concerning Egypt's regional role, which has been clearly linked to the Palestinian cause--Mohammad Abulfadl in Emirati al-Arab

This shift [in the range in Ansarullah's maritime attack], marked by challenging U.S. dominance over an area beyond Yemen's national scope, presents the U.S. with difficult prospects. Its options are between embarking on a major war, when it barely escaped a less dangerous war in Afghanistan to avoid losses, and living with a war of attrition that undermines its prestige and the image of deterrence it seeks to maintain. Otherwise, the U.S. can hasten to take steps within its power to ensure the end of the aggression and blockade on Gaza--Lebanese al-Bina

Some believe that the Israelis will continue to insist on delivering severe blows to Hezbollah until the party finds itself facing the moment of deciding to pursue major escalation. The Israelis want this moment to come so as to draw the Americans into fighting alongside them and benefit from Washington's support. Hezbollah, for its part, wants to choose the timing that suits it, especially since the prolonged duration of the war in Gaza and the inability to reach a political and diplomatic settlement on the situation in the South will bring it face to face with the option of escalating against the Israelis on its own timeline. It will choose a moment when the Israeli army is scattered, its strength shaken and suffering from exhaustion--Munir ar-Rabi' on Lebanese www.almodon.com

 

 

The claims that the recent public disagreements between the Biden administration and the Israeli government over the war on Gaza are serious and will hinder Israel's war are exaggerated propaganda discourse that should mislead no one, insists a leading Palestinian commentator. The disagreements are not on the principle of waging war on Gaza and its people but on the way this war should be conducted, with each of Biden and Netanyahu having his domestic political reasons for choosing his preferred way. Israel's main option in its search for alternatives to administer the Gaza Strip in the "day after" has been to forge alliances with clans and prominent families, notes a Palestinian commentator. However, these Israeli plans have been foiled by the fact that 66% of Gaza's population are refugees distributed over districts and camps rendering it unlikely for clan authority to dominate, and the fact that the Islamist movements' organizational structures have dug deep roots among a loyal and defiant population that refuses to collaborate. The planned pier in Gaza, purportedly for the delivery of humanitarian aid, threatens to create a new rift between Cairo and the Palestinian cause after the Camp David treaty created the initial rift, warns an Egyptian commentator. Egypt stands to lose the most if it is not extra careful to thwart others from turning the pier into a prelude to major changes to the regional geopolitical landscape by cutting off Egypt's main connection to Palestine, thereby threatening Cairo's regional role. Yesterday's announcement by the Yemeni Ansarullah's leader that the group's attacks will now include the area extending from the Indian Ocean to the Cape of Good Hope is a major shift in the resistance axis' war in support of Gaza, maintains the editorial in a Lebanese daily. It faces the U.S. with a difficult choice between embarking on a dangerous major war, adapting to a war of attrition that undermines its prestige, or ensuring the end of the blockade on Gaza. Neither Hezbollah nor Iran wants a wide-scale war with Israel, which is why their response to Israeli provocations have so far been restrained, but if Israel carries out ground operations in Lebanese territories, the gloves will come off and the response will be a greater escalation, claims a Lebanese commentator. Israel may want such war if it can draw the U.S. into it; but Hezbollah wants to choose a moment in which the Israeli army is weakened and suffering from exhaustion before it opts for inflicting significant damage on Israel.

 

PROPAGANDA: "There is a lot of propaganda portraying the disagreement between President Biden and Netanyahu as a fundamental dispute between the two parties," remarks Palestinian commentator Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

They say the former seeks to stop the war, rejects the invasion of the city of Rafah, and wants to provide humanitarian aid to our people in Gaza, while the latter seeks to continue the war, invade Rafah, and starve our people in Gaza.

But Biden's conduct and his officials' statements confirm that he does not differ from Netanyahu in his goals, and that the dispute between them stems from entirely different reasons, which the media mostly ignores.

Let us start with what we all know.

Biden seeks a six-week truce, during which most or all of Israeli captives in Gaza will be released, after which Israel can resume the war however it pleases. His administration claims that a six-week truce could potentially be developed into a permanent ceasefire afterward.

Logic dictates that if the resistance relinquishes the trump card represented by the captives, that will make the occupation state's mission of eliminating the resistance much easier.

Biden also will not veto the occupation state's invasion of Rafah. All he says is that he wants to see a practical plan in Rafah that avoids killing tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians.

When asked by journalists if an invasion of Rafah without major civilian casualties is possible, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken answered, 'Yes, it's possible', but they have not yet seen an Israeli plan that can achieve that. The U.S. does not want to be further accused of contributing to the killing of Palestinian civilians, as this has become a source of embarrassment to it. It wants to appear as though it cares about the bloodshed of innocent civilians.

Thus, there is no 'fundamental disagreement' between the two sides regarding the invasion of Rafah. The only issue is how to avoid killing thousands of civilians.

From previous experiences, we know that the occupation state will present a plan to the U.S. that the latter will approve, but the occupation state will not abide by it. Thus, the invasion will take place, thousands of civilians will be killed, and the Biden administration will defend the plan in all international institutions.

There is also no dispute between Biden and Netanyahu on weaponizing the starvation of Palestinians to pressure the resistance and force it to accept their conditions for a 'truce'.

If the Biden administration were serious about providing humanitarian aid to the Palestinians of Gaza, it would have done so long ago.

All it would take is threatening to suspend weapon shipments to Israel until it opens all crossings to allow aid in.

The floating pier that Washington proposes will take two months to build, during which thousands of Palestinians will starve to death. As for its aid airdrops, they are no more than a PR spectacle. The aid was insufficient to feed even 1% of the population of the Strip, while bearing in mind that some of it fell into the sea or inside the occupation state itself, and some of it killed the civilians scrambling to catch it.

When another journalist asked Blinken if he agreed with EU foreign policy chief Joseph Borrell's assessment that Israel is causing a famine in Gaza, he responded that Hamas is responsible for everything happening in Gaza, and Israel is consistently bringing in aid through multiple crossings, but he wants to see an increase in this aid. Blinken refuses to recognize that there is a famine or that the occupation state is weaponizing starvation.

Therefore, there is no dispute between the authentic Zionist Netanyahu and the fake, Zionized Biden on killing our people. So what do they differ on?

President Biden is in an election year, and he feels that losing the votes of Arabs, Muslims, and many other supporters of the Palestinian people could cause him to lose the race, especially since opinion polls show the infamous Republican candidate Trump as the frontrunner.

Therefore, he wants three interconnected things from Netanyahu to help him win the elections, but the latter refuses to provide them, not out of spite for Biden or as a snub to the U.S.'s support, but because fulfilling those demands would lead to the collapse of his ruling coalition. Biden's three demands are:

First, Netanyahu only needs to verbally agree to the principle of the two-state solution. Such an Israeli agreement would enable Biden to claim that he extracted the concession from Netanyahu due to the pressure he exerted, thereby opening the door to swaying constituents who will not commit to vote for him just because he has a project to establish a Palestinian state, which he claims will happen after eliminating the Palestinian resistance.

However, Netanyahu does not want to give such an agreement, not because he does not want to lie, as deceit is a hallmark of his personality, but because he does not want to lose the support of ally fascist religious parties that seek to annex the West Bank. These parties are explicit about their objectives and have signed a pact with him to intensify the settlement and annexation of the West Bank. To breach it would mean the dissolution of his government.

Let us also remember that Netanyahu wants to annex Area C of the West Bank, like all the Zionist parties in both the ruling coalition and the opposition.

Second, Biden wants Netanyahu to agree to the PA's return to Gaza after the resistance is eliminated. He wants to be able to claim to be preparing the PA to develop into a state, which is why he wants it to take over affairs in Gaza.

However, Netanyahu does not want that. He maintains that he and his army will stay in Gaza as long as possible, and he wants to annex parts of it and manage them directly or through local proxies.

Netanyahu's refusal weakens Biden's position in front of his constituents. How can he convince them that he is serious about the Palestinian state project when Netanyahu refuses to hand over Gaza to the PA?

Of course, even if Netanyahu agrees, the PA's return to Gaza is not possible without an internal Palestinian consensus.

Finally, Biden wants to proceed with the project he launched prior to October 7 to integrate Israel into the Arab world. However, Netanyahu's rejection of the two-state solution and his refusal to allow the PA to return to Gaza create a big problem for this project. The Arab states that want to believe that Biden is serious about his project need to see something tangible. However, Netanyahu does not care about that, which embarrasses Biden and makes him appear in front of Arab states as dwarfed by the Israeli 'giant' controlling the gears of U.S. policy.

There is also a personal aspect that can be added to the above.

Biden has supported Israel more than any previous U.S. president, and he believes that Netanyahu should be grateful and accommodate his needs to return the favor. However, Netanyahu treats him with condescension, without regard for his needs. Therefore, Biden feels insulted and responds through statements, reports, and useless meetings with Gantz, all of which are of no benefit to the Palestinians.

How does it benefit the Palestinian people to say that Netanyahu does not have Israel's interest at heart and runs an extremist government that will collapse, when Biden continues to provide Israel with weapons and funding, stand by its side in international forums, and prevent any state from sanctioning it?

Whether the killing happens Biden's way or Netanyahu's way, the Palestinian people are ultimately being killed.

"Therefore, the Biden administration is implicated to its ears in the genocidal war against the Palestinian people, and its current dispute with Netanyahu is nothing more than a meaningless political spectacle with no benefit to the Palestinian people," concludes Yaghi.

End…

 

"DAY AFTER" DEBATE: "The ongoing debate over scenarios for the 'day after' in the Gaza Strip has taken up the most space in the discussions of concerned states both regionally and internationally," notes Palestinian commentator Ahmad al-Tanani on Friday 's Palestinian www.qudsn.co.

Each party is engaged in desperate attempts to engineer this occasion to suit its requirements and strategic approaches to addressing the Palestinian dossier. In the process, everyone disregards the Palestinian people's right to choose their representatives and presumes that the defeat of the resistance (which has been fighting staunchly for six months) is a foregone conclusion.

As part of the ongoing pursuit of multiple visions for the future of the Palestinian people and leadership, various proposals have emerged ranging from revamping the PA or exploring national unity options, to returning to the origins and restructuring the PLO, to Zionist right-wing approaches proposing complete control of the Strip and resettlement, and beyond. Many scenarios and ideas have been proposed in the midst of all this, some of them realistic and others mere slogans and pipe dreams. However, the common denominator between them is a lack of real understanding of the complex environment in the Gaza Strip.

While Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu stalled on presenting his vision for the 'day after' in the Strip, he finally came out with a short document, only a page and a quarter long, presenting a vision fundamentally based on reoccupying Gaza and extending Israeli security control over it, followed by working with local components to establish a civilian administration loyal to the occupation, while Israel retains security control over the Strip. His proposal also sees Israel imposing broader control over Gaza's Southern borders, in cooperation with Egypt 'as much as possible', and establishing buffer zones on the borders to prevent smuggling and ensure no further attacks occur.

Netanyahu's vision, which he has summarized as not allowing Gaza to become 'Hamastan or Fatahstan', mainly focuses on the idea of dismantling any systems of Palestinian governance, and replacing them, according to his document, with 'local officials' with 'administrative experience' and no affiliation to 'states or entities that support terrorism' to manage civil affairs in Gaza. The document also avoids any mention of the PA playing a role in the Strip.

Clearly, Netanyahu's plan for the 'day after' has essentially nothing to do with a true vision in the PM's mind addressed to the world, either in the format in which it was issued and announced to the Israeli public, or in its content. Rather, it is connected in one way or another to Zionist right-wing propaganda. It is designed to suit the requirements of Netanyahu's coalition allies Ben-Gvir and Smotrich and thus keep his government afloat. It is also a recipe for prolonging the war and fulfilling its amorphous objectives, which are both unattainable and unquantifiable.

The occupation army has extensively searched the Gaza Strip for an ally to take on the task of distributing aid, if only in a nominal capacity, to serve as proof that local allies can be found to work with the occupation, if only in appearance, thus projecting the image that there are grounds to discuss the proposed steps as realistic options.

The main option in the search operations was to forge alliances with clans and prominent families and invest in the relationship with them to turn them into a civilian instrument that serves the occupation's objectives, initially taking on the distribution of aid and gradually embarking on the process of meeting the population's civilian needs under the occupation army's oversight.

In the same vein, the occupation army has intensified its assault on all security and governmental capabilities to prevent any form of official operation in Northern parts of Gaza especially. It has also turned the process of obtaining aid into a deadly pursuit by targeting the hungry masses waiting for relief trucks to arrive on Rashid Street in Southwest Gaza City, so as to eliminate all opportunities to obtain basic necessities in the usual way. This would make it easier to promote local proxies and get the public to agree to deal with them by ensuring it is the only avenue for obtaining basic necessities, making the choice either to accept this or die of hunger or migrate Southward.

The occupation army has closed all avenues of life and enabled, facilitated, and perhaps even employed instigators of chaos and violence to ensure the law of the jungle prevails, striking at all components of security and order to that end. But despite all this, there remains the crucial missing link of an instrument on the ground: Those who would cooperate with the occupation's schemes and play the required role in creating an alternative system.

From the outset, the Gazan clans maintained the stance of refusing to engage in any such processes designed to create a civilian environment that cooperates with the occupation. The vast majority of Gazan clans have outright rejected any form of communication with the occupation, and all attempts to get them to play the required role hit a brick wall, even when presented through intermediaries under the guise of international institutions. But while this is an important and pivotal stance, it is not the sole decisive factor.

Despite the clans' heavy presence and weight in the Strip, the nature of power dynamics, decision-making, and influence in Gaza is not closely related to clan dominance over society or the ability to impose tribal authority within the power hierarchy in the Strip.

In the demographic distribution in the Gaza Strip, 66% of the population are refugees, distributed among eight refugee camps across the Strip's five governorates. This makes for a dynamic where clan authority or tribalist tendencies are unlikely to dominate. Moreover, no clan in the Strip has influence beyond the district it is located in, including the clans of the Shuja'iya, Zeitoun, Sabra, Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, Khan Yunis, and Rafah districts.

On the other hand, the environment in the Strip is organized in a way that has enabled years of relatively comfortable factional and party activity, which has expanded after Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. This enabled national and Islamic forces to build strong, solid bases throughout the Strip. As a result, organizational presence prevails in every community of Gaza, including major clan communities, making the vast majority of the public in the Strip an organized society that has direct or indirect connections to organizations and factions and falls under their jurisdictional influence.

In the same vein, despite the horror of the constant psychological warfare practiced against the people of Gaza for the past six months to try to turn the popular tide against the resistance and create a hostile environment to it, the people of the Strip are characterized by the loyalty of their affiliation and their attachment to their land and their right to life, as well as their right to resistance. People who insist on staying in their homes and lay low under daily fire to resist displacement schemes will not allow themselves to be taken in by today's conspiracies under the pressure of hunger.

Despite the fervent efforts employing carrot-and-stick tactics and using all propaganda methods, the occupation has not – and will not – succeed in creating civilian formulas from within the Strip that agree to deal with the occupation, thereby serving as an avenue for the Zionist war government to claim that the idea of establishing alternative administrations that answer to the occupation and serve its purposes is a realistic scenario. The proof is that this option has failed despite six months of continuous killing and destruction against the people of the Strip, and despite the starvation and blockade of the long-suffering residents of the North. These policies have not managed to create an alternative reality that accepts occupation.

It is crucial to understand that the Gaza Strip's environment is not conducive to passing malign schemes, nor is it an environment that can abide formulas manufactured in intelligence rooms or regional meetings, or Netanyahu's pursuit to salvage his political career.

"The environment of the Gaza Strip is impregnable, and its main characteristics are defiance, dignity and pride," concludes Tanani.

End…

 

A ROLE THAT IS SLIPPING AWAY: "Unless Egypt updates its political and security dynamics in dealing with the Palestinian cause, its role will slip away from its hands," warns Egyptian commentator Mohammed Abulfadl in Friday's Emirates'-owned pan-Arab news portal al-Arab.

In that case, many keys of control will end up in others' hands, to the detriment of Cairo's regional role and Egyptian national security, much of which is historically linked to developments in this cause. Israel's war on Gaza could have ramifications that affect the traditional relationship between Egypt and Palestine.

The step that the U.S. and some European countries have taken, with Israel's support, to establish a floating pier in Gaza to provide aid to its residents is just one of the moves unraveling the connection between Egypt and the Strip. The Rafah crossing is the only remaining crossing point to and from Gaza, after Israel closed its six crossings with Gaza years ago and seized control over its airspace and waters. This has made the Rafah crossing Gaza's only link to the world.

On the surface, the pier project seeks to provide humanitarian relief and save the starving, but there are ulterior motives underlying it, including inflating the humanitarian dossier so it takes precedence over other crucial dossiers. Israel, which closed its crossings and restricted the Rafah crossing from the Palestinian side, is generously cooperating to build the pier. It seems as if the U.S. and the international community are unwilling to pressure Israel to allow aid to enter through the current gates and crossing points, to the extent that aid airdrops to disparate areas of Gaza have been portrayed as a remarkable event and moral achievement for the participating countries.

Israel has created obstacles to hinder the Rafah crossing's function because it wants to complete its takeover of the Strip and keep Egypt from playing any tangible role in its interactions. To avoid clashing with Israel, the idea of a pier was embraced by the U.S. as a humanitarian solution to the obstacles to the delivery of aid to the Strip. It has been promoted as a political and military miracle, although its details pose a significant danger to the Palestinians.

The Egyptian perspective on the pier issue must be highlighted. As a direct consequence of building this port, another rift will emerge between Cairo and the Palestinian cause, after the Camp David treaty created the initial rift. Sinai was returned to Egypt after marathon negotiations, but the political settlement process effectively put an end to Egyptian military involvement in confronting Israel, by enforcing harsh conditions that make the cost of returning to it prohibitive.

Nevertheless, Egypt managed to maintain its material and moral connection to the Palestinian cause. In the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, it found an avenue to avoid being sidelined. It sought to maintain a distance from Israel's military engagements with some Arab countries by maximizing its political role in the region. This was its solution to avoid exclusion while protecting its national security in the way it wanted, due to the organic relationship with Palestine and the dire consequences that sacrificing it might hold.

Cairo carved out a regional role from a void that could have engulfed it. It forged a political bond with the Palestinian cause and endured immense pressure from some Arab countries and Israel, as well as criticism and condemnation from Palestinian factions for its approach to the political settlement. The heated criticisms and accusations only subsided when talk of peace gained traction in the region and multiple dialogues were launched that largely favored the settlement approach over confrontation.

Israel's pursuit of normalization with some Arab countries under the Abraham Accords track further detracted from Egypt's capital in the region and diminished its connection to the Palestinian cause. The most alarming aspect of this track for Egypt is that it impacts some of the fixed principles of the cause that the Arabs have stood by, to the detriment of both the Palestinians and Egypt. Their vision for a political settlement will recede with every breakthrough Israel makes into the Arab fold.

Operation al-Aqsa Flood has recalibrated some aspects of the Palestinian cause, temporarily halting the Abraham Accords track. Although October 7th and its aftermath came as a surprise, it brought Egypt back to the forefront, returned Palestine to the list of priorities, and revived talk of the centrality of the conflict with Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, statehood advocates were shocked to find the war government engaging in practices that deflate the idea.

Egypt has been consumed by the controversy over the opening and closure of the Rafah border crossing, the entry and obstruction of aid, the scrutiny of inspection operations at the Kerem Shalom crossing, the settler protests blocking trucks, the bristling remarks from U.S. President Joe Biden regarding Egypt's crucial role in opening the Rafah crossing after the war. Egypt has faced accusations of security coordination with Israel in the Philadelphi Route, then allegations of collusion with the occupation forces' invasion of the city of Rafah in Southern Gaza. After being drained by this controversy and responding to it, the narrative has now reached the issue of the pier being built in Gaza.

Egypt has dealt with the overall situation wisely. It has avoided getting drawn into military clashes or political squabbles, while maintaining the firmness of its vision. Those who sought to sideline it after the Camp David Accords failed to achieve their designs in the Gaza war. Egypt has kept the ball rolling in the prisoner swap negotiations and discussions of most regional proposals since the war began. However, the port issue may be a grueling test, as Egypt stands to lose the most if it fails to thwart others from seizing the opportunity to turn it into an alternative to the Rafah crossing.

The problem with the Gaza pier, its expected mode of operations, and the reasons the idea was devised stem from the change it may introduce to the geopolitical landscape and the efforts expended to effect such change. Not content with severing Gaza's military ties and controlling its internal social map, Israel has embarked on reshaping its external landscape, so as to ultimately maintain full control of all of its entry points by land, air, and sea, as a prelude to nullifying the role of the Rafah crossing or pressuring Egypt into extensive cooperation in regulating overland and underground traffic.

The issue here transcends the delivery of aid and closing the security gaps that terrorists have used to infiltrate Sinai. It reaches a deeper level concerning Egypt's regional role, which has been clearly linked to the Palestinian cause.

"Previous attempts to sideline Egypt have failed, and Cairo has managed to circumvent them through various means, carving out a role for itself in all the wars that have occurred in Gaza by virtue of its undeniable geographic position," concludes Abulfadl.

End…

 

A QUALITATIVE SHIFT: "Ansarullah commander 'Abdulmalik al-Houthi's announcement of the transition to a new phase of escalation in support of Gaza, its people, and its resistance marks a qualitative shift in the course of the war between the resistance axis and the U.S./Israeli alliance," maintains Friday's editorial in the pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina.

This is especially true given that the focus of this new phase is expanding the range of attacks on vessels that support the occupation state from the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea to include the area extending from the Indian Ocean to the Cape of Good Hope. This will block all maritime trade to the occupation state from the East, in defiance of U.S. dominance over the oceans and seas beyond Bab al-Mandeb.

This shift, marked by challenging U.S. dominance over an area beyond Yemen's national scope, presents the U.S. with difficult prospects. Its options are between embarking on a major war, when it barely escaped a less dangerous war in Afghanistan to avoid losses, and living with a war of attrition that undermines its prestige and the image of deterrence it seeks to maintain. Otherwise, the U.S. can hasten to take steps within its power to ensure the end of the aggression and blockade on Gaza.

In taking on the responsibility of spearheading this war, Ansarullah has shouldered the most challenging mission. After the resistance in Gaza and South Lebanon took it upon themselves to defeat the occupation army, Ansarullah has assumed the task of routing the U.S. support for Israel that drives the war and is responsible for its continuation.

When the resistance forces say that the battle is against the clock and will go down to the wire, they are not approaching their responsibilities from a defensive standpoint, in the sense of settling to endure and wait for results. Rather, they, as well as Yemen, are using the time to escalate operations so as to further constrain the U.S.-led enemy front and limit their options, while bearing the risks and sacrifices.

"When history remembers Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the great Palestinian heroism that has underscored the epic struggle of the resistance and people in Gaza, it will also record that Ansarullah was the surprise in this war, adding value to it and creating major shifts in it," concludes the editorial.

End…

 

HEZBOLLAH'S PLANS: "Hezbollah maintains that it does not seek to expand the war," notes Lebanese commentator Munir ar-Rabi' on Friday's Lebanese news portal www.almodon.com.

The majority of Hezbollah officials stress the 'auxiliary front' equation and link the end of attacks from South Lebanon to the end of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip.

This equation is the result of many discussions and deliberations between Hezbollah and the Iranians. A clear Iranian decision has been taken not to escalate the war at this stage and to exercise maximum restraint until the conditions mature for a humanitarian truce in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah translated this decision in his own way, stating that the matter will take some time and that patience and endurance are necessary because victory will be on the side of those with the capacity to endure.

In practice, Iran and Hezbollah are wagering on U.S. efforts and the pressure that the Biden administration will ostensibly exert on Israel to stop the war and prevent its expansion. However, the Israeli government has other considerations, the most important being to prolong the war as much as possible.

In one aspect of the discussions between Hezbollah and the Iranians, the clear conclusion was reached not to respond to Israeli strikes in a manner that would precipitate a wide-scale war, regardless of Israeli provocations and attacks and the intensity of the escalation.

The information indicates that the Iranians are drawing a new red line at Israel mounting ground operations or attempting to infiltrate Lebanese territory. In that event, the gloves will come off and Hezbollah will respond with a greater escalation. Otherwise, the current course of the Israeli operations will continue for a long time.

Faced with these facts, no one in Lebanon or outside of it can speculate or predict what the Israelis will do, especially Binyamin Netanyahu. So far, they have rejected all the proposed settlement formulas. Meanwhile, reports reaching Lebanon from Israel give the impression that the Israelis have no confidence in UNIFI and the Lebanese army's ability to control the situation in South Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from continuing to stockpile weapons and make preparations. Therefore, Israel fears that a potential settlement will revert the situation to how it was after the 2006 July War. Resolution 1701 failed to prevent Hezbollah from amassing arms, and it continued to stockpile weapons and bring them into Lebanon and the South.

Some believe that the Israelis will continue to insist on delivering severe blows to Hezbollah until the party finds itself facing the moment of deciding to pursue major escalation. The Israelis want this moment to come so as to draw the Americans into fighting alongside them and benefit from Washington's support.

Hezbollah, for its part, wants to choose the timing that suits it, especially since the prolonged duration of the war in Gaza and the inability to reach a political and diplomatic settlement on the situation in the South will bring it face to face with the option of escalating against the Israelis on its own timeline. It will choose a moment when the Israeli army is scattered, its strength shaken and suffering from exhaustion. At that point, Hezbollah will resort to operations and strikes that inflict significant damage on the Israelis.

The party is wagering on U.S./Israeli tensions and serious U.S. measures against the Netanyahu government to compel it to stop the war. Nasrallah explicitly revealed this when he said that President Biden is capable of stopping the war with a stroke of his pen, thus ending the clashes in the entire region. Hezbollah is also betting on the Israeli internal scene's fatigue and ire towards Netanyahu and the prolongation of the war and its losses. The party is also banking on all the internal divisions in Israel.

"That will lead it then to choose the moment of escalation in a bid to restore a balance of deterrence and improve its defensive posture by going on the offensive before engaging in serious negotiations," concludes Rabi'.

Ends…

MIDEAST MIRROR 27.01.23, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

QUR'AN-BURNING INCIDENT IN SWEDEN: Tamer Korkmaz claims in pro-government Yeni Safak that NATO has prioritized hostility towards Islam after the fall of the Eastern bloc: "NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also interpreted the burning of the Qur'an as an exercise of the 'freedom of thought'. He said the act was not a crime. The NATO concept underwent a change as the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s. It prioritized enmity towards Islam. Ned Price, the U.S. State Department's gay spokesperson, did not condemn the act of burning the Qur'an outside the Turkish embassy in Sweden. He said the act sabotaged NATO. Since the Swedish state allowed the despicable act, it is they who sabotaged NATO while looking forward to entering the organization."

Writing in Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, Baskin Oran maintains that the violation of symbols of other peoples' faith is a fascist hate crime: "'Workers of the world, unite,' Marx said. They could not. But the fascists of the world are uniting. Most recently Edwin Wagensveld, the head of anti-Islam group Pegida, tore the Qur'an's pages in The Hague. Freedom of expression does not include violating symbols of faith with the aim of hurting or humiliating those believing in them. This can only count as a hate crime. The imperialists who have pillaged the whole world are now paying the price. They are subjected to large influxes of migration by those fleeing economic hardships and grave anti-democratic pressure in those poor countries. This triggers rightist or rather racist reactions among the Western public."

Writing in pro-Kurdish opposition Arti Gercek, Murad Mihci warns that action against Rasmus Paludan who burnt a copy of the Qur'an in Sweden would help him achieve his racist aims: "It should be stressed that the Swedish and Danish governments have not come up with a sufficiently realistic response to the Qur'an-burning incident. Turkey immediately reacted as expected. Any response to the person who burnt the Qur'an will put his racist attack back on the agenda and render his provocative act successful. Nevertheless, groups from various beliefs have criticized and condemned the act, showing mutual sensitivity. However, racist groups have also emerged in our country. Some ultra-nationalist groups chanted 'Let Sweden be raided and Paludan hanged' while saying 'Allah-u-Akbar' outside the Swedish consulate in Istanbul."

 

TURKEY/U.S.: Armagan Kuloglu suggests in nationalist opposition Yenicag that Turkey should be more open to Finland's NATO membership bid since it is more moderate than Sweden: "The U.S. is utilizing NATO among other tools to ensure that Turkey acts in line with American interests while putting pressure on Ankara in various ways. The U.S. tries to employ rhetoric that says that 'Turkey is an uncompromising ally.' As a temporary solution, we can create the perception that Finland's membership bid for NATO may be approved, assuming it fulfils Turkey's conditions and expectations, because it is more moderate compared to Sweden. Thus the Swedish prime minister seems to have accepted not obstructing Finland."

Ozay Sendir warns in pro-government Milliyet that the U.S. would force Turkey to take action if it gives Greece a green light to expand its territorial waters: "U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to visit Turkey, Israel and Greece in February. Blinken will force Turkey to take action if he gives a green light to Greece's extension of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and acts like U.S. multinational company ExxonMobil's CEO, which wants to complete business in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' exclusive economic zone with a license from the Greek Cypriot administration. Ankara will also focus its attention on Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lately undertaken the task of improving Saudi/U.S. ties. We will see if he becomes an instrument in Athens' propaganda and throws away the recent rapprochement with Turkey."

 

WESTERN MEDIA COVERAGE OF TURKEY: Hande Firat contends in pro-government Hurriyet that hostility towards President Erdogan in the Western media is in reaction to his policies exposing the West's exploitation of the rest of the world: "Stories in The Economist, Bloomberg and Stern about Turkey share hostility towards Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his foreign policies. These original policies exposed the exploitation system known to those governing the current global system. As a result, Erdogan has been turned into a target. Western countries fuel the fire of enmity towards Erdogan further because of Turkey's role and independent actions concerning Libya, Azerbaijan and particularly the Russia/Ukraine war."

 

Iran media watch

 

(Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Network One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

ISRAELI 'MASSACRE' IN JENIN: Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian condemned an Israeli raid on a refugee camp in Jenin, describing it as a "barbaric attack" and a "massacre". Israeli forces yesterday killed 10 Palestinians, including a woman in her 60s, and wounded 20 in a large-scale raid that set off armed clashes in the occupied West Bank. Tweeting in Persian and Arabic, Amir-Abdollahian called for an "immediate" international response to Israeli "criminals" and insisted that there would be "no retreat" for Jenin. Separately, the foreign ministry spokesperson called on Muslim nations to launch "coordinated measures" in support of Palestinians.

 

DESECRATION OF QURAN: State-organized rallies will be held today after Friday prayers to condemn the "desecration" of the Quran in Sweden and the Netherlands. A copy of the Quran was burned in a Sweden protest and another was torn up in a gathering outside the Dutch parliament last week. Hojjat-ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohsen Mahmoudi, the head of the Islamic Propagation Coordination Council of Tehran Province, appeared on a live TV program this morning to promote the rallies. He urged Muslims around the world to "force their governments to take action" and criticised Saudi officials for not condemning the incidents.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: The parents of a 9-year-old boy killed during recent protests were summoned to the prosecutor's office. Kian Pirfalak was killed in a shooting last November in the south-western city of Izeh. Officials blame "terrorists" for the shooting, but his family maintains that he was killed by security forces. Critics of the court summons turned the young boy's name into a trending hashtag. A Germany-based writer Tweeted: "Apparently things have calmed down, but atrocities continue with the same intensity." An Iran-based political activist pointed out that the authorities have called Pirfalak a "martyr" but his mother lost her teaching job for challenging the official narrative of his death. He wrote: "The Islamic Republic is the regime of liars led by Ali Khamenei, the epitome of insolence and shamelessness." The chief editor of the official news agency of the judiciary, said Pirfalak's parents had been summoned to "lodge a complaint in relation to the murder of their son".

MIDEAST MIRROR 18.11.21, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKIC STATES/ NATO: Levent Yilmaz is optimistic about the prospects for improved trade relations among Turkic states in pro-government Yeni Safak: "The Organization of Turkic States countries' share in Turkey's total foreign trade is only 3.17%. This must be increased. Developments that will help lead to this are around the corner. One of these is the opening of the Zangezur Corridor. The corridor, which will open the political climate after Azerbaijan's Karabakh victory, will connect the Turkic world with Turkey in a more cost-effective and secure way. It is clear that this will certainly have a positive effect on economic relations."

Hakki Ocal believes Turkey does not need NATO more than NATO needs Turkey in pro-government Milliyet: "If Turkey bids farewell to NATO of its own will and deprives the latter, especially the U.S., of a political counterbalance politics to Russia, will the Western world be able to bear this? Hawkish senior EU and U.S. diplomats keep bragging and dismiss the need for this balance. No one considers the damage inflicted on Turkey by sanctions imposed on U.S. adversaries. But Turkey not only knows how to sustain itself; it also knows very well how to say goodbye to NATO after its exclusion from the F-35 program."

 

TURKEY/RUSSIA/LIBYA: Oguz Baran urges Turkish/Russian understanding in the Black Sea in Islamist pro-government Milat: "Russia, which lost Ukraine, made a critical move by occupying Crimea. However, it is clear that Turkey is trying to balance the situation by developing good relations with Ukraine and taking its side. It is not hard to assume that Turkey's stance carries the potential of being used as a card in Syria, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean. Regardless of this, it is very important that tension in the Black Sea is resolved with a Turkish/Russian accord. Otherwise, it is highly likely that NATO will infiltrate into the Black Sea to encircle Russia, destabilizing the region at a level impossible to manage."

Hediye Levent is worried about the situation in Libya in leftist opposition Evrensel: "Over 20,000 foreign fighters and mercenaries are estimated to still be in Libya. Foreign mercenaries who are commissioned by many prominent people, including Khalifa Haftar, as well as Libyan fighters, are of course not included in this number. Any sign of crisis could put these local and foreign mercenaries on stand-by for war. Because of such risks, Libya is on the agenda of countries that are active there or have stakes in the regular delivery of oil. The withdrawal of foreign troops was again discussed at the Paris summit last week, as it was during the Berlin summit. However, these discussions were limited to mutual accusations and demands for 'others to pull out first'."

 

MIGRATION POLICIES: Latif Salihoglu is critical of the Western countries' double-talk regarding refugees from Syria in Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "Many people who go to the U.S. or European countries via Turkey or via another route seem to be leaving Syria without the will or intention of returning. However, the intention and view of these states receiving them is not aligned with the thinking of the refugees. They say they will receive refugees, but at the same time they try to find a way to send back those who are already there – sometimes by force. We should examine the case of refugees related to us very well, analyzing the issue correctly. In the end, we should work out our responsibilities and liabilities, especially in religious terms."

Ayse Ozek Karasu doubts whether the Hungarian PM will recognize the rulings of the highest EU judicial court regarding asylum seekers on privately-owned news channel's website Haberturk: "The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg recently ruled that legislation that deems assistance to asylum seekers supported by civilian organizations backed by Hungarian-US philanthropist George Soros a crime was in violation of EU law. People's right to seek legal assistance in their asylum application, which is under international protection, could not be obstructed by any national legislation. The ruling, which came after an EU Commission application, was welcomed by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch. However, it is questionable whether Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will recognize the ruling of the highest judicial organ of Europe".

 

Iran media watch

 

IAEA: Iran has told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refrain from making "hasty and politically motivated comments" ahead of the upcoming nuclear talks after the agency detailed its conflicts with Tehran in two reports yesterday. The confidential reports, whose contents were seen and reported by various outlets, alleged that Iran had yet to grant access to IAEA inspectors to re-install surveillance cameras as the TESA Karaj complex, which manufactures components for centrifuges. The complex was the victim of apparent sabotage earlier this year, which destroyed one of the IAEA's four cameras at the site. The UN nuclear watchdog also accused Iran of carrying out "excessively physical searches" of its inspectors, according to Reuters. Iran's UN envoy, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, said the agency's "impartiality should never be jeopardized in the context of safeguards obligations," rolling news channel IRINN and Network One (IRTV1) report. The IAEA's quarterly reports come as its director general, Rafael Grossi, prepares to visit Iran on November 22nd. He is scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and nuclear energy chief, Mohammad Eslami, the following day. Grossi's trip comes ahead of the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting on November 24th, prompting speculation that Iran may be hoping to avoid being censured by the board. Indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) will kick off on November 29th in Vienna. Despite the IAEA's reports, no action is expected to be taken against Iran by the IAEA's board, according to diplomats quoted by Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. Takht-Ravanchi said Iran is ready to fully implement the JCPOA as long as U.S. sanctions are lifted in a verifiable manner, according to English-language Press TV.

 

IRAN/IRAQ: President Raisi said Tehran supports unity among all Iraqi factions in a phone call with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kazemi. He hailed Iraq's parliamentary election last month but said ambiguities with the results should be addressed "through a transparent legal and political process". Kazemi survived an assassination attempt after his residence was targeted by a drone earlier this month. Iran-backed groups are suspected of involvement. Several Iranian officials have questioned the nature of the assassination attempt.

 

BRAIN DRAIN: In a meeting yesterday with a group of students and academics, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said encouraging young people to emigrate was a "betrayal" of Iran. In reference to the West, Khamenei said a part of the "colonialists' soft war" against Iran was making the Iranian nation "neglect its talents". As is standard practice, his comments made front-page headlines in the papers this morning.

 

CORONAVIRUS: More than 43.3m people have received at least two shots of a coronavirus vaccine in Iran, according to official figures released by the Health Ministry yesterday. Just over 643,000 people have received three shots. Overall, Iran has administered more than 100m vaccine doses.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranians on Twitter continue to commemorate the second anniversary of the November 2019 protests during which hundreds were killed and thousands were injured or arrested. Two hashtags related to the protests have gone viral on Twitter; both include the word Aban, the Iranian calendar month during which the protests took place. One user pointed to the week-long nationwide internet shutdown that was imposed during the protests. Not having access to international news outlets, he recalled trying to piece together anecdotes from taxi drivers to understand what was happening. One user shared an image composed of the names of those killed in the protests written in red and white over a black background. A video of a painting showing a fist made up of the names of victims has also been widely shared on Twitter.

MIDEAST MIRROR 19.02.19, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKEY/U.S./ISIS/KURDS: Hande Firat offers a solution to the ISIS militants held in Syria in center-right Hurriyet: "I understand that President Trump brought up the subject of 800 ISIS militants twice during his phone conversations with President Erdogan. A source told me, 'Trump asks what will happen to the militants in almost every phone conversation. It is obvious that the risk of their release by the YPG [Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units] is continuously being mentioned to him.' Ankara, which has had this subject brought up several times before, reminded the U.S. that the FSA [opposition Free Syrian Army] also holds ISIS militants and that they are kept in prison. Finally, it sent the message, 'We have a solution for ISIS militants inside Syria, we will take them, and we know where to put them'."

Ibrahim Varli detects some cracks between Moscow and Ankara in leftist opposition Birgun: "Russia, Turkey, and Iran brought Syria to the table at the Black Sea resort of Sochi. They tried to reach a common accord on the issues of a new Syrian constitution, Idlib, East of Euphrates, and Syria after the U.S. withdrawal. While the summit failed to generate the desired outcome, the disagreements between Ankara and Moscow became more visible."

Burhanettin Duran cautions Europe in pro-government Sabah: "There is a point that Europe should be careful about. The YPG issue is nothing like that of foreign ISIS fighters. Europe's attempt to 'protect the YPG from Turkey in the same format as the international coalition against terror' is unworkable. A goal that the U.S. cannot attain is unlikely to be realized by France, Germany, or any other European power. This will only drive a wedge between the European capitals and Ankara. The burden that the U.S. has shifted onto the Europeans' shoulders is not easy to bear. Some, who are affected by 'PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] romanticism' may not be worried about losing Turkey. However, Turkey is of critical importance on many levels; from the future of Syria, to immigration. And it is in a position of acting as Europe's security gate."

 

THE ECONOMY: Ihsan Caralan points the finger at the government in leftist opposition Evrensel: "President Erdogan said something on TV that would astonish anyone with a modicum of sense, claiming that 'there two types of queues. During the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] government, it was that of poverty. After the new steps were taken, the queue of wealth emerged'. So the president is arguing that the producers sell goods to ordinary citizens at high prices, whereas the municipality-run marketplaces have solved this problem by bringing abundance to the people. Even if we accept this thesis, any citizen who has not been confused by the AKP [the ruling Justice and Development Party] knows that it is the government that has been running the country for 17 years that is primarily responsible for this situation." 

Ibrahim Kahveci is unconvinced by the government's economic policies in liberal pro-government Karar: "The entire system is the problem. Taxes and fees increase the costs. The rent increases in shops, and the rental costs of the district market stalls are reflected in the price of goods. Transferring the goods has become a big cost in itself. And the result: If the government wants to stabilize food prices, the problems should be handled as a whole. In fact, the most urgent problem is to enable producers to earn money from their products. Otherwise, price suppression will put the farmers even in a more difficult situation and they may produce less in the new season. We are facing a very, very dangerous situation."

Kemal Ozturk is also concerned about the cost of the government's policy in pro-government Yeni Safak: "After talking to commissioners in the wholesale market hall I checked the internet to see the price of vegetables. Then I went to the municipality-run marketplaces and compared prices. If the municipality-run marketplaces buy the goods from the Kumluca wholesale market, they make no profit in the sales of some goods, and in some cases they lose money."

 

Iran media watch

 

'DECEPTIVE EUROPEANS': Most Iranian newspapers today lead with Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i's warning yesterday that officials must "not be deceived" by Europe, whose enmity with Iran is less apparent that the US. "Let officials not bring about problems for themselves and the nation by relying on Europe," hardline Javan's headline cited the Leader as saying. Moderate Qanun and hardline Keyhan highlighted the leader's emphasis on domestic capabilities in order to ensure that Iranian youth are able to "fire at will". In 2017, Khamenei controversially called on his supporters to "fire at will" when they see that government bodies are not functioning appropriately.

 

IMPEACHING ROWHANI: Several pro-reform newspapers have discussed a parliamentary motion to impeach President Hassan Rowhani, which has so far garnered 18 signatures. Ninety-six are required to summon him to parliament. Reformist E'temad highlighted that although the motion failed to get a considerable number of signatures, its initiators continued to push it forward and even published the text of the motion. E'temad speculated that those behind the motion have been promoting a plot to appoint a military figure in Rouhani's place. Moderate Besharat-e No published the text itself. Meanwhile, while reporting on President Rowhani's speech yesterday at a refinery opening ceremony, governmental Iran's headline quoted him as saying that "everybody should defend the government elected by the people".

 

TRUMP/VENEZUELA/BORDER WALL: The top foreign news story on broadcast media this morning was President Trump's call for the Venezuelan military to abandon President Nicolas Maduro and embrace the cause of opposition leader and self-declared acting president Juan Guaido. "Trump, who failed to incite the Venezuelan people and army against their government, has warned Venezuelan army officers that their support for the government may risk their life," Channel One (IRTV1) said. Rolling news network IRINN said Trump threatened that "all options are on the table" in regard to Venezuela. English-language Press TV, meanwhile, led with protests against Trump's declaration of a state of emergency regarding the need to build a wall along the Mexico border.

 

PETROL SELF-SUFFICIENCY: Today's dailies also highlight that Iran does not need to import petrol any more, as the Oil Minister Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh said at a refinery inauguration ceremony yesterday in Southern Hormozgan Province. Reporting on the story, hardline Javan's headline noted that the "The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) forged a key for the government to export petrol", as the IRGC Khatam-Anbia economic base built the refinery that was opened yesterday. Conservative Khorasan stressed the "timeliness" of petrol self-sufficiency given the intensification of U.S. economic pressure. Business daily Hadaf va Eqtesad said that U.S. sanctions on Iran have been defeated through the construction of this refinery.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Persian Twitter has thrown its weight behind Iranian Kurdish football player Voria Ghafuri following his summoning by the Sports Ministry for criticizing Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In an Instagram story, Ghafuri rebuked Zarif for remarking that "we [Iranians] are proud to be under pressure for supporting Palestine", saying that only "ordinary people" were in fact under pressure and not the country's elite. Relevant hashtags have been used over 31,000 times in the past 24 hours. Some praised Ghafuri for "not being indifferent" despite being a wealthy football player who is not under financial pressure. "It makes what he did a hundred times more valuable," said one user. Ghafuri's comments seemed to have drawn the ire of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i. In a speech yesterday about the recent suicide attack that killed 27 IRGC personnel, Khamenei said: "Some people who take advantage of the country's security to work and play sport should know that it is martyrdom that ensures security". Ghafuri, who plays for the state-owned Tehran football club Esteghlal FC, was summoned by the Sports Ministry for questioning hours after Khamene'i's speech. One user said Ghafuri's comments had scared Khamene'i, and his summoning only served to prove that "you've reached the end of the line, Mr Dictator!"

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 06.11.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Occupation is bull

 

Shin Bet Director Nadav Argaman told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee today that his agency has thwarted 480 Palestinian attacks in the last year. The Shin Bet's efforts, he said, were a major factor in the maintenance of a fragile calm between Israel and the Palestinians. Argaman also referred to 590 potential lone wolf attacks that the Shin Bet had prevented. Argaman said that Hamas branches in Gaza and Turkey have attempted to orchestrate attacks in the West Bank. He also mentioned similar efforts from Lebanon, presumably referring to Hezbollah. These foiled attempts are in addition to the ongoing Gaza border conflict and periodic rocket fire. There are reports that Israel and Hamas have reached a possible ceasefire deal, but Argaman warned the Knesset that the situation remains precarious.

Meanwhile, claims against Israel that it occupies the Palestinians are "nonsense", Prime Minister Netanyahu told his Likud Party on Sunday, claiming that other superpowers have occupied people and no one said a word. "Occupation is bull. Empires have conquered and replaced entire populations and no one is talking about it," Netanyahu said according to a report in Yedioth Ahronoth. What truly matters is strong diplomacy, Netanyahu added. "Power is key. Power changes everything in our policy with Arab countries." Netanyahu told his party colleagues that concessions are regarded as weakness in the Middle East, which do not bring about lasting change. Instead, "aligning Arab interests with Israel, based on Israel being a technological superpower must lead the way", he claimed. 

Russia's top diplomat on Monday accused Israel of breaching its commitment to inform Moscow before it carries out airstrikes in Syria, placing its military personnel in danger "on several occasions" and forcing Russia to respond in a "firm but contained manner." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's criticism came after Israel/Russia ties soured, following the September 17 downing of a Russian spy plane by Syrian forces during an Israeli air raid. Moscow's Defense Ministry had blamed Israel for the deaths of 15 servicemen on the plane, arguing that Israeli jets were hiding behind the Russian aircraft. Israel denies that claim. "Unfortunately, the Israeli side did not always strictly comply with its obligations , especially as regards the obligation to notify the Russian military about combat operations in Syrian territory," he told the Spanish-language El Pais on Monday.

Israel has told the Palestinian Authority that it could take tax revenues collected on Ramallah's behalf and send it to Gaza to offset money Mahmoud 'Abbas's government has threatened to withhold from the beleaguered Strip, a top Palestinian official said Monday. In the past several months, PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas has suggested on many occasions that the Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership will cut all funds allocated to Gaza, if Hamas does not hand over control of the territory to the PA. "Last week, the Israeli side informed us that if we do not pay all funds allocated for the Gaza Strip, they will cut money from the taxes – they collect customs duties and taxes for us – and transfer them to Gaza," top Palestinian negotiator Sa'eb 'Erekat told a seminar in Ramallah.

Elsewhere, the state does not know who is behind the illegal outpost being erected in an abandoned army base in the Jordan Valley, state prosecutors told the court, adding that the Civil Administration will be demolishing illegal construction at the base. The state prosecution advised the High Court of Justice that following discussion at the Civil Administration, the decision was made to raze the illegally possessed buildings, but they still don't know who took improper possession of the base. Also on Monday, military prosecutors charged a soldier from the Home Front Command's rescue unit with assaulting a blindfolded, handcuffed Palestinian detainee. The indictment says the soldier struck the detainee at the Shaked outpost in the Northern West Bank. On Tuesday, the Israel Defense Forces said that a demolition order was issued for the home of a Palestinian suspected of carrying out a shooting attack at a West Bank industrial park last month in which two Israelis were killed. The head of Central Command, Maj. Gen. Nadav Padan, put out the order for the basement and ground floors of the building where Ashraf Na'alweh lived with his family in the Northern West Bank village of Shuweika, the military said. Those areas of the building will be rendered unusable. The development came after the military rejected an objection against the demolition filed by Na'alweh's family following an initial demolition order issued last month.

Prime Minister Netanyahu on Tuesday called an urgent meeting with Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon to discuss the soaring budget deficit that is threatening a planned increase in defense spending, Haaretz reported. The Finance Ministry announced Monday that there was a NIS 9 billion ($2.4 billion) deficit in the state budget, approximately 3.6 percent of the GDP, the highest rate in years and almost 1% more than the 2.5% cumulative deficit in September. Netanyahu, who earlier this year unveiled his "2030 Security Concept" calling for spending hundreds of millions of shekels to upgrade the Israeli army, convened a meeting with economic advisers after Sunday's cabinet meeting in an effort to free up money for defense spending. At that meeting, the Finance Ministry Director-General informed the prime minster there was little room in the budget to divert additional money to the military, noting the soaring deficit. Kahlon did not attend the meeting.

The Trump Administration has backed an Israeli plan to link Haifa with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, hinting that it was in line with the U.S. peace plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Jerusalem Post reports. U.S. Special Envoy Jason Greenblatt Tweeted his support for the rail line as Israeli Minister of Transportation and Intelligence Israel Katz made a historic visit to Oman to present its details to an international transportation event, the IRU World Congress. "Today Transportation & Intelligence Minister Israel_Katz is in Oman at an international transportation event," Greenblatt Tweeted. "He will present a plan for the construction of a railway between Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia & the Gulf. Let's keep the dialogue going. These efforts support our efforts." Katz is expected to address the congress and participate in its panels, a first for an Israeli minister in Oman, which has no ties with Israel. The minister's office Tweeted that this was "the first time the United States has publicly supported the plan," called "Tracks for Regional Peace." The plan was developed by both Katz and the prime minister. A Middle East rail line would be a "dramatic development that may affect many countries in the region," Katz's office said. He has spent two years gaining supporters for the plan, including of some Arab officials in the region.

Finally, Iran's telecommunications minister accused Israel of a new cyberattack on the same day that U.S. sanctions (which were lifted by the 2015 nuclear deal) were re-imposed. This comes days after Iran said it had neutralized a new version of the Stuxnet virus. In a series of Tweets, the Telecommunication Minister blamed Israel for the attack, saying it targeted Iran's communications infrastructure and that Iran would sue for the cyberattack via international bodies. Iran greeted the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Monday with air defense drills and an acknowledgement from President Hassan Rowhani that the nation faces a "war situation," raising Mideast tensions as America's maximalist approach to the Islamic Republic takes hold.

 

 

BENNETT VERSUS LIEBERMAN: Yoaz Hendel in Yedioth Ahronoth explains that with polls showing Netanyahu strong, Bennett needs someone to blame and has picked Lieberman. But after the elections the two will remain bickering dwarfs overshadowed by a big, strong Likud.

"The campaign being waged by Naftali Bennett against Avigdor Lieberman is a farce. Politicians fight amongst themselves all the time. Sometimes the fights are real, sometimes they are beneficial to both sides. Deri and Lieberman are the living example of invented quarrels – Deri defends religious laws, Lieberman opposes, all hell breaks loose – and on the day after each side has gained a few votes.

In this case, the attacks against Lieberman look like a political campaign for the weak. Bennett is trying to differentiate himself, unsuccessfully, from Netanyahu's Likud. He is afraid to criticize Netanyahu, afraid to say out loud that his party is clean as a whistle while Netanyahu and some of his men are embroiled in investigations.

Bennett is afraid to say in meetings of the Habayit Hayehudi Party that Netanyahu is implementing left-wing policies in Gaza, and that he is willing to contain the occasional rocket fire, the incursions and infiltrations. He is also unwilling to talk about the negotiations that the Israeli government is conducting with a state that supports terrorism such as Qatar or with Hamas, and it makes no difference what you call it. Bennett is afraid because the polls show that Netanyahu is strong. Like others, he is waiting for the flood to pass. Making calculations of investigations and results, indictments and who will take over the right-wing. Meanwhile, until the Messiah comes or Mandelblit moves his butt, there is a need for someone on whom to put the blame – in this case, Lieberman.

Bennett sits in the cabinet and is responsible for what goes on there just like Lieberman. If the government's left-wing containment policy (and yes, it is leftist) displeases him, he can vote against it. If this is a 'terrible' situation and Israeli deterrence is eroding, he can at any given moment leave the government; at least threaten, so that something will change. Bennett could also have secured the death sentence for terrorists, or at least compelled the government to accept the Shamgar report, so that additional terrorists would not be released soon. With all due respect to the laws meant to circumvent the High court, what could be more salient for Israel's citizens than the security in the South and the deterrence of Hamas?

Lieberman is not an innocent little lamb. What Bennett is doing now, Lieberman did without any qualms to all past defense ministers. In the cynicism index, Lieberman is way ahead of Bennett. The difference between them is in the potential. Lieberman is far from being a candidate for prime minister, there is no scenario (including unification of parties) in which he becomes head of the right-wing. Bennett, on the other hand, has what it takes to run for prime minister. He is talented, not corrupt, understands politics, and his heart is where most Israelis are on most subjects – a few centimeters to the right of center: Conservative risk taker, a security hawk, moderate in matters of religion and state. Bennett has political potential that is wasted for fear of challenging Netanyahu. The campaign against Lieberman only illustrates this.

In Bennett's first term as head of Habayit Hayehudi, Netanyahu turned him into an equal opponent. Bennett wanted to supply him with a tailwind, Netanyahu saw him as a dangerous rival, and turned him into the great right-wing political hope by attacking him incessantly. Netanyahu has that ability – to attack and promote political players. This is what he is doing these days to Gideon Sa'ar, who is keeping mum. The conspiracy theory and the law named after him are molding him into a possible heir.

Netanyahu is no longer making this mistake with Bennett. He is indifferent to his embrace. Ignores the massive support from every suggestion he puts on the table, from every whim; acts as if he is impervious to the fact that Bennett does not dare say a word concerning the investigations or the problems surrounding the prime minister. Worst of all for Bennett: Netanyahu no longer needs Habayit Hayehudi. In the eyes of the public, Netanyahu is more right-wing than Bennett, and there is no one to say the emperor is naked.

Perhaps all those who fear Netanyahu are right. Perhaps it is better to keep your head down, wait for the wave to pass, pray to Mandelblit quietly and in closed rooms, while publicly singing Netanyahu's praises. If they are wrong, after the next elections you will find a large and strong Likud, and two political dwarfs bickering amongst themselves all the way to a party that will barely pass the electoral threshold."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU'S NIGHTMARE SCENARIO: Amir Oren in Walla! stresses that the PM is scared of a mutiny in Likud. His rational for the Gideon Sa'ar bill is the possibility that President Rivlin will encourage representatives of the different parties to conspire against him, exploiting the legal loophole that will allow his adversary to oust him.

"Binyamin Netanyahu is afraid of mutiny in Likud. In all his nightmares, most of the MKs from his party rally around one of his adversaries, for example – Gideon Sa'ar. There is no precedent of mutiny in Likud against a PM in office, but that does not comfort Netanyahu. He is haunted by fears. Julius of Caesarea sees in every flash the glare of Brutus's cold knife.

Since he does not trust the loyalty of members of his faction, and for some reason suspects that their attitude towards him is as functional as his towards them, he aspires to turn an internal Likud matter into a change in the law. With the help of his close associate David Amsalem, Netanyahu, after nearly three decades in the Knesset, has detected a dangerous loophole in the law. If it is not plugged, Sa'ar could use it to infiltrate into the President's Residence and flank Netanyahu from there, with the enthusiastic support of Reuven Rivlin.

The law requires the president, after elections or death/resignation of a prime minister, to consult with representatives of the Knesset factions. At the end of the consultations, the president appoints an agreed upon MK to form a government. The most important tool a president needs when considering who to task with forming a government is the ability to count to 61. There may be crises during the negotiations, and the conflicting demands of the potential partners may not be settled, but presidents have never propelled the country into a prolonged governmental crisis only for slapping a political opponent and petting a friends' ego.

According to Netanyahu's nightmare scenario, assuming that the makeup of the next Knesset is more or less the same as the current one, representatives of the factions participating in the outgoing government will come to Rivlin and talk to him, harboring no malicious intent towards Netanyahu. Assuming that there is no legal barrier in the form of an indictment and a High Court of Justice ruling, they will recommend to Rivlin that he again task Netanyahu with forming the government. Ostensibly, game over, because at that point Netanyahu has 61 MKs recommending him. But in Netanyahu's nightmare, sly Rivlin does not despair. He tries to convince Likud, Habayit Hayehudi, and the rest of the coalition parties to choose Gideon Sa'ar. And they, out of stupidity or because they are partners in the conspiracy, will go along with him and say – sure, why not, Sa'ar will do just fine, even better.

In order to prevent such a development, which, according to Netanyahu, could distort the will of the voter, this loophole must be plugged. The president will be stripped of his discretionary powers and will not be allowed to task anyone but Netanyahu with forming the government. There will be no government without Likud at its center, and only the head of Likud will be PM.

In Netanyahu's eyes, the President – well, Rivlin, anyway - is superfluous. Why consult with him? A meeting between the heads of the parties, at the end of which an announcement of Netanyahu's recycling is posted, will do nicely. Democracy at its best, without checks and balances. Because of an internal Likud problem, or one man and his wife's persecution craze, a Basic Law will be changed, even though a decision in the party institutions would suffice."

Ends…

 

DESPITE IT ALL, SAUDI ARABIA IS A PARTNER: Prof. Eyal Zisser in Israel Hayom claims that following Khashoggi's murder Riyadh has become a global punching bag, but those punches only strengthen Iran, and Israel should mobilize all its influence to solve the crisis between the Saudis and the West.

"All at once, Saudi Arabia has turned from a courted ally into a leper state, which everyone is renouncing. In Israel, too, there are those who advocate keeping a healthy distance from Saudi Arabia, because it does not comply with the values that distinguish dark dictatorships from enlightened Western states, and also because it has been revealed to be unreliable at a time of crisis.

There is a lot of hypocrisy in the attack on Saudi Arabia, particularly in view of the fact that the initiator and leader of the attack on the Saudis is the President of Turkey, Erdogan, who wiped out democracy and the free press in his country. The Turkish President does love his whims and one-upmanship games, which dictate, not very successfully, his country's foreign policy. Herein lies the problem. For in a better world ,Turkey, as a progress-loving country, was supposed to lead the region in its many challenges and serve as a reliable ally of the United States, and no less important – a point of support for a regional alignment against Iran. But Erdogan chose a path that distanced him from Arab Sunni countries, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and caused his ties with Israel to deteriorate into crisis.

The vacuum left by Turkey must therefore be filled by Saudi Arabia, which did not hesitate to stand up to the Iranians and their allies, even at moments when the American administration turned a cold shoulder towards her. Saudi Arabia is not a problem-free country, and there is merit in the argument that it is weaker than it seems to the outside observer. There is an exaggeration in the attempt to portray the Saudis, as well as the rest of the Gulf States, as omnipotent regional powers, with whom if Israel links up all her problems will be solved and she will be able to establish a strong front against the ayatollahs, and perhaps even promote a political settlement with the Palestinians.

Like Jordan in the era of King Hussein, Saudi Arabia has a lot of power. Perhaps in Washington or Europe they regret that Iran is not the Axis state on which Western interests in the region hinge, as was the case during the Shah's time. But today Iran is an ally of Russia, serving and promoting Russia's expansionist ambitions in the region, while Turkey is subject to the whims of a frenzied and jumpy president. In contrast, Saudi Arabia's conduct radiates stability and continuity. With all due respect or disrespect to the heir to the throne, MbS, this is a regime that never allowed a single person to lead it and knew how to balance the whims of its rulers.

The growing relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia must be examined with open eyes. One should not be overly impressed by the apparent power emanating from the Kingdom, but also not underestimate the sources of its strength. As of this moment, Israel and the U.S. have no other partner in the region, trustworthy, and stable as Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis erred when they assassinated the journalist on Turkish soil and as a result, they have now become a global punching bag. But punches will not transform Saudi Arabia, like other places in the world, into a paradise of free press and human rights. On the contrary, they will only strengthen regional forces such as Iran, which have openly killed not only journalists and members of the opposition, but lately also half a million Syrians and whose plans for Israel are well known. Israel would do well to mobile its influence, especially in the United States, to help find a solution to the crisis in Western-Saudi relations."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL AND MBS: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 believes that Israel has broken its silence on the Khashoggi murder out of fear that international retaliation will thwart efforts to contain Iran's aggression. The U.S. must take into consideration Israel's security interests and the regional implications of sanctions against Saudi Arabia.

"The Khashoggi affair has thus far incurred benefits for two countries hostile to Israel and Saudi Arabia - Iran and Turkey. Turkey, led by President Erdogan, is competing with Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Sunni world, and supports the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, while Saudi Arabia views these organizations as a threat to the existence of the Arab regimes.

President Erdogan, aided by Qatar's propaganda trumpet in the Arab world al-Jazeera, is trying with all his might to get Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdelaziz to oust his son, the crown-prince, and weaken Saudi Arabia's position in the Muslim world. He is threatening to reveal the details of Khashoggi's assassination and who ordered the assassination. According to Arab sources, there is a balance of terror between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Saudi Arabia has proof of Turkish assistance to ISIS in Syria, assistance to Iran in breaking the sanctions, huge money laundering through Turkish banks, and other sensitive personal information concerning President Erdogan.

The new head of the CIA, Gina Haspel, recently visited Turkey and received Turkey's intelligence evidence against the Saudi royal family in the Khashoggi affair, but it seems that President Trump is continuing to protect Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. Except for revoking the travel visas of those Saudis who were arrested by the Saudi authorities for their involvement in Khashoggi's murder, the U.S. administration has not yet implemented any sanction against the Saudi royal family. The White House is making an effort to reduce the role of the Saudi royal family in the affair. President Trump is doing everything possible to underscore the great economic importance of U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia with regard to oil, arms deals and the U.S. labor market.

Opponents of the Saudi royal family have suddenly become human rights defenders. This is typical Middle Eastern hypocrisy, starting with Erdogan and Qatari ruler Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, who support terrorist organizations and ignore the serious human rights violations of Hamas and the PA security services. They ignore the violent measures taken by Hamas and the PA against Palestinian journalists who dare to utter a hint of criticism.

Prime Minister Netanyahu defined the Khashoggi murder as a 'terrible act', as it indeed is. This cruel act must be dealt with, and those responsible should be punished with all the severity of the law. However, Israel's supreme security interest is to combat Iran's hostile intentions and its plans to destroy Israel. This interest is a national interest, more important to Israel than any other. This is an existential threat to the entire nation. The ayatollahs' regime is working to bring another Holocaust to the Jewish people through nuclear weapons, and it declares this intention openly day and night.

Opponents of the Crown Prince accuse him of embroiling Saudi Arabia in a war in Yemen, imposing a political and economic embargo on Qatar and holding the Lebanese prime minister under house arrest in Riyadh. They also accuse him of under-the-table normalization with Israel and of promoting Trump's deal of the century. In the media and social networks in the Arab world, many reports have circulated concerning secret meetings between Mohammed bin Salman and senior Israeli officials, including a meeting between him and Prime Minister Netanyahu and a secret visit to Tel Aviv.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that elements hostile to Israel, who want to sabotage the political process and normalization with the Arab states, are the same elements that are working to politically eliminate the heir to the throne, Mohammed bin Salman. Meanwhile, the Saudi royal family is withstanding the pressure and the status of the crown prince is still stable, despite the fact that his image has been tarnished badly. Israel is concerned that the stability of the Saudi regime will be undermined. The regime's destabilization is liable to lead to the rise of extremist elements who will control the advanced weaponry of the Saudi army.

In the wake of the Khashoggi affair, Turkey's regional status has strengthened, and there has been a rapprochement between Erdogan and Trump. Israel is also concerned about possible damage to the rule of President Sissi in Egypt. The Saudi royal family provides important economic and political support to Egypt, and the undermining of the Saudi king's regime, if heavy sanctions are imposed, could adversely affect the stability of the Egyptian president's rule. It is very important that the U.S. maintain the regional balance of power when deciding on its response to the murder of Khashoggi. This should be a response that takes into account the regional implications and the possible impact on the security of the State of Israel. Turkey should not be bolstered at Saudi Arabia's expense, especially if President Trump wants to promote his so-called Deal of the Century."

Ends…

 

THE LIMITS OF ROMANCE: Evan Gottesman in Haaretz contends that despite warm receptions in Oman and Abu Dhabi, Israel should not overstate the strength of its Gulf alliances. A common enemy like Iran can produce photo-ops and covert collaboration – but that is not normalization.

"The last few weeks have seen a flurry of apparent breakthroughs in Israel's foreign relations with the Arab world. A week ago, Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu visited Oman, an Arab monarchy with which Israel lacks formal diplomatic ties. The following weekend, Israeli Culture Minister Miri Regev was present at an international judoka tournament in Abu Dhabi where Hatikvah, the Israeli national anthem, was played for Israeli medal winners, a sharp departure from the Egyptian judoka who snubbed the offer of a handshake by his Israeli competitor in 2016. Days after, Emirati officials accompanied Regev on a tour of their capital's Grand Mosque, although the UAE, like 29 other Arab and Muslim states, does not recognize Israel. Minister of Communications Minister Ayoub Kara was also in the Emirates, although his trip was for a meeting of a United Nations agency.

Some have leveraged these developments to question the axiom that Israel's international standing will suffer as the country drifts further and further away from a negotiated two-state solution. The Mitvim Institute's recently released 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index showed that 49 percent of Israelis think a breakthrough with the Arab states is achievable even absent movement on the Palestinian track. On Wednesday, U.S. envoy Jason Greenblatt also praised this apparent progress. 

Such sentiment – that Israel's relations with the Arab world are flourishing, rather than being diminished, by the lack of progress in resolving the conflict with the Palestinians – seems to gain traction whenever a Gulf Arab state makes even the most basic gesture toward the Jewish state. But it was never quite so simple. Israel's position in the world is stronger today than it was for most of the country's history. Netanyahu deserves some credit for this, but the groundwork for this shift occurred over two decades ago.

The Arab League boycotted Israel from the country's founding, reaffirming its intransigent stance under the 1967 Khartoum Declaration. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites (except Romania) severed relations with Israel following the Six Day War, and 25 African states broke ties after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Spain and Portugal did not recognize Israel until 1986 and 1977 respectively, after the collapse of fascist governments in both countries. Major powers like India and the People's Republic of China did not establish official relations with Israel until the 1990s.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict especially, only have an immediate impact on a small number of countries. Israel's relative isolation during its formative years was reflective of Arab states and Soviet influence, as well as communist, anti-colonial, and non-aligned political commitments in developing nations. The end of the Cold War rendered these alliances obsolete, opening Israel to the world. This was not the work of any one Israeli leader, but a side-effect of broader geopolitical events.

But the Arab and Muslim countries remained obstinate. Their quarrel with Israel was direct, not an extension of the East-West superpower struggle. Ultimately, Israel's victory in the 1967 war removed the Jewish state's total erasure as an objective for all but the most radical regimes, namely Syria and Iraq (later joined by Iran after the Islamic Revolution). But it also opened up the question of Palestinian statehood on the newly occupied territories, especially after the 1980s: The catastrophe in Lebanon, the First Intifada, and the Palestinian declaration of independence. Progress on the Palestinian front would yield progress in regional integration. On the flipside, stagnation would keep the Arab world at arm's length, and Israel's ties with Egypt and Jordan would never evolve past a cold peace.

The heady days of the Oslo peace process saw officials in the Labor governments of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres as guests in many countries that lacked relations with Israel. Like Netanyahu, Peres, and Rabin visited Oman, but not just Oman. Morocco and Indonesia also welcomed Israeli leaders. Bahrain hosted an Israeli minister in 1994. As prime minister, Peres also traveled to Qatar.

It's useful to juxtapose the circumstances informing Israeli foreign policy advancements in the 1990s versus today's developments. Rabin and Peres were riding the wave of optimism surrounding a reinvigorated peace process. That diplomacy yielded real, lasting improvements. For instance, in 1994, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council stopped enforcing most elements of the Arab League boycott and ceased urging other countries to do the same.

In a way, Netanyahu is instrumentalizing the products of a peace process he vehemently opposed two decades ago and has partly helped upend today. But Netanyahu has also benefited from regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its allies. While the confrontation with Iran takes clear precedence over the Palestinian question in terms of immediate impact and importance to the Arab states, it will not last forever and so its benefits for Israel will likely prove ephemeral. A relationship that is a function of present circumstances is the basis for a tactical arrangement, not a lasting peace.

Recall that before Israel destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, Iran attempted to do the same thing. Israel coordinated its attack on their shared enemy with Tehran, and even continued arms sales to the Islamic Republic into the 1980s – well after the fall of the Shah. Where are the fruits of that alliance today?

A common enemy can produce some meetings and covert collaboration, but only a final status agreement with the Palestinians can inspire normalization. Jordan's recent termination of leases on two small territories to Israel under the 1994 peace treaty, a concession to the country's massive anti-Israel movement, is evidence of that. Moreover, minor steps taken with hereditary dictatorships will do nothing to address ambivalence toward Israel among Western audiences or popular boycott campaigns. While BDS has little tangible impact on Israel, anti-Israel campaigns understandably perturb Israelis who crave normalcy.

Despite the real gains made by Israel's government over the weekend and in previous years, Israel's position vis-a-vis the Arab world is anything but normal. Playing a country's national anthem at an international sporting event signals the most basic level of decorum, opening a trade office is pretty standard fare, and leaders exchange visits regularly.

Indeed, some of what is being touted as progress with the Arab states has little to do with the Arabs themselves. Ayoub Kara's visit to the Emirates, as well as this week's visit to Oman by Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz, are for conferences organized by multilateral institutions, not their host governments. And Regev's time in the UAE came after the International Judo Federation threatened to cancel last weekend's competition if it did not treat all participating countries equally, a hazard which would undermine the Emirates' aspiration to be a global cultural hub.

That right-wing Israeli leaders and their supporters now fawn over the Gulf states for undertaking relatively simple steps only underscores the enormous room for growth that still remains. Israeli leaders could exploit the situation with Iran and recent minor openings to build Arab state support on the back of progress toward a comprehensive agreement with the Palestinians. But absent momentum with the Palestinians, sustainable growth with the rest of the Arab world will remain elusive."

Ends…

 

ROOTS OF EVIL: Naomi Linder Kahn in The Jerusalem Post argues that under the guise of "agricultural assistance", the PA is taking over Area C with European financial support.

"In the 1993 Oslo Accords, the State of Israel empowered the PLO to establish a Palestinian Authority to oversee autonomous Arab governance in parts of Judea and Samaria. Despite the fact that, in practice, many of the Oslo Accords' clauses were never activated and other elements are no longer relevant, the division of jurisdictional authority between Areas A (full Palestinian jurisdiction), B (PA civil control, Israeli security), and C (full Israeli jurisdiction), remains in force. 

In 2009, Salam Fayyad, former prime minister of the PA, publicized his program for the unilateral creation of 'an independent, fully autonomous Arab state on all of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as per the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.' The Fayyad Plan is based on de facto annexation of Area C, with the underlying assumption that Areas A and B have already been 'taken care of' by the Oslo Accords. 

The implementation of this program of creeping annexation has been, and continues to be, carried out on two parallel tracks. The first involves cooperation with Israel: The PA submits requests to the relevant Israeli authorities for approval of 'special priority' construction projects; generally, international funding for these projects is contingent upon a 'seal of approval' from Israel. Despite the often-repeated claims of anti-Zionist NGOs, many thousands of housing units and other building projects have been approved by the Israeli government for the Palestinian sector. 

The second track, which is far more widespread, is the creation of facts on the ground, through extensive illegal construction and development, without coordination with Israel. The projects in this illegal track are planned and executed according to a very clear, systematic, master plan that aims to create territorial contiguity for the future Palestinian state while disrupting the growth and contiguity of Israeli communities. 

Over the past number of years, the illegal track has become not only more pronounced but more ingenious, using agricultural work to establish facts on the ground – in violation of the law in force in this region; in violation of the Oslo Accords, which stipulate that the State of Israel has sole jurisdiction over this territory; and in violation of international law. 

Although it was a partner to the Oslo Accords, in recent years the EU has actively funded many of the PA's illegal activities in Area C, contributing to the projects that undermine the accords by taking unilateral steps to create a Palestinian state encompassing all of Judea and Samaria. Since the publication of the Fayyad Plan, the EU has built more than 2,000 structures in Area C for the Palestinian population, creating or supporting dozens of illegal settlement clusters, without requesting or receiving construction permits or coordinating these projects with the relevant Israeli authorities. The flagship outpost of these projects is Khan al-Ahmar. Recently, the EU made a commitment to desist from further illegal building in Area C. But rather than abandon the goals of this illegal activity, the EU simply switched tactics. 

The law in force in Area C of Judea and Samaria is comprised of many layers, including Ottoman law, Mandatory law, Jordanian law, military rule, international law, as well as legislative acts of Knesset. In general, however, the essential underpinnings of property law in Area C rest upon Ottoman law. According to Ottoman law (and Israeli Supreme Court decisions that continue to enforce it), uncultivated land belongs to the sovereign – a principle known elsewhere as 'eminent domain.' The case of administered territory is no different; the State of Israel has sole jurisdiction. Additionally, some of the land in Area C is classified as 'survey land' – tracts that are not registered as privately owned, which the Israeli government is in the process of regulating and registering as state land.

However – and herein lies the rub – under Section 78 of the Ottoman Legal Code, a private individual may be granted rights akin to ownership of agricultural land if he has held and cultivated the land in question for a period of time (the precise length of time required is dictated by the nature of the land parcel in question). 

Thus, a person who poaches land and uses it for agricultural purposes may claim ownership or other rights, simply by claiming to have worked the land for a relatively short period. Activities carried out under the Roots Project exploit this loophole in Ottoman law to great advantage. To make matters worse, much of the so-called 'agricultural projects' presently being carried out by the PA in Area C– erecting fences and walls, excavating with heavy machinery, creating roads and more – requires building permits, which have never been obtained. In contrast, the regulations that require permits for work of this kind are meticulously enforced in the Jewish sector, through military orders issued by the commanding officer in the area. 

The Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) is the main operational arm of the agricultural front of the Fayyad Plan. Despite UAWC's overt and covert ties to the Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization 'PFLP – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine;' despite UAWC's active support for the BDS movement; and despite UAWC's judicial, media, and diplomatic campaigns to prevent the IDF and the Civil Administration from acting against the illegal land seizures it carries out, the UAWC is funded, to the tune of millions, by direct and indirect donations from the EU, the UN, and the governments of France, Norway, Holland, and Germany. These same governments and organizations are among Israel's most vocal critics. 

In the course of monitoring PA/EU efforts to seize control of Area C, Regavim's staff identified 247 new agricultural sites and 181 new roads, all of which we investigated and mapped out through meticulous analysis of aerial photos taken between 2013-2017. We presented our findings to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee's subcommittee on Judea and Samaria, along with practical and comprehensive recommendations for combating this threat. 

The damage being caused by the 'Roots Program' cannot be addressed as a case-by-case, localized problem. The only way to meet this challenge is with clear, decisive action on the part of policy makers, who must implement a comprehensive response that acknowledges the strategic dangers to Israel's future. Sadly, the State of Israel remains virtually absent from the scene of the crime. To date, no military, law enforcement, or diplomatic steps have been taken to prevent this de facto annexation, and the Civil Administration allows the Palestinians and their European co-conspirators to effectively seize more and more strategically vital land. If the government of Israel does not come to its senses soon, the Roots Project, the PA's master plan for overtaking Area C, will take root, and the facts it creates on the ground will be irreversible."

Ends…

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.11.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

U.S. MIDTERM ELECTIONS: Ismail Kaplan maintains that the U.S. is facing the moment of truth in pro-government Turkiye: "There are elections in the U.S. today for one-third of the House of Representatives and the full Senate. In other words, this is a very important test for U.S. President Trump. If the Democrats maintain their 49 seats and add one more, they will win a majority in the Senate, and the opportunity to impeach Trump based on allegations that he committed 'treason, bribery, etc.' will be on the cards. Now, let us see: What kind of gains and losses the Iran embargo will bring Trump? That is the moment of truth..."

Zulal Kalkandelen believes that the Americans have been motivated to vote in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "Two weeks prior to the 2016 elections, only one-third of the Americans thought their votes would be counted correctly. Then, there were the allegations that Russians had interfered in the elections. It is not easy to convince people to vote under such circumstances. However, the hatred towards Trump in some parts of society is so great that some say they would no longer be friends with those who fail to vote. In the end, polarization in society and the desire to get rid of Trump seem to have worked."

 

U.S./RUSSIA/MIDDLE EAST: Deniz Gokce notes Russia's growing role in the Middle East at Washington's expense in pro-government Aksam: "In May, the U.S. announced it would prevent Iran's oil sales. Under those circumstances, Russia and Saudi Arabia brought down oil prices. When U.S. restrictions on Iranian oil sales proved to be invalid, this added to Russia's prestige in the Middle East, due to its role as an influential country and because of the agreements between Moscow and Iran and Syria's support. It is still unclear what the U.S. can do at this point!"

 

OPPOSITION POLITICS: Oral Calislar takes aim at the opposition in centrist tabloid Posta: "The opposition's way of acting is also problematic in Turkey. Its prevailing rhetoric refers to the government as worse than an enemy. It is impossible to say that this fury-filled language genuinely reflects tough opposition, and what is striking is the prevalence of a mood that can best be summed up as, 'We wish the economy would go down, that there was a coup and chaos, and that country would be derailed, so that we can be saved from the government'."

Musa Piroglu calls for a new form of struggle in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "The naked truth is that if the left continues as it is, Erdogan's 15-year government will face no obstacle. Nobody has the right to be carried away by the unnecessary optimism that international relations and the economic crisis could topple the presidency. It has become obligatory to create a structure that could awaken the class movement and the masses that have no option but to struggle due to the pressure. This is a responsibility that cannot be delayed until tomorrow." 

Sabahattin Onkibar paints a grim picture for the opposition in ultra-nationalist opposition Aydinlik: "MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] Chair Devlet Bahceli and CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu have guaranteed Erdogan's victory even in the 2023 elections by their mere existence. So, you may ask, what about after 2023? The period of [Erdogan's] son-in-law [Treasury and Economy Minister] Berat Albayrak will begin, until God knows when. I am neither a pessimist nor a doomsayer; I am just letting everyone know in advance. You will all see; after the March 2019 local elections, Turkey will be officially – not de facto – an AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] state."

 

Iran media watch

 

SANCTIONS: Iranian President Hassan Rowhani's comments yesterday on U.S. sanctions were a leading topic in today's press. He was speaking to Economy Ministry staff shortly after the U.S. administration imposed a wide range of fresh sanctions on Iran. "We will overcome the sanctions", official Iran daily and hardline Javan quoted Rowhani as saying in their front-page headlines. Moderate Qanun wrote: "We must overcome the sanctions and we will do so." Pro-reform Mardom Salari, Arman, and Hamdeli quoted Rowhani as saying that Iran will negotiate with the U.S. only "if it respects its own promises". Centrist Jomhuri-e Eslami quoted Rowhani as saying, "We will defeat Trump like we did Saddam", an allusion to the 1980-88 war with Iraq. Meanwhile, broadcast media highlighted Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi's comment that "nothing new will happen". Araqchi said that the only country supporting the new U.S. sanctions is Israel and that this means Iran will overcome this obstacle.

 

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: English-language Press TV only reported about the sanctions in the second half of its morning newscasts and instead led with regional developments in Yemen, the Palestinian, and Egypt. "The UN Chief's Spokesman Stephane Dujarric has expressed concern over the escalation of fights in al-Hudaydah and the humanitarian crisis," Press TV reported.

 

AIR DEFENSE DRILL: Iran is holding an air defense drill titled "Defenders of the Sky of Guardianship 97". The war game is being held with the collaboration of Khatam al-Anbia (The Last Prophet) Air Defense Force, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC's) Air Force, and the Army's Air Force in an area spanning over 500,000 square kilometers. Rolling news channel IRINN showed the Iranian Army's Deputy Commander Habibollah Sayyari saying that all weapons and equipment used in the drill are domestically manufactured. Channel One showed another army commander Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi saying that air defense systems downed all drones with "almost 100 percent precision".

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Contrary to signals sent by print and broadcast media showing Iran's rhetoric in overcoming the sanctions, social media users expressed their concern about their potential impact. Thousands of Iranians expressed shock at the scale of the sanctions that target 50 banks and their subsidiaries, the nation's flagship carrier Iran Air, and 200 members of the shipping industry and vessels. More than 700 individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft are now on the sanctions list. "Do you know what this predicament means? It means the regime will not change its policies without sanctions and with the sanctions we will be adversely affected," a user Tweeted, sharing a similar sentiment with many Iranians.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 06.11.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Mixed signals and brave stances

2-Netanyahu defends, the Saudis procrastinate

 

1-Mixed signals and brave stances

 

In both Tehran and Washington, there are those who still tend towards the option of negotiation and dialogue and would rather avoid policies that seek decisive victories, militarization, and 'bone-breaking.' They will not stand aside in silence as they see both their countries sliding toward the bottom of a dark abyss. And in their effort to avoid such an outcome, they will receive backing from an international community, which, while not sympathetic to Iran, does not agree with Trump's rash and aggressive positions and policies. There is another side to the image of U.S./Iranian relations whose main features have yet to be fully drawn, but that still raises its head from among the folds of the fiery statements emanating from the two administrations' hawks and conservatives--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

What would really remain of the deterrent effect of this new package of sanctions if the process unfolds and the exemptions were to expand exponentially? Moreover, did the first installment of U.S. sanctions and the overall strategy of sanctions imposed on Iran for many long years succeed in achieving their aims – namely, to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program completely (which was the declared aim) and alter the nature of Iran's political regime by exacerbating its daily livelihood difficulties (which was the real aim)? The answer, of course, is 'No,' as witnessed by 19 previous packages of sanctions. They succeeded in aggravating the Iranian citizens' livelihood problems, in fact; but they did not weaken the regime as much as consolidate its domination domestically and expand its influence regionally, to say nothing of strengthening its hardline conservatives and ayatollahs--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

We hope that the Iranian people and government will not offer any concessions to the U.S./Israeli alliance. We hope they will stand up to the blockade and learn from the sad lessons of Iraq and Libya. For, if the course of concessions ever begins, it will only end in invasion and occupation. But we are confident that the Iranian leadership, which astonished the six major powers during the nuclear negotiations, is fully aware of this fact. Trump fears Iran because it is a strong country that possesses an arsenal of missiles and military equipment that can destroy his allies, his bases, and his forces in the Gulf region. This is why he is resorting to a blockade in the hope that the Iranian people will rebel against their government and topple the regime. But the U.S. president forgets that this country lived for forty years under blockade without ever raising the white flags of surrender. We have no doubt whatsoever that it will not do so now-- 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Despite the hostile rhetoric emanating from Washington and Tehran regarding the latest installment of U.S. sanctions on Iran, there may be another side to this picture, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. For the U.S. administration realizes that sanctions will not compel Iran to surrender, and Iran is aware that the sanctions will harm it in the long run, which is why both sides may be seeking a back channel for dialogue. Sanctions may hurt Iran's economy, but they will not succeed in altering the regime's behavior, maintains the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. It is difficult to see how Iran's oil exports will fall to zero when the U.S. has exempted major industrial powers from the sanctions. Iran will succeed in withstanding the sanctions regardless of how harsh they may be, insists the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. But it is unclear whether the U.S.'s Arab allies and Israel can stand their ground if Iran were to retaliate against any military attack on it via its regional allies.

 

TAKING NOTE OF THE SIGNALS: "In the heat of mutual accusations and threats between Tehran and Washington, and with their verbal exchanges reaching unprecedented levels of tension and escalation, no one seems to have noted the signs that could open the door to options other than confrontation, and that keep the possibility of reaching accords and understandings at the negotiating table alive," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This is the result of two things:

- The first has to do with the U.S. administration, which undoubtedly realizes that bringing Iran's oil exports down to 'zero' is impossible, that the 'net' of sanctions it has imposed on Iran is ripped in more than one place, and that President Trump may leave the White House before Tehran raises the white flag of surrender – as we said in yesterday's article. [See Mideast Mirror, Section B, 05/11/2018]. And the last thing that Trump and his administration want is to head towards a fourth Gulf war. So what is to be done? What options does the administration have if it becomes clear that Iran is once again able to meet the challenge of sanctions, as it did when they were even more comprehensive and effective?

- The second reason has to do with Iran. For even if defiance, dismissal of the sanctions, and confidence in its ability to defeat on Washington has dominated its discourse, Rowhani's government (with Khamene'i's authority behind it) is also fully aware that it will be difficult to bear the sanctions' heavy burden for a long time. This could also have dire consequences in the medium and long-term. Moreover, Tehran's regional influence is facing real challenges after rising to unprecedented levels in recent years.

In light of these 'difficulties', both sides have issued signals that are worth noting and pursuing. Trump has repeatedly said that he is waiting for a phone call from the Iranians to start new negotiations without any preconditions, thus seemingly completely ignoring [Secretary of State] Mike Pompeo's twelve points. Meanwhile, Iran's smiling Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has told the Japanese News Agency Kyodo of a single precondition for resuming negotiations with the 'Great Satan' – namely, that they should be conducted on the basis of mutual respect!

At the same time, reports continue to come in of indirect negotiations via numerous mediators, including the Sultanate of Oman, in order to soften the sharp edges of the two countries' positions. Some have explained the sudden development in Muscat's relations with Tel Aviv by placing it within this context, despite all the talk of an Omani mediation between the Palestinians and Israelis.

Relations between the two countries will pass through a phase of arm-twisting that will be painful to Iran, the international community, and the region in particular. It is difficult to argue that an imminent and genuine easing of tension will occur in this file. However, it may not be too long before Trump's positions and policies do a surprise U-turn, as has been his wont. Iran realizes this, and every now and then issues statements and expresses positions that could make it easier for Trump to do so.

The latest such statement came from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Deputy-Commander, who suddenly and without any preliminaries said that his country's military presence in Syria was not permanent and that it does not aspire to such a presence. True, this came in the context of denying any 'strategic divergence' between Iran and Russia in and over Syria, but it is also useful as a message of good intentions for Washington's 'remote sensing' centers to pick up.

To this one should add that in both Tehran and Washington, there are those who still tend towards the option of negotiation and dialogue and would rather avoid policies that seek decisive victories, militarization, and 'bone-breaking.' They will not stand aside in silence as they see both their countries sliding toward the bottom of a dark abyss. And in their effort to avoid such an outcome, they will receive backing from an international community, which, while not sympathetic to Iran, does not agree with Trump's rash and aggressive positions and policies.

"There is another side to the image of U.S./Iranian relations whose main features have yet to be fully drawn, but that still raises its head from among the folds of the fiery statements emanating from the two administrations' hawks and conservatives," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

TRUMP'S BOAST: "On the occasion of the second installment of U.S. sanctions re-imposed on Iran after Washington has withdrawn from the international agreement on Tehran's nuclear program, President Donald Trump has boasted that these sanctions have already had 'a destructive effect on Iranian economy,' noting that the value of the national currency has fallen by 70%, inflation has risen by 37%, and that 'recession has begun to threaten the Iranian economy'," writes Tuesday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi.

These and other direct effects may have really occurred; in fact, they are likely to worsen after the second installment of sanctions has begun, especially since they will affect the oil, energy, banking, shipping, and ship-building sectors, and include more than 600 Iranian figures and institutions this time around. The new installment also includes further restrictions and punitive measures against any international company that deals with the Iranian economy.

But the strange thing is that while U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has declared that the aim of the new package of sanctions is to drive Iranian oil exports down to zero, he has also decided to exempt eight countries from any restrictions on importing Iranian oil. After it has become clear that this list includes China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey, it is possible to ask: How can there be zero oil exports in light of the giant industrial economies of countries such as China, Japan, and India, for example? And what would really remain of the deterrent effect of this new package of sanctions if the process unfolds and the exemptions were to expand exponentially?

Moreover, did the first installment of U.S. sanctions and the overall strategy of sanctions imposed on Iran for many long years succeed in achieving their aims – namely, to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program completely (which was the declared aim) and alter the nature of Iran's political regime by exacerbating its daily livelihood difficulties (which was the real aim)?

The answer, of course, is 'No,' as witnessed by 19 previous packages of sanctions. They succeeded in aggravating the Iranian citizens' livelihood problems, in fact; but they did not weaken the regime as much as consolidate its domination domestically and expand its influence regionally, to say nothing of strengthening its hardline conservatives and ayatollahs

On the other hand, this strategy has deepened the disagreements between Washington and its partners in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program that was concluded with the UN Security Council's permanent members. It has also created serious problems with the great majority of the U.S.'s allies, especially in the industrial, metal, and energy fields.

One of the wonders of Trump's actions is that he does not want to cancel contracts worth $110 billion with Saudi Arabia lest these contracts go to Russia and China, but is tightening the noose around the Iranian economy and handing it over as easy prey to these two countries and others in the process.

Like the first installment, the latest sanctions are in violation of international law. However, and before that, they are an extension of the policies of isolation and arrogance that the U.S. president has been pursuing ever since he reached the White House.

"True, these policies affect the entire world; but it is also true that they do not absolve the U.S. itself of their dire consequences," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THE HONORABLE ARAB STAND: "When Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu describes the implementation of the second installment of U.S. sanctions on Iran directed at its energy and banking sectors as a 'historic day,' all honorable Arabs and Muslims must unhesitatingly take a forceful stance against these sanctions," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

These sanctions have been imposed on Iran because it stands in the trench of resistance to Israel's occupation of Arab and Islamic holy sites in occupied Jerusalem. Had the Iranian government been laying out the red carpet for Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and had its gymnastics and Judo teams been playing on its soil, had it been playing the Israeli national anthem for those teams [as in the UAE], it would have been the close friend of the U.S. and its Jewish lobby, and the leader of the region crowned with the jewels of the U.S. Treasury.

By imposing a starvation blockade on the Iranian people, President Trump is implementing a purely Israeli agenda, just as his Republican predecessor George Bush Jr. did in Iraq. But this blockade's prospects of success are weak, not to say nonexistent. The fact that eight countries have been exempted– including China, India, Japan, and Turkey – offers the most prominent evidence of its failure, because these countries have already declared their intention, and have courageously announced that they would continue to buy Iranian oil without hesitation, just as they continued to trade with Iran despite the first installment of sanctions that were not oil-related.

We hope that the Iranian people and government will not offer any concessions to the U.S./Israeli alliance. We hope they will stand up to the blockade and learn from the sad lessons of Iraq and Libya. For if the course of concessions ever begins, it will only end in invasion and occupation. But we are confident that the Iranian leadership, which astonished the six major powers during the nuclear negotiations, is fully aware of this fact.

Trump fears Iran because it is a strong country that possesses an arsenal of missiles and military equipment that can destroy his allies, his bases, and his forces in the Gulf region. This is why he is resorting to a blockade in the hope that the Iranian people will rebel against their government and topple the regime. But the U.S. president forgets that this country lived for forty years under blockade without ever raising the white flags of surrender. We have no doubt whatsoever that it will not do so now.

We will not use the language of figures and oil barrels, but that of reason and logic. After all, if ISIS managed to find buyers for its impure and primitive oil, will Iran fail in this regard? (And please forgive us for this completely inappropriate comparison). And if North Korea has managed to develop nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads and reach deep inside the U.S. despite an unprecedented and suffocating starvation blockade, will Iran prove unable to stand its ground, and perhaps retaliate as well?

The unarmed but heroic Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip have remained steadfast for more than ten years in the face of a suffocating blockade imposed by Israel and its Arab allies. They have confronted three Israeli aggressions, during which they succeeded in sending three million Israeli settlers to the shelters in fear and panic. Moreover, the resistance's 'primitive' missiles suspended air travel in Tel Aviv Airport for over 18 hours when this heroic nation was living on just half-a-meal and two hours of electricity a day, with all the crossing points shut in its face. This being so, what are we to expect in the case of the Iranian nation that lives in a land as large as a continent, eating from what it plants, and wearing and fighting with what it produces?

What the Israelis, their American representatives, and their new and old Arab allies fear most are the resistance factions that Iran has sponsored and 'fattened up' waiting for the 'white day' [when they will be put to use]. We are speaking here of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, which are laying siege to the occupation state from North and South, and whose missile strike forces – especially Hezbollah's – are protecting Iran instead of the other way around. These are the forces that will make Israel and the U.S. think a thousand times before firing a single bullet at Tehran.

Iran, the continent with rough terrain, will absorb the first American strike. But will Israel and its Arab allies succeed in absorbing the first retaliation from Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad? Can they withstand the thousands of missiles that will rain down on them from all directions? If the Patriot missiles, the pride of America's air defense systems, have failed to intercept the Houthis' missiles [fired at Saudi Arabia], will they succeed in intercepting the thousands of more advanced and accurate Hezbollah missiles when they are launched simultaneously, with tens and perhaps hundreds in each salvo?

On Sunday, President Hassan Rowhani revealed that during his stay in New York, four countries offered to mediate a meeting between him and Donald Trump on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but he rejected them all. This man rejects these proposals because he stands on firm ground and relies on an even firmer nation. He is not intimidated by the U.S. And anyone who says otherwise knows nothing about dignity, pride, and the will to stand one's ground and resist.

Once again, we say this loud and clear: When Netanyahu describes the imposition of blockade on Iran as a historic day this makes our choice very easy. And that is to stand in the other and opposed trench without hesitation.

"After all, life is nothing more than an honorable stance," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

2-Netanyahu defends, the Saudis procrastinate

 

Netanyahu's call to address [the Khashoggi affair] in an 'appropriate manner' is intended to set a ceiling for the way the murder is handled, making sure that it does not harm the Saudi regime's stability or damage its crown-prince. In doing so, he was inviting U.S. officials to address this issue in a manner that takes Israel's regional priorities into consideration. And Netanyahu made no secret of their nature when he added that the greater problem lies in Iran. Netanyahu's position amounts to a direct admission of the scale of the role played by the Saudi regime, and Mohammad bin Salman in particular, in the battle against Iran alongside Israel. The motive behind the Israeli PM's public entreaty clearly stems from his concern that harming the Saudi crown-prince would have domestic repercussions that could affect the entire scheme that the Trump/Netanyahu/bin-Salman triad relies on--Ali Haidar in Lebanese al-Akhbar

The Saudis may be wagering on the time factor to diminish the effect of what happened. After all, should a major crisis break out in the region, this issue would become of secondary interest for people in general, and could completely disappear off the map as far as politicians are concerned. The second notion suggests that the procrastination is intended to allow the Saudi ruling family to rearrange the regime's domestic household. For the Khashoggi case has not only undermined the Saudi crown-prince's image, reputation, and rule: It has also had repercussions on Saudi Arabia's political and economic situation. And if the situation remains the same, or if new evidence were to emerge that directly implicates the crown prince in what happened, that would have a ruinous effect on the ruling family's future as well--Mohammad Hussein Bakeer in Qatari al-Watan

 

Israeli PM Netanyahu's recent public defense of Saudi Arabia in light of the Khashoggi case is an indication of Israel's concern and uncertainty over the fate of a major regional ally, says a commentator in a pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily. This follows signs of secret attempts by Israel to protect Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman against the repercussions of this case. Despite its admission that Khashoggi's murder took place with prior intent in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the Saudi authorities have been procrastinating about revealing the location of his corpse, notes a Jordanian commentator. Three theories may explain what lies behind this procrastination.

 

FROM SECRET TO PUBLIC DEFENSE: "Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu's defense of Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and his call for the need to safeguard the Saudi regime's stability was not only a decision to abandon Israel's official silence more than one month after journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder," writes Ali Haidar in Tuesday's left-leaning pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

It also expressed a decision to move Israel's defense of this regime from the secret to the public phase as required by the course of unfolding developments and as a result of which there are concerns for the regime's stability and the possibility that the scheme that seeks to undermine the Islamic regime in Iran and confront the [Iran-led] resistance axis may be damaged.

Ever since Khashoggi's murder, its political repercussions have continued to unfold in response to the flow of information from Ankara regarding what actually transpired. As a result, Riyadh was forced to abandon the initial narrative that it tried to promote. Parallel to that, it became clear that Israel's defense of the Saudi regime, and specifically that of Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, has also passed through different phases in tandem with the continuing developments that have apparently lasted longer than Saudi Arabia had anticipated and what Tel Aviv had hoped for.

As for the secret phase of Israel's defense of the Saudi regime, The Washington Post has revealed that Netanyahu has devoted himself to defending bin Salman in his talks with President Donald Trump's administration. The paper revealed that Netanyahu has beseeched U.S. officials not to harm relations with the Saudis because they are vital allies in the region. In fact, Israel's role in this issue may be very extensive, after it has become clear that Netanyahu played a direct role himself due to his realization of the dangers lurking in what is happening.

It seems that the growing concern for bin Salman's fate as a result of the continuous and escalatory political consequences of this case has driven Netanyahu to the phase of defending the Saudi regime in public. He chose the Hungarian capital Budapest to express his position, which seemed closer to an open plea after his secret efforts in this regard. This is why he formulated his position in a careful and deliberate manner: 'What happened in the Istanbul consulate was horrendous and it should be duly dealt with. Yet [at] the same time I say it – it is very important for the stability of the world, for the region and for the world, that Saudi Arabia remain stable… I think that a way must be found to achieve both goals. Because the larger problem is Iran and we have to make sure that Iran does not continue the malign activities that it has been doing...'

Netanyahu's call to address what happened in an 'appropriate manner' is intended to set a ceiling for the way the murder is handled, making sure that it does not harm the Saudi regime's stability or damage its crown-prince. In doing so, he was inviting U.S. officials to address this issue in a manner that takes Israel's regional priorities into consideration. And Netanyahu made no secret of their nature when he added that the greater problem lies in Iran.

Netanyahu's position amounts to a direct admission of the scale of the role played by the Saudi regime, and Mohammad bin Salman in particular, in the battle against Iran alongside Israel. The motive behind the Israeli PM's public entreaty clearly stems from his concern that harming the Saudi crown-prince would have domestic repercussions that could affect the entire scheme that the Trump/Netanyahu/bin-Salman triad relies on.

Among bin Salman's most important roles is that of financing many activities linked to Israel, as revealed by Trump himself a few days ago when he told The Wall Street Journal: '[The Saudis] have been a very good ally with respect to Iran and with respect to Israel.' And he added that Saudi Arabia 'has helped us a lot with Israel, and they have been financing many things.'

Saudi Arabia has also been playing a fundamental role in providing cover for the attempt to bypass the Palestinian cause and pushing for normalization with the enemy. It may be no coincidence that this track has coincided with the increasingly rapid rush towards normalizing relations between Israel and the Gulf states, moving on to the phase of publicizing the secret relations that have existed for some time, and leading up to successive official Israeli visits to these states. And this is in addition to the Saudi Arabia's role regarding the sanctions on Iran, specifically those having to do with the ban on Tehran's oil exports.

The detailed assessments that Israeli intelligence has presented to the political establishment regarding the horizon for the continuing repercussions of Khashoggi's murder have not been disclosed. Nevertheless, what the Head of Israeli Military Intelligence's Research Division Brigadier-General Dror Shalom revealed in an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth (on 2/11/2018) points to some of Tel Aviv's concern and uncertainty. In response to a question as to whether the repercussions of Khashoggi's murder could end in toppling Mohammad bin Salman; Shalom said that that was possible. And he went on: 'The stability of regimes in the Middle East is shaky. A shake in any of them is possible. All of the world's intelligence agencies were taken by surprise in 2011. And this remains true today. It is not possible to predict when a regime might fall. I cannot guess the crown-prince's fate; but it is enough to say that Saudi Arabia has received a serious blow.'

"In light of this, it is not insignificant for Netanyahu to have no qualms about publicly defending the Saudi regime's stability against the pressures it is being subjected to, as this suggests his fear of a domino effect on the Saudi and regional situation, especially since the issue remains alive despite the fact that over a month has passed since it first erupted," concludes Haidar.

End…

 

A MONTH AND A FEW DAYS ON: "A month and a few days have passed since the heinous murder by a Saudi assassination team that came to Turkey with the specific intent of carrying out this mission," writes Mohammad Hussein Bakeer in Tuesday's Qatari daily al-Watan.

After a long period of denial and desperate attempts to camouflage what happened, and under pressure from Turkish leaks and investigations, Saudi Arabia confessed to the crime inside the Saudi consulate, as well to the fact that the murder took place with prior planning and intent.

Yet despite this admission, the Saudi authorities are still procrastinating about revealing the location of the corpse, and are avoiding answering the question as to who gave the direct order to the group to carry out this murder.

On this immediate issue, it would appear that revealing the corpse's location would entail a new scandal for Riyadh that would raise the heat of this already very hot dossier. For, if killing a human being is impermissible to begin with, especially if the person concerned is unarmed and was promised safety, one can imagine what the situation would be if the Saudi authorities were to admit to having dismembered the corpse and dissolving it in acid.

But as regards the broader issues, Riyadh may be wagering on other factors. Within this context, there are those who believe that three basic notions may explain the calculations behind Saudi Arabia's procrastination:

- The first notion is that the Middle East is a region brimming with crises, catastrophes, wars, and conflicts. In this sort of environment and because of the rapidly unfolding events, it is rare for any event to dominate the news for a long time. This being the case, the Saudis may be wagering on the time factor to diminish the effect of what happened. After all, should a major crisis break out in the region, this issue would become of secondary interest for people in general, and could completely disappear off the map as far as politicians are concerned.

--The second notion suggests that the procrastination is intended to allow the Saudi ruling family to rearrange the regime's domestic household. For the Khashoggi case has not only undermined the Saudi crown-prince's image, reputation, and rule: It has also had repercussions on Saudi Arabia's political and economic situation. And if the situation remains the same, or if new evidence were to emerge that directly implicates the crown-prince in what happened, that would have a ruinous effect on the ruling family's future as well.

The advocates of this view take into consideration some of the changes in the behavior of certain officials when it comes to dealing with Saudi Arabia. This includes King Salman's brother and former interior minister Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz's return to the kingdom, as well as the release of Prince Khaled bin Talal, Prince al-Walid bin Talal's brother, after being detained for a year.

- On the other hand, others claim that the procrastination may be linked to an assessment of Trump's situation after the U.S mid-term elections. In this regard, there are those who say that the procrastination is due to another wager on Trump, for if he were to emerge strong from this electoral challenge, he may be able to soften some of the likely consequences of Khashoggi's murder.

Each of these theories is possible. But the decisive factor in determining each of them is intimately linked to the nature of evidence that the Turkish side may produce in this case. The ambiguity about what evidence Ankara has in its possession is keeping the pressure on Riyadh at a high level.

"Meanwhile, it is clear that Riyadh is also trying to make use of this time to find out if this evidence will lead directly to the crown-prince in order to act accordingly," concludes Bakeer.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 05.11.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Almost there

 

In an apparent break from its previous stance, Fatah, which dominates the Palestinian Authority, has reportedly given Egyptian negotiators the go-ahead to mediate an agreement to quell violence between Israel and Hamas-led factions in the Gaza Strip. But Palestinian officials continue to insist that any formal ceasefire with Israel can only be inked after rival Palestinian factions achieve a reconciliation deal. Senior Palestinian sources told al-Hayat Sunday that Fatah officials gave their approval to the Egyptians in Cairo during a meeting with Hamas leaders. The meeting was attended by Fatah Central Committee member 'Azzam al-Ahmad and Hussein al-Sheikh, another committee member and close confidant of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas. The sources noted that the current Egyptian efforts, reportedly nearing a conclusion, are aimed only at achieving "calm" between Gaza and Israel and are not a formal agreement or ceasefire, which they said can only be reached after Palestinian reconciliation. According to the report, Fatah gave its approval in order to "restore normalcy" to Gaza and prevent another war between Hamas and Israel.

Arab media reports have said that if achieved, a ceasefire would include at least a partial lifting of Israel's restrictions on the movement of goods and people into and out of Gaza. Israel holds that its restrictions on movement serve security purposes, including preventing the entry of weapons into the Strip. Fatah agreed to a two-stage plan, under which over the coming two weeks Gazans would agree to end violent protests. In return, Israel will allow the entry of Qatari-funded fuel oil to power Gaza's power station, as well as easing other restrictions, al-Hayat reported. Over the next six months, more restrictions would be lifted if the quiet is maintained with the goal of returning to a 2014 ceasefire that brought an end to the last major confrontation between Israel and Hamas-led groups in Gaza.

An emerging agreement between Israel and Hamas aimed at easing violence on the Gaza border will last until the end of 2018, the Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar reported on Saturday. The paper published a draft agreement said to be an Israel-Hamas deal that will limit protest activities near the border and restrict violence. According to clauses in the draft agreement, Egypt will pressure Israel to lift 70 percent of the blockade on Gaza and expand the fishing zone to 14 nautical miles; 5,000 Gazan workers under 40 will be allowed to enter Israel for employment; and Egypt will open the Rafah border crossing.

In news of Jordanian-Israeli ties, Jordan said it has received a formal request from Israel to open negotiations about the future of two parcels of land along the border that the kingdom last month said it would retake control of, in a move perceived as downgrading the peace treaty between the two nations. Jordanian Minister of State for Media Affairs said Sunday that Israel had asked to hold consultations about the Baqoura and Ghumar regions, Jordan's official Petra News Agency reported. As part of the peace agreement between the two countries, Amman had agreed Israeli farmers could access and work the plots as part of a 25-year lease that had been widely expected in Israel to be renewed. Meanwhile, Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi on Sunday affirmed that "the peace agreement with Israel is stable and permanent" and said most Egyptians support the nearly 40-year-old treaty.

In other news, Israel's burgeoning diplomatic ties with the Persian Gulf states suffered a minor setback when Communications Minister Ayoub Kara was detained at Dubai airport and missed his flight after apparently failing to heed instructions from airport officials, the Kan news broadcaster reported Sunday, calling the incident "a farce." Kara has a long history of diplomatic snafus, but this incident comes at a particularly sensitive time, when Israel's previously clandestine ties with Arab states are coming out into the open. Kara, who was on a week-long visit to the United Arab Emirates to attend a telecommunications conference, was held for several hours at the airport last Thursday when trying to leave, the report said. Citing officials in Dubai, the report said that Kara was late for the flight and refused to follow instructions from airport personnel on the ground, prompting officials to detain him for several hours. "He was held up; there was chaos and arguments," the report said, calling the incident "a farce" and "an embarrassment" for those involved. Kara missed his flight but was later released and flew out.

Meanwhile, Transportation and Intelligence Minister Israel Katz flew Sunday to Oman at the invitation of his Omani counterpart to present a plan that could see a rail link between Israel and the Gulf. Katz was to participate in an international transportation conference in Muscat and to present a regional transportation initiative, which he is advancing jointly with Prime Minister Netanyahu, who visited the Sultanate last month. It is the first time an Israeli minister has been formally invited to participate in an international conference in Oman, reflecting the strengthening ties between the two countries. The transportation initiative, called "Tracks for Regional Peace," is based on the planned extension of railway tracks in Northern Israel, which would link Haifa's seaport to Jordan's rail network, which in turn would be linked with that of Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states. The network is envisioned as creating a regional transportation system to enhance trade relations and promote coexistence. The initiative, which seemed overly optimistic when it was proposed last year, now seems more realistic.

The United States re-imposed oil and financial sanctions on Iran today, significantly turning up the pressure on Tehran in order to curb its missile and nuclear programs and counter its growing military and political influence in the region. The move will restore U.S. sanctions that were lifted under a 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by the administration of Barack Obama, and add 300 new designations in Iran's oil, shipping, insurance and banking sectors. Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman took to Twitter on Monday morning to thank Trump for re-imposing sanctions. "President Trump's bold decision is the sea-change the Middle East has been waiting for. In a single move, the United States is dealing a critical blow to Iran's entrenchment in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen," Lieberman wrote. Iranian President Hassan Rowhani said that Iran will sell its oil and break the sanctions, pledging to government officials in comments aired on state TV that Iran would overcome the sanctions. "We are in a war situation", Rowhani said. "We are in an economic war situation. We are confronting a bullying enemy. We have to stand firm to win."

In other news, according to data published by the Ministry of Interior, voting rates in the Arab and Druze sectors were significantly higher than in the Jewish sector for the municipal elections held on Tuesday reports Yedioth Ahronoth. The data, which is yet to be finalized, also show that citizens whose socio-economic status is low vote in higher rates than citizens whose socio-economic status is high, people residing in small municipalities cast their vote in the ballot box more than those living in big municipalities, and that the voting percentages in the periphery are higher than those in the center of the country. Some 3,840,000 people voted in the municipal elections last week, with the national voting rate being 58%, a 7% increase in comparison to the previous municipal elections five years ago. In the Arab and Druze sectors, the voting rate was 84%, as opposed to 55% in the Jewish sector. Studies show that Arab citizens are interested in local politics, since they consider it the only vehicle for their political, social and economic development. However, most of the Arabs residing in East Jerusalem, who are permanent residents and not citizens, therefore have the right to only vote in the municipal elections and not for the Knesset, regularly boycott local elections, and this time was not any different.

The Times of Israel reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu gave the go-ahead Sunday for lawmakers to advance a controversial bill calling for the death penalty for convicted Palestinian killers of Israeli civilians and soldiers, reportedly rejecting the advice of the security establishment. Meeting coalition party heads to set the legislative agenda for the week, the prime minister said there was nothing preventing the proposal, which has been stalled since January, from being put to Knesset votes and becoming law. Netanyahu told coalition heads that opposition from both the Shin Bet security service and the Israel Defense Forces should not prevent lawmakers from advancing the bill, Israel Radio reported Monday morning. Although the death penalty formally exists in Israeli law, it has only ever been used once — in 1962 in the case of Nazi officer Adolf Eichmann, one of the architects of the Holocaust. It is technically allowed in cases of high treason, as well as in certain circumstances under the martial law that applies within the IDF and in the West Bank, but currently requires a unanimous decision from a panel of three judges and has never been implemented. The bill, proposed by Yisrael Beitenu and championed by the party's chairman, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, would allow a simple majority of two judges to one to impose the death penalty. Lieberman said at the opening the of Knesset's winter session last month that the passage of the bill was a condition for his party to remain in the coalition.

Hoping that better market conditions and bidding terms will draw more interest than its last disappointing efforts did, Israel is planning a second auction of energy-exploration licenses over the next few weeks, the Energy Ministry said Sunday. The government will offer to oil and gas companies 19 offshore blocks in its waters offshore its Mediterranean coast, where there have been seven natural gas discoveries since 2004. "The aim is to continue the momentum of the Israeli gas sector's development, increase competition by bringing in new international energy companies and increase the energy security of the State of Israel," Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said. He pointed to plans to develop an undersea gas pipeline that would run from Israel through Cyprus and on to Greece and Italy. If the pipeline is indeed built it would enable Israel to export energy to Europe and make the blocs being auctioned more attractive to bidders who see little potential in the tiny Israeli market. Meanwhile, Israel's domestic pipeline network does not have the capacity to carry all the natural gas the Tamar and Leviathan partners have contracted to sell to Egypt, TheMarker has learned. The partners are scrambling to find a solution before exports begin in the first half of 2019.

Finally, the lights are going back on in the Gaza Strip, in a rare piece of positive news from the blockaded Palestinian enclave. In recent days, residents say they have received up to 16 hours of power from the grid per day, compared with as little as four previously. UN humanitarian officials report an average of between nine and 11 hours per day since October 25. It is the result of a landmark six-month deal, part of efforts to end unrest along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip that has raised fears of a fourth war since 2008. The deal emerged amid ongoing indirect negotiations between Hamas, which rules the Strip, and Israel, mediated by the UN and Egypt, in hopes of reaching a long-term truce. The fuel agreement, whose first deliveries arrived on October 9, has provided the most power to Gaza residents in years. Last month's deal sees Qatar pay $60 million for fuel delivered to Gaza's sole power station. The deliveries are sent through Israel, which agreed on condition that the United Nations monitors them to avoid interference by Hamas, which it has long accused of diverting humanitarian aid for terror purposes at the expense of Gaza's population. The tentative results are showing in the enclave's beleaguered economy: Companies able to work longer, restaurant costs falling, and even an increase in ice cream.

 

 

BACKING IRAN INTO A CORNER: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom asserts the new sanctions imposed on Iran today are different than those levied against Tehran in the past. This time the edicts are only American, but the Iranians will have a hard time finding breaches.

"The sanctions imposed today on Iran are not the end of the story, but another, vital step in the long struggle aimed at blocking the aspirations of the ayatollah regime in all spheres – nuclear, territorial, and religious. This struggle has been going on for more than two decades at an alternating pace, combining a variety of actions: Economic, political, operational, and media related. Throughout this period Iran has deluded the entire world and stopped only twice – following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and with the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015.

In both cases, Iran stopped when its leaders felt the sword on their necks and feared for their rule. First when Tehran believed that after Afghanistan and Iraq their turn would come and hastened to halt the activities of the 'weapons group' responsible for the production of nuclear weapons, and again when the sanctions threatened to overwhelm the Iranian economy.

The undeclared goal of the current sanctions is to push the Iranian leadership into a corner and force it to make other decisions. There are those in the United States and Israel who hope that the growing economic pressure on Iran will lead to the overthrow of the regime, but this scenario is far-fetched. Despite the increasing number of recent street demonstrations, the regime is strong, and the energies required for overthrowing it have yet to gather.

The current sanctions are different from those that existed up to three years ago. They are only American - Europe, Russia and China will not partake in them - and they do not envelop the entire banking system. It is likely that Iran will try to maintain its economy in the near future on the basis of cash and money-changing, and will look for loopholes or partners that will enable it to continue to survive. The likelihood of Iran succeeding in this is low. The European effort to develop a 'sanctions bypass route' is likely to fail, because it is doubtful that any Western company will prefer to trade with Iran than with the U.S. Russia does have the potential to sabotage U.S. efforts if it agrees to export Iran's oil for it – and transfer the returns in cash. Still, that would be no more than aspirin for a serious illness; not something that will save the Iranian economy, which is gasping for air regardless.

Those expected to pay the price will be first and foremost the Iranian people. Washington and Jerusalem hope that the sanctions will also affect others supported by the regime in Tehran; Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and the rebels in Yemen. This will not happen automatically and without a struggle between extremists and moderates in Iran, but it will soon be necessary for Tehran to decide between continuing to export the revolution and diverting funds to calm the Iranian street.

For Israel, this is good news. If Iran chooses the path of war, even the skeptics will acknowledge that its intentions are negative. If it chooses to withdraw, the threat from its proxies will diminish. Less money for terror means less weapons, less training and, by implication, less motivation and energy for war adventures.

Tehran will probably try to survive this process until the U.S. administration changes. It is doubtful that this will happen, and Iran may be forced to decide as soon as possible whether to 'go crazy' and go nuclear in the hope that will buy her immunity (based on the North Korean precedent), or reach a less convenient deal, but one that would give her some breathing space. For Israel, such an agreement must be much broader than the one from which the Americans withdrew. It must include not only nuclear issues, but also significant restrictions on the development of long-range missiles and Iran's involvement in terrorism and destabilization of the region. To date, apart from rumors, we have no knowledge of serious talks on a new agreement, but it is likely that mediators will soon emerge to promote the idea; the more Tehran feels the weight of the sanctions, the greater its willingness will be to compromise in order to secure their removal."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU'S BLACK OCTOBER: Amit Segal in Makor Rishon cites the reasons why the past month was so difficult for the PM and claims that although they do not signal the beginning of his demise; they do explain why he has lost his appetite for early elections.

"Of the 115 consecutive months in office, October 2018 will not be remembered as one of Binyamin Netanyahu's best. In fact, he would prefer to forget it. The blows engulfed him from all sides: He got in trouble with his political base over the decision to postpone the evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar, his lawyer of many years Ya'akov Weinroth passed away, in Kiryat Shmona he needlessly offended a woman heckler who presented herself as his supporter, And then rammed into Gideon Sa'ar at a hundred Kilometers per hour – a political brawl that never benefits a prime minister against his junior. Above all, the ongoing situation in the South continues to disrupt many Israeli's peace of mind, and the new situation in the North continues to deprive a few senior Israelis of their sleep. The apparent difficulty of continuing the air attacks in the North is engendering whispers of nightmare events in Lebanon and Syria. Netanyahu's control of security and the international arena is his main source of strength, and these two situations are unpleasant, with no end to them in sight.

Politicians are sophisticated sensors for detecting weakness. Netanyahu is not weak. Far from it. But such a buildup of internal statements against him has not been recorded in a very long time. It began with Sa'ar's vehement reply to the putsch accusations, continued with Lieberman announcing the appointment of the new chief of staff while Netanyahu was on a visit to Oman, and later with Lieberman's disparaging remarks regarding the identity of the deputy chief of staff ('He will be chosen by the defense minister, as is the custom'). There were also secret recordings of MK Miki Zohar against him, with expressions that are unprintable in a newspaper, and the interviews given by David Bitan and Dudi Amsalem, who did not bother hiding off-record, questioning and debating his decision to support the Likud's opponent in the mayoral elections in Bat Yam. Bitan made clear that Netanyahu did not tell the truth and the decision was his, not the Likud's; Amsalem defined the decision as a grave mistake.

This is not the beginning of the end for the prime minister. Merely a seasonal cold in his popularity. But it does explain why he lost his appetite for early elections. There were those in his inner circle who urged him to finally cash in on the thirty-something mandates he has been receiving in the polls in the past half a year, but there were others who suggested that he first distance himself from recent events. This is the reason for the gap between Finance Minister Kahlon, who is in a hurry to dissolve the Knesset, and the dull tranquility with which the Knesset is approaching its fifth year. By the way, Deri, who had a good surprise showing in the municipal elections, will want to capitalize soon on his local gains in national elections. This has created a strange situation in terms of this coalition, although common in any other coalition. For the first time in a long time, Netanyahu wants elections less than a few of his partners."

Ends…

 

NEW DIRECTION IN THE GULF: Smadar Perry in Yedioth Ahronoth writes that Israeli agents are running around in all the Gulf States, alongside high-tech people and business men. Oman and Bahrain are not about to sign peace treaties with Israel, but there is a new generation there that accepts the Jewish state.

"Notice how in one week, Israeli delegations visited three principalities in the Persian Gulf: the prime minister and the head of Mossad were in Oman, culture and sports minister Miri Regev and a group of athletes were in Abu Dhabi, and a delegation of former academics and army personnel, and another small delegation of athletes, went to Qatar. Every country has its own separate agenda. After the meeting with the ruler of Oman, next in line is Bahrain, which announced yesterday that it would invite Netanyahu for an official visit. A date has not yet been set.

Here are the differences. Oman has a long tradition of mediation, parleying between embroiled elements within the country, between neighboring countries, and between foreign countries as well. This special mediation method is designed to sit the parties down at the negotiating table, after which Oman exits the scene and makes room for a more senior mediator. The ruler of Oman now wants to create negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians and then bring in his American allies. He also has a longer-term plan regarding the Iranians. He wanted to make clear to Netanyahu: First the Palestinians, a pause, and then Tehran. No pressure, no time restraints, no agenda. When they decide in Washington that the time has come, the Omani foreign minister is ready pave the way.

Abu Dhabi is an interesting country. Like Dubai, it is mainly a venue for the good life, has a lot more foreigners than residents, and a de facto ruler (who did not bother making an appearance for the visit of the Israeli delegation), Muhammad bin Zaid, who is assisted quite a bit by Muhammad Dahlan, who resides there. If Ben Zaid asks for advice on an Israeli issue, he knows whom to summon.

In Qatar matters are much more complex. Four Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, are waging a war against it. There were moments when Saudi Crown Prince MbS, who closed the borders, threatened not only to cut off Qatar but to turn it into a hovering island. But this is where the largest American base in the Arab world is situated. With a view to Iran, President Trump and his gang will not let the Saudi Crown Prince run wild. Qatar maintains a special ambassador to Gaza, Muhammad al-Amadi, who frequently visits Israel, and has managed to establish pretty good ties here. His official role: To transfer money (never a problem in Qatar) to Gaza. The money, as always, buys influence and special status.

I was in Qatar last week. It is hard to describe the wealth, the splendor, the momentum of construction and the preparations that are gaining incredible momentum, for the soccer World Cup games in about three years. For the first time in the Arab world, the competition will be held in this small, wealthy emirate, which dreams of becoming a 'sports empire'. Hotels, restaurants, and clubs are being built at a riveting pace, with promises of alcohol flowing freely in closed places. But Qatar is also striving for a political role in the region. The Saudi Crown Prince has hinted that he is willing to end the boycott, without committing to a timeline, but Egypt is pressing for Qatar to be expelled from the dialogue with the Palestinians. My bet: Ambassador Al-Amadi will be allowed to continue his work between Tel Aviv and Gaza.

In all the Gulf states there are Israeli agents running around, alongside high-tech and business people. You speak to an Omani or a Qatari or a Bahraini, and a new world is revealed to you. No pressure, no stress. They are not going to sign peace pacts with Israel, but they see the Israelis differently now. The sequence of meetings in the Gulf should be maintained. It will benefit Israel in Egypt and Jordan and will open new routes. Each of the princedoms has a link to a large Arab country, and Israel can take advantage of this bridge. It is also very important to listen to the young people in the Emirates. A new generation of business owners, factory managers and young academics who are not put off by Israel, provided of course they receive a green light from the ruler's grand palace."

Ends…

 

HAMAS'S RENEWED TRUST IN EGYPT: Tal Lev-Ram in Maariv comments that the sight of Egyptian vehicles in Gaza during the weekend is making us think that we are on the cautious path to an arrangement. Everything will continue to progress in small steps and the road ahead is very long.

"The picture of the three white vehicles belonging to the Egyptian intelligence delegation, which came to survey the fence area in Saja'iya, to see first-hand whether Hamas is working to curb the demonstrations, is probably the picture that best summarizes this weekend's events, which were completely different from what happened in the South last weekend, when Israel and Hamas were very close to further escalation. Despite the relative calm, more difficulties are expected as the pendulum swings between a deal and an escalation. It is too early to tell whether Egypt's efforts will indeed lead to a period of quiet in the South.

More than anything else, the weekend events in Gaza prove to what extent Hamas is capable of regulating the height of the violence according to its interests and its satisfaction with the pace of negotiations to reach the objectives it has set itself for the removal of the blockade on the Strip. The difference on the ground is not apparent only in the number of participants in the demonstrations. About 10,000 Palestinians are still expected to arrive at the fence in coming weeks. The major difference was in the method of protest and violence. It was yet again revealed that when Hamas wants to, it can control the territory and even prevent the burning of tires.

For Hamas, this weekend was mainly a gesture and show of confidence in Egypt and its leadership, for the efforts they are making to reach an arrangement. Hamas has absorbed some internal criticism of its actions to rein in the events on the ground over the weekend. It is much too early to judge this as a sign of things to come. Reality may change and make a complete U-turn, as we saw in the previous week. But this weekend, Hamas provided Egypt with what it requested, and did not embarrass the delegation that visited the fence.

Between Cairo, Gaza, Ramallah, and Jerusalem there remain great distances and differences of interests. Until the arrangement is reached many obstacles are expected to crop up. At this point the focus is on small steps, in an effort to calm the area from week to week. Beyond the steps Israel is taking, which are expected to begin in the near future – opening the crossings, expanding the fishing areas, approving international projects, funding salaries and transferring funds to the Strip – the crux of the problem is still the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

Despite his threats, Abu Mazin has refrained at this stage from imposing additional sanctions on the Strip. The meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh between him and Egyptian President Sissi was of great importance. The Egyptians seem to be succeeding in gaining some time, but the PA chairman has not given up his demand that the PA's control in Gaza be complete, including of the security services. Such a scenario is not currently viable. In recent months, whenever Israel and Hamas have come close to a lull, some event would routinely crop up and cause a breakdown. Despite the progress of the past week, Hamas, Israel and the Palestinian Authority are very far from a deal, and other security escalations are likely to emerge on the way to one."

Ends…

 

GAZANS BENDING ISRAEL AND HAMAS: Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz argues that Gazans have become a strategic force that cannot be ignored. They have managed to cultivate a political relationship between Israel and Hamas, even forging unofficial security coordination.

"The Egyptian delegation to Gaza arrived on Friday to watch Hamas work its magic on the demonstrators. They were indeed enthralled. There were fewer protesters – thousands, not tens of thousands. They kept a greater distance from the border fences and there were no fatalities. The Egyptian and Israeli conclusion is that Hamas not only holds the knobs on the stove, it can also adjust the height and intensity of the flames. If it chooses, the thousands will confront the Israel Defense Forces, and if it chooses, they will stop the attacks on the fence.

But this is a conclusion that did not need any proof, certainly since Israel constantly claims that Hamas is the sole responsible party in Gaza and controls everything that happens there. This conclusion should have made Israel realize years ago that trying to foment a civil revolt against Hamas through a blockade and sanctions is simply not realistic. The theory that replaced it said that while the punishments should not cease, they should be reframed as a means of pressuring Hamas and putting it in a position where it was liable to lose its legitimacy and public support if it did not do what Israel wanted, which would lead to an easing of Gaza's living conditions.

In fact, it was the same theory and strategy as its failed predecessor. The real threat is the two million Palestinians who have been living under a brutal siege for 11 years. Both Israeli pressure on Hamas from above by reducing its ability to rule, and the attempt to provoke public protest against Hamas from below, relied on a role that the Gaza public was supposed to play. But the public in Gaza turned into a strategic force that led even the IDF to speak up about the severe living conditions in the Strip, and in the end forced Hamas to pursue an arrangement that is still being negotiated. For six months, tens of thousands of people were enlisted in a show of force called the March of Return. Some 20,000 to 30,000 people, young and old, women and children, take their lives in their hands, and they do not come to the confrontation line just because Hamas orders them to. They are the force that represents two million people who have nothing to lose.

One could ask why tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands more do not join them, but it is the same question that could be asked of the Arab Spring demonstrations in Egypt, which in the best case drew half a million to a million people representing some 90 million citizens. If you compare the size of the Egyptian and Gazan populations, one could say that 20,000 Gaza demonstrators are equal in force to a million people, around half the Strip's population. The consistency and devotion exhibited by the demonstrators in Gaza have an enormous power that proved to Israel and Hamas that this was not a temporary show of strength, but a phenomenon unprecedented in Gaza or the West Bank since the second intifada ended, or at least since Hamas seized control of the Strip in 2007.

Israel chose to ignore this public display and aimed its sharpshooters at those launching balloons or who were identified as leaders of the demonstrations, or who dared to come too close to the fence. Thus it could bypass the substantive reason for the demonstrations by portraying its mission as the defeat of an 'armed' enemy endangering Israel's security.

There is no disputing that the balloons caused great damage and put lives at risk; this enabled Israel to present the conflict as a struggle against a terrorist organization and not as a confrontation with a civilian population. At the same time, it neutralized the danger of war, because who is going to launch a war against balloons? One can heap praises on Prime Minister Netanyahu for abstaining from war, but what prevented war was the nature of the conflict, which did not provide the required legitimacy for a full-scale military campaign.

The issue of an arrangement that has been accompanying the confrontation all along – and which has shattered the established view that one does not negotiate with terrorist groups – turned the talks with Hamas into talks with Gaza's population. The permit to bring in fuel, arranging for salaries to be paid through Qatar, the emerging willingness to allow 5,000 Gazan laborers to come work in Israel, the promise to build a port and to enlarge the fishing zone – these are all civil steps aimed at calming the Gazan public and giving Hamas means of control.

Israel is not demanding that Hamas disarm or that it disarm other groups such as Islamic Jihad and the Popular Committees, nor is it demanding that Hamas give control over the border crossings or tax collection to the Palestinian Authority. PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas is making those demands of Hamas, not Israel. From this we see that the question of 'strengthening' or 'weakening' Hamas is no longer relevant, since Israel gave up testing the organization's power when it abandoned the diplomatic process and went over to a policy of splitting the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, which makes preserving Hamas' power important. This policy requires Israel to be concerned about Gaza's welfare, not for humanitarian or altruistic reasons, but as a strategic decision that ascribes power to this exhausted and impoverished populace, which has managed to fashion a diplomatic relationship between Israel and Hamas that even includes undeclared security cooperation.

This strategy cannot tolerate any more delays. It requires declaring the intent to totally lift the blockade, subject to practical security restrictions, to open the gates to large investments, to create jobs for thousands of Gaza residents and to implement the rehabilitation plan that was agreed on after Operation Protective Edge, and which Egypt and Israel agreed upon again a few weeks ago. The conflict is no longer with Hamas, but with a large population that has proven its strength."

Ends…

 

TOPPLING HAMAS IS NOT THE SOLUTION: Jeff Barak in The Jerusalem Post avows that even Prime Minister Netanyahu accepts there is no alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza, and perhaps come the 2019 election campaign he will for the first time in a decade spare us his empty threats to destroy Hamas.

"Back in 2009, on the eve of the general elections that brought Prime Minister Netanyahu back into power, life was much more black and white for the man who has been our prime minister ever since. Talking about Hamas' control over the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu the contender had no doubts as to what Israel's policy regarding the Palestinian territory on Israel's Southern border should be: 'There is no choice but to uproot the Iranian-backed regime in Gaza.' Hamas, he said 'is at the service of Iran and militant Islam. Israel cannot tolerate an Iranian base next to its cities.' Talking at a conference a week before the elections took place, Bibi also harshly criticized the just-completed Operation Cast Lead, arguing that the then-government had not allowed 'the military to plug the hole in the South.'

One decade later, two terms in power and two large-scale major military offensives against Gaza (Operation Pillar of Defense and Operation Protective Edge), and the past summer skies filled with incendiary kites setting Israeli farmland and forests ablaze, Netanyahu's government today is, at one step removed, deep in negotiations with Hamas, seeking a long-term cease fire that will provide Israel with quiet in the South and maintain Hamas' rule over Gaza. As Netanyahu well knew back in 2009 and is totally aware of today, Israel has no alternative but to accept Hamas control in Gaza.

In a rare, on-the-record interview with Yediot Ahronoth a few days ago, Brig.-Gen. Dror Shalom, head of the IDF's Military Intelligence research department, laid out clearly the situation facing Israeli policymakers. The 2014 Operation Protective Edge, the senior IDF officer said, bought Israel a few years of quiet but did not resolve the humanitarian crisis inside the Strip. Rather than concentrate on relieving the suffering, Hamas continued seeking to improve its rocket capability, thus keeping the closure on Gaza firmly in place, further deteriorating the economic situation for ordinary Gazans. Much as Netanyahu and U.S. President Trump seek out and inflate external enemies to hide their failings and keep their base energized (my words here, not those of Shalom), Hamas turned the population's discontent against Israel and began the weekly demonstrations at the border fence, which sparked off this summer's round of violence, almost setting off another large-scale IDF ground offensive.

What is to be done? Not a lot, according to Shalom, the senior IDF military intelligence officer. 'Our challenge,' he said, 'is to keep the Gazan population's head above the sewage. Bringing about the collapse of the Hamas is not the solution. If Hamas falls, who will rule in Gaza? Poli (Yoav) Mordechai' (the former IDF Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories)? Without having the political courage to say so openly, it seems as if our prime minister has reached the same conclusion. In a briefing last week with reporters, part on the record and part 'senior political source' for those topics less on-message with his official talking points, Netanyahu made it clear that the humanitarian problem in Gaza was the most pressing issue there, not Hamas.

Sending in tanks and troops will not solve the need to restore Gaza's infrastructure nor resolve the deep economic crisis in the Strip. As Shalom said on the record, there is nobody in the wings to take over control from Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is unable to do so, Egypt is not interested and as Hamas leader Yahiya as-Sinwar himself pointed out last month in an interview, the last thing Netanyahu wants is responsibility for another two million Arabs.

This past weekend saw perhaps the beginning of the end of the current round of tension between Israel and Gaza. While the regular Friday protests at the border fence did take place, they passed relatively quietly and no incendiary balloons were launched into Israel. This was no coincidence. In recent days, Egyptian intelligence officials, and the United Nations Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov have been holding intense talks with the Hamas to bring about a cease-fire. While not officially part of the talks, Israel is closely monitoring and playing its role in helping bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion, supporting the Qatari-funded shipments of diesel fuel into the Strip, which is increasing the number of hours a day Gazans have electricity, as well as backing an arrangement under which Qatar would pay for government workers' salaries in Gaza. According to a Lebanese newspaper report over the weekend, there is a 10-step incremental accord on the table, including a prisoner swap toward the end of the process, to ensure long-term quiet.

Could it be that come the 2019 election campaign – whenever that falls – for the first time in a decade we will be spared Netanyahu's and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman's empty threats to destroy the Hamas?"

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 05.11.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Ahmet Hakan hazards a prediction in centre-right Hurriyet: "It may happen this way or that, create a big fuss, or spread many names and much speculation around, but I bet that the outlook will be thus in the end: In Istanbul, the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will join the race with its parliamentary chair Binali Yildirim, or with deputy chairman Numan Kurtulmus. The CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] will join the race with its former presidential candidate Muharrem Ince. In Ankara, the AKP will join the race with interior minister Suleyman Soylu, and CHP will run with Mansur Yavas. Let us mark these names out as our favourites and wait."

Guven Gurkan Oztan sees an opportunity to strengthen secularism in leftist opposition Birgun: "There are dozens of opportunities to stop Islamism, which has lost its ideological appeal. Rather than a strategy to take over the highest echelons of the state, another success story should be grounded locally, stemming from people's tangible issues. All of Turkey needs this success story, not only Ankara and Istanbul. Let us not forget that social municipality management in its true sense can help to downgrade political Islam, while also serving to strengthen the struggle for secularism at its base."

Hasmet Babaoglu demands respect for the new political regime in pro-government Sabah: "If parliament is democratic, national, and independent, it must acknowledge that the resistance against the July 15th 2016 coup attempt is sacred, and should act accordingly. A rhetoric that casts doubt over those who the defeated the coup plotters cannot be allowed beneath parliament's roof. It is clear on which side those who do have taken their positions: There is no point hemming and hawing! This parliament, together with the fact that it came after July 15th and the transition to a presidential system, embodies the special characteristic of a 'founding' institution."

 

TURKEY/U.S./SYRIA: Kurtulus Tayiz maintains that Ankara has outmaneuvered Washington in Northern Syria in pro-government Aksam: "Turkey's military and diplomatic moves in Syria have cornered the U.S. further each day, thereby limiting Washington's ability to maneuver. As Ankara escalates its pressure West of the Euphrates, its pressure on the river's Eastern banks is also being more strongly felt. Taking the Brunson crisis as an excuse, the Pentagon sought to cover up the promises it made to Ankara regarding Manbij in Syria and East of the Euphrates. However, Ankara managed to overcome this artificial crisis quickly, and sought to focus on real issues with the U.S. And Turkey has succeeded in resolving the Brunson crisis and elevating Manbij and East of the Euphrates as the primary issue on the agenda that calls for a resolution."

 

U.S. MIDTERM ELECTIONS: Ergin Yildizoglu contemplates the potential course of tomorrow's midterm U.S. congressional elections in opposition nationalist Cumhuriyet: "The results of the U.S. elections will not only affect the future of the people of the country, but also the peoples of the entire world. If the results go in one direction, there is going to be a chance to dismiss the racist, LGBT-hostile Trump who withdrew from vital agreements such as the Paris Climate agreement, the mid-range nuclear missile agreement with Russia, and who launched trade wars. If they go in another direction, fascism will soar while strengthening the prospects of a 'Great War' in the international arena."

 

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION: Faruk Cakir proclaims the virtues of vocational training in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "Is vocational education not the first step towards advanced technology? How can we explain that vocational schools are not considered a matter of state interest and that they are not given the necessary importance and attention? It should be noted that according to a recent survey, vocational schools have the highest non-attendance rates. Is this how we are going to take further steps in our advanced technology and research and development?"

 

Iran media watch

 

AIR DEFENSE DRILLS: A two-day air defense drill dubbed "Defenders of the Sky of Guardianship 97" started this morning. The military exercise is held jointly by Khatam al-Anbia (The Last Prophet) Air Defense Force, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Air Force, and the Army's Air Force. State radio VIRI said the drills are carried out in an area stretched over 500,000 square kilometers in the North, East and West of the country.

 

NEW ECONOMIC OFFICIALS: This morning President Hassan Rowhani met the newly appointed Economy Minister Farhad Dejpasand, his deputies and other officials at the ministry. Rolling news channel IRINN and English-language Press TV broadcasted his speech live.

 

ANTI-U.S. RALLIES: The anti-U.S. rallies of yesterday dominated Iranian media today. Most newspapers put photos of the nationwide demonstrations on their front pages and highlighted the coincidence of the U.S. embassy seizure anniversary with the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. Reformist Ebtekar published a photo of a woman's hands with "Death to America" painted on them under the headline "Death to America on American sanctions day". Government-run Iran said the rallies were a "response to sanctions on the embassy seizure anniversary", while business daily Tejarat and conservative Hemayat spoke of a "crushing response" to Trump and his sanctions. Hardline Quds highlighted "40 years of Death to America", and Vatan-e Emruz published a collage of the rallies' under the headline: "Smacking Trump in the face". Channel One (IRTV1) reported on foreign media coverage of the rallies.

 

ANTI-TERROR BILL: Several newspapers covered the Guardian Council's announcement yesterday that it had turned down a bill on Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) passed by Parliament. "The Guardian Council found over 20 faults in the CFT Convention," the council's secretary said yesterday. He added that the bill was sent back to the Majlis after the council found out that "those faults include ambiguities and cases of non-compliance with Sharia law and the Constitution". "CFT rejected," read a banner headline on reformist Aftab-e Yazd's front page. The daily said the Guardian Council's move was unexpected since the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has given the Islamic Republic until February 2019 to complete changes to legislature regarding money laundering and terrorism financing. Reformist Ebtekar also wrote of "risks of failing to ratify CFT". Business daily Eqtesad-e Melli ran the headline "back to square one", while pro-reform Bahar questioned the timing of the council's announcement, which came on the day of anti-U.S. rallies. Hardline Keyhan lauded the bill's rejection under the headline "People and Guardian Council's slap in America's face".

 

TALKS WITH SCANDINAVIANS: The Iranian Foreign Ministry hosted the Norwegian and Swedish ambassadors to Tehran and Denmark's charge d'affaires for talks over recent murder plot accusations against the Islamic Republic.

 

U.S. MIDTERM ELECTIONS: Press TV reported that President Donald Trump had attended a rally in the U.S. state of Georgia ahead of the midterm elections where he warned about "migrants' invasion". Elsewhere, at a rally for Democrats in Indiana, former President Barack Obama said that Republicans in control of the White House and Congress have "racked up enough indictments to field a football team," said the channel.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian users on Twitter have been reacting to the CFT bill's rejection by the Guardian Council. CFT in English has been mentioned over 3,000 times by users, who have largely condemned the council's move in light of the new U.S. sanctions. One user said the council's move on the day anti-U.S. rallies were held was "a present to Trump". Others highlighted the negative impact of the Guardian Council's move on Tehran's stock exchange market. 'Sattar Beheshti' has been used over 7,000 times over the past few days as Iranian anti-regime users post Tweets on the anniversary of the death of Sattar Beheshti, an Iranian blogger who died in November 2012 a few days after being arrested by the Cyber Police unit for criticizing the Islamic establishment on Facebook.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 05.11.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Fasten your safety belts

2-A pointless attack

 

1-Fasten your safety belts

 

Iran is wagering on the time factor. And it may be also be wagering on the end of Trump's term in office. Equally, it is wagering on certain European voices that believe that sanctions harm people but do not harm these kinds of regimes, and that Iran's reformist current will be the main victim of any new sanctions, which the regime will portray as a blockade imposed on the country and not on its political regime. In light of the North Korean precedent, Trump dreams that painful sanctions will ultimately convince Iran to return to the negotiating table, but ready to change its behavior this time around. We will have to wait to find out if Iran will confine itself to resisting the sanctions inside its borders, or whether it will use its regional cards in one country or another – and if its reactions will go so far as to harass U.S. troops in the region directly or by proxy, or whether it will tamper with the security of naval straits and passageways. A new chapter is beginning. The sanctions' winds are blowing on the Iranian economy. And when the weather gets turbulent, we must fasten our safety belts--Ghassan Charbel in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

Iran is not a party that can be easily broken or uprooted from the region, or whose role in many of the region's conflicts can be ended. It has built many 'mansions' inside Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine over the past four decades. It is unimaginable that any of these countries' open-ended crises can find a final resolution without Tehran's presence at the negotiating table in some form or another. Indeed, Washington's regional cards are neither more numerous nor significantly stronger than Tehran's…The sanctions will not break Tehran's back. They will not compel it to raise the white flag of surrender and accept Pompeo's preconditions, which are just a variation of Netanyahu's terms. But it is also naïve to believe that Iran will be unaffected by these harsh sanctions, or to think that it has not adopted sufficient measures to avert severe damage to its economy and its citizens' prosperity. And this means that the confrontation and the arm-twisting game between the two sides may last for a long time to come. In fact, Trump may leave the White House before Tehran screams out in pain or collapses to its knees and begs for the U.S.'s forgiveness-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

Iran is entering a new phase as it faces the sanctions' guillotine. This was inevitable after the regime's rash behavior reached a point that was impossible to ignore, and after its schemes for imposing Iranian hegemony and control became clear to everyone, and after Iran's extensions began to threaten the region's countries and their Arab character, and after its expenditure on armament and the production of missiles of various sizes and ranges reached levels that gave rise to suspicions regarding Tehran's aims and objectives… The Tehran regime has driven the Iranian people into a bottleneck against its people's will. It is responsible for the blockade and Iran's isolation from the world, and for leaving the Iranian people hostage to the sanctions and the tragedies and catastrophes that will unfold in the form of hunger, deprivation, and misery. But the Iranian people, who have been living under the mullahs' regime which has deprived them of their freedom and dignity for forty years, will not stand by with folded arms as they see themselves hanging from the sanctions' gallows against their will--Emirates' al-Khaleej

The Trump administration's policies enjoy only a little popularity, whether in the U.S. or among its European allies. But the administration now faces a test of how serious and able it is when it confronts a shrewd and difficult opponent that has managed to benefit more from the U.S.'s mistakes than from its own capabilities. For Iran has emerged the winner from every regional confrontation that the U.S. has engaged in, and today more than at any previous time, it is backed by strong international allies, with Russia and China at their forefront. It is as if Iran were the spearhead in a war that will only end either by surrendering to unilateral American hegemony over the world, or by inaugurating a new multi-polar world order base--Mustafa as-Sa'id in Egyptian al-Ahram

 

As the U.S.'s latest round of sanctions on Iran take effect today and a new chapter in the history of the conflict between the two countries begins, it is clear that while the Iranian economy will suffer greatly, Tehran will simply not comply with Washington's demands, maintains the Lebanese editor-in-chief of a Saudi daily. The question is whether in its attempt to resist these sanctions, Iran would go as far as to harass U.S. troops in the region or in its strategic water straits. Although the sanctions are certain to hurt Iran, they are unlikely to do so to the extent that Washington believes or hopes, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. President Trump is much more likely to depart the White House before Iran falls to its knees and begs for America's forgiveness. The sanctions will force Iran to its knees, insists the editorial in an Emirati daily. But the Iranian people will not stand back and watch their descent into the disasters inflicted on them by the regime's rash policies. In light of the new sanctions' unlikely prospects of success, Washington's prestige in the region and on the world-stage is at risk, argues an Egyptian commentator. Since a direct military confrontation with Iran will be extremely costly, and since it has consumed all its other options, the U.S. is most likely resort to its regional allies and to wage a media campaign so as to portray its moves as a victory against Iran.

 

TRUMP'S DEMANDS: "Donald Trump is demanding things of the Iranian regime that it cannot provide or accept," writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat.

He is demanding a full and final divorce between the regime and its nuclear dream, which some of its hawks view as 'an insurance policy' against American surprises. He is also demanding that the Iranian revolution should go into retirement in the shadow of a state that, together with its army and its 'Revolutionary Guard,' subsists within the revolution's map. He wants the revolution to refrain from infiltrating other peoples' lands, undermining their stability, and surrounding them with missiles. He also wants Iran to submit and behave as a normal state that does not give itself the right to deploy its oil returns and militias in order to restructure the region based on its designs and confiscate some capital or another's decisions.

But those familiar with the Iranian regime say that fanning the revolution's burning embers is one of the preconditions for its survival, and that ceasing to 'export the revolution' would undermine the entire project and confront the regime with the domestic test of an economic performance that is not encouraging at all.

And so, a new chapter in the U.S./Iranian confrontation, which has been going on for the past four decades, begins. This has been a political, diplomatic, and economic conflict, with a number of security-related interludes, but without sliding into a large-scale and direct military confrontation.

There are those who believe that the new chapter may be the most difficult so far, and that its result will determine Iran's position on the regional map and the extent of its role. For the U.S. sanctions, that have taken effect as of dawn today, target the country's vital oil and banking sectors. And analysts agree that they will inflict severe damage on the Iranian economy, despite the Iranians expertise' in circumventing previous sanctions.

Nor is it any exaggeration to say that the region's countries are totally involved in the results of the new chapter in this confrontation. For Tehran is deeply implicated in the region's conflicts. For decades now, it has been managing a large-scale program that seeks to overturn the region's previous balances and traditional roles.

On the eve of this new chapter, the exchanged messages were frank and heated. President Trump clearly stated, 'Our objective is to force the regime into a clear choice: Either abandon its destructive behavior or continue down the path toward economic disaster.' And he urged the regime 'to abandon its nuclear ambitions, change its destructive behavior, respect the rights of its people and return in good faith to the negotiating table.' So, via numerous statements from its senior members, the U.S. administration has set the main features of its policy, confirming that its aim is to change Iran's behavior and not its regime, and that the door is open for Tehran to return to the negotiating table if is serious about reconsidering its behavior and ambitions.

And the messages were also clear from the other side of the divide. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran and reminded everyone of what happened on November 4th 1979, when demonstrators attacked and stormed the U.S. embassy. Angry students held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The aim was to humiliate the 'Great Satan' and give the impression that the U.S. itself had been driven into a small cage, just like its embassy's hostages.

The slogan that resounded most loudly that day was 'Death to America.' And it has been repeated many times over the past decades. But it is clear is that America has not died, and proof is provided by the fact that it is launching a new round of unprecedented sanctions on the Iranian regime today. And the Revolutionary Guard's commanders have appeared in the context of their mobilization to confront the new phase, stressing their determination to hold their ground, while supreme leader Ali Khamene'i intervened to announce that Trump has 'brought shame to what remains of the U.S. and liberal democracy's standing.'

Before being elected president, Trump had said that the nuclear deal with Iran was a 'disaster' because it gave the impression that Tehran was well-behaved although it had not changed its behavior. He said that the agreement allowed Tehran to use its financial and diplomatic gains in pursuit of its missile program and its policy of undermining the stability of [Arab] regimes and altering the identity of [Arab] cities.

There were those who believed that Trump was merely threatening to withdraw from the agreement, but that he would not carry it out, especially since the other signatories had publicly opposed his step. But this is Trump we are dealing with: It is difficult to predict how far he may be ready to go, in one direction or another.

The new chapter of U.S. sanctions comes at a time when the difficulties that bedevil the Iranian economy are evident. The past few months have sent clear signals such as the fall in the Iranian Rial's value and the rise in the rate of inflation and unemployment. The itinerant Iranian protests were an expression of popular anger, as manifested in the truck-drivers and teachers' strikes. And to this we should add the ordinary Iranian citizen's sense that they must prepare for more difficult days ahead, forcing them to tighten their belt more than ever before.

On the other hand, the Iranian authorities do not have many other options. They will clearly try to elicit a stronger and clearer European position; but nothing suggests that Europe can play an exceptional role in this regard. The 'financial mechanism' [to avoid U.S. sanctions] that has been spoken of will not take effect for months and may have only limited results. The leading European companies prefer safety and it would be difficult for them to prefer the Iranian market if that entails losing their American markets. Moreover, Europe is not in the best of its days. The UK is persisting with its divorce measures, and the rebellion against the EU's spirit continues to spread. Angela Merkel does not want to seek a new term, and there are some who expect Germany to suffer a degree of political instability.

Iran is wagering on the time factor. And it may be also be wagering on the end of Trump's term in office. Equally, it is wagering on certain European voices that believe that sanctions harm people but do not harm these kinds of regimes, and that Iran's reformist current will be the main victim of any new sanctions, which the regime will portray as a blockade imposed on the country and not on its political regime.

In light of the North Korean precedent, Trump dreams that painful sanctions will ultimately convince Iran to return to the negotiating table, but ready to change its behavior this time around. We will have to wait to find out if Iran will confine itself to resisting the sanctions inside its borders, or whether it will use its regional cards in one country or another – and if its reactions will go so far as to harass U.S. troops in the region directly or by proxy, or whether it will tamper with the security of naval straits and passageways.

"A new chapter is beginning. The sanctions' winds are blowing on the Iranian economy. And when the weather gets turbulent, we must fasten our safety belts," concludes Charbel.

End…

 

SECOND INSTALLMENT IMPLEMENTATION: "The second installment of U.S. sanctions on Iran has entered the phase of implementation, specifically targeting its two strategic sectors, energy and banking" writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Washington's original wager was on cutting Iran's oil exports down to 'zero' and severing its relations with the international banking system (SWIFT). But there are serious doubts about its ability to achieve these aims; in fact, some people believe that it is more likely to return to negotiating table with Iran from a much lower point than that suggested by [U.S. Secretary of State] Mike Pompeo's twelve demands.

As the first 'exemptions' that Washington has allowed eight countries were announced, four have been revealed – Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and India. And this has immediately confirmed that it is impossible to implement a 'zero exports' policy. After all, these four exempted countries alone consume half of Iran's crude oil exports. And when the identity of the other four countries is revealed, the proportion of exported oil will rise, possibly significantly.

Moreover, because replacing Iranian oil does not seem easily achievable for the oil-producing and exporting countries, the price of crude oil is expected to rise notably in the coming phase, which means that Iran will compensate for any reduction in its income as a result of the U.S. ban on its exports via these high prices. Consequently, Tehran will be able to maintain a 'reasonable' level of oil returns.

Furthermore, if Europe succeeds in honoring its commitments by creating a 'new mechanism' that protects those of its companies that want do business with the Iranian market, Tehran would ensure its trade exchanges with the most important international centers outside the U.S., such as Russia, China, India, the BRIC countries, Turkey, and the EU.

Tehran is well known to have escaped the clutch of previous strict and comprehensive international and global sanctions, in which most of the abovementioned parties took part. Is it likely to submit to the new sanctions in the coming days, when most of the world's countries have no intention of complying with the American demands?

As for using the dollar as the currency for Iran's trade exchanges and its exclusion from the 'SWIFT' system, which it never joined to begin with, this is a different story; one whose medium-term effects on Washington may be even worse than its effects on Tehran. For the Trump administration's excessive imposition of sanctions on a large number of countries around the world – in effect two billion of the globe's inhabitants – is driving these countries to seek alternative and parallel systems to 'SWIFT' and the U.S. dollar as the currency for international trade. Iran would be the main beneficiary of such a new system, and many countries are ready to continue trading with Tehran using local currencies or hard currencies other than the U.S. dollar.

Furthermore, Iran is not a party that can be easily broken or uprooted from the region, or whose role in many of the region's conflicts can be ended. It has built many 'mansions' inside Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine over the past four decades. It is unimaginable that any of these countries' open-ended crises can find a final resolution without Tehran's presence at the negotiating table in some form or another. Indeed, Washington's regional cards are neither more numerous nor significantly stronger than Tehran's. Experience has demonstrated Iran's success in winning its wagers on its allies in more than one arena, unlike Washington, which has often displayed little staying power in managing these crises or trying to resolve them.

For these reasons, the Trump administration has continued to issue one invitation after another to Tehran to join a new round of negotiations over its nuclear and missile programs and regional influence. And, in fact, despite the deafening din of the confrontation between them, many well-informed sources speak of direct and indirect negotiations mediated by various parties – one of which is Oman – in order to contain the situation and prevent a slide towards the abyss of a confrontation whose outcome is unknown, possibly leading to new understandings over the abovementioned issues.

The sanctions will not break Tehran's back. They will not compel it to raise the white flag of surrender and accept Pompeo's preconditions, which are just a variation of Netanyahu's terms. But it is also naïve to believe that Iran will be unaffected by these harsh sanctions, or to think that it has not adopted sufficient measures to avert severe damage to its economy and its citizens' prosperity. And this means that the confrontation and the arm-twisting game between the two sides may last for a long time to come.

"In fact, Trump may leave the White House before Tehran screams out in pain or collapses to its knees and begs for the U.S.'s forgiveness," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

TODAY IS UNLIKE TOMORROW: "The situation in Iran tomorrow will be unlike before," writes Monday's editorial in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

Tehran is facing a new form of sanctions that may be the strongest and harshest so far. They will leave a clear imprint on the Iranians' life and on the behavior of the regime that is in charge of Iran's rash policies that have produced these sorts of sanctions.

These are unprecedented financial, oil, and economic sanctions that include target specific persons as well as political and military institutions and bodies and oil sectors. And Tehran will be unable to evade their effects because they will affect the countries and foreign companies that have investments in Iran and that will be unable to bypass these sanctions.

Tehran is dismissing the sanctions. Its leaders repeat that they can defeat them, just as they have defeated earlier sanctions. But experts confirm the situation in Iran will be catastrophic in the long- and medium-term. It will lead to social and economic crises that will not be easy to confront, especially since oil exports– the mainstay of the Iranian economy – will shrink severely and in a manner that will affect the country's entire economic situation. The fact that certain countries will not comply with the sanctions and have been exempted from them, or are trying to circumvent them, will not be sufficient to provide the requirements of development or satisfy the Iranians' daily livelihood demands. And this may produce stronger and more violent popular protests than those Iran's cities have witnessed over the past few months.

Iran would not have had to suffer these and other sanctions had its leaders been sufficiently wise and realized that playing with fire may burn them, or that their interventions in neighboring countries would confront them and the Iranian people with disaster. Anyway, these leaders have brought this upon themselves and the people they claim to represent.

As of today, Iran is entering a new phase as it faces the sanctions' guillotine. This was inevitable after the regime's rash behavior reached a point that was impossible to ignore, and after its schemes for imposing Iranian hegemony and control became clear to everyone, and after Iran's extensions began to threaten the region's countries and their Arab character, and after its expenditure on armament and the production of missiles of various sizes and ranges reached levels that gave rise to suspicions regarding Tehran's aims and objectives. Meanwhile, the Iranian leadership has been depriving its people of their right to their monies, which have been squandered on armament and backing regional groups that area loyal to it and that operate to promote its aims.

The Tehran regime has driven the Iranian people into a bottleneck against its people's will. It is responsible for the blockade and Iran's isolation from the world, and for leaving the Iranian people hostage to the sanctions and the tragedies and catastrophes that will unfold in the form of hunger, deprivation, and misery.

"But the Iranian people, who have been living under the mullahs' regime which has deprived them of their freedom and dignity for forty years, will not stand by with folded arms as they see themselves hanging from the sanctions' gallows against their will," concludes the daily.

End…

 

LENIENT-SOUNDING BOLTON: "One day before the second installment of U.S. sanctions on Iran took effect, and contrary to previous American threats that Washington was determined to totally strangle Iran, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton made a lenient-sounding declaration, saying that Washington does not wish to harm its friends and allies, and realizes that a number of countries that are geographically close to Iran cannot stop buying its oil," notes Mustafa as-Sa'id in the authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

It is as if Bolton were paving the way for the U.S.'s failure to convince most of the countries that purchase Iranian oil to join the sanctions, but wanted to present this as being up to the U.S. to decide rather than a rebellion and rejection of its policies. As a result, he gave the countries allied with or close to Iran permission not to take part in the oil embargo.

But Bolton is fully aware that the U.S. has done everything possible to convince each of these countries to take part in the embargo, either by threatening them or by offering them incentives, all to no avail. The EU, India, Pakistan, and South Korea have all insisted on continuing to import oil from Iran. For their part, China and Russia will lend Iran a helping hand in marketing its oil and overcoming the sanctions. Russia has announced that it will sell Iranian oil on its stock exchange, while China plans to increase its imports of Iranian oil. All of which means that the U.S. sanctions will have paltry results.

Iran will not submit to the American demands regarding the development of ballistic missiles or amend its policies because it believes that the U.S. only understands the language of power. Moreover, it has already been subjected to comprehensive sanctions that lasted for almost 40 years, and it will not be severely damaged if it withstands sanctions for a few more years, especially since Trump is facing domestic problems and opinion polls predict that the Democratic Party will win the mid-term elections. And the Democrats are opposed to the U.S.'s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran. Therefore, the incoming U.S. Congress may obstruct Trump's policies, even if it does not manage to impeach him.

The worrisome thing for the Trump administration is that it will be forced to escalate its clash with Tehran or lose much of its prestige after it its economic war on Iran fails to produce any tangible results. But it will not find new means of pressure, having already consumed all such means. In fact, Iran's allies in Yemen will benefit from the growing pressure from public opinion in the U.S., France, and Britain to end a war that is threatening millions with starvation or lethal epidemics with growing numbers of civilian victims of a conflict that is about to enter its fourth year with no prospect of victory. The result will be that Iran will achieve greater influence in a region that is of extreme importance for international navigation.

Meanwhile, all this is happening against the background of the PMU's (largely Shiite Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units') growing military activity, reports that Syrian military formations are being trained in waging guerilla warfare [against U.S. troops in Syria], growing Israeli concern at its inability to resume its air raids in Syria after Russia has provided the Syrian army with S-300 missile systems, the Russian president's refusal to meet with Binyamin Netanyahu, and an end to contacts between the Russian and Israeli defense ministries.

Bolton has threatened the EU countries that are ruining the attempt to strangle the Iranian economy to impose sanctions on the international 'SWIFT' system that links and coordinates transactions between banks. This is an extremely dangerous card that could damage the international banking system, which is largely dominated by the U.S., and it may harm American banks before anyone else.

All this means that Washington has limited options, especially since military action has been ruled out from the very start because it would expose the U.S. presence in the region to serious threats. The U.S. is thus more likely to confine itself to media and political pressure while persisting with the sanctions and claiming that it has achieved many gains and succeeded in weakening Iran, shifting the burden to the region's states and demanding that they should do what is expected of them.

The Trump administration's policies enjoy only a little popularity, whether in the U.S. or among its European allies. But the administration now faces a test of how serious and able it is when it confronts a shrewd and difficult opponent that has managed to benefit more from the U.S.'s mistakes than from its own capabilities. For Iran has emerged the winner from every regional confrontation that the U.S. has engaged in, and today more than at any previous time, it is backed by strong international allies, with Russia and China at their forefront.

"It is as if Iran were the spearhead in a war that will only end either by surrendering to unilateral American hegemony over the world, or by inaugurating a new multi-polar world order base," concludes Sa'id.

Ends…

 

2-A pointless attack

 

The latest Saudi/Emirati assault on the Houthi-held port of Hodeida is desperate attempt to seek some advantage before the war is forced to an end, says Luqman al-'Abdullah in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The recent escalation represented by the attack on the Yemeni Port of Hodeida comes against the background of statements by U.S. officials calling for an end to the Yemeni war, notes a Yemeni commentator in a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily. The attack clearly represents a last-ditch attempt by the Saudi/Emirati-led coalition to achieve gains before serious political negotiations begin.

 

NO RATIONALE: "The current attack on the Port of Hodeida can only be described as pointless, with no political or battlefield rationale," writes Luqman al-'Abdullah in Monday's left-leaning pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

This is not only because of the recent American position calling for an end to the war on Yemen, but also because of the formidable defensive line that the [pro-Houthi] Yemeni army and the Popular Committees have set up at the city's environs.

The latest attacks come after more than four months of repeated failures, demonstrating that military operations have ran their course and proven to be ineffective as a means of attaining any achievements. The motive behind the current operations is to exploit the extra time before political negotiations begin, because both Riyadh and Abu-Dhabi feel the need to compensate for their failure at every level by trying to capture advanced positions on Yemen's western coastline, especially the Port of Hodeida, thereby controlling the main gateway for delivering supplies to three-quarters of the Yemeni people living in the country's North and center. They also hope to deprive the [Houthi] Ansarullah of a naval position that overlooks the Red Sea.

It would appear that concern that U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis's call for a form of [Yemeni] self-rule may become the 'terms of reference' for a political settlement lies at the background of this effort. This would be tantamount to recognizing the Ansarullah's presence and power and allowing it to occupy a geo-political position in the region.

But the motives for the latest attacks on Hodeida are not confined to the [Saudi-led] coalition's interests. They are a mix between Riyadh and Abu-Dhabi's genuine fears of being defeated by the Ansarullah and the resounding effect that would have on them, and domestic considerations having to do with the local Yemeni forces that are loyal to the coalition who fear that a political settlement will come at the expense of their presence and role, after these have been revived by their role in the war economy over the past years.

The U.S. call for ending the war on Yemen – assuming it is serious – undoubtedly represents an admission of the equation that has been imposed by the Yemeni people's legendary steadfastness. This will be followed by a long and difficult political negotiating track that aims to uphold that equation. And this, in turn, calls for staying power and political acumen since the coming negotiations will include maneuvers and attempts at deception, as well as incentives regarding reconstruction and alleviating the humanitarian situation.

Attempts will be made to make reconstruction and improvement of the humanitarian situation contingent on [Houthi] political concessions in the hope of denuding the power equation of its content and achieving by politics what the aggression has failed to achieve by war. In other words, the political confrontation will be no less ferocious and brutal than the military battles.

The coming days and weeks will reveal how serious the American position is, and whether it was merely in temporary compliance with public pressures, especially after the war on Yemen has become part of the U.S. electoral calculations, forcing the Trump administration to deal with it in a manner that is different than before. Alternatively, the U.S.'s position may be an expression of Washington's realization of the scale of the predicament in which its ally – Saudi Arabia – has implicated itself, but without succeeding in finding an exit strategy.

If the latter explanation proves to be correct, it seems to have been motivated by journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder that has exposed the Saudi regime's brittle nature and has highlighted the fact that Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's 'boat' is overloaded in a manner that is almost drowning his regime and is taking U.S. and Israeli interests towards an unknown fate.

In light of this, Washington finds itself forced to reduce the weight in the 'boat' by helping the Kingdom find a strategy to disengage from regional crises and direct its efforts towards consolidating domestic Saudi stability, employing what remains of its foreign resources in the service of the U.S./Israeli project, especially in terms of the [U.S.-sponsored Palestine/Israel] 'deal of the century' and the sanctions on Iran.

Be that as it may, what appears to be certain is that Washington has woken up to a humanitarian crisis whose images have been filling the media for the past three years. The image of the starving little girl Amal and the subsequent announcement of her death two days later was not one of a kind. The UN has ensured that world hears that Yemen is facing the worst humanitarian crisis ever. The UN's committee of experts declared last September that the coalition was responsible for most of the civilian victims.

"Yet the U.S. administration did not bat an eyelid at the time. Instead, after absolving themselves of any responsibility for these violations, American officials emerged repeatedly to renew their full support for the Saudi and Emirati regimes and confirm their commitment to participating in the war by providing intelligence, logistical, and technical aid, and providing the coalition's warplanes with air-to-air refueling, as well as unlimited political protection," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 02.11.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The view of military intelligence

 

Gaza protest leaders are calling for calmer border demonstrations Friday to give a chance to efforts to reach a long-term truce with Israel after months of deadly unrest, a source in the organizing committee said. Previous such hopes for a deal have been dashed since protests and clashes along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip began on March 30 and tensions in the region remain high. It was not clear if demonstrators would heed calls for calm. "Friday's events will be quiet," an official from the committee in charge of organizing the marches told AFP Thursday. Egypt and UN officials have been engaged in indirect talks between Hamas and Israel. An Egyptian delegation was in Gaza on Thursday for further discussions, meeting with leaders of different factions.

The protest organizing committee is technically independent from Hamas, but includes other groups, as well as Islamic Jihad. The official said the agreement to calm the border Friday "will give an opportunity for the success of Egyptian efforts to achieve calm and lift the siege." Protests would still go ahead, but demonstrators would be encouraged not to approach the fence too closely, burn tires or send balloons equipped with incendiary devices across the border. In a statement after a meeting of their leaders on Thursday, Hamas and Islamic Jihad said the marches would continue, albeit without violence. Both groups praised Egyptian and UN efforts to broker a deal. A separate statement by Islamic Jihad threatened that it would use a "new tactic," along the border, without providing details. After the meeting, a member of the organizing committee said the Egyptian delegation would attend Friday's protests. "The Egyptian security delegation will visit one of the return march sites tomorrow," journalists were told. A leader of Islamic Jihad told Haaretz that the Egyptians had agreed to work to curb any Israeli response to the protests over the next three weeks. He said the protests could be called off after that period if Israel keeps to its commitment to ease a blockade on the Strip.

Elsewhere, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been seeking to renew political ties with the Palestinian Authority in recent months, and for the purpose dispatched the head of the Shin Bet security agency to offer PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas an economic incentive package, Hadashot news reported Thursday. During their meeting in Ramallah, Nadav Argaman told 'Abbas that Israel was prepared to set up a joint industrial area and open up gas production off the Gaza coast, according to the network, which said 'Abbas rebuffed both offers. The report did not specify when the meeting took place, but said it came amid a series of meetings Argaman held with senior PA officials in recent months in which he stressed the Palestinian economy would benefit from renewed contact with Israeli leaders. Netanyahu's efforts to reestablish ties with the PA came following warnings of growing instability in the West Bank and Gaza from IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot.

Meanwhile, Egyptian negotiators have proposed a three-year agreement to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, Army Radio reported on Thursday. The proposed agreement would be enacted in stages. The PA would first take responsibility for civil services and the government ministries in the Gaza Strip that are now under Hamas control. In its second phase the PA would be in control of the police and the border crossings. If all went well for three years, Hamas' military wing Ezz-el-Din al-Qassam would be placed under PA control as well. Separately, elections would be held for a new Palestinian parliament and a new constitution would be drawn up, according to Army Radio. The plan was designed by Egyptian General Ahmad Abd al-Khaliq, who has made four trips to Gaza and the West Bank in the past two weeks to secure agreements for the plan. He has also met with senior Israelis in the Defense Ministry. The Egyptian plan includes detailed timetables and formulas for each stage. Hamas is prepared to consider the plan but is waiting for a response from PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas who in the past has rejected any plan that did not immediately place the security services under his control. The Palestinian News and Information Agency, WAFA, said that 'Abbas is expected to meet Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi in Sharm el-Sheikh on Friday. It's 'Abbas' first meeting with Sissi in Egypt in ten months.

On the Northern front, Israel has reportedly sent a message to the Lebanese government via Paris demanding that it act against Hezbollah's rocket factories in the country, saying if Lebanon refused to do so, Israel could take military action. The message was delivered by Israel's deputy national security adviser Eitan Ben-David to Orléan la-Chevalier, an adviser to French President Emmanuel Macron, during his visit to Jerusalem on Monday, according to Channel 10 news. "The Lebanese government must be careful when it comes to Hezbollah's rocket factories. If the issue is not dealt with through diplomatic means by the Lebanese government, Israel will act on its own," the message that cited unnamed "Western diplomatic sources" read. Ben-David asked that la-Chevalier deliver the message to Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'ad al-Hariri. France has close longstanding ties with Lebanon, and is close to Hariri. Ben-David said Israel would be patient, and was willing to wait to see if Lebanon took steps against the factories, but said it would not allow their construction to continue undisturbed.

In other news, Brazil's president-elect Jair Bolsonaro confirmed on Twitter Thursday that he intends to move his country's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. "As previously stated during our campaign, we intend to transfer the Brazilian Embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem," Bolsonaro wrote. "Israel is a sovereign state and we shall duly respect that." Bolsonaro's public statement confirmed his comments to Israel Hayom on Thursday. "When I was asked during the campaign if I would do it when I became president, I said, 'Yes, the one who decides where the capital of Israel is, is you, not other nations,'" he told the paper.

In regional news, Prime Minister Netanyahu asked senior officials in the Trump White House to continue supporting Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Washington Post reported on Thursday. Citing U.S. officials, the report stated that Netanyahu described the Crown Prince as a "strategic ally". The report said that a similar message was conveyed to the White House by Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi. There have been reports in recent months of an increase in Israeli-Saudi intelligence cooperation. In a new sign of growing ties, the kingdom's Crown Prince hosted a delegation of Evangelical Christians on Thursday in Riyadh led by a prominent pro-Israel advocate, Joel C. Rosenberg, an author and Evangelical activist who lives in Israel. Other participants included Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem.

Finally, business ties between Israel and China took another step forward as several high-level bilateral collaboration agreements were signed at the fourth annual China Yunnan-Israel Innovation Cooperation Forum on Thursday.
One week after the business-oriented visit of Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan, a high-level business delegation from China's Southwestern Yunnan province including Vice Governor Zong Guoying arrived in the country to deepen relations with Israel's innovation scene. Zong said that in order to implement collaboration plans signed by Wang and Prime Minister Netanyahu last week, Yunnan would focus on deepening cooperation in the fields of technology, trade and agriculture. Among the agreements concluded at the forum, Yunnan Investment Holdings Group (YIG), which has assets worth approximately $40 billion, inked deals with Israel Chemicals and leading IT company, Aman Group.

 

 

MONEY TIME FOR ISRAEL ON ALL FRONTS: Nahum Barnea in Yedioth Ahronoth interviews Brigadier Dror Shalom, head of the research division in IDF military intelligence, about the day after Abu Mazin, Gaza, Iran and Syria.

"Q: Are we witnessing Abu Mazin's swan song? What awaits us after him?

A: I will say a few things that are uncomfortable for some people. There are two big issues before us – Iran and the Palestinians. Now is the money time. The main arena is Iran and its affiliates. There is a tremendous opportunity to put pressure on Iran in a full-court press, an opportunity that is beginning to materialize. Regarding the Palestinians, I am very cautious. What I will say will not be a recommendation, will not be a political opinion. I will make a strategic assessment. We voice our assessments out of complete freedom, within and outside Military Intelligence, even when our opinions are not popular.

Gaza First. Operation Protective Edge created relative quiet for a while. Gaza is a real swamp – a serious humanitarian problem, a desperate public. We calculated in real time that the humanitarian problem would pose a challenge to Hamas, and that they would lay their public on our shoulders. They tried to bring into Gaza tools that improve their rocket's performance. The attempt failed. What did they do? Went to the fence. We are on the brink of escalation. Our challenge is to raise the heads of the residents above the sewage water. The collapse of Hamas is not a solution. If Hamas collapses, who will rule Gaza, Polli Mordechai?

The second challenge is Judea and Samaria. There is relative calm there. We have maintained the fabric of life. We have succeeded in stopping the lone-wolf terror – inter alia because we have prevented collective punishment, despite the calls to use collective punishment. But there is also despair and frustration there, a society in depression. Two ideas have accompanied them since 1967 - the armed struggle and the accords. As far as they are concerned, they both failed.

After Abu Mazin there will be changes. The security forces may reduce their cooperation with the IDF. That is a serious problem. Abu Mazin sees a dead end everywhere, in every way. In his desperation he is becoming more and more oppositional. He is surrounded by people who do not want to commit suicide - the Palestinian Authority is the basis of their existence. The PA will not disappear, but I do not believe that whoever replaces Abu Mazin will be more pragmatic than him, and will stick to the coordination with Israel like him. The challenge is great.

Q: This Sunday, the new sanctions that Trump imposed on Iran will be activated. What do you think will happen after that?

A: The sanctions create a great drama in Iran. They will worsen the economic situation. Iran is currently at a low point. With the exception of Hezbollah, she does not have many successes. The Khomeini revolution has failed. External pressure can lead to a regime change or a change in its policy. Iran can break away - renew the nuclear project. That means, a year before they reach fissile material, two years to the bomb. I believe that the probability for that is low. They are in a waiting position right now, looking for all sorts of solutions that will enable them to bypass the sanctions. But they are unsuccessful. I believe that the Russians will not supply them with a meaningful solution either, nor will Western Europe. The Europeans are dependent on the United States.

Q: What does that mean for intelligence?

A: It means that we need to pay renewed attention to everything that happens in the nuclear project, to see where they are cutting corners, where they are violating the agreement, and what they are aiming for.

Q: What are the other options?

A: They can seek a new nuclear agreement, and they can reach a collapse of the regime. That is the result John Bolton, the American national security adviser, is striving for - to kill them softly. Iranian policy is determined by a game between three forces – Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani, who is seeking a confrontation; President Hassan Rowhani, who shares the same vision but believes in a pragmatic approach; and Khamene'i, the Supreme Leader, who vacillates between the two and is procrastinating.

Q: In September the Syrians downed the Russian plane. Since then, the Russians have imposed heavy restrictions on the IDF's activity against Iranian presence in Syria. Are the Iranians taking advantage of the opportunity and moving in?

A: No. The good news is that the Iranian entrenchment in Syria is being stopped. The reason is decisions made in Tehran. The bad news is that the Iranians are bringing into Syria capabilities that are designed for a military confrontation. Suleimani is not giving in. He views Syria as a pouncing-point into Israel. I estimate there will be an intensification in the friction between us and them.

The Russian presence is a dramatic change. We have to deal with them cautiously. Israel is operating in Syria and will act in the future as much as necessary, but it cannot ignore Russian interests. The Russians have an interest that the Iranians will not be in Syria. They want quiet, and they know that when the Iranians are there, facing Israel, there will be no quiet. They fully understand the potential for escalation.

Q: The Russians are far from being our friends. They have no respect for the interests of others. Their reaction to a minor operation of ours in Syria was severe.

A: In the IDF no one is confused about the Russians.

Q: The problem starts with the Americans. The Trump administration gave up on being involved in determining the fate of Syria.

A: I do not want to talk about the Americans. I prefer to say something general about the Western world. The West has come to the conclusion that over-investment in the Middle East does not bear fruit.

Q: What will Syria look like in the future?

A: There is a struggle over the future of Syria. The rebels are still in Idlib. The struggle there is not over. There are ISIS pockets of resistance, and Kurdish activity. Controlling Syria's border crossings is a major challenge. Perhaps in the next war the Syrian space will be more active against us than it was in past wars.

Q: Will the Iranians take Jordan?

A: What happens in Iraq will affect the fate of Jordan. Both America and Iran are satisfied with the situation in Iraq. This worries me. Jordan is dealing with the spread of Iran and leakage from ISIS. She has severe economic problems.

Q: Why did King 'Abdullah decide not to extend the lease that enabled Israel to cultivate thousands of dunams in Naharayim and the Arava River? Was it the street pressure?

A: Mainly because of street pressure.

Q: Israel made a surprised face. No one knew, not even the prime minister. The question is where was military intelligence? Did you not know?

A: Military Intelligence was in the right place. In this case, no special intelligence effort was required - it was in the newspapers in Jordan. We knew and reported.

Q: So why did everyone say they were surprised?

A: Sometimes that is what they decide to say."

Ends…

 

CHANGING THE FORMULA: Amos Gilboa in Maariv affirms no war is needed. Israel's strategic goal should be returning to the situation that existed for four years since Operation Protective Edge until March 2018, with some humanitarian relief.

"This is the first time in the history of the State of Israel that its government is faced with a security problem that it has difficulty dealing with. For seven months now, a terrorist organization has been creating a new security situation for Israel on its Southern border, and the state is abandoning tens of thousands of its citizens and thousands of dunams of its land to a deliberate and orchestrated terrorist initiative. What are the main characteristics of Israel's shameful confrontation with Hamas?

First, since the first moment on March 30, Hamas has been the initiator. It is the one being constantly original and surprising with the various effective methods of terrorism it is coming up with. It is the one dictating the rules of the game to the IDF and the population of the Gaza envelope. It is the one setting up special units in order to drive IDF soldiers and our civilian population crazy. More importantly; it is succeeding in harassing us, and liking it. Why not continue?

Second, the IDF has so far successfully prevented the border fence from being breached, sustaining only one casualty, and has destroyed many tunnels. But it is solely defensive and responsive. This is an IDF that does not initiate, does not surprise; only responds, in a lackluster manner, while ensuring that Hamas members are not killed in retaliation attacks. These are reactions that do not detract from Hamas' desire to continue with its various initiatives. In other words, Israel refrains from exacting a painful price from Hamas for its terrorist activities.

Third, in the past week a new factor has come into contention in the Gaza Strip: Iran via Islamic Jihad, which is its ward, and has a new leader based in Lebanon. The Iranian signal to Israel: We can cause you problems from Gaza as well.

What is behind this limp Israeli policy? The almost official explanation is that utmost restraint must be exercised in order to exhaust the political process aimed at reaching an understanding with Hamas on an arrangement that will bring quiet and prevent a humanitarian collapse in the Gaza Strip. Everything must be done to avoid a war at the end of which we will have to remain in the Gaza Strip after its occupation. This is because no political entity will be willing to take Gaza off our hands. In general, the greatest threat is from the North, and we must not devote ourselves to this negligible 'bothersome' business in the South.

This perception is mistaken and I am not referring to the opposition's delusional concept, according to which the IDF must destroy Hamas, hand over the Gaza Strip to Abu Mazin and start a political process. The strategic goal of the State of Israel should be a return to the situation that existed for four years from Protective Edge until March 2018, with additional humanitarian relief. In the present policy, Israel will not achieve this. Diplomacy or defensive and reactionary moves alone will not cause Hamas to agree to such an arrangement.

There is no need for war, no need to conquer the Gaza Strip, no need to destroy Hamas. We must change the formula and exact a painful price from Hamas – from commanders on all levels, fighters, expensive military assets – by means of initiative, not response. The IDF should initiate and surprise; not Hamas. Only in this way perhaps it will be possible to reach a long-term arrangement that will meet our strategic objectives.

My friend Professor Hovev Telpaz has surmised that Netanyahu's extreme restraint stems from the desire not to make trouble for President Trump before the U.S. Midterms on November 6. This is indeed restraint of the highest strategic order. We shall wait until November 7 and see."

Ends…

 

TO OMAN WITHOUT CONCESSIONS: Ariel Kahana in Israel Hayom argues that Netanyahu's trip to Oman was made possible through mutual interests – and with no need for a preliminary political agreement that would ease the atmosphere and placate the Palestinians. Now political sources claim they are parleying about conducting similar visits to additional Arab countries.

"On Monday of this week, Prime Minister Netanyahu convened dozens of journalists for a briefing on a subject that as per usual was quite quickly swallowed up in the news whirlwind of our lives - the visit to the Persian Gulf Sultanate of Oman. Whether it is because the visit was conducted on Friday, or because it was not preceded by an impressive withdrawal agreement, the breakthrough visit garnered almost no attention, even though it is certainly worth dwelling upon.

The first and only visit so far to Oman was Yitzhak Rabin's in 1994. But then the background conditions were completely different. Rabin signed the Oslo Accords, and the sweeping concessions included in it ostensibly justified the counter-gesture by Sultan Qaboos of receiving him in the capital Muscat. This time, as Netanyahu himself explained, there is no deal of visits in return for concessions. Oman, and it is not alone, is snuggling up to Israel because of 'interests that stand in their own right', as Netanyahu put it.

What are these interests? The common fear of Iran's aggression and the terror of ISIS and the like, Israeli knowledge and experience regarding desertification and water management, technological innovations in general and in agriculture in particular, and so on. In other words, there will be no more Israeli withdrawals from the territories as a means of rapprochement, only the mutual needs of Jews and Arabs from each other, regardless of the Palestinian issue.

Abu Mazin and his clan are losing their grip on the key that has allowed them for so long to prevent an entente between Israel and the Arab states. The Palestinian refusal to accept any proposal is also causing the Arab states to distance themselves from the Palestinians and move closer, very gradually, to Israel. They do it because it is worth their while, and regardless of whether we withdraw from territories in Judea and Samaria.

The contacts with the Middle Eastern sultanate began about a year and a half ago. Oman's foreign minister, Yusuf bin Allawi bin 'Abdullah, was the main axis in the process. He spoke on the phone and held several meetings with the prime minister. Most of the meetings took place during Netanyahu's travels abroad, but not only there. Netanyahu also spoke on the phone with Sultan Qaboos during the period. Last February, as part of what was then defined as a 'visit by Foreign Minister Ben Allawi to the Palestinian Authority,' he went up to Temple Mount with Israeli approval. If the man arrived in Jerusalem, he did not refrain from meetings with Israelis in the western part of the city.

At first, a multi-participant meeting was held with senior officials from both countries in attendance, followed by a private meeting between Netanyahu and Sultan Qaboos. Later, the prime minister also met with the foreign minister of Oman. Members of the entourage, who have already seen a palace or two in their lifetime, testified that Qaboos' was extraordinary and also in especially good taste.

After the political talks, an authentic musical event was held for Netanyahu. A political source who was present at the event said that the prime minister 'met a very rich musical world with African, Indian, and Persian influences. This is a less familiar style of music, which penetrates the heart and touches the soul'. Later on, the delegations dined at a meal that began at 3 AM, and included plenty of dishes of all kinds, including fish for kosher eaters. The banquet went on until 6:30 in the morning, with classical music playing in the background, according to the personal choice of the 78-year-old sultan. Qaboos is not just another Arab dictator, but a man who was educated at Oxford, and in his youth embarked on a four-year journey to learn about different cultures around the world. Netanyahu, for his part, admired the elderly and sick ruler's soul of an artist as well as his political wisdom. According to sources close to him, the prime minister even changed his mind on some issues following the talks with Qaboos.

Oman is not the only one seeking rapprochement with Israel. One might say that Netanyahu himself has made visits to other Arab countries, that have not been revealed - and that he is not the only Israeli to do so. To get an idea of what is going on under the table, we must look at what is happening above it. Saudi Arabia speaks positively of Israel and has made historical precedent by allowing commercial flights destined for Israel to fly over its land. The clues and reports regarding coordination of interests and intelligence relations are increasing. Israel is conducting secret contacts similar to those that existed with Oman prior to the visit, with the overwhelming majority of Arab states. The process is taking place quietly, carefully, step by step, and without pressure from Israel."

Ends…

 

THE DEAL WITH JORDAN: Arnon Segal in Makor Rishon claims that in order to salvage the lands leased from Jordan in Tzofar and Naharayim and the cooling relations with King 'Abdullah, the Israeli government may grant the Jordanians what they really crave – increased control on Temple Mount.

"In the coming year, following frenzied contacts at the palace in Amman by some emissary appointed by the prime minister, a laconic announcement to the press will be issued, concerning the continuation of the Israeli lease in the Naharayim region and the Tzofar enclave in the Arava. A general sigh of relief will be heard. By the same token, the benefit to King 'Abdullah for permitting in his grace the preservation of the peace agreement - even on the lowest possible flame - will not be mentioned in this future announcement. Israelis will be forced to discover what it is on their own.

Will it be another cut in the quota of skullcap wearing Jews authorized to ascend to Temple Mount? A dramatic increase in the scope of the Waqf? The construction of another mosque on the Mount or the depletion of the presence of Zionist police on it? Maybe all these together, and more? Only Netanyahu knows.

Netanyahu does not need crises such as the present one to grant the neighboring poor Kingdom generous sovereign rights over the mountain. In the fall of 2015, in order to preserve relations with 'Abdullah, he did what no Israeli prime minister had done before, when he publicly declared that Jews may only visit Temple Mount, while the right to pray there is reserved solely for Muslims. In order to maintain proper relations with the Jordanian King, a year and quarter ago the prime minister removed the metal detector on Temple Mount. Before that, he authorized the Jordanians to monitor events on the Mount by means of cameras, a move that was not implemented only because of the Palestinians, who were not enthusiastic about granting such means of control to 'Abdullah. For 'Abdullah's sake, Netanyahu has repeatedly allowed to increase up to many hundreds – record numbers hitherto never seen - the number of Waqf members who harass Jewish groups on the Mount. Four years ago, Netanyahu traveled to Amman only to grant the king his wish (which was only revealed later of course, and not in an official announcement) - restricting ascent of observant Jews to the Mount to groups of five, and forbidding members of the Knesset to ascend the mountain.

The sad truth is that as far as the Israeli prime minister is concerned, Temple Mount is mainly an available means of payment. It is not only to the Jordanians that Netanyahu generously hands out the assets of the Jewish people in the holiest place in the world. In his first term as prime minister, he allowed the Waqf, without any restrictions, to build two mosques on the Mount - in Solomon's Stables and in the double Hulda Gate ('Al-Aqsa Al-Kadima'). He did this after 1,300 years in which no new mosques were built on the Mount. Recently, the media has come up with ideas, whose source can be surmised, to bring the Saudis as well into this no-man's land, the Temple Mount. Who knows? Maybe that notion will be scrapped after the murder of Khashoggi.

In recent years, the Jordanians have watched with disdain the growing number of Jews ascending the Mount, the stubborn struggle of observant Jews for the right to pray there, the occasional waving of the State's flags there by Jewish citizens, and they are seething with anger. Naharayim and Tzofar, the gas deal and even the vital water that Israel, in its grace, pumps to Jordan, thus saving it from dying of thirst, are not as important to the Hashemite King as the status of his royal house on the Mount. In practice, those who control the compound with an iron hand are the people of Raed Salah, but even the appearance of control is more important to 'Abdullah than all the precious gifts that the State of Israel gives him. It sounds almost mystical, but what leaves the Hashemite kingdom above water, in the opinion of its own leaders, is the possession of this holy place.

Had it not been for the traditional title of 'Guardian of the Holy Places', the Hashemites would have been decapitated long ago. It is very likely that in coming years this will happen regardless, despite Israeli resuscitation efforts. Anyway, one cannot escape the question – what is in it for us? Why does Netanyahu really do this? Because he adheres to the belief – which should be put to the test once and for all – according to which rescuing the Hashemite rule and keeping it alive artificially is in Israel's interest. Our Prime Minister is an advocate of maintaining the existing order, of status quo in all matters. The cost of maintaining regular relations with this weak entity has been swelling over the years, yet Netanyahu pays it, and apparently not with a broken heart."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL WILL END UP FACING IRAN ALONE: Chuck Freilich in Haaretz writes the Trump administration's well-intentioned efforts to challenge the Iranian regime, its expansionism and nuclear ambitions are partial, unrealistic and incoherent. Israel cannot rely on them – or on a mercurial U.S. president.

"Eureka! Saudi Arabia, as the 'enlightened' international community has recently learned, is not a cuddly country. Its regime is probably the most heinous on earth, but it took the gruesome murder of one journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, to offend international sensibilities. Not the beheadings of 146 people in 2017 alone. Not the thousands of lashes meted out for such horrific transgressions as the belief in atheism. Not the women, who can now drive, but still cannot leave their hometown, or receive medical care, without the approval of their male guardian.

Nearly all other news, including the Trump administration's recent efforts to contain Iran, were drowned out by the self-righteous indignation that consumed the international community. Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh's sexual activities had a similar effect on the recent speeches by U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu on Iran in the UN. The very same Iran that is no more cuddly than Saudi Arabia, that is guilty of extreme human rights violations, and continues to pursue both regional expansionism and an unacceptable nuclear capability.

Whereas past U.S. administrations have customarily completed major policy reviews during their first half year in office, the overall contours of Donald Trump's strategy towards Iran are only now emerging. Heated rhetoric aside, Trump is actually no more avid to confront Iran militarily than his hated predecessor and has thus adopted the same policy instruments that Obama wielded until the 2015 nuclear deal – sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions. To his credit, this now includes the Basij militia, the primary instrument of brutal domestic suppression.

There are, however, two critical differences between Trump's policy and Obama's. First, the European Union and Russia are doing everything they can, this time, to undermine U.S. sanctions, admittedly with limited success so far, by establishing special trading mechanisms designed to circumvent them. Second, Trump has refrained thus far from the ultimate measure adopted by Obama, in the form of sanctions on Iranian use of the international financial clearinghouse, known as SWIFT. The international sanctions regime led by Obama proved sufficient to bring Iran to the negotiating table and to make significant compromises, but not to forgo its nuclear infrastructure or long-term nuclear aspirations. The Trump administration has yet to explain why a less comprehensive regime would now yield greater concessions.

Netanyahu believed that Obama was too quick to reach an agreement with Iran, and presumably hopes that Trump will now stick to the hardline approach longer, prior to reaching his stated goal of an improved agreement. Experience with Trump to date is not necessarily encouraging. Be that as it may, the specter of lost access to the U.S. market has proven so daunting, that the multinational corporations have already significantly cut trade ties with Iran, even before U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil, due in early November, come into effect. Iran's economy has already entered a tailspin.

A further difference between Obama and Trump, is that the former sought to engage Iran, whereas Trump appears bent on regime change, primarily through sanctions. The administration has yet to adopt regime change as its official policy, but senior officials have resorted to every possible rhetorical flourish just short of this. It has also begun an intensive campaign to delegitimize the regime, including a special report entitled 'Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran's Destructive Activities,' which sets forth all of its misdeeds in the nuclear, missile, cyber, human rights and other realms.

There is just one small, pesky, problem. 39 years after the Iranian revolution, no one has any idea how to bring about regime change, despite the intensive efforts that have been devoted to this. The administration has presumably tasked its best and brightest with a review of the issue, much as its predecessors have done, but readers would be well advised not to wait in breathless anticipation. The regime, for its part, has responded by announcing a 'resistance economy.'

The administration has also begun trying to establish a Sunni axis to contain Iran, an essential move, which was tried by its predecessors with notably little success. The differences between the Arab states that prevented effective cooperation in the past, as well as the limitations of their true capabilities, have only grown worse. Qatar is under Arab boycott, Oman maintains good relations with Iran, Egypt is preoccupied with its own domestic travails and the Saudis have now gone from being the poster child of reform, to a rogue state. One would be hard-pressed to overstate the vehemence of current anti-Saudi sentiment both in the American media and Congress.

Israel was never intended to be a part of the putative Sunni axis, but both its and the administration's hopes of containing Iran were predicated on broad, if quiet, strategic cooperation between it and Israel. The primary Saudi contribution was to have been an increase in oil output, once the U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil went into effect, designed to prevent a rise in prices that might have both hurt the international economy and undermined domestic support for the administration' policy. The international outcry following the Khashoggi affair may prove to be an unfortunate strategic turning point in the attempt to contain Iran.

The administration is also reportedly completing, belatedly, a review of its policies toward Syria, and Iran's involvement there. Under the new policy, the administration will supposedly call for political change in Syria, without making this contingent on Assad's removal, for an end to Iranian involvement in Syria, without calling for a complete severance of ties, and for as yet unspecified measures to deter Syria from using chemical weapons and hasten ISIS' destruction. The small American military contingent deployed in Syria will remain in place, to prevent Iranian territorial contiguity, and sanctions will be imposed on Iranian and Russian firms that invest in Syria's reconstruction. The U.S., for its part, will stay out of Syrian reconstruction, until the administration's conditions are met. The new policy reads like a playbill borrowed directly from Obama.

The administration continues to present Iran with a list of 12 demands, all of which are eminently desirable, but entirely unrealistic, and the lacunae in its approach remain such that it is very difficult to speak of a coherent policy. The deployment of S-300 missiles in Syria, along with President Vladimir Putin's repeated rejections of Netanyahu's requests to meet, demonstrate the limitations of Israel's Russian option.

The good news is that the importance that Iran attaches to its ties with Europe and Russia have forced it to continue adhering to the nuclear agreement, despite the U.S. withdrawal, although it is unclear for how much longer. Israel should be grateful that the nuclear agreement has enabled it to attack Iran's growing military presence in Syria repeatedly, before it has succeeded in going nuclear.

It is incumbent upon those of us who believed - and still believe - that the nuclear agreement was the best of the bad options available, to now support the administration's efforts. Only the outcome matters. Nevertheless, and as welcome as Trump's hardline approach towards Iran may be, Israel cannot rely on such a mercurial president. Indeed, the bottom line may very well prove to be that Israel will essentially stand alone against Iran, but with greater limitations on its freedom of action over Syria. Israel must, therefore, define its priorities carefully, first and foremost, preventing Iran from going nuclear at almost all costs, and only secondarily, dealing with its missile presence in Syria and with Hezbollah. To this end, it must continue building its own independent capabilities."

Ends…

 

WHY IS THE EU STILL FANTASIZING ABOUT THE IRAN DEAL?: Daniel Roth in The Jerusalem Post asks why EU politicians continue to peddle these fantasies of a revived JCPOA, and surmises the official EU response to the U.S. decision provides a strong clue.

"The European Union's bizarre insistence on seeking to resuscitate the corpse of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) reveals more about the EU mindset than about the merits of the agreement itself. With foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini manning the defibrillator, the EU Commission, Council and Parliament continue to pledge an imaginative array of mechanisms to thwart U.S. sanctions, keep the money flowing to Tehran, and shock the JCPOA back to life. According to Iranian media, the EU's latest gambit is to consider opening a Tehran office.

Six months ago, when President Trump landed the fatal blow in announcing the American withdrawal from the JCPOA, extravagant EU promises to fortify the JCPOA by shielding companies from looming U.S. sanctions made a little more sense. At that time, many big European firms contemplating Iran operations or agreements were still wavering. But today, following more than 150 confirmed European pullouts since May – including some of the biggest names in EU business like Volvo, Renault, Maersk and Siemens – there are no longer buyers for what the EU is selling. Even the French and German governments, traditionally 'the engine of European integration,' are scornful of the Brussels-based efforts.

So why do EU politicians continue to peddle these fantasies of a revivified JCPOA? The official EU response to the U.S. decision provides a strong clue. Soon after President Trump's announcement, Mogherini insisted that the JCPOA was 'a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy.' That is accurate. Whatever one's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the deal, the act of reaching agreement among eight separate and unique players after 20 months of negotiations was unarguably a monumental diplomatic triumph.

For the EU, in particular, it was a moment of exaltation. It demonstrated, even without its own armed forces, the EU's strength and value on the global stage – 'one of the few instances where the bloc could deploy its collective diplomatic weight.' It showed that the EU, distinct from its constituent country members, could walk tall among the big beasts and carve out its own world-shaping – perhaps indispensable – mediating role. In iconic photographs, the EU's '12 stars' flag was seen flying high alongside the flags of the U.S., Iran, Russia, China, France, Germany and the UK. And standing beneath the EU flag was the EU high representative – first Lady Catherine Ashton, then Mogherini – repeatedly lauded between 2013 and 2015 as the 'unlikely peacemaker between America and Iran,' playing 'arguably the most important role in world diplomacy,' who 'was front and center as European and American political leaders congratulated themselves over a historic nuclear agreement with Iran.' The Iran deal ensured that the EU went 'from zero to hero'.

But the JCPOA turned into the last significant achievement for the EU. Since that heady moment it has been zero rather than hero. No sooner had the ink dried in Vienna in July 2015, than the EU began struggling with the combined fallout from the Syrian civil war migrant crisis, explicitly anti-EU governments sweeping to power in Hungary, Poland, and Italy, and most importantly, the Brexit referendum.

Within a short 12 months, the EU had gone from JCPOA hero to Brexit zero – easily the lowest point in the EU's 67-year history, and a possible harbinger of 'Italexit,' 'Irexit,' 'Grexit,' and any number of other 'exits.' Even George Soros, one of the most prominent supporters of the EU project, acknowledged earlier in 2018 that the 'EU is mired in an existential crisis' in which 'everything that could go wrong has gone wrong.'

The EU's ongoing attempts to double down on the JCPOA make far more sense when viewed within the broader context of its own existential challenges brought upon during these last three traumatic years. Obviously, Brussels must not truly believe it can revive the deal when its companies and member-states have explicitly chosen U.S. business over the small Iranian market (which has a national GDP smaller than Washington State). But nonetheless, it simply cannot let go of a symbolically important achievement that has brought great prestige to the organization. It is therefore not surprising that the EU seeks to preserve what may be one of its final major legacies – even at the high costs of threatening the integrity of the global financial system by excluding U.S. anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism expertise and damaging the trans-Atlantic alliance (just two of the potential fallouts from the current shortsighted schemes emanating from Brussels).

Rightly, the White House has blasted Brussels for genuflecting to Iran, the world's premier state sponsor of terrorism, which continues to finance five of the world's top-10 richest terrorist groups. But maybe the president, secretaries Pompeo and Mnuchin, and National Defense Adviser Bolton should view the EU's behavior more sympathetically and see it is not as much about reanimating the JCPOA cadaver – dead in practice yet alive in symbolism – but about breathing life into the EU project itself."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 02.11.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The new balance in Yemen

2-Prince Ahmad's return

3-What Erdogan wants

 

1-  The new balance in Yemen

 

Washington's demand, backed by London, to end all military action in Saudi Arabia's disaster-stricken neighbor, and specifying a timetable of 30 days to achieve this aim, is not just about Yemen. It also seeks to record negative points on the political 'driving license' Washington has issued to bin Salman– perhaps as a prelude to withdrawing it completely if he does not comply. In other words, it represents the first step towards withdrawing the political cover the Trump administration has extended to the crow-prince. And this is an extremely important development for the balance of political power inside the Kingdom. A number of media outlets have suggested that the next step in the growing pressures on the crown-prince consists of action to end the Saudi/Emirati/Bahraini blockade on Qatar. The third step has to do with restructuring the ruling equation inside the Kingdom and loosening bin Salman's hold on all its sources of power--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

Mattis's statement is closer to a military order to Saudi Arabia and Yemen to end the war. The rest consists of calls and demands made to the Yemeni leadership and Ansarullah [Houthis] in particular to accept an end to the Saudi and Emirati military operations in return for stopping the missile fire at Saudi territory. These calls received a clear response from the Ansarullah, linking any further discussion to the demand for a comprehensive end to hostilities, and for lifting the blockade imposed on Yemen as the first step to be taken in this regard. The new balance in Yemen is now clear after the U.S. position. It places Ansarullah on equal footing with Washington, which has now declared that it has taken control of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their Yemeni backers' decision. It is also clear that Muscat will manage the negotiations between the American and Yemeni sides, and that Washington is doing this after forcing Muscat to pay for the prize of playing a mediation role by normalizing its relations with Israel--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

Thanks to the problem resulting from the journalist Jamal Khashoggi's affair, the appetite of every party that has a demand or a bill to settle with the Saudi state has been whetted. Some want Saudi Arabia to end its hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood; others want it to stop confronting the Iranian threat; and other demands are being made, including some that are nothing short of financial blackmail. Among the bills that Saudi Arabia is being asked to settle is one that calls upon it to stop confronting Iran's agents in Yemen – the Houthis – on the pretext of being merciful towards humanity. This is humanitarianism the likes of which we failed to see the British left's journalists shedding any tears for in the case of this century's greatest humanitarian catastrophe, namely, in Syria--Mashari adh-Dhaydi in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

The U.S. and UK's call for all military action in Yemen to end within a period of 30 days represents an ultimatum to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, maintains the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. But this is not just about Yemen; it is also the prelude to curbing the crown-prince's power and reversing his policies in the region. Washington's apparent decision to end the Yemen war appears to be an admission of its regional allies' failure to secure the U.S.'s aims in its confrontation with Iran, claims the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. It also demonstrates that Washington is not convinced of the effectiveness of its sanctions on Iran, and that it is hoping to open a back channel with Tehran via Oman. The Khashoggi affair is being used to blackmail Saudi Arabia politically and financially and to secure concessions from it, maintains a Saudi commentator. Under the guise of humanitarian concern, a number of leftist hacks in the West are seeking to end the war in Yemen and to ensure the victory of Iran's proxies.

 

OPENING THE DOOR TO A NEW PHASE: "U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis's unexpected call on Tuesday to end all military action in Yemen within 30 days has opened the door wide to a new phase that could end the raging Yemeni war that has become a factory for catastrophes and a giant and bloody mill that is grinding down the Yemeni people," writes Friday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt welcomed the American call and it was commended by both sides to the Yemeni conflict: President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's legitimate government that is backed by the Saudi-led military coalition, and the Iranian-backed Houthis. But it has been met with complete silence from Saudi Arabia and its allies so far.

The implications of the coalition's delayed response are clear. For when the Americans set a specific timeframe for ending all military action, that seems closer to a command than an entreaty. And since the current Yemeni war has been linked to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's name, he will judge this order to be directed at him in person. It represents a no-confidence vote in one of the most important pillars of the Saudi crown prince's rule.

The decision to go to war in Yemen was, in effect, a declaration by the crown prince that he has taken control of the Kingdom's military capabilities. It was also the prelude to a different sort of war waged against the Saudi interior that sought to impose a one-man rule over the Kingdom's political, security, financial, and media resources.

This paved the way for various forms of unprecedented arrogance exercised against the Saudi political and financial elite. In fact, this extended beyond the Kingdom's borders, and was inflicted on leading Arab and non-Arab figures such as Lebanese PM Sa'd al-Hariri, Palestinian/Jordanian businessman Sabih al-Masri, and Ethiopian/Saudi billionaire Mohammad Hussein al-Amoudi. It also led to exceptionally rash clashes with significant countries around the world, such as Germany and Canada.

And this arrogance reached its limits with the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in a reckless and savage manner whose details continue to be revealed, eliciting global reactions that the Saudi crown prince's team had not expected.

Since all these major developments were linked to the rise of bin Salman and the small coterie around him, it was only natural for him to be held directly responsible for them, and for the fall-out from the Khashoggi affair to create pressures on the crown prince's protectors in U.S. President Donald Trump's administration.

It was also natural for the growing political and media demands to produce an American review of the dangerous consequences of the U.S.'s political investment and support for the young crown prince and all the catastrophic consequences that have occurred as a result in Yemen, the Arab region, within Saudi Arabia itself, and around the world.

In this sense, Washington's demand, backed by London, to end all military action in Saudi Arabia's disaster-stricken neighbor, and specifying a timetable of 30 days to achieve this aim, is not just about Yemen. It also seeks to record negative points on the political 'driving license' Washington has issued to bin Salman– perhaps as a prelude to withdrawing it completely if he does not comply. In other words, it represents the first step towards withdrawing the political cover the Trump administration has extended to the crown prince. And this is an extremely important development for the balance of political power inside the Kingdom.

A number of media outlets have suggested that the next step in the growing pressures on the crown prince consists of action to end the Saudi/Emirati/Bahraini blockade on Qatar. The third step has to do with restructuring the ruling equation inside the Kingdom and loosening bin Salman's hold on all its sources of power.

"In this sense, ending the war in Yemen is a necessary prelude to putting the Saudi household in order again, so as to end the series of political, financial, and military losses as a result of bin Salman's rising star," concludes the daily.

End…

 

SIGNIFICANT FORMULA: "The formula for ending the war in Yemen proposed by U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis is significant," notes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

He did not issue a merely political call; instead, he presented a practical calendar with a ceiling of 30 days to end the fighting and begin political negotiations. And he did so without bothering to visit Riyadh and consult with the Saudi leadership in its capacity as the U.S.'s strategic partner in the region – the previous description of the U.S./Saudi relationship used by Mattis and U.S. President Donald Trump.

Mattis's statement is closer to a military order to Saudi Arabia and Yemen to end the war. The rest consists of calls and demands made to the Yemeni leadership and Ansarullah [Houthis] in particular to accept an end to the Saudi and Emirati military operations in return for stopping the missile fire at Saudi territory. These calls received a clear response from the Ansarullah, linking any further discussion to the demand for a comprehensive end to hostilities, and for lifting the blockade imposed on Yemen as the first step to be taken in this regard.

The new balance in Yemen is now clear after the U.S. position. It places Ansarullah on equal footing with Washington, which has now declared that it has taken control of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their Yemeni backers' decision. It is also clear that Muscat will manage the negotiations between the American and Yemeni sides, and that Washington is doing this after forcing Muscat to pay for the prize of playing a mediation role by normalizing its relations with Israel.

But regardless of the fact that Ansarullah's relations with Iran are not that of lackey and its master, the geopolitical equations in the region are such that Saudi Arabia and the UAE's war in Yemen represents the gateway for ensuring [the U.S.'s] superiority over Iran in the seas, ground, and water passageways. The need for Saudi Arabia in the U.S.'s declared confrontation with Iran finds no clearer translation than in what the war on Yemen provides. Ending the war in Yemen by an American decision will compel the various parties to address the Yemeni demands and preconditions having to do with lifting the blockade. And this means that the Saudis have officially been forced to resign their role, especially in what Washington refers to as the 'confrontation with Iran.'

In practice, Washington is well aware that even without any coordination between Ansarullah and Iran, the preconditions for ending the war do not include the removal the Ansarullah's ballistic missiles. It also realizes that talk of international supervision over these missiles is a mere media delusion, and that the Ansarullah will not accept a temporary self-rule of the Yemeni areas. Washington also knows hand that the road will be open for a provisional government that paves the way for elections, and that the course of developments in Yemen will be no different from that in Syria, where the U.S.'s failure in the war against the independent Syrian state will be sufficient to declare Iran's victory.

What Iran is seeking, according to the American media and the research centers that the U.S. administration relies on in determining its policies, is to ensure that there will an independent, capable and combat-ready Syrian state on Palestine's borders, and there will be a Yemeni state that believes in its national independence on the Gulf and Red Sea's shores – a state that Washington cannot take under its wing directly or via Saudi Arabia. And this is something that Washington knows will happen as soon as the war whose end it has been trying to prevent, now actually ends.

The course of U.S. sanctions on Iran, and the fact that they coincide with what appears to be an important Yemeni message of openness to meeting Iranian interests, and the opening of a negotiating channel via Muscat – all raise a question concerning Washington's seriousness about heading towards a confrontation with Iran, and its confidence in its sanctions' ability to break Iran's will.

"For these sanctions have merely become a necessity for facilitating negotiations, after the cornerstone of the confrontation as represented by Saudi Arabia has been badly wounded and is being withdrawn from the arena," concludes Qandil.

End…

 

GLAD TIDINGS: "It is often said that crises bear glad tidings within their wombs; for changes emerge and at the lowest of prices from within the folds of problems," writes Mashari adh-Dhaydi in Friday's Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Thanks to the problem resulting from the journalist Jamal Khashoggi's affair, the appetite of every party that has a demand or a bill to settle with the Saudi state has been whetted. Some want Saudi Arabia to end its hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood; others want it to stop confronting the Iranian threat; and other demands are being made, including some that are nothing short of financial blackmail.

Among the bills that Saudi Arabia is being asked to settle is one that calls upon it to stop confronting Iran's agents in Yemen – the Houthis – on the pretext of being merciful towards humanity. This is humanitarianism the likes of which we failed to see the British left's journalists shedding any tears for in the case of this century's greatest humanitarian catastrophe, namely, in Syria.

The British Guardian published an analysis by a hack by the name Patrick Wintour, who is the paper's diplomatic editor, as to how to use the Khashoggi crisis to compel Saudi Arabia to end its actions in Yemen that aim to erase the Iranian threat from that country. Wintour specifically referred to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman – the bane of the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and the left everywhere. Our hack friend wants to intensify the pressures on Saudi Arabia regarding Yemen after Jamal Khashoggi's death because this is 'an opportunity not to be missed.'

What he is really saying meaning is this: Exploit the opportunity and transform the situation in Yemen in Iran's favor; and preoccupy Saudi Arabia with the Houthi cat's claws; and do this now since Saudi Arabia is suffering from the 'Jamal' [Khashoggi] crisis!

This crude political exploitation and stark blackmail of Saudi Arabia did not escape the notice of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, for example, who commented on the exploitation of the Khashoggi crisis to target Saudi Arabia thus: 'It is frightening for this tragedy to be magnified with so much political machination and fabrication that we see today.'

What Zakharova is referring to is obvious to any fair person who would tangibly notice it. For example, the researcher at Oxford University's Oxford Internet Institute Lisat-Maria Neudert has written that Khashoggi's death has contributed to exposing how information and the social media are being manipulated to promote political aims.

As for the American initiative to stop the fighting in Yemen and to pave the path for a political solution there, neither Saudi Arabia nor the coalition members have said they oppose such a solution. In fact, Saudi Arabia's demand and aim was that of a political solution from day one. And we can all recall the Kuwaiti and Geneva negotiations regarding Yemen.

In fact, Saudi Arabia and the coalition have demonstrated their concern and made way for a political solution and halting their air raids on more than one occasion; but every time, the Houthis have viewed this matter as no more than a 'truce' during which to rally their ranks.

Al-Houthi will once again deal with the ceasefire as no more than a tactical truce. Yet Saudi Arabia and the coalition will continue to support the political efforts; and that is nothing new.

"But this is not the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is to ask people such as the British hack whether the UK would accept to reconcile with a bordering country ruled by a pro-Russian gang that fires missiles on London and Liverpool," concludes Dhayidi.

Ends…

 

2-  Prince Ahmad's return

 

Saudi Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz unexpected return to Riyadh has fuelled speculation of a shake-up at the summit of power in the Kingdom, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Khashoggi case continues to reverberate and have momentous consequences for Saudi Arabia and its ruling family, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. The return to Riyadh of one of King Salman's brothers who had mildly criticized the king and his crown-prince has led to speculation of imminent changes at the summit of power in Saudi Arabia.

 

THE PRINCE'S VISIT: "The visit to the UK by former Saudi interior minister Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz, who is also the youngest son of King 'Abdelaziz's seven sons from his Sudairi wife, had given rise to many questions," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This was especially after he confronted a group of protestors in front of his house, declaring: 'Do not blame the ruling family; blame those who have caused the war in Yemen.'

But his return to Riyadh and the fact that Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman was at the head of those receiving him have raised even larger questions and flung the door open to speculation regarding the Saudi throne's future 'surprise.'

Prince Ahmad left the Kingdom before journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. But the prevailing view is that he would not have returned to Riyadh and been accorded such a special welcome had that murder not occurred, and had the current Saudi leadership not admitted to committing it and ordering a 'death squad' of 18 security officers along with a specialized pathologist to carry it out inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who is currently the true ruler of the Kingdom due to his father's illness, has never shown his opponents any leniency, including those who did not pledge allegiance to him, whether members of the ruling family, or common folk. In fact, and at his own admission, some 1500 of these opponents, including some princes, are still behind bars. This is why it was noteworthy for him to receive the most prominent of these opponents, his uncle Prince Ahmad, who has never pledged allegiance to him. So was the fact that Prince Ahmad did not hang bin Salman's picture next to that of his father the King [Salman] and the picture of his grandfather, the Kingdom's founder, in his living room where he receives his guests in Riyadh.

A reliable Saudi source who resides in London has confirmed to us that Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz – who is married to his cousin, Prince Mohammad bin Nawwaf bin 'Abdelaziz Al Saud's daughter, the Saudi ambassador to London, was planning to stay in the British capital for a long period. His sudden return three weeks after Khashoggi's assassination could not have happened without some British and American 'arrangements' regarding restructuring the ruling regime in Riyadh via a 'white coup.'

It is difficult to guess what formula may emerge as a result of Prince Ahmad's contacts with American and British officials in London, then with others after his return to Riyadh. The most important contact was with Prince Talal bin 'Abdelaziz who used to head the Allegiance Council [the body responsible for determining future succession to the Saudi throne], but also with the former crown prince Prince Muqrin bin 'Abdelaziz, who was deposed by King Salman as soon as he rose to the throne, despite the late King 'Abdullah's instructions that he should remain crown prince and occupy throne if it became vacant for whatever reason.

Changing crown princes in the Kingdom has ceased to be a difficult process since King Salman ascended to the throne in 2015. Since that time, he has changed two crown princes with a few months. He replaced his brothers Prince Muqrin and Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, and made his son Prince Mohammad crown prince. In fact, and in light of many leaks and reports, it is not unlikely that we may be witnessing some movement in this regard in the next few weeks.

A number of questions need to be considered in this regard:

- First, in case there is a wish to appoint Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz in a leading post, what could it be? Will he be made king or crown prince? And if he is made king, who will be his crown prince?

- Second, has Prince Ahmad met with King Salman after his return or not? There are two reports in this regard, the first claiming that he has met with the King and the other denying that.

- Third, what is President Trump's administration's attitude towards Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz? Will it accept him as king or as crown prince?

- Fourth, what post will Saudi Arabia's current ambassador to Washington, Prince Khaled bin Salman, (who is was slated to replace 'Adel al-Jubeir as foreign minister within a short period) occupy? Will he be made crown prince if King Salman is removed from power and is officially replaced by his brother Mohammad bin Salman in a preemptive strike?

There is one important issue that needs to be taken into account, and that many people may not know. Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz did not visit Washington throughout the period when he occupied senior posts in the Saudi state – whether as deputy interior minister under his brother Prince Nayef, or when he succeeded Prince Nayef in that post. A Saudi friend of mine who visited him a number of times in his office has confirmed that Prince Ahmad never received any American official, and that Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, who was in charge of security, was in charge of receiving such officials. In fact, Prince Mohammad bin Nayef had many disagreements with Prince Ahmad because he bypassed him on a number of issues and coordinated directly with the late King 'Abdullah and his Diwan instead.

The Saudi ruling family always tends towards secrecy when dealing with its internal affairs. For this reason, anything that can be said regarding these sensitive issues remains mere speculation, leaks, and analyses – which is why most of the family's decisions seem to be surprising and without any prelude.

In conclusion, we say that all that interests the U.S. – and the Trump administration in particular – which views its relations with Saudi Arabia as one of a strategic nature, is to ensure that the arms deals with Riyadh will continue. In fact, we think that there is no disagreement over this issue among the ruling family's princes, whether at the summit of power or powerless. We have said this before, and we repeat it now: The U.S. gives priority to its arms deals over its principles, and resorts to inciting minorities and partitioning states when dealing with those who oppose it.

The consequences of Khashoggi's murder will continue to be full of surprises and changes, and at the summit of power specifically. We are still at the beginning of this road, and what lies ahead is even more momentous.

"But God knows best!" concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

3-  What Erdogan wants

 

Turkish President Erdogan's handling of the Khashoggi affair matter has nothing to do with the desire to punish the party behind the assassination; it is about restructuring the Saudi regime, says Mohammad Yaghi in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The manner in which Turkish President Erdogan has been handling the Khashoggi affair is part of his broader strategy for the Arab world, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. His campaign has focused on the Saudi crown prince who is seen as a major obstacle to that strategy; but there is no guarantee that this strategy will succeed in achieving Erdogan's goals even if it manages to remove the crown prince from power.

 

PHASED REVELATIONS: "Everyone now knows that Turkey knew the details of the heinous murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi only a few hours after it occurred," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

But instead of publicizing the facts at one go, Erdogan's Turkey chose to reveal them gradually and in phased installments that have still not reached their end.

Why choose this method that resembles Turkey's own long TV soap opera series? Was the release of the American pastor Andrew Brunson, who was accused of spying for the U.S., during the investigations into Khashoggi's murder a mere coincidence?

Moreover, why has Erdogan made every effort to preserve his friendship with the Saudi king, while continuing to target the crown prince at the same time?

To begin with, I should say that the episodes of this 'Turkish series' regarding Khashoggi's murder have still not reached their peak, and that Turkey is still holding back cards to use in its hard and simultaneous haggling with both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

I believe that the matter has nothing to do with the desire to punish the party behind the assassination; or, more accurately, to seek justice in the Khashoggi case. It is about Turkey's strategy in the Arab world.

The release of the American pastor Brunson, after a surprise verdict of innocence, is intended to improve relations with the U.S. and hence to ensure its endorsement of the Turkish project that targets Saudi Arabia.

For in Turkey's view the Saudi crown prince is the man behind the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule in Egypt, who pushed for hostility towards Qatar and for imposing a blockade it, and who abandoned support for Syria's 'rebels' and ended the Arab/Turkish alliance in addressing the Syrian dossier.

In all these files, Turkey was among the parties that was most harmed. To give an idea of the scale of Turkish interest in the Arab world, it is worth noting that over 3000 Arab journalists now reside in Turkey. Most work in satellite TV stations that broadcast to the Arab world, and most belong to the Muslim Brotherhood that became a pursued and suspect organization overnight, accused of conspiring with the U.S., despite its decades' long close relations with a number of Arab regimes.

Turkey is interested in the Arab world for economic, security, and ideological reasons. Economically, Turkey wants the Arab world as its largest trade market. It also wants to end its reliance on Iranian oil and Russian gas, replacing them with Arab oil and gas. But that cannot be achieved as long as the current Iranian regime remains in place, especially since Iran's hegemony over Iraq is even greater than its hegemony over Syria.

As for security, Turkey feels that the main threat comes from its Southern Syria/Iraqi borders where the Kurds are located. Toppling the Syrian regime and replacing it with a regime loyal to it would protect a significant part of its borders. And a regime in Syria that is loyal to Turkey can also play a role in Iraq in coalition with the civilian Sunni groups there.

And ideological terms, the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) is an advanced version of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the Brotherhood is the closest to the AKP ideologically; they are the horse that Erdogan believes he can ride to achieve his strategic aims in the Arab world.

Here, we should remember that the fact that Turkey has interests in the Arab world does not mean that the Arabs have to be hostile towards it. If the Arabs understand these interests correctly, they can build on them to benefit from Turkey in creating a regional balance that enables the Arab world to secure a higher level of political and economic independence.

For example, Turkey and Iran compete with each other in the region; but this has not prevented them from pursuing trade exchanges and trying to reach understandings over many political issues. This is what nation states that care for their interests do.

Regardless of the Khashoggi case, the Saudi crown prince's policies conflict with Turkey's strategy, and have been a major reasons for weakening, if not foiling them: He backed toppling the Brotherhood's rule in Egypt, imposed a blockade on Qatar that is Turkey's ally, declared the Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization, and withdrew from the Arab/Turkish alliance in Syria.

If my analysis is correct, then Erdogan's courtship of U.S. President Trump by releasing Brunson, as well as his courtship of the Saudi monarch by saying that Turkey respects and appreciates him, are intended to create an American/Saudi/Turkish consensus on the need to replace the crown prince with another member of the Saudi ruling family.

This will not restore to Turkey what it has lost strategically in the Arab world; but it could help lift the siege imposed on the Brotherhood in the Arab world and end the crisis with Qatar, and may improve Turkey's chances in Syria.

We say 'may' because there is no guarantee that changing Saudi Arabia's ruling structure will produce harmony in its positions with Turkey, especially since the current U.S. administration may not concur with Turkish strategy. But such a change would provide Turkey with a broader margin with to push forward its strategy in the Arab world.

Will Erdogan achieve his aim? I tend to believe that he is more likely to fail, for two main reasons:

- First, the U.S. under Trump does not want to bring about the change that Erdogan is seeking. Its current Middle East strategy has been built on the foundations of what is now in place in Saudi Arabia. Any change at the summit of Saudi power could mean a different policy towards Iran and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, to be added to the loss of financial deals worth tens-of-billions of dollars.

- Second, based on what they have seen and heard, Saudi citizens will reject foreign intervention. And this means that external pressures will add to the cohesion within the ruling family, backed by popular Saudi support.

"This will make it impossible to bring about any change," concludes Yaghi.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 02.11.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Rauf Tamer is rendered speechless by the turn of events in centrist tabloid Posta: "Such brazenness is unheard of. Think about it: As if the lies they uttered from their diplomatic platforms were not enough, Saudi Arabia's chief prosecutor, who claims to be a man of law, also lies separately. There is nothing more one can say: I give up, dear readers. I can no longer bear to be treated like a fool."

Tamer Korkmaz charges Washington with a cover up in pro-government Yeni Safak: "Those who have appealed to the U.S. from the very beginning for the Khashoggi assassination to be resolved, are acting under a blind illusion to say the least. Jamal Khashoggi was not an American citizen, the murder was not committed on U.S. soil, and yet some have demanded that the U.S., which they describe as the 'land of freedoms', should reveal the perpetrators behind Jamal Khashoggi's assassination! But what is the reality? Let alone shedding light on the murder, the U.S. is juggling six things at the same time in order to cover it up!"

 

2019 LOCAL ELECTIONS: Yusuf Karatas claims that the government thrives on strife in leftist opposition Evrensel: "As we enter the period of local elections that will serve as a referendum on the country's new political regime, the area East of Euphrates has become the main item on our agenda. This is because the government realizes that it rather than peace, democracy or tranquility, it is pressure, tension and interference that are empowering. It thrives on this policy of tension. Therefore, although this policy causes the country, and the peoples to lose a lot, it helps the government to gain. That is why government representatives keep harping on the word war: 'War against terror', 'war against foreign powers', 'economic war'. It is always war!"

Sadrettin Karaduman does not lament the dissolution of the current parliamentary alliance in pro-Islamist opposition Milli Gazete: "The alliance between the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] and MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] has no future. This mandatory and problematic alliance has come to an end. However, two questions remain unanswered: First: Has MHP leader Devlet Bahceli, who was assigned to form this alliance, completed his mission? Second: Who, or which party, has this alliance, which was formed in the lead up to the June 2017 general elections, served? This alliance has ended because of its incompatibility with the electorate's blood type. This is more than enough to disperse it."

Nuh Albayrak warns against playing into the Kurds' hands in pro-government Star:" Most of the names that the people of Southeast Turkey respect are not involved in politics, and do not beg to be named a candidate. These are the ones that should be reached and convinced, asking them to act as candidates to serve the people. March 2019 is not a local election at all, and the results in the South East will be extra crucial. It should not be forgotten that each mistake will play into the HDP's [pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party] hands."

 

SEXUAL ABUSE: Rahmi Turan turns the spotlight on a grave social problem in opposition nationalist Sozcu: "The Khashoggi murder, U.S. pastor Brunson's case, the soldiers who froze to death, the Syrian swamp, etc.: We, as a society, have been stupefied by the chain of events one after another! We have so many issues to worry about. One of them is the rape of minors, both boys and girls! It is estimated that only a tenth of incidents get reported. Incest makes up 20 to 25 % of sexual abuse cases. We have to accept 'struggle against sexual child abuse' as a 'national duty'!"

 

Iran media watch

 

 

(Please note that Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Channel One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

ROWHANI'S FT ARTICLE: Iranian broadcast media today led with President Hassan Rowhani's opinion piece published by the Financial Times yesterday in which he warned the world about the "dangers" posed by Washington's "unilateralism", and urged European countries to work with Iran against the U.S. State radio VIRI picked part of Rowhani's article ,where he urged Europe, Russia, and China to "present and implement their final proposed package of measures to compensate for and mitigate the effects of America's newest unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions before they are imposed." English language Press TV pitched into Rowhani's criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump's policies over the past two years, especially with regards to "complicity in the daily atrocities in Yemen," "humiliation and gradual perishing of the great nation of Palestine," among other things.

 

ARBA'EEN: Rolling news channel IRINN quoted the Interior Minister as saying that over 80 percent of Iranian pilgrims who had travelled to Iraq for the Arba'een Shiite mourning rituals have returned home. VIRI quoted the Minister as saying that over 12,000 buses were dispatched to border areas for pilgrim transport.

 

ISRAEL/BRAZIL: Press TV this morning led with Brazilian president-elect Jair Bolsonaro's announcement that he will move his country's embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The TV said Bolsonaro was a "staunch" supporter of Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu. Political commentator Isaac Bigio told Press TV that Bolsonaro's move may prompt Colombia and other countries in South America to do the same, and predicted a "complete change" in the politics of the continent as a result.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian users on Twitter have been posting comments in reaction to Iran International TV's Q&A with opposition figure Reza Pahlavi. Nearly 10,000 Tweets have been posted by over four-thousand genuine accounts over the past 24 hours after the London-based channel aired the recorded interview last night. Pahlavi was asked by the audience about his plans for his homeland in a post-Islamic Republic future. Many users shared a quote from him that the biggest betrayal to Iran today was being "indifferent" to the developing situation. Some described what he was promoting as "the first principle of patriotism". Some were happy to hear from the exiled son of the late Shah of Iran that once the Islamic establishment is gone, economic problems would no longer be a major problem. Others welcomed his secular views. However, a group of pro-regime users and pro-reform journalists expressed strong disapproval of Pahlavi's remarks.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 01.11.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Between local and national

 

Iranian infrastructure and strategic networks have come under attack in the last few days by a computer virus similar to Stuxnet but "more violent, more advanced and more sophisticated". Israeli officials are refusing to discuss what role, if any, they may have had in the operation, an Israeli TV report said Wednesday. The report came hours after Israel said Mossad had thwarted an Iranian murder plot in Denmark, and two days after Iran acknowledged that President Hassan Rowhani's mobile phone had been bugged. It also follows a string of Israeli intelligence coups in Iran, including the extraction from Tehran in January of the contents of a vast archive documenting Iran's nuclear weapons program, and the detailing by Prime Minister Netanyahu at the UN in September of other alleged Iranian nuclear and missile assets inside Iran, in Syria and in Lebanon.

"Remember Stuxnet, the virus that penetrated the computers of the Iranian nuclear industry?" the report on Israel's Hadashot news asked. Iran "has admitted in the past few days that it is again facing a similar attack, from a more violent, more advanced and more sophisticated virus than before, that has hit infrastructure and strategic networks." The Iranians, the TV report went on, are "not admitting, of course, how much damage has been caused." On Sunday, Gholamreza Jalali, the head of Iran's civil defense agency, said Tehran had neutralized a new version of StuxnetReuters reports. "Recently we discovered a new generation of Stuxnet which consisted of several parts … and was trying to enter our systems," Jalali said. Wednesday's TV report noted that "in the past, the U.S. and Israel have been alleged to have worked together on operations." The report noted that "behind the scenes lately, Mossad," under its director Yossi Cohen, has been "fighting a real shadow war." Without attributing responsibility to Mossad, the report mentioned the tapping of Rouhani's phone, noting that the Iranians "had to switch it for an encrypted model because they understand that someone has been listening to him for days and weeks."

Meanwhile, Mossad provided Denmark with information that thwarted an Iranian plot to assassinate an Iranian separatist leader in the Scandinavian country, it was revealed on Wednesday. According to a KAN report, information from Mossad is what led to the arrest of the suspect in the alleged plot. Mossad was also responsible for providing information to French authorities in June about a plan to attack a meeting of Iranian opposition figures there.

In Gaza, Israel has agreed to allow Qatar to transfer funds to Hamas to pay the salaries of its civil servants, media outlets in Gaza reported Wednesday. According to the reports, this was made possible after Israel negotiated with Qatar and received guarantees that the money will be transferred only for the stated purpose. It remains unclear whether Israel has agreed in principle only or whether the details have been finalized and an overall agreement signed. A senior diplomatic source told reporters this week that Israel is interested in promoting the Qatari transfer to Hamas in order to prevent a humanitarian collapse "that will end up exploding in our faces." Hamas' Finance Ministry in Gaza will reportedly use the Qatari funding to pay the salaries over the next two weeks. Gaza's Finance Ministry has prepared the list of officials who will receive the payments, as requested by the Qataris. It is still unknown whether security officials in the police and the security forces will also receive their salaries from the Qatari money. Hamas has been demanding for years that the Palestinian Authority pay the salaries of public-sector workers whom Hamas hired since it took power of the Strip in 2007. Ramallah insists that it first be given full control of all government activities in Gaza, including tax collection and payments.  PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas has used the salary payment issue as a punitive measure against Hamas.

In other news, more than half of the Israelis (51 percent) oppose holding talks with Hamas for a long-term ceasefire arrangement, according to the Israeli Foreign Policy Index (IFPI) report. Only 32% are in favor of holding talks with the group. Despite the opposition to an agreement with Gaza's rulers, 43% percent of the Israelis wish the government would improve the living conditions in the strip, while 38% think increasing economic pressure on the area is the right policy. In addition, the report shows that 50% of Israel's population want the government to go back to the negotiating table in order to achieve a peace deal with the Palestinian Authority, while 49% believe that peace between Israel and the Palestinians is not essential when it comes to establishing better relations with the Arab world. Nevertheless, 33% of citizens are convinced that a breakthrough in relations with the Arab states is dependent on normalization of relations with the Palestinian Authority. A large majority of the Israeli public (69%) believes that regional cooperation between Israel and the Middle East countries is possible. However, 41% do not want to visit any Arab country, even when relations between the two countries are normal. 28% of the respondents believe that Israel should not promote cooperation with the Arab countries. Those who believe in the importance of developing relationship with the Arab world, think Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the two most important Muslim countries with which cooperation should be developed. The other foreign policy related issues that arouse concern among the Israeli public—besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations with the Arab world—are Israel's ties with Russia and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Israelis see Russia as the most important country besides the U.S., followed by Germany, UK, China, France and Egypt. Most of the Israeli public believes that the European Union today is more of a foe to Israel (55%) than a friend (18%). The public is also divided on whether Israel should work to improve its relations with Turkey, with 42% being in favor and 45% opposing it. When it comes to Israel-U.S. relations, the respondents ranked them at 7.75 out of 10, with 63% describing the relations as good, compared to 41% last year.

In news of Israeli-Egyptian relations, Delek Drilling's partner in the EMG gas pipeline to Egypt, the Egyptian company East Gas, is owned by Egypt's intelligence service, Egyptian news site Mada Masr reported. East Gas, the main beneficiary of plans to export Israeli natural gas to Egypt's private consortium Dolphinus Holdings via the EMG pipeline, is a private company, most of whose shares are held by Egypt's intelligence service, says the report. "The gas import deal – scheduled to come into effect early next year – found that the repeated claims by Egyptian government officials that the venture is a purely private sector affair wholly outside the 'government framework' are misleading at best," stated Mada Masr in its report. The intelligence service is slated to receive 80% of East Gas's income. Egyptian intelligence also has an interest in Dolphinus. "Documents and sources reveal that through a complex web of overseas shell corporations and subsidiaries, the intelligence body stands to cash in at all stages of the deal, from the transport of Israeli gas to Egypt to its final sale to the Egyptian government. These profits end up in the coffers of the GIS, and not the public budget," states Mada Masr. Israel is supposed to start exporting gas to Egypt's Dolphinus in March 2019, via the EMG pipeline. The gas, from Israel's Tamar and Leviathan reserves, is valued at $15 billion.

Finally, Prime Minister Netanyahu is likely to attend the inauguration on January 1 of Brazilian president-elect Jair Bolsonaro, a symbolic step that would signify a dramatic change in relations between the two countries. Bolsonaro responded by posting on Facebook that "I have just received incredible words from the prime minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu, as well as from Israel's Ambassador Yossi Shelley. Our friendly ties will undoubtedly result in mutual agreements that will surely benefit both of our nations and citizens." Less than 24 hours after the announcement of his victory, Bolsonaro welcomed Shelley and the Israeli honorary consul in Rio for a private meeting in his apartment. Bolsonaro, an Evangelical Christian, said during his campaign that Israel would be the first country he would visit as president, that he will move the country's embassy to Jerusalem, and that he will close the Palestinian embassy in Brazil because Palestine is not a country. "Last year I went to Israel for eight days," he said in an i24 interview last month. "I felt it was another country with which we could develop closer ties. I went to see what agriculture is like in a desert. How could a place with precipitation levels that are lower than in our Northeastern regions have enough food for itself and be able to export some of its food to Europe while the Northeast of Brazil is starving?" He said that Israel and Brazil should "team up."

 

 

NETANYAHU'S POWER IS DWINDLING: Nahum Barnea in Yedioth Ahronoth writes that running under Netanyahu's personal endorsement and the Likud Banner was not worth much in the municipal elections. Meanwhile, the ultra-orthodox voters acted independently, defying their Rabbi's orders. Will these trends carry over to the national elections?

"At the entrance to Yeruham, between the lake and the city, stands a large billboard with a photograph; Netanyahu in a joint picture with Nili Aharon, the Likud candidate for mayor. The Patron and his protégé. Netanyahu in a gray business suit, foreign to the scorching Negev sun, authoritarian and remote. And Aharon, the excited groupie.

Similar twosome pictures were placed on the eve of the elections in other communities. The largest of them was hung on the wall of one of the hotels at the entrance to Jerusalem; Netanyahu and Elkin; a couple whose height, on the wall at least, was six stories high. Netanyahu chose who to be photographed with, on whose behalf he would make calls, in whose assemblies he would make an appearance, and from whose he would abstain. Some of the winners ran with Likud, others ran against it. The accounts were personal; the desires destructive.

Jerusalem and Yeruham are die-hard Likud-supporting communities. Nevertheless, Elkin and Aharon were defeated badly at the ballot box. Elkin received 19.8 percent of the vote, and came in third out of four; Aharon received 32 percent, compared with 59 percent garnered by the winner, Tal Ohana. Aharon's candidacy, in accordance with a review of election results throughout the country, shows that Netanyahu's choice had no decisive influence, or had no effect whatsoever. Those who won did so in their own right, and the losers lost all by themselves. Aharon, Miri Regev's protégé, was forced upon the local Likud branch. 'We love you Bibi, we vote for Tal Ohana', was the battle cry adopted by Likudniks in Yeruham. This does not mean much for the upcoming Knesset elections, but it does mean something about what is happening to Netanyahu and to the party he heads.

The second point that is relevant for national politics is the split in the ultra-orthodox sector. Gafni and Deri against Litzman and Porush, Lithuanians and Sephardim against Hassidim. Many things can happen in this sector until the elections, from the disintegration of United Torah Judaism into two rival parties, to the unification of all three, or the unification of Degel Hatorah and Shas, leaving the Hassidic Agudat Yisrael fluttering on the brink of the electoral threshold. The historic division of power between the Hassidim and the Lithuanians was based on the assumption that the Hassidim bring more votes. They received more seats on joint lists, more positions of power. The election results in Jerusalem require a new index.

And perhaps the index itself has ceased to be relevant. A new generation of ultra-Orthodox has arisen, one that feels it has power and is unwilling to automatically put it into the pockets of Rabbis. The ultra-orthodox were active in almost all the lists in the mixed cities. They operated openly, together with those wearing knitted yarmulkes and sworn seculars, on the same social networks, in the same headquarters. Perhaps the talk of an Israeli society divided into separate, hostile tribes, was premature. The real test will be in the national elections."

Ends…

 

KOCHAVI'S MAIN TASK IS TO AVOID NEEDLESS BATTLES: Ran Edelist in Maariv argues that although the new chief of staff must prepare the army for war, it will be his job to halt before the slippery slope, where the philosophy represented by Eleor Azaria and the right-wing Rabbis rules the day.

"The chief of staff's job is to prepare the army for war. This includes the army's fighting spirit, but mainly the avoidance of unnecessary battles that are the product of warped politics and distorted ideologies. I do not pretend to be knowledgeable in the building of the army's force, but the problem is that the IDF has not fought since Lebanon 2006. Hunting down terrorists and violent policing in the territories are not a war, and the reality today is no different than it was in 2006. In addition, there is a real problem regarding the motivation to fight among those who do not agree with the government's policy.

On the other hand, this is a democratic state, etc., and the result is the campaigns between the wars; those small wars in the meantime. The wisdom of the small wars is avoiding getting dragged into a large and unnecessary war in the North and South. This is Eizenkot's great success. The chief of staff is supposed to be the commander of the army, from the General Staff forum to the last of the privates, but also a politician – to be able to deal with a castrated, frightened and aggressive Cabinet; and even a statesman, in order to plan his actions in order to ensure that military activity will not damage Israel's political standing in the world.

It also appropriate that the chief of staff be a moral man, or as Kochavi himself put it in an interview about 10 years ago: 'A moral army, like a person, is a body that constantly makes an effort to be moral. But even moral people can sin. The question is what the general spirit is. From my experience, this is an army for which this issue is constantly on the agenda. Have the moral questions been at the same level of intensity throughout the past five years? I am not so sure'.

Dr. Niv Gordon, a lecturer in philosophy who was Kochavi's teacher, accused him in the past of war crimes because he commanded an operation for the liquidation of terrorists in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. In response, Kochavi wrote him: 'I have to fulfill my duty toward three moral imperatives: My moral obligation to my soldiers, my moral duty as a human being, and my moral obligation to the citizens of the State of Israel! As long as I am a man and the ranks of an officer in the IDF are placed on my shoulders, I will continue to stand in the center of the triangle. I will not give up any side and will work tirelessly to connect the three sides. At the end of the day we will be left alone, me, my obligations and my conscience'. Kochavi is right in his diagnosis, but his job is not to juggle practical philosophy, as he wrote to Gordon, but to stop before the slippery slope, where the practical philosophy is represented by Eleor Azaria and the right-wing Rabbis."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL MUST HALT THE PALESTINIAN TAKEOVER: Dr. Anat Rot in Israel Hayom claims the Palestinians are invaders and Israel must immediately evacuate Khan al-Ahmar, remove all other Palestinian outposts, stop the PA's takeover on the ground – and start ruling like a landlord.

"The Khan al-Ahmar affair infuriates many Israelis for various reasons. It illustrates the discrimination between the Palestinian invaders and the settlers of Migron, Giv'at Haolpana, Amona and Nativ Ha'avot – in whose cases the state strictly adhered to the ruling by the High Court of Justice. The affair hints at the government's helplessness regarding the activities of leftist organizations, the media atmosphere and the diplomatic pressure. It conveys a message of limpness and lack of governance in the face of delinquency and illegal activity in strategic areas, and indicates the unwillingness of the state to implement its decisions.

But most disturbing is the lack of a decisive response to a phenomenon that poses a significant threat at Israel's doorstep. The Bedouin outpost of Khan al-Ahmar is not an exceptional case of illegal Palestinian construction. This is a comprehensive campaign waged by the Palestinian Authority against the State of Israel during the past decade, in order to gain control of strategic areas in Area C – which is under Israeli civil and security control - in violation of the Oslo Accords. This strategic move was initiated and led by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. In 2008, Fayyad established an official bureau for coordinating activities on the ground (UAWC), which is funded by tens of millions of euros from EU countries.

This creeping takeover is made possible, first of all, through the systematic and organized settlement of Palestinians in selected strategic areas. Those willing to man abandoned buildings and areas receive economic incentives from the PA. In addition, these areas benefit from investment in infrastructure – from paving roads to developing water reservoirs, stretching pipes and installing irrigation systems. Finally, this settlement activity is accelerated by agriculture. The populated areas receive systematic agricultural development – terraces, grazing areas and crop processing - largely at the initiative of the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.

Located in area E1 and adjacent to Route 1, Israel's central latitude highway, Khan al-Ahmar is one example of many of the Palestinian Authority's efforts to control strategic areas through settlement. There are dozens of similar illegal outposts on the ground that house tens of thousands of Palestinians.

The solution proposed by the State of Israel to the residents of Khan al-Ahmar can significantly improve their standard of living. If their wellbeing was foremost on the minds of the PA and its supporters, they would readily accept this proposal. However, as far as Palestinian leaders are concerned, moving the residents to another location harms the efforts to take over Highway 1, and therefore they are working diligently to torpedo the government's proposal.

Although there is no official change in the status quo, there has recently been the impression of a gradual movement toward Israeli annexation of Area C. This is a false impression. In recent years, especially since Ayelet Shaked became Minister of Justice, important steps have been taken in regulating the settlements and normalizing life in Judea and Samaria; legislation in the Knesset is being adapted to Judea and Samaria and there is an effort to repel the offensive of anti-settlements appeals to the High Court of Justice. However, right under our noses, the Palestinian Authority is flooding the ground with tens of thousands of squatters and through them is carrying out a creeping annexation of Area C. To date, the Palestinian invasion covers seven percent of Area C. The area of Palestinian settlement is almost three times larger than that on which the entire Jewish settlement enterprise is situated.

The Palestinians and their partners believe that establishing facts on the ground constitutes an irreversible reality, and that any territory they have managed to take control of will remain in their hands in any future arrangement. The government's capitulation to pressure from those working to harm Israel's interest sends a message of lack of governance, and encourages further criminality. The immediate evacuation of the Khan al-Ahmar outpost is therefore essential in order to clarify that the facts that have been illegally established on the ground can be reversed. Israel must urgently formulate a comprehensive plan for removing other Palestinian outposts, stopping the PA's takeover on the ground - and beginning to rule like landlords."

Ends…

 

THE ONLY WEAPON THAT CAN RESTORE QUIET TO GAZA: Amir Buhbot in Walla! states that Lieberman tried to intensify the response to terror organizations but was unable to sway the Cabinet. Netanyahu and Eizenkot share a conciliatory stance, and we are headed towards a dangerous escalation.

"Defense minister Lieberman believes that the time has come to launch a sweeping and broad offensive against Gaza by attacking quality targets belonging to the terrorist organizations in the Strip, but was unable to sway the political-security Cabinet to get behind him. That is how the current tension in the Netanyahu/Lieberman/Eizenkot triangle was created. At the moment, the prime minister is united with the chief of staff. But if the situation continues this way and Hamas does not restrain itself and the forces in Gaza, the moment will come when it will be too late and the IDF will really find itself in a no-choice campaign.

Despite the spins and headlines concerning an arrangement and talk of a fragile period that will end in a long-term lull in return for Palestinian getting returns such as Qatari fuel; Palestinian violence has intensified and the initiative is undoubtedly on the Palestinian side, and has long been out of the hands of the IDF, who has enabled the current reality to develop. Lieberman believes - this is not a time for waiting idly and patiently for the end of the process or the deliberations, because the more achievements are offered to the terrorist organizations, the more they will want. According to his approach, they must be shown Israel's tough side, followed by the soft side later on. But as always, talk is one thing and deeds something different altogether. Netanyahu and Eizenkot remain unconvinced as the Cabinet.

Islamic Jihad is operating according to directives from Damascus, and is not really interested in breaking the rules of the game. If it were, it would launch heavier barrages at Tel Aviv and Be'er Sheva. The organization is examining just how far it can go and is mainly interested in creating new equations - to enter the game in which until now it has been a bystander watching from the sidelines, except for the demonstrations on the fence. The organization is exploiting a position of power as the Iranians channel money to Hamas and funding its military wing. The broad operation of Islamic Jihad fits well with the lack of IDF initiative in Gaza. As soon as an organized and armed terrorist organization understands that on the Israeli side there is no intention of launching a campaign and using the most threatening tool - targeted assassinations, in addition to shooting at demonstrators on the fence – it broadens its actions, and launches rocket barrages against Israel.

More than 30 rockets were fired by Jihad during the weekend, and Iron Dome intercepted those that were destined to explode in built-up areas. In response, the IDF attacked more than 80 targets, including Hamas headquarters in Gaza. These were sensitive attacks, and it was not for nothing that the IDF Spokesperson announced that they had been preceded by messages sent to the Palestinians, calling them to leave the structures. No one was killed, and according to the Palestinian street and the social networks, Gaza is not impressed by the numbers. On the other hand, no one really understands what the IAF attacked, and therefore the effect on the sense of security on the Israeli side is also low.

Of all the targets attacked, only a handful were Islamic Jihad's and most of those were unimportant. The IDF is trying to impose restraint on Hamas, so that it will be the one to exert pressure on Jihad. If that does not work, there will soon be more significant attacks on Islamic Jihad. The question will then be: Real-estate assets or operatives and senior leadership? Only targeted assassinations can restore deterrence to Gaza, but it also bears the risk of plunging the region in a war that carries a heavy price on both sides. That is why the prime minister and the chief of staff think we should wait

Ends…

 

WILL TRUMP'S MIDEAST POLICY BE AN EXPLOSIVE FAILURE?: Daniel Shapiro in Haaretz claims Trump's two year Mideast policy scoreboard is a mixed picture of partial successes that face deep challenges. The Midterms will determine if the administration's wilder policy instincts will be constrained.

"Middle East policy is unlikely to determine the outcome of next week's mid-term elections in the United States. Voters will more likely be motivated by their sense of their economic well-being and prospects, the social and political tensions dividing America, and whether they want a more unleashed or a more constrained President Donald Trump. But it bears evaluating how Trump's Middle East record stacks up at the halfway point of his term, and considering the paths it is likely to take depending on the election results.

On a range of issues, Trump has achieved at least a partial success. In Syria, U.S. and allied forces have nearly completed the campaign to destroy ISIS, and U.S. strikes on Assad following chemical attacks seem to have deterred the dictator from resorting to the use of those weapons (although not other atrocities against regime opponents). Trump's Iran gambit, withdrawing from the nuclear deal and imposing harsh unilateral sanctions, is generating far more pressure on the Iranian economy and regime than many observers predicted could be achieved at this point. Even tougher blows are still to come when full oil sanctions are restored in November. In Israel, Trump enjoys widespread popularity, a product of his unstinting support, his warm relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Iran decision, and his historic relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. Regionally, the United States maintains partnerships with a coalition of Israel and Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan, and has pushed hard for openings toward normalization between Israel and Arab states. Netanyahu's visit to Oman and the Israeli athletic teams competing in the UAE are recent dividends on that strategy.

Each of these areas of progress, however, are incomplete, and many run parallel to ongoing challenges. Some initiatives drift with low prospects of resolution. Trump's ability to consolidate the gains and advance further toward his goals, will be tested in 2019. In Syria, the Assad regime has been stabilized through brutal crushing of the opposition, and Russia has emerged as the dominant player. Israel is working hard, with U.S. support, to protect its interests by acting kinetically to disrupt Iran's ongoing efforts to entrench threatening military assets in Syria. But Russia's willingness to accommodate Israeli action is being tested following the downing of a Russian military aircraft by Syrian air defense units. Overall, the United States is largely absent from efforts to shape the post-war Syrian reality now emerging, raising questions about its ability to ensure that U.S. and Israeli interests are protected.

The Iran strategy, so far, involves the United States acting alone. While acquiescent to some secondary sanctions, no European country has followed the United States out of the nuclear deal. And the desired endgame is far from clear. After sanctions impose a further bite on Iran, then what? Will the United States entertain negotiations with Iran on a new nuclear agreement, and if so, what kind of agreement would be considered success? What are the chances one could be reached? And if Iran pulls out of the agreement and resumes uranium enrichment to the threshold of nuclear breakout it was at before the JCPOA; would the United States pursue a military option or give Israel a green light to do so? If Trump has answers to these questions, they remain opaque

The Israeli-Palestinian peace effort, meanwhile, seems hopelessly stuck. That is not Trump's fault, given the deep and abiding mistrust between the two sides, but the extreme Palestinian reaction to the Jerusalem announcement, and subsequent blows by the administration against the Palestinians, cutting off nearly all U.S. non-security assistance, has left the United States unable to conduct even a rudimentary dialogue with a Palestinian partner. With no channel to one of the parties, no prospects for a deal or even negotiations between the current leaders, and Israeli elections around the corner, Trump may simply decide never to present his plan for the ultimate deal.

And while the regional partnerships have borne fruit, they are also susceptible to the whims of unreliable players. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, on the heels of Saudi missteps with Qatar, Lebanon, and Canada, and a grinding war with devastating civilian suffering in Yemen, raise questions about the reliability and effectiveness of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is supposed to be the strategic anchor of the U.S.-led anti-Iran regional coalition.

Can Trump rally to advance on this complex agenda? Sustained attention is one challenge. His foreign policy interests run toward consolidating his friendship with Russia's Vladimir Putin and reaching a nuclear agreement with North Korea's Kim Jung Un. He will soon turn his focus toward his own reelection campaign. And in the coming months, Special Counsel Robert Mueller may issue a report that could derail his presidency.

Meanwhile, if Democrats gain control of even one house of Congress, their ability to clip Trump's wings, through hearings, investigations, and subpoenas, will be formidable. Under these circumstances, Trump and his national security team will be tested in a way they have not been yet: Building bipartisan support in Congress for controversial foreign policy initiatives. To succeed on rolling back Iran's nuclear program further, to ensure a robust U.S. military presence in Syria as leverage for the diplomatic endgame of the civil war, to effectively pressure and incentivize the Palestinians to come back to the negotiation table and to keep the newly troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia on track, Trump will need Congressional help. Democrats, if they finally control the gavels, may be slow to provide it. If, on the other hand, Republicans maintain full control on Capitol Hill, Trump will have few, if any constraints. A full-on confrontation with Iran, an unrestrained Saudi Arabia, a collapsed Palestinian Authority, and a fully Russian-dominated Syria could all come to pass.

Americans often choose divided government as a way of keeping the parties' policy agendas in balance. With the Middle East in a delicate phase, and U.S. decisions that can inflame it or keep it calm still pending, there may be wisdom in that approach."

Ends…

 

NEW WEST BANK LEADERSHIP CRACKS SETTLER UNITY: Jacob Magid in The Times of Israel proclaims that municipal election results embolden the camp of council chairs who prefer working outside of the Judea and Samaria umbrella body to advance policies on behalf of Israelis over Green Line.

"Twenty-two elections were held in Israeli municipalities over the Green Line Tuesday, and while the majority saw incumbents maintain their positions as council chairs, six municipalities woke up Wednesday to new leadership after upsets that could upend the political makeup of the settlement movement.

Israel's 2005 pullout from 25 communities in the Gaza Strip and Northern West Bank caused a split among settler leaders between those affiliated with the establishment and those who thought more could have been done to prevent the government from carrying out its decision. The former camp sees lobbying as a unified front for policies benefiting their constituents as most effective. But the ability of a number of more outspoken council chairs to achieve results on their own has others wondering whether moderating their views in order to maintain a consensus on issues within the Yesha (Judea and Samaria) settlement umbrella council is worth the compromise. That rupture has been most noticeable at meetings of the Yesha Council, where no small amount of chairs have been vacant over the past decade, despite an open invitation to all settlement leaders.

Current Yesha Council chairman Hananel Dorani, like his predecessors, has worked to reunite the leaders of the Israeli local and regional councils beyond the Green Line. However, Tuesday's results largely gave a boost to those uninterested in working as a unified front. In the Binyamin Regional Council, Yisrael Gantz narrowly defeated Shiloh Adler 50.3 percent to 49.7%, capping a mudslinging campaign that frequently got personal. Both had aimed to replace outgoing chairman and former Yesha Council head Avi Roeh in one of just two races in the West Bank that did not feature an incumbent candidate. But while the 1,000 vote margin (out of 22,000) may have been razor-thin, the candidates differed starkly in their feelings toward the Yesha Council, and by extension, on the importance of settler unity.

Adler, until announcing his candidacy, had served as secretary-general of the umbrella body. Gantz, on the other hand, had campaigned on a platform that attacked the 'old establishment' Yesha Council for neglecting the interests of settlers. He has been known to take a more combative approach to advancing pro-settler policy and has been unafraid of criticizing one of the most right-wing governments in Israeli history. This bold attitude earned him the endorsement of anti-establishment heavyweights such as Jewish Home MK Bezalel Smotrich.

Of the five races in the West Bank that saw the incumbent unseated, Eliyahu Libman's victory over Melachi Levinger in the Kiryat Arba-Hebron Local Council may have been the most consequential. Levinger had chaired the Southern West Bank municipality for the past 10 years and had worked closely with the Yesha Council. Libman, for his part, enjoyed the support of far-right activists such as Otzma Yehudit's Baruch Marzel, who have long criticized the Yesha Council for taking what they view as a non-confrontational approach to disagreements with the government.

Since his shock victory in the special elections called after the 2017 resignation of former Gush Etzion Regional Council head Davidi Pearl, Shlomo Ne'eman has been viewed as a rising star in settler politics and a rumored candidate for Yesha Council chair. However, the 45-year-old resident of Karmei Tzur was unable to garner 40% of the vote on Tuesday and will face Moshe Seville in a runoff on November 13. Seville is viewed as a mentee and ally of Samaria Regional Council chair Yossi Dagan, who has long refused to work within the Yesha Council.

Among the 14 incumbents who managed to maintain their seats were a group of chairs who have long deemed the Yesha Council as ineffective and have been absent at the umbrella body's monthly meetings. They include Samaria Regional Council head Dagan, Jordan Valley Regional Council head David Elhayani, Har Hebron Regional Council head Yochai Damari and Karnei Shomron Local Council head Yigal Lahav who each handily won their respective races. Rather than working within the confines of the Yesha Council, the four have worked to establish close personal ties to various members of the government, speaking on behalf of their own residents rather than the broader settler movement.

In the Kedumim Local Council, Dorani cruised to a third term in office, garnering nearly 70% of the vote. But with the results of Tuesday's elections, his second job as Yesha Council chair is poised to be a much greater challenge."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 01.11.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

SYRIAN SETTLEMENT: Sedat Ergin laments the slow progress towards a Syrian settlement in center-right Hurriyet: "The key person is UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura. Mistura, whose term of office is due to end this month, has extended the list of 50 people to join the talks that he has prepared after long consultations with the Assad regime. He was actually in Damascus last week to discuss this list. But Syria has rejected this list. So summits are convening to underline the need for a diplomatic solution, on the one hand, but the process has made a painful start, on the other."

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Mehmet Acet deciphers the rumors emanating from the ruling party's current ally in pro-government Yeni Safak: "I wonder whether the rumors spreading from the halls of the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] that they are considering nominating Melih Gokcek for the mayor of Ankara and Bedrettin Dalan for Istanbul, are intended as a message to the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party], rather than a genuine candidate announcement? As far as we can understand it, the MHP leader has made these statements in the belief that the AKP is unwilling to form an electoral alliance and is unwilling to continue the talks."

Mehmet Barlas poses an unanswerable question in pro-government Sabah: "Is Eskisehir Mayor Yilmaz Buyukersen not one of the people who is considered to be the future, despite actually representing the past? Would the magic of his name not be destroyed if Melih Gokcek, who served as Ankara mayor for over 20 years, goes back to square one and becomes another party's candidate for the Eskisehir Municipality in upcoming local elections?"

 

THE ECONOMY: Can Atakli accuses the Central Bank of playing politics in opposition Korkusuz: "Turkey's inflation rate was previously estimated to go down to 9.3 percent in 2019 and 6.7 percent in 2020. Yesterday, however, the Central Bank said its inflation expectations had gone up to 23.5 percent. According to the bank's calculations that often make projections that are proven to be false by a wide margin, it would not be surprising if the inflation rate were to go higher than 30 percent. It seems like the Central Bank is making all kinds of reason-defying calculations in the hope of proving Erdogan right, and is coming up with more unrealistic estimates."  

Fikri Saglar blames the ruling party for the country's economic woes in leftist opposition Birgun: "Turkey is currently going through the deepest economic and social crisis in its history. The AKP's populism is the reason for this economic downfall and social destruction! If this continues for much longer, Turkey is certain to face may more serious issues than those it faces today."

 

Iran media watch

 

DENMARK PLOT: Iranian broadcast media today led with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's Tweet accusing Israeli intelligence of "perverse and stubborn planting of false flags" against the Islamic Republic. His comment came after reports said the Mossad intelligence service had tipped off its Danish counterpart to an alleged plot by the Islamic Republic's intelligence service to assassinate an Iranian-Arab opposition figure in Denmark. State radio VIRI quoted Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qassemi as saying that Denmark's envoy to Tehran was summoned and informed of Iran's "repudiation of hasty political and media accusations" made by some Danish officials. Denmark had earlier recalled its ambassador to Iran for consultations. Some dailies suspected that the allegations were aimed at damaging Iran/EU relations ahead of a new round of US sanctions against the Islamic Republic scheduled to be enforced on 4 November. "Denmark's suspicious behaviour ahead of 4 November," read a headline in moderate Arman-e Emruz, while hardline daily Javan wrote: "Israelis in Denmark in support of terrorists." Another hardline daily, Keyhan, ran a report on what it called "a series of terror allegations" and opined that they were all part of "Europe's plot" to dodge its commitments regarding the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA). "Copenhagen, new piece of anti-Iranian puzzle in Europe," read reformist Mardom Salari's front-page headline.

 

ZARIF IN PAKISTAN: Zarif is in Pakistan to pursue the release of Iranian border guards kidnapped at a border area last month. On 15 October, Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), a militant Sunni group, abducted a number of Iranian servicemen based at a border guard station in south-eastern Sistan-Baluchestan Province and took them to a hideout in Pakistan. English-language Press TV reported on Zarif's talks with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan over the latest developments concerning the abducted border guards. Initial reports had said that 14 border guards were kidnapped; state media now puts the number at 12.

 

ROWHANI REMARKS: Several newspapers have highlighted remarks made yesterday by President Rowhani days ahead of a new round of U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic comes into effect. Pro-reform Ebtekar quoted Rowhani as saying that "America will not achieve its goals", while hardline Javan highlighted part of his speech where he said Washington was "retreating step by step" from its anti-Iran stance. Sedaye Eslahat predicted that November will be a difficult month for President Rowhani. "4 November in Iran's history is a reminder of U.S. crimes," wrote centrist Jomhouri-e Eslami quoting Rowhani, in a reference to the various occasions marked on the day, including Student Day and the anniversary of the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian anti-regime users have launched yet another Twitter campaign (23,000 Tweets in the last day) in English, urging European countries to cut business ties with the Islamic Republic over its alleged plots to assassinate foreign-based dissidents. "The events in Denmark and France have proven that Europe's support for the Islamic Republic actually means protecting terrorism," one user wrote.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 01.11.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The simple truth

2-Between threats and action

3-The new American scheme

 

1- The simple truth

 

The U.S. officials who have suddenly woken up to the war in Yemen and want to end it within a matter of days have not done so out of concern for the Yemeni people's blood and lives. They want to help the Saudi-coalition find a way out of this trap that has destroyed its image around the world, bled its fortunes (the war's cost stands at $9 billion each month), and is beginning to produce negative results, most importantly fragmenting the [Saudi] Kingdom, undermining its security and stability, bleeding it financially, and destroying its and its Emirati ally's economy as a result the increasing number of [Houthi] missiles that are becoming more accurate in striking their [Saudi] targets. We may have exaggerated a little when we attributed this 'rush' to end the war to Khashoggi's murder and its effects on Saudi Arabia. But we attribute the main cause of this to the Yemeni people in particular, who have fought ferociously in defense of their land, dignity, history, and Arabism. Without this heroic steadfastness, this war would not have lasted for almost four years. This is the simple truth that cannot be denied--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

Let us imagine the state of affairs in Yemen if the Houthi coup had managed to consolidate its legitimacy, take hold of the country's foreign relations, and succeeded in transforming Yemen into an Iranian base and missile launching-pad that would have threatened the entire Southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and its allies have prevented Yemen from falling into the abyss of becoming an ideological state led by slogans and ruled by a religious authority that believes that it derives its legitimacy from God. So, when the international community demands an end to the war in Yemen, it must specify the bases on which the war will end--Khaled as-Suleiman in Saudi Okaz

 

The one positive outcome of Khashoggi's murder is that it may now be used as a gateway to end the war on Yemen, suggests the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. But this would not have been possible without the Yemeni people's ferocious defense of their land. Riyadh and its allies would be very happy if a way is found to end the war in Yemen, provided that its causes are addressed, says a Saudi commentator. These have to do with the Iranian-backed Houthis' attempt to take over the country and oust its legitimate government, threatening the entire region.

 

ONE POSITIVE OUTCOME: "If there is one positive outcome of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's inhuman, bloody and heinous murder, this may lie in the growing likelihood that the Yemen war may end, and that stability and security may return to this country that is overflowing with Arab sentiment, dignity, and a vast reservoir of courage, chivalry, and pride," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The Saudi leadership has admitted that its officials carried out the crime. It has detained 18 members of the death squad that carried out the murder. After being provided with conclusive Turkish evidence, and after a growing tide of international anger against it, it has admitted that the crime was premeditated. This has forced it into a tight corner, weakened its position domestically and internationally, and driven it from the offensive to the defensive. It is now trying every means to overcome this crisis, no matter what the financial or political cost.

Suddenly, the 'forgotten' Yemeni war is back in the headlines, with rising voices demanding its immediate cessation, and calls for negotiations between the various parties to reach a permanent political solution:

- First, we heard U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis (on Tuesday) calling for a ceasefire within 30 days. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took a similar stance demanding that the Saudi-led coalition should cease all its air raids on inhabited areas immediately.

- Second, Martin Griffiths, the UN Envoy to Yemen, has said that he remains committed to bringing all Yemeni parties to the negotiating table within a month – please note the coordination [with the U.S. talk of 30 days] – because dialogue is the only means of reaching a comprehensive solution.

- Third, French Defense Minister Florence Parly has said that it is time for the war in Yemen to end. She repeated her condemnation of the continuing humanitarian crisis there. Meanwhile, British PM Theresa May has confirmed that she is contact with the U.S. to push for a permanent political solution.

- Fourth, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Marc Lecoq has confirmed that 14 million Yemenis are on the brink of starvation, and that deaths due to malnutrition are doubling, especially among children, against the background of the almost total absence of health care or measures to confront epidemics, primarily cholera.

These Western governments – the American, French, and British, in particular – were among the most prominent supporters of this war, backing the Saudi/Emirati coalition with weapons and ammunition. They all gave priority to billions of dollars' worth of arms deals over human rights and human values. They have now been compelled to back away from these shameful positions because that the war continues to rage and is approaching the beginning of its fifth year without achieving any of its aims.

We took a stance against this war from the very first day and the very first air raid. We confidently predicted its failure at a time when many people disagreed with us and expected it to be won decisively within a matter of weeks because of the incomparable difference between the coalition's military might, backed by the most advanced American warplanes, and the almost primitive power of the targeted Yemeni victims along with the deep divisions in the country that had just emerged from a domestic war of attrition that went by the title of an 'Arab Spring' revolution.

We predicted this war's failure because we know the Yemeni people and the country's history that brims with heroism and victory, and the defeats it has inflicted on invading empires no matter how powerful and mighty. In fact, [Saudi] King 'Abdelaziz bin 'Abdulrahman Al Saud was wise [in the 1930s] when he asked his two sons, Prince Saud and Prince Faisal, to return immediately and not remain a single hour on Yemeni soil. He told his advisor, 'Abdullah Philby, who opposed him: 'Silence. You do not know Yemen. It is the graveyard of invaders.' It is unfortunate that those who lit the fuse of this war had not read history or familiarized themselves with Yemen's geography or demography.

The U.S. officials who have suddenly woken up to the war in Yemen and want to end it within a matter of days have not done so out of concern for the Yemeni people's blood and lives. They want to help the Saudi-coalition find a way out of this trap that has destroyed its image around the world, bled its fortunes (the war's cost stands at $9 billion each month), and is beginning to produce negative results, most importantly fragmenting the [Saudi] Kingdom, undermining its security and stability, bleeding it financially, and destroying its and its Emirati ally's economy as a result the increasing number of [Houthi] missiles that are becoming more accurate in striking their [Saudi] targets.

We may have exaggerated a little when we attributed this 'rush' to end the war to Khashoggi's murder and its effects on Saudi Arabia. But we attribute the main cause of this to the Yemeni people in particular, who have fought ferociously in defense of their land, dignity, history, and Arabism. Without this heroic steadfastness, this war would not have lasted for almost four years. This is the simple truth that cannot be denied.

We were fully convinced that the Saudi/Emirati alliance had lost this war when it totally failed to control the city of Hodeida, despite months of fighting and bombardment from air and land, seeking help from all forces around the globe.

We will continue stand in the same trench alongside Yemen, the whole of Yemen, against this aggression until it ends, and until Yemen returns, stable, healthy, and recovered, reconciled and tolerant based on a uniting and all-inclusive national identity. And we believe that these wishes are not difficult to realize when we speak of the people of Yemen with their wisdom and deep roots in history.

"Anyway, tomorrow is around the corner and it will show that we are right," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

NO ONE WANTS AN ENDLESS WAR: "No one wants the war in Yemen to continue forever," writes Khaled as-Suleiman in Thursday's Saudi daily Okaz.

The aim behind the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen was to pre-empt the conditions that would have led to a greater war whose flames would have consumed the entire region. For let us imagine the state of affairs in Yemen if the Houthi coup had managed to consolidate its legitimacy, take hold of the country's foreign relations, and succeeded in transforming Yemen into an Iranian base and missile launching-pad that would have threatened the entire Southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.

Saudi Arabia and its allies have prevented Yemen from falling into the abyss of becoming an ideological state led by slogans and ruled by a religious authority that believes that it derives its legitimacy from God.

So, when the international community demands an end to the war in Yemen, it must specify the bases on which the war will end. It must determine the main features of the future that awaits the Yemeni people so as to ensure that their sacrifices have not been wasted like dust in the wind, as the Houthi coup and its military actions have squandered the lives of their victims in pursuit of power and subjugating their opponents.

The Saudis and their allies are not just passing time in Yemen. They do not aim to remain there or to intervene in Yemen's affairs. They would be happy when the conditions that forced them to intervene in support of the country's legitimate government come to an end, allowing them to devote their resources and energies to fields that are of greater benefit to their people. Consequently, they will back any proposed solution to end the war.

However, that said, the world must bear in mind that the problem never stemmed from the Saudi-led coalition, but always from the other side that adopts the same creed that led Iran to sacrifice the lives of hundreds-of-thousands of Iranians in the [1980/88] Iraq/Iran war.

"Ending the war without dealing with its causes would be no more than a fragile and temporary truce that would not prevent a more painful and longer war from breaking out," concludes Suleiman.

Ends…

 

2-Between threats and action

 

My advice to the PA is to stop posturing and issuing threats that it is unable or unwilling to follow up on. Repeating such practices weakens the PA's credibility and undermines what remains of its image. It does more to highlight its weakness than display its power. I understand that the PA and the presidency's deeper positions are not in alignment with such slogans nor comply with such demands and calls. In light of this, is there any need to continue with such a game? Do such practices help to reinforce the mutual trust between the parties to the Palestinian national project? And is it possible to base the endeavor to revive and resurrect the Palestinian national movement and reinvigorate the PLO on such fragile foundations, typified by mistrust, uncertainty, 'loss of direction,' and mutual accusations of responsibility for the difficult circumstances that the Palestinian national project has ended up in?-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

If there is any fault regarding the implementation of [the PCC's] resolutions, it does not apply to their nature. But their implementation, on the other hand, requires facing some very serious challenges. The cost will be enormous, which is why this entails preparing the proper tools to manage this conflict at the least possible cost. It also demands a different sort of national Palestinian situation in order to bear the consequences. These resolutions are supposed to deal with what has happened over 25 years since the Oslo process began. Many facts have accumulated over these years that are not easy to overcome. The matter requires a roadmap and a gradual vision when it comes to implementing the resolutions... Events have taken dangerous course that is not open to adjustment by the U.S./Israeli alliance after developments on the ground have bypassed the possibility of employing these resolutions as threats--Talal 'Awkal in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

This week's Palestinian Central Council's (PCC's) meeting ended with the same resolutions adopted at previous meetings, but with nothing to suggest that the Palestinian leadership intends to implement them this time around, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. The Palestinian national movement is paying an enormous price for this dissonance between its discourse and practice. Critics of the PCC have failed to detect the new elements in its latest resolutions, argues a Gaza-based Palestinian commentator. These resolutions are also meant to reverse accumulations of 25 years of the Oslo process, which cannot be done overnight, and requires careful action to minimize the cost to the Palestinian people.

 

'TAKE-3' BUT NO 'ACTION': "The PLO's PCC has adopted the same resolutions for the third time in row," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

For the third time, the president and the PLO Executive Committee have been authorized to follow up on these resolutions and implement them. To use the language of cinema, this is like saying 'Take-3'; but the maestro or director has still not shouted out: 'Action!' for the camera lenses to begin turning and the film to be shot. In fact, we may witness a 'Take-4'; but we are most unlikely to hear anyone shouting: 'Action!'

The demands to implement the resolutions adopted by the PNC (Palestinian National Council) and the PCC have never ceased; but no one has paid any attention to them. This has led a number of factions and independent figures to boycott the two councils' sessions, and the PCC in particular. In fact, the Palestinian leadership barely succeeded in securing a quorum for the PCC meeting, even though its membership was tailored to fit the leadership's size, calculations, and preferences.

It is also worth noting that as soon as those meeting in Ramallah went their separate ways, voices emerged from within the 'Follow-up Committee' calling for realism and rationality, and warning against taking leaps in the void or the unknown. And this means that no one will take the trouble to implement these resolutions or translate them into action.

So, why does the PA/PLO's leadership bother to reproduce the same resolutions, when it has no intention of implementing them? I suspect – and not all suspicion is a sin – that it is doing so in order to achieve two aims:

- First to send a message to Israel and the international community that it will respond to U.S./Israeli escalation with similar escalation.

- Second, in order to offer a means for the complainers, rejectionists, oppositionists, and revolutionaries to let off steam inside the meeting halls, and to express what is on their minds and in their hearts, putting it all in ink on paper but with no intention of implementing it.

But I am sure that this game – or tactic, if one wants to raise the moral level of the debate – no longer fools anyone. There was no shock to Israel's political and security establishments, and it is likely that no one in Israel took these decisions seriously. And the same goes for Washington and the international community.

Moreover, the Palestinian 'factions' and 'figures' are now fully aware of the game's rules and aims. Those who still have the last vestiges of self-respect preferred to boycott the meeting in order not be recorded as 'false witnesses.' As for others, who have no place, except at the back as a member of the chorus, all they had to do was to applaud or passively watch what was happening. And there are always sufficient justifications to market one position or another, and they will never lack the means to do so.

The escalatory resolutions adopted by the latest PNC and PCC meetings are akin to the [the Palestinian leadership's] ceaseless threats to 'hand over the PA's keys to Binyamin Netanyahu'. They have lost their effect as a card to be brandished. And those who may believe that the PA has abandoned its belief in the 'sacred' character of security coordination or is about to withdraw from signed agreements, or 'suspend' recognition of Israel, are deluding themselves. In fact, I do not know what 'suspending' recognition means and whether it has any place in international law or not.

My advice to the PA is to stop posturing and issuing threats that it is unable or unwilling to follow up on. Repeating such practices weakens the PA's credibility and undermines what remains of its image. It does more to highlight its weakness than display its power.

I understand that the PA and the presidency's deeper positions are not in alignment with such slogans nor comply with such demands and calls. In light of this, is there any need to continue with such a game? Do such practices help to reinforce the mutual trust between the parties to the Palestinian national project?

"And is it possible to base the endeavor to revive and resurrect the Palestinian national movement and reinvigorate the PLO on such fragile foundations, typified by mistrust, uncertainty, 'loss of direction,' and mutual accusations of responsibility for the difficult circumstances that the Palestinian national project has ended up in?" asks Rintawi in conclusion.

End…

 

AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT: "Against the background of the absence of a number of national and Islamist factions whose size and political and popular role in the struggle exceed the number of boycotters and absentees from the PCC's 30th session – 31 members out of 143 – the PCC held its ordinary meeting and produced an important political statement," writes Talal 'Awkal in Thursday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Despite the quorum– which in itself underlines a problem having to do with extent to which it was properly representative even without taking Hamas and Islamic Jihad into consideration – very fact of holding this meeting highlights the extent of the crisis that is taking the Palestinian national institution by storm and threatening the Palestinians' representative bodies' inclusiveness.

I will not here discuss this crisis or the conflicting legitimacies or the question of representation; nor will I discuss the mechanism for reaching decisions in our national institutions that are supposed to be all-inclusive. Many factions and political observers have already offered many criticisms, objections, and remarks on these issues.

But what may be more important is the PCC's final communiqué that has elicited two sorts of criticisms: The first has to do with the claim that its resolutions are repetitive and contain nothing new; and the second focuses on the issue of implementation. Those making these criticisms believe that the PCC's resolutions are repetitions of the same council's 2015 and 2018 resolutions that were confirmed by the PNC and the PLO Executive Committee, but that have not seen the light of day so far.

But we believe that the PCC's 30th session's final statement included new elements over and above the previous resolutions. Moreover, it was formulated in more serious, firmer, and more decisive terms. And the statement's spirit reflects a determined will to continue the struggle against the challenges facing the Palestinians.

Among the new elements was the PCC's description of relations with the racist occupation as one of struggle, and by extension, one of struggle with the U.S. as well, which the PCC's statement describes as the Israeli occupation's partner and a part of the problem and not of the solution. This point in particular should slam the door on the doubters who have pointed to certain expressions in order to demonstrate that the leadership is wagering on the possibility of returning to negotiations based on the [U.S.-sponsored] deal of the century.

This point goes beyond the previously declared positions of rejecting and confronting the deal of the century and ending all contacts and dealings with the U.S. until it rescinds its decisions regarding Palestinian rights. For by describing the U.S. in these terms, the PCC's latest statement places it at the head of the Palestinian people's list of enemies, alongside the occupation state.

Another new thing in the PCC's statement is its firm opposition to the normalization of Arab/Israeli relations: First, by insisting on the need to implement the 1980 Amman summit's resolutions that call for severing relations with any state that recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital or that moves its embassy to the city. Second, by stressing that the PLO clings to the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the 2002 Beirut summit that is facing determined efforts to turn on its head.

Another new element that emerged from the PCC's session is that the PLO has officially adopted the Boycott/Divestment/Sanctions (BDS) movement for the first time, calling for strengthening it, expanding the areas in which it operates, and promoting international compliance with that movement's aims.

It is also important to note that the PCC's statement failed to mention any punitive measures against Hamas or the people of Gaza. In fact, it even reversed previous measures taken by the PNC by urging the need to rescind them.

This point's importance stems from the fact that almost everyone had expected the PCC to adopt new measures in light of the angry and tense terms used in the [President Abbas's] speech that inaugurated the PCC session and that placed Hamas alongside Israel and the U.S. – when it was better to separate and distinguish between them. Moreover, a few days before the PCC session, Fatah's Revolutionary Council had recommended dissolving the PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council), not to mention the many threats and leaks regarding new sanctions [on Hamas/Gaza].

I believe that the absence of such measures from the PCC's resolutions, as well as other points in its statement that address the internal Palestinian situation – including the readiness for new PNC based on previous agreements and for resolving the crisis between the Palestinian factions – mean that the PCC has opened the door to a new effort to achieve inter-Palestinian reconciliation. In fact, the Egyptian delegation's trip to the Gaza Strip the day after the PCC meetings ended confirms this last point, thereby initiating a new shuttle effort between Gaza and Ramallah centering on reconciliation and tahdi'a [lull or calming down] issues.

As for the other fundamental objections to the PCC's resolutions that raise the issue of impotence and procrastination when it comes to implementing previous PNC resolutions, they fail to take into consideration the following:

- If there is any fault regarding the implementation of these resolutions, it does not apply to their nature. But their implementation, on the other hand, requires facing some very serious challenges. The cost will be enormous, which is why this entails preparing the proper tools to manage this conflict at the least possible cost. It also demands a different sort of national Palestinian situation in order to bear the consequences.

- These resolutions are supposed to deal with what has happened over 25 years since the Oslo process began. Many facts have accumulated over these years that are not easy to overcome. The matter requires a roadmap and a gradual vision when it comes to implementing the resolutions.

We should also not ignore the fact that adopting such resolutions before Trump and his deal was meant to threaten an adjustment in the Palestinians' course, which is permissible in political action. However, the situation is different today.

"Events have taken dangerous course that is not open to adjustment by the U.S./Israeli alliance after developments on the ground have bypassed the possibility of employing these resolutions as threats," concludes 'Awkal.

Ends…

 

3-The new American scheme

 

The U.S.-backed SDF's withdrawal in the face of ISIS, suggests that Washington is concocting a new scheme to foil a Syrian settlement using ISIS as its tool, says Mohammad Kharroub in today's Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF's) rapid withdrawal before advancing ISIS forces East of the Euphrates could not have happened without collusion between the U.S., ISIS, and the SDF, maintains a Jordanian commentator. These developments offer the 'glad tiding' of a new U.S. scheme that is meant to obstruct a peaceful solution in Syria, topple the Syrian president, and cut Russian and Iranian influence there down to size.

 

COLLAPSED HORSE: "Suddenly, the SDF – the horse on which the American invaders have been betting –collapsed," notes Mohammad Kharroub in Thursday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

The SDF threw themselves into the Americans' lap. They became the cat's claw and the tool by which the Americans established their military bases in Northern and Northeastern Syria; based on the lie they invented, namely, to fight terrorism. But they soon revealed their scheme that is intended to obstruct, or in fact undermine, the attempt to resolve the Syrian crisis by political means. They have said it loud and clear instead that they will be 'staying' in Syria, even after ISIS is defeated and repulsed.

The resounding defeat inflicted on the U.S.-backed Kurdish militias would not have occurred had the 'coalition' air force intervened to support those heavily armed militias. However, as the Syrian 'opposition' media reported, these militias simply withdrew before the attacking ISIS groups only hours after the attack began without putting up a strong fight on the pretext that they failed to secure backing from the coalition due to difficult weather conditions. However, those who have investigated what really happened have said that this claim is unjustified, especially since the attacking groups were not numerous and faced large defending forces equipped with the best weapons.

What is happening is a malicious but self-evident game, especially since the SDF's leaders have said that the reason for the setback was partially due to the 'lack of experience' of the Arab fighters in SDF ranks. This raises the level of suspicion and leads to further questions regarding the secret behind ISIS's 'surprise' return to Eastern Syria after the major strikes and defeats that have driven it to the brink of exhaustion and rendered it unable to rally ranks or carry out any counterattacks.

The justifications provided by U.S.-led coalition Spokesman Sean Ryan give us cause to believe that something is being hatched behind the scenes, and that certain parties have wanted to revive ISIS and renew its role. The aim is to exploit it once more in the coming phase, just as it was wagered on it in the phase that preceded its defeat when the Syrian state recaptured many of its lost positions and governorates. The last governorates to be liberated were in South, where ISIS was forced to retreat. As a result, the Americans embraced it and provided it with a safe haven and protection. In fact, they even helped it to deploy in Deir az-Zour areas. More specifically, U.S. helicopters have provided the mode of transportation that Russia's Hmeimim Base has monitored and declared to the world, and that Washington has never officially denied.

By way of justifying the SDF's suspect withdrawal before ISIS's attack, the international coalition's American spokesman said: 'This battle is give and take sometimes like most military fights and we have been saying from the beginning, this will be a difficult struggle.' And he added: 'ISIS is using experienced foreign fighters with nothing to lose and the SDF will come back with coalition support and continue to degrade and destroy ISIS.'

We are dealing here with a torrent of unconvincing justifications that reek of confusion, indeed, of collusion, something that Turkey as well as Iraq are pointing to as reflected in President Erdogan's statements (or 'threats') to invade the area East of the Euphrates and not only Manbij. For he has threatened to destroy 'the terror structure East of the Euphrates,' and clearly declared: 'We have completed our preparations, plans, and programs regarding this issue,' deeming this to be 'a final warning to those who are threatening Turkey's borders and exposing them to dangers,' and stressing 'Ankara's determination to devote its attention to the area East of the Euphrates and not to Manbij, which is in Aleppo's countryside.'

In Iraq as well, the head of the Iraqi National Preventive Security Agency Qassim al-'Araji, has cast doubt on the SDF militias recent withdrawal in the face of ISIS attacks. He said that this withdrawal and the deployment of ISIS in its place raise more than one question, especially since all this has occurred near the Iraqi/Syrian borders.

Erdogan (as well as the Iraqi official) knows that the SDF enjoys the Americans' protection, sponsorship, and backing. In fact, two days ago, on Tuesday, the Turkish president dropped hints, declaring that 'we know there are efforts to give ISIS a free hand via its members who have received training from well-known circles and who have deployed in the area.'

So, is there any doubt that U.S. forces have the upper hand in this area via its military bases and via its tool that goes by the name of 'SDF'? The latter evacuated its strategic positions, especially in the Hajeen Front, leaving them to ISIS fighters who seem to have secured an American green light to launch their recent attacks and announce their 'return', after a series of defeats and setbacks and the fall of their alleged Caliphate state.

We will have to wait until the facts regarding this sudden return of ISIS have been revealed, and until we know the reasons behind the effort to revive it especially after the Trump administration has made up its mind, backed by some regional –Arab – states to keep its invading forces on Syrian soil so as to obstruct a political resolution and impose its vision on the ground by toppling the Syrian president and cutting Russia and Iran's influence down to size. And it is doing so by threatening to create 'mini-states' in Northern and Eastern Syria.

"Meanwhile, what is happening East of the Euphrates and along the common borders with Iraq suggests that a new American scheme is being prepared whose initial 'glad tidings' are already evident from the green light given to ISIS to return and to the SDF to withdraw in favor of the U.S.'s new/old [ISIS] 'ally'," concludes Kharroub.

Ends...

 

...

MIDEAST MIRROR 31.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Waiting for the big one

 

The results of Israel's municipal elections Tuesday are coming in with Tel Aviv's long-standing mayor Ron Huldai reelected for another term after 20 years at the helm. In Haifa, Labor newcomer Einat Kalisch-Rotem seems to have beaten incumbent mayor Yona Yahav, who headed the city for the past 15 years. Kalisch-Rotem is now the first woman ever to lead a major city in Israel. In Jerusalem, none of the candidates reached the 40 percent threshold necessary to win the first round. Secular candidate Ofer Berkovitch, the founder and chairman of the Hitorerut (Awakening) movement that is comprised of both secular and Orthodox Jews, will be running in a second round against Moshe Leon, who has the unofficial support of ministers Avigdor Lieberman and Arye Deri. The second round is slated for November 13.

Overall, 53 percent of those eligible to vote participated in local elections across the country. This represents a slight increase compared to the last elections in 2013. This year, election day was declared a holiday in order to increase voter participation, which is also the standard in Israeli national elections. Tuesday's local elections are not Israel's version of the midterms. They are not even similar to local and regional elections in most Western democracies, where the national parties can use the results as a barometer of their popularity. In most cities and local governments in Israel, the majority of slates competing for seats are formed on an ad-hoc basis, and at most are only loosely aligned with national parties. Most mayoral candidates are independent, and while they vie for the endorsement of national leaders, whether they win or lose does not necessarily reflect on those who backed them. For all these reasons, there are usually few takeaways about national politics to be gleaned from local elections.

That said, they do sometimes indicate important and wider political trends. 2018 could turn out to be the rare local election that signals a generational shift in Israeli politics. Two major trends are occurring. First, the leaderships of the main ultra-Orthodox parties that succeeded in coordinating electoral strategy on the local and national levels since the early 1990s have dissolved. The breakdown of ultra-Orthodox politics will almost certainly influence next year's national election and could quite likely deny Netanyahu the crucial alliance he needs for forming a strong coalition – one that will stick by him if he is indicted for corruption. Meanwhile, the prime minister has more immediate troubles: The wheels are falling off his formidable election machine partly due to the fact that for years he has failed to invest in Likud's local operations, but also to a weakening of his authority. It is nowhere near a total collapse, but it is the start of Likud beginning to prepare itself for the succession battle on the day Netanyahu is forced to leave.

The municipal-election campaign in Arab towns and cities swung into full gear only in the past two months. A change felt in Arab communities in these elections was the challenge young people presented to the extended families' traditional power. In many communities, young people, including women, ran on independent tickets, and some won enough votes to ensure a spot in local councils. But they did not manage to outweigh the tribal or extended-family system; many national Arab parties did not even run alternatives to the extended-family candidates.

Controversial first-time polls in Druze communities in the Golan Heights drew protests and attacks on polling stations. A significant new element to the vote saw Druze cast ballots in the Golan Heights for the first time since Israel seized the strategic region from Syria in 1967. The vote was controversial since many Druze who feel connected to Syria fear it will help Israel legitimize its control over the region. Several hundred protesters in the village of Majdal Shams, some carrying Syrian flags, temporarily blocked a polling center as police sought to maintain calm. There had been calls to boycott the election during campaigning and a string of candidates pulled out. Israel has previously appointed local leaders in the villages. In Yarka, a separate Druze village in Northern Israel not in the Golan, police said two polling stations were closed after a stun grenade was thrown at one of them, lightly wounding 10 people. There is similar controversy in East Jerusalem, which Israel also captured in 1967 and later annexed, though there were no reports of incidents there. Unlike in national elections, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who have not taken Israeli citizenship are eligible to vote in local polls. But the vast majority stay away, refusing to recognize Israel's control over the sector of the city they see as the capital of their future state. Some 300,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem.

In political news, with the first round of municipal elections over, Prime Minister Netanyahu will soon decide when he wants the next general election to be held, sources close to him said on Tuesday. Netanyahu said in closed conversations that he cannot deal with the race for the Knesset until the completion of local races, in which he has backed more than 60 mayoral candidates across the country. The prime minister would want to distance the general election from the municipal races because his endorsements earned him many enemies. Now that most municipal races have been decided, the Knesset, which had been distracted, can return to passing the controversial haredi (ultra-Orthodox) enlistment bill, which the Supreme Court has said must be passed by December 2. Others have speculated that Netanyahu will want to advance the election in order to hold it before Attorney-General Avichai Mandelblit decides on indicting him. Channel 2 reported last week that the indictment would be ready in early 2019.

Elsewhere, an East Jerusalemite has been held for two weeks by the Palestinian Authority under suspicion that he sold an apartment to Jews in Jerusalem's Old City. Issam Aqel, who is also an American citizen, was arrested in Ramallah earlier in October by Palestinian security for suspected involvement in the sale of a house in the Old City's Muslim Quarter, near Herod's Gate. Israel Police arrested several other Palestinian suspects for involvement in Aqel's arrest, including the PA's Jerusalem governor, Adnan Ghaith, as well as Jihad al-Faqeeh, chief of intelligence for the PA in the Jerusalem area. Both were released from detention last week. In a discussion held in the Knesset's Interior Committee, right-wing MKs harshly criticized the police and the Defense Ministry for not releasing Aqel from arrest. "Why don't you pick up the phone and call the responsible person in the PA and tell him that either the guy gets back within an hour or two or buildings start to fall? What if this was a Jew from Tel Aviv?" MK Bezalel Smotrich (Habayit Hayehudi) said. According to Smotrich, Aqel arrived at the police station before he left for Ramallah and said he feared for his life. Smotrich added that since Aqel is an American citizen, American consular officials have visited him.

Finally, in financial news, Boeing has agreed to spend billions of dollars in Israel over the coming decade if it wins major defense contracts, Israel's Economy Ministry said on Tuesday. The "reciprocal procurement" agreement calls for Boeing to collaborate with Israeli industries for at least 35 percent of the value of any transaction it signs with the Israeli government. This could ease concerns in Israel over new requirements in a U.S. aid package that divert funds away from local industries. Boeing is competing in Israel for a number of key Defense Ministry contracts, including the purchase of additional F-15 aircraft, fueling planes and a squadron of transport helicopters, the ministry said. With Israel expecting to make about $10 billion of military purchases from Boeing over the next decade, the agreement with the U.S. aerospace company means $3.5 billion in new business in Israel, the ministry said in a statement.

 

 

LIEBERMAN SMELLS NETSNYAHU'S WEAKNESS: Amir Oren in Walla! argues the defense minister's appointment of Aviv Kochavi to chief of staff, without the PM's validation, was not a rash whim. Lieberman understood that Netanyahu's legal situation is about to end his tenure as PM, and made a level-headed decision to tease his rival and former partner.

"The central fact in the story of the appointment of the next chief of staff, the right choice of Major General Aviv Kochavi, has become a footnote in an even more enticing and intriguing plot: Avigdor Lieberman's war with Binyamin Netanyahu.

Kochavi is an excellent officer with an impressive background. Not only does he have no skeletons in his closet, he does not even have a closet. The greatest obstacle he faced was the defense minister's announcement. Netanyahu's half-hearted endorsement ('the worthy candidate'), following hours of silence, proves Lieberman calculated the balance of power correctly.

Lieberman has for years held Netanyahu's limpness in contempt and aspires to succeed him. Two and a half years ago he identified his weakness and achieved for himself, as head of a small faction that is necessary to ensure a stable majority, the most important portfolio in the government, his heart's desire. There he came across a strange phenomenon in the prime minister's relationship with the minister of defense: In decisions pertaining to war and peace, the buck stops with the PM, even in total opposition to the defense minister's opinion, but in the most important appointment the government can make; that of a chief of staff, the defense minister is more influential than the prime minister.

Lieberman's decision to propose to the government to appoint Kohavi, which was based on a lengthy, orderly and highly consultative process, effectively thwarted any possibility that Netanyahu - who did not partake in the process - would be able to justify his preference for another general. This is the result of Lieberman's disregard of Netanyahu's will, but in order to understand this, one must go back to the reason, or perhaps two reasons.

The first, over which Netanyahu exercised control, was his reluctance to keep the defense portfolio to himself. Netanyahu is afraid to serve as defense minister. If he so desired, he could have held the portfolio when he was elected prime minister in 1996. No one would have stood in his way and prevented him from controlling the IDF directly, after four years of Rabin and Peres (who refused to give up the portfolio for Barak, in the period between Rabin's assassination and the elections); but he was afraid of the responsibility. 'Put it down to lack of experience', he replied years later - but before he returned to the premiership – to the question why he did not keep the defense portfolio for himself. The answer was perhaps sincere, but incomplete. Even when he was very experienced, standing at the head of three governments for almost 10 consecutive years, and able of taking any portfolio for himself, he attached the media and foreign affairs portfolios to himself – but not defense. The man who was foreign secretary and minister of finance in Sharon's government but never asked for the defense portfolio, apparently does not feel secure enough to be responsible for security. A matter of personality structure, or of fear of the post-war commission of inquiry. Bibi has no security.

And despite all that, Lieberman would not have provoked Bibi so openly had he not smelled blood. Lieberman simply understands that Netanyahu's legal status is about to put an end to his term as prime minister, come the Knesset elections. In announcing Kochavi's appointment, under his own authority and without Netanyahu's validation, Lieberman hunted two fowls with one stone – made a sound decision, not borne out of reckless whimsy, his own or that of others, and exposed Netanyahu's growing weakness. Fowls rather than birds, because Netanyahu emerges from Lieberman's Kochavi story a lame duck with plucked feathers."

Ends…

 

THE CHAOS ENGULFING NETANYAHU: Ben Caspit in Maariv believes Netanyahu has long since become an independent non-party entity with an independent existence outside Likud. He has become convinced his brand is bigger, stronger, and more important than his party's brand. He may be right.

"The recording broadcast on Hadashot TV news, in which an activist from the Likud branch in Bat Yam and MK Miki Zohar are heard analyzing Prime Minister Netanyahu's behavior, reveals the tip of an iceberg. Sometimes one recording is better than a thousand words. This authentic conversation, during which MK Zohar says of the prime minister, 'I am telling you the truth, he behaved like a maniac, I have never seen anything like it', illustrates the chaos in Netanyahu's conduct. The reality, described here many times, in which Netanyahu's chamber's has been emptied (because so many of his former confidantes have turned state's witnesses), and there is no suitable professional work environment in the PM's vicinity, is worsening at a rapid pace. A hodgepodge crew of wheeler-dealers is quarreling in this Byzantine courtyard for the attention of one Chani Bleiweis, who is close to the monarch itself, meaning Lady Sarah of Balfour. She is the one who issued tapes of support from the prime minister to all and sundry. Netanyahu's tape of support for Yossi Bachar, in the face of Bat-Yam's official Likud candidate Zvika Brot, and in total contradiction to the public backing of all the party's leaders and senior members, is just one example of the chaos.

Let us move on to Or Yehuda, where Netanyahu filmed a video supporting the mayor of the city, Liat Shochat. The problem is that Shochat is not running on a Likud ticket. Quite the opposite; in the past she even ran for a seat on Labor's Knesset list. Shochat is competing against Likud. But Netanyahu supports her. Apparently due to the fact that one of the Likud leaders in Or Yehuda serves as Shochat's assistant, or something like that, and is running against his own party.

Netanyahu has long since become an independent, supra-partisan entity, with an independent existence outside of Likud. He has become convinced that his brand today is bigger, more important, stronger and more influential than his party's brand. He may be right. His party can only blame itself. Those who act like doormats – end up being trodden on like doormats.

Who is this Chani Bleiweis? Maariv readers are familiar with her from a scene she caused media minister Ayoub Kara in his office in the Ministry. She walked in like a storm, slammed the door, threw out anyone present, and stayed with the minister alone. Her shouts were heard in high heaven. After she left, the orders she brought with her from Jerusalem were immediately executed. During these local elections, she was in charge of Netanyahu's endorsement tapes. Netanyahu is a winning brand in many local authorities in Israel. Candidates were willing to kill for his endorsement. It turns out that you do not have to be a Likudnik in order to get one.

This Likud chaos is taking place in many other places. The same Miki Zohar, for example, star of the recording broadcast on Hadashot, was at the center of a similar scene in his hometown of Kiryat Gat. Zohar's group in the local Likud branch in Kiryat Gat lost by one vote to a rival group, which led the list in the local elections. Despite the loss, Zohar did not give up. He managed to extract a considerable sum (probably hundreds of thousands of shekels) from Likud's municipal headquarters, in support of an independent list he ran there. Yes, that list ran against Likud's list, but Likud (i.e., the taxpayer) financed both lists, one against the other. At our expense."

Ends…

 

WE HAVE THE TOOLS TO DETER TERROR: Einat Korman in Makor Rishon claims Israel is capable of combating terror and creating effective deterrence by demanding the death penalty for terrorists and imposing sanctions on their families. Israel can become an international example, if only MKs had the will.

"How do we create deterrence? There are two main ways to do this: First, by taking more severe punitive action against the terrorists themselves and adopting a more sever approach to dealing with them, and by implementing deterring measures against those who assist and are close to the terrorist, usually family members. There is a distinction to be made between punishment and deterrence; it is a distinction that exists in both law and legislation. But government policy does not distinguish between these two measures, and just as the government does not want to over-punish, so too it does not want to deter.

The State of Israel can easily, under existing law, demand the death penalty for terrorists; but it does not do so. The state can worsen the conditions of detention of terrorists, deprive them of extensive rights, deny family visits, freeze canteen money; but it does not do so. The state may permanently revoke the residency or citizenship of a terrorist; but it does not do so. All these and more are legitimate means of punishment, but the Israeli government does not have an unequivocal resolution to take these measures. Each case is examined on its merits, each terrorist receives his own conditions and there is no policy and no uniform approach and, therefore, no deterrence.

If there is no organized policy regarding terrorists, the situation is even worse when it comes to attempts to create deterrence by imposing sanctions against families of terrorists. The state can demolish homes of terrorists and their families; but it does not do so, because the High Court forbids it. The state can revoke work permits from families of terrorists, relocate them for a limited period of time, revoke their residency or citizenship; but it does not do so in a consistent and comprehensive manner. This does not help in creating deterrence.

The State of Israel has options for creating deterrence that already exist in the law; it simply does not use them properly. The High Court of Justice is no longer an excuse. If the State of Israel wants to use an iron fist against the terrorists and use deterrence measures against their families, it must fight for it in the courts. When it was announced that the home of the terrorist who murdered Adiel Kolman would be destroyed his family protested and claimed he was mentally ill, the state attorney accepted the claim immediately and the demolition was canceled. Only after the public protest was heard and after the Kolman family proved that the terrorist had published hate speech and was aware of his actions - the attorney general advisor ordered that the possibility of demolishing the house be reconsidered. When the three youths were kidnapped and murdered, and later during the massacre of the Solomon family, we demanded in the legal forum to place the murderers on trial and to demand the death penalty. The Military Advocate General replied that this is not the policy of the State Attorney's Office, and that he refuses to do so. But is it the military prosecutor's job to determine policy? Is this not the purview of the government?

It is to be hoped that the State of Israel's confrontation with terror will serve as an example to all the other countries in which terrorists seek to murder us."

Ends…

 

THE IRON FIST AGAINST HAMAS IS NOT WORKING: Yaela Ronen, a resident of the Gaza envelope, argues in Sicha Mekomit that Michael Gladwell's book "David and Goliath" proves using violence against a populace creates a refusal to give in, as exemplified in London in WW2 and in Northern Ireland. It is high time Israel understood Gaza will not be subdued in this way.

"I live in Kissufim. Israel's policy towards Gaza affects me and my family fast and hard. It is clear to me that Israeli governments do not formulate policies that benefit me. Look at the results: Once every week or two, missiles are launched towards us. We all live with severe anxieties. I am afraid of any loud noise, and do not know if schools will open tomorrow or if I will be forced to flee to my friends' home in Tel Aviv.

Just read the book "David and Goliath" by Malcolm Gladwell. It clearly shows that the political path of the government will only make our lives worse. It certainly will not bring any solution to the Gaza Strip. Gladwell stipulates that the use of force against an ostensibly weaker populace creates both resistance and greater survival power. The result is neither what was desired nor expected.

The first example relates to the German bombing of London during World War II. The Germans expected that the heavy bombings would drive millions out of the city and that as a result London's ability to survive – followed by Britain as a whole – would be severely damaged. But the bombings had the opposite effect. Tens of thousands were killed, tens of thousands were injured, but the millions who survived became more determined and durable and able to withstand the bombings. Gladwell gives a psychological explanation for this phenomenon: If you have not died and have not been injured, you are not 'supposed' to be hit by the bombs. The next bombardments frighten you less. They certainly will not convince you to surrender.

The second example is Northern Ireland. In the late 1960s, British General Ian Freeland decided to eliminate the violence and used force against Belfast's Catholic neighborhoods: Curfews, house searches, arrests, and the use of live ammunition. However, these actions did not 'curb' the Catholics. They only infuriated them, and the level of violence in Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants only increased. Dozens of years passed and thousands of people were killed until they reached an agreement there.

In 2008, Israel decided to impose a siege on the Gaza Strip. Israel claimed that the siege was intended to isolate Hamas and prevent rocket fire towards Israeli communities in the Negev. Since then, the level of exports from the Gaza Strip has dropped to two percent of what it was in 2007, and the volume of incoming goods has dropped to a quarter. In the last year Gaza residents have been forced to contend with a few hours of electricity a day. In recent months, as a result of over-pumping and lack of water from other sources, the amount of drinking water in the Gaza Strip has declined alarmingly. And yet, they have not surrendered. 1,166 Palestinians were killed during Operation Cast Lead. 174 were killed during Cloud Pillar. 2,125 were killed in Protective Edge. Three heavy-duty military operations, immense destruction. And yet the residents of the Gaza Strip refuse to cooperate with Israel in taking action to topple the Hamas regime.

For many of us it is clear that the path Israel has chosen is not working. Gladwell's book clarifies why this is happening: It shows that excessive use of force against a populace creates emotional resilience towards violence, and an ever- increasing desire not to surrender. Therefore, the cries emanating from some of the residents in the region, and of course also from the ministers in the government, to 'strike' Hamas in Gaza, will only lead to greater resistance from Hamas and the residents of Gaza against Israel's might. If so, why does Israel insist on continuing on this fruitless path?"

Ends…

 

THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK TOWARD CONFLICT: Amos Harel in Haaretz warns another round of violence with Islamic Jihad may lead to a more serious Israeli response that could complicate peace efforts.

"The Palestinian situation as described by Israeli defense officials is nearly identical to that as depicted by a senior politician in a conversation with reporters Monday. Last week Israel and Hamas were not far from achieving a long-term cease-fire – until the escalation over the weekend. But now, amid the violence led by Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, and the obstacles placed by the Palestinian Authority, a more pessimistic tone has replaced qualified optimism.

The coming days are expected to be sensitive – and another round of violence with Islamic Jihad may lead to a more serious military response by Israel that could complicate efforts to achieve calm. The senior command of the Israel Defense Forces, just like Prime Minister Netanyahu, seeks any alternative to launching a large-scale operation in Gaza.

Last weekend, after the many ups and downs in the indirect talks brokered by Egyptian and UN officials, it seemed the sides were approaching a deal. Hamas leaders in Gaza were encouraged by the Israeli decision to let in Qatari-funded fuel shipments, which substantially increased the electricity supply for Gazans. At the same time, there were signs of a Qatari willingness to fund a significant chunk of Hamas employees' salaries, which Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has been threatening to curtail.

The contacts went awry after Friday's incidents. First, five protesters were killed by the IDF at the Gaza border fence in confrontations that the army described as more violent than usual. Through Friday night Islamic Jihad fired dozens of rockets and mortar bombs at Israeli communities near Gaza. On Saturday morning a cease-fire was once again declared, under Egyptian pressure, but Sunday evening an Israeli airstrike killed three Palestinian teens as they approached the border fence, apparently with the aim of planting an explosive. Islamic Jihad threatened to respond but did not, after pressure by Egypt and Hamas.

Hamas now finds itself facing a dual challenge. On the one hand, Islamic Jihad is again raising the flag of resistance and is lambasting Hamas for its lack of response to IDF killings during the violent protests at the fence. On the other hand, 'Abbas is threatening further sanctions against Gaza (and at the same time is saying he will halt security coordination with Israel – a step the PA has threatened many times without actually doing so). What looked like the start of a positive dynamic, if only for a few moments last week, has been replaced by a dynamic of escalation. In the background, tensions that are palpable on the streets have risen between the various Palestinian factions. In Gaza, protests were held near the homes of several Hamas leaders. In Ramallah there was a widely attended protest against alleged PA corruption.

IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot visited the Gaza Division headquarters Tuesday to view the preparation of forces for the coming days. There will be a decent-sized deployment near Gaza toward the weekend amid concerns of a renewed escalation along the border and the possibility that Islamic Jihad will again fire rockets. The international mediation efforts will continue, but the pendulum swinging between an escalation and a deal seems to be moving once again toward renewed conflict."

Ends…

 

HOW ISRAEL BECAME INDIA'S STRATEGIC PARTNER: Mayuri Mukherjee in The Jerusalem Post explains that Israel's bottom-up diplomacy has paid off. By focusing on agriculture and water management, instead of lobbying to change India's foreign policy, Israel had shifted the core of its India policy from a politically-charged single issue (the Palestinian cause) to a much wider non-political grassroots platform.

"The recent award of a $777-million contract to Israel Aerospace Industries for the supply of air and missile defense systems to the Indian Navy has re-emphasized how India/Israel relations have evolved in the last two and a half decades. From outright hostility at the time of independence seven decades ago to a strategic partnership today, the bilateral has come a long way.

That this has been possible in part because of robust defense cooperation between New Delhi and Jerusalem is well-known but what is less acknowledged is the importance of cooperation with Indian States, in fields such as agriculture and water-management. So while the IAI deal made international headlines, the Israel tour of the chief minister of one of India's most prosperous States, Punjab, went under the radar. During his five-day visit from October 21-25, Capt. Amarinder Singh toured the NaanDanJain agricultural facility, the Dan Region wastewater treatment plant, the Afikim dairy farm, and met with President Reuven Rivlin. Earlier in the year, his counterparts from the States of Gujarat and Haryana also visited Israel, and agriculture featured prominently on both their agendas.

This decentralized strategy of partnering with different political and private players including State governments, through cooperation in agriculture and allied fields, has long been an integral part of Israeli diplomacy in India – especially in the early years when Jerusalem had few friends in New Delhi. For example, in 1949, Israel favorably considered India's request for assistance in agriculture even as India refused to recognize the Jewish State and opposed its UN membership. Israel's Histadrut maintained ties with India's labor leaders, many of whom visited the Jewish State. In 1960, two large Indian delegations – one comprising land reforms activists from the Bhoodan movement, and another comprising young farmers – visited Israel. In 1970, India's leading agriculturist Appasaheb Pawar lived in Israel for months, studying new agro-tech. His brother, Sharad Pawar – who would later serve three terms as Maharashtra chief minister and two as Union Minister – also played an important role in building agricultural ties between the two countries.

This decentralized approach to diplomacy continued even after India and Israel established diplomatic ties in 1992. A significant development in itself, it, however did not translate into policy shifts on the ground. Delhi issued a curt official statement and kept the new bilateral on a low profile. Left-wing parties opposed diplomatic ties and argued that India should have waited till Palestinian statehood had been achieved. However, the normalization of India-Israel ties coincided with the liberalization of the Indian economy – and States were now empowered to work with foreign governments to bring in economic investment. Israeli diplomats seized the opportunity. Often ignored in the power corridors of Delhi, they sought to build durable partnerships in state capitals.

A slew of chief ministerial visits to Israel, from across party lines, followed--starting with Gujarat's Chimanbhai Patel (Congress) in 1992, then Maharashtra's Sharad Pawar (Nationalist Congress Party), who led an 800-member strong delegation to the agritech conference in 1993, then Rajasthan's Bhairon Singh Shekhawat (Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1994, and Karnataka's Deve Gowda (Janata Dal-Secular) in 1995. In 1996, Deve Gowda became Prime Minister and, within six months, hosted President Ezer Weizman in Delhi – even though his own party had opposed normalization. Gowda and Weizman signed four agreements, including one to set up a model farm at India's premier agriculture research institute near Delhi. By this time, Israeli firms had also begun to build a profile in India – Tahal was working on water management in Gujarat and Rajasthan while Netafim had a joint venture with an Indian firm that it had been doing business with even before 1992. Both Israeli companies now have a pan-India presence.

The bilateral grew stronger with the pro-Israel BJP coming to the helm in Delhi in 1998. In 2000, West Bengal's Jyoti Basu, a Communist party veteran, broke taboo and visited Israel with a large business delegation. This was a big win, but it was derailed by the Second Intifada. Still, Prime Minister AB Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon in 2003, indicating a qualitative improvement in bilateral ties.

This was again taken down a notch when the Congress party returned to power in 2004 and rolled back public engagement. However, bilateral trade in general and cooperation in agriculture in particular continued to grow. In 2007, Israel's NaanDan joined with India's Jain Irrigation Systems to form NaanDanJain which now provides irrigation solutions across 100 countries. In 2008, the flagship Indo-Israel Agriculture Project was established. Jointly implemented by the India's horticulture mission and Israel's MASHAV, it now has more than 15 agricultural centers across nine Indians states.

When the BJP returned to power in 2014, the pro-Israel Prime Minister Narendra Modi was able to build on decades of quiet but effective diplomacy that had already delivered tangible benefits. Modi himself was chief minister of Gujarat for 14 years, during which time his state developed a close partnership with Israel. When he became Prime Minister, few other diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi.

Israel's bottom-up diplomacy has paid off. By focusing on agriculture and water management, instead of, say, lobbying to change India's foreign policy perspectives, Israel had shifted the core of its India's policy from a politically-charged single issue (the Palestinian cause) to a much wider non-political grassroots platform. This is not to suggest that cooperation in other areas, particularly defense, was not important – it was and is. But defense cooperation is also inherently susceptible to secrecy and negative opinion, which can be challenging for public diplomacy. In contrast, agricultural cooperation at the state level, allowed Israel to accrue the goodwill of the people, make friends across the ideological spectrum, and shield the bilateral from political upheavals."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 31.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Oral Calislar evaluates the upcoming Ankara local elections' race in centrist tabloid Posta: "We are witnessing one of the most critical rounds in the chess game of politics. President Erdogan does not want to lose Ankara. According to the available data, the race for the Ankara municipality will be very close. In the March 2014 elections, AKP [Justice and Development Party] candidate Melih Gokcek, garnered 1.417 million votes, while CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] candidate Mansur Yavas won 1.385 million, i.e. with only 35,000 difference between them. It is easy to say that if Gokcek shifts and becomes the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] candidate, the chances of an AKP loss will increase."

Ahmet Kaya strikes a hopeful note in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "The meetings that have begun between the Kurdish parties before the local elections have taken a positive course. I have been witness to these meetings on behalf of the Human and Freedom Party. Those who give importance to solidarity, dialogue, and cooperation between the Kurdish parties should know that what we have seen so far is much more positive and advanced than ever before. Unless there is some serious unexpected trouble, and if everyone behaves responsibly and acts with a high degree of consciousness, we are very likely to secure the desired result."

Mehmet Barlas notes the president's appreciation of loyalty in pro-government Sabah: "President Erdogan's assessment of former Ankara mayor Melih Gokcek at yesterday's AKP meeting revealed something very important about his approach, which everyone knows but is forgotten from time to time. Loyalty is one of the most important values for Erdogan, who said of Melih Gokcek that 'he has been my companion since 1994.' Getting to know Erdogan makes it easier to understand contemporary Turkish politics."

 

NATIONALISM: Sonar Polat wonders what is holding the nationalists back in left-wing opposition Aydinlik: "Those who want to align Kemalism with the West should first look in the mirror! Where do you stand today in relation to NATO and the EU? What do you think about the EU project that will hand over sovereignty to Brussels? At a time when nationalism is at rise and nationalist parties are gaining ground everywhere in the world, what possible reason is there for them to head downwards in Turkey? At a time when Turkey faces major challenges and threats, when PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] terror is out of control, why does the nationalist structure seem unable to make a big leap forward?"

Enver Aysever searches for a new Kemalism in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "Let it be known that Erdogan will allow nothing but his own ideology. It is extremely important to note that the government is now handling the October 29th Republic Day celebrations because we have to think about what are celebrating, what kind of a motherland we aspire to, and what kind of a future we dream about. Another major danger arises from a Kemalism that is severed from its revolutionary roots, linked to global imperialism, and degraded to a way of life that ultimately plays into the AKP's hands. Today, we need to revive the revolutionary Republic."

 

SYRIA/KURDS: Fadime Ozcan detects a message to Washington in pro-government Star: "The state-funded Anadolu Agency has reported that the Turkish Armed forces have struck at PKK/YPG [Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units] bases in Mor Zaghar region along the 'Ain al-Arab/Kobane border in Syria. Furthermore, speaking to the AKP's parliamentary group meeting yesterday, the president repeated that there could be another operation East of Euphrates any moment. This message was surely not addressed to the PKK/PYD [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party] but to its owner: In other words, to the U.S., which has fallen so low as to support a terror organization."

 

Iran media watch

 

'ECONOMIC TERRORISM': Iran "slammed U.S. sanctions and economic terrorism against Tehran as part of Washington's psychological war against the Iranian nation", English-language Press TV reported. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qassemi said, "Tehran's battle against terrorism to restore peace and stability in the region foiled a U.S. scheme". Qassemi rejected U.S. claims about the country's economic situation. His remarks came after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a Tweet that Iran's economy declined 3.6 percent due to Tehran's support of the Syrian regime.

 

'ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT': Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qassemi has dismissed accusations that Iran was allegedly involved in an assassination attempt on an opposition activist in Denmark, rolling news channel IRINN and Channel One (IRTV1) report. According to IRINN, following the "claim", Denmark recalled its ambassador to Tehran for consultations. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo thanked the Danish government for its "anti-Iran action", the channel said.

 

ARBA'EEN: Reports on the return of Iranian pilgrims from Iraq dominated news coverage in Iranian newspapers and domestic broadcast media. According to reports, about two million Iranian pilgrims took part in Arba'een rallies held in the city of Karbala on 30 October. Hardline Keyhan estimated that 20 million pilgrims from around the world were in Karbala for the event. "Another epic on Arba'een," reformist Aftab-e Yazd's front-page headline read. "Ideal of the United Nations," har-line Vatan-e Emruz's caption over a large photo of the massive Arba'een ceremony said.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Persian-language social media users continue to ask for the release of arrested truck drivers using. Over 4,000 Tweets were used to show support for the drives. "Iranian truck drivers are still in prison because of the strike, they need our help," wrote one. "Solidarity with truckers is the duty of every Iranian," wrote another. One user by "expressing his support for the truckers in the strike", asked "international and human rights communities for action to release the arrested". Lorry drivers went on strike on 22 September in protest over the government's failure to meet their demands. According to an unofficial tally at least 170 people have been arrested since the beginning of the strikes; some of those detained have been threatened with execution on "banditry" charges.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 31.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-A heroic posture

2-Khashoggi one month on

3-Rebuffing Putin

 

1-  A heroic posture

 

The Palestinian leadership's stance against 'the [U.S.-sponsored] deal of the century' is a point in its favor in national and patriotic terms. It is a firm position in confronting the Trump administration that has imposed its control over the world – Russia, China, NATO, the EU – while Palestine alone is boldly and unwaveringly saying 'No'. This heroic posture, however, will remain just that in light of what we know about the internal Palestinian situation… In order to be implemented, any decisions, no matter how necessary and important, require a balance of power that is different from what we have today. And the first step towards changing this balance must focus on restoring our national unity as our primary concern, if we are to implement the PCC's [Palestine Central Council's] resolutions. The inter-Palestinian issue must take national precedence over all other issues, no matter how important they may be. Without that, there can be no hope of changing the current balance of power-- Hani Habib in Palestinian al-Ayyam

As soon as President Trump took office two years ago, the U.S. administration changed from a sponsor of peace to the Palestinians' enemy. It took steps in which it confirmed that it fully sides with Israel. This is especially true of its controversial decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and its subsequent decisions that are unfair to the Palestinians... The pressing question now is this: What will happen after the decision to revoke the Palestinian recognition of Israel? Will this bring an end to Israel's policies in dealing with the PA? The situation seems difficult for the Palestinians and their leadership. But what is certain is that this decision will reshuffle the cards and cast its shadow over the moves that have already begun to reach what has come to be referred to as 'the deal of the century.' But this 'deal' has now been exposed to the winds--Emirates' al-Khaleej

 

The Palestinian Central Council (PCC) latest resolutions are to a large extent repetitions of previous resolutions that have not been implemented, notes a Palestinian commentator. If they are to be implemented now, the balance of power with Israel must be changed; and the first step towards this is to overcome the existing inter-Palestinian rifts and divisions. The PCC's most important decisions were to revoke Palestinian recognition of Israel and end security coordination with it, notes the editorial in an Emirati daily. Although the Palestinian leadership may find it difficult to follow up on these decisions, Israel and the U.S. have driven it into a corner where it has no other option. Meanwhile, the Trump administration's proposed 'deal of the century' is going nowhere.

 

REVOKING RECOGNITION: "At its latest 30th session, the PCC declared that it was revoking the PLO's recognition of Israel until Israel recognizes the State of Palestine, and it upheld the right to resist the occupation by all means possible that are consistent with international law," notes Hani Habib in Wednesday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

The PCC also decided to cease all forms of security coordination with Israel and end the Palestinian commitments to the signed agreements with Israel. It mandated for President 'Abbas to implement these decisions.

As soon as the PCC meetings ended, the president headed a meeting of the SNC (Supreme National Council) that he had formed made up of the PLO's Executive Committee members, Fatah Central Council members, and other security, government, and national figures, in order to speed up the creation of the appropriate mechanisms for implementing the PCC's resolutions.

The fact that the SNC met so quickly gives an impression of the seriousness with which the PCC's resolutions will be addressed. But the fact that no timetable was set for the Council's activities raises reasonable doubt as to whether the required seriousness will actually be manifest, especially since the PCC's latest resolutions are repetitions of its resolutions adopted at previous meetings.

Was there any need to establish the SNC at all? Doing so seems logical in light of the PNC's (PLO Palestinian National Council) recent decision to delegate its powers to the PCC. A number of observers have viewed this decision as a violation of the PLO's Basic Rules and as marginalizing the PLO Executive Committee, turning it into a consultative structure in the best of cases, even though it is meant to be the agency responsible for implementing both the PNC and PCC's resolutions.

The fact is that the establishment of the SNC as a replacement of the PLO Executive Committee recalls previous decisions to delegate the latter's powers that have not been successful in implementing the resolutions taken by the PLO's leading institutions. In March 2015, for example, the PCC delegated the implementation of its resolutions to a political committee stemming from the PLO Executive Committee, only for the matter to return to the PCC without any of the resolutions having been implemented. Proof of this comes from the fact that most of the PCC's 30th session's resolutions were referred back to it from previous sessions of the PCC itself.

In a comment he made immediately after the end of the PCC's 30th session, the PLO's Executive Committee's Secretary Sa'eb 'Ereikat, said that these resolutions would be implemented gradually so to avoid a leap into the void, because the issues in question were not mere slogans. This comment is both proper and necessary to some extent, because the issue goes beyond our ability to implement these resolutions on the ground. Moreover, the use of the term 'gradually' is an attempt to escape the fact that the issue is less about whether the positions and resolutions are the right ones, and more about the ability to implement them in practice.

Postponing these and other resolutions for years and months and the repeated meetings, all confirm that we very far from actually implementing them, even if the will to do so may be there. This is the result of a number of factors, not the least of which is the internal Palestinian [Hamas/Fatah] rift and our inability to emerge from it, despite all the agreements, initiatives, pressures, and efforts. Moreover, this is taking place in the shadow of a decline of the PLO's institutions, with the two founding PLO members – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front (PDF) – refraining from taking part in these institutions' proceedings, despite the fact that both these organizations as well as other factions, have confronted all attempts to create alternatives to the PLO.

The Palestinian leadership's stance against 'the [U.S.-sponsored] deal of the century' is a point in its favor in national and patriotic terms. It is a firm position in confronting the Trump administration that has imposed its control over the world – Russia, China, NATO, the EU – while Palestine alone is boldly and unwaveringly saying 'No'. This heroic posture, however, will remain just that in light of what we know about the internal Palestinian situation.

And to this one should add the breakdown of the Arab order that has tangibly begun to turn against its own resolutions as declared in the [2002/2007] Arab Peace Initiative, especially regarding recognition of Israel. In fact, the latest Arab developments are likely to ensure that Palestinians' will be left alone in this confrontation with Israel and the Trump administration.

In order to be implemented, any decisions, no matter how necessary and important, require a balance of power that is different from what we have today. And the first step towards changing this balance must focus on restoring our national unity as our primary concern, if we are to implement the PCC's resolutions. The inter-Palestinian issue must take national precedence over all other issues, no matter how important they may be.

"Without that, there can be no hope of changing the current balance of power," concludes Habib.

End…

 

BOLD RESOLUTION: "In a step expected by observers of the Palestinian situation, the PCC adopted a bold resolution on Monday that revoked recognition of Israel, ended security coordination with it, and authorized the PLO to follow up and implement these resolutions," writes Wednesday's editorial in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

The PCC's resolutions also linked recognition of Israel to the occupation state's recognition of the State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital based on the June 5th 1967 borders.

The decision to adopt these resolutions was not an easy one to take. But it was no longer acceptable to remain without taking such a decision, especially in light of Israel's continued violation of the agreements and understandings reached with the PA under regional and international sponsorship over the past years.

The fact is that the occupation state went too far in humiliating the PA and portraying it as impotent before its people, and as unable to take meaningful decisions in response to such endless violations. The primary manifestation of this has been the violence against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and other Palestinian cities and occupied territories, who have been staging 'Marches of Return' for months in opposition to the policy of settlement-construction, blockade, the violation of holy sites, and the Hebrew state's other policies that are meant to suppress the legitimate owners of the land and uproot them from their country.

Many issues have accumulated and driven the PCC to adopt these latest resolutions, perhaps the most important of which are the developments regarding final status issues in the Arab/Israeli conflict, including, of course, the right of return, an end to settlement activities, and recognition of a fully sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders.

Rather than respect these rights, and encouraged by the U.S., Israel has taken decisions that have contributed to weakening the PA and President Mahmoud 'Abbas. Even worse, it has persisted with its policy of settlement construction, so much so that the outlines of the promised Palestinian state have begun to disappear, after they have been besieged by settlements from every direction.

But the matter is not confined to Israel's policies alone. It also concerns the U.S. itself, which has continued to claim that it is a sponsor of peace. For, as soon as President Trump took office two years ago, the U.S. administration changed from a sponsor of peace to the Palestinians' enemy. It took steps in which it confirmed that it fully sides with Israel. This is especially true of its controversial decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and its subsequent decisions that are unfair to the Palestinians, including the expulsion of the PLO's delegation from Washington, ending U.S. aid to UNRWA, and hostility towards Palestine in international forums by using its veto right at the UN Security Council so as to prevent it from denouncing Israel for the crimes it commits in the occupied Palestinian territories on a daily basis.

The pressing question now is this: What will happen after the decision to revoke the Palestinian recognition of Israel? Will this bring an end to Israel's policies in dealing with the PA?

The situation seems difficult for the Palestinians and their leadership. But what is certain is that this decision will reshuffle the cards and cast its shadow over the moves that have already begun to reach what has come to be referred to as 'the deal of the century.'

"But this 'deal' has now been exposed to the winds," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

2-Khashoggi one month on

 

The Saudis will not hand over the 18 suspects to be tried before Turkish courts. They will not reveal [Khashoggi's] corpse's location. And President Erdogan is well aware of this. But the pressing question is this: Why does he continue to raise these demands while refraining from revealing the facts; all the facts at one go? And why does he refrain from moving on to the next phase, that of an international investigation that will compel Saudi Arabia to cooperate with investigators?... What is certain, however, is that the Saudi authorities, and Prince bin Salman in particular, have moved from the phase of attack to that of defense. They have become more flexible in dealing with many regional files and are using their strongest weapon – money – to recruit allies in confronting this crisis. After all, this crisis poses an unprecedented existential threat to these authorities given its complex threads and the involvement of international parties in it-- 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

The political situation in the U.S. is unprecedented. It is characterized by the sharp conflict between the deep state and the president, and between the president and the leading media, which are encouraged by the deep state's position, of course. This unprecedented situation – as well as the imminent mid-term Congressional elections and the Republican Party's fears of losing them – has forced Trump to change his positions, leading up to his demand for the whole truth, and even going so far as to brandish the possibility of sanctions on Saudi Arabia. Yet no one can doubt his concern for the safeguarding his relations with the Saudi leadership in light of his well-known calculations and that could later lead to a deal ...In conclusion, Jamal Khashoggi did not turn the world upside down, as is being said. The world was already turned upside down. In fact, had it not been so, Khashoggi's case would have passed without much uproar, despite its boundless ugliness and manifest rashness--Yasser az-Za'atra in Qatari al-Arab

 

While the Saudi authorities have been less than transparent in dealing with the Khashoggi case, especially as regards revealing the location of Khashoggi's body and who issued the order to murder him, Turkey has also been dragging its feet in revealing the evidence it claims to possess about the case, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. The international, mainly Western, interest in the Khashoggi case is not the result of a conspiracy, as some have claimed, argues a moderate Jordanian Islamist in a Doha daily. It is the product of a number of factors, the most important of which are the anarchy and fluidity that characterize the current international situation, and the timing at which this case erupted on the American scene.

 

THE ONLY CERTAIN TRUTH: "A month has passed since Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder in his country's Istanbul consulate," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But the only certain truth so far is that he was alive when he entered the consulate and was dead when he left it. But what remains as a puzzling mystery is the state of his corpse: Was it cut up into pieces or is it complete? Is it with or without a head? And who issued the orders to kill him? And how will the final episode of this series end?

The Saudi authorities have admitted that the murder took place inside its consulate. It also named the 15 members of the 'death squad' that it said was responsible for the murder. But it has refused all of Turkey's requests to reveal the name of the local collaborator to whom the corpse was handed and how he has disposed of it. It has also refused to reveal the identity of the person who issued the orders to carry out the crime.

A review of the manner in which the Saudi authorities have been dealing with this crime demonstrates that they believe that admitting to it is less serious than revealing the location of the corpse and its condition due to the consequences that may have negative repercussions for the entire current Saudi regime and topple some of its senior figures.

We believe that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will receive not receive any answer to the question he has posed to Saudi Public Prosecutor Saud al-Mu'jib – who is currently visiting Turkey – regarding the corpse's location or the identity of the person who issued the order to kill him, quite simply because Mr. Mu'jib does not know the corpse's location; moreover, he would not dare to point the finger at Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, as the Turkish president expects and hopes.

President Erdogan confronted the Saudi public prosecutor and told him: 'We must solve this case and there is no need for procrastination. It is illogical to try to save certain individuals' – in reference to Prince Mohammad bin Salman. However, the same demands may also be directed at President Erdogan who has promised to reveal all the facts. Moreover, sources close to him have insisted that he is in possession of audiotapes and videotapes that confirm how the murder occurred and that many officials have seen, most recently CIA Director Gina Haspel, who visited Ankara around a week ago and reported back to her boss, Donald Trump, who has kept his silence ever since and has not mentioned the matter at all – may God undo his knotted tongue.

The Saudis will not hand over the 18 suspects to be tried before Turkish courts. They will not reveal the corpse's location. And President Erdogan is well aware of this. But the pressing question is this: Why does he continue to raise these demands while refraining from revealing the facts; all the facts at one go? And why does he refrain from moving on to the next phase, that of an international investigation that will compel Saudi Arabia to cooperate with investigators?

Turkish sources have once again returned to the weapon of leaks, the most important of which two days ago concerned a list of figures have been targeted for assassination by the Saudi authorities that were behind Khashoggi's murder. This list includes other Saudi opposition figures living in more than one country – Turkey, European and other Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the party behind this scheme is acting in cooperation with American, Egyptian, Israeli, and Emirati intelligence agencies. These leaks have also claimed that President Erdogan himself is one of this scheme's targets. However, like previous such leaks, they speak in general terms and do not name any names, which casts doubt on their credibility.

What is certain, however, is that the Saudi authorities, and Prince bin Salman in particular, have moved from the phase of attack to that of defense. They have become more flexible in dealing with many regional files and are using their strongest weapon – money – to recruit allies in confronting this crisis. After all, this crisis poses an unprecedented existential threat to these authorities given its complex threads and the involvement of international parties in it.

The most significant development in the U.S. is not the media mobilization behind this issue with the aim of keeping it alive as long as possible, but the emergence of a new theory whose most important advocate is the Republican Elliot Abrams, who served as an official in former U.S. president George Bush Jr.'s administration.

This theory is finding widespread acceptance in Congress and among the political and economic elite. It says that ending arms sales to Saudi Arabia, as many people have been demanding, is not the solution. The solution is to bring about changes in the Saudi regime and expand its decision-making circles rather than concentrating them in the hands of one person. Ending arms' sales would promote Iran's interests and those of other countries such as China and Russia that are ready to fill any vacuum created by the U.S. in this regard, making billions of dollars from the Saudi treasury.

Trump's silence may be the calm before the storm, as some in Washington are claiming, because they believe that his attempts to save his 'friend' Prince bin Salman have almost reached a dead-end. Meanwhile, the American 'establishment' is ready to confront Trump and perhaps tighten the noose around his presidency's neck.

We await two important and fundamental developments in this case: To find the corpse's location and what happened to it; and the fulfilment of Erdogan's promises to reveal the whole truth and publish the audio and video evidence. And we hope that we do not have long to wait.

"We will have more to say once these two developments occur," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

DROWNING IN CONSPIRACIES: "Many have drowned in conspiracy theories, seeking an explanation for the secret behind the international interest in the martyr Jamal Khashoggi's case," writes Yasser az-Za'atra in Wednesday's Qatari daily al-Arab.

The inability to find an answer to this question seems to be important. Moreover, many similar incidents have occurred – and with figures who were more important politically than Khashoggi – but they did not receive the same attention as in the martyr Jamal's case.

A number of factors could provide a prelude to answering this question, perhaps the first of which is the fact that international concern with the Khashoggi case has effectively been confined to the U.S./Western axis. The other axes – with China and Russia at the forefront – have been absent. And when we speak of the Western axis, we are speaking of those states that are closest to Saudi Arabia, that have strong relations with it, and that are naturally concerned with keeping it on their side rather than losing it.

The other important issue is the fact that this Western axis is no longer as united as it once was. It was riddled with disagreements even before Trump came to power, and these have become much worse since. And this, to begin with, undermines the claims of conspiracies orchestrated by a single and united side, and that were not true in most cases anyway.

Another important issue is that Trump has no interest in denouncing the Saudi leadership for what happened to Jamal. In fact, it was clear that was concerned to do the opposite. But faced with a torrent of attacks from the media and the Democratic Party three weeks before the mid-term Congressional elections, Trump had no alternative but to change his position, despite his obvious vacillation in this regard. The timing of what is happening is thus an extremely important issue.

We may now begin to consider the reasons for this international concern, and the most important by far is the anarchy and fluidity that characterize the world today. This is an unprecedented situation for over a century perhaps. And this anarchy prevents the understandings that can decide the international situation and determine the fate of its problems.

In addition to this political fluidity, there is the enormous power of the traditional and social media that now have the strongest influence on politicians all around the world, but especially in those countries that enjoy margins of freedom. The situation is largely different in totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes such as China and Russia.

In this regard, we need to bear in mind that Jamal was a journalist with extensive relations with leading sectors. There is no doubt that this dimension – in addition to the crime's rash and ugly character – has played a role. However, it would not have been enough had it not been for the general political situation as mentioned above, and for the American political scene that we shall now speak of below.

The political situation in the U.S. is unprecedented. It is characterized by the sharp conflict between the deep state and the president, and between the president and the leading media, which are encouraged by the deep state's position, of course. This unprecedented situation – as well as the imminent mid-term Congressional elections and the Republican Party's fears of losing them – has forced Trump to change his positions, leading up to his demand for the whole truth, and even going so far as to brandish the possibility of sanctions on Saudi Arabia. Yet no one can doubt his concern for the safeguarding his relations with the Saudi leadership in light of his well-known calculations and that could later lead to a deal.

In conclusion, Jamal Khashoggi did not turn the world upside down, as is being said. The world was already turned upside down. In fact, had it not been so, Khashoggi's case would have passed without much uproar, despite its boundless ugliness and manifest rashness.

"Broadly speaking, this is how political changes come about: they are the result of a number of factors, even if seems that the most important is the last and most direct cause of what may happen," concludes Za'atra.

Ends…

 

3-Rebuffing Putin

 

Europe's leading powers along with Washington have told the Russian president that they will not participate in Syria's reconstruction without progress towards a new Syrian political regime, says Randa Taqiyyiddin in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

President Putin's efforts to convince France and Germany to take part in the reconstruction of Syria at the four-way weekend Istanbul summit were firmly rebuffed, claims an anti-Damascus Lebanese commentator in a Saudi daily. Moreover, Washington has changed track and is now more involved in the Syrian question, insisting on the need to find a comprehensive transitional solution before any reconstruction efforts can begin.

 

FIRM REJECTION: "During the four-way summit hosted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last Saturday, Vladimir Putin asked his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron and German counterpart Angela Merkel to begin taking part in Syria's reconstruction so that rebuilding what was destroyed would allow the refugees to return to their country," writes Randa Taqiyyiddin in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

But this was met by a firm rejection from both leaders.

Macron told the Russian president that the regime's war on those opposed to it has led millions of Syrians to leave their country, and that the only way of finding a permanent solution is to come up with a political settlement that allows all Syrians to live in permanent peace and security in their country – which can only come about after a comprehensive political solution that includes all of the country's constituents. He added that the regime's logic based on recapturing the cities it has lost militarily cannot guarantee Syria's stability or ensure the refugees' safe return.

Macron's position – that as long as the regime refuses to negotiate a comprehensive political solution that includes all of Syria's popular constituents, it would be difficult to reconstruct the country – is based on a clear and logical argument. The U.S. has already adopted the same position.

For how does Putin expect the country to be rebuilt while Bashar al-Assad remains in power, despite his attitude towards a nation that he has forcefully displaced and killed, and whose cities and homes he has destroyed?

How does he expect the country to be reconstructed with French, German and U.S. support, when the people's fate remains in the hands of the man who has forcefully displaced them, dropped explosive barrels on them, and sought the help of Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces in order to remain the leader of a destroyed country?

In his upcoming summit with his American counterpart Donald Trump in Paris on November 11th (on the margins of the celebrations of Armistice Day and the Peace Forum that Macron is holding), Putin will find that all members of the 'Small Group on Syria' have adopted the same stance towards Syria's reconstruction. After all, it is impossible to rebuild the country while Bashar al-Assad continues to oppose any discussion of the constitution for the future of a country and a nation that aspires to a transitional period that removes Assad and the foreign forces, and that grants the Syrian people the right to determine their future and fate.

Putin's insistence that the Europeans should initiate the reconstruction process means that Russia alone cannot rebuild the country. Even if Putin secures an eternal base in Tartous on the Mediterranean, Russia realizes that it cannot assume the burden of reconstruction alone. True, Putin has imposed himself on the Middle East and perhaps the world via his intervention and war in Syria. But Russia no longer has the Soviet Union's power and abilities that were once equal to the other major powers including the U.S. and the free world in these respects.

In fact, Putin's insistence on securing France and Germany's role in reconstructing Syria expresses Russia's need for Europe in this process. But this is impossible as long as the situation remains as it is, and as long as there is no genuine political solution.

The negotiations over the committee charged with drafting a Syrian constitution and the fact that this committee is supposed to hold its first meeting in Geneva under UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura before the end of the year, indicate that an agreement was reached at the four-way summit in Istanbul over an issue that Moscow used to oppose in principle because it claimed it would be difficult to convince the regime to accept this immediately.

Macron, Merkel, and Erdogan, however, managed to impose this on the summit's final communique. But who can believe that Putin, who has saved Bashar al-Assad and protected his regime, cannot convince him of the need to actively join the negotiations regarding his country's future?

The U.S. administration has now raised its involvement in the Syrian file, and senior diplomats have been appointed to follow up on this issue, one of which will visit Paris today to coordinate with the French over the Syrian issue. This is a new development in the U.S.'s policy after its previous talk of leaving Syria. Washington has now changed direction and the administration is involved in the effort to launch political negotiations, rather that leaving everything in the Middle East to Russia. Trump wanted to withdraw all his forces from the region, but some members of his inner circle and Macron have convinced him that it would be better to remain there as long as Iranian forces are in Syria.

"But the question remains: Will the U.S.'s Israeli ally allow for a political transition given that, like Russia and Iran, it prefers Bashar al-Assad to remain in power?" asks Taqiyyiddin in conclusion.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 30.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Values and interests

 

Israelis are heading to the polls to elect local and regional representatives, with a newly instituted vacation day seeking to challenge widespread voter apathy and raise the country's traditionally low turnout rates. Ballot stations nationwide opened at 7 a.m. and will close by 10 p.m.  The preliminary results are expected to trickle in overnight Tuesday-Wednesday, with a final count anticipated by Wednesday. Some 6.6 million Israeli citizens and residents over the age of 17 are eligible to cast their votes in the local elections, electing officials to some 251 city, town, and regional councils nationwide, according to Interior Ministry figures. In Israel's largest cities, veteran mayors in Tel Aviv and Haifa were battling increasingly formidable challengers, while in Jerusalem, where the incumbent is not running, the race appeared to be wide open. Jerusalem is holding the most nail-biting contest in the country, with no clear winner emerging in the run-up to the race. The front-runners in the mayoral race are Jerusalem Affairs Minister Ze'ev Elkin and Jerusalem council members Moshe Lion and Ofer Berkovitch. Ultra-Orthodox candidate Yossi Deitch, a Jerusalem deputy mayor, has also been campaigning for the post and has cast himself as a dark horse. In East Jerusalem, most of the city's 300,000 Arab residents were expected to uphold a longstanding boycott of the municipal elections.

A top Palestinian body on Monday passed a motion urging Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas to suspend all agreements with Israel and revoke recognition of the Jewish state until Israel formally recognizes a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines. "We recognize the right to resist the occupation in all methods that comply with international law," the Palestinian Central Council, a Palestine Liberation Organization decision-making body, said in its decision. The body, convening in Ramallah, said Palestinians should end "all forms" of security coordination with Israel and nullify several economic agreements that it said were being "ignored" by Jerusalem. The vote is not binding, and a final decision rests with 'Abbas. The PLO said that a committee will now be created to examine the recommendation, which would need the approval of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas. Formal adoption of the recommendation would bring the Oslo Accord to an end. Previous votes by the council in January 2018 and in 2015 to suspend security coordination with Israel were not implemented.

Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon slammed the Palestinian Authority today after the PLO Central Council decisions. "This is a big mistake," Kahlon, who is chairman of the Kulanu Party and a member of Israel's security cabinet, told Army Radio. "Over the last year, Ramllah has become more and more extreme and is torpedoing any chance of an agreement. Their desire is to starve the Gaza Strip." Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid said that the PLO's decision was a "bad joke. For all we care, they can decide not to recognize the sun, the invention of the wheel, and gravity," Lapid said. "We established a glorious state with our own hands without asking anyone. We will continue to build strong and safe Israel and when the Palestinians decide to recognize reality they are more than welcome to give us a call." Education Minister Naftali Bennett responded to the PLO's announcement by stating: "The Palestinians have never been serious about recognizing Israel. They have always been planning to destroy Israel piece by piece and throw the Jews out of our land. The charade has ended. They have shown their true colors - the Palestinians are not interested in peace and never have been."

Elsewhere, Israel has a plan to spend NIS 2.8 billion to help expand the Ma'aleh Adumim settlement by 20,000 new homes within the next 10 years. Construction of all but 470 units in the plan still needs bureaucratic and prime ministerial approvals, including for some 4,200 units that would be in the highly controversial and unbuilt E1 section of the city. Located in Area C of the West Bank just outside of Jerusalem, Ma'aleh Adumim has a population of 37,817 and is the third-largest Jewish city in the West Bank, after Modi'in Illit, with 70,081 and Betar Illit, with a population of 54,557. Ariel, the fourth largest settlement has a population of 19,626, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' 2017 database. The completion of 20,000 new homes for Ma'aleh Adumim could more than triple the size of the city.

In diplomatic news, Israeli leaders on Monday welcomed the election of Jair Bolsonaro, a controversial hardliner, as new president of Brazil, hailing his bona fide pro-Israel credentials. "I am certain that your election will lead to a great friendship between our nations and to a strengthening of Israel-Brazil ties," Prime Minister Netanyahu told Bolsonaro during a congratulatory phone call. "Looking forward to your visit to Israel," he added, referring to the far-right politician's pledge to come to Israel as president. A declared friend of the Jewish state, Bolsonaro has said that he will move Brazil's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and that his first foreign trip will be to Israel. A source close to the president-elect told Kan public radio that Bolsonaro still wants to move the embassy and that the issue will be considered soon. At the same time, the source added that the new government will investigate if such a move "would help advance the Middle East peace process." Brazil and the Arab world have close business ties and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moving the embassy there could hurt trade, the source added.

About Gaza, Prime Minister Netanyahu said yesterday that Israel's top priority in dealing with the ongoing violence is to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into Israel and to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. While another large-scale military operation in the Strip might prove unavoidable, it is in Israel's interest to try to do everything possible, including accepting the mediation and assistance offered by the international community, to prevent such a scenario, he said. "We are acting first of all to protect Israel from infiltration by people who come to harm us – our soldiers and our communities – and who want to cross the border and kill our civilians and soldiers. We have prevented it thus far," he told Israeli diplomatic reporters during a briefing at his Jerusalem office.

Meanwhile, the Israel Defense Forces has ordered a criminal probe into the killing of Razan al-Najjar, a Palestinian medic who was killed at the end of May during protests on the Gaza border. The IDF's Military Advocate General Brig. Gen. Sharon Afek rejected the findings of the preliminary military investigation from June. He ordered the Military Police to open a criminal investigation. The June investigation found that Israeli soldiers did not fire directly at Razan al-Najjar.

The Jerusalem Post reports that Saudi Arabia and Israel held secret meetings which led to an estimated $250-million deal, including the transfer of Israeli espionage technologies to the kingdom, citing an exclusive report by the United Arab Emirate news website al-Khaleej. Some of the spy systems, which are the most sophisticated systems Israel has ever sold to any Arab country, have already been transferred to Saudi Arabia and put into use after a Saudi technical team received training in operating them, the report added. The exclusive report also revealed that the two countries exchanged strategic military information in the meetings, which were conducted in Washington and London through a European mediator. Such cooperation would not be the first of its kind between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In September, al-Khaleej reported that Saudi Arabia had purchased Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system to defend itself from Houthi missile attacks. The deal, which was reportedly mediated by the United States included further plans to reach an agreement on broad military cooperation between the two countries.

Finally, Volkswagen and Intel Corp's Mobileye are planning to roll out Israel's first ride-hailing service using self-driving cars starting early next year. The two companies are forming a joint venture with Israeli car importer Champion Motors, under which Volkswagen will provide the electric vehicles and Mobileye its autonomous driving technology, the companies said in a statement on Monday. The Israeli government, which has accepted the proposal, will also support it by sharing required infrastructure and traffic data, the companies said.

 

 

VALUES AND INTERESTS: Nadav Eyal in Yedioth Ahronoth argues that Israel must consider the long term in its international ties. The support for Orban in Hungary, Duterte in the Philippines, and Bolsonaro in Brazil is not worth their promise to transfer embassies to Jerusalem.

"Should countries, and especially Israel, have moral or liberal considerations in foreign relations? This is a resounding question, and the answer to it, it must be said openly, is not self-evident. If the leader of the Philippines, for example, supports Israel – should we care that he admitted to killing civilians with his own hands? And if the elected president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, admires military dictatorship and threatens to kill leftists – is that important, given that he says he will transfer his country's embassy to Jerusalem?

Diplomatic relations are based on interests, first and foremost. A constant attempt to educate other countries, many of which are not democratic, is not necessarily effective. It is often unsuccessful when it comes from superpowers, such as the United States in the 1990s, and certainly Israeli pressure will be even less effective. Netanyahu's Israel has immediate concerns. The government wants to promote the transfer of embassies to Jerusalem and block any recognition of a Palestinian state. Whoever is willing to supply that - even if he is called Victor Orban, for example, the Hungarian prime minister, whom the Jewish community in Hungary feels incites anti-Semitism - will be considered acceptable and legitimate.

These are the claims that arise again and again when a tyrant or a democratically elected leader appears and seeks to curb freedom in his country - but says that he supports Israel. It is appropriate to answer them, because the error apparent in these assumptions is profound and has far-reaching implications.

Foreign policy is not based only on the short term, but also and mainly on long-term relations. What will happen on the day after Orban, Duterte, Trump and others? Does Israel maintain friendly relations with these people, or a relationship of demonstrable political support? In order to answer the question, we must examine how leaders use Israel, and what the second political camp has to say about it. There is a difference between friendly relations, which Israel can and should maintain with every country – except those riddled with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a passionate and close relationship that could endanger Israel's future after the disappearance of the authoritarian leader. Perhaps Israel should maintain good relations with the Duterte's Philippines, but inviting him to Israel, the only Western country he has visited, was precisely the kind of wanton excess that will in the future come at a steep political price for Israel.

It is important for Netanyahu that the Poles block pan-European initiatives for the peace process (the truth is that there are none, but what the heck), and perhaps the government is prepared to help Poland operate leverages in order to coerce the U.S. to support it regarding Russia. But to gleefully run to a humiliating compromise agreement with the government in Warsaw concerning the historical memory of Polish collaborators with the Nazis in the Holocaust?

So the first mistake is short-term thinking: The willingness to immediately sell all the political assets that Israel holds (and the fact is that these countries are courting Israel), in exchange for a puny return of blocking some failed Palestinian initiative. The second mistake is the assumption that Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, has no moral or practical duty to act cautiously. Morally, because as a people that were persecuted for generations, Jews have always been devoted to human and civil rights, desperately advancing a liberal reality, and sometimes sacrificed their lives in its name. But even if this perception seems to be downright naïve, there is still a duty of practical caution in such relations.

The reason they seek Israel's closeness is not only that she is a successful, entrepreneurial nation with close ties to the U.S., but also the ability to be cleansed and to whitewash through partnership and friendship with the Jewish state. And that is exactly because of the Jewish people's moral duty to be cautious – i.e., because the Jews who were persecuted still took care to advance the liberal values of the Enlightenment. The duty of caution is not to corrupt anything that is of benefit to the State of Israel, and that is precisely the aura that the Jewish state enjoys because of the actions of our forefathers in the past. Let us not damage it – neither with Brazil, nor with Hungary."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL STORMING ARAB COUNTRIES: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 claims the PA is deeply frustrated by the success of formal Israeli visits to Gulf states. The Palestinian problem is no longer the most pressing priority for the Arab world, which fears Iran and sees Israel as a new ally.

"Senior officials in the Palestinian Authority say that during this past week Israel has been carrying out a diplomatic offensive on the Gulf states in order to begin acclimatizing them to the idea of normalization before reaching an agreement with the Palestinians on a solution to the conflict.

Prime Minister Netanyahu made a public visit in Oman and will be followed there by Minister Yisrael Katz. Minister Miri Regev joined a Judo delegation to Abu Dhabi, another sports delegation embarked to Qatar, and Minister Ayoub Karra went to an international media conference in Dubai. The next country on Israel's list is Bahrain. This is the background for understanding the statements made by Bahrain's foreign minister, who publicly defended the ruler of Oman for inviting the prime minister to visit his country. Netanyahu said on October 28 that there will be more visits to Arab countries.

The scene of the Israeli flag openly raised in Abu Dhabi, when the Israeli Judo delegation won two gold medals and the national anthem 'Hatikva' was played, only strengthens the Palestinian feeling that Israel has attained an important diplomatic achievement by demonstrating its presence in Arab countries as just another country from the region, instead of a 'hostile political entity'.

These Arab states do not object to Israel and even welcome it. A senior Palestinian official avows that Israel has managed to skip over most of the articles of the Arab peace initiative, directly to the last section dealing with normalization. It has begun normalizing relations with the Arab states, delaying to later the attempt to achieve a permanent settlement with the Palestinians. Netanyahu has succeeded in persuading several Arab countries to accept his political approach, and he is aided by two important developments: The growing danger to the Gulf states from Iran, and the unprecedented political support he is receiving from President Trump in everything related to normalization with Arab states.

The political offensive with the Gulf states is taking place without any country mentioning the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the transfer of the American embassy to it, or the low-intensity war on the border of the Gaza Strip for the past seven months. Israel's settlement in the West Bank is also no longer mentioned. The moment the Trump administration, unlike the Obama administration, removed this issue from its agenda, the Arab world began to get used to it. The Palestinians fear is that the Gulf states are beginning to get used to the new Israeli policy, which as far as they are concerned is the beginning of the execution of the ideas that appear in President Trump's American peace plan, dubbed 'the deal of the century'.

Israel has no diplomatic relations with any Arab country other than Egypt and Jordan. Egyptian President Sisi agreed to a public meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu on the sidelines of last month's UN General Assembly debate. Behind the scenes there are security and intelligence ties with several Arab countries. All this openness in the relations of Arab countries with Israel is taking place prior to the new sanctions President Trump is planning to impose on Iran in November.

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas' mistake was misreading regional developments. The Palestinian problem no longer tops the Arab world's agenda. It is the Iranian danger that is most worrisome to the Arab countries, who are beginning to regard Israel as their natural ally rather than an enemy. At this stage the Israeli political concept is winning. As long as the Israeli government does not make any mistakes regarding its policy toward the West Bank and Gaza, the Trump administration will also adopt its point of view.

According to senior Fatah officials, in recent months the PA has sought out the Trump administration to see if there is any way of ending the rift between the PA and the administration, declared by 'Abbas after Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The secret contacts were held by Majed Faraj, Mahmoud 'Abbas' confidante, in meetings with advisor Jared Kushner and billionaire Ron Lauder. But so far they have failed to yield positive results. The very existence of these contacts indicates that 'Abbas is searching for a way to get off his high horse, following harsh criticism of his handling of the situation by the Fatah leadership, and fear that President Trump will try to impose his peace deal on the Palestinians, following the unilateral steps he has already taken on Jerusalem and refugees.

The Palestinians are liable to pay the price of their obstinate refusal and the latest developments in Israel's conduct toward the Gulf states prove that a positive change in the Arab world can be achieved in relation to Israel. As Omani Foreign Minister Yousef Ben Alawi stated last week: 'Israel is an existing state in the region and we all understand this. Perhaps it is time to treat Israel as other countries are treated.'

Netanyahu's well-publicized visit to Oman proved that it is possible to maintain diplomatic relations with Arab countries even before reaching a political agreement with the PA. These relations are limited, but it is important that the Arab world begin to get used to them, despite Palestinian protests. Israel must continue its secret diplomatic effort to persuade other Arab countries to invite Israeli delegations to visit their capitals and slowly open to public view what is happening behind the scenes. It is very important to accustom the Palestinians and the masses in the Arab countries that Israel is not about to disappear, and that she is a fact in the Middle East that cannot be ignored."

Ends…

 

AMMAN KNOWS ISRAEL WILL NOT RETALIATE: Yossi Ahimeir in Maariv stresses the peace agreement is no less important to Jordan than to Israel, and King 'Abdullah is banking on Israel not to reduce the water supply, not to disrupt economic cooperation, not to take defiant action on Temple Mount, and continue to guarantee the throne's security.

"On Friday, the 24th anniversary of the peace agreement between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, the Prime Minister held a historic visit. He did not come to Amman to meet King 'Abdullah and toast the continuation of peaceful relations with the Hashemite Kingdom; He went much farther away, to the Sultanate of Oman, which lies on the Southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, facing Iran. We do not have official peace relations with Oman, but Sultan Qaboos is probably willing to cooperate with us, in the name of peace.

And thus Netanyahu proved his assertion, which he makes in every opportunity, that Israel is warming its relations with several Arab countries in an unprecedented manner, in contradiction to the worsening hostility toward us in the immediate neighborhood; on our borders with Syria and Gaza, with the encouragement of non-Arab Iran and Turkey. He also went in order to signal to Iran that: You are in Syria, we are close to you, in the Persian Gulf.

While the prime minister did not visit Jordan, other Israelis did make a visit there on Friday. They were the fighters of the 669 rescue unit, which were dispatched aboard several Israeli Air Force helicopters to rescue people trapped by the floods that hit the Eastern Dead Sea. 20 Jordanian children and hikers were killed - an understandable reason for a day of mourning in the kingdom.

Even without this heavy calamity, Jordan should not have been expected to mark the peace treaty in any special way. Quite the opposite; the anniversary is usually marked by parades of opponents of the agreement, who are also identified with the opposition to the royal family. 'Abdullah understands better than anyone that these are demonstrations against his throne that usually disperse peacefully. This year, the King found a creative solution to calm the hostile spirits, by announcing that he would not extend the lease of two Jordanian enclaves in Israel – in Naharayim and the Arava. In so doing, he only exemplified his weakness. He surrendered to the anti-Israeli mood in his kingdom, which is also finding expression in anti-Semitic speeches in his parliament and in hate articles in the local media.

How different King 'Abdullah is from his father, the brave King Hussein, who towards the end of his life signed the peace treaty and even came to Israel to console the grieving families following the abominable murder of seven girls on the Peace Island in Naharayim in 1997. In the days of Hussein, the vile murderer was placed in long-term incarceration. Today he is a free man who publicly preaches the murder of Israelis.

King 'Abdullah has not broken the rules of the game. In his view, and he is right, he did not violate the appendix to the agreement. He only announced, with his grace, a year in advance, that the lease will cease, and the territories will revert to full Jordanian ownership. Their color will also change – the green and the blossoming will return to being yellow and pallid. The main thing is that this gift will satisfy the appetites of his domestic opponents.

The royal palace understands that Israel will not retaliate against Jordan. Keeping the peace treaty is as important to the kingdom as it is to its neighbor to the West. Israel will not reduce its water supply, will not cut off economic and other forms of cooperation, will not take defiant action on Temple Mount, and will not cease to guarantee the security of the throne. Negotiations are probably already being held with the royal palace in a bid to soften the steps it has taken, with its implications for the future.

While contemplating our relations with Jordan, we can hear the sounds of Hamas' frenzied rhetoric and rocket fire on the Gaza border, and the beating of the drums of war echoing from Syria and Lebanon. The prime minister's visit to distant Oman and the complicated relationship with nearby Amman are indeed important, but let us not forget: In the Middle East everything is liquid, everything might turn against us suddenly, with a 180 degrees U-turn."

Ends…

 

NO SURPRISE FROM JORDANIAN KING: Motti Karpel in Makor Rishon asserts that the annulment of Jordan's leasing agreement indicates the essence of peace agreements with our Arab enemies, and also the short-sightedness of Israeli politicians.

"King 'Abdullah of Jordan sure does have a keen sense of humor. His decision to announce the cancellation of the leasing of the territories in Naharayim and Tzofar precisely during the anniversary of the assassination of former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, is a real poke in the eye of all those who seek peace. If there was anything that remained intact from Yitzhak Rabin's political legacy, it was the peace agreement with Jordan. Until this week. Now it too, like every element of the Oslo process, has begun to crack.

The cancellation of the lease does not formally harm the peace agreement with Jordan. It is fully anchored in its annexes, and the Jordanians were given full right to cancel the lease 25 years later. But the cancellation hurts something deeper: The spirit of the agreement. Wording on a piece of paper is not what makes peace. There is supposed to be a spirit of compromise, trust, acceptance, reconciliation, mutual recognition and genuine and sincere willingness from both sides to march onwards together. If these are lacking, the formal details will change nothing. This is precisely the meaning of the cancellation of the lease agreements: A blow to the spirit of the peace treaty with Jordan.

The importance of the cancellation can be underestimated and seen as marginal, but in fact it points to the essence of the peace agreements with our Arab enemies; temporary arrangements, rickety by their very nature, which have only temporary and specific value. Any such agreement, with any party, must be taken with a very big grain of salt. There is no room for celebrations like those that were held here during the joyous Oslo days, and for the feelings of euphoria and messianic tidings that spread among some sectors of our society. This does not mean that it is forbidden to sign such agreements, but it certainly does mean that it is absolutely forbidden to see them as more than what they are: A temporary political arrangement, to be measured in terms of momentary loss and benefit, and not greeted with declarations about the coming of the Messiah.

In any agreement, the parties tend to postpone many elements to future periods, 25 or even 50 years ahead. This is their way of bypassing impassable hurdles. In the proposals attempting to advance a peace agreement with the Arabs living in the Land of Israel, on the basis of the two-state solution, for example, the issue of Israeli sovereignty or security responsibility in the Jordan Valley is regularly included in the category of 'so and so years, and then we shall see'. This is just one example.

This little delusion, in which politicians and policy makers deceive themselves and the public, assumes that 25 years are beyond the dark mountains of time. Well, 25 years have passed, and anyone who thought the end could be postponed in the hope that it would never come has been proven wrong. The abrogation of the lease agreements by Jordan teaches us that we must never deny the future for the sake of the present and give up eternal assets in the name of a passing political or geo-strategic need. In any such agreement, the possibility must be taken into account that when the conditions of its signatories change, the agreement will be denied. Therefore no assets that are the bedrock of our existence should be given in return for it.

A member of one of the kibbutzim in the Beit Shean Valley, who was asked this week how he received the news of the cancellation of the lease agreements, responded with one word: 'Astonishment'. The fact that he was astonished by the cancellation of the lease agreements is in itself astonishing. The brainwashing that we have all been subjected to here, caused him to view these papers as something much more real than a temporary deal, good for the moment of signing. It did not occur to him that after 25 years the checks he received might bounce back from the bank. Only those who live in an imaginary Middle East, and not in the real world, can greet this fact with astonishment."

Ends…

 

TO WEAKEN HAMAS NOT TOPPLE IT: Yaniv Kubovich and Noa Landau in Haaretz contend the plan to keep Hamas in power in the Strip stems from a desire to prevent a collapse of Gaza's infrastructure.

"Political and military leaders have concluded that it would be better for Israel not to overthrow the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip, officials who took part in the deliberations told Haaretz. A political source said Israel's policy on Hamas has not changed; the plan to keep the group in power in the Strip stems from a desire to prevent a collapse of Gaza's infrastructure, a problem that could harm Israel as well. Accordingly, the instructions to defense officials are to deter Hamas and weaken it, but in a way that will not put its control of Gaza at risk. Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to support efforts to reach an agreement that will restore quiet to the South.

The Israeli officials' conclusion stems from Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas' rigid stance on Gaza and the attempts to reach an agreement. 'Abbas is making it difficult to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza, for example, by opposing the entry of fuel trucks financed by Qatar. Israel fears that this increases the chances of an escalation. According to the officials, 'Abbas is hoping for a flare-up because he believes that this would serve the PA in its reconciliation talks with Hamas. In the near term, he plans to increase the punitive measures against the organization, the officials say.

As a result, senior political and defense officials say Israel's talks with Hamas through intermediaries will be more effective than a process that involves the PA. Netanyahu told reporters Monday that he continues to support efforts to de-escalate tensions between Israel and the Strip. 'We are working to prevent Gaza forces getting into Israel to harm our soldiers and communities,' Netanyahu said. 'On the other hand, we are working to prevent a humanitarian crisis, which is why we are willing to accept UN and Egyptian mediation efforts to achieve quiet and fix the electricity situation.'

A political source added that 'there is no diplomatic solution with a group that wants to destroy us. The only solution is deterrence and a humanitarian solution to prevent a collapse that will end up exploding in our faces.' The source added that 'the collapse is a result of Abu Mazin's decision to cut the Gazans' funding. We were close to signing an agreement for getting back to calm, but it was scuttled by the protests at the fence Friday. They were getting fuel before, so we thought things would calm down, but then they came to the fence.'

According to political sources, Netanyahu wants to avoid a war, but that does not mean he will be able to. 'Our options are occupying Gaza, but if we had someone to give it to, we would have occupied it already,' one source said. 'And it has to be done in a way that prevents casualties. But there is no one to give it to; the Arabs do not want to hear about it, so the other option is to hit it hard without occupying it. To give us time. But actually, we are already giving them pretty hard blows.' Netanyahu is willing to take criticism because he believes he still has options to achieve quiet. 'It is not only a question of political capital, we have not exhausted all options,' the source said."

Ends…

 

TIME FOR ISRAELI/JORDANIAN COVERT DIALOGUE: Gilead Sher and Mor Ben-Kalifa, writing in The Institute for National Security Studies argue the profound common interests that Jordan and Israel have shared for decades may help in overcoming the abrogation of the leases, provided the crisis is handled promptly, far from the spotlight.

"King 'Abdullah II's dramatic announcement of the decision not to renew the special regime governing the areas of Zofar and Naharayim that are cultivated by Israelis is based on clause 6 in both Annex 1.B and Annex 1.C of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, which was signed on October 26, 1994. Clause 6 states:

Without prejudice to private rights of ownership of land within the area, this Annex will remain in force for 25 years, and shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one-year prior notice of termination is given by either Party, in which case, at the request of either Party, consultations shall be entered into.

One year before the automatic renewal of the annex, King 'Abdullah announced that he will not renew the arrangement and will impose full Jordanian sovereignty over these areas. The two annexes to the peace treaty are identical, and relate to areas in the Naharayim/Baqura region in the North and to the Zofar region in the South, extending over about 200 and 500 acres, respectively. The complex reality in these two defined regions dictated a unique arrangement, governed by a 'special regime': Jordanian sovereignty, Israeli ownership of the land and/or agricultural cultivation of the region by Israeli farmers, and land rights that Jordan granted to Israel for renewable periods of 25 years each.

Covert relations between Israel and Jordan began in the 1950s and continued in the ensuing decades. In 1987 King Hussein and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres reached an informal principles agreement during a meeting in London. This agreement focused on a process, rather than on material issues: Convening an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, which would discuss solutions for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242; and the formation of joint committees, one of them for the negotiations between Israel and Jordanian-Palestinian representation. However, this agreement was torpedoed by both sides, first by Israel, in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and then by King Hussein, who after the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 renounced any involvement and claims to Jordanian sovereignty over the Palestinian territories. A joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation participated in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles by Israel and the PLO in September 1993 facilitated the renewal of the covert talks between Israel and Jordan, and a year later, the peace treaty was signed at the Arava border crossing. The agreement included minor border adjustments, including special provisions relating to the agricultural areas in Naharayim and in Zofar. The agreement also included a clause whereby 'Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.'

The royal family in Amman believes that if an Israeli-Palestinian permanent arrangement is not reached in general, and in relation to the Old City of Jerusalem in particular, matters could develop into a regional conflagration and pose a serious threat to Jordan. That is why the Jordanians have been active partners at key crossroads in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and first King Hussein and subsequently King 'Abdullah attended the various agreement-signing ceremonies between Israel and the PLO, including the eighth and last agreement signed to date – the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of September 1999.

The Israel-Jordan peace treaty has survived difficult crises over the past twenty-four years, from the murder in 1997 of seven Israeli girls in Naharayim by a Jordanian soldier, and the failed attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mish'aal in Jordan during that same year, through the al-Aqsa intifada (2000-2005) and the violent riots on Temple Mount in 2014 and in 2017, to the murder of two Jordanian citizens by an Israeli security guard from the embassy in Amman in July 2017. Jordan had no ambassador in Israel for several long periods. However, and notwithstanding the political crises over the years, numerous understandings have been signed and implemented, in relation to economics, environmental quality, trade, public health, science, culture, and agriculture. Wide scale agreements have also been signed over the last decade relating to natural gas, water, and tourism.

The Red Sea/Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project, the regional flagship venture intended initially to revive the Dead Sea, provide desalinated water to the region, generate hydroelectric energy, and develop the agriculture and tourism industries - is not progressing as planned on Israel's part. For its part, Jordan announced that it is proceeding independently with the project, and accused Israel of undermining the regional cooperation. The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Jericho Corridor for Peace and Prosperity Initiative demonstrates efforts to promote an 'economic foundation for regional peace,' and is supposed to be a key component of the efforts to develop Palestinian industry in the West Bank. The Jordan Gateway project, a joint Israeli-Jordanian industrial zone spanning the river that is a natural border between the two countries in the Emek Hamaayanot region, is based on a free trade principle between both countries and the United States. It was agreed upon in 1998, but the bridge on the Israeli side was completed only during the summer of 2018, and the development works at the site will only begin in the near future.

As for security, both countries continue to cooperate fully along the peaceful border between them. Military and police weapons and equipment deals are carried out with the support and assistance of the United States away from public eye, and both armies maintain regular cooperation in relation to training. Nevertheless, Jordan considers the Israeli-Palestinian political deadlock and Israel's continued control over the West Bank as a substantive strategic threat. As long as the status quo continues and no progress is made toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Jordanians are concerned about expulsions of Palestinians to Jordanian territory. Prince Hassan, King Hussein's brother, once called this potential contingency a 'demographic aggression.'

Jordan is battling a poor, tense socio-economic situation, which derives inter alia from the enormous systemic economic, infrastructure, political, and social burden imposed on it by the more than one million refugees (some assess their number at 1.5 million, while the United Nations cites 760,360 refugees), the majority of whom fled from Syria, with some from Iraq and Yemen. Furthermore, the financial support from the Gulf states has diminished in recent years, and in 2017, Jordanian unemployment reached 18 percent, the highest level in 25 years. About one quarter of all college graduates are unemployed. The recession in Jordan is palpable as a result of the steadily rising prices of basic consumer goods and the drastic hikes in income tax and in corporate tax. In May 2018, The Economist ranked Amman as the most expensive city in Arab countries and 28th among cities globally.

As a result of the economic hardships in Jordan, there has been a surge in protests against the royal family over the last six months. In June, these protests intensified and spread to the major cities. Unlike most of the previous events, during these protests the demonstrators did not cover their faces. At the same time, deterrence by the security forces has eroded significantly. In response, in June King 'Abdullah dismissed Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki, and replaced him with Dr. Omar al-Razzaz, an economist and the Minister of Education, with the hope that he will generate a shift in public sentiments.

The prevailing assumption is that the demonstrations are political, and many argue that they are orchestrated by political opposition factions in the kingdom. These factions also point an accusing finger at Israel, given both its behavior toward Jordan and its policy toward the Palestinians, and this assignment of blame is supported by elements in the Jordanian government and establishment. Even Trump's peace initiative (despite the fact that it has not yet been officially presented or made public) is perceived by the Jordanian government – both the King and government officials – as a potential threat to the kingdom's security, and sweeping opposition to Trump's initiative is voiced both on the Jordanian street and in the media.

Closely related issues are Jordan's honor and authority regarding its border with Israel. Demonstrators in Amman demanded that the lands in both enclaves be returned to Jordan. In August, Marwan al-Muasher, the former Jordanian ambassador to Israel and to the United States, former foreign minister, and deputy prime minister, published a lengthy article against the Trump initiative in the daily al-Rai, and called for Jordan to institute a series of measures, including 'the adoption of a resolution by the Jordanian government and parliament not to renew the lease agreement for al-Baqura lands [Naharayim]. No one in the international community will be able to claim that this constitutes a breach of the peace treaty, since Jordan is vested with the full right not to renew this agreement.'

The more vehement the demonstrations became – which were not solely about economic issues – the more intense public pressure targeted King 'Abdullah to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel altogether, with particular focus on the lands used by Israel. Of the 130 members of the Jordanian parliament, 87 signed a petition to terminate the special regime in these areas and restore Jordan's full sovereignty over them.

The current crisis could likely have been prevented, had Israel instituted a wise and forward-looking policy and thereby avoided this surprise political move that jeopardizes the future of Israeli farmers. Now that it has materialized, this crisis will hopefully not constitute a watershed in the bilateral relations. Israel and Jordan have proven in the past that they are capable of overcoming complex developments and resolving disagreements. The profound mutual interests between the countries are numerous – relating to economy, homeland security, water supply, agriculture, and of course regional security.

The peace treaty itself contains a mechanism for consultations, and these should begin immediately, at the outset of this one-year notification period, rather than once again sitting by idly. Both sides are interested in maintaining the peace treaty. Consequently, the threats made by Israeli government ministers to punish Jordan for the step that it took are both illogical and irresponsible. However, as the King will likely not retract his decision, Israel must focus on negotiations and preparations to end Israeli use of these areas - by negotiating an extension of the transition period, accommodating alternative solutions for the Israeli farmers, and determining the rate of compensation to be paid to Israel. This is a serious problem that must be handled through judicious dialogue that is independent of domestic political considerations and – most importantly – takes place far from the spotlight."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 30.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

REPUBLIC DAY CELEBRATIONS: Can Atakli takes aim at the pro-government press in opposition Korkusuz: "Those papers that are not shy about identifying themselves as foes of the Republic dedicated their front-page headlines to celebrating Republic Day because it was about 'making easy money'. Therefore, those who saw their front pages naturally assumed it was a celebration of the Republic, not an ad. Yesterday, the Republic Day ads of government companies that we have never heard of filled the pro-government papers, whereas they left pages of the opposition newspapers bare of course. The stand of the media that has no principles and displays a common enmity towards the Republic and Ataturk is disgusting."

Kazim Gulecyuz warns of a dire future in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "The absolutist regime that was put into effect under the name of the Republic has had a one-party and one-man rule since the very beginning. Today's Turkey has also been dragged towards a one-man regime based on that same model. We are not being ruled by well-attended debates but by the imperial orders of a one-man regime. If the current state of affairs were to continue, the 100th anniversary of the republic would be 'celebrated' with diverse and multi-dimensional crisis and issues. Let us not do the Republic wrong."

Kemal Ozturk explains what the Republic really means in pro-government Yeni Safak: "We believe that the Republic means that we claim the heritage of our forebears with all the good deeds as well as the bad, feel proud of its good deeds and learn lessons from its mistakes. For us, the owners of the Republic are not Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians, Albanians, and Bosnians, but everyone who feels attached to these lands. For us, the Republic is the dictatorship of the masses, unless there is democracy."

 

ISTANBUL SUMMIT: Sedat Ergin examines the photo of the four leaders who meet in Istanbul over the weekend in center-right Hurriyet: "The important point to underline in this photo is the absence of two important actors. One is the U.S., and in that respect, this points at Washington's loss of international grounds under President Trump. Iran is not in the picture, either. However, both President Erdogan and Russian President Putin have defended Iran in their statements and they seemed to make an effort to appease their partner in Astana."

 

REFUGEES/MIGRANTS: Ibrahim Sirkeci seeks to improve refugee life in leftist opposition Birgun: "One of the quickest ways to ensure that refugees adapt is to lift the obstacles facing their political and economic life. Regulations that leave them in a limbo and drive them towards illegalities, thus leaving them open to exploitation, should be revised. For example, the 5+1 or six-year residency rule that almost all countries apply is not a God-given edict. It is a pretty new rule that is arbitrary and has no objective basis."

 

Iran media watch

 

ARBA'EEN: Iran marks a public holiday today on the occasion of Arba'een, the fortieth day after the death of third Shiite Imam Hussein killed in 680 in Karbala, Iraq. No newspapers are published today. Almost two million Iranians have travelled to Iraq, many on foot, to take part in the mourning ceremonies. Iranian broadcast media say almost 500,000 pilgrims are already returning to Iran. Rallies are also to be held across Iran today, including the capital Tehran. Broadcast media have been reporting on the ceremonies both in the country and in Iraq, as well as some European countries. IRINN carried live reports of the rallies being held in Tehran and Qom, as well as Iraq's Karbala.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Many Persian-speaking users are discussing the story of a girl, who reportedly protested alone against compulsory hijab in Tehran yesterday by removing her headscarf in Enghelab Square. Users are using various hashtags to express their opinion. A U.S.-based Iranian journalist published a 32-second video on her Instagram account yesterday showing a girl taking off the headscarf and holding several balloons, standing on the dome-like structure in the middle of Enghelab Square. The video shows a policeman helping her to descend. Publishing another 56-second video of the woman, another user wrote in Persian: "We will win when onlookers support the girls of Enghelab instead of watching and filming." Yet another user wrote: "It is good that the fight against compulsory hijab is alive in Iran". A few months ago, a number of Iranian women held public protests against compulsory hijab. The bareheaded protesting women usually stand on telecom boxes and wave their headscarves on sticks. In March, at least 30 women who publicly defied hijab rules were arrested in Tehran. Back then, Iranian police and judiciary were widely criticized on social media for using force against these protesters.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 30.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Questions 'Abbas should ask himself

2-The rush to normalization

3-Weaving the carpet of a Syrian political solution

 

1-Questions 'Abbas should ask himself

 

The Palestinian president is angry at the absentees from this week's Central Council sessions, but he should ask himself why anyone would want to attend such impotent bodies' meetings, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has expressed his anger at the absence of the main PLO factions' representatives from the current 30th session of the PLO's Central Council, its second highest body, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. But he should ask himself why anyone would bother to attend such a meeting when only a narrow circle will take the decisions, and when the PLO bodies' previous decisions have not been implemented.

 

REASONS TO BE ANGRY: "President Mahmoud 'Abbas seemed to be angry during the opening session of the 30th PLO Central Council meeting," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

There are many reasons for him to be angry, and most of them anger us as well. But his anger was focused on the representatives of the factions and the independent members who decided to boycott this session. And we are not speaking of Hamas and Islamic Jihad here, as they are not represented in the PLO's institutions anyway. We are speaking of factions that were founding members of the PLO, such as the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the PDF (Popular Democratic Front).

The president said this boycott was 'shameful.' How can a faction or a PLO member boycott such an important meeting and at such a delicate and dangerous moment: one of unbounded settlement activities and the imminent date for revealing the 'Second Balfour Declaration', or what has come to be known as the [U.S.-sponsored] ' deal of the century'? The president reminded everyone that democracy in Palestine is among 'the best' in the world, and that anyone who has an opinion is free to express it under the Central Council's roof and not outside it.

We too are annoyed by the images of the empty seats at the meeting, which seemed akin to a Fatah convention. In fact, it would have been closer to a version of Fatah's Revolutionary Council had it not been for the presence of a few factions that were small even at the height of their unity and power.

But unlike the president perhaps we were also unhappy at the images of some representatives and delegates to the meeting when no one knows how they became members, who chose them, and for how long they will remain in their post. In fact, had it not been for the fear of creating a leadership 'vacuum', we would have responded with a resounding 'No!' to the question of whether this Council represents the Palestinian people.

The most prominent absence from the Central Council's meeting, Mr. President, is not confined to the PLO factions or those that have remained outside the PLO. Most of the Palestinian people's vanguard, creative elements, and genuine sectors from two successive generations of Palestinians are now outside the PLO's frameworks and institutions. I propose that you scrutinize the names of the new the Central Council members at least and ask those who have promoted and chosen them about the true reasons and motives for their choice. And what is true of the Central Council is even truer of the PNC (Palestine National Council) that met a few months ago.

Be that as it may, why should the factions and those who are characterized by even the least degree of seriousness go to the trouble of taking part in a meeting such as this, when the resolutions adopted by previous meetings have remained mere ink on paper? What guarantees are there that this round of meetings will end up adopting truly 'momentous' and 'exceptional' resolutions? And even if adopted, who can ensure that they would be respected, or that they will find their way to implementation?

Consequently, what is the point of attending this meeting where anyone can say whatever he or she likes, while the very narrow elite that is charge of taking decisions and drafting policies has the total freedom to do whatever they like, including placing the PNC and Central Council's resolutions on the highest of shelves or at the back of the lowest drawers where they will meet with their fate of being abandoned and forgotten?

Is it enough to fire the arrows of criticism at the boycotters, while leaving the attendees' 'spokespersons' to attack them viciously, accuse them of going along with the 'deal of the century', 'back-stabbing,' 'conspiracy,' and every other term in the readymade lexicon of accusatory words? Is this the sort of national dialogue that the Palestinians need in these times of anarchy, bleak horizons, confusion, loss of direction, and frustration that haunts Palestinian circles, while [Palestinian] lands, rights, and gains are ceaselessly and successively draining away with each passing day?

I recall a time when intensive 'workshops' used to precede the PLO's PNC or Central Council meetings, and when the leaders of the various factions used to travel to Aden, Algiers, and elsewhere in an attempt to reach concord and agreement. It is true that the late Yasser Arafat did not abide by or adhere to these resolutions. But leaders such as Georges Habash (PFLP), Nayef Hawatmeh (DFLP), Abu-Ali Mustafa (PFLP), and others felt they were partners. This is not the scene today. Everyone feel that they are members of a 'chorus' that must sing the same tune, or part of an extended audience whose sole function is to applaud.

Where is the partnership in leadership and taking decisions? Where is the rule of institutions in drafting policies and adopting resolutions? Where is the collective leadership? Where are the consultations and preparations? Where is the unified leadership framework?

Is it fair to blame everyone without exception and forget our own [i.e. Abbas's] responsibility? Are they being invited to an extraordinary meeting or a prearranged 'wedding party'? Does it even make sense to expect fateful resolutions without even bothering to coordinate, consult, overcome obstacles, and build accords and understandings?

"Is this how in the Palestinian national movement's 'camels' are being brought to water these days?" asks Rintawi in conclusion.

Ends…

 

2-The rush to normalization

 

The mere occurrence of Israeli visits to Arab countries represents an Israeli gain, especially since they send a message to the Israeli leadership and the Israeli public that they are not isolated, as well as to the world to the effect that if the Arabs are opening up to us [Israelis], then why do you want to use the boycott tools or means of pressure against us? What is happening also makes it clear that many things are taking place behind closed doors. These developments may be a means of 'testing the waters' to see how far Israel is ready to go. And they may be occurring within the context of political requirements that have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause. But what is beyond doubt is that there is very little time left to come up with a clear Arab and Palestinian vision regarding these developments and in a manner that blocks the way before free-of-charge Israeli gains--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

What is hard to understand or accept is the extent of Arab concessions to Israel. It is as if they were rewarding it for declaring Jerusalem as its eternal capital; for passing the nation-state law that strips the Palestinians in the diaspora and inside Palestine of their national rights; and for its settlement expansion, its blockade on Gaza, and its starvation of the Strip's people. Moreover, the Gulf states have not explained why Israel should return East Jerusalem to the Arabs, or grant the Palestinians their rights, especially that of establishing their independent state – which is the most basic requirement of what the official Arabs describe as a just and comprehensive peace – after Israel has already secured more than it has ever dreamt of, free-of-charge and before offering anything in return... But there are other explanations of this Arab rush towards Israel, foremost among which stem from the demands and slogans raised by the Arab Spring revolutions that threatened the stability of the ruling Arab regimes--Mohammad 'Ismat in Egyptian Ashurouq

 

There are two aspects to Israeli PM Netanyahu's visit to Oman last Friday, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. In light of Muscat's relations with Iran, the visit is likely to part of its efforts to calm down regional tensions; and Oman may also be trying to mediate between the Palestinians and Israel. But the Arabs and Palestinians are in urgent need of coming up with a clear strategy regarding such normalization. The Arab Gulf states' rush towards normalization with Israel seems to be motivated by the desire to secure Washington's support for undemocratic regimes in the aftermath of the Arab Spring's revolutions, maintains an Egyptian commentator. But these states are deluding themselves, since another wave of this spring is certain to arrive, sooner or later.

 

TWO ASPECTS: "There are at least two aspects to the Israeli PM's visit to the Omani capital Muscat last Friday October 26th," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

The first has to do with Iran, and the second has to do with the Palestinians. But, naturally, it is not possible to separate the two aspects and their significance for the future of the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause.

- The Iranian issue highlights the special nature of the Iranian/Omani relationship. There is a calm and known alliance between Tehran and Muscat that began in the days of the Shah of Iran and did not end under the Islamic Republic regime since the 1980s. The Sultanate adopted a different position towards the Iraq/Iran war in the 1980s, preferring to remain neutral. Among other reasons, this was because of the geopolitical factor – namely, Iran's proximity to it.

But the Omani role has seemed clearer since 2013 when it emerged that Muscat had played a role in reaching the nuclear agreement between the U.S. and the West and Iran that upset some other Arab Gulf states. The Sultanate also sought to initiate a process that leads to a resolution of the conflict over the Emirati islands that Iran has been occupying since the 1970s.

In light of this, it is difficult to view Netanyahu's visit as part of the U.S./Israeli efforts to establish 'an Arab/Israeli alliance' against Iran. On the contrary; the visit may have occurred within the traditional context of Omani policy that seeks to calm the situation down in a manner that includes normalizing Iran's relations with the region and the world. Moreover, the visit takes on additional importance against the background of the attempt to agree on the map of understandings and relations regarding Iran's presence in Syria and Israel's demands in this regard.

- The second aspect naturally has to do with the Palestinian cause. The visit comes less than a year after U.S. President Donald Trump's decision on Jerusalem, and against the background of the faltering political process and the severing of U.S./Palestinian political contacts. It is also taking place parallel to Israeli sporting visits to Qatar and the UAE. And it comes two days after Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas's visit to Muscat.

The official Palestinian and Arab positions are based on the assumption that the [2002/2007] Arab Peace Initiative calls for a resolution of the Palestinian issue before any normalization of Arab relations with Israel. They are also based on concern and opposition to Israel's attempts to use the Iranian card so as to promote the notion of 'normalization before a solution.' For the Israelis would then have achieved their goal of being accepted regionally and would therefore offer nothing on the Palestinian issue in return.

But the Palestinians are not adopting a clear position against such visits – not only against the visit to Oman. In this, the PLO's leadership position is almost the same as Hamas's for two reasons: As far as the PLO's leadership is concerned, the Palestinian/Israeli peace agreements have bypassed the 'taboo' on relations with Israel. On the other hand, fear of the economic and political repercussion of any sharp hostile position on such issues may be part of the Palestinians' calculations.

For example, Hamas's leader in Gaza Yahiya as-Sinwar, has made demands and issued threats should Israel fail to facilitate the arrival of a monthly grant of $15 million to Gaza, without even considering the implicit implications of the Qatari/Israeli understandings in this regard. In other words, there are details and 'necessities' (from this perspective) that allow for breaking the 'taboos' and making room for 'realism' when it comes to Arab/Israeli contacts.

There is also a third aspect, namely the fact that the Palestinians do not unequivocally reject Arab mediation with Israel. This is clear, for example, in the Egyptian and Qatari mediation between Hamas and the Israelis. Nor does this conflict with the official Palestinian demand for an international/Arab mechanism to sponsor the negotiations – without this in any way meaning that the Palestinians accept or are happy at the normalization of Arab/Israeli relations, especially not before the establishment of the Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.

The mere occurrence of Israeli visits to Arab countries represents an Israeli gain, especially since they send a message to the Israeli leadership and the Israeli public that they are not isolated, as well as to the world to the effect that if the Arabs are opening up to us [Israelis], then why do you want to use the boycott tools or means of pressure against us? What is happening also makes it clear that many things are taking place behind closed doors. These developments may be a means of 'testing the waters' to see how far Israel is ready to go. And they may be occurring within the context of political requirements that have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause.

"But what is beyond doubt is that there is very little time left to come up with a clear Arab and Palestinian vision regarding these developments and in a manner that blocks the way before free-of-charge Israeli gains," concludes 'Azm.

End…

 

NOT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: "The normalization of Israeli/Gulf relations is no longer taking place inside dark basements or behind closed doors as it did in the past," writes Mohammad 'Ismat in Tuesday's left-of-center Egyptian daily Ashurouq.

Nor is it confined to these countries second-tier figures or covert relations having to do with the exchange of intelligence, or political, economic, and security discussions. Nor, for that matter, are such meetings intended to test the Arab peoples' reactions by announcing the mutual visits between Gulf and Zionist officials. It seems that the time has come for playing openly, so that the region can prepare for the next major step, which is that of the official recognition of Israel and exchanging diplomatic representation with it.

The Arab Peace Initiative launched by the late Saudi monarch King 'Abdullah bin 'Abdelaziz at the 2002 Beirut Arab summit represented a qualitative turning-point in the Gulf states' relations with Israel. True, the initiative made normalization conditional on Israel's withdrawal to the June 5th 1967 borders, in return for full recognition and the establishment of trade and economic relations – even though it was said at the time that the initiative's true aim was to alleviate U.S. pressures on the Kingdom after the 9/11 attacks. But this initiative – that Israel has rejected by the way – flung the doors open to raising the level of unpublicized trade relations between the Gulf and Israel.

This continued until Israel established public trade offices in many Gulf capitals, a step that was crowned by many visits by Israeli officials to Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Oman. It also coincided with announcement of a visit to Israel by Saudi General Anwar Eshki, who is close to the Saudi royal family. And this went on until we arrived at the moment when Israeli PM Netanyahu paid an official visit to the Sultanate of Oman; a step that took everyone by surprise and raised many questions regarding the visit's reasons and its potential results.

It is impossible to understand these developments without taking the so-called 'deal of the century' into consideration, as well as U.S. President Donald Trump's demand to establish a so-called 'Arab NATO' that includes the Gulf states, together with Egypt, Jordan and Israel, to confront what is referred to as 'terrorism' and the 'Shiite threat' from Iran.

But what is hard to understand or accept is the extent of Arab concessions to Israel. It is as if they were rewarding it for declaring Jerusalem as its eternal capital; for passing the nation-state law that strips the Palestinians in the diaspora and inside Palestine of their national rights; and for its settlement expansion, its blockade on Gaza, and its starvation of the Strip's people. Moreover, the Gulf states have not explained why Israel should return East Jerusalem to the Arabs, or grant the Palestinians their rights, especially that of establishing their independent state – which is the most basic requirement of what the official Arabs describe as a just and comprehensive peace – after Israel has already secured more than it has ever dreamt of, free-of-charge and before offering anything in return.

There may be violent American pressures on the Arab governments to normalize relations with Israel under the delusional pretext of confronting the threat posed by Iran and terrorism. But there are other explanations of this Arab rush towards Israel, foremost among which stem from the demands and slogans raised by the Arab Spring revolutions that threatened the stability of the ruling Arab regimes. This has driven these regimes towards Israel in an attempt to secure the American backing they need in order to tighten their control over their peoples' active search of freedom and social justice. They need such backing so as to ensure that the nondemocratic conditions in the Arab world would remain as they are!

But what the Arab governments are ignoring is that the rush towards Israel will have no effect other than buying them time until a new Arab Spring arrives. They are ignoring the fact that, no matter how intense the disagreements and disputes with Iran may get, they will be no more than a drop in the ocean of the Zionist threat to the Arab nation. And they are ignoring the fact that extremism and terrorism cannot be dealt with via security solutions alone but by spreading a climate of freedom and democratic practice.

"All of the Arab governments' strategies in dealing with our issues are doomed to failure. Even worse, they carry within their folds all the factors that will inevitably lead to large-scale social and political explosions that we are certain to witness sooner or later," concludes 'Ismat.

Ends…

 

3-Weaving the carpet of a Syrian political solution

 

The area East of the Euphrates, where the oil and gas reserves are located, is Syrian land. It must return to the Syrian state's sovereignty like the other cities and areas. Moreover, these resources remain fundamental for financing the reconstruction process or at least a major part of it, reducing the financial burdens on both the Syrian government and people in light of the refusal of the U.S. and its Arab allies that receive their orders from it to provide such financing, except on the basis of impossible preconditions. A four-way [Istanbul] summit in which the internationally recognized Syrian government does not take part cannot be successful in restoring security and stability to Syria and its people. Moreover, a constitutional committee that is not formed in agreement with this government will find it difficult to come up with the required reforms; or so we believe --'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

Weaving the carpet of a Syrian political solution will not be easy. It is not enough to achieve cohabitation between the Sochi and Geneva tracks. The Syrian regime did not offer concessions when it was weak, so why should we expect it to offer any concessions after the changes in its favor on the ground? And what about the position of Iran, which is preparing for an extraordinary round of U.S. pressures? Moreover, can Putin secure enough from Iran to justify including the American and European threads in the solution's carpet? We are now facing an extremely complicated crisis with domestic, regional, and international dimensions. The solution calls for pressure, patience, arranging the deck of cards, and reaching serious understandings. And it almost needs a miracle--Ghassan Charbel in pan-Arab Asharq al-Awsat

 

Saturday's four-way Turkish/Russian/French/German Istanbul summit issued a communiqué with a contradictory call for both eradicating the terrorist groups and a permanent ceasefire in Idlib, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. It also spoke of forming a committee charged with drafting a Syrian constitution, something that Damascus, which was not invited to the summit, views as a sovereign matter. A political solution in Syria is akin to a multi-threaded carpet that requires the cooperation of various conflicting parties, argues the Lebanese editor-in-chief of a Saudi daily. Even though Russia represents the main thread, the U.S., the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel, as well as the Arab world must all be included in weaving it; but reconciling their different interests will all but require a miracle.

 

INCOMPLETE ISTANBUL: "We do not know how Saturday's four-way Istanbul summit between the leaders of Russia, France, Britain and Turkey will contribute to a political solution for the Syrian crisis, reduce the growing tension, and prepare the climate for the refugees' return," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

We also do not know how the summit will lead to establishing a committee charged with drafting a constitution before the end of the year without the participation of two main parties: Syria, which is the country for which a constitution is supposed to be drafted, and Iran, the main partner in the Astana track that played a major role in paving the way for the current military achievements on the ground. In addition, the Arab members of the 'Small Group on Syria' – which includes seven countries, three of which are Arab, namely, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – were also excluded.

True, the summit's final communiqué stressed the unity of Syrian territories, backed a political solution, stressed the need to destroy all terrorist groups and organizations such as ISIS and the Tahrir ash-Sham Organization (the former Nusra Front) and rejected all separatist agendas. But this entire position is marred by a major contradiction in the text that calls for a permanent ceasefire in Idlib without offering any explanation as to how that is to be achieved.

The aforementioned two groups have refused to lay down their arms, abide by the Russian/Turkish agreement to establish a 20 kilometers-deep buffer zone, or hand over their heavy weaponry. So, does this mean that the status quo in Idlib – which contains four million citizens and over 100,000 armed elements – will remain the same? Or does this paragraph in the final communiqué mean that a green light has been given to liquidate the two groups? Moreover, who will carry out this mission and when will they do so?

The other point has to do with the formation of a constitutional committee before the end of this year. The committee's main mission will be to draft a new Syrian constitution that will provide the bases for constitutional reforms as well as the presidential and parliamentary elections that are supposed to take place by the year 2020 at the latest.

This may be the first time in history in which a constitution is drafted for a sovereign state such as Syria, whose army has won the fight on the ground. This is why we were not surprised to hear from resigned UN Syria Envoy, Staffan de Mistura that Syrian Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Mr. Walid al-Mu'allem has refused the very notion of forming such a committee. After a quick visit to Damascus, de Mistura said that Mr. Mu'allem had stressed that the formation of a constitutional committee is a sovereign issue; and he refused any role for the UN in the formation or designation of the names of the members of the abovementioned constitutional committee at the same time.

The Kremlin's spokesman, Mr. Dmitry Peskov, said that Moscow would inform Damascus of the results of the four-way summit in Istanbul. But he did not explain how this would be done. For example, will it be done via a Russian envoy to the Syrian capital, who may be Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov? Or will it be done by inviting Mr. Mu'allem, 'the doyen of Syrian diplomacy,' to the Russian capital?

The Syrian government's opposition and suspicion of this constitutional committee are justified especially since the draft constitution that a Russian delegation distributed to the delegations taking part in one of the rounds of the Astana conference more than a year ago spoke of partitioning Syria into federal units along sectarian and ethnic lines, marginalizing the central authority, bestowing absolute powers on the regional parliaments, and reducing the central authorities' military capabilities.

The bombing by Turkish warplanes of positions belonging to the largely Kurdish SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) East of the Euphrates two days ago in tandem with an unexpected ISIS offensive that succeeded in recapturing many of the areas that the SDF had previously taken, gives the impression of secret 'understandings' between Russia and Turkey. We do not know if the Syrian authorities have been informed of the details of these 'understandings.' After all, giving priority to the area East of the Euphrates again means that the Idlib ceasefire will remain in its present state, transforming it into a semi-permanent agreement – or so many observers believe.

The area East of the Euphrates, where the oil and gas reserves are located, is Syrian land. It must return to the Syrian state's sovereignty like the other cities and areas. Moreover, these resources remain fundamental for financing the reconstruction process or at least a major part of it, reducing the financial burdens on both the Syrian government and people in light of the refusal of the U.S. and its Arab allies that receive their orders from it to provide such financing, except on the basis of impossible preconditions.

A four-way summit in which the internationally recognized Syrian government does not take part cannot be successful in restoring security and stability to Syria and its people. Moreover, a constitutional committee that is not formed in agreement with this government will find it difficult to come up with the required reforms; or so we believe. The only thing we can do is to wait for to see the Syrian leadership's attitude and for the clarifications that the Russian envoy to Damascus will bring.

"For the moment, we have no other option," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

REQUIRING A MIRACLE: "Weaving the carpet of a political solution for Syria calls for exhausting and creative efforts that will need a miracle if they are to succeed," writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

They will require hard negotiations, enormous pressures, and tough compromises. The complex intermeshing of conflicting roles and the old and new obstacles demonstrate that we are dealing with the most complicated crises that the world has faced in recent times.

The situation would have definitely been different had one side been able to declare its victory via a knockout blow and its ability to impose a solution. And if it is possible to identify the Russian side as the main actor on this complicated stage, it is not the sole actor. Russia has partners on the ground whose interests it has to take into account. Moreover, the Syrian issue is just one of the many pending files in its relations with the West, and especially with the U.S.

Syria is an important stage in the coup that Vladimir Putin has led against the world's only superpower. But it would be hasty to believe that the Kremlin is interested in achieving full victory in Syria even if that leads to losing its relations with Israel, Turkey, and the West. Putin's calculations are more complicated than to be restricted to the Syrian stage.

There is no doubt that the Russian thread will be the most prominent in the solution's carpet. Moscow is an obligatory gateway to any permanent solution in Syria, and U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton knows this, as does UN Syrian Envoy Staffan de Mistura, who is preparing to leave the stage. But the Russian thread is not enough to weave a carpet. Moscow will not take the burden of reconstructing Syria upon itself; nor is it able to do so. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the Western states will want to take part in Syria's reconstruction if their role is confined to polishing the Russian victory and merely normalizing the situation in a Syria that lives under Moscow's umbrella, without restraining the influence of Iran, which has participated in preventing the fall of the Syrian regime via its militias.

The Russian thread is inevitable, but so is the American thread. And the U.S. is militarily present in Eastern Syria. It recently chose to escalate its pressures to force the Iranian militias to withdraw from Syria. Furthermore, and starting from the first week of November, American pressures will enter a new phase of escalation when Washington will move towards imposing 'the harshest possible sanctions' on Tehran, which is no longer hiding the difficulties facing its economy.

The carpet of a political solution in Syria also requires a European, Turkish, Iranian, Arab, and Israeli thread – at least when it comes to security arrangements.

It is in the context of the journey in search for the carpet's threads that we can place the four-way Istanbul summit that included the heads of Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the host country's president. The summit called for the establishment of a committee for drafting the Syrian constitution, provided that it meets by the end of the year. And the participants stressed the need to prepare Syria's various parts for a safe and voluntary return of refugees, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to this country, the need for a permanent ceasefire, and the need to continue fighting the extremists.

There is no doubt that the mere fact that the summit was held has exposed the need for the presence of partners, albeit to various degrees. Putin needs Europe's participation to provide an umbrella for the solution because Europe can serve as a gateway for the U.S. to join this umbrella. Turkey also needs European partners to strengthen its role and achieve some balance with the Iranian role on the one hand, and the Russian role on the other. And France and Germany also want to participate so as to give the impression that Europe has not lost its role because Britain decided to leave the EU and because Italy and other countries are threatening to rebel against the EU's spirit and constraints.

But a brief meeting in Istanbul is not enough to resolve the differences between the various parties' calculations. The post summit press conference exposed these differences: Angela Merkel stressed that there can be no military solution for the Syrian crisis. She stressed that, 'at the end of this political process, free elections must be held in which all Syrians take part, including those living outside the country.' And President Emmanuel Macron hastened to support the German Chancellor and urged Russia to 'exert very clear pressure on the Syrian regime.' Putin emphasized the fight against terrorism and expressed his hope that Turkey would soon complete the establishment of a de-militarized zone in Idlib. And for his part, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that it is up to 'the Syrian people inside and outside Syria' to decide President Bashar al-Assad's fate, while at the same time stressing the need to fight the 'terrorists' in Northern Syria –i.e. the Kurdish organizations.

The Istanbul summit's result should be present at the table of the Small Group on Syria's meeting in London on Monday. This group includes the U.S., France, the UK, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt; and it is only natural to assume that de Mistura will also be there. Also present will be the need to arrange the situation so as to ensure coexistence between the various necessary threads at other venues including the expected summit between Putin and Donald Trump on the margins of France's World War I celebrations. And the Syrian dossier is likely to occupy a major position in light of the results of Bolton's visit to Moscow. After all, the Russian/U.S. dialogue is ongoing and has been confirmed by Trump's invitation to Putin to visit Washington, even if the Chinese dimension seems to lie at the background of that invitation. And this same dossier will be present when de Mistura presents his final report to the UN Security Council on November 19th regarding the results of his effort to reach a political solution and his failure to convince Damascus to facilitate the establishment of the committee charged with drafting the constitution.

Weaving the carpet of a Syrian political solution will not be easy. It is not enough to achieve cohabitation between the Sochi and Geneva tracks. The Syrian regime did not offer concessions when it was weak; so why should we expect it to offer any concessions after the changes in its favor on the ground? And what about the position of Iran, which is preparing for an extraordinary round of U.S. pressures? Moreover, can Putin secure enough from Iran to justify including the American and European threads in the solution's carpet?

We are now facing an extremely complicated crisis with domestic, regional, and international dimensions. The solution calls for pressure, patience, arranging the deck of cards, and reaching serious understandings.

"And it almost needs a miracle," concludes Charbel.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 29.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Iran connection

 

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas on Sunday again vowed to oppose any peace proposal by President Trump as PLO officials met to consider their next moves. Speaking at the opening of a meeting of the Palestinian Liberation Organization's central council, 'Abbas said Palestinians were facing perhaps the "most dangerous stage" in their history, highlighting a series of U.S. measures including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital. 'Abbas has boycotted the White House since that December decision. The U.S. is still expected to release a peace plan in the coming months. 'Abbas compared the expected Trump proposal to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which saw the British government commit to the creation of a state for Jews in historic Palestine. "If the Balfour Declaration passed, this deal will not pass," he pledged. The Palestinian leader accused his Hamas rivals of serving U.S. interests by refusing to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip.

Meanwhile, three people killed in an IDF strike in Gaza on Sunday were young teens, the Hamas-run health ministry said. The IDF said it carried out an airstrike targeting three Palestinians who were attempting to damage the fence surrounding the Strip. The army added that the suspects were "apparently in the process of planting an explosive device" at the Southern part of the coastal enclave. According to the IDF, some 16,000 Palestinians gathered at five locations along the border on Friday, burning tires and throwing rocks and firebombs at Israeli troops, who responded with tear gas and occasional live fire. Later, 34 rockets were fired at Israel overnight and into Saturday morning, 13 of which were intercepted by the Iron Dome anti-missile system. Two of the rockets fell in Gaza and the rest were said to have landed in open areas. In response to the rocket fire, Israeli aircraft attacked 95 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza.

Israeli security officials believe that the fighting on Friday and Saturday, which was led by the Islamic Jihad under orders from Iran, is tied to a power struggle between Islamic Jihad and Hamas over credit for the protests along the border fence as well as for gains from an anticipated agreement with Israel. Iranian involvement is connected to the fight over leadership of the weekly protests. Iran wants Gaza's residents to see it as the country that stood by them in recent months and is responsible for the improvement in their situation. Tehran wishes to prevent Egypt, Qatar, and the UN – who have been mediating between Israel and Hamas – from receiving any credit. To this end, Iran is paying about $100 million a year to organizations in Gaza and families of Palestinians killed and wounded in the protests.

Israeli residents from the Southern border communities blocked the Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza Monday morning. The group, protesting the continuous rocket fire and security situation in the South, were joined by activists from the right-wing organization Im Tirtzu, and managed to block dozens of trucks carrying supplies from entering the coastal enclave. 

President 'Abbas received a special emissary Sunday in Ramallah from Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said, a few days after Prime Minister Netanyahu made a surprise visit to Oman. A report by the official Palestinian news agency said that the Omani official gave 'Abbas a personal letter from Qaboos. The sultan thanked 'Abbas for his visit to Oman last week and stressed the importance of ties between Oman and the PA. Ramallah took pains not to criticize Netanyahu's visit to Oman, but the Palestinian political world did not like the visit and the timing. A Palestinian official close to 'Abbas told Haaretz that it cannot be ruled out that the Omani emissary brought calming messages, mainly about the normalization of ties with Israel. The PA expects all Arab countries to commit to the formula set in the Arab peace plan, whereby normalization with Israel would occur only in exchange for a comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. In a sign of continued warming ties with the Arab world, Transportation and Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz will head to Oman to push for a regional rail line that will link Haifa with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Katz is expected to present the plan when he addresses a regional transportation conference, called the IRU World Congress, which will convene is Muscat from November 6th to 8th. According to his office, "This is the first time an Israeli Minister has been formally invited to participate in an international conference in Oman."

American military officials are concerned over Israel's campaign against Iran in Syria, which has won the encouragement of the White House, the Wall Street Journal reported Sunday. "It is a growing concern for us," a senior military official told the Journal. The report says that U.S. military officials fear that if Iran would believe the United States is behind some of the strikes in Syria, or that the United States is feeding Israel intelligence for the strikes, it could prompt attacks by Iran-backed militias on American troops in the region. The officials expressed concern particularly about more than 5,000 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq.

Elsewhere, the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday began with a minute of silence to honor the 11 Jewish worshipers killed in an anti-Semitic shooting attack a day earlier at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. "It is hard to overstate the horror of a murder of Jews gathered in a synagogue on Shabbat, who were murdered just because they were Jews," Prime Minister Netanyahu said at the start of the meeting. Israel's Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau on Sunday condemned the killing but could not bring himself to call the house of worship a synagogue, instead labeling it "a place of clear Jewish character." The ultra-Orthodox Lau is an avowed foe of the more liberal streams of Judaism and was last year, along with Chief Sephardi Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, instrumental in pushing the government to backtrack on the deal for an egalitarian prayer section at the Western Wall. "I will say one simple thing: Any murder of a Jew in any corner of the world, because they are Jewish, is unforgivable, it's a crime that cannot, under any circumstances, be ignored," Lau told Makor Rishon. Israel's Minister of Diaspora Affairs drew a parallel on Sunday evening between the gunman in Pittsburgh and Hamas militants who target Israel with rockets. Addressing a memorial vigil sponsored by the Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh, Naftali Bennett said: "From Sderot to Pittsburgh, the hand that fires missiles is the same hand that shoots worshippers. We will fight against the hatred of Jews, and anti-Semitism wherever it raises its head. And we will prevail

Finally, Sagi Muki of Israel won a gold medal on Sunday at the International Judo Federation's Grand Slam competition in Abu Dhabi. For the first time, the Israeli national anthem, "Hatikva" was played in Abu Dhabi as the Israeli judoka received the medal. Muki received the medal in the presence of Culture and Sports Minister Miri Regev, who attended the competition despite the fact that Israel has no diplomatic relations with the UAE. In 2017, Israeli judoka Tal Flicker won gold medal at the Grand Slam. No Israeli flag was flown at the podium in 2017, after the hosts forbade any representation of the Israeli team's nationality, something that they claimed was done for their own safety. Israelis competed under similar conditions during the same event held in 2015 in Abu Dhabi.

 

 

KOCHAVI NEEDS EYES IN THE BACK OF HIS HEAD: Nahum Barnea in Yedioth Ahronoth states that the new chief of staff Aviv Kochavi knows how to deal with external enemies – but the government will use him as a scapegoat, and social network bullies will vilify him as a soft leftist. His problem is the crooks from within.

"There are more convenient roles in the civil service, but aside from the prime minister, there is no role more responsible and demanding than that of the chief of staff. Millions of Israelis look up to him: in their eyes he embodies security, deterrence, and, just as importantly, the expectation to see the fighters, their kin, return home safely.

Four generals competed for the job. All four are good. The most senior of them was Aviv Kochavi. Not only because of the many roles that he has filled in the IDF, but because of the way he succeeded in each of them. Lieberman and Netanyahu chose correctly. The grating sounds that accompanied the announcement of the decision came from the ego games rife at the top of the government, but they do not overshadow the choice itself. They even have a silver lining: Kochavi will begin his tenure as the 22nd chief of staff not owing his appointment to anyone. Independence is power. It releases the chief of staff from personal and political constraints. Gadi Eizenkot solidified his position as one of the most powerful and esteemed chiefs of staff in the history of the IDF because he stood, and is still standing, on his own two feet. Kochavi enjoys similar opening circumstances.

I have been following Kochavi's work since the early 1990s, when he commanded the 101st Paratroopers Regiment, at the edge of the Eastern sector in Lebanon. Regardless of him, the regiment was the station I made sure to reach every time I went to Lebanon. I found a brave, intelligent, sober combat commander, who saw far beyond his battalion's sector. I met him again as commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, in the fight against terror in the West Bank, before and during Operation Defensive Shield. He led the breach of walls from house to house, the method that the IDF used to regain control of the Balata refugee camp. Under his command the Nablus Casbah was reoccupied.

There are commanders in the army who advance in the ranks but remain forever at the level of Regiment or Brigade commander. Raful Eitan was like that. Kochavi, on the other hand, grew in stature with every role he filled. That was the case in Military Intelligence, as in the Northern Command and as deputy chief of staff.

The chief of staff's job is to prepare the army for war. His additional job is to prevent war. In the present reality, in which Israel has nothing to gain from a head-on collision with its enemies, this aspect is no less important.

Eizenkot is leaving Kochavi with an army that is in good shape and good spirits, well equipped, rich in budgets. Military Intelligence estimates that the likelihood of war initiated by Iran or its proxies is low. There is, however, a pretty high likelihood of war developing in the North against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the pro-Iranian militias in Syria, and in Gaza as well, with Hamas. Iran has not given up on turning Syria into a launch pad for its campaign against Israel. It has not given up on its nuclear ambitions either. Gaza is far from calming down. Something will happen on that front even before Kochavi begins his tenure, on December 31.

The government that Kochavi will work under is different from previous ones. The belligerent rhetoric of its ministers is breaking records – including the rhetoric of the prime minister and the defense minister. The military moves that the political echelon actually approves, however, are much more cautious, much more sober. Gaza is a prime example: The gap between rhetoric and action requires explanation, and the explanation the politicians have found is the IDF – the chief of staff is to blame. Because of him Gaza is hungry. Because of him Gaza is boiling; that is why it is spilling over on the fence. This false view will intensify in the coming months, because of elections. Government ministers will need scapegoats to cover up their failures and the IDF is one of them. Every cynical lie will be inflated and rolled through the social networks and the radio and television talk shows. This ugly wave is already gnawing at the margins of the IDF today. The chief of staff and the generals are presented again and again as closet leftists. The IDF Spokesperson's statements are presented as Fake News. The soldiers on the ground read the talkbacks, and do not know who to believe.

Last week, a terrorist stabbed an IDF soldier in Hebron. The soldiers responded as required: They shot the stabber. The soldier was lightly wounded, and the terrorist was killed. One of the internet bullies published some information he had ostensibly heard from a source in the military attorney's office that the chief of staff and military attorney general had ordered that the soldier be indicted 'like Eleor Azaria'. The network thug has tens of thousands of followers; within minutes he received hundreds of Likes.

And so on and so forth. Kochavi will discover, as Eizenkot discovered, that he has tools to deal with the external enemy. The problem is dealing with the crooks from within."

Ends…

 

A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO REMOVE IRAN FROM SYRIA: Eyal Zisser in Israel Hayom argues that the new chief of staff must attack not only the parasite (Iran), but also the host, Bashar al-Assad, to whom it should be made clear that the Iranian entrenchment on his soil comes with a price.

"The decision to prevent Iran from establishing itself in Syria requires resolve, daring, intelligence and operational capabilities, and contemporaneously caution not to drag the region into a general confrontation. But it seems that this campaign has exhausted itself. True, Israeli spokesmen continue to claim that Israeli freedom of action has not been harmed, and that Israel continues to act against Iranian targets on Syrian soil. Defense Minister Lieberman said last week that Israel had not stopped attacking Syria, but that the attacks had not been reported in the media. And Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would do everything needed to prevent Iran from establishing itself in Syria.

But on the ground, a gap is emerging between Israeli rhetoric and reality. Instead of reports of air force strikes we are getting reports of the Russians completing deployment of S-300 batteries throughout Syria. Moreover, Mustafa Mughniyeh, the son of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah chief of staff who was assassinated in 2008, is setting up the organization's infrastructures along the Israeli border in the Golan Heights, as a continuation of the actions of his brother, Jihad, who was assassinated by Israel in December 2014 near Quneitra.

The window of opportunity that opened for Israel to operate in Syria would have closed even without the downing of the Russian plane a month ago. After all, Russia wishes to ensure peace and stability in Syria, so that its investments will bear fruit. Besides, Russia does not perceive Iran as a threat, and in any case does not see its presence in Syria as a Russian problem, as Putin clearly explained just recently.

But even without the Russian indifference, it is hard to imagine that the air strikes would have been sufficient to remove the Iranians. Such attacks can perhaps prevent the Iranians taking hold of one site or another, and possibly even the deployment of combat squadrons or advanced weapons systems (which are easy to identify). But all this is a drop in the sea compared to the presence of tens of thousands of Shiite militia fighters brought by Iran to Syria, and of thousands of Iranian fighters and Hezbollah fighters. The Israeli-Iranian confrontation in Syria last May did not end with great success, for it marked clear red lines that Israel adheres to, including not killing Iranian soldiers, which limits the scope of action.

In light of this reality, Israel must think outside the box and recalculate its direction. A possible course of action is to revert to past policy, which was successfully implemented against the PLO in Jordan in the early 1970s: exacting a price not only from the guest (Iran) but also from the host, which in our case is Bashar al-Assad.

Israel does not 'count' Bashar, and mistakenly believes that he is a puppet in the hands of the Iranians and the Russians. Meanwhile Bashar is strengthening his position. It is possible that if he understands, along with his Russian patrons, that the Iranian presence on his land carries a price tag – he will act to restrict it. Israel missed such an opportunity by allowing Assad to return to Southern Syria for nothing, bringing with him and under his patronage the Iranians and Hezbollah as well. It is not too late; the change of course must be made cautiously and sensitively so as not to slide to a general confrontation. There is no time more apt than now, with a new tenant in the chief of staff's office."

Ends…

 

JIHAD TRYING TO CIRCUMVENT HAMAS: Tal Lev-Ram in Maariv claims the Cabinet will have to decide whether the time has come to change course, get creative, and authorize direct hits of Islamic Jihad activists, who are trying to drag Israel into war.

"The appointment of Ziad Nakhala as new commander of Islamic Jihad, replacing Ramadan Salah about a month ago after the latter suffered a stroke, signaled a change of direction – from the headquarters of the terrorist organization in Damascus to the commanders on the ground in Gaza. Perhaps this stems from the Iranian Quds Force's desire, as the army claims, to entangle Israel in a war in Gaza, which will make it easier for the Iranians to establish themselves militarily in Syria, or from the wish for a more hawkish line than Hamas in the struggle against Israel.

Either way, the signs indicating these developments were abundantly clear in the declarations of the leaders, in the discourse on Gaza among commanders in Damascus and in the events that took place on the ground. On October 6, Nakhala attacked Abu Mazin regarding Gaza, and sent a message to Israel: 'The Palestinian organizations have the ability to turn the communities of the Gaza envelope into a place where it is impossible to live. For our people, a martyr's death is life and surrender is death.'

This last weekend, Islamic Jihad clearly moved further than Hamas, when, under the auspices of the violent events on the fence; it began a round of escalation and explained its actions as retaliation for the five Palestinian fatalities in Gaza last Friday. The IDF is stressing the connection between the group and the Iranian Quds Force and the desire to entangle Israel in a confrontation in Gaza as the most significant factors. This change in Islamic Jihad's policy further exemplifies the dangers of continuing the violent confrontations on the fence. The more they continue the more they drag Israel closer to a war it does not want.

The IDF opted this time as well for aerial attacks against Hamas targets, in response to rocket attacks on Israel. More than 80 targets in 12 different areas were hit, damaging Hamas' infrastructure and capabilities, but without targeting terrorists and senior members of Hamas or other organizations, in order not to create further escalation in the South. Such attacks cannot be underrated. Over time they cause damage to Hamas capabilities, but at this stage they are not instigating a change in Hamas policy regarding the continuation of its struggle to lift the siege, which includes a willingness to risk a military confrontation in Gaza.

Israel attacked Hamas targets even though it was not the one who fired, so that Hamas apply pressure on Islamic Jihad and stop it from operating in the future. The effectiveness of this action is questionable; it may have short-term impact, but in the longer term it is doubtful whether this will suffice. At the moment it seems that politically and militarily Israel is at an impasse. Prime Minister Netanyahu and the defense establishment have placed preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria as the top priority, much more important than Gaza. The restrained Israeli policy in Gaza is often explained by our senior officials as stemming from this consideration. Precisely because of this factor, the recent developments in the Gaza Strip are of great concern.

The Cabinet will have to decide whether it is time to change course and directly hit Islamic Jihad operatives, in targeted assassinations or by bombing manned HQs, in response to the continued rocket fire, or to continue with the same method of action – only harming Hamas. At this stage, it is too early to know what the decisions will be; it is too early to sum up the period yet awaiting us. At this stage, at least, Israel is behaving in exactly the same way. Anyone looking for creativity, in action or thought – should look elsewhere.

To a certain extent, there is one clear line connecting the days before Protective Edge to the past seven months in the Gaza Strip: The limited ability of Israeli intelligence to analyze the intentions of the enemy in the Strip. The latest move in the Strip illustrates just how far Hamas is willing to go walking the tightrope. It is vacillating between political achievements and a military operation."

Ends…

 

JIHAD FOILING LULL ON ORDERS FROM IRAN: Shimrit Meir in Yedioth Ahronoth writes that the Gaza conundrum seems unsolvable. The IDF and government cannot come up with answers and the Iranians, who hold the initiative, want to cash in on their long-standing financial investment in the military wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

"This last weekend, Islamic Jihad joined the endless list of obstacles to an arrangement that will prevent war in Gaza. Jihad, a veteran organization which recently elected a new leader, is determined to put itself and the Iranians on the map.

Ziad al-Nakhala, the new secretary-general of the organization, who was elected following the coma that Ramadan Salah fell into, is not a new face. In fact, he is a very old face. 65 years old, first incarcerated in an Israeli prison in 1971, and with a lifetime of military struggle against Israel behind him. From the establishment of the al-Quds Force, the military wing of Jihad, to teaching of Hebrew to Hezbollah intelligence officers. Nakhala was the Iranian's candidate for the post, and as such he did not leave his rivals much of a chance: Islamic Jihad is an Iranian organization no less than it is a Palestinian organization. Nakhala lives on the Beirut-Damascus axis, and from there the woes of Gaza's residents seem less urgent than the interests of the Revolutionary Guards. If he re-enters the list of Israeli assassination targets, it will not be the first time.

Nakhala makes sure to maintain good relations with his colleagues in the other Palestinian organizations, including Hamas, where they apparently do not like the extra independence he allowed himself when he decided to fire dozens of missiles at the communities of the Gaza envelope, just when Gaza's residents were beginning to enjoy the first significant achievement of the negotiations on an arrangement: The entry of Qatari diesel fuel that enables eight hours of electricity per day instead of four. Imagine life with four hours of electricity a day, when every action is calculated and there are large families to feed, in order to understand the depth of despair in Gaza.

Nakhala did not act on his own. The claim that Islamic Jihad is trying to disrupt the efforts to attain an arrangement on Iranian orders is not a spin. The Iranians have an interest in keeping Israel close to the fence in Gaza, and keeping its political and security leadership busy with futile rounds of violence in the Strip, instead of turning their attention and energy to the Iranian military buildup in Syria. As long as they estimate that Egyptian chances of bringing the arrangement efforts to the finishing line are slim, they allow them to go on. But when something begins to move between Israel and Hamas, they activate Islamic Jihad.

You do not have to be a strategic genius to surmise that this is not the last event. Hamas has indeed taken a break from the balloons, perhaps in exchange for the diesel fuel, but in the coming days there is still a significant potential for eruption. Abu Mazin refuses to let go, despite all the pressure on him, and wants to make more cuts in the funds he transfers to Gaza. Palestinian logic says that such decisions are more difficult to make when Gaza is in a state of combat with Israel. Hamas, for its part, is determined to continue with the marches of return, and now it has also entered into a competition against jihad for the title of the most militant organization in Gaza.

The Gaza conundrum looks complicated and unresolvable, but the government and the army have an obligation to try and find answers, instead of rolling with the punches from Friday to Friday. If we want to strive for a deal, the processes must be accelerated, and if the Egyptians are having a hard time delivering the goods, another intermediary must be found soon. If it is expected that Abu Mazin, by starving Gaza, is liable to entangle us in war, contrary to our broad interests, we must find a way to bypass Abu Mazin. On the other hand, the fact that week after week Hamas brings about 15,000 people to the fence shows that in our deterrence there is not working. Islamic Jihad paid a minimal price for a long Friday night of shooting at Israeli citizens. There is no reason to think it will not try it again.

We may be approaching the moment when the Iranians will want to cash in on their long-standing financial investment in the military arms of Hamas and Jihad. At the moment, they have the initiative."

Ends…

 

WHY DID NETANYAHU VISIT OMAN?: Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz surmises that if we let our imaginations run wild, Trump might now encourage the Saudi prince to promote an agreement with Israel to cleanse himself of the Khashoggi affair. Netanyahu's visit to Oman may be part of the process.

"Sultan Qaboos of Oman is a very secretive leader. He is minister of defense, finance, foreign affairs and intelligence, and heads the central bank. In Oman there are no democratic institutions and the ruler appoints the judges. Leaks are unlikely to come out of Muscat to shed light on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit. But that does not diminish the importance of the trip, which cracks the wall of no public meetings between Arab leaders and Israel's prime minister.

Netanyahu had good reason not to visit Oman and one excellent reason to do so. Oman is the close ally of Iran and Qatar. One is Israel's great enemy and one has been defined by Israel as supporting terror because of its assistance to Hamas and its alliance with Iran and Turkey. Oman recently announced that it opposes sanctions on Iran and that it intends to build a gas pipeline connecting it to Iran. It helped Iranian smugglers do business during the previous period of sanctions and it opposes Saudi Arabia's anti-Iranian policy.

Sultan Qaboos, Oman's absolute ruler, is the most veteran Arab leader; he came to power in a coup against his father in 1970. He opposes the Saudi war in Yemen, though he decided late to join the Arab coalition, and has even threatened to withdraw from the Gulf Cooperation Council due to his opposition to Saudi hegemony in the Gulf. When three Gulf States imposed an embargo on Qatar more than a year ago, Oman and Kuwait did not join this dramatic move and Oman even allowed Qatar free use of its ports to get around the blockade, setting a collision course with Saudi Arabia. Ostensibly Oman should have incurred Saudi sanctions no less than Qatar did, and Saudi Arabia might even have penalized Oman if not for American pressure and the desire to avoid a greater rift among the Gulf States.

The visit by an Israeli prime minister to Oman contradicts not only Israel's policy toward Iran, it sticks a toothpick in the eye of the Saudi kingdom. And yet, no condemnation has been heard from Riyadh or other Arab countries. Only Iran responded to the surprise visit with the interpretation that once again Israel and the United States are trying to drive a wedge into the Muslim world. This is relatively moderate verbiage that did not touch on the initiator of the visit, Sultan Qaboos, who is Tehran's ally. Iran cannot criticize Qaboos because back in 2013 it agreed to hold talks in Oman with U.S. officials on laying the groundwork for the nuclear agreement, and then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry subsequently met with Iranian officials for discussions that led to the nuclear talks.

And here we have Oman, on whose soil was born what President Trump called 'the worst agreement ever,' hosting with pomp and circumstance the Israeli prime minister, his wife and his entourage, and no less importantly, the Mossad chief. It is not superfluous to ask why the Mossad head of all people joined the visit, and it would not be baseless to assume that Mossad had a hand not only in planning the trip but also in assisting Qaboos in his rule for years. For years, the sultan's power relied on the British intelligence services to protect his little country of 2.9 million citizens, and another 2 million foreign workers or so. In any case, it is possible to conclude that the visit to Oman is the fulfilment of a promise Netanyahu made to forge ties with Arab countries that have not signed peace agreements with Israel. Thus the visit is very important politically to Netanyahu, but it is still too early to say whether the visit will lead to full diplomatic relations, with other Arab countries following suit.

In the same breath one might wonder what led Qaboos, Iran's ally, to invite an Israeli prime minister and thus raise a wave of speculation about the possibility of talks between Iran and Israel. We do not have to get excited about talks with Iran. The 76-year-old Qaboos, who three years ago fell ill with cancer, is a realistic leader who knows very well the limitations of the conflicts in the region. He certainly received a long lecture from Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen about the Iranian threat and Israel's desire for Oman to distance itself from Israel's enemy and join the U.S. sanctions. Qaboos certainly politely explained to his visitors that he has no intention of changing his taste for Iran. There is nothing new about Israelis visiting his country, considering that an Israeli representation operated in Muscat until 2000, but that was Israel's status in Morocco and Qatar as well.

Qaboos may have understood from Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, who visited the sultan's palace shortly before Netanyahu, that there is a chance for renewal of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. But it is unlikely that this was the reason that Qaboos invited Netanyahu, especially when on the horizon the Trump administration is threatening to announce its deal of the century. If there is someone who should and can persuade Netanyahu to renew the talks, he is sitting in the White House, not on the Persian Gulf coast.

If we let our imagination run wild, Trump might now encourage the Saudi crown prince to promote an agreement with Israel to cleanse himself of the Khashoggi affair, with the Israeli visit to Oman, to the expert go-between, being part of the process. But you have to exercise great caution when you let your imagination speak."

Ends…

 

OMAN IS ISRAEL'S LINK TO THE MIDDLE EAST: Ronen Bergman on Ynet contends that Israel and Oman have been keeping a secret channel of communications since the 1970's. Netanyahu's public visit to the sultanate serves both countries. For Israel, Oman can open a door to normalizing ties with other Arab countries, while Oman gets to present itself to the West as a more moderate and liberal nation.

"In the fall of 1979, two Israelis carrying foreign passports arrived on a flight to Muscat, the capital of Oman. One of them was Reuven Merhav, a senior Mossad official dealing with matters concerning the Middle East, who will later become the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other was a member of the IDF's General Staff, Maj. Gen. Menachem (Mendy) Maron. After landing, the two were transferred to a luxurious villa in Muscat and from there flown on a royal jet to meet with Sultan Qaboos at an encampment outside the capital. They were amused by the fact the bathroom on the plane, including the toilet itself, was made of gold.

The discussions lasted into the night, following which the guests went on a covert visit to a tiny Omani enclave called Ras Musandam, which is at the edge of the Musandam Peninsula, which essentially controls the Strait of Hormuz – the global oil gateway. 'The importance of that meeting was in its very existence,' Merhav recounted on Saturday. 'These are direct ties, though covert, with an important Arab country at a highly important strategic location.' This meeting was one of many held since the early 1970s between senior Israeli officials and officials in Oman. The ties with Oman opened the door to important covert ties with other countries in the gulf, primarily the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

 The public visit and the royal reception Prime Minister Netanyahu received over the weekend is the result of four months' work, led by Mossad. It is safe to assume Mossad Director Yossi Cohen visited Muscat to finalize the details of that visit.

Some of the Israeli officials involved in the covert ties with Oman could not help but wonder why the sultan is suddenly willing to have such a public and broadly covered visit now? The answer to that will not be found in Jerusalem. Qaboos wants to show a different side of his country to the West: A more liberal and tolerant side. Netanyahu's visit was scheduled before the Khashoggi assassination, but that terrible event definitely served the sultan's needs in showing the world that Oman is different.

Israel's possible gain from this visit is threefold: Primarily, Oman can serve as a channel to many countries – including Iran, Qatar, and Syria – and is seen by all as an honest broker. Through Oman, Israel could establish covert ties with any player in the region. This, of course, is conditional upon the agreement of that player, but under Qaboos' sponsorship, things are a lot simpler. A senior Israeli official even said that he does not 'rule out the use of Oman to open a secret channel with Iran and Syria.' Secondly, the hope is that other countries would take courage from this visit and also expose their own covert ties with Israel. Finally, for Netanyahu, exposing the ties with Oman is another layer in his Middle Eastern strategy, which includes creating covert alliances – and public ones whenever possible – with moderate Sunni nations and movements, in an effort to prevent Iran's spread throughout the region, as well as undermine Tehran's regional power, all the while proving that Israel can normalize its ties with Arab nations even without solving the Palestinian issue.

There is no doubt Netanyahu's public trip to Muscat is an important diplomatic achievement, but it is doubtful it could lead to normalization with many other Arab countries. It would be far more convenient and safe for the rulers of most of these countries to have close ties with Israel, but quietly, for fear of enraging their citizens."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 29.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

REPUBLIC DAY ANNIVERSARY: Rauf Tamer celebrates the Turkish Republic's foundation day in centrist tabloid Posta: "It is not only the Republic; it is the Secular Republic. We will always commemorate Ataturk and his comrades with gratitude and thankfulness, looking at the fire of hell in our region and the regimes in our neighboring countries. The aim of contemporary civilization is our shared enthusiasm."

Orsan Oymen charges the president and ruling party with betraying the founder's legacy in opposition Sozcu: "What President Erdogan and the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] are trying to do is akin to Greece trying to go back to the Byzantine Empire, or Italy to the Roman Empire. This is a tragicomic situation. There is no government on earth that hates the founder of its own country so much, erases his name from every corner, places dynamite at the base of the country's founding principles, limits those who celebrate the anniversary of their country's foundation and national day, and serves as the instrument of imperialism while doing so! This is how Erdogan and the AKP will go down in history, no matter how many airports they may open."

Melih Altinok takes pride in the opening of a new airport in pro-government Star: "No one has any problem with Turkey's founding leader, the leader of the republican revolution. The only ones who have a problem are those who cheat Ataturk's system by exploiting his legacy. Anyway, we should feel proud of our republic, which will celebrate its 95th anniversary today by opening a majestic monument, one of the world's biggest airports, rather than boring receptions in Ankara. That is how to feel proud, work hard, and be honest. May this holiday be a joyful one."

 

SYRIA MEETING: Zekeriya Kursun sees hope for progress in Syria in pro-government Sabah: "The Istanbul meeting between those [Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany] that have opposing views and conflicts of interests and the expression of their common will should be seen as a sign of a transition from the era of war to that of armed peace in which diplomacy plays a more active role. The most important demonstration of the quartet's common will is their wish to activate a constitutional commission for Syria."

 

WOMEN'S RIGHTS: Ozge Yurrtas is concerned about the erosion of women's rights in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "Women's guarantees at work, and for their future are being snatched out of their hands one by one. After all these misogynist policies in the social, legal, and cultural aspects of life, we are almost out of breath. By expanding women's exploitation in the workplace, the AKP's main political line on the issue of women's rights, and especially labor, is adding to the inequality women are already subjected to. Ultimately, this is our government: Old, selfish men who do not consider women their equal rule over us. Is this not the case?"

 

LOCAL POLITICS: Zeki Ceyhan takes aim at the ruling party's spokespeople in pro-Islamist opposition Milli Gazete: "The AKP spokespeople need to straighten themselves out, rather than try to advise people. This course of events does not bode well. What good can come from people who try to strangle each other in a teacup? Everyone stares at the leader and expects everything from him. Their leader, meanwhile, complains about being sick of interfering with them." 

 

Iran media watch

 

ARBA'EEN: Iranian media report extensively on the final preparations ahead of the mass gathering of mourners in Karbala in Iraq, to mark the 40th day after the anniversary of the third Shiite Imam Hussein's death in the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. Rolling news channel IRINN quoted the Arba'een HQ and central bank officials as ensuring that infrastructure and other services are in place for Iranian pilgrims in Iraq. IRTV1 (Channel One) reported on a large group footslogging from Najaf to Karbala. While the main event is expected to take place tomorrow, the TV said more than 20 percent of Iranian pilgrims have already returned home. State radio VIRI said there has been a 30 percent rise this year in the number of foreign pilgrims travelling to Iraq through Iranian border. First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri has called Iraqi Prime Minister 'Adil Abdul-Mahdi to thank him and the people of Iraq for hosting Iranians, the radio added.

 

PASSIVE DEFENSE: Conservative dailies Hemayat, Resalat, and Siyasat-e Ruz pitched into yesterday's remarks of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, who urged the country's "passive defense" to confront "all infiltration by the enemies" of the regime.

 

OIL: Most reformist and business dailies cover the start of sales of crude oil at the Iranian Energy Stock Exchange (IRENEX). Iran began selling crude oil to private companies for export yesterday, part of a strategy to counter U.S. sanctions that will come into effect on 4 November to stop the country's vital crude exports. For its front-page headline, moderate Arman-e Emruz ran a quote from First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri who said yesterday: "We will sell oil regardless of U.S. intention". Business daily Kharidar (buyer in Persian) quoted Jahangiri as saying that "there is no replacement for Iran's oil". Government-run Iran pointed out that oil trading was now being run by the private sector – even though there is not enough clarity as to what exactly is considered private in the Iranian economy. Business daily Jahan-e Sanaat wrote: "The stock exchange smells like oil". English-language Press TV described the move as "a landmark strategy to dodge the impact of returning sanctions".

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Pro-regime users continue to post comments under different hashtags to mark the major Shiite ritual of Arba'een. Many Tweets have been re-posted by recently created accounts lacking proper profile pictures and names. Several thousand Persian-language users have commented on the occasion of the 7 Aban (29 October) uprising, which is commemorated, though unofficially, by many in Iran as Cyrus Day. Cyrus the Great enthusiasts say this was the day the Achaemenid king "peacefully" conquered Babylonia in 539 BC. A user shared a picture of the Tomb of Cyrus in Pasargad near the Southern city of Shiraz, along with a poem depicting how a simple monument made of stone has frightened the Islamic regime. "I will come to see you, thou King of the good ones, to mortify the ill-intentioned," wrote another user. Some called for unity against the Islamic regime by sharing photos of the U.S.-based Reza Pahlavi, son of the late Shah of Iran, at a meeting with members of the newly formed opposition group Farashgard in Washington last week.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 29.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Opening up to Israel

2-Beneficiaries and spectators

3-A major development in Istanbul

 

1-Opening up to Israel

 

By opening up to Israel, [Oman] would be strengthening its position with the U.S., thereby strengthening the safety net that surrounds it. But this seems totally unlikely in light of the past three weeks' developments, specifically the 'Khashoggi affair.' Oman has experienced more difficult, more complicated, and more threatening circumstances over the past four years, but did not commit this deed then, so why should it do this now, when its opponents are in a more difficult position than before, whether in Yemen or in their relations with the international community? I suspect – and to suspect is not always a sin – that the repercussions of Netanyahu's visit will not end soon, and that the Sultanate will pay from the credit and prestige that it has accumulated over the past years – unless it is embracing 'an initiative that matches the risk' either in Palestine, or in Iran, or on both tracks-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

What is happening is nothing more than an Omani gift to Israel in compliance with an American demand, in return for giving Muscat a green light to sponsor U.S./Iranian negotiations in light of the expected failure of the U.S. sanctions on Iran and the ongoing Saudi developments; and in return for another green light for Muscat to lead negotiations that will pave the way for a Yemeni settlement in light of Riyadh's current predicament. However, Israel remains as the main winner, even if has no plan to make use of this gain and even if Palestine is no longer an Arab priority and the calculations of pan-Arab interest have dropped off the agenda of [Arab] rulers and governments--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

A number of different explanations have been offered as to why Oman agreed to receive Israeli PM Netanyahu last week, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. The Sultanate may be launching a new mediation between the U.S. and Iran and wishes to appease Israel; it may be mediating between Israel and the Palestinians; or it may be trying to protect itself against the background of a very difficult geopolitical situation. The view that Netanyahu's visit is a prelude to a U.S./Israeli war on Iran is totally misguided, especially in light of Riyadh's current predicament, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. The visit was more likely to have been a gift to Israel in order to facilitate Muscat's mediation between Iran and the U.S., in light of the expected failure of Washington's impending sanctions on Tehran.

 

THREE EXPLANATIONS: "What impelled the Sultanate of Oman to receive the Israeli PM at this specific point in time?" asks 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

There have been three different explanations of this extraordinary step that runs counter to Oman's customary foreign policy:

- The first, most convincing, but least widespread explanation suggests that the Sultanate has launched a new mediation effort between the U.S. and Iran, thereby extending its earlier mediation under the Obama administration that paved the way for the nuclear agreement between Tehran and the '5 + 1' group. The advocates of this view believe that the Sultanate may have taken this step either at its own initiative or at the request of one of the two sides – Washington or Tehran. And because it believes that the 'Israeli knot' is the most important obstacle facing U.S./Iranian relations, it took the initiative, or was asked to help overcome it, which is why it complied with the Israeli PM's request to visit Muscat.

The advocates of this view also note what the Iranian foreign minister told the Japanese Kyodo News Agency regarding his country's readiness to resume negotiations with Washington without pre-conditions and on the basis of mutual respect. In this context, a certain Iranian 'tendency' (but not all its centers of power) may have decided to respond to Trump's call to launch new negotiations leading to a new nuclear agreement. This tendency or current may have found in the 'Omani channel' the means it is seeking to test the waters and begin indirect contacts with both Washington and Tel Aviv.

The advocates of this viewpoint add that this explains the Iranian Foreign Ministry's balanced and moderate reaction to Netanyahu's visit, compared to the revolutionary and conservative currents' violent campaign against both the visit and the Sultanate, whose echoes have reverberated in Lebanon. These same advocates recall what Trump has repeatedly said, namely, that the fate of the Iranian crisis will be determined at the negotiating table, albeit on terms that are unfavorable to Iran, and that he is totally confident that the Iranians will eventually return to negotiations over a 'new and comprehensive deal' with Washington. It is worth remembering that Iran and the U.S. are in a playground that Iranian diplomacy is very familiar with, and in which it has acquired great experience based on numerous precedents.

- The second and more widespread explanation says that the Sultanate is seeking to mediate between the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and the U.S. on the other. The supporters of this view link Netanyahu's visit to 'Abbas's three-day visit to Muscat that shortly preceded Netanyahu's. In this regard, it is worth noting that Abbas made a statement in an interview with Palestine TV that was impossible to understand except after Netanyahu's visit was revealed. Speaking from the Omani capital, he said: 'Everything that the Sultanate says and does stems from good intentions.' It was as if he had been informed about Netanyahu's visit beforehand and was offering the Palestinian reaction to it before it took place.

Advocates of this point of view suggest that 'Abbas may have asked for Omani intervention to overcome the difficult problems between him and Israel over Gaza, especially since the tahdi'a [lull or calming down] talks are drawing closer to achieving their aims, according to the Egyptian mediators. For 'Abbas fears that a tahdi'a may be achieved before [Fatah/Hamas] reconciliation. And he does not seem to be very happy with Egypt's behavior, while at the same time viewing Qatar's support for Hamas and the idea of a 'tahdi'a first' with suspicion. Moreover, he has no other Arab capital to resort to or whose help he can call to strengthen his position based on achieving reconciliation prior to any tahdi'a and empowering Rami al-Hamdallah's [PA] government before discussing any other issue.

Should this explanation prove to be true, Oman will pay a heavy price for taking the risky step of wagering its reputation and image on Netanyahu. For he is an untrustworthy liar. He hates the Palestinians and peace, and has never been known to honor any commitments or keep any promises. His visit to the Sultanate would have been a free-of-charge step that will benefit neither the Palestinians nor the Omanis. In other words, Netanyahu will be the sole winner from this risky venture.

- The third explanation suggests that the Sultanate is in a very difficult geopolitical position as the war in and on Yemen draws close to completing its fourth year, and in light of Muscat's tepid or cold relations with some weighty neighboring Gulf states [Saudi Arabia and the UAE]. By opening up to Israel, it would be strengthening its position with the U.S., thereby strengthening the safety net that surrounds it.

But this seems totally unlikely in light of the past three weeks' developments, specifically the 'Khashoggi affair.' Oman has experienced more difficult, more complicated, and more threatening circumstances over the past four years, but did not commit this deed then, so why should it do this now, when its opponents are in a more difficult position than before, whether in Yemen or in their relations with the international community?

"I suspect – and to suspect is not always a sin – that the repercussions of Netanyahu's visit will not end soon, and that the Sultanate will pay from the credit and prestige that it has accumulated over the past years – unless it is embracing 'an initiative that matches the risk' either in Palestine, or in Iran, or on both tracks," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

AN ACT OF NORMALIZATION: "The Sultanate of Oman's reception of the [Israeli] occupation's PM represents an act of normalization that must be rejected and denounced, regardless of the pretexts and justifications," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

Israel is the sole winner from the Gulf states' 'normalization wave' in sports, culture, security, and politics. These are confirmed facts. But the political question concerns this visit's implications and significance: Is it paving the way for a military action against Iran, as some believe? Or is it meant to pave the way for a similar visit by Netanyahu to Saudi Arabia? Or is it merely the fruit of the relationship with Oman; one that has ripened and that Netanyahu has sought to pick at a moment when Saudi Arabia's image as a reliable ally has collapsed? Or is it all of these things?

What is certain is that in light of Saudi Arabia's current predicament, this is not the appropriate moment for the U.S. and Israel to consider waging war on Iran. After all, Saudi Arabia is the central Gulf state and in the official Arab order. It thus seems unlikely to play any strategic and fateful cards in the Gulf before it regains its health. Moreover, logic requires that when the goal is of a security and military nature, it should be kept secret, contrary to the public fanfare that has surrounded the visit and in which the [Israeli] occupation state's senior intelligence officials have joined in.

What is also certain is that normalization is a cumulative cultural and psychological process. Every step is a gain for Israel. But the qualitative step that American and Israeli efforts are focused on is that of normalization and an alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But the obstacles facing public normalization in this case are growing, despite the distance that the secret and half-public Saudi/Israeli cooperation has covered so far. Moreover, and after its latest and worsening predicament, Saudi Arabia seem to be in no condition to take a step of the sort that Israel requires. Talk of the [U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian] deal of the century that requires a significant Palestinian partner who will agree to relinquish Jerusalem, seems less and less plausible.

But Oman's step does not seem difficult to take, after having taken similar steps in the past, as did Qatar. Yitzhak Rabin visit to Muscat in 1994 and Shimon Peres's subsequent visit in 1996 are very significant. In fact, some believe that Muscat's moderate position regarding the regional conflicts stems from its greater ability to commit to refusing normalization than the rest of the Gulf states.

For like Qatar, Oman would rather join the normalization process once the U.S. effort to achieve compromises regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict is close to achieving its aims, rather than stand at the starting line when there are likely to be many clashes. Moreover, after Qatar lost this role and risked its ability to play a more major role by leading the Arab Spring's phase, Oman's chances of occupying its seat in hosting agreements increased. But there is a constant American set of requirements that must be satisfied by those who want to assume this role, and this includes the precondition that Israel must receive a certain prize.

For its part, Israel finds itself in a strategic predicament, unable to go to war and unable to make compromises. Its wager on liquidating the Palestinian cause by forging a partnership with Saudi Arabia under the banner of forming a common alliance against Iran is becoming more difficult. It is vital for it to safeguard its position and prepare for what may happen once Saudi developments, which are still in their first stage, have unfolded. And Muscat offers a window for that. Moreover, it also necessary to keep all that is happening open-ended if Israel is to return to the old negotiating framework once the Saudi opportunity collapses.

But this is not what is happening today. What is happening is nothing more than an Omani gift to Israel in compliance with an American demand, in return for giving Muscat a green light to sponsor U.S./Iranian negotiations in light of the expected failure of the U.S. sanctions on Iran and the ongoing Saudi developments; and in return for another green light for Muscat to lead negotiations that will pave the way for a Yemeni settlement in light of Riyadh's current predicament.

"However, Israel remains as the main winner, even if has no plan to make use of this gain and even if Palestine is no longer an Arab priority and the calculations of pan-Arab interest have dropped off the agenda of [Arab] rulers and governments," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

2-Beneficiaries and spectators

 

Anyone following the statements made by the leaders of the free world would be very hard pressed to find a single one in favor of the Saudi crown-prince… no one knows exactly how to build [an anti-Iranian] alliance between a group of countries that are in competition, hostility, and perhaps cold war with each other. The idea that they all face a common source of threat is not enough to establish this alliance. After all, the member states must decide on a mechanism for confronting this threat; but how can Saudi Arabia assume this mission when its regional policies have earned it hostility and driven away those who may have sided with it against Iran? [U.S. Defense Secretary] Mattis's [Manama] statement warrants very careful scrutiny. The implicit references to Saudi Arabia's role in undermining security and stability in the region are worrisome. And the greatest beneficiary of what has happened in recent weeks is Iran, which Riyadh claims is threatening regional security--Hassan al-Barari in Qatari Asharq

Tehran's position today is consistent with the notion that 'a stupid enemy is better than a clever ally.' For Saudi Arabia has presented Iran with a reward it never expected, at a time when the U.S. was drawing close to implementing its sanctions. What happened pushed Tehran out of the limelight; with the result that Riyadh has come to head the list of targets for international anger instead. For the moment at least, Iran will continue to occupy the seat of a gloating spectator waiting to see how matters may develop. It expects that the affair and its repercussions will continue to unfold for some time to come, which would serve its interest. Russia is another spectator – a non-gloating one this time – one that also waited for a long time before taking a stance on Khashoggi's murder that ran contrary to all that is being said in Europe and the U.S. The Kremlin has set itself up as a defender of the Saudi ruling family, refusing to believe that it was responsible for the crime--Hussam Kanafani on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis's statements in Manama regarding the Khashoggi affair should be read carefully because of their strong implicit criticism of Saudi Arabia, maintains a Jordanian commentator. Riyadh has lost much of its prestige after this affair, and it is difficult to see how it would be possible to create an anti-Iran 'Arab NATO' under its leadership in light of the hostility it has elicited from many potential members of that alliance. While most Western states have been gripped by the Khashoggi affair, other countries – primarily Iran, Russia, and China – have been occupying the spectators' seats preferring to wait and see what may happen next, notes a Lebanese commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. Meanwhile, they are hoping to secure political and/or economic gains from Riyadh's plight.

 

UNDERMINING STABILITY: "In his speech to a security conference in Manama two days ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis said that Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder could undermine stability in the region," writes Hassan al-Barari in Monday's Qatari daily Asharq.

And he added that any country's failure to commit to international criteria and the rule of law could undermine regional stability at a time of growing need for it.

Secretary Mattis was speaking in the context of a strategic culture that was manifest at two levels:

- First, he was implicitly criticizing Saudi domestic policies when he said that a nation is more secure when it allows opposition voices to express themselves. A close scrutiny of his words allows us to decode the U.S.'s understanding of the situation that held Saudi Arabia responsible for certain terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 bombings. There is a common impression in the U.S. that had Saudi Arabia allowed for opposition and held elections, Osama bin Laden would have been no more than an extremist Saudi member of parliament and al-Qa'ida would not have attacked the U.S.

- Second, the U.S. is trying to build a broad regional alliance to confront and contain Iran. It ended with the view that Saudi Arabia will be at the forefront of this alliance. And the fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia is also eager to establish the so-called 'Arab NATO' that will include 'moderate' Arab countries in addition to Israel, which will be part of that alliance in one form or another. But if Saudi Arabia is going to lead this alliance and help the U.S. in its cold war with Iran, Riyadh should not implicate itself in disagreements with countries that are members of this same group – for example, the blockade on Qatar.

Against this background, Jamal Khashoggi's murder delivered a strong blow to the prestige of Saudi Arabia and its crown prince in whom the U.S. has invested much to polish up his image. For how can the U.S. proceed to justify its relationship with a state led by a man whom the international community has accused of being implicated in the murder of a Saudi citizen whose only fault was to express an opinion that the crown-prince does like to hear? I believe that the White House will find it difficult to maintain its relationship with the Saudi crown prince while at the same time preserving respect for the administration within the U.S.

Has Saudi Arabia turned into a burden on its allies? Anyone following what is being written in the Western press would say 'yes.' And anyone following the statements made by the leaders of the free world would be very hard pressed to find a single one in favor of the Saudi crown-prince. Moreover, respectable international voices are calling for the perpetrators of this crime to be brought before an international tribunal, clearly casting doubt on the Saudi judiciary's transparency and credibility, even though the issue has less to do with the judiciary, as much as it has to do with the credibility of the Saudi position in general.

It is worth noting that James Mattis spoke of the alliance planned for next year, but no one knows exactly how to build such an alliance between a group of countries that are in competition, hostility, and perhaps cold war with each other. The idea that they all face a common source of threat is not enough to establish this alliance. After all, the member states must decide on a mechanism for confronting this threat; but how can Saudi Arabia assume this mission when its regional policies have earned it hostility and driven away those who may have sided with it against Iran?

"In short, Mattis's statement warrants very careful scrutiny. The implicit references to Saudi Arabia's role in undermining security and stability in the region are worrisome. And the greatest beneficiary of what has happened in recent weeks is Iran, which Riyadh claims is threatening regional security," concludes Barari.

End…

 

CALCULATING THE BENEFIT: "As the Saudi journalist and writer Jamal Khashoggi's case grips the world, especially the Western countries, certain countries have occupied the spectators' seats observing the development of Saudi Arabia's crisis from afar, and calculating how they may benefit from it at some later time," writes Hussam Kanafani on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

This has begun to gradually emerge on the ground; especially in light of the growing possibility that Riyadh may turn towards other alliances should the U.S. and the European escalation regarding this case continue.

Iran, for example, is sitting in the first row. There is no doubt that it is enjoying the statements, positions, and suggestions regarding possible sanctions on Saudi Arabia issuing daily from the Western countries. Tehran waited for more than 15 days after Khashoggi's death before it issued a statement denouncing the crime and holding Saudi Arabia and the U.S. responsible. It had previously confined itself to watching from afar, undoubtedly accompanied by a strong dose of schadenfreude regarding Saudi Arabia.

After all, Riyadh had led the campaign against Tehran's nuclear agreement with former U.S. president Barack Obama. It also succeeded in pushing current U.S. President, Donald Trump to withdraw from the agreement and place Iran under the sword of sanctions once more.

Now, however, Tehran can see that the situation may be reversed, with Saudi Arabia threatened with sanctions and international isolation due to Khashoggi's murder. This has reduced the U.S. pressure on Iran after Trump administration has found itself in an awkward position regarding its alliance with Riyadh due to Congressional and media pressure on the administration.

In other words, Tehran's position today is consistent with the notion that 'a stupid enemy is better than a clever ally.' For Saudi Arabia has presented Iran with a reward it never expected, at a time when the U.S. was drawing close to implementing its sanctions. What happened pushed Tehran out of the limelight with the result that Riyadh has come to head the list of targets for international anger instead.

For the moment at least, Iran will continue to occupy the seat of a gloating spectator waiting to see how matters may develop. It expects that the affair and its repercussions will continue to unfold for some time to come, which would serve its interest.

Russia is another spectator – a non-gloating one this time – one that also waited for a long time before taking a stance on Khashoggi's murder that ran contrary to all that is being said in Europe and the U.S. The Kremlin has set itself up as a defender of the Saudi ruling family, refusing to believe that it was responsible for the crime.

Russia's public position, which is different from the Kremlin's men's hidden beliefs, reflects a high degree of political cunning and economic opportunism. The Russians are cautiously watching how Saudi Arabia's relations with the West, especially with the U.S., are developing waiting to build a new regional political alliance that would give them greater influence at the U.S.'s expense. The echoes of [senior Saudi commentator] Turki ad-Dakhil's article [claiming that Riyadh would realign with Moscow-see Mideast Mirror 16.10.2018] reached Moscow, which is in no hurry to move towards political normalization with Saudi Arabia and prefers to wait for the scene to become clear instead.

But Russia has no objection to exploiting the situation economically, as emerged clearly from the agreements signed at last week's 'Davos in the Desert' forum when Moscow made use of the Western boycott to be at the forefront of the scene and secure gains from the crisis that Saudi Arabia is undergoing. For Riyadh wanted to ensure the forum's success, regardless of who attends, and the Russians and the Chinese were the most prominent attendees.

China also is sitting in the spectators' seats. But its basic interests seem to be less expansive than Russia's and appear to be restricted to securing economic gains and filling the vacuum created by the Western companies' boycott or the Western states' halting their weapons' sales to Saudi Arabia.

"Jamal Khashoggi's death has not turned into a crime carried out by mere individuals. On the contrary; it appears to be a turning-point that may change the region political scene, after which those in the spectators' seats may join the field and occupy the place currently occupied by the leading players," concludes Kanafani.

Ends…

 

3-A major development in Istanbul

 

The major European parties finally appear to have acknowledged the need to join the Astana process and to recognize Syria and its allies' achievements on the ground, says Ali Nasrallah in today's Syrian ath-Thawra

 

This weekend's four-way Istanbul summit may prove to be a major development in Europe's views of the Syrian crisis, maintains a commentator in a Syrian state-owned daily. France and Germany's participation in the summit suggests that these two major European countries have decided to join the Astana process despite their initial opposition to it – an achievement that would have been impossible had it not been for the Syrian army's victories on the battlefield.

 

A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? "Does the four-way Russian/French/German/Turkish summit in Istanbul represent a step in the right direction?" asks Ali Nasrallah in Monday's state-run Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

In other words, did it point to a belated European attempt to mark its distance from the American position? Or did it take place with Washington's acquiescence, suggesting that it is no more than an attempt to test Russia's determination, at best?

The analyses of the four-way summit are sure to examine it from different angles and different vantage points and positions. These differences will also correspond to the different results expected by various parties' and the degree to which they agree or disagree over the subjects under discussion and their proposed visions.

One realistic understanding of France and Germany's attendance of the summit and joining the Astana track and agreement to work with it – as indicated in the summit's final communiqué that states that 'the more the number of countries taking part in the Astana formula, the greater its chances of success' – suggests that this amounts to a admission of the mistakes committed when these Western countries joined Washington blindly (or with eyes wide-open) and contributed to supporting or sustaining terrorism, either willingly or because they were forced to do so.

France and Germany's attendance could also lead to the conclusion that the West now appreciates the danger of remaining absent, at a time when Russia is making great advances. This compels the West to claim that it is participating in the achievements of the war on terrorism, even if this comes at the final quarter-hour. This would allow the West to preempt any accusations of having acted otherwise, or to try to reserve a seat for itself, or not lose its role as an international player.

Be that as it may, the Istanbul meeting appears to be significant. For one thing, it has wrested out of parties hostile to Syria – France, Germany, and Turkey – what conflicted with the essence of their agendas of aggression until recently. For another, the meeting displayed Moscow's firm and determined position to these parties, if the aim was to test it. And on a third level, the meeting gave a legitimacy that was previously denied to the Astana formula; the West cast doubt on the entire process, in fact. The result is that these countries are now moving towards expanding their participation in this process and recognizing its achievements as a platform for a political solution and for fighting and defeating terrorism.

But no matter which direction commentators, observers, and players may take in their analyses and inferences, the main and fixed aspect that no one can ignore is that it is the situation on the ground that is creating and determining the course of political change.

"For had it not been for what the Syrian Arab Army and its allies have achieved on the battlefield, the Astana formula would not have been born, the Sochi conference would not have been held, and the Geneva proposals would not have melted away and disappeared," concludes Nasrallah

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 26.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

A Gaza deal?

 

The Egyptian delegation that visited Tel Aviv, Gaza and Ramallah in recent days has reportedly orchestrated an understanding between Israel and Hamas that would stop all violence from the Strip, including incendiary balloons and the flare-ups at the border fence. Sources told the London-based al-Hayat that Egypt has conveyed a message to senior officials in Gaza and the West Bank that all parties should refrain from escalating the situation, Channel 10 news reported. The sources clarified that the agreement did not amount to a ceasefire and that Palestinians will be able to continue weekly demonstrations at the border with Israel, but they will not commit acts of violence such as trying to breach the border, flying incendiary balloons or throwing Molotov cocktails at Israeli troops stationed in the area. Israel has pledged in return to expand the maritime zone for permitted fishing off the Gaza coast, allow fuel to be supplied to the coastal enclave and extend the number of hours electricity is supplied. It will allow the United Nations to carry out infrastructure projects in Gaza. Sources told al-Hayat that Hamas and Islamic Jihad have accepted the terms of the offer. The Egyptians have reportedly pledged to the Palestinian Authority, which opposes an agreement between Israel and Hamas without Palestinian reconciliation; that they will work to reinstate the PA in Gaza. Egypt has recently tried to revive the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah, hosting leaders from the two rival factions for separate talks in Cairo in the past month.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman on Friday said he was "hopeful" that the Gaza Strip would be calm over the coming weekend, without clashes between Palestinians and Israeli troops, following weeks of heightened tensions and two flare-ups that threatened to lead Israel and the Hamas terror group to war. "I am hopeful and I anticipate that this Friday will pass more quietly – that's what we need to hope for," the defense minister said. Lieberman made his remarks in Kibbutz Kerem Shalom, next to the Gaza border, where he met with the heads of local governments to discuss the current strained security situation in the Strip.

Jordan said Thursday its decision to end a pair of land leases with Israel would not affect the decades-old peace agreement between the two countries, seeking to calm fears in Jerusalem that ties could be downgraded. King 'Abdullah announced Sunday that Amman would not renew an agreement to lease two parcels of land on the border to Israel for agriculture use, which it has done for the past 24 years as part of an annex of the peace treaty signed in 1994. Officials in Jerusalem feared that the move signaled Jordan's desire to effectively reduce diplomatic ties with Israel. Many saw it as a reflection of intense domestic pressure that still largely views Israel as an enemy. Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi told Reuters that Amman had never planned to extend the land leases indefinitely.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman rejected reported demands by Moscow that Israel give the Russian military additional warning before carrying out airstrikes in Syria. "We will not accept any restrictions on our freedom of operation, and when it comes to national security, we will take action," Lieberman told Army Radio in an interview. He indicated that Israel has carried out more airstrikes in Syria than have been attributed to it by foreign media. "Just because the media did not report on Syria strikes does not mean there were none," Lieberman said. "I don't think it's our duty to report what the army must do. An army needs to act."

The Trump administration's envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will travel to Israel next week to meet with officials, as the White House prepares to release its peace plan and attempts to calm the situation at the Gaza border. "I can confirm that Special Representative Jason Greenblatt will be traveling to Israel this coming week," a White House official told The Times of Israel on Thursday. "This trip reflects the administration's commitment to productive engagement, as well as the value it places on understanding the situation on the ground, especially amid recent tensions." Greenblatt's agenda is not yet clear, but he is likely to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu, though not with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas.

In political news, a poll by Channel 10 news finds that Likud would suffer, though not by much, were it led by former minister Gideon Sa'ar instead of Binyamin Netanyahu. According to the survey, Netanyahu's Likud would win 30 seats, and Sa'ar's 25. The five seats would go to Jewish Home and Yisrael Beitenu. Considering that both these parties are natural coalition partners of Likud, the difference in terms of coalition-formation calculus is minimal. Meanwhile, fallout from the radioactive Netanyahu/Sa'ar (and President Reuven Rivlin) brouhaha is continuing to pulsate through the press. Moti Tuchfeld from Israel Hayom, who kicked off the whole story by taking the bait and reporting on the supposed coup plot between Sa'ar and Rivlin, writes that Netanyahu did not have a beef with the fact that he could lose, but that he could win and the will of the people for him to remain in power might not be realized. Netanyahu does not have many friends in the press. Even former aide Yoaz Hendel writes scathingly in Yedioth Ahronoth, accusing Likud of suffering from mass delusions. Haaretz's Yossi Verter goes through the list of putsch attempts claimed by Netanyahu, back to the 1993 cassette affair, through a claim in 2009 that then-President Shimon Peres would do everything to give the government to "the left," to Netanyahu's claim that brought down the government in 2014 that Yair Lapid and Tzipi Livni were plotting against him.

In domestic news, Police said Friday morning they are investigating an apparent hate crime in the Northern town of Yafa an-Naseriyye in the Galilee after residents reported that around 20 cars and two houses were vandalized overnight. Police said the vehicles had their tires punctured and were sprayed with anti-Arab graffiti, and the walls of two houses were daubed with Stars of David as well as Hebrew slogans including "revenge," and "price tag." "Price tag" refers to vandalism and other hate crimes carried out by Jewish ultra-nationalists ostensibly in retaliation for Palestinian violence or government policies perceived as hostile to the settler movement. Mosques, churches, dovish Israeli groups, and even Israeli military bases have been targeted by nationalist vandals in recent years.

A report by Haaretz names former Barack Obama and Harry Reid aide Caroline Tess as a previously unknown third target by private Israeli intelligence firm Black Cube during an operation that went after Iran deal backers in the administration. Previous reports listed Ben Rhodes and Colin Kahl as targets. The report claims that the operation was not meant to discredit the deal on behalf of Trump's people, but was actually a scheme to get info for a lawsuit to claim seized Iranian assets as part of terrorism judgments.

Finally, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman on Friday announced that Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi was his top candidate for the next commander of the Israel Defense Forces, according to The Times of Israel, ending a months-long selection process. Kochavi, who now serves as IDF deputy chief of staff, will need to be approved first by an official vetting committee and then by the cabinet before he can take over the post from Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, who has been in the position since 2015. Deputy Chief of Staff Kochavi was seen as a front-runner for the position, having served as the head of the IDF Northern Command and head of Military Intelligence, following years as a field commander in the Paratroopers Brigade. He beat out the other three candidates who were considered for the position: Maj. Gen. Yair Golan, Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon and Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir. Kochavi was scheduled to appear before the vetting committee on Sunday. Once the general is approved – as he is expected to be – Liberman will bring his candidacy for the position for approval before the government.

 

 

HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA: Dr. Anat Rot in Israel Hayom calls on Israel to annex territories. In areas A and B Palestinians will enjoy self-rule and freedom in domestic issues, while Israeli civil law will be applied to area C. Such a plan will bring calm.

"In the opening speech of the winter session, Prime Minister Netanyahu described the wonderful relationship he has forged with the American administration, the ideological partnership between the two countries, and the historic moves Trump is leading, such as the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the cessation of funding for UNRWA. Netanyahu is right. We are faced with a rare political window of opportunity, and we must use it to finally disengage from the vision of Oslo and the two-state solution and apply Israeli sovereignty to the territories of Judea and Samaria.

In the past decade, social and political elements, both local and regional, have joined together to lead most of the Israeli people – as well as senior American officials – to the conclusion that the two-state idea is not the 'solution' to the conflict, but rather its fuel. The demand that the Palestinians give up their ethos and agree to a final border, to the end of the conflict and the end of all their claims – is the main cause of violence and terrorism against us. It is a demand they are unable to meet, and they will do anything to avoid doing so.

The architects of Oslo and their partners repeatedly argue that there is a distinction to be made between Fatah and Hamas. The 25 years that have passed since then demonstrate that this is an artificial distinction. The difference between the two is merely tactical: Hamas openly talks about its longing for the destruction of the Zionist state and goes for broke: The return of the Palestinians to their lands and homes in Jaffa and Ramla, Haifa and Safed, and opposition to any territorial compromise. Abu Mazin, on the other hand follows in the footsteps of his mentor, Arafat, and adheres to a phased plan: He is prepared to accept a state within the 1967 borders, but only as a first stage. His goal is identical to that of Hamas; the destruction of the State of Israel. Therefore, he is unwilling to give up the right of return, to agree to the 'end of the conflict and the end of all claims' and to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. That is also why the Palestinians do not have a state yet. Not because of us, but because of them.

Assuming that left and right are in agreement that it is not recommended to continue the policy of 'sit and do nothing', there are two options on the table: Separation or annexation. Leftist elements, like the Institute for National Security Studies, suggest commencing a unilateral separation from Judea and Samaria, i.e., to grant the Palestinians a state inside our homeland – a front-line bastion for the destruction of Israel – without demanding anything in return.

The right, on the other hand, proposes diverting the train from the bloody Oslo track, and changing direction. Instead of Oslo's 'peace now' stance, which attempts to impose ideas from above and force an 'end to the conflict', it is time to create a reality of shared life from the bottom up that will of itself lead to the end of the conflict, naturally, step by step. On the basis of current reality, two separate living spaces must be established, Israeli and Palestinian, in a manner that will ensure Jewish majority, abolish the military government and normalize life in Samaria and Judea. Areas A and B, in which 98 percent of the Palestinians live, will be granted self-rule and residents will be given full freedom of action in all domestic matters (education, culture, tourism, economy, welfare, etc.). In Area C, Israel will apply Israeli civil law. At the same time, Israel will work to reduce friction points with the Palestinians, increase their freedom of movement, develop their infrastructure and create conditions for economic growth and improved quality of life. All this will be done by a series of steps that will replace walls with bridges.

In contrast to the left-wing programs, which generate constant tension and hyper-vigilance, this program will induce calm. As soon as we stop insisting on determining the basics, neither the Arabs nor the Jews will have to give up their dreams, erase their identity, blur their narrative and resolve 'now' the most charged issues. This is the climate in which it will be possible to lower the level of hostility and fear and bring stability and prosperity to the peoples of the region.

The Americans have already declared that they are open to hearing and learning new ideas. All that is needed is for Netanyahu to seize the day, take advantage of the window of opportunity that has opened, and lead the historic move that the entire right-wing camp is expecting: The reinstatement of Israeli sovereignty to our homeland."

Ends…

 

'ABDULLAH'S LESSON: Shimon Cohen on Arutz7 argues that King 'Abdullah has made clear to Israel the worth of the piece of paper on which a friendly peace agreement with Israel is signed. What will be the fate of an agreement signed with real enemies?

"Whatever the outcome of the current conflict between King 'Abdullah of Jordan and the Israeli government over the leased land, and whatever the reasons for that emphatic declaration by the King, Israeli politics and statesmanship have been given yet another chance to draw conclusions regarding the value of a peace agreement with our Arab neighbors.

Since the days of Oslo, and even before that, the Israeli right has warned about the validity of the piece of paper hashed out in Norway and signed on the White House lawn. Even if you succeed in signing an agreement with Arafat/'Abbas, there is no one who can vouch for the longevity of this agreement. The right-wing repeatedly warned that at any given moment an internal coup could occur, bringing to power far more violent elements than Arafat/'Abbas. If this were to happen when they have a state that controls the Dan region, Jerusalem and other cities, we will face a real existential threat.

These warnings have been reinforced over the years by a number of factors, most prominently by the PA itself. This was the case when Yasser Arafat himself was unable to restrain himself and in a Johannesburg speech, at the height of the Oslo talks, compared the agreements to Muhammad's agreements with the Quraysh tribe, a Hudaybah agreement that taught generations the Muslim principle according to which it is permissible to sign an agreement which will remain valid only so long as the Muslim is weak. When the Muslim grows stronger, he has the right to violate the agreement and attack his peace partner.

This was also the case with Faisal Husseini, the PA's senior official in charge of Jerusalem, in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper al-Arabi, in which he compared the Oslo Accords to the famous Trojan Horse, thereby clarifying the purpose of those agreements, which was to lure Israel into opening its gates to the armed entry of Palestinians, who would then instigate the revolution from within and defeat Israel in the future.

All these, and other declarations, were supposed to be warning signs staring the Oslo flag-bearers in the face, but as is well known, they did not heed them. They continued on the same path even when Hamas instigated the democratic upheaval and took control of the Gaza Strip. They were not bothered by the right's early warning, because they deem the right to be delusional and crazed; that the day would come when the agreement would be exploited by much more violent terrorist groups, which would direct their missiles from the hills of Samaria and Judea towards Israeli population centers.

It seems to me that one must also view King 'Abdullah's recent declaration in the spirit of that ancient warning: Jordan is a country that is defined by many, even prior to the signing of the peace treaty with it, as a friendly country. 'Abdullah is purportedly an enlightened and progressive king, a product of Western education, the son of a king who looked like a kind and smiling grandfather, who kneeled before the bereaved families from the terrible massacre at Naharayim. This is a king in whose names we were promised, in the wake of his father's death, that he would rule in his father's style and not change a thing in his attitude toward Israel. This is a neighboring country with which we have not had a violent conflict for decades; a kingdom who has enormous economic and political interests in maintaining its agreements with Israel.

The moment the political chains that prevented him from taking action for 25 years were removed from the hands of the King, he immediately hastened to announce the cancellation of what is not the core of the agreement. Anything that might be considered a gesture of goodwill and cooperation no longer interests the King, and the appendix signed by his father and the Israeli prime minister is worth nothing in his eyes. For what is an addendum to a peace agreement and what are economic interests when compared to the deep hatred of the Zionist enemy. This relatively small step taken by the enlightened and Western King to our East should be another warning in a long line of warning signs that have flashed throughout the 25 years of Oslo. One has to be a particularly disturbed dreamer to believe that the Palestinians in spite of their open declarations will act otherwise in an agreement signed with them, if it is ever signed."

Ends…

 

JORDAN'S COLD SHOULDER AND THE KHASHOGGI MURDER: Ariel Kahana in Israel Hayom claims the common thread between Khashoggi and Jordan is that Arab states' attitude towards Israel has been damaged. MbS's weakening is troubling Jerusalem. Hopefully, Riyadh and Amman understand that if they do not side with Israel – they will be forced to give in to Iran.

"Two completely different events, in completely different countries, by completely different people and in completely different contexts. And yet, even if indirectly, from the Israeli point of view, there is a connection between the murder of the Saudi journalist in Turkey and the withdrawal of Jordan from the appendices to the peace treaty.

Saudi Arabia and Jordan both planned their moves long before they were carried out. The common thread linking the two events is that they undermine the rapprochement between the Arab states and Israel. Many reports in the media and many statements made by the prime minister in recent years, tell of close ties, under the table, between Israel and the 'moderate' Sunni Arab states. This term refers mainly to the Gulf emirates who fear Iran. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, therefore countries of the region are flocking to Israel's side.

One of the main figures supporting this is Saudi Crown-Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Khashoggi's greatest enemy, and whose associates reportedly carried out his barbaric murder. The 32-year-old MbS detests Iran, whose Yemenite proxies have been bombarding the cities of Saudi Arabia with missiles for months. He exhibited a tolerant attitude towards Israel, markedly different from the tone set in Riyadh since the establishment of the state. 'Palestinians and Israelis have a right to a land of their own', he asserted, in what was considered a very moderate utterance in Saudi terms.

MbS was a pivotal player in the new Middle East power map, at the center of which is Israeli/Arab/American resistance to Iranian expansion. Even if not openly or officially, he was the one on whom Trump and Netanyahu relied when they dreamed of and promoted a regional breakthrough bypassing the Palestinians, and against the aggression from Tehran. The extent of the damage to MbS's status in his country and the U.S. is still unclear, but he will obviously be weakened. And when MbS bleeds; his non-conformist policy towards Israel bleeds as well.

MbS's distant cousin, King 'Abdullah of Jordan, did not need the crown-prince's embarrassment to distance himself from Israel. For several years now, the Kingdom of Jordan has been intensifying its practical cooperation with Israel, but increasingly silencing any external exposure of these ties. Jordan buys gas and water from Israel. The security coordination between the two countries is closer than ever. Nevertheless, King 'Abdullah refuses to be photographed with Netanyahu when he meets him. His emissaries at UNESCO and the Security Council do not miss an opportunity to poke fingers in our eyes. De Jure, there is peace between the two countries. De facto, the tensions are rising incessantly.

Whatever his motives, 'Abdullah seized the first opportunity and signaled to his people and to the world that he downgrading peace with Israel. In Israel there was talk this week of a severe blow, disappointment and a clear signal that is part of a clear trend. While the prime minister and defense minister are trying to lower the flames, the Jordanians, it seems, have exhausted the possibilities of increasing them. Netanyahu said he would begin negotiations with Jordan and stressed the importance of relations with it. Lieberman did the same.

In Jordan, even the moderate and supposedly pro-Israeli camp is squeezing the lemon of hostility to the end. 'The position of the Jordanian people and the state of Jordan is clear: Give us our lands and go away,' wrote Marwan Mu'asher, who was the first Jordanian ambassador to Israel and later became the kingdom's foreign minister. This is the feeling in what is supposed to be the Jordanian peace camp.

Dr. Eran Lerman, former deputy head of the National Security Council, concurs that we are at the end of an 'unsuccessful week,' as he puts it, in matters pertaining to the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states. He views the Jordanian action as legitimate but 'infuriating'. They rely on us for security, receive water above and beyond the agreements, and were able to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis thanks to our security envelope. There is a huge gap between what is happening on the political level and the public's positions.

As for the link between the Khashoggi affair and the Jordanian action, Lerman, a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, also sees this, although he believes that the main trends will continue. 'The Khashoggi issue is creating tension within the Sunni camp, which is also called the moderate camp of the Arab states. And there are internal contradictions between Jordan and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. But, despite what happened this week, the main parameters have not changed and the fear of Iran, which led to the rapprochement with Israel, still exists. Saudi Arabia is at war, Iranian missiles are falling on Riyadh, and soldiers are being killed in numbers they have not experienced. The fear of Iran did not begin with MbS, and will not disappear if he is ousted. This threat also affects Jordan'.

The smiling photograph depicting King 'Abdullah with MbS at the height of the Khashoggi storm was meant to signal to Saudi Arabia that Jordan, despite the global onslaught, would remain faithful. The reason, which precedes even the fear of Iran, is the shaky Jordanian economy, which depends on Saudi Riyals for subsistence. 'Abdullah can afford a quarrel with tolerant Israel, but not with MbS the killer. Moreover, Iran was and remains the dominant factor in the region, where players align on the chess board in accordance with their fear of her. Therefore, despite this stormy week, in the long run both Saudi Arabia and Jordan will discover that if they do not stand by Israel, they will have to surrender to the ayatollahs in Iran."

Ends…

 

RETALIATION AGAINST TRUMP: Shlomo Shamir in Maariv explains that the peace plan Macron is expected to present soon is a warning to Trump. He ruined the nuclear accord for the French, now they will proceed to disrupt his peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians.

"French President Macron is not the only one vying to initiate and promote a peace plan, key EU member states also harbor similar ambitions. The president of France is not the only one tired of waiting for the publication of the U.S. peace plan – excuse me, 'deal of the century' – that President Trump has been promising since he entered the White House. In off the record conversations amongst ambassadors and senior diplomats at the UN headquarters in New York, statements have been heard for some time now mocking what is termed 'the infinite amount of time and endless amount of work that the White House is investing in the formulation and wording of the peace plan'.

The report according to which the president of France is threatening to publish an independent peace plan, has been interpreted by diplomats, representatives of Western powers and pundits in New York as a warning to President Trump: 'You spoiled the nuclear agreement with Iran for us. We will disrupt your peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians'. This is no joke. France, Britain and Germany, which were involved in the negotiations that yielded the nuclear agreement with Iran, do not forgive the U.S. for its decision to withdraw from the agreement. Russia and China, who were partners in the 'group of six' that signed the nuclear agreement, are also angry at the U.S. efforts to thwart it.

Diplomatic intrusion into American monopoly in promoting a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears to be a sweet act of revenge against the U.S. The French president cannot be denied his peace plan. But the chances of a French initiative being officially discussed in the UN Security Council are extremely slim. If it is presented for discussion, it will not be approved, due to a guaranteed U.S. veto. Mediation, diplomatic activity and efforts to promote a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reserved exclusively for the U.S. No administration in the past three decades has allowed any power or international party to interfere in the negotiations. President Trump, whose relations with the Western powers are in any case shaky, will be even more adamant than his predecessors in the White House that the U.S. maintain this exclusivity."

Ends…

 

THE DANGEROUS ILLUSION OF ABSOLUTE SECURITY: Yoram Yuval on Ynet claims that we need to acknowledge that no high-tech defense system can provide absolute security, even if time and time again our politicians lead us to believe otherwise; this is dangerous nonsense that will blow up in our faces.

"IDF Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Ronen Manlis said a simple truth this week. This truth must be said, and everyone who lives in Israel must hear it, and internalize it too. It is the truth that our politicians do not want to tell us about the Iron Dome, David's Sling and the other expensive defense systems: 'The system's defense capability is not hermetic. What saved the day were the correct actions of a citizen,' the IDF spokesman said after a rocket hit a residence in Be'er Sheva.

That is the truth; and we need, and can, live with this truth. Protection, any protection, will never be perfect. The illusion of absolute security, which our politicians pretend to demonstrate to us time and time again, is seductive but also a flawed and dangerous illusion.

This is not the first time that the IDF has been forced to do the dirty and unpopular work for the politicians on behalf of the Israeli public, and will almost certainly not be the last time.

Even the coalition members, who do not say so explicitly, constantly emphasize Israel's wonderful defense capabilities. They lead us to believe that the Israeli home front is on its way to being completely protected, hinting that we will all soon live in safety under a multi-layered defense shield of the Iron Dome, David Sling, the technological barrier around the Gaza Strip and other amazing and expensive defense systems that will protect us from harm.

It is written in the monthly prayer for the sanctification of the new moon: 'Just as I leap (and dance) opposite you and cannot touch you, so may my enemies be unable to touch me for harm.' Our politicians lead us to believe that when crunch time arrives, the Iron Dome will ensure that hundreds of thousands of Hezbollah and Hamas rockets will not harm us. This is not just false, it is utter nonsense; nonsense that will smack us in the face in the next major military confrontation, as it did this week in the apartment of Miri Tamano and her three children in Be'er Sheva.

Anyone who suggests that we can, now or in the future, be totally protected from harm on the home front, thanks to our defensive missile systems – is simply lying to us. About two months ago, Prime Minister Netanyahu presented the 'Security Concept 2030'. Its main aim is to add enormous funds to the air defense and cyber defense systems at the expense of the ground forces; in other words, strengthening the home front defenses, at the cost of eroding IDF's ability to achieve a swift and decisive victory on land. 'Rest assured,' the politicians say, 'we are watching over you. Vote for us, and we will spare no amount of money so that you are completely protected.'

But why? Why do politicians insist on lying to us over and over again by telling us about the wonders of Israel's impenetrable defense technology? Why are they telling us that high-tech missiles will protect us from all evil and thwart any possibility of harming Israel's citizens? The answer is human nature – we very much want to hear it and believe it. Our politicians, clever and efficient at marketing, are always happy to soft-soap us. Who does not want absolute security for themselves and their family? And who is unwilling to pay any price, and vote for any candidate in order to attain this confidence?

There is only one small problem: There is no such thing as absolute security; nor will there ever be. We are always living under some level of danger. Mental health is the ability to live with this knowledge, to live with doubt and in the shadow of danger, and still function normally, and feel at ease. What we need in the home front is not blind faith in the falsehood that we are completely protected, but rather the readiness to act when attacked. The air defense systems will successfully intercept most of the missiles that would hit us, but not all of them. There is no substitute for a well-trained home front that is prepared for any challenge.

This, in fact, is what Miri Tamano, a true Israeli hero, understood this week. As her sister, attorney Ora Tamano, said: 'My sister is a lioness, she slept downstairs and the children slept in three separate rooms upstairs. She simply grabbed them (upon hearing the alarm) and dragged them to the security room. It gave them life. There is nothing left of the house except for that protected room. She is special; a woman of valor. When I myself am at home, there is a dilemma whether to go to the security room or not, because we rely on the Iron Dome. She did the right thing.'

She is 100% correct. We have the means to deal with the missile threat to the Israeli home front. Our air defense systems are indeed a pride-worthy technological achievement, and they are an important element in protecting the home front. But they have cracks, and there will always be cracks. They cannot – and must not – replace vigilance and resourcefulness, readiness for quick response, and use of safety rooms.

The desire for absolute security, and hermetic defense of the home front, is a dangerous illusion. And since our politicians will not tell us this, we should listen to the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. We must be prepared to carry out the instructions of the Home Front Command, which is what Miri Tamano did, and by doing so; she saved her children's lives. This is our true defense, which must be nurtured and practiced, even if it does not add points to politicians in the polls."

Ends…

 

A LOOMING CRISIS THAT SHOULD BE PREVENTED: Elie Podeh in The Jerusalem Post asserts Israel must not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement.

"Less than 10 months after the resolution of the previous Israeli-Jordanian crisis, a new crisis may be sparked by King 'Abdullah's recent decision not to renew the two annexes to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a 'special regime' in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The 'special regime' granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation. According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year's notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired Prime Minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail. 

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people's attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king's bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King 'Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan's special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of ISIS. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: The public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king's decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel's decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel's 'everything will be OK' (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan's quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so. What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries' shared experience. 

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to 'enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.' A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel's foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 26.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Ertugrul Ozkok expects new developments in the Khashoggi affair in center-right Hurriyet: "The Washington Post has reported that the U.S. Senate could call on CIA director Gina Haspel for a briefing. I think that would represent a major step. Haspel is herself an interrogator and the things she is going to talk about could move the issue from the White House and turn it into a more institutionalized means of pressure."

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Sabahattin Onkibar suggests that the president is capable of anything in ultra-nationalist opposition Aydinlik: "Erdogan could go arm-in- arm with the U.S again. He could take the East of the Euphrates and the [Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units] YPG off his agenda again. He could start a new love affair with the EU, which he once attacked as 'crusaders'. He could agree to withdraw troops from Cyprus. He could sit down for talks with the HDP [pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party] again. He could agree to an IMF program after the local elections. In reference to Russia and China, he could say: 'They're communists, anyway.' On Iran, he could say, 'They are just the remnants of Shiites and Persians'. These are all possibilities. The opposite could also happen. But tell me, would you be 'surprised' if they did?" 

Kazim Gulecyuz sees a parting of the ways within the ruling alliance in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "How can the People's Alliance between the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] and AKP [ruling Justice and Development Part] continue when the list of issues causing polemics between them keeps mounting? What will they all do when the MHP's draft criminal amnesty law gets pushed aside and the AKP's version comes to parliament? It seems that the AKP will be left alone after its alliance with the MHP ends, and that it will be obliged to look for another partner to top up its numbers in a critical vote." 

Nuh Albayrak hopes to sustain the alliance in pro-government Star: "The 'People's Alliance' should continue until the executive presidential system is fully institutionalized. With this understanding, we have attributed the utmost importance to the 'Yenikapi spirit' and the alliance that it produced ever since the July 2016 coup attempt. With this in mind, it was obvious that one-sided, surprise statements about issues relating to both parties, such as the amnesty bill and the local election alliance, would affect the alliance negatively."

Mahmut Ovur notes the difficult search for candidates in pro-government Sabah: "In Ankara's power halls, the talk is also about possible municipal candidates. But nothing is certain. All the parties are searching for suitable candidates. Names that are spelled out or opened to debate are little more than assumptions. This also plays into the hands of the political parties. They check whom public opinion is talking about and how it reacts to certain names. The opposite is also being considered: The possibility that names are being circulated simply to damage them by unnecessary marketing. This is why parties are paying utmost attention to prevent any surprising names from being leaked."

 

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: Rahmi Turan reminds the president of the separation of powers in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "President Erdogan cried out: 'What is this about? Am I supposed to check with the Court of Cassation before I sign a decree?' He could not help himself. He added: 'If I have to seek permission of the Court of Cassation, I better not hold this office.' He said all this looking at the faces of judges in a symposium. He was obviously quite upset about the Court of Cassation's ruling that allowed the nationalist Student's Oath to return to schools. Such aggressive behavior and words mean 'pressure on the judiciary'! Mr. Erdogan: The duty of the Court of Cassation is to rule in compliance with the laws of the Republic of Turkey and on behalf of the Turkish nation."

 

Iran media watch

 

(Please note that Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Channel One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

ARBA'EEN: Domestic broadcast media this morning led with preparations ahead of the Arba'een ceremonies that mark 40 days after the anniversary of the third Shiite Imam Hussein’s death in the battle of Karbala. Most pilgrims will footslog across the border to attend the main event in Iraq on 30 October. State radio VIRI reported that up to 1.8 million Iranians have registered to take part in the pilgrimage, adding that so far 1.7 million have received visas. More than 1.3 million pilgrims have already entered Iraq, the radio added.

 

ICJ RULING: All broadcast media, including English-language Press TV, highlighted a statement by Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, who urged the world to abide by a recent ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic. He called on the U.S. "to implement the provisional measure, including refraining from measures such as wrongful sanctions that will aggravate disputes," Press TV said. "Other states are also expected to refrain from assisting the U.S. in imposing any impediments in transactions involving specified items, which would amount to violation of the court's order and would be tantamount to providing assistance to the wrongdoer," rolling news channel IRINN quoted the Iranian envoy as saying. On 3 October, the ICJ ruled on an Iranian lawsuit against U.S. government sanctions, ordering Washington to lift restrictive measures linked to humanitarian trade, food, medicine and civil aviation.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: A group of pro-regime users have commented after Twitter suspended the accounts of some hardline users apparently due to their anti-Israeli comments and spread of "hate speech". "For us revolutionaries, waiting for the elimination of Israel is like waiting for the arrival of the 1979 Revolution anniversary: Definite and delightful," one cleric wrote in a Tweet he posted on his new account, saying that access to his original account had been restricted. Most of these users have changed their header photos to a screenshot of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i's mantra that "Israel will not exist in 25 years". Thousands of others have commented under different hashtags with regards to the upcoming Arba'een mourning rituals. Some have shared images of the seemingly indecorous conditions the Iranian pilgrims faced as they lined up to exchange their Iranian rials with subsidized foreign cash (Iraqi dinars) on the way to Karbala. "They have knelt down to get their Iraqi dinars from holes dug in the wall. Self-abasement is indeed a Shiite tradition," one user wrote to a relevant video. A hardline cleric posted mobile phone footage of a crowd of pilgrims gathered outside a Bank Melli branch in the city of Najaf, and complained that this had "blighted the Arba'een horizons".

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 26.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The kingdom of silence and gold

2-'Sovereign matters'

 

1-  The kingdom of silence and gold

 

Saudi Arabia used to have many international and regional friends. The Khashoggi incident has driven it far down the ladder as far as most democratic countries are concerned, and is also subjecting it to many questions even in the countries of tyranny and enslavement, such as the Arab countries. The U.S. for example, used to believe that Saudi Arabia is fighting terrorism. But it has now been proven that there is no terrorism worse than that which Saudi Arabia is engaged in against its own citizens. Even ISIS's terrorism did not descend to the level of what happened in the Saudi consulate. Saudi Arabia has damaged its image and reputation by engaging in many rash adventures such as its war on Yemen and its blockade of Qatar. But it has now caused itself grave additional harm by murdering Khashoggi--Abdelsattar Qassem on www.arabi21.com

We do not exclude the possibility that the suspects in Khashoggi case will be tried on charges of failing in their duties, covering up the crime, and hiding the evidence, after which death sentences would be issued against them that would be carried out immediately. More than one party, led by President Trump himself, is seeking to 'wrap up' this case. But we believe that these attempts will fail because this has become a case of interest to American public opinion in which the American media are involved, making sure to keep it in the limelight, not out of love for justice but out of hatred for Saudi Arabia and its close relations with President Trump, especially those between his son-in-law Jared Kushner and Prince Mohammad bin Salman--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

Has there been a crime in history more foolish than this? Or did the planners of the crime reassure the perpetrators that no one would dare to expose them? After all, those who drop a hint that they may expose the perpetrators would have their mouth filled with gold; otherwise, steps will be taken to ensure that they would share Jamal Khashoggi's fate. It seems that Saudi Arabia's 'high and mighty' were sure that they had sufficient gold to seal the mouths of all curious people or those enamored of thrillers and who like to wallow in the blood of victims of political assassination. But it is rare for such assassinations to be so public and to demonstrate such lack of concern for other countries, large or small, relying on the Kingdom of Silence and Gold's gilded immunity-- Talal Salman on Lebanese www.assafirarabi.com

 

The Khashoggi case will have major repercussions for the region, argues a Palestinian commentator in a Qatari-owned news portal. It will weaken the Saudi royal family and the Sunni axis that it leads, and strengthen the Iran-led 'resistance axis' in return; it will also allow Arab intellectuals to be more daring in their criticisms of their tyrannical regimes, and will undermine Israel's attempts to normalize relations with a number of Arab states. Despite successful American and other attempts to convince Turkish President Erdogan not to expose all the facts concerning the Khashoggi case, he is clearly under domestic pressure to do so, argues the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. There is also growing pressure from the U.S. media and members of congress not to support any coverup of the Saudi crown-prince's role in Khashoggi's murder. This must be one of the most foolish political crimes in history, maintains a veteran Lebanese commentator. It could not have been carried out without direct orders from a rash and arrogant Saudi crown-prince who seems to believe that he can silence everyone with either his copious gold or his sword.

 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS: "Khashoggi's murder will not pass without regional and international repercussions that may serve the Arab peoples' interest but will come at the expense of their rulers," writes 'Abdelsattar Qassem on the Qatari-owned news portal www.arabi21.com.

These repercussions can best be summarized as follows:

- Khashoggi's death has weakened the Saudi royal family. It has placed it under the entire world's scrutiny. Anyone who previously viewed it as a family of respectable and convincing rulers is now reconsidering these assumptions.

Saudi Arabia used to have many international and regional friends. The Khashoggi incident has driven it far down the ladder as far as most democratic countries are concerned, and is also subjecting it to many questions even in the countries of tyranny and enslavement, such as the Arab countries. The U.S. for example, used to believe that Saudi Arabia is fighting terrorism. But it has now been proven that there is no terrorism worse than that which Saudi Arabia is engaged in against its own citizens. Even ISIS's terrorism did not descend to the level of what happened in the Saudi consulate. Saudi Arabia has damaged its image and reputation by engaging in many rash adventures such as its war on Yemen and its blockade of Qatar. But it has now caused itself grave additional harm by murdering Khashoggi.

Saudi Arabia has been severely weakened in moral terms, but it has also weakened many Arab regimes with it because the practices of the Arab tyrannical regimes are all one and the same. How many Arab intellectuals, journalists, and academics have met with a harsh fate in their countries? How many have been persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, murdered, or been forced to flee in search of safety and security?

But what happened may benefit Arab opinion makers, who may now be able to escalate their activities in the Western countries, and demand that the West should cease backing Arab tyranny and admonish Arab rulers. Arab opinion makers and writers were in need of such a serious shock that would awaken the international media and the world's conscience from its deep slumbers. The shock, however, came at Khashoggi's expense.

- If Saudi Arabia is weakened, its axis – which it portrays as a Sunni axis confronting Iran and its axis – will also be weakened. (It is very unfortunate that Saudi Arabia and its ilk have forced Arab commentators to use the terms 'Sunni' and 'Shiite', which we would never have otherwise used in other circumstances). It is worth noting that Iran and Hezbollah have stood silently on the sidelines, but have also been delighted by the Saudi downfall and by the attitude expressed by other countries towards this event. Saudi Arabia's credibility on the Arab arena has been increasingly weakened, and the support that it enjoys from the other Sunni parties will now also shrink.

What is happening is similar to what happened after its misdeed against Sa'd al-Hariri. Hariri's detention affected Saudi support among Lebanon's Sunnis, and its misdeed turned against it in the [May 2018] Lebanese elections. A state may acquire popular and media support, but it needs to remain loyal to those who support it. In many cases, Saudi Arabia has shown no respect for its supporters, such as its backing for ISIS and its sister organizations, its war on Yemen, and its blockade of Qatar.

Consequently, the [Iran-led] axis that refers to itself as 'the axis of resistance' is likely to benefit from Saudi Arabia's weakness. It will gain further if the Western countries were to impose sanctions or some blockade, or if economic sanctions were to be applied against it. The charge of 'Iranian terrorism' will lose credibility across the region, and Iran's claims regarding the region's security will become more persuasive. For the U.S. president cannot now talk of Iran's terrorism without speaking of Saudi Arabia's terrorism as well. He cannot tell the world that Saudi Arabia is fighting terrorism.

This is not to wager on the U.S. president's position or on the position of the colonialist countries. These parties have always been willing to disregard principles in pursuit of gains and interests. These are the same countries that have supported Arab tyranny, enabled Arab rulers to grab the masses by the throat, restrained the attempts to achieve Arab unity, and looted Arab riches. But these countries' media may now be more aware of what is happening on the Arab arena and could thereby contribute to lifting the burden of tyranny from the people's shoulders.

- Saudi Arabi's offense has left both itself and the U.S. president under siege. The U.S. president has always sought good relations with Saudi Arabia based on mutual interests – namely, protecting the Saudi regime, in return for payment to the U.S. But Trump is now in shock at what happened because his claims regarding U.S./Saudi friendship have been largely refuted. Saudi Arabia has become a liability rather than an asset for him, at least in the short run. Republican Party members are now directing harsh criticisms at Saudi Arabia, taking the president to task because of his soft stance on what happened in the consulate. Saudi Arabia has effectively undermined the position of its allies in the U.S., and the more it weakens them, the more it affects their ability to confront its alleged main enemy– namely, Iran.

- Khashoggi's murder will also weaken the Arab regimes' ability to confront their academics, intellectuals, and thinkers, who will now be more daring in talking about injustice and tyranny, thanks to the international interest in Khashoggi's case. In other words, Arab intellectuals will now feel somewhat safer because of the international and regional support they can expect if threatened. Moreover, the campaign that Saudi Arabia is currently being subjected to scares the Arab regimes that have made it their habit to 'disappear' intellectuals and journalists. The stick that has been used to whip the Arab thinkers' backs will now become lighter. In other words, the agencies of Arab repression will be weakened.

- The Zionist entity will also be harmed, especially if bin Salman disappears from the Saudi political scene. The Saudis are now trying to save the royal family and bin Salman in particular from the charges against them. However, it would appear that the world is now convinced that the sort of action that took place in the consulate could not have happened based on some initiative from outside the royal family.

If bin Salman disappears from the scene, all the Saudi measures to move closer to the Zionist entity will be severely damaged. And any deterioration in Saudi/Zionist relations will cause a deterioration in the Zionist entity's relations with a number of Arab countries.

"In other words, the process of normalization and coordination with a number of Arab countries that the Zionists have achieved, will also deteriorate," concludes Qassem.

End…

 

ROOM FOR MANEUVER: "When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses parliament about journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder and recounts the information about it, and when he does not leave that mission to the public prosecutor who is tasked with pursuing the criminal investigations based on the proper procedures, this is because Erdogan wants to give priority to the crime's political character over its criminal character, thereby giving himself room for maneuver and gaining time in the hope of reaching a satisfactory 'deal'," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

A number of noteworthy facts emerged from President Erdogan's review, the most important of which is that he said nothing at all about Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. But he made sure to reaffirm his confidence in Saudi King Salman, and to hint that the crown prince is a lead suspect of being behind the crime and having issued the orders to carry it out, thereby distinguishing between him and his father. President Erdogan also revealed that the crime was premeditated and insisted on the need to bring the 18 perpetrators to trial before the Turkish courts.

There are three indications that confirm the claim that President Erdogan introduced a number of adjustments to his speech and removed any mention of a number of conclusive facts, especially regarding the victim's body and its location, as well as conclusive evidence found during the Turkish investigators' search of the Saudi consulate and the consul's home.

- First, CIA Director Gina Haspel's arrival in Ankara hours before President Erdogan delivered his speech. For the first time, [Turkish Foreign Minister] Mevlut Cavusoglu admitted that his country had presented sufficient information regarding the murder to its allies via the usual official channels. Ms. Haspel is thus not unlikely to have asked the Turkish authorities to 'avoid haste' and 'take their time' before exposing all the facts, especially in light of the notable improvement in Turkish/U.S. relations after pastor Brunson's release.

- Second, the phone call between President Erdogan and his American counterpart Donald Trump, one day before the former's speech.

- Third, the turnabout in the Saudi attitude towards Turkey from absolute hostility to outright courtship. Turkey has suddenly become a 'sisterly state,' and President Erdogan has become a respected Islamic leader. This all followed the phone conversation between the Saudi monarch and the Turkish leader before his speech.

Mr. Cavusoglu used his joint press conference with his Palestinian counterpart yesterday (Thursday) to say that a number of questions remain unanswered and require clarification, the most important of which concerns the party that issued the orders to carry out the murder, and the fact that no information has been provided regarding the corpse's location or the identity of the local collaborators who received the corpse rolled up in a carpet.

In turn, we may ask: If the Turkish authorities possess adequate evidence regarding the prior intention to assassinate Khashoggi, and if they presented this to the Saudi authorities that began investigating this matter – especially the claim that Saudi intelligence members arrived in Ankara ahead of time to prepare for the assassination – why were they not arrested in order to prevent it? After all, these were not diplomats but security officers – unless, of course, this fact only came to light after the crime was committed. All this requires proof and clarification.

Saudi Arabia will not hand over the suspects to Turkey. It will not allow them to be tried before the Turkish courts. It has absolutely refused to hand over those involved in the 1996 bombing of the U.S. forces' headquarters in al-Khobar who were alleged to be members of Saudi Hezbollah. And it has refused to hand them over despite ferocious American pressures. Consequently, we do not exclude the possibility that the suspects in Khashoggi case will be tried on charges of failing in their duties, covering up the crime, and hiding the evidence, after which death sentences would be issued against them that would be carried out immediately.

More than one party, led by President Trump himself, is seeking to 'wrap up' this case. But we believe that these attempts will fail because this has become a case of interest to American public opinion and in which the American media are involved, making sure to keep it in the limelight not out of love for justice, but out of hatred for Saudi Arabia and its close relations with President Trump, especially those between his son-in-law Jared Kushner and Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

In fact, we are beginning to read new facts regarding this relationship, with information regarding business deals. The Wall Street Journal published a report on Wednesday claiming that Trump sold apartments to the value of $40-$50 million to members of the Saudi ruling family, to say nothing of the [alleged] $460 billion [in arms and business deals] that he brought back with him after visiting Riyadh in May 2017.

Once again, we say that The Washington Post, which exposed the Watergate scandal that toppled U.S. president Richard Nixon, has called for the Magnitsky Act that requires sanctions to be imposed on foreign countries that violate human rights within 120 days. Moreover, the number of Senate and House representatives who support invoking this act is growing with each passing day.

President Erdogan, who is often described as the 'sheikh of political pragmatism,' will find himself forced to comply with the desire of a significant proportion of his supporters to expose the full facts, especially after the hardline MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) has ended its alliance with him, and the Turkish opposition is exploiting this crisis in order to ruin Erdogan's image as an ethical man who clings to Islamic principles and morals.

"But God knows best!" concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

THEATRICAL ACHIEVEMENT: "Saudi Arabia presented its Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's second historic achievement on the stage of the Turkish Republic's theater led by its 'Sultan' Erdogan: The dismemberment of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul," writes Talal Salman on the Lebanese website www.assafirarabi.com.

This followed the internationally-witnessed royal celebration in which (former) crown-prince Mohammad bin Nayef was arrested and isolated together with a number of bin Salman's cousin/emirs and senior businessmen [in late 2017]. That was meant to pave the way for bin Salman to be set up as Emperor of the Kingdom of White Silence and Black Gold, the same land that witnessed the birth and rise of the Arab Prophet Mohammad bin 'Abdullah who spread the message of the pure religion of Islam.

But, naturally, we should not forget to mention the incomplete achievement of the crown prince who views himself as Emperor of the Universe when he summoned Lebanon's PM Sa'd al-Hariri to a 'hunting trip,' only to imprison, insult, and isolate him from his bodyguards – until French President Emmanuel Macron intervened and insisted on seeing him so as to be reassured of his good health, after which Hariri was released and his family had to travel [from Riyadh] to Paris to meet with him.

For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan complied with the 'requirements of friendship and Islamic brotherhood' for two weeks, in the hope that Riyadh would reveal what 'its men' had really done in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's body was dismembered by fifteen members of Saudi intelligence who had been sent to the consulate specially in order to carry out this 'sacred mission' just a few hours before.'

But when Riyadh clung to its narrative that its intelligence agencies were responsible for the crime in a failed attempt to absolve Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Erdogan took upon himself to recount what happened. He thereby gave the Saudi King a chance to try and absolve himself and confine responsibility for the crime to those ranking below him. But that is a difficult mission; in fact, it is impossible for the King to accept to sacrifice his son who 'sacrificed' all his uncles in order to ensure that he would be King of Kings who has neither partner nor equal.

But while some 'reward' for Erdogan may yet be possible despite its enormous cost, where will the Kingdom come up with what is needed to shut U.S. President Donald Trump up? For Trump has found in the Khashoggi case what is capable of taking him back to his glory days of reveling in the stock market. Achieving profits now is beyond doubt; but there is also nothing to prevent doubling or tripling these profits every day.

In this manner, the Kingdom has found itself caught up by Erdogan's 'growing powers.' For Erdogan – he who hails from the very heart of the Muslim Brotherhood – has found a golden opportunity to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for competing with him over the leadership of the entire Islamic world, a competitor that rules over the Holy Kaaba in Mecca (which it conquered by the power of the sword) and Medina, and the other holy sites that Muslims, including the Turks, go to seeking blessing and forgiveness for their sins.

The perpetrators who entered the consulate and took part in Khashoggi's murder and dismemberment, quickly removed his remains to the consul's home by car, and from there to nearby forests in Istanbul's suburbs, and then most likely to Riyadh – so as to ensure those who ordered the disappearance of this journalist who had recently found someone who was prepared to offer him the frontpages of the most dangerous American newspaper--The Washington Post.

Has there been a crime in history more foolish than this? Or did the planners of the crime reassure the perpetrators that no one would dare to expose them? After all, those who drop a hint that they may expose the perpetrators would have their mouth filled with gold; otherwise, steps will be taken to ensure that they would share Jamal Khashoggi's fate.

It seems that Saudi Arabia's 'high and mighty' were sure that they had sufficient gold to seal the mouths of all curious people or those enamored of thrillers and who like to wallow in the blood of victims of political assassination. But it is rare for such assassinations to be so public and to demonstrate such lack of concern for other countries, large or small, relying on the Kingdom of Silence and Gold's gilded immunity.

If we believe what the international media have been reporting quoting Saudi sources, it would seem that [senior Saudi intelligence officer] al-Qahtani is the same man who carried out Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's orders and detained PM Sa'd al-Hariri in Riyadh for days. As mentioned above, that lasted for days and only ended after French President Emmanuel Macron, who was on an official visit to Abu-Dhabi at the time, intervened and went to Riyadh in person, where he insisted on meeting Sa'd al-Hariri to assure himself of his safety.

This crime – with its exceptional ugliness, its planning that shows no concern for other states' sovereignty and borders, and the manner in which it was carried out that disgusts ordinary human beings regardless of their political views – cannot be shelved or filed as 'unsolved.' This is not possible when eighteen men who hold senior positions in Saudi military intelligence, and who could not have carried out such an exceptional mission except at the direct orders of Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman who is now almost 'synonymous' with Saudi Arabia, have been detained on charges of carrying out a crime that is unprecedented in the public manner in which it was carried out.

This heinous crime will cost the Kingdom of Silence and Gold much of its 'credit' that was fundamentally made possible by the absence of the major Arab countries – Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria – in addition to its legendary riches. This is the Kingdom that is known for carrying out death sentences against law-breakers (and opposition figures) by cutting off their heads in public so as to ensure that they would serve as an example for others.

After all, human progress cannot be imported together with planes. It is not achieved by implementing mythical plans drafted by foreign advisors on demand, in return for the gold of a prince who knows little about the world, has never recognized the people, and has never accepted any partner in decision-making, not even his father, the king. In fact, this father/king will be the first victim of his son, Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

The fact is that this heinous crime will add more victims to the bloody history of this family that came to power by the sword and foreign collusion – first with Britain, then with the U.S. once the oil fields began to overflow with oil after the historic meeting between King Abdelaziz and U.S. president Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal at the end of World War II.

In short, the Saudi crown prince has beheaded the Saudi 'Vision-30' plan with the sword of his rashness and the reliance on his riches that were sadly procured by the sword and foreign collusion.

"But the exposure of this heinous crime and those responsible for planning and carrying it out may bring some some consolation for the victims of Saudi (and Emirati) savagery in Yemen, which used to be Arabia Felix before Al Saud consolidated their power in its neighboring country – always by the sway of the sword and gold," concludes Salman.

Ends…

 

2-  'Sovereign matters'

 

Syrian Foreign Minister] al-Mu'allem need feel no awkwardness in leaving 'sovereign matters' to Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara, and to each of the three states' need to engage maneuvers in pursuit of their relations with the U.S. before the summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump's on November 11th. After all, the Astana track represented the regime's surrender to the Russian/Iranian/Turkish management of the Syrian conflict based on each of its members' need for their relations with the U.S. administration. And given the exacerbating conflict between Washington and Moscow over international and regional influence, and now that Washington is preparing to withdraw from the medium-range nuclear missiles treaty, reaching an accord on the constitutional committee as a prelude to a Syrian political solution and the Syrian transitional phase has dropped to the bottom of the list of issues of disagreement between the two superpowers--Walid Shuqair in pan-Arab al-Hayat

It was clear from the very start that the U.S.-led axis of aggression will try to foil [the Sochi] conference. And if it fails to do so – which it did – it would cast doubt on the conference's results and seek to obstruct any progress towards a solution based on the conference's conclusions. There is no doubt that the conference's conclusions constitute a point of reference today. For the U.S. will be unable to bypass them or deem them to be null and void, no matter what it does. After specifying its aims and launching its proceedings, the conference adopted timetables and action plans to address all the important issues based on a new and daring vision that contains sufficient defiance, courage, and determination to make it an extremely important step forward--Ali Nasrallah in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Together with its Russian and Iranian allies, the Syrian regime seem to have succeeded in ensuring a two-thirds majority in the committee charged with drafting the new Syrian constitution, maintains a Lebanese commentator in Saudi daily. But the regime has effectively ceded Syrian sovereignty – which it claims to hold dear – to Russia and Iran. UN Syria Envoy de Mistura has been trying to undermine the committee charged with discussing the Syrian constitution by referring to it as a consultative committee, notes a commentator in a Syrian state-owned daily. This is part of a misguided U.S.-led attempt to foil a resolution of the Syrian crisis

 

MINISTERIAL COMEDY: "It was truly comic to hear Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem telling UN Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura a couple of days ago that drafting the Syrian constitution 'is a purely sovereign matter that the Syrian people will decide by themselves without the foreign intervention that some parties and states are using to try and impose their will'," writes Walid Shuqair in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

This statement may have passed without comment had it not coincided – or shortly followed– Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's meeting with Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Jaberi-Ansari to discuss the composition of the committee charged with drafting the Syrian constitution.

After that meeting, Jaberi-Ansari said that 'the committee's formation and its agenda have achieved the required results after long talks and consultations between the three [Russia/Iran/Turkey] guarantor states.' In fact, he went further, and declared that the three Astana track guarantors 'are seeking a suitable formula for appointing representatives of Syrian civil society in the committee,' and noted that 'two-thirds of the issues regarding the committee charged with drafting the new Syrian constitution have been resolved.'

The previous disagreement over these issues centered on how to ensure that the regime could secure a two-thirds majority in the committee by appointing representatives to one of the committee's three constituents– the regime, the opposition, and civil society. While Moscow succeeded in including figures loyal to itself and the regime as part of the opposition's representatives, which secured a majority of votes in its favor in the committee, its attempt alongside Tehran to appoint civil society's representatives was naturally intended to ensure a two-thirds majority in drafting the constitution. This would allow it to block any attempt to limit the Syrian president's powers in favor of the government, or the security agencies' subjugation to any institution other than the presidency; alternatively, it would allow it to invent presidential powers that would allow to influence the work of those agencies.

It is not strange for Damascus to belittle the work of the UN envoy who is set to retire from a mission that has lasted more than it should have, despite the fact that ever since his appointment more than four years ago and together with his team, he went too far in taking the Syrian regime's interests into consideration in most of the steps he took during all phases of Russian/Iranian/Assad triad's gradual military advances under the banner of 'de-escalation zones.

Moscow, however, should have at least tried to save some of his face. After all, by exerting pressure on him and the UN, it contributed to dragging him towards its agenda of protecting the regime and ensuring its survival, and to the Astana track, as well as distancing him from the mechanism to implement UNSCR 2254, the crux of which is to stop the regime's savage military onslaught against the opposition and against the Syrians in general, and to launch the phase of transitional rule.

The two-thirds majority in the Syrian constitutional committee is specifically Russia and Iran's share. The remaining one-third barely allows the Turkish leg of the Astana triangle to ensure that genuine opposition representatives will be present. After all, Ankara's main concerns are now focused on the Syrian North and ensuring the success of its agreement with Washington to neutralize the Kurds' weapons in Manbij via joint patrols. It is also focused on benefiting from its improved relations with the Americans.

But Minister al-Mu'allem need feel no awkwardness in leaving 'sovereign matters' to Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara, and to each of the three states' need to engage maneuvers in pursuit of their relations with the U.S. before the summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump's on November 11th. After all, the Astana track represented the regime's surrender to the Russian/Iranian/Turkish management of the Syrian conflict based on each of its members' need for their relations with the U.S. administration. And given the exacerbating conflict between Washington and Moscow over international and regional influence, and now that Washington is preparing to withdraw from the medium-range nuclear missiles treaty, reaching an accord on the constitutional committee as a prelude to a Syrian political solution and the Syrian transitional phase has dropped to the bottom of the list of issues of disagreement between the two superpowers. At the same time, it is one of Putin and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's cards, each of which will use it to promote its interests in this conflict.

Given his skill and experience, Mu'allem must understand how sovereignty can be ceded to his two allies especially since, together with Iran, the regime is proceeding with the policy of gradual conquest and demographic change in Syria, and since Moscow is allowing Iranian forces to consolidate their expansion in Syria including in those areas it had agreed with the Americans and Israelis to keep the Iranians away from. And the clear aim is to regain control of the borders with Israel and lay siege to the U.S. forces deployed along the borders with Iraq up to Deir az-Zour and in the Kurdish-controlled areas, which are being harassed every now and then.

"While the superpowers are preoccupied with 'the new strategic scene', as John Bolton has described it after meeting with Putin, the [constitutional] committee may be of some importance after its formation has been smuggled through based on Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus's interests," concludes Shuqair.

End…

 

MOSCOW'S INVITATION: "Ever since Moscow decided to issue invitations to the Syrian national dialogue conference in Sochi, the Russian Foreign Ministry has contacted all parties concerned with a solution, as well as those that do not want any solution that does not achieve their evil objectives, which they will never achieve anyway," writes Ali Nasrallah in the state-run Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

It was clear from the very start that the U.S.-led axis of aggression will try to foil this conference. And if it fails to do so – which it did – it would cast doubt on the conference's results and seek to obstruct any progress towards a solution based on the conference's conclusions.

There is no doubt that the conference's conclusions constitute a point of reference today. For the U.S. will be unable to bypass them or deem them to be null and void, no matter what it does. After specifying its aims and launching its proceedings, the conference adopted timetables and action plans to address all the important issues based on a new and daring vision that contains sufficient defiance, courage, and determination to make it an extremely important step forward.

What has happened throughout all the time that has passed since Sochi? And why is the UN, via its special envoy, insisting on seeing nothing in the conference but Washington's delusions regarding the constitution, which it shares with a group of its tools? In fact, since Staffan de Mistura is still insisting on tampering with the name of the committee that the Sochi statement clearly designated as the committee charged with discussing the constitution and not drafting it, confidence in him and the UN has descended to zero – today, tomorrow, and forever, as long as he and those operating him do not abandon the illusion that has taken over their minds.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with de Mistura on Wednesday with a single purpose in mind. Or, to be more precise, the sole title that was circulated regarding this meeting in the press was to discuss the phase that the abovementioned committee had reached – the committee that de Mistura refers to, but not by its proper name. And this means that Washington is still deluded and is still wagering on what can no longer be put on the agenda or is up for discussion.

The attempt to falsify the committee's name and tamper with its formation and representation, not to mention the attempt to grant the UN envoy powers that are not part of his jurisdiction or expertise, are all undoubtedly part of the effort to foil the committee. This is a decision that Washington took from the very start and that de Mistura continues to submit to. In fact, his successor may submit to this as well.

If it is important for Washington to heed the voice of reason and have a little wisdom at least, then all it has to do is to examine the situation in order to reconsider its erroneous calculations. But if it insists on living in denial and refuses to respect the voice of reason after having a long abandoned all wisdom, it will have to bear the consequences of its denial, refusal, and foolishness.

"At the very least, it will have learned the lessons of the Astana track's results that will converge with the conclusions reached in Sochi at some specific point – the point at which the leaf will be turned on the aggression and it will come to an end once and for all," concludes Nasrallah.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 25.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Conspiracies, hallucinations, and paranoia

 

Russia is demanding Israel give it more advanced notice before carrying out airstrikes on targets in Syria, Israeli television reported Wednesday, as newly published satellite photographs purported to show the deployment of four advanced Russian anti-aircraft batteries near a suspected Syrian chemical weapons site. According to Hadashot TV, Russia is seeking to set new terms for Israeli operations in Syria and overhaul the current Israeli-Russian military coordination. Russia is insisting it receives further advance warning of Israeli strikes, the network said, though the report did not say how much. Israel usually informs Russia minutes before an airstrike. The Russian demand would likely limit Israel's freedom of maneuver in Syria, with the report noting it could endanger Israeli aircraft and allow Iranian operatives more time to hide targeted materiel. A senior diplomatic source quoted in the report said the demand was unacceptable operationally and Israel must not acquiesce to it. The report came as ImageSat International published photos showing four S-300 batteries deployed at a newly constructed site near the Northwestern Syrian city of Masyaf, where Israel has carried out raids on targets allegedly tied to Syria's chemical weapons program.

In political news, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu struck out at former minister Gideon Sa'ar Wednesday, accusing the once close ally from his Likud party of plotting behind the scenes to replace him as premier. The comments came after a report in the pro-Netanyahu Israel Hayom daily said the prime minister has put off moving up Knesset elections scheduled for next year amid fears that President Reuven Rivlin could task someone else with forming a government. According to the daily, the reported plot would have seen Rivlin choose Gideon Sa'ar, a popular former Likud minister seen as a potential challenger to Netanyahu from within the ruling party. Speaking at his 69th birthday party thrown for him yesterday, Netanyahu said he has been aware of the alleged scheme for weeks and jokingly called it the "conspiracy of the century." "I have known for a few weeks that a former Likud minister is talking to coalition sources and has concocted a subversive maneuver," he said, without naming Sa'ar. This was the first time Netanyahu related directly to the report about his suspicions published in Israel Hayom on Monday. Israeli coalition whip David Amsalem (Likud) said on Wednesday he would promote a bill that would limit the president's discretion in the decision on who to appoint to form a government after the elections.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed on Wednesday to maintain a permanent Israeli military force in the West Bank, saying that if it weren't for Israeli troops stationed there, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas would be "overrun in two minutes" by Hamas. Netanyahu told a major Jewish conference that Israel doesn't have the liberty to repeat its mistake in Gaza, where Hamas violently seized control from 'Abbas after Israeli forces withdrew from the coastal strip. Asked about his vision for the West Bank, Netanyahu said he preferred to avoid labels such as "Palestinian state." But he did make clear his view that 'Abbas, known by his nickname Abu Mazen, and his Palestinian Authority owe their very existence to Israel's protection, and directly benefit from the presence of Israeli troops. "They'd be overrun in two minutes. A couple of years ago we uncovered a plot of 100 Hamas men to overthrow Abu Mazin. Overthrow? Kill him. Not kill him politically. Kill him. So, if we weren't there, they'd not be there, which is exactly what happened when we left Gaza," Netanyahu told an assembly of the Jewish Federation of North America.

In economic news, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and China's Vice President Wang Qishan on Wednesday co-hosted a high-profile trade and innovation conference in Jerusalem and toured together an exhibition of Israeli technology start-ups as the two countries worked to cement their fast-growing trade ties. A quarter century after establishing diplomatic relations, Israel and China have become important trade partners, with China emerging as an eager customer of Israeli technology. Netanyahu said that the Chinese government's choice to send Qishan, a close confidant of President Xi Jinping, to co-chair this year's Israeli innovation summit "reflects the growing ties between our countries, our economies, our peoples." Wang praised Israel as an innovation hub that China hopes to learn from as it modernizes its fast-growing economy. "Israel leads the world in electronics, information technology, modern medicine, and agriculture," he said. "China is still striving to achieve modernization."

China has become Israel's second most important export market after the United States, with exports of about $2.8 billion in the first half of 2018 – an increase of 80 percent compared to the first half of 2017. The two countries are conducting advanced negotiations for a free-trade zone, which would help Israeli exporters to compete in one of the world's growing markets, as well as help Israeli consumers benefit from low-priced consumer goods. Chinese investment in Israeli companies are important for the Israeli high-tech industry and are estimated to account an average of about 20 percent of total foreign investments in the industry. Gilad Cohen in Haaretz, writes that Israel is enjoying an unprecedented flourishing in its relations with the Far East in general, and is conducting advanced contacts to sign free trade zone agreements with Korea, Vietnam, and India. Many trade agreements were signed with the Philippines during the visit here of President Duterte, and Israeli exports to that country have doubled. Israel is looking Eastward, but the East is looking at Israel too. It sees a country that is worth investing in, where one can purchase varied products characterized by outstanding technology.

In Gaza, The Iron Dome missile fired Wednesday night to intercept an incoming rocket from the Strip was redirected after it became apparent the projectile was headed for an open field and did not represent a threat to human life, the army said. Shortly after 11 p.m. on Wednesday, a rocket was launched at Southern Israel from Gaza, triggering sirens in a number of communities in the Eshkol region, ending a week-long stretch of relative calm. An interceptor missile was launched from a nearby Iron Dome air defense battery. However, it was called off after air defense units calculated that the incoming rocket was heading toward an open field. In response to the late-night rocket attack, Israeli aircraft bombed eight Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip, including training bases and a weapons production facility, in the early hours of Thursday morning. The army said Israeli Air Force fighter jets struck Hamas targets in the North of the Strip and in the South, near the cities of Khan Younis and Rafah. There were no immediate reports of Palestinian casualties.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that there is no escaping confrontation with Hamas, in an interview on Army Radio Thursday morning. However, the defense establishment "must turn over every stone before any confrontation, so they will not say that I'm dragging Israel into battle because of my own agenda," he added. Neither fuel nor salaries interest them," Lieberman said. "The heads of Hamas themselves claim, 'We want to remove the siege." He said that following Hamas' latest attacks by rockets and incendiary balloons, Egyptian negotiators reached out and asked the defense establishment to provide another chance for truce talks. On Wednesday, Israel allowed Qatari-funded fuel into Gaza, even though Lieberman had banned the fuel last week until Gaza violence was halted. He claimed, however, that there seemed to be no choice but war in Gaza, adding that "anything less than the toughest response won't help anymore. We have exhausted the other options." Education Minister Naftali Bennet called for a "zero tolerance policy" for Gaza violence in an address to the Institute for National Security Studies. "The security policy of a right-wing government is first to ensure security and only then agreements."

Egypt has warned PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas not to impose new sanctions on the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian official in Ramallah said on Wednesday. The Egyptians are also trying to convince Hamas to avoid taking measures that could aggravate tensions with 'Abbas's ruling Fatah faction, the official told The Jerusalem Post. Hamas leaders have told the Egyptians that they will reinstall the "administrative committee" that had functioned as a de facto Hamas government in the Gaza Strip until a year ago, if 'Abbas imposes new sanctions on the coastal enclave. Hamas suspended the work of the committee after it signed another "reconciliation" agreement with Fatah in Cairo in October 2017. 'Abbas had demanded that Hamas dissolve the committee as a precondition for signing the agreement. "The Egyptians have warned President 'Abbas that any sanctions on the Gaza Strip will increase tensions and result in more violence and bloodshed," the Palestinian official told the Post. On Wednesday, the Egyptian intelligence officials returned to the Gaza Strip for the second time in less than 24 hours for additional talks with leaders of Hamas and several Palestinian factions. The Egyptian delegation, headed by Ahmed 'Abdel-khaleq, director of the "Palestinian portfolio" in Egypt's General Intelligence Directorate, has also had talks with senior Fatah officials in Ramallah in the past few days. It was not clear on Wednesday whether the Egyptian officials had made any progress with regards to ending the Hamas-Fatah dispute and achieving a truce with Israel.

Finally, Israel on Thursday was bracing for its first winter storms of the season, with heavy rainfall, strong winds, and flooding expected across the country. Flash flood warnings were issued in the South, as rain began to fall in the region on Thursday morning and was expected to spread throughout the day.

 

 

NETANYAHU BEHIND CONSPIRACY THEORY: Ben Caspit in Maariv affirms that PM disseminated the story of a plot through Nathan Eshel, who tried for many days until he found an outlet. Having run out of all other options, he took it to Israel Hayom, the Netanyahu mouthpiece, where there is no editing.

"On January 14, 1993, Binyamin Netanyahu rushed to Channel 1's news studio in order to confess that he had betrayed his wife and had an extramarital affair with another woman (also married). The reason for this unusual move was Netanyahu's belief that his political enemies were in possession of a tape documenting his performances with his lover. In a telephone conversation received at the Netanyahu family's home the night before, the young wife was told that if Bibi did not step down from the primaries for the Likud leadership immediately, the tape would be released to the public. There were those who tried to dissuade Netanyahu from rushing to appear on television. Have you seen the tape? They asked. The answer was no. Has anyone you know seen the tape? No. So why go on TV? Calm down, count to ten, and see if there is anything in it.

Netanyahu heard, but did not listen. His enlarged paranoia glands threatened to explode. He was in a trance. In his memorable appearance, Netanyahu hinted that one of his rivals in the primaries for the Likud leadership, surrounded by a 'bunch of criminals,' was behind the deed. He meant David Levy. Twenty-five years later, Netanyahu is using one of Levy's former confidantes to disseminate the new conspiracy theory, the Putsch-Banana hatched by President Rivlin and former minister Gideon Sa'ar, to oust the prime minister.

Both plots never existed. In retrospect, it turned out that there was no hot tape. A midsummer night's dream, a total delirium, a hoax that caused Netanyahu to humiliate his wife in front of an entire nation on what was in those days the only TV channel, and to create a huge and juicy ruckus, with many casualties, much ado about nothing. It turns out that in the 25 years since then, not much has changed. The hallucination is the same hallucination, the paranoia has turned from neurotic to psychotic, the threats have swelled to huge proportions and control of the situation has been forever lost. The Israeli prime minister is spreading a conspiracy theory against the president and a member of his party, with no fault of their own, just because someone pressed the wrong buttons and whispered some tall tales in his ears.

A comic moment occurred yesterday during Netanyahu's birthday party in the Prime Minister's Office. He said a few words, and here is an exact quote: 'I have just come from... just something amazing. I am still thrilled by the meeting with the vice president of China; the second most powerful man in China. He has been here a few days, and I saw that the media is not interested at all, they do not care'. Here Netanyahu's voice rose, out of character, two or three octaves –to almost a shriek. 'The only thing that interests them,' he added, 'is the plot of the century, and that is all.'

You have to see it to believe it. Netanyahu, he is the man who disseminated this plot, through his lackey Nathan Eshel. Eshel toiled and sweated many days until he found buyers for the rotten merchandise in his possession. No professional journalist published the story, because none of its details could be cross-checked. In the end, they had no choice but to take it to the propaganda newspaper Israel Hayom, where there is no editing, censorship, or any obstruction whatsoever between propaganda and the printing press. After it was finally published and made waves, the first thing Netanyahu did was complain about the media's lack of coverage for the visit of the Chinaman.

What did you want the media to be interested in, Mr. Prime Minister? When a president and a former minister concoct a plot to oust the prime minister, it is a huge story. An earthquake. You spread this story. Now you complain that we were gullible enough to buy these used goods from you? And if you think it is over, you think again. Because immediately after complaining about the media, the prime minister went on to describe, in his voice, in great detail, that same 'conspiracy of the century' hatched by the 'former Likud minister' – against the will of Likud voters, the will of the public; an attempt to usurp an incumbent prime minister, etc.

To our horror, there is no one in the PM's entourage who will step up and take responsibility, put a hand on his shoulder and whisper in his ear: 'No, Bibi. Do not say that in your voice. When you say it in your voice, you justify the media frenzy, cancel everything you have said so far and raise the bar of proof to heights you cannot live up to. Remember January '93. Not every murmur that someone mumbles should become a conspiracy theory."

Ends...

 

BETWEEN INTERROGATIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS: Sima Kadmon in Yedioth Ahronoth explains how the report that the Netanyahu probes have ended and the Attorney General's decisions will be submitted before the expected date has ratcheted up the pressure in the PM's residence.

"This is a new one. A prime minister accusing the president of conspiring to oust him in a putsch attempt, and in response being diagnosed by the president as paranoid and recommended to see a psychiatrist. And all this smeared across the front page of Netanyahu's home newspaper, with the fingerprints leading like candy in the story of Hanzal and Gretel to the Prime Minister's Office.

The accusations are harsh: Netanyahu decided not to call early elections because he was informed that Rivlin, in partnership with a senior Likud member, intends to rob him of the possibility of forming a coalition. According to the same rumors, after the elections the president intends to place the task on that same senior person, and not on Netanyahu.

After Rivlin sent Netanyahu to have his head examined, the fire was aimed at another veteran enemy of Netanyahu, Gideon Sa'ar, who is also succeeding in arousing paranoia in the prime minister's home. He is portrayed as a subversive who wants to topple Netanyahu and prevent him from forming a government after the elections. Against the background of Netanyahu's current situation, the sense of persecution he is nurturing and the warm embrace he receives in Likud – it was only a matter of time until Netanyahu's fire would be directed towards his domestic rival. Signs of this have recently appeared in radio and television programs broadcast by pro-Netanyahu journalists. These same journalists fanned the flames and advanced the theory of cooperation between the 'former senior minister', as Netanyahu called him last night, and the president of the state, in an attempt to execute a coup against the prime minister.

Even if it is true – which it probably is not – that Netanyahu received a warning about Rivlin, it is clear that it is he who made the connection between Rivlin and Sa'ar and turned it into a global conspiracy. The idea that Sa'ar, who is currently outside Likud, is working together with the president to steal the premiership from Netanyahu is so farfetched that it is unnecessary to waste words on it. There was not even one member of Likud who said, publicly or privately, that he had heard something about the plot Rivlin and Sa'ar supposedly concocted. Even Yariv Levin, the man closest to Netanyahu, admitted in a radio interview that he had not heard about it.

But it is doubtful whether Netanyahu's intention, when using his newspaper to leak this ridiculous conspiracy theory, was only to hurt Sa'ar. It is far more logical that this is a spin, an experimental balloon launched to test the prevailing mood and prepare the ground for the enactment of a new law soon to be submitted to the Knesset plenum, aimed at limiting Rivlin's discretion and reducing the decisive weight he has in forming the government. This is the really important thing: The attempt by the prime minister and his lackeys to change a Basic Law – on the basis of this delusion, which Netanyahu apparently invented in his mind.

Instead of looking for traces of the conspiracy, we should try to understand why it was important for Netanyahu to make such accusations. What does he get from this whole affair? And the answer is the investigations. It always comes down to the investigations. The news that the prime minister's investigations have ended and that the Attorney General's decisions, subject to a hearing, will be submitted before the expected date has increased the pressure at the prime minister. The intention to announce elections and thus precede the Attorney General's decision – no longer seems relevant. The last thing Netanyahu wants is a decision by the Attorney General during an election period. So, less than a day after the report on the AG was published, the conspiracy theory was born."

Ends…

 

THERE IS A NEW KID IN TOWN: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom states that Hezbollah's secret has been revealed. Mustafa Mughniyeh, son of former Hezbollah chief 'Imad Mughniyeh, who was liquidated by Israel, is initiating the organization's return to the Syrian Golan by collaborators who spy on the IDF.

"Hezbollah is busy these days establishing a new military infrastructure in the Druze village of Khader on the Syrian Golan Heights. The person responsible for setting up the organization's infrastructure is Mustafa Mughniyeh, the eldest son of 'Imad Mughniyeh, who was the organization's chief of staff and was assassinated in February 2008 in Damascus, in an operation attributed to Israel.

Hezbollah's military activity in the Golan Heights has been renewed in recent weeks. A tour along the border does not raise any suspicion of unusual activity, but Israel has learned that the organization has reestablished its military infrastructure in the village of Khader, situated about 3.5 kilometers from the fence. At this stage, this activity mainly includes observations and using equipment provided by Hezbollah to activists it is recruiting from the village who report to it.

The person responsible for this activity is Mustafa Mughniyeh. In the past, it was claimed that Mughniyeh was appointed chief of staff of Hezbollah (a position his father held until he was liquidated), but this lacked credibility, and according to information compiled in Israel, until recently he filled a major role in the organization's arms smuggling operation. Mustafa is the brother of Jihad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in January 2015 while on a tour of the Syrian Golan with other senior officials. This assassination was also attributed to Israel, after it was claimed that Jihad was responsible for establishing a military infrastructure in the village of Khader, which was engaged in terrorist activity against Israel - just as his older brother is now doing. A move to establish a similar infrastructure, led by Samir Kuntar, ended in his assassination in December 2015 near Damascus.

Since the end of the civil war in the Golan this July, quiet along the border has been maintained. The rebels have surrendered or fled, and the Syrian army controls the area. Russian military police have been deployed along the border, and the Quneitra crossing was opened – at this stage for the passage of UNDOF soldiers, who are also returning to positions vacated during the war. Israel recently warned that Hezbollah is expected to try to exploit the new reality to establish a renewed grip on the Heights. The campaign has three phases: entrenchment and intelligence gathering, transfer of weapons, and further on down the road a shift to attacks. The leader of this secret campaign is Mustafa Mughniyeh, who is following in his father's and brother's footsteps and flying the flag of resistance against Israel."

Ends…

 

BLAME IT ON THE IDF: Alex Fishman in Yedioth Ahronoth argues that Netanyahu makes threats and then advocates a moderation regarding a military solution in Gaza, pinning his restraint on the army. Lieberman and Bennett have repeatedly carpet-bombed Gaza from the air in their statements, and then accused the army of opposing them. This game has been going on for months.

"What will the cabinet ministers do when the chief of staff retires? Who will be their lightning rod in the coming winter? On whom will they pin their political frustrations? The Prime Minister shows up in the Gaza envelope, makes threats, but ultimately adopts a very moderate position regarding a military solution, because the army 'does not recommend'. He is so blessed to have an army, otherwise he would have been forced to make good on his threats against his will.

The Defense Minister and the Minister of Education, who are squabbling for the appointment of the next defense minister, have already flattened Gaza from the air three or four times in their statements in recent months. Luckily, the army 'opposes it'. Otherwise, the cabinet would have instructed the air force to carry out the dumbest move imaginable: Carpet-bombing Gaza in response to disturbances on the fence and the incendiary balloons. Now Lieberman has announced he is renewing delivery of the Qatari fuel to Gaza because the IDF recommended it. Not because it is necessary and important, not in order to prevent unnecessary confrontation, but because the army and its leaders are merciful and compassionate and cannot see the approaching winter tempest that will overcome the residents of Gaza without electricity and heaters.

Cabinet ministers have been occupied with this game for months. Time after time the army 'rescues' them from their own statements, and they present it and its chief as soft and defeatist. No cabinet ever dared to erode the image of the chief of staff and the army just to stoke dubious political maneuvering. At no point in time did the army claim that it was not prepared to carry out the order to occupy the Strip. The question asked was always: To what purpose? And that is where it ended. Even when the cabinet convened after rockets were fired at Beersheba and the sea, the army did not have to sweat too much to convince the cabinet that the firing was a result of a 'force majeure.' The story of the lightning that activated the rockets is only one possible explanation, and not the most convincing one. But the ministers gladly bought in to it, so that they would not be required to keep their rhetorical commitments to burn down the house.

The Gaza front is now ripe for a military confrontation, and is only looking for the spark. But the political aim still does not exist. The defense establishment claims the confrontation is inevitable, and there is nothing to do but try to postpone it to a more convenient time - one that will enable Israel to derive some political benefit from it. In the same vein, Lieberman's decision this week to renew the supply of Qatari fuel to the Gaza power plant is not a humanitarian move, but pure 'realpolitik'. Just as Israel reduced the scope of its activities in Syria, in order to calm the Russians down. Just as Israel refrains from bombing Lebanon, for fear of war in the North. And just as Israel does not act against threats from other countries in the region, because the Americans vetoed it. Political plays are produced in the Cabinet room, but outside the room there is a real world. This gap, between the aggressive hallucinations and the 'realpolitik' oppressing the nation, is being pinned on the chief of staff. He has been turned into a political garbage bucket and expected to shut up.

Tomorrow, an event of a similar magnitude to the one that took place last week is expected again on the Gaza fence. The demonstrations will not stop, because they are an optimal recipe that allows Hamas to display resistance for seven consecutive months without going to war. If Hamas stops the demonstrations without a real achievement, it will have a hard time renewing the momentum. Hamas will also not make do with the fuel Lieberman is sending its way: It wants the Qatari money to pay salaries to its officials. This is also in Israel's interest - that money for subsistence enter the Strip. However, Israel cannot agree to serve as a banking conduit for the transfer of funds to a terrorist organization. So what is to be done? Where is the creativity? Where is the 'Swedish official' who will arrive from Egypt with the suitcase full of money?"

Ends…

 

NEW CONSPIRACY THEORY BORDERS ON PSYCHOSIS: Yossi Verter in Haaretz claims that if the PM opted against moving up elections, it is not because anyone is out to get him but rather to avoid elections coinciding with criminal charges that might lose him the vote.

"The Prime Minister's Office has been working hard for a long time, using its close confederates, to plant the story in the media of a putsch being put together by President Reuven Rivlin against Netanyahu. Lacking any evidence, logic, realism or even the most wobbly of legs to stand on, no one could be found to buy these worthless, rancid goods. It was rejected out of hand and returned to sender.

Today, the story was put out of its misery. Netanyahu's own trumpet, Israel Hayom, came out in its main headline attributing to Netanyahu the decision to reverse his position on moving up the Knesset elections because of 'fears concerning Rivlin.' The quick response from the President's Residence attributed a mental illness – paranoia – to he who feared, giving him a referral for psychiatric treatment, was violent and jaw-dropping. Rivlin long ago lost his patience for political spin, lies and tricks that those surrounding Netanyahu have been pulling against him. Rivlin has decided to nip this stupidity while it is still in the bud. In the Prime Minister's Office, they panicked. They realized that this could be just an appetizer.

In a split-second, the missile changed direction: It was not born in the President's Residence, Netanyahu's cronies dissembled, but by a 'former senior Likud official' – in other words, Gideon Sa'ar, who allegedly spoke with someone who heard from someone else. Sa'ar quickly put out a flat denial.

This is truly the type of story that is hard to deal with using rational tools because it is so obviously absurd. The thought that Rivlin, the No. 1 democrat in the country, would start a revolt against the will of the people in the elections and grant Sa'ar the mandate to establish the next government, just because they are friends while Rivlin and Bibi are at each other's throats, is more than paranoia. It is full psychosis. True insanity.

The Israel Hayom freebie newspaper is known for loyally echoing Netanyahu's messages. If the story is true that Netanyahu decided not to move up the elections to February or March of next year, then his motive is not related to the conspiracy theory about Rivlin/Sa'ar stealing the Prime Minister's Office from him. It lies in the end of the investigative process for Case 4000, the Bezeq/Walla case, and the statements attributed to senior law enforcement officials – that this time the speed with which the decision is made whether to put Netanyahu on trial will surprise everyone involved – as reported by Guy Peleg Wednesday evening on Hadashot Television News.

What is evident from these events is that Attorney General Avichai Mendelblit may very well make the initial decision on an indictment, yes or no, in the next few months. At the beginning of 2019. If the elections are moved forward, according to Netanyahu's original plan, to February or March, then Mendelblit's decision will fall during the height of the election campaign.

There is no doubt that the decision will be released, including materials from the investigation. The public will need to know who they may be about to vote for. Assuming that Netanyahu will be charged with accepting bribes in one or more cases, his chances of winning again will drop. Even if Likud, with him at its head, comes out as the largest party in the Knesset, it is very doubtful whether they will find partners who will agree to join forces with a prime minister charged with accepting bribes. It is possible he will not be able to form a government.

In this scenario, early elections are a two-edged sword. It would be better from Netanyahu's perspective for him to stay in the job for as long as possible, arrive as prime minister at the hearing with the attorney general over filing an indictment, and try to reach a deal that would save him from prison in return for his retirement from political life. Not Rivlin and not Sa'ar, the two demons, bother him at the moment, only the tidings that come from Mendelblit's office – and maybe sooner than later."

Ends…

 

THE CHALLENGE OF PRECISION-GUIDED MISSILES: Ofek Riemer for The Institute for National Security Studies asserts that if the military buildup in Lebanon is indeed a genuine strategic threat, Israel must take greater risks to confront them and prove that it is not deterred from removing the danger.

"In his speech at the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu warned, 'Iran is directing Hezbollah to build secret sites to convert inaccurate projectiles into precision-guided missiles.' As evidence, he presented a map showing three sites in Southern Beirut near the international airport, which Israeli intelligence claims are related to this project. The expose was accompanied by a video clip distributed by the IDF spokesperson to the media and on social networks with more information about the project, and text messages were sent to residents of Beirut. The speech, including the disclosure of sensitive information about both the missile conversion sites in Lebanon and the warehouse of nuclear materials in Iran, met with a mixed reception. Some praised the political act designed to increase pressure on Iran and Hezbollah. Conversely, some criticized the disclosure of the hard-earned intelligence material.

What is Israel's ultimate goal in the campaign against the production of missiles in Lebanon - prevention or delay? And, is the media policy, including the disclosure of intelligence, useful in attaining this goal?

The information about the project to convert rockets into high-precision missiles on Lebanese territory was first revealed in a Kuwaiti newspaper in March 2017. Already then the Israeli press hinted that Israel was behind this report. Three months later, then-Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi confirmed the information in a public lecture. The Prime Minister and senior military establishment leaders then declared that Israel regards 'gravely' the construction of factories for production of advanced weapons in Lebanon, but refrained from threatening direct military action to attack the project.

The impression is that the Israeli leadership has refused to commit itself to take direct military action to remove the threat due to Hezbollah's success in consolidating a deterrence equation against Israel, whereby an attack in Lebanon is a red line for Hezbollah. As part of Israel's ongoing campaign since early 2013 against Hezbollah's arming itself with advanced weapons, in February 2014 IDF forces attacked an arms shipment on the Western side of the Syrian-Lebanese border. In a counterattack against IDF forces on Mt. Dov (Shab'a Farms), Hezbollah acted for the first time since the beginning of the campaign to enforce the red line it had drawn. Since then, the IDF has refrained from attacks on Lebanese territory. In establishing weapons production plants in Lebanon, Iran and Hezbollah therefore presumably assume that Israel will not attack them out of concern about Hezbollah's response and the possibility of escalation in Lebanon.

In these circumstances, Israel has continued its operations against the project through air force attacks in Syrian territory – a conduit for delivery of advanced missiles and conversion equipment to Lebanon – and also probably through covert operations in Lebanon itself. In July 2017, IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot claimed that Israel was 'working all the time against missile conversion in Lebanon with a set of tools that it is best to keep quiet about, and with the aim of not causing a deterioration.' Two months later, he said that the IDF had successfully prevented Hezbollah from attaining capability to launch precision missiles into Israeli territory. It appears, however, that the Israeli efforts did not succeed in delaying the project for long, and Israel accordingly resumed its use of the media to reveal additional information about the project and deliver threats aimed mostly at the Lebanese side, such as in an article published by the IDF spokesperson early this year.

The repeated use of the media indicates that Israel has likely not achieved its goals in Lebanon through other means. Furthermore, in the absence of a credible threat of military action, its use of the media indicates that Israel is deterred from acting in Lebanon, thereby signaling indirectly that Iran and Hezbollah are free to continue to carry out their plans. It therefore appears that Israel's use of the media to expose Hezbollah's operations is not aimed at those directly responsible; rather, it is designed mainly to exert pressure on the international community and the authorities and public in Lebanon. This pressure is meant to increase concern about a war between Israel and Hezbollah that will 'cause the destruction' of Lebanon, its infrastructure, and its army, and aggravate instability in the region, in the hope that the parties who are the subject of this pressure will intervene and halt the project.

Nevertheless, it appears that these efforts have not borne fruit. Even after the Prime Minister's speech at the UN, the international community is still indifferent to the issue, and refuses to use the means at its disposal to exert pressure on Lebanon. The U.S. administration is preoccupied with internal affairs and other urgent foreign policy issues (the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, relations with NATO, and trade with China), and has left the Syrian-Lebanese theater to Russia. This is evident through Russia's expanding influence in Syria, as indicated inter alia by the orchestration of diplomatic measures aimed at reaching a political settlement of the crisis and bringing the refugees back to the country; the emerging economic and security agreements between Russia and Lebanon; and the withdrawal of American Patriot missile batteries from Jordan. The sanctions imposed on Hezbollah, including those recently approved by the U.S. House of Representatives, are also proving unsuccessful in exerting pressure on the organization on this issue. Europe, for its part, regards Hezbollah as an element contributing to internal stability in Lebanon, and still supplies unconditional monetary and military aid to that country. The response of the Lebanese administration, paralyzed in any case in the absence of a government almost six months after the elections, is led by Hezbollah's allies, who are helping to cover up for it, as indicated by the staged tour for foreign ambassadors conducted by the Foreign Minister and Hezbollah's partner in the March 8 alliance. The Lebanese public, including residents of Southern Beirut living in the vicinity of the production sites, has refrained from criticism of Hezbollah.

The ongoing attempts to upset the Iranian efforts to arm Hezbollah with advanced weapons, whether through kinetic attacks in Syria, diplomatic activity, or clandestine operations in Syria and Lebanon, show the difficulty in deterring enemies from force buildup (in contrast to the use of force). The repeated intelligence disclosures about the project for manufacturing precision-guided missiles in Lebanon and the public statements on the matter have failed to halt the project and remove the threat against Israel. However, the disclosure has not upset Israel's ability to take military action against the threat in Lebanon, and in all probability Jerusalem never intended to take such action. In addition, the disclosure is likely to enhance the sense among the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah that they have been penetrated by Israeli intelligence, and in this specific case may also delay the process, due to the need to move the exposed sites to alternative locations. Nevertheless, the ongoing recourse to the media has a negative impact on the image of Israeli deterrence, and reinforces the sense that Israel is deterred and does not wish to operate militarily in Lebanon.

It appears, therefore, that at this stage Israeli action is insufficient to achieve its main goal of forcing the international community and Lebanon, not to mention Iran and Hezbollah, to take action to halt the project. Thus if this is indeed a genuine strategic threat to Israel that is in the advanced stages of development, and considering the growing difficulty in taking kinetic action in Syria, Israel will have to take greater risks in order to create a credible threat and signal its determination to remove the danger. Possible means include delivering an ultimatum, with an explicit threat of military action in Lebanon, or conducting a preemptive attack on the known production sites there, even with the accompanying risk of escalation into a large-scale military conflict.

The importance that Iran and Hezbollah attach to high-precision missiles to create a balance of deterrence against Israel, which still maintains its military supremacy, and the high risk of escalation incurred in an attack on Hezbollah's military buildup that could culminate in a war that Israel wishes to avoid, require continued efforts to develop responses to the challenge of precision missiles in Lebanon. Whether Israel attacks the existing sites or whether it succeeds in generating indirect pressure that makes Iran and Hezbollah suspend the project, it cannot be ruled out that Iran's goal to arm Hezbollah with advanced weapons will remain unchanged."

Ends…

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 25.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Husnu Mahalli maintains that President Erdogan has failed to grasp the moment in opposition Korkusuz: "The Saudi royal family is the cause of all the problems in the Arab and Islamic region. President Erdogan could have saved the Muslim world from them. Someone who saves the region from these men could have made himself and Turkey the leader of the Islamic world. But that did not happen. U.S. President Trump and the Western leaders will continue to bargain a little longer. After they get their bonuses from Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman, the case will be closed and this file will be shelved. If the U.S. and Israel have struck a deal with bin Salman and agreed that he should stay, this man will soon become king and continue to hang over the heads of the Arab and Muslim peoples for the next 40 or 50 years. Turkey would be harmed most by this."

Ibrahim Karagul insists that bin Salman will have to go in pro-government Yeni Safak: "From this point onwards, the Saudi regime cannot carry the weight of this crown prince. The U.S. cannot build a regional architecture based on a man who has been mired in the dirt and damaged to such a degree. Whether they like it or not, the U.S. and Israel, will have to let go of bin Salman. If they keep protecting him, they will lose very serious ground in the region."

Markar Esayan claims that Turkey is playing a historic role in pro-government Aksam: "The Khashoggi killing will become a weathervane regarding whether the world's states will turn into a gang of mobsters, or whether they will choose democracy with all its international laws and regulations. We all know what states did in the past during the Cold War. If the Khashoggi killing fails to become a milestone and justice is kept at bay, the vital legal element of states will rot. In brief, Turkey is playing a historic role once again."  

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Candas Tolga Isik detects a chink in the ruling alliance's armor in centrist tabloid Posta: "We do not know whom the HDP [opposition pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party] will name as its local elections candidate in Istanbul. But in today's circumstances, whichever party comes up with a candidate regarded as a good alternative for Kurdish voters will win the election. With this in mind, it is clear that the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will lean towards a candidate who has a better chance of appealing to Kurdish voters, rather than one who appeals to the [AKP-allied] MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] base."

Abdulkadir Ozcan finds a formula for the alliance in pro-Islamist opposition Milli Gazete: "It is as if there were a perception that the MHP and the AKP are about to completely merge if they were to strike another election agreement. It is almost as if a step has been taken to push the many other problems facing Turkey off the agenda. In the end, since both parties are committed to the current 'People's Alliance', they could implement a kind of unannounced alliance for the upcoming local elections as well."

Ferda Koc foresees serious trouble ahead in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "The AKP's divorce process from FETO [Gulen movement] began with under-the-belt blows with intelligence chief Hakan Fidan being called to the prosecutor's office and the December 2015 [anti-corruption] operations. It ended in a bloody manner with the July 2016 coup attempt. It is hard to guess whether the AKP/MHP divorce process will take the same course. The reaction against narrowing down the MHP's space in the police, the courts and the Education Ministry – all of which it sees as its own patch – could even take the form of a FETO-style 'internal blow'. The government and the state are once again trembling on the same fault line, even though those at the epicenter are not the same."

 

Iran media watch

 

HONORING FIGHTERS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: Iranian newspapers focused this morning on Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i's remarks praising Iranian fighters in Syria and Iraq. He said that the Arb'aeen march to Iraq (religious ceremony commemorating 40 days after the martyrdom of Imam Hussein) is safe thanks to their heroic struggle. Khamene'i made the remarks at a meeting with a group of families who lost their loved ones in battles in Syria. Reformist Ebtekar, centrist Etelaat, conservative Khorasan, and hardline Keyhan were among those carrying Khamene'i's report with photos of his meeting on their front pages. Domestic broadcast media carried reports about Iranians' pilgrimage to Iraq to take part in the Arba'een ceremony on 30 October. Channel One (IRTV1) said that over one million pilgrims have already entered Iraq.

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST'S DEATH: Another story in today's press was the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Hardline Vatan-e Emruz carried a photo of Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and U.S. President Donald Trump and said Trump "indirectly" accused Bin Salman for being involved in the murderer of Khashoggi. "Trump: He [bin Salman] could be behind Khashoggi's death." Financial Donya-e Eqtesad wrote about "Battle between the Sultan [Turkish President Erdogan] and prince". Conservative Afkar described Trump's recent statements about Khashoggi's case as "suspicious U.S. U-turn." "Pressure mounting on Riyadh" broadcast English language Press TV as UK Prime Minister Theresa May called on Saudi Arabia to cooperate, as their explanations regarding Khashoggi's murder in Turkey lacked credibility.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Pro-regime social media users are asking Iran's Judiciary to arrest an Iranian journalist for "insulting" third Shiite Imam Hussein. Pouyan Khoshhal from Ebtekar newspaper published an article on 21 October, citing Imam Hussein's "passing-away" instead of "martyrdom". People are using hashtags (over 10,000 times) to comment on the issue. Mizan news agency, run by the Judiciary, said on 24 October that Tehran's prosecutor had brought charges against an "individual who works for a high-circulation newspaper (not exactly a description of Ebtekar) and has written several offensive pieces against Imam Hussain". The prosecutor did not name any individual or newspaper, but hardliners are talking about Khoshhal in social media. "We ask the judiciary to deal with such irreverent people decisively to prevent the repetition of such matters", posted one. "Insulting sanctities must be costly", wrote another.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 25.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Messages of peace and threats

2-To Moscow and Damascus's satisfaction

3-In the people's interest

 

1-  Messages of peace and threats

 

Bin Salman's defensive plan began with the first line of attack in Turkey. He called Turkish President Erdogan, and according to news reports, he discussed 'joint efforts to expose all aspects of journalist Khashoggi's murder' with him. After all, in addition to all his major responsibilities in the Kingdom, bin Salman has been also 'designated' [by his father King Salman] to head the committee charged with restructuring the Saudi intelligence agencies and investigating Khashoggi's murder! At…the proceedings of the investment forum (which no longer goes by the name of 'Davos in the Desert' at the request of the real Davos forum) bin Salman persisted with his plan to 'court' Turkey. He sent a very direct signal that he wants to deliver a 'message' that there will be 'no rift' between Turkey and Saudi Arabia 'as long as a King called Salman bin 'Abdelaziz, a Crown Prince called Mohammad bin Salman, and a Turkish President called Erdogan are there.' By placing his name as the 'cornerstone' of the equation that aims to prevent 'any rift', bin Salman was dismantling the formula that Erdogan – and Trump against his will – had tried to piece together, namely, one that separates the King from his crown-prince. So this was a message of 'peace,' but also a threatening one--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

Every now and then, the capitalist regimes' ideological and propaganda machines take up stories and incidents that lend credence to the claims of their models of government's cultural and moral superiority over other models: A rebellious girl murdered by her fanatic family; a pro-democracy opposition figure, preferably Russian or Chinese, who has been assassinated, imprisoned or tortured; domesticated dogs that are cooked and eaten; and so on. As for the millions of victims of their violation of large parts of the Southern globe, including those who are drowning before the shores of the Europe of enlightenment and human rights, their fate is to be forgotten. After all, they are not Washington Post columnists, and have no close links to the U.S. State Department or Congress. As a result, after imposing itself on the world's media space thanks to the calibrated and ongoing Turkish leaks and its adoption by influential political circles in the West, Khashoggi's case became one of the 'easy' issues that can be employed to promote the credibility of the West's claims to defend human rights and freedom of expression--Walid Sharara in Lebanese al-Akhbar

The internationalization of the issue, with Turkey continuing to control the manner in which the truth is being revealed, has helped Ankara to achieve half its objectives. It has succeeded in highlighting the Saudi narratives' lies a number of times. Moreover, Ankara's exposure of the fact that those involved in the crime are close to Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and its proof that Khashoggi's murder was political and not criminal or security related, has helped to support the conclusion that there was a political decision to carry out this crime. This complicated management of the issue has helped to portray Turkey as a responsible and capable state so far. It has also allowed it to display its security, judicial, and political capabilities. But that on its own will not be sufficient for it to fully achieve its objectives. Moreover, it goes without saying that Ankara cannot persist with this same tactic for long--Ali Hussein Bakeer in Qatari al-Arab

 

Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman seems to have decided to go on the counter-offensive yesterday (Wednesday) in the aftermath of the Khashoggi affair, notes the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. He has sought to court the Turkish president and even praised Qatar in an attempt to suggest that he is unfazed by the collapse of his international public image. Despite the human rights rhetoric invoked by the various parties waging the campaign that has turned Khashoggi's murder into a major international cause célèbre, these parties' motives have little to do with the denunciation of a crime, which pales in comparison to other crimes committed in the region, argues a Lebanese commentator. The murder is being used to promote various political agendas and uphold certain cultural assumptions about the West's superiority. Those who maintain that Turkey has struck deals with Saudi Arabia and/or the U.S. regarding the Khashoggi affair have provided no evidence of this claim, argues a Jordanian commentator. Turkey is trying to achieve a number of different objectives via its management of this affair; but it cannot achieve them all by pursuing the tactics it has adopted so far.

 

REGAINED COMPOSURE: "After Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's psychologically and visually damaging display two days ago when he offered his 'condolences' to Salah Khashoggi the son of the murdered journalist– who is banned from leaving the country – the effective ruler of the Kingdom appears to have regained his composure," writes Thursday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

He seems to have decided to wager a counter-offensive after his international public image (which cost hundreds and perhaps billions of dollars paid to PR relations companies and political pressure groups) has been devastated, with the exposure of the vast mountain of Saudi lies about Khashoggi 'leaving' his country's consulate in Istanbul, and after the emergence of the terrifying facts about the plan to murder the man, dismember him and hide his body parts in areas that remain unknown.

This counter-offensive was launched during a meeting between bin Salman, Bahrain's Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Lebanese PM-designate Sa'd al-Hariri, and Dubai's ruler and UAE Vice-President Mohammad bin Rashed, which was broadcast live on satellite TV. The latter three officials' songs of praise, especially Hariri's, focused on the Saudi crown prince, who was so pleased that he reminded the attendees of Hariri's detention in Riyadh [in November 2017] [jokingly] declaring that the Lebanese PM-designate 'was going to remain in the Kingdom for two more years.' In fact, he had no qualms mentioning Khashoggi, describing his death 'an ugly incident' and promising to 'hold the criminals accountable.'

All this comes at a time when the international media – especially in the U.S. – are tending towards holding bin Salman directly responsible for the murder. This was clear from U.S. President Donald Trump's statement yesterday that Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdelaziz may have not known about the operation to murder Khashoggi because the crown-prince is the country's actual ruler. (Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a similar statement in his speech on Tuesday). This explains the sense of self-confidence bin Salman tried to convey to a large extent; but it also explains why he had to take some defensive measures under pressure from the serious storm raised by Khashoggi's assassination and the collapse of the ill-conceived narrative composed by the network of powerful [Saudi] officials whom he personally manages.

Bin Salman's defensive plan began with the first line of attack in Turkey. He called Turkish President Erdogan, and according to news reports, he discussed 'joint efforts to expose all aspects of journalist Khashoggi's murder' with him. After all, in addition to all his major responsibilities in the Kingdom, bin Salman has been also 'designated' [by his father King Salman] to head the committee charged with restructuring the Saudi intelligence agencies and investigating Khashoggi's murder!

At the abovementioned meeting that was part of the proceedings of the investment forum (which no longer goes by the name of 'Davos in the Desert' at the request of the real Davos forum) bin Salman persisted with his plan to 'court' Turkey. He sent a very direct signal that he wants to deliver a 'message' that there will be 'no rift' between Turkey and Saudi Arabia 'as long as a King called Salman bin 'Abdelaziz, a Crown-Prince called Mohammad bin Salman, and a Turkish President called Erdogan are there.' By placing his name as the 'cornerstone' of the equation that aims to prevent 'any rift', bin Salman was dismantling the formula that Erdogan – and Trump against his will – had tried to piece together, namely, one that separates the King from his crown-prince. So this was a message of 'peace,' but also a threatening one.

The courtship also included Qatar, whose blockade bin Salman was one of the most eager to impose. He said that some of Saudi Arabia's neighboring countries were also proceeding towards success in their plans, and that these include Qatar, which, he said, has a strong economy. But sadly, this gesture would not have issued from the Saudi crown prince had it not been for Khashoggi's murder, in which case it will not be interpreted as fair praise, but as forced and fake flattery.

Even more strangely, bin Salman praised his own people, whom he described as a 'mighty and great nation.' But this great nation that is being promised economic miracles is the same nation whose elite has been imprisoned by the Saudi crown prince, beginning with its leading businessmen, and moving on to its emirs, academics, activists, and preachers.

"In doing so this, he not only targeted his opponents, but also those who offered him some advice or disagreed with him, even a little," concludes the daily.

End…

 

A PUBLIC CRIME: "There is no doubt that the savagery and audacity of the crime committed by the Saudi regime against its citizen Jamal Khashoggi – a public crime in the full sense of the word that was all but carried out before the cameras – partially explains the force with which broad sectors of world public opinion have denounced it," writes Walid Sharara in Thursday's left-leaning pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

But the fact that it has turned into an international affair par excellence thanks to the positions of European and American politicians, their decisions regarding it, and its presence at the forefront of the Western media's news' reports, stems from these politicians and others' ideological and political exploitation of the incident, such as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The fact is that it has become an inseparable part of political strategies and is no longer merely a humanitarian or moral issue.

The 'international conscience' that some believe has been awakened by the crime's terrible nature, only exists in their fertile imagination. Its effect and that of moral values on international politics is as forceful as the influence of music or poetry. In the current international context, we are dealing with a case of the sort that can be used by a significant part of the dominant powers in order to implement their agendas, settle scores, and engage in blackmail. But it will have consequences for the Saudi Arabia's rulers first, and for the Trump administration, to a lesser degree.

Former British PM Winston Churchill's definition of a democratic regime that he introduced on November 11th 1947 remains the most widely circulating definition among Western ruling elites, both those in power and those in opposition. According to this definition, that former French PM Emmanuel Valls reminded us at the start of the French presidential elections campaign in 2016, 'democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.'

Capitalist parliamentary regimes like to present themselves to their own people and the rest of the world via this negative definition: 'Our form of government is the least bad' in light of the growing conflicts, contradictions, social discrepancies, and injustices that essentially result from their policies and their regime's working mechanisms. This is one of the main ideological bases of the capitalist countries' self-narratives, aiming to gain legitimacy by lowering the people's ceilings of demands and aspirations, and diverting their attention towards the countries that are drowning in catastrophes and wars, or that live under bloody and tyrannical regimes. The object is to lead their people towards a self-evident conclusion, namely, that they are living in paradise when compared to others.

In fact, it was no coincidence that Churchill was the man who produced this definition. He was the man whom the West views as a main architect of the victory against Nazism, which is synonymous with absolute evil in the prevailing Western discourse. He is also one of the greatest perpetrators of crimes against humanity from the perspective of international law. He supervised one of the greatest famines India had ever known leading to the death of millions, so as to break the back of its national movement demanding independence. He also ordered savage repression of the peoples of Iraq, Palestine, and Sudan and refused to his last breath grant the colonies the right to self-determination.

After his long experience at the summit of power, this cunning British politician realized the importance of such definitions in providing the ideological and intellectual foundations for a consensus at home, even if it remains weak, as long as it allows him to devote himself to the policies of control and looting abroad.

Today more than at any previous time, the capitalist parliamentary regimes need to rehabilitate their legitimacy that has been shaken as a result of their social and political crises, and the rise of extreme rightwing currents, all of which are linked to neoliberal globalization and the changes in the international economic and strategic balance of power, and the emergence of competing non-Western major powers. The deep logic of the Western narrative remains the same: We are the best thing available and what lies outside our walls are various and differing forms of barbarism.

Every now and then, the capitalist regimes' ideological and propaganda machines take up stories and incidents that lend credence to the claims of their models of government's cultural and moral superiority over other models: A rebellious girl murdered by her fanatic family; a pro-democracy opposition figure, preferably Russian or Chinese, who has been assassinated, imprisoned or tortured; domesticated dogs that are cooked and eaten; and so on. As for the millions of victims of their violation of large parts of the Southern globe, including those who are drowning before the shores of the Europe of enlightenment and human rights, their fate is to be forgotten. After all, they are not Washington Post columnists, and have no close links to the U.S. State Department or Congress.

As a result, after imposing itself on the world's media space thanks to the calibrated and ongoing Turkish leaks and its adoption by influential political circles in the West, Khashoggi's case became one of the 'easy' issues that can be employed to promote the credibility of the West's claims to defend human rights and freedom of expression.

As the famous French proverb says, 'revenge is a dish best served cold.' The analyses that belittled the intensity of the confrontation between the Saudi/Emirati axis that Egypt joined after the July 2013 coup, and the Turkish/Qatari axis that backed and sponsored the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power via elections in Tunisia and Egypt, have proven to be mistaken. The arena for that confrontation expanded to include Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and even Syria, where the conflict manifested itself in the fighting between the various Syrian opposition factions, which in some cases surpassed the fighting between the army and its allies in its violence.

This confrontation peaked with the UAE and Saudi Arabia's involvement – together with the U.S. – in the coup attempt against the Turkish president in June 2016 and the eruption of the crisis with Qatar, which according to confirmed reports, almost led to an armed invasion led by Saudi Arabia. And the confrontation was intensified with the U.S.'s siding with the Saudi/Emirati/Egyptian axis, especially after Trump's rise to power, and the deterioration with its relations with Turkey, which was beginning to be viewed by some as a Fifth Column inside NATO, after the great improvement in its relations with Russia, Iran, and China.

Erdogan had wagered on the possibility of turning Turkey – in cooperation and understanding with the major powers – into a major regional pole that can sponsor and supervise the political changes in the region that were believed to be inevitable at the time. But the opposing axis succeeded in foiling that change, in alliance with the ancient regime's forces in Egypt and Tunisia. It also received Washington's support in this in this axis's capacity as the U.S.'s major regional partner, together with Israel.

In light of the above, bin Salman's crime against Khashoggi and the catastrophic political and media effects on him represent an unmissable opportunity for Erdogan to demolish that axis's credibility before the Western powers, prove the futility of their wagers on Saudi Arabia as an allied regional pole, and to convince them to return to working with a major and responsible regional power such as Turkey.

This is Erdogan's main aim before any other – such as securing investments or backing for the Turkish Lira for example. This has been the main motive for Turkey's exposure of the crime's circumstances; and without this, Jamal Khashoggi would not have turned into a cause célèbre.

By adopting Khashoggi's case, most of the other Western – American and European – forces wanted to confound the U.S. president by denouncing his ally, Mohammad bin Salman, and by pushing him into an awkward political and media position, especially since the mid-term elections in November are imminent. Bin Salman's crime is also a golden opportunity for some Europeans – Germany for example – who have been suffering from Trump and his decisions, and for the Democratic Party in the U.S. to damage Trump's reputation as much possible as a friend and partner of bloody murderers, and cast doubt on his strategic options, namely, his alliance with the rash camp that is leading Saudi Arabia today.

"The convergence between all these political and ideological factors has led to the transformation of a savage murder, even uglier instances of which our countries sadly witness on a daily basis, into an international cause that will be employed in the service of agendas that have nothing to do with the higher ideals and values that those who are in charge of the campaigns to denounce this crime are invoking today," concludes Sharara.

End…

 

NO INFORMATION: "Much has been said over the past three weeks about a Turkish/Saudi deal and another Turkish/American deal regarding the Jamal Khashoggi affair," writes Ali Hussein Bakeer in Thursday's Qatari daily al-Arab.

But the advocates of this theory have offered no information or details to confirm the shape and content of this supposed deal. They have not backed up their theories with any logical justifications, especially at a time when the leaks regarding the case have been increasingly undermining the claims about such a deal in practice, which would require that the truth itself be murdered and the Khashoggi file be closed.

In the speech he delivered before the AKP (ruling Justice and Development Party) parliamentary bloc on Tuesday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shed light on part of Turkey's strategy regarding this issue. Even though many people may have expected him to reveal more information, his contribution remained within the confines of what he could say at this juncture, without dismissing the importance of his words.

I believe that Turkey's strategy regarding this issue seeks to achieve three objectives: First, to push the Saudis to tell the full truth regarding Khashoggi's murder; second, to undermine Mohammad bin Salman's authority since he is primarily responsible for this murder that took place inside Turkey; and third, to uphold Turkey's honor via demand that all those involved in the murder should be tried on Turkish soil.

Although it is not possible to be absolutely certain that all the reports that have been leaked so far are true, and although we are waiting for more evidence to be revealed, the tactic of using such leaks has continued to serve the abovementioned three Turkish objectives.

Another point worth highlighting has to do with the Turkish president's attempt to distance King Salman from the consequences of what has happened. On the one hand, this allows further light to be focused on Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's role as a suspect; and on the other hand, it allows Turkey to maintain a thin thread linking it to Saudi Arabia as a state.

In this regard, one could say that, had the Turkish side transformed the crisis into a bilateral Turkish/Saudi one, it would not have been able to achieve much. The most it could have done would have been to sever all relations with Saudi Arabia. But it is unclear how that could have served a judicial inquiry, for example, or how it could have helped subject Saudi Arabia and Mohammad bin Salman personally to pressure.

The internationalization of the issue, with Turkey continuing to control the manner in which the truth is being revealed, has helped Ankara to achieve half its objectives. It has succeeded in highlighting the Saudi narratives' lies a number of times. Moreover, Ankara's exposure of the fact that those involved in the crime are close to Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and its proof that Khashoggi's murder was political and not criminal or security related has helped to support the conclusion that there was a political decision to carry out this crime.

This complicated management of the issue has helped to portray Turkey as a responsible and capable state so far. It has also allowed it to display its security, judicial, and political capabilities. But that on its own will not be sufficient for it to fully achieve its objectives. Moreover, it goes without saying that Ankara cannot persist with this same tactic for long.

"Only the possession of qualitative and unconventional evidence will help Turkey achieve its aims, block Mohammad bin Salman's path to repairing his image, and prevent any possible U.S./Saudi deal to contain the matter and seal the dossier with the least possible harm," concludes Bakeer.

Ends…

 

2-To Moscow and Damascus's satisfaction

 

The ongoing dialogue between Washington and Moscow suggests that the issue of the U.S. military presence East of the Euphrates will be resolved to Syria and Russia's satisfaction, says Silva Razzouq in today's Syrian al-Watan

 

The fact that there are clear signs that the U.S. is now ready to hold a dialogue with Russia regarding the situation in Syria suggests that the fate of the U.S. military presence East of the Euphrates will be the next major issue that will be resolved in a manner satisfactory to Damascus and its Russian ally, maintains a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily.

 

SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS: "At an unexpected international timing and at a regional moment that seemed extremely complicated and intricate imposed by the unfolding changes produced by Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder, Moscow has come out with statements that have significant implications for the region," writes Silva Razzouq in Thursday's pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

Moscow has spoken of a Russian/American understanding and successful talks with U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton regarding the Syrian dossier in particular.

The successful results that Moscow and Washington have both spoken of, and that have produced an agreement on summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump after the U.S. congressional mid-term elections, certainly did not emerge by accident. They were preceded by important regional political moves led by Moscow that seemed to pave the way for placing the Syrian file on a new political track. This was expressed by UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura's resignation at the end of next month, with the UN beginning to search for alternatives in order to coordinate with Damascus.

The region has entered a phase of intensive political activity that began with Russian presidential representative Alexander Lavrentiev's tour of Damascus and other capitals, in tandem with U.S. special envoy James Jeffrey's tour of a number of regional states and areas inside Syria. Turkey has also announced that a four-way summit will be held including Russia, Turkey, France, and Germany – with the latter two joining the numerous political tracks linked to the Syrian file for the first time. And there was also the announcement of a hasty meeting in Moscow for the representatives and foreign ministers of the countries guaranteeing the Astana track.

This has all sent a definite signal that further activity is certain, that it will take final decisions regarding the Idlib question, and will produce parallel political conditions that will impart serious momentum to the political track, of which the [Syrian] 'Constitutional Committee' constitutes the main title.

This climate was accompanied by a new American military display led by the Commander of the U.S. Central Command Joseph Votel who visited Tanaf and spoke of the U.S.'s need to remain in this area for a long time. There was also an announcement that joint U.S./Turkish patrols will take to the streets in Manbij, giving the impression that the Pentagon needs to send a number of messages to more than one party that this area is still under Washington's protection and outside any negotiations, at least for the moment.

The rapid regional developments or arrangements, that were crowned by the announcement of the success of the U.S./Russian talks in Moscow regarding 'the conflict in Syria' (as U.S. National Security Advisor Bolton described it), confirm that Washington is now ready to divulge its negotiating cards in return for receiving Russian guarantees regarding the remaining international dossiers relating to Iran, China and other issues that the administration needs at this 'awkward' American moment.

Setting aside what is being said about priorities, and although the Idlib question remains at the forefront, the most important issue that the U.S. and Russia must have discussed in Moscow was that of the area East of the Euphrates and the U.S.'s illegal presence in Syria in general. After all, and regardless of the direction the situation may take, the fate of the Idlib issue has already been determined.

The clear position regarding the next step that the Syrian state will take on the ground– namely, recapturing the area East of the Euphrates – confirm that this card has headed or will be heading the coming U.S./Russian dialogue's list of priorities. And this will take place parallel to the revival of the political track in a manner that reflects the great change in the balance of power in the Syrian state's favor. This will be manifest in the name and identity of the new UN envoy, who will, naturally, not be burdened by de Mistura's legacy and his political choices.

It would thus appear that the area East of the Euphrates will be at the heart of the coming political moves and that arranging the cards as a prelude to dealing with this issue will take the time needed to undo the knots imposed by the facts on the ground.

"The Americans' readiness for a dialogue with Moscow will impart great momentum to the effort to settle these issues in the manner that satisfies Damascus and its Russian ally,' concludes Razzouq.

Ends…

 

3-In the people's interest

 

Amman's decision to end the lease of aJordanian land to Israel is not only a popular demand, but will bring the country significant economic returns, says today's Emirates' al-Khaleej

 

In addition to its patriotic dimensions and popularity among the Jordanians in general, Amman's decision to end Israel's lease of the Baqoura and Ghumar areas will be of great economic benefit for Jordan, says the editorial in an Emirati daily. It will create job opportunities for thousands of Jordanians and increase the country's water and agricultural resources.

 

CLINGING TO THE LAND: "Jordan decision a few days ago to stop applying the two annexes regarding Baqoura and Ghumar that were signed as part of the 1994 Jordanian/Israeli peace agreement known as Wadi Araba, and that allowed Israel to benefit from these areas for a quarter-of-a-century, has reconfirmed that Jordan will not squander its sovereignty and that it is ready to deal with situations based on the interests of the Jordanian people who cling to their land," writes Thursday's editorial in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

Ending the lease, which is supposed to officially expire on November 10th 2019, is part of Jordan's fixed principles. Jordan aims to protect its people's interests and rights, dealing with them in a manner that ascertains the state's sovereignty, especially since there is no disagreement over Jordan's sovereignty over these areas, and that it has the best arguments to defend its interests. This is why the decision was strongly applauded inside and outside Jordan, and why many observers have described it as 'an exceptional and historic step,' especially since in introducing his decision, the Jordanian monarch said that Baqoura and Ghumar are 'Jordanian territories and will remain Jordanian territories,' and that 'Jordan will exercise its sovereignty in full over all its territories.'

The decision is comprehensive and requires Jordan to enter into negotiations with Israel to end its presence in these two areas, especially since the Kingdom's legal position regarding ending Israel's lease is very strong. In fact, even the Israeli side recognizes Jordanian sovereignty.

King 'Abdullah II's decision to reimpose Jordanian sovereignty over Baqoura and Ghumar seems to be consistent with growing popular demands. In fact, one could say that it is the only acceptable decision in popular and patriotic terms. It satisfies everyone in the country's interest regaining full sovereignty over Jordan's lands in these two areas as well as other areas. There appeared to be a pressing need to end the situation imposed on these two areas by the Wadi Araba treaty.

After this decision, there has been a growing debate among the Jordanians regarding the major economic and political benefits of regaining sovereignty over the two areas, especially in agricultural and water terms. These two files have been a source of concern for the Jordanian government for some time now, especially since both areas are of exceptional importance due to their strategic and geographic location, and their fertility and underground water they contain.

One may thus understand why the Jordanian government was in a hurry to regain these two areas by begin to develop clear and speedy plans to benefit from their lands. This will enhance Jordan's economic gains and will help invigorate business activities and provide job opportunities for thousands of unemployed Jordanians, since both areas offer the government many investment opportunities. In addition, they may become a future free trade zone and an area for managing Jordan's exports and imports to Europe and other countries using the occupied Palestinian ports.

The two areas' return to Jordanian sovereignty will not be free of problems and crises with Israel, which seems to be unhappy with this step that has deprived it of the possibility of exploiting the two areas.

"But Jordan is undoubtedly aware of the consequences of its decision, and is dealing with them based on its interests," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 24.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The don speaks

 

Police have finished a series of corruption investigations into Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Israeli television reported Tuesday. A decision on whether to indict the premier is expected in the next six months. "The investigations of Netanyahu have all been completed," Hadashot TV news quoted a senior legal source as saying. Investigators have been looking into suspected wrongdoing by the prime minister in three separate probes, known as Cases 1000, 2000, and 4000, which involve suspicions Netanyahu accepted gifts and favors in exchange for advancing businessmen's interests. A source in the State Prosecutor's Office quoted by the network said investigators would "surprise everyone" by finalizing their recommendations sooner than expected. The source said Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit would likely make a decision in the first four months of 2019.

In the West Bank, a Palestinian man was killed overnight in clashes with Israeli soldiers, Palestinian media reported. A riot broke out when troops entered the village of Tammun, close to Jenin, during a predawn raid. According to the IDF, some 50 Palestinians threw rocks and set off fireworks at the soldiers as they entered the village. In predawn raids across the West Bank, Israeli troops arrested 16 Palestinian suspects, the army said. They were handed over to the Shin Bet security service for further questioning. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Netanyahu said Tuesday that Hamas is a greater threat than in the past, but added that it "fully understands" the messages Israel sends to it. "We are preparing for every scenario," Netanyahu told local activists at a closed ceremony at the Sdot Negev regional council near the Gaza border. "We are dealing with a theological junta that has taken control of two million people," he said, referring to Hamas.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman's office said Tuesday evening that Israel would renew the supply of Qatari-purchased fuel into Gaza starting today, following relative calm along the border this week. Lieberman will now need the consent of the security cabinet if he wants to stop the delivery of fuel and humanitarian aid to the Strip, defense officials said Tuesday, following criticism of his actions. Earlier this month, security-cabinet members were surprised by Lieberman's decision to halt supplies of diesel fuel and gas to the Strip, contrary to the stance of the wider defense establishment. Prime Minister Netanyahu and the rest of the inner cabinet learned of Lieberman's decision in the media. Political and defense officials believe that Lieberman's position – that fuel and aid be conditioned on a complete cessation of airborne-firebomb attacks and violent protests – is too high a bar. According to defense officials, halting fuel supply could quickly worsen the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and Netanyahu and the rest of the security cabinet agree.

Elsewhere, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas said the Palestinian National Council, which will meet at the end of the month, is expected to pass important and dangerous resolutions concerning relations with Israel and the United States, as well as Hamas and the Gaza Strip. In an interview with Palestinian television 'Abbas gave in Oman during his recent official visit there, the Palestinian president said the National Council is the highest authority and the Palestinian leadership cannot ignore its decisions. "We will discuss all the issues on the agenda including the recent decisions by the United States against the Palestinian people, such as moving the embassy and closing the PLO offices in Washington. There are signed agreements too between us and them, and Israel has violated all these agreements and because of this violation we see ourselves as freed from the agreements," said 'Abbas. 'Abbas noted that the Paris Economic Agreement, for example, needs to be rewritten after 25 years and changes in relations with Israel. "The National Council will make all the decisions, including on the issue of security coordination and economic relations. Even if such decisions will have dangerous implications it is impossible to continue with the present situation," he said. Concerning Hamas, 'Abbas rejected claims that the Palestinian Authority has imposed sanctions or other harsh decrees on the Gaza Strip. "This is not true, every month we pay $96 million to the Gaza Strip, but I made it clear to Egyptian President Sissi that this situation cannot continue after 12 years of division – and our position is still clear: Either we receive responsibility for everything or they take responsibility for everything, and this too is something that will be brought before the National Council."

Jerusalem's city hall said Tuesday that 15 municipal sanitation workers entered the Shuafat Palestinian refugee camp for the first time ever to carry out trash removal and other cleaning services, in what has been branded part of outgoing Mayor Nir Barkat's plan to expel UNRWA from Jerusalem and "end the refugee lie." The move was ordered by Barkat, who wants to outlaw the UN agency for Palestinian refugees from operating in the city and providing services to Palestinian residents in the camp which was founded in 1965 and is home to some 20,000 residents. The sanitation workers found hundreds of tons of untended garbage and construction waste. They will enter the camp daily to gradually take over what the city called UNRWA's "inadequate services." The municipality will also start to provide "far superior" education, health, and other services, to replace UNRWA, it said in a statement. While in the Jerusalem city limits, municipal workers, police, and others have never entered the Shuafat camp, which is situated beyond the West Bank security barrier, leading to charges of official neglect.

In news of Peace plans, France will submit its own plan a few weeks after the U.S. midterm elections if President Trump does not lay out his peace plan, Foreign Ministry Political Director Alon Ushpiz said Tuesday in a closed meeting. Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Ushpiz said that France was waiting for the elections, after which it would demand that Trump make his plan public, otherwise France would reveal its own plan. "The elections in November are critical for Israel. A third of the members of Congress will be replaced and it is not clear if they are all for us. We are starting from zero. We believe the Democrats will grow stronger and that will affect Israel due to their influence on Trump," Ushpiz said. Speaking of efforts to reach an agreement with Hamas, Ushpiz said: "We have been unable to persuade diplomats and government officials who have visited Gaza. In light of the humanitarian situation there, our people cannot do much. Nothing will help," he said. Ushpiz also said the move of foreign embassies to Jerusalem was a political matter that did not involve the Foreign Ministry and that the ministry had not been given the task of moving embassies to Jerusalem.

In other news, state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has won an additional, $777 million contract to supply LRSAM air and missile defense systems to seven ships in the Indian navy, the company said on Wednesday. The contract is with India's state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), which is the main contractor in the project, IAI said. The LRSAM, part of the Barak 8 family, is an air and missile defense system used by Israel's navy as well as India's navy, air and land forces. With this deal, sales of the Barak 8 over the past few years total over $6 billion, IAI said. Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman wrote on his Twitter account: "This is another proof that security is an investment and not an expense. IAI is a national asset that we need to protect and strengthen." "IAI's partnership with India dates many years back and has culminated in joint system development and production," IAI Chief Executive Officer Nimrod Sheffer said. "India is a major market for IAI and we plan to ... reinforce our positioning in India, also in view of increasing competition." Israel's and India's leaders have pledged to deepen ties and the countries have been increasing cooperation in fields like agriculture and advanced technologies. Israel is also emerging as one of India's biggest suppliers of weapons, alongside the United States and long-term partner Russia. Last year, IAI struck a deal worth almost $2 billion to supply India's army and navy with missile defense systems. This was followed by a $630 million contract with BEL to supply Barak 8 surface-to-air missile systems for four ships in the Indian navy. The Barak 8 was developed by IAI in collaboration with Israel's Defense Ministry, India's Defense Research and Development Organization, the navies of both countries, Israel's Rafael and local industries in India and Israel.

Finally, a report that President Reuven Rivlin has decided to prevent Prime Minister Netanyahu from forming the next government is nothing but "baseless paranoia," the President's Residence said today. Israel Hayom reported that Netanyahu was going to immediately initiate an early election last week, when the Knesset returned from its extended summer and holiday recess. But Netanyahu chose instead to pass the controversial haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription bill and keep the current Knesset intact out of concern that even if he won the next election, Rivlin would ask a different Likud MK to form the government. The report said Netanyahu revealed his fears to his close associates and Likud figures. Following those consultations, coalition chairman David Amsalem, who is close to Netanyahu, drafted a bill intended to limit the discretion of the president, who currently can ask any MK to form a government. The report said a Likud figure who is considered very close to Rivlin spoke about the idea with Likud MKs in recent days and asked for their support. The President's Residence ridiculed the report in an official statement. "We had trouble finding real information in the report other than an in-depth description of paranoia that is not based on any actual step that is happening in reality," the statement said. "Dealing with such phenomena should be left to professionals who are not spokespeople."

 

 

THE ISRAELI SILENCE ON KHASHOGGI: Ronen Bergman in Yedioth Ahronoth asserts that even if all the truth regarding what occurred in the Saudi Consulate has yet to be revealed, one thing is certain: Saudi Arabia and MbS suffered a severe blow with implications for the entire Middle East, including the country most conspicuous in its silence in the affair – Israel.

"'I wish the Turks would show the same determination in gathering intelligence and conducting the inquiry regarding Hamas and its senior representatives in the country as they do regarding the murderers of the Saudi journalist,' an extremely senior Israeli intelligence source said yesterday. His message is clear: Turkey has in the past couple of years become an active partner for those whom many in the Israeli intelligence community consider to be terrorists. In the face of Israeli information that has been sent to it time and again over the past eight years, the Turks repeatedly claimed that they had checked, interrogated – but found nothing.

The Erdogan regime has severely damaged the intelligence cooperation between the two countries. Hakan Fidan, head of Turkish intelligence, is viewed by many in Israel to be close to the Iranians and Hezbollah – that is to say, to Israel's bitter enemies. Senior Israeli intelligence officials gritted their teeth when he told them of his warm relations with Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards.

In recent years, Erdogan has prohibited Fidan from traveling to Israel, which in effect disrupts intelligence contacts between the sides at the highest levels. The results show that Saleh al-'Arouri, deputy head of Hamas and head of operations in the West Bank, operates the organization's weapons development and smuggling network from Istanbul. The Hamas scientist whose liquidation in April in Kuala Lumpur was attributed to Israel was under his command and was even supposed to fly to Istanbul the day after he was killed.

Since the murder of Khashoggi, the Turks have thrown everything at their disposal into the investigation of this horrific, failed, and terrible assassination, which in its amateurism competes with the absurd exploits of Inspector Clouseau of the Pink Panther comedies. First: It turns out that Turkish intelligence had pretty good surveillance of what was happening inside the consulate. This is not an embassy, and usually such places, used for bureaucratic matters such as renewal of passports, do not justify investing time and effort in listening devices.

The evidence from the affair raises the question: Were the Saudis more amateurs or more arrogant? Beyond the fact that they carried out the operation inside their mission, when they should have guessed that it was at least under surveillance, they made so many mistakes that it is hard to believe that intelligence personnel were actually involved in them. The New York Times managed relatively easily to find perfect matches between some of the assassins and those who surround the Saudi Crown-Prince. How did it happen that these specific people were sent, even though their mere presence at the scene incriminates him as well? And if that were not enough, how could it be that they did not notice the UAV's that recorded them burning documents in the consulate yard?

Perhaps ultimately the Saudis will manage yet again to bribe their way out of this. Due to Trump's eagerness to enter into deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars with Saudi Arabia, they will probably succeed in 'convincing' him to accept their refuted version.

There is no doubt that the kingdom and especially Mohammed bin Salman have suffered a severe blow. This will have implications for the entire Middle East, including the country most conspicuous in its silence in the affair: Israel. Just as in the case of Russian involvement in the genocide in Syria, Netanyahu is keeping his distance. One might hazard a guess as to why. On the tactical level, if the reports concerning a dialogue between Israel and Saudi Arabia are correct, then it is possible that those same Saudi agents who were reportedly arrested or interrogated are the confidantes of MbS who may also be promoting his intelligence relations with foreign countries. First and foremost of them is General Muhammad Asiri, the close adviser to the heir apparent who is also likely to be the first to pay the price for the debacle in Istanbul.

The widespread implications of the assassination will be felt throughout the region. MBS's Saudi Arabia is a central component of the vision of a new Middle East of leaders such as Trump and Netanyahu. At its center is the moderate Sunni axis, which, in cooperation with Israel – and with American support – is promoting the fight against Iran, Hezbollah, Assad, and the jihadist organizations. MbS promoted this vision. But now his wings will be cut, if he remains in office and his ability to proceed with these secret moves and harness his intelligence services – and his enormous resources – against Iran and its satellites will be severely damaged. Trump will not be able to give him any more automatic support. One hopes that if he wishes again to liquidate people – say the heads of the Revolutionary Guards – he will do so in consultation with those who have some experience in the matter."

Ends…

 

NO MORE FREE LUNCHES FOR NETANYAHU: Amir Oren on Walla! points out the Jordanian announcement regarding the nixing of the land lease and the report of Trump using security aid to Israel as leverage for his peace plan, have one common denominator: No more credit. Netanyahu has amassed a debt, and now the creditors are demanding payment.

"Jordan's announcement of its intention to nix the lease of the territories to Israel and the report regarding Trump's view of American defense aid as a lever for rescuing PM Netanyahu from his entrenchment in the territories, have a common denominator: No more credit. Netanyahu, as is his wont, is spending a fortune that is not his, as if there is no tomorrow. The debt is accumulating, the creditors are getting angry, and are finally demanding the account be settled. And then, shock on Balfour Street. Has tomorrow arrived already? How is that possible? For it was not here yesterday.

This can be seen in many pieces of the puzzle, including fear of the international response to the affairs of Khan al-Ahmar and Lara Alqassem. When Yitzhak Rabin set off on his hesitant path to Oslo, there was no BDS. A quarter of a century later, when it is clear to all that Netanyahu is too weak or too frightened to advance towards peace, Israeli policy – and not the State of Israel or Judaism, as suggested by the official lie – is pushed into a defensive defeat.

Israel began the Six-Day War with a soundtrack of Moshe Dayan declaring: 'We have no goals of occupation'. Israel had no motives to hold territories beyond the Green Line and govern hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The occupation, in its professional military sense, was intended to preserve security chips that would be cashed in for peace agreements.

Over the years, Israel deluded itself that the temporary would become permanent for nothing. She awoke from her nap at noon on Yom Kippur 1973, understood the painful message and exchanged the Sinai for peace – a separate agreement, but with a Palestinian asterisk. Instead of dealing with it and arranging the Palestinian issue with King Hussein, Menachem Begin tried to be a wise guy, ridiculed his commitment – which is why Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman quit his government – and even annexed the Golan Heights and invaded Lebanon. The solution to the conflict, which was within reach as a continuation of the Camp David process, was thwarted. The debt was not deleted. Quite the opposite, it continued growing, with interest.

Since 2003, when Netanyahu was a minister in the Ariel Sharon government and a partner in its collective responsibility, Israel is committed to the road map leading to a Palestinian state. The suspicious and skeptical Sharon was convinced that Abu Mazin was a different type of leader, the opposite of Yasser Arafat, perhaps a Palestinian Gorbachev or De Klerk; but only a short year, and the disengagement from Gaza, separated Arafat's death from Sharon's stroke. The endeavor was cut short.

Netanyahu, in his smugness, believed that he could outwit everyone forever, and not only in the private, criminal context: Strive against a Democratic president without remaining just the Republicans' friend; block Abu Mazin without strengthening Hamas; sabotage the containment policy of Iran without harming other aspects of Israel's security; and obey his family members, who extorted him into radicalizing the Jordanian front without suffering a double blow from King 'Abdullah in Naharayim and Tzofar.

He encouraged Trump to transfer the embassy to Jerusalem, an empty and ostentatious move (the administration continues to oppose the annexation of East Jerusalem; the whole of Jerusalem is still registered in Mike Pompeo's foreign ministry as a separate entity), presented in advance as a one-handed clap – with the other hand slapping the Israeli face.

In his efforts to undermine the nuclear agreement with Iran, Netanyahu joined forces with Saudi Arabia. His voice, which bellowed 'Iran lied', fell silent when Mohammed bin Salman lied about the Khashoggi murder. Even the murder itself, of course, did not generate a condemnation from him, because the murderers belong to the 'good guys' and not to the 'bad guys', in the elegant division made by Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, who is personally loyal to him. The Saudi lie does not bother Netanyahu, because the truth is indeed his guiding light, but sometimes he forgets to turn that light on.

Trump, Netanyahu's partner in the pragmatic attitude towards the truth, knows only one weapon – money. He will deny aid to anyone who insults or defies him. Mexico will finance the wall. His allies will suffer blows to their pockets. He is a repo man. This works both ways: If the Saudis promise to buy a hundred billion dollars' worth of weapons from the U.S. in Texas and Missouri - this is more important to Trump and his voters than some dead Arab who, to his detriment, also wrote for The Washington Post.

If Netanyahu, who enjoyed the imaginary honey Trump showered on him, should refuse to accept the sting, the president will ask Congress and the voters why the hell Israel is so ungrateful. True, the Americans have a moral obligation to prevent a second holocaust and a practical aspiration to keep Israel out of existential distress that would force it to use Doomsday weapons and create worldwide havoc, but what does that have to do with diverting the money saved in the F-35 and missile-defense gifts to building peace-foiling settlements?

The waiter is approaching bearing the expression of someone who does not want to hear again that the wallet was forgotten at home. There are no free lunches. How pleasant were yesterday and the day before yesterday. Everything was bright and carefree. And suddenly – it is tomorrow."

Ends…

 

A FORCEFUL RESPONSE TO JORDAN: Ze'ev Jabotinsky in Israel Hayom explains the prevailing Israeli view that it is better that Jordan be ruled by a Hashemite despotic monarch than a regime that represents the public. Perhaps it is time Israel examines whether this paradigm is endangering it in a changing region.

"The King of Jordan announced on Sunday that it had initiated and passed a resolution to discontinue leasing land to Israel in the Arava and in Naharayim, as stated in two appendices to the 1994 peace treaty between the two countries. The cancellation was announced by the king himself. It is clear that his goal is to weaken the peace treaty with Israel.

In response to the decision, Shimon Sheves, Director General of the Prime Minister Rabin's Office at the time of signing, said that the lease agreement was signed for 25 years, in the hope that 25 years later the agreement would be upgraded instead of annulled. The king's decision, published exactly on the day marking 23 years since Rabin's assassination, proves that agreements between states must not count on concessions concerning sovereignty – on hopes that seem realistic at the time of signing, but are gnawed by time's teeth.

In this case, time's teeth included, among other things, the expected replacement of King Hussein, but he was not replaced by his brother, who supported the agreement, but by his son 'Abdullah. The Arab spring and the appearance of ISIS to are also included in time's teeth. With regard to ISIS, its main enemy is the Hashemite King, who is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and therefore more senior in the religious hierarchy than ISIS's leader, who crowned himself a Caliph; the successor and heir to the Prophet.

But despite all the sympathy to the King's problems, he assumes that Israel's cooperation with his regime can be taken for granted and therefore he can cause harm to Israel's citizens (in this case, the Arava farmers will bear the brunt of most of the damage), without Israel retaliating. The Israeli government now has a choice between an attempt to appease the King at its own expense, and a firm response that will preserve the agreement only in its written form.

Jordan receives from Israel much more than what was agreed on in the peace agreement. This was done out of a desire to strengthen the relationship, the hopes for which led Rabin to reach a time-limited lease agreement, according to Sheves. In the water sector, for example, the agreement stipulates that Israel will supply Jordan with 50 million cubic meters of water per year; in practice it supplies almost double that amount each year. The difference can greatly reduce the drying out process of the Sea of Galilee and the decline of the national water level below all defined lines. The decline of the level below a critical threshold is dangerous; it can cause the eruption of saline springs, whose gushing forth is prevented only by the water pressure on the plug of their opening. Once the plugs are pushed out, they cannot be returned. The salinity of the Sea of Galilee will pose a hydrological disaster for both us and Jordan.

The government should initiate an examination of the water supply process beyond what is stipulated in the peace agreement with Jordan to prevent this hydrological disaster. There is no doubt that such a serious examination will curb the Jordanian king's enthusiasm to strictly adhere to what is stipulated in the peace agreement alone, while abandoning the hopes on which it was based.

The dominant view in Israel today is that it is preferable that Jordan be ruled by a Hashemite despot than a regime that represents its people. This paradigm led Israel to intervene and abort Yasser Arafat's coup attempt in September 1970, and save the life of the Hashemite rulers. Perhaps it is time to examine whether this is not a policy that endangers us in a changing Middle East."

Ends…

 

PA VIOLATING OSLO ACCORDS IN EAST JERUSALEM: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 claims that since Trump's announcement of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the PA has intensified its illegal activity in East Jerusalem, contravening the Oslo accords and focusing on combating Palestinians who sell lands and houses in the city to Jews.

"The sale of the Juda family home in the Sa'adia neighborhood in the Old City of Jerusalem to Jews is causing uproar among residents of the territories in the past couple of weeks. The details of the sale were revealed by the family members themselves after they sold their three-story house to a Palestinian businessman named Khalid al-'Atari, but were astonished to find out, a short time afterwards, that he transferred ownership of the house, for $17 million, to a group of Jews, who immediately moved in.

The affair is a severe blow to the status of the PA, which is perceived by the residents of the territories as corrupt and whose officials make deals with Israel, through straw men, to purchase real estate in the Old City, in the area of Temple Mount, as a precursor to an Israeli takeover of al-Aqsa Mosque. On October 13, Sheikh Akrama Sabri, the preacher of al-Aqsa Mosque, issued a fatwa that anyone selling to Jews in the Old City of Jerusalem is not part of Islam. 'We will not accept his repentance and he will not be buried in the cemeteries of Muslims' stressed Sabri.

Senior Fatah officials say that following the affair, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas ordered the Palestinian security services to intensify the manner in which sellers of land and houses to Jews are being handled, in order to distance himself from the scandal of the sale of the Juda family home in the Old City, to which his name has been linked. The task was entrusted to his close associate, General Majed Faraj, who activated his people in East Jerusalem. This week the Jerusalem police and the Shin Bet arrested two Faraj confidantes, on suspicion of kidnapping a resident of the neighborhood Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem, who is known as a mediator in land and property transactions, on suspicion that he recently sold a house to Jews in the Flower Gate area of the Old City.

He is an Israeli citizen who also carries an American passport. According to Palestinian sources, he is still being detained at the Palestinian General Intelligence interrogation facility in Ramallah. His family filed a complaint about his arrest with the American consulate in Jerusalem, but according to sources in Fatah, 'Abbas does not care what the Trump administration says or does, and he ordered the man not be released from detention. 'Abbas wants to create a policy of deterrence against sellers of land and homes to Jews in the Old City and he seems to have found a scapegoat, of whom he will make an example.

According to the Oslo Accords, Palestinian security forces are not allowed to operate in East Jerusalem, but the PA is openly violating the agreement. This is a 'cat and mouse' game between the PA security forces and Israel Police and the Shin Bet. Residents of East Jerusalem say that in the past year, following President Trump's declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the PA's security forces in the Eastern part of the city have increased their activity, threatening residents daily and summoning them to interrogations. They also distribute money to Fatah merchants and activists to strengthen 'Abbas's status in East Jerusalem. However, the kidnapping of the Israeli citizen who carries an American passport is an extremely grave incident, and the PA is obliged to release him immediately under the Oslo Accords. Such an incident has not occurred in East Jerusalem for many years.

Some 18 years ago, Yasser Arafat ordered Jibril Rajoub, then head of the Preventive Security Service, to kidnap the merchant 'Abd al-Salam Hirbawi from East Jerusalem, after he defied Arafat's order to transfer a plot of land under his ownership in the Old City to the Coptic Church. Hirbawi, an Israeli citizen, was kidnapped to Ramallah, but Israel refused to accept this. A closure was imposed on Ramallah and it was surrounded by tanks, in order to prevent Rajoub's men from transferring the kidnapped Hirbawi to Nablus. The Israeli pressure worked, and Hirbawi was released from his detention in short order.

It is time for Israel to wake up and deal sternly with members of the Palestinian security services who violate the Oslo Accords in East Jerusalem in order to strengthen 'Abbas' status. 'Abbas is now trying to scare the residents of East Jerusalem, so that they will not sell lands and houses to Jews, in an attempt to foil Israel's hold on East Jerusalem. Anyone who foments war, should get war thrown right back at him. Israel has many tools to thwart 'Abbas's people in East Jerusalem, such as the use of administrative orders, or their legal removal from the city. The battle for Jerusalem is in full swing and it is time to play hardball."

Ends…

 

ERDOGAN MILKING KHASHOGGI PROBE: Anshel Pfeffer in Haaretz argues that the Turkish president may have only revealed a couple of new pieces of information in his speech, but the underlying message of his new-found power over a Middle East rival was clear.

"Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the leader of a government that has jailed more journalists than any other in the world. Yet he opened the section of his speech devoted to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi with condolences not just to his family and friends, but to the 'media world' as well.

Interestingly, he said nothing on Tuesday about Khashoggi's work as a journalist, his criticism of the Saudi leadership and his support for a brand of political Islam similar to the one Erdogan himself has championed. Erdogan did not show much emotion or outrage and, despite promising the 'naked truth,' did not add much to what was already known.

The two new pieces of information Erdogan supplied during his weekly parliamentary speech to party members were that an advance team of Saudis scouted out possible burial sites; and that the hard drive of the surveillance system at the consulate in Istanbul was removed in advance of Khashoggi's murder. These items were specifically picked to blow away what is now the official Saudi version that Khashoggi's death was somehow the result of a rogue operation gone wrong.

He held back, however, on what the Turkish authorities know about what actually happened behind the consulate's walls. Was this because Erdogan did not want to reveal how Turkey has been monitoring goings-on within the building? Or is he simply keeping the information in reserve to subtly pressure Riyadh. The Turkish president did not just leave out the grisly details of the murder itself. He did not mention any names either – save that of King Salman, who he addressed respectfully as a fellow leader.

This was not the same Erdogan who often viciously attacks his rivals with angry slurs. He was speaking with all the politeness of a mafia don informing his victim, 'I know where you live.' He paid utmost respect to the king, repeatedly using his full title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. But there was no missing the menace. The man everyone has been talking about whom Erdogan did not mention was Crown-Prince Mohammed bin Salman. But it was clear to whom he was referring when he said that the question of who gave the orders would have to be answered, and that justice would have to be done 'at the highest levels.'

Erdogan ended the Khashoggi chapter in his speech with a polite but firm demand of the Saudi king that the 18 men allegedly involved in the murder be put on trial in Istanbul, where the crime took place. There is no question of that ever happening. The Saudis, under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, are not obliged to extradite the alleged perpetrators – and they certainly have no intention of allowing any foreign authority to question them and reveal who actually gave the order.

Erdogan's message to the Saudis, and to the other governments he alluded to in his speech (Egypt and the United Arab Emirates), is that he plans to milk the Khashoggi murder for all he can. He has been gifted an unexpected lever of international pressure over the Saudi-led camp in the Middle East, which has been defying him since the overthrow of Egyptian President Mohammed Mursi in 2013. He will not relinquish that lever anytime soon.

The presidential press office will have informed him of the unprecedented global attention around his speech Tuesday, and that the direct broadcast by his government's English-language TRT World broke its ratings record. Erdogan may be one of the world's biggest suppressors of free journalism, but he now has control of a media cause célèbre. To keep the media interested, he will make sure to either leak or deliver further speeches with any more information he holds."

Ends…

 

HEZBOLLAH VIOLATION: The Jerusalem Post's editorial says that Hezbollah is clearly gathering intelligence and waiting for the opportunity to attack Israelis. The UN must take action.

"News that Hezbollah has captured a bird of prey and is holding it as a suspected Israeli spy is periodically creating local headlines and raising smirks. But what happened this week might shed some light on the Hezbollah way of thinking – and it is no laughing matter.

On Monday, the IDF announced that it had uncovered an observation post used by the terrorist group about a kilometer from Israel's Northern border. It was the sixth such post discovered in the past couple of years. The Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization had sinisterly tried to conceal the intelligence gathering post as a birdwatching station for a non-existent environmental NGO called 'Green Without Borders.''

Like the Hamas terror tunnels spreading from Gaza toward and into Israeli territory, there is nothing innocent about the activity. Hezbollah, like Hamas, is funded and supported by Iran; both terrorist organizations have a history of kidnapping and murdering Israeli soldiers and citizens.

The hidden Hezbollah post was located in the village of al-'Adeiseh, just across the border from Kibbutz Misgav Am. Nobody in the kibbutz needs a reminder of the cost of terrorism. In 1980, five Palestinian terrorists crossed the nearby border and penetrated the community and held hostage a group of toddlers sleeping in the then-typical kibbutz 'children house.' A two-year-old and an adult kibbutz member were killed in the attack, along with an Israeli soldier who was participating in the rescue.

Hezbollah's cynical use of a fictitious environmental group as a guise for intelligence gathering is yet another flagrant violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which set the terms to end the month-long Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006. The resolution bans any military presence South of the Litani River except for the Lebanese Army and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

A senior official in the Northern Command was reported as saying, 'Hezbollah is building military infrastructure along the border with armed men moving there and watching the Israeli border. This is military infrastructure in civilian guise... The objective is to gather intelligence on the border.' As the Jerusalem Post's military correspondent Anna Ahronheim noted, the phenomenon is well known. In February, the Post reported that UNIFIL peacekeepers accused Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army of hampering their work. The UNIFIL forces were denied access to a location in a Southern Lebanese village by three men wearing military-style outfits who had left a mosque bearing a 'Green Without Borders' flag.

Such actions make a mockery not only of Resolution 1701, but also bring into question the role of UN peace keepers in the area in general. UNIFIL publications stress that its main focus has been on 'restoring international peace and security' with the functions of an observer and monitoring mission. According to UNIFIL's own website, under the terms of Resolution 1701, the UN Security Council authorized UNIFIL to 'take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. It should also resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.'

What is the point of observing and monitoring without taking any action? That UNIFIL is watching Hezbollah but not acting on what is sees, or not capable of acting, only encourages the terrorist organization. It also gives the wrong message elsewhere in the North, where United Nations Disengagement Observer Force peacekeepers are meant to be safekeeping the border between Israel and Syria. UNDOF only recently resumed its full activities there – having fled, with the help of Israel, following a series on kidnappings and attacks on its members by Islamist terrorist groups that took over the area in 2014 during the ongoing Syrian civil war.

The time has come for the international community to ensure that UN forces carry out the job they were sent to do: Preventing hostile activity. Hezbollah is clearly gathering intelligence and waiting for the opportunity to attack Israelis. The United Nations cannot say it did not know; if it does not take real action to prevent an attack, the UN will be complicit in it."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 24.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Ertugrul Ozkok adopts a cynical stance in center-right Hurriyet: "So what will happen now? The Khashoggi affair has ruined the image of the [Saudi] crown-prince, who U.S. President Trump personally tried to portray as a reformist. But we should not forget that the Middle East is a region of despotic leaders who continue to rule despite the horrible images. In other words, nothing will come of this. Unfortunately, the rules of the Middle East apply. In this region, life goes on as if nothing has happened. Brutality is the law of the jungle in the region."

Emin Colasan claims that the president is making unachievable demands in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "President Erdogan said nothing new about any phase of the Khashoggi murder case in his speech yesterday. He satisfied himself with offering a summary of events laced with slogans, accompanied by chants from party cheerleaders especially brought to parliament. He also laid out two demands: Firstly, that the Saudis should reveal the name of the local accomplice who allegedly buried the body. Secondly, that the 18 Saudi citizens – in other words the execution squad – should be tried in Istanbul. Because he knows that neither is going to happen, he had to end by saying 'it is within their [the Saudis'] discretion.'"

 

THE PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE: Mehmet Barlas asserts his faith in the current ruling alliance in pro-government Sabah: "In President Erdogan's words, maintaining the same line on fundamental issues such as structuring the new administrative system does not require being on the same page on all issues. In brief, the AKP [ruling Justice and Development] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] have recently adopted different perspectives on matters such as a criminal amnesty, early retirement, and the students' oath. However, this does not mean that the 'People's Alliance' is over."

Yalcin Akdogan takes a similar view in pro-government Star: "The attitude towards the ruling alliance of a leader such as Erdogan – who makes all kinds of self-sacrifices for the good of the country, drinks poison if necessary, and never betrays or lets anyone down – should be perceived correctly. MHP leader Bahceli's sincere efforts for the alliance and in favor of a change in the political system are also well-known. Not formally cooperating in the upcoming local elections does not entail dismissing the wider agreement."

 

ATATURK'S LEGACY: Baris Doster invokes Turkey's founding father in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "The Court of Cassation's decision regarding reading out the Students' Oath in schools has created a new debate. Ataturk's definition of 'who is a Turk' and the Turkish nation is very clear and contains no references to race or ethnic origin. When defining the Turkish citizen, he said: 'How happy are they who call themselves Turk.' He prioritized the foundation of the Republic while defining the Turkish nation by saying: 'The Turkish people who founded the Republic of Turkey are together called the Turkish nation.'"

Kazim Gulecyuz takes aim at the opposition in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "Because the government appears to be more eager than anyone else to claim the official old rhetoric and its symbols, it continues to send strange messages in that direction. It is as if it was trying to say: 'We are the best supporters of Ataturk'. And when the government takes such a stance, the opposition parties are delighted. Is this how one sends the message that 'we [the opposition] are the address that you have been searching for' to all the people who are looking for an alternative?"

 

Iran media watch

 

FOOTBALL CLUB VICTORY: The Iranian Persepolis football club advanced to the finals of the AFC Champions League 2018 on Tuesday in a breath-taking game. The team advanced to the Asian finals in a 1-1 draw with al-Sadd of Qatar in Tehran in the presence of thousands of enthusiastic fans. Most Iranian newspapers carried reports on their front pages this morning on Persepolis reaching its first-ever AFC Champions League final. Conservative Kelid wrote: "Arabs' respect for Persepolis." Reformist Arman dedicated its entire front page to jubilant footballers and fans and wrote: "Advancing to the finals emptyhanded", referring to FIFA's transfer ban imposed on Persepolis for two transfer windows in 2018. Hardline Javan and conservative Hemayat carried photos of yesterday's match on their front pages. In the previous match, Persepolis defeated the Qatari team in Doha 1-0. The final result was 2-1 to the advantage of the Iranian club.

 

IRANIANS CROSSING INTO IRAQ: Domestic broadcast media, including Channel One (IRTV1), Radio Iran (VIRI), and IRINN led their news bulletins with reports related to the Arba'een religious ceremony to be held in Iraq on 30 October. According to reports, up to 1.8 million Iranians have registered to take part in the pilgrimage to Iraq, of whom 1.5 million have already received visas and 950,000 have already crossed the border from Mehran and other border checkpoints. VIRI said that 420 flights would be added to regular flights to Najaf to facilitate pilgrims travel. IRTV1 showed Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi saying that borders are secured and his forces arrested members of three "terrorist teams" in the Southern Khuzestan Province. He was visiting a border checkpoint in the province.

 

KHASHOGGI: English-language Press TV led with a report on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saying that his country has some evidence that dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's death was planned. Erdogan demanded that all "18 people" behind the murder be brought to justice. In another development, U.S. President Donald Trump blasted Saudi Arabia's efforts to cover up the killing of Khashoggi as the "worst cover-up ever", but again indicated that he would not end arms sales to Washington's Middle East ally. Rolling news channel IRINN carried a report saying that many invitees have pulled out from the Future Investment Initiative conference that started on 23 October in the Saudi capital of Riyadh following the death of the Saudi journalist inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Over 13,000 people on Twitter and many others on Instagram and Telegram celebrated the victory of Iranian football club Persepolis in the semi-final match of AFC Champions League. "I've always said that passion wins matches, Persepolis proved once again that no matter what difficulty they have to overcome, they will triumph," a user posted in English. Elsewhere, over 17,000 Tweets were posted in 12 hours referring to a call for "civil disobedience of a million men and a general strike". The call was made by members of the newly-established opposition Farashgard (also known by their English name Iran Revival). "We believe that the current regime is destroying our country by its anti-Iran policies. We must act now to prevent any further destruction," a user wrote in English. Another user Tweeted: "We can change if we want. Long live freedom and democracy."

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 24.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Taken to a new level

2-Not-so-deserted Davos

3-De Mistura departs

 

1-  Taken to a new level

 

Erdogan has become the cornerstone in this case that will continue to develop for a long time to come. Winning his favor, in order to secure information or reach possible political compromises or come up with a suitable production, will become the aim of politicians East and West: Both those who want to save bin Salman and those eager to denounce him and get rid of him. Today, whether he likes it or not, Erdogan is the man who, together with others, – the first and last of whom will be the Americans – will decide whether the entire region will be forced to cohabit for decades with a man who gets away with a heinous crime that will continue to pursue him as a curse throughout his rule, or whether the heinousness of what happened will lead Saudi Arabia, the region, and the world to soon get rid of a symbol of savagery who was in a rush to rise to the throne, and whose barbarity toppled him before he could fulfill his desire--Mohammad Kureishan in pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi

If Erdogan was trying to gain sympathy by describing the tragic nature of the case, the Kingdom has officially declared that the crime was heinous and that it absolutely rejects it. And if he is showing his concern for justice, the Kingdom has very firmly confirmed its very same concern before his speech. This being the case, Erdogan's speech offered no new information. Erdogan stressed that he believes in King Salman's good intentions and his cooperation in a case where the investigations are not yet complete. However, he dropped hints regarding the operation's planning. We know who he has in mind and what he means, even though the Kingdom has denied that its leadership knew anything about the case… in one way or another [Erdogan] confirmed Turkish policies towards the Arab region whose center of gravity and main weight are represented by Saudi Arabia. His speech, therefore, had nothing to do with the Jamal Khashoggi case-- Hammoud Abu-Talib in Saudi 'Okaz

Erdogan seems unlikely to waste this 'crime/opportunity.' There are many files open in the world and the region where Saudi Arabia and Turkey are engaged in a tug-of-war: From Syria to Iraq to Libya to Yemen, to a number of countries in the Horn of Africa. Today, the Turkish president has kicked the ball rolling into the Saudi pitch, and specifically to the King, who finds himself under pressure to respond to Erdogan's speech. The Saudi King has a number of options. So, will he produce a fourth narrative that undermines the three previous ones? Or will he belie Erdogan, who has declared that he has more information in his bag and that the case's file is not yet closed? Or will he admit to guilt at higher levels? Be that as it may, it appears that the Khashoggi affair has been taken to a new level, and that the Saudi monarch has realized the enormity of the step that he must take if he is to stand his ground--Hamza al-Khansa on www.alahednews.com.lb

 

While some people may have been disappointed and others relieved by Turkish President Erdogan's speech on the Khashoggi affair yesterday (Tuesday), it is too early to reach a final conclusion as to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's ultimate fate, argues a Tunisian commentator in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. Erdogan has not absolved bin Salman of the crime, but is leaving it to the crown-prince's American friends to denounce him and get rid of him, while simultaneously strengthening his own position as a major leader. Erdogan's speech was devoid of any new information regarding the Khashoggi case, but it did include an illegal demand for the investigation to be internationalized and the accused to be tried in Istanbul, maintains a Saudi commentator. Consequently, it was a political speech that dropped unsubstantiated hints that the Saudi leadership was implicated in the crime. Erdogan hinted that he has evidence that other countries are involved in the Khashoggi case, notes a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Hezbollah news portal. This may confirm that he is trying to secure concessions regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as well as detained figures and clerics in Saudi Arabia; but he is also trying to promote Turkey as best qualified to lead the Islamic world.

 

DISAPPOINTMENT AND RELIEF: "All those who were expecting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech yesterday to detonate a real bomb that exposes all the facts regarding Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder in his country's consulate were certainly disappointed," writes Mohammad Kureishan on Wednesday in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

By contrast, all those who feared that the speech would deliver the coup de grace to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman must have breathed a sigh of relief, after all the blows and bullets that have been fired at him by his U.S. allies before anyone else.

But neither the former's disappointment nor the latter's sigh of relief is appropriate. The former were more optimistic than they had cause to be, while the latter will not enjoy their current relief for long. In short, Erdogan's speech did not quench the thirst of those who wanted it to be the final word that would bring the curtain down on this case's mysteries by ultimately pointing the finger at Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Moreover, however, Erdogan failed to satisfy the unfounded wishes of those who hoped his speech would close the case's file and absolve the Saudi political leadership based on certain political calculations or political pressures.

In the coming phase, Erdogan will be operating in this precise zone that separates between those who were disappointed and those who were not totally relieved, and in a manner that will either intensify the disappointment or shrink the sense of relief. He will continue to move between these two extremes, further aggravating both sides' nerves, until the picture becomes completely clear.

The clearest thing that emerged from Erdogan's speech was that the Saudi narrative regarding what happened in the consulate is totally unconvincing as far as Turkey's leadership is concerned, even if the Turkish president did not say this openly and frankly. For he did confirm that the entire operation was prearranged and preplanned, and that it was no mere deviation in a benign attempt to convince Khashoggi to return to his country.

It was never likely for the Turkish president to be the first to offer conclusive evidence that the Saudi leadership was behind this heinous crime. Yet he did not slam the door in the face of such a conclusion. For one thing, he did say that accusing Saudi security officers of being responsible for the crime 'does not reassure either us or the international community.' He also said that the Saudi authorities must expose all those involved in the crime 'from the lowest to the topmost rung of the ladder.' And since we now know who stands on the lowest rung since they have been exposed, we must now wait to see who really stands at the top.

Erdogan has become the ultimate destination of all those interested in the investigation. The first are the Americans whose politicians and security officials have begun to visit him in succession.

Erdogan was most likely to have been deliberately inconclusive in his speech. He neither stated that the Saudi leadership – namely, the Saudi crown-prince – was definitely implicated in the crime, nor did he absolve it of this charge that has been hanging over the leadership's head in a manner that borders on certainty. In fact, Erdogan may have deliberately avoided accusing the leadership directly, leaving this mission to the Saudis' friends – Americans and Europeans – to fulfill. After all, their statements would be more effective and carry greater weight, especially when they come from senators and senior security officials, most of whom present themselves as having been Riyadh's friend and among its staunchest defenders before the consulate crime.

It is not in Erdogan's interest to be at the forefront of an official denunciation of Mohammad bin Salman. For if that is where the investigation is finally heading in line with the well-studied [Turkish] leaks to the media, why bear the weight of such a conclusion if it is going to emerge naturally from the course of events? Why should he be at the forefront of this scene that could completely ruin his country's relations with the entire Saudi state?

The other no less important matter is that Erdogan did not deliver his speech so as to put an end to the 'one-drip-at-a-time' method that Ankara has adopted in dealing with this case ever since it erupted on the scene. He is most likely to persist with this approach, as between one drop and the next, he can benefit by repairing some relations here or there, or extending a line of communication with one party or another. As a result, he will be – or rather already has become – the ultimate destination of all those interested in the investigation. And the Americans, who have begun to inundate him with their politicians and security officials' visits at the highest levels, are the first among them, as evident from the fact that the head of the CIA arrived in Turkey on the eve of Erdogan's speech!!

Erdogan has become the cornerstone in this case that will continue to develop for a long time to come. Winning his favor, in order to secure information or reach possible political compromises or come up with a suitable production, will become the aim of politicians East and West: Both those who want to save bin Salman and those eager to denounce him and get rid of him.

Today, whether he likes it or not, Erdogan is the man who, together with others, – the first and last of whom will be the Americans – will decide whether the entire region will be forced to cohabit for decades with a man who gets away with a heinous crime that will continue to pursue him as a curse throughout his rule, or whether the heinousness of what happened will lead Saudi Arabia, the region, and the world to soon get rid of a symbol of savagery who was in a rush to rise to the throne, and whose barbarity toppled him before he could fulfill his desire.

"To quote the French daily L'Humanité, the question regarding bin Salman is: Will he lose his throne after losing his mind?" concludes Kureishan.

End…

 

ANTICIPATION AND EXPECTATION: "The anticipation that preceded President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech yesterday led the world to await his words with great expectation," writes Hammoud Abu-Talib in Wednesday's Saudi daily 'Okaz.

This was especially due to the fact that the media had reported that he would be stating the 'naked truth' regarding the death of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi – an issue that Turkey has deliberately and continuously leaked reports about in an attempt to transform it into a matter of international concern and mobilize public opinion with the object of confronting the Kingdom with a predicament before the world.

We expected Erdogan to surprise us by revealing new information consistent with the level of excitement that was created before his speech. But that did not happen. Instead, all that Erdogan said had already previously been in the news. In fact, the Saudi Public Prosecutor's official statement included more details and revealed more important facts than Erdogan. All that Erdogan did was to review what happened, while all the time including the hidden feelings in his scenario that are taking this dossier in a direction that does not serve the main issue [Khashoggi's death], and does not promote the interests of common relations between the two countries.

Erdogan knows that the preliminary information regarding the case was reached by the joint Saudi/Turkish team, which he confirmed the Kingdom had agreed to form after he had called King Salman, who welcomed his proposal. Erdogan also knows that the Kingdom has revealed what its preliminary investigations have concluded. He also knows that the Kingdom will not rest until all the investigations are complete and all those implicated in the crime are held accountable and are brought to justice.

So, if Erdogan was trying to gain sympathy by describing the tragic nature of the case, the Kingdom has officially declared that the crime was heinous and that it absolutely rejects it. And if he is showing his concern for justice, the Kingdom has very firmly confirmed its very same concern before his speech. This being the case, Erdogan's speech offered no new information.

Erdogan stressed that he believes in King Salman's good intentions and his cooperation in a case where the investigations are not yet complete. However, he dropped hints regarding the operation's planning. We know who he has in mind and what he means, even though the Kingdom has denied that its leadership knew anything about the case.

Moreover, even though the Kingdom's investigations have yet to reach their final results, Erdogan demanded that a neutral committee pursue these investigations – in other words, he called for the internationalization of this issue. He also expressed his desire for the accused to be put on trial in Istanbul. These two demands represent the crux of the speech. They represent Erdogan's real aim, even though they are legally erroneous and inappropriate in view of the case's circumstances and conditions.

In short, Erdogan delivered a party-political speech before his parliamentary bloc that was part of the power game. It was also political, and in one way or another it confirmed Turkish policies towards the Arab region whose center of gravity and main weight are represented by Saudi Arabia.

"His speech, therefore, had nothing to do with the Jamal Khashoggi case," concludes Abu-Talib.

End…

 

JUSTIFIABLE ANXIETY: "The Saudis waited anxiously for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech," writes Hamza al-Khansa on the Hezbollah-affiliated news portal www.alahednews.com.lb.

Their anxiety was justifiable in light of the 'theatrical' manner with which the Turkish media announced this speech. Moreover, the Saudis are certain that the Turkish president's bag contains much evidence proving that the 'idea' of murdering the journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul was endorsed by the narrowest circles close to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

The Saudi tension peaked a few hours before Erdogan's speech as manifest in Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir's hasty message in the form of a press conference in the Indonesian capital Jakarta, promising that his country 'will never repeat what happened with Khashoggi again.'

Meanwhile, the Turkish president delivered his first speech since October 2nd [when Khashoggi disappeared in the Saudi consulate] dealing with the Khashoggi case. True, he said nothing more than what al-Jazeera, Reuters, and The Washington Post have all been reporting regarding the Saudi journalist's murder. But it is also true that his speech transported the information that has been circulating for two weeks from the category of 'media leaks ' to that of the 'official Turkish narrative.'

With that narrative, Erdogan demolished the entire logic that Saudi Arabia has been trying to promote via its media and its journalists over the previous two weeks. According to this logic, Saudi Arabia is a 'victim,' and the murderers were 'lone wolves' who have nothing to do with the ruling family; moreover, Khashoggi was killed 'by mistake.'

Erdogan extended the angle from which this case is being viewed. He set bin Salman aside as someone who cannot be trusted, and endorsed King Salman as the sole authority in this case. In short, Erdogan's aim was to impart momentum to the current that has begun to take shape around the world, and that calls for finding an alternative to the current rash crown-prince. From the Turks' perspective, the matter is not confined to redirecting the focus towards the King and setting the crown-prince aside.

It also consists of opening other tracks for the case that go beyond Turkey as the land where the crime was perpetrated, and beyond Saudi Arabia as the country of whom the perpetrators are citizens. For Erdogan's claim that Khashoggi's murder is a political crime and that there are those implicated in it who hail from other countries and must be included in the investigations opens the door to various possibilities and complex phases and solutions. But Erdogan did not shut the door to the Saudi monarch; on the contrary, he proposed that those involved should be tried in Turkey.

There are those in Turkey who viewed Erdogan's position as tantamount to 'collusion' with the Saudis in Khashoggi's murder. For example, the main opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) demanded steps such as the Saudi ambassador's arrest and severing relations with Riyadh. The CHP's radical demands naturally stem from being in opposition to the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), which means that it is lying in wait to exploit any opportunity to promote its opposition to the ruling party.

But the 'Erdoganists' view the entire matter from a different angle – one that allows them to expand the horizon that allows them to 'invest in the crime' and its many tracks. This is the context in which to view Erdogan's talk of other countries being involved, and that can be better understood if the leaks of 'a package of preconditions' that he has set for settling the Khashoggi case prove to be true. Among the most important of these conditions is the release of tens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders imprisoned in Egypt, primarily former president Mohammad Mursi, as well as the release of a number of social figures and clerics detained in Saudi Arabia.

Erdogan's sees the Khashoggi case as an 'opportunity' to demonstrate Turkey's qualifications and the uniqueness of its experiment as 'a leading moderate Islamist state.' It is this precisely that led Erdogan to say on October 15th – two weeks after Khashoggi's death – that 'with its historic heritage, geographic location, and cultural heritage that has ensured that the various creeds could live together in peace in all times, Turkey is the only state that is able to lead and guide the entire Islamic world.'

Erdogan seems unlikely to waste this 'crime/opportunity.' There are many files open in the world and the region where Saudi Arabia and Turkey are engaged in a tug-of-war: From Syria to Iraq to Libya to Yemen, to a number of countries in the Horn of Africa. Today, the Turkish president has kicked the ball rolling into the Saudi pitch, and specifically to the King, who finds himself under pressure to respond to Erdogan's speech.

The Saudi King has a number of options. So, will he produce a fourth narrative that undermines the three previous ones? Or will he belie Erdogan, who has declared that he has more information in his bag and that the case's file is not yet closed? Or will he admit to guilt at higher levels?

Be that as it may, it appears that the Khashoggi affair has been taken to a new level, and that the Saudi monarch has realized the enormity of the step that he must take if he is to stand his ground.

"A few hours after Erdogan's message, the King's response came in the form of a statement issued by the Saudi cabinet that confirmed the Kingdom's determination to hold all those who had failed in the Khashoggi case accountable 'whoever they may be,' and its determination to 'adopt corrective measures that will not stop at bringing those directly responsible for the Khashoggi incident to account," notes Khansa in conclusion.

Ends…

 

2-Not-so-deserted Davos

 

Despite the Western boycott of Riyadh's 'Davos in the Desert', Russia and China were there in force, and Mohammad bin Salman appears to have been untouched, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Saudi Arabia's 'Davos in the Desert' forum went ahead yesterday, despite boycotts from many Western companies and banks, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. Crown-Prince bin Salman's attendance at the event and the lack of any new evidence regarding the Khashoggi case in the Turkish president's speech yesterday suggest that some sort of deal may have been struck behind the scenes and that bin Salman will remain in power.

 

ANOTHER RITZ CARLTON EVENT: "It is ironic for Saudi Arabia to hold the 'Davos in the Desert' international investment conference in the same Ritz-Carlton Hotel where Prince Mohammad bin Salman held around 350 Saudi businessmen including 13 emirs prisoner, the best known of whom was the famous billionaire al-Walid bin Talal," notes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Wednesday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

According to reports, Prince bin Salman forced the detainees to pay some $30 billion from their own monies and fortunes that they were accused of having amassed via business deals marred by corruption.

Many countries, such as the UK, France, Germany, and Holland cancelled their finance ministers' participation in this conference in protest against the official Saudi role in journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who said that he had cancelled his participation, arrived in Riyadh, met with Prince bin Salman, and discussed the means of developing the two countries' economic cooperation with him.

President Donald Trump's fears that China and Russia may conclude huge business deals with Saudi Arabia to the value of tens of billions of dollars may not be misplaced. Companies and delegations from the two countries dominated the conference. We cannot exclude the possibility that the U.S. treasury secretary's visit to Riyadh and his meeting with Prince bin Salman was meant to discuss this issue and to guarantee the American arms' deal that is estimated at $110 billion for this year alone.

Showing less concern for Khashoggi's death, President Putin wishes to accept the official Saudi narrative and to guide his actions based on the official information regarding this crime, according to which no members of the ruling family – specifically Prince Mohammad bin Salman – are involved in any of its episodes.

This Russian statement of innocence aims to side with Saudi Arabia as it faces its most serious crisis in the hope of securing a greater share of its business and arms' deals, especially since Prince bin Salman has visited Moscow more than once and has expressed his interest in the Russian S-400 missile system, as well as in acquiring 15 nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. Consequently, by participating in this economic forum and preferring it to the cabinet meeting from which he was absent, bin Salman wanted to deliver a message to the U.S. that Russia and China are ready to fill its place.

Saudi commentator Turki ad-Dakhil, who is close to Prince bin Salman, had Tweeted that the response to any American sanctions on Saudi Arabia would be to establish a Russian base in Tabuk (in Northwestern Saudi Arabia) and to purchase Russian missiles and warplanes. But the Saudi authorities distanced themselves from this Tweet and its content.

The new Pakistani PM Imran Khan, who presented himself as the champion of the poor and promised a different Pakistani foreign policy that ends his country's submission to any regional axes, summarized his participation in the forum by telling the British daily The Independent that while he is sorry for Khashoggi's death, his country 'needs money', which is why he headed to Riyadh. And he was proven right when he was rewarded for his visit and participation by being given three billion dollars, as Saudi Arabia announced yesterday.

We said it before and we repeat it today: Money and business deals take precedence over human rights and values. This is why many have rushed to take part in this conference and exploit the absence Western banks and companies' officials and directors, in the hope of getting a slice of the Saudi financial cake.

But we do not know where the Saudi leadership will find the hundreds of billions of dollars that will satisfy all those who are presenting their beggars' bowls to it. Its financial reserves, which were estimated at some $750 billion four years ago, have evaporated or are close to doing so, thanks to its intensive armament projects and the Yemen war that costs Saudi coffers close to $9 billion every month, according to the Brookings Institution. Moreover, the Saudi budget deficit has been standing at around $90 billion on average over the past three years.

Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who wants to transform Saudi Arabia into the world's largest investment base, was wagering on the privatization of part of ARAMCO. But that plan has been postponed or canceled because Trump wants the money to be invested in the American financial markets or New York's Wall Street stock exchange. The Saudis are unhappy with that, since these monies could be frozen at any moment, especially if the JASTA act is implemented or economic sanctions are imposed on Saudi Arabia.

Proceeding with the Riyadh investment conference with the participation of Crown-Prince bin Salman despite the fact that many people believe that he is behind Khashoggi's murder confirms that he will remain as the actual ruler of Saudi Arabia, and that all is well and he has suffered no harm.

Moreover, the fact that Erdogan's speech to parliament on Tuesday was devoid of any new and documented evidence, and that the victim's corpse has not been found, suggests that some sort of permanent or temporary 'deal' may have been struck.

"But God knows best," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

3-De Mistura departs

 

Like his predecessors, UN Syria Envoy de Mistura has finally given up, but the real problem stems from the UN's growing impotence, says As'ad 'Abboud in today's Syrian ath-Thawra

 

UN Syrian Envoy Staffan de Mistura's resignation was no surprise, nor was the fact that he has not achieved much in his mission, says a commentator in a Syrian state-owned daily. This reflects the UN's general weakness and irrelevance, and the false assumptions on which it has based its approach to the Syrian crisis.

 

REACHING A DEAD END: "The man [de Mistura] has made up his mind to resign and he has set the date for that," writes As'ad 'Abboud in Wednesday's state-run Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

For he has reached a dead-end, just like his predecessors Lakhdar Brahimi and Kofi Anan.

The natural question is this: Why do international envoys to Syria reach a dead-end somewhat quickly and largely without achieving any results worth mentioning, when the goal of their mission is to find some sort of solution? Why is that so?

I believe that the international envoys' failure is closely linked to the UN's broader lack of success, not only in Syria but elsewhere. The envoys' missions are part of this international organization's activities, and the UN secretary-general chooses them after consultations with various parties. But the problem is that the UN's role in resolving the world's pending and dangerous issues has continuously been shrinking and on the retreat.

For what is the UN's role in Yemen or Libya or Palestine? What role does it play in the collapse of a large number of international agreements? What is its role in binding governments to international conventions and agreements? What role does it have in dealing with international and other sorts of crimes? What role does it play in any of these issues?

The UN has been impotent ever since the Cold War between the two major camps. Its impotence increased during the phase of American hegemony. In fact, the U.S. has continuously stressed the UN's limited role in all its international political behavior. For the U.S. views the UN as an institution that was based on World War II's results. And since the multiplicity of victors, which specifically included the Soviet Union, was one of these results, U.S. administrations now believe that this institution is longer of any use, no matter how submissive it may be to Washington's desires.

If that is the state of the UN, what can be expected from its envoys?

In Syria's case, the UN's policy has been based on a mistake ever since it began to deal with the events that have developed into a multi-faceted and compound war with catastrophic results. Moreover, in light of the Western and Arab pressure on Syria and what happened in the case of other countries including Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia, it behaved towards Syria on the assumption that it was going to fall soon. And the UN failed to see anything wrong about dealing with Syria on this basis, going so far as to back Western military strikes against it, or at least remaining silent in response to them. Nor was it embarrassed about about its shameful positions regarding what happened in Libya.

In general, and at the very basis of the manner in which the UN viewed Syria – if one can use such terms – was a stance that treated a Syrian force that rules the country and a foreign force that was demanding power equally. It failed to take into consideration that ruling power's true character, its position, and its role in the Syrians' and Syria's life. The truth is that the international envoys repeatedly submitted to a logic whereby they were in fact parties to the conflict rather than mediators.

"If Mr. Secretary-General is searching for a new envoy on the same basis, there is no doubt that his mission will face the same fate," concludes 'Abboud.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 23.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

'I can be tough with Netanyahu on the peace plan'

 

U.S. President Donald Trump has said he is willing to "be tough" on Israel in peace negotiations, mirroring the administration's combative stance toward the Palestinian Authority, according to an Israeli report Monday. Such a move would mark a significant shift in the U.S. approach to peace talks so far, which has seen a number of concessions to Israel and punitive measures against Ramallah, stoking Palestinian anger and a boycott of efforts to jump start peace talks. According to a Channel 10 news report, which cited four Western diplomats with knowledge of the matter, Trump told French President Emmanuel Macron that he was prepared to pressure Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to accept the administration's long-gestating peace initiative, once it is unveiled, mirroring pressure already leveled against the Palestinians.

"I have given a lot to Netanyahu. I moved the embassy to Jerusalem… We give Israel $5 billion a year. I can be tough with Netanyahu on the peace plan, just like I have been tough on the Palestinians," Trump reportedly told Macron on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September. It is unclear where the $5 billion number comes from. The U.S. currently gives Israel $3.8 billion annually in defense aid as part of a memorandum of understanding. When Macron told the U.S. leader that he was under the impression that Netanyahu preferred the status quo over making progress on a peace deal, Trump allegedly replied: "You know, Emmanuel, I am very close to reaching that same conclusion." The reported comments to Macron took place three days before Trump, during a meeting with Netanyahu at the UN, said he favors the two-state solution to the conflict, seemingly signaling a reversal in the administration's previous refusal to endorse the formula.

Responding to the report, a White House official told The Times of Israel that "the president believes that the prime minister is committed to pursuing a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians." Trump, the official added, "has faith in the prime minister's efforts."

Meanwhile, senior White House adviser Jared Kushner said Monday that a "reasonable" Palestinian leadership will be willing to negotiate with Israel based on the Trump administration's peace plan, when it is eventually unveiled, and said the status quo was "not acceptable." "If there is a reasonable leadership and there is a reasonable plan, then they will come to the table," U.S. President Donald Trump's son-in-law told CNN during an interview at the channel's "Citizen CNN" conference. He also claimed the administration had made progress on Middle East peace, without providing details, and said leaders on both sides would need to make concessions.

In Jordanian-Israeli relations, Jordan will not negotiate with Israel to renew part of the 1994 peace treaty that granted the Jewish state use of two small agricultural areas along the border, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said Monday night, dashing hopes in Jerusalem that Amman could be convinced to reverse course. Speaking to a local Jordanian news channel, Safadi insisted that the Hashemite kingdom would not renege on King 'Abdullah II's promise to take back control of the areas that Israel has been allowed to lease for the past 25 years. "We will not negotiate over the sovereignty of these areas," Safadi said of Naharayim in the North and the Tzofar enclave in the Southern Arava desert.

In Gaza, Hamas appears to be scaling back mass protests along the Gaza/Israel frontier as Egypt renews its efforts to broker a cease-fire. Only a few hundred people joined a beach demonstration near the perimeter fence in Northern Gaza on Monday; a much smaller turnout than previous weeks. The Gaza Health Ministry said 20 protesters were wounded by Israeli fire. The march took place as Egyptian mediators were in Gaza for cease-fire talks. Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said Monday that he does not believe in the possibility of reaching a long-term ceasefire arrangement with Hamas, emphasizing that nothing short of striking the group with “the hardest blow” is going to improve security in Southern Israel.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad may not have intentionally fired the two rockets at Be'er Sheva and central Israel last week. Security Cabinet ministers told Ynet on Monday the government decided against launching a military operation in the Gaza Strip following the rocket attack because Israeli intelligence determined, with a very high degree of certainty, that the rockets were fired due to a malfunction caused by the lightning storm that raged on the night between Tuesday and Wednesday. According to one minister, there was indication Hamas and Islamic Jihad were embarrassed by the incident and even exchanged accusations before realizing the rocket launches were the result of a malfunction. "We acted very responsibly," the minister explained. "It wasn't right to go to war because of the weather." He stressed that despite the tensions on the Gaza border, Israel continues giving a chance to efforts by Egypt and the UN to reach an arrangement between Israel and Hamas.

Elsewhere, a human rights report released Tuesday accuses both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas of routinely engaging in unwarranted arrests and systematic torture of critics, suspected dissidents and political opponents, and of developing "parallel police states" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively. The 149-page Human Rights Watch report, which is based on interviews with 147 witnesses, details a common method of abuse and torture used both by the PA and Hamas in which detainees are placed in painful physical positions for lengthy periods of time. Such practices cause distress and trauma to detainees, while often leaving "little or no trace on the body," the report said. The widespread occurrence of such brutality indicates that "torture is governmental policy for both the PA and Hamas," HRW stated.

In other news, Ynet reports Mossad Director Yossi Cohen warned of Iranian expansionist aspirations in the Middle East in a rare public speech on Monday. One of Israel's main objectives, he said at a budget conference held by the Finance Ministry, "is to push Iran out of the rest of the Middle East. It has a strong presence on the Lebanese border thanks to Hezbollah; it has a strong presence on the Syrian border. And it is establishing itself more and more inside Iraq – both politically and militarily. Inside Iraq, we can see the Iranians operating exactly as they are in other areas of the Middle East, by turning to the Shiite population." Cohen explained that the Iranian takeover of Iraq could lead to Tehran's vision of a "Shiite Crescent" from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. "Creating a Shiite territorial contiguity is possible for them," he said. He said other countries in the region share Israel's views of the Islamic Republic, with "some even defining Iran as their central existential threat, something the world should be aware of and deal with accordingly."

Israel Hayom reports that Iran is building factories for manufacturing and upgrading missiles in Iraq. The pro-government daily reports that the intense activity in Iraq enhances the Iranian effort to establish itself in Syria and is coupled with an attempt to build a missile factory in Lebanon. According to the report, Israel does not rule out the possibility that as a result, Iraq will also enter the circle of conflict, but is fearful such a development could threaten the stability of Jordan.

Finally, in diplomatic news, Prime Minister Netanyahu hailed ties between Israel and China as he met with Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan for a working dinner in Jerusalem on Monday. "This is the most important visit by a Chinese leader in the last 18 years. It is a sign of our growing friendship," said Netanyahu. "The fact that the Vice President of China came to Israel at my invitation for the Prime Minister's Innovation Conference is a tremendous compliment to Israel and a reflection of the growing ties between China and Israel. I look forward to our discussions." Wang arrived in Israel Monday for a four-day visit focusing on high-level talks on economic cooperation.

 

 

ISRAEL WAITED UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE: Giora Eiland in Yedioth Ahronoth suggests that prior to King 'Abdullah's announcement it was possible to reach a compromise through discreet dialogue. But the problem was not identified in time, because the foreign ministry and National Security Council are dysfunctional.

"Ostensibly it seems that the latest Jordanian move – the King's decision not to renew the agreement to lease the territories to Israel – came as a complete surprise to us, out of nowhere; a thunderstorm on a clear day. I do not like to quote myself, but I will deviate from my practice and quote from an article I wrote more than a year ago, following the tension with Jordan over the Temple Mount events and the incident in which an Israeli security guard shot dead an innocent Jordanian citizen. I concluded the article by saying: 'For many months now, there has existed a situation whereby if the prime minister himself does not lead diplomatic activity, nothing happens. Talented as he may be, it is not possible to conduct foreign policy in this manner. The Jordanian debacle is just another example of this.'

More than a year passed, and lo and behold – we are faced with yet another crisis, with similar features. There are two deep reasons for the current crisis, which go beyond the specific factors that caused Jordan to decide as it decided. One is the weakness of any Israeli institution, which is not a security organization and is not the prime minister, and – in the Jordanian case – at least three institutions.

The first institution is the Foreign Ministry. The crisis with Jordan about a year ago, the fragility of the peace agreement with it and Jordan's strategic importance for us, all required special attention. In my article, I recommended that the ambassador to Jordan be a person of exceptional political and security status, who would be able to be in direct contact with the King and with the most senior officials in Israel. This did not happen. The second institution is the National Security Council, whose first task is to determine the agenda of deliberations in the government and Cabinet. I am not sure this is the case today. There are too many tactical discussions on Gaza, while less noisy but more important issues are neglected. The third institution is the Ministry for Regional Cooperation, 80 percent of whose activity regards Jordan.

None of these institutions identified the problem, even though the Jordanian desire not to renew the lease agreement has been at the center of the public/political discourse in Jordan for a long time. As stated, if the prime minister does not initiate something, it seems that there is no one else capable of initiating it.

The second Israeli problem is the bad habit of waiting until the emerging crisis blows up in our faces, and only then do we remember to respond. Here is an example: In March 2009, a first case of swine flu was identified in Mexico. A month later, the U.S. Department of Health declared the disease an epidemic. Three months passed, and nothing was done in Israel to prepare for the predicament. Only in July of that year, after 30 Israelis had died of the disease, the government convened hastily and adopted a series of hysterical resolutions, including the purchase of vaccines worth hundreds of millions of shekels – vaccines, some of which had by then been proven ineffective.

Another example: In February 2010, credible intelligence was received about the intention of the Turkish government and the IHH organization to dispatch a large flotilla to break the Israeli siege on Gaza. The flotilla arrived near the coast of Gaza on May 31 of that year. The first discussion on the issue involving the prime minister was held only four days earlier. At the time of the discussion, the scope of Israel's options had already been limited to only one possibility – a noisy military takeover. Had the discussion taken place three months earlier, it would have been possible to identify better ways to deal with the affair.

In the current crisis, before King 'Abdullah's declaration it was possible to hold a discreet dialogue with him and perhaps reach a reasonable compromise. The Prime Minister announced yesterday that we will conduct negotiations with Jordan. The issue was first addressed, only after the Jordanian king publicly pledged not to extend the land lease to Israel, which reflects the typical Israel behavior of dealing with the right issue at the wrong time."

Ends…

 

NOT TO PLAY INTO TEHRAN'S HANDS: Professor Eyal Zisser in Israel Hayom argues that color has returned to Iran's cheeks and the united Sunni front against it has crumbled, Turkey is squabbling with Saudi Arabia, and Israel is sinking in the Gaza quagmire, while Iran ramps up arms shipments to Hezbollah.

"The situation on the Gaza border is still on hold. One moment it seems we are headed for a lull and an arrangement, and the next moment we are on the precipice of a large-scale military operation, which will see the firing of Hamas missiles to the cities of the South and Gush Dan, and IDF soldiers entering the Gaza Strip.

The situation is being monitored not only in Israel and Gaza; Tehran is also awaiting the outcome, since any deterioration on the Southern border helps it divert the world's attention – and Israel's – from its misdeeds throughout the region.

The past several months have not been easy for the Iranians. The sanctions imposed by the United States severely damaged the economy and led to unmatched public criticism of the ayatollahs' regime. The Iranian people are demanding their rulers invest the money in Iran instead of allowing the Revolutionary Guards to waste it in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. But, even more than the protests, the authorities in Tehran fear the possibility that Washington will join Israel, and harm the Iranian presence throughout the region, especially in Syria.

In recent days, however, the color has returned to the cheeks of senior officials in Tehran. The front that Washington and Jerusalem are working to establish against them in the Middle East is faltering, and there is much concern that it will collapse. Just a little over a year ago, American President Donald Trump held a historic visit to Saudi Arabia, during which he announced the creation of a pan-Arab Sunni front against Iran. Israel was meant to be a partner behind the scenes in this alliance, but the axis state on which the Americans pinned their hopes was Saudi Arabia.

The united Arab and Sunni front soon went up in flames. There is a great tempest raging in the Gulf, after Saudi Arabia and Qatar found themselves in a struggle for prestige and honor, which has gone out of control and foiled the attempt to create a united front against the Iranians in the Gulf. Erdogan's Turkey, which also has a role in the anti-Iranian alliance, is in the midst of an exchange of blows with Saudi Arabia following the killing of the Saudi journalist at the consulate in Istanbul. You never know with Erdogan whether this stems from a commitment to freedom of the press, long ago forgotten in Turkey, or a justified affront in light of the violation of Turkish sovereignty, or is this perhaps Erdogan settling accounts with Saudi Arabia because of its hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood, so dear to his soul, of which Hamas is also a part.

Israel, an important element in every anti-Iranian front, also finds itself mired up to its neck in a crisis with Hamas, and drawn into an unwanted conflagration as a result of intra-Palestinian conflicts. No wonder the Iranians can afford to smile. Unfortunately, they are not content with smiling. Just last week it was reported that Iran had increased arms shipments to Hezbollah, including equipment designed to improve the accuracy of its missiles. The Iranians are taking advantage of Israel's increasing difficulty in operating in Syria since the downing of the Russian aircraft by the Syrian air defenses about a month ago. Following the incident, the Russians handed over to the Syrians the advanced S-300, and in recent days it was reported that they had transferred additional advanced equipment to Damascus. President Putin even declared that removing the Iranians from Syria was not his business. Thus, perhaps Israel's window of opportunity for action in Syria is gradually closing.

The only positive news is that Washington has declared a new policy aimed at curbing Iran's expansion in Iraq and Syria. This is a refreshing change in the American approach, but it turns out that the U.S. is pinning its hopes on sanctions and economic warfare that are less effective without practical measures on the ground.

The Americans must extinguish the fire that erupted in the Gulf between their allies, save Saudi Arabia and its heir to the throne from themselves, and end the affair of the murder of the Saudi journalist, which threatens to undermine Saudi Arabia's regional and international standing. Beyond all the above, action must be taken on the ground. Talk against Iranian outposts throughout the Middle East, and especially in Iraq and Syria, is not enough."

Ends…

 

WHAT WILL THE NEXT WAR LOOK LIKE?: Amir Rappaport in Makor Rishon describes the elements that will affect the campaign Israel is on the verge of embarking on in Gaza: A blitzkrieg to topple Hamas that will include the evacuation of the Gaza envelope.

"Whenever it may occur, the next war in Gaza will not necessarily resemble the recent 'rounds' with Hamas – the last of which was Operation Protective Edge.

One of the lessons of the previous rounds is that the prolongation of the campaign does not play out in Israel's favor. From round to round the duration of the campaign has become longer. Protective Edge lasted nearly two months. Although Iron Dome made the long duration more bearable for the home front, and made it difficult for Hamas; it was also problematic for us. A long period of fighting requires a huge number of Iron Dome interceptors and ultimately erodes our home front as well. Another way of conducting the campaign is to open strongly, instead of ratcheting up the degree of force in accordance with Hamas' reactions, and without pauses for mediation attempts.

The biggest change will be in defining the goal. In the past, the defense establishment and the political echelon believed that the best situation for Israel was to keep the Hamas regime in place, while deterring it from firing at Israel for a long time. According to this policy, Palestinian unity between Gaza and Judea and Samaria is not necessarily in Israel's favor. If the situation in the South escalates quickly, it is very possible that the goal this time will be to topple Hamas; a move that will bring about a new reality under the auspices of the Egyptians.

In accordance with the instructions of the defense minister for some time now, and in contrast to previous campaigns, the IDF will come to the next war with plans to topple the Hamas regime. This is not a simple military mission, and may involve extensive ground incursions into Gaza. A takeover of the Strip can be a matter of months, during which missiles will be launched at Israel's home front. In any event, the IDF and Shin Bet are expected to mark the heads of Hamas as top priority targets for elimination.

In every war the opponent prepares surprises. The IDF was not properly prepared for the tunnel threat although it knew of their existence. In the wake of massive anti-tunnel activity, especially recently, this threat has decreased, but it still exists. What would be the next surprise? Hamas has invested enormous effort in building an array of unmanned aircraft and armed UAVs, and they will present a difficult challenge. There are also enhanced rockets – even more than the heavy rocket, carrying 20 kg of explosives, which landed a week ago in Beersheba.

Hamas will fire a lot of mortar shells, for which the IDF is still having difficulty finding a complete solution; an upgraded version of Iron Dome is already capable of intercepting mortar shells, but is not a sensible solution against massive fire, since the 'domes' are primarily designed to protect against rockets and missiles. Especially due to the mortar threat, one of the clear lessons from Protective Edge is that there is no reason to persuade the residents of the Gaza envelope to remain in their homes under heavy fire. In case of war, there will be a rapid evacuation of the residents who live within a distance of up to seven kilometers from the Gaza Strip. The Ministry of Defense is prepared for this.

The fact that Ben-Gurion Airport continued to operate almost completely during the long days of Protective Edge is not to be taken for granted. In the next campaign, it is quite possible that Ben-Gurion Airport will be shut down, at least during the peak days of the fighting. This is the main reason why Israel has prepared the 'Ramon' airport, next to Ovda, as an alternative international airfield that can continue operating and will prevent cutting Israel off from the world.

The summer of 2018 teetered for many weeks on the brink of war on two fronts – the Gaza Strip in the South and Iran and Assad's army in Syria. The explosive situation in the North has not changed; the last word has not yet been said, despite the arrival of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile batteries. A war with Hamas in Gaza might spur Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran to escalate in the North, using strategic weapons such as missiles carrying hundreds of kilograms of explosives and possessing a targeting navigation mechanism, or surface-to-sea missiles that would paralyze maritime movement.

Although this is a bad scenario for Israel, since inter alia Iron Dome will have to provide full protection to all the population centers and strategic facilities in the country, the IDF is also prepared to fight on two fronts. Still there is the possibility that we will see more of the same - an exchange of blows and empty threats, or a campaign aimed at deterring Hamas for a limited period of time."

Ends…

 

THE LAST THING THE SECURITY COUNCIL MERITS: Shlomo Shamir in Maariv writes that even though the director general of B'tselem has a point and told no lies, Hagai Elad's problem was his choice of venue for delivering his speech, which bore no significant results – or even anything close to it.

"The United Nations is a hostile arena for Israel, and the Security Council is the place in which the hostility is expressed in the most grating way. In the United Nations one-sidedness against Israel is routine in the declarative sense of the word, and in the Security Council this one-sidedness is inserted into initiatives and resolutions. The person who approved, confirmed and strengthened this reality is actually an Israeli figure, the director general of B'Tselem, Hagai Elad, who spoke at the Security Council and harshly condemned Israel's occupation policy and the suffering that this policy causes to the Palestinian civilian population.

Not that he is totally wrong, or – God forbid – lied. The problem is in his choice of the Security Council as the forum in which to deliver his speech. There is no precedent in the history of the Security Council of a representative of a local organization, active in its country, delivering a harsh speech against his own country. No one could imagine, for example, seeing a Russian activist in the Council, attacking President Vladimir Putin for annexing Crimea, in violation of international law. Just as it is not expected that we will ever see an Egyptian public figure attacking President Sissi in the Security Council for suppressing opponents of the regime. And of course, there is no point in talking about an Iranian opposition member attacking his country in the Security Council for its support of terrorism.

But Israel, as always, is a light unto the nations. With head held high, in fluent English and visible pride, Elad stood before the representatives of the 15 Security Council member states and delivered a categorical and convicting speech against his own government. The very fact that he was even invited to speak at the Security Council should have been a red light for Elad. But he did not hesitate for a moment. On the contrary, he regarded the invitation as a gesture of respect and appreciation towards him.

But the speech yielded no significant result, or even anything close to it. The Palestinian representative whined and the director general of B'Tselem attacked. Big deal. To this day the Security Council has yet to make even one significant and operative move that will advance the aspirations of the Palestinian people, and it will continue to do nothing for the Palestinians even in the wake of Elad's speech against Israeli government policy. The bottom line is that Elad gave the Security Council respect, even though it is a forum that, at least as far as Israel is concerned - the last thing it deserves is respect."

Ends…

 

PAYBACK FOR TRUMP AND NETANYAHU: Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz affirms that Jordan's anger over exclusion from the goings on of Jerusalem and Temple Mount, as well as Jared Kushner's snub when discussing a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation with 'Abbas, has finally boiled over.

"Jordan's King 'Abdullah knew 10 months ago that he would have to make a tough decision that was likely to get him into trouble with Israel, the U.S. administration or the Jordanian public.

The question of whether to let the lease agreement for Naharayim in the Jordan Valley and for Zofar in the Arava renew itself automatically, which is one of the options in the peace treaty with Israel, was first debated with his senior advisers back in January. This came amid the large demonstrations in Jordan against the country's new tax law, when there were also calls to cancel the peace agreement with Israel, or at least not to extend the leases.

The king asked then-Prime Minister Hani Mulki to prepare a comprehensive survey on the status of the leased lands, and the conclusion was that Jordan could take the lands back, since it owns them and under the peace agreement either party can cancel the lease agreement after 25 years, with a year's notice. This is explicit in the peace treaty and in essence there was no need for any further research; Mulki's study was aimed at giving the Jordanian government some breathing room to make a diplomatic decision.

Mulki has a personal connection to these lands, since when his father, Fawzi Mulki, was prime minister in the 1950s, he made a commitment to return the lands at Naharayim to Jordan, except for the 75 dunams on which the Rutenberg power plant had been built with the permission of the British Mandatory rulers.

The younger Mulki was fired in June following more demonstrations in Jordan, as part of efforts by 'Abdullah to calm the public, and the tax law was frozen. But the new Prime minister, Omar Razzaz, has refrained until now from making any public statements on the future of the lease agreement. 'When the time comes we will tell parliament what we have decided,' Razzaz told MPs, who were demanding an answer. 'Our decision will be based on the kingdom's national interests.'

Israel was not surprised by the decision, nor should it have been. Not only was it aware of the public and parliamentary pressures exerted on the king, it was also getting clear messages about the matter and had even been asked what its position would be if the king cancelled the agreement. Diplomatic efforts to dissuade 'Abdullah, which involved the United States, were unsuccessful. Jordan, it turned out, had too many complaints about Israeli policy in the territories and in Jerusalem. It was being excluded from issues related to Temple Mount, despite an explicit commitment under the peace agreement to give it special status in Jerusalem and on the mount. Jordan was also kept out of the diplomatic talks with the Palestinians before they collapsed.

Jordan is also angry at the United States because Jared Kushner made a proposal to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas about establishing a confederation with Jordan – without having asked 'Abdullah's opinion. 'The proposal is not worthy of discussion,' said the Jordanian government spokesman, in the sharpest response ever to an American proposal. Jordan sees this proposal as a threat, whose purpose is to turn the kingdom into an 'alternative homeland' for the Palestinians, or as another way to circumvent the two-state solution.

Later, Jordan protested U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to stop aid to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which could spark dissent among the two million Palestinian refugees living in the kingdom, and impose another economic burden on the coffers of a country also dealing with some 1.5 million refugees from Syria, tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq, and public debt of more than $40 billion.

Jordan is also aware of Israel's cold shoulder towards the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal project despite the 2015 agreement signed on this undertaking, whose completion could help Jordan overcome chronic water shortages.

Thus, even if the king could have coped with the increasing public criticism against extending the lease agreement, Israel and the United States had not equipped him with sufficient ammunition to make a different decision. The kingdom's diplomatic and economic circumstances offer it no justification to agree to lease lands it owns for no recompense. Moreover, nationalist and religious groups have been demanding to know why Jordan does not apply its sovereignty over all its territory, instead of allowing the farmers of the Zionist entity to enjoy free land.

The termination of the lease is not a breach of the peace agreement; it is part of the rights granted to Jordan and Israel under the agreement. The two countries have the right to open negotiations now on a new agreement under new conditions that would presumably include substantial payment for use of the land. The next test for Israeli-Jordanian relations will come when Israel asks to begin such negotiations. It is not clear whether Israel has received any indication of Jordan's willingness to negotiate, or, if it agrees to talk, whether the conditions Jordan will set will not be aimed at scuttling the talks in advance.

What is undeniable is the close link between, on the one hand, Israel's policy in the territories and Washington's attitude towards Jordan and the Palestinians, and, on the other hand, Jordan's willingness to go beyond the written language of the agreements. It is true that Israel and Washington can impose unofficial sanctions on Amman by delaying projects or moderating the assistance it receives from American and international institutions. But it would be a mistake to employ this Pavlovian response against a country whose strategic importance to Israel and its security needs no proof."

Ends…

 

CHINA'S VP IN ISRAEL TO BOOST TECH, TRADE TIES: Alexander B. Pevzner in The Jerusalem Post claims Wang's visit is significant because of its agenda. Israel faces an all-too-common dilemma – how to balance its security cooperation with the U.S., its main ally, against the growing economic cooperation with China.

"The visit of Vice President Wang Qishan of the People's Republic of China, one of the most senior Chinese officials to visit Israel in nearly two decades, is significant because of its agenda – and in the context of global and regional tensions, it may create headwinds for one of Israel's most important bilateral relationships.

Wang visits Israel October 22 to 25 and together with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will co-host the fourth meeting of the Israel-China Joint Committee on Innovation Cooperation (JCIC). The JCIC, which convenes annually, alternating between Beijing and Jerusalem, was established in 2014. It is one of the key government-to-government platforms between Israel and China – the others being a political dialogue at the level of deputy foreign ministers and an economic dialogue with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's top economic planning body. The JCIC has a broad agenda. For example, the start of the free trade talks and the signing of a 10-year multiple entry visa agreement for tourists and business-people were announced at the 2016 JCIC. 

The JCIC acquired additional significance after Israel and China upgraded their relationship to an 'innovative comprehensive partnership.' This was announced when Netanyahu visited Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in March 2017, the second such visit since May 2013, which helped kick-start a wide-ranging relationship.

Wang's visit is important not simply due to any new agreements to be signed or the attendance at the summit of business luminaries such as Alibaba CEO Jack Ma. It is also because China decided to upgrade the ranking of its representative co-chairing the JCIC in relation to the prime minister of Israel. It used to be headed by a Chinese vice-premier and a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC). There are four vice-premiers in China's State Council, one of them an executive vice-premier who also sits on the Standing Committee, the highest decision-making body in China. The Chinese co-chair of the JCIC was one of the three vice-premiers. In this case, it was Mme. Liu Yandong, responsible for science and technology and the only woman in the top-25 party hierarchy.

While Wang is not currently a member of the Politburo (nor even on the Central Committee of the party), he is ranked No. 8 in the Communist Party hierarchy (above a vice-premier) and is, of course, a state leader. This demonstrates the importance with which China views its technology and innovation cooperation with Israel, especially in the context of rising U.S.-China tensions. Wang enjoys the trust of Chinese President and Party Secretary Xi Jinping and was on the Politburo Standing Committee (ranked six at the time) from 2012 to 2017 and headed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's highly respected anti-corruption body. He is known in China for his financial expertise (he is nicknamed the 'firefighter' for his ability in dealing with crises) and his experience with the U.S. Finally, Wang is one of the most senior Chinese officials to arrive in Israel since Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited in April 2000. Chinese speaker Zhang Dejiang, who visited Israel in September 2016, was ranked number three in the party hierarchy, formally higher than Wang, but he was nearing the end of his career and was not seen as close to Xi as Wang is. According to Brookings, Xi and Wang have known each other for 40 years.

The role of a vice president in China used to be considered a ceremonial one, but not in Wang's case. Wang, 70, had to retire from the standing committee in 2017 due to commonly accepted age limits, but with recent removal of term limits on the position of China's president and vice president, he clearly wields a larger role in China's policy formulation.

Israel-China ties have flourished in recent years. Only this summer, two new destinations for direct flights – Chengdu and Guangzhou – were added to the broadening network. There are growing ties in science and research, trade and tourism. In recent years, China has become an important, if still relatively modest, investor in Israeli technology and a source for venture capital.

Still, China is careful to balance between its burgeoning ties with Israel and its traditional ties with the Arab world. In addition to Israel, Wang is scheduled to visit the Palestinian territories, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Chinese top leader Xi Jinping has already visited the Middle East twice since 2012, both times omitting Israel from his schedule. Nor did China mince words when U.S. President Donald Trump moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, a decision seen as acknowledging reality by Israelis but opposed by China, which supports a two-state solution as a resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Belt & Road Initiative, China's most important foreign policy effort in decades and a blueprint for a Chinese model of development, includes both Israel and Iran.

Some American sources have recently voiced concern over the growing profile of Chinese investments in Israel, especially in critical technologies like artificial intelligence. Israel faces an all-too-common dilemma – how to balance its security cooperation with the U.S., its main ally, against the growing economic cooperation with China."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 23.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Hakan Celik argues that nothing will save the Saudis from condemnation in tabloid centrist Posta: "Both the Saudi regime and the West will try to find a scapegoat, since they want to absolve themselves of any responsibility for this incident. President Erdogan's statements could negate these efforts. There is an apparent murder and those who committed it should be revealed, instigators and supporters alike. No matter how strong their effort to cover up this incident, Saudi Arabia has been pretty badly caught out, and even though it may spend hundreds of billions of dollars, it will be impossible for it to repair its image."

Can Atakli wonders what President Erdogan may reveal in opposition Korkusuz: "I suppose Turkey knew about this incident from the very start. It might have even made sure that Khashoggi entered the Saudi consulate. The unexpected development may have been Khashoggi's death – which would eventually be to Turkey's benefit because the scene of the murder and the criminal investigation are under its control. Who knows if Turkey's statements along the lines of protecting Prince Mohammed bin Salman may provide Turkey with billions of dollars? This is why President Erdogan's speech today is very important, and I am very curious about it. Quite serious accusations have been made against Prince Salman in some of the pro-government media. Will Erdogan confirm these accusations or do as Trump says, again?"

Sabahattin Onkibar suggests that Ankara may be bought off in ultra-nationalist opposition Aydinlik: "The Saudis murder a man in Istanbul, and mockingly say there is no corpse. Even German Chancellor Merkel revolts at such impudence, and halts Germany's weapons sale to this country. However, Turkey, the actual scene of the murder, pays no attention to anything. Why? Is this so as not to anger the U.S. and Israel and to flash an eye at the Saudi dollar? But did these same Saudis not pay $100 million to the PYD-PKK [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party/Kurdistan Workers' Party] only five days ago?"

Ibrahim Tigli blames the Saudis' commitment to neo-liberalism in pro-government Yeni Safak: "The Khashoggi murder that was committed by Saudi officials reflects their neo-liberal politics. Classic liberalism aimed at more humane concepts, such as freedom, human rights, and justice, while classic capitalism steered its course solely on the economic field. The Saudis' neo-liberalism goes one step further, as it wants to continue the previous liberal, capitalist leanings and carve out a new path for itself through persuasion while it tries to punish to those who have the same beliefs. The Khashoggi murder has demonstrated that there can never be any room for freedom and human rights in the Saudis' neo-liberalism."  

Yasar Hacisalihoglu is unconvinced by Saudi spin in pro-government Aksam: "Can the Muslims' sacred lands be ruled by those who commit such a brutal murder? Can their rule be acceptable? The Saudi government is in a big rush to save Crown-Prince Mohammed bin Salman from this brutal murder. For this purpose, they have tried to produce false scenarios. But there is nothing convincing about what they have told us about the murder so far. Besides, the late Jamal Khashoggi's body is nowhere to be found."

 

WORKERS' RIGHTS: Ihasan Caralan stands up for the workers in leftist opposition Evrensel: "The Labor Party says 'No, there is an economic crisis. Workers should acknowledge the weight of the crisis, and struggle with a rallying cry for Jobs, Bread, and Liberty.' The prosecutor's office accuses the Labor Party members who were detained in Adana distributing the workers' newspaper Emege Seslenis. What lies behind this is not a violation of any prohibition defined by law, but the accusation of 'How dare you could say there is a crisis when the president says there is none?'"

 

Iran media watch

 

TRANSPARENCY: Almost all newspapers this morning quoted Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i urging officials to be transparent in their dealings with the public. "Officials should be transparent with the people, no secrets should remain hidden", reformist Arman, hardline Keyhan, and government-run Iran quoted Khamene'i saying on their front pages. Other newspapers, such as reformist Aftab-e Yazd, Ebtekar, Etemad, and centrist Etelaat, focused on a different part of his remarks: "Officials should not hide anything from the people except for military and security issues." Khamene'i reportedly made the remarks during a lecture on 15 October at a religious and theological seminary.

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST'S MURDER: English-language Press TV reported on a new recording, allegedly of Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman speaking with journalist Jamal Khashoggi shortly before he was murdered in Istanbul. Rolling news channel IRINN said that Saud al-Qahtani, a top aide for bin Salman, used Skype to oversee the brutal killing of Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian social media users are outraged after a former presidential adviser reported on the alleged killing of a lawyer and economist, Farshid Hakki. Abdolreza Davari, an adviser to former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tweeted that Farshid Hakki was "brutally murdered". Hakki was a scientific advisor for the monthly Economic Review. Davari's post spiked quickly on Twitter, prompting thousands to comment on the alleged killing. Over 17,000 Tweets have been posted on the subject. Hardline Tasnim news agency carried a report saying that police have discovered Hakki's burned body and claimed there were signs of a "suicide attempt". With the tragic fate of the slain Saudi journalist Jamal Khashogji still making headlines, many Iranians have urged the media to make the alleged killing global news using over 32,000 Tweets used over the past 24 hours. Elsewhere, the official website of Iran's top sport show "Navad" (ninety) reported that the program would not be aired yesterday. The website did not provide any explanation why it is not broadcasting the show for the second consecutive week but many social media users speculated why the show is not being aired. One popular theory was a disagreement with the management of Channel Three. Many users also commented on an Instagram account affiliated to the director of Channel Three and supported the host and producer of Navad.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 23.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Consequences and opportunities

2-The logic of what is right

3-A sign of political maturity

 

1-Consequences and opportunities

 

The Turks have proven adept in implementing their strategy with a degree of cunning that is a point in their favor. They have proved to be 'masters' in the art of public relations, while their Saudi counterparts have failed this test. Their narrative has been shaky, lacking in credibility, and full of holes...Saudi Arabia will be in an awkward – in fact, shocking – position if President Erdogan confirms the truth of story of an electric saw. The image of that saw, as well as all the black 'jokes' that have surrounded it, constitute a nightmare that will continue to pursue the Kingdom's leaders, haunt their nights, and prevent them from sleeping for many years to come. In fact, all the waters in all the world's oceans will not be enough to cleanse the blood and consequences of this crime and the stain that has besmirched the Saudi leadership's Arab, Islamic, and international image as a result--Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

Erdogan has benefited from the chance provided by the vertical split in the U.S. over Trump's management of Washington's domestic and foreign policies. This has contributed to forcing Trump to abandon his fulsome support for Mohammad bin Salman and to move towards a more vacillating position, unsure whether to retain him as an ally, or to lift the cover the U.S. has provided him and submit to the pressure of U.S. public opinion, which now views bin Salman as a burden to the U.S., or as a bad ally, at best. The consequences of the Khashoggi crisis have created a situation that is different from previous experiences. Bin Salman's position as crown-prince and the U.S.'s first man in Saudi Arabia and the region has been shaken and is now fragile. His image has changed, from modern reformer to terrible butcher. His name is now a synonym for ridicule and derision. And no matter how hard he may try, he can no longer erase the bad image that the Turks have contributed to creating in the mind of world public opinion--Luqman 'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Akhbar

What chance is there of Riyadh opening up to Iran? As mentioned, Riyadh's relationship with Washington is strategic, while its trust in Iran as a peaceful neighbor is nonexistent. But there always remains a margin of maneuver that does not bypass Riyadh's supreme interests. Tehran may wish to repair the relationship with the Saudis for reasons that have nothing to do with the Khashoggi crisis. For Tehran has discovered that at a time when it wishes to win in Syria, it is threatened with losing Iraq, as the results of the recent [May 2018] elections have shown. It has also discovered that, despite its harsh nature and costs, the war in Yemen has not provided it with the sort of gains it has secured from Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in South Lebanon. So, if the Iranians wish to reach a solution in Yemen, this is the appropriate time. They should not expect to achieve even a half-victory but some degree of political partnership for their Houthi allies is achievable in the promised solution in Yemen--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

The entire world awaits Turkish President Erdogan's most important speech today, Tuesday, in which he promised to reveal all the facts regarding the Khashoggi murder case, says the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. While some believe that he will be "pragmatic" and strike deals with the Saudi regime, he is more likely to show no concern for the Saudi response, thereby tightening the noose around Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman's neck. Erdogan is most likely to connect bin Salman directly to Khashoggi's murder even though he will insist on maintaining the best of relations with Saudi Arabia, says a Yemeni commentator in a pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily. But he will also make sure to benefit from this opportunity to promote his leadership of the Islamic world. Realizing that the Saudi crisis will not last long and that Riyadh and Washington's ties are of a strategic nature, Iran has kept officially silent about the Khashoggi case in the hope of using it to build closer relations with Riyadh, maintains a leading Saudi commentator. This is the moment for Iran to act with Riyadh in Yemen by involving its Houthi partners in a political solution.

 

[Reuters reports Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday there were strong signs Jamal Khashoggi's 'savage' killing was planned and attempts to blame it on intelligence operatives 'will not satisfy us'. In a speech to parliament, Erdogan did not mention Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who some U.S. lawmakers suspect ordered the killing. But he said Turkey would not complete its investigation into Khashoggi's death until all questions were answered. 'Intelligence and security institutions have evidence showing the murder was planned.... Pinning such a case on some security and intelligence members will not satisfy us or the international community,' he said. Erdogan said the whereabouts of Khashoggi's body were still unknown and he demanded Saudi Arabia reveal the identity of a 'local co-operator' who purportedly took the body. Turkish officials suspect Khashoggi was killed and dismembered inside the consulate by Saudi agents. Turkish sources say authorities have an audio recording purportedly documenting the killing of the 59-year-old. Erdogan made no reference to any audio recording in his speech. Erdogan said three operatives arrived in Istanbul the day before his killing on an apparent reconnaissance mission. The next day 15 people came to the consulate. 'Why did these 15 people meet in Istanbul on the day of the murder? We are seeking answers to this. Who are these people receiving orders from?' Erdogan said.]

 

THE MOST IMPORTANT EPISODE: "The world is holding its breath, waiting for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech today because this may turn out to be the most important episode in the long Turkish series whose events concern the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in his country's consulate in Istanbul," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The decision to delay the speech for a few days was meant to add to the thrill and anticipation, and make room for potential compromises and perhaps some deals.

The people who will sit around the international TV screens that will broadcast his speech live will be expecting specific statements and answers to many questions that have been circulating for the past twenty days. Most important are: Has the victim's body been found? Is it dismembered or in one piece? How did the killing take place? Was the victim strangled or sawn apart (with an electric saw)? Did the head remain with the rest of the corpse, or was it brought back to Riyadh in a black bag?

This is the first time President Erdogan is addressing the world since the crisis began. Throughout the past period, he has confined himself to leaks attributed to 'unknown' Turkish sources. This was meant to sustain the level of excitement; to ensure that the crisis would remain alive and continue to occupy the lead headlines; and, finally to exert pressure on the Saudi authorities to abandon their 'state of denial' and admit to the crime. And the Turks have proven adept in implementing their strategy with a degree of cunning that is a point in their favor. They have proved to be 'masters' in the art of public relations, while their Saudi counterparts have failed this test. Their narrative has been shaky, lacking in credibility, and full of holes.

An announcement that the victim's body has been found would be an earth-shaking development and a strong and speedy achievement for Turkey's security agencies, bearing in mind that, according to the latest official Saudi story, Khashoggi died from suffocation after a quarrel with the investigators inside the consulate. One Turkish leak said that the strangulation took eight minutes, while another said that Khashoggi was decapitated by means of an electric saw and taken to Riyadh to 'reassure' officials, primarily Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman – whom most sources insist was behind the decision to perpetrate this crime – that the deed was done.

Saudi Arabia will be in an awkward – in fact, shocking – position if President Erdogan confirms the truth of story of an electric saw. The image of that saw, as well as all the black 'jokes' that have surrounded it, constitute a nightmare that will continue to pursue the Kingdom's leaders, haunt their nights, and prevent them from sleeping for many years to come. In fact, all the waters in all the world's oceans will not be enough to cleanse the blood and consequences of this crime and the stain that has besmirched the Saudi leadership's Arab, Islamic, and international image as a result.

It would be no exaggeration to say that Erdogan's expected official 'testimony,' backed by images and documents, will embarrass many Arab governments that have rushed to issue official statements directly or indirectly voicing their solidarity with the Kingdom, supporting its claims of transparency, praising its respect for human rights, and expressing their confidence in the truth of its investigations and statements.

There are two theories regarding how President Erdogan may address this crisis, which may be reflected in his speech today:

- The first claims that he will be firm in revealing all the facts, showing no concern for the Saudi response because he views Prince bin Salman and his country as his country's first enemy, and does not want to see him in power for the next fifty years. This is why he will insist on keeping the issue alive and will go all the way with it until the Saudi crown-prince is toppled.

- The second insists that President Erdogan is a 'pragmatic' leader who is skilled in striking deals in a way that benefits his country. He may thus use this crime to secure the greatest possible political and economic gains for his country. Advocates of this theory offer the example of his recent deal with President Trump in which he released [U.S.] pastor Brunson, and his previous deal with President Vladimir Putin ending the crisis resulting from Turkey's decision to down a Russian Sukhoi warplane near the Syrian/Turkish borders two years ago.

It is hard to rule out either theory, even though we tend more towards the first, which is also the more likely in many people's eyes. After all, President Erdogan's relations with Saudi Arabia have never been good, based on the traditional rivalry between the two Sunni authorities, Mecca and Istanbul. Moreover, the two countries have taken a respective stance in two conflicting trenches regarding various issues. And even though they were in broad agreement regarding the Syrian issue throughout the crisis, that agreement was cool and involved the lowest degree of coordination.

The noose is tightening around Saudi Arabia and Crown-Prince bin Salman's neck. It may reach its tightest phase after Erdogan's speech today, even though we believe that the curtain will not be brought down on this crisis that has preoccupied the entire world. In fact, we believe that this will be the beginning of a new, different, and more interesting phase in this long and exciting tragic series that is searching for a conclusion that offers both divine and positive justice.

Together with the entire world, we wait Erdogan's most important speech in his political history. And we do not exclude the possibility of many surprises. What is also certain is that there will be no more leaks after the speech, only practical steps on the ground, erecting the gallows for the political 'hanging'– or 'sawing', we leave the option to you – of certain figures.

"Our wait will not be long. We will be patient and will finally receive the just rewards that those who are patient deserve. But God knows best!" concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

ALL EYES ON ERDOGAN: "All eyes are focused on what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will reveal today regarding Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder in his country's consulate in Istanbul," writes Luqman 'Abdullah in Tuesday's left-leaning pro-Hezbollah Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

The details will determine whether the accusation will point to senior levels in Saudi Arabia, specifically Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, by providing conclusive evidence that he issued the order to murder Khashoggi. The other possibility is that Erdogan's account will be closer to the Saudi narrative, indicating that Erdogan is heading towards striking a U.S.-sponsored deal with Riyadh.

Turkey has succeeded in transforming Khashoggi's disappearance and the subsequent announcement that he was murdered into a global public case via its adept management that has already inflicted severe damage on Saudi Arabia's reputation and has undermined its foreign relations, especially with the West.

From the start of the crisis, the very carefully studied leaks allowed by the Turkish leadership have indicated that the object goes beyond defending Turkish sovereignty because the crime occurred on Turkish soil. It also goes beyond revenge for the insult to Turkish security as a result of the crude security breach committed by the 15 [Saudi security] men who came to murder Khashoggi in Riyadh's Istanbul consulate.

Throughout the past twenty days of the crisis, Ankara was fully aware that the Kingdom's political and religious eminence was beyond demolished, and that its leadership of the Islamic world has retreated to its lowest levels. In fact, it seems obvious that Turkey's management of the crisis is still deliberately aimed at undermining the eminence the Kingdom gained decades ago. But it did so without directly confronting Riyadh, and by creating an international public climate that has forced the West to pressure their historic ally and compel it to admit to the crime instead.

In pursuit of this aim, Erdogan has benefited from the chance provided by the vertical split in the U.S. over Trump's management of Washington's domestic and foreign policies. This has contributed to forcing Trump to abandon his fulsome support for Mohammad bin Salman and to move towards a more vacillating position, unsure whether to retain him as an ally, or to lift the cover the U.S. has provided him and submit to the pressure of U.S. public opinion, which now views bin Salman as a burden to the U.S., or as a bad ally, at best.

The consequences of the Khashoggi crisis have created a situation that is different from previous experiences. Bin Salman's position as crown-prince and the U.S.'s first man in Saudi Arabia and the region has been shaken and is now fragile. His image has changed, from modern reformer to terrible butcher. His name is now a synonym for ridicule and derision. And no matter how hard he may try, he can no longer erase the bad image that the Turks have contributed to creating in the mind of world public opinion.

It is no longer important whether Erdogan will connect bin Salman to the execution squad directly or keep the crime within a merely criminal framework, even if he appears to be more likely to do the former. After all, yesterday's press leak of repeated phone calls between the head of the Saudi execution squad Maher al-Mutrib and bin Salman's office director Badr al-'Asaker after the crime was committed was not for nothing.

It is no longer important whether bin Salman is linked directly to the murder or not because events have gone beyond bin Salman's role at the summit of the Saudi pyramid, either on his father's side or as a candidate for succession to the throne. For it is no longer possible to keep him at the summit of power when he is weighed down by such an enormous burden of ongoing and thorny issues that are drowning the regime and limiting its ability to move and maneuver, or even to stop or review its current mistaken domestic and foreign policies, with all that this entails in terms of losing prestige and being held responsible for the terrible damage done to others as a result.

Erdogan will make clear his concern for the Kingdom, its role, and its status, and for maintaining the best of relations with it. This is only natural. His entire biography suggests that he will not forgo his position or his longstanding dream of Turkey leading the Islamic world, presenting his regime as an Islamist model that the West can deal with. And this is a very appropriate opportunity for doing so.

Erdogan makes no secret of his aim of presenting himself and his regime as candidates for leading the Islamic world, anyway. He has continued to work on turning Ankara into the Muslim Brotherhood's political qibla [direction of prayer] and they have found what they have been seeking in Khashoggi's murder. They knew how to benefit from the opportunity that has risen and have pounced on the Saudi regime and delivered a painful blow to it.

Erdogan will try to restore his broken links with the U.S. administration. He will try to present his country as an alternative that compensates for the retreat of the Saudi role as a strong ally of Washington. And he can do this, even though the Turks do not aim to replace Saudi Arabia fully and lack the ability to do so. For Riyadh will remain as Washington's ally because of its advantages that neither the Turks nor anyone else can provide – namely, its oil wealth. This is what concerns the West and is the subject of its greed in dealing with a kingdom that has been exhausted by its diseases, with its friends snapping at its flesh before its enemies. And this will remain the case whether Mohammad bin Salman remains in power or is forced to step down – even though the latter seems unlikely at present.

"The conflict over the Khashoggi case is also likely to continue for some time. That being so, the West, headed by the U.S., will focus on the Kingdom's oil wealth, and the coming phase will witness a sustained effort to keep oil away from current and future conflicts," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

DINNERTIME TV SHOW: "Ever since the crisis of Jamal Khashoggi's death, Iran has avoided making any comment or adopting official positions, even though its media have turned the incident into a daily subject watched by millions on its official TV at dinnertime," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The comment heard in Tehran is this: We prefer to wait and see. In fact, the Iranian attitude towards Saudi Arabia was not hostile as that of the Turks; instead, they have left the door slightly ajar.

Does driving Saudi Arabia into a corner serve Iran? Certainly; especially since the serious sanctions on Iran – boycotting its oil and blocking its bank transactions in dollars – will take effect in less than two weeks' time.

In Tehran, they view the crisis and the Turkish offensive against Saudi Arabia as a gift from heaven. They pray for God to grant them one of three wishes: Either for Washington to back down from its blockade on Iran because it believes that it would be difficult to manage and ensure this battle's success in the current tense conditions; or that Riyadh would no longer back Donald Trump's plan to confront Iran, would abandon him, and hence leave him to fail by himself; or that the crisis would change the regional balance of power by weakening the Saudi front, in which case, even if the blockade on Iran proceeds as planned, it would still be able to complete its project of imposing its hegemony over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, which would ultimately force the Americans to deal with Khamenei's regime.

As far as Riyadh is concerned, its relations with the U.S. are strategic no matter what disagreements or weaknesses may afflict it. The most recent problems stemmed from the 9/11 attacks and Saudi Arabia's refusal to cooperate with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which gave Iran a great opportunity to act as an important party to the invasion and developed the relationship between Tehran and Washington at Riyadh's expense, at the time. By comparison, what Saudi Arabia is currently undergoing is a mere storm in a teacup because the supreme interests that bind the two countries together are much greater than what is being written and said.

The Iranians have been displaying great skill in dealing with the crisis. They can see that Saudi Arabia has been driven into a very awkward corner; at the same time, they realize that it will emerge from it some time later. Consequently, they wish to achieve gains by using the crisis in a different manner than the Turks– either by drawing closer to Washington or by drawing closer to Riyadh.

But what chance is there of Riyadh opening up to Iran? As mentioned, Riyadh's relationship with Washington is strategic, while its trust in Iran as a peaceful neighbor is nonexistent. But there always remains a margin of maneuver that does not bypass Riyadh's supreme interests.

Tehran may wish to repair the relationship with the Saudis for reasons that have nothing to do with the Khashoggi crisis. For Tehran has discovered that at a time when it wishes to win in Syria, it is threatened with losing Iraq, as the results of the recent [May 2018] elections have shown. It has also discovered that, despite its harsh nature and costs, the war in Yemen has not provided it with the sort of gains it has secured from Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in South Lebanon. So, if the Iranians wish to reach a solution in Yemen, this is the appropriate time. They should not expect to achieve even a half-victory but some degree of political partnership for their Houthi allies is achievable in the promised solution in Yemen.

"In politics, crises can often create opportunities. Besieged Iran knows this, and has previously benefited from Saddam's invasion of Kuwait by building closer relations with Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia's predicament is temporary and its date of expiry is limited," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

2-The logic of what is right

 

In refusing to renew the lease of its lands to Israel, Amman is drawing on its rights in international law and its public mood, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

It is only proper for Jordan's leadership to respond to its own public opinion and take the historic and brave decision not to renew Israel's lease of Jordanian land in Ghumar and Baqoura, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. This decision should pass without problems since Amman is only exercising its right according to the 1994 peace treaty; but Israel will try to foil this decision with all the means it can muster.

 

SHOCKED ISRAEL: "The Jordanian state's historic and courageous decision not to renew the lease of al-Ghumar and al-Baqoura included in the annex to the [1994 Jordan/Israeli] peace treaty has shocked Israel," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Israel's PM promised to consult with Jordan in order to extend the lease for another quarter-of-a-century, while his minister of agriculture described the decision as a 'provocation.' Meanwhile, the Israeli media – newspapers and websites – have taken various directions in their analyses.

The torrent of telephone calls I have received from journalists and diplomats has not ceased since this Tweet that ended the uncertainty, and all these calls pointed to a surprise and perhaps 'shock.' For it seems that those who contacted me have not been following the Jordanian public's mood; in fact, they seem to give no weight to the very notion of 'public opinion' in our Arab countries, so much so that, intentionally or not, some have portrayed the royal decision as submission to the Jordanian street, and even though they come from countries and societies where public opinion plays a significant and decisive role in shaping domestic and foreign positions and policies. It seems, however, that they believe that we [Arabs] are unworthy of what they are.

My answer to this sort of remark was as follows: We have public opinion like you do, and the leadership's compliance with its 'pulse' is a point in its favor and not against it. What, then, is the source of this sense of shock coupled with astonishment that bears 'accusatory' implications within its folds?

Be that as it may, all eyes are now focused on Israel's reaction. Expert in consultations that are devoid of any content, Netanyahu is proposing another round whose end we do not know, with the goal of renewing the lease for another twenty-five years. But the minister of agriculture offered the most honest expression of Israel's true position by describing the decision as a provocation.

But I do not know how this was a 'provocation', since Jordan was merely exercising its right not to renew the lease mentioned in the annex, and since it resorted to the agreed mechanisms, whose conditions govern the lease, for that purpose. It is Jordan's right to renew or extend the lease, just as it is its right to refuse to do so – always in accordance with the peace treaty, and not in violation of it.

Unlike Israel, Jordan is a country that respects legitimacy, international law, and signed agreements. It did what it did within this context and against that background, and within the framework of these fixed principles that determine its foreign policy and international relations. It would have been only wise and logical – assuming that there are still those in Israel who still think logically and wisely – for Israel to comply with Jordan's decision in a positive and immediate manner without procrastination or delay.

But we know that Israel does not think in this manner. In fact, I am sure that those who signed the agreement on the Israeli side hoped to transform the 'temporary' to 'permanent' and the 'rental agreement' to a 'property deed.' This would be entirely consistent with Israel's customary policy in Palestine, the whole of Palestine: What is temporary becomes permanent, and transitional arrangements become final.

In these circumstances, we expect Israel to respond to Jordan's decision based on a number of possible scenarios:

- First, pursuing 'endless' consultations with the goal of changing Jordan's decision but without altering the situation in Ghumar and Baqoura. And Israel may seek the U.S.'s help, which may propose to mediate so as to avoid a crisis between two of its important allies.

- Second, if Jordan does not accept this mediation or proposal, Israel will resort to blackmail and pressure. It will brandish the cards it holds in the water and energy dossiers – in fact, we have often warned against Jordan's 'reliance' on Israel in such strategic matters. And it may resort to mobilizing the U.S Zionist lobby in order to alter the American position, from that of proposed 'mediation' to that of 'pressure' on Jordan. And Jordan has important relations with the U.S. that we need not discuss here.

- As for the third scenario, Israel may maintain control of these Jordanian lands as if Amman had said nothing, while simultaneously pursuing a widespread 'deception' campaign under a heavy curtain of talk about good intentions, readiness, and the desire to reach a negotiated solution.

But Jordan does not lack cards. It has 'the logic of what is right' on its side, as well as international law and the international justice system. It also has its standing in the international community's calculations, including the U.S. And it has the ability to foil Israel's projects at various levels and in a number of forums.

Moreover, what Israel's black propaganda can promote against the Palestinians, it cannot practice against Jordan under any conditions. The Jordanian state enjoys enormous international respect that is sufficient to ensure that Netanyahu and his gang's mission would be extremely difficult.

The normal thing is for the Jordanian decision to cause no problems. But we should expect Israel to try and block this decision from passing easily. Consequently, we should prepare ourselves for harsh media, diplomatic, legal, and political battles in the coming days. More importantly, we should arm ourselves with awareness, solidarity, and unity in confronting one of the most important challenges facing the Jordanian/Israeli relationship over the past half-century.

"I believe that we are capable of engaging in this confrontation and that we can win our wager," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

3-A sign of political maturity

 

Hamas and Islamic Jihad have joined Fatah in accepting that armed action must be determined by its political goals, thereby creating the basis for a common national program, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in today's Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The statement by the Gaza-based Palestinian resistance factions denouncing last week's missile fire at Israel as "suspect" and "irresponsible" points to a new maturity on their part, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. Like Fatah before them, these factions now realize that military action must serve a political purpose, and this should now allow for rebuilding the Palestinian national movement on new and shared bases.

 

'IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION': "The Palestinian factions, with Hamas and Islamic Jihad at their forefront, have issued a statement describing last week's missile fire at the Israeli occupation as an 'irresponsible action'," notes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

Meanwhile, leading Hamas figure Mahmoud az-Zahar has said that 'either Israel or a party linked to the PA' had fired the missile.

Regardless of its significance as part of the Palestinian inter-factional 'bickering,' this latest position means that all Palestinian forces have now adopted a political position regarding armed resistance that calls for judging every such action based on its political results. In other words, the position is no longer one of supporting every act of resistance regardless of who carries it out and for whatever reason. And this opens the door to a different sort of Palestinian national strategy.

We should mention three other points to complete this scene:

- First, the aforementioned statement issued by the Joint Operation Room of the Palestinian Resistance on Wednesday October 17th included a clear declaration that the Palestinian factions 'would maintain their weapons as the protective shield of our nation and will continue to take up arms against the occupation.'

- Second, the statement failed to include the customary statement that resistance is a right, holding the enemy responsible for any Palestinian action, regardless of the identity of those carrying it out and its details– as in the past.

- Third, Mahmoud az-Zahar's position is an extension of his previous positions describing firing missiles as suspect. He has expressed such positions repeatedly since 2010 at least, even though he used to attack Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas who used the term 'futile' in reference to the missiles that used to be fired from Gaza. And the term 'futile' is less harsh than Zahar's term 'suspect', or the accusations of treason he intimated when he said that the action was 'harmful.'

An analysis of the scene thus leads us to the following observations:

- First, the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip are describing some of the missile fire as 'futile', 'suspect' or 'harmful.' Naturally, these descriptions are not being used in all cases or against the use of weapons in general. This in no way means that the Palestinians should abandon their deterrent to be used at the appropriate moment – something that the factions have insisted on; it only means that the use of such means should be carefully-studied and as part of the national consensus. Moreover, it means that the resort to other means, such as popular resistance and the peaceful Marches of Return, may require that other means, such as missiles, for example, should not be used.

- Second, it is Fatah's right as well as that of those who support the Palestinian president's position to ask: What was behind all the attacks on us when the president said that these missiles are 'futile'? And why is the PA now being accused of firing these missiles? Fatah also has the right to say many other things in commenting on the change in Hamas's position. But the most important thing is that this situation should be used in a positive way.

- Third, from a purely academic and objective perspective, one could argue that this change in discourse is a natural product of the change in the position of the factions involved – primarily Hamas – as a result of being in power. For the calculations of those in power; those who are responsible before the nation and the international community, are different from the calculations of those in opposition.

And the same goes for Islamic Jihad, which wants to avoid the destruction or being placed in an awkward position vis-à-vis the Egyptian side. (The factions' recent statement was clear in focusing on distancing them from the missile fire because that undermines 'the Egyptian effort being exerted to achieve our people's demands'). Islamic Jihad has decided to be part of the tahdi'a [lull or calming down] negotiations.

One could say that if Fatah returns to be in charge of Gaza, Hamas or a leading figure such as Zahar's position would not be the same. They would no longer describe the missile fire as (sometimes) harmful, and would attack anyone who describes them as such. Therefore, it may be worthwhile thinking from now of adopting a common convention that builds the foundations for resistance and political action.

Steering clear of factional issues and bickering, the idea of linking political action to the struggle and the resistance has matured at the Palestinian level. The years 1994-2010 were a period of great disagreement over this issue between factions that had come to realize this – those that belonged to the PLO – and the factions that were new at the time – the Islamist ones.

"Therefore, this 'new' [Hamas/Islamic Jihad] position is a point in favor of rebuilding Palestinian national action on shared foundations, while taking into consideration that are still numerous points of disagreement between them," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 22.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Jordan file

 

Jordan's King 'Abdullah II announced on Sunday he would not renew part of the 1994 peace treaty that granted Israel use of two small agricultural areas along the border. In a statement, 'Abdullah said he would be pulling out of two sections annexed to the peace agreement that allowed Israel to lease the areas from the Jordanians for 25 years. The leases expire next year. 'Abdullah said he had informed Israel of his decision. "We are practicing our full sovereignty on our land," he said. "Our priority in these regional circumstances is to protect our interests and do whatever is required for Jordan and the Jordanians." 'Abdullah did not give a reason for his decision, but he has been under domestic pressure to end the lease. On Sunday, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that despite the monarch's announcement, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty is "an agreement of true peace." "We will enter into negotiations with Jordan to extend the current agreement, but the entire agreement from a comprehensive perspective is important and dear to both countries," said Netanyahu. Netanyahu spoke at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem during the official memorial ceremony for assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the original peace treaty with Jordan.

The Prime Minister used his speech at the Knesset memorial ceremony for Rabin on Sunday to hit back at claims made by the slain prime minister's granddaughter earlier in the day that an official in the PM's Office had branded her grandfather a "traitor." "To my amazement, and I am still amazed, I heard today that a spokesperson at my Office published a post with a picture of Yitzhak Rabin's handshake with Arafat in the White House under the headline 'traitor,'" Netanyahu said, referring to the claim made by the granddaughter of the late Rabin, at the official state ceremony held at Mount Herzl marking the 23rd anniversary of the assassination. "It did not happen and never would," the prime minister said, using the incident to rebuff long-made allegations that he contributed to the incendiary political climate that led to the 1995 murder.

Israel's security cabinet approved on Sunday Netanyahu's proposal to postpone the evacuation of the West Bank village of Khan al-Ahmar in order to exhaust talks with the village residents. Earlier on Sunday, the PM said that the cabinet will be setting the timetable for negotiations. "Khan al-Ahmar will be evacuated, it is a court ruling, that is our policy and it will be done," Netanyahu said, following massive pressure from his ministers. "The period of time to try to evacuate the village with the residents' agreement will be determined by the cabinet," he added. "We will set a date. It will be short, and I believe it will be with consent." His comments, made at a press conference alongside U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, come a day after sources in Netanyahu's office told Haaretz that the evacuation will be delayed until further notice. Ahead of the cabinet's decision to delay the demolition, Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit warned ministers that a forced evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar could compromise the Israeli position regarding Palestinian claims against the Jewish state at the International Criminal Court. Ministers at the meeting told the Kan public broadcaster that Mandelblit highlighted the legal implications and urged cabinet members to ensure that Israel exhausts all options to reach a voluntary clearing of the hamlet, whose fate has drawn international scrutiny.

In news of Trump's peace plan, Israel is reportedly concerned that the Trump administration is considering recognizing Jerusalem as the Palestinian as well as the Israeli capital in a bid to bring Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas back to the negotiating table. That fear is born of an Israeli assessment that the administration sees getting a deal as a fairly simple task once both sides are at the negotiating table, Yedioth Ahronoth reported Sunday. "Trump wants a deal and he is very serious," a senior Israeli official told the paper. "To the Americans, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is relatively easy to solve." Sources told the newspaper that U.S.-led talks between the two sides will work on a strategy of give and take. Anyone who comes to the table has to ante up a concession, one the other side agrees to. Anyone who does not come to the table has to pay a penalty, and anyone who rejects the draft deal risks being put in a weaker position for the next round. According to the newspaper, Prime Minister Netanyahu is likely to ask the Americans to hold off on an announcement of the plan until after Israel goes to the polls in 2019, as any clause regarding the possibility of Jerusalem also being a Palestinian capital could cause him problems in his coalition as well as open him up to attack from the right.

In the tensions between Israel and Iran, former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yadlin, currently head of the INSS, told Ynet in an interview, that "the Iranians were severely beaten on May 10. The IDF attacked about 50 targets in Syria where the Iranians were based, it took them some time, but according to my estimates, they changed strategy: Instead of basing the precision missile factories in Syria, they decided to put them in Lebanon. It is more problematic for Israel since Israel, to this day, has not attacked Iranian consolidation in Lebanon or Hezbollah's weaponry, and now there are missile conversion factories. According to the report, these are missiles that strike at a distance of several kilometers, which poses a very difficult dilemma for Israel. Yadlin explained that if Israel directly attacks Hezbollah targets, the working assumption should be certain war.

Finally, Culture Minister Miri Regev's controversial Loyalty Bill passed a vote on Sunday in the Ministerial Committee on Legislation. The bill seeks to cut state funding to cultural works or institutions that harm or disrespect the symbols of the State of Israel, refer to Independence Day as a day of mourning, or incite to violence or terrorism. The legislation, which gained the backing of Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon last month, will now move to the Knesset for debate and further voting.

 

 

'ABDULLAH FEARS WRATH OF HIS SUBJECTS: Prof. Eyal Zisser in Israel Hayom argues the Jordanian king is acting against Jordan's interests. The non-renewal of the leasing agreements in Naharayim and the Arava is meant to placate his public and is not supposed to affect strategic cooperation, which is very crucial for both countries.

"The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin regarded the peace agreement with Jordan as one of his most important political achievements, perhaps the most salient of all. He was proud of this agreement, and especially believed in it and in his partner in the agreement, King Hussein. This is in complete contradiction to the skepticism and doubt he displayed toward the Oslo agreement and Yasser Arafat, with whom he signed that agreement.

It is symbolic that on the day Israel marks the anniversary of Rabin's assassination, King Hussein's heir, King 'Abdullah, announces that he will not extend the validity of one of the addendums of the peace treaty signed by his father with Rabin, pertaining to the leasing of Jordanian lands in Naharayim and the Arava to Israel.

The Jordanian announcement is neither a big surprise nor a move of far-reaching strategic significance. These are Jordanian-owned territories, and it was assumed that one day they would revert to Jordan's sovereignty, since there is no state in the Middle East that will agree to give up territories under its sovereignty forever. This was the case when Saudi Arabia leased the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Egypt. The problem, therefore, is not in the substance but rather in the manner and timing in which the Jordanians chose to declare their disavowal of the spirit of the peace agreement and to turn their back on the partnership forged between Itzhak Rabin and King Hussein.

One should not be surprised at Jordan's conduct. The Jordanian public is the most hostile towards Israel compared to Arabs in other Arab countries. It is regrettable that the Jordanian regime does not try in any way to deal with this hostility, and because of its domestic weakness even allows Jordanian public opinion to 'let off steam' against Israel, in the hope that this will soften criticism of the King. But at the same time, Jordan is more dependent on Israel than any other Arab country, especially in matters pertaining to sources of energy and water and of national security. There is no Arab state that maintains strategic cooperation with Israel, even when discreet, like Jordan. Israel is blessed with this cooperation and its importance is immeasurably greater than the acres that Jordan is now demanding back or the quantities of water that Rabin once gave generously to the Jordanians.

As far as Israel is concerned, this is a worthwhile deal, and that is why it treats the hostile winds blowing in its direction from Jordan with patience and tolerance. Nevertheless, the Jordanian move is one of weakness, just as the signing of the peace treaty by King Hussein was a courageous act. It is fitting to continue to maintain the same strategic cooperation with the Kingdom of Jordan, but with eyes wide open."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU TOOK JORDAN FOR GRANTED: Smadar Perry in Yedioth Ahronoth explains that King 'Abdullah never liked Netanyahu's attitude. Israel can do much more to tighten relations and empower the King against his opponents.

"In the final analysis, King 'Abdullah's decision contains a significant component of personal chemistry. His personal relations with Netanyahu never worked, and he often complained about him in private conversations and in media interviews, including in Yedioth Ahronoth. The King accused Netanyahu of totally 'ignoring him', praised the 'excellent relations' between the security forces and the army in the two countries, and continued complaining about Netanyahu.

One can surmise that the late Rabin would have behaved differently. King Hussein or 'Abdullah would have sit down to a private conversation with him, explained to him what Jordan needs and how things are not working out in the kingdom, and both of them would have come up with a solution together. But with Netanyahu there is no such chemistry. Jordan, as far as he is concerned, is in Israel's pocket.

Jordan's interest in the two areas leased to Israel was not born yesterday. As early as March of this year, the architect of the peace treaty, 'Abdelsalam al-Majali, commented that 'there is a problem', and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi followed suit. The elderly al-Majali is a revered figure in Jordan, and is well appreciated here as well. Safadi is close to the king, initiates moves, and suggests ideas. Those who know him know that he does not exactly like us.

Just this Friday, several thousand marched on the streets of Amman to the Prime Minister's Residence, demanding the annulment of the peace treaty with Israel. The king does not want to and cannot cancel the agreement, but has many gripes; the central issue being the status of East Jerusalem. The Jordanians have a role, which was conferred on King Hussein, 'Abdullah's father, by Prime Minister Rabin – with no expiration date. Jordan is responsible for the holy places, and for the choice of clerics. Rabin certainly wanted the royal family's involvement in East Jerusalem. But the Jordanians feel that those currently conducting relations with them take them for granted. Although, there are quite many conflicts between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, outwardly, 'Abdullah and Abu Mazin walk hand in hand.

King 'Abdullah's statement yesterday reveals that he decided to take the necessary step. A year before the addendums pertaining to Arava and Naharayim come up for renewal, he released the dramatic announcement: 'I will not renew.' If you examine his domestic situation, it is not simple; not only the demonstrators, but 81 out of 130 members of parliament demand the annulment of the peace agreements.

Netanyahu did not know what was about to fall on his head. Yesterday, at the memorial service for the late Rabin, he immediately spoke of negotiating with the Jordanians, and the truth is that the door has not been shut. But he will have to give King 'Abdullah more. Perhaps a lot more. Netanyahu knows the situation in Jordan is complex, with a massive influx of refugees from Iraq and Syria, unemployment among locals, and spasmodic relations with the Arab world. On the Israeli side it is certainly possible to do more to tighten relations and work intensely and correctly with the Jordanians, and to give the King more power against his opponents in the kingdom."

Ends…

 

A WEEKEND TIMEOUT TO THINK THINGS OVER: Tal Lev-Ram in Maariv contends that one should be cautious not to ascribe too much significance to the drop in the number of protests in Gaza on the weekend; it is not yet a trend.

"In the congregation areas, the IDF tanks were arranged this weekend in orderly rows. Despite the deployment near the fence with Gaza, even if this weekend had been stormier, the tanks and the ground forces would still not have crossed the border. At this stage, they are there mainly to be seen and photographed from every direction, in an attempt to create question marks on the other side regarding IDF intentions.

Israel is not interested in entering a military confrontation on the ground. There are many reasons for this, and not just military ones. The weekend report on Fox News regarding arms shipments continuing to arrive from Iran to Syria, also mentions that for the senior political and military echelons at this time the North takes priority over the South. The Fox News report appears to bear an Israeli fingerprint.

Since the downing of the Russian aircraft, Israel has been operating against Iranian targets in Syria, but has been much more cautious. Israel has already acted in Syria, but the freedom of action has been damaged, at least temporarily. The publication in foreign media detailing continued smuggling may also have been intended to convey to the Russians that Israel will have no choice. It seems that developments on the Northern front are also expected in the coming days.

Back in the South, Israel is interested in providing Hamas with an opportunity to calm the atmosphere. When examining the rocket fire towards Beersheba and the Dan region, despite the fact that Israel placed responsibility on Hamas, it also quickly stressed that Hamas did not execute the launches. Regarding the demonstrations along the fence this past Friday, the IDF also chose to underline the full half of the glass. According to army data, the number of participants was cut by half, as was the scale of violent incidents. Indeed, in the vicinity of the fence there were fewer confrontations this time, and for the first time in a long time there were no fatalities on the Palestinian side.

The IDF has also identified that Hamas are working to remove demonstrators from the fence in a number of focal points and calm the area. Still, Hamas conducted the event in accordance with their interest, because they too understand the meaning of a military operation in Gaza. They took a half step back, but did not relinquish the disturbances, the violent riots, the attempts to infiltrate into Israel, the launching of incendiary balloons and the hurling of explosive charges at IDF forces.

Both Israel and Hamas took a timeout for contemplation this past weekend. Events on the border this Friday left the situation unchanged at the beginning of the week. One must be careful in attributing too much importance to the drop in disturbances at the end of last week. This is still not a trend. In any event - if the fires and explosive balloons continue, then the level of tension is actually expected to rise again, and quite soon.

The Israeli government, the prime minister, and the army are not interested in an operation in Gaza. They are careful about the extent of force used by the IDF in response to the events, so as not to inadvertently slide into a military operation. But after half a year of continuous confrontation, our public opinion is also demanding solutions from the government. The decline in the number of incidents during the weekend is meaningless, unless the trend continues and the decline will be more pronounced. In any event, if the Israeli government again chooses the diplomatic track over the military, it will again be required to display much more initiative than it is currently wielding."

Ends…

 

EGYPT BACK, BALL IN RAMALLAH'S COURT: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 writes that despite a relatively calm weekend in Gaza, the security situation is still tense and the head of Egyptian intelligence is expected back this week, amid concerns that 'Abbas is planning resolutions that will cause the Strip to erupt.

"According to Hamas sources, the events of last Friday on the Gaza border indicate that Hamas and Israel are not interested in an all-out military confrontation. Both sides showed restraint. Israel did not use the dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers it deployed, and Hamas for its part removed many of the demonstrators from the border fence. In the end, the day of demonstrations ended with no casualties.

The Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar reported on October 20 that Egyptian Intelligence Chief General 'Abbas Kamel would arrive in Gaza in the middle of the week provided the security situation improved and the tension with Israel reduced. Egypt is continuing its mediation efforts to achieve calm between Israel and Hamas, but the security situation is very fragile, the launching of incendiary balloons continues, and it is unclear whether the manner in which Hamas operated last Friday, when demonstrators were removed from the border fence, will be repeated in the coming weeks. Hamas is determined to achieve its main task of lifting the siege. Senior Hamas figure Ahmed Baher said that the 'settlers' in the Gaza envelope communities will not feel safe until after the blockade of Gaza is lifted.

The 'Marches of Return' will continue. Al-Hayat reported that Hamas has rejected the request by Egyptian intelligence to stop the marches and retreat from the border fence. Israel last week contained the incident in which two rockets were fired at Beersheba and central Israel, and the security cabinet signaled to Hamas that it was not interested in an escalation. Hamas likewise proved during the weekend that it is in full control of the flames on the Gaza border. Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas is trying to push the sides into war, expecting Israel to do the job for him and topple the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. 'Abbas' plan to embroil Israel and Hamas in war is well known to all sides. Israel, Hamas, Egypt, Qatar and the United Nations reached an agreement to bypass 'Abbas and supply industrial diesel to the Gaza power plant, in order to increase the power supply in the Strip.

But 'Abbas has not despaired, and is trying to use the tools available to him to increase the pressure on Hamas and on Israel. Last week, he convened the Fatah Revolutionary Council, which adopted a resolution recommending to the PLO Central Council, set to convene on October 26, to dissolve the Legislative Council, in which Hamas holds a two-thirds majority, on the grounds that the PLO's Central Council made the decision to establish the PA in 1994, and therefore the powers of the Legislative Council must be transferred to it. 'Abbas is trying, through this decision, to delegitimize Hamas and its claim to a 'governmental partnership' with the PA.

The PLO Central Council is scheduled to discuss several other proposals relating to the Gaza Strip:

Stopping the PA's $ 96 million monthly financial aid to the Strip. This cut will severely impair health, education and welfare in Gaza. 'Abbas claims that the PA is not the Gaza Strip's ATM.

Stopping the payment of salaries to tens of thousands of officials in the Strip.

Stopping the transfer of funds to banks in Gaza, on instructions from the Palestinian Monetary Authority.

Relations between the PA and Israel will also be at the center of the discussions of the PLO Central Council. Nabil Sha'ath, 'Abbas' adviser on international affairs, told the Palestinian news agencies Ma'an on October 16 that 'Mahmoud 'Abbas is leaning towards canceling the economic agreement, called the Paris Agreement.' According to senior Fatah officials, the PLO's Central Council will decide to establish a committee to study all agreements with Israel and propose ways to implement recommendations immediately or gradually.

The PLO is beginning to use the term 'disengagement' from Israel. Regarding the security coordination, it appears that 'Abbas is very concerned that cancellation of this agreement will backfire and harm the PA more than Israel, but he intends to adopt a resolution in the central council stipulating that security coordination between the PA and Israel will continue on condition Israel recommits to IDF forces not deploying in Area A in the West Bank, where according to the Oslo Accords full security and civilian control resides with the PA.

Hamas is preparing to fight the decisions of the PLO Central Council pertaining to Gaza. Israel and Egypt are working to prevent a halt of financial aid, and the European Union has also warned 'Abbas not to take steps that will cause the Strip to erupt. Hamas conveyed a message to Egypt whereby the continued pressure on Gaza would lead to the borders with Egypt and Israel being breached by tens of thousands of Palestinians, and will result in thousands of dead. 'Abbas is fully aware of the situation and the question is whether he will risk taking these steps. It is likely that he will demand recompense from Israel and Egypt in return for adopting 'moderate' resolutions or postponing the implementation of decisions pertaining to the Strip. 'Abbas, despite his weakness, is again becoming a factor that can directly affect the security situation in Gaza, and all sides must now hang on his every word."

Ends…

 

RUSSIA TOUGHENS STANCE IN SYRIAN SKIES: Amos Harel in Haaretz reports Russia demands Israeli army increase use of hotline mechanism to prevent friction. The S-300 missile defense systems provided to Syria will be manned first by Russian experts and Russian air defense radars in Syria are activated over Israeli air force activity.

"In recent weeks Russia has been taking a more forceful stance toward Israel concerning Israel Air Force activity in the North. The Russians are demanding further clarifications from the Israel Defense Forces via the 'hotline' that is meant to prevent aerial clashes between the two parties, and there have been several instances in which Russian air defense radars in Syria were activated in connection with Israel's air force action in the North.

Russia's behavior is interpreted in Israel as a response to the incident in which a Syrian anti-aircraft missile downed an Ilyushin Russian intelligence-gathering plane on September 17 at the end of an Israeli airstrike near Latakia in Northwestern Syria.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said last week that Israel will continue to operate in Syria for the purpose of thwarting Hezbollah's military buildup.

At the end of last week, the Russian newspaper Izvestia reported that three air defense systems supplied to Syria by Russia in late September, following the September 17 incident, were of the most advanced model of the S-300 missiles with the highest radar and target-identification capabilities. The newspaper also reported that the missile batteries will initially be operated by Russian experts. The Israeli security establishment believes that, if necessary, Israel's air force could still manage to strike targets in Syria despite the new missile batteries.

The process of training Syrian soldiers to operate the missile batteries is expected to take some time and the batteries themselves are not yet fully operative. However, Russia's main move is on the public and diplomatic front: Moscow is signaling to Israel that it intends to limit Israel's freedom to maneuver in the Syrian skies. The presence of Russian troops with the missile batteries will also make it harder for Israel to strike those batteries if missiles are fired from them at its air force jets.

Netanyahu said two weeks ago that he spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that they had agreed to meet soon. No date for such a meeting has been announced yet. In the contacts that occurred in the days following the incident, the Russians were not enthusiastic about holding a high-level meeting and felt that the visit to Moscow by an Israeli military delegation headed by Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin, commander of the air force, was sufficient.

Norkin shared with his Russian counterparts the detailed findings of the air force investigation of the incident, which placed full responsibility for the downing of the plane on the Syrian Army. But Russia rejected these findings and issued its own account that accused the Israel Air Force of dangerous conduct and relied upon a completely different timetable of the events. Israeli officials believed the Russians had falsified the radar images they published of the event in order to pin the blame on the Israeli air force jets.

Russia's moves do not spell the end of Israeli airstrikes in Syria. But now, more than a month after the incident, it is clear that something has fundamentally changed and that Israel will have to take a new diplomatic and military approach in order to preserve at least some of its freedom of operation. Thus it is worth re-examining the policies of the last few years. The string of successes by the intelligence community and the air force led to a feeling in the government that Israel could do practically whatever it pleases in Syria. Perhaps before the downing of the Russian plane occurred, Israel did not fully grasp the attitude shift in Moscow and Damascus that came with the Assad regime's major gains in Southern Syria.

After the offensive in Latakia during which the Ilyushin plane was shot down, the IDF said that the target struck included machinery for manufacturing equipment that would improve the precision of Hezbollah rockets. According to Israel, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah militants were about to smuggle this equipment from Syria to Lebanon. The question, in retrospect, is whether this was indeed a target that justified an Israeli strike in the heart of the Russian area of influence and interest, close to Hmeimim air base and the Tartus port, both held by Russia. It would not be the first time that an impressive show of Israel's tactical and intelligence capabilities causes an entanglement on the strategic level.

Last week, Fox News reported, quoting Western intelligence sources, that Iran has recently increased the frequency of its arms shipments to Hezbollah using civilian flights to Beirut. According to the report, components for installing GPS navigation systems on Hezbollah's rockets in order to turn them into precision-guided weapons were transferred on Boeing 747s, some of which made stopovers at the Damascus airport. Hezbollah apparently still lacks the full technological capability needed to quickly and effectively install these components on its rockets in Lebanon in a way that would rapidly improve their precision.

In his speech before the UN General Assembly last month, Netanyahu warned about Iran and Hezbollah's effort to build production lines for installing the components at several sites in Beirut, including an underground compound beneath a soccer stadium and one adjacent to the airport. It is quite possible that Israel will soon take further public measures to expose Hezbollah's plans. In response to Netanyahu's UN speech, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech at a rally that he had had enough of the Israeli reports and that from now on, he would not comment publicly on accusations about Hezbollah's moves.

The Iranian focus on smuggling efforts directly to Lebanon is occurring in tandem with a certain decline over the past month in smuggling via Syria territory. Israel is not ruling out the possibility that the change is due to a Russian directive in wake of the incident in which the Russian plane was shot down. This development could reflect an attempt by Moscow to set new rules of the game in Syria and to reduce the friction between Israel and Iran there as part of the effort to stabilize Assad's rule."

Ends…

 

HEZBOLLAH SEES ISRAEL'S EMPTY THREATS IN GAZA: Yossi Yehoshua on Ynet affirms that Iran has recently increased the frequency of its advanced weapons deliveries to Hezbollah and the Cabinet needs to decide whether or not to attack the Iranian missile factory in a preemptive strike.

While IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot was in the Gaza Division on Friday to closely monitor the border fence riots, Fox News reported that American and other Western intelligence officials estimate Iran has recently increased the frequency of its advanced weapons deliveries to Hezbollah. As far as Eisenkot is concerned, this is the real headache he is bequeathing his successor, who has not only yet to be announced, but will also not have enough time for on-the-job training. According to Fox News' report, the latest shipments included GPS components meant to upgrade rockets and turn them into precision-guided missiles. Senior officials told the TV network that one of the flights landed in Lebanon on Tuesday. The plane, a Boeing 747, first touched down in Damascus and then continued to Beirut.

Fox News' report follows another report that noted that 'accuracy kits' meant for the long-range missiles the Iranians have in Lebanon, are smuggled on commercial passenger airplanes going directly to Beirut airport, where they enjoy cooperation from local authorities. This is how Iran overcomes the main obstacle to arms shipments—the possibility they will be attacked by Israeli aircraft, as has happened more than once in the past.

This modus operandi is consistent with the pressure Russia has been exerting on Iran in an effort to maintain the quiet in Syria since the Russian intelligence plane was shot down in the Latakia area over a month ago. But this is not enough for Hezbollah, as in addition to the GPS components the Shi'ite terror organization wants more long-range missiles as well as additional components to upgrade the accuracy of existing missiles.

This is the place to mention the comments made by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Lieberman last week, according to which Israel continues to operate in Syria against Iran and Hezbollah's military buildup. In his speech at the UN General Assembly last month, Netanyahu presented an aerial image of a missile factory Iran built near Beirut airport, and sent a message to Iran and Hezbollah: 'We will continue to act against you in Syria. We will act against you in Lebanon. We will act against you in Iraq. We will act against you whenever, and wherever. We must act to defend our state and to defend our people.'

In light of these remarks and the recent developments, it is likely the Cabinet's main dilemma is whether or not to attack the Iranian missile factory in Lebanon in a preemptive strike. Israel has not attacked Hezbollah in Lebanon, nor acted to stop the terror group's military buildup, since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Such a move would very likely lead to war.

At this point we should go back to the images of the home of Miri Tamano in Be'er Sheva, which was hit last week by a rocket with a 20 kilogram warhead, perhaps a little more, causing significant damage to the structure. Twenty kilograms is not a lot in Hezbollah's terms, as the terror group has missiles with hundreds of kilograms of payload, and highly accurate. Hezbollah has tens of thousands of the missiles fired at Be'er Sheva last week, several thousand heavier missiles and hundreds of heavy and accurate missiles.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is watching the developments on the Gaza border closely, and how Israel conducts itself against Hamas, which has far lesser capabilities than the Lebanese organization. The IDF respects itself too much to hide or minimize the events on the Gaza border. Contrary to what was claimed, the protests on the border last Friday were not the quietest over the past seven months. Like in recent weeks, grenades were thrown at IDF forces and Palestinians managed to cross the border fence in several locations. The quietest Friday was after the declaration of a ceasefire in August, and not last weekend. What did happen this time was that Hamas sent to the border fence only half the number of people that were there the week before – 10,000 instead of 20,000 – and tried to curb the violence, to some degree. Hamas proves again and again that it controls the height of the flames and has no intention to put out this fire until it gets what it wants.

Israel's political leadership, which is mostly busy with making threats that are like bounced checks, is now required not only to stop making threats, but also to formulate a strategy – and fast – for Gaza. The solution, at the end of the day, is diplomatic – even if it comes after a military blow. If anyone thinks otherwise, they ought to instruct the IDF accordingly."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 22.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Abdulkadir Selvi takes a long view of the Khashoggi murder crisis in center-right Hurriyet: "The Saudi crown-prince was caught red handed in Jamal Khashoggi's murder. The U.S. is playing both sides. On one hand, it is cornering the crown-prince by using the murder, but on the other, it is trying to save him. This is because Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Emirates' Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Zayed, and Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner make up the 'devil's triangle'. This trio's main goal is to topple President Erdogan. We should not close this file before the crown prince is held accountable and is removed from office. Otherwise, we cannot live with a crown prince who is Turkey's enemy for another 50 years."

Selim Atalay sees Turkey on the rise in pro-government Star: "The Trump's administration support for Israel via Crown-Prince bin Salman explains latest developments to a large degree. When one looks at Saudi/U.S. relations, it is debatable whether Trump protects U.S. interests, or his own interests that have yet to come to light. In response to the claim that 'Saudi Arabia is important for the U.S.', the question is, 'Which Saudi Arabia?' Turkey has come out of the crisis successfully and its regional weight and decisive role have increased. The Saudi regime, on the other hand, faces the consequences of its own mistakes."

 

EDUCATION: Baris Terkoglu detects a touch of hypocrisy in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "'I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any nationality and sovereignty of a state of which I have heretofore been a citizen; that I will defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law.' The patron of the [pro-government] Turkiye newspaper Mucahid Oren and Merve Kavakci, who have been appointed as Turkish ambassadors, have repeated this oath while becoming U.S. citizens. 'With the Qur'an in our hands and belief in our hearts, we are Muslims. Long live Islam!' This was the oath repeated in some schools controlled by Islamists. When the videos became public, the parliamentary chairman said it was a matter of 'privacy'. But by the looks of it, they [government officials] have no allergies to oaths!"

Faruk Cakir highlights the importance of vocational schools in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "While the business world looks for qualified workers, non-attendance at vocational schools is one of the primary issues that we need to resolve. The education ministry has to do much more in order to resolve this problem, which is a 'national issue'. If the goal is to lead Turkey out of crises is through more production and work, it is this will not be easy to accomplish without vocational schools."

Melih Altinok has a lesson for the young in pro-government Sabah: "Instead of trying to have young and tender brains swear on 'what they are', let us teach them how they 'should be'. Let us teach them, so that they will not become like their elders who were subjected to propaganda and still strive to free themselves out of its influence. So that they may realize that the important thing is what they do and practice much earlier than we did."

 

ENVIRONMENT: Ozgur Gurbuz is concerned about the environment in leftist opposition Birgun: "There is no culture of security and democracy here, and we have become a market for nuclear energy promoters. Our air pollution levels are much lower than others, but diesel vehicles that are prohibited anywhere else fill our streets. If we adopt the objectives that suit the needs of the companies rather than the best environmental standards in the world, we will open our doors to the 'third world'.

 

Iran media watch

 

HURRICANE: Iranian broadcast media have been reporting on a hurricane raging in the country's Western Ilam Province. According to state radio channel (VIRI), it has killed one person and a total of 600 underwent treatment. VIRI also announced official advice to Iranian pilgrims travelling to Iraq to participate in the Arba'een religious festival to change their route to avoid passing through the Mehran customs checkpoint, which has been affected by the hurricane. Meanwhile, Channel One (IRTV1) said the customs office and the highway to Mehran were open to serve pilgrims despite the damage the hurricane inflicted on the town's infrastructure.

 

NUCLEAR DEAL: VIRI and Channel One quoted the head of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee as saying that the EU package of proposals for persuading Iran to stay in the 2015 nuclear deal after the U.S. withdrawal has been finalized. He made the remarks after the committee's meeting with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

 

KHASHOGGI: The assassination of Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi remains one of the main topics in Iranian broadcast media. Reporting on the case, rolling news channel IRINN quoted a Turkish official as saying that the assassination in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul could not have happened without high-ranking Saudi officials knowing it. English-language Press TV highlighted Germany's decision to halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the journalist's case. VIRI and IRTV1 cited Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir as saying that high-ranking Saudi officials had no knowledge of the crime.

 

'SUPERMAN WITH NO AUTHORITY': Many Iranian newspapers have highlighted First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri's remarks made at a ceremony to mark the National Export Day yesterday. He allegedly said that he does not have the power to replace his secretary, never mind ministers. "Superman with no authority?" hardline Farhikhtegan asked sarcastically. "Eshaq speaks of incapacity," moderate Mostaqell's headline said. Reformist E'temad called the first vice-president's statement "untimely". Hamshahri, reporting on Jahangiri's statement, referred to similar statements made by Roads and Urban Development Minister Abbas Akhundi and Industry, Mining, and Commerce Minister Mohammad Shari'atmadari, noting that they had no authority.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Over 21,000 Tweets used the English hashtag 'Release Iran Truckers' to support truck drivers in Iran. Truck drivers went on strike on 22 September in protest against the government's failure to meet their demands. Later, Iran's judiciary vowed to "take serious action" against those who either organize strikes or incite others to join them. According to an unofficial tally, at least 170 people have been arrested since the beginning of the strikes. Some of those detained have been threatened with execution on "banditry" charges. A user wrote in English: "In which democratic country in the world would the supreme court imprison and sentence to death workers whose only crime was going on strike?" "Free the truckers. The protest does not deserve a prison sentence or execution," another user posted in English.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 22.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The spider's web

2-A unique moment

3-The Marches' success

 

1-The spider's web

 

If the U.S., its spoiled child Israel, and its other Arab conservative allies constitute the side that has been harmed most by Khashoggi's murder, its circumstances, and its consequences, the [Iran-led] resistance axis's members constitute the side that has gained the most from this momentous event, albeit to different degrees. But these benefits remain threatened by the moves and possible attacks the U.S. and Israel are preparing against Iran and the remaining members of the resistance axis so as to prevent them from winning and gaining further strength against their regional enemies. All eyes are now focused on Saudi Arabia, waiting with anxiety and anticipation for the internal consequences that this momentous event may uncover. For what has happened and will happen next will reveal the major players' positions and offer an indication of the future changes that will affect the Arabian Peninsula's political map-- 'Issam Nu'man in Lebanese al-Bina'

It [is] easy to distinguish between two camps: One was truly interested in Jamal Khashoggi and his fate; but the other viewed this painful incident a golden opportunity to target Saudi Arabia based on calculations that have nothing whatsoever to do with what took place at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. With Riyadh's latest measures, the first camp should have received what it was looking for: A transparent means of dealing with this painful incident, going all the way in order to expose the circumstances and the facts, and informing the public of what had happened…The second camp's problem is that it is deliberately confusing between two issues: It wants Khashoggi's disappearance to contribute to a clash between Saudi Arabia and the leading countries linked to it by relations of alliance or cooperation, alongside a wide network of common interests. But this camp is forgetting that Saudi Arabia has passed difficult tests in its international relations before, such as the attempt to exploit the 9/11 attacks to harm it. At the same time, it forgets that Jamal Khashoggi himself would not have accepted his name or what he has suffered to be used to harm his own country. By adopting the path of justice and accountability, Riyadh has brought this painful incident back to its proper legal and judicial context. This is the logic of state, responsibility and institutions, the logic of learning the lesson and restructuring institutions under the umbrella of the law--Ghassan Charbel in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

Why do we believe that the Saudi narrative is as fragile as a spider's web? Perhaps the main reason is the total conviction that it was only intended to achieve a single aim, namely, to ensure that Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman was kept outside the circle of accusations, and if necessary, to produce a scapegoat to help the prince safeguard his image that has suffered a violent shock. Suffice for anyone to read the leading U.S. and Western newspapers to see how the international community is in agreement – perhaps for the first time – regarding the perpetrator's true identity. What is clear is the shining truth that Saudi Arabia is not a state ruled by institutions for any such institution to carry out such an operation at its own initiative. Riyadh's extreme central control indicates that Jamal Khashoggi's murder could not have been carried out without a directive from the country's most senior level-- Hassan Barari in Qatari Asharq

 

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder will have political, economic, and existential consequences for the kingdom as it haggles with Turkey and the U.S. over the "blood money" it will have to pay in order to contain the consequences of this event, maintains a former Lebanese government minister in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Riyadh has consistently opted for a just and legal path in dealing with Khashoggi case, maintains the Lebanese editor-in-chief of a Saudi daily. The kingdom says that it will hold all those responsible for what happened accountable; but some people seem to believe that they can exploit this incident to harm Saudi Arabia. The official Saudi story regarding what happened to Khashoggi is riddled with holes, maintains a Jordanian commentator in a Qatari daily. This entire narrative was clearly concocted merely to save the Saudi crown-prince's skin.

 

MURDER ADMITTED: "After a calculated period of procrastination, Saudi Arabia has admitted that Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated," writes 'Issam Nu'man on Monday in the pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

And how did that assassination take place? During a 'fistfight' inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. But the murderer or murderers remain unknown, as do how the murder took place and the corpse's whereabouts!

Ankara has made no official comment after this absurd Saudi statement. But the international media has reminded the world that King Salman phoned President Erdogan a few hours before it was issued. Did they discuss a deal to cover up this shocking crime and agree on the blood money to be paid in compensation for the assassinated Saudi journalist?

This 'second deal of the century' may have been confirmed (or almost confirmed) by the U.S. president's haste to endorse the Saudi statement's 'credibility' and his expressed desire that Congress should refrain from punishing Riyadh harshly so as to avoid losing some $110 billion of arms' deals.

But how much blood money will Turkey and the U.S. share between them in compensation for Khashoggi's blood? It may be premature to determine the full sum because the criminal investigation in Turkey has yet to be concluded, and the doors to political and financial haggling between the tripartite deal's parties have not been shut.

However, regardless of how Khashoggi was murdered, his savage liquidation will have important political, economic, and existential consequences:

- One of the most significant and likely political consequences will be the emergence of a split inside the Saudi royal family. King Salman may succeed in containing the crime's repercussions at the expense of a few advisors in his diwan and some officers and intelligence agents who specialize in killing and dismemberment. But he may also fail, in which case the divisions within the royal family with its many members and violent history of conflict may deepen.

- The most significant economic consequence is the collapse of the Kingdom's financial reputation, and perhaps its solvency as well. The signs of such collapse are clear to see: Most of the West's finance and economy ministers who were invited to the 'Davos in the Desert' conference to discuss investment and development in the Kingdom have announced that they will not attend, as have representatives of international agencies, banks, and companies aspiring to implement huge investment projects.

- The most serous existential consequence is that the reactions to Khashoggi's dismemberment – assuming that this is proven – could develop into cracks in the very structure of the Kingdom, perhaps leading to its geographic and political dismemberment. Close observers of the Saudi scene are aware of the schemes and scenarios whose main titles have reverberated in Washington's political corridors and the halls of its major research institutions and Middle East think-tanks that are close to the White House and senior members of Congress and State Department and Defense Department officials.

The intense reactions to this momentous event in NATO capitals give the impression that their aim goes beyond mere support for human rights or concern for international law. These leading decision-making capitals have come to the conclusion that they cannot contain the consequences of this heinous crime via ordinary means, and that extraordinary political measures with strategic dimensions will have to be taken so as to confront the challenges that may emerge as a result of the following:

- First, the early November U.S. mid-term elections and President Trump and his Republican Party's concern to prevent the Khashoggi murder from having a negative impact on their prospects, and possibly developing in favor of the Democratic Party, which is lying in wait for Trump and that hopes to impeach him or prevent his reelection for a second term at the very least.

- Second, the U.S. sanctions against Iran, which are supposed to be strengthened via a new and harsher package early next month. The Trump administration is determined to pursue its punitive campaign and wants to make sure that that Saudi Arabia is not weakened since it wants to avoid a situation whereby Khashoggi's liquidation could affect Riyadh's financial and oil role in backing these sanctions.

- Third, Iran and the other members of the resistance axis' role in confronting U.S. and the Zionist entity's policies in the Arab world – especially in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and occupied Palestine, where Washington is supporting certain terrorist organizations that have been active against the resistance forces that support the Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese governments and are determined to safeguard their countries' unity and confront Israel's expansionist policies of aggression.

- Fourth, Russia's role in Western Asia, especially after it has reached an understanding with Iran over confronting the terrorist organizations and preserving Syria and Iraq's unity. Moreover, they are also in agreement over exerting considerable political and armament efforts with Turkey so as to convince it to abandon NATO.

- Fifth, Washington's concern to confront Russia regionally and globally, with the aim of containing Moscow's efforts to undermine the U.S.'s unipolar control of the world and create a multipolar world instead. There is also Trump's insistence on persisting with the trade war with China in order to prevent its giant economy from continuing to grow and reach various parts of the world, especially in Africa and South America, to say nothing of China's determination to complete its Silk Road project that stretches all the way to Europe via East and West Asia's countries.

The current process underway between the leading capitals concerned with containing the consequences of Khashoggi's liquidation is meant to find a legal and media way out that would be acceptable to world public opinion, and to agree on an implicit political and practical compromise so as to ensure that the stronger parties will secure significant financial gains, consolidate their economic interests, and fortify their security positions in Saudi Arabia in particular, and in the Arab world, in general.

If the U.S., its spoiled child Israel, and its other Arab conservative allies constitute the side that has been harmed most by Khashoggi's murder, its circumstances, and its consequences, the resistance axis's members constitute the side that has gained the most from this momentous event, albeit to different degrees. But these benefits remain threatened by the moves and possible attacks the U.S. and Israel are preparing against Iran and the remaining members of the resistance axis so as to prevent them from winning and gaining further strength against their regional enemies.

"All eyes are now focused on Saudi Arabia, waiting with anxiety and anticipation for the internal consequences that this momentous event may uncover. For what has happened and will happen next will reveal the major players' positions, and offer an indication of the future changes that will affect the Arabian Peninsula's political map," concludes Nu'man.

End…

 

CONFRONTING PAINFUL NEWS: "In the lives of states as well as individuals, certain times bear difficult or painful news," writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Experience shows that the best way of dealing with such days is to confront them courageously, responsibly, and transparently. The only option when faced with painful news is to deal with them very seriously, determine their circumstances and the conditions that led to them as well as the causes and the responsibilities, and hold those involved or have been derelict in their duties accountable. And, alongside all that, the lessons of what happened must be absorbed so as to avoid any repetition.

Anyone who considers the experience of individuals and states would realize that mistakes can occur and that some may be exceptionally dangerous. Individuals make mistakes due to erroneous assessments, exaggeration, exceeding their allotted powers, and the delusion that they can avoid being held accountable. And members of certain agencies may commit the same sort of misbehavior or misappraisal as any individual, forgetting the limit to their powers and ignoring the restrictions that are meant to determine the behavior of members of an agency or group.

Speaking of mistakes does not in any way mean that we are justifying them. On the contrary; we are insisting on the need to provide the mechanisms that prevent such mistakes from occurring and reduce as far as possible the chance that the coming days will bring more difficult or painful news because laws, conventions and limits to powers have been violated.

Anyone who knows Saudi Arabia knows that the disappearance of our colleague Jamal Khashoggi – may God rest his soul – was painful news for his family, friends, and country. For before being a journalist who was critical of his country's policies, Jamal was a Saudi citizen. And it is not Saudi Arabia's custom to wash its hands of the fate of any of its citizens, regardless of their attitude to some issue or another. Moreover, open-mindedness has been a part of Saudi Arabia's way of dealing with what happens at home or abroad. Anyone who has followed Saudi Arabia's news over the past two decades would surely remember how a number of opposition figures returned and resumed their normal lives in their country, and that even some of those who engaged in excessive violence inside the country were reintegrated in their society after being subjected to a rehabilitation process. And Saudi Arabia's domestic and foreign policies are clearly based on the principles of dialogue, narrowing disagreements, and persistently searching for shared views.

After the painful incident in its consulate in Istanbul, Saudi Arabia took a series of measures to find out what happened to Khashoggi. It sent a security team to cooperate with Turkey's investigations. It opened the consulate's doors and the consul's home to Turkish investigators. Alongside that, it carried out an internal investigation, insisting that it has nothing to hide, and that it would act in light of the facts and whatever information it will uncover.

Based on what these steps have revealed, Riyadh has announced that Khashoggi was dead, removed a number of important officials from their post, including senior intelligence officers, and arrested 18 people who are currently under investigation. Moreover, an official Saudi statement has noted that participants in the incident 'tried to cover up and hide what had happened.' And this has been accompanied by an announcement that the Saudi monarch has established a ministerial committee led by Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman tasked with restructuring the Kingdom's intelligence agencies.

What this means is that this painful incident is being addressed on the basis of upholding justice, holding those who have failed their duties accountable, and adopting transparency in informing public opinion of what the investigations have revealed. Parallel to that, the intelligence agency leadership will be restructured so as to ensure that strict constraints will prevent such painful incidents from being repeated in the future.

In the period between the incident and the official Saudi statement, TV screens, websites, and newspapers were overflowing with reports, rumors, and scenarios. Interest in this incident was natural because of the person involved and where it occurred. But it was easy to distinguish between two camps: One was truly interested in Jamal Khashoggi and his fate; but the other viewed this painful incident a golden opportunity to target Saudi Arabia based on calculations that have nothing whatsoever to do with what took place at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

With Riyadh's latest measures, the first camp should have received what it was looking for: A transparent means of dealing with this painful incident, going all the way in order to expose the circumstances and the facts, and informing the public of what had happened. But for the second camp, which sought to weaken Saudi Arabia and target its role from the start, resorting to holding those responsible accountable is annoying because it was looking for a deep crisis in Saudi Arabia's international relations.

The second camp's problem is that it is deliberately confusing between two issues: It wants Khashoggi's disappearance to contribute to a clash between Saudi Arabia and the leading countries linked to it by relations of alliance or cooperation alongside a wide network of common interests. But this camp is forgetting that Saudi Arabia has passed difficult tests in its international relations before, such as the attempt to exploit the 9/11 attacks to harm it. At the same time, it forgets that Jamal Khashoggi himself would not have accepted his name or what he has suffered to be used to harm his own country.

"By adopting the path of justice and accountability, Riyadh has brought this painful incident back to its proper legal and judicial context. This is the logic of state, responsibility, and institutions, the logic of learning the lesson and restructuring institutions under the umbrella of the law," concludes Charbel.

End…

 

UNBELIEVABLE: "Not many people would have believed that Saudi Arabia's official imagination could be so superficial," writes Hassan Barari in today's Qatari daily Asharq.

For how can the decision-makers in a state of Saudi Arabia's importance produce a narrative akin to a chunk of Swiss cheese – with less cheese than holes – and believe that the international community would take this seriously? Would it not have been better if Riyadh had immediately acknowledged the truth, and avoided successive denunciations from every direction, especially those of its crown-prince whom the entire world is accusing of ordering Jamal Khashoggi's savage murder?

It is as if Saudi Arabia needed more failures and had to carry out such an operation in a primitive and exposed manner! Its regional wars and successive failures should have led it to reconsider its overall foreign policy, rather than persisting with unrehearsed actions, dangerous and uncalculated adventures. Even the Saudi media has been unable to defend the Kingdom's position. It initially flatly denied that the crime had ever occurred, and then accused Qatar of committing it, coming up with the worst possible narrative from Riyadh!

But why do we believe that the Saudi narrative is as fragile as a spider's web? Perhaps the main reason is the total conviction that it was only intended to achieve a single aim, namely, to ensure that Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman was kept outside the circle of accusations, and if necessary, to produce a scapegoat to help the prince safeguard his image that has suffered a violent shock.

Suffice for anyone to read the leading U.S. and Western newspapers to see how the international community is in agreement – perhaps for the first time – regarding the perpetrator's true identity. What is clear is the shining truth that Saudi Arabia is not a state ruled by institutions for any such institution to carry out such an operation at its own initiative. Riyadh's extreme central control indicates that Jamal Khashoggi's murder could not have been carried out without a directive from the country's most senior level.

Moreover, the [official Saudi] story of a fistfight [inside the consulate leading to Khashoggi's death] shows little respect for the international community's intelligence. For why would the team that went to negotiate with Khashoggi otherwise bring a saw that was used to dismember the victim's corpse?

The one true part of the Saudi narrative is that Jamal Khashoggi was murdered inside the consulate. It is also worth noting that the admission of the crime against Khashoggi came some twenty days after Mohammad bin Salman's statement in which he insisted that Khashoggi had entered the consulate and left it twenty minutes later. In other words, the latest Saudi narrative belies the Saudi crown-prince's own words, who is now seeking ways of ensuring his political survival, especially after the growing Western voices demanding his removal.

On a different level, one can say that the entire Saudi narrative is false. For the attempt to present Mohammad bin Salman as a reformist who wants to move his country from one phase to another stands in radical contradiction with the required conditions for such a transition to take place.

"For example, Saudi society cannot become productive by restricting freedoms and liquidating anyone who has a different opinion," concludes Barari.

Ends…

 

2-A unique moment

 

Jordanian King 'Abdullah's decision not to renew Israel's lease of the Baqoura and Ghumar areas based on the 1994 Jordanian/Israeli peace treaty represents a unique historic moment, says Fahd al-Khitan in today's Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Jordanian King 'Abdullah's decision not to renew Israel's lease of the Baqoura and Ghumar areas based on the 1994 Jordanian/Israeli peace treaty was already taken last May, maintains a Jordanian commentator. But was also decided to postpone announcing it until the last moment to limit Israel's ability to mobilize its allies and exert pressure on Jordan.

 

ANNOUNCING THE DECISION: "After a wait that lasted for weeks, King 'Abdullah II yesterday [Sunday] announced the kingdom's decision not to renew the lease of Baqoura and Ghumar, a year before it ends," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

It worth mentioning here that the lease was for 25 years and ends on November 10th 2019, according to the October 26th 1994 Jordan/Israel peace treaty.

In tandem with the King's announcement, Foreign Ministry officials notified the Israeli side of the Jordanian government's decision not to renew the lease.

The King's decision represents a unique moment in modern Jordanian history, which according to one politician, is no less important than King Hussein's decision to Arabize the Jordanian army's high command in the 1950s [after it had been led by British officers]. In both cases, this decision coincided with the people's wishes.

There has been a total national consensus that the Baqoura and Ghumar lease should not be renewed and that Jordanian sovereignty should be fully restored over both these areas that are an inseparable part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, according to the peace treaty with Israel. Political and media activity has been on the rise in recent weeks demanding that the government should not to renew the lease. Some have doubted the Jordanian state's ability to take such a decision, but certain facts need to be clarified in this context.

King 'Abdullah took his decision not to renew the lease last May after political and legal discussions inside the halls of power. He also directed the official teams specialized in such matters to prepare the necessary measures required for implementing and announcing this decision at the appropriate time. The fact of the matter, however, is that there has been only one viable option in the King's mind and the issue did not take much time for him to consider. For the issue of Jordanian sovereignty is a foregone conclusion and beyond debate for him, as it is for all Jordanians.

A month later, the specialized state institutions' teams had completed a full vision necessary to implement the King's instructions. However, due to considerations relating to the management of negotiations and ensuring that Jordan's interests would be preserved from all angles, it was decided not to disclose this decision until the appropriate time. In fact, anyone who gets a chance to take up the matter with the relevant government parties today would find their drawers full of heavy tomes that include a package of legal consultations and special reviews regarding the two lease agreements, and that have to do with Israel's possible reactions and how to deal with them in subsequent phases.

As a negotiating tactic, Jordan made sure not to give Israel a long time for the expected consultations regarding the decision. This is why care was taken to postpone announcing the decision till the very last days that separate us from the end of the deadline for notifying Israel. I believe that this is why officials were careful to say that the decision would be announced at the appropriate time in a manner that achieves the national interest when replying to questions.

The political situation at the regional and international levels is extremely complex. Israel is an internationally comfortable position, receiving unprecedented support from the current U.S. administration. Meanwhile, the Arab system is totally unable to back Jordan in case it is subjected to American and Western pressures. And, in light of its current difficult economic conditions, it was not unlikely that attempts would be made to drive Jordan into a corner and force it to accept renewing the lease.

On the other hand, a number of Jordanian interests must be protected without harming the principle of national sovereignty. And this is what ultimately happened.

"The importance of the decision regarding Baqoura and Ghumar not only stems from its implications regarding the King's absolute commitment to safeguarding the national interest, but from the fact that it represents a response to all those who doubt Jordan's ability to resist pressures when it comes to defending the country's supreme national interest," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

3-The Marches' success

 

Despite their high human cost, the unequal and surrealistic confrontation taking place on Gaza's borders is once again imposing the problem of Israeli occupation and Palestinian suffering on the international agenda, says Randa Haidar on today's pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

 

Despite the terrible losses suffered by Palestinian civilians during the weekly Marches of Return along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, they continue to be important and effective, insists a Lebanese commentator on a pan-Arab new portal. They cause serious divisions within Israel and have rallied world public opinion to the Palestinians' side.

 

FATEFUL FRIDAY: "Last Friday (19/10/2018) was fateful for Gaza, not only for those taking part in the Marches of Return that head to the border fence with Israel every Friday," writes Randa Haidar on Monday on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

In fact, it was fateful for all the Strip's inhabitants after a week of extreme tension during which missiles were fired at Israel, Israeli raids were carried out against the Strip, and there was a spate of Israeli warnings against the possibility that the confrontations could escalate and lead to a new wave of violence. And these threats were accompanied by the [Israeli] occupation army's reinforcements along the borders in anticipation of a serious bout of violence that could develop into a military confrontation, as well as intense pressure from Egypt on Hamas's leadership to contain the conflict and prevent a slide into a new war.

But despite this tense atmosphere, last Friday's march was massively attended. Also noteworthy was the presence of Hamas members to prevent the demonstrators from approaching the fence in order to prevent them from being harmed. However, despite this, over 100 Palestinians were wounded in the confrontations, some seriously.

This is all taking place amidst suffocating humanitarian conditions in Gaza after Israel prevented trucks carrying fuel for operating the electricity plants from entering the Strip that Qatar had undertaken to finance. It is also taking place amidst a sharp Israeli debate over how to deal with the Gaza Strip's problem, and an international insistence on the need to find a solution for the humanitarian predicament of over two million Palestinians who have been living under a blockade for over ten years.

Against this background, it is important to shed light on the multidimensional dynamic created by the Marches of Return that have been taking place for more than seven months, despite the huge losses suffered by the Palestinians, including 200 martyrs and ten thousand wounded, most of whom are young men and women and children.

These marches have managed to create a rift within Israel's political and military echelons over how to deal with this challenge, which has not turned into a routine action and continues to attract many young men and women despite the passage of time and human losses. The marches have become what Israeli commentators refer to as a veritable 'war of harassment' against the army deployed along the Strip's borders, as well as the inhabitants of the [Israeli] settlements near the Strip.

Israel's military establishment believes that sniper fire and tear gas is the best and least costly method to confront the demonstrations using. But nationalist right-wing representatives have been demanding a stronger and more violent response. The hardline, nationalist, rightwing Yisrael Beiteinu Party believes that no Palestinian who launches a paper kite or an incendiary balloon should be allowed to remain alive in Gaza.

The disagreement worsened recently between the chief of staff and rightwing Knesset members who accused the army of weakness and prevarication, viewing its self-control as having eroded Israel's deterrence. They demanded that Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot should carry out a crushing military operation to suppress the demonstrations and topple Hamas's rule – bearing in mind that the decision to go to war is in the political authorities' hand, namely, the premiership and the security inner-cabinet, and not in the army's hands whose task is to offer recommendations but implement the government's directives.

In terms of the Israeli public, especially the inhabitants of the settlements near the border with Gaza – such as Nahal Oz– what is taking place near their homes is worrisome, and is preventing them from pursuing their normal lives. But they disagree over what is happening. While some settlers with leftist leanings believe that the army is using excessive force against Palestinian civilians, and that army snipers are deliberately shooting at unarmed demonstrators inflicting wounds that cause permanent disabilities, others argue that Hamas is using civilians and children to achieve political aims and that the Palestinian demand for the right of return is unacceptable.

The Marches of Return are receiving wide international media coverage with live images of what is happening at the border fence broadcast to the entire world. This is giving rise to an international wave of sympathy for the unarmed Palestinian demonstrators who are confronting the strongest military force in the Middle East using primitive methods, such as slingshots, paper kites, and incendiary balloons, and scissors to cut the fence wire, but without anyone really succeeding in doing so. This unequal and surrealistic confrontation is currently the main event that is once again imposing the problem of Israeli occupation and Palestinian suffering on the international agenda.

Evidence of the importance of the Western media's coverage comes from the violent Israeli reaction to France's Canal-2 report that tells the story of Palestinian youths who have lost their arms or legs to Israeli sniper fire. Israel's ambassador in Paris sent a strongly-worded letter to the TV channel's director demanding that the report not be broadcast because, she claimed, it carries 'a message of hatred' that encourages anti-Semitism, portrays the situation in an un-objective manner, and expresses sympathy for a terrorist organization [Hamas].

None of the above is meant to justify the great losses suffered by the Palestinians or Hamas's political exploitation of the Marches of Return. The marches also need to be reinvigorated to include a broader spectrum of the Palestinian public. They also need to be reorganized in a manner that prevents losses among civilians.

"But what is clear so far is that, despite all this, the marches still have massive support, and that they are effective, important, and successful," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 19.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

No war, no peace

 

Israel and Gaza were girding for a possible return to violence Friday, amid fears that renewed border protests could push the sides back to the brink of war after a brief violent flare-up days earlier. Israeli troops were readying for weekly border protests Friday that have turned deadly in the past, with the day being seen as a key test in whether the sides can continue negotiating a long-term ceasefire deal as part of an Egyptian-led effort. Israel has demanded an end to the weekly confrontations, as well as the frequent launches of incendiary balloons into Israeli territory. Daoud Shehab, a member of the organizing committee of the marches, said officials were encouraging protesters to stay away from the border fence, but said he was not sure to what extent they would succeed in "restraining the public mood." "There will be attempts to prevent them from approaching the fence and there might be a drop in the number of balloons," he said. "We hope there will be no human losses. We are giving a chance to the Egyptian efforts."

According to reports, Egypt had warned Hamas that renewed protests would bring a heavy Israeli response. On Thursday, a team of Egyptian mediators shuttled between Israel and Hamas in a stepped-up effort to forge a cease-fire. The four Egyptian intelligence officials entered Gaza from Israel on Thursday afternoon, and then returned to Israel after meeting with Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas's top leader. The group did not include Cairo's spy Chief 'Abbas Kamel, who on Wednesday canceled a planned trip to Gaza, the West Bank and Israel.

On Thursday, Israel's top-level security cabinet instructed the army to take a wait-and-see approach to allow mediation efforts to succeed, but also ordered the military to step up reprisal attacks should there be border violence. Ministers said the IDF should ultimately adopt a zero-tolerance policy to rocket attacks, arson balloons and rioting along the border. The army may also look to clamp down on border riots by entering areas where it previously stayed away from, according to Israel's Channel 10 news. Several cabinet ministers have criticized Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot for what they described as the army's overly complacent policy toward Gaza. In leaks to Hadashot television news Thursday following a meeting of the security cabinet the previous evening, one unnamed minister was quoted as saying, "In the final analysis, Eisenkot's policy on responding to Gaza violence has failed and allowed things to deteriorate." The comment reflected the opinions of several members of the 10-member security cabinet, according to Hebrew media reports. It followed a tense five-hour meeting of the cabinet, during which officials considered upping the IDF's response to violence along the Gaza border in the wake of a rocket attack earlier that day. Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman defended Eisenkot during the meeting and afterward, slamming the criticism of the IDF chief as "petty politics."

With its economy in freefall and tensions rising with Israel, the Gaza Strip is imploding, the UN envoy to the region warned on Thursday according to The Times of Israel. Nickolay Mladenov delivered the warning to the Security Council a day after a Palestinian rocket slammed into a home in the city of Beersheba and Israeli warplanes pounded the Gaza Strip in retaliation. "Gaza is imploding. This is not hyperbole. This is not alarmism. It is a reality," Mladenov told the council. He cited World Bank figures showing official unemployment at 53 percent, with more than 70 percent of Palestinian youths jobless. Every second person in Gaza now lives below the poverty line, he said. "We remain on the brink of another potentially devastating conflict, a conflict that nobody claims to want, but a conflict that needs much more than just words to prevent," said Mladenov. The United Nations has made some headway in joint efforts with Egypt to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but Mladenov warned this could collapse. "Barring substantial steps to reverse the current course, this precarious sense of calm is doomed to give way under the mounting pressure. It is already beginning to fray," he said.

Mladenov condemned the recent launching of rockets, one of which struck a home in the Southern city of Beersheba and the other landed off the coast of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Hamas, on Thursday pledged to launch an investigation into the rocket fire after denying any involvement in the attack, but Israel rejected the denials. At the same time, the Palestinian group's military wing released a video warning Israeli leaders against making a "mistake."

Jewish-American billionaire Ronald Lauder was reportedly dispatched by U.S. President Donald Trump this week to meet with Palestinian Authority Mahmoud 'Abbas in a bid to encourage Ramallah's return to peace talks with Israel. According to a Hadashot TV news report Thursday, Lauder met with 'Abbas "behind Israel's back" and without the knowledge of Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt, the two White House officials in charge of the Israeli-Palestinian peace portfolio. The report, which was unsourced, said Lauder urged 'Abbas to work with the Trump administration to jump-start talks and told him he would be positively surprised by the U.S. president's peace plan, details of which have been kept carefully under wraps. Lauder also met with Sa'eb 'Erekat, the top Palestinian peace negotiator; and the PA's intelligence chief, Majid Faraj, the report said. The White House swiftly denied the report. "Ambassador Lauder is a friend of the President but he was not sent by the White House to meet with the Palestinians on the President's behalf — secretly or otherwise," National Security Council spokesman Garrett Marquis said.

'Abbas last month told a group of former Israeli lawmakers that Lauder had proposed running a back channel between the PA leader and Prime Minister Netanyahu, but the initiative ultimately fizzled. 'Abbas said Lauder, who has been involved as a conduit between Netanyahu and Arab leaders for decades, floated the idea to him several months earlier, according to former justice minister Yossi Beilin, who was at the meeting. 'Abbas said he gave Lauder, who was once close to Netanyahu and is a friend of Trump, his commitment to participate in the channel of communication, but that nothing ever came of it, Beilin told The Times of Israel at the time. An official in 'Abbas's office, who asked to remain unnamed, said that Lauder had previously suggested running a back channel between the Palestinian leader and Netanyahu. The official, however, said that 'Abbas had told Lauder he would only participate in the line of communication if Israel enacts a freeze on settlement building.

U.S. President Donald Trump's policies toward Israel are not generating support for him among American Jews, a poll released Wednesday found. While a slim majority of American Jews said they approved of Trump's handling of relations with the Jewish state, the vast majority said that would not cause them to vote for him. The survey, by The Mellman Group, found that 51 percent of American Jewish respondents said they approved of the president's U.S.-Israel approach, but just 6% said they would vote for him due to his Israel policies despite differing from him on other issues. Moreover, 20% said they agreed with Trump on Israel, but would still not vote for him. The poll also found that American Jews – long loyal to the Democratic Party – remained that way, with 75% of respondents saying they planned to vote for Democratic candidates in the 2018 midterms. 68% said they identified with the Democratic Party, whereas 25% said they did with the Republican Party. The Mellman poll also found widespread American Jewish distaste for Trump, with 75% expressing disapproval of him.

In other news, the Trump administration will merge the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into its Jerusalem embassy, in a move widely cast as a "downgrade" in U.S.-Palestinian relations. It breaks with over two decades of protocol offering the Palestinians a direct line to Washington through a consulate staff that deal directly with the Palestinian Authority and the U.S. Administration. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the move was meant to "achieve significant efficiencies and increase our effectiveness" following the opening of the embassy in May. He insisted the merger of the two missions did not signal a change in U.S. policy on the status of Jerusalem, the West Bank, or Gaza Strip. "The United States continues to take no position on final status issues, including boundaries or borders," Pompeo said in a statement. "The specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final status negotiations between the parties." Pompeo said U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman would be in charge of the tie-up and that the new Palestinian Affairs Unit inside the embassy would remain, as before, at the consulate general building on Agron Street in the Western part of Jerusalem. The announcement was met with immediate anger from the Palestinians, who accused the White House of working to bring the entire West Bank under Israeli sovereignty. "The Trump Administration is making clear that it is working together with the Israeli Government to impose Greater Israel rather than the two-state solution on the 1967 border," top peace negotiator Sa'eb 'Erekat said in a statement. "The U.S. administration has fully endorsed the Israeli narrative, including on Jerusalem, Refugees and Settlements."

In the Alqasem affair, the American graduate student accused of supporting a boycott of Israel was let into the country late Thursday following two weeks in detention at Ben Gurion Airport, after the Supreme Court ruled she could not be barred under a controversial law banning people who advocate for boycotts of the Jewish state, putting an end to a saga that drew intense international scrutiny. Justice Neal Hendel, one of three Supreme Court judges wrote. "The fight against boycotts is fitting and vital, as are the actions taken by the State of Israel on the matter. However, the concrete action before us clearly deviates from the range of reasonableness and cannot be accepted," he added.

Meanwhile, the Ministerial Committee for Legislation will discuss a bill on Sunday that would subject activists convicted of promoting a boycott of Israel to prison terms of up to seven years. The bill would apply to anyone who works to "undermine Israel's interests, its relations with any other country, organization or institution." According to the bill's explanatory notes, it is primarily meant "to apply to anyone who plays an active role in a movement that boycotts Israel or its products." "It is possible to criticize Israel," the explanatory notes say, "and freedom of expression shouldn't be undermined, heaven forbid. But anyone who lends a hand to boycotts that harm Israel economically or harm it in other ways, like academic boycotts, must be called to account. That is the difference between criticism, which is legitimate, and damage that's a thuggish act in and of itself and harms Israel and its citizens."

Israel's ambassador to the United Nations and the head of a dovish Israeli human rights group faced off at the Security Council on Thursday. B'Tselem Executive Director Hagai El-Ad delivered a speech critical of various Israeli policies with regard to Palestinians, comparing them to apartheid-era South Africa and urging the international community to act on their behalf. Ambassador Danny Danon called him a "collaborator" who should be ashamed of himself. During his first-ever speech to a formal Security Council session, El-Ad focused on Israel's settlement policies, accusing the government of deliberately "splitting up an entire people, fragmenting their land, and disrupting their lives." El-Ad did not dispute that Khan al-Ahmar, a Bedouin village in the West Bank slated for demolition by Israeli authorities, was built without the proper permits. "But this is the case not because Palestinians are inherently law-breakers, as some in Israel suggest. Rather, it is because they have no other alternative," he said, sitting next to Palestinian Ambassador to the UN Riyad Mansour. "It is all but impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits from Israeli authorities because the Israeli-established planning regime in the West Bank is meant, by design, to serve settlers and dispossess Palestinians," he said.

Finally, a comprehensive investigation carried out by Haaretz, based on about 100 sources in 15 countries, shows that Israeli industry have not hesitated to sell offensive capabilities to many countries that lack a strong democratic tradition, even when they have no way to ascertain whether the items sold were being used to violate human rights. The testimonies show that the Israeli equipment has been used to locate and detain activists, persecute members of the LGBT community, silence citizens who were critical of their government, and even to fabricate cases of heresy against Islam in Muslim countries that don't maintain formal relations with Israel. Haaretz also found that Israeli firms continued to sell espionage products even when it was revealed publicly that the equipment was used for malicious purposes.

 

 

LIGHTNING STRUCK, ROCKETS FLEW: Ben Caspit in Maariv writes that the assessments in Israel and the Strip is that in all likelihood the rockets on Beersheba and the center of Israel were not man launched, but resulted from the weather and rockets that were already prepped for launching.

"Were the missiles on Israel, which only due to enormous luck did not end with casualties, a freak accident - the result of the weather? According to estimates in Israel and in Gaza, there is a high probability that a lightning strike activated the rockets, which were prepped and ready for launching on Tuesday night. In the Cabinet, quite a few jokes were made about this during the night session (lightning in Hebrew is 'barak', so Ehud Barak quips were abundant).

On Thursday, Minister of Housing and Construction Yoav Galant addressed the matter of the marathon cabinet meeting that continued into the early hours of Thursday morning, despite Netanyahu's ban on ministers talking. Galant, who spoke at the conference of the Association of Contractors and Builders in Eilat, said: 'I am not referring to cabinet discussions. I can say one thing very clearly: The rules of the game are about to change. We will no longer accept the arson and the terror along the fence.'

Galant's comments correspond to the report by Hadashot TV news, according to which the ministers made a decision to ratchet up the tough policy against Hamas and to act to change the rules of the game on the violent incidents on the fence and the incendiary balloons. According to the report, the execution of the decision will begin today, in dealing with the demonstrations on the border fence. At the same time, Israel will continue to strive for an arrangement, within the new rules.

Three days ago defense minister Avigdor Lieberman asserted that the current situation cannot continue. 'We must strike Hamas hard; this is the only way to bring the situation back to normal and lower the rate of violence to zero or almost zero, or to the pre March 29 level,' the minister said during a visit to the Gaza Division on Tuesday. 'It must be a cabinet decision, unfortunately, neither the defense minister nor the prime minister, or the prime minister and the defense minister alone, can make such a decision.'

Incidentally, despite the return to routine, the launching of incendiary balloons continues. One balloon fell near the Barzilai hospital in Ashkelon and was neutralized by a police sapper. Another fell in the Eshkol Regional Council. Let us suppose we embark on a wide-scale military strike on Gaza. Anyone who thinks it can end with the air force is wrong. Hamas and Jihad have a hefty rocket capability, some much more dangerous than in the past, especially for the Gaza envelope. We will sustain casualties, and in the end Netanyahu will be forced to order the IDF to enter Gaza. In the past few years, Hamas has built a large city of tunnels under the Strip. It will be a bloodbath. The IDF estimates that the number of soldiers that will be killed in a real operation in the Strip will be several hundred. And for what? If Netanyahu had a strategic goal to topple Hamas, so be it. But his goal is the opposite. So after we bury half a battalion of young soldiers, we will return to exactly the same spot we are mired in today. And so it is no wonder that most of the ministers understand that the current reality is heaven when compared to the alternatives."

Ends…

 

LIEBERMAN WANTS EVERYONE TO HOLD HIM: Sima Kadmon in Yedioth Ahronoth explains that more than war, the defense minister wants to make clear that what everyone understands now, that Hamas is not headed for a deal, he understood a long time ago. Up till now he restrained himself. Now he wants to be restrained.

"It is not yet clear whether Israel is headed for an arrangement or war. What is certain is that at least verbally the defense minister is prepping us for war. He told me this week that there is no need for a war, because something short and powerful can be done – but decisions must be made. This gap, between what he says and what he does, can be summed up in a succinct and clear expression: Hold me. In other words: More than Lieberman wants war, he wants to make clear that what everyone understands now – that Hamas is not headed for an arrangement - he understood a long time ago. That the restraint he exhibited should be attributed only to his belief that there is need for calm during the holidays, Passover, Independence Day, summer vacation and the holidays of Tishrei. But, now, the party is over.

This was a few hours before the cabinet convened, and Lieberman was particularly militant. There were those who believed in the option of achieving an arrangement with Hamas, he said, and the person who led that was Meir Ben Shabat, the national security adviser, formerly head of the Southern region in the Shin Bet, who regards himself as a great expert on Gaza. I did not believe it, Lieberman says, but I allowed this option to run its course until last Friday, which for me was a turning point. On Friday morning four fuel tankers entered the Strip, and in the evening we witnessed a Hamas rampage on the fence that resulted in 7 dead and 200 wounded. After Friday I said: That is it, it is clear. There is no arrangement. Haniyeh only strengthened my opinion, by saying that they would not stop the violence on the fence until the siege was completely lifted. Not fuels, not salaries, only lifting the siege. Even after Haniyeh's remarks, Lieberman said, I heard voices on our side saying: Haniyeh is only saying that because he has to, he does not really mean it. That is what they said in the 1930s about Hitler, or about Khomeini. He is just saying that, he does not mean it. And I say he means it. Hamas let a genie out of the bottle and cannot put it back in. It does not want to, either. The only way left to us is to administer the biggest blow possible.

The first goal of such a blow, avows the defense minister, is to return to the situation we were in on March 29, on the eve of the march of return. The second goal: Not merely to return to the situation prior to March 29, but also to achieve a lull that will last at least 5 years. Will a strong blow indeed achieve these goals? Lieberman is convinced it will. It has been proven, in his opinion that after a severe blow there is a long period of quiet. We evacuated 21 flourishing settlements, transferred 10,000 Jews into Israel, returned to the 1967 lines, and received more Qassams and tunnels, he says. Not everything depends on us. I do not know of two Muslim countries in the Middle East who live in peace with one another. The defense minister has apparently forgotten some prominent examples, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But, so be it.

The political establishment, including elements within the coalition, claims that Lieberman's belligerent attitude stems from political motivations. His dire situation in the polls is forcing him to veer to the right, far from where he has been since entering the Defense Ministry and discovering how different things seem from there. Bennett, who is striving to grab Lieberman's portfolio, continues to challenge him with the demand to strike a hard blow at Hamas. This is in contrast to the position of the defense establishment, which harbors deep reservations regarding a broad operation, which according to them cannot put a stop to the demonstrations on the fence and the incendiary balloons.

By the way, during the cabinet meeting on Wednesday night, Bennett surprised the cabinet by demanding that the Kerem Shalom crossing be opened immediately, saying: 'I cannot understand why you are closing the crossings. Why not continue to let goods flow to the populace. The trucks need to be let in.' People in the room testified that Bennett was very, very adamant, even when he was told that some of the goods let in were serving Hamas.

And Lieberman? He just wants to be held.

Ends…

 

ESCALATION OR LULL?: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom expects that the demonstrations along the fence will indicate the direction of the entire sector. A senior source stresses Israel will not count the single balloon, but will monitor the general trend.

"The Political/Security Cabinet decided to give truce in Gaza another chance. If the lull is maintained today along the fence, Israel will renew the entry of fuel and goods into the Strip early next week, and expand the fishing area. The decision was made at the end of a long and somewhat stormy debate. Defense Minister Lieberman demanded that immediate action be taken against Hamas. He insisted that the situation in Gaza would not change and that even if a lull was achieved, it would be violated sooner rather than later, and Israel would be forced to act. Lieberman added that it would be better to act now, before the weather and international conditions worsened.

The Defense Minister's proposal was not brought to a vote in the meeting, and was sharply criticized by some of the ministers. Sharp criticism was also meted out to the chief of staff, who was told his policy had failed and was detrimental to deterrence. Earlier, Lieberman issued a statement in which he said that 'it is unfortunate and outrageous that ministers in the cabinet practice petty politics on the back of the chief of staff. It is inconceivable that members of the cabinet will accuse the chief of staff of the policy they themselves outlined. This crosses a red line and damages state security.'

Eizenkot himself came to the meeting straight from the airport, after cutting short his working visit to the U.S. He supported the efforts to achieve a lull, led by UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov, along with Egyptian, American, and European officials. Eizenkot believes Israel should only wage wars of 'no choice', and that the current situation was not of that kind. The defense minister disagreed with the chief of staff and claimed that Israel was already in a situation of 'no choice'. However, Prime Minister Netanyahu decided in favor of the chief of staff and the IDF – to give truce another chance. But, the IDF was instructed to take a harder line against the demonstrators along the fence and the cells launching the balloons and kites.

Netanyahu's decision was based, among other things, on the position of his national security adviser, Meir Ben-Shabbat, former head of the Southern region of the Shin Bet, who believes that Hamas does not want war now and will act to restrain the violence. Ben-Shabbat also received messages from a number of sources, Western and Arab, who claimed that the shooting at Beersheba was carried out without the knowledge or permission of the Hamas leadership, and that the organization was conducting a manhunt to track down those responsible for it.

The cabinet ministers were instructed not to talk at the end of the meeting, in order to preserve ambiguity and deterrence, but the message conveyed yesterday to Hamas was that quiet would be met with gestures. A senior official said yesterday that the organization's test will be today. 'We will not count the single balloon, but we will closely monitor the trend,' he said, 'if there will be widespread violence – we will respond forcefully, but if Hamas acts to restrain the violence – it will not be met with a cold shoulder.'

Last night's assessments in Israel were that Hamas would indeed act to ease the violence. If this is indeed the case, Israel will permit the reopening of the Gaza crossings and the expansion of fishing areas on Sunday, and will also resume the supply of fuels, which was halted in the wake of last Friday's violence. In addition, the Egyptian delegation that is trying to mediate in the Palestinian reconciliation talks and the efforts to reach a long-term truce agreement, returned to Gaza yesterday.

Despite the cabinet's decision, pessimistic assessments were voiced by the political and security echelons yesterday regarding the ability to restore calm to the border. A combination of factors – primarily Abu Mazin's opposition to the supply of electricity and the anticipated delay in the payment of salaries – will not allow even a minimal improvement in living conditions in Gaza; the road to a resumption of Hamas-initiated violence and the return of Israel's dilemma – is short.

In view of the security situation, the Airports Authority decided to change the takeoff and landing routes at Ben Gurion Airport. This is a routine move, which is being carried out as part of the division of flight zones with the Air Force, and in order to reduce the potential risk to civilian aviation."

Ends…

 

ANOTHER ROUND, NOT ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 states that Israel has decided not to escalate in Gaza, but the coming days are critical and Hamas intentions remain unclear. 'Abbas is trying to push Israel and Hamas into war and is expected to announce new sanctions against the Strip, which could lead to an eruption.

"Recent developments on the Gaza border following the firing of two long-range rockets into Israeli territory, one of which hit a house in Be'ersheba, are ushering in another military round between Israel and Hamas. However, both sides have no interest in a comprehensive military confrontation.

The next two days are critical, especially today, with Hamas planning to continue the demonstrations on the border and the attempts to infiltrate Israel. Al-Hayat reported on October 18, citing informed Palestinian sources, that the headquarters of the 'March of Return' had already decided on Monday to ease the clashes in the coming days in order to reduce the casualties and to give Egypt's mediation efforts a chance to succeed in easing the siege .

On the other hand, the Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, claimed in a report published yesterday that Hamas had informed Egypt that it could not put a stop to the demonstrations and that 'popular activity' could not be moderated without the residents of Gaza feeling an improvement in water, electricity and wages. Hamas speaks in two voices and it is impossible to believe its statements or promises. Israel will have to wait. The test is in events on the ground.

The cancellation of the visit to Israel and the PA by the head of Egyptian Intelligence 'Abbas Kamel and the departure of the Egyptian security delegation from the Gaza Strip are negative signs. Apparently, the Egyptian delegation failed to advance the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, which Egypt views as an important element in achieving a truce between Israel and Hamas.

The rocket fire at Beersheba and the center of the country damaged Egypt's honor as a mediator and especially the honor of Intelligence Minister 'Abbas Kamel, who has invested a great deal of effort in promoting Palestinian reconciliation and the truce between Hamas and Israel, from the day he entered office. Hamas did not hesitate and poked a finger straight into Egypt's eye by launching two Rockets towards Israel. Egyptian patience is admirable. Egypt has been mediating for 12 years between Hamas and Fatah in an attempt to achieve reconciliation, despite the many difficulties, and has not yet given up.

This time Egypt is again waiting for the security tension to dissipate and will then resume its mediation between Hamas and Israel in an attempt to achieve calm. Despite media reports that Egypt will withdraw from its role as mediator, Egypt does not want to create a vacuum into which anti-Egyptian elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar will enter. This is an issue of national security, because the Gaza Strip is Egypt's 'backyard'. Egyptian mediation will continue in order to prevent an eruption in the Gaza Strip.

Another negative development is the convening of the PLO Central Council next week, in which Mahmoud 'Abbas is expected to pass decisions on imposing new sanctions on the Strip and examining agreements with Israel. The visit of 'Abbas Kamel in Ramallah was intended to warn Mahmoud 'Abbas of the serious consequences of imposing new sanctions on Gaza. The visit was canceled due to rocket fire into Israel, and Egypt is expected to try to find another way to convey the message to 'Abbas.

Senior officials in Israel believe that 'Abbas is pulling strings behind the scenes and is doing everything possible to bring about a war between Israel and Hamas. 'Abbas' wet dream is to return to the Gaza Strip after Israel overthrows Hamas, and to receive full control of the Strip on a silver platter. 'Abbas is furious at Israel, Hamas, Qatar, and the United Nations envoy Mladenov, who all bypassed him a week ago and, contrary to his wishes, allowed the supply of industrial diesel to the Strip, in order to increase the electricity supply to the residents. The PA is pleased with the escalation on the border. Senior Fatah officials said that Israel and Egypt should have listened to 'Abbas and not relied on Hamas and its promises. Hamas has no reverence for any factor in the region and is determined to implement its goals according to its interests.

Meanwhile, the security cabinet has decided to halt the military response to the rocket fire towards Israel and revert to routine on the Gaza border. Israel's top strategic interest has not changed. As far as it is concerned, the emphasis is on the danger in the North, because of Iran's military buildup in Syria. Hence, even if in the coming days a military confrontation should develop between Israel and Hamas, Israel still prefers to reach a truce in Gaza and a prisoner exchange deal that will allow the return of the four Israelis held by Hamas.

Even after a military round of confrontation with Hamas, Israel and Hamas are expected to return to Egyptian mediation in order to advance a truce agreement. The Hamas leadership needs to prove it has succeeded in easing the blockade. So far it has only exacerbated the humanitarian situation. In the wake of the rocket fire, Israel has closed the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings, the fishing area has been reduced and there is no supply of fuel to the Gaza Strip. If there are no unusual developments in the next two days, things are likely to return to routine on the border. The marches of return will continue until the next military round." 

Ends…

 

TALKING ISRAEL INTO A CORNER: Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz argues that the situation with Gaza is escalating because the balance of threats contradicts the working assumption that neither Israel nor Hamas wants war.

"'If these attacks do not stop, then we will stop them. Israel will act with great force,' vowed Prime Minister Netanyahu on Wednesday, after conducting a security assessment in the South with senior defense officials. 'We have exhausted all the possibilities. We have to deal a harsh blow to Hamas,' added Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

In the film 'The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,' the character Tuco, played by Eli Wallach, famously said, 'When you have to shoot, shoot. Don't talk'. The cast and crew of the film reportedly burst out laughing at Wallach's brilliant improvised line. But Wallach later said that he thought it sounded pretty sensible; he did not mean it as a joke. That is not the case when it comes to Israel's leaders.

The working assumption that has accompanied the confrontations with Hamas and the other groups in Gaza ever since the marches of return began over six months ago is that Israel and Hamas are not interested in war. Both sides want an 'arrangement,' that is, a long-term cease-fire whose terms are known. Israel will allow the economic rehabilitation of Gaza (not just infusions of humanitarian aid) that will include the construction of a port and industrial zones in Egyptian territory. Hamas, in turn, will commit to stopping the marches and the incendiary balloons and will abandon the armed struggle against Israel.

'No side is interested in war,' said Yahiya as-Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, in an interview he gave indirectly to Yedioth Ahronoth. 'War is not good for anyone.' Sinwar's words did not seem to impress Israel's leaders much, especially given the continued demonstrations at the border fence, the balloons and the rocket launched early Wednesday morning at Be’er Sheva.

Israel has painted itself into a corner with belligerent rhetoric that aims to pass the ball into Hamas' court. If Hamas contains the demonstrations this Friday, Israel will see it as a sign of its willingness to continue advancing toward an 'arrangement.' But if the rocket fire continues and the demonstrations lead to more confrontations, it will mean that Hamas is seeking to force Israel to either yield or go to war. This is an unrealistic equation that has for weeks put only one side to the test. It does not require Israel to stop firing at demonstrators, which is itself fueling more and more demonstrations. The result is that from a situation in which both sides were conducting indirect negotiations through Egypt to finalize the details of the arrangement, they are now conducting public negotiations on drawing the line that, if crossed, will lead to war.

This balance of threats contradicts the working assumption that neither side is interested in war. In the absence of progress in negotiations, and as the prospect of Gaza's rehabilitation recedes, and after Sinwar, as he sees it, offered a hand and got a fist in return, Hamas may conclude that it can achieve more by war than it can get through ongoing, fruitless negotiations with Israel. After all, Hamas achieved the most promising rehabilitation agreement after Operation Protective Edge. Although the rehabilitation was not implemented, the agreement became the cornerstone of any cease-fire plan, short term or long term, or any other proposed arrangement that followed. Hamas explains that Israel's statements are meant to frighten Hamas and make it retreat from its demands. But Hamas may find itself in the same trap – that is, believing that Israel does not want a war – and thus believing it can push the negotiations envelope without fear.

Egyptian intelligence chief 'Abbas Kamel sees that Israel and Hamas are again putting Egypt to a test of control. Egypt, according to the agreements reached to date, is the one who is meant to guarantee Hamas' 'good' security behavior. The license to open the Strip to the rehabilitation process, subject to Hamas' behavior, is in Cairo's hands. Kamel, who was meant to visit both Israel and Ramallah on Thursday, has delayed his visit, although that decision may also change. Kamel had summed up the understandings with Hamas at the beginning of the month, when he met in Cairo with a senior Hamas delegation led by Saleh al-'Arouri. On Thursday he was meant to meet with Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas to finalize the details of cooperation between the PA and Hamas, mainly the release of funds to pay salaries and moves that will lead to the PA's return to Gaza.

'Abbas' stubborn refusal to cooperate with the Egyptian plan as long as Hamas does not relinquish control in Gaza and disarm has allowed Qatar to step in as the ATM that will finance the salaries until another solution is found. But Qatar's involvement does not make Egypt very happy, since the two countries have severed their diplomatic ties and are publicly hostile toward one another. It seems, however, that in a time of distress, and to force 'Abbas' hand after he trapped himself in a web of anger with Washington, Israel, and Egypt, Qatar is a temporary solution that even Egypt is willing to accept.

The Egyptian goal was and remains to bring about the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas in order to restore responsibility for Gaza to Palestinian hands, so that Cairo can be relieved of responsibility for securing the border with Israel. Here, too, Egypt was forced to give in, and it no longer insists on having the PA assume control of Gaza as a condition for rebuilding the Strip. This, however, is reinforcing Israel's policy of opposing internal Palestinian reconciliation in order to keep the two Palestinian territories separate and thwart any effort to establish a Palestinian state.

The verbal and military escalation makes it clear to Egypt that it may again be required to engage in achieving a cease-fire instead of promoting a long-term arrangement. This is apparently the reason for the postponement of Kamel's visit, since he would prefer that his visit yield a diplomatic result, not just temporary calm. The question now is whether there is still room for containment, with Israel prepared to 'settle' for attacking controlled targets in Gaza rather than making good on the threats of Lieberman and Netanyahu. This is no longer just a military dilemma but a political dispute in which not only Hamas is setting the tone, but also, and perhaps mainly, the right-wing parties."

Ends…

 

THERE IS A PATH FOR GAZA: Jason Greenblatt in The Jerusalem Post declares that the United States, as it has said many times, cares for the Palestinian people and wants to help, but refuses to empower a regime that launches attacks on Israeli kindergartens.

"This Administration vehemently opposes everything Hamas, a terrorist organization that targets and hides behind innocents, stands for. But, judging by Yahiya as-Sinwar's interview published on October 5, 2018, it would appear that he agrees with the Administration's position on some things: we agree that Palestinian children should have every opportunity to become doctors or pursue any other profession they choose and we agree that they should be able to see 'what the world looks like on the other side.' We share the desire to see a thriving economy in Gaza with jobs for all those who strive to work. We both understand that war will not bring a better life to Palestinians in Gaza; in fact it will create more misery, suffering, and loss for all.

We completely disagree, however, on how to bring that better life to Palestinians. Hamas chooses terrorism, rationalizing violence as a means of achieving their political objectives. But even Mr. Sinwar points out, this has no chance of succeeding. Hamas will never defeat Israel, and each rocket, flaming swastika-displaying kite, and terror tunnel brings Gaza closer to destruction, not to prosperity.

In that same vein, the old tactic of threating violence to elicit international aid has failed. The United States, as we have said many times, cares for the Palestinian people and wants to help, but we will not empower a regime that launches attacks on Israeli kindergartens. The threats and violent behavior of Hamas prevent the international community from being able to ease the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The rocket attacks from Gaza on October 17, which hit Israeli homes and closed schools in Be'er Sheva once again have set back the world's efforts to better the lives of Palestinians in Gaza.

Hamas must realize that the world has passed it by. The civilized world does not accept violence and terrorism as a legitimate form of resistance. Hamas must renounce these tactics and admit that Gaza needs help it cannot provide. It needs the Palestinian Authority (working with countries willing to help) to establish strong institutions and provide services to the populace. Gaza needs international engagement and support to keep the lights on and to bring safe drinking water, and it needs the United States to help Palestinians and Israelis find a way to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace.

If, as Mr. Sinwar says, Hamas wants Gaza to be like Singapore or Dubai, it is time for its actions to align with that goal. Hamas needs to embrace change, to embrace the values Mr. Sinwar professes to revere: Democracy, pluralism, cooperation, human rights, and freedom. These do not exist in Gaza. There is no question that violence, corruption, and suppression of freedom of speech are completely inconsistent with these values under any circumstances. These are also completely inconsistent with the peace agreement we are trying to develop. How is Hamas helping its youth realize their vast potential? Peace will give the youth an opportunity to develop their talents, which Mr. Sinwar rightly points out are stifled by the situation in Gaza.

Palestinians in Gaza have suffered growing hardship and poverty since Hamas seized power. If Hamas no longer wants to be regarded as an armed terrorist organization, we and others around the world have made it clear what Hamas' next steps must be: renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept previous agreements. Show the world Hamas actually cares for the Palestinians and allow the Palestinian Authority to return so that all Palestinians can be united under one leadership. Commit to peace and the improvement of Palestinian lives.

If Mr. Sinwar's interview was more than a marketing stunt, if Hamas genuinely wants change and peace with its neighbors, the peace plan that the Trump Administration is developing will offer a path to a change that will be the most significant gift Mr. Sinwar could ever give to his children and the children that he and Hamas claim to care for. If Mr. Sinwar's words were just a clumsy ploy to garner attention and sympathy and distract from Hamas' own failings, nothing will change. Hamas will continue to drive Gaza from one dreadful cycle to another."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 19.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Yilmaz Ozdil laments Turkey's response to the Khashoggi affair in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "They chopped up Khashoggi and turned him into casserole at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. The Saudi consul-general then freely hopped on a plane and left. We used to be the 'Khashoggi Diamond' [rare gem exhibited at Topkapi Museum in Istanbul] of diplomacy in this region. Now we have turned into a country that gets slapped in the face, has its food snatched from its mouth, where intelligence agencies run wild, and we have been transformed into a three-ring circus. We have no weight, respectability, or credibility left, and cannot intimidate anyone. Our foreign policy, which they claim the world is amazed with, and the assertion that we are a world power, has proven to be false. Unfortunately, this is what has been happening."

Ozlem Albayrak praises the government's efforts in pro-government Yeni Safak: "Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman's deeds, each of which break his own record, have always been followed by the world with astonishment, but have fallen short of causing a global reaction. This was also because unlawfulness and tyranny are part of the daily life in many Arab countries, not only because most have no democracy but also because they are ruled by autocratic regimes. However, the situation has changed because the murder was committed in Turkey, regardless of the fact that the consulate's grounds are Saudi soil. Surely the issue of presentation is also important, because Turkey's careful strategy applied in Khashoggi murder has prevented the case from turning into a Saudi – Turkey conflict, and has been addressed on the basis of human rights and freedom of expression."

Ercan Citlioglu voices similar praise in pro-government Vatan: "As understood from the stories in the local and international media, the authorities have audio recordings and other serious evidence. As we saw in similar situations, these recordings may be too sensitive to announce because of how they were obtained, but they will be used to block Saudi Arabia's exit or denial roads in this incident. What may be said at this point is that Turkish security forces and the government have been managing the current crisis in a careful and highly professional manner, despite the Saudis' total and groundless arrogance."

 

JUDICIARY/BUREAUCRACY: Faruk Cakir seeks judicial reform not new courthouses in pro-Islamic opposition Yeni Asya: "Politicians, judges, lawyers; and anyone who deals with courts is complaining about the current situation. The common demand is for the immediate improvement and correction of the justice system. Another mistake made by the government is to highlight the newly-built 'justice palaces' as an example of progress. But what would use is not 300 but 3,000 justice palaces, if the system is unjust?"

Fuat Tamer takes aim at the bureaucracy in center-right Hurriyet: "Have the things that have happened to the democracy over the past 70 years ever happened to the bureaucracy? No. We are a country that has executed a prime minister, but has anyone ever blamed the bureaucracy for failing to sign its signature, or for obstruction, in other words? Our bureaucracy is shy to say 'yes', but always very eager to say 'no'. Because if it says yes, the work begins and this requires responsibility. However, saying no carries no risk. Better to turn down the file. Rejection. That's it. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs were never discouraged: Well, bravo. They were wasted instead. So, now, I hope that the bureaucracy, not the bureaucrat, will be straightened out."

 

KURDS/LOCAL POLITICS: Kenan Kirkaya argues that there is only one way to stop the current regime from becoming permanent in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "The CHP [main opposition Republican People's party] is not the only partner in a democratic alliance with the HDP [pro-Kurdish People's Democracy party]. On the contrary, the CHP, besides its policies that pave the way for the AKP/MHP [ruling Justice and Development Party/Nationalist Movement Party] alliance, has turned HDP into the address for an extensive social alliance. Turkish society will determine whether it approves of this oppressive regime becoming a permanent one by its attitude toward the HDP. Therefore, the HDP's success will also be that of those who resent and oppose to the government."

 

Iran media watch

 

(Please note that Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Channel One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

MISSING SAUDI JOURNALIST: Iranian media continue to report on the fate of missing Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. State radio VIRI quoted Iranian Speaker's special aide on international affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as saying that the U.S. is "extorting" in the case of Khashoggi. Rolling news channel IRINN highlighted Russian President Vladimir Putin's statement that the US bears a "certain responsibility" in Khashoggi's case. French President Emmanuel Macron has said France has suspended political visits to Saudi Arabia in coordination with Germany, the UK and the Netherlands as he awaits "clarifications" on his disappearance, the TV station reported frequently in its morning news bulletins. The official IRNA news agency wrote "Trump has confirmed Khashoggi's death" after the US president said: "It certainly looks that way to me."

 

ARABA'EEN: Official accounts show that more than 1.3 million Iranians have applied for visas to attend Arba'een mourning ceremonies commemorating 40 days after the anniversary of the third Shiite Imam Hussein’s death in the battle of Karbala. Most pilgrims will footslog across the border to attend the event in Iraq at the end of this month. IRINN reported that so far visas have been issued for 800,000 Iranian applicants while 51,000 have already crossed the border on their way to Karbala. The telecom ministry has reduced mobile phone tariffs for the pilgrims to less than a third of regular roaming charges, while advising travelers to buy SIM cards from Iraqi operators instead of using their Iranian ones.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian users and human rights activists have launched a Twitter storm (14,000 Tweets in the last day) raising alarm about the deteriorating health of Farhad Meysami, a political detainee on hunger strike. Meysami is an Iranian physician and civil rights activist who was arrested two months ago for participating in a nationwide peaceful campaign against mandatory hijab. "Farhad Maysami is under torture in Tehran's notorious Evin Prison," wrote one user on Twitter in English. "Farhad Meysami's life is in danger following days of hunger strike," another one Tweeted in Persian.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 19.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Lost allies, while Moscow waits in the wings

2-Time for Trump to go

3-On the edge of a volcano

 

1-  Lost allies, while Moscow waits in the wings

 

Any positive attitude towards bin Salman at present as regards his responsibility for Khashoggi's murder would be viewed with anger. It would only give rise to rage rather than understanding. And it will only yield fury and disgust against those who take such a stance. This how we can best understand why bin Salman's most important allies [Egypt and the UAE] have refrained from contacting him. This has influenced many major international figures and institutions' decision to boycott Saudi Arabia and the international media campaign, which has gone far towards exposing him even before the final results of the investigations have been officially declared--Bashir al-Bakr on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

Russia would be the main winner from holding the Saudi Arabian authorities formally responsible for the crime. And this would be a major and shocking turnabout in regional and international policy in favor of Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. In the other and more likely scenario, Saudi security and diplomatic personnel will be held responsible for killing Khashoggi after torturing and mutilating him without the knowledge of their leadership. Alternatively, they may be held responsible for his unintended death because of the excessive violence used during his interrogation. This would constitute an acceptable way out for the Saudi authorities, which in return would offer Turkey and the U.S. vast sums and many deals, undertakings, and services, as well as a broad spectrum of diplomatic and political decisions, especially regarding regional issues that the Kingdom influences or in which it has the major say. In this second scenario Russia…would claim that the concepts of international law can be selectively changed in return for various and huge offerings from any state (Saudi Arabia in this case) --Charles Abi-Nader on Lebanese www.alahednews.com.lb

Saudi Arabia will be in a predicament and face huge economic crises in the foreseeable future. It may need to take major decisions to find a way out of these crises, or at least to mitigate their threats and losses, the most important of which will be to introduce changes in the leadership structure of the Kingdom, and bring in a new leadership that enjoys credibility and a good reputation. This leadership must be able to restore the international community's trust to its former levels, before the Yemen war and the war crimes and massacres committed there, and before all red lines were crossed by murdering Khashoggi in an ugly and bloody manner that sends shivers down the spine... One of the most important sources of Saudi power stems from its economy's strength and its alliance with the West. This power appears to have begun to erode and is now approaching rock bottom after most of the world's countries are backing the accusation that Saudi Arabia has murdered Khashoggi--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The fact that Egypt and the UAE, Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's most important allies, have not hastened to demonstrate their official support for him in the Khashoggi affair may appear to be surprising, notes a Syrian commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. But Egyptian President Sissi may view this as an opportunity to blackmail bin Salman further, while Emirati Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Zayed may be wary of attracting international anger against him if he were to express solidarity with bin Salman. Russia's influence in Saudi Arabia and the region may receive a significant boost if the Saudi authorities were to be officially held responsible for the crime, but if a way out is found for the Saudi regime, Moscow will use this to accuse the West of hypocrisy in applying the standards of international law as regards its alleged involvement in the Skripal case, argues a retired Lebanese general. Saudi Arabia's closest Western allies' boycott of the 'Davos by the Desert' conference represents a major blow to the Saudi crown-prince's economic plans, maintains the editorial on an online pan-Arab daily. Riyadh's power and standing in the world may now be at risk unless there is a change in its leadership that restores its international credibility.

 

UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT: "Almost 18 days have passed since Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance from his country's consulate in Istanbul during which Saudi Arabia has been on the receiving end of an intensive and unprecedented media and political assault," writes Bashir al-Bakr on Friday on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

Although the Kingdom's media and diplomatic agencies that should have been concerned with this issue have been totally absent, the absence of any weighty or significant positions from Cairo or Abu-Dhabi that would bolster Riyadh's position is also noteworthy, despite the fact that both capitals are Riyadh's closest allies, and all three countries are partners in addressing a number of regional files in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Middle East – from the blockade on Qatar, to the [U.S. sponsored Israeli/Palestinian] deal of the century, to hostility towards Turkey.

So, why have Egypt and the UAE not hastened to take a stance on what is happening? Why have these two countries officials' not visited Saudi Arabia, if only as a formal expression of solidarity, but have left Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman to receive the media and political blows alone throughout this time, instead? Is this the result of confusion or a misappraisal of the situation, which has led the two countries' officials to conclude that the issue will soon be shelved and will quickly disappear, thanks to Israel and the U.S.'s rush to support bin Salman?

This strange position cannot be explained on the grounds that the two countries want nothing to do with such crimes. After all, the Egyptian and Abu-Dhabi regimes are no less horrible than Saudi Arabia in dealing with their opposition. Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi is adept at killing, imprisoning, banishing, and torturing those opposed to his rule. For his part, Abu-Dhabi's Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Zayed has conducted show trials and fabricated false charges against those opposed to him. Intellectuals, writers, journalists, and preachers are incarcerated in his prisons. Moreover, he has transformed the UAE, which used to be a welcoming land of openness and safety, into a terror farm where the security forces are the only voice to be heard.

Cairo and Abu-Dhabi's positions are most likely to have different motives, and each of Sissi and bin Zayed has his own different calculations regarding what Saudi Arabia is facing.

The Egyptian president has undoubtedly taken the American response to the crime into consideration. He must have heard President Trump's loud voice as he threatened Saudi Arabia should it prove to be involved in Khashoggi's liquidation. Egypt's ruler must therefore have feared Trump anger if he were to support his ally bin Salman during his difficult times just as bin Salman has stood by him throughout these years.

Moreover, certain Egyptian elements believe that Sissi sees bin Salman's weakness as an opportunity to blackmail him further. Sissi has previously tried this sort of behavior that has yielded important results in Yemen, and as regards Iran. Saudi Arabia has continued to back him economically, even though Riyadh has failed to elicit any tangible positions from Sissi as far as its real crises are concerned, especially its involvement in Yemen.

For his part, bin Zayed's calculations stem from his special relationship with bin Salman and his sponsorship of the latter's actions throughout the past years during which he has mobilized all the UAE's resources and its significant lobby in the U.S. in order to market bin Salman in the U.S. and Israel. Bin Zayed may have sensed that this investment has delivered a negative yield, with the result that his main ally, bin Salman, now has Khashoggi's corpse wrapped around his neck and is unable to act or take the initiative in addressing a predicament from which bin Zayed cannot save him – especially after voices in Europe and the U.S. have begun to rise demanding that bin Salman should step down, or else the Kingdom and the region will be heading down a very dangerous path.

Any positive attitude towards bin Salman at present as regards his responsibility for Khashoggi's murder would be viewed with anger. It would only give rise to rage rather than understanding. And it will only yield fury and disgust against those who take such a stance. This how we can best understand why bin Salman's most important allies have refrained from contacting him.

"This has influenced many major international figures and institutions' decision to boycott Saudi Arabia and the international media campaign, which has gone far towards exposing him even before the final results of the investigations have been officially declared," concludes Bakr.

End…

 

WAIT AND SEE: "Russia is not the only country that is waiting to see how the dossier of Saudi opposition journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder or disappearance will be handled," writes Charles Abi-Nader on Friday in Istanbul on the Hezbollah-affiliated news portal www.alahednews.com.lb.

Many other countries are holding their breath, waiting for how this affair will end and who will be held responsible. The issue has captured the attention of world public opinion in an unprecedented manner, even though ongoing events, crimes, and catastrophes around the world greatly surpass what has happened in the Khashoggi case.

True, many countries are directly concerned with the issue and are working to find an appropriate way out, such as the U.S., Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, of course, as the main suspect in the crime. But even though that it has no direct influence on the issue, Russia remains the country most interested in the form and content that this escape route may take, waiting impatiently to base its policies on it.

The common factor between Khashoggi's murder and the attempted murder of former Russian and British intelligence double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter is the fact that both crimes are subject to the jurisdiction of international criminal law. In both cases, a sovereign state is accused of committing a crime against one of its citizens outside its own territories, but with the difference that the Khashoggi crime occurred inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, while Skripal and his daughter's attempted poisoning occurred in a public place in Salisbury in South England, using the mysterious Novichok nerve agent.

In the latter case, Russian agents were accused of the attempted poisoning, while Moscow strongly denied these accusations and declared its readiness to hold joint investigations with the British authorities to find out what happened. Moreover, Moscow said that the entire affair was part of a Western intelligence ploy to defame Russia. And economic, financial, and diplomatic American and Western sanctions were imposed on Russia against the background of these accusations, even though the British authorities have been unable to prove or confirm their truth so far.

All the official or semi-official Turkish revelations regarding Khashoggi's murder confirm that he was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in an ugly and savage manner by a specialized and professional Saudi security and medical team that arrived in Turkey specifically for that purpose, and that left a few hours after carrying out their crime, even though it had reserved hotel rooms for four days. But the talk now is of finding a way out for those responsible by accusing 'rogue elements' who acted on their own initiative – for what purpose it is still unclear– without referring to the Saudi leadership represented by the crown-prince or the kingdom's military or intelligence agencies.

Based on what is being reported in the media or by Turkish, Saudi, or U.S., officials, there are a number of possibilities as to how responsibility for the Khashoggi's murder will be apportioned, ranging from holding Saudi Arabia as a state (that is, Saudi authorities and officials) officially responsible for this heinous crime, to holding specific Saudi security officers or diplomats personally responsible without a decision by the Saudi authorities and at their own initiative, or by holding them responsible for an unintended murder that occurred while interrogating the victim, after severely beating him up and violently harming him.

Based on the above potential scenarios that Russia is waiting for in order to base its strategy for a new confrontation, we may conclude the following:

If Saudi Arabia were to be officially held responsible, this would have significant consequences for Saudi/U.S. relations. The Kingdom has recently threatened such consequences against the background of semi-official American leaks concerning unprecedented sanctions on the Kingdom. Should this happen, Russia will focus on these consequences and base its policies on Saudi al-Arabiya TV director Turki ad-Dakhil's semi-official statements [see Mideast Mirror 15.10.2018], the main thrust of which was that the Kingdom would resort to the Russian lap, purchase Russian weapons, establish Russian military bases on its soil, and turn to Russia politically, diplomatically, and economically.

Should that occur, Russia would be the main winner from holding the Saudi Arabian authorities formally responsible for the crime. And this would be a major and shocking turnabout in regional and international policy in favor of Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.

In the other and more likely scenario, Saudi security and diplomatic personnel will be held responsible for killing Khashoggi after torturing and mutilating him without the knowledge of their leadership. Alternatively, they may be held responsible for his unintended death because of the excessive violence used during his interrogation. This would constitute an acceptable way out for the Saudi authorities, which, in return, would offer Turkey and the U.S. vast sums and many deals, undertakings, and services, as well as a broad spectrum of diplomatic and political decisions especially regarding regional issues that the Kingdom influences or in which it has the major say.

In this second scenario Russia will focus on the following:

- It would claim that the concepts of international law can be selectively changed in return for various and huge offerings from any state (Saudi Arabia in this case). There will thus be a readymade way out to absolve the suspected state, regardless of the facts and the evidence that may be used to convict it.

- If there is tension in the relations between one state and other states – as recently between Russia and the West against the background of the accusation of committing an international crime such as Skripal and his daughter's attempted murder – and if that state (Russia in this case) is unable or refuses to offer any financial services or political or other concessions, the immediate implementation of international law becomes necessary with or without any proof or evidence, and without any possibility of self-defense. And at the very least, the weapon of economic sanctions will be used against the accused state regardless of whether its responsibility has been proven or not.

In this manner, and as part of the already open confrontation with a number of Western states led by the U.S., Russia would demonstrate that international law is futile and cannot uphold what is right. And there are many other instances to be added to the Khashoggi affair and the crude manner in which his murder would be covered up: From what happened when Iraq was falsely accused of having weapons of mass destruction, using that as a pretext to wage war and destroy it; to the unjust war on Yemen with all the massacres and crimes against humanity and against international law committed there before the very eyes of the UN, which is unable to stop them; to the war on Syria and what has been revealed about the international collusion behind it.

"And many other such wars and unfair and unjust international files may be cited in this regard," concludes Abi-Nader.

End…

 

A LETHAL BLOW: "Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's ambitions have received a strong, perhaps lethal, blow after many Western trade and economy ministers, and heads of banks and major companies, have cancelled their participation in the Future Investment Initiative – Davos in the Desert – against the background of charges that the kingdom is behind journalist Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul," writes Friday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The boycott and withdrawal of most major institutions and banks would not have occurred had the governments of countries such as France, the UK, Holland, and Germany not been convinced that there is much truth in these accusations, providing a strong basis for convicting the Kingdom and Prince Mohammad bin Salman personally – with reports that he, or his immediate circle, are responsible for planning and executing this assassination.

Saudi Arabia was pinning great hopes on this conference as a means of attracting international investments in the projects it is planning for the NEOM area on the Red Sea, as well projects in other areas as part of the 'Vision-2030' plan drafted by Prince bin Salman. The main thrust of these projects is to diversify the Kingdom's sources of income and end its reliance on oil, transforming Saudi Arabia into a major international investment base.

The Kingdom's attractive image for foreign investments was violently shaken after bin Salman arrested around 350 of the most prominent Saudi businessmen and senior princes such as al-Walid bin Talal on the pretext of fighting corruption. Then came journalist Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, which seems more akin to a knockout blow to these projects, especially since most of the ministers who have cancelled their participation represent European states that are the Kingdom's allies. This is a message that clearly says that justice and human rights take precedence over trade deals.

We believe that the boycott of this important economic investment conference is a prelude to other steps. These may be even more painful to Saudi Arabia and its economy in light of the threat of imposing economic sanctions and reactivating the [U.S.'s] JASTA act to secure compensation for the victims of the 9/11 attacks carried out by a [mostly Saudi] group of 19 al-Qa'ida members.

Saudi Arabia will be in a predicament and face huge economic crises in the foreseeable future. It may need to take major decisions to find a way out of these crises, or at least to mitigate their threats and losses, the most important of which will be to introduce changes in the leadership structure of the Kingdom, and bring in a new leadership that enjoys credibility and a good reputation. This leadership must be able to restore the international community's trust to its former levels, before the Yemen war and the war crimes and massacres committed there, and before all red lines were crossed by murdering Khashoggi in an ugly and bloody manner that sends shivers down the spine – assuming the stories about cutting up his body with an electric saw after his death are true.

"One of the most important sources of Saudi power stems from its economy's strength and its alliance with the West. This power appears to have begun to erode and is now approaching rock bottom after most of the world's countries are backing the accusation that Saudi Arabia has murdered Khashoggi," concludes the daily.

Ends...

 

2-  Time for Trump to go

 

 

The man who came up with the slogan 'Make America Great Again' has become the greatest threat to the U.S.'s standing and leadership in the world today, and it is time for the American people and their institutions to get rid of him, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

With his 'businessman' mentality in dealing with other states that are only valued depending on their ability to purchase American goods, U.S. President Trump has proven that he is not only a threat to world peace, but an even a greater threat to America's system of values and its image and standing around the world, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. It is time for the U.S. 'establishment' to get rid of him.

 

NOT STATES BUT CLIENTS: "With each passing day, the U.S. president reveals new aspects of how he views the world's states, societies, and nations," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Friday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

For him, these are not states; they are mere 'clients.' And his purchasing power and his financial statements of account, regardless of any moral, ethical, or even political considerations, determine a client's value.

Viewing the world's states as 'clients' has become the criterion for defining and redefining the camps of enemies and friends. You are good for the U.S. if you have monies that can be 'milked' and 'tapped' to create new job opportunities for the Americans. It does not matter who or what you are, and from what value-related, cultural, or human background you come from. And you are bad for the U.S., even if you share its value system and principles, or if you are one of its possible competitors in winning over these 'clients' and their monies.

This explains the man's boorish attitude towards the U.S.'s closest allies – NATO members, EU members, Canada, and Mexico – and his readiness to establish the best and closest relations with reactionary, repressive, and tyrannical states, as long as 'business' with them is possible and rewarding.

Because he made a large fortune in the 'lower worlds' of combative speculation markets, where there is no room for values and creative competition to produce and invent, the man does not lead the world's greatest superpower based on the criteria of economic competition, open world markets, and free trade. He resorts to 'bullying' and extortion instead, so as to gain customers and markets. As a result, he is subjecting more than two billion people around the world – about a third of humanity – to various regime sanctions. And he does not confine himself to deciding what American goods a client must buy; he also threatens this client with a strict sanctions regime if he were to refrain from buying these goods, or head to other sources to shop.

Trump does not care if these clients are 'sovereign states'; nor is he concerned about their political regime– even though he tends to be more enamored of dictatorial regimes and absolute rulers. He does not care about democracy and never mentions human rights. In fact, he never mentions 'human beings' at all. But, after all, the 'client' logic leaves no room for this man to value any human beings in these 'clients/states'.

When we were still young, we used to wonder when we hailed a cab: How does the driver view us, and what does he see in us who are standing by the side road? Our unrehearsed answer would flow naturally and without hesitation: For him, we are just 'ten piasters,' the fare that each passenger must pay, multiplied by our overall number. This simple theory that we came up with when we were young provides the essence of the very same 'clients/states' theory on which the intellectual, political, moral, and value system of this president and his administrations is based. Otherwise, we would not have seen him behaving before the leaders of states in the manner of marketing, public relations, and advertising companies' 'salesmen'.

Perhaps the man's most important 'tool' – in addition to his cellphone, which is dedicated to launching his endless Tweets – is the calculator. All he needs is a calculator, and no more, as long as international relations and the U.S.'s role and message in the world can be calculated on this small and handheld machine, as far as he concerned.

This man, who had come up with the slogan 'Make America Great Again,' has almost become the greatest threat to the U.S.'s standing, image, and leadership in the world. He does not confine himself to lighting fires and spreading climates of anxiety and tension on various fronts; what he is threatening the most, is his country's image and status as the leader of the free world.

Even though it is weak, today's wager remains on American society's ability to 'stand its ground and resist' and to correct the current course that is being taken, kicking out this dangerous 'Third World' administration that threatens world peace from the White House. I believe that the 'Wilsonian' spirit – whether Republican or Democrat – as well as the press, the feminist movement, the human rights organizations, and the rest of the American 'system' or 'establishment' will not allow this farce to continue for long.

"Anyway, tomorrow [the U.S. midterm elections] is around the corner and we shall see," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

3-  On the edge of a volcano

 

The West Bank may be about to explode, but there is no evident force to mobilize and direct this confrontation, says Yasser Manna' on Hamas-affiliated www.palestine-info.info

 

After a period of relative calm, the West Bank has witnessed an escalation in the number and nature of attacks by Palestinians on Israeli settlers this year, notes a pro-Hamas Palestinian commentator. This suggests that a number of factors are pushing the West Bank towards a major explosion, but there may be no organized force capable of directing it.

 

NO SECRET: "The fact that the West Bank today is on the edge of a volcano is no secret to ordinary folk and their leaders," writes Yasser Manna' on the Hamas-affiliated website www.palestine-info.info.

In other words, it is capable of exploding at any moment, whether in the immediate future or in the medium term, due to a number of domestic and foreign conditions and circumstances that have come to determine the course of life of ordinary West Bank citizens, and that may consequently drive the situation towards a new confrontation willingly or unwillingly.

It is worth noting that after a period of relative calm with a significant drop in the number of attacks, the West Bank has recently witnessed a number of fedayeen attacks that have primarily targeted settlers. And, despite the fact that these attacks have been few in number, they have been of high quality and quite painful.

In fact, the period that we are speaking of may be said to have begun with the [January 2018] Havat Gilad attack by the martyr Ahmad Jarrar early this year, leading up to the Barkan attack last week. Also noteworthy is the extent of [Palestinian] popular support for these attacks, even if it has sometimes been concealed.

It is possible to list a number of circumstances and conditions in which the ordinary citizens in the West Bank are living these days and that are significantly contributing to pushing matters towards a confrontation at great speed (even though other factors that are not mentioned here may also be viewed as reasons for lighting the fuse of a future confrontation). These include:

- Israel's right wing's policy in the West Bank that seeks to Judaize it and control it absolutely. To this end, the settlers and the army are being used in tandem. There are an increasing number of settler attacks that are assuming systematic form against the inhabitants of Palestinian villages, especially those that are isolated. One may also take note of the army's policy of collective punishment and its tightening restrictions on the Palestinians when they enter or leave their cities and villages, and when they are pursuing their daily work.

- The Palestinians citizens' frustration and loss of hope at the prospects of reaching any political solution with Israel, whether interim or final, after many long years of promises and Arab and international attempts at deluding them, especially on the part of the U.S. A conviction has taken deep root on the Palestinian street that resistance is the only option, in light of the [PA/PLO's] 'political bankruptcy' and the persistence of the detestable inter-Palestinian [Fatah/Hamas] split. And this conviction has been consolidated after Israel has been seen to be losing the deterrent power it has always boasted of in the Gaza Strip.

- The already bad economic conditions that are getting worse, along with the rise in unemployment and the trade slowdown in the Palestinian markets. This is a result of Israel's decisions, as well as Israeli pressures on the PA to cut off the salaries paid to the families of Palestinian prisoners and martyrs, and the rise in prices and taxes.

- The ebb and flow of events in the Gaza Strip and its surroundings, as well Israel's media and political incitement against the Palestinians, which is casting a long shadow over the conditions in the West Bank and that will have a greater and more wide-spread effect, especially as regards the weekly Marches of Return. As a result, Israel realizes the ease with which the confrontation may move from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, where potential flashpoints are spread across all its areas.

- Washington's current policy towards the Palestinians and their rights, especially Jerusalem and the right of return, together with its efforts that are proceeding apace to end UNRWA and thereby do away with the right of return. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the West Bank contains some 19 heavily populated refugee camps, the majority of whose inhabitants are youths. Therefore, all these U.S. steps and measures may have practical consequences that will lead to escalation on the ground.

In short, a notable tension dominates the West Bank. However, there no organized force to mobilize, motivate and recruit the masses on the ground, especially after the failure of the political peace process and the unravelling of the Palestinians' social fabric.

"Without such an organized body we will be left with a negative force that will not push towards any political and popular confrontation with Israel," concludes Manna'

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 18.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Sedat Ergin searches for a key witness in center right Hurriyet: "Whatever happened to Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, it occurred in premises that were under Saudi Consul General in Istanbul Mohammad al-Otaibi's jurisdiction. Consequently, he bears an evident and inevitable responsibility. His testimony is vital for the prosecution's office that is conducting an investigation into the truth of what happened. According to the Vienna conventions, there is no obstacle in seeking his testimony, or even his detention. But Al-Otaibi and his departure have left an inexplicable contradiction behind."

Mustafa Balbay wanders about the internal repercussions in Saudi Arabia in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "Khashoggi was among those who believed that Saudi Arabia could no longer be ruled 'like in the old times' amid the Arab Spring. He was not alone in thinking this. The kingdom has also been boiling over as reflected in the palace 'Game of Thrones'. It remains uncertain who will come to the fore in the family that rules Saudi Arabia. The talk is whether this internal boiling might turn into an internal bleeding. And between all these dilemmas, Khashoggi entered in the Istanbul consulate and could not get out."

Ihsan Caralan claims that Ankara is exploiting the murder for its own purposes in leftist opposition Evrensel: "The very choice of Turkey for Khashoggi's alleged murder has driven it into 'the category of countries eligible for foreign covert operations' and dealt a big blow to its international credibility. However, in face of such a blow, President Erdogan and his administration are talking as if this operation took place in another country, and their reluctance to blame the Saudi government is quite telling. Because now using a scandalous murder as a vehicle or even a chance to mend the relationship between two 'brotherly countries' [Turkey and US] that have had cold winds blowing between them for a long time, is on the agenda." 

Ardan Zenturk seeks to exonerate Turkey in pro-government Star: "U.S. President Trump talks about 'rogue elements' that committed the murder! However, four members of the Saudi team [that came to the consulate] are directly related to the crown prince, and a Saudi official did the dismembering. I would never wonder what U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, who casually poses with a bloodstained prince and pockets 100 million of petro-dollars for the PKK [Kurdish Worker's Party], could demand from Ankara. The important thing is for Khashoggi's blood that was spilled on him not to smear on my own country."

 

U.S./TURKISH RELATIONS: Ufuk Soylemez sees no chance of a Gulen deal in ultra-nationalist opposition Aydinlik: "Are U.S. pastor Andrew Brunson and FETO [Gulen network] leader Gulen not on the U.S. payroll? Does anyone believe that the U.S. would take Brunson and send back the FETO leader, who is also its man? This is not about a spy exchange – they are both U.S. men and its staff. When this is the situation, expecting the government, which presents such a mistake of logic as a foreign policy bargaining chip - to resolve grand economic issues would be mere daydreaming."

Mehmet Acet is unconcerned by the approaching U.S. embargo on Iran in pro-government Star: "'Turkey will be unaffected by the Iran oil embargo that will begin on November 4th. The issue of Iranian fuel concerned Turkey's Koc Group and Tupras the most, because these companies need it the most. And they have resolved the issue after talks with the U.S. If we consider this as a fact, the highly detailed 'embargo concessions' will ease Turkey's hand. Natural gas trade is already exempt, which can be listed as another comforting factor for Ankara."

 

Iran media watch

 

ABDUCTION OF IRANIAN SERVICEMEN: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has told his Pakistani counterpart to double efforts to protect the two country's shared border days after Iranian security forces were kidnapped in the Southeastern Sistan-Baluchestan Province. Anti-Islamic Republic Sunni extremist group Jaish al-Adl has claimed responsibility for the abduction on the night of 15/16 October of at least 11 members of the Basij paramilitary force and border guards from a base near the Iran-Pakistan border. In a phone conversation yesterday, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mahmood Qureshi, assured Zarif that "terrorist groups are enemies of both nations" who do not want Tehran and Islamabad to have cordial relations.

 

U.S. SANCTIONS: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qassemi described the U.S.Treasury's latest round of sanctions as "political blackmail". The U.S. Treasury announced on 16 October that it was designating Iran's Basij paramilitary force, as well as a host of other entities with ties to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Zarif condemned Washington's "addiction to sanctions" as "out of control" in a tweet yesterday. He added in another tweet that the new sanctions violate a recent ruling by the International Court of Justice, which ordered the U.S. to suspend sanctions that impact humanitarian aid. Iran's envoy to the United Nations said the United States' "unilateral sanctions" are "morally wrong" and violate basic human rights.

 

KHAMENE'I'S MEETING WITH SCHOLARS: Newspapers today highlighted Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i's meeting with "elite scholars and scientists" yesterday. In his address, he said Iran's enemies were attempting to "portray a disappointing image" of the country. Government paper Iran quoted Khamene'i with the headline “Enemies’ plan for misrepresenting Iran”. Reformist Shargh and conservative Jomhuri-ye Eslami picked out the very same quote for their own front pages. Hard-line Javan quoted the Iranian leader as saying that looking to the West for help will result in "groveling and denigration".

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranians on Twitter continue to comment on the abduction of members of the Basij force by Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), with some going as far as renaming the group Jaish al-Zolm (Army of Injustice). Relevant hashtags have been trending for days. One user said the kidnapping was a sign that "the Islamic Republic is a thorn in the side of its enemies". Elsewhere, an online campaign calling on authorities to provide immediate medical treatment to a political prisoner was started by human rights activists on Twitter. The dissident was arrested in June 2016 and has been sentenced to 15 years in prison on espionage charges. He was diagnosed with a rare form of bone cancer in August this year and is said to be in need of surgery.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 18.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Bin Salman's bitter cup

2-Gaza can't take it anymore

3-Idlib extension

4-Kuwait and Turkey sign a military cooperation agreement

 

1-  Bin Salman's bitter cup

 

There are attempts underway to 'dilute' the issue, either by forming a Saudi committee to investigate the crime, determine the identity of the persons involved, and try them on the pretext of acting without the Saudi leadership's knowledge. There are also attempts to buy President Trump's silence and satisfy his greed for money and deals. But these attempts' prospects seem dim in light of the growing number of influential parties opposed to them. After all, how does it make sense for the lead suspect in the crime to investigate who committed it? And how can this suspect's investigations be taken seriously?...The search for a new crown-prince has already begun in some Saudi circles and is beginning to be encouraged by certain Western governments, for example in Britain, France, and Germany. The object is to hit more than one bird with one stone, and to find a way out of the region's complex crises, foremost among which is the Yemen war. For if there were to be a change of leadership, this war could be ended-- 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

The Khashoggi crime and the international uproar that has accompanied it may put the brakes on bin Salman's plans to pursue activists outside Saudi Arabia. But the discourse issuing from the crown-prince's retinue and such unrestrained practices do not give the impression of forthcoming review that will produce a change in this behavior that is severely damaging Saudi Arabia's reputation and its political and economic future, even its religious status. …Even if U.S. President Donald Trump were to intervene and try to push the bitter cup away from bin Salman's lips, there are limits to his interventions. Moreover, it is no secret that part of Trump's actions aims to defend himself against the charge of being responsible for sponsoring bin Salman who has been behaving as if Trump's family has extended an umbrella over his head--Bashir al-Bakr on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

Leading U.S. congressmen, the Turkish authorities, and the U.S. media are the three main obstacles preventing the Trump administration from coming up with a coverup for Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's alleged involvement in the horrific murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. In fact, bin Salman's future is at stake, with signs that the search is already on for a replacement. The Khashoggi case and the international reactions to it raise a number of questions, the most important of which has to do with the Saudi crown-prince's responsibility for the crime and whether he will be held accountable for it, says a Syrian commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. But the kingdom's reputation has been tarnished regardless of what happens next.

 

THREE PARTIES: "Three main parties are currently confronting U.S. President Donald Trump's attempts to 'whitewash' journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder inside his country's consulate in Istanbul, and Trump's attempt to absolve Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman – Saudi Arabia's real ruler– of any blame," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

We believe that these three parties may end up having the final word in this matter:

- First, prominent members in the U.S. Congress have been acting in a focused manner with the aim of toppling Prince bin Salman, holding him responsible for this crime. Foremost among them are Republican Senator and former presidential candidate Marco Rubio and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham. This is in addition to 22 other legislators who have invoked an article in the U.S. constitution that imposes sanctions on foreign countries that violate human rights.

- Second, the Turkish authorities, who want to maintain the current media momentum regarding the Khashoggi case with continuing leaks confirming that he was killed and that his body was chopped into pieces, making sure to mention the smallest details in manner that emulates Turkey's well-known TV dramas.

- Third, the American media that have formed a single and united front opposed to the Trump administration's dealings with this issue, insisting that those implicated in this crime should be exposed and held accountable, with Prince Mohammad bin Salman at the forefront.

Senator Graham's ferocious attack on Prince bin Salman was remarkable. In an interview with Fox News, which supports President Trump and is his preferred channel, he described bin Salman as a 'wrecking ball,' frankly accusing him of giving the orders to murder Khashoggi. He added that the Saudi authorities have nothing but contempt for American 'values' and that this man – bin Salman – has to leave because he is 'toxic' and 'can never be a world leader on the world stage.'

For his part, Graham's colleague, Senator Marco Rubio, who almost beat President Trump in the Republican Party's primaries, was even more ferocious in dealing with both bin Salman and his friend Trump. He refused to give priority to arms deals over human rights, declaring: 'There isn't enough money in the world to purchase back our credibility on human rights and the way nations should conduct themselves.'

Both these senators represent the deep state in the U.S. – the wing opposed to the manner in which President Trump's administration has been managing this crisis by blackmailing the Saudi authorities and exploiting its current weakness on order to secure as large a sum of money as possible, whether in the form of investments or arms deals. And they are both receiving growing support from their colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives.

The Turkish security establishment is leaking the ugly details of the manner in which Khashoggi was executed in dribs and drabs. According to the latest details, his fingers were chopped off during his interrogation before being decapitated. The aim is to mobilize and rally world public opinion against the Saudi authorities, specifically Prince Mohammad bin Salman, inciting for removing him from power. The case is being kept alive in both the traditional and digital media so as to give the impression that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not seeking a financial deal in return for 'covering up' this case, or diverting attention away from the party that is really behind it and seeking a 'scapegoat.'

It is may be worth bearing in mind that The Washington Post, which had added Khashoggi to its list of columnists and is now adopting his cause and embracing his family, is the same newspaper that exposed the Watergate scandal that toppled U.S. president Richard Nixon. Consequently, we do not believe that it will stop in the middle of the road, especially since it is coordinating with the Turkish authorities and is the first to publish the leaks about the crime. Nor do we believe it unlikely that it is ultimately seeking Prince Mohammad bin Salman's head.

There are attempts underway to 'dilute' the issue, either by forming a Saudi committee to investigate the crime, determine the identity of the persons involved, and try them, on the pretext of acting without the Saudi leadership's knowledge. There are also attempts to buy President Trump's silence and satisfy his greed for money and deals. But these attempts' prospects seem dim in light of the growing number of influential parties opposed to them. After all, how does it make sense for the lead suspect in the crime to investigate who committed it? And how can this suspect's investigations be taken seriously?

This crime will not fade from international attention. According to the UN Charter, the General Assembly has the right to form an investigative team and a special tribunal to examine this assassination. We mention the General Assembly [rather than the Security Council] so as to avoid the possibility of the Trump administration or any other party using their veto right to block such an investigation.

The search for a new crown-prince has already begun in some Saudi circles and is beginning to be encouraged by certain Western governments, for example in Britain, France, and Germany. The object is to hit more than one bird with one stone, and to find a way out of the region's complex crises, foremost among which is the Yemen war. For if there were to be a change of leadership, this war could be ended – just as the late Egyptian president Anwar as-Sadat's assassination provided the gateway for Egypt to regain its seat at the Arab League, thereby ending the Arab boycott of it.

The London Times has begun to draw lists of candidates for the 'succession stock market.' It speaks of Prince Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the U.S., as a replacement for his brother. Certain American circles are proposing Prince Mohammad bin Nayef's return as crown-prince [after being removed in bin-Salman's favor]. And certain parties continue to nominate Prince Ahmad bin 'Abdelaziz, the founder of the Kingdom's second youngest son who currently lives in London.

The coming days will be pregnant with surprises and leaks. The clamor raised Khashoggi's assassination will not die out easily. In fact, all the 'saws' of marginalization and cover-up, no matter how sharp and modern, will be unable to kill it off.

"The coming days will show that we are right," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

MANY QUESTIONS: "Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance on October 2nd in his country's consulate in Istanbul has raised many questions," writes Bashir al-Bakr on Thursday on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

Some questions have been answered and others are still waiting for an answer and may not receive one at all, now or in the future. After all, there are other similar cases where no one knows what happened to the victims, as in the case of Saudi opposition figure Nasser as-Sa'id for example, who was kidnapped by the Saudi regime from Beirut in 1979. And there are other cases whose details were exposed only after the regime responsible for the crime was changed, as in the case of Libyan opposition figure Mansour al-Kikhia who was kidnapped from Cairo in 1993 at Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's request, who then killed him and hid all traces of him. The mystery of his kidnapping and liquidation was only solved after Qadhafi's death in 2011.

Among the most pressing questions today is whether Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman will be held officially responsible for Khashoggi's liquidation? But whether the investigations heads in this direction or not, and whether it actually succeeds in demonstrating that bin Salman played a direct role in the case or not, there is a large body of evidence leading directly to him, foremost amongst which is the decision to pursue Saudi activists outside Saudi Arabia and imprison all those who disagree with the regime inside the country. Moreover, it is no secret that envoys from the Royal Diwan have contacted activists living outside Saudi Arabia – among them 'Omar 'Abdelaziz who lives in Canada – and threatened them in the crown-prince's name.

Furthermore, if Khashoggi did not personally anger bin Salman, why did the Saudi agencies eavesdrop on his phone? Who issued the order to do so? But whatever the answer, bin Salman bears the largest responsibility for the crime. For no official can take the decision to eavesdrop on a leading journalist without the knowledge of his inner circle, led by Saud al-Qahtani and Turki Al ash-Sheikh.

Nor can any investigator fail to take the crown-prince into consideration when he finds out that one of those in charge of bin Salman's personal protection, namely, Dha'ar Ghanem al-Harbi, was among the members of the team that entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Does it make sense for this officer to volunteer to take part in such a dangerous mission at his own initiative without informing his immediate superior who must present bin Salman with a fully detailed report? And the other important question is this: Is the matter confined to Khashoggi alone, or are we dealing with a Saudi policy based on pursuing all those who disagree with the regime?

According to international human rights' organizations, the matter is not confined to Khashoggi. It has to do with all those who are active in the media and in defense of human rights. Otherwise, why was an Israeli hi-tech company used to tap 'Omar 'Abdulaziz's phone?

The Khashoggi crime and the international uproar that has accompanied it may put the brakes on bin Salman's plans to pursue activists outside Saudi Arabia. But the discourse issuing from the crown-prince's retinue and such unrestrained practices do not give the impression of forthcoming review that will produce a change in this behavior that is severely damaging Saudi Arabia's reputation and its political and economic future, even its religious status.

Another question has been raised by the Khashoggi case, having to do with the ongoing international reactions. Can these develop into a response to bin Salman, or will this crime's file be shelved?

"Even if U.S. President Donald Trump were to intervene and try to push the bitter cup away from bin Salman's lips, there are limits to his interventions. Moreover, it is no secret that part of Trump's actions aims to defend himself against the charge of being responsible for sponsoring bin Salman who has been behaving as if Trump's family has extended an umbrella over his head," concludes Bakr.

Ends…

 

2-Gaza can't take it anymore

 

The situation in Gaza is intolerable but the Marches of Return offer a logical alternative to a new war, says Nasser Nasser on today's www.palestine-info.info

 

The missile fired at Beersheba from the Gaza Strip yesterday [Wednesday] and Israel's retaliatory air raids indicate the volatility of the situation, says a Palestinian commentator. This demonstrates that the Marches of Return offer a logical alternative to an all-out confrontation that neither party wants, especially since the Palestinians in Gaza are determined to end the blockade imposed on them.

 

A MISSILE FELL: "A missile fell on Bi'r as-Sabi' [Beersheba] at 3:39 am on 17/10/2018," writes Nasser Nasser on Thursday's Hamas-affiliated website www.palestine-info.info.

Four Israelis were traumatized by fear and two were wounded while fleeing to shelters, and schools were shut throughout the city. Another missile fell in the sea near one of the cities in the country's center. Subsequent Israeli air raids on various areas all around the Gaza Strip killed one Palestinian and wounded many others.

This comes against the background of the failure to make any progress in lifting the siege and the aggression on Gaza, at a time, in fact, when pressures continue to weaken the marches protesting against this situation and ending the Marches of Return. And this is in addition to Abu Mazin's [PA President Abbas's] threats to impose more sanctions, all within the context of the Egyptian delegation's attempts to achieve tahdi'a [lull or calming down with Israel], but without producing any results worth mentioning so far.

The recent escalation primarily underlines the extent of the pressure and tension that the region is passing through. Gaza simply cannot take any more. Any party can cause an unintentional deterioration in the security conditions either by firing a missile, or by taking steps that exert further pressure on Gaza.

The fact that the resistance [Hamas] said that the Bir as-Sabi' missile was an attempt to ruin our Egyptian brothers' efforts, does not mean that the resistance is afraid of confronting the occupation and its escalatory measures. Rather, and before anything else, it means that it honors its word and appreciates the Egyptian and other mediators' efforts to find a solution for the problem posed by the suffocating siege. But all indications point to the fact that such a solution will not be achieved except after further military friction or confrontations with the occupation. In other words, the occupation is not ready or able to pay the required price and to take the correct decision by lifting the siege imposed on Gaza.

The Bir as-Sabi' missile is another signal to the occupation government – albeit unintended and not the result of a decision taken by the resistance – of how serious and ferocious the next war will be, should it break out. It is a reminder to all parties that the Marches of Return provide a logical and reasonable alternative to escalation via firing missiles and heading to a large-scale war so as to protest and break the blockade.

"For the Palestinian people in Gaza insist on breaking the siege whatever the price, even if they are forced to go to a large-scale confrontation," concludes Nasser.

Ends…

 

3-Idlib extension

 

The Syrian/Iranian/Russian deadline for Turkey in Idlib has been extended until the appropriate time for its final liberation, says Elia Mighnayer in today's Kuwaiti al-Ra'i al-'Am

 

Syria, Russia, and Iran did not object to extending the deadline offered to Turkey to secure the armed opposition groups' withdrawal from the Idlib demilitarized zone because they realize that this area represents the U.S.'s first line of defense for the areas under its control East of the Euphrates, says a Lebanese commentator in a Kuwaiti daily. But the Syrian war is almost over, the liberation of the U.S.-controlled areas will follow after Idlib's liberation, and Syria will return to the Arab League.

 

ALONG THE FRONT LINE: "The time that Russia and Iran had given Turkey to withdraw all heavy weapons and destroy or deport the jihadis present in the Northern Syrian city of Idlib has ended," writes Elia Mighnayer in Thursday's Kuwaiti daily al-Ra'i al-'Am.

The most that has happened is that Turkish forces have been deployed along the 'frontline', while the jihadis have taken up different positions amidst continuous Turkish pressures to avoid a situation whereby the Syrian army, backed by Russia, would enter the city. However, the political timeframe and the current situation on the ground allow for an extension of the deadline given Turkey to fulfill its commitments, especially since the moment is still not appropriate for heading towards an all-out battle against the Americans' first line of defense near Idlib.

But why are we speaking of an American defense line? Simply, because Syria has been fully liberated and the only remaining areas are Idlib and Hasaka Governorate (and a part of Deir az-Zour). Russia, Iran, and Damascus have decided that Idlib's liberation is the first priority, and that the turn of Hasaka, which is occupied by U.S. troops, will follow in the post-Idlib phase.

In these circumstances, the U.S. views Idlib as the first line of defense of its presence in the Syrian Northeast. Therefore, it prepared to strike at the Syrian army under the false pretext of 'using chemical weapons' so as to prevent Idlib's liberation, after which the areas occupied by Washington's troops would be next.

The timing for liberating Idlib two months ago was wrong, due to the presence of American naval forces ready to strike at Syria. The war's fuse had to be extinguished, and Turkey had to be given a chance, thereby lowering the level of Middle East tensions between the two superpowers, Russia and the U.S.

Syria's allies have built fortifications and defensive lines – first defense line in Tal al-'Iss, a second line in the Apartments 3000 area, and a third at the entrance to Aleppo – because they knew that the jihadis were preparing for a large-scale offensive with around 10,000 fighters who would advance towards Aleppo. But the Turkish/Russian/Iranian [Idlib] agreement prevented this attack from materializing.

Therefore, giving Turkey a chance and extending the period allocated to impose its control on Idlib were inevitable until the appropriate opportunity arises. Once this happens, Russia and Syria will pounce on Idlib if Turkey fails to honor its commitments and the U.S. agrees not to attack the Syrian army.

Sources close to President Bashar al-Assad say that 'Syria will recapture all the occupied territories such as Idlib and Hasaka, and will reopen the borders with Iraq after reopening the Jaber crossing and the Nasib crossing [with Jordan] in the South.'

According to these sources, 'Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari came to Syria to discuss reopening the borders between the two countries and Syria's return to the Arab League. Iraq believes that Saudi Arabia no longer objects to Syria reclaiming its seat as it did in the past, especially after the Syrian army has regained control of all Syrian territories, except for the North where the Turkish and American army are present.'

These sources add that 'Jordan will send its diplomats to Damascus to restore relations back to where they were in 2011 as agreed by the Arabs and the West, so as to ensure that Syria does not remain in Russia's hands alone, together with Iran. The parties that backed, armed, and released its jihadis from prison and sent them to Syria, are now doing a U-turn and trying to restore their diplomatic relations, one at a time. Damascus does object to this, but it has learnt the lesson and paid a heavy price because of its 'old friends' who became its enemies for seven years, and are now resuming their contacts with it.'

Senior Syrian leadership sources confirm that 'Damascus and Tehran believe that there is no longer any reason to keep large numbers of volunteers-- Afghans, Pakistanis, Iraqis, and others-- in Syria because the war's outcome is now clear. This will also reduce the financial and logistical burden on the Islamic Republic [Iran]. However, no one can ask Syria to abandon Iran or ask it to leave, because this alliance has been forged across Syrian territories throughout the seven years of war. Therefore, any talk of trading Tehran against huge sums of money, or the Golan Heights, or reconstruction, is risible, underlining the stupidity of those who say such things and who seem ignorant of the common fate and strategic alliance that links Iran (and Hezbollah) to Syria.'

So, the deadline for Turkey in Idlib has been extended until the appropriate time for its liberation. Meanwhile, the Middle East is preparing to receive Assad once more as a member of the Arab League, restoring its contacts and links with Damascus after the failure to 'topple the regime.' But the armed elements in Idlib remain unconvinced that the war is over, and that they have no future even after the little extra time they have gained. And the same goes for Hasaka's Kurds who have yet to learn that the U.S. will not stay there, that the Abu-Kamal crossing between Iraq and Syria will be reopened, and that the only solution is for them to return to the embrace of a single and united [Syrian] state.

"For no other solution is possible for Bilad ash-Sham," concludes Mighnayer.

Ends…

 

4-Kuwait and Turkey sign a military cooperation agreement

 

Kuwait is trying to merge Turkey into its package of preventive strategic measures in light of the growing Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi threats, says Mhanna al-Hobail in today's Qatari al-Watan

 

The military cooperation agreement signed between Kuwait and Turkey should be seen in the context of a number of threats to Kuwait from Iran, Iraq, and most recently Saudi Arabia, maintains a Qatari commentator. Kuwait is trying to diversify its alliances so as to ensure that the Gulf's currently turbulent conditions will not seriously harm it.

 

STREGTHENING RELATIONS WITH THE GULF COAST: "On October 10th, the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff signed a defense cooperation agreement with the Turkish armed forces," writes Mhanna al-Hobail in Thursday's Qatari daily al-Watan.

The agreement will further strengthen Ankara's strategic relations with the Arab Gulf's coast after the Turkish military base in Qatar. The decision to establish this base and implement the defense agreement between Qatar and Turkey played an important role in preventing the [Saudi/Emirati] Gulf axis's threats to invade Qatar militarily.

The Kuwaiti announcement may not reflect both sides' assessments for determining the extent of the Turkish military presence that has yet to be specified. Nonetheless, Kuwait is definitely trying to merge Turkey into its package of preventive strategic measures, in light of the Iranian and Iraqi threats to it, that were followed by a sharp Saudi position and a direct media campaign of threats due to its neutrality in the Gulf [Qatar] crisis and its refusal to join in the blockade imposed on the people of Qatar.

Turkish/Kuwaiti relations have gradually expanded, especially in light of the personal relationship between Turkish President Erdogan and Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad. Although this is a personal relationship, it is also the result of a realization on the part of the leader [Kuwaiti emir] commonly described as 'the sheikh of Gulf and Arab diplomacy' that Turkey today plays a very important balancing role that cannot be fulfilled by any other party, while keeping Kuwait's existing military agreements with Washington and Europe in place.

The other issue has to do with the Arab Gulf coast's countries' growing conviction that regional developments remain tense, especially as regards the Saudi dossier and the area's future strategic stability. Meanwhile, neither Kuwait nor any other party has succeeded in finding a formula to convince Riyadh to alter its course in the Gulf crisis, even though developments after the martyr Jamal Khashoggi's case could create an important breakthrough that will serve the region's peoples and reduce the current intense estrangement.

But the concern here is not only about tension with Riyadh; it is also fear of the Arab Gulf's exposure should the Saudi regime partially or totally collapse, leaving the coastal states that are ancient sheikhdoms, to confront this collapse alone with the cover provided by the former British mandate. For with the exception of Oman, these states have no national base that provides a balance and secures them in the face of sudden Gulf developments, whether in the Saudi east and North, or the tense Iraqi South.

Here, Turkish role is a balancing factor, especially after it has benefited from recent developments, and now that it is mending its relations with Berlin and the rest of Europe, as well as with Washington, and especially in the aftermath of Jamal Khashoggi's liquidation. This is all reassuring for Kuwait, which has been careful to neutralize the Saudi position and to forestall its ferocious hostility before ratifying the agreement with Ankara.

With Trump's recent escalation and his turning against the Saudis – even if he sealed this with a new set of bills to be paid to the U.S by Riyadh– dark clouds are gathering over the region as a result of the recent Saudi serious mistakes. These mistakes have enabled international scheme to take control of the main levers of Saudi national security and its security files via Abu-Dhabi. And the Gulf crisis has provided this scheme with a vast store of documents to use against Riyadh via the Saudi archives that the West has been monitoring closely.

In this context, Kuwait is carefully considering what may happen after these disturbances. With the Russians' rapid advance towards the Arab Gulf, the region needs a basket of balancing factors that each state will have to implement during the transitional phase, and that will help to save them from falling or being caught up in various instabilities. For the Kuwaiti and Bahraini emirates are both facing difficult times; but Kuwait has not allowed its future and fate to be left hostage to the Gulf crisis, as Manama has done.

Moreover, Turkey's presence represents a dual balancing act against Iran, on the one hand, and Britain's old and historic presence in the region, on the other. This does not mean that Kuwait has to sever its special relations with Britain; but it is trying not to be dependent on a purely Western protective net. This is why it has brought Turkey into the picture, over and above its strategic partnership with the U.S.'s broad presence in the region.

For their part, the Turks are practical, and realize that the Arab Gulf's coastal states will not pull out of their agreements with the West, and that they view their partnership with Turkey's armed forces for protection as a new element to be added to these agreements especially since Turkey's departure from NATO is not unlikely. Moreover, the leaf has been turned on the recent Turkish/American tension over the detention of the American pastor [Andrew Brunson] in Turkey and Trump's expressions of gratitude to President Erdogan.

These all point to a settlement that may consolidate Washington's return to Turkey after Ankara has lent too far in the direction of Moscow's Eurasian project in an effort to secure its interests independently of Washington's seasonal mood swings. At the same time, Turkey is observing Europe and Washington's concerns about its relations with Russia and is telling them: You have the chance to mend our relationship that you have destroyed.

This imparts another reassuring dimension to the Kuwaiti/Turkish military cooperation agreement, since Kuwait views Ankara's balanced relations with Moscow and NATO as a source of strength for its new national security project. It sends a message to its threatening surroundings that Kuwait has brought many strings together in weaving its strategic defensive basket.

"This is what Kuwait is trying to do, until the great Gulf autumn winds pass and people find themselves located on new maps," concludes Hobail.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 18.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Gaza games

 

After thousands of residents spent the night in bomb shelters, the IDF announced Thursday morning that it was removing restrictions put in place on Gaza border communities a day earlier amid a surge in violence from the Strip. The decision came after a tense but quiet night in the South, after rocket fire from Gaza overnight Tuesday/Wednesday and Israeli retaliatory strikes raised the possibility of a large-scale military conflict. Following the IDF announcement, the Sha'ar Henegev Regional Council sent a message to residents saying that, "After a short but tense wait, we are happy to let you know that following an operational assessment by the army, it has been decided on a full return to normalcy." The council also said that "school lessons and all other educational frameworks will be running as usual." The Southern city of Beersheba, where the rocket landed the night before, also announced that schools would be reopening.

Hours earlier, top political leaders and army brass finished a meeting of the high-level security cabinet after five and a half hours of talks on how to deal with the Gaza tensions. Prime Minister Netanyahu convened the security cabinet on Wednesday evening and it went on until 2.30 am Thursday morning. 'Abbas Kamel, head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Services, had cancelled a trip to Gaza, the West Bank and Israel set for Thursday amid the tensions. It remains unclear whether the cancellation was meant to send a message to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or is due to Kamel's schedule, as he is accompanying President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi in his official visit to Russia. IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who cut short a trip to the United States due to the fresh violence in Gaza, went directly to the security cabinet session after landing in Israel, Hadashot TV news reported.

As the security cabinet convened, Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi, the head of the Israel Defense Forces Southern Command, warned Hamas that Israel will "know how to respond more forcefully to situations in the future." Hamas on its part warned Israel that any strike overnight by Israel in the Strip would trigger "an immediate and decisive response." A Grad rocket destroyed a home in Beersheba and another rocket landed in the sea next to the central city of Bat Yam. On the front page of the pro-government daily Israel Hayom, the paper's senior analyst Yoav Limor proclaimed the direct hit on the home in Beersheba is "a reality-altering event", and that Israel must treat it as if it had killed all the residents of the house. The heroism of the mother who managed to save herself and her three sleeping children was given wide coverage in Israeli media. The manager of the Trauma and Resiliency Center NATAL, told The Jerusalem Post that on days like these she sees a 100% increase in calls, coming in not just from the South, but from all over the country. "It is reactivating symptoms in people who remember what happened in previous incidents like this," she said. "The memories are coming back, even if you sat in a shelter in Tel Aviv in Operation Protective Edge in 2014." She explained that the recent incidents trigger anxiety in people all over the country "because we are a nation in trauma." Twenty percent of Israelis suffer from post-trauma symptoms and are at high risk of developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) if they do not get help, according to a new study by NATAL. 

In the West Bank, the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor has issued a warning that if Israel goes ahead and destroys a Palestinian Bedouin village; it could constitute a war crime. The Supreme Court recently rejected a final appeal against plans to demolish the village, Khan al-Ahmar. In a statement, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said "evacuation by force now appears imminent." Bensouda added that the "extensive destruction of property without military necessity and population transfers in an occupied territory constitute war crimes" under the Rome Statute treaty that established the ICC. Israel says Khan al-Ahmar was built illegally and has offered to resettle its residents a few miles away.

Amid a nadir in U.S.-Palestinian relations, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas met Wednesday with the leadership of the liberal U.S. Mideast policy group J Street at his headquarters in Ramallah and thanked the group for its lobbying efforts in support of the peace process, The Times of Israel reports. 'Abbas welcomed the delegation; led by J Street Executive Director Jeremy Ben Ami, expressing his "appreciation for their efforts to support the peace process within American society," according to a readout of the meeting published by the official PA news site Wafa. 'Abbas noted the group's involvement in signing 112 Democratic representatives of the House of Representatives and 34 senators to a letter sent to the White House calling to reverse the decision to "end vital United States contributions to the United National Relief [and] Works Agency (UNRWA)." 'Abbas told the group that despite the tense relations with Washington, "We distinguish between America and the current American administration that has brought the peace process to a dead end."

In news of the Netanyahu probes, Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit on Wednesday warned that attempts to discredit him and top prosecutors would increase as a decision on whether to indict Prime Minister Netanyahu in a series of corruption probes inches closer. While indicating such a decision was near, Mandelblit would not say when it would be made or when investigators would wrap up their work. "But I do know that the efforts to delegitimize the work of the State Attorney's Office and my own as the head of the prosecution will only intensify" as a decision approaches, he said. Mandelblit also rejected allegations of bias among prosecutors leveled by political allies of Netanyahu. "Last week the claim was heard that 'in certain respects' the Justice Ministry is 'Sodom' and on another occasion it was claimed that the State Attorney's Office allegedly has a political bias and even chases after the prime minister," he said, referring in the former instance to remarks by coalition chairman David Amsalem, a member of Netanyahu's Likud party. Mandelblit said such comments were "unacceptable" and aimed at pressuring prosecutors from issuing an indictment. He likened them to "parallel efforts that request a decision to prosecute at any cost, even before the investigations are finished and regardless of their results." Mandelblit's handling of the investigations has come under withering criticism from both sides of the political aisle. Supporters of the prime minister on the right claim they are an undemocratic effort to topple him, while critics on the left accuse Mandelblit of slow-walking the investigations, noting he was appointed to his post by Netanyahu and previously served as his cabinet secretary. Mandelblit has pushed back on the criticism and also decried attacks on the media and law enforcement amid denunciations of those institutions by the prime minister and his associates.

In other news, Australia's spy agency warned that Prime Minister Morrison's proposal to relocate its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem may "provoke protest, unrest and possibly some violence in Gaza and the West Bank," according to Guardian Australia. The warning came in light of Prime Minister John Morrison's announcement the day before about a shift in his Middle East policy, and his decision to relocate Australia's embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Morrison also said that he is considering withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal.

Finally, with global life expectancy on the rise, Israelis in the year 2040 are projected to live among the longest, on average, on the planet, according to statistics released Wednesday. At an expected 84.4, Israelis will be ranked seventh in the world in longevity, moving up from their current 13th place spot (82.1). Meanwhile life expectancy for Palestinians is expected to drop the most out of any country in the next twenty-two years, sinking from 114th in 2016 (with 71.9) to 152nd place (with 72.2) in 2040. With a projected average lifespan of nearly 85.8 years, Spain — formerly in 4th place — will dethrone Japan, which sits atop the rankings today with a lifespan of 83.7 years but will drop to 2nd place in 2040. After Spain and Japan, the countries with the greatest longevity in 2040 are projected to be Singapore (85.4 years), Switzerland (85.2 years), Portugal and Italy (84.5 years), Israel (84.4 years), France (84.2 years), Australia and Luxembourg (84.1 years).

 

 

AN IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO DRAG ISRAEL TO WAR: Assaf Golan in Israel Hayom avows that after Hamas renounced the long-range rocket fire, security experts claim Iran is behind the firing, and that Israel would make a grave mistake if it allows itself to be dragged into the Iranian trap.

"Two long-range rockets were fired Wednesday from Gaza into Israel. The first hit a residential building in Be'er Sheva, the second was launched at the sea, near the shores of Gush Dan. In response, the IDF attacked terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip. Hamas and Islamic Jihad disclaim responsibility for the shooting.

According to Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of the NSC, 'There is only one party that wants us to be at war in Gaza - the Iranians. Therefore we must ask which of their proxies in the Strip has long-range rockets and act against them'. Amidror adds that in his opinion, 'Israel will make a grave mistake, if it allows itself to get dragged into the Iranian trap and operates in the Strip. This situation will only play into Iran's hands and benefit no one else.'

Palestinian expert Yoni Ben Menachem, of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, states that the rocket fire is Hamas' doing and has a political message to Egypt and Israel. 'There is no other organization in the Gaza Strip that would dare to fire two long-range rockets deep into Israeli territory. This is no longer a matter of firing at the Gaza envelope, but of firing at Beersheba and the center of Israel.' Ben-Menachem describes what would have happened if the two rockets had caused casualties. 'It would have led to war. No rogue organization would do anything without a green light from Hamas, and therefore the shooting today is the direct responsibility of Hamas, because it is the sovereign in Gaza together with Islamic Jihad,' he says. 'Hamas continues to claim that the rockets were launched by rogue organizations in order to reject the accusations against it. But this is a lie, and unfortunately the Israeli defense establishment accepts this lie.'

Why is Hamas taking this action at the current timing? Anyone who describes the relationship between Hamas and Egypt as close should be cautious, because Hamas is not happy with the way Egyptian intelligence is conducting the negotiations on a truce with Israel', adds Ben Menachem. 'There is actually a double message here from Hamas - it is signaling to Egypt that it is dissatisfied with the manner in which the negotiations are being conducted, while at the same time sending a message to Israel, which is threatening to retaliate with a severe blow against the organization, and saying – if you dare strike against us, we will strike the Israeli home front with all our might. Hamas has control over the Strip up to the last balloon and kite, even when they claim – it is not us, it is them. Israeli intelligence did not asses the organization correctly and did not prepare for rocket fire deep into Israeli territory. Hamas cannot be trusted, and therefore we have to be prepared for all possibilities', Ben Menachem concludes.

Dr. Yehuda Balanga, a lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern History at Bar-Ilan University and an expert on Syria and Egypt, believes that there are other elements in the Gaza Strip who are exploiting Israel's and Egypt's efforts to achieve a lull in order to heat things up on the ground and embarrass Hamas.

'Although Hamas is the sovereign in the Gaza Strip; on the ground there are more extremist forces, which Hamas is trying to restrain, but these organizations have their own agenda. They view every attack on Israel as a great victory. It is clear to them that against the background of the tension in the North and an election year, Israel will not launch a counter-operation at this point. These extremist elements consider every missile fired from Gaza to be an achievement, because it does not endanger them, Israel will not act to destroy the Hamas regime, nor to liquidate their organizations, so as far as they are concerned they are the great winners.'

'These are elements who have their own independent agenda and their goal is also to embarrass Hamas', explains Dr. Balanga. 'The head of Egyptian intelligence is on his way to Gaza to again attempt to bring about a truce with Israel, and for them this is just the right time to act,' explains Dr. Balanga. 'It is clear to everyone that ultimately, after all the attempts to postpone the inevitable, Israel will enter Gaza for another operation,' adds Balanga. 'In such a situation, these extremists have nothing to lose, because Israel will not topple Hamas, and the distress of the residents of the Gaza Strip also works in their favor. These organizations feel they score a victory in any scenario - they will survive, get backing from the public in Gaza, and will be received as victors. That is the real reason they are firing'."

Ends…

 

THE EGYPTIAN MEDIATING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HAMAS: Assaf Gabor in Makor Rishon affirms that the head of Egyptian intelligence, 'Abbas Kamel, is trying to get the credit for bringing about the end of the war of attrition in the South. Will his military background, connections with the security apparatuses, and close relations with president Sissi help him live up to the task?

"The escalation in the South has crossed new red lines. The firing towards Beersheba has once again thwarted the arrangement Israel is trying to achieve. Hamas and Islamic Jihad's joint operations team denied any involvement in the rocket fire and said they opposed it, calling it 'irresponsible fire aimed at sabotaging Egypt's efforts to reach a truce and lift the siege'.

The Egyptian intelligence delegation, headed by the Palestinian portfolio holder in Egyptian intelligence, is still in the Gaza Strip, and according to Palestinian reports, it is trying to prevent a renewed escalation of the situation. Egypt is the main party working for a lull between Israel and Hamas. The person carrying this burden is 'Abbas Kamel, head of Egyptian intelligence. Kamel's visit to Israel was scheduled before the firing of the rockets, and was supposed to focus on the situation in Gaza, but on Wednesday afternoon it was reported that he had decided to postpone it.

'Abbas Kamel, 61, started his army career in tanks, but as he progressed up the chain of command turned his attentions to intelligence. He served as president Sissi's chief of staff when the latter served as the commander of Egyptian field intelligence, and continued as director-general of his ministry when Sissi was appointed minster of defense in 2012. His name was first mentioned in the media by Sissi in a newspaper interview he gave in 2013, about the riots organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. Information about the man, as well as pictures of him, are extremely rare. Kamel is Sissi's close associate and confidant. His proximity to the president has given him nicknames such as 'the presidential fox' and 'the shadow of the president'. Many consider him to be the number two man in Egypt.

One of the great secrets that 'Abbas Kamel was privy to was Sissi's intention to oust Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi in 2014. Kamel even ran Sissi's election campaign after the coup, and served as director-general of the president's office following his election. He conducted the investigation against Morsi and senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In January, after Sissi was elected to a second term as president, 'Abbas Kamel was appointed Head of intelligence.

The talks between the Egyptians and the various Palestinian factions have been going on for more than six months. So far, they have failed to reach reconciliation between the factions. In the background, the deep rift between the Egyptian president and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas resonates. The arrangement efforts between Hamas and Israel were progressing. Even before the holidays there was talk of a written agreement that was waiting to be signed. But the dynamic situation has again put escalation as one of the options on the table.

'Abbas Kamel's intelligence background, ties with the security apparatuses, and proximity to the Egyptian president, give him all the credentials he needs to end the war of attrition Hamas is waging against Israel. The big questions are what levers he has against the Gazan terror organization, and whether he will succeed in achieving what no one has succeeded in achieving thus far."

Ends…

 

THE WORLD WILL NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA: Shmuel Rosner in Maariv argues that whoever breaks Hamas' rule will have to designate its replacement. Anyone who thinks the next ruler of the Strip will be the PA will have to explain in what way things will be different this time.

"The problem of Gaza goes beyond the borders of Israel and Egypt; it reflects international developments in which Israel has only limited influence, the moods in the capitals of the world, and the cumulative experience of global players. The problem began long ago, but the root of the current difficulty in dealing with it can be sought in the previous decade, in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is the decade that decided, at least for a while, the cost and benefit of 'Nation Building'.

Gaza needs rehabilitation. In order for it to ever become a tolerable neighbor; reasonable living conditions must be provided for its residents. It needs a stable government capable of providing security and order. Gaza is unable to implement the rehabilitation process on its own. Its inhabitants are weak and subjected to tyrannical rule. The Hamas regime itself has an interest in maintaining a climate of unrest, and little interest in the welfare of the residents. It is concerned with matters it deems more significant. Potential candidates to replace Hamas - like Abu Mazin and his colleagues - are unwilling to pay the necessary price of a difficult and bloody internal war, in which victory is far from guaranteed.

The only candidates to extricate Gaza from its current state are foreign players. But foreign players have learned an important lesson in the last decade: Nation building is a complicated endeavor. It is expensive, it is bloody, it is protracted, it is complex, and often - perhaps usually - it fails. Iraq has calmed down since the difficult war days of the previous decade, but has not become a Western paradise as the planers of that war had hoped. Afghanistan is still a remote and wild hell hole. Billions were poured into its deep crevices; the rows of tombs lengthened, public debates flared, neighboring countries meddled, each in its own interest. Nations were not built. Those who thought - and there were indeed some - that it is possible to do in the Middle East what was done after World War II in Japan and Germany – were undoubtedly proven wrong. It cannot be done.

Israel learned this lesson earlier when it tried to engineer Lebanon in the 1980s, and when it tried to engineer a Palestinian leadership in the 1990s. She too failed. Lebanon did not become a prosperous country and a convenient neighbor after the first Lebanon war. The Palestinian Authority did not cure the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1990s. It turns out that there are things that nations must do themselves. Until the Lebanese do what is necessary - and there is no sign that this is about to happen, neither tomorrow nor the day after - their state will be a mosaic of rival tribes in conflict. Until the Palestinians accept and divert their resources to another goal - not to war against Israel, but to building institutions and a routine life for the Palestinians – the places in which they live will continue to lurch between great misery and medium-sized misery.

There is no one to take responsibility for Gaza, because the world has learned the lesson of responsibility. Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed this well when he used the phrase 'you broke it – it is yours' talking of Iraq. Whoever breaks the Hamas regime, will have to supply an answer to the question of what will replace it. Those who believe that what will replace it is the PA will have to explain how this time will be different than the previous time when the PA got the opportunity to rule Gaza. Those who think that Israel should take responsibility for the rehabilitation of Gaza, will have to explain why Israel will succeed where it failed in the distant past, and where the great and powerful America failed in the recent past.

Rehabilitation of Gaza is a nice idea, very humane, very empathetic. It would be good for Israel if Gaza were rehabilitated. It would be good for the miserable Gazans if Gaza were rehabilitated. Only one question remains: Who is willing to take responsibility for Gaza? Who is ready to return to the failed strategy of Nation building? America? Not a chance. Egypt? Too smart. The rest of the world? Definitely - it will come as soon as it finishes rebuilding Afghanistan, so have a little patience."

Ends…

 

THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING NEIGHBOURHOODS IN GAZA: Alex Fishman in Yedioth Ahronoth writes that Israel has no intention of embarking on an all-out war to occupy the Strip. Its only current option is measured strikes that will not damage its future freedom of action regarding Egypt, the PA and Hamas.

"The army is not crazy about going crazy. As far as the IDF is concerned, there are different kinds of blows. The defense minister is talking about a crushing blow - once and for all. For three days now he has been explaining that there is no other way to convey a true message to Hamas; that it must be a dramatic action that will leave its mark on Gaza for a long time to come. Both the defense minister and the chief of staff are referring to a barrage of fire on the ground - but mostly from the air. A ground operation in Gaza involves recruiting reserve forces, preparing and deploying them - and none of this is taking place. If Israel indeed wants to punish Hamas with a heavy barrage of fire without entering Gaza on the ground, it must hurry. Every day that passes invites more and more international pressure for restoring calm.

Yesterday the cabinet convened for another meeting, on the eve of making an important security decision that could turn the situation around by 180 degrees. The chief of staff cut short his visit to the United States and arrived especially for the meeting. Such meetings usually end on a high and heroic note, with decisive declarations and threats of war. But the actions on the ground, at least for the time being, are more moderate and may result in a feeble response. The latest crisis in the Gaza Strip revolves around electricity. Hamas thought it was about to receive funds from Qatar which would allow it to operate the power plant eight hours a day, but as soon as the tankers began to enter Gaza, it became clear to Hamas that the amount of fuel did not meet its expectations. As far as Hamas was concerned, it had been fooled again. And suddenly, without prior warning, two rockets were fired at Beersheba and the center of the country in the early hours of the morning.

Why did Iron Dome batteries not respond to the shooting? It is clear that there was no advance warning before the shooting and that there is apparently no hermetic system of Iron Dome batteries. This is accompanied by another disturbing question that arose a few days ago when an Iron Dome battery suddenly opened fire aimlessly. These random incidents raise a suspicion. Perhaps Hamas has some skill, or someone has found a loophole that harms Iron Dome's capabilities?

There is a possibility that some insight has led Hamas or Jihad to conclude that there is no choice but to break the rules of the game with Israel, in order to break the deadlock. But that does not explain why sporadic fire was launched at Israel, instead of a heavy barrage. It is more plausible that behind the shooting stood some element in Hamas, Jihad, or in other organizations, which is trying - on orders from Iran - to reignite Gaza. Another IDF strike, on one scale or another, will not dramatically change the situation, unless Israel decides that this strike will have significant implications for the Hamas regime this time.

The learned discussion in the cabinet yesterday will likely give rise to the formula: A measured strike, which will instill the feeling that Israel is regaining its deterrent capability, without compromising its future freedom of action regarding Egypt, the PA and Hamas. But the destruction of neighborhoods in Gaza - under which Hamas tunnels are dug - will only hit back Israel like a boomerang, unless it is part of a comprehensive war to conquer the Strip. That is not currently being discussed.

The only ground option, under current conditions, is likely a land grab of a specific area - for example, on the perimeter fence - while avoiding a large operation. But as always, the cabinet also has the further option of ordering the army and the Shin Bet security service to commence assassinating the Hamas leadership."

Ends…

 

WHY ISN'T LIEBERMAN TALKING ABOUT VICTORY OVER HAMAS?: Tovah Lazaroff in The Jerusalem Post maintains that both Israel and Hamas wanted quiet, they simply couldn't agree on the terms for such a cessation of hostilities, settling instead for a series of minimal understandings.

"Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman sounds strong when he talks about a Gaza 'military operation' and dealing Hamas 'the harshest of blows.' His words stoke the fantasy that Hamas violence, such as rockets and incendiary devices, would disappear if only the IDF would unleash its full military powers.

The Palestinian launch of two powerful rockets Wednesday morning – one that hit a home in the Southern city of Beersheba and one that landed near the coast in the center of the country – almost seemed to be a way of egging Lieberman on. MK Michael Oren (Kulanu), Israel's former ambassador to the United States, quickly noted that Hamas was exploiting Israel's unwillingness for a full-out war, the kind that leads to victory.

Lieberman has not even used the word, nor has he even made reference to a cease-fire, let alone peace. His best assessment of an outcome from a military operation was four to five years of quiet, not even a decade. Lieberman's war-hawk talk has not included a strategy of how to end the threat from Hamas, but rather an assessment of the quagmire regarding Israel's policy toward Hamas and Gaza in general. It's a quagmire fed by the perceived existential threats attached to the most basic of conditions for any form of a cease-fire. It is for this reason that the guns of the last war fell silent without any formal cease-fire agreement.

Both Israel and Hamas wanted quiet, they simply couldn't agree on the terms for such a cessation of hostilities, settling instead for a series of minimal understandings. The IDF is likely strong enough to defeat Hamas and if necessary reoccupy the Gaza Strip, which was under its military control from 1967 to 2005. But Israel is not willing to pay the heavy diplomatic price such a step would cost, or the domestic price of the resulting loss of Israeli soldiers' lives. Nor can it risk meeting Hamas's most basic demand – that it rescind all its border restrictions – including the naval and air blockades that were imposed in order to halt the free flow of arms into Gaza.

The military blockade pre-dates Hamas's rule of Gaza, which began in 2007 when it ousted Fatah in a bloody coup. Israel holds that this blockade is more vital now than ever, in order to prevent Iran from gaining the same military foothold on the Southern borders that it holds near Israel's Northern border. Hamas in turn has no desire to sign its own death warrant by agreeing to Israel's demand that it demilitarize the Gaza Strip. The terrorist group's military wing, with its rockets and infiltration tunnels, remains the only form of an army that the Palestinians have.

Israel had hoped that the economic sanctions it has imposed on Gaza for the last 11 years would help lead to its domestic demise. Instead, those restrictions, plus Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas's stricter economic measures, have led to a Hamas-led popular, low level violent uprising along Israel's borders for the last half-year, with no end in sight. Efforts by Egyptian General Intelligence Services chief 'Abbas Kamel to restore calm have intensified this week.

The security cabinet, which already met Sunday regarding Gaza, was expected to meet again on Wednesday. Opinions there are harshly divided, between a limited military response, such as Lieberman is advocating, and another round of sanctions and appeasements, such as has been done in the past. What the ministers are unlikely to green-light is a plan – any kind of a plan – that will lead to full victory or defeat, thereby ensuring for now that the Gaza conflict will remain an endlessly repeating Groundhog Day."

Ends…

 

SPEAKING AGAINST THE OCCUPATION: Hagai El-Ad, executive director of B'Tselem, the Israeli information center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, argues in The Times of Israel that control of the West Bank is an international matter not an internal Israeli affair.

"An Israeli government drunk on power believes it can do as it pleases. Domestically, political opposition is practically non-existent. The politicians who are supposed to be an alternative to the government are either vigorously arguing that they are practically joined at the hip with the occupation regime and therefore deserving of Israeli voters' trust and support, or else they are busy mounting assaults against government policy from further to the right, seeking even greater oppression of the Palestinians.

Meanwhile, in the international arena, we find a reckless American presidency and see powers ranging from proto-fascist (Hungary and Poland) to out-and-out neo-Nazi (Austria, Germany) gaining in strength or even becoming the ruling parties. The present Israeli government does not balk at granting legitimacy to these regimes and parties. In exchange, it gets their support to block any international action against the ongoing occupation.

Given this state of affairs, it is understandable that the Israeli government threw a temper tantrum when they discovered that, lo and behold, even with Trump and Orbán, the AfD (Alternative for Germany party) and the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria); and even despite the feebleness of Israeli 'opposition' party leaders Avi Gabbay, Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid, there is still opposition to the occupation, both in Israel and internationally. Confound it all! Just when we thought we had been left alone to do as we please with the Palestinians – to dispossess and destroy, to arrest and to kill – without hearing a peep out of anyone.

True, this resistance is nowhere near strong enough to play a significant role in the decision-making process of Israeli voters or policy-makers. Nonetheless, it is alive and kicking. And now is a good opportunity to remind us all of some basic facts: Israel's control over the Palestinians is, without question, an international matter. Firstly, because human rights issues are always a universal matter, not the domestic concern of the country perpetrating the violation. Second, because the occupation is not an internal Israeli matter, and it is not up to Israelis whether or not to carry on with it. The occupation is in effect in an area beyond Israel's sovereign borders, and applies to another people, one whose daughters and sons are the ones being denied civil and political rights.

Israel is a party to a host of international agreements that afford it considerable financial benefits, with the EU-Israel Association Agreement just one example of many. These treaties and ties with Western countries are supposed to be predicated on shared values of human rights and democracy. Yet these values are completely at odds with Israel's decades-long control over millions of subjects bereft of political rights: Subjects for whom Israel makes all the decisions, even pulling the very ground out from under their feet by continually carrying out acts of dispossession, demolition, and thwarting development. Israel's actions mean it is ripping apart the fabric of the international agreements to which it is a party, undercutting their legitimacy and very foundation.

My duty to speak about the occupation in international settings is therefore crystal clear. That is why I accepted an invitation to address the UN Security Council. Israel trusts that the Likud party will continue to drive Mideast policy in American politics, and that the U.S. will continue to veto Council resolutions condemning the occupation. Israel is also banking on the continued rise of nationalist forces in Europe and the United States, trusting in a future in which we will share new 'common values,' of nationalism, tyranny of the majority, and the silencing of local opposition.

But what if the current winds shift? Does Israel truly aspire to be identified – along with the likes of Saudi Arabia – with the Trump administration? This cynical and short-sighted conduct is first and foremost an insult to Jewish history and human morality. Israelis willing to bind up their future with that of Donald Trump and Steve Bannon ought perhaps to ask themselves how they feel about a party such as the AfD, against whom a quarter of a million Germans marched this week in Berlin. They marched because they believe in the very same humanist values that we at B'Tselem seek to promote.

For all of these reasons, there has been, there is, and there will be a reason for me to speak against the occupation before the UN Security Council. Danny Danon, Israel's ambassador to the UN, is horrified by the idea that I might speak in New York about the Palestinian community of Khan al-Ahmar. He is right, on two counts: One, I will be talking about what is happening there, and two, it is certainly a cause for horror, not because I will be speaking about it, but because of what Israel plans to do there. 'The matter has already been decided by the High Court!' Danon loudly protests. But the High Court has green-lighted nearly every single violation of Palestinians' rights. This time was no different. The Court hastened to provide a legal stamp of approval to the outrageous planning policy that Israel devised for itself and its settlers decades ago: A planning reality that precludes any 'legal' Palestinian construction. This is merely legal formalism in the service of the occupation. Any person with an ounce of decency must oppose this crime.

We must oppose the occupation. We must do so in Khan al-Ahmar, and also in New York. And that is precisely what B'Tselem has been doing, is doing and will continue to do, until the occupation ends."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 17.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Is Sinwar the ultimate winner?

 

A rocket launched from Gaza hit a house in the Southern Israeli city of Be'er Sheva early morning today, Wednesday, damaging it heavily. Another rocket landed in the sea near one of the major cities in Israel's largest metropolitan area. The Israel Air Force struck targets in the Gaza Strip in response, with the Gaza Health Ministry reporting that three people were moderately wounded by a strike in Rafah. The military said it was investigating why the Iron Dome missile defense system was not activated. Hours later, rocket sirens sounded in Southern Israeli communities near the Gaza border. The military said it struck a group that was attempting to fire a rocket at Israel and that the sirens were activated during the incident. Gaza's Health Ministry reported shortly later that a 25-year-old man was killed and three were wounded in an airstrike on Beit Lahya.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad released a joint statement after the flare-up began, distancing themselves from the rocket launches. "We welcome the Egyptian effort to fulfill the Palestinian people's demand to lift the siege, and reject irresponsible attempts meant to incite and sabotage that effort," the statement said. The Palestinian factions, it added, "will always be ready to deal with Israeli aggression". IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot cut short his visit to the United States following the escalation on the Southern border and a planned security cabinet meeting was canceled. Prime Minister Netanyahu is preparing to call a meeting to assess the situation with Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, the IDF's deputy chief of staff, the head of the national Security Council, the chief of the Shin Bet and other senior defense officials. Lieberman ordered the closure of the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings into Gaza and a reduction in the permitted fishing zone off the coast of the enclave. 

A delegation of senior Egyptian intelligence officials arrived in the Gaza Strip on Tuesday for a series of meetings with Hamas leaders to discuss efforts to clinch deals for Palestinian reconciliation and a long-term understanding with Israel. Sources in Gaza told Haaretz that the talks are part of final efforts to head off an escalation in the region following months of clashes between Gazans and Israeli forces along the border. According to sources in Gaza, the delegation headed by the intelligence officer tasked with Palestinian issues met with Hamas Politburo chief Isma'il Haniyeh and with Yahiya as-Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza. A source told Haaretz that Tuesday's meetings constituted preparations for the planned visit by Egyptian intelligence chief 'Abbas Kamel to Gaza on Thursday. Kamel is also expected to visit Ramallah for a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas. A Hamas source told Haaretz that Hamas and Israel are not interested in a confrontation despite combative statements from both sides, and that there is an attempt to advance a plan to provide aid to Gaza without an official announcement. This would be reflected in a flow of money and goods from Israel and Egypt into Gaza to promote projects that will provide jobs in exchange for a gradual de-escalation of tensions without an explicit announcement by Hamas and without formally severing the Palestinian Authority from this plan.

Meanwhile, The General Assembly on Tuesday voted by an overwhelming majority to temporarily grant the "State of Palestine" additional rights and privileges, allowing it to head the biggest bloc of developing countries at the United Nations. 146 states voted in favor, while only three countries – the U.S., Israel and Australia – opposed the resolution. Fifteen countries abstained. U.S. ambassador Nikki Haley branded the move "a mistake." Palestine's delegates will be able to co-sponsor proposals and amendments, make statements, and raise procedural motions. They will have these extra rights for the duration of Palestine's chairmanship of the Group of 77, the largest bloc of developing nations at the UN. The Palestinians will assume the bloc's presidency on January 1, 2019, and hold it for one year. Israel's Deputy Ambassador to the UN Noa Furman said the resolution "clearly weakens and undermines the UN." Despite the claim that it is technical in nature, the document gives the Palestinian rights beyond what is necessary to preside over the G77, she charged, accusing Ramallah of a "pattern of manipulative behavior."

The Times of Israel reports that U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman met on Tuesday with a group of Israeli and Palestinian business leaders to discuss the joint economic ventures they are working to launch in the West Bank, saying people on the ground are ready to cooperate despite the differences between political leaders. The closed-door meeting took place in the settlement of Ariel and was organized by the Judea and Samaria Chamber of Commerce and Industry, an NGO that promotes Israeli-Palestinian commercial partnerships beyond the Green Line. Critics said this was another instance of Friedman breaking with U.S. policy and supporting Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Friedman used the sit-down to take a shot at the Palestinian Authority, tweeting afterward that the businessmen he met with are "ready, willing and able to advance joint opportunity & peaceful coexistence. People want peace and we are ready to help! Is the Palestinian leadership listening?"

IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot met with his counterparts from several Arab countries while in Washington for the Counter–Violent Extremist Organizations conference for military commanders, Israeli media reported Tuesday evening. According to a report by Israel's KAN public television, Eisenkot met with Saudi Arabia's Chief of Staff Gen. Fayyad bin Hamed Al-Ruwaili on Tuesday on the sidelines of the conference about several regional issues, including Iran. A statement released by the IDF had said that Eisenkot would meet with military officials from both the U.S. and other foreign military officials; it did not specify which military leaders he would meet. While this seems to be the first publicized meeting between Eisenkot and al-Ruwaili, it is the second consecutive year that the two officers attended the Counter–Violent Extremist Organizations conference for military commanders, where the two are believed to have also spoken about Iran. Last November a spokesperson for Yemeni rebels accused Israel of taking part in the Saudi Arabia led-coalition against Yemen and warned that Israeli military bases in Africa are within range of Houthi missiles. In September the Emirati news website al-Khaleej reported that Saudi Arabia had purchased Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system to defend itself from Houthi missile attacks. The deal, which was reportedly mediated by the United States, included further plans to reach an agreement on broad military cooperation between the two countries. Israel's Ministry of Defense and Rafael which manufactures the system denied the report.

In news of the Alqasem affair, the Supreme Court is set to rule on Wednesday on the request by Lara Alqasem, the American student who has been detained at Ben-Gurion Airport for over two weeks because she allegedly supports boycotting Israel, to hear an appeal against her deportation. Alqasem's attorney asked the Justices to consider the entry visa originally issued to Alqasem, and said that the reasoning for barring her from entering the country does not meet the criteria set by the Strategic Affairs Ministry, which state that current "leading activists" working in a "consistent and continuous" manner can be denied entry. A representative for Hebrew University, which has joined Alqasem's appeal, told the court that any law limiting freedom of expression must be interpreted in a limited manner. "We chose to join the appeal because of the importance we place on taking in foreign students and researchers," she said. "We are not afraid of Lara Alqasem. Her right to change her mind and to be exposed to life here must be respected." The university had stated that she was not a pro-boycott activist and asked in what way refusing entry to her fulfilled the purpose of the law. 

In economic news, Israel ranks first in the world for its attitude toward entrepreneurial risk and for the growth of innovative companies, and second, after the U.S., in venture capital availability, according to the latest Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Wednesday. The so-called Startup Nation's R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP is also the highest in the world, and the nation is third, out of 140 countries ranked, in the number of companies that embrace disruptive ideas. The country's weakest points in the new report were the incidents of terrorism, putting it at 117 out of 140; the ease of hiring foreign labor at 125; and imports as a percentage of GDP, in which Israel was ranked 109 globally, the report showed. Overall, Israel ranked 20th out of the 140 countries listed in the latest competitiveness report. Israel led the Middle East and North Africa ranking, and "the country has grown to become one of the world's innovation hubs thanks to a very strong innovation ecosystem (10th best in the world)," the report said.

The number of Chinese tourists entering Israel is beginning to recover after a steep decline earlier this year, based on the latest figures from Israel’s Ministry of Tourism. Some 8,400 Chinese tourists traveled to Israel last month, compared to 9,200 in September of last year. From January through September of this year, 73,900 tourists from China visited Israel – an eight percent decrease over the same period last year, but a 38% rise over 2016. Overall, Chinese travel to the Holy Land has more than doubled since 2015, with some 114,000 people from the Asian country visiting Israel last year. However, in the beginning of 2018 the number of Chinese travelers dropped sharply when the Chinese government issued a travel advisory following the United States' announcement that it would relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem last December. The Tourism Ministry also attributed the slight decrease to the ongoing unrest along the Gaza-Israel border. The Tourism Ministry expects this trend to reverse by the end of the year, thanks to new direct flight routes between Israel and China, as well as an Israeli government marketing initiative targeting Chinese travelers.

Finally, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is generally a model of self-control and campaign discipline and who never loses his composure even during the stormiest Knesset debates, lost it yesterday in the worst possible place for him – in the "periphery," which he thinks belongs to him and his party. He lost it in a city that's more Likud than Likud, and in front of a sworn supporter, according to Yossi Verter in Haaretz. "One moment of carelessness, arrogance and recklessness became a political fire that ignited the social networks. Less than 24 hours after a pretty successful day in the Knesset, Netanyahu kicked over the pail twice; once at the event in Kiryat Shmona, and afterward, when he failed to douse the fire he'd lit by attacking social activist Orna Peretz, 'A Likudnik from birth,' in her words, after she heckled him at a ceremony marking the opening of a 24-hour regional medical service. 'You're boring… you simply don't interest us,' he said to her, mockingly, when she complained at the lack of an emergency room in the city. It was an aggressive, sarcastic retort that was taken well by his supporters and by almost anyone except the Kiryat Shmona resident who was complaining about an ongoing failure that threatens her health and that of other residents. There are those who will see Netanyahu's verbal assault on the woman as a possible crack in his emotional strength, perhaps as a result of the police investigations. He preferred to attribute it to his deep sorrow over the death the previous night of his lawyer, Jacob Weinroth, from cancer." Verter wrote.

 

 

NETANYAHU'S HUBRIS: Ben Caspit in Maariv asserts that the speech Netanyahu delivered in the North showed again that the PM has gotten used to getting away with neglecting the lower classes and treating them with contempt. Still, at the moment of truth they will vote for him, because "the Arabs are on the fences".

"He let it slip yesterday in Kiryat Shmona. This usually happens to him in front of a home audience, in situations of euphoria or exaltation, like the infamous whisper in Rabbi Kadouri's ear ('the leftists, they have forgotten what it means to be Jews'), or the flak jacket he took off at an election rally ('are everyone here Likudniks'?).

What should be of concern to him, more than this unnecessary slip of the tongue, is the behavior behind it. An efficient Prime Minister's Office would have identified the imbroglio in real time and immediately launched a supertanker to put out the fire. A real apology, for example. But Netanyahu's office has long since been divested of reliable people, most of them were carried away by the wind, or the police, and yesterday it seemed that Binyamin Netanyahu was being ill advised by Yair Netanyahu. People who worked with Bibi for years testify that there is no one more disciplined than him. He is an exemplary campaigner, will not budge a millimeter from the planned line, will not deviate an inch from the message points, and will avoid any kind of adventures or personal ventures.

Yesterday we saw the hubris show. Netanyahu is no longer afraid of anyone or anything. His Highness is immortal. As Donald Trump once said, 'Even if I go down on Fifth Avenue and shoot people, they will still vote for me,' so goes Netanyahu. He has become accustomed to the fact that he can abandon the weakest sectors, treat them with scorn, not take them into account, and still they will come out to vote in real time because 'the Arabs are on the fences'.

Even when he finally published a stuttering apology regarding Orna Peretz, a Likudnik from Kiryat Shmona, there was nothing apologetic about it. He explained that he was distraught following the death of his attorney Jacob Weinroth, and it was already tweeted yesterday that Weinroth's greatness as a lawyer was proved again. He is the first lawyer to rescue his client even after his death.

After leaving the Likud angrily (because of Netanyahu), Moshe Kahlon told his associates about his experience with the Ethiopians. He was welfare minister and the country was flooded with protest demonstrations by the Ethiopian community. In the end, the prime minister and welfare minister met with members of the community and its leaders in a conference in Kiryat Malachi. Netanyahu sat on stage, Kahlon sat with the Ethiopians in the audience. Netanyahu made promises, at one point the signal was given and one of the activists stood up and read a thank you speech, full of praise, in honor of the prime minister (the television crew and Netanyahu's photographer filmed it), and the ceremony ended. On the way back they travelled together. Kahlon spoke with emotion, beseeching Netanyahu to help the Ethiopians, who 'are being treated worse than our parents were when they came over from North Africa', and noted that he already has a special program to help the community. Netanyahu smiled and said that there is no need. We have already taken pictures, Moshe.

He actually had an excellent speech in the Knesset on Monday. Classic Netanyahu. He is also quite right about the great decade that Israel has undergone, most of it under his leadership. He is less right about those responsible for all this goodness. He has a share in these successes, but does not own them. Besides, since he usually lays failures on others doorsteps, he should also be generous with successes. The problem with Netanyahu is that ultimately, in the rare moments of truth and authenticity, the Bibi will always get away from him and jump out, into public space. Usually, an apology will follow. Yesterday, even that did not happen."

Ends…

 

HOW TO ESCAPE THE PALESTINIAN CATCH-22: Amos Yadlin in Yedioth Ahronoth stresses that recent events are once again proving Israel must formulate a way of separating from the Palestinians. He suggests a new national strategy that will secure a democracy and a Jewish majority, without delusions regarding a Palestinian partner.

"Last weekend's events made it clear that we are closer to escalation than to regulation in Gaza. Murderous terror attacks are taking place in the West Bank as well, and an escalation is expected there too. The security establishment is committed to providing the best response to the security challenges, but the political echelon is obligated to challenge itself and to examine how to implement a long-term policy regarding the Palestinians.

It turns out, again, that the way in which both the left and the right address the conflict does not correspond with reality, and that Israel must formulate a path for itself that will lead us to separate from the Palestinians. The reality we live in proves that the Greater Land of Israel cannot be preserved, that it is impossible to achieve a 'complete peace,' and that a second disengagement must be avoided. However, the Israeli government is adopting a policy that preserves the current situation, leading to the erosion of security and to a potential for escalation, as we see now, and in the future will not allow the preservation of the vision of a safe and just Jewish-democratic state.

What is to be done? We must cease treading water through a new national strategy that will ensure a democratic state with a solid Jewish majority, without delusions about a Palestinian partner. We must extricate ourselves from the absurd situation through a policy that does not offer two states now, but at the same time prevents the formation of one state tomorrow. We must create in Judea and Samaria a reality that does not repeat the mistakes of the disengagement, does not revert to the Green Line, does not tear people apart by evacuating settlements, and does not send the Palestinians into a humanitarian crisis, while at the same time marking the future border of Israel and keeping security in our hands.

A comprehensive study conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies in the past two years has led to the formulation of a realistic and creative political plan that achieves all of these goals. At its core is the national goal of ensuring the existence of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure and just state. Realization of the goal will be made possible through the immediate and decisive blocking of the slippery slope towards a one-state reality, which will not be Zionist, but without endangering our security.

The six main steps proposed by the outline are: First, Israel will restate its readiness to sign a comprehensive peace agreement, if and when the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people's right to a state, agree to end the conflict without a right of return and accept Israel's security requirements. Second, the area of Judea and Samaria will be redistributed by creating a contiguous Palestinian space (which will cover 65% of the area) and three Israeli zones: the zone of the settlements blocs which are designated to be part of Israel in times of peace as well, a security zone in the Jordan Valley and the zone of isolated settlements. Third, settlement activity East of the security fence will be frozen, and construction will continue in settlements situated to the West of it. Fourth, the IDF's full military and intelligence freedom of action will be maintained throughout Judea and Samaria. Fifth, the security fence will be completed, so that Israel and the large settlement blocs will be better protected from Palestinian terror. Sixth, a comprehensive and ambitious economic plan for developing Palestinian territories will be launched, with Arab and international funding.

We Israelis are so innovative, sophisticated, and creative, but from the political point of view - in recent decades we have not been innovative, nor sophisticated or creative. Israel is stronger than ever. Many of the threats of the past have been weakened or suspended. It is precisely for this reason that we must not sit idly by, and we must use our strength today to ensure our tomorrow. We must take our fate into our own hands and secure the future of the Jewish national home."

Ends…

 

YADLIN'S PLAN EXPESSES MORE DESPAIR THAN HOPE: Shalom Yerushalmi in Makor Rishon argues that the heads of the INSS blame the Palestinians, but have no grievances against Israel. The political solution they propose seems to have a very low rate of feasibility.

"For two years, the heads of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) toiled on a new political plan. The best minds, generals in the army, researchers and retired politicians, headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin, the former head of Military Intelligence, tried to solve the conundrum. The result is a minimalist plan, based on unilateral action, which seems difficult to implement. It expresses despair much more than hope.

Yadlin and his friends have despaired of the Palestinians and claim that in the current situation, peace cannot be achieved. The Geneva Initiative launched in 2003 will not be accepted by any Palestinian today, especially Hamas, which does not even recognize Oslo. Yadlin claims that Hamas is stronger than Abu Mazin, even in the West Bank.

The logic behind the new plan is to prevent the Palestinians from controlling the political process and determining our fate. For this reason, Yadlin seeks to execute immediate Israeli moves and to establish facts on the ground: To complete the security fence, to increase construction in the settlement blocs while freezing construction in the settlements beyond the blocs. He proposes flooding the Palestinians with economic benefits, industrial zones, and road infrastructure and interchanges that will create territorial contiguity devoid of road blocks. The question of whether it is worth investing billions in a country that Yadlin claims will eventually fall into the hands of Hamas remains open. What is clear is that he does not want to see Gaza II there.

Yadlin assumes that his program is probably identical to the 'Deal of the Century' being hashed out by U.S. President Trump. This is a revelation, if we are to take seriously a person who is considered one of the best intelligence professionals we have ever had.

Yadlin and his colleagues in the INSS blame the Palestinians, but they have no complaints against Israel, which for decades has been flooding the ground with settlements, and did not really want to make peace, withdraw from the territories and grant the Palestinians a state. Minister Gila Gamliel recently allocated NIS1.5 million solely for the documentation and praise of the settlements ethos. Yadlin claims that evacuating 100-150 thousand settlers living outside the blocs is still possible. I think this is a sham, because there is no one who is willing or able to evacuate Kiryat Arba, Beit-El, Shilo, Emmanuel, and Ofra.

The former head of Military Intelligence believes that Netanyahu will adopt his plan, dismantle the partnership with the Jewish home and win public confidence before the elections in order to preserve the Jewish state. Netanyahu, however, will not make any political move now, particularly against right-wing allies, and will not abandon Likud or Kahlon and the ultra-Orthodox. Moreover, he has no special ideological reason. Just like them, Netanyahu does not want to freeze settlements. He wants to occupy.

Yadlin argues that he wants to create in Israel a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just state. 'We will do our part, and if the Palestinians want, they can always participate in the process and accept a state, but time will work against them.' And what would this country look like? What will be its capital, if and when they capitulate? This week I heard Yadlin repeat President Clinton's statement, 'Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem will remain Jewish, and Arab will remain Arab.' I think this is absolute nonsense. For what is Ras el-Amud (Maale Zeitim), or Silwan (City of David) or Sheikh-Jarrah (Shimon Hatzadik) – Jewish, Arab, or inexorably mixed neighborhoods?

And exactly where will the international border, which will divide the two countries, be marked in Jerusalem? This is simply not viable, neither in the territories nor in Jerusalem. We are entangled in each other's throats. AB Yehoshua has already understood this. So has Eitan Cabel. So will Yadlin."

Ends…

 

THE ATTRITION IN GAZA CAN BE WON: Hanan Shay in Israel Hayom argues Israel must embark on two operations – a quick and temporary ground invasion of Gaza to destroy Hamas capabilities and assassinate its leadership; and a moral endeavor to recalibrate the conscience of Israel's democratic friends.

"The IDF was designed and built to wage short and 'cheap' decisive campaigns. From their very inception they were forced to also wage long wars of attrition. The IDF stopped these wars at the right timing, by defeating the enemy and destroying its fighting capabilities, in order to achieve lulls that would last as long as possible.

Such lulls were achieved following the Sinai Campaign (1956), which ended the Fedayeen War of Attrition; following Operation Peace for the Galilee (1982), with the Katyushas war of attrition against the North; and following Operation Defensive Shield (2002), which ended the second intifada. Today, too, Israel is waging a war of attrition, this time against Hamas in Gaza. However, this war of attrition has become the longest in the history of Israel, due to Israel's delay in ending it through a decisive operation.

The reason for the delay is Hamas' military deployment, which poses a threat to Israel. This deployment includes a continuum of fortified ground systems that include tunnels and booby-traps, constructed in the heart of dense civilian areas. In addition, they are equipped with a variety of weapons against the Israeli home front, and weapons for heavy erosion of the IDF ground forces if they try to occupy the Gaza Strip.

The deployment of Hamas has 'skewered' Israel, as defined by the military theorist Liddell Hart, on the antlers of three very difficult dilemmas: The continuous and prolonged erosion of its forces if they are used to stop the exhaustion of its citizens; prolonged attrition of its citizens if it avoids the erosion of its soldiers in order to conquer the Gaza Strip (this is the current reality); or, alternatively, the prevention of high erosion of its soldiers and prolonged attrition of its citizens, through the rapid and massive destruction from afar of the enemy's arsenals, its equipment and its operators. The third alternative involves extensive harm to civilians who serve as 'human shields' for Hamas, and as a result may harm Israel's international standing.

The residents of Gaza have become Hamas' powerful weapon, exploited to create a balance of terror, equivalent to a nuclear balance of terror between superpowers. This balance has neutralized the strength of the IDF – one of the most advanced armies in the world – and forced Israel into a brutal war of attrition that cannot be stopped at a reasonable price, as was the case in past wars of attrition.

Israel cannot live with the strategic impotence imposed on it by a transient terror organization, while waiting for a major terror attack that would justify embarking on a large operation and causing extensive damage to civilian population. Hamas is apparently refraining from providing this justification. We must not hide the fact that the decisiveness and deterrence that Israel is unable to impose on Hamas, it has succeeded in imposing on itself.

Israel's strength has not been neutralized by military, political or economic means, but through the cynical and manipulative use of moral rules that prohibit harming civilians. But Israel can mobilize in its favor the moral value system that has been exploited to its detriment, in order to free itself from the predicament that forces it into paralysis, destruction and despair. The key lies in the moral discussion of the question of 'whose life takes precedence?' And in the decisive answer to this question – 'your life!' The answer is based on the commandments 'choose life' and 'the life of your brother is with you'; all the more so when the one living with you and making the lives of your citizens hell is your enemy.

Freed from the catch-22 it got entangled in and with universal morality on its side, Israel must say in a loud and clear voice that the lives of Israelis come before the lives of their enemies. Israel must embark on two operations. The first, a military operation: It must include a rapid and temporary ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, along paths pre-cleared of enemy fire, in order to prevent the loss of IDF fighters, while avoiding unnecessary harm to civilians and their property. The goal should be the destruction of firing capabilities against Israel and the assassination of the wayward Hamas leadership. The second operation will be cultural and moral: its goal should be to recalibrate the conscience of Israel's democratic friends with the moral and universal 'Northern star', whose values can and must guide the whole world in its action against terrorism that is devoid of conscience and morality."

Ends…

 

THE THREE MEN KEEPING PEACE IN GAZA: Anshel Pfeffer in Haaretz argues Netanyahu, 'Abbas, and Sinwar are incapable of agreeing on a long-term ceasefire. They will do their utmost to prevent war in Gaza, but will not try that hard to end the suffering either.

"Nothing seems to be working in Gaza. The weekly clashes on the border are now daily, the flaming balloons continue to float over toward Israel, Gaza's economic and humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate and even tiny chinks of light, such as the supply of diesel fuel, paid for by the Qatari regime, were cut off by Israel in retaliation over the attempts to break through the border fence. 

On Tuesday, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned that Israel would launch a military blow 'even at a price of moving to a wide-scale confrontation,' and that in his opinion 'we must land a strong blow against Hamas. That is the only way to lower the level of violence to zero or close to zero.' But it is empty talk. On the ground there are no preparations for such an offensive. 

The three men who hold Gaza's situation in their hands, Binyamin Netanyahu, Mahmoud 'Abbas, and Yahiya as-Sinwar are incapable of agreeing on a long-term ceasefire, which will include an easing of the Israeli-Egyptian closure imposed on the Strip. But they do not want an escalation either. Each in his own way, is making sure not to reach breaking point. 

Sinwar, the first person to combine leadership of both the military and political wings of Hamas in Gaza, embarked recently on a charm offensive, saying in an interview for an Israeli newspaper (his people tried rather ineffectually to deny later on that he knew his words were destined for Yedioth Ahronoth): 'A new war is in no one's interest, certainly not our interest. Who really wants to confront a nuclear superpower with four slingshots? War does not achieve anything.' No one is under any illusions that Sinwar is a reborn Zionist. But those in the Israeli military establishment who have been following him closely for years were not surprised. 

Sinwar is not wedded to the policies of his colleagues who led Hamas in Gaza while he was serving four life sentences for murdering Palestinians accused of 'collaboration' with Israel. His calculation is that nothing of any real use was achieved by the rounds of warfare since Hamas' bloody Gaza coup in 2006. And as Israel continues to destroy the attack tunnels dug by Hamas under the border, he is shedding no tears. He was not in the leadership when the decision was made to invest valuable resources and the lives of hundreds of diggers.

His burning ambition is not to be only a guerrilla leader, but a statesman – which is why he seriously tried to pursue reconciliation with Fatah and is now serious about a truce with Israel. He has not repudiated violence. To keep up the heat, he has no problem in continuing to fling thousands of protesters at the border fence, no matter how many are wounded and killed by Israeli sniper fire. But he knows he can gain more now by seeking a deal than by ratcheting up violence and launching rockets against Israel. 

There is a deep disagreement within the Israeli intelligence community, including among those who met with Sinwar during his 22-year-long incarceration, regarding the degree to which he is capable of reining in his own militancy, and that of Hamas' members, in pursuit of broader goals. Is he really capable of reaching a long-term ceasefire with Israel? Or is he simply playing for time before the next round of warfare? No one has any illusions about Sinwar. He is a very ruthless pragmatist, but there is a growing assessment that Sinwar sees himself not only as a commander of Hamas and ruler of Gaza, but believes he can rival Fatah's historical dominance of the Palestinian nationalist movement. He is planning to emerge from the lengthy succession fight that is about to engulf Palestinian politics the ultimate winner. 

The man Sinwar hopes to succeed, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, is at his weakest point. The Trump administration's decisions to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, end funding of UNRWA and other aid programs for the Palestinians and to close down the PLO representation office in Washington, have forced him to cut off any dialogue with the U.S. Meanwhile, the aging Palestinian leader is constantly being marginalized by the Arab regimes, including Egypt, the Saudis, and the Qataris, from their negotiations with Israel and even Hamas. But he still holds two assets – the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatus. No one else wants to take responsibility for the three million Palestinians living in the West Bank and through this power base, 'Abbas' Palestinian Authority, as weak as it may be, will continue to exert influence as co-guarantor, together with Israel, of security and as a conduit of most funds to Gaza. 'Abbas cannot end the security coordination with Israel – without it he loses the remains of his political influence and risks Hamas regaining a foothold in the West Bank. 

Cutting Gaza's budget, while still transferring most of it; trying to disrupt any Gaza deal that bypasses his administration, and continuing the security coordination with Israel – these are 'Abbas' ways of trying to remain relevant while not allowing the situation to spiral out of hand and thus lose his own rule over the Palestinian Authority. The sanctions against Gaza are deeply unpopular among the Palestinian public, and not just among Hamas supporters, but 'Abbas can get away with it. He is unlikely to ever have to run for re-election. Thanks to the security coordination with Israel, his rule over the Palestinian areas of control in the West Bank is undisputed and he can prolong Gaza's suffering without allowing it to boil over completely. 

The third leader holding Gaza's fate is Netanyahu. For him this currently is a lose-lose situation. A long-term ceasefire agreement with Hamas will cost him on the right, as the deal will not include in its first stage a return to Israel of the civilians held in Gaza and the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and there will be ample space for his rival, Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett, to attack him for going soft. No deal means a continuation of the low-level skirmishing on the border and accusations that under his government, Israel's 'deterrence has eroded.' Both harm him politically, and he is undecided which is worse. But the third alternative, a new all-out campaign against Gaza, is even less palatable. For all his criticism of the 2005 Disengagement Plan, he has no interest in reoccupying the Strip and knows full well that nothing less can eliminate Hamas' arsenal in Gaza. Netanyahu's calculations are complicated by this being election season. A casualty-heavy Gaza offensive will disrupt his plans to present to the voters a flourishing and secure Israel under his leadership. 

Despite his image and rhetoric, Netanyahu is a realist when it comes to using military power, and anyway he does not trust the Israel Defense Forces to end another major conflict in Gaza with the kind of result that would thrill his base. His personal inclination is not to launch wide-scale operations and his political calculation is that it will not help him at the polls anyway. Together with Sinwar and 'Abbas, he will do his utmost to prevent war in Gaza, but will not try that hard to end the suffering of civilians there. At least not quite yet."

Ends…

 

RHETORIC COULD LEAD TO ESCALATION: Ron Ben-Yishai on Ynet states that Israel must remain wary lest its conflict management be interpreted by Hamas as weakness, but a rational analysis of the current situation demonstrates it is far superior to a bloody, protracted IDF operation in the Strip. However, Israeli politicians are reluctant to admit this.

"The heads of the defense establishment and the Security Cabinet have reached the conclusion that the clashes with Hamas on the Gaza border in their current format are the preferable option to all of the other military actions Israel and the IDF can take in the strip. This position – recommended by the IDF, the Shin Bet and the National Security Council – was adopted by the Cabinet.

This is why despite the fact that Hamas is constantly escalating the provocations on the border and continues digging tunnels, the decision has been made on several different occasions recently to avoid military moves that 'exact a price,' which the IDF has already planned and is ready to carry out. The same decision was made in the Cabinet meeting on Sunday.

Except that the current Israeli government, mostly due to political considerations relating to elections that are likely to come sooner than later, does not dare unhesitatingly tell the Israeli public that this is its position, and so has condemned itself to frustrating restraint. Instead, every time that Hamas goes too far in its provocations, Netanyahu and Lieberman both put on a show of anger, saying their patience has expired – or is about to expire – while at the same time they qualify their statements, adding that they are giving Hamas 'one last chance.'

Unlike them, another Cabinet minister, Naftali Bennett, truly means what he says when he demands to pulverize the Gazans from the air; but during Cabinet discussions, after he hears the heads of the defense establishment, he too is a lot less combative than during his public mud-slinging with Lieberman. The problem is that this pre-elections belligerent rhetoric which is all too common in the Israeli political arena nowadays, could lead us to an unnecessary escalation that would extract a much heavier, bloodier price than we are currently paying for the clashes on the border.

Even the most militant politician understands that a situation in which the Palestinians have over 200 dead and thousands of wounded as a result of the clashes on the border, while Israel has one soldier dead and another wounded, is better than a situation in which a ground military operation in the strip will lead to dozens of casualties on our side, with the Southern and central parts of the country running to shelter every few hours for weeks on end. Furthermore, the IDF is currently stopping the clashes on the border with a small team of snipers, a number of combat battalions and a small number of tanks and drones, at a cost that is not unusual and more typical of routine security operations.

On the other hand, every military move – even if it lasts for less than 50 days (like Operation Protective Edge) will require the IDF to recruit reservists, open up the war reserves store units, and chip away at stockpiles of weapons and spare parts, among other things. All of this would cost billions of shekels. Apart from that, in the current situation the construction work to establish an obstacle on the Gaza border continues undisturbed and it is likely that when the obstacle is ready in about six months, it will provide a better solution to the terror tunnels problem. A military operation would disrupt the schedule of this important strategic-defensive component.

In addition, we have not yet mentioned the possibility of violent unrest in the West Bank in response to the cries that would undoubtedly come out of the Gaza Strip. We also have to consider the possibility that the Iranians, Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime will try to take advantage of the fact the IDF is busy in Gaza to further boost their strength or even to mount an attack on the Lebanon-Syria front.

On the international level, too, Israel will have to contend with a number of difficult legal, media and diplomatic challenges if it embarks on a large operation in Gaza. The biggest question of all is: For what purpose? What will we achieve there that we have not achieved in previous operations? If we want a few years of calm for the residents of the western Negev and especially for the Gaza border communities, we can still achieve this through mediation by the Egyptians and the UN envoy. Israel already believes that, regardless of what is happening on the Gaza border fence, it must do all in its power to alleviate the distress of the citizens of Gaza and especially to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the territory. This, on condition that the military wing of Hamas does not exploit the opening of the crossings and the easing of restrictions in order to strengthen its military power.

When considering this rational and non-emotional calculation, it is easier to excuse the damaged honor, to control the anger and to agree that the clash with rioters on the fence, the extinguishing of fires and the complacent attitude towards the minor damage caused by the incendiary balloons and the smoking tires in the Gaza vicinity communities are far superior to the price that we will have to pay if the IDF embarks on a major battle in the Gaza Strip at the present time.

The only drawback of avoiding a strong military strike on Hamas at present is the eroding deterrence. There are already clear signs that this is happening. Hamas, in recent days, has been more daring and less cautious in its provocations, expecting that Israel will not dare to act against it. As a result of this situation, Hamas may draw the wrong conclusions and try to achieve some sort of windfall. Therefore, we must be careful not to become complacent so that the rioters will not take advantage of the current and relatively thin deployment of the IDF along the Gaza fence to carry out mass incursions into Israeli territory, abduct soldiers and civilians for bargaining purposes and carry out attacks in adjacent communities using the remaining tunnels.

It is important that the cabinet ministers, especially Netanyahu and Lieberman, cease issuing threatening pronouncements in order to please their electoral base, and focus on an ongoing practical dialogue with senior officers of the General Staff and the Shin Bet security service to ensure the country is prepared for a change in the situation. A time will surely come when the IDF will have to strike Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip with a decisive blow, but it should only happen after it is clear that all political-civil settlement efforts have categorically failed. In such a situation – which we are already very close to now – both Hamas and Israel will be left solely with the military option to use as leverage to escape the current bloody and exhausting dead end. Only then will an IDF military operation in Gaza really be a war of no choice."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 17.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Rauf Tamer lambastes an amateur production in centrist tabloid Posta: "Strange sounds are coming from across the ocean. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo has hit the road, gone to Riyadh, and sat down with the Saudi king for consultations. Meanwhile all hell has broken loose back in Istanbul. Everyone has said something different. People are confused. All possibilities have been put forward one by one. Then what? Suddenly the possibility that Khashoggi had a heart attack has come to the fore. It is possible. The poor guy might have had a heart attack either inside the consulate or wherever he was taken to and died. But why hide this for 15 days? This is pure theatre and all those involved are amateurs."

Husnu Mahalli ponders the price in opposition Korkusuz: "Trump sent Pompeo to King Salman, probably to talk about a payment plan: Cash, checks, or bars of gold! Pompeo arrived in Ankara yesterday. This trilateral traffic will resolve this issue and the case will be closed. Some people will be blamed and the Saudi king and his son Mohammad will be saved. Trump has determined the 'price' and the Saudi couple has taken a deep breath. It could be a trillion dollars. This is a very dark case, complicated and fascinating. The U.S. would never and can never give up on Saudi Arabia. Neither can the others!"

Kurtulus Tayiz proclaims Riyadh's guilt in pro-government Aksam: "The Saudis do not have the power or chance to cover up the Khashoggi murder that they committed in front of the eyes of the entire world. Riyadh cannot absolve itself by blaming a few civil servants. Visuals and photos prove that the 'death squad' that arrived in Istanbul in two jets were Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's men. The power of money only goes so far. The Saudi government has already been found guilty and convicted in the conscience of the Islam world. They will face punishment and consequences, and will be unable to escape this one."

 

U.S./TURKISH RELATIONS: Yalcin Akdogan sets the terms for improving ties with Washington in pro-government Star: "A serious revival of confidence is necessary to normalize U.S./Turkey relations. A primary requirement is for the U.S. to abandon aiding and abetting the terror organizations that constitute a serious threat to Turkey. The Turkish people would surely like to 'feel good' about the U.S. But it is not easy for these feelings to develop unless the U.S. changes its politics and tone. Recent statements from Russia and the Syrian foreign minister regarding the situation east of the Euphrates indicate that the alarm bells are ringing for the PYD [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party]. Things are coming to the boil."

 

LOCAL POLITICS: Selin Sayek Boke notes a series of hostile government measures in left-wing opposition Birgun: "We are entering an electoral mood at a time when the government and its allies are hurling threats about replacing elected municipal officials with local administrators. Neighborhood heads have been dismissed, municipal budgets have been centralized, shrinking the margins of maneuver for local administrations, a fair and secure election process is being hijacked, and the alliance law remains in place. A profit-based, neoliberal understanding has encircled us both from the center and locally." 

Murat Muratoglu questions the government's move against the main opposition party in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "Why is there a struggle to take over the CHP's [main opposition Republican People's Party's] shares in Is Bank? What is at stake is not in use and has no income value. What exactly is the government going to hand over to the Treasury? Is it all about executive council members? Those memberships are symbolic anyway. They have no influence! Well, that is the case today, at least. Finance Minister Berat Albayrak is going to appoint new executive council members. What will they do? Their influence will be understood. The pro-government partisans are hungry and they expect to be fed. Is Bank is a liquid bank with a clear balance sheet, especially if you need fresh cash."

 

Iran media watch

 

PAKISTAN BORDER INCIDENT: Iran has summoned Pakistan's ambassador following the abduction of a number of Iranian military personnel at the Iran/Pakistan border. Tehran urged Islamabad to do all it can to find the Iranians and arrest the "terrorists" involved. Reformist Ebtekar carried a photo of a border guard standing near the border at night with the headline, "Game of death at the border." Hardline Keyhan's front page headline reads, "Revolutionary Guards readiness to conduct joint operation with Pakistani army against terrorists." Moderate Arman-e Emruz reported that "Jaishul-adl (Army of Justice) has claimed responsibility for kidnapping 14 border guards in Mirjaveh", while conservative Setareh-e Sobh quoted the IRGC's Quds Base as saying that "infiltrators" had assisted in the abduction of border guards.

 

WOMEN AT STADIUM: Iran has allowed a group of women to attend a men's football match at Tehran's Azadi stadium for the first time in decades, after years of campaigning by activists against the ban. "Azadi's doors are open to women: A step forward," reformist Etemad said on its front page, carrying a large photo of women in the stadium. Another reformist paper, Sharq, wrote: "Azadi says hello to Iranian women." Other reformist newspapers, including Arman and Aftab-e Yazd and many sports newspapers carried similar front-page reports.

 

AHWAZ ATTACK: Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) says the leader who planned the terrorist attack on a military parade in Ahwaz was killed in Iraq. The IRGC announced in a statement that Islamic State (ISIS) leader in Iraq's Diyala Province, known as Abu Dhoha, who was the mastermind of the 22 September attack, has been killed. The statement was reported prominently by Iranian TV stations.

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST DISAPPEARANCE: Domestic broadcast media and English-language Press TV continue their coverage of the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. Rolling news channel IRINN quoted U.S. media as saying that after the meeting between Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammed bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo yesterday, there is "no crisis at play".

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: The Persian hashtag 'Basij terrorist organization' has been trending since the U.S. Treasury announced yesterday that it was designating Iran's Basij paramilitary force, as well as a host of other entities, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on the Basij force for its ties to the IRGC and "training child soldiers". The hashtag has been used over 3,100 times by 1,029 unique accounts in the past 12 hours. Original posts make up 14 percent and Retweets comprise 84 percent of the Tweets. The remaining 2 percent are replies. "From now on, don't forget to include 'terrorist' in parenthesis whenever you write Basij," wrote one. Another said Basij members' aggression towards ordinary Iranians will now be considered an "act of terrorism". Elsewhere, government critics railed against the administration following news that a government critic had been sentenced to seven months in prison for slandering President Hassan Rowhani. "In your opinion, what should be done with a person who calls millions of Iranians stupid, liars, junkies, and gullible?" asked a conservative host in reference to Rowhani.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 17.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The Khashoggi curse

2-An unlikely war

3-The reconstruction challenge

 

1-  The Khashoggi curse

 

Khashoggi's liquidation was undoubtedly a foolish operation both in its conception and its execution. Its curse and repercussions will continue to pursue Riyadh for a long time to come. Moreover, it will not be so easy to turn the leaf on it in the near future if the Kingdom persists with its obstinate refusal to have those who actually took the decision regarding Khashoggi pay the price for their action as soon as possible. And it goes without saying that Saudi Arabia's preoccupation with containing this crisis's effects will hinder its ability to address other burning issues, foremost among which are the Yemen war and the pursuit of the Kingdom's declared program of economic reforms. This is especially likely since what happened cannot pass without casting a heavy shadow over the Kingdom's economic situation. In this regard, the fact that leading international companies have refrained from attending the giant economic forum 'Davos in the Desert' in Saudi Arabia this month is just a preliminary indication of the economic frustrations that await kingdom--Mohammad Kureishan on pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

What has come to be known as 'the Khashoggi disappearance file' has turned into a factor that is changing the rules of engagement and the dynamics of certain crises in a region where the only constant is that everything is continuously changing, and that sleeps to the background of one scene only to awaken to a different one the next day. This is a region whose secrets are difficult to unravel via reason and its tools, or logic and its wisdom. Everything is in state of rapid flux and everything happens in the blink of an eye…we are witnessing a regional movement that goes further than Istanbul and is more momentous than the incident there that has captivated public opinion. And observers will need to mobilize their educated tools so as to measure the direction in which the winds will blow in the coming phase-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

The Turkish government and its security agencies are up to their ears pursuing the investigations into the [Khashoggi] crime that is now the center of regional and international interest. And the Nusra Front appears to be well aware of this, and views as an opportunity not to withdraw and hand over its heavy weapons…Khashoggi's kidnapping, which has turned into a heavy burden on Turkey's security and political leadership, could have a negative effect on the Idlib agreement. It could not only postpone this agreement, but could cancel it completely. That would serve the official Syrian side that believes that a military solution is ultimately necessary to restore the city to Syrian sovereignty--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

 

After Jamal Khashoggi's murder inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the Gulf region will not be the same as before, argues a Tunisian commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman's image has received a lethal blow, as have his economic projects for the kingdom. The Khashoggi case is having widespread regional repercussions that go beyond the incident itself and that may have a positive effect on many countries in the region, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. These include the Yemen war, the Gulf crisis, and the long delayed formation of the Lebanese and Iraqi governments. However, its effect on the U.S.-sponsored Israeli/Palestinian deal of the century, and the proposed 'Arab NATO' remains unclear. The Khashoggi affair will have an impact on the Idlib accord between Turkey and Russia, maintains the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. Ankara is totally preoccupied with this issue, and at least one wing of the Nusra Front seems to see it as an opportunity to renege on the Idlib agreement thereby driving matters towards a military confrontation.

 

BEFORE AND AFTER THE MURDER: "Now that the right thing is being done regarding Jamal Khashoggi's murder and the terrifying facts are gradually beginning to emerge, one can say without exaggeration that the post-Khashoggi-murder phase will be different from the phase that preceded it, not only for the Saudi regime, but for the entire Gulf region as well," writes Mohammad Kureishan on Wednesday in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi.

This is in addition to the points that this case has exposed, the most important of which warrant further consideration below:

- Regardless of what political arrangements may be reached after the criminal investigation is over, nothing can ultimately disguise the fact that the Saudi crown prince's international image has suffered a lethal blow. Whether true or not, the heinous accusations will continue to pursue him like his shadow. They will either remove him from his post, or keep him in it weak and exhausted. Both situations are devastating for the country and for the man who believed that nothing could stand in the way of his sweeping ambitions.

- The one certain consequence is that the Saudi ruling family will try to rearrange its cards in light of the earthquake that has struck it, especially since the mechanism for succession to the throne was severely shaken after Prince Mohammad bin Salman's was appointed crown prince in contravention of the conventions that have been in place for decades. This has stirred great anger within the ruling family, and the young prince's policies as well as the character of those with whom he has surrounded himself, have further exacerbated the ruling family's largely suppressed dissatisfaction.

- Saudi/U.S. relations have entered a phase of unprecedented crisis – excluding the period of the early 1970s oil embargo. This was not only manifest in President Trump and some of his advisors' statements, but even more importantly in what was said by some members of the Senate. For its part, the American media has been mobilized in a merciless news campaign monitoring all details, no matter how large or small. And if the Saudis can explain away Al-Jazeera's intensive coverage as motivated by 'old hatreds and settling scores,' to what can they ascribe CNN and other U.S. TV channels' coverage? Together with the leading American newspapers, especially The Washington Post, these channels have already destroyed the Saudi leadership's image that will take years and years to repair.

- The Saudi media machine and its allied Emirati machine have utterly, and potentially lethally, failed to make their case. TV stations, commentators, and journalists have found themselves in an unprecedented situation, forced to justify the unjustifiable and defend the indefensible. The narrative they wanted to convince the world of that the entire story was fabricated and a theatrical production got nowhere. Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir was not the only one to swallow his tongue; many other media figures did the same. And as for those who dared and tried hard to write about the matter, it became clear that they would have much better been served by silence.

- The ruling Arab establishment's terrible moral failure is evident. Most Arab officials have not uttered a single word. And if we exclude the strange statements of 'solidarity' with the Kingdom against 'the unjust campaigns waged against it' issued by some Arab foreign ministries, no Arab minister has addressed this issue, if only in vague and foggy terms. Meanwhile, hardly any Western official has failed to say something about the matter, even though the murdered journalist is Arab, and the alleged murderer is Arab as well!

Be that as it may, terrible and ruinous damage has done to the Saudi regime as a result of this murder. The slate cannot be wiped clean by the millions of dollars spent in the West in order to promote images of reform and development inside Saudi society and [bin Salman's] '2030 Vision.' It is also the sort of damage that cannot be washed away based on the Land of the Two Holy Shrines' [Saudi Arabia's] special status in the hearts of millions of Arabs and Muslims – and this is may be the more serious matter.

Khashoggi's liquidation was undoubtedly a foolish operation both in its conception and its execution. Its curse and repercussions will continue to pursue Riyadh for a long time to come. Moreover, it will not be so easy to turn the leaf on it in the near future if the Kingdom persists with its obstinate refusal to have those who actually took the decision regarding Khashoggi pay the price for their action as soon as possible.

And it goes without saying that Saudi Arabia's preoccupation with containing this crisis's effects will hinder its ability to address other burning issues, foremost among which are the Yemen war and the pursuit of the Kingdom's declared program of economic reforms. This is especially likely since what happened cannot pass without casting a heavy shadow over the Kingdom's economic situation. In this regard, the fact that leading international companies have refrained from attending the giant economic forum 'Davos in the Desert' in Saudi Arabia this month is just a preliminary indication of the economic frustrations that await kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is a leading country and it is both very important and pressing for it to recover from what has befallen its policies recently; namely, confusion and shallowness resulting from immaturity, rash behavior, and arrogance of the sort that was unheard of under its previous kings.

"Should such recovery occur – which would be in everyone's interest –our colleague Jamal Khashoggi's blood would not have been spilt in vain … God rest his soul!" concludes Kureishan.

End…

 

REPEATED FAILURE: "More than three years of political and diplomatic efforts to stop the war in and on Yemen have ended in repeated failure," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Wednesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The humanitarian catastrophe has worsened, and according to UN reports, it is now unprecedented in its scale. International envoys have succeeded one another but all to no avail. Dialogue and consultations have moved between numerous capitals without achieving any results. But new winds are blowing today, maybe lightly for now, but full of signs of optimism at the possibilities and prospects of reaching a solution.

The Gulf [Qatari] crisis was in no better state. The Kuwaiti and American mediations were mired in stalemate. Plans were made for holding summits at Camp David and Washington, but they never saw the light. The various parties still cling to their positions; in fact, they are sliding into the furnace of costly media and diplomatic wars and PR battles to enhance one side's image and blacken the other's. There has been no progress so far; but in this case as well, good omens of easing tensions loom on the horizon.

These are just some of the repercussions of the events of the past two weeks in Istanbul, and more seem to be on their way. What has come to be known as 'the Khashoggi disappearance file' has turned into a factor that is changing the rules of engagement and the dynamics of certain crises in a region where the only constant is that everything is continuously changing, and that sleeps to the background of one scene only to awaken to a different one the next day. This is a region whose secrets are difficult to unravel via reason and its tools, or logic and its wisdom. Everything is in state of rapid flux and everything happens in the blink of an eye.

Yemen, or the forgotten war, is once again attracting greater interest from the international media and decision-making centers. Talk in it and about it is now focused on a 'comprehensive settlement' whose elements are being discussed. UN Yemen Envoy Martin Griffiths is certain to be following all of the past two weeks' events closely, monitoring how they could affect his mission with an expert's eye and what new developments they may give rise to in the positions of the important parties, their alliances and priorities. He must be feeling that the old adage – 'the catastrophes of some are the good fortune of others' – is applicable in his case.

This does not mean that the war will stop tomorrow, or that the suffering of Yemen's children, women, and old folk will end overnight, or that the era of major battles is over. But peace in Yemen now and for the first time has a serious chance of being achieved. And this stems from the war's occluded horizons, its growing cost, the exhaustion afflicting its warring sides, and the possibility that some of its major parties are increasingly keen on reaching settlements and finding compromise solutions now that their situation has become almost untenable.

In turn, the Gulf crisis is beginning to appear as if it were a mere side-effect, one that will disappear with the disappearance of the primary disease. The tepid state of Turkish/Gulf relations, which hit unprecedented lows over the past two years, is on its way to warming up again. In fact, we may witness a major boost in the level and quality of relations between these parties, which Washington would view as an opportunity to resume its reconciliation efforts – as would Kuwait, the 'first sponsor' of the attempt to repair the inter-Gulf rift. Again, the crisis may not end totally and immediately; but it is also on its way to being eased.

We do not know how the developments of the past two weeks will affect the rest of the region's crises. But we do know that many Lebanese are now optimistic that their new government can soon be formed. And Iraq is now less weighed down by the burden of 'the regional factor,' even though Iran remains a major regional player on its lands, facing off the main international player, Washington.

But what remains uncertain is how these developments may impact the 'deal of the century' and 'the Arab NATO' project that was inaugurated in Washington on the margins of last month's UN General Assembly meetings. It is here, and here in particular, where change in the opposite direction might come from.

"We are witnessing a regional movement that goes further than Istanbul and is more momentous than the incident there that has captivated public opinion. And observers will need to mobilize their educated tools so as to measure the direction in which the winds will blow in the coming phase," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

IMPACT ON IDLIB: "Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's criminal 'disappearance' has indirectly affected the Idlib agreement between Russia and Turkey," notes the editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Monday was the date for the more important part of that agreement that calls for the withdrawal of the Tahrir ash-Sham Organization (former Nusra Front) from the demilitarized zone, but it passed without it being implemented on the ground.

The Turkish government and its security agencies are up to their ears pursuing the investigations into the aforementioned crime that is now the center of regional and international interest. And the Nusra Front appears to be well aware of this, and views as an opportunity not to withdraw and hand over its heavy weapons.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that there is no problem regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and that implementation of the agreement is proceeding as planned. But a Nusra spokesman has confirmed his organization's refusal to lay down its arms and withdraw from the areas specified in the agreement.

The Syrian authorities are also monitoring the situation closely, but leaving the matter to the Russians. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem has stressed that his country is in no hurry, that it backed this agreement so as to avoid bloodshed, and that Syrian forces are deployed in the Idlib area and ready to act militarily to recapture the city unless all parties honor the agreement. He said this at press conference on Monday held after the conclusion of his talks with his Iraqi counterpart Dr. Ibrahim al-Ja'fari.

The agreement's Turkish and Russian sponsors are likely to agree on an extension, not only because of the worsening crisis over the Khashoggi's disappearance, but also because of reports of a rift inside the Nusra Front over the withdrawal from the demilitarized zones. One wing, led by [Nusra leader] Abu-Mohammad al-Jawlani, whose members are primarily Syrians, does not object to implementing the agreement and joining the Tahrir ash-Sham Front that includes pro-Turkish factions. The second wing, which consists of mostly foreign members and is led by an Egyptian, is opposed to laying down its arms and withdrawing from the specified areas, because it views this as the prelude to its subsequent liquidation.

Khashoggi's kidnapping, which has turned into a heavy burden on Turkey's security and political leadership, could have a negative effect on the Idlib agreement. It could not only postpone this agreement, but could cancel it completely. That would serve the official Syrian side that believes that a military solution is ultimately necessary to restore the city to Syrian sovereignty.

"But God knows best," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

2-An unlikely war

 

Despite the heated rhetoric emanating from Israel, another Gaza war is unlikely and Cairo is most likely to pursue its mediation efforts regardless, says Hani Habib in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Despite Israeli PM Netanyahu and his defense minister's rhetoric, and despite the occasional escalation on the ground, a fourth large-scale war on the Gaza Strip is unlikely, primarily for Israeli reasons, argues a Palestinian commentator. Cairo will also pursue its mediation between Israel and the Palestinians and between the Palestinians themselves, since this is of utmost importance for Egyptian national security.

 

THIRD MEETING IN A WEEK: "The Israeli mini-cabinet will meet today 'to discuss the tense situation in the Gaza Strip' for the third time in a week," notes Hani Habib in Wednesday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Meanwhile, a security delegation, led by Egyptian intelligence head 'Abbas Kamel, is due to arrive in Israel and visit Ramallah and the Gaza Strip as well. Against this background, there are growing threats of a fourth Israeli large-scale war on the Gaza Strip. But observers believe that this escalation – whether on the ground or in the statements exchanged between Hamas's leadership and the various Israeli security and political echelons – is all part of an attempt to improve the terms of negotiations over the issues that the Egyptian security delegation will raise and that concern both inter-Palestinian reconciliation and a tahdi'a [lull or calming down] between Hamas and Israel.

Some people wonder whether the Egyptian efforts will cease after the meetings that 'Abbas Kamel will hold with the various parties if they fail to achieve any real breakthrough. This is a pertinent question after all that Cairo has done over the past years regarding the reconciliation file, and more recently, regarding a tahdi'a.

Could all this lead to a fourth war of aggression on the Gaza Strip, and an acceptance of the notion that that there are no prospects of ending the split on the Palestinian arena? Moreover, will Cairo refrain from pursuing it efforts, or will it continue to move forward relentlessly despite the occluded horizon? Will it continue to work to bridge the gaps and overcome the disagreements so as to secure a new breakthrough in these various files?

It is extremely difficult to answer these questions. But we can already say that that current uncertainty does necessarily entail a new large-scale war on the Gaza Strip for reasons that are primarily Israeli. For if we were to follow the security and political statements made by some Israeli leaders, we would find genuine concern about the prospects of such a war despite PM Netanyahu and War [Defense] Minister Lieberman's statements that war may be the solution.

In contrast, Israel's Settlement [Construction] Minister believes that 'any new war will be a gateway to another war; and in light of the humanitarian and economic deterioration in the Gaza Strip, the victims of this war will be civilians, which will only exacerbate the international criticisms of Israel. We must therefore think ten times before we head to a new war.'

Moreover, the leaks from last Sunday's mini-cabinet meeting suggest that the Israeli army prefers to postpone the confrontation to some point before the end of next year, by which time it would have completed building the 'barrier' that will neutralize Hamas's offensive tunnels. Meanwhile, Israeli Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot believes that Syria poses a greater threat to Israel, and that the army's attention should be focused on the Golan Heights, and Israeli Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz agrees with this view.

But the Egyptian effort will not cease. These issues are not mere options for it to pursue or drop at leisure. They are a necessity imposed on Egypt by its Arab leadership role and that in the region in general. More importantly, they are linked and overlap with issues pertaining to Egyptian national security. In other words, the Palestinian issue is a domestic Egyptian matter, not only as regards Cairo's capacity as a mediator, but also as a positive party and effective partner. Cairo is concerned about removing the obstacles and difficulties that confront its effort to end the split and regain Palestinian unity.

Cairo is also interested in preventing the slide toward a new Israeli war of aggression and achieving a tahdi'a that renews the truce agreement reached at the end of the third Israeli 2014 war, and that calls for an end to the blockade and freedom of movement and trade on all crossings whether with the occupation or Egypt, via the Rafah crossing. It also calls for the reconstruction of what three wars on the Gaza Strip destroyed and an end to the humanitarian crises, by rebuilding Gaza's infrastructure and its electricity, water, sewage system, and the expansion of its fishing zone in the Mediterranean.

Focusing on the humanitarian issue in the Gaza Strip will remain the key to the effort to find some solution. But the danger of such focus is precisely because it comes at the expense of the core of the problem and its primarily political nature.

"Consequently, the solutions that are being sought will remain only partial, unless a genuine effort is exerted to end the occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state," concludes Habib.

Ends…

 

3-The reconstruction challenge

 

The challenge of Syria's reconstruction is not just about money, but about its future regime's nature and polices, says Mohammad 'Obeid in today's Syrian al-Watan

 

By producing exaggerated estimates of the cost of Syria's post-war reconstruction and setting impossible political conditions for financing this process, the West and its regional Gulf allies are trying to achieve the political aims that they failed to achieve by military means, argues a Lebanese commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. But Syria should learn from what happened with Lebanon and Iraq's reconstruction, and ensure that this does not come at the cost of its national sovereignty.

 

STRINGENT TERMS: "The closer Syria comes to achieving final victory against the terrorist groups and their sponsors, the more stringent the international and especially Western (American or European) terms regarding the supposed political price that Syria must pay for its reconstruction," writes Mohammad 'Obeid in Wednesday's pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

The UN has joined in setting such preconditions. Its general secretariat prepared a secret document late in 2017 that included the criteria that the UN will abide by in dealing with the reconstruction process based on a single formula: Contribution is possible but only if the required change in the regime occurs.

For their part, the Arab states, specifically the Gulf states that can support the reconstruction process, seem unconcerned as long as they do not get a green light from the U.S., Britain, France, and the other countries that control the oil revenues and decide how they should be spent based on their interests and regional policies.

In short, the decision regarding international, Western, and Arab contributions to reconstruction is in Washington's hands, as are the keys to the coffers of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and most of the EU's institutions and investment banks, to say nothing of Arab development funds.

In light of this, the belief that proceeding with the political process as consistent with UNSCR 2254's spirit and concept is sufficient to end the international ban on reconstruction, development, and economic investments is misplaced. Iran's experience with the nuclear agreement is the best example of this.

On the contrary; after growing accustomed to fighting its wars to expand its presence and military and political influence in our region using Arab Gulf monies, the U.S. continues to blackmail the oil-rich Gulf states in order to finance its forces and intelligence agencies' occupation of Syrian territories. It also uses these states' monies to train and arm the Kurdish separatist groups, after it has once again decided to sponsor, protect and wager on these groups to foil the liberation of all of Syrian territories and their return to the Syrian state's lap.

For this reason, talk of international and regional sources for financing the reconstruction process outside the circle of allies and friends that have backed Syria and sacrificed alongside it is nothing more than an attempt to cast dust in the eyes. Merely raising this issue in statements from international, American, and European officials is meant to blackmail the Syrian leadership so as to drag it towards political understandings, or more accurately, the political concessions they failed to obtain militarily.

Washington and its allies and friends believe that adopting the same traditional recipe for reconstruction that proved its effectiveness in Lebanon after the [1975/89] civil war will produce the same results in Syria. In fact, they believe that this same recipe could yield even greater results in Syria because of the scale of the destruction and devastation caused by the terrorist groups across the country's expansive lands far exceeds that in Lebanon. Moreover, the preliminary estimates of the cost of reconstruction in Syria published by international institutions and organizations have been vastly exaggerated. These figures range between $200 and $400 billion, which are unsound and unrealistic because they are based on imagined assessments rather than on a careful survey of the cities, villages, and neighborhoods where the terrorist groups reveled in spreading destruction and ruin.

But more important is the fact that financing reconstruction in Lebanon not only left the country's natural resources and its bank deposits hostage to the public debt that now actually exceeds $100 billion. It also left the future of the Lebanese, and their future generations hostage, by drowning them in a domestic corruption regime from which there is no salvation. More importantly, it has imposed policies on the Lebanese state that least of which can be described as 'compromising' regarding issues that have to do with country's national security, and that Lebanon would have been unable to circumvent had it not been for the resistance's [Hezbollah's] role and presence.

And the same goes for Iraq after the U.S. invasion, but with one major negative difference stemming from the ruling authorities' ineptitude in managing the country's vast natural resources and economic capabilities that have not been exploited in an honest, transparent, and patriotic manner. Moreover, some these authorities' leading lights are hostage of their American sponsor and give priority to its interests at the expense of the Iraqis' interests and future.

One can say that both the Lebanese and Iraqi national will and sovereign decisions have been commandeered and their economies and resources are being held hostage to a foreign, specifically American, decision even though it comes packaged in the form of international bodies' recommendations.

The challenge facing the Syrian leadership requires it to reconcile safeguarding its national will and sovereign decision on the one hand, with providing the necessary resources for the reconstruction process and the requirements for motivating the economy and containing the social and livelihood consequences of the global war that was waged on Syria.

Reconstruction is not a purely financial and investment matter. In fact, before all that, it is a political/sovereign decision that will determine the nature of Syria's political system at the national and patriotic levels and its hoped-for regional role after the war," concludes 'Obeid.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 16.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Eyeless in Gaza

 

Illness caused by water pollution is a leading cause of child mortality in Gaza, says a study by the RAND Corporation, a copy of which was obtained by Haaretz. The study shows that water pollution accounts for more than a quarter of illnesses in the Strip and that more than 12 percent of child deaths up until four years ago was linked to gastrointestinal disorders due to water pollution. These numbers have continued to grow. The collapse of water infrastructure has led to a sharp rise in germs and viruses such as rotavirus, cholera and salmonella, the report says. 97 percent of drinking water in the Strip is not drinkable by any international standard. Some 90 percent of residents drink water from private purifiers, because the larger installations have been damaged by fighting or have fallen into disuse since they could not be maintained. The current situation, according to the study, is that Gaza is incapable of supplying enough water for its 2 million inhabitants. The study shows Gaza schools have one toilet per 75 pupils and one sink for washing hands per 80. Most of this water is either recycled or from a reservoir. As a result, the very presence of children in these schools puts them at risk of contracting gastrointestinal diseases. Schools, public buildings and hospitals are only cleaned when necessary in order to conserve water. Hospital staff only wash their hands when it is essential and not on a regular basis when going from one patient to another, in order to conserve water for life-saving treatment. The researchers estimate that within two years, even the isolated sources of water used today will cease to operate without proper maintenance.

Meanwhile, an IDF aircraft opened fire at a group of Palestinians launching incendiary balloons at Israel from Northern Gaza on Tuesday morning, the army said. There were no immediate reports of injuries. The incident came amid a marked uptick in suspected incendiary balloon attacks. The use of fire balloons had been halted for several weeks, after months of multiple daily attacks left thousands of acres in Southern Israel scorched and sparked fears of children being injured by bombs placed on balloons or kites and launched over the border. Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said Monday that a "hard blow" to Hamas would return calm to Southern Israel, as an internal Palestinian conflict and failed negotiations between Israel and Hamas threatened to bring about another war. The Defense Minister lashed against former coalition chairman David Bitan after the latter criticized the IDF chief's policies in Gaza, while Prime Minister Netanyahu dismissed Bitan's comments and praised the army head. Bitan, who left his post as coalition whip in 2017 due to a corruption investigation but who remains a Likud MK, claimed Gadi Eisenkot had lost Israel's deterrent capability in Gaza by holding back against military operations to quell months of border unrest. Lieberman called the comments "intolerable" and "unthinkable" and said they cause "true harm to national security."

At the opening of the Knesset on Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu said in an apparent reference to the tensions on the Gaza border that he is "doing everything to prevent unnecessary wars," before adding that Israel will not hesitate to fight when required. Yesterday, an Israeli military aircraft bombed a Hamas position in the Southern Strip after two Palestinian men set off an explosive device near the security fence earlier in the day, the army said. In the evening several thousand Palestinians protested on the border with Israel, throwing rocks and firebombs and burning tires, the army said. The IDF understands that there is pressure from politicians to do something and that events at the border fence are escalating, which is why there will be a situation assessment before Friday, when thousands of demonstrators are once again expected at the border. The Southern Command is preparing for soldiers to respond more forcefully and will set clearer boundaries for those who approach the fence. It is possible that the no-entry area near the border will be enlarged or that more care will be taken to prevent breaches of the type that occurred last Friday.

Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot left for a conference of military commanders in the United States, where he is expected to attend working meetings mainly on the situation in Syria, which in Eisenkot's view is still the most important arena and should receive the military's main attention, even at the expense of events in Gaza. As far as Eisenkot is concerned, the North must be the focus in terms of training, resources and alertness. In Gaza, intelligence officials say they have identified a different trend from that presented by the politicians and some of the media. The intelligence assessment is that Gaza residents are resentful of Hamas' conduct and the fact that until now Hamas has not managed to realize any achievements from the weekly demonstrations. Hamas understands the situation, which is why the process of trying to seek an arrangement should be pursued to bring calm to the area.

Elsewhere, Israel and the United States sent a secret military delegation to Ukraine to test the Russian-made S-300 missile defense system, which Moscow recently provided to Syria, Hadashot TV news reported Monday, citing Syrian and Russian news outlets. There was no comment on the reports from either Israel or the U.S. According to the reports, members of the Ukrainian military instructed their U.S. and Israeli counterparts on the capabilities of the system, as well as running through various possible scenarios. One Russian report said that F-15 planes are training in Ukraine against the S-300 as part of an international exercise that includes Israeli pilots. It wasn't immediately clear if the Israeli pilots were flying or merely observing from the ground. It has been widely reported that the Israeli Air Force has been training against the S-300 in exercises in Greece, perhaps since 2007. Israel and the U.S. are both thought to be using stealth aircraft in Syrian maneuvers.

In diplomatic news, Prime Minister Netanyahu commended his Australian counterpart for weighing the possibility of moving his country's embassy to Jerusalem, following the lead of President Trump, but Palestinians slammed the "very disturbing" move. Scott Morrison "informed me that he is considering officially recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel & moving the Australian embassy to Jerusalem. I am very thankful to him for this," Netanyahu Tweeted late Monday night. "We will continue to strengthen ties between Israel and Australia," he added. The Palestinian Authority delegation to Australia castigated the announcement, calling it "deeply disturbing" and adding that it would boost Trump's attempts to resume peace negotiations in a way that leaves the issues of Jerusalem and refugees "off the table."

The Trump administration is "reviewing legislation" that would create an investment fund for the Palestinian economy, a White House official told The Jerusalem Post on Monday. The bill, introduced by Republicans and Democrats in both houses of Congress last week, proposes the establishment of a Palestinian Partnership Fund that would "promote joint economic development and finance joint ventures between Palestinian entrepreneurs and companies in the United States, Israel and countries in the Middle East." A senior group of senators on the Foreign Relations Committee introduced the legislation just two days after meeting with members of U.S. President Donald Trump's peace team on Capitol Hill. But sources say the bill, which would encourage "people-to-people" exchanges and community building across dividing lines of the conflict, was not drafted in conjunction with the White House on its peace effort. Neither administration nor congressional sources would comment on the timing of the legislation, introduced just months before the president plans to roll out his peace plan. Trump told reporters in New York last month that he would like to release his team's proposals by the end of the year. The White House has recently cut a slew of budget lines related to the Palestinian Authority, including aid for people-to-people exchanges between Palestinians and Israelis. The congressional fund would provide $100 million in additional investment funds.

In the Netanyahu corruption probes, Jacob Weinroth, chief lawyer for the Prime Minister in the corruption probes against him, and possibly the country's most storied lawyer, died suddenly at the age of 71 on Tuesday morning. Weinroth's death throws Netanyahu's defense into unprecedented uncertainty, both because of his unique skills and relationships with judges and top officials like Attorney-General Avichai Mandelblit, and because he has shepherded the cases against the prime minister from the beginning. Though he was accompanied by other top lawyers, like his younger partner Amit Haddad, most of the other lawyers had to quit the case to defend related clients. Haddad, while a rising star, may be viewed as too young to be the case's lead lawyer. Weinroth had been sick for an extended period and was visibly frail in interviews he gave on the prime minister's behalf over the past year, but there had been no indications that he would die. He was even supposed to start a trial representing Sara Netanyahu on October 7, but pulled out days before, saying that his firm believed she should have reached a plea deal. With his death so soon after that trial started, questions may be raised about his reasons for pulling out, though his preference for a deal had been widely known for months before.

Finally, the "Syrian baby," an infant who was flown to Israel a few months ago for life-saving surgery when it was only a few days old, will be back in Israel today for an additional operation, according to Israeli media. The case of the Syrian baby made headlines late last year, when it was flown to Israel on a special medically-equipped plane from Cyprus, where the child's parents, Syrian refugees, are staying, and its life was saved thanks to an emergency operation at Israel's Sheba Medical Center. 

 

 

NETANYAHU AIDING AND ABETTING HAMAS TERROR: Haim Ramon in Yedioth Ahronoth claims that Netanyahu is mediating in the transfer of funds and fuel from Qatar to Hamas, which will use them for terror. Netanyahu objects to Abu Mazin's return to the Strip, because to him the PA's moderate policies are a much bigger threat than Hamas terror.

"Qatar is a terror-supporting state that is helping Hamas. Without its financial and political support, Hamas would have collapsed a long time ago. Over the last decade, Hamas has murdered about 100 of our citizens and soldiers, more than any other terrorist organization. Israel is known for its war on money transfers to Hamas. But a few days ago, something striking occurred: Israel, headed by Netanyahu, became a mediator in the transfer of funds from Qatar to Hamas. For the first time, the money from Qatar reached Israeli hands, and the government used it to finance fuel that was supplied to Hamas.

Government spokesmen are playing dumb when they assert the fuel is intended to serve the Gaza power plant in order to produce electricity for the Strip's residents. Perhaps, that may be partially correct. We have extensive experience in supplying strategic materials to Hamas. Israel has supplied Gaza in the past few years with hundreds of thousands of tons of building materials; a significant portion of them have been used to build Hamas' attack tunnels, including the 15 that the IDF exposed this year. This is what will happen with part of the fuel as well. It will be utilized for the Hamas terror's military needs.

On the other hand, the Abu Mazin-led Palestinian Authority acts against the Hamas regime in Gaza. Abu Mazin imposed economic sanctions on Hamas, and refuses to finance the introduction of strategic materials into the Strip. The bitter truth is that Netanyahu is helping Haniyeh and his clan strengthen Hamas, and is sabotaging Abu Mazin's efforts to weaken Hamas. It is worth mentioning here that the PA is fighting together with Israel against Hamas terrorism in Judea and Samaria. The man responsible for the Palestinian security bodies, Hussein al-Sheikh, parleys often with Shin Bet Chief Nadav Argaman, to coordinate the joint struggle. Right now, Abu Mazin's forces are taking part in the manhunt for the despicable murderer from Barkan. In contrast, Hamas activists danced on the day of the murder in the streets of Khan Yunis. Confused? You should be.

Behind the absurd there is logic – Netanyahu's logic. He understands that the only practical alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza is the Palestinian Authority. Abu Mazin adamantly demands to be reinstated in control of the political, administrative and military rule in Gaza. But Hamas 'agreed' in the arrangement talks in Egypt that Abu Mazin would be responsible for cleaning and sewage and other services, and is firmly resisting to disarm itself (as Israel demanded in the past). Lo and behold; Netanyahu is ignoring the PA's demand, attacks it regarding the economic sanctions it has imposed on Hamas, and threatens to make cuts in the tax revenues that Israel collects for the PA and transfer them directly to Hamas.

The reason is clear. Netanyahu opposes the PA's return to Gaza, because it will threaten the status quo and break the political deadlock. In his eyes, Abu Mazin is a far more dangerous enemy than Muhammad Deif and his successors. The status quo perpetuates the current situation, in which the PA does not represent all the Palestinians. Many on the right see in Gaza under Hamas rule the de-facto Palestinian state, and therefore there is no room for another Palestinian state in the West Bank. That is why Bibi has bestowed immunity on Hamas and its leaders, who have been operating for half a year against the Gaza envelope communities, burning their fields, poisoning the air and scattering explosives without fear of being harmed. They understand that Bibi prefers Hamas rule over Abu Mazin's regime.

Israel is the only country opposed to the return of Abu Mazin to the Gaza Strip. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, most of the Gulf States, and even the United States support the overthrow of Hamas, which is supported by Iran, and want the PA to return to Gaza. There is no doubt that as long as Hamas controls the Strip, talk of humanitarian aid for the benefit of its residents is baseless: You cannot rehabilitate Gaza without recognizing the Hamas regime. Obviously, I am not suggesting that Israel conquer and control Gaza. I am suggesting – as opposed to Netanyahu – that Israel join hands with the world and the moderate Arab countries, primarily Egypt and Jordan, in a joint effort to reinstate Abu Mazin and the PA in Gaza.

It is fitting that the residents of the South know that Netanyahu is willing to let them suffocate in smoke and inhale the poison from the tires burnt by Hamas, so long as the PA does not return to Gaza. It is clear that he is trying to camouflage his policy and hide it from the public eye. It was incumbent upon the opposition to present these facts and fight Netanyahu's policy. But, as is well known, there is no opposition."

Ends…

 

OUR EXPERTS KNOW ARABIC, NOT ARABS: Professor Arie Eldad in Maariv argues that Israeli "security sources" stress that if Israel supplies diesel to the Strip, Gazans will stop trying to burn us – but the problem is that the logic guiding Gaza's rulers is not the logic guiding leaders in the Western world.

"Diesel fuel is a product of refined petroleum, used to propel diesel engines. It consists of long chains of hydrocarbons, with 10 to 15 carbon atoms and 22 to 32 hydrogen atoms in each chain. A liter of diesel fuel releases about 8,600 calories during combustion. After reading a number of chemistry books and Wikipedia, and consulting with the attendant at my regular gas station, I can assert that diesel is useless for fire extinguishing purposes. Quite the contrary.

Nevertheless, 'security sources' recommend that the government supply fuel to the Gaza Strip. They insist that channeling fuel into the Strip will make Hamas reduce the flames. They will stop launching incendiary and explosive balloons, will refrain from 'demonstrations' on the fence and will not provide their terrorists with explosives and cutters for breaching the fence. The same security experts are sure that they understand the motives of Hamas' leaders in Gaza, and therefore pressure the government to accept money from Qatar in order to double the amount of diesel transferred to the Strip.

If that is what the 'experts' from the army, the universities, and perhaps our secret security forces think – then it will not be easy to find a leader who will put his foot down and tell them that they are talking nonsense and that they should get out of his sight and return with better ideas. Diesel fuel does not extinguish fire, certainly not in Hamas's fuel reserves.

One may wonder if these are not the very same experts who explained to the people of Israel in general, and to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in particular, how the disengagement from Gaza would improve our security situation. Perhaps they are also the exact same 'security experts' who proved to us why Israel must 'take advantage of the window of opportunity' and reach an agreement with Assad to withdraw from the Golan Heights. When they left the army, they established academic research institutes, and today they produce new papers that include detailed plans for unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria even without an agreement, without a chance for an agreement, without a partner for peace. A unilateral withdrawal. They are there and we are here. Like in ... Gaza. Yes? Like in Gaza.

It is impossible not to recall that Albert Einstein said that total madness is the attempt to repeat the same action over and over in the hope of getting a different result next time. The withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, which turned Hezbollah into an army armed with more than 100,000 missiles capable of reaching any point in the country, taught them nothing. The disengagement, which turned the Gaza Strip into a huge terror base that Israel is deterred from crushing, taught them nothing. And they have no shame. There is no humility in them and they do not learn a lesson from the catastrophic mistakes of similar experts, who enthusiastically supported bringing Arafat and his army of murderers to Israel, so that they would fight Hamas for us. So today they are trying to sell us this stupid nonsense, whereby if we inject a lot of diesel into the Gaza Strip - the atmosphere will calm down. That if we withdraw from Judea and Samaria - we will be rid of the Arab problem.

They fail again and again because they analyze the enemy's expected behavior with their logical tools. They convince themselves and Israel's leaders that the situation in Gaza is so terrible, that the Gazans have nothing to lose, and Hamas itself is afraid of the terrible despair it has inflicted on the residents of Gaza, hence in order for Hamas to be able to control the flames – we must solve the humanitarian crisis. That is why the experts' logic asserts that if we supply diesel, the Gazans will stop trying to burn us.

The problem is that the logic guiding the leaders of Gaza is not the logic guiding leaders in the Western world. They have underlying ideological goals that are not the welfare of their citizens. The desire to destroy Israel, to spill our blood, to exhaust us until we get tired of it all and leave – this desire overcomes Western democratic logic. Disregarding the ideological driving force behind Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, and other murderous enemies – repeatedly leads our 'experts' to impose their logic on our enemies, to rape reality, and to bear no responsibility when their assumptions are shattered in the face of Arab reality. Our experts may understand Arabic, but they do not understand Arabs."

Ends…

 

A CHIEF OF STAFF MUST BE APPOINTED URGENTLY: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom writes that Chief of Staff is the second most important job in the country. Eisenkot's successor should have been chosen a long time ago, and the delay is detrimental to Israel's national security.

"Last week, the cabinet approved the appointment of two new members of the advisory committee for the appointment of senior civil servants, Prof. Talia Einhorn and Moshe Terry. The two joined the committee in place of Iris Stark and Yaakov Nagel, who resigned after the movement for integrity petitioned the High Court of Justice, claiming that the prime minister's men cannot serve as public representatives on the committee.

After his resignation, Nagel harshly criticized the witch-hunt surrounding him and explained that he wanted to avoid delaying 'important appointments that the honorable committee is supposed to discuss'. He was referring to three positions in the public sector: The chief of staff, the police commissioner, and the governor of the Bank of Israel, whose candidates are supposed to appear before the committee.

Nagel, a decent man, must have assumed that immediately after a replacement for him was found, the appointments would be carried out. There is no reason to delay appointment processes, not only in order to prevent unnecessary politicization, but to allow orderly appointment and on-the-job training, which would enable the new appointees to begin their work at ease.

With all due respect to the police and to the Bank of Israel (whose governor has meanwhile been appointed), this all pertains mainly to the IDF. Chief of staff is the second most important position in the country, after the prime minister. He is more important than all the ministers, and certainly than his colleagues, the heads of the other security branches. A whole world of responsibility, much more than a single rank, separates a major general from a chief of staff. Only those who have fulfilled the role can understand the loneliness that is intrinsic to it. Everyone under you is subordinate to you in a hierarchical system and looks up to your decisions; everyone above you is a politician whose interests are sometimes comprised of more than just matters of state. Although he is subordinate to the government, his absolute duty is to the people and to the homeland. He must comply with the decisions of the political echelon, but express his opinion honestly and professionally. This is a complex job which one needs time to grow into; a long time is required in order to prepare for it. Anyone expecting an instant chief of staff, is languishing in dreams.

For all these reasons, a chief of staff should have been appointed long ago to allow the appointee to prepare (and perhaps also to take a short vacation, before he stops sleeping for four years), and to carry out the round of appointments stemming from the decision. This was the original intention. The defense minister, who conducted an orderly process of consultations, announced at the beginning of the summer that he would announce his decision 'by Rosh Hashanah' (the Jewish New Year), and later on – immediately after the appointment of the new members of the committee. Meanwhile, there is no new chief of staff on the horizon. This hints at a difference of opinion between the prime minister and the defense minister regarding the agreed candidate for the position.

The price is being paid not only by the four candidates, whose nerves are ragged, but by national security. 'Soldier no. 1' is not only a symbol; He is the shield of the land, and that is not merely a figure of speech. In order for him to successfully fulfill his task, he must be allowed to enter the job properly. In the current complex regional and domestic reality, an immediate decision is required."

Ends…

 

SAUDI CRISIS WILL HURT ISRAELI TIES: Shlomo Shamir in Maariv explains that the murder of the journalist in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul ignited a wave of angry reactions towards the Saudis, and Trump cannot refrain from responding. The current confrontation will radicalize MBS's objection to the peace plan.

"The Saudi explosive charge in the Oval Office was planted by Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law and chief adviser. The murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate detonated the charge. Because of the close ties that the president developed and cultivated with the Saudis, the White House found itself in an embarrassing and very unpleasant situation. The timing only makes matters worse. A serious crisis in relations with Saudi Arabia three weeks before the midterm elections.

Trump cannot, as is his wont and habit, blame anyone for this mess, because the one to blame is his son-in-law. Immediately after Trump's election, even before his inauguration ceremony, Kushner began negotiations with senior Saudi officials, which turned into a tireless endeavor of courting them. More than a year ago, in negotiations over the huge arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the Saudis complained that the price of the new fighter jets included in the deal was too high. Kushner, who took part in the negotiations, called the CEO of the factory that manufactured the planes, and in the presence of the astonished Saudis, asked her to lower the price of the planes.

 The reason and cause of Jared Kushner's Saudi obsession are not political. The Saudis have a lot of money, and Kushner needs and craves a lot of money. He was also the one who influenced President Trump to hold his first official visit as president to Riyadh. The president's son-in-law then asked and received permission from a Rabbi in New York to fly on Saturday so that he could join in the visit.

The murder of the journalist at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul sparked a wave of angry reactions against Saudi Arabia from Western countries. The American president could not help but respond. He refused to cancel the arms deal, and declared that 'the U.S. will punish Saudi Arabia.' It is unclear how, with what and when.

The abhorrent murder scandal has an unpleasant significance for Israel. According to reports, relations and secret ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia have developed, and there have even been meetings between senior Israeli and Saudi officials. The relationship was damaged following the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem, a move that aroused great anger in the Saudi royal family. In Riyadh they also did not and do not, and that is putting it mildly, like the details of the peace plan, which were reported to them by Kushner when he visited Riyadh. The current crisis in relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia will intensify and radicalize the opposition of the Saudis to the peace plan, and based on the reports, it will cast a cloud over the hidden ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and perhaps block their development."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU'S MIND DEEP IN NEXT ELECTIONS: Yossi Verter in Haaretz argues that there is no doubt that Netanyahu's mind is already focused on his Likud party's next campaign, but also on the day after the election.

"Prime Minister Netanyahu built great expectations when he Tweeted, an hour before the Knesset's winter session opened, that he was about to deliver an 'interesting speech.' The media and political elites waited expectantly. But what we saw from the Knesset podium were the same old tricks from the same old Bibi, which were even staler than usual. The punch lines ('not a stolen country, a golden country!') were weak. The self-glorification ('what a wonderful decade!') was hackneyed. The whining about the media, which undermines freedom of expression, was warmed-over hash reheated for the thousandth time.

The speech was also a spectacular display of effrontery from the man suspected of bribery in two cases, 2000 and 4000, that revolve around allegedly criminal intervention in the media market. And it hit the peak of chutzpah when delivered by a man who tried in the past (and may still be trying) to destroy two media outlets, Channel 10 television and the public broadcasting corporation.

The inevitable sparring with the opposition also never got off the ground. Netanyahu once again called his rivals 'sourpusses.' And the pauper from the villa in Caesarea, which is maintained with great largesse by the state, even complained about 'people who dwell in luxurious living rooms and lofty towers.' That was apparently a reference to former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's luxury apartment in the Akirov Towers.

Netanyahu never mentioned the word 'elections.' But that does not mean that in mid-November, once the runoff elections for mayoral races are over, he will not dissolve the Knesset on some pretext or another. What is really sour here is the stench given off by this government. But in any event, it will complete almost a full four-year term, a great political achievement for the man who heads it. Barring a war, heaven forbid, it no longer has anything to do. There is no doubt that Netanyahu's mind is already focused on his Likud party's next campaign, but also on the day after the election.

One name he did mention in his speech was Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon, chairman of the Kulanu party, whom he credited with the 'major achievement' of lowering both housing prices and unemployment. Netanyahu is not usually generous in handing out credit, except when doing so serves his needs. In contrast, the name of his Likud colleague, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz, somehow escaped him, even though he bestowed lavish praise on the 'unprecedented revolution in transportation' that occurred during the past wonderful decade, his decade ('trains, tunnels, roads, tunnels'). This praise proved a jinx. He had only just finished speaking when the train on the brand-new line between Ben-Gurion Airport and Jerusalem got stuck in one of those vaunted tunnels.

Tzipi Livni, delivering her first speech as opposition leader during the current Knesset, was very downbeat. Like Netanyahu, she was appealing to her base, the center-left. She called the prime minister a 'criminal suspect' and declared that 'corruption is a way of life' for the state's current leadership. She did not hesitate to bring Netanyahu's family into the mix. ('The state does not belong only to you or your family.') It is about time. Netanyahu's family is fair game. His wife is accused of aggravated fraud in a case that involved stealing public funds. His son Yair, whose bodyguards and drivers are government workers, regularly spews hate speech against half the country.

Livni's speech included all the requisite elements: The Declaration of Independence, support for the media and a defense of state institutions like the State Prosecutor's Office and the army, which are under attack from Netanyahu's flunkies – MKs David Amsalem, David Bitan and Co. But that was also more of the same, nothing we have not heard before. Perhaps Livni and her colleagues in the opposition should have tried a different tack – mocking a government which, on matters of national security, looks like a helpless government, one with no answer but empty bluster to the incendiary kites and balloons from the Gaza Strip. Instead of fighting Hamas, Likud is fighting the army chief of staff. Instead of finding a solution for the communities near Gaza, the education minister, a member of the security cabinet, is abusing the defense minister.

'That debate which is a source of pride and strength for a democracy sometimes becomes a parody of democracy,' President Reuven Rivlin said in his speech. He was referring to Israeli society as a whole, but he could just as well have been referring to Israel's government in the run-up to the 2019 elections."

Ends…

 

QUNEITRA HOPE: In its editorial The Jerusalem Post hopes that with the border crossing reopened and the Syrian regime expected to keep the area demilitarized based on the 1974 agreement, there is a chance that relative peace may return.

"On Monday, the Quneitra border crossing between Israel and Syria was reopened after four years. The crossing was closed in 2014 during the Syrian civil war and its reopening comes after the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad retook the border areas from Syrian rebels in July.

During those four years, tensions were high because of the proximity of Iranian-supported militias and concerns that Iran would exploit the instability in Southern Syria to move its forces close to Israel. Israel warned that Iran must withdraw from Syria and the Syrian regime's media reported Israeli air strikes in Syria. In early September, Jerusalem said that it had struck Iranian targets more than 200 times in two years, revealing the scale of the shadow war against Iran in Syria. However, that conflict almost created a major diplomatic incident with Russia in mid-September when a Russian aircraft was struck by Syrian air defense during an air strike in Latakia. Russia sent its S-300 system to Syria and Jerusalem has been more cautious since then.

On Sunday, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman told the cabinet that Israel was prepared for any scenario and that the IDF was in a 'top state of readiness.' The opening of the Quneitra crossing indicates that confidence. Security and calm have returned to the Golan after months of fighting earlier this year led to numerous sirens and fears of threats. A missile volley from Syria was intercepted along with drones and one Syrian aircraft. In addition, the chaos in Southern Syria caused thousands of refugees to flee to the border fence.

Israel has pulled back its medical support that it once provided the Syrian rebels. Now the border has returned to a normalcy not seen since 2011. The re-opening of the gate will assist in implementing the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, which mainly focuses on the declaration of an area of separation, a demilitarized zone between the two countries. Israel coordinated the opening with the U.S. and UN and Jerusalem says it is "dedicated to UNDOF's [United Nations Disengagement Observer Force] mission and aspires to maintain stability in the region."

The IDF says that the closure of the crossing and the security reality from 2015 to 2018 'did not allow cooperative security measures to be carried out in the Quneitra Crossing, while maintaining quiet and stability in the space.' This is important because the area along the border between the cease-fire lines of Alpha and Bravo had been violated during the civil war and militants and other threats could have threatened the Golan. In addition, the withdrawal of UNDOF made the situation more chaotic and caused a heightened degree of tension along the fence. Israel has improved the fence and has learned from the previous four years, but for the civilians who live near the border, the last years have been an uncertain time.

The return of the UNDOF forces and the changes at the border, so soon after the July offensive by the Syrian regime, shouldn't be underestimated. They are important symbols of normalcy in the region after the stability and chaos unleashed by the Arab spring. We now know that the hopes and dreams of that period were dashed and turned into a hell of terrorism and the rise of the Iranian regime. Hezbollah has exploited the chaos in Syria to sink its claws into the landscape.

Now, with the border crossing reopened and the Syrian regime expected to keep the area demilitarized based on the 1974 agreement, there is a chance that the paradigm of relative peace may return. In another sign pointing to that, the Jordan border crossing with Southern Syria also reopened.

The reopening of the Quneitra crossing will also benefit the Druze community in the Golan. In years past, they have exported apples to Syria and they have also had joint weddings, crossing the border to marry. This community was threatened during the war, with the village of al-Khader being targeted by jihadists. In addition, Druze in Suwaida were massacred by ISIS. Now the community can recover and reach out to co-religionists on the other side.

The Quneitra crossing is a symbol of the ties that bind Israel to its neighbors. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the Syrian regime and its allies, peace has not prospered, but the reopening represents hope after years of massacre and war."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 16.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Crime and cover-up

2-Opening the border crossings

 

1-Crime and cover-up

 

King Salman was telling the truth when he insisted that he knows nothing to the U.S. president. After all, his crown-prince Mohammad bin Salman is the actual ruler of the Kingdom. And all fingers point to him and his surrounding coterie. For who inside the Saudi security agencies would have dared to carry out such a crime in a Saudi consulate, assassinate a famous journalist, and send private jets with a team of 15 security men to Istanbul other than the highest official and the man who has the final say inside the Kingdom today? After all, he who took the decision to wage war on Yemen would not hesitate to assassinate a journalist who used to be a member of the Saudi inner circle but subsequently became a dissident…The pressing question now concerns the identity of the 'scapegoat' who will be sacrificed to absolve the Saudi monarch, his crown-prince, and the Kingdom's senior officials of the crime. Moreover, what will Turkey and the U.S be paid in return for helping to 'cover up' this murder and turn the leaf on it--'Abdelbari Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

Riyadh has no alternative but to submit to international pressures demanding to know the truth behind Khashoggi's disappearance. Against this background, the joint statement from the foreign ministries of France, Germany, and the UK that was later joined by Spain, as well as the confusion in the Saudi statements – which have vacillated between threats of counter-measures and attempts to soften them to such an extent that they have been effectively withdrawn – represent additional and successive factors pressuring Riyadh. But this does not mean that the Saudi authorities will admit to the consulate's, and hence the crown-prince's personal responsibility for Khashoggi's murder. It also does not rule out the possibility of producing some sort of scapegoat who assumes the burden of the crime on behalf of its actual and primary perpetrator. Finally, it does not rule out the possibility that the entire case will be 'wrapped up,' indicating that the billions of Davos in the Desert have succeeded in covering up the murder at the consulate--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

Trump's enemies – the left inside the U.S., and Iran and Qatar outside – hope that the Democrats will win, thereby weakening him and increasing the chances of his impeachment. However, after his recent victories, they have reached the certain conclusion that he himself is a center of power and that he will implement the sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the Republicans may win again, which would fortify his position. Once this realization sank in, Iran and Qatar's cells intensified their offensive on the Kingdom because it is one of Trump's most important allies. The Western left – as represented by Democrat politicians, CNN, MSNBC, The Washington Post, and The New York Times – allied itself with them. And their joint aim is to ruin the Kingdom's relationship with the U.S. on the one hand, and to pressure Trump on the other, in the hope that he may back down from implementing the sanctions on Iran--Ahmad al-Farraj in Saudi al-Jazeera

The Saudi leadership needs to consider the Arab and Islamic popular pressure on Turkey to adopt a severe position towards Saudi Arabia. This is less a matter of supporting Erdogan as it much as it represents a terrible collapse of the Kingdom's soft power. The Kingdom has lost its popular Arab and Islamic credit because of its rash policies. It has established close relations with the Zionists, joined Abu-Dhabi in the destruction of Yemen and Libya, marginalized Egypt, stirred hatred and hostility towards the Palestinians, backed tyrants such as Bashar al-Assad, acted in highhanded manner with Kuwait and Oman, and wallowed in racism towards the Yemenis and other residents in the Kingdom. One last word: He who digs holes for others to fall in will fall into one of them sooner or later, and pay the price for his sins and iniquities--Ibrahim Falamarzi in Qatari Asharq

 

President Trump's hints that 'rogue killers' may have been behind Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder suggest that a deal is being hatched between Washington, Riyadh, and Ankara in order to save Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who is most likely responsible for this crime, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. A scapegoat will be found, and Saudi Arabia will be forced to pay huge sums of money to the U.S. The Khashoggi case is already having major political and economic repercussions for Saudi Arabia and its allies, notes the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. Despite the joint Turkish/Saudi search of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Saudi money may yet succeed in absolving bin Salman of his responsibility. The ferocious attacks on Saudi Arabia against the background of the Khashoggi case are the product of an unholy alliance between Iran and Qatar on the one hand, and the Western left represented by the Democratic Party and the leading American media on the other, claims a Saudi commentator. The goal is to destroy the historic Saudi/U.S. alliance. The Saudi leadership cannot escape the consequences of the crime that was committed in its Istanbul consulate, insists a Qatari commentator. Moreover, it has failed to build a supportive popular base either inside Saudi Arabia or in the broader Arab and Islamic worlds.

 

[Reuters reports: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met Saudi Arabia's King Salman on Tuesday to discuss the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, as Turkish police prepared to search the Saudi consul's residence in Istanbul in a widening probe. Turkish officials say they believe he was murdered there and his body removed, which the Saudis strongly deny. After talks with the king, Pompeo met Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir and will have dinner with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. He may go on to Turkey. Overnight, Turkish crime scene investigators entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the last place Khashoggi was seen before vanishing, for the first time and searched the premises for over nine hours, Reuters witnesses said. A Turkish foreign ministry source said the police would search the consulate again on Tuesday as well as the consul's residence, which Turkish television has previously reported could be linked to Khashoggi's disappearance. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, speaking to reporters in parliament, raised the possibility that parts of the consulate had been repainted. "The investigation is looking into many things such as toxic materials and those materials being removed by painting them over," he said.]

 

'ROGUE KILLERS': "When U.S. President Donald Trump says that 'rogue killers' may have been responsible for murdering the journalist Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, and that Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdelaziz has firmly denied all knowledge of what happened, this means that the search for a scapegoat on whom to pin the crime has begun, and that a tripartite U.S./Turkish/Saudi deal may have been concluded with the object of sealing this dossier, perhaps once and for all", writes Editor-in- Chief 'Abdelbari Atwan on today's London-based, pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

King Salman's claim to have ordered an internal investigation into this crime amounts to an 'admission' that the Saudis are implicated in it. It represents a climb down from all the kingdom's previous positions over the past 13 days in which it has denied having any role and insisted that Khashoggi left the consulate twenty minutes after entering it, going so far as to claim that the Saudi authorities are concerned about his disappearance.

We believe that the main turning-point that led to this official Saudi climb down was the Reuters report quoting two official Turkish security sources that the country's security agencies are in possession of an audiotape that confirms Khashoggi's murder inside the consulate, and that copies of it may have been sent to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

King Salman was telling the truth when he insisted that he knows nothing to the U.S. president. After all, his crown-prince Mohammad bin Salman is the actual ruler of the Kingdom. And all fingers point to him and his surrounding coterie. For who inside the Saudi security agencies would have dared to carry out such a crime in a Saudi consulate, assassinate a famous journalist, and send private jets with a team of 15 security men to Istanbul, other than the highest official and the man who has the final say inside the Kingdom today? After all, he who took the decision to wage war on Yemen would not hesitate to assassinate a journalist who used to be a member of the Saudi inner circle but subsequently became a dissident.

King Salman's interventions (or rather, those made in his name) whenever the Kingdom finds itself in a difficult crisis have become a customary practice. When Saudi Arabia and its crown-prince were accused of backing the [U.S. sponsored Palestinian/Israeli] deal of the century with the Judaization of occupied Jerusalem as its major pillar, the Saudi monarch came out with a statement that stressed that his country's commitment to the [2002/07] Arab Peace Initiative and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and that it would never agree to anything that was unacceptable to the Palestinians. The same [climb-down] scenario is now being repeated to the letter.

The pressing question now concerns the identity of the 'scapegoat' who will be sacrificed to absolve the Saudi monarch, his crown-prince, and the Kingdom's senior officials of the crime. Moreover, what will Turkey and the U.S be paid in return for helping to 'cover up' this murder and turn the leaf on it?

In order answer these questions (or at least some of them), we should reexamine the [1988] Lockerbie bombing case and the deal that saved Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, lifted the charges against him, and ended the suffocating siege that was imposed on Libya. It is ironic that Saudi Arabia and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, its ambassador to Washington at the time, were among the most prominent architects of that deal.

I personally met with the main culprit in that affair – or, rather, the Libyan scapegoat in that deal, namely, 'Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the Libyan security officer who was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of planting the suitcase bomb that destroyed the Pan-Am plane over Scotland in which some 300 passengers died. Megrahi, who invited me to visit him in his Glasgow prison, confirmed that he played no role at all in that crime. He was suffering from prostrate cancer that had metastasized all over his body, and had only a few months to live before his certain death. And he cried in front of me in a way that I have never seen or heard a man do in my life.

Megrahi told me that he had the courage to say that he had committed the crime since he had nothing left to lose on the brink of death. But he insisted that he was used as a pretext and a victim to save others. Moreover, a few weeks later, the former Libyan foreign minister, 'Abderrahman Shalgham – who is a school friend of mine – confirmed to me that Libya had nothing to do with the Lockerbie incident and that it had to pay up around $3 billion in compensation to the U.S. for Libya's sake so as to lift the siege imposed on it. Shalgham is still alive [and can be asked about this].

For the third time, we say that deals take precedence over the principles of human rights, especially for a president such as Trump who only believes in hard cash and is good at nothing besides blackmailing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and looting most of their billions. Never in the U.S.'s history has an American leader engaged in extortion in this insolent manner. He even 'shamed' these [Gulf] states four times over a few days, claiming that their governments would not remain in power for even two weeks without American protection. In fact, he went on to say something even more serious when he hinted that Iran could occupy Saudi Arabia in 12 minutes without American protection.

We do not know what sum Trump will receive in return for his role in extracting the Saudi government from this crisis with the least possible harm. But we can speculate that it will be more than hundreds of millions of dollars. In fact, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who left for Riyadh on Monday must be carrying the 'bill' that will include the details of these sums.

God have mercy on Jamal Khashoggi, whether he is dead or alive. We believe that the next press scoop that will occupy the headlines will be the discovery of his corpse, its location, and how he was murdered in the Saudi consulate.

"The coming days will show that we are right," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

RAPIDLY UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS: "Developments linked to Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance inside his country's consulate in Istanbul have been unfolding rapidly," noes Tuesday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This is the result of many factors that have begun to point to the likelihood that he was tortured and savagely murdered, and whose astonishing details and conclusive evidence have become difficult for Saudi Arabia's allies and friends to ignore, or cover up.

One important political development concerns the UAE, the Kingdom's most prominent Gulf ally. Abu-Dhabi's Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Zayed has cancelled a visit to France that was supposed to begin today, and on which much hope had been pinned to improve the UAE's image since it is Saudi Arabia's most important partner in the Yemen war, and to reintroduce it into Europe via the French gateway. There was no pressing reason to prevent bin Zayed from carrying out this important visit other than the fact that he anticipated the scale of his embarrassment before public opinion and the press in France due to Abu-Dhabi's support for Riyadh and its adoption of the Saudi narrative regarding the Khashoggi case.

In terms of the economic, financial, and investment costs, the Saudi stock market index fell by 7%, its largest such fall since December 2014 when the price of oil was noticeably dropping. The Saudi currency's rate of exchange also fell to its lowest level in two years, while the price of Saudi stocks on the international markets also fell after growing indications that the projected investments may subside after major projects inside the Kingdom have been frozen. But the clearest indication that the markets were influenced by the Khashoggi case came from the series of withdrawals from the 'Davos in the Desert' conference that Riyadh is organizing and intends to hold in a few days' time, and that is personally sponsored by Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

The latest security and judicial developments took the shape of press reports that Prince Khaled al-Faisal, the Emir of the Mecca Region and the Saudi King's advisor, has reached Ankara and met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This means that certain elements of the Khashoggi dossier may be in the process of being handed over to the 'Faisali' branch of Al Saud, which may end up as a double-edged sword that is both in favor and against bin Salman's interests.

On the other hand, Saudi intelligence head Khalid al-Humaidan's visit to Turkey to join the joint Turkish/Saudi working group, followed by the announcement that the Turkish authorities have begun to search the Saudi consulate, confirm that Riyadh has no alternative but to submit to international pressures demanding to know the truth behind Khashoggi's disappearance. Against this background, the joint statement from the foreign ministries of France, Germany, and the UK that was later joined by Spain, as well as the confusion in the Saudi statements – which have vacillated between threats of counter-measures and attempts to soften them to such an extent that they have been effectively withdrawn– represent additional and successive factors pressuring Riyadh.

But this does not mean that the Saudi authorities will admit to the consulate's, and hence the crown-prince's personal responsibility for Khashoggi's murder. It also does not rule out the possibility of producing some sort of scapegoat who assumes the burden of the crime on behalf of its actual and primary perpetrator.

"Finally, it does not rule out the possibility that the entire case will be 'wrapped up,' indicating that the billions of Davos in the Desert have succeeded in covering up the murder at the consulate," concludes the daily.

End…

 

AN ASTONISHING CAMPAIGN: "Observers must have been astonished by the recent media campaign against the Kingdom that is unprecedented by all criteria," writes Ahmad al-Farraj in Tuesday's Saudi daily al-Jazeera.

This is clearly a systematic campaign that has been pre-planned for some time. Various parties East and West are playing pre-arranged roles in it, and anyone who looks at the picture in its entirety cannot but link the events to each other in order to reach a conclusion.

The entire story began when Trump won the presidency against Hillary Clinton, who was going to continue with Obama's soft policies towards terrorism and the rogue states backing it. Then lightning struck and reshuffled these forces' cards after Trump decided that the Kingdom would be the destination for his first foreign visit. This represented a major blow to these forces that had exploited Obama's weakness in order to wreak havoc in the region, especially since Obama had undermined the historic relations between the U.S. and the Kingdom.

Ever since that time, the media cells backed by Qatar began working on targeting the Kingdom. This stemmed from the knowledge that reviving the historic alliance between the Kingdom and the U.S. would undermine all the evil schemes that had almost destroyed the region, whether that of Iranian expansion or the project for Arab revolutions that the Obama administration had sponsored and Qatar had financed.

But these media cells did not only belong to the Arab East. Qatar managed to buy Western journalists, some of whom we believed were leading figures such as [former Guardian editorialist and current Mideast Eye editor] David Hearst.

And when Trump announced his withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, these cells' attacks on the Kingdom intensified via the West's leftist press and the online websites that Qatar has been financing with its golden coins. But while Qatar and Iran were promoting the notion of Trump's impeachment, the U.S. president was achieving major victories. His popularity increased after his great political and economic achievements, and after he succeeded in restoring the U.S.'s prestige and power to pre-Obama levels.

Economic sanctions await Iran on November 4th and the U.S. mid-term congressional elections will be held on November 6th. Trump's enemies – the left inside the U.S., and Iran and Qatar outside – hope that the Democrats will win, thereby weakening him and increasing the chances of his impeachment. However, after his recent victories, they have reached the certain conclusion that he himself is a center of power and that he will implement the sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the Republicans may win again, which would fortify his position.

Once this realization sank in, Iran and Qatar's cells intensified their offensive on the Kingdom because it is one of Trump's most important allies. The Western left – as represented by Democrat politicians, CNN, MSNBC, The Washington Post, and The New York Times – allied itself with them. And their joint aim is to ruin the Kingdom's relationship with the U.S. on the one hand, and to pressure Trump on the other, in the hope that he may back down from implementing the sanctions on Iran.

In short, the ferocious attack on the Kingdom is the result of the mutual services exchanged between Qatar and Iran's cells on the one hand, and the Western left on the other. And the target is the historic alliance between the Kingdom and the U.S.

"But they will be defeated," concludes Farraj.

End…

 

THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION: "Most people are asking what happened to Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, whereas the more important question is what will happen as a result of this heinous crime in which the Kingdom [Saudi Arabia] surpassed itself in its black human rights' record and its rash policies against states and nations," writes Ibrahim Falamarzi in Tuesday's Qatari daily Asharq.

So, what are the possible scenarios in this regard?

- First, the Lockerbie scenario: In 1988, the Qadhafi regime blew up an American civilian aircraft over Lockerbie in Scotland. A huge international uproar against Libya followed, forcing Qadhafi to sacrifice two of his intelligence heads, who were handed over to an international court in Holland. In 2003, the regime admitted its responsibility for the bombing and paid billions of dollars in compensation.

But such a scenario is unlikely in the case of the consulate crime because this is a humanitarian and political crime that occurred inside a Saudi diplomatic building upon the direct orders and follow-up from the Saudi leadership. This makes it difficult for the world to accept the sacrifice of the fifteen people who actually carried out the crime, presenting them as criminals who acted on their own behalf without referring back to their leadership. Moreover, these fifteen people do not have sufficient weight to serve as political compensation for Turkey or to appease the international community.

- Second, the Rafiq Hariri scenario: In 2005, Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri was assassinated by blowing up his car in Beirut. As a result of enormous international pressure, Syrian forces left Lebanon and Bashar al-Assad began to eliminate leading Syrian figures such as then interior minister and former head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon Ghazi Kan'an, but whose death was publicized as suicide because of his links to Hariri's assassination.

This scenario is also very unlikely in the case of consulate crime because the interior and foreign ministers, as well as senior Saudi security officials are all members of the ruling family or hail from major tribes. They were appointed by royal decree, and it is impossible to sacrifice one (or some) of them and pin responsibility for the crime on them. Moreover, the result would not be guaranteed if one of them were to decide to save himself and admit to the facts.

- Third, the Naksa scenario: After the Arabs' defeat in the 1967 war, Jamal 'Abdel Nasser delivered a speech to the Arab nation in which he announced that he bears full responsibility for what happened and that he resigns as Egypt's president. The Arabs and Egyptians took to the streets in huge demonstrations, pleading with him to withdraw his resignation, which he did.

But this scenario is also impossible in the consulate case because, despite his regime's mistake, Nasser was pursuing an Arab nationalist and Egyptian patriotic project for which he created a strong popular base it and whose policies it supported. There is nothing of the sort to compare in the Saudi leadership's policies.

All this leads us to two very important conclusions that militate against the Saudi leadership's desire to get rid of the consequences of the crime:

--The domestic popular base: It is worth noting that the Saudi leadership did not address its people directly, but via those of its journalists and clerics and 'electronic flies' [social media contributors] who suffer from a dearth of culture and political awareness, in an attempt to create a reliable popular base to confront the crime's consequences. They are all promoting worthless ideas that speak of an international conspiracy against their country, claiming that the Qatari and Turkish intelligence agencies are responsible for Khashoggi's disappearance, or urging the people to remain silent and leave the matter to the wali al-amr [the Saudi monarch] and the clerics – as the imam of the Mecca Mosque said in last Friday's sermon.

But the Saudi leadership is forgetting that the people, who are waiting for the promises of reforms that would save them from detention, taxes and unemployment to be fulfilled, expect what happened to be exposed and the perpetrators to be punished. But time has run out and there little of it left after the crime; consequently it is no longer possible to build such a popular base.

--The Arab and Islamic popular base: The Saudi leadership needs to consider the Arab and Islamic popular pressure on Turkey to adopt a severe position towards Saudi Arabia. This is less a matter of supporting Erdogan as it much as it represents a terrible collapse of the Kingdom's soft power. The Kingdom has lost its popular Arab and Islamic credit because of its rash policies. It has established close relations with the Zionists, joined Abu-Dhabi in the destruction of Yemen and Libya, marginalized Egypt, stirred hatred and hostility towards the Palestinians, backed tyrants such as Bashar al-Assad, acted in highhanded manner with Kuwait and Oman, and wallowed in racism towards the Yemenis and other residents in the Kingdom.

"One last word: He who digs holes for others to fall in will fall into one of them sooner or later and pay the price for his sins and iniquities," concludes Falamarzi.

Ends…

 

2-Opening the border crossings

 

Syria has a great interest in reopening the [Jordan border] crossings. In political terms, this represents a development that underlines the return of Syrian sovereignty and normal life to its borders while it waits for its borders with Iraq and Turkey to be reopened. Until then, Jordan will serve as main linkage point with the international trade markets for Syria and a major gateway to rebuild what the war has destroyed. The private sector in both countries is expected to launch joint projects as well as trade deals that will benefit their respective economies…the two countries also need to bolster their embassies in Amman and Damascus with diplomatic cadres so as to parallel the development of their economic relations in a manner that paves the way for raising the level of diplomatic representation at a later phase. Jordan's interest lies in its Arab neighbors, primarily Syria and Iraq, regaining their stability and security, after it has paid a heavy price for the anarchy and destruction that have befallen these two brotherly states--Fahd al-Khitan in Jordanian al-Ghad

Syria, Iraq, and Jordan's interests required that the crossings to be reopened quickly once their use had become safe, after the terrorists had been expelled from them. But the U.S. used its influence in Jordan and Iraq to delay their reopening as a means of exerting pressure on the Syrian state, transforming the crossings into a card with which to blackmail Syria and its allies. It seems, however, that the change in the balance of power and in the equations on the ground whether as a result of the Syrian army and its allies' victories in Syria or the results of the Iraqi elections, has forced the U.S. to loosen its grip and to take Jordan and Iraq's interests into consideration--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Yesterday's (Monday's) reopening of the Nasib/Jaber border crossing between Jordan and Syria confirms that Amman refused to submit to foreign pressure to delay this reopening, argues a Jordanian commentator. Diplomatic steps taken in tandem with the revival of trade and economic exchanges between the two sides should now be pursued. Reopening Nasib and the expected reopening of another crossing between Syria and Iraq point to a new U.S. policy towards this issue, maintains a commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Washington has been forced to take the Syrian army's victory and the results of the Iraqi elections into consideration, and has acted pragmatically.

 

PRECONDITIONS SATISFIED: "The government has fulfilled its promise to open the border crossings with Syria once its preconditions have been satisfied," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

This belies the claim repeated by some, alleging that foreign pressures on Jordan have prevented it from taking its independent decision in this regard.

Three years ago, Jordan was forced to shut down the border crossings with Syria after the manifestations of sovereignty on the Syrian side had vanished. But, as soon as the Syrian forces and their executive agencies returned, joint technical and security committees were formed to agree on the arrangements that would ensure the Nasib/Jaber crossing's reopening.

The process is still at its beginnings because the technical arrangements on the Syrian side have yet to be completed. Despite this, Jordan is providing our Syrian brothers with the necessary services regarding the inspection and clearance of goods until the reconstruction and re-equipment operations in the Syrian customs' center have been completed.

Optimism has spread on both sides of the border at the opening of the crossing. And, yesterday, Jordan gave a very warm welcome to the first Syrian economic delegation representing the private sector, while the first Jordanian truck filled with vegetables crossed towards Damascus.

It will take a few more weeks before the movement of trade between the two countries regains its former momentum. This will be in both their interest as well as Lebanon, which has been very keen on reopening the crossings so as to resume its vegetable and fruits exports to the Jordanian market and to the Gulf markets via Jordan.

Syria has a great interest in reopening the crossings. In political terms, this represents a development that underlines the return of Syrian sovereignty and normal life to its borders while it waits for its borders with Iraq and Turkey to be reopened. Until then, Jordan will serve as main linkage point with the international trade markets for Syria and a major gateway to rebuild what the war has destroyed.

The private sector in both countries is expected to launch joint projects as well as trade deals that will benefit their respective economies. Mutual interests should determine the two countries' relationship in the coming transitional phase.

During the coming phase as well, the two countries also need to bolster their embassies in Amman and Damascus with diplomatic cadres so as to parallel the development of their economic relations in a manner that paves the way for raising the level of diplomatic representation at a later phase.

Jordan's interest lies in its Arab neighbors, primarily Syria and Iraq, regaining their stability and security, after it has paid a heavy price for the anarchy and destruction that have befallen these two brotherly states.

The refugee issue is of common concern for both sides. Jordan's duty is to work with the Syrian side and the UN, so as to facilitate the Syrians' return to their homes. This requires us to support the reconstruction efforts and the Syrian economy's revival, which would secure the appropriate social environment for the Syrians wishing to return.

Jordan is not beginning from point zero in these efforts. It has forcefully backed the effort to restore security to the Syrian South and helped to prepare the conditions for the Syrian army's return to the borders and the deployment of security forces in the areas evacuated by the armed and terrorist groups.

"The Jordanians are not hiding their satisfaction at the reopening of the borders with Syria, just as they did when the Karama Crossing was reopened with Iraq. For despite the ruin that has befallen our Arab nation, the sense of collective identity and common fate continues dominate the Jordanians' consciousness," concludes Khitan.

End…

 

REOPENING AGREED: "Jordan agreed to reopen the Nasib/Jaber crossing that links Syria to Jordan," notes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The crossing's reopening coincided with the Iraqi foreign minister's visit to Syria, with expectations that reopening the Abu-Kamal/Qa'im crossing will also be considered, a topic Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem discussed with the visiting minister. But reopening that crossing may still be postponed until the new Iraqi government is formed.

Nonetheless, one may conclude that the U.S., which planned and led the war on Syria, has given the green light to reopen the borders between Syria and Jordan and Syria and Iraq. Reopening the crossing that links the occupied Golan Heights with Syria was announced from Washington. It is worth noting here that reopening the Nasib/Jaber crossing also coincided with reopening the Quneitra crossing.

In short, reopening the border crossings, especially between Syria and Jordan, and the expected reopening of the borders between Iraq and Syria are primarily the result of U.S. decisions. After all, it was not Syrian/Jordanian or Syrian/Iraqi disagreements that prevented the border crossings between Syria and Jordan and Syria and Iraq from being reopened.

Syria had already announced its readiness to reopen the border crossings with Iraq more than six months ago. It also announced its readiness to reopen the border crossings with Jordan more than two weeks ago. However, Jordanian officials said that the technical measures had still not been completed, while the Syrian state was ready.

The delay in reopening the crossings was most likely, to have been the result of an American decision or policy. Consequently, reopening them reflects a new policy that acknowledges the fact that the Syrian state has emerged victorious from the war waged on it. In such circumstances, political realism requires all parties involved in the war, no matter how important and powerful they may be, to admit this fact and act accordingly. Denying reality in this respect is futile and could yield negative results for those who do so.

Syria, Iraq, and Jordan's interests required that the crossings to be reopened quickly once their use had become safe, after the terrorists had been expelled from them. But the U.S. used its influence in Jordan and Iraq to delay their reopening as a means of exerting pressure on the Syrian state, transforming the crossings into a card with which to blackmail Syria and its allies. It seems, however, that the change in the balance of power and in the equations on the ground whether as a result of the Syrian army and its allies' victories in Syria or the results of the Iraqi elections, has forced the U.S. to loosen its grip and to take Jordan and Iraq's interests into consideration.

"After all, these interests will be harmed as much as Syria as a result of the continued closure of the border crossings," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 16.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

BRUNSON CASE: After the resolution of the Brunson affair with Washington, Abdulkadir Selvi eyes another potential deal with the EU in center-right Hurriyet: "The best part about the Brunson crisis was Turkey's return to the EU agenda. Now all eyes are on the 'Judicial Reform Strategy' to be announced at the Reform Action meeting scheduled for December 11th. However, one issue needs to be resolved: The continued arrest of businessman Osman Kavala. Just as Brunson's release presented a chance to change a crisis into an opportunity in Turkish-American relations, we can achieve the same in our relations with the EU through Kavala."

Mustafa Balbay rails against the course of the Brunson case in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "The practice of secret witnesses continued after Ergenekon [2008 alleged coup] trial. It almost always produced bad results. Brunson's case laid this bare before the entire world. Let us ask: Where in the world would a court case be based on two secret witnesses who would change their testimonies 180 degrees, and a verdict would be made pretending that both were normal, and that this country could then be called a state of law? Secret witnesses are identified by code names. The secret witnesses in the Brunson case were code named Sword and Dagger! We congratulate those who picked these names. There is no better explanation of how the judiciary got perforated by a wedge."

Necmettin Batirel detects a sour taste in his mouth in pro-government Turkiye: "Brunson remained under arrest for 20 months for the crime he committed, the economy was hit worse than in the 2016 coup attempt. The prosecutor who prepared the indictment and the judge who accepted it surely had no idea that the court case, which cost the country billions of dollars, was going to end in this way. In the end, the pastor was convicted, despite the sharp discrepancy between the demanded sentence and what he got, and he was released in consideration of the time he spent in jail and escaped back to his country with the speed of light, leaving a wreck behind. Now, we are trying to clean up this mess."

 

KHASHOGGI CASE: Ibrahim Tigli smells a rat in pro-government Yeni Safak: "Turkey should display what role the Saudi government has chosen to play by thoroughly investigating the case of Saudi journalist Jalal Khashoggi. One should not fall into the trap of the Saudi rhetoric of bribery under the guise of aid or investment. Because the Saudi king's use of the concept of 'brotherly country' when thanking Turkey is, in a way, proof that he is asking for a deal."

 

TREASURY TAKEOVER: Ufuk Soylemez is appalled by a government move in nationalist opposition Aydinlik: "The transfer of the CHP's (main opposition Republican People's Party's) 28 percent minority shares in the Turkiye Is Bank to the treasury should be treated as a total annexation and hijacking of rights. Such a deed would seriously hurt the credibility of the bank in business and economy circles at home and abroad, which it has built with great diligence and success, as well as its impartial and objective banking activities. It would also confirm that Turkey has become a state of authoritarian laws run by a single party and a single man."

 

Iran media watch

 

OIL MINISTER VISITS RUSSIA: Iranian broadcast media highlighted Oil Minister Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh's "unexpected" visit to Moscow yesterday and his meeting with his Russian counterpart Aleksandr Novak. State radio channel VIRI noted that the meeting was held behind closed doors. It quoted Zanganeh as saying that gas and oil cooperation, the world oil market, and oil extraction under OPEC memoranda of understanding (MOUs) were on the agenda.

 

KHASHOGGI: Iranian media continues to follow developments in the case of vanished Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Rolling news channel IRINN and English-language Press TV led with Turkish investigators' findings, which they said showed "evidence" of the possible killing of the journalist in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. VIRI outlined a potential "U.S./Saudi scenario" absolving Saudi Crown-Prince Muhammad bin Salman over the case. Moderate newspaper Shoru' speculated on the episode's effects on the global oil market, while hardline daily Vatan-e Emruz suggested the Saudis may have played a similarly sinister role in the death of Iranian diplomat (Ambassador to Lebanon) Ghazanfar Roknabadi in 2015. He is said to have died in the Mina stampede during the Hajj pilgrimage.

 

FATF OFFICIAL'S INTERVIEW: Iranian newspapers widely discussed the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Executive Secretary David Lewis's interview with the BBC yesterday. Centrist, reformist, and moderate newspapers, including Ettela'at, Setare-yeh Sobh, and Mardom Salari, highlighted parts of the interview in which Lewis said that Iran joining the FATF would guarantee security for investors in the country. Conservative dailies took another tack, and quoted Lewis as saying that passing the laws required for joining the FATF by Iran cannot guarantee its removal from the FATF's "black list". Ultra-conservative Keyhan published remarks by a commentator who challenged Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to guarantee economic benefits if Iran joined the FATF and CFT (Combating Financing of Terrorism) conventions. Siyasat-e Ruz remarked that according to international standards, Iran stands as a supporter of terrorism, and therefore, the country should not ratify FATF legislation only to suffer by being in contravention of it.

 

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ECONOMISTS: Reformist and moderate newspapers today made President Rowhani's meeting with economists yesterday their top story, although some complained that the gathering was held in a closed session with no reporters present. "Economists' secret meeting with the president!" wrote reformist Seda-ye Eslahat. Conservative newspaper Khorasan said the president "listened and responded to harsh criticisms" during the meeting.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Following a Twitter storm yesterday evening, the hashtag 'Listen to women' is trending, gathering almost 15,000 mentions in the last 12 hours alone. The hashtag and its subsequent popularity appear to have been launched in part by the Imam Ali Popular Students' Relief Society. In their call for the Twitter storm last night the organization, also known as the Society of Students against Poverty, invited people to be "the voice of women against violence". Women and men alike shared stories on cyberspace of abuse and expressed solidarity with victims. A feminist activist wrote: "It had been one month since we got married, he came home drunk, when I asked him why he came home late, he shouted so much that the whole building could hear. Then he threw me against the wall and broke my nose. From that day on I never fought with him again because I was afraid and everyone asked me why I put up with so much…" Some 1,750 unique accounts have engaged with the hashtag, which has grown popular among anti-regime social media users. Persian speakers outside of Iran have also engaged with the hashtag. Whilst not as popular on Instagram as on Twitter, a post by an Iranian in Tbilisi detailing her personal experience of "abuse" from radical feminists gained almost 5,000 likes on the image-sharing platform.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 15.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

BRUNSON RELEASE: Rauf Tamer finds it hard to please everyone in centrist tabloid Posta: "For months, we paid a high price, including a slump in the dollar to lira exchange rate. Why? Simply because we resisted and protected our judiciary's honor. Now it seems that this was all for nothing. Now someone dares to ask: how come a 35-year-long sentence passed on [U.S. pastor Brunson] gets reduced to three-to-five years? But it does. There are court cases where the prosecutor asks for life imprisonment, yet the court rules for a release. What do they want? 35 years? But this would not have made them happy, either. It would have been called it a political decision and they would have started to scream. What is wrong with everyone?"

Melih Altinok asserts Turkey's independent path in pro-government Sabah: "Turkey is pursuing a multi-dimensional policy because today's global world is no longer as two-dimensional as it once was. Ankara now tends towards bilateral agreements in diverse circles because the threat is no longer contained within one focal point. Turkey bases its relations on different grounds with the U.S., Russia, China, and the EU, which are all competing with each other. It has had some 'experience' with them all, and is doing the right thing. We should stick to our guns, without being discouraged by the empty talk from the bigots from all backgrounds who are trying to lock Turkey into a single axis, like the Saudis."

 

RUSSIA/SYRIA/KURDS: Yusuf Karatas takes a stand against imperialism in leftist opposition Evrensel: "Russia and the U.S. only remember the Kurds and other oppressed people's rights when it serves their purpose. Therefore, behind the tension [in Syria] over developments East of Euphrates lies a struggle of power between imperialists. And the fact is that Kurds are not a threat here but are the victim of this struggle."

Abdulkadir Ozcan detects a U.S./Israeli threat in pro-Islamist Milli Gazete: "What would we gain from joint-exercises in the guise of acting against terror organizations, with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov saying 'The U.S. wants to establish a [Kurdish] state in Syria' and U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo's remarks that the YPG [Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units] will have a place in peace talks, and despite the U.S.'s rushed arm shipments to the terror organization? Turkey has always supported Iraq's territorial unity. Yet, a Kurdish state was established there. Now, Syria seems to be this project's second leg, because Israel is seeking to establish a Kurdish state there for its own security. And the U.S. is behind it."

Kurtulus Tayiz makes a similar point in pro-government Aksam: "Moscow's shared concerns with Ankara regarding East of the Euphrates will significantly strengthen our hand. If this concern develops into a common political will, the U.S. and Israel's plans to establish a [Kurdish] garrison state East of Euphrates will be shattered. Any preparations for an operation on Manbij will show that Ankara is quick to act."

 

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS BUDGET: Necati Dogru sees a waste of resources in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "During the past year of the economic crisis, the budget of Diyanet [Religious Affairs Directorate] was increased from 7.7 to 10.5 billion lira. There is no austerity at Diyanet. The existing mosques are not full, but more are to be built. There is a surge in the number of religious officials and more are to be recruited. Money has to be spent for that purpose. The religious understanding imposed on the public is that the more you spend on Diyanet, mosques, and imams, the more pleased God will be! He will welcome you in heaven. There is no austerity when it comes to heaven! One gets to heaven by spending."

 

Iran media watch

 

U.S. COUNTER-TERROR STRATEGY: Domestic broadcast media today highlighted Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qassemi's reaction to the recent release of the Trump administration's counter-terrorism strategy. Qassemi reacted to the "accusations against Iran by U.S. officials, saying it stems from America's defeat by the Iranian nation's will", IRTV1 (Channel One), state radio VIRI, and rolling news channel IRINN reported this morning.

 

NEW OIL BUYERS: Iran's First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri said that the Islamic Republic has found new partners to buy its oil ahead of a fresh round of U.S. sanctions. Hardline Javan and business daily Donya-ye Eqtesad covered his statement on their front pages.

 

ROWHANI'S SPEECH: Most newspapers report on President Hassan Rowhani's speech at the University of Tehran yesterday, where he tried to ease the public's worries over the economic consequences of the next round of U.S. sanctions – scheduled to take effect on 4 November. Centrist Abrar, business daily Eghtesad-e Melli, reformist Ebtekar and hardline Javan all led with Rowhani's call for optimism ahead of the new sanctions. Keyhan dismissed the president's assertion that Europeans support Iran against the Trump administration. "How else is Europe supposed to say that they are against us, not behind us?" read the hardline daily's front-page headline. Moderate Arman and Farhikhtegan highlighted the student protests that took place yesterday as Rowhani spoke.

 

MISSING SAUDI JOURNALIST: Press TV said JP Morgan Chase and Ford are the latest U.S. firms to cancel plans to attend a Saudi investor conference later this month. This follows the disappearance of journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in the Turkish city of Istanbul. IRINN reported that for the first time after Khashoggi's disappearance, the Saudi king has called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, welcoming the formation of a joint investigation commission to look into the case.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Teachers' strikes hashtags have been trending among Iranian users on Twitter over the past hours. Many users have shared photos of teachers on strike in different cities and towns in protest at their dire conditions, expressed solidarity with them, and encouraged them to continue their strikes. Some have asked other people to join the teachers to topple the Islamic Republic. Footage has been shared of a teacher who is telling pupils of the reasons behind the strike. "These noble people are protesting in the most civil manner, yet the elite try to discourage them by scaring them about Iran becoming another Syria or Somalia," wrote a user. Users have also been criticizing yesterday's remarks by President Rowhani at the University of Tehran. Some expressed support for students who were not allowed to attend his speech and blasted officials for the ban. "Officials know that they have no base among any people anymore". Some have shared photos and footage of student protests outside the university as Rowhani was giving his speech. Pro-regime users seem to be happy that the same students who supported Rowhani in his presidential campaign are now critics of his policies.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 15.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Confused Gaza policy

 

The security cabinet on Sunday decided to hold off on a wide-scale military offensive in Gaza for at least a week, despite warnings from the prime minister and defense minister that Israel was poised to unleash a serious response to the recent surge in deadly violence along the border with the Strip. Ministers decided to wait and see if Hamas heeds the warnings from Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Lieberman earlier on Sunday, and turns down the violence, Hadashot television news reported. After the four-hour meeting, Lieberman indicated to the Kan public broadcaster that he supported a military operation in Gaza, saying that Israel had "exhausted all options" in dealing with the months of Hamas-orchestrated demonstrations along the border. "I do not want Hamas leaders to be under any illusions, we are prepared to give the hardest blow possible." "What we saw last week requires us to redeploy," Lieberman said, but added that Israel did not need to fully conquer Gaza in order to inflict a harsh blow. Military officials, however, were said to be opposed to an operation, according to the television report. As cabinet ministers discussed the rising tensions in Gaza on Sunday afternoon, the IDF said it carried out a strike on a group of Palestinians launching incendiary balloons toward Israel from northern Gaza. Ahead of the meeting, Netanyahu issued his own sharp warning to Hamas, suggesting Israel could be on the brink of a full-blown military operation against if violent riots along the border fence persist.

The Times of Israel reports that a border crossing between Syria and Israel reopened on Monday – four years after it closed as UN observers fled the area due to fierce fighting in the Syrian civil war. The move marked a formal recognition by Israel that President Bashar al-Assad has returned to govern in southern Syria, after he defeated rebel groups in the area earlier this summer. The Syrian flag was raised at the Quneitra crossing, and as it reopened, the United Nations peacekeeping force UNDOF sent a number of white trucks from Syria to the Israeli side of the border. "The opening of the crossing symbolizes the return of the enforcement of the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria," Maj. Nehemia Berkey, the Israeli liaison to UNDOF, told reporters. "The crossing was closed in 2014 after hostile forces took over the area and has remained closed at the request of the other side ever since," he said. "We expect UNDOF to again enforce the buffer zone and keep away hostile forces." In the future the crossing may be used by Druze citizens in Israel to visit family in Syria and for the passage of a small amount of goods, notably apples.

Elsewhere, Russia and Iran have agreed on a mechanism to spare Iran the impact of U.S. crippling sanctions on its oil industry from next month, an Israeli Foreign Ministry document reportedly warns. The mechanism provides for Iran to export crude oil to Russia across the Caspian Sea. The oil will then be refined at Russian refineries, and from there it will be exported worldwide, the "secret" Israeli document states, according to a report on Hadashot TV news on Sunday. In return, Moscow will provide Iran with unspecified trade and service benefits. The deal was reportedly reached last month in Tehran, where Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held talks. The Israeli document warns that European states, which remain supportive of the 2015 nuclear deal, are ready to quietly agree to let Iran continue to sell oil to various states in Asia.

In the Alqasem affair, the Supreme Court on Sunday ruled to delay the deportation of the American student refused entry to Israel over her alleged support for BDS efforts until justices make a final decision on whether to hear her appeal to be allowed to stay. The court said it will hold a hearing this week on whether to consider Lara Alqasem's appeal, which was filed earlier Sunday, hours before her expected deportation. Her request came two days after the Tel Aviv District Court upheld an entry ban, saying the state was acting legitimately to protect itself in preventing her from entering Israel. Alqasem has been denied entry into Israel since arriving at the airport nearly two weeks ago over allegations she supports a boycott of the Jewish state. In its ruling Friday, Judge Erez Yekuel said that "any self-respecting state defends its own interests and those of its citizens, and has the right to fight against the actions of a boycott… as well as any attacks on its image."

In the West Bank, the cabinet approved the establishment of a new neighborhood for Jewish settlers in Hebron in a project that will, for the first time in 16 years, see homes built for Israelis in the flashpoint West Bank city. The decision will see 16 government ministries allocate a total of NIS 21.6 million ($5.96 million) for the construction of 31 homes, two kindergartens, a daycare center and a public park in the Hezekiah Quarter of Hebron. The site has since the 1980s housed an IDF base, which will be downsized with the neighborhood's establishment. Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman lauded the approval, calling it "another important milestone in the extensive activity we are leading to strengthen settlement in Judea and Samaria". Some 500 settlers currently live in Hebron, in four heavily guarded enclaves surrounded by over 100,000 Palestinians. Home to the Tomb of the Patriarchs shrine holy to both Jews and Muslims, the city has been a frequent site of Israeli-Palestinian friction. Meanwhile, Israeli forces issued a demolition order on Monday for the home of Ashraf Na'alweh, the suspect in a shooting attack that killed two Israelis last week. The order was served to his parents, the IDF said. IDF troops are still searching for Na'alweh, 23, who has been on the run since the killings at the factory in the Barkan Industrial Zone where he was employed. A third Israeli was wounded in the attack.

Four activists were arrested Monday morning after blocking construction equipment from operating in Khan al-Ahmar ahead of the Palestinian hamlet's demolition, police said. Two Israelis and two Palestinians were obstructing a bulldozer that operated by a Defense Ministry worker to clear a swamp that had formed due to the bursting of a water pipe near the central West Bank village. Activists reported that security forces had been violently pushing back dozens of protesters who had converged on the scene upon the arrival of Israeli troops, and that at least three had been injured. Several other bulldozers were also on site to pave additional roads in preparation for the demolition.

Supreme Court Justice David Mintz reported on Monday that he escaped an attack by three Palestinians near his home in a West Bank settlement. Mintz told police that the assailants blocked his car with their vehicle, and came toward him carrying hammers. He managed to flee the scene and was not injured; no damage was done. The assailants have not been found. According to the police, the three Palestinians were riding in a car with a Palestinian license plate. Following the incident, Mintz arrived to the courthouse and is expected to work as usual. Police said that Mintz has yet to file an official complaint.

Finally, the Knesset winter session that opens Monday may quickly turn out be a lost and pointless legislative season. If early elections are called, the Knesset will be dissolved. Several dramatic bills are on the agenda. Some are new, while others were carried over from the summer session. The main task of the governing coalition will be to pass the military conscription bill; a major threat to the stability of Prime Minister Netanyahu's government. The challenge lies in bridging the positions of Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and his partner in promoting the bill, Yesh Atid Chairman MK Yair Lapid, and those of the ultra-Orthodox parties. Netanyahu must also meet two promises he made before the Knesset's summer recess: Passing a law to "rectify" some of the damage caused by the nation-state law to the status of the Druze and Bedouin communities. At the same time, the prime minister will have to contend with his public statements that he supports a law allowing surrogacy for members of the LGBT community. On Sunday, the Ministerial Committee for Legislation postponed by two months a vote on a parallel proposal by Yesh Atid that will embarrass Netanyahu, who will not support it despite his earlier proclamations. Culture and Sports Minister Miri Regev is expected to attempt to move forward two flagship laws she has initiated. The so-called loyalty and culture bill would allow the culture minister to deny state funding to institutions for disrespecting state symbols. The second law regulates the culture ministry's appointment of lectors to movie foundations for the purpose of determining which movies to fund.

 

 

ISRAEL'S POLICY IN GAZA IS CONFUSED: Yossi Yehoshua in Yedioth Ahronoth argues the main problem is that threatening declarations are made but never implemented. Israel issues threats in the morning and in the evening gives one more chance. It is clear she does not really mean it.

"A month has passed since the Russian plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire, resulting in the severe crisis between Moscow and Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Russia has transferred the S-300 missile system to Syria and since then there have been no reports of attacks by the air force in Syria – despite the IDF warning that Iran would speed up the smuggling to Hezbollah via Syria and take advantage of this sensitive period.

Yesterday, for the first time, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman shed light on what was happening in a radio interview with Reshet Bet and said: 'The fact that you do not hear, does not mean it did not happen. We have not given up on any operational need. There is no difference. The fact that people are standing with a stopwatch in their hands, does not mean we are not acting. Our policy has not changed; we will not allow Syria to become a front base for Iran.' We can conclude that when Israel was faced lately with the smuggling of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; she acted, using various methods and means.

But what works in the North does not go well in the South. Israeli policy in Gaza is confused. The main problem is declarations that threaten, but are never executed. Yesterday morning Lieberman again threatened Hamas. 'We have reached the moment that we must strike the hardest blow to Hamas; we have reached the point where we must strike the most severe blow'. But then the evening comes, and the cabinet gives Hamas another chance until Friday. And we wonder why both Hamas and the Israeli public no longer believe them. Had they really wanted to respond to Hamas, they would have attacked legitimate Hamas targets on Friday, and not waited for Sunday morning to make threats, only to capitulate on Sunday evening.

On the Judea and Samaria front, the results are also not good. For eight days now, the terrorist who carried out the attack in the Barkan industrial zone has been out there, and the Shin Bet and the IDF have not managed to get hold of him. This is happening in an area where Israel has good security control and from which the attacker was not supposed to escape, and should certainly have been caught within a short period of time – but so far without results."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S THREATS TO GAZA ARE UNCONVINCING: Amnon Lord in Israel Hayom writes that while Hamas threatens and delivers, the government's lack of meaningful action is eroding Israel's deterrence. Israel is ignoring the fact that at this point a deal is not a realistic option.

"We have reached the point where we can ask the top echelons of the defense establishment, including the prime minister and the defense minister, how many times can they threaten to embark on a large operation while at the same time signaling: Someone please restrain me. Not only is IDF deterrence eroding, but the credibility of the political-security leadership is eroding in the face of Hamas provocations in Gaza and the boasting of its leadership.

Just recently the leader of Islamic Jihad appeared and directly threatened the residents of the Western Negev that the Palestinians would not allow life to continue in communities near the Gaza border. The Palestinian propaganda achievement in the past seven months is not significant, but on the ground, they have recorded a great achievement. In their weekly attacks on the fence, they have completely undermined Israel's sovereignty over the entire border area, both from the Gaza side and mainly from the Israeli side. There is no point in repeating all the things Israel has learned to live with, even though Palestinian terror to burn down assets and dictate life to a large Israeli population is not something that the state can accept.

At the same time the terror organizations have schooled Israel in political fraud, alongside the attacks on the border. For several months now, negotiations and contacts have been conducted through Egyptian mediation and through UN representative Nickolay Mladenov. Just before the attacks on the fence last Friday, Isma'il Haniyeh announced progress in the negotiations.

As Israel signals preparedness for action, the Egyptian mediator, intelligence Chief 'Abbas Kamal, is arriving this week. So do you embark on major operations when a respected Egyptian guest lands in Israel? And whilst he will be arriving, another has departed while issuing threats. Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot flew yesterday to a joint work conference with U.S. military chiefs.

Israel, including all its commentators and senior officers, is in a daze of comments and analyses regarding the various factors that must be taken into account. There is Abu Mazin; there are the Iranians; there is the 'humanitarian situation'; there is the well-known 'Deal of the Century', which has now become the goal for which Yahiya as-Sinwar and Haniyeh are sacrificing Gaza boys on the altar of the fence. The election clock has commenced ticking as well.

The right thing to do is probably to abandon the futile attempts to understand the Arabs. There might be some arrangement on the horizon. At the moment it is not realistic. This horizon always approaches to stop an Israeli operation. Sometimes a response must come from the gut, and according to past experience it must be of an intensity many times greater than is necessary. Statements of the kind made yesterday by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Lieberman create commitment. If we have already reached the 'no choice' stage, then Israel is probably at the stage of 'If you want to shoot, shoot, don't talk'."

Ends…

 

CONTROL OVER PALESTINIANS SEVERLY CRIPPLES THE IDF: Major General (Res.) Amiram Levin in Yedioth Ahronoth proclaims that the Israeli government, which perpetuates the continued control over the Palestinians, is responsible for damaging IDF capabilities and readiness to win.

"Even during the most difficult days of the Yom Kippur War, when he was a young company commander, Yitzhak Brick distinguished himself as one of the most courageous, level-headed and responsible commanders in the Israel Defense Forces. These characteristics are bolstered by the humility that accompanied all his endeavors during his long years in the army. That is enough to warrant we all listen very carefully to the report he wrote.

Another reason to appreciate him and listen to what he has to say is the fact that it is not the duty of the Ombudsman to review the army's fitness for war. Precisely because Brick, this time as a Major General, has decided to take responsibility and exhibit courage and to summarize what he saw and heard in his ten years in this position in a written, orderly and penetrating critical report.

We must believe Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot that he is working tirelessly and successfully to advance and improve the army's functioning, capabilities and readiness, and balancing correctly between the tasks and the difficult challenges facing the IDF. Eizenkot does not need anyone's approval - his achievements are impressive and visible to all. The chief of staff's responsibility and seniority require him to find a way to transcend the personal dispute and to find the proper way to professionally examine the report, and I am sure he will do so.

Which brings us to the painful truth. The real, continuous and severe damage to IDF capabilities stems from the continued control over the Palestinians. As long as it continues, the chiefs of staff and the generals of the General Staff, as good and outstanding as they may be (and they are), can only try to minimize damage, and it will get more and more difficult. The one truly crippling Israeli society, and mortally crippling the IDF, is the Israeli government, which has been unable or does not want to put an end to control over the Palestinians. It is not the number of tanks, not the number of planes and submarines, and not the billions invested in obstacles and fences and other technologies, that will determine IDF readiness for war and its ability to win. They are important, they contribute to our enormous advantage against our enemies, but they are not sufficient.

The strength of Israeli society, the mentality of the IDF and its commanders, the toughness of the IDF commanders and fighters, the patterns of combat command, the concepts of courage and the willingness to risk one's life while storming the enemy – all these will determine the IDF's ability to win the war and defeat any enemy. It is precisely these salient capabilities that are being damaged. They are already severely damaged, as is evident in Major General Brick's report, and they will continue to be damaged. We have rightly conquered Gaza and Judea and Samaria, but that does not change the fact that over time an occupying army is doomed to disintegrate.

If we continue arguing with Brick, instead of understanding that we are dissolving the foundations of our army's strength through too many years of policing civilian population, we will find ourselves in the midst of another 'Yom Kippur'. There is a prophet at the gate, and we must listen to him. Just as it is the duty of the IDF to continue to carry out its missions in the best possible way, so it is the professional duty of its senior commanders to know, recognize and warn of damages being caused to the army and its readiness.

The government of Israel, which perpetuates the continued control over the Palestinians, is the one responsible for the damage to IDF readiness and ability to win. Therefore, not only those who believe in an agreement with the Palestinians and those who dream of peace, but also – especially - those who believe that in the hostile Middle East we will need to rely on the IDF for many years to come, must demand the government take responsibility for the weakening of the IDF. Otherwise the damage will degenerate into decay, and the decay into defeat.

True, we cannot ignore the many years of hostility and the murderous terrorism of the Palestinians against us, and therefore we cannot absolve them of responsibility for our continued rule over them. But it does not alter the fact that only when we cease to control the Palestinians (not in haste, and without free gifts), will we be able to win again on the battlefield whenever we are required to do so."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL MUST EXAMINE ITS SAUDI TIES: Yossi Melman in Maariv claims that in the past it was reported that Saudi Arabia purchased Israeli made weapons and intelligence equipment. It should be clear to Israel to what ends these "toys" were acquired.

"Last Thursday, U.S. media reported that Turkish officials had told their U.S. counterparts that they had video and audio documentation according to which the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was interrogated, tortured, and murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. According to sources who heard the tapes, they document the voices of Khashoggi and other people who speak Arabic, his interrogation, the torture he underwent, and finally his murder. If these reports are true, it means that Turkish intelligence managed to penetrate the consulate and plant bugs in it.

It is no secret that many security services around the world keep diplomatic missions under surveillance, install cameras outside of them and attempt to break into them. The security services of the guest countries know this and do everything in their power to expose the cameras and the listening devices and disrupt the ability to listen from outside. There are quite a few countries that also install sealed rooms in the embassies, where the most sensitive conversations are carried out.

The Turkish newspaper Sabah reported that the record of the journalist's assassination came from his Apple watch, which was connected to the iPhone he had left with his Turkish fiancée Khadija Gingiz, who was waiting for him outside. She said he had entered the Saudi consulate on Tuesday to obtain documents related to his divorce, so that he could remarry. According to her, when she realized that he was not about to come out, she summoned the police. Fearing he would be mistreated, Khashoggi activated the telephone recorder. The Saudi intelligence agents understood after his death that the phone had made a recording, and they used his fingerprint to open it and delete certain files, but not all of them were erased. The recordings were later found on his phone. This may be the correct version, but one cannot rule out the possibility that Turkish intelligence services disseminated it to conceal that they succeeded to penetrate the consulate and install bugging equipment and cameras.

Either way, it is clear that Saudi Arabia in general and specifically its acting ruler, the ambitious heir to the throne Mohammed bin Salman, have become entangled in the affair. Although bin Salman wants to march Saudi Arabia into a modern era and institute reforms, he demonstrated his lust for power when he arrested Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'd al-Hariri. Then he imprisoned some 200 of the country's wealthiest princes, who threatened his rule, and accused them of corruption. Human rights are not holy to him; hence his brutal attitude to his opponents, which is why Khashoggi was in his sights.

Khashoggi, who was educated in the United States, was about 30 years ago a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an avid supporter of global jihad and a friend of Osama bin Laden. He also maintained close ties with Saudi intelligence and with its chief, Prince Turki, who was his patron. From time to time he displayed independent thought and since September 11, 2001 became disillusioned, and as a journalist did not hesitate to attack extremists, and recently even bin Salman. Fearing for his safety he moved to the United States and was invited to write in the Washington Post as a 'contributor'. This was probably too much for MBS.

It is hard to believe that Saudi intelligence sent its men under false identities to Istanbul, on two planes, to murder Khashoggi after he entered the consulate, since they must have known that Turkish intelligence had installed cameras outside the building and that his family would report his disappearance. Senior intelligence officials in the United States believe that the Saudis hoped to persuade Khashoggi to return to Saudi Arabia or to commit to stop attacking MBS and the regime. They believe that something went wrong during the interrogation at the consulate and Khashoggi died. The Saudis are now forced to invent wild tales concerning his whereabouts, which nobody believes.

In the West, they continue to harshly criticize Saudi Arabia and MBS and demand explanations. It is not inconceivable that due to the international pressure the Saudis will have to provide a more detailed explanation, to pin the murder on one or two of the interrogators, and to assert they acted contrary to instructions, all in order to cover up for MBS.

Israel has some soul searching to do. The country's leaders and intelligence chiefs continuously hint at the intention to establish close ties with the Saudi royal family. In the past, it was reported that Saudi Arabia acquired weapons and intelligence equipment made by Israel's advanced technology. It was reported that such equipment was sold to Mexico and the Gulf states. The security services and police in these countries use Israeli software to track dissidents. These sales must be approved by the Ministry of Defense. It is true that the export license states that sales are only to governments, but when it comes to questionable regimes, it is clear to what purpose they buy these 'toys'. Khashoggi did indeed enter the consulate in Istanbul voluntarily. But perhaps the intelligence community should think twice about the cost and benefits of maintaining intelligence relations with problematic regimes, and ask whether they are necessary. The battle against Iran requires extreme caution."

Ends…

 

TURKEY IN NO HURRY TO CUT OFF TIES WITH RIYADH: Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz argues the alleged torture and murder of Saudi journalist Khashoggi puts the West, as well as the Turks and Saudis, in a bind.

"The shocking accounts – to the effect that agents of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sawed up the body of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul after he was tortured there – put Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain, in a major dilemma. Should they demand an international investigation into Khashoggi's alleged arrest and possible murder? Should there be sanctions on senior Saudi officials, which Britain is threatening, when such a move might endanger major commercial deals with the kingdom?

Or perhaps the problem will sort itself out, as President Donald Trump initially suggested before saying later that Khoshoggi's fate is 'not looking too good… from what we're hearing.' Trump threatened 'severe punishment' if Saudi authorities are indeed responsible for assassinating the journalist, who had been critical of the regime. The dilemma is not only over the required response but what the target of punitive measures should be. Why, for example, should Saudi Arabia be targeted but not Russia or Bulgaria, or Egypt or Turkey, where journalists, male and female, have been killed or raped or arrested without trial, or have disappeared?

A new dimension has suddenly surfaced in threats posed to regimes by journalists. The latter do not only supply critical information and reveal outrageous facts that could result in criminal actions against presidents and prime ministers, or could even topple entire regimes. Harassment of journalists – as well as their assassination – could have far-reaching effects on international relations in general.

Turkey now finds itself at the center of the storm surrounding Khashoggi's disappearance, after he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, but apparently never walked out alive. Turkey is now in a bind between responding forcefully to what appears to have been inexcusable infringement of its sovereignty – and its desire to preserve what is left of its badly damaged ties with Riyadh. If it had been any other country besides Saudi Arabia that had been involved in the disappearance of the journalist on Turkish soil, President Erdogan would have immediately severed diplomatic relations with that country and probably even demanded an immediate emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the incident. But Turkey, which has links to the Russian-Iranian-Qatari axis, has still not given up on its dream to exert influence on the Middle East.

It is difficult for Ankara to forgo the huge achievement that it snagged in 2015 when it became a member of the Saudi coalition in the war against ISIS, which then gave Turkey an admission ticket into the Arab club of Middle Eastern countries, many of which still view Erdogan's republic as hostile. In addition, too much Saudi money is invested in Turkey. Last year alone, the Saudis, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait invested nearly $2 billion, equal to all other foreign investments in Turkish markets. But these interests and investments did not keep the UAE's ambassador in Washington from labeling Turkey a threat.

With respect to the Khashoggi case, Ankara, which is committed to a cautious approach, has now suggested a compromise in the form of a joint Turkish and Saudi investigation that will examine the evidence and sequence of events involving the journalist. But the Saudis, as expected, are not cooperating.

On top of this, initial reports about Khashoggi's disappearance in the Arab press, particularly the Egyptian media, actually portrayed Turkey rather than the Saudis as the culprit. Dandrawi al-Harawi, editor of the Egyptian daily al-Yawm al-Sabe', has alleged that Turkey was directly involved in abducting Khashoggi, and added that the Turks falsified evidence to sully the Saudis' reputation, as part of an effort by the Muslim Brotherhood to harm Arab regimes, 'since it is well known that Khashoggi was part of the Muslim Brotherhood and was previously even a close associate of Osama Bin Laden and radical Muslim movements.'

These media outlets also highlighted what they called Khashoggi's ties to the CIA and Britain's MI6 – meaning that if he was not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (considered an enemy of the government in Cairo), he worked on behalf of Western spy agencies. It follows that the assassination of a traitor is not such a major tragedy.

When that is how the Khashoggi incident is being framed in the Arab media, the fact that the West is determined to get to the bottom of the case might be seen as supporting the claim that he was indeed a Western intelligence agent. But commentators spreading that idea 'forget' to mention the close ties that the Egyptian and Saudi intelligence services themselves have with their Western counterparts.

It is also not by chance that Arab pundits refrain from mentioning Jamal Khashoggi's family ties to the late Adnan Khashoggi, the billionaire arms dealer who mediated deals in the 1980s involving the United States, Israel and Iran in what was dubbed Irangate. Renewed attention to that scandal could greatly embarrass the Saudi leadership, making it preferable if the focus were to remain solely on the journalist, whose sharply honed writing exposed the weak spots of the regime in Riyadh.

For now, Saudi Arabia denies any connection to the presumed assassination of Khashoggi. It has even cited the wide-ranging wave of arrests by the regime of political rivals in the kingdom in an attempt to show that when it comes to enemies from within, it applies the rule of law. But it cannot ply such an argument abroad, in a world that is beginning to regret its initial enthusiasm over the appointment of Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince.

Usually the accepted solution in the face of such a scandal would be to find a scapegoat on whom the Saudi ruler can pin the blame, and accuse the culprit of exceeding his authority and of harming the kingdom's good name, thereby sweeping the whole issue of assassination off the international agenda. In this case, however, such a move would constitute an admission of guilt on the part of the entire Saudi leadership, since an assassination of this kind would require the approval of at least the head of intelligence in the kingdom, Khaled al-Hamidan, who was appointed to his post just a year ago.

It now appears that if Khashoggi was indeed hoping to advocate for changes in how Saudi Arabia is run, it is possible that in death, at least in this regard, he may be more successful than in life."

Ends…

 

IF NOT FOR UNRWA, THERE WOULD BE NO REFUGEE PROBLEM: Former ambassador to the U.S. Zalman Shoval in The Jerusalem Post maintains that he and Khalil E. Jahshan, who is so worried about Jordan's fate, have one thing in common – neither of them have actually seen the Trump peace plan or its details.

"In his last week's highly tendentious article in the American magazine Foreign Policy, Khalil E. Jahshan, the executive director of the 'Arab Center' in Washington D.C., asserts that U.S. President Donald Trump's yet-to-be-released peace plan (he prefers calling it Jared Kushner's Peace Plan) would 'turn Jordan upside down'. His somewhat lopsided reasoning is that if the Palestinian refugees in Jordan are stripped of their refugee status, it would destabilize the Hashemite Kingdom, 'one of America's closest allies in the region.'

Jordan is indeed a close ally of the U.S. and one can assume that its leaders are fully aware of the benefits of this to their country. Mr. Jahshan's argument goes something like this: If UNRWA stops supporting the refugees in Jordan, this will create a serious economic burden for the country and potentially unhinge it politically. However, that argument can surely be discounted by the fact he himself mentioned – that the U.S. would almost certainly compensate Jordan directly for any additional costs it would incur as a result of UNRWA being out of the picture.

Jahshan and I have one thing in common: Neither of us has actually seen the Trump peace plan or its details. His solicitude for Jordan is commendable, although a bit undercut by his not very positive views about the country's ability to manage its own affairs – in addition to more than a few inaccuracies about the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem as well as cavalierly forgetting that Trans-Jordan at the time created part of the problem by annexing most of the parts of Palestine which the UN had intended for a future Arab state. He tries to shift the emphasis from the basic issue of the unresolved refugee problem, i.e. perpetuating it by assuring that three generations, often in inhuman conditions, are left in camps all over the Middle East without providing them with basic civil, political, economic or other rights.

The reason for the Arab states' refusing to integrate the refugees derives both from the stance of the Palestinian leadership, which cynically seeks to preserve the refugee problem as a political cudgel against Israel, thus sabotaging all attempts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – and from the 'host countries' interest to continue the exploitation of the refugees for their own economic purposes. The refugees' lack of basic civil rights makes them largely defenseless (Jordan has actually treated them better than most). We all saw what happened to many of the refugees in the camps in Syria, falling victim to the brutalities of both President Assad and ISIS during the civil war there.

After World War II, there were greater refugee problems in the world than the Palestinian one – the difference being that with the help of national governments and international bodies they were solved. Not to mention Israel, which successfully absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees, including many from Arab countries, while the Palestinian refugee problem has been deliberately perpetuated with the help of UNRWA, whose activities reinforced the purposely misleading illusion that those refugees or their third-, fourth- and even fifth-generation descendants will one day be sent to Israel, rather than helping to permanently resettle them in the countries in which they reside with generous financial benefits provided by the international community.

UNRWA has been an accessory to the crime of condemning these people to permanent refugee status. Even if a separate Palestinian state should one day come into being, few of those unfortunate permanent camp dwellers will actually choose to live there (as I have heard myself from refugees in Lebanon), so that keeping up the pretense of UNRWA supposedly aiding the refugees only serves the purpose of the enemies of peace."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 15.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Sanctions and retaliation

2-Towards a new phase of instability

3-No interest in an explosion

 

1-Sanctions and retaliation

 

If American sanctions were to be imposed on Saudi Arabia, we would be facing an economic catastrophe that will shake up the world…If the price of $80 per barrel has angered President Trump, no one should exclude the possibility that it could shoot up to $100 or $200 per barrel, or perhaps even double that figure. In fact, oil may be priced in Chinese Yuan instead of the dollar, bearing in mind that oil is the most important commodity priced in dollars today… Russia and China would be the two alternatives that are ready to satisfy Riyadh's military and other needs. Nor should anyone rule out the possibility that one consequence of such sanctions could be a Russian military base in Tabuk in Northwestern Saudi Arabia on the edge of the crucial square that includes Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq. At the same time, Hamas and Hezbollah would turn from being Riyadh's enemies to its friends. Moreover, moving so close to Russia would also lead Saudi Arabia to move closer to Iran, and perhaps reconcile with it --Turki ad-Dakhil on www.alarabiya.net

The Saudi hints at a major economic, political, strategic, and military turnabout indicate that this is a major crisis. They also suggest that the Saudi leadership is deeply aware that its disagreements with Iran and the resistance forces do not stem from Saudi interests, but from its attempt to comply with American interests. Furthermore, they indicate that Saudi Arabia is in no danger from Iran and the resistance forces, but is threatened by Washington, and that it does not need U.S. protection against an imagined threat, nor does it need to brook successive insults…Saudi Arabia today can turn the tables on the Americans and change the rules of the game at the international and regional levels. Moreover, it can be assured that, should it do so, it would be welcomed by Iran and the resistance axis's forces who harbor no schadenfreude towards it, and see no interest in Riyadh throwing itself into the U.S.'s lap or in its blind submission and humiliation and degradation by the U.S.--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

Sympathy for Khashoggi at the Saudi, Arab, and international levels has exceeded all limits, and the charge that Saudi Arabia has murdered him seems almost certain. Moreover, defending the kingdom has been confined to a few figures close to its leadership. We thus believe that sending a delegation to Ankara is unlikely to alter many of these facts. And the same goes for the ferocious attacks waged against the kingdom's enemies on social media that have been totally counterproductive and are doing away with any sympathy for Saudi Arabia, and embarrassing its friends – or those among them who remain. Thirteen days have passed since Khashoggi's 'disappearance.' Meanwhile, Turkey's security agencies have been threatening that they possess a video of the murder inside the consulate, and that they are waiting for the visiting Saudi delegation to present them with the victim's corpse, or what remains of it, before they storm the consulate and the consul's home, publishing the results of their investigations and filing official charges – or so a number of media outlets claim. This would transform what happened into an international incident that may claim some of the Saudi state's biggest heads--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

If Washington were to impose sanctions on Saudi Arabia against the background of the Khashoggi case, Riyadh is prepared to respond with a series of measures that will wreak havoc on the U.S. economy and badly shake up the global economic order, maintains a leading Saudi commentator known for his close ties to the kingdom's leadership. Riyadh may also change its regional political alliances and reconcile itself with Iran and its allies. The source of the threats of serious retaliation against any U.S. sanctions is none other than Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman himself, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. But if Riyadh were to be serious about these threats, Iran and its allies would welcome it with open arms, and it would become a major regional and international power. Khashoggi's "disappearance" may represent turning-point for Saudi Arabia, especially if the U.S. and Europe were to end their protective cover for the kingdom, argues the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily.

 

BEYOND THE OFFICIAL SATEMENT: "I read the Saudi government's statement in response to the American assertions concerning sanctions on Saudi Arabia," writes [Saudi-owned] al-Arabiya TV's General Manager Turki ad-Dakhil on www.alarabiya.net.

But what we know about what is taking place inside the kingdom's decision-making hallways suggests that the response under consideration goes beyond the language used in the Saudi statement. There is talk of over 30 counter-measures in retaliation for sanctions imposed on Riyadh. In fact, there is an almost unanimous view that such counter-measures amount to scenarios that would be catastrophic for the U.S. economy before the Saudi economy.

If American sanctions were to be imposed on Saudi Arabia, we would be facing an economic catastrophe that will shake up the world. For Riyadh is the capital of the world's fuel, and harming it would affect vital oil production before anything else. For example, Saudi Arabia may decide not to commit to producing 7.5 million barrels a day. If the price of $80 per barrel has angered President Trump, no one should exclude the possibility that it could shoot up to $100 or $200 per barrel, or perhaps even double that figure.

In fact, oil may be priced in Chinese Yuan instead of the dollar, bearing in mind that oil is the most important commodity priced in dollars today.

Moreover, this could all throw the entire Middle East and perhaps even the Islamic world into Iran's lap, which would be closer to Riyadh than Washington.

This is as far as oil goes. But Saudi Arabia is not merely a barrel of oil. Thanks to its status and geographic location, it is the leader of the Islamic world. And the close cooperation between Riyadh, and the U.S. and the Western states over [security] information exchanges would be a thing of the past, after having contributed to protecting the lives of millions of Westerners as testified by senior Western officials themselves.

Any Western sanctions on Saudi Arabia would drive Riyadh towards other options that President Trump himself mentioned a few days ago, when he noted that Russia and China would be the two alternatives that are ready to satisfy Riyadh's military and other needs. Nor should anyone rule out the possibility that one consequence of such sanctions could be a Russian military base in Tabuk in Northwestern Saudi Arabia on the edge of the crucial square that includes Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq.

At the same time, Hamas and Hezbollah would turn from being Riyadh's enemies to its friends. Moreover, moving so close to Russia would also lead Saudi Arabia to move closer to Iran, and perhaps reconcile with it.

Nor would it be strange for Riyadh to cease to buy weapons from the U.S. Riyadh is the most important [foreign] customer for the American arms' industry. Saudi Arabia is responsible for 10% of the U.S.'s total arms sales, while 85% go to the U.S. army, and only the remaining 5% goes to the rest of the world. In addition, Riyadh's capital investments in the U.S. government, which stand at $800 billion, would be liquidated. Furthermore, the U.S. would be deprived of the Saudi market, which is considered to be one of the twenty largest economies in the world.

These are just a few out of more than thirty measures that Riyadh would take immediately without batting an eyelid if sanctions were imposed on it – as sources close to Saudi decision-taking centers are saying.

"The truth is that, by imposing sanctions on Riyadh, Washington would be fatally stabbing its own economy in the belief that it was stabbing Riyadh," concludes Dakhil.

End…

 

A MINOR DETAIL: "In The New York Times' article about relations with Saudi Arabia, Jamal Khashoggi's fate seems to be a minor detail," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The article calls for deposing Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, describing him as mad, and waging a violent campaign against what it referred to as the lies about reform and anti-corruption measures, and mere claims of protecting freedoms. The article also spoke of U.S. President Donald Trump and his family's involvement in bin Salman's corruption.

Meanwhile, statements from 'an official Saudi source' and the subsequent explanations of them by the journalist Turki ad-Dakhil indicate that this 'official source' is bin Salman and the 'sources close to those in charge of decision-making' [as described by Dakhil] also refer to bin Salman. Moreover, judging by Dakhil's statements about retaliating against threats to Saudi Arabia with even more severe counter-measures, bin Salman appears to be taking the threats of American sanctions on Saudi Arabia seriously. These retaliatory measures could also constitute a turning-point in the existing regional and international equations and in Saudi Arabia's position with regard to its alliances and hostilities. And this is to say nothing of the threat to detonate a major global oil crisis.

It is no ordinary matter for Saudi Arabia to threaten to ally itself with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah or allow Russian military bases on its soil. Nor is this reaction consistent with a crisis of the scale of Khashoggi's disappearance. It is clear that this Saudi/U.S. crisis comes against the background of the Saudi failure in the Yemen war, and the [U.S. sponsored Palestine/Israel] deal of the century, and the approaching date for imposing the promised strict sanctions on Iran. The latter were part of a package of American commitments to facilitate the deal of the century in response to demands from Saudi Arabia and Israel to facilitate the establishment of an alliance against Iran and its allies.

But the deal of century is dying after it has become clear that Saudi Arabia has failed to find a Palestinian partner that is ready to offer concessions on Jerusalem and the right of return. And after Russia's firm stance on Iran's side in Syria, and the deployment of S-300 missiles on Syrian soil, Israel has lost its ability to influence the regional balance since its air force is its sole tool for doing so. Moreover, the awaited U.S. sanctions on Iran are clearly finding no international or regional partners, thereby exposing them to failure even before they are implemented.

Washington is also clearly entering the phase of preparing the files that will be discussed during the U.S. National Security Advisor's trip to Moscow, where together with the Russian leadership he will draw the main features for a new regional order in which Turkey's role seems to be advancing and the Saudi role seems to be on the retreat. More importantly, it seems that the Saudi/Israeli option based on confrontation [with Iran] is on the retreat, while Turkey's option based on settlements and compromises seems to be advancing. It is also clear that the political dimensions of the Khashoggi case are unfolding along the Turkish/Saudi frontline, just as American Pastor Andrew Brunson's case unfolded along the Turkish/U.S. frontline.

But most important in all this is that the Saudi hints at a major economic, political, strategic, and military turnabout indicate that this is a major crisis. They also suggest that the Saudi leadership is deeply aware that its disagreements with Iran and the resistance forces do not stem from Saudi interests, but from its attempt to comply with American interests. Furthermore, they indicate that Saudi Arabia is in no danger from Iran and the resistance forces, but is threatened by Washington, and that it does not need U.S. protection against an imagined threat, nor does it need to brook successive insults. And finally, they indicate that Saudi Arabia understands the truth and validity of what Iran and the resistance forces have been urging it to do, and realizes that this is not beyond its abilities.

In short, these hints indicate that Saudi Arabia today can turn the tables on the Americans and change the rules of the game at the international and regional levels. Moreover, it can be assured that should it do so, it would be welcomed by Iran and the resistance axis's forces who harbor no schadenfreude towards it, and see no interest in Riyadh throwing itself into the U.S.'s lap or in its blind submission and humiliation and degradation by the U.S.

Consequently, Iran and the resistance axis will extend their hand to Riyadh to the degree to which Riyadh will be serious about distancing itself from its degrading submission to U.S. diktats, and the extent to which it refuses to submit to the endless extortion bills imposed on it on the pretext of protecting it against the imagined threat posed by Iran.

"So, let Saudi Arabia carry out its threats, in which case the Arabs, with Palestine at the forefront, would be in their best state ever, and Saudi Arabia will become a major international political focal point," concludes Qandil.

End…

 

REJECTING THE AMERICAN THREATS: "The Saudi government issued a statement on Sunday rejecting the American threats to impose economic, and possible political, sanctions on it if its involvement in the kidnapping and murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi were to be proven," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Monday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This statement reflects the serious nature of the U.S.'s threats. They also reflect the kingdom's fears about them as well as its 'suicidal' tendency in confronting them. For this is the first time in eighty years in which the two 'allies' have exchanged threats in such a public manner.

President Trump has apparently given in to the pressures of the American 'establishment' or deep state and its institutions, and has been forced to back down from his previous stance in which he belittled the importance of the crime, and gave the impression that he was washing his hands of any moves against it. This was clear from his interview with Fox TV in which he said that Khashoggi is not an American citizen and the crime did not occur on American soil and that over $110 billion in arms deals with Saudi Arabia cannot be canceled because this means jobs and the continuous prospering of the U.S. economy.

But Trump later changed his tone and vowed 'severe punishment' if it turns out that Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, without specifying exactly what punishment he has in mind. At the same time, he hinted that the murder had actually occurred and that his old/new Turkish allies have provided him with conclusive evidence in this regard.

The one certain thing is that Trump – who has attacked Saudi Arabia in an insolent and blackmailing manner over four times in less than two weeks using the same terms about its huge fortune and free-of-charge protection from the U.S. without which Iran would have occupied it within 12 minutes – was using such blackmail as part of his Republican Party's campaign against the background of the mid-term congressional elections' in three weeks' time.

Against the same background, he must have realized that U.S. public opinion is currently in shock as a result of successive U.S. press revelations regarding Khashoggi's kidnapping and being chopped into pieces inside his country's consulate in Istanbul. Trump thus wants to employ this state of shock mixed with anger in the service of his electoral interests, appearing as a strong man who does not hesitate to punish those responsible for this crime.

Trump does not like the Saudis and hates the Arabs and Muslims. But he makes no secret of his fondness for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf's riches, and his belief that he is owed a large part of them on the grounds that his country has been providing protection for these riches and the states that host the oil wells for almost eighty years. Consequently, he will have no compunction looting these riches via blackmail and extortion, either by exploiting the current crisis or at a subsequent phase.

The White House's economic advisor Larry Kudlow, who is no less racist about Arabs and Muslims than his boss, has warned that President Trump is 'very, very, very' serious about his threats. This means that an agreement has been reached over certain measures should Saudi Arabia's involvement in this crime be proven. These could include a freeze on Saudi monies, deposits, and investments in the U.S. that stand at over $2 trillion. This is exactly what happened to Iran's monies and deposits in American banks after the Shah was toppled and Imam Khomeini's revolution succeeded in 1979.

'Leading' Saudi Tweeters have explained some aspects of the likely Saudi response, which an official Saudi statement has said would be severe and would deploy the kingdom's economic and financial power as a weapon. They have hinted that their country could turn to Russia or China to buy weapons, and may even go further towards reconciliation and alliance with Iran against the U.S. and the West.

The fact that the Saudi government sent Prince Khalid al-Faisal at the head of a delegation to Ankara to discuss common means of finding a way out of this crisis means that Riyadh is avoiding a confrontation with Ankara and has opted for a diplomatic path. Prince Khalid al-Faisal, who is an advisor to the Saudi monarch, is said to be one of the most prudent and wise princes, as well as being a poet, a painter, an intellectual, and the Mecca Region's emir. He also has strong and friendly relations with Turkish officials and with Khashoggi as well, who served as editor of al-Watan, the paper that Prince Khaled founded in Abha as a model for the new Saudi media – a wish that was only satisfied for a short period.

But what can wisdom and prudence do to resolve a crisis that has to do with an almost certain crime carried out by 'amateur' perpetrators, and after local international public opinion has been mobilized against the state accused of being behind the crime?

The Saudi leadership is facing an unprecedented predicament. Sympathy for Khashoggi at the Saudi, Arab, and international levels has exceeded all limits, and the charge that Saudi Arabia has murdered him seems almost certain. Moreover, defending the kingdom has been confined to a few figures close to its leadership. We thus believe that sending a delegation to Ankara is unlikely to alter many of these facts. And the same goes for the ferocious attacks waged against the kingdom's enemies on social media that have been totally counterproductive and are doing away with any sympathy for Saudi Arabia, and embarrassing its friends – or those among them who remain.

Thirteen days have passed since Khashoggi's 'disappearance.' Meanwhile, Turkey's security agencies have been threatening that they possess a video of the murder inside the consulate, and that they are waiting for the visiting Saudi delegation to present them with the victim's corpse, or what remains of it, before they storm the consulate and the consul's home, publishing the results of their investigations and filing official charges – or so a number of media outlets claim. This would transform what happened into an international incident that may claim some of the Saudi state's biggest heads.

On Sunday alone, $33 billion was wiped off the Saudi stock and share market. Moreover, many international economic and media companies and figures have already withdrawn from an international investment conference in Riyadh next week under the banner of 'Davos in the Desert' in protest against Khashoggi's disappearance. And the statement issued by the British, German, and French foreign ministers demanding a credible investigation into the truth of what happened inside the Saudi consulate, identifying those responsible, and putting them on trial has sprinkled more salt on the crisis's wound. It may make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to sign arms deals that could have a negative effect on the war in Yemen.

The curse of Jamal Khashoggi will pursue the Kingdom and its senior officials for many months, perhaps even for years to come, especially if the U.S. and the European states were to lift their protective security cover. And there are signs that this is what may happen.

If the involvement of Saudi officials proves to be true, this crime will bring about major and perhaps radical changes for the Kingdom at the domestic and foreign levels. It will constitute a turning-point between two totally different phases: Saudi Arabia after this crisis will be unlike what it was before it.

"The coming days will show that we are right," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

2-Towards a new phase of instability

 

After resolving the Brunson affair, Washington and Ankara are moving towards an agreement on Northern Syria that will drive the region towards a new phase of instability, says Mustafa az-Zein in today's pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

 

With American Pastor Andrew Brunson's release, there are signs of an implicit agreement between Washington and Ankara over the occupation of parts of Northern Syria, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi-owned daily. Washington does not seem to object to Turkey's continued control of areas around Idlib, while Ankara is ready to turn a blind eye to the U.S.'s occupation of areas East of the Euphrates, all of which will drive the Middle East towards a new phase of instability.

 

BRUNSON RELEASED: "A witness in a Turkish court changed his testimony regarding American Pastor Andrew Brunson, as a result of which the court decided to release him," writes Mustafa az-Zein in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Trump expressed his satisfaction at this decision and said that relations between Washington and Ankara will become 'good, in fact excellent.' And judging by what the U.S. president's words, this means that the economic pressures on this U.S. ally and NATO member will be eased, and other measures will be taken regarding geostrategic issues relating to the Middle East and especially Syria, where the two sides' interests east of the Euphrates and in Idlib have been at odds. Both sides are trying to play a role in 'the new Syria.' So, can they agree that each should keep a part of these areas under its control?

Erdogan has been trying to establish safe zones in Northern Syria ever since the war in and on Syria began. At first, he did not do so because he did not have Syrian forces that could help him achieve his project, and he was unwilling to implicate his own army in endless battles with the Kurds deployed in this area. Then came Russia's [September 2105] intervention and Damascus's recapture of Aleppo from the terrorists and armed elements, as a result of which the situation became more complicated.

Erdogan then confined himself to occupying 'Afrin and some of its surroundings, and he continued to back the armed elements that flowed into Idlib where their massed gatherings in the governorate created a crisis for the Russian and regular Syrian forces on the one hand, and for the Americans and their allies, on the other. Calls were made to recapture the area by force, which would have created a crisis for Ankara, which would have to receive thousands of armed elements and terrorists.

Along with its Western allies, Ankara thus sought to pressure Russia to postpone or cancel the offensive. As a result, the story about the [Syrian army's potential] use of chemical was promoted by the U.S., France, and the UK, together with the [Western] warnings that accompanied this story. Consequently, Moscow backed down from the offensive. And the Russian/Turkish/Iranian summit was held and reached an understanding on establishing a demilitarized zone around Idlib, provided that Ankara ensures that its affiliated armed elements with would withdraw to other areas far from the Russian bases.

Erdogan fulfilled what he promised, and the heavy weapons were withdrawn from the 'safe zone' around Idlib in anticipation of the full implementation of the agreement to return the governorate to the Syrian state. However, many obstacles remain, including the fact that certain armed factions – some of which are affiliated to Turkey – have refused to withdraw. Some may also be kept there by Ankara so as to confront any new developments. In fact, Turkey will not be at a loss to find pretexts for keeping these forces there. After all, it is not Erdogan's custom to fulfill all his promises. Even if the armed elements were to withdraw, he will find another pretext for maintaining control of the demilitarized zone via his participation with the Russians in 'preserving security and preventing the inflow of refugees' to his country. After all, and as he has said, 'Idlib's security affects Turkish national security.'

Erdogan's ambitions in Syria are clear to all. They are no less than the Americans' ambitions who are occupying a part of the area east of the Euphrates so as to prevent any contiguous Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian connection. In fact, many indications suggest Turkey and the U.S. are ready to cooperate to realize their ambitions: U.S. troops will ensure that the Kurds do not pose a threat to Turkey, in return for remaining silent regarding the Turkish army's continued presence in Idlib's surroundings.

John Bolton was very clear and frank when he made a 'gift' of Idlib to Ankara. He said that 'Turkey has been occupying the Northern part of Cyprus since 1974 amidst total international silence, and nothing prevents it from staying' in this Syrian governorate.

"The occupation of parts of Syria, whether by Turkey or the U.S., points to the start of a new phase of instability in the Middle East," concludes Zein.

Ends…

 

3-No interest in an explosion

 

Neither Hamas nor Israel are interested in a new Gaza war, and the current escalation is merely intended to improve the terms of a tahdi'a, says Talal 'Awkal in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Despite Israel's escalating threats to carry out an all-out attack on the Gaza Strip, and despite the recent escalation in the Marches of Return and Israel's violent reaction to them, there will be no major explosion in the Strip because the 'American master' does not want this at present, maintains a Gaza-based Palestinian commentator.

 

RISING TENSIONS: "After a period when it appeared as if the situation in the Gaza Strip were heading towards gradual ease of tension, we are now witnessing a major rise in tension once more, leading many journalists and observers to raise the question as to whether another war is in the offing," writes Talal 'Awkal in Monday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Last Friday was a difficult day. Seven Palestinian martyrs fell, and not much less than 200 Palestinians were wounded. The Israeli army used live ammunition of a new and destructive sort that specialists have yet to identify.

And despite this escalation that Israel initiated, its defense minister decided not to allow any fuel or gas to enter the Gaza Strip, and not only the Qatari fuel for the electricity plant.

The Israeli cabinet's meetings have produced a new round of threats, claiming that the situation has hit rock bottom, and that Israel is losing its patience and may resort to dealing with the situation with extreme violence. For its part, the resistance seems ready for a confrontation, and Hamas and the 'National Committee for Breaking the Siege' have announced that they are determined to persist with the marches unless firm assurances are received that the siege will be fully lifted, declaring that partial measures are not enough to end the Marches of Return.

The fact is that Israeli promises cannot be trusted. They can easily be reneged on or cancelled at any time depending on Israel's interests and the aims it is trying to achieve. Despite the practical indications that have emerged so far by allowing Qatari fuel for the electricity plant to enter the Strip, the financial aid that the Emir of Qatar has provided, and the indications that Hamas's civilian employees will soon receive full three months salaries, these are not enough to end the currently rising tension.

All parties are in a hurry to deal with the Gaza Strip's file on the ground. Even though the different parties have different aims based on varying premises, the outcome is the same. And at their forefront stands the U.S., which has issued its instructions to those concerned to offer aid to the Strip's inhabitants, then thanked those who do so. Israel also is in a rush to open the Gaza dossier so as to 'rehabilitate' the Strip, as Netanyahu says, and so that it can turn towards the West Bank and take decisive steps that go beyond the current schemes to Judaize Jerusalem and Hebron, and raze Khan al-Ahmar [on the West Bank].

Hamas and the other resistance factions are also in a hurry to reap the fruits of the popular protests along the Gaza Strip's Northern and Eastern borders. They realize that these protests cannot last forever, and that the tragic conditions in the Strip do not allow for more pressure, suffering, and hemorrhage. The people in the Gaza Strip are observing these developments and waiting for the relief that has been long in coming after the blockade has divested them of everything they possess.

But despite this, the assumption that the deteriorating conditions will reach a point where a fourth Israeli aggression is waged against the Strip calls for closer scrutiny.

Israel is still far from committing a large-scale aggression whose aims it cannot specify and in which it can secure a clean victory that would consolidate the position of the political parties that are competing over the public's favor in any future elections. Moreover, Israel's calculations are based on the possibility of reaching a tahdi'a [lull or calming down] or a truce that would allow the Gaza file to proceed with the 'rehabilitation' process without Israel having to pay a price, and without having to reshuffle the cards and waste a long time before the possibility of addressing the Gaza file materializes again.

Hamas also has no interest in allowing the situation to explode in a large-scale and comprehensive manner. For in addition to having other less costly options, it realizes the nature of the losses and destruction that would occur, and is aware that the people in the Gaza Strip do not welcome the ensuing destructive escalation that ends in returning back to square-one and another unstable tahdi'a every time.

Hamas and the other factions are relatively comfortable with the pressure of the Marches of Return that aim to break the siege, despite the price they are paying as a result. They are also comfortable because they know that the conditions surrounding what is happening favor a tahdi'a and non-military solutions. How many times has [UN envoy] Mladenov declared that the conditions are on the brink of an explosion, and how many times has he claimed the honor of preventing it – even though he knows better than anyone else that neither of the two parties wants an explosion?

Mladenov also knows, as do all parties, that even a small part of the Marches of Return would in previous circumstances have provided Israel with a strong pretext for waging a large-scale aggression on the Gaza Strip, but that the situation is different this time round.

Similarly, the Israeli government at all its political, security, and military levels knows, just as Hamas does, that there are parties that are ready to act immediately to prevent an explosion and revive the negotiations over the tahdi'a and its conditions.

That being so, everything that is happening today is no more than an attempt by each side to exert pressure on the other so to improve the terms of the tahdi'a in a manner that would allow it to declare victory.

I still believe that the Gaza Strip is on the verge of a new phase of openness and improved circumstances because the American master wants it, as does the Israeli side for political reasons above all.

"As for addressing the current humanitarian conditions, this is just a decoration or a means, and nothing more," concludes 'Awkal.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 12.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-An open door to pressure and blackmail

2-Advantage Ankara

3-Resolute lackeys

 

1-  An open door to pressure and blackmail

 

The Saudi authorities are relying on the element of time, in the belief that the longer the investigations take, the less the international and Arab and media interest in this [Khashoggi] crime. President Trump and his advisors appear to be supporting this wager and encouraging it. In this regard, they are relying on the fact that the West seeks its own interests. After all, Germany apologized to Saudi Arabia, Spain withdrew its decision to stop selling arms to Riyadh in protest against the Yemen war, and Canada is about to take the same path after its ambassador to Riyadh apologized for his government's interference in domestic Saudi affairs, including calling for the release of prisoners of conscience. In short: Deals take precedence over human rights for most, if not all, Western governments and any exceptions to this rule are very rare. Anyone who says otherwise does not really know Western governments, especially the American administration-- 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

[U.S. special envoy] Kushner's (and therefore Trump's) 'special relationship' with bin Salman is no longer the two-way relationship it once was: Providing cover for domestic repression in return for arms deals and pressure on the Palestinians to impose the 'deal of the century', as well opening the oil taps to compensate for the consequences of the sanctions on Iran, etc., etc. Judged by America's political and media criteria, bin Salman's men have gone too far and in manner that cannot be covered up; they have committed a major sin. The question now is this: What is bin Salman now thinking in order emerge from the major predicament in which he has landed his country?-- pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

The fact is that the kidnapping (and possible murder?) of a journalist of Jamal Khashoggi's caliber, moreover on foreign territory and in this stark manner, is the height of rashness, recklessness, and lack of concern for the consequences. Bin Salman's involvement in Khashoggi's kidnapping (and possible murder?) – is most likely to fling open the door of pressure and blackmail on him and the Kingdom, from both the U.S. and other parties. It will further consolidate his image as a foolish adolescent who resorts to bullying and crime when dealing with his opponents, rather than as a responsible person fit to be the king of a strategic and important country such as Saudi Arabia--Khalil al-'Anani on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

Washington is clearly seeking to contain the Khashoggi case and reach a 'compromise' with Riyadh over this affair, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. U.S. President Trump has all but confirmed this, warning against any measures against Riyadh that would harm the U.S. economy. Despite Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman and Trump's son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner's 'special relationship', Trump appears to be unable to cover up the crime committed against Khashoggi, claims the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. The question is whether the bin Salman can do anything to extract his country from the predicament that he has landed it in. Khashoggi's kidnapping and possible murder could yet be the straw to break the camel's back of Saudi/U.S. relations, argues an Arab commentator. This was a reckless act by all criteria, given the manner of its execution, the victim's profile, and The Washington Post's determination to get to the bottom of the case.

 

TRUMP'S SUMMARY: "U.S. President Donald Trump summarized the most important scenario that will serve as the final chapter in the crime represented by Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance or kidnapping after he entered his country's consulate in Istanbul last Tuesday, with nothing to suggest that he emerged from it either whole or 'cut into pieces'," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Before we move on to the most important part of what Trump said, which we and many others may find shocking, we should note that the U.S. president lied twice in his talk on his favorite TV channel, Fox News, on Thursday:

- He lied first when he said that American investigators were working with Ankara and Riyadh to find out what happened in Khashoggi's disappearance. The Turkish authorities quickly denied these claims and insisted that they will not allow any American or any other investigators to participate in the investigations because Turkish investigators are quite capable of doing so.

- His second lie was evident from his 'cool' expressions of compassion with the victim that lacked any real empathy. He also came across as confused and fretful, for example, when he said that we are working with Turkey and Saudi Arabia (we have heard of no such Saudi investigations so far). Further evidence of his confusion or refusal to say anything useful or decisive came from his claim that Khashoggi 'went in but did not come out. It certainly does not look like he is around.' In other words, Trump said nothing really. Instead, he confined himself to inviting Khashoggi's fiancée Hatice Cengiz to the White House to take pictures with him before the famous fireplace in the hope that this will put the matter to rest.

But we should return to this article's more important point, which is that the U.S. administration appears to be unsettled but also unwilling to take any measures against Saudi Arabia, even if Riyadh's involvement in the crime were to be proven. In the same interview, President Trump said about curbing arms sales to Saudi Arabia – and we quote him literally: 'That would be hurting us. We have jobs. We have a lot of things happening in this country. We have a country that's doing probably better economically than it's ever done before. Part of that is what we are doing with our defense systems and everybody is wanting them, and frankly, I think that would be a very, very tough pill to swallow for our country.' And he severely criticized the 22 members of Congress who have sent him a letter demanding that sanctions be imposed on Saudi Arabia in line with the Magnitsky Act, saying that they were acting hastily, and warning that such a move would harm the U.S.

Trump's very important words give the impression that the real action underway gives priority to reaching a secret 'deal' over the victim's 'remains,' rather than trying to figure out what really happened. There is an active channel of communication in this regard between three American officials and Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman – National Security Advisor John Bolton, President Trump's son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. At the same time, there is a secret Turkish/Saudi channel amidst reports indicating that the Ankara does not wish to enter a confrontation with Saudi Arabia, the 'major regional power,' and is trying to find a 'compromise solution' to end this crisis instead.

Anyone following the Turkish press close to the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) would note that it has dealt with the crime and its developments in a much calmer manner over the past two days, unlike the U.S. media. It is worth noting that yesterday's editorial in Turkey's [pro-government] as-Sabah's confirmed that 'no human remains were seen when the Saudi security team's bags passed under the security scanners before they left Istanbul International Airport aboard two private jets.' If true, this reshuffles many cards and undermines many assumptions regarding the current claims that Khashoggi's corpse was cut into pieces.

Quoting three sources informed about the Turkish investigations, the American TV network NBC reported yesterday that Ankara has told Washington that it has eavesdropping equipment inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and audiotapes confirming that Khashoggi was killed by a professional Saudi security team that flew in from Riyadh for that purpose. Other reports have mentioned that Turkish intelligence tested the Saudi consulate's sewage pipes and found criminal evidence, possibly blood.

More importantly, Turkish intelligence that published the images and names of this Saudi security team confirmed that one of its most prominent members is an expert in dissecting human corpses for autopsies and serves a medical examiner with the Saudi Interior Ministry. It compared his image on Facebook with the picture taken when the team entered and left the consulate, and found them to be identical. This doctor's presence has raised many questions regarding his role: Was he sent to carry out an autopsy or to cut the corpse into pieces or to inject Khashoggi with a sedative as a prelude to removing him to Riyadh – like other emirs and opposition figures?

In conclusion, we can ay that only two possibilities remain by the time this article was written:

- First, that Mr. Khashoggi was actually murdered, but that his corpse's fate and location remain unknown.

- Second, that he was kidnapped alive to Riyadh, just like other Saudi emirs and opposition figures, some of whom were later liquidated, and some who have been placed under house arrest.

A very close friend of Khashoggi and who is familiar with his most intimate secrets, has confirmed to us that Saudi intelligence decided to liquidate him because he was planning to establish a human rights organization by the name al-Fajr [Dawn] that he would have headed and that would have included many Arab and Saudi opposition figures, with its headquarters in Istanbul and under public Turkish sponsorship.

The Saudi authorities are relying on the element of time, in the belief that the longer the investigations take, the less the international and Arab and media interest in this crime. President Trump and his advisors appear to be supporting this wager and encouraging it. In this regard, they are relying on the fact that the West seeks its own interests. After all, Germany apologized to Saudi Arabia, Spain withdrew its decision to stop selling arms to Riyadh in protest against the Yemen war, and Canada is about to take the same path after its ambassador to Riyadh apologized for his government's interference in domestic Saudi affairs, including calling for the release of prisoners of conscience.

In short: Deals take precedence over human rights for most, if not all, Western governments and any exceptions to this rule are very rare. Anyone who says otherwise does not really know Western governments, especially the American administration. A simple review of Trump's statement above is sufficient to confirm this.

"Anyway, the coming days will show that we are right," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

A NOTABLE DEVELOPMENT: "After President Trump's administration delay in issuing any statements regarding the disappearance of prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and after a series of bland statements regarding this case, there was a notable development," writes Friday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

The White House announced that a phone conversation had taken place between Trump's son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner and Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, with National Security Advisor John Bolton joining the conversation. This was followed by a call from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to bin Salman.

According to some sources, the first communication was initiated by Mohammad bin Salman, which suggests that he is seeking help from his 'excellent friendship' with Trump's son-in-law in order to confront the growing pressures on Riyadh. Moreover, the fact that Bolton joined the conversation and Pompeo's subsequent call, point to an attempt to distance Kushner from this relationship, which has now become somewhat 'dubious', with the leader of a country that has committed a major sin; one moreover that the Trump administration should not be linked to, according to American calculations. For the administration and its president have sufficient 'poisonous' political, financial, and personal files on their hands, and they do not need to add the Khashoggi case to them.

Many analyses have linked Kushner's intensive meetings with bin Salman and the two men's 'special relationship' to the detention of leading emirs, businessmen, and political activists in Saudi Arabia, as well as the blockade imposed on Qatar and the [Israel/Palestine] 'deal of the century.' The young Saudi prince clearly took that 'special' relationship to mean a broad license to act not only inside Saudi Arabia but outside it as well, and he consequently exploited it to the maximum.

The Khashoggi case is most likely to be part of the young prince's understanding of the 'broad license' that he was granted. The idea of carrying out the operation in Turkey, which has significant disagreements with both Washington and Riyadh, may have appealed to the Saudi security authorities who may have believed that they would be striking two birds with one stone: Getting rid of a journalist who has significant influence over international and Arab public opinion, and exploiting the American and Saudi political disagreements with Turkey in order to contain Ankara's reaction to the operation.

These very mistaken calculations have apparently led the Saudi authorities to commit what appears to be a major public crime that is riddled with security and political scandals and atrocities. In fact, any sane politician or journalist would only describe as heinous, the fact that this crime was committed by a state whose crown-prince claims to be leading his country's march towards modernization and reform.

Moreover, the international reaction was equally sharp because of Khashoggi's significant media and political profile both inside and outside Saudi Arabia, so much so that it has totally prevented the Trump/Kushner duo from any attempt to cover it up, despite the fact that the U.S. president and some of his officials are still talking of the need to continue to supply Riyadh with weapons so as to confront Iran in Yemen.

The U.S. president has made a major statement regarding the Khashoggi case, in which he said that the famous journalist 'did not leave the Saudi consulate.' In doing so, he is holding Riyadh responsible for his disappearance and is unambiguously demanding that it offer an explanation of what happened.

Meanwhile, the American political machine in both houses of Congress is ratcheting up the pressure on the U.S. administration, and by extension on Saudi Arabia and its crown-prince. In this regard, Republican Senator and former presidential candidate Marco Rubio's sharp statement is noteworthy. Rubio said that if Khashoggi's kidnapping and liquidation proves true, this will lead to a 'complete revolt' against 'the Saudi's allies' that will go beyond sanctions. Other American legislators in the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have also sent a letter to Trump demanding an investigation into Khashoggi's disappearance based on the Magnitsky Act that allows sanctions to be imposed on any foreign official who is seen to be responsible for serious human rights violations.

Kushner's (and therefore Trump's) 'special relationship' with bin Salman is no longer the two-way relationship it once was: Providing cover for domestic repression in return for arms deals and pressure on the Palestinians to impose the 'deal of the century', as well opening the oil taps to compensate for the consequences of the sanctions on Iran, etc., etc. Judged by America's political and media criteria, bin Salman's men have gone too far and in a manner that cannot be covered up; they have committed a major sin.

"The question now is this: What is bin Salman now thinking in order emerge from the major predicament in which he has landed his country?" the daily concludes by asking.

End…

 

RIYADH'S PREDICAMENT: "As the circumstances surrounding journalist Jamal Khashoggi's kidnapping in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul are gradually being revealed, it seems impossible to ignore the extent of Riyadh's predicament as a result of this crime," writes Khalil al-'Anani on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

There is no longer any doubt that the crime was carried out in accordance with shoddy and rash Saudi planning and execution with no apparent concern for the consequences of the act. But while the Kingdom's records are rife with the kidnapping and 'disappearance' of Saudi journalists, officials, and emirs, this crime seems different for a number of reasons:

- First, the sheer recklessness and thoughtlessness with which this crime was committed in broad daylight, inside a Saudi government building, and before cameras both outside the consulate and outside Consul Mohammad al-'Oteibi's home, which is only a few meters away from the consulate building. The consul himself is now the subject of suspicion that Khashoggi's liquidation and getting rid of his corpse took place in his house – assuming that this is what really happened. A large Mercedes van was seen moving from the consulate to his house, staying there for more than four hours, before driving off to the airport bearing the members of the team that assassinated Khashoggi.

- Second, Khashoggi's considerable regional and international weight. He toured the leading international capitals from Washington (where he used to reside) to London, Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and other capitals, presenting an analyses of the situation in Saudi Arabia, especially after the rapid developments of the past two years and Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's controversial rise to power.

In his tours, Jamal offered a rational voice, analyzing the situation without exaggeration or understatement, which only added to his influence in influential international political circles. We saw how the Arab and foreign media competed to host him to talk about the changes in Saudi Arabia. And this is to say nothing of the fact that he was close to the Saudi royal palace until recently, which imparted a different taste to his words.

- Third, Khashoggi was a regular contributor to one of the world's most important and influential newspapers, The Washington Post, which views his kidnapping and possible murder as a brazen attack on one of its writers. It will therefore not stop digging and exerting pressure until the real perpetrators are exposed and brought to justice. This may explain the American reaction to the crime which has been snowballing with each passing day, especially in Congress, and which will not end unless there is real American pressure on Saudi Arabia.

- Finally, Riyadh's involvement in planning and executing the crime cannot be hidden or overlooked; nor can the fact that the decision to get rid of Khashoggi was issued at the Kingdom's highest political levels, specifically by bin Salman. If that is proven, then bin Salman's crime goes beyond his other crimes this time round, whether in his war on Yemen, or Lebanese PM Sa'd al-Hariri's kidnapping, or the imprisonment of Saudi businessmen in the Ritz Carlton Hotel and stealing their money, or his kidnapping of a number of emirs opposed to his arrogant behavior and methods. The fact is that the kidnapping (and possible murder?) of a journalist of Jamal Khashoggi's caliber, moreover on foreign territory and in this stark manner, is the height of rashness, recklessness, and lack of concern for the consequences.

Bin Salman's involvement in Khashoggi's kidnapping (and possible murder?) – is most likely to fling open the door of pressure and blackmail on him and the Kingdom, from both the U.S. and other parties. It will further consolidate his image as a foolish adolescent who resorts to bullying and crime when dealing with his opponents, rather than as a responsible person fit to be the king of a strategic and important country such as Saudi Arabia.

"Khashoggi's life may well be the proverbial straw that will break the camel's back," concludes 'Anani.

Ends…

 

2-  Advantage Ankara

 

After eight years of competition Ankara now seems to have beaten Riyadh in the contest over regional leadership, says Nasser Qandil in today's Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Over the past eight years since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have competed over the leadership of the region alongside Iran, and on who will represent the Islamic world vis-à-vis the West, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. Riyadh appeared to have had the upper hand until recently, but recent events have tipped the balance decisively in Ankara's favor.

 

EIGHT YEARS OF COMPETITION: "Saudi/Turkish competition for leadership of the Islamic world has not been absent over the past eight lean years of the Arab Spring and in which the two countries successively occupied a leading role," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

In the first two years, Turkey was ahead of Saudi Arabia. This was at the time when Qatar and al-Jazeera were fabricating 'revolutions', forming governments in Egypt and Tunisia, and leading the war on Syria. Washington was still wagering on Neo-Ottomanism as project to take control of Asia in the same manner that it wagered on the EU to inherit the European parts of the former Soviet Union.

Over the next two years, Saudi Arabia advanced with the collapse of the project to place Egypt and Tunisia under the Muslim Brotherhood's control, and the return of the [Egyptian military] ancien regime in a new garb, with public Saudi support, and moving towards a wager on al-Qa'ida, financed and sponsored by Saudi Arabia, to win the war on Syria.

In the following two years, Saudi Arabia and Turkey both lost the wager of acting as partners in the nuclear understanding with Iran, just as they lost their shared but conflicting wagers on the war on Syria via ISIS.

Now, the last two years are approaching the finish line after the Saudi crown-prince scored extra points after placing all of Saudi Arabia's eggs and money in U.S. President Donald Trump's basket. He seemed to be heading towards being crowned as the Islamic world's ruler, while Turkey seemed to be in financial, political, and military retreat.

At the end of the eight years, however, Saudi Arabia is losing its claim leadership, while Turkey is winning it; meanwhile, Iran has reserved for itself the role of a parallel and equal partner, and Israel has reserved for itself a regional role that Washington is backing with all its weight, and Egypt is retreating from any leadership role.

For while the Saudi crown-prince seems mired in the Yemen war, Turkish President Erdogan appears to have secured a Russian insurance policy that allows him to exit the Syrian war. And while the Saudi crown-prince has become the main symbol of crimes against humanity in Yemen, Turkey's president is leading a settlement for Idlib that has spared the region an exhausting bloodbath.

Parallel to that, while Saudi Arabia seems a partner to the American failure in the deal of the century that was stillborn after Jerusalem was declared Israel's capital, Turkey has escaped from this game unscathed. Moreover, it remained able to deal with U.S./Iranian tensions rationally, realizing that Washington's ultimate aim is to negotiate, and that it will go to whoever can talk with Iran after the end of the crises and the time comes for a settlement. For this reason, Turkey has maintained its purchases of oil and gas from Iran despite U.S. sanctions; whereas Saudi Arabia has made no secret of the fact that it has been behind the incitement to impose these sanctions. And Iran will not forget these positions when the crisis ends. Furthermore, whereas Saudi Arabia is sitting squarely in the Americans' lap, Ankara has succeeded in demonstrating that it can combine NATO membership with building the best of relations with Russia from a position of independence.

Amidst all this, Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance and the likelihood that he was murdered has come to place Saudi Arabia and Turkey face-to-face. Turkey has come across as a country that is behaving cleverly, building up an international legal case against Saudi Arabia on the one hand, while avoiding a crisis in bilateral relations, on the other. By contrast, Saudi Arabia seems drowned in confusion, having committed a lethal mistake and deluding itself that it can be rescued from its predicament via a media campaign.

Meanwhile, the snowball is growing bigger and bigger, and the Western press is unanimously adopting the view that is impossible to trust the Saudi crown-prince as a partner representing the Islamic world in making policies.

"And all this comes follows the Pakistani presidential elections' that took a turn contrary to Saudi wishes, against a background in which Pakistan occupies a critical position in determining Afghanistan's future and the Pakistani and Afghani files' significant place in relations with America and Chinese/Iranian relations," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

3-  Resolute lackeys

 

The official Arab order is not as obedient to the West as is commonly believed, the trouble is that it only asserts its will for its own narrow interest, says Mohammad Yaghi in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The official Arab order and its "official Arabs" are commonly portrayed as lackeys of the West, but a close look at their behavior suggests otherwise, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. They can act in a resolute manner when it comes to defending their own interests; but the interests of their peoples and those of the Arab nation seem to be of no concern.

 

UNJUSTIFIED CLAIM: "The claim that the official Arab order is a 'lackey' of the West, and that it lacks all will and is consequently unable to defend its causes, is unjustified despite the fact that many Arabs are convinced of this," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

In searching for the official Arab order's faults, one finds the idea of 'hostility to the Arabs', which supposedly is the cause of all the catastrophes that have befallen the Arab world and whose source is that of a non-Arab party that hates the Arabs.

But in order for this analysis to hold its ground, the Arab elite must be stripped of all agency: that is to say, of all its ability to think, plan, choose, and act. Stripping it of its agency transforms the elite into mere helpless tool in the hands of others.

In this regard, we should admit that there is a politicized religious/cultural dimension to this idea. The claim that 'official Arabs' are mere pawns on a chessboard, moved by Western players, is not meant to absolve the Arab official order of its responsibilities. But the claim is that the West is still the power that controls the Arabs' fate. This claim is supported by the argument that the regimes that have refused to cooperate with the West have been either toppled or weakened by the use of Western armed force. The examples given in this regard are Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

There is some truth of this in the case of Iraq, regardless of the fact that Saddam Hussein's regime was one of the bloodiest in modern Arab history. As a result, there was a genuine split over it in Iraq. In other words, foreign intervention would not have occurred had a majority of Iraqis supported Saddam Hussein.

But the situation is different in the Libyan and Syrian cases. Colonel Qadhafi's regime maintained good relations with the West. He had eliminated his nuclear program in compliance with U.S. demands, paid compensation for the civilian Lockerbie aircraft that he was accused of downing [in 1988], and covered the cost of [former French president] Sarkozy's election campaign. Western intervention to topple him thus did not stem from his hostility towards the West, but because of the 'official Arabs' exaggeration of what was said to be his campaign to annihilate his opponents who had rebelled against his rule.

In the Syrian case, the civil war raged there because of a regional conflict, not because of Western intervention. Western intervention was subsidiary to the regional conflict on Syria's soil between Iran and its allies on the one hand, and the Syrian opposition and its Arab allies on the other. The West intervened in a limited manner so as to ensure that its regional allies, who were demanding such intervention and seeking to topple the Syrian regime, would not lose the war.

In both the Libyan and the Syrian cases, the official Arabs did not appear to be stripped of their will, but fully in charge of their own decisions; meanwhile, the West's intervention seems to have been designed to appease them at minimum cost. But there are other more recent examples that prove that the official Arabs are not only in control of their will, but can impose their terms on the West as well.

When the German Foreign Minister criticized the state of human rights in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of this year, Riyadh recalled its ambassador to Berlin and did not return him except after securing an official and public German apology.

When the Canadian ambassador criticized the Saudi government for the apparent arrest of a woman political activist, the Kingdom expelled the Canadian ambassador and threatened to recall some 12,000 Saudi students studying at Canadian universities. In fact, we still do not know what the fate of Canadian/Saudi relations will be, or whether the case will end with a Canadian apology.

In both the German and Canadian cases, the 'West' remained neutral and its governments did not dare declare their solidarity with Berlin or Ottawa out of concern for their interests in Saudi Arabia.

It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia justified what it did by claiming that these countries had intervened in its domestic affairs. But, had the West the true ability to move the official Arab regimes like pawns on a chessboard, would Saudi Arabia have been allowed to do what it did to begin with?

The official Arab order is not a lackey. And if it is, the reasons for that should be sought in the official elite's interests, rather than in the absence of willpower and the ability to act. Just imagine what would have happened has the official order decided to support the cause of Jerusalem by withdrawing its ambassador from Washington or cancelling the arms deals with it, or threatening to withdraw their deposits in its banks. Would the U.S. have dared to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital? The answer is a resounding 'No!'

The official Arabs can support their nation's causes if they so desire. But they do not, not because they lack willpower, as the proponents of the 'lackey' theory claim, but because they see no self-interest in doing so. In their relations with the West, the official Arabs ground their actions in their assessment of their narrow interests, and not in their nation's broader interests.

Within these narrow confines, the official Arabs ask: will this stance benefit us and bolster our interests, or does it conflict with them? The question concerning the 'nation's' interest – that is, the Arabs' interest– is absent from the decision-making table. This leads us back to the source of the crisis in the Arab world: The Arabs' crisis stems from their political elite. Unless it alters its behavior, other states West or East, will continue to ignore the Arabs' interests.

"In short, the official Arabs are not lackeys, but are in control of their own decisions and posses the will to implement them. But these traits only emerge when their own interests are at stake, rather than those of their peoples and nations," concludes Yaghi.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 12.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Sedat Ergin sympathizes with Ankara's plight in center-right Hurriyet: "Turkey can take series of critical steps that are consistent with international law with regard to the disappearance of Saudi Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi if he is deemed to have been a victim of murder. Such steps could lead to a freeze in bilateral relations for many long years. It goes without saying that a political decision in this regard is not going to be easy." 

Ibrahim Karagul maintains that the Saudi and Emirati crown princes are in a fix in pro-government Yeni Safak: "Let me say this openly: Saudi Crown-Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Abu Dhabi Crown-Prince Mohammed bin Zayed are the regional representatives of the post-Second-World-War order. They are the T.E. Lawrences of our times. They could not care less about Jerusalem, Mecca, Islam, history, or geography. The U.S. media and administration and the world media and political circles will corner them quite badly. This might be the end of their dream. Talk of criminal cases, allegations, evidence, and international trials will now begin."

Mustafa Kartoglu call for a comprehensive investigation in pro-government Star: "'The U.S. already has CIA and FBI offices in Turkey. However, we cannot talk of a 'joint investigation'. Besides, the U.S. has no ambassador in Ankara. (The appointment of David Satterfield was announced in May, but the approval process has been going on for five months). Trump's statement on 'working together' is important. However, countries such as the U.S. and Britain that have leverage on the Riyadh government should call for a 'comprehensive criminal investigation'. After all, if a country makes a human being disappear at its diplomatic mission in another country, this is not only an issue for Turkey, but for all democracies."

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Ilhan Cihaner challenges the government's move on municipal appointees in leftist opposition Birgun: "Election security and government intervention in local administrations are now affecting the AKP's [ruling Justice and Development Party's] constituency and other parties too. Which trustee [government] appointment to a municipality who will be removed from office and which enforced resignation can be explained to the public in a persuasive manner? There is no question that this practice, if accepted, will be used only in favor of the [presidential] palace and the AKP's elites."

 

FAKE NEWS: Faruk Cakir has a solution for fake news in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "Is there any public, any system, or any media world that does not object to fake news? They allow fake news, but complain about people not reading. Had there had been a serious review of what readers want, and if papers that include fake news knowingly and deliberately were to be punished and not purchased, could these papers continue to be published?"

 

PROPOSED AMNESTY: Umit Zileli finds black humor in a judicial sentence in opposition Korkusuz: "If the MHP's [Nationalist Movement Party's] calculation is that some 150,000 ordinary prisoners will benefit from its proposed 'covert amnesty', we can assume that 75,000 are currently in jail on charges of aiding and abetting a terror group, while 50,000 are in jail on charges related to FETO terror organization [Gulen network] and nearly 5,000 for affiliation with the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and its extensions. Surely, it does not end with how you land in jail. Grup Yorum music band member Sevcan Adiguzel was given a penalty I could not believe for protesting a stand-up head-count and limitation on books. Can you imagine what a 24-year-old woman who was already deprived of visits for one year because of the state of emergency was penalized with: No open visits for 200 years! This is black humor, is it not?"

 

Iran media watch

 

(Please note that Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Channel One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST DISAPPEARANCE: Domestic broadcast media and English-language Press TV continued their coverage of the disappearance of Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. According to Iranian media, Turkish officials have shared contents of video and audio recordings that reportedly contain evidence supporting claims that the Washington Post columnist was murdered by the Saudi government. Radio Iran (VIRI) reported that President Donald Trump said he is not willing to throw away billions of dollars in military deals with Saudi Arabia over the suspected murder of the prominent Saudi journalist. Rolling news channel IRINN's correspondent reported that "it is not clear if his mutilated body was buried inside the consulate or was taken out of Turkey secretly that night by those 15 agents of Saudi Crown-Prince bin Salman".

 

ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICIAL FIRED: A local environmental official in Semnan Province has been sacked over his negligence in transferring a number of Asiatic zebras to their natural habitat in central Iran, IRINN reports. Five out of 10 zebras died while being transferred from Shahrud National Park to their natural habitat in Garmsar. The five that survived are being taken care of, according to the report. The general director of Semnan Province's Department of Environment cited "human error" as the reason behind the mishap. The Persian zebra is listed as an endangered species.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: A campaign on Twitter encouraging students to go on strike across the country on 14 October has set the social media platform abuzz. The movement aims to rile students up against the Islamic regime and in support of striking truck drivers and issues at universities. The relevant hashtag has been used around 13,400 times in the past 24 hours by 1,648 unique accounts, but only about nine percent (or 1,100 Tweets) seem to be original Tweets. Retweets make up the vast majority (90 percent) of the hashtag's activity. One user posted a two-panel picture showing a large fish attacking a scattered group of smaller fish in the first panel. In the second panel, the same group of small fish was shown taking the fight to the large fish once they had organized. "Dear students, you can display Iranian honor in an artistic way," the user posted.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 12.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Between 'Abbas and Sinwar

 

Early elections have not been called yet, and in fact the earliest they can be is Monday when the Knesset resumes after a several-week recess, but speculation is running to the point of certainty that Prime Minister Netanyahu is on the verge of calling for a new vote. "Among coalition party heads there is wide agreement that a decision has been made. Everything is heading toward February 2019, the beginning of March at the most for new elections," Haaretz's Yossi Verter writes. "It will be before the attorney general makes a decision on his investigations, after a new police chief and IDF chief are picked and near the end of the second round of municipal elections. They did not believe Netanyahu when he told them at the start of the week that he still has not decided." Israel Hayom's Motti Tuchfeld writes that the press conference held by the normally camera-shy Netanyahu is proof that elections are on the way. During the last elections, "Netanyahu even gave interviews to internet sites he had never heard of. After he has done away with the bi-annual holiday interviews over the last few years, the press conference this week definitely shows that things are moving in a different direction; that there is an end-of-term atmosphere, the strong smell of elections in the air," he writes.

A poll from Channel 10 news dovetails with previous polls showing Likud still in the lead, Yesh Atid gaining, others shrinking and Orly Levy Abukasis making it in. Where it differs, though, is that it shows Zionist Union dropping to an unprecedented low of eight seats should former IDF chief Benny Gantz enter the race or 14 if Ehud Barak retakes the party's helm. The poll shows Gantz nabbing votes from all over the place, including Likud, Yesh Atid and even Jewish Home. While the numbers show Likud still comfortably ahead of every other party, in the analysis of ideological blocs, the Channel 10 poll sees Gantz as actually boosting the center left, leading them to advise Yesh Atid and Zionist Union of going after him. "If they want to capture control, the center-left bloc needs to campaign against Orly Levy Abukasis, since she takes votes away from them and takes them to the right-wing bloc."

In Gaza, Israel's announcement that it found and destroyed a Hamas tunnel into Israel is plastered all over the print press, a sign of the still high border tensions. Describing the passageway's pimped out electricity, telephone line, and "advanced building methods," Israel Hayom calls it the "supreme tunnel." It is not only the schemes planned for the tunnel that bothers some, but also the funneling of money that Gazans could really use for other projects. "The destruction of the tunnel signals again that Hamas is continuing to lose assets and military infrastructure," Israel Hayom's Amnon Lord writes. "When you speak about the larger conflict, without getting into the fence intifada, time is working in Israel's favor." Yedioth Ahronoth plays up the tunnel story as a sign of the success of Israel's methods to find and block tunnels.

In contrast, Yedioth columnist Yossi Yehoshua writes that the army is not seeing the same kind of successes against terror in the West Bank, after two attacks in which the assailant got away. Hours after Thursday's stabbing, the attack suspect was indeed collared, leading Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman to promise, yet again, that the Palestinian behind the Barkan industrial zone shooting will be caught. But Yehoshua is not so sure: "The intelligence picture in the hunt for the terrorist is not good enough, and so he is still out free. If we add to that the fact that he managed to escape despite the fact that the area was blanketed in security cameras, we find unsatisfactory effectiveness of the army and Shin Bet in the West Bank."

Meanwhile, the Palestinian leadership will no longer work with the United Nation's peace envoy, a senior official said Thursday, accusing him of overstepping his role by seeking a deal between Israel and Hamas. Ahmad Majdalani, a member of the PLO's executive committee, said it had informed the UN secretary-general that envoy Nickolay Mladenov was "no longer acceptable" to the Palestinian government. Mladenov had "gone beyond his role" in seeking agreements between Israel and Hamas, he said, adding that his actions impacted "Palestinian national security and the unity of our people."

Israel could soon significantly downgrade the prison conditions for Palestinian security convicts, in a move likely to spark outrage among prisoners and outside prison walls. Hadashot TV news published what it said were conclusions soon to be presented by a committee established four months ago by Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan, tasked with examining the possibility of worsening the prisoners' conditions to the minimum required by international law. Erdan announced the formation of the public committee in June in a bid to put pressure on the groups to which they belong, chiefly Hamas, to release Israeli citizens and soldiers' bodies held in Gaza. According to the report, the committee intends to recommend that Israel drastically reduce family visits for security prisoners, and stop letting them buy meat, fish, fruits and vegetables outside prison. They will also be prohibited from cooking meals in their wards and cells, and their food grinders and blenders are to be taken away. Additionally, the Israel Prison Service will stop separating the prisoners according to the groups to which they belong, meaning that members of rival factions such as Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic Jihad will be staying in the same ward and even in the same cells. Other recommendations cited in the report include limiting the number of television channels available, closing the canteens in the wards, and canceling the status of "ward spokesperson" – meaning that a representative of the prisoners will only be allowed to speak on a few, specific topics on their behalf. The report said the repercussions from such measures, if they are approved by Erdan, could be dramatic – both inside the prisons and on Palestinian streets – and would require special preparation by the Prisons Service.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman announced Thursday that a project for the first new Israeli homes in the flashpoint West Bank city of Hebron in 16 years will be submitted to cabinet ministers for approval. "On Sunday, the cabinet will approve the plan to build 31 housing units in the Hezekiah Quarter of Hebron. The plan, which has already been advanced through various planning stages, also includes kindergartens and public parks," Lieberman tweeted. A defense official told The Times of Israel that Prime Minister Netanyahu green-lit the project a year ago, allowing the Civil Administration – the Defense Ministry body that authorizes West Bank construction – to grant building permits for the 31 homes.

Finally, the Tel Aviv District Court discussed on Thursday morning the appeal of an American student who was barred entry to Israel over alleged ties to the BDS movement. Lara Alqasem, 22, was accepted as a graduate student at the Hebrew University but was barred from entering the country and detained at Ben-Gurion Airport on October 2 because Israeli authorities claim she supports an anti-Israel boycott. Alqasem is being held at a facility at the airport despite obtaining a student visa from the Israeli consulate in Miami. She was returned to the holding facility at Ben-Gurion Airport for foreigners who have been denied entry to Israel, where she has been detained for nine days. The judges did not issue a ruling and it will be sent to all the parties involved later. Yossi Zadok, the attorney representing the state, said the attempts to minimize her involvement by invoking Alqasem's age and the number of members of her organization was irrelevant, because campuses are the center of BDS activity and by its nature the movement is led by young people. "The language of the law does not require the success of the activities, only the participation itself", he said.

 

 

AN ARRANGEMENT STILL POSSIBLE: Nahum Barnea in Yedioth Ahronoth avows that war with Gaza is far from inevitable. Israel cannot accept Sinwar's offer of a five-year truce, during which he can strengthen his military power, but a more modest cease-fire is certainly an option.

"Since March 30, the Palestinians have sustained 207 dead and 5,800 wounded from IDF sniper fire. The IDF has one dead, Givati fighter Aviv Levy. The videos on the web and the politician's tweets create a feeling that we are on the verge of war, but the reality is much less certain. One cannot rule out the possibility we are headed towards an arrangement.

On the high mound of dirt that the bulldozers have stacked on the Israeli side of the fence is an Israeli sniper position. In front is a tent with a large Palestinian flag flying over it. This is one of the five epicenters of rioting along the Gaza Strip. On the first, spontaneous, day of demonstrations, there were 25 such epicenters. Hamas wanted to instill order and reduced the number to five. This made life much easier for the IDF. When Gaza understood the mistake, it was too late: The protestors continued going to the places they were used to. The technique did not change: They burn tires, and under cover of the heavy black smoke, the bold among them attempt to reach the fence. Some of those storming the fence are equipped with charges, grenades, weapons, others come empty-handed. IDF snipers fire into the smoke. According to IDF records, 100 of the 207 dead are Hamas fighters.

The ongoing confrontation on the fence has generated criticism from left and right. Human rights organizations view firing on demonstrators as a violation of international norms; politicians on the right protest there is not enough of it. Deep inside the area, around Hamas positions, grenades are sometimes thrown, tires burn, shots fired in the air. Maybe it is a game, maybe an exercise, maybe a dress rehearsal. Right-wing politicians expect the snipers to respond to this as well, for appearances sake, rather than for any essential reason. According to them, the more casualties on the other side; the better. The IDF acts differently. 'What does not endanger me, does not interest me,' asserts one of the commanders on the ground.

There are rules of engagement for this confrontation, and both sides are making heroic efforts to stick to them. Hamas focuses on the fence line. Even when it has casualties, it prefers to absorb. Activity begins at dusk. There is a visible effort to hold one event per day. On Friday, the mass event along the line took place; on Sunday, at 9 PM, 300 people marched to the fence at the Karni Crossing, opposite Nahal Oz. One was shot in his leg, and the others retreated. On Monday, thousands demonstrated on the beach, opposite Kibbutz Zikim, while at the same time boats tried to cross the border at sea.

Netanyahu and Lieberman chose containment. From time to time the two made war threats, but it was merely rhetoric for internal needs. The Air Force bombing sorties likewise were conducted in a way meant to prevent unnecessary killing. Netanyahu, Abu Mazin, and Yahiya as-Sinwar took each other by the throat. Netanyahu strangled Sinwar, but left him a narrow opening for breathing. His interest was to preserve the Hamas regime, despite Abu Mazin's seething rage; Abu Mazin tightened his grip on Sinwar's throat; he hoped to bring Gaza down on Netanyahu; Sinwar also had hopes: He hoped to impose a national reconciliation, which would place the responsibility for all Gaza's hardships on Abu Mazin while leaving the weapons in his hands; Alternatively, he hoped that the demonstrations on the fence would give birth to a new intifada; The West Bank would fall on Abu Mazin and Netanyahu. But those who really choked were the residents, two million people. They are not in the game.

Yesterday, Thursday, the IDF announced the discovery of another tunnel that penetrated into Israel, the 15th in the past year. The tunnel left from the direction of Khan Yunis. On Tuesday I visited a parallel tunnel, which reached as far as the outskirts of Kibbutz Nirim, one kilometer inside Israeli territory. The construction is impressive – concrete walls, a convex concrete ceiling, and power cables. The width of the tunnel allows one armed combatant to run through it. At certain points it drops 20 meters below the ground, between five and six floors.

Sinwar has failed in all his moves – failed in reconciliation, failed to breach the fence, failed in the tunnels. However, he has proved he is in control and his ability to survive. In an interview last Friday, he offered Israel a cease-fire for five years, during which he could become stronger and arm himself. In other words, a proposal for a lull now – and Hezbollah later. The offer cannot be accepted, but a more modest cease-fire is definitely an option.

Ends…

 

CAN SINWAR DELIVER A COMPROMISE?: Michel Kleiner in Maariv argues that the Hamas chief does not attempt to hide his deep hatred of Israel, but for the first time it seems there is a Palestinian leader who is fed up with his people's hardship and despair.

"Two Palestinian leaders; two different approaches. The Palestinians' choice is not between the PA and Hamas, not between a two-state or one-state solution – but between the one who is betting on their lives and the one who sees their suffering. All the commentaries following the interview with Yahiya as-Sinwar missed significant and interesting aspects of his personality. The journalistic and political focus was on the words of the Hamas leader. I want to focus on his tone, which attests more than anything to his personality. Sinwar did not offer us an agreement or long-term truce. He offered an ocean of deep hatred, and with that threw the towel into the ring.

The Hamas leader openly informed us that he hated us, but that he was ready at this stage to give up and admit the failure of armed struggle. Sinwar differs in his credibility. We all understand that he is honest; that he is telling us the whole truth, in the face. No more Yasser Arafat and Abu Mazin, whose expressions of hatred for Israel were only made in internal speeches. Sinwar puts the hatred on the table.

As someone who sat in an Israeli prison and emerged from it to the chaotic reality of the Gaza Strip, he found himself in a terrible dissonance. Suddenly he discovered that a life of freedom in Gaza could be significantly worse than a prison life in Israel. The sense of hatred may have been intensified by the fact that life in Gaza makes him miss the Israeli prison.

But there is something he loves even more than hating us. Sinwar genuinely loves the Palestinian people and does not want to see them suffer. Understanding his emotional world reveals the emotional motives leading him to suggest a Palestinian compromise under some guise. This is the first time since the Israeli/Palestinian conflict hardened that there is someone in the Palestinian leadership who is truly struggling with the severe hardships, the poverty, the life-threatening feeling and constant lack of hope on the Palestinian side.

In order to understand how different Sinwar is, it is necessary to compare him to Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas. The common denominator between the two is the deep hatred of Israel. But while the latter covers it with lip service and cunning, the former expresses it openly and proudly. Once this common denominator is set aside, a deep difference in values and personality is revealed. The 'moderate' 'Abbas is willing to continue spilling the blood of the Palestinian people, as long as he regains control over Gaza, instead of placing the immediate interests of his people at the top of his agenda. He is disdainful of his people and gives his pride a central role in managing the conflict. He is a leader of the old generation, with whom Eastern honor overshadows logic and compassion. Sinwar, on the other hand, feels Palestinian suffering, identifies with it and realizes that it is first of all an existential-human pain, and only afterwards a national pain. On the practical level, he is ready to abandon at this stage the pursuit of national rights. The right to life is more important to him. From his point of view, achieving personal and economic security comes before a political framework. This does not prevent him, on a spiritual and ideological level, from continuing to hold on to the concept of Greater Palestine on both sides of the Jordan, and the fantasy of the destruction of Israel that can be bequeathed to the next generation.

Sinwar is now more eager to focus on the physical rescue of the next Palestinian generation, in preventing epidemics and malignant poverty, which will completely destroy Palestinian society. With the sharp senses of a former prisoner, he recognizes that the pressure cooker may also explode in the face of Hamas. Due to the humanitarian crisis, the organization's rule in Gaza is hanging by a thread. On a good day, the Palestinian rage is aimed at the IDF and Israel; but on a bad day, it will target Hamas and bring about a civil coup, and who knows how that will end.

Sinwar's attempt to save his people from a humanitarian and ecological disaster through an interview with an Italian journalist has succeeded. The first truckload of diesel fuel arrived in Gaza on the basis of agreement between Israel and the United Nations. The U.S. special envoy Jason Greenblatt gave his blessing; Hamas talked with Egypt about a quiet understanding to reduce the demonstrations near the fence; Qatar made a commitment to pay Israel for a half a year's worth of diesel.

Only one factor, as expected, was a killjoy: A senior official in the Palestinian Authority was very upset that Gaza residents would be connected to electricity for eight hours a day instead of four. The desire to topple Hamas has become a greater obsession for the PA than even the desire to destroy Israel. If the Palestinian side could once set aside internal disputes in favor of continuing the struggle against Israel; that has completely dwindled following the humiliation Abu Mazin suffered when he was expelled in disgrace from Gaza. He cannot forget the humiliation, and bares a grudge towards both Hamas and the Gazans for electing Ismail Haniyeh.

Hamas has already collapsed. It has given up. It is pleading for a respectable ladder that will enable it to stop the armed struggle and restore the lives of the residents of Gaza. Long before a stable government framework, The Palestinians have a need for social and economic stability in order to create some kind of normalization in the region. The people are far more important than the government that will run them. Sinwar has understood what Israel already knows. Abu Mazin will never understand this."

Ends…

 

WEST BANK SEETHING, GAZA HEATING UP: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom stresses that while the greater danger lies in Syria and Lebanon, the immediate concern is in the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank is teeming with illegal weapons, most of them improvised, but the Palestinian public there is disinterested in a violent struggle.

"The terror attack in Barkan and the events on the fence in the Gaza Strip are a reminder that the greater danger may lie in Syria and Lebanon, but the immediate explosiveness is in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza.

The attack was a kick in the gut. Not only because of the monstrosity of the murder, but because of the slap on the cheek it gave to the appearance of sanity; in the heart of an industrial zone designed to enable the Palestinians to make a decent living, and prove that despite everything it is possible to find points of common interest that will enable coexistence.

130,000 Palestinians work in Israel with a permit. Approximately 90,000 of them inside the Green Line (plus about 25,000 illegal residents), approximately 12,000 merchants, and another 30,000 in industrial zones such as Barkan. Every one of them has undergone a comprehensive security check, and received a work permit. In general, the method proves itself. It is rare for those with work permits to be involved in terrorism.

If an average Palestinian family has five people, the permit holders feed about 20 percent of the West Bank's population. Add to this the tax revenues that Israel collects for the Palestinian Authority, and this comes out to more than half of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria that subsist on the ties with Israel. This is also the best tranquilizer for the PA leadership. They do not have an alternative source of income, especially after the cut in American aid. This logic is the focus of the decision to establish industrial zones.

The terror attack exposed a clear intelligence failure. The terrorist wrote a post on Facebook, and left a will with a friend. This should have been a warning sign. Since the beginning of the year, some 4,000 Palestinians have been arrested in the West Bank on suspicion of terrorism; a quarter of them with organizational affiliations, and the rest lone-wolves. This week's attack proved once again that despite the successes in foiling terrorism, this system is not hermetic.

Another issue is the weapon. The terrorist bought or received it, and that too was supposed to light a warning sign. But the story here is much broader. In the West Bank there are many illegal weapons today, most of them improvised. Lathes moonlight at nighttime, engaged in the production of 'Carlo' rifles, such as the one used for the attack. There are 'Carlo' Balata and 'Carlo' Ramallah rifles, and the average price of a rifle is 3,000-7,000 shekels - depending on the quality.

In the past month alone the IDF and Shin Bet seized more than 100 improvised rifles. Since the beginning of the year, the number exceeded 350. This is far from sufficient for solving the problem, because demand far exceeds supply: iI a standard rifle costs NIS 60,000-50,000, 'Carlo' is a cheap and convenient solution for manufacturers and consumers. It is true that the damage from such weapons is limited in scope and effectiveness compared to standard weapons, but as was proven this week, and not for the first time - it is enough for murder.

Palestinian security bodies have a supreme interest in reducing this phenomenon. Illegal weapons threaten, or may threaten, them as well. In contrast to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, which operates in an ostentatious and outrageously oppositional manner, the security forces are practical; cooperation with them is ongoing and efficient. Both sides understand the damage an attack such as this causes, which reaches far beyond its immediate victims.

Since the beginning of the year, ten Israelis have been killed in terrorist attacks from Judea and Samaria. The main effort is to prevent them from becoming a wave, a chain that will be hard to stem. The endeavor has been successful until now, mainly thanks to the Palestinian public's conspicuous lack of interest in a violent struggle, mostly for fear of losing what little they have. This is also the reason that despite the attack, business in Judea and Samaria will continue as usual. Israel realizes that there is currently no alternative.

Meanwhile, Gaza is heating up again. After relatively quiet weeks, the likelihood of escalation is increasing again. Tens of thousands of people are expected to arrive at the fence today to rub shoulders with the IDF. Molotov cocktails and explosive charges will be hurled there, incendiary kites and balloons will be launched, and there may also be shooting incidents.

The situation in the Gaza Strip is deteriorating. Despair is mounting. There is no solution in sight. All attempts to reach an arrangement, permanent or temporary, have failed so far. Hamas is ready to compromise. So is Israel. The one obstructing the efforts is Abu Mazin. As far as he is concerned, it is all or nothing; either Gaza will be 'his', totally, including full control of all the fighting forces and weapons (a condition that Hamas will never accept), or Gaza can go up in smoke, and he will not flinch.

The whole world is sitting on Abu Mazin's back to send money to Gaza. The Egyptians (who have resumed mediations in full swing), Qatar (who has already transferred money to finance fuel diesel for more hours of electricity in the Gaza Strip), the U.S. (which has imposed all possible sanctions on the Palestinians and lost its influence on them), and the Europeans (who have understood that asking nicely will not do and have switched to threats). Abu Mazin is refusing: I am not the bad guy in this story, but the good, he says. Hamas are the bad guys, fighting Israel and threatening Egypt and the West, dealing with Iran and cooperating with ISIS. I am fighting the bad guys for you, and instead of thanking me, you are fighting me.

Abu Mazin makes a lot of sense. Hamas is much worse than him. But that is not the question; if we do it his way, Gaza will explode. The blast will not reach Ramallah, but Israel. Hamas is preying on this logic: Diverting its frustration from the situation to us, in the hope that we will solve the problems for it.

In this state of affairs, the potential for escalation is high. Any unusual incident, on our side or on their side, may be grounds for deterioration. But there is also a positive side: Hamas is restrained. Deterred. Very timid. It embarked on Operation Protective Edge four years ago with much less cause than it has today. This means that there is still wiggling room for action, military and political.

The nerves in Israel – of the public, but especially of a political echelon in an election year – will have a huge bearing in the near future. It is to be hoped that the level-headedness and common sense that have accompanied the decision-making in recent months will not be replaced with unnecessary pressure now - the consequences of which could be dire."

Ends…

 

'ABBAS BYPASSED: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 writes that Hamas is pleased industrial diesel has begun to flow from Egypt. 'Abbas believes this signals the beginning of the "deal of the century", and has declared war.

"Hamas is pleased with the industrial diesel fuel from Egypt intended for the Gaza power plant to generate more electricity for the residents. The fuel is financed by Qatar with the consent of Egypt, Israel, and the United Nations, bypassing the resistance of the PA and its leader. Qatar's official news agency said Qatar's ruler Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad ordered the urgent transfer of $130 million to Gaza to ease the situation there. Senior Palestinian officials also say that Qatar conveyed a message to Hamas that it had nothing to fear from the possibility that PA Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas would stop the $96 million monthly aid to the Gaza Strip, and that Qatar would cover all expenses if 'Abbas made good on his threat.

Senior Hamas figure Musa Abu Marzuq said on October 11 that regional and international sources had informed Hamas that if 'Abbas continues to act in this manner, they would bypass him. Sources in Hamas say that this is the beginning of a new phase in which the organization is harvesting the fruits of the 'March of Return' campaign which began six months ago, without paying any political compensation to Israel. The organization may reduce the intensity of the demonstrations on the border fence and the amount of incendiary balloons and kites it launches, but will not stop them completely and will continue toting this threat. According to Hamas sources, the PA has also failed in its attempt to bend the Hamas leadership through the economic sanctions it imposed on it.

Issam Da'alis, deputy head of Hamas' political department, said on October 10 that the riots along the border fence were causing Israeli attrition and willingness to compromise, and that Egypt and Qatar, with international backing, were working to ease the situation in the Strip, even without the PA's approval, for fear of an explosion which would be aimed at Israel. He added that Israel is exhausted by the Palestinian people's determination to break the siege and is not interested in a military confrontation.

'Abbas is furious at Israel, Egypt, Qatar and the UN, who bypassed him and effectively neutralized some of the sanctions he imposed on Gaza in an attempt to force Hamas to comply with his demands. Sources in the PA say 'Abbas will find the appropriate opportunity to take revenge on anyone who bypassed him. Senior PA officials regard the bypassing of the PA as the inception of the implementation of American-Israeli plans regarding the Gaza Strip, in accordance with President Trump's 'deal of the century'. A senior Palestinian official says that Gaza's problem is political and not humanitarian. It must return to the control of the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and achieve national independence together with the West Bank, as a unified Palestinian state.

Israel has agreed to the move bypassing the PA and its leader in order to avoid escalation in the Gaza Strip, and has also received the blessing of the Trump administration. There is no doubt that this move weakens the status of the PA chairman and strengthens that of Hamas, with whom Israel, Egypt, Qatar and the UN prefer to close a deal, despite Abu Mazin's opposition.

Senior Fatah officials say Israel made a big mistake by allowing Qatar to gain a foothold in the Gaza Strip, stressing that Qatar is a terrorist-sponsoring state that hosts the headquarters of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Doha, and that Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have been boycotting it for more than a year. The test will probably be in the coming days. Will Hamas, in return for the diesel, now reduce the level of violence against Israel? Will it reduce the number of demonstrations on the border fence and the number of incendiary balloons and kites launched towards the Gaza envelope? Hamas' main objective was and remains the total lifting of the siege. Until then, it will continue its campaign."

Ends…

 

KHASHOGGI AND THE JEWISH QUESTION: Herb Keinon in The Jerusalem Post quotes a former deputy national Security Council head: "It is certainly not in our interests to see the status of the Saudi government diminished in Washington."

"Here's the rule: If some major event happens in the Middle East, it will generally have an impact on Israel. The disappearance of Saudi government critic and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey – and the very real possibility that the Saudis either kidnapped him, killed him, or both – is no exception.

On the surface, this story seems distant from Jerusalem. Israel was not involved in any way, and even Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who never misses an opportunity to blast Israel, is not saying that Jerusalem had anything to do with it.

Then how does this impact Israel? As Eran Lerman, the vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies and a former deputy national Security Council head, said: 'It is certainly not in our interests to see the status of the Saudi government diminished in Washington.' But, as it increasingly appears that the Saudi government – even the reformist Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS – had a hand in Khashoggi's disappearance; that is exactly what is starting to happen: The shine is coming off MBS's luster.

It didn't start with this incident. Already in August, when Saudi Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador and froze new trade deals because of Canadian criticism of Saudi human rights violations, voices were raised in the U.S. asking whether MBS is the right leader to cozy up to. The Khashoggi incident is strengthening that trend. As a New York Times headline read on Thursday, 'Khashoggi's disappearance puts Kushner's bet on Saudi crown prince at risk.' U.S. President Donald Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner has invested much in building a relationship with MBS, and Jerusalem – for its own interests – hopes that this particular bet does not turn sour.

Saudi Arabia's position in Washington is indeed imperiled, according to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Corker, a Republican, who said on Wednesday that the opinion of the kingdom on Capitol Hill had reached a nadir. The committee that day triggered the Magnitsky Act with respect to Khashoggi's disappearance, forcing the Trump administration to report to Congress within 120 days a determination of what happened – and a decision on whether to sanction those responsible.

As Dore Gold, the head of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and former Foreign Ministry director-general, said: 'This problem could be used by the Iranians to drive a wedge between the West and Saudi Arabia.' That is bad for Israel, he added, because 'anything that strengthens Iran's posturing in the Middle East is bad for Israel,' and in the Mideast balance of power, a weakened Saudi Arabia means a strengthened Iran.

It also means a strengthened Turkey, which could explain why Ankara is going the full Monty on this issue, releasing surveillance tape and leaking information about the investigation. 'Turkey is part of an axis with Qatar,' Gold said, 'and that puts Saudi Arabia at odds with the Turkish government. There is another theme in the relations as well, and that is that Saudi Arabia looks around the Middle East and sees hegemonic powers that threaten its vital security interests,' he said. 'The most obvious is Iran, but Turkey is another hegemonic power that could put Saudi interests at risk. For this reason, Saudi Arabia was never an opponent of Kurdish independence aspirations.'

At first glance one might think that the reason Saudi Arabia losing status in Washington is bad for Israel is because of the increased cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the hope that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu often alludes to being able to leverage that into Sunni pressure on the Palestinians to show some flexibility in the diplomatic process. A Washington-Riyadh tiff could compel the Saudis to rethink this cooperation. But that observation, Lerman maintained, misses a critical point: Israel's major concern – the number one issue on its agenda – is Iran, and not the Palestinians. And a Saudi Arabia that does not have the same cachet in Washington is bad for Israel because 'the Saudis, even more so than us in some ways, have turned around the American position on Iran. This is central and uppermost in our list of priorities, and so to have a Saudi government held in high regard in Washington is very much in our interest,' Lerman said. True, Netanyahu led the rhetorical charge in Washington to get Trump to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear deal earlier this year, but the Saudis – and other Persian Gulf states – were equally involved behind closed doors lobbying heavily against it.

Saudi influence in Washington will now be dimmed if its involvement in the Khashoggi incident is proved beyond doubt. Lerman envisions a scenario where Jewish political organizations in Washington – such as the American Jewish Committee, which he once worked for as head of its Israel office – may actually go to Capitol Hill, as they have done in the past, and discreetly lobby for the Saudis, something that could paradoxically bring the two countries even closer together. While Saudi Arabia has excellent relations with the Trump administration, its position in Congress – where there is mounting criticism – is much weaker, and they might look to Israel to help press their case.

The one positive fallout from the Khashoggi affair, Lerman said, might be that it will force MBS to be more cautious. 'For all the good that he has been doing from our perspective on the balance of power in the region, there is one after-effect that I hear all too often from people watching – that he is impetuous, reckless, doing too much, too fast and that he is not careful enough about the consequences. So if this ends up adding a dimension of caution,' Lerman said, 'it will not be a bad thing.'"

Ends…

 

HALEY SUCCEEDED DESPITE TRUMP: Former U.S. ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro on Ynet affirms that Nikki Haley used tough diplomacy and called out hypocrisy at the UN, but with Trump alienating allies, her successor must ensure the U.S. remains a respected leader in the world. Israel's well-being depends on it.

"A U.S. ambassador to the United Nations faces a difficult assignment: How to maximize U.S. interests by working with other nations in an important global forum, and at the same time, to be a critic, or a reformer, of a dysfunctional institution. Nikki Haley has handled the challenge well. On the one hand, she developed relationships and used tough diplomacy to achieve important American objectives, like strengthening sanctions on North Korea, which required Russia and China to agree. In that regard, she borrowed tools from predecessors like Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, and Susan Rice. On the other hand, she has been vocal in calling out the hypocrisy that is often heard at the United Nations, and has strongly demanded reforms in the bloated bureaucracy. In this way, she recalls the work of predecessors like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jean Kirkpatrick.

Of course, for Israelis, she is most appreciated for her strong defense of Israel against the unfair, one-sided criticism Israel so often receives at the United Nations. That is not a new policy. All American Administrations have worked hard to protect Israel at the United Nations (even though many, like the Obama Administration in December 2016, have also occasionally expressed differences). But Nikki Haley was especially forthright in her defense of Israel, and she deserves praise for it. Whether her support for cutting all aid to Palestinians will serve Israel's interests, or contribute to security challenges Israel will have to manage, remains to be seen. But she was right to highlight the way UNRWA perpetuates the myth that millions of Palestinian refugees and their descendants will return to Israel.

There is much speculation about the timing of Haley's departure. I do not think it is complicated. There is a clear understanding that her ambition is to run for president. She will not run against Trump, so that means 2024. By leaving now, she maintains her excellent reputation, which she has bolstered with national security credentials. She has avoided being pulled into the major Trump scandals and investigations, which will probably get worse in the next year. She announced her resignation before the mid-term elections, so she leaves on good terms with Trump and without appearing to abandon the administration because of a poor showing in November. She now has an opportunity to write a book, give some speeches, become a television commentator, make some money in the private sector, and help Republican candidates. All of that helps her get ready to run for president, but that is still four years away.

It is understandable that Israelis are sorry to see Haley go. Her support for Israel has been impressive. But the overall foreign policy of the Trump Administration is more complex. A story that Shimon Peres used to tell illustrates why. Peres described the only meeting between Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben Gurion, and then-President-elect John F. Kennedy, in December 1960. Kennedy asked Ben Gurion, 'What can I do to help Israel?' Ben Gurion's answer was: 'Be a great President of the United States.' Ben Gurion's point was, when the United States is strong and united and respected as a leader in the world, Israel benefits.

But these days, the United States is estranged from many of its closest allies. Trump's attacks on NATO, his withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, and his praise for dictators like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, make many countries less confident in American leadership. A recent international survey by the Pew Research Center shows that ratings of trust in the United States under Trump in Germany, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Japan are down 30, 40, even 50 points. Putin and China's Xi Jingpeng are more trusted than Trump.

Worse, Americans are more divided than ever, with a president who demonizes immigrants and minority groups, and treats political opponents as enemies. Even Israelis who support Trump's move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem agreed on the decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, and deeply appreciate Haley's support, sometimes say to me, 'We appreciate what Trump has done for Israel, but we worry about what he is doing to the United States.' Like many others, they do not recognize this America, and they worry that its internal divisions will weaken the U.S. role as the global leader. That will be the main challenge for Haley's successor: How to ensure that the United States remains respected as the leader everywhere. Israel will benefit if it is. But the new ambassador will need a new approach from President Trump, at home and abroad, to make that possible."

Ends…

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Writing in centrist tabloid Posta, Candas Tolga Isik anticipates the course of events regarding the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul: "Remember that just a few days ago, U.S. President Trump called on the Saudi king saying, 'If it weren't for us, you wouldn't be in your seat for two weeks, you have to pay us for that.' So, they are ready to send the FBI to Turkey? The U.S. will take part in this affair only to whitewash the Saudi King who it has been shaking down. So the process will be this: the FBI will join in, the Saudis will be declared innocent, Turkey will probably be left holding the baby, and the White House will bill Riyadh for services rendered."

 

BRUNSON AFFAIR/RELATIONS WITH U.S.: Ardan Zenturk demands respect in pro-government Star: "We should not offer suggestions to the judiciary, yet we may make one request as a nation: The court should act in haste to remove the judicial process from the shadow of political controversy and put American pastor Andrew Brunson back in jail after sentencing him. As to all the talk about the dollar reaching 8.5 Turkish lira if we do that, we say: Let it go up to 10, as we cannot pursue the nation's struggle for survival by constantly seeking a consensus with imperialists. Everyone should know their place! The U.S. should not dare to intimidate us with economic attacks from across the Atlantic. They should come, sit down at the table on equal terms, and deal with the issues as two sovereign states."

 

LOCAL POLITICS: Mustafa Balbay adopts a cynical tone in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "If a society has had enough of crises, there is remedy: create a new one. Then, ask the society for support in combatting this new threat. Are there some who are unwilling to join in? They are either traitors or terrorists or pawns of foreign powers. Once such fear is implanted, defeat can be avoided. As much as producing a crisis requires great talent, managing it requires it as well. It should be managed so well that it either gets resolved late, or never get resolved at all, or leads up to a new crisis. How is it possible not to congratulate President Erdogan then? The most charismatic government in history!"

Kazim Gulecyuz reaffirms the duties of political parties in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "The NGO Balance Inspection Network's latest report reminds political parties in parliament of the four promises they made prior to elections: 1) A strong and effective parliament 2) An independent and impartial judiciary 3) Strong local administration 4) Good management. Is there any point mentioning all this when Turkey has been driven into a one-man regime? Surely, the need is even greater today. Due to the new crises and troubles caused by practices under the one-man regime, there is greater need for an exceptionally strong and effective parliament, independent and impartial judiciary, strengthening local administrations, good management, and public awareness. In other words, for balance and inspection."

Ferda Koc detects a fatal opposition flaw in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "In the political representation of the people's democratic opposition, both the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] and the HDP [pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party] have acted in manner that does not correspond with this reality, blurs minds of opposition circles, and allows room for political fundamentalism. The CHP front's obsessive enmity towards Kurds and its tendency to 'flirt with the right-wing', just like the HDP's mainstream political circles' search for an ally in TUSIAD [Turkey's largest staunchly secular business group], distancing it from the struggle for secularism and indifference to the U.S./Israeli imperialist intervention, appear as the Achilles heel of the democratic opposition against the AKP [ruling Justice and Development party] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] alliance."

Mehmet Barlas maintains that the opposition has crossed a line in pro-government Sabah: "Can we assess today's solidarity between the CHP and the HDP in light of previous circumstances when the constitutional court shut down political parties like shutting off a tap? Could an HDP that functions as the political wing of the PKK [Kurdish Workers' Party] with candidates named by Qandil [PKK Northern Iraq headquarters] have remained open in the former political party order? Or could a previous CHP cooperate with such a political party?"

 

Iran media watch

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST DISAPPEARANCE: Domestic broadcast media and English-language Press TV continued their coverage of the disappearance of Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. Citing U.S. media, they reported that the crown-prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, had signed off on an operation to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia from his home in Virginia and then detain him. Several of Khashoggi's friends said that over the past four months, senior Saudi officials close to the crown-prince had called Khashoggi to offer him protection, and even a high-level job in the government, if he returned to his home country, according to Press TV and Radio Iran (VIRI).

 

SUICIDE PREVENTION MINISTER IN THE UK: Domestic broadcast media also covered a story about the appointment of a minister for suicide prevention in the UK for the first time by Prime Minister Theresa May. The appointment of Health Minister Jackie Doyle-Price to the new role is to help tackle the stigma surrounding suicide. According to VIRI, 4,500 people commit suicide in the UK every year

 

IRANIAN ASSETS: No single story takes center stage in Iranian dailies. Official news agency IRNA yesterday quoted the head of the Presidential International Legal Center as saying that an appeals court in Rome, Italy had overturned a verdict by a lower court to freeze 5bn dollars of Iran's assets. The assets, belonging to the Central Bank of Iran, had been frozen following a lawsuit by American plaintiffs who blame Iran for a 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. "Iran's 5bn dollars unfrozen," read reformist Sharq's top headline, while pro-reform Arman-e Emruz praised Iran's "second legal victory over America," referring to a ruling last week by the International Court of Justice ordering Washington to suspend a number of sanctions against Tehran. Prominent conservative and hardline outlets did not cover the story on their front pages.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranians have been commenting on Serbia's decision yesterday to scrap its visa-free regime with Iran a year after it was introduced. Serbia's Interior Minister said on Wednesday that Iranians had been "abusing" the visa-free travel to cross into EU countries. A vast majority of commenters sympathized with Serbia. "I spent 20 days in Serbia; a war-torn country trying to rebuild itself and stand on its own feet, this time last year. I think they have every right to do what they did, given the sheer number of migrants," wrote one user. "It is strange that Serbian authorities tolerated this for so long," another posted. Some directed their criticism at Iran's Islamic regime for policies that compel many to move. "Breaking out of Iran has become harder than breaking out of Guantanamo," a user Tweeted. "People, come to your senses! Running away isn't the answer. You have to build your country," said another, finishing off his Tweet with a call for strikes.

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The lethal snowball

2-An-Nusra's Idlib dilemma

3-On a collision course with Moscow

 

1-  The lethal snowball

 

[Jamal] Khashoggi's disappearance is an issue that deserves to be closely scrutinized in itself. It is unacceptable in humanitarian and moral terms, and if, as Qatari/Turkish propaganda is suggesting, he has been murdered, then it becomes an international crime. But, it is now being transformed into a battle against the new Saudi project that has secured strong international support within only two years because its clear ideas and daring steps have begun to be implemented and it is proceeding to destroy, rebuild, and move forward. We should expect that various crises will be used to doubt and foil this project, and turn world public opinion against it, especially those who have declared that they believe in it and are enthusiastic about it. This is what we are already witnessing in manner in which the Khashoggi crisis is being addressed in the Western media--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

Logic would have demanded that if Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman wished to liquidate Khashoggi, he could have done so without raising suspicions regarding the Kingdom's direct involvement in such an act: A road accident or a stabbing or some personal fight could have been arranged in which Khashoggi died by accident; or any of the many other means used by intelligence agencies to eliminate people could have been used. But there is no room for logic in this Saudi administration, which views itself as unaccountable and as protected by the leading countries around the world, with the U.S. at their forefront, simply because it can pay blood money for any human rights violations, whether it kills, kidnaps, or tortures. In such circumstances, the bin Salman regime may have decided to carry out the murder inside the consulate and may have already set the price it is ready to pay, whether to the U.S. or others, so as to secure their silence--Hussam Kanafani on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

What lies behind this great uproar concerning a Saudi journalist who disappeared in another country and whose own country has taken all the necessary measures to prove to the world that it is concerned for his safety because he is its citizen, and that all the reports about its actions are totally false? The fig leaves have begun to fall from this deceitful and clear targeting of the Kingdom. But what is truly regrettable is that some of the international media has lost its neutrality, principles, and morals and has sided with lobbies that use money to buy allegiance and are served by those who are slaves to money--Hammoud Abu-Talib in Saudi 'Okaz

In Jamal Khashoggi's case, it is clear that a majority of those joining the campaign under the banner of pursuing Saudi officials until they expose the truth behind his disappearance, and deeming the Saudi crown-prince responsible for this until he proves his government's innocence, are, in fact, friends of the Saudi ruler. They are the ones who have provided cover for much worse criminal acts than that of 'disappearing' Khashoggi, as evident from the terrible and savage crimes against innocent civilians, children, and old folk in Yemen. But these friends of the Saudi regime also feel that their support has reached a point that they cannot cross when the regime continues to deeply embarrass them by claiming victories when it is failing, and by demanding to be rewarded for its failure. In these circumstances, these 'friends' see the lethal mistake as an opportunity to brandish the red card in the regime's face, and a snowball that no one had expected begins to roll and grow in size--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was last seen entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, is being used as fodder by those opposed to the kingdom's project for change, maintains a leading Saudi commentator. Those who have taken up his cause have little interest in his safety and are using his case in order to undermine the international support for that project. One would have expected the Saudi regime to be more professional and cautious in carrying out Khashoggi's kidnapping and/or murder, maintains a Lebanese commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. But logic does not seem to characterize the behavior of a regime that has become brazenly impudent thanks to American cover and its readiness to pay blood money for its crimes. The true goal behind the international clamor over the Khashoggi case is to target Saudi Arabia, insists another Saudi commentator. The country is passing through its most dangerous phase and it must be prepared to fight this battle with all the tools necessary so as to ensure that it will not be defeated. The Saudi regime, which may have believed that it was untouchable, has committed a lethal mistake by probably murdering Jamal Khashoggi, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's fate now seems to be hanging in the balance.

 

ACTIVE VOLCANOES: "In addition to the ongoing military confrontations, the region is teeming with other confrontations that are an extension of the conflict that has been going on for some seven years in the aftermath of the so-called 'Arab Spring'," notes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The region's volcanoes remain active and are still spuming lava. We seem to witness scattered and passing crises; but they continue to repeat themselves in an ongoing context between certain governments, and between the latter and certain activist organizations. And this is all taking place amidst a struggle that seeks to change the old situation or foil the new changes that are unfolding on the ground.

In fact, it is not strange for regional governments such as Saudi Arabia, which are engaged in changing themselves, to be targeted. Change is a difficult process as these governments are trying to eliminate ideas that have dug deep roots, cultures that have spread, and to overturn vast standing edifices.

Our colleague Jamal Khashoggi has been killed even if he emerges alive, because he has been used as ammunition in the media battle. Those who have rushed to adopt his cause are the least interested in his fate. The true target, after all, is Riyadh.

All those who may have believed that uprooting or marginalizing the activist groups and organizations could proceed smoothly are now discovering how difficult this is. These groups are present and ferocious. They are redeploying in the region: For example, some Muslim Brotherhood followers have fled to Turkey and Qatar. They are using their extensions in Europe and the U.S. after their capabilities in Egypt and the Gulf states have been partially undermined, and after the screws have been tightened on them in Tunisia and Morocco. And the rest have gone underground. And apart from the Brotherhood, there are the other ideological schools and organization that are putting their houses in order based on the changes that have occurred after the Arab Spring. These schools and organizations do not simply come to an end; they step back and reposition themselves.

Jamal is the victim of the war raging in the region. His battle is an extension of a series of media and political battles in which everyone is trying to exploit his or her 'cause.' In the crisis stemming from Khashoggi's disappearance, the ultimate aim is to portray governments – in this case, Saudi Arabia– as evil, as a new North Korea or Russia or other such governments that have been classified as evil before. And Saudi Arabia is under attack in this instance because it is the one country that has taken the greatest number of daring and far-reaching steps towards domestic reform, and because it faces powerful forces in the entire region that are opposed to it. So, one cannot view these different and repeated crises except as part of a continuing broad political and media battle.

When facing such challenges, is it possible to defang the ideological and organized forces in the region and pursue them till the very end of a difficult path? We should realize that it is no easy task to dislodge the hardline ideological and organized edifices in the region that have been erected over a period of more than four decades. Indeed, it will become more difficult in the coming days.

Targeting Saudi Arabia is to be expected because it is the engine that is driving the process of change that will affect a huge geographic and demographic area stretching from Indonesia to California, and that will develop new and moderate political and religious conceptions at the expense of the old regime in the Islamic region. TV screens will overflow with more incidents and issues that will be exploited in order to besmirch the new Arab order that is opposed to the old one. Further confrontations will break out aimed at creating a generally accepted Arab and international image based on the same idea – namely, that the project of modernization is exaggerated, that it is no more than the personal effort of a single ruler, or that such modernization is not enough and less than what is expected. In doing so, ongoing and inherited obstacles will be invoked as evidence and the behavior of individuals will be confused with that of governments. So, let us admit the truth: Emerging from the old situation will not take place without paying a price.

Khashoggi's disappearance is an issue that deserves to be closely scrutinized in itself. It is unacceptable in humanitarian and moral terms, and if, as Qatari/Turkish propaganda is suggesting, he has been murdered, then it becomes an international crime. But it is now being transformed into a battle against the new Saudi project that has secured strong international support within only two years because its clear ideas and daring steps have begun to be implemented and it is proceeding to destroy, rebuild, and move forward.

We should expect that various crises will be used to doubt and foil this project, and turn world public opinion against it, especially those who have declared that they believe in it and are enthusiastic about it. This is what we are already witnessing in manner in which the Khashoggi crisis is being addressed in the Western media

"Change is a major battle, and we can see two fronts there: There are those who have undertaken the task of change and will not permit its path to be blocked, and there are those who have sworn to foil the attempt to bring about change by challenging it, distorting its image, and building up the forces opposed to it," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

CREATIVE CRIMINALITY: "After reading and hearing many reports about assassinations and liquidations, we believed that Arab and Western repressive regimes and militia-like and mafia-like factions, have tried all possible ways of carrying out their operations, and that there is no room left for creativity in the world of organized crime," writes Hussam Kanafani on Thursday on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

But the past few days and hours have forced us to reconsider our views. The horizon seems to have been opened up for new creative criminal acts. This is especially true if the reports regarding Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder inside his country's consulate in Istanbul prove to be true. And these reports are becoming more and more reliable, especially since more than a week has passed since the man's disappearance without a trace of him dead or alive.

If these current reports are true, they underline the brazen criminal mentality with which Saudi Arabia is being governed today. We already witnessed a partial manifestation of that mentality in the detention of Saudi emirs and the kidnapping and forced resignation of Lebanese PM Sa'd al-Hariri [in November 2017]. These were all indications of the current Saudi regime's insolent mindset, specifically in the case of Hariri, who was lured to the Kingdom, where he was held hostage. This affair is now clear and publicly known; but the Saudi regime continues to deny that anything ever happened. And exactly the same thing is happening in Khashoggi's case today, with the difference that this crime is many times more heinous.

What has been reported of the details of this crime exposes a brazenly insolent mentality that chose to lure Khashoggi into the Saudi consulate where he was killed. Only an amateur murderer would try such a scenario, unless the murderer's arrogance matches that that characterizes the Saudi regime these days, since not even an incompetent murderer would have lured his victim into his own house; nor would he have sent a team of security officers known by name and rank, accompanied by a pathologist, from Saudi Arabia to Istanbul to supervise the murder.

Logic would have demanded that if Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman wished to liquidate Khashoggi, he could have done so without raising suspicions regarding the Kingdom's direct involvement in such an act: A road accident or a stabbing or some personal fight could have been arranged in which Khashoggi died by accident; or any of the many other means used by intelligence agencies to eliminate people could have been used.

But there is no room for logic in this Saudi administration, which views itself as unaccountable and as protected by the leading countries around the world, with the U.S. at their forefront, simply because it can pay blood money for any human rights violations, whether it kills, kidnaps, or tortures. In such circumstances, the bin Salman regime may have decided to carry out the murder inside the consulate and may have already set the price it is ready to pay, whether to the U.S. or others, so as to secure their silence.

This seems to be already clear judging by the public statements from senior U.S. officials. President Donald Trump is still 'thinking' of talking to Saudi monarch Salman bin 'Abdelaziz in order to ask him about Khashoggi's situation. For his part, VP Mike Pence has announced his country's readiness to join the investigations into the Saudi journalist's disappearance, but only if Riyadh requests this and despite the fact that the crime did not occur in Saudi Arabia, but in Turkey, which implies that any request of this kind should come from Turkey, not Riyadh. But what Pence really means is that his country is ready to take part in the investigations only with Saudi Arabia's consent.

"America's readiness to offer such cover bolsters the brazenly criminal mentality that guides the Saudi regime's behavior, and on whose basis it has carried out Khashoggi's murder and may be preparing for many other crimes," concludes Kanafani.

End…

 

WISHING FOR A WONDERFUL WORLD: "I wish the world were so beautiful that one human being's disappearance could cause widespread concern across the entire international community with its governments, civil organizations, humanitarian organizations, media, human rights activists, commentators, and all those who care about the lives of human beings everywhere," writes Hammoud Abu-Talib in Thursday's Saudi daily 'Okaz.

Had that been the case, no state or gang or organization would have dared violate the dignity of any human being, or attack or kidnap or end his or her life for mere political calculations that border on the criminal.

Over the past two years, thousands of journalists have disappeared in Turkey's prison. And during the current year, which has yet to end, hundreds of journalists have been liquidated around the world, without moving the international community's conscience. But when Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi disappeared, this dead conscience has suddenly awakened, not in defense of humanity, but simply because he is Saudi and hails from Saudi Arabia.

U.S. President Donald Trump, members of the U.S. Congress, American administration secretaries, senators, the governor of Virginia, Britain's foreign secretary as well as the foreign ministers of other countries, internationally-renowned writers such Thomas Friedman and Robert Fisk, famous television program presenters like Farid Zakaria, Anderson Cooper, and Christiane Amanpour, leading TV stations such as the BBC, France-24, and Russian, German and other stations –are all questioning one and the same party, Saudi Arabia, about the circumstances of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance, as if Saudi Arabia had 'disappeared' him.

So, what lies behind this great uproar concerning a Saudi journalist who disappeared in another country and whose own country has taken all the necessary measures to prove to the world that it is concerned for his safety because he is its citizen, and that all the reports about its actions are totally false?

The fig leaves have begun to fall from this deceitful and clear targeting of the Kingdom. But what is truly regrettable is that some of the international media has lost its neutrality, principles, and morals and has sided with lobbies that use money to buy allegiance and are served by those who are slaves to money.

This incident has dangerously reconfirmed what we have constantly warned against: That our country is facing a major media campaign directed and backed by certain states in collusion with others. We are passing through the most dangerous confrontation and must be prepared for it.

"This war has been imposed on us, and we must confront it using tools that will ensure our victory – or at the very worst, to ensure that we are not defeated," concludes Abu-Talib.

End…

 

GLAD TIDINGS OF CHANGE: "In their attempt to absolve Saudi Arabia from the crime of 'disappearing' and probably murdering Jamal Khashoggi, many people are asking: Does it make sense for the kingdom to commit such an act of folly that could bring about a U-turn in the international situation against it, one whose first glad tidings have begun to appear?" writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Thursday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But those who are raising such questions seem to believe that we are talking of a decision of the gravity of declaring war, or assassinating the head of a state or major leader. In such cases, states calculate carefully before getting involved because their dangers and consequences may be open to prediction and calculation. But even though the decision to go to war may demand such calculations and predictions, states often miscalculate. This was the case in the U.S. war on Iraq in 2003, and the Israeli war on Lebanon and the resistance [Hezbollah] in July 2006. The subsequent facts showed that these wars were lost and failed; moreover, they were fought with no exit strategy under the declared banner of extreme and unachievable demands.

But these are the kind of conclusions that can be reached after failure has occurred. The degree of calculation and expectation is much less when the matter concerns eliminating someone who is believed to be too unimportant to raise a storm in the face of a country that enjoys the best of relations with the leading superpower, the U.S., and enjoys its cover.

A vibrant example of this comes from the U.S. occupation in Iraq. In this case, it was impossible to predict that images leaked from the torture campaigns in Abu-Ghraib prison would serve as the lethal beginning of the end of the U.S.'s ability to remain in Iraq, or that they would open up a track that would lead its occupation out of the country.

A similar case is provided by the [Israeli] occupation army's Qana massacre of civilians in 1996 [in South Lebanon]. It was difficult to expect that the images of such massacres would inaugurate the countdown to the end of the aggression.

These sorts of incidents in their magnitude, the parties committing them, and the extent of their confidence that no one can hold them accountable resemble what has happened in Saudi Arabia's kidnapping or liquidation of Khashoggi. This sort of incident can be described as a 'lethal mistake' that generates repercussions that are greater than its actual size, and that weigh down more heavily on a state that thinks of itself as so powerful, safe, and protected, that it is above questioning or being held to account. And this flings the door open to predictable consequences.

In such situations, the state concerned that may have believed that it was too important to be questioned may be failed to predict what awaits it, in light of its previous similar actions. Instead, it appears to be bent on interpreting international and regional relations in an arrogant and boastful manner, relying on its assumed power. Then it suddenly finds that is has fallen where it had not expected to fall, and that the snowball is starting to roll, and that its supposed friends are beginning to distance themselves and perhaps hinting at estrangement and sometimes at punitive measures.

This is because, in such cases, too much would have already happened before, the failures were building up, and the weakness was consuming the concerned state's image and sources of power. In such circumstances, a lethal mistake comes to expose all the states vulnerabilities and cast light on a new and true picture of the state created by its weakness and failure, neither of which its decision-maker was ready to see or believe, which is why he committed this lethal mistake.

In Jamal Khashoggi's case, it is clear that a majority of those joining the campaign under the banner of pursuing Saudi officials until they expose the truth behind his disappearance, and deeming the Saudi crown-prince responsible for this until he proves his government's innocence, are, in fact, friends of the Saudi ruler. They are the ones who have provided cover for much worse criminal acts than that of 'disappearing' Khashoggi, as evident from the terrible and savage crimes against innocent civilians, children, and old folk in Yemen.

But these friends of the Saudi regime also feel that their support has reached a point that they cannot cross when the regime continues to deeply embarrass them by claiming victories when it is failing, and by demanding to be rewarded for its failure. In these circumstances, these 'friends' see the lethal mistake as an opportunity to brandish the red card in the regime's face, and a snowball that no one had expected begins to roll and grow in size.

"The lethal mistake appears to be the cause for much, much more that lies in wait for Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman; in fact, the situation appears only to be beginning," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

2-An-Nusra's Idlib dilemma

 

An-Nusra may have responded to Ankara's request to withdraw its heavy weapons from the Idlib buffer zone, but the jihadist movement is likely to be deeply divided over the next step, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Even though the Nusra Front has not accepted the Sochi understandings between Moscow and Ankara, it has apparently implemented the requirement to withdraw its heavy weapons from the buffer zone with the Syrian army, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. This is likely to intensify the rifts within the Nusra and between it and other hardline factions.

 

TAKING THE INITIATIVE: "The Nusra Front did not take a clear position on the Sochi understandings, but like the other armed [Syrian opposition] factions classified as part of the 'moderate' camp, it has taken the initiative of withdrawing its heavy weapons from the agreed buffer zone," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This is undoubtedly a guileful move, but it reflects the depth of a widely reported crisis within the organization, just as it reflects the difficulty that an organization affiliated to the jihadist al-Qa'ida –and that has, in fact, become al-Qa'ida's largest military arm as the Syrian crisis has developed– finds in 'swallowing' the agreement.

Abiding by the October 10th deadline [to withdraw heavy weapons] sends a positive signal regarding Ankara's commitment to the Erdogan/Putin understandings – although we still do not know whether the heavy weapons have actually and fully been withdrawn from the buffer zone, or whether the Nusra and perhaps other factions have resorted to hiding these weapons and keeping them in reserve in case something new emerges in the Idlib file. The precedents set by many jihadi and other movements in this regard always lead us to doubt the sincerity of their intentions and commitments; moreover, and the situation in Idib offers other reasons for doubt.

Be that as it may, Turkey has succeeded in fulfilling the first part of its commitments as required by the Sochi understandings. This underlines the extent of its links with the jihadi and other armed factions. It also tangibly exposes the firm 'umbilical cord' that extends from Ankara to Idlib and its environs. For even if Turkey has classified the Nusra as a terrorist organization, it clearly still wields some influence with this organization, forcing it to sip from the poisoned chalice of the Sochi understandings.

That is the first point worth making. But Turkey will face another challenge in a few days time when the Tahrir ash-Sham Organization (former Nusra) will have to withdraw its fighters from the buffer zone, after claiming to have completed the withdrawal of its heavy weapons. Should this occur, [Nusra leader] Abu-Mohammad al-Jawlani would be risking handing over a third of the area that his organization controls to a third party: i.e. Turkey and Russia, the regime's ally and the Nusra's sworn enemy. And this is all happening against the background of daily statements from Moscow stressing the temporary and 'transitional' nature of the Sochi understandings, and insisting on the Syrian army's right to reach the very last point on the international borders between the two countries [Syria and Turkey].

As its president and foreign minister have said, there is no doubt that the regime in Damascus is happy with the manner in which the situation in Idlib is developing. But reports speak of only 'relative happiness' mixed with a degree of concern that the 'temporary' may become 'permanent,' especially since Ankara continues to make statements and take measures that give rise to worries and anxieties that Turkey may be planning to remain longer than it should in the governorate, perhaps imposing its permanent control over it and establishing zones of influence there connected to its Southern governorates.

Another thing worth monitoring closely is the Nusra Front's fate, and how its internal disagreements may develop against the background of its attitude towards the Sochi understandings, its subjugation to Ankara, and its attempt to identify itself with the 'moderate' opposition factions. Jawlani's decision to go along with the Sochi understandings and to coordinate his moves with Ankara and its affiliated factions, which has already caused splits inside the Nusra, is certain to create further divisions after that decision has entered the phase of implementation.

Just as the Syrian crisis's years have witnessed the largest inter-jihadi rift between the Nusra and ISIS, we may be facing a new chapter of jihadi splits and rifts. And the conflict and competition between [the al-Qa'ida affiliated] Hurras ad-Din and the Nusra may become the main title of this conflict in the coming phase, after ISIS is on the retreat under pressure from its successive defeats in both Syria and Iraq.

"The fact is that the recent battles between the Nusra and some of its opponents in the countryside near Idlib and its environs threaten to spread in the coming days, especially if Moscow maintains its pressures on Ankara to speed up the Syrian state's return to the governorate and the re-imposition of its control over the areas remaining outside its writ," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

3-On a collision course with Moscow

 

Israel PM Netanyahu is threatening to resume strikes against Syria, putting him on a potential collision course with Moscow, says today's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Israeli PM has been trying to no avail to arrange for a meeting with the Russian president in the hope of reviving the two countries' coordination in Syria prior to last month's downing of the Russian IL-20, notes the editorial on an online pan-Arab daily. He is also trying to acquire more advanced weapons from the U.S to counter the Russian S-300; but even if he succeeds in this, he would be on placing his country on a collision course with Russia.

 

DEFYING RUSSIA: "On Tuesday, Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu returned to defying Russia when he said that he had informed Deputy Russian PM Maxim Akimov who was visiting Tel Aviv, that the Israeli air force will resume its attacks on hostile targets in Syria despite the delivery of advanced Russian anti-aircraft S-300 missiles to the Syrian Arab Army," writes Thursday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Netanyahu's threats are meant to reassure the Israelis who are concerned about Syria's recovery, the growth of Hezbollah's missile power, and Iran's hints at retaliating for any Israeli aggression on its forces in Syria.

Russia's delivery of the S-300 missiles to bolster Syria's air defenses so as to down any Israeli warplane that infiltrates Syrian airspace has left Israel's military and political leadership in a quandary. In fact, Israel has not raided any Iranian or Syrian targets deep inside Syria ever since the Russian IL-20 was downed last month [September].

Netanyahu is now acting in two directions in order to confront the predicament facing him and his government:

- First, he is trying to arrange a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in an attempt to revive Russian/Israeli coordination to what it was before the crisis and mend relations between the two governments.

- Second, he is trying to pressure the U.S. to secure arms and equipment that would enable Israel to forestall the threat posed by the S-300 and to provide protection for its warplanes attacking Syria.

Regarding the first point, Netanyahu's insistence on meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow seems to reflect a state of frustration and despair. The Russian president who has turned down Netanyahu's requests for a meeting during three telephone conversations, is still considering the latest request, according to his spokesman Dmitry Peskov. In other words, Putin is in no rush specify a date for this meeting. And even if the two men were to meet, this does not entail Russia's 'automatic' compliance with the Israeli PM's demands.

Washington is likely to respond positively to Netanyahu's 'entreaties' to secure American defense systems to protect his planes against the S-300 missiles. But that would constitute a challenge to Moscow and President Putin personally, and would be viewed as a provocation of him, in fact. And such a challenge cannot be allowed to pass so easily, in which case Moscow may supply the Syrian army with the even more advanced S-400 missiles.

Any new Israeli aggression on Syria may light the fuse of war with Iran. The 'booby-trapped advice' that General Hossein Salami, the Deputy Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, gave to Netanyahu – namely, that 'he should quickly learn how to swim in the Mediterranean because he may find himself forced to escape in the coming days' – summarizes the new balance of fear that is emerging in the region, and that is putting an end to all manifestations of Israeli arrogance.

Netanyahu's theatrical display from the UN General Assembly podium two weeks ago during which he brandished photographs and maps of what he claimed was is a secret nuclear reactor in Iran and missile factories in Syria, has totally backfired after it was proven that the first set of pictures were of a carpet factory, and the second was of a football field in Northern Syria.

Netanyahu is facing a dilemma. And he is expressing his frustration by resorting to the 'verbal' threats at which he is skilled, but that have lost all meaning and ability to affect. If Netanyahu is the sort of person who not only speaks, but speaks and acts, all he has to do is to send his warplanes to Syria immediately. So, what has he been waiting for all this time?

"The answer is that he fears that he would find a response he had not expected and that could topple him and his government and fuel Jewish emigration [from Israel]," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

False alarm

 

Rocket sirens blared in Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip on Thursday morning, amid reports of Israeli military activity near the border. There were no immediate reports of injuries or damage. Residents of the area reported hearing explosions and seeing the types of trails left behind by the Iron Dome air defense system. The IDF said it was investigating what triggered the alarm system. Earlier in the morning, the Israeli military shut down a number of roads adjacent to the Strip for "security activities," but it would not elaborate on the nature of its operation. The sirens sounded in regions of Southern Israel, Northeast of Gaza.

Meanwhile, Israeli forces on Thursday arrested the sister of the Palestinian who shot dead two Israelis in the West Bank earlier this week, as part of the manhunt for the suspect, the Shin Bet said. For the fourth night in a row, Israeli security forces continued operations in the village of Shuweika, the home of Ashraf Na'alweh, who is suspected of killing his co-workers Kim Levengrond Yehezkel, 28, and Ziv Hajbi, 35, and wounding Sara Vaturi, 54, in an attack Sunday morning in the Northern West Bank's Barkan Industrial Park where he was employed. Na'alweh fled and has eluded capture, according to the Israeli military. The hunt for the suspect entered its fifth day Thursday. His sister Fayrouz was arrested in the predawn hours of Thursday morning from her home in Nablus, the Shin Bet said. Fayrouz had previously been questioned by Israeli forces, but was released. His brother was arrested the day after the attack. The Shin Bet refused to say on what grounds Fayrouz was arrested. The IDF said it also arrested two other Palestinians in the West Bank overnight.

Elsewhere, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly told the foreign ministers of Greece and Cyprus last month that he is deeply pessimistic about Turkey's future as a democracy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and said he believes its economy is destined for further decline. "Turkey is becoming undemocratic," Netanyahu said, according to a Wednesday Channel 10 report that cited Israeli officials familiar with the September meeting. "Erdogan calls me 'Hitler' every two weeks. It is a systemic problem – I do not see light at the end of the tunnel," he said, also noting his concerns that Turkey may take delivery of advanced F-35 fighter jets. "Erdogan is making economic decisions that make no sense," he said. "The situation there is getting worse." Netanyahu warned the Greek and Cypriot officials. The Turkish leader may act to sabotage their natural gas drilling operations in the Mediterranean, he warned, according to the report. "Erdogan is unpredictable and reckless. We are worried and watching to see if he does something in the region about the gas. I am pessimistic."

In other news, Israel's top UN envoy blasted UNESCO's attempt to water down its controversial bi-annual Jerusalem resolution, reaffirming that Israel planned to leave the organization at the end of the year. Danny Danon spoke after the 58 members of UNESCO's executive board in Paris hid language disavowing Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem in the lengthy annex to an otherwise short benign text called Resolution 28. Danon said the statements in the resolution's annexes are "further evidence, for anyone who did not understand why the United States and Israel withdrew from UNESCO." Previous UNESCO resolutions had ignored Jewish ties to its most holy site, Temple Mount, known in Hebrew as Har Habayit, referring to it solely by its Arabic/Muslim name al-Haram al-Sharif. But this resolution's annex modified some of that tone, stating that while Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron "are an integral part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory," the two tombs "are of religious significance for Judaism, Christianity and Islam." In addition, it affirmed the importance of the "Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls for the three monotheistic religions."

In a sign of the warming ties between Israel and some of the Arab Gulf states, Haaretz reports that Israel's Ambassador to the U.S. Ron Dermer shared a table on Wednesday at a public event with his counterpart from the United Arab Emirates.

Dermer and UAE Ambassador Yousef al Otaiba sat together at the annual dinner of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in Washington. It is rare for officials from Arab states that don't have formal ties with Israel to be seen in public with Israeli officials. The two were seen talking to each other during the event. Another diplomat seated at the same table was Egyptian ambassador to Washington Yasser Reda. Meanwhile, Palestinian representatives on Wednesday vowed not to stay silent as they closed their mission in Washington on orders of President Trump. "This is an attempt to shut down your voice; this is an act of censorship," said Hakam Takash, a diplomat at the PLO's Washington office which had been set up in 1994 after the Oslo peace accords. "This is a new beginning, not just in Palestinian-American relations but in the work of this community," he told a ceremony as the office symbolically took down a plaque on the Washington building according to The Times of Israel.

SpaceIL, which is behind Israel's first mission to the moon, announced Wednesday a delay in the vessel's launch from December to early 2019. SpaceIL said Elon Musk's SpaceX firm, whose rockets are set to carry the unmanned probe into space, had informed it of "a delay of a number of weeks to the beginning of 2019." SpaceIL stressed that the delay was SpaceX's decision, noting in a statement that tests on their craft, shaped like a pod and weighing some 585 kilos, were proceeding successfully. The craft was originally set to reach the moon on February 13, 2019, where its mission would include research on the moon's magnetic field and planting an Israeli flag.

Finally, Likud MK Oren Hazan caused outrage on Wednesday when he slammed Israeli-Arab journalist Lucy Aharish and actor Tzahi Halevi after the two got married. "I do not blame Lucy Aharish for seducing the soul of a Jewish man in order to hurt our state and prevent more Jewish offspring from continuing the Jewish lineage. On the contrary, she is welcome to convert to Judaism," Hazan wrote on Twitter and Facebook. "I do blame Tzahi the Islam Levi, who took (TV show) Fauda one step too far. Bro, snap out of it. Lucy, it is not personal, but know that Tzahi is my brother and the people of Israel are my people. No more assimilation," the Likud MK added. "I will say this gently: The brave and good-hearted Lucy Aharish understands what being a Jew means better than the person who Tweeted that sickening and racist post I am forced to share here – in the hopes everyone sees who we are dealing with and what filth Netanyahu has brought into our homes," MK Stav Shaffir (Zionist Union) wrote on social media.

 

 

THE MYTH OF THE LONE-WOLF TERRORIST: Alex Fishman in Yedioth Ahronoth writes that the Israeli public learns about the Palestinian public through the very narrow perspective of security, which deals mainly with threats and focuses on the rising tension in the West Bank.

"About a week before the murderous terror attack in the Barkan industrial zone, a huge music festival was held in the new Palestinian city of Rawabi, attended by tens of thousands of young Palestinian men and women. Not one of them was walking around there with a burka, and no one fired shots in the air. Just another Western-style festival, of the kind we see during the summer months in Hayarkon Park. What troubled the Palestinian leadership was the fact that the festival took place on Saturday, a day after bloody clashes on the Gaza border, during which seven young people were killed and 500 were wounded. But that did not stop the tens of thousands of young people who flocked to Rawabi from all over the West Bank to celebrate life, just as the power struggles in the Palestinian leadership ahead of the PLO Central Council meeting at the end of the month are of absolutely no interest to them whatsoever.

Nothing in the so-called 'atmosphere of violence in the West Bank' changed substantially in the days before the murder in Barkan, nor in the days that followed. The talk about the Palestinian public being more incited than ever now – a state of affairs of which the Barkan attack is supposedly one of the symptoms – is just another educated guess by the army about the mood of the Palestinian public. And that is the problem. The Israeli public learns about what is going on on the Palestinian street through the limited perspective of the defense establishment. This is a very thin straw, which focuses mainly on dealing with threats. It is no wonder, therefore, that even after the attack in Barkan, the Israeli public was bombarded with a chorus of routine messages from the defense establishment: There is a rise in tension in the territories, security forces are preparing for copy-cat attacks.

'Copy-cat terror attacks' is a term adopted by the army from psychology, in order to make some sort of sense of the phenomenon of 'lone-wolf terrorists,' who pop up out of nowhere and expose the system as useless. But being a copy-cat is only one reason, and not the central one, why a person with a personal-emotional problem takes a weapon and embarks on a murder spree under the guise of a 'freedom fighter'. Of the 800 security incidents of various types that the army and Shin Bet cracked this year in the West Bank, 8% -9% were not stopped; some breached the fence and security measures and committed murder.

The United States also suffers, with growing frequency, from the phenomenon of the 'lone-wolf terrorist': The young person who decides to enter a school, place of work or club, and murder people. In the United States, the murderer will act in the name of God, in the name of racism, in the name of revenge against the system, and so forth. Here he usually has a nationalistic pretense. This ritual is also followed by routine ceremonies that include live broadcasts from the scene of the crime, huge headlines, mass funerals, harsh words from politicians, and recommendations from experts on what to do in the future. And then, it's back to normal. The next murder washes away the memory of the previous murder.

Both in Israel and in the United States it is known that these spasms of madness can be reduced, but no one really does anything to reduce the phenomenon. In the U.S. it is a domestic political issue, highly contentious, concerning the availability of guns. With tight restrictions on arms purchases and reasonable security in facilities and institutions, the number of lone-wolf murderers would likely decrease. Here, too, this is a controversial political story. Were an atmosphere of dialogue to be created with the Palestinians, the number of lone-wolf terrorists would decrease. While dissatisfied terrorist organizations would continue to attack, the phenomenon of the terrorist who is not under any organizational umbrella would diminish. At least that is what occurred in the past. The argument that the current punitive measures are insufficient is demagoguery, since the law and the security interest do not allow doing much more than is already being done today.

In matters of security, too, we maintain the same regular ritual: We set up committees, make decisions, but in most cases the execution is partial or non-existent. After the magnetometer scandal on Temple Mount, the police issued tenders to the best security companies. The police were enthusiastic about the plans, but when they saw how much they would cost they folded. In order to secure the Barkan industrial zone and each factory separately, both the government and business owners will have to invest huge sums. This will not happen. This is the price of our acclimatization to stagnation with the Palestinians, which has routine patterns of conduct: A popular outburst, a lull, a lone-wolf terrorist, victims, national mourning, threats, punishment, forgetfulness, a lull and then everything starts all over again."

Ends…

 

MOSCOW STRENGTHENING ITS HAND WITH JERUSALEM: Ariel Bulstein in Israel Hayom argues that when the Russian foreign minister addressed the need for UN Security Council approval for Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, he made clear that Syria's position on the matter is simply irrelevant. Israel will, of course, receive a bill for this surprising support.

"Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's statement regarding the need to obtain UN Security Council approval for Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights is more striking in virtue of what is not in it, rather than what is. It is important to point out that Lavrov's statement does not meet the test of international law and does not conform to the precedents of the past.

The annexations of territories in the past took place without the Security Council's blessing. This was sometimes done by agreement between the two sides, the landowner and the recipient of the territory, as happened in the transfer of the Tiran Islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and sometimes through unilateral annexation, as Russia itself did when it effectively occupied and annexed Crimea. In all the precedents no one requested the consent of the Security Council. Israel, too, does not need the approval of other countries. Since Menachem Begin's government applied Israeli law to the Golan Heights, this region has become part of the State of Israel forever. The recognition by foreign governments of this reality will come sooner or later and be a welcome step, but even today the annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel is a done deal. The people of Israel have returned to the Golan Heights, in order to stay there forever.

Lavrov's statement is surprising precisely in what it does not include. The Russian foreign minister never even thought to mention Syria and its ruling regime. As far as he is concerned, in order for Israel to secure its control of the Golan Heights, it must seek the consent of the great powers, i.e., the five permanent members of the Security Council, including Russia, and Assad's position on the issue is simply irrelevant. This is more than a hint from the Kremlin, and perhaps it can be seen as an invitation to begin a dialogue between Israel and Russia on the conditions of Russian recognition of the Israeli Golan Heights.

Lavrov's statement came against the backdrop of an artificial crisis that Russia initiated in order to consolidate new understandings with Israel regarding what is happening in Syria. The Russians understand that the American recognition of the Israeli Golan is sure to come and do not intend to grant Russian recognition without compensation. The Kremlin does not believe in free lunches – and will try to extort various concessions from Israel concerning its activities in Syria."

Ends…

 

THE ARAB WORLD IS INDIFFERENT ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS: Yoran Ettinger in Israel Hayom contends that the Palestinian issue has sunk to the bottom of Arab priorities, while Western public opinion continues to view it, wrongly, as a central factor in the Middle East, which is focused on Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and Erdogan's imperialism.

"Iraq is spewing pro-Palestinian statements, but since 2017 has denied the Palestinians (including Iraqi-born) free education and health services, employment in government institutions, and travel documents. Jordan calls upon Israel to capitulate to the Palestinians and absorbs more than a million displaced Syrians, but since 2012 does not accept Palestinian refugees from Syria. Egypt declares its support for the Palestinians, but is deepening its cooperation with Israel in the struggle against terror hubs in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are expanding the geo-strategic relationship with Israel, despite the stalemate on the Palestinian issue. Riyadh is also making it difficult for the Palestinians, including the Arabs of Jerusalem, to enter the kingdom.

Like all the Arab states, Saudi Arabia does not see the Palestinian issue as an important strategic goal, and makes do with generous rhetoric that has few deeds behind it. In the years 1979-1989, for instance, Saudi Arabia gave the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan annual aid of $1 billion, compared with 'only' $100 million to the PLO. In 2018, Saudi Arabia received praise from UNRWA for $50 million in donations to Palestinian refugees, while at the same time the Saudi crown prince purchased a yacht worth $588 million and a painting by Leonardo da Vinci for $450 million.

The Middle East exposes in all its worthlessness the fixation of Western policy makers and Western public opinion agents. They see the Palestinian issue as a central factor in the regional agenda, and afford the Palestinians much greater support than the Arabs give them, if they give them any support at all. The gap between rhetoric and actions regarding the Palestinians was emphasized at the end of the War of Independence, when Jordan and Egypt took control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and did not consider transferring control to the Palestinians. The Arab countries did not lift a military finger – and barely an economic or political one – on behalf of the Palestinians in the first Lebanon war either, nor in two intifadas and three wars in Gaza.

In fact, the Arab states view the Palestinians – the PLO and Hamas alike – as a source of inspiration for terror and a subversive threat, which has already bared its claws in Egypt (1955), Syria (1966), Jordan (1970), Lebanon (1970-1982) and Kuwait (1990). Behind the scenes they would welcome a more aggressive Israeli position in the war against Palestinian terror.

In 2018, the Palestinian issue fell to the bottom of the Arab list of priorities, certainly in the face of threats from Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and al-Qa'ida, or Erdogan's imperialistic vision. The Arab states are closely following the Arab tsunami (known in the West as the 'Arab spring'), whose murky waters threaten the entire Middle East.

Western and international media provide extensive coverage of the confrontation between Israel and Hamas, but rarely report on the indifference of the Arab world towards the Palestinian issue. This disregard has considerable implications for the shaping of public opinion and decision-making processes related to our region. Will the West agree to learn something from the approach of the Arab world?"

Ends…

 

"COEXISTENCE" MEANS JEWS CEASING TO EXIST: Colonel (Res.) Tal Brown on Arutz7 claims 'coexistence' platitudes waved after every terror attack in which the victims are Jewish should be waived until Palestinians cease viewing 'coexistence' as a temporary delay on the way to a Palestinian state from the sea to the river.

"From time to time, especially after a terrorist attack or a nationalist incident usually aimed against Israelis, one hears the familiar cliché regarding 'coexistence' between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley. Every time the phrase is heard, quite a few people around me ask: Is 'coexistence' a slogan, a recommendation, an old wishful thought or just a platitude which creates an illusion?

When we mention the term 'coexistence', the basic meaning is that two parties will be able, first and foremost, to live side by side. Quite simply – to live! To exist side by side in relative peace or at least in practical security. Afterwards one can discuss the questions of whether they exist at each other's expense, one instead of the other, or do they cooperate with one another, and other such issues and nuances, which are subject to different interpretations and involve a variety of challenges and complexities.

Unfortunately, the discourse surrounding 'coexistence' often arises when individuals on one side (usually Jews) simply cease to physically 'exist', because the other side has not really accepted the idea and vision of a new Middle East, whereby Jews and Arabs can live together, on the same land, in true 'coexistence', respectful and wondrous.

Palestinian Arabs have for many years worked for a living in various jobs in Israeli factories, in Judea and Samaria, and with work permits throughout the country. They are entitled to privileges under Israeli law, and they usually receive rights and conditions that are not bad compared to what they would receive in the territories, or in the other countries of their Muslim brethren. But, one has yet to find or hear about the courageous Jew who dared to work in a factory or a business run by a peace-pursuing Palestinian Arab who seeks equality and brotherhood, in the framework of exemplary 'coexistence' in Palestinian territory or merely in proximity, not to mention inside an Arab village.

Palestinians receive decent, proper, and professional medical treatment in hospitals at the expense of Israeli taxpayers, while Israeli citizens and the bodies of our soldiers are still being held in the cursed hands of some Palestinians. Will this be called 'coexistence' or perhaps 'unilateral-existence'?

Palestinians drive safely and without fear of malicious and lethal injury while traveling on the roads of Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley. But Israeli cars traveling on the same roads are stoned almost every day, fired at with live ammunition from ambushes and incinerated by Molotov cocktails thrown at them from the hilly areas near the villages and 'refugee' camps. The Israeli vehicles that are legally licensed to travel on the road, do so with armor protected windows and are connected to an emergency aid center, while the Arab neighbors drive around in unlicensed cars, do not adhere to traffic laws and endanger the lives of all of us.

The Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria, Jordan Valley and even on the Green Line are surrounded by fences, gates and security measures, while the Arab villages are wide open and Arab families are calm and secure in their homes.

Palestinians with a blue ID card, from East Jerusalem and its vicinity, study in Israeli institutions of higher education, without any discrimination, despite their often provocative demonstrations in support of terrorist organizations and against the only state that looks after their needs. But how is it that there is not even one Jewish medical student in a college or university in the 'West Bank' or in Jerusalem, who would dare to study chemistry or engineering, not for purposes of sabotage, at Al Quds University, which is supported by outside sources?

If you claim all this is true only in the 'West Bank', then you will quickly find that that is a fairy tale, for this applies throughout the country, even to those called by some of the Jews 'Israeli Arabs with a blue certificate', though in their own eyes they continue to call themselves Palestinians, and that is all there is to it.

It is sufficient to examine the 'coexistence' that does not exist to any significant extent in the security forces and in the national civil service, for example, the extent of the contribution to the state that feeds and protects them from their other Arab brethren, who are not known for their excessive affection for the Palestinians and their concern for the refugees.

While my friends and I served in the army and went into action, in operations or wars, one Arab MK served Hezbollah, another MK smuggled cell phones to terrorists in the prison cell, yet another supported the 'Mavi Marmara' flotilla, while others did not bother to hide their open support for the PLO or Hamas, whether in the open media or in speeches in the Knesset in Jerusalem. If this is not enough for you, examine how the 'coexistence' is realized every 'Land Day', or just a day of anger and frustration at the establishment of the state, the only democracy in the area, for more than 70 years.

So enough of the hypocrisy, sanctimoniousness and the platitude of 'coexistence' that is paraded after every deadly terrorist event, in which the victim is usually an Israeli, preferably a Jew. After all, in the framework of 'coexistence', it is forbidden to say out loud that the Palestinian is usually one hell of a racist under the guise of an 'Arab freedom fighter' or only a Muslim.

Relations that reflect or are based on fear and interests, are not necessarily a platform and a guarantee for a happy, healthy life, in the framework of 'coexistence' like in the movies. This is the case as long as there is at least one side that views the relationship as temporary, until the day when the land will be called Palestine from the sea to the river, without coexistence at all, but a land devoid of Jews or at most one that permits the Jews who will be left to live as wards under restrictive conditions of oppression and inferiority.

In conclusion, I will clarify - there is no command and no real need to live in a forced 'coexistence' and talk about a 'wonderful relationship', in a place where this has not been proving itself and working well for over a hundred and twenty years. If the Israeli people want to live, there is nothing wrong with making do with a simple and calm life, in which Palestinians are respected but suspected."

Ends…

 

GAZA VOLENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY WIDER CONFLICT: Yaniv Kubovich in Haaretz argues that Hamas chief Yahiya as-Sinwar is behind the resurgence of border violence, but despite tensions in the South, Sunday's West Bank attack in Barkan is a bigger cause of concern for the Israeli army.

"The resurgence of violent Hamas demonstrations along Israel's border with the Gaza Strip in the last several weeks is increasing the likelihood of military escalation in the South. The decision to resume the demonstrations and ratchet up the violence was made by Hamas leader Yahiya as-Sinwar, in an effort to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority and Israel to break through the stalemate in talks about plans to rehabilitate the Strip, which his organization controls.

Thousands of Palestinians have been protesting along the border with the Strip over the past few weeks on Sinwar's instructions. There are about 20,000 protesters at each Friday demonstration, and smaller protests take place all day long during the week. The IDF recently reinforced its presence by augmenting its Southern Command troops but up to now, the army has not found a solution for dealing with the border unrest, which has led to the deaths in recent months of roughly 200 Palestinians, in addition to the thousands wounded by Israeli sniper fire.

Still, the IDF is firm in its view that the situation in the Strip does not justify launching a broad military confrontation against Hamas. Defense officials believe that United Nations Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov and Egypt should be given a chance to come to an arrangement in Gaza that would restore calm and lead to reconstruction of the Strip's infrastructure. On Tuesday morning, following Mladenov's efforts, two trucks carrying 35,000 liters of diesel fuel paid for by Qatar entered the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom crossing, despite efforts to stymie the move by Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas.

IDF sources believe coverage of events along the border by local news outlets and on social media has encouraged the fiery protests, and the army spokesman is now trying to influence the coverage by limiting the information about Gaza released by the IDF. On Sunday Gazans broke through the inner border fence and set fire to camouflage netting at an unmanned Israeli army sniper post. On Monday, video clips of the incident were posted on social media, eliciting an IDF spokesman's response, even though the IDF had not reported it. Before the fire, about 7,000 Gazans turned up near the Israeli border fence in the Northern Gaza Strip near Kibbutz Zikim. According to the Palestinian Health Ministry, 29 Palestinians were wounded on Monday in clashes with the IDF, among them 11 by live fire.

Meanwhile, defense officials were concerned that Sunday's terror attack in the West Bank industrial zone of Barkan, in which two Israelis were killed, would lead to an outbreak of violence in the West Bank. The army and the Shin Bet security service fear that the diplomatic stalemate between Israel and the PA, and the exclusion of Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas from negotiations on a longer-term arrangement in Gaza, might lead to a perceived 'successful' terror attack that could usher in a wave of copycat assaults.

Escalation in the West Bank would mean increased friction with Israeli troops in Palestinian cities, bolstering security arrangements at the Jewish settlements, halting security coordination with the PA, and coping with terrorist attacks in the territories and inside Israel proper. Larger numbers of troops would then have to be deployed at the expense of IDF training exercises and courses, and would involve bringing in forces from other fronts."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S EXILIC EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY PERSISTS: Aviad Kleinberg on Ynet claims Israel's founding fathers hoped that with independence the existential anxiety that characterized Jews for over 2,000 years of exile would disappear. But it has not. Israel's hysterical treatment of BDS supporters is not strategic; it is psychological.

"Israeli society is living in internal contradiction. On the one hand, we champion the 'we do not care what others think about us' attitude. Supposedly, as Ben-Gurion declared, 'it is not important what the gentiles say, it is important what the Jews do.'

The new Jew neglected his outward appearance, dismissed manners in the name of the sacred Hebrew 'dugri' (direct speech) attitude, and carried out retaliatory actions that drew criticism in the world. Any attention to what others think – on the way we dress, speak or run our country – is seen as exilic, as an offensive symptom of that hyper-sensitivity to the gentiles. The exilic Jew did not want to cause antagonism, he wanted to be invited to dinner by the neighbors, he was willing to adapt to the expectations of the non-Jewish crowd. The new Jew does not need this. He is home, and at home he is doing whatever he wants, and damn the neighbors.

On the other hand, the new Jew is hyper-sensitive to what others say about him. He would have liked – after the first moments of shock – the neighbors to love him, appreciate him, and follow his example. He wants to be a 'Light unto the Nations.'

This theoretical yearning is connected to something deeper than anxiety over one's image. Armed from head to toe, protected by nuclear warheads, no longer a servant with no rights, but an over privileged master who has his own 'Jews' – the new Jew has yet to complete the mental recovery that Israel's founding fathers wished for. After we returned to our land and established a sovereign state in it, they hoped, after we once again became accustomed to being able to defend ourselves by ourselves, the existential anxiety that characterized us over the course of '2,000 years in exile' would disappear. The new Jew will get rid of the nightmares of the old Jew, of the terror that was always hovering over our very existence. Without this anxiety, which made the Jew constantly vigilant so he could prepare himself in advance for the blow to come, we would finally be 'like all other nations.'

What does it mean to be 'like all other nations'? That is a good question. It appears it is not about becoming similar to them in customs or faith; the State of Israel was established so we could be different without fear. Being 'like all other nations' means not to act out of the existential need to please, but also not out of complete disregard to the world. To stop viewing everything in terms of 'what will they say about us,' but also not give ourselves a general indulgence (a pardon) because of our being the chosen people or past suffering. To listen to criticism without having to accept it right away, but at the same time not automatically define it as anti-Semitic. To examine our actions and the actions of our friends in their own right, based on the principles of universal justice: Whether – in the terms of philosopher Immanuel Kant – we would be willing to make our actions the norm. Meaning, are we willing to be treated in the same way we have treated others?

This process has not happened. Under the Netanyahu governments, the exilic existential anxiety has become the main characteristic of the Israeli. And if there is no existential threat, there is no choice but to make one up. The most typical example of the Israeli anomaly is the hysterics over the BDS Movement. This movement, which calls for boycott—full or partial—of Israel, represents the margins of the margins. Most of the world's governments have friendly relations with Israel. So what is the problem? In some of the universities in the West, there are BDS groups that get little support from their institutions.

When you inquire about the achievements of the BDS movements, you are presented with a list of entertainers who refused to perform in Israel. The exalters of BDS also mention several academics who refused to come to Israel and even – may the all-merciful protect us – will not write letters of recommendation. How many of them? Let me tell you that in my three years as the head of the History Department at Tel Aviv University, hundreds of guests have visited us. How many refusals did we receive, in a field that is supposedly a breeding ground for bleeding heart liberals? You can count them on one hand.

How did the BDS Movement become an existential threat that justifies unfounded conduct, like in the case of Lara Alqasem? The answer will not be found in the field of strategy, but in psychology."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 10.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Election whispers

 

Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon on Tuesday said Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot continue to lead Israel if he is charged in a series of corruption probes, as talk of early elections gathered pace. "A prime minister under indictment and after a hearing cannot function," Kahlon said in an interview with Hadashot TV news. Kahlon, a former member of Netanyahu's Likud party who now heads the center-right Kulanu, said in March he would pull out of the coalition if the premier is indicted. Such a move would lead to the government's collapse and likely presage early elections. The finance minister said at the time he expected Netanyahu would step down by himself if indicted, or that he would be forced out by other members of the coalition. His remarks came hours after Netanyahu insisted the police investigations were not hindering his work. Netanyahu has been grilled by police a dozen times in recent months over suspicions against him in three separate graft cases, raising speculation that he may call snap elections to gain a new mandate before any possible indictment.

Rebuffing rumors that he would call new elections soon after the Knesset returns from its recess next week, the Premier said an early vote is not inevitable. He said his government was "making efforts" to solve coalition crises, "including the ultra-Orthodox draft problem," and would be "happy" to see his government last until November 2019, when elections must take place by law. Interior Minister Aryeh Deri, however, expressed skepticism that the government would serve out till the end of its term, saying he believed early elections are inevitable. "I estimate the elections will be held at the end of winter," Deri told the Walla news site Tuesday evening. He said he expects a date for early Knesset elections to be determined after municipal elections are held later this month.

Also Tuesday, a leader of a coalition party told Channel 10 news that assuming Netanyahu is reelected, his party will support a law that grants the prime minister immunity in case he is charged in one or more of the corruption cases against him. According to the report, the unnamed minister explained that toppling Netanyahu's government after the election would be a "distortion of the voters' wishes," since they are already aware of the suspicions against the premier. He also said his party would not want to strengthen another senior Likud member, who would replace Netanyahu, ahead of elections that would follow. Coalition whip David Amsalem had said earlier Tuesday that he would vote in favor of preserving the prime minister's immunity in case of an indictment. Netanyahu said he thought it would be a moot point anyway. "I do not think I will need to preserve my immunity because I do not think they will file an indictment against me," he said.

In Gaza, Qatari-bought fuel arrived at the Gaza Strip's only power station after entering through Israel on Tuesday in a bid to alleviate conditions in the enclave, a Hamas spokesman said. The delivery could help ease months of protests and clashes along the border between Israel and Hamas-run Gaza, which has been under a crippling Israeli blockade for more than a decade. But it was met with criticism by officials close to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas, whose rival administration was not involved. A Palestinian source at the Kerem Shalom crossing in Southern Gaza – the only goods crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel – said six trucks carrying 450,000 liters of fuel crossed Tuesday. The trucks were the first part of a $60 million fuel donation from Qatar.

On the Northern front, Prime Minister Netanyahu said he told Russia's vice premier in talks on Tuesday that Israel must continue to hit hostile targets in neighboring Syria, despite Moscow's decision to equip Damascus with advanced air defense missiles. Netanyahu said at a press conference that he told Maxim Akimov in talks in Jerusalem that Israel would continue to fight what it says are Iranian attempts to entrench itself in Syria and channel advanced weaponry to its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. Despite the delivery of the S-300 air defense systems to the Syrian military, Israel was committed as a matter of self-defense to continue its "legitimate activity in Syria against Iran and its proxies, who state their intention to destroy us," Netanyahu said. The meeting was the first public sit-down between Yahiya as-Sinwar, a senior Russian official, and Netanyahu since the incident.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked said that Israel is able to absorb and grant citizenship to 100,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank, she told The Atlantic in an interview published Tuesday. In the interview with Israeli anchorwoman Yonit Levi, Shaked expressed her support for the annexation of Area C, the part of the West Bank that is under Israeli control. She said public opinion about the plan will gradually change. "People will see what is going on in the Middle East and realize that it really could happen," she added. Shaked acknowledged that annexation could put Israel at odds with the United States, especially if Democrats take the White House in 2020. "Sadly, it is impossible to ignore the processes taking place in the Democratic Party. You know, the party itself is becoming less and less what is considered Zionist," Shaked said. In reference to the nation-state law, which faced a growing backlash in Israel and abroad, Shaked said that "there is no contradiction between the fact that Israel has full personal equality of citizenship but extends national rights only to the Jewish people." "Perhaps if the words Jewish and democratic had been included in the final version, it would have been easier to swallow," she added.

Finally, Strategic Affairs Minister Gilad Erdan said Tuesday that he would reconsider his office's stance on denying entry to an American student over alleged links to the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement (BDS) if she publicly condemned a boycott of Israel. Last week, Lara Alqasem was barred from entering the country despite obtaining a student visa from the Israeli consulate in Miami, because Israeli authorities claim she supported and took part in campaigns to boycott Israel. The ministry's profile of Alqasem was composed of several Facebook posts and a profile compiled by the controversial right-wing website Canary Mission. Alqasem appealed the decision and has since been detained at Ben-Gurion Airport pending a final ruling on her case. Her first appeal was denied. The second appeal is expected to be heard in coming days. Speaking on Army Radio, Erdan said that if "Alqasem comes forward tomorrow morning with her own voice, not with all sorts of lawyers' wisecracking and statements that could be construed this way or another – and declares that supporting BDS, she thinks today is illegitimate and she regrets what she did on this matter, we will reconsider our stance."

 

 

RIGHT-WING IN DANGER: Shlomo Pioterkovsky in Yedioth Ahronoth argues that Netanyahu has good reason to be confident of victory but his smugness may cost him dearly, because the right-wing bloc is weak and splintered.

"The prime minister is incessantly dropping hints that elections are around the corner. His last comment on the subject came yesterday, at a press conference, on the occasion of the appointment of the new governor of the Bank of Israel. In an uncharacteristic manner, Netanyahu opened the event to questions and addressed a variety of issues, one of the most major of which was the election. Although he did not announce elections; he did not rule out that they would be held soon. 'I cannot state that elections will be held early', he said, refraining from declaring as in the past that he intends to serve out this term for another year, until the time of general elections scheduled by law.

The very improvised press conference may be part of the hint, since Netanyahu tends to answer journalists' questions mainly before elections. At the beginning of the week, the hint was even blunter: During a media briefing in the Likud ministers' meeting, Netanyahu was quoted as saying, 'I hear that they are asking if there are elections and when. The answer is that there is no decision'. Both statements reinforce recent ones made by his close associates, according to which, Netanyahu has already made up his mind to call early elections this coming winter, and the only question is when he will make the announcement.

Netanyahu is approaching the question of advancing elections as someone who is convinced that victory is his. It is hard to blame him. The election polls in the media bolster his sense of security, and until now do not point to the advent of a political figure capable of challenging his hegemony. Avi Gabbay, the great hope of Zionist camp, is emerging as an electoral disaster. If we are to believe this weeks' polls, the party under his leadership is not even guaranteed a low double-digit result, and a victory over Netanyahu is totally out of his reach. Likewise, Yair Lapid does not seem capable of rising to a level that challenges Netanyahu in a real way. The days when Likud and Yesh Atid hovered around a similar number of Knesset seats seem far away. Yesh Atid will likely significantly increase its power in the upcoming elections, but at best Yair Lapid will see the prime minister's office at weekly government meetings, if he enters the government. There is of course the possibility he will glimpse it only when parleying with the prime minister in his capacity as opposition leader once every few months.

Netanyahu's smugness may turn out to be a serious mistake. He has already learned in the past, the hard way, that the composition of the government is as important as the question of who heads it. He headed a government that lasted for four years, and a government that barely survived for two years. The differences between the governments were many, but a main one was the state of the ultra-Orthodox bloc. This bloc, a primary basis for any stable Likud government, is experiencing one of its lowest moments. Shas is tittering on the threshold. The Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox are more divided than ever. Israel Beitenu is weakening and shreds of many other parties are liable to weaken the bloc even further. Moshe Feiglin's Zehut, Eli Yishai's Yahad, the as of yet nameless party of Bogey Ya'alon, and the Jewish Power party of former followers of Rabbi Meir Kahana/immigrants, is now divided, Yisrael Beiteinu is weakening, Kach are liable to 'burn' close to six mandates together, and the count is rising. Even Habayit Hayehudi, whose results in polls are relatively flattering, is far from its heyday.

The split on the right leads to a situation in which Netanyahu may find himself dependent on the most problematic associates, such as a party headed by MK Orly Levy-Abekasis. In such a case he may miss the current coalition wars between Bennett and Lieberman. The smugness will quickly turn into a particularly painful headache, which he never even imagined."

Ends…

 

NO WORRIES FOR ISRAEL: Shlomo Shamir in Maariv writes that the summation of recently published news of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, widespread among diplomats at the UN, is uniform: The chances for a political solution have never been so slim.

"Those who are waiting for the publication of President Trump's peace plan and engaging in assessments and guesses about what the plan will include - can curb their enthusiasm. Especially those who fear that the plan will not be good for Israel or wonder to what extent its content will be a reason for Israel to reject it and enter into a confrontation with the White House. Even if President Trump makes good on his words, according to which the plan is expected to be published in about four months, there is no reason to worry.

It does not matter what the content of the U.S. peace plan will be; it does not matter which clauses the right-wing camp in Israel will reject out of hand and it does not matter what the Pavlovian response of the Palestinian leadership will be. The plan, if it is indeed officially published, will probably fall on barren land, and die a few days later. The summary of events and statements recently published pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevalent among senior UN diplomats, is uniform: The chances of a political solution to the conflict have never been as slim as they are today.

The conduct of President Trump's administration in recent weeks in an effort to revive negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians included one policy that was implemented in the most meticulous manner: A series of sanctions and punitive measures against the Palestinians. In a review of 'President Trump's vision in the field of foreign policy', as expressed in his speech at the UN General Assembly, the New York Times argued, based on experts' quotes, that the policy of punishing Palestinians 'only increased their ire'; not exactly an encouraging result.

The speeches at the UN General Assembly by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas confirmed the view that talk of a peace plan is a sham. Netanyahu proved this with the marginal place allotted to the peace issue in his speech and in the scarce mention of the word Palestinians in his long speech. Abu Mazin, for his part, proved the futility of the chances of peace in his aggressive and defiant focus on the conditions the Palestinians set for renewing the negotiations. He did not utter a single word of reconciliation or goodwill.

After two such speeches, talking about a peace plan or holding a long-winded debate about what it includes - seems to be not connected to reality. Prime Minister Netanyahu said during a joint press conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel: 'I do not see a willingness for peace on the Palestinian side'. He is right. But a good doctor is not satisfied with diagnosing the condition of the patient. He offers a remedy to improve his condition. It seems that the prime minister understands the futility of a peace plan, which is not at all encouraging, but that is all there is folks."

Ends…

 

IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND SINWAR'S LOGIC: Yossi Beilin in Israel Hayom contends Israel should support a Palestinian unity government and refrain from parleying with Hamas as long as it adheres to the position expressed by Sinwar in his interview.

"It is hard not to get upset when reading the interview in Yedioth Ahronoth with Hamas leader Yahiya as-Sinwar. It is difficult to accept the worldview of this man, who spent most of his adult life in an Israeli prison, and whose life was saved thanks to surgery in which a cancerous tumor was removed from his brain in an Israeli hospital. He justifies the use of violence on the grounds that 'the armed resistance' is a right granted by international law, and therefore he is not concerned about the possible verdict of the International Criminal Court.

The fact that Hamas was elected by majority vote in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council – which was established in accordance with the Oslo Accords, which stipulates democratic elections – does not apparently oblige him to recognize the agreement itself. He prefers to present the agreement as an Israeli plot, designed to ensure continued settlement in the territories. But it is important to understand the logic of this sworn enemy, and to examine if there is a way to prevent the next round of violence, which will exact an unnecessary price from both sides.

Sinwar talks about a complete cessation of violence on both sides, in return for the lifting of the blockade from the Gaza Strip. He strongly opposes disarming Gaza of missiles and other weapons, but promises not to use them if quiet is maintained. He is careful to emphasize, in sharp contrast to Mahmoud 'Abbas – who rejects the use of weapons against Israel under any circumstances – that even though he does not want wars, he will fight.

But putting that aside, Sinwar is revealed as someone who studied Israel while in prison. He can write, read and speak Hebrew, and even has praise for the Jews who know how to invent and innovate as opposed to Israelis who focus on weapons of destruction. He does not hint at recognizing Israel, but is willing to make do with the 1967 borders, and does not ignore the suffering that children are going through on the other side of the border. You have to listen to Sinwar, who admits that in the confrontation between four children with slingshots and the most equipped air force in the region, the slingshots will not be victorious. But one must also remember Sadat's threats in the early 1970s about the 'decisive year', and Golda Meir's haughty contempt for them.

The mother of all sins was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's agreement to accept President Bush's request to allow Hamas to participate in elections, in contradiction to the Oslo agreement, which prohibits the participation of terror supporters in the democratic process. But you cannot unscramble the egg. The preferred move at the moment is Israeli support for a Palestinian unity government that will be our interlocutor and responsible for the Gaza Strip as well. It will ensure both the prevention of violence from Gaza and its rehabilitation. In this situation, Israel will not hold talks with Hamas representatives in the Palestinian unity government, as long as their position continues to be as expressed in the interview with their leader."

Ends…

 

'ABBAS EMERGES VICTORIOUS: Yoni Ben-Menachem in News1 affirms Sissi and 'Abbas blame each other for the failure to achieve Palestinian reconciliation and a lull with Israel. 'Abbas has the upper hand because Egypt must maintain ties with him in order to achieve stability that will serve its interests.

"The tension between the PA and Egypt has intensified over the past month, as Egypt tries to mediate between Hamas and Israel to achieve a long-term truce, giving preference to the issue of a lull over Palestinian internal reconciliation and the possibility of the PA re-establishing complete control of the Gaza Strip. According to senior Palestinian officials, as a result of this tension, the planned meeting between Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas and Egyptian President Sissi, scheduled to take place at the margins of the UN General Assembly, was canceled.

In a tense telephone conversation between President Sissi and the PA chairman, which took place about a month ago, the Egyptian president demanded that the PA chairman cancel the sanctions imposed on the Gaza Strip, for fear they will cause an explosion due to the severe humanitarian situation. 'Abbas refused to back down from his decision. When Sissi told him that he was 'endangering Egyptian national security' 'Abbas replied, 'what endangers Egyptian national security is a Muslim Brotherhood state in the Gaza Strip, which is what Hamas aspires to'.

On October 8, the newspaper al-Arabi al-Jadid also reported, quoting a senior Egyptian official, that 'Abbas and senior Egyptian officials were exchanging threats concerning President Trump's 'deal of the century'. 'Abbas was furious at Egypt's handling of the contacts with Hamas over a long-term truce with Israel over his head, and warned that if things continue in that way, 'the PA will fall apart and everyone will bear responsibility for it.' In talks with senior Egyptian officials, 'Abbas accused Egypt of 'trying to benefit from the Palestinian problem for its own interests and exploiting it until the last moment.'

According to a senior Egyptian source, the Egyptian response to 'Abbas' remarks was severe, but 'Abbas will emerge half victorious from this round. Egypt was eventually forced to accept 'Abbas' demand to first achieve reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas that would allow the PA to regain full control of Gaza, and only then to discuss a truce between Hamas and Israel, which the PA would lead. Egyptian intelligence tried to follow this path but encountered many difficulties on the part of Hamas. Hamas has had no political achievement since it began the March of Return campaign on March 30. It failed to fulfill its promises to Gazans that it would lift the siege on the Strip. Hamas urgently needs an achievement to present to the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Hamas can gain such an achievement only from Israel, and therefore it is interested in advancing a truce with it. Last week, Egyptian intelligence chiefs summoned a Hamas delegation to Cairo to discuss a new mediation proposal. According to senior Palestinian officials, this is a new proposal that deals with achieving calm with Israel without angering the PA and its leader. Talks with Hamas have concluded, but there has been no breakthrough in the discussions.

'Abbas is pondering imposing new sanctions on Gaza and cancelling the PA's $96 million monthly financial aid to the Hamas administration, which facilitates the operation of the education system in the Strip. Egypt fears this could lead Gaza to erupt, resulting in a military confrontation with Israel with regional consequences.

According to senior Fatah officials, relations between the PA and Egypt are tense, but the rift is not total. The two sides need each other and are not interested in blowing up the talks. The final decisions on reconciliation and calm with Israel will be made only at the end of the month. Egypt is maintaining an open channel with the PA, despite its belief that 'Abbas is playing a dangerous game that could blow up the fragile situation on the ground, which will not be in anyone's interest."

Ends…

 

PRO-ISRAEL GROUPS LOSE THEIR FAVORITE TRUMP OFFICIAL: Amir Tibon in Haaretz proclaims that as UN ambassador, Nikki Haley gave many pro-Israel Americans what they wanted: An official with a Trump-like absolute support for Israel who is not Trump.

"Nikki Haley's resignation on Tuesday caught the entire political world by surprise. It is too early to analyze what consequences it may have for President Donald Trump, the midterm elections and Haley's own political future. But one thing does seem clear: With Haley's departure, the 'pro-Israel' community in the United States – meaning organizations that support the current Israeli government – has lost its favorite Trump administration official.

Ever since Trump entered the White House in January 2017, his administration has unleashed a string of decisions benefiting Israel's right-wing government. These decisions included the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem; significant cuts in American aid to the Palestinians; a withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal; and an upcoming peace plan that, according to all signs, will be tailor-made for Prime Minister Netanyahu's political needs.

Throughout this period, Trump has become very popular in Israel, but not so much among Israel-supporting American Jews. For them, the most popular figure in the administration was Haley. On Tuesday, following Haley’s resignation, Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank that had a leading role in opposing the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Tweeted: 'Thank you Nikki Haley for your remarkable service. We look forward to welcoming you back to public service as President of the United States.'

His words seemed to echo the hopes of many in the pro-Israel community. One source at a leading pro-Israel organization, who asked not to be identified, told Haaretz, 'Our people want a politician with Trump's policy of total support for Israel. They just do not want that politician to be Trump.' The administration and the president – both immensely popular in Israel itself – have remained unpopular among many supporters of Israel in the United States, especially within the Jewish community.

It is no secret that Trump is loathed by most liberal, left-leaning American Jews, but even conservative and centrist American Jews have a hard time with many of his policies, not to mention his toxic and divisive rhetoric. It is not uncommon to hear officials in pro-Israeli organizations say, always on background or off-the-record, that as much as they like some of Trump's policies toward Israel, they are still troubled by his policies on almost any other issue.

For this segment of the American-Jewish community – liberal or centrist in its general worldview, but closer to the right-wing government in Jerusalem when it comes to Israel – Haley quickly became a favorite, soon after she became Trump's UN ambassador. She is identical to Trump in her unquestionable and sometimes unreasonable support for any position of the Israeli government. However, she differs from him in her views and statements on issues like Russia, immigration and sexual harassment.

One example of how far Haley was willing to go in order to support Israel's government was her decision, in February 2017, to block the appointment of former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to the position of UN special envoy to Libya. Fayyad is considered a moderate and is known for his strong opposition to both terrorism and the BDS movement. He has close ties to many former Israeli and U.S. officials. Yet Haley blocked his appointment, signaling to Palestinians that even those who are against violence and boycotts will be humiliated by the United States under the Trump administration.

If Fayyad had belonged to any other nationality, Haley would have probably praised him for his opposition to violence, his determined fight against corruption (which led Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to fire him and force him into exile) and his willingness to take upon himself the lost cause of trying to fix Libya. Her refusal to support him, on the grounds that his appointment would be a gift to the Palestinian Authority, was hypocritical – but it was also the first sign of her unwavering commitment to Israel.

The Obama and Trump presidencies have sharpened the debate over Israel in the United States. Republicans and the religious right are more supportive of Israel than ever; Democrats are split, with younger and more liberal segments of the party becoming increasingly critical of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, and sometimes also of the country as a whole. The traditional pro-Israel groups, which cherish bipartisanship and believe Israel needs to have broad support among all parts of American society, are alarmed by this trend. They see Trump's polarizing effect on American politics, coupled with his close affiliation with Israel – and specifically with Netanyahu – as an existential danger in the long run.

That is why Haley became such a favorite. Her unwavering support for the Netanyahu government, coupled with her softer style of politics, allowed many people to cheer for the Trump administration's policy on Israel without feeling that they were effectively supporting Trump in doing so. This was clearly evident at the last two AIPAC policy conferences in Washington, where Haley was received as a rock star and drew more applause than any other speaker. Vice President Mike Pence, the other senior Trump administration official to speak at the two conferences, was also warmly received, but it was clear that the AIPAC crowd connected more easily with Haley than with him.

Identity politics played a role in that: Pence is an evangelical Christian, while Haley is the daughter of Sikh immigrants. But there is also an issue of style. Haley speaks in a tone and language that tries to appeal to centrists; Pence has built his political career on appealing to the base. There are many centrist Democrats and Republicans at AIPAC events and, for them; Haley's style is easier to identify with than Pence's. During his speech at this year's conference, Pence drew laughter from the crowd when he accidentally said that Trump was 'the most pro-life' president ever. He wanted, of course, to say 'pro-Israel,' but got confused and touted the president's views on abortion in front of a crowd that overwhelmingly disagreed with Trump on that issue.

It was a moment that perfectly captured why, despite the administration's 'let Netanyahu have whatever he wants' policy, Trump's administration is still very unpopular among American Jews. Haley is the exception. She is the one figure within the administration that many American Jews seem to like. Michael Koplow, policy director at the Israel Policy Forum, wrote earlier this year: 'When Nikki Haley runs for president, she will be the first Republican to approach 50 percent of the Jewish vote. Her popularity even among committed Democrats is remarkable.' Even Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel under the Clinton administration, wrote on Tuesday: 'Could Nikki Haley be preparing to challenge Trump in 2020? Seems hard to imagine now but if he loses badly in the midterms maybe Republicans might consider a more responsible, dignified, capable, intelligent daughter of immigrants as an alternative?' Dan Shapiro, the U.S. ambassador to Israel under former President Barack Obama, wrote in reply: 'Dream on, Martin. Wish it were so, but no chance.'"

Ends…

 

BEHIND THE PLAN: In its editorial The Jerusalem Post quotes President Trump's envoy to the Middle East, Jason Greenblatt: "Let's stop focusing on tired talking points and throwing more money at the same things we have been doing since 1993. It is time to realistically evaluate what works and what does not."

"President Donald Trump has the world in suspense. Everywhere in the Middle East, and in capitals around the world, everyone awaits the unveiling, the roll out, of America's so-called 'Deal of the Century.' What is the president's peace plan, all are wondering? What is he going to throw out there that, we've been told, is way different than anything that's ever come before?

It's got everyone guessing, and there have been hints and unconfirmed reports along the way about this point or that – this neighborhood's borders, or that country's direct involvement, etc. – but nobody is sure what's in it, and if they do know, they're not talking. But even while we don't know the details, we do have an idea about what the U.S. is thinking – from the man who's helping to craft that peace plan: Jason Greenblatt.

Two weeks ago, Trump's Special Representative for International Negotiations addressed the semi-annual meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The AHLC – established on October 1, 1993, less than a month after the signing of the Oslo Accords – is a 15-member committee of countries and organizations that serves as the central body bringing together international efforts to finance aid to the Palestinians. If anything in the Trump peace plan will include money, then what Greenblatt had to say to the committee has extreme importance.

'Let's stop focusing on tired talking points and throwing more money at the same things we have been doing since 1993,' he said. 'It is time to realistically evaluate what works and what does not.' Greenblatt was very clear: The U.S. is fed up with bad Palestinian governance, and will no longer throw good money after bad: 'We could continue the same pattern for years to come, but that would be folly. Clearly, none of our financial assistance is getting Israelis and Palestinians closer to a solution.'

His speech did not get a lot of notice, having taken place the same day as the Kavanaugh hearings and Prime Minister Netanyahu's Iran nuclear-warehouse speech to the General Assembly. But under the radar, Greenblatt laid out to the committee one point that bears noting, for it spells out what he believes is a central stumbling block to further progress on any kind of peace deal.

Greenblatt first attacked Hamas, telling the Ad Hoc committee that despite 'decades of work and billions of dollars, euros, shekels, and dinars donated… life continues to get worse in Gaza.' He slammed the leadership in Gaza for having driven the Strip 'to a state of utter desperation,' and for year by year taking the people living there 'further and further away from the potential for a better life.'

Then Greenblatt turned to the PA: 'There is an old philosophy that Palestinian economic cooperation with Israel, which would lead to an improved quality of life for the Palestinian people, must be avoided. This philosophy is based on the notion that such cooperation and improvement of Palestinian lives and their economic situation would cause apathy for Palestinians' national aspirations. This old philosophy – the anti-normalization philosophy – has never worked, and it will never work. It is time for the Palestinian leadership to recognize that reality.'

The U.S. gives nearly a quarter of the annual global funding for peace and reconciliation activities between Israelis and Palestinians – a total of $6.3 billion since 1994 in aid to support the Palestinian people. But no more, he said, would the United States 'use the hard-earned tax dollars of its citizens to subsidize 'anti-normalization' – a failed political philosophy. The PA can work with all interested parties, including Israel, to help all Palestinians thrive and prosper and, at the same time, continue to advocate their political positions.'

We live with hope that the Palestinian leadership can move forward and write a new headline. As we await details of the Deal of the Century, we salute Jason Greenblatt for telling it like it is."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 10.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-'A stupid act with far-reaching consequences'

2-Syria's surplus opposition

3-A tangle of responsibilities

4-Fake glitter

 

1-  'A stupid act with far-reaching consequences'

 

Mr. Khashoggi has been kidnapped and may have been murdered; and it is the right of world public opinion, which is disturbed by these developments, to know the truth. If it is confirmed that Saudi security officers detained or killed him inside the consulate then all those responsible, from the summit of the pyramid to its base, must be held accountable…Khashoggi's disappearance should not be allowed to fade from the circle of attention and assiduous pursuit with the passage of time. The full details of what happened and the identity of the party behind his kidnapping or disappearance must be revealed. Consequently, an international investigation committee that includes experts from around the world is needed for this purpose; one in which Turkey and Saudi Arabia would also participate, all within a framework of transparency--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

I believe that Khashoggi's ability to infiltrate the West's political class is the reason for the [Saudi] anger against him and his disappearance. For besmirching the Saudi regime's image is forbidden, and it seems that the man had the required tools to do so. Jamal Khashoggi disappeared suddenly. Or, as our fellow journalist Hassan Zou'bi put it: 'He entered [the Saudi consulate in Istanbul] as a journalist, and emerged as a news item for journalists.' Saudi/Turkish exchanges regarding his disappearance are still ongoing: Where is he? Is he still alive? His disappearance is horrific and horror-inspiring. I hope he is not dead. But if that seems more likely, then whoever committed this crime must face the entire world today, and, in my view, has committed an immensely stupid act with far-reaching consequences--'Omar 'Ayasra in Jordanian as-Sabil

 

A number of pressing questions concerning the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul demand clear answers, especially from the Turkish authorities, says the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. In the end, all those behind this crime must be punished no matter how senior they may be. Despite the mildness of his criticisms of the Saudi government, Khashoggi was 'disappeared' and Riyadh now finds itself in the dock, notes a commentator in a Muslim-Brotherhood-affiliated Jordanian daily. This merely reaffirms the fact that Arab opposition figures have no rights whatsoever.

 

AN AGATHA CHRISTIE STORY: "The case of the well-known Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance is getting more mysterious with each passing day due to the conflicting information and the absence of any conclusive evidence as to his fate," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Wednesday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The entire affair is turning into an Agatha-Christie-style 'detective story.' But this may be precisely what those behind his disappearance wanted, whether it is Saudi Arabia, which has denied all the charges made against it in this regard, or some other parties whose identity remains unknown.

It should be noted that thanks to his Arab and international fame, Mr. Khashoggi's criticisms of his country's government's human rights' record and its persecution and kidnapping of those opposed to it, whether members of the ruling family or not, have been severely damaging. Moreover, Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's admission in an interview with Bloomberg a few days ago that some 1500 Saudis have been arrested and are now behind bars leaves Riyadh as the primary suspect in Khashoggi's disappearance or kidnapping. This will now lead to reopening the other detainees' files and will fuel the international interest in their case, all of which conflicts with the Kingdom's PR campaign that has cost it millions of dollars in order to portray it as undergoing a major process of reform.

In their various statements, the Turkish authorities have insisted that Mr. Khashoggi never left the Saudi consulate after he entered it at around 1:00 pm last Tuesday [2/10/2018]. Later, sources close to these authorities leaked a story published in The Washington Post yesterday, claiming that Mr. Khashoggi was killed and dismembered inside the consulate, after which his body parts were put in boxes and transported to an unknown destination (possibly, Istanbul International Airport) via black, shaded diplomatic cars. The U.S. newspaper, to which Khashoggi contributed, further confirmed its story by publishing an image of Khashoggi entering his country's consulate.

In an official statement, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that the Saudi authorities have allowed the consulate building – where Khashoggi was said to have been detained and possibly dismembered – to be searched. Meanwhile, the Saudi monarch's son and ambassador to Washington Prince Khaled bin Salman has said that all reports concerning Khashoggi's disappearance and killing are 'absolutely false and baseless,' and that the investigations will reveal many surprising facts. He added that Mr. Khashoggi was his 'friend' despite their differing points of view, and that he had met him more than once both inside and outside the Saudi embassy, and had remained in touch with him throughout his presence in Washington.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has added to the mystery by adopting a 'cautious' position saying that he is waiting for the investigations' results and has asked the Saudi authorities to 'prove' by facts and evidence that Khashoggi actually did leave the consulate.

We believe that the Saudi authorities would not have allowed Turkish security men to enter the consulate had Mr. Khashoggi still been there or had he been killed and dismembered before his remains were removed – assuming that this is what really happened. Nonetheless, we should not rule out the possibility that the investigators will find some useful evidence in one form or another, even if many traces of the crime have been eliminated– assuming of course that the reports of a crime are really true.

We believe that a number of questions call for clear answers, and they all concern points that appeared in reports attributed to Turkish state officials:

- First, why were all local employees working at the Saudi consul's home unexpectedly given a day off on the very same day that Khashoggi disappeared, as the Turkish daily Sabah, which is close to Erdogan, reported yesterday? And what about the local Turkish employees at the consulate itself who were also given a day off?

- Second, Sabah also spoke for the first time of a new theory according to which Mr. Khashoggi may not have been killed and may have been taken alive in black-shaded cars that left through the consulate's backdoor to Istanbul Airport accompanied by a 15-member team of [Saudi] security officers that arrived at the consulate on the same day as the 'disappearance.' Two private jets were waiting for them at the airport, one of which headed to Cairo and the other to Dubai.

- Third, The Washington Post published images of the abovementioned security team clearly showing the faces of its members who had booked rooms in a hotel near the consulate, but did not stay in them. Will Turkish investigators interrogate them concerning their role, their mission, and the reason for their hasty departure from Istanbul?

- Fourth, if one jet landed in Cairo and the other in Dubai, where did Mr. Khashoggi disembark, assuming he was on board, either alive or dead? Will the authorities at the two airports be interrogated? And why did the jets not fly directly to Riyadh?

- Fifth, the Turkish authorities have summoned the Saudi ambassador to Ankara twice since the 'victim's' disappearance. But we have heard nothing about summoning the Saudi consul or other diplomats at the Istanbul consulate. The question is this: Why were these diplomats not expelled even before the investigations began since the Turkish authorities are certain that Mr. Khashoggi was killed at the embassy, judging by their initial statements? This, after all, is what the UK did when it expelled 25 Russian diplomats from London after it accused Moscow of being behind the attempted assassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter using chemical weapons.

All these questions call for answers from the various parties concerned, especially from the Saudi and Turkish authorities. Mr. Khashoggi has been kidnapped and may have been murdered; and it is the right of world public opinion, which is disturbed by these developments, to know the truth. If it is confirmed that Saudi security officers detained or killed him inside the consulate then all those responsible, from the summit of the pyramid to its base, must be held accountable.

From the very start, we have refused to adopt any of the conflicting speculations regarding this 'crime,' preferring to wait to discover the facts and see the evidence. We have noted a number of facts whose truth was later confirmed, such as Mr. Khashoggi's meetings with the Saudi ambassador in Washington, his purchase of an apartment in Istanbul that was furnished to be his married home with his fiancée Hatice Cengiz, and his desire to settle permanently in Istanbul.

On Tuesday, we received an email that we do not endorse and whose truth we cannot vouch for. The sender, who did not mention his name, said that Mr. Khashoggi is still alive, that he was detained when he visited the Saudi consulate, that he was kidnapped in a black car by Saudi officers who had come specifically for this purpose, that he was then moved to a properly-equipped truck that headed to the port and boarded a Turkish ship that then reached the al-Joory Suites Hotel in the Saudi city of al-Khafji, where he was interrogated using psychological pressure techniques without being physically tortured so as not to leave any marks on his body after his release. He then was transferred to a secret detention center. Moreover, the email claims, King Salman and his crown prince know all about this operation.

Khashoggi's disappearance should not be allowed to fade from the circle of attention and assiduous pursuit with the passage of time. The full details of what happened and the identity of the party behind his kidnapping or disappearance must be revealed. Consequently, an international investigation committee that includes experts from around the world is needed for this purpose; one in which Turkey and Saudi Arabia would also participate, all within a framework of transparency.

Until the results become clear either as a result of the investigations that Turkey is carrying out, or through the proposed international committee, we must wait and see. True, Mr. Khashoggi is not a prime minister or a rich businessman like the late [Lebanese PM] Rafiq Hariri. But the importance of the crime of his kidnapping or – God forbid – murder should not be belittled.

"For justice should not discriminate between a major and minor figure, or between an important figure and a less important one," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

RATIONAL AND REASONABLE: "I used to read his articles in the London-based al-Hayat and like them," writes 'Omar 'Ayasra in the Jordanian daily as-Sabil.

Even though he was one of those who wrote in defense of the Saudi authorities at the time, his position was rational with a reasonable outlook. One of his articles carried the title: 'I am Saudi, but Different.'

After the Arab Spring, he disagreed with the Saudi state, as evident from his intensive appearances on [Qatari-owned] al-Jazeera, despite the Gulf crisis. But he was rational in his criticisms and patriotic to the bone. In one chat program, he was asked about his appearance on al-Jazeera, and he said that it is different and better than other TV channels, but that he appears on it as an objective journalist and refuses to appear as someone who has rebelled against the Saudi state.

I recall he was strongly in favor of King Salman and his engagement in the Yemen and Syria files; but his enthusiasm subsided and his disagreement with the regime deepened after the domestic measures that were taken in Saudi Arabia.

He wrote in The Washington Post and penetrated the circles of influence in the U.S. and the West, as a result of which [UK journalist] David Hearst wrote an article a couple of days ago entitled: 'Jamal Khashoggi, a Different Sort of Saudi.'

I believe that Khashoggi's ability to infiltrate the West's political class is the reason for the anger against him and his disappearance. For besmirching the Saudi regime's image is forbidden, and it seems that the man had the required tools to do so.

Jamal Khashoggi disappeared suddenly. Or, as our fellow journalist Hassan Zou'bi put it: 'He entered as a journalist, and emerged as a news item for journalists.' Saudi/Turkish exchanges regarding his disappearance are still ongoing: Where is he? Is he still alive?

His disappearance is horrific and horror-inspiring. I hope he is not dead. But if that seems more likely, then whoever committed this crime must face the entire world today, and, in my view, has committed an immensely stupid act with far-reaching consequences.

In talking about Khashoggi's disappearance, [Turkish President] Erdogan was balanced. He does not want to escalate against Riyadh and is hoping that the crisis can be resolved. Moreover, the information available to the Turks is growing gradually even if it may still be insufficient.

For its part, Saudi Arabia is being accused, but denies the accusations. But as far as its motives are concerned, one can say that it has an interest in Khashoggi's disappearance and must prove that it is not involved.

"But the ultimate conclusion is that opposition figures in Arab lands have no rights. In fact, we may soon discover that the responsibility for Khashoggi's disappearance or death has been lost amidst the ongoing feverish competition between interests, tyranny, and fear for one's throne," concludes 'Ayasra.

Ends…

 

2-Syria's surplus opposition

 

Recent meetings have merely reinforced the truth that the so-called foreign-based Syrian opposition has no place at the negotiating table and that its sponsors are still seeking to wrest victory from defeat, says Mohammad 'Obeid in today's Syrian al-Watan

 

The most recent meetings between the foreign-based Syrian opposition and its regional and international sponsors regarding a proposed political solution for the Syrian crisis suggest that this opposition will be merely a front for these sponsors, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. Consequently, there is no point in discussing a new Syrian constitution with this opposition.

 

A PERTINENT QUESTION: "Is the 'political process' for resolving the Syrian crisis still a matter of priority for the international and regional powers that have sponsored, backed, and invested in terrorism?" asks Mohammad 'Obeid in Wednesday's pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

This question is pertinent due to the side-meetings in Geneva between the reduced International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and [UN Syria Envoy] Staffan de Mistura and his working team on September 14th. But the most important meeting may have been that held between the so-called 'opposition' (or 'oppositions'') delegation, and the new U.S. envoy to Syria, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Levant Affairs at the U.S. State Department Joel Rayburn. The delegation was surprised to hear Rayburn focusing on the need to confront and contain Iran in the region, and the effort to remove it from Syria as the current U.S. administration's first priority.

The same idea dominated the talks between de Mistura and his team on the one hand, and U.S. State Department's Special Secretary for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey and Joel Rayburn, on the other. In addition, there was a discussion of what was referred to as the 'Declaration of Principles' paper that made no secret of the fact that the seven ISSG member states, (with the U.S. at their forefront) have two main priorities: 'severing Syria's relations with the Iranian regime and its military extensions' – which of course refers to Hezbollah first and last; and 'Syria's commitment not to threaten its neighbors,' without specifying who these neighbors are and what attitude Syria is supposed to adopt towards them; or, more accurately, leaving the term 'neighbor' deliberately ambiguous so as to include the Israeli enemy on the grounds that it is a de facto geographical neighbor.

But the deeper and at the same time clearer conclusion to be drawn from both these meetings, previous similar meetings, and those that will follow is that the international and regional parties that are portraying themselves as concerned about sponsoring the political process because they wish to speed up a solution in Syria, really want to be the party on the other side of the inter-Syrian negotiating table, facing the Syrian government's delegation.

And this means that no seats will be reserved for the so-called 'opposition' because it will be unable to raise these international and regional parties' demands and conditions. That puts paid to the debate over this so-called opposition's independence and patriotism, and how its political agenda differs from that of the hostile international and regional agenda that has been conspiring against Syria.

For all these reasons, it seems meaningless to review the names of the 'opposition' figures that are supposed to take part in the promised dialogue and their political and party affiliations. After all, they will play no role in deciding this dialogue's agenda; moreover, their participation will not serve the supreme Syrian national interest.

In addition, and according to many of the papers that are circulating among the regional and international parties, what is being prepared behind the scenes points to an effort to bypass the text and spirit of UNSCR 2254, moving on to discuss a formula for a solution that resembles the [1989] Lebanese Ta'if settlement, based on the 'sectarian-ization' of the Syrian political situation.

Against this background, a number of European delegations have visited Lebanon's political leaders and senior party-political figures to test their views concerning the possibility of cloning 'the Lebanese formula' and exploring its prospects of success, especially when it comes to sharing state powers, as well as the distribution of state posts and positions along sectarian lines.

The international and regional powers that planned, arranged, and financed this terrible global war on the Syrian state, people, and armed forces, are still not convinced that they will emerge as losers from this war, and that Syria in all its patriotic constituents has already emerged victorious. That being so, discussions regarding changes or amendments to the constitution are the exclusive right of the Syrian people who have held their ground, made sacrifices, and confronted this war until they have won it.

As for the constitutional committee that is supposed to be in charge of these discussions, its natural place is within the national frameworks and the government and legislative institutions that have protected the state project in Syria against ruptures, fragmentation, and collapse.

"Anything other else would be just a belated attempt on the part of Syria's enemies to invest in what remains of the so-called 'foreign-based opposition' so as to smuggle through a political solution that harms Syria's patriotic, nationalist, and resistance position, and its regional role in confronting the Israeli enemy and the American schemes," concludes 'Obeid.

Ends…

 

3-A tangle of responsibilities

 

In the tangle of PLO and PA bodies and authorities it is very hard to determine who is responsible for implementing and following up on decisions on the ground, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in today's Jordanian al-Ghad

 

As the Palestinian Central Council (PCC) prepares to meet at the end of October, its relationship to the various executive bodies of the PLO, the State of Palestine, and the PA should be high on its agenda, urges a leading Palestinian commentator. For the PCC does not have the power to implement its own decisions, but can only supervise the PA's executive bodies in doing so, which is a very complicated matter in the complex Palestinian situation.

 

IMPLEMENTING DECISIONS: "The PCC meets at the end of October to follow up on files that primarily have to do with implementing previous PLO decisions and deciding on certain outstanding issues," notes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

In other words, there are no new issues for the PCC to discuss; but this does not mean that certain crucial decisions cannot be taken regarding issues such as the PA and its political system's future.

Parliament – any parliament – is not the proper place for discussing how to implement decisions. The executive branch is in charge of such implementation. Parliaments can decide on certain issues that require implementation and can monitor that process. The PCC is thus not expected to take any executive decisions regarding security coordination with the occupation, or suspending recognition of Israel, or reaching a new agreement, or the details regarding the Gaza Strip's financial administration. Decisions have already been taken and instructions have been issued regarding all these issues.

Apart from that, the PCC may now decide the PLO Executive Committee should not be in charge of implementing decisions. Rather than empowering the Executive Committee and the Palestinian president to suspend recognition of Israel, the PCC may decide to do so itself. But that seems neither possible nor practical; in fact, there are serious doubts concerning its legal standing. For the executive authorities – departments and foreign ministries – are the ones that usually implement such decisions.

The 'security coordination' file in particular makes it clear how difficult it is to implement decisions without having any real plans on how to implement them. The difficulty of implementing decisions on various issues, makes it clear why committees stemming from the PLO's Executive Committee met 37 times between the PNC (Palestinian National Council) meeting in April 2018 and August 2018, in order to come up with plans some of which were actually discussed in August. But the security issue in particular embodies the difficulty of the PCC's mission. For the executive branch consists of the Palestinian Interior Ministry and the various Palestinian security agencies. Therefore, there is no clear authority to which to refer that links those who will implement the decisions to the PCC.

Customary parliamentary practice requires the PM or the primary security official– the interior minister or the national security advisor, or whoever – to present their report to parliament if there is an issue regarding which a decision must be taken, or that requires follow up. On certain occasions, this may include holding the executive power accountable for the failure to implement decisions; and this usually entails a no-confidence vote that produces a change in the executive authority – by means of a government reshuffle for example.

But this is not possible in the complex Palestinian situation. When the PCC decided to establish the PA in its October 1993 session, it did not go into the details of the relationship between the PCC and the PA. The situation developed in such a manner that the result was the establishment of a separate PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) for the PA. (For example, it would have been possible to keep the PCC responsible for the PA's executive branch).

The PLC – which has been frozen for 11 years now – has not assumed and has no right to assume tasks having to do with international political agreements that concern the Palestinian people because the PLO is the Palestinian people's legal representative: It is the PLO that recognized Israel, and it is the PLO that signs peace agreements or takes other decisions in this regard. But the PA, its agencies, and its institutions bear the responsibility for implementing decisions and agreements on the ground inside Palestine (and in some cases outside Palestine).

This means that the executive level in the PLO, the State of Palestine, and the PA – with all these bodies' overlapping powers – is primarily responsible for implementing the PCC's decisions. But there is no clear mechanism concerning how the PCC can follow up on the actions of the executive level and hold it accountable, especially if we are talking of the Palestinian [PA] government. In fact, in the recent PCC meeting, the PLO Executive Committee frankly blamed the PA's government for failing to implement certain decisions.

The PCC's current importance is generally a political and national one, having to do with developing the broad outlines of Palestinian policies. And the PCC can be decisive and have the final word regarding matters such as peace agreements and the overall national situation. But following up on the implementation of these decisions primarily requires a system that determines the various bodies' different responsibilities, how they work, and how they are related to each other; foremost of which are the relations between three main constituents: The PLO, the Palestinian State, and the PA.

"These relations should perhaps be the focus of the PCC's working agenda for the coming phase, including its own relationship to the PA and the Palestinian State's executive branch," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

4-Fake glitter

 

Israeli PM Netanyahu is trying to blind his public and world opinion with the fake glitter of lies and alleged intelligence coups, possibly in preparation for the next elections, says Randa Haidar on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu has been consistently using the UN General Assembly as a podium to issue lies about Iran's alleged violations of the nuclear agreement, although he recently included Hezbollah in his lies, maintains a Lebanese commentator on a Qatari-news portal. Netanyahu's main objective may be to divert attention from the Palestinian/Israeli conflict and rally his supporters for the next Israeli elections.

 

ONE LINK IN THE CHAIN: "Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu allegations from the UN podium regarding what he referred to as Iran's violations of the 2015 nuclear agreement with the major powers are just one link in a chain that began to unfold after he became PM in 2009 and that continues to do so at a faster pace and with greater ferocity, especially in light of Iran's military presence in Syria," writes Randa Haidar on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

Every time Netanyahu addresses the UN General Assembly, he comes armed to the teeth with documents, photographs, and graphs aimed to turn world public opinion against Iran and its allies in the region. This time round, however, Hezbollah received its share of 'evidence and proof' regarding the deployment of precise missiles just a few kilometers from Rafiq Hariri International Airport, specifically under a football field in Beirut's Southern Dahyieh.

The question here is this: What does Netanyahu aim to achieve with his accusations and warnings? Is he seeking to stir Lebanese fears regarding the possibility of a new Israeli aggression on their country? Or is he trying to intimidate Hezbollah and create renewed tumult over its weapons arsenal amongst Lebanese public opinion? Or is Israel once again focusing on Lebanon as an arena for its proxy war with Iran? Or does he also aim to focus on Iran's negative role in the region via its intervention in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen's domestic policies?

These may all be among the aims and objectives of Netanyahu's intimidations and threats. But there is also a completely different reason behind this rabid campaign against Iran's nuclear weapons and Hezbollah's precise weapons – namely, to avoid talking about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and avoid making any comments on the settlement that U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is preparing for. And, most importantly, it is to avoid mentioning the two-state solution that Trump spoke of at his last meeting with Netanyahu [at the UN].

There is another reason behind Netanyahu's boasts, namely, his desire to exaggerate Israeli intelligence's achievements, portraying these agencies as capable of monitoring anything that takes place over or under ground because of its advanced and cutting-edge technology that can see through walls, and infiltrate the internet, computers and email and other accounts, intercept phone calls, and keep persons under surveillance.

The irony, however, is that all this exaggeration came at a time when the Israelis were commemorating the October 1973 war's 45th anniversary which, is linked in Israel's consciousness to Israeli intelligence's great failure to foresee the war that the Egyptians [and Syrians] waged on them at the time, and that has remained the subject of permanent criticism.

The same sort of failure reemerged in Military Intelligence's performance during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge against the Gaza Strip when it failed to foresee the offensive [Hamas] tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Israel that came as an unexpected surprise to the Israeli army. This led to a wave of criticism of Netanyahu's government from the Israeli right, which almost led to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the intelligence agencies' performance.

On the other hand, and Netanyahu's lies aside, Israel has recently been working on exploiting its great advantages in cyber security and to improve its intelligence capabilities by merging this new field – which is undergoing amazing progress – into its military doctrine. As a result, its cyber weapons will constitute a new and advanced operational arm that works in tandem with its air, sea, and ground forces in any future confrontation.

But the real test of all of Netanyahu's boasts of intelligence achievements lies in the next military confrontation that no one wishes for – at least for the moment. Meanwhile, the truth of the claim of a secret depot in Tehran's suburbs that is being used for nuclear purposes will be determined by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which is in charge of monitoring the implementation the nuclear agreement with Iran. The IAEA has not confirmed these allegations so far. Meanwhile also, the Lebanese state rushed to dispel Netanyahu's lies by organizing a tour for foreign diplomats and journalists of the areas where Netanyahu claimed the missiles were hidden.

Netanyahu believes that lying and insisting on doing so will turn his lies into a truth. But he will ultimately deceive no one except his own supporters and the rightwing public who he is trying to blind with all this fake glitter.

"Perhaps this is all in preparation for the next Israeli elections," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 10.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

EU REFERENDUM: Sedat Ergin is concerned about Turkish President Erdogan's statement on a potential EU referendum in center right Hurriyet: "If there were a referendum in Turkey on pursuing the talks on EU membership, Erdogan would probably not be satisfied with the position of an impartial referee, simply asking 'End them, or continue with them', and he would express his choice. The outcome of a scenario whereby he would take a stance against full membership could lead to a grave loss of ground in Turkey's pro-Western perspective, and drive the river to take a different course. All these developments could rattle the balance in Turkish foreign policy at a time when relations with the U.S. have derailed."

Batuhan Yasar argues that the president is merely reflecting reality in pro-government Turkiye: "The president's statement that 'we could go to an EU referendum' has attracted a lot of attention. The EU nations' ambassadors in Ankara are trying to understand what is going on. Some are asking whether 'he has made the final move'. Others are inquiring whether Turkey would really go for such a referendum. Surely, it would: But why should the president make a final move? He has just summarized the realities: What is happening and what is likely to happen."

 

THE ECONOMY: Murathan Murat dismisses a potential economic move in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "Everyone might as well be given a 10% discount coupon. This is nothing like combating inflation, but is simply a final seasonal discount. The 10% discount is one element in the inflation basket. Therefore, it will temporarily bring inflation down. But then what? It will be the turn for price increases again. I wish things were that easy! Because while discount campaigns are being requested by chain supermarkets, small shop owners will be shutting their doors early."

Israfil Bayrakci depicts a possible economic meltdown in pro-Islamist opposition Milli Gazete: "The wolf enjoys uncertain weather. The constant increase in foreign currency prices followed by sharp drops must have played into the hands of some suspicious people since the number of millionaires has gone up dramatically. In other words, those who know how to fish in murky waters strike it rich. It is the poor and ordinary citizen who pays the price. Poverty and hunger are steadily increasing. The discrepancy between rich and poor keeps widening, and price increases come down like rain."

Ismet Ozcelik takes aim at the government in left-wing opposition Aydinlik: "The government is in despair. It does not recognize the law or anything else. The unemployment fund is not being utilized for the workers. It is being left as capital for the banks. Although the presidential spokesman has referred to this as an established method since former president Ozal's time, the law is very clear. This practice is a crime! The government is startled. It tries to save the day. Everything is in turmoil."

 

KURDISH ISSUE: Kurtulus Tayiz defends the government's 'anti-terror' measures in pro-government Aksam: "Certain circles will criticize and oppose the 'government-appointed trustee model' [for HDP (pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party) municipalities where mayors are accused of terror links] and find this 'undemocratic'. However, anywhere in the world, especially in Europe, which is regarded as the cradle of democracy, not only is the political space locked against parties and personalities affiliated to terror organizations, heavy sanctions are also in place. We have seen this clearly in the example of [Catalan leader] Batasuna in Spain."

 

Iran media watch

 

HALEY'S RESIGNATION: The resignation of U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley was the top international news across Iranian broadcast media. During her tenure, Haley pushed for a tougher line on Iran and tried to rally support for President Trump's decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal, which Iran signed with six world powers. Rolling news channel IRINN said her resignation was a "sign of chaos" in the White House, while Radio Iran (VIRI) quoted "experts" as saying that she stepped down due to her role in "isolating" the United States. Iran's envoy to the UN said Haley "entered the United Nations with a unilateralist view but in practice was melted by the process of multilateralism and is leaving the United Nations with no achievements". "New sheriff in town is no longer," quipped the Iranian UN mission's press secretary on Twitter, referring to a speech last year by Haley in which she described herself as a "new sheriff" at the UN. IRINN said Dina Powell, former deputy national security advisor to President Trump and "Ivanka Trump's best friend", was a likely candidate to succeed Haley. Haley's resignation featured prominently in Iranian newspapers today. Reformist Etemad led with "Resignation of Iran-phobic Sheriff", while financial daily Jahan-e Sanat described Haley's departure as "An Unexpected Separation". Government-run newspaper Iran dubbed Haley "the enemy of the nuclear deal". Top conservative and hardline outlets made no mention of the news on their front pages.

 

KHASHOGGI'S DISAPPEARANCE: English-language Press TV led its morning bulletin with the mysterious disappearance Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who has not been seen since he entered his country's consulate in Istanbul on 2 October to obtain a marriage document. The TV said Turkish security officials had concluded that Khashoggi was assassinated in the consulate on orders from "the highest levels of the Riyadh regime". The channel also aired a video report about the "controversial disappearance" of a number of Saudi critics in recent years.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: A number of Iranian social media users are calling for an uprising on 29 October. The relevant hashtag has been used more than 4,200 times over the past 24 hours. The day is celebrated annually by thousands to commemorate Cyrus the Great, who founded the Achaemenid Persian Empire some 2,500 years ago. Many gather to mark the occasion in Pasargadae, in Fars Province, where the Tomb of Cyrus is located. "Nationwide strikes prepare the ground for the uprising, leading to the explosion of the dollar on 4 November, which will ultimately cripple the regime," wrote one. The United States will impose sanctions targeting Iran's key petrochemical sector on 4 November. The first round of sanctions, which went into effect in early August, hurt the economy and contributed to the rial's steep devaluation. "The uprising will not only be in Pasargadae. It will be all over the country", another user posted.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 9.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI AFFAIR: Hasan Basri Yalcin calls for caution in pro-government Sabah: "This incident came at a time when U.S. President Trump was threatening the Saudis. If the story of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's execution is true and is confirmed, Saudi dependence on Trump will increase. Turkey is being cautious. Committing such a crime is bad on its own. The fact that it has been committed in Turkey is even more unsettling. However, matters should not be rushed. There is a legal process. There will be an investigation. If the Saudis have done something illegal, this will be handled accordingly. However, let us see first. What will Trump tell the [Saudi] king and his crown prince whom he loves so much? Let us wait and see."

Resul Tosun reviews the legal niceties in pro-government Star: "According to the Vienna Convention, diplomatic personnel have full immunity and cannot be arrested, tried, or sentenced for crimes committed in their country of assignment. They are not only exempt from giving testimony, but also cannot be forced to stand as a witness. Turkey cannot try the Saudi consul general, but it can declare him 'persona non grata' and ask him to leave the country within 48 hours! Turkish–Saudi relations will then be handled in a wholly different manner. Turkey is not an unlawful passageway!"

 

MCKINSEY CRISIS: Oral Calislar has advice for the opposition in centrist tabloid Posta: "True the 'row' with the West is based on partially legitimate grounds. However, the criteria of human rights and democracy (as formulated by the West) are universal. So is the mathematics of the markets. If distanced from these norms, the people pay the price. Would the opposition not handle the McKinsey [international management consultancy firm] crisis better by posing questions such as 'Why cause tensions in our relations with the West?' 'Why not abide by the universal rules of the economy?"

Ali Sirmen warns of a political crisis to follow the economic crisis in nationalist opposition Cumhuriyet: "There is nothing surprising here. By deepening the political crisis and taking it to a new level, the economic crisis has also finally allowed the will of the ballot box, which has been unprotected until now, to come to the fore. Who can guarantee that mass arrests of opponents accused of treachery will not follow dysfunction at the ballot box? Yes, economic crises never ride alone."

Cevher Ilhan seeks an answer in pro-Islamist opposition Yeni Asya: "The most striking thing was that President Erdogan has ordered the McKinsey deal to be cancelled just nine days after it was announced, as if he had just heard about it. At this point, these questions come to mind: Did the related minister strike a deal with McKinsey in the U.S. without the president's consent? Is this how the new political system going to function, and why did the president wait for nine days to react? These questions, which were lost in the McKinsey jumble, await an answer."

 

LOCAL ELECTIONS: Ihasan Caralan fears for democracy in leftist opposition Evrensel: "Now, in a step further six months ahead of the local elections, the people's will is being mortgaged to the president's declaration that those assigned to manage the municipalities as a result of the votes cast with the free will of the people 'will be removed from office and replaced by appointed administrators'. This threat is directed against the HDP [pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party] but is also primarily a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the CHP [main opposition Republican people's Party] and other opposition parties!"

 

Iran media watch

 

IRAN/U.S. TALKS: Reformist and moderate newspapers featured Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's remarks few days ago that did not rule out talks with the U.S. "Nothing is impossible," Zarif told the BBC 's Lyse Doucet in an interview in New York. Reformist-leaning Sharq, Abrar, Bahar, Mardom Salari, as well as the hardline Afkar published similar front-page headlines alongside prominent photos of Zarif.

 

FATF: The Iranian parliament's approval of a bill on Sunday that aims to facilitate Iran's membership in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) continues to dominate headlines. "First the JCPOA [nuclear deal], now FATF; what is the next excuse?" wrote hardline daily Keyhan, criticizing the government for claiming that signing of the nuclear accord in 2015 and joining FATF will help ease economic woes. Reformist and moderate newspapers widely reported on hardline political figure Khalil Movahedi's confession to orchestrating threatening text messages to MPs from Mashhad, the political hub of hardliners, warning them to vote against FATF-related bills. "You voted? I'll kill you!" read moderate daily Jomleh's large headline.

 

SWIFT: English language Press TV reported an "internal battle" being fought in the U.S. administration to save Iran's access to international financial markets and keep it connected to the SWIFT global payment network ahead of the looming sanctions.

 

SAUDI COLUMNIST'S DISAPPEARANCE: Saudi Columnist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance remains a top topic in Iranian media. State-run broadcast media highlighted that President Trump did not mention the Saudi authorities' role in the case, as he expressed concern over the disappearance. Some Iranian newspapers also continue to discuss the issue. "Bin Salman-style democracy," wrote conservative Siyasat-e Rooz on a blood-spattered picture of Khashoggi. "Bin Flayer," read hardline outlet Vatan-e Emruz's terse headline.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian social media users launched a hashtag yesterday calling for a general anti-regime strike, at least in part in support of the ongoing intermittent strikes by Iranian truck drivers. The hashtag has been used some 45,000 times over the past 24 hours, yet many of the hits on the hashtag seem to be coming from outside the country. Roughly 7,000 accounts have engaged with the trend in some way. Some 91 percent of its reach is owed to Retweets as opposed to original content, the top accounts for which are affiliated with outlawed self-styled opposition group the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MKO). Unverified video clips of closed shops have also circulated widely, claiming to show areas of the country taking part in the strike. One user claimed that "today there have been strikes in 45 cities. Truckers have gone on strike in 318 cities. How many stadiums could all these strikes fill? This is a question that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i has asked himself a few times this morning." Another user, captioning a slideshow of closed shops around the country, posted: "The collapse of the regime is close at hand."

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 9.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Iraq joins the list of Israeli targets

2-Smoldering under the ashes

3-'Chopped meat'

4-Saleh and Barzani at odds

 

1-Iraq joins the list of Israeli targets

 

Those who desire to emerge from the [Syrian] crisis will need to introduce a series of changes across the entire Middle East that begin with the center of the conflict moving from Syria to other countries. And in doing so, these decision-makers will have to take two issues into account: First, that there must be some justification for choosing the new site of the conflict; and, second, that the tactics for withdrawing from it in the future should be more straightforward and less costly [than in the case of Syria]. Washington and its main instrument in the region – Israel – understand that Russia's Middle Eastern policy will become more active and crucial after Moscow's series of strategic steps in Syria, the most recent of which was to deploy the S-300 missile system only days after the Sochi agreement regarding Idlib was announced; all of which sends a message to the world that Washington has become a secondary party to the Syrian dossier, and is not a major active partner to all its various extensions--Mazin Jabbour in Syrian al-Watan

[Israel's leaders have] added Iraq to the list of countries – which includes Iran, Syria, and Lebanon –where they are threatening to strike at the [anti-Israeli] resistance's weapons' sites. From the podium of the UN General Assembly in New York, the occupation entity's PM Binyamin Netanyahu renewed his threats to Iraq, adding the country to the list of Israeli targets. It is no coincidence that this threat overlapped with Russia's decision to deploy the S-300 missile systems and deliver them to the Syrian army. Nor was it a coincidence that this came shortly after Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah's announcement that 'the mission has been accomplished' and that precise missiles are already in the [Hezbollah's] resistance's hands. And this was followed, in turn, by the photographs brandished by Netanyahu, which he claimed were missile sites near Beirut Airport in a performance that was akin to a farce, and that was made a mockery of after the Lebanese Foreign Ministry took foreign ambassadors on a tour of the alleged sites--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

As the Syrian crisis heads towards its end, the Middle East is on the brink of a number of radical strategic changes, maintains a commentator in a pro-regime Damascus daily. Moscow has asserted its role as the main player in Syria, the center of conflict in the region will move towards Iran and the Gulf, the Arab countries are beginning to open up to Damascus, and the U.S. may gradually end its presence in Syria. Iraq has joined Iran, Syria, and Lebanon on Israel's target list in an attempt to prevent qualitative weapons from being transferred from Iran to Hezbollah, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. This follows the deployment of Russian S-300 missile systems in Syria and Israel's fears that a tactical strike in Lebanon could develop into a major war that Israel would be unable to extract itself from.

 

ENTERING AND EXITING THE CRISIS: "Exiting the Syrian crisis will not be as straightforward as getting into it," writes Mazin Jabbour in Tuesday's pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

Those who desire to emerge from the crisis will need to introduce a series of changes across the entire Middle East that begin with the center of the conflict moving from Syria to other countries. And in doing so, these decision-makers will have to take two issues into account: First, that there must be some justification for choosing the new site of the conflict; and, second, that the tactics for withdrawing from it in the future should be more straightforward and less costly [than in the case of Syria].

Washington and its main instrument in the region – Israel – understand that Russia's Middle Eastern policy will become more active and crucial after Moscow's series of strategic steps in Syria, the most recent of which was to deploy the S-300 missile system only days after the Sochi agreement regarding Idlib was announced; all of which sends a message to the world that Washington has become a secondary party to the Syrian dossier, and is not a major active partner to all its various extensions.

Moreover, the U.S. and Israel both realize that deploying the S-300 is no mere act of revenge or retaliation for the loss of the IL-20, but is part of a strategic plan to ensure Russia's security in Syria and Syria's security at the same time. The loss of the IL-20s only speeded up Russia's moves.

There are also two intentional American attempts to aggravate the tension in the Arab Gulf: The announcement of Washington's plans to withdraw two Patriot missile systems from Kuwait, and one each from Jordan and Bahrain, and to return them all to the U.S. on the pretext of improving them. But the missiles' final destination after they have been upgraded has yet to be determined, bearing in mind that that their withdrawal was followed by Washington's provocation of Saudi Arabia, demanding that it pays the cost of U.S. protection for the Saudi regime.

We should also take into consideration the U.S.'s repeated, renewed, and urgent calls on Britain, France, and Germany in particular to contribute more to NATO's defense operations. Berlin has responded by hinting that it may establish strategic military bases in the Middle East, while the public French and British presence in Eastern Syria has been growing recently. These are all indications of the changes that the U.S. is pushing for in the Middle East so as to fill the vacuum it may soon create there.

All of this is consistent with two major changes in the Middle East: First, Syria and its allies' major victories in their war on terrorism; and second, the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. The latter move contributes to the Americans' effort to create a new center for the conflict in the Middle East, which would allow it to withdraw calmly from the Syrian dossier on the pretext of having fulfilled its mission of fighting terrorism there, and turn its attention to the more important and greater Iranian threat by reviving the question of Iran's nuclear program.

The Middle East is entering a phase of strategic transformations to the pace of developments in the Syrian crisis. The first results will be reflected in this crisis itself, and then across the entire region. And signs of these transformations have already begun to loom on the horizon in fact, starting with [last week's] meeting between Deputy-PM and Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem and Bahraini Foreign Minister Khaled bin Ahmad Al Khalifa in the UN's corridors, moving onto the visit to Syria by a Kuwait media delegation headed by a member of the Kuwaiti ruling family that met with President Bashar al-Assad, and the subsequent praise of this visit by the Kuwaiti journalists, and ending with Saudi Arabia's U-turn on Syria, and the positive positions it expressed, that Damascus has welcomed.

But these new Middle Eastern transformations will not end here; they will develop further in the near future and cast their shadows over the Syrian crisis. And the immediate results will take the form of new Arab political and economic steps; the first of which will be Arab initiatives regarding [Syrian] reconstruction, while the second step will be a renewed discussion of Syria's return to the Arab League. Both these results will be proposed over the few remaining months of this year.

The abovementioned developments are all at the Arab level. At the international level, the most important result that the Syrians wish to achieve may be an American withdrawal from Syria, which is achievable gradually and in the short term.

"Finally, all these developments suggest that the Middle East is on the verge of radical changes in its main actors' regional and international alliances," concludes Jabbour.

End…

 

RENEWED THREATS: "More than a month ago, the leaders of the occupation entity [Israel] added Iraq to the list of countries – which includes Iran, Syria, and Lebanon –where they are threatening to strike at the [anti-Israeli] resistance's weapons' sites," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

From the podium of the UN General Assembly in New York, the occupation entity's PM Binyamin Netanyahu renewed his threats to Iraq, adding the country to the list of Israeli targets. It is no coincidence that this threat overlapped with Russia's decision to deploy the S-300 missile systems and deliver them to the Syrian army. Nor was it a coincidence that this came shortly after Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah's announcement that 'the mission has been accomplished' and that precise missiles are already in the [Hezbollah's] resistance's hands. And this was followed, in turn, by the photographs brandished by Netanyahu, which he claimed were missile sites near Beirut Airport in a performance that was akin to a farce, and that was made a mockery of after the Lebanese Foreign Ministry took foreign ambassadors on a tour of the alleged sites.

The occupation state's leaders believe that the time required to fill the gap that the Israeli air force will have to fill as a result of the Russian move in Syria – which has enabled the Syrian army to acquire weapons that tip the balance of power, according to the Russian military – is to be measured in months, not weeks. And this is according to whether readjusting the balance of power will come via mending Russian/Israeli relations and agreeing on new rules of engagement that will grant Israel new margins of maneuver (although this is unlikely), or via operating advanced American warplanes that have been modified to handle the S-300 systems, such as the F-35 (or Stealth) aircraft. For the Americans have said that these warplanes need to be modified before they are ready, and that the occupation army will need months before they can rely on them and test their effectiveness.

There is also consensus among the occupation entity's leaders that the balance of deterrence that determines Israel's relationship with its Northern front with Lebanon is changing, in light of the growth of the resistance's qualitative capabilities, and that Israel is unsure whether this includes air defense systems. These new deterrent measures are sufficient to ensure that any attempt by Israel to stage a tactical operation will turn into a project for a possible war that Israel may be unable to extract itself from. Moreover, there is a consensus among Israel's leaders that the mere admission that the pursuit of the resistance in an attempt to ensure that qualitative weapons' development will be conducted outside Lebanon, amounts to an admission of Israel's growing anxiety when it comes to taking any provocative actions against Lebanon or its resistance since the results cannot be guaranteed.

The occupation entity's leaders are also unanimous that if the occupation army remains in a state of warlike silence for months to come, this would be tantamount to an Israeli defeat in a war that did not take place. Moreover, the occupation army's self-proclaimed deterrent image will be shaken. Furthermore, the period during which the occupation army will remain silent will be one in which the resistance forces will ceaselessly raise their level of readiness and preparedness. Moreover, this would mean that the resistance would be able to develop a more effective infrastructure for the new technically advanced systems that it will acquire. And, of course, resuming the psychological and material war that Israel has been waging on the resistance forces is an Israeli morale need as much as it is a military and logistical one.

In his latest speech, Netanyahu for the first time offered an ambiguous answer to the question regarding the means that Israel may use to prevent the resistance from continuing to raise its level of readiness and to accumulate more qualitative weapons. Contrary to the past when he used to say that his army would continue to pursue Iranian weapons' shipments to Hezbollah via Syria, Netanyahu spoke from the Golan Heights for the first time, and left his threats somewhat general. He said: 'Iran and Hezbollah are ceaselessly attempting to form a force that will operate against us, against the Golan and against the Galilee. We are preventing them from entrenching themselves and we will continue to act with determination to counter attempts to provide Hezbollah with lethal weapons.'

In short, Netanyahu is going along with what the Israeli newspapers have been publishing and paving the way for by speaking of qualitative Iranian weapons crossing into Iraq as the first step to transferring them to Lebanon.

"This is a prelude to an act of aggression that will target the resistance forces in Iraq," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

2-Smoldering under the ashes

 

The lesson to be learned from the Barkan attack is that Israeli repression will only lead to an inevitable explosion and that continued occupation is not the path to coexistence, says Rajab Abu-Siriyyeh in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The attack on the Israeli settlement of Barkan near Nablus sends a strong signal that the fires in the West Bank and Jerusalem are smoldering under the ashes, and that the situation in those areas is akin to the calm before the storm, warns a Palestinian commentator. But Israel's rightwing government seems unable to recognize these signs, which renders an explosion all the more likely.

 

ONE-SIDED LOGIC: "At the time when Gaza was holding the funeral of three martyrs who fell last Friday, three Israeli settlers were falling – two killed and one wounded – in Barkan in the North of the West Bank," notes Rajab Abu-Siriyyeh in Tuesday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This means that the logic that the Israeli government has been pursuing to ensure that the victims who may fall because the door has been slammed shut in the face of political solution would be from one side alone cannot last forever.

The total absence of any moral constraints inside the Israel's political system makes it acceptable for victims to fall on the Palestinian side without batting an eyelid, and without considering for one moment that its soldiers and settlers' deliberate killings of unarmed Palestinian civilians makes them savages. With the passage of time, this will make these soldiers and settlers Israel's own enemies. For the settlers' extremism and the growth of rightwing and extremist tendencies is ensuring that Israel will be an isolated and hated state, even if it seems that many parties are seeking to curry favor with it in the short run. With such savagery, Israel will find itself in a war with the entire world in the long run.

As it their wont, Israel's occupation forces imposed a blockade on the towns of Shuweika and Beit Lid in Tulkarm, with claims that attacker started out from the latter town. And as is their wont, as well, the occupation forces stormed the young man's home in Shuweika as a prelude to destroying it – which is what they do whenever such an attack takes place. But drunk on the ecstasy of power, Israel's security officers do not for one moment consider that dealing with a problem requires addressing its causes first; and that there is no moral logic in punishing those who have nothing to do with planning or carrying out an attack even if they happen to be the assailant's father, mother, brother, or sister. Such action can only be described as collective punishment, which is what Israel has always meted out to the Palestinians anyway.

And because extremist parties have ruled Israel for almost two decades now, reason and prudence have no role in determining its policies, especially as regards its relations with the Palestinian side. Otherwise, it would have thought a thousand times before giving free rein to all forms and modes of provocation, repression, and humiliation against its Palestinian citizens. The result is that it has turned the occupied lands into a tightly sealed and boiling cauldron, and the only result will be an explosion, which is now certain, if not today, then tomorrow.

The truth is that the current 'calm' in the West Bank and Jerusalem is deceptive. A more accurate description would be the 'calm before the storm.' True, Gaza has long displayed a greater readiness to react and perhaps more violently; but one should beware the anger of the forbearing when they lose heir patience. Over the past years, the West Bank and Jerusalem have sent many signals of their anger; but Israel has shown no interest in addressing the causes and confined itself to security measures in which it arrested 2500 Palestinians during the months of August and September alone, and confiscated monies and weapons, of which 80 were locally made.

As long as there is discrimination between human beings, as long as no concern is shown for the lives of human beings living 'here' and excessive concern is shown for human beings living 'there', the coexistence that Israeli President Reuven Rivlin spoke of when he said that the Barkan attack 'harms the possibility of coexistence between the Palestinians and the Israelis' – will remain a risible and false delusion.

Unfortunately, the Palestinians will come to the conviction that the Israelis are uninterested in what happens to them, and only show interest when Israelis fall victim. This has always been their wont and this is how it will remain. It is as if they were saying that the only thing that will force Israel to recognize the Palestinians is when the latter succeed in inflicting victims on Israel.

An entire quarter of a century has passed since the peace negotiations and Oslo Accords were signed calling for a five years interim phase to be followed by a permanent solution that ends the occupation and realizes the Palestinian people's minimal aspirations of establishing an independent state on less than a quarter of historical [pre-1948] Palestine. By insisting on maintaining its occupation, blockading Gaza, closing off Jerusalem, and waging a destructive offensive on the refugees' file, Israel is pushing the situation with great force towards an explosion. It leaves the Palestinians – the truly moderate as well as the hardliners among them – with no option but to head to the battlefield and resist.

The situation on the ground is one of great tension. An explosion is inevitable and is on its way. It is only a matter of time before what Israel does not want ton happen will happen. But it is important to ensure that it is not too late to avoid another bloody chapter between the Palestinians and Israelis.

"It is important for the Israeli government to think in a rational and prudent way, if only for once," concludes Abu-Siriyyeh.

Ends…

 

3-'Chopped meat'

 

What happened to Saudi journalist Khashoggi on the territories of another state is a terrifying instance of the practices of the new Saudi regime, says Ahmad Theban in today's Qatari al-Rayah

 

Riyadh is clearly responsible for Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance, despite the Saudi authorities' non-credible denials, insists a Jordanian commentator in a Qatari daily. This is the sort of behavior that has come to characterize Saudi Arabia under Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

 

A 'TERRORIST CRIME': "I do not know the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi personally," writes Ahmad Theban in Tuesday's Qatari daily al-Rayah.

Everything suggests that he may have been killed inside his country's consulate in Istanbul. But whether he was killed or only kidnapped, this is a 'terrorist' crime that sickens any independent journalist since it targets freedom of expression and the free press everywhere.

What has happened takes us back to the age when police states used carry out assassinations outside their borders, in addition to the repression of any voice that criticizes or opposes the policies of the wali al-amr [ruler of the people] at home.

Khashoggi was not an opposition figure in the literal sense. He did not subscribe to any radical ideology. In fact, he served for many long decades within the Saudi regime's media and diplomatic institutions. The only new thing is that he recently began to 'softly' criticize some of the Kingdom's policies and positions after Mohammad bin Salman became crown-prince.

Moreover, Khashoggi did not rebel against wali al-amr. The most that his writings demanded were gradual and 'gentle' reforms. He was not a 'terrorist' or 'an ISIS man.' Consequently, what happened to him was state terrorism no matter how one may look at it, an act no less heinous than Israel's Mossad's assassinations of Palestinian freedom-fighters outside Palestine, as in the case of leading Hamas figure Mahmoud Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel in 2010.

The Saudi authorities, however, seem to have invented new means of seeking revenge against a Saudi journalist inside its diplomatic consulate in Turkey. According to information leaked from the Turkish security authorities, Khashoggi was detained inside the consulate where he was tortured, killed, and dismembered, after which he was taken to a site outside the consulate – which enjoys diplomatic immunity according to international laws and conventions!

Khashoggi was lured into the consulate to get some documents. What happened was akin to an ambush. Two private planes arrived in Istanbul carrying fifteen Saudis who it later transpired were security men, and who entered the Saudi consulate when he was still inside. They then left Turkey the same day. Nothing has been conclusively proven so far; but the imagined scene of how the liquidation took place according to leaked reports – torture, killing, and dismemberment – recalls ISIS's [2015] burning alive and execution of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh. Moreover, reports suggest Khashoggi's liquidation was videotaped to be used later to intimidate any critical or opposition voice!

The Saudi authorities seemed confused. Their denial that they had committed the crime appears as risible. The Saudi consul in Istanbul says that it has cameras monitoring what happened in and around it, but that they do not record what they see!

Even was more risible was the permission granted to a Reuters correspondent to enter the consulate and photograph parts of it, which resembled a naïve theatrical act. After all, Khashoggi entered the consulate on his feet, as the Turkish security authorities found out. He did not come out, but disappeared – like 'a grain of salt that melted.' He most likely did get out, but in diplomatic briefcases and in the form of 'chopped meat.'

This operation offers new and conclusive proof of the nature of the Saudi regime and the shocking changes in its policies since Mohammad bin Salman became crown prince. The regime's most dangerous acts have had to do with the Yemen war and the blockade on Qatar. Meanwhile, Riyadh raises the slogan of 'reform' and views its permission for women to drive as its greatest 'historic achievements' – a decision that comes tens of years behind the rest of the world.

This is a regime that remains silent and swallows President Trump's repeated insults regarding America's protection, and his repeated demands for it to pay the price of this protection without which it would not survive for two weeks. Even the trade and armament deals it struck with the U.S. to the value of more than $700 billion have proven to be useless in appeasing the U.S. president.

By contrast, the wali al-amr's regime acted like a brave lion against Canada, a peaceful and civilized country. It lost its composure and declared a diplomatic and economic war against it because of the Canadian embassy in Riyadh's Tweet criticizing the Kingdom's violations of human rights after the detention of civil society and women's rights activists. And the irony was that the angry reactions to Canada were themselves human rights violations: Halting air travel between the two countries, ordering Saudi patients receiving medical treatment and students studying there to return and move to other countries, without even consulting them.

What happened to Khashoggi on the territories of another state is a terrifying instance of what could happen to anyone who criticizes Saudi policies, whether Saudi citizens or other nationalities.

"Their lives are all in danger, even if they are only carrying out an 'umra pilgrimage or the regular hajj," concludes Theban.

Ends…

 

4-Saleh and Barzani at odds

 

Barham Saleh's election as Iraqi state president has highlighted the depth of the inter-Kurdish split, and has further jeopardized the Kurds' fading dreams of independence, says Khurshid Dalli on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

The split between the two main Kurdish parties has deepened due to Barham Saleh's election as Iraqi state President, with Mas'ud Barzani's party going as so far to hint that it may boycott Saleh, notes a Syrian Kurdish commentator. The Kurds are now far from achieving their national aspirations, after having failed to exploit changes in the region that were in their favor until recently.

 

DEEPENED SPLIT: "Barham Saleh's election as Iraqi state President has deepened the inter-Kurdish split," notes Khurshid Dalli on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

No sooner was he elected than the two major Kurdish parties, the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) headed by Mas'ud Barzani with Irbil as its headquarters and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) based in Sulaimaniyya, began to level accusations at each other.

The KDP's supporters insist that Saleh's election took place without securing a Kurdish accord, contrary to customary conventions. They believe that the presidency rightfully belongs to their party since it is the largest [Kurdish] parliamentary bloc. As a result, accusations of treason and conspiracy theories were bandied about, linking Saleh's election to what happened to Kirkuk [the Kurds' 2017 withdrawal]. KPD supporters claim that they were betrayed by an agreement between PUK leaders and Baghdad sponsored by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, as a result of which peshmerga forces were withdrawn from the city at midnight without the KDP's knowledge, which led to the loss of Kirkuk and the rest of the disputed areas.

For their part, PUK supporters have had no qualms accusing Barzani's party of monopolizing power in ruling the Iraqi Kurdistan Province. They add that the Iraqi presidency is the PUK's share anyway, according the 2005 agreement between the two parties, which allocates this position to the PUK in return for offering Kurdistan Province's presidency to the KDP. Moreover, they add, the KDP's argument that Mas'ud Barzani resigned Kurdistan Province's presidency after the [2017 independence] referendum's failure is unconvincing, since his powers were automatically transferred to his nephew Nechirvan Barzani, Kurdistan Province's PM – which demonstrates that the KDP's true aim is to consolidate its hold on the Province.

Saleh's election as Iraqi state president has once again highlighted the depth of the inter-Kurdish split. Each side has entrenched itself behind its party-political, local, and clan authorities, asserting that it is the other's peer on the basis of these powers. But the main element that has been absent from the ongoing argument between each side's supporters is an understanding of where the Iraqi presidency stands in the regional and international intersections, polarizations, and conflicts over Iraq.

Amidst all this, the one apparently sure point is that Iranian Saleh's election did not take place in the absence of an Iranian/U.S. accord. The man previously served as the PUK's representative in London and Washington, before returning to Iraq to become Kurdistan Province's PM and President of American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. He then broke off from the PUK, before returning to it on the eve of his election as Iraq's president. At the same time, he has good relations with Iran, which views Barzani as Turkey and the U.S.'s ally and in whose eyes Barham Saleh remains closer to its strategy in Iraq.

But Barzani's frank hints that he may boycott Saleh on the grounds that what happened was illegal, may be the most serious aspect of the inter-Kurdish split. This could aggravate inter-Kurdish divisions in the coming phase, possibly leading to a boycott between the Sulaimaniyya and Irbil administrations, not to say to a clash between them, as has happened before. At the very least, it could transform the Kurdistan Province into two separate de facto administrations.

The inter-Kurdish crisis could also produce closer relations between Sulaimaniyya and Baghdad, and further estrangement between Irbil and Baghdad. All of which would deepen the chronic Kurdish problem – the split that could nip the Kurds' nationalist aspirations and ambitions in the bud, despite the circumstances and changes that have served their cause.

"But this may have become a Kurdish rule that goes beyond Iraq's Kurdistan Province to affect the other Kurdish areas in the region," concludes Dalli.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 9.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Hamas plan

 

Seven Palestinians were arrested in the West Bank early Tuesday as the manhunt for the shooter in the deadly Barkan Industrial Park attack entered its third day, the IDF said. Overnight, Israeli security forces continued operations in the village of Shuweika, near Tulkarem, the home of Ashraf Na'alweh, 23, who is suspected of killing his coworkers Kim Levengrond Yehezkel, 28, and Ziv Hajbi, 35, and wounding Sara Vaturi, 54, using a locally produced Carlo-style submachine gun. Na'alweh's mother and sisters were detained and brought in for questioning in the pre-dawn raid, but were later released, according to the Shin Bet. After carrying out the shooting, the suspect fled the scene, prompting a large-scale search of the area and a deployment of additional troops to the West Bank to prevent copycat attacks, the army said. No details were provided by authorities Tuesday morning on the progress of the manhunt for Na'alweh. Officials reportedly believe that Na'alweh, who is said to have left a suicide note before the attack, is preparing to engage troops who close in on him in a firefight that could turn deadly.

Meanwhile, Palestinian Authority security forces have been helping Israel in its search for the suspect, a Palestinian security official confirmed. "We are helping the Israeli side locate him," a Palestinian security official told The Times of Israel, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "The main way we are helping is in providing them with information." Ynet had reported on Sunday that PA security forces were participating in efforts to find Na'alweh. The Palestinian security official said the PA has been helping Israel because it "does not support violent acts and wants to maintain security and stability" in the West Bank. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the branch of the Defense Ministry responsible for liaising with the Palestinians, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The PA has been heavily criticized by Palestinians for cooperating with Israel on security. Polls have shown that a majority of Palestinians support an end to security cooperation between the PA and Israel. Sixty-eight percent of Palestinians said they support the Palestinian Central Council's decision to end security coordination with Israel, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in September found.

The chase makes the front page of all three major Hebrew-language newspapers. Yedioth Ahronoth (front page headline "turning over every stone") reports that Na'alweh is armed and dangerous, and says the hunt is "unprecedented." "The IDF and the Shin Bet estimate that his capture is only a matter of time, given that he cannot survive for long on the run and as far as is known he did not plan ahead of time to escape the attack alive," the paper reports. Israel Hayom's top story focuses on an even more heartbreaking search under the headline "Kai is looking for Mommy," referring to the 16-month-old son of Kim Yehezkel, one of the Barkan attack victims. "Kai does not understand, he is looking for his mother and we do not know what to tell him," Yehezkel's older brother Schachar tells the paper. In a separate operation in the village of Beit Sira near Ramallah in pursuit of a terror financing ring, IDF troops overnight uncovered thousands of shekels in cash that the army said were meant to fund "terror networks" in the West Bank.

Gaza is continuing to heat up, with Monday night seeing a large protest that included several Palestinians busting across the border fence and setting an IDF post alight. While Palestinians occasionally sneak across the border, this incident was of a more riotous nature, and was captured on video, garnering fairly major coverage and sparking a fair amount of hand-wringing. "How much is Israel deterred from acting against Hamas," Noam Amir, military correspondent for the right-wing Channel 20, asks on Twitter, sharing the video. "In the past something like this would have ended with a significant attack on Hamas. There is no response, and no media coverage." Walla correspondent Amir Buhbot writes that "the videos will encourage more terror." Monday night also saw a fairly large fire started in a nature reserve near the Gaza border from a suspected balloon launched by Palestinians.

In breaking news by Haaretz, diesel fuel funded by Qatar has begun arriving in the Gaza Strip though the Keren Shalom border crossing with Israel on Tuesday, Palestinian sources in Gaza reported. According to the reports, two trucks carrying a total of 35,000 liters (9,200 gallons) of fuel arrived at the border crossing in the company of United Nations vehicles. Israel confirmed the delivery of several diesel drums through the Kerem Shalon crossing. It is not clear whether the supply of the fuel is being provided with the approval of the Palestinian Authority, which was ousted from Gaza by Hamas in 2007. Despite the Israeli security establishment warning against moving forward without 'Abbas's involvement, it supported the fuel transfer. This was in light of the humanitarian condition in Gaza, which was deemed too fragile to risk, with diesel fuel being essential to power vital to infrastructures and electricity.

On Tuesday, the Qatari-sponsored London daily al-Arabi al-Jadeed reported that Egyptian intelligence chief 'Abbas Kamel will visit Tel Aviv, Ramallah and Amman in the coming days as part of a tour meant to promote a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Kamel is set to meet Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas, the report said, and convey a conclusive message from Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi that he must cooperate with efforts to move towards calm and rehabilitation in the Gaza Strip, as well as advancing a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Otherwise Egypt will withdraw as mediator and sponsor of the negotiations and will work exclusively with Hamas as sovereign of Gaza, and the one responsible for the Strip's border with Sinai. It was also reported that Kamel will present 'Abbas with the terms consolidated with Hamas leadership during their visit to Cairo last week. He will also ask for Jordan to support Egypt's efforts, as Amman still back 'Abbas' stance. 'Abbas opposes any concessions or assistance to the Strip without the supervision and cooperation of the PA, which he stipulates on Hamas relinquishing control of Gaza.

Elsewhere, Russia provided the advanced S-300 air defense system to Syria's military free of charge, transferring three battalions with eight launchers each to the Assad regime, Russia's state news agency TASS reported Monday. "On October 1, three battalion sets of S-300PM systems of eight launchers each were delivered to Syria," a military source told the agency. "These systems were previously deployed at one of the Russian aerospace forces' regiments which now uses the S-400 Triumf systems. The S-300 systems underwent capital repairs at Russian defense enterprises, are in good condition and are capable of performing combat tasks," he said. The source added that the systems were provided free of charge, along with 100 surface-to-air guided missiles for each battalion, 300 in all.

Another story dominating the Israeli press this morning is a New York Times report detailing Israeli firm Psy-Group's offer to employ dirty tricks for Trump's presidential campaign. Though it appears the proposal was never accepted, the story sheds a bit of light on a shady Israeli industry, as well as on the kind of tactics the Trump campaign was considering. While some Israeli stories focus on the social media campaign, most lead with the spying allegations. "Is there an Israeli firm that spied for Trump?" reads a headline on Hadashot's website.

Haaretz reports that Hebrew University's senate is asking to join an appeal by American student Lara Alqasem, who is seeking to be allowed into the country to study, despite claims by the government that she supports the BDS movement. The university is "a place for the exchange of ideas and the acquisition and creation of knowledge. It is a place that does not shrink from disagreement and is pleased with a multiplicity of opinions. Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan's decision not to allow the student into the country merely because of her opinions constitutes a threat to what the university represents," the paper quotes a statement from the senate. Erdan responded by calling it "another politicization of Israeli academia for the sake of someone who actively works to harm the State and its citizens."

Finally, a day after a report by the world's top climate experts warned that the earth is doomed without drastic action now, the Israeli press finally takes a bit of note, though not much. Yedioth Ahronoth reports that Israeli climate experts say the country will not be immune from the changes and may even feel it more than other places. "Israel is on the coast and on the edge of the desert. Any scenario with a rise in sea level will influence us greatly," expert Aryeh Wenger says. Alon Tal, another expert, says that many changes are already here: "According to the models we can expect the winter to shorten by two months. That is a worrying forecast and we can already start to feel it. Where is the fall? Every year, the rains are delayed. It is becoming chronic." Meanwhile, Tal will be happy to know that Tuesday is expected to see a drop in temperatures and yes, even some of that sweet rain. "Where did you put the umbrella? The weather will finally line up with the season," reads a headline on the Walla website. The site notes, though, that the rain will be scattered, and quite light.

 

 

ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO BAR LARA ALQASEM'S ENTRY: Yoaz Hendel in Yedioth Ahronoth states that Alqasem lied to get a visa. In Europe and the U.S., she would be deported immediately, without being allowed to hold a media festival while in detention.

"Israel is the world's largest tourist site for human rights activists. The only experimental laboratory where one can enjoy Western conditions and democratic freedom, while protesting against the government. Human rights activists cannot arrive in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, China, Thailand, and even Moscow and feel safe. Here they can. Drink beer at night in Tel Aviv, in the morning demonstrate at a checkpoint against IDF soldiers.

It is not clear how the undesirable romance with Lara Alqasem will end. She is an American student, a boycott activist who wishes to enter the country. One of the options raised last night is to allow her to enter if she declares that she opposes boycotts of Israel and will not act against the security forces. The second option is to deport her after the petitions against her deportation are rejected.

It does not matter where Alqasem finds herself in a week. What does matter is the recurrent double standards when dealing with Israeli interests. To illustrate the house of cards that was built around Alqasem, imagine an Israeli student who heads an organization that calls for boycotting the United States or demonstrates against its representatives in Israel for several months. He comes to the American embassy to obtain a visa, hides this detail and receives a tourist visa. And then, when he arrives in the United States, it is discovered. What will the American authorities do? There is not one reader who does not know the answer.

The United States, Alqasem's homeland, prevents the entry of thousands of Israelis due to criminal records, tax offenses, lies detected in obtaining a visa, unusual political activity or any suspicion relating to state security. Even former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was recently denied entry because he visited countries that support terrorism (a regulation from the days of Obama). Maccabi Haifa basketball player Roman Sorkin was forced to return to Israel immediately after landing in the United States with his team because American border police felt there was a problem with his visa. A woman who went jogging in Canada and accidentally crossed the border to the United States was arrested for two weeks. All these cases occurred just in the past two months. For years the U.S. and European countries have at times denied entry to their territory only because they do not like the look of a certain person or because he was born in the wrong place.

Israel erred in choosing a free policy until the enactment of the law prohibiting boycott activists from entering Israel. Anyone who harms the security or economy of the State of Israel has no business receiving an entry permit. It is worth refuting the lies being told since Lara Alqasem arrived here. We are dealing with a student who at the University of Florida was president of an organization called Students for Justice in Palestine; one of about 20 organizations that are barred from entering Israel. Alqasem lied when she concealed this fact during the process of obtaining a visa. This would have been enough to deny her entry into half the countries of Europe and the U.S. She lied or 'changed versions' between border control and the beginning of her court hearing. She erased her Twitter and Facebook accounts from her rough airport 'detention cell'. By the way, her supporters are lying when they state she is being detained here. Making up a fake story. At any given moment she can board a plane back to the U.S., at the expense of the airline.

The difference between Israel and the U.S. is that there they would not have allowed her to hold such a festival at an airport detention facility. The expulsion would have taken place immediately. And by the way, anyone expelled from the U.S. is granted the right to appeal – from home. To express 'remorse' or ask for forgiveness. A Waiver Request. It takes time, a lot of paperwork. Sometimes it works, sometimes not, but it is never done in the midst of a media festival.

Make no mistake: The argument is about a principle. Is it permissible for Israel, like all nations, to prevent entry into its territory? Yes, even to someone who received a visa by mistake, or through submitting misleading data. Is it permissible to prevent entry to anyone who calls for harming the state's economy or diplomatic standing, and not only its security status; or who is active in an organization that is defined in some of the lists as anti-Semitic? Lara Alqasem is only the allegory. The moral is the refusal to see Israel as a country that has the right to refuse."

Ends…

 

RUSSIA AND IRAN STRATEGIC ALLIES: Eyal Zisser in Israel Hayom argues that Putin and Netanyahu's upcoming meeting is crucial for future relations. Israel must remember that Iran and Russia have a mutual opponent – Israel's staunchest supporter, the U.S.

"Prime Minister Netanyahu's upcoming meeting with President Vladimir Putin, which was announced at the last cabinet meeting, will be one of the most important meetings the two have held in recent years. On the agenda will be not only the question of ensuring Israel's continued freedom of action in Syria, but also the future of relations between the two countries after getting embroiled in a deep crisis following the downing of the Russian aircraft by Syrian air defenses.

Reports of the meeting in the Arab press added that Russia offered to mediate between Israel and Iran in order to reduce the tension between the two foes, and perhaps reach understandings and draw red lines regarding Iranian activity in Syria. In so doing, it would be possible to prevent the outbreak of an Israeli-Iranian confrontation, which many consider inevitable and only a matter of time.

It is possible that Moscow has concluded it is satisfied with the punitive measures it imposed on Israel – the reproaching tone and more importantly the delivery of S-300 missiles to Syrian aerial defenses, which are expected to reduce the scope of Israeli action in Syria's skies. Netanyahu and Putin will therefore meet as old friends, but it is important for Israel to learn lessons from the incident and from what transpired after it. The incident was only an excuse for the Russians and a catalyst for implementing steps they intended to take in any case, with the war in Syria nearing its end – both the imposition of restrictions on the Israel air force's freedom of flight and the supply of advanced weapons to the Syrians.

Israel-Russia relations, with the establishment of the state, began with a 'wonderful friendship'. Russia, and not the United States, stood by the recently born country and supplied it with weapons, even if not directly, but through Czechoslovakia. It also permitted the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews from Eastern European countries who were under its control. Russia, or rather, the Soviet Union, did so not for 'the love of Mordecai', but from hatred of Britain and its allies in the Arab world.

But the Soviet Union quickly changed its course. Israel refused to become a Soviet satellite, as the Russians had hoped, while in Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria, revolutionary regimes of anti-Western army officers rose. They sought weapons, and the USSR hastened to provide them. Russian weapons helped the Soviet Union gain a stronghold in the Arab world, but contributed to the escalation of tensions between Israel and the Arabs, and eventually led the region to war. That is what happened in 1956, and again in 1967. The inevitable result was the deterioration of relations between Jerusalem and Moscow, until they reached complete disengagement in 1967.

Although the Russian president does not hide his desire to make his country great again, like in the glory days that it knew as a world power, Putin's Russia is not the Soviet Union, certainly as far as Israel is concerned. But many things have remained the same in Moscow. First, the blazing hostility of the political and military bureaucracy toward the West and the U.S. Israel, whether she likes it or not, is perceived in Moscow as part of the Western bloc. Second, the recognition that the sale of advanced weapons was and remains a winning card in the hands of the Russians in their attempts to expand their influence in the world and particularly in the Middle East.

Israel is indeed a country with which Moscow maintains friendly relations, but Iran is the strategic ally with which the Russians are trying to return to the Middle East. Moreover, Iran and Russia have a common foe – the United States. The Israeli interest is to restore the understandings with Moscow, and, more importantly, the friendly relations. At the same time, it is important to understand the challenge that Israel will be faced with again in the future with the Russian. In contrast to Israel's relations with the United States, which are based on the firm support of American public opinion alongside a system of checks between the administration and Congress, ensuring against unexpected fluctuations; in Russia everything begins and ends with the Kremlin."

Ends…

 

THE PA CONTINUES TO NURTURE INCITEMENT: Nadav Haetzni in Maariv contends that as long as the PA educates kids in Palestinian kindergartens and schools that Jews are the descendants of Monkeys and Pigs and have no right to live in Barkan and Tel Aviv, terror will continue to strike.

"The Barkan industrial zone is further proof of the folly of conventional wisdom in our political discourse. Barkan is a clear-cut part of the settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria, deliberately established by the first settlers in Samaria in order to entrench and strengthen the settlements and also to prove that the Jewish return to our homeland is good, among other things, for the Arabs.

This industrial zone and the Jewish settlement blocs scattered around it have every possible virtue. From the point of view of the factories themselves, the location is as central as it gets: A 15-minute drive on the highway from Rosh Ha'ayin, close to the center of the Dan region and accessible to the main traffic arteries. For both Jews and Arabs a clear win-win situation has been created here. For the factories it is a paradise of working hands, with the manpower shortage in many places in Israel not felt here.

The benefits for the Arabs are endless. They do not need entry permits into the Green Line and many of them live in the vicinity. There is no need to get up in the middle of the night and travel to distant places. Such availability of livelihood in the corrupt and failed PA is a daydream. Thousands of Arab families live in dignity only because of the Zionist factories that work here.

The Shomron Regional Council and the Samaria Development Corporation also operate from Barkan and see that communal life is good. Reality also shatters what are considered the accepted views of the Israeli right. That is why Yossi Dagan, head of the Samaria Regional Council, promised after the attack that coexistence in Barkan would continue.

Although according to the law in Judea and Samaria it is permissible in certain circumstances to pay Arabs reduced salaries, under Jordanian law, this is not customary at the Barkan factories, as testified by the owners of the Alon Metal factory, where the double murder was carried out on Sunday. Arab workers receive wages and conditions like the Jews, without discrimination. This attitude and its consequences are the norm in other factories in Barkan; it also radiates on the Arab workers, their family members and their surroundings.

The settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria crushes the thought conventions of right and left. The settlements – in Barkan, as in the Gush Etzion junction and in all the employment and commercial centers of Judea and Samaria, have real coexistence. It is not for nothing that the communal life in Barkan is in the sights of various BDS activists.

It is hard to say that it will ever be possible to completely prevent the terrorist acts of lone-wolves such as the terrorist Ashraf Na'alweh, or the terrorist from the Gush Etzion junction two weeks ago. One can only prove that the more Jews there are in Judea and Samaria, and the more they head projects like the Barkan industrial zone, the more hostility will die down. There will be more reasons for Arab society to weed out the murderous weeds that grow within it. But that is not enough.

As long as there exists on the ground an entity that educates the children of the Palestinian kindergartens and schools that we are descendants of monkeys and pigs and have no right to live in Barkan and Tel Aviv, terror will continue and intensify. The Israeli political and security establishment understands that the Arabs must be given incentives to live with us, and that stupid collective punishments should not be applied. But, for some reason, it continues to cultivate the well of incitement that constantly ignites the ever-present terror against our very existence – the Palestinian Authority. Anyone who wants to complete Barkan's coexistence project must, in the same breath, put an end to the entity that murderously and perpetually attempts to undermine it."

Ends…

 

MOUNTING DANGER TO GAZA ENVELOPE SETTLEMENTS: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 believes Hamas is planning a limited military action in which it will gain control of a number of Israeli settlements and take hostages, in order to break the current deadlock.

"For the past six months, since Land Day on March 30, the communities in the Gaza envelope have been suffering from Hamas' terror by balloons and incendiary kites that have burned large areas of agricultural crops and natural groves. This is in addition to concerns about Hamas' tunnels to penetrate into the settlements and the launching of rockets and mortar shells.

In the past two weeks, Hamas has intensified the level of violence following the impasse in negotiations with Israel and reconciliation talks with Fatah. Every Friday, about 20,000 demonstrators were sent to the border fence. They threw dozens of explosive devices and grenades at IDF soldiers and there has been a significant increase in the launching of incendiary balloons and kites, including balloons carrying explosive charges.

On September 28, Hamas' 'Unit for Nighttime Attrition' published a video in which it called on residents of the Gaza vicinity communities to evacuate their homes every day at 8 PM and return to them only after the unit decides to allow it. The video also said that the unit was planning to throw stink bombs containing toxic substances to spray fields and trees in Israeli territory. The video promised that the unit would launch balloons daily, with shock grenades attached, at the communities surrounding the Gaza Strip.

What is even more worrying is the tendency of the terrorist organizations headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to intensify their attacks on the communities surrounding the Gaza Strip until their future occupation. The manifest expression to make the lives of the residents of the Gaza envelope insufferable, as a counterbalance to the miserable situation of the Strip, was given by the new leader of Islamic Jihad, Ziad Nakhala, in his inaugural speech on October 5, his first since he was elected head of the organization. Nakhala said the following: 'Death is life for our people and for our children; surrender is death. The resistance must take responsibility for this, it has the ability to turn the Gaza envelope and the settlements into a place not worth living in'.

Khaled al-Batsh, a senior Islamic Jihad official and head of the Supreme Command of the March of Return, repeated this in a speech in Gaza on October 5: 'We will not pay the price of the crippling siege imposed on the Strip alone – the enemy is the one who will pay it, the settlers in the Gaza envelope are the ones who will pay'.

Sources in Hamas openly say that the organization's military wing is planning a 'big surprise' for Israel in the Gaza vicinity. According to them, Yahiya as-Sinwar and Muhammad Deif, heads of the organization's military wing, have for several months been planning a surprise attack on the Gaza perimeter communities, during which the elite forces of the military wing will penetrate into Israel through tunnels that have not yet been detected by the IDF; they will occupy settlements and abduct civilians and soldiers through the tunnels into Gaza. The operation will be carried out through a deceptive maneuver in which dozens of military wing operatives will infiltrate Israeli territory on the ground, through the border fence, as a decoy to distract the attention of IDF soldiers.

This is a bold plan meant to blackmail Israel by taking dozens of hostages and forcing it to immediately lift the siege on Gaza. According to Hamas sources, the activists of the nightly attrition unit are acclimatizing the IDF soldiers to their presence on the border fence on a permanent basis, and at the appropriate time they will breach the security fence and smuggle dozens of operatives from the military wing into Israeli territory, in parallel to the penetration through the tunnels.

An open expression of Hamas' operational plan was given by the Gazan political commentator Faiz Abu Shammaleh, who is close to the Hamas leadership. In an interview with a television channel in Gaza on September 16, he warned that if the blockade was not lifted, the Strip would be in a general confrontation with Israel, which would include launching rockets at Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport. He said that the highlight of this military confrontation would be the occupation of 'settlements' in the Gaza envelope and the taking of hostages. 'It will be a surprise for the Israelis and the Israeli army will have to admit that Gaza has changed the equation; the lands of the settlements will be returned to the Palestinians,' Abu Shammaleh bragged.

The Israeli defense establishment is well aware of this plan and is preparing for it. This is one reason why last week Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot ordered large reinforcements to the Gaza perimeter zone. The security cabinet also discussed Hamas' attack intentions and the possibility of evacuating some 30,000 civilians from the communities surrounding the Strip, if need be, in order to remove them from the line of fire. The longer the deadlock continues, the greater the danger that Hamas will carry out its plan in an attempt to break the impasse and gain important bargaining chips with Israel.

Sources in Hamas estimate that if their plan to kidnap civilians and soldiers from the Gaza vicinity communities succeeds, Israel will embark on a major military operation, as it did in the second Lebanon war in 2006 after Hezbollah kidnapped the soldiers Regev and Goldwasser near the Lebanese border. But ultimately Israel will be forced to capitulate and lift the siege of Gaza and release security prisoners in exchange for the release of the Israeli hostages, so Hamas' victory is guaranteed.

It is important at this time to increase vigilance on the border of the Gaza Strip and intelligence monitoring, to identify the intentions of Hamas before it can carry out the plans it has prepared for the communities surrounding the Strip."

Ends…

 

CLOSING UNRWA IN EAST JERUSALEM: Nir Hasson in Haaretz explains plans to shut down all UNRWA activities would force Jerusalem to take responsibility for all Palestinians living in the city when it can barely provide necessary services to its Palestinian residents.

"Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat has announced a plan to shut the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in East Jerusalem. The agency cast doubt on the legality of such a step in light of Israeli agreements with the United Nations, as doubt also arose whether Barkat can carry out such a step just two months before he leaves office.

If not for the plan's show of force and the mayor's blatant hostility toward the city's Palestinian residents, Barkat's desire to take responsibility for the city's refugee camp residents might be welcomed.

The plan to shut UNRWA was published on Channel 2's Thursday night news edition. Barkat gave an interview as he stood next to UNRWA's warehouses on Ammunition Hill. For understandable reasons he did not give an interview next to UNRWA's main Jerusalem activity center, in the Shuafat refugee camp. The camp, located on the opposite side of a separation barrier, is barely recognized by the city as a neighborhood and the city hardly provides it with any services. It is UNRWA that steps in to provide the camp with education, health and welfare services.

The plan calls for the city, in cooperation with the government, to shut down all UNRWA activities in the city, including its schools – which would involve absorbing their 1,800 pupils into city schools. Mother/child medical services would also be shut down as well as the clinics run by UNRWA, and the buildings where these services operate would be seized. The municipality will seek to take responsibility for welfare services, and to collect the garbage and take care of cleaning up the refugee camp, instead of UNRWA. The plan calls for the city, in cooperation with the government, to shut the UNRWA offices on Ammunition Hill, 'as an illegal organization operating to advance terrorism and incitement,' a statement says. The city's plan to take responsibility for all the Palestinians living in the city, including refugees, might in other circumstances be welcomed, but even with UNRWA in place, the municipality barely supplies the necessary services to its Palestinian residents. The plan calls for the city to increase the number of classrooms available for residents of East Jerusalem, where there is already a shortage in early childcare clinics as well as welfare and sanitation services.

'Instead of establishing infrastructure where needed, Barkat wants to take over existing infrastructure,' says Nisreen Elayan, an attorney who recently worked with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and is knowledgeable about UNRWA's activities in East Jerusalem. 'We are fighting for years with the city to open more mother-child centers in East Jerusalem and it has not done so. So now they are going to take over the good clinics run by UNRWA,' she said.

The city's statement is entitled 'the end of the refugee lie.' Barkat says that the Trump administration's decision to sharply cut UNRWA's budget opens a window of opportunity to force the agency out of Jerusalem. 'Barkat's decision aims to blow up the lie of the Palestinian refugee problem, which is part of the Palestinian Authority's propaganda under UN sponsorship and encouragement, which aims to destroy Israel by eternalizing refugee status and the perpetual call for the right of return to Israel,' the city's statement says. That the city does not regard Shuafat refugee camp as a part of Israel to where the refugees seek to return exposes the truth about the municipality's view of Jerusalem's Palestinian neighborhoods.

Chris Gunness, spokesman for UNRWA, said the agency is worried by Barkat's statement and that UNRWA operates on the basis of agreements still valid between the UN and Israel and General Assembly resolutions. 'The statement (by Barkat) challenges the independent humanitarian, non-discriminatory actions by UNRWA and does not reflect the traditionally positive dialogue between UNRWA and Israel,' he said.

The plan was welcomed by candidates running in the mayoral election, including Ze'ev Elkin who did not notice that it contradicts his plan to separate the neighborhoods beyond the separation fence from the city of Jerusalem. Arieh King, Barkat's rival on the right, said the mayor has published grandiose plans for a 'King's park' in Silwan, and the destruction of dozens of houses in Kafr Aqeb, which were never implemented. 'These are plans for propaganda purposes only,' King said on Twitter.

Attorney Danny Seidemann, an expert on Jerusalem affairs, doubts the plan is legal. 'Barkat can make UNRWA's life difficult but he cannot shut it down. This is a positive influence that does not disturb anyone and supplies good services that the city is not capable of supplying. How can the mayor of Jerusalem declare war on a recognized international establishment that does no damage and is helpful? It is all about theater, pure McCarthyism for the sake of Likud primaries,' Seidemann said."

Ends…

 

ENOUGH GRANDSTANDING ON KHAN AL-AHMAR: Defense minister Avigdor Lieberman in The Jerusalem Post argues Khan al-Ahmar is a cluster of makeshift shacks erected illegally by members of the Jahalin Abu-Dahuk Bedouin tribe, which houses some 28 families, comprising about 135 people. Removing it is the right and moral thing to do.

"Once again, the usual international chorus against Israel is flaring up, this time due to an Israeli government decision to implement a judicial ruling for the relocation of a small group of squatters from Khan al-Ahmar, a compound built illegally near Jerusalem. If the matter did not concern the rule of law and the well-being of these people themselves, it could be written off as just another instance of Palestinian and international cynicism. But someone needs to speak up for common sense and reason.

Khan al-Ahmar is a cluster of makeshift shacks erected illegally by members of the Jahalin Abu-Dahuk Bedouin tribe, which houses some 28 families, comprising about 135 people. The compound is situated precariously close to the adjacent highway, presenting an imminent safety hazard to its residents. In particular, the proximity of its makeshift school to the road poses an ongoing threat to the children who attend it. Like other illegal compounds built in a haphazard sprawl, with no basic infrastructure or planning, the living conditions are poor, the health risks many and the future bleak.

The predicament of the residents is actually part of a much broader challenge in ensuring 21st-century health and living standards and infrastructure for nomadic communities, which typically need to be relocated to areas where such infrastructure can be provided reliably and feasibly. This is the case elsewhere in the world where governments must address the needs of such communities. To this end, for many years Israel has engaged in prolonged contact with the residents of Khan al-Ahmar to achieve agreed-upon solutions for their relocation to a nearby area, where their basic needs can be adequately met. This would include the free allocation of generous plots of land, provision of a proper water supply and sewage infrastructure, proper telecommunications and safe electrical connectivity, and the construction of a school.

Unfortunately, swept up in the irresponsibility of a cynical Palestinian leadership, which has seized upon the issue as a gold mine for vilifying Israel, the residents have thus far refused. In doing so, they continue to expose themselves and their children to serious health and safety hazards, preferring continued destitution to achieving a genuine improvement in their situation. European and other countries that have come out against Israel on the matter are doing the residents of Khan al-Ahmar no favor.

As has become too common when it comes to Israel, we again hear tired claims of illegality. Israel's High Court of Justice only recently ruled on the legality of the relocation, after a lengthy legal process in which the residents petitioned the Court. Despite the issue' urgency, successive Israeli governments, in meticulous respect of due process and separation of powers, were blocked for years from implementing governmental policy. This is the very same court that is broadly praised when it comes to relocating Jewish residents from their homes.

As to those who would question the integrity of Israel's judiciary, few accusations are more spurious or more easily refuted. Numerous respected international measures of judicial independence have consistently ranked Israel's judiciary among the most independent in the world, including in comparison to many liberal democracies.

Thus, Israel's fiercely independent and highly respected High Court needs no lectures on jurisprudence from other countries, neither with regard to international law nor otherwise. I can imagine the uproar that would occur if Israel were to similarly question the probity of other countries' internal judicial processes.

Some have argued that relocating the residents to proper homes several kilometers to the West will somehow preclude an eventual political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is high time we replace theatrics with sensible discourse. In this regard, the idea that moving a small group of people within a several kilometer radius will prevent a resolution to such a complex historical conflict is absurd, to say the least. Does Israel need to heed such cynical grandstanding? Do these people really need to pay with their health and lives and futures for it? Not on my watch.

The Israeli government will continue to pursue a real, practical solution to the plight of these people, far too long exploited by an irresponsible Palestinian leadership and its misguided supporters around the world.

As always, the Israeli government will do so while abiding scrupulously by the law and while balancing the different interests at stake, including the genuine needs of the residents themselves. It is the legal thing to do. It is the moral thing to do. And despite the same old international clamor against Israel, it is the right thing to do."

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 8.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KHASHOGGI CASE: Ibrahim Karagul identifies the killers of Saudi opposition journalist Jamal Khashoggi in pro-government Yeni Safak: "The team and mentality that poisoned the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat to death is also behind the Khashoggi murder. Killers such as [former Fatah Gaza leader] Mohammed Dahlan are lingering backstage. The Dahlan team studied Turkey a year before THE July 2016 coup attempt too! Although a journalist in opposition to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has been killed, the event bears Abu Dhabi Crown-Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed's signature. He is Bin Salman's patron. And U.S.-Israel intelligence is the patron of both of them."

Kurtulus Tayiz expects Riyadh to pay a high price in pro-government Aksam: "Saudi Arabia is about to face a period of headaches. A big crisis could break out between Ankara and Riyadh. The horrible 'elimination' of a journalist who is also a U.S. citizen could also bring about Crown-Prince Bin Salman's end because this issue does not concern Ankara alone. The U.S. and Britain have said they are investigating Khashoggi's fate very closely. So the cost of this as yet unidentified killing could be very high for the Saudis."

 

BRUNSON CASE: Abdulkadir Selvi hopes for an early resolution of the Brunson case in center-right Hurriyet: "There is a widespread public expectation that jailed U.S. pastor Andrew Brunson will soon be released. The markets are reacting positively to the pastor's case. I have no idea what will happen, of course. But if Brunson is released as expected, the political leg of the crisis that began on August 10th will be resolved. I believe Brunson's trial will be concluded and he will be convicted, but released based on the time he has already spent in jail."

Can Atakli questions the judiciary's independence in opposition Korkusuz: "The Constitutional Court may rule in favor of Brunson's release, freeing the local court from the trouble of doing so. All this is occurring right before our very eyes. Our so-called independent judiciary is in a test with the U.S. Once again, we will see whether the judiciary really independent or whether it will bow to U.S. demands. When I look at what pro-government pens have been writing in recent days, I predict that judicial independence will remain hanging in the air."

 

THE ECONOMY: Aziz Ferman finds deeper causes for the economic crisis in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "AKP and MHP [ruling Justice and Development Party and Nationalist Movement Party] spokespersons have brought polemics into the arrest of a U.S. citizen [Brunson] and framed our problems with the U.S as an 'economic attack'. But U.S. sanctions are not the cause of the rapid depreciation in the Turkish Lira and currency rates are not the only aspect of the crisis. In fact, the fluctuation in currency rates is simply the end result of a broader crisis."

Guven Gurkan Oztan claims that the president abuses his friends and allies in left-wing opposition Birgun: "President Erdogan has realized that the cost of the government's deal with the international consultancy firm McKinsey would be greater than its benefits. He has therefore rapidly changed course. Now, all those who deemed that the assignment of an international administrator to oversee the economy was in compliance with 'national and local' politics, thereby singing the praises of the son-in-law [Treasury and Finance Minister Berat Albayrak], have lost their bearings. Columnists Ertugrul Ozkok and Hilal Kaplan, as well as MHP chairman Devlet Bahceli who loyally defended the McKinsey agreement, are now at a loss. But most important is the fact that Erdogan can so easily use and dispose of even those who are closest to him, while arbitrarily manipulating clashes between sovereign powers. And he has turned this order into a 'regime.'"

 

Iran media watch

 

ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTION: Today's papers almost universally lead with yesterday's parliamentary vote in favor of a bill to join the convention on Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), part of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Reformist dailies welcomed the step by the Majlis. Arman highlighted the "worldwide praise for Parliament's vote". Aftab-e Yazd called the bill's passage a "victory of reason over chaos". Both ran photos of the unrest over the bill on the Majlis floor. Conservative newspapers continued to attack the bill and the administration over the vote, with Javan saying that while "the Majlis approved the FATF, the government offered no assurances" of a better economic situation after its passage. Hardline Keyhan struck out against the secret ballot taken for the vote, called it a "vote in the dark" and asked, "Why are those in favor of the CFT afraid to reveal their names?"

 

ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS: Rolling news channel IRINN leads with particle pollution in Southeastern parts of the country. The pollution sent many residents in Kerman Province to hospital and disrupted traffic. Pollution also caused the closure of schools in Hirmand, Sistan-Baluchestan Province. Channel One's leading report was about floods in Northern Mazanadaran Province, which damaged the infrastructure of 276 villages.

 

SAUDI JOURNALIST'S DISAPPEARANCE: Several newspapers addressed the ongoing mystery of the disappearance and rumored death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Reformist Etemad sardonically referred to Khashoggi's fate as "reforms, bin Salman style", referring to Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Hamdeli addressed the affair, asking whether it was a "crime at the consulate", referring to Khashoggi's last sighting, when he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. English-language Press TV reported the UN's call for an "independent" and "international" probe into his disappearance.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: A group of online users have criticized the "brutality" of the Saudi royal family under both English and Persian hashtags. A pro-regime analyst called on the BBC Hard Talk program to "rebroadcast" its interview with Khashoggi "so that people can better understand the magnitude of Mohammad bin Salman's crime". An Iranian journalist in an English Tweet described what happened as "another masterpiece from the Saudi royal family. Now, everyone knows why they chose a sharp sword for their flag! Well-done bin Salman!". A Twitter user wrote that it is the "same Saudi government that nurtures Islamic State group terrorists, sponsors the London-based TV channel Iran International, and supports the exiled opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq Organisation". Referring to the way Saudi Arabia "treats its own citizen", a Tehran-based journalist added: "One wonders, based on what kind of trust tens of thousands of our people are sent to this country for the Hajj pilgrimage". Elsewhere, some online users have called on people from different walks of life to join a strike today. Relevant hashtags were Tweeted more than 17,000 times in the past 24 hours. A Twitter user called on the people "to stay at home" and not go to work or out of their homes to stage a protest. Another user wrote that "civil movements are the last chance before society opts for violence" and called on people to support the stoppage.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 8.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The Khashoggi affair

2-Barkan turning point

3-Unworthy leaders

 

1-The Khashoggi affair

 

It remains unclear whether the U.S. administration can turn a blind eye to the Jamal Khashoggi affair. After all, its need for Saudi money may not be sufficient to disregard the scale of this crime against a Saudi citizen whose only fault was to write in The Washington Post and criticize his country's policies from a patriotic perspective. Moreover, the American media may not give the administration a chance to ignore this incident; they may force it to take a stance on what is happening. But even if Trump chooses not to fan the flames, the damage has been done, and the world can no longer remain silent regarding how matters have developed in Saudi Arabia. In short, Saudi Arabia may have succeeded in silencing a free Saudi voice, but this deed is surrounded by great threats as it has severely damaged the crown-prince's image: He who – perhaps without being aware of it – has turned his country into the Kingdom of Fear--Hassan al-Barari in Qatari Asharq

Does a leading power such as Saudi Arabia, with all its political resources and accumulated security expertise, need to wait until one of its citizens in opposition enters an official building – its Istanbul consulate– in order to detain and hide him, or perhaps kidnap him? After all, it knows that such an act cannot be hidden in security terms and cannot be passed over in silence, especially now that the planet has become as small as an orange thanks to all the latest technological advances. Saudi Arabia is known to possess a long arm, which it needs because many parties are targeting it continuously. Consequently, it did not have to wait for Jamal Khashoggi or anyone else to enter its Istanbul consulate so as to detain him and make him disappear--Saleh al-Qallab in Jordanian al-Ra'i

There is little doubt, in fact, that the Saudi authorities kidnapped [Khashoggi] after he entered his country's Istanbul consulate last Tuesday, even though he was not – and did not consider himself –an opponent of his country's regime. Instead, he chose to be critical and sought to correct the path that Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman has been leading the country down. But it appears that the current Saudi reign allows no voice to sing to a tune that differs from 'obedience to the powers that be.' Kidnapping and killing is an old Saudi practice; but it used to be confined to the regime's real opponents inside the Kingdom. Today, however, it has become common practice. For as far as bin Salman is concerned, there is no room for any position that does not sing the praises of the 'corrective measures' that he believes he is implementing, or the 'vision' that is guiding his leadership of Saudi Arabia --Hussam Kanafani on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

The disappearance and possible assassination of a leading Saudi journalist inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul represents a major development that will severely damage Riyadh's image and possibly its relations with the international community and the U.S., maintains a Jordanian commentator in a Doha daily. Saudi Arabia did not really need to lure Khashoggi into its Istanbul consulate in order to get rid of him, as some are claiming, maintains a pro-Saudi Jordanian commentator. It could have easily got rid of him in Istanbul's streets had it wished to do so. Even though Riyadh has adamantly denied any knowledge of Khashoggi's fate, it remains certain that the Saudi authorities kidnapped him, maintains a Lebanese commentator. What is also puzzling is Turkey's official silence so far regarding his fate, except for leaks from anonymous sources. [See below]

 

[Reuters reports: President Tayyip Erdogan said on Sunday he was closely following the case of missing Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi after Turkish officials said they believed he had been killed at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Erdogan told reporters that authorities were examining camera footage and airport records as part of their investigation into the disappearance last week of Khashoggi, who had been increasingly critical of Saudi Arabia's rulers. Two Turkish sources told Reuters Turkish authorities believe Khashoggi was deliberately killed inside the consulate. Erdogan said he was personally following the issue, without saying what he believed had happened to Khashoggi. "Entries and exits into the embassy, airport transits and all camera records are being looked at and followed. We want to swiftly get results," he said, adding without explanation: "My expectation is still positive." A Saudi source at the consulate denied that Khashoggi had been killed at the mission and said in a statement that the accusations were baseless. The consulate has also denied that Khashoggi was abducted. The United States is seeking information, a State Department official said. "We are not in a position to confirm these reports, but we are following them closely," the official said. Another Turkish security source told Reuters that a group of 15 Saudi nationals, including some officials, had arrived in Istanbul in two planes and entered the consulate on the same day Khashoggi was there, and later left the country. The source said Turkish officials were trying to identify them. Turkey's Anadolu news agency also reported that the group of Saudis were briefly at the consulate.]

 

A CLEAR MESSAGE: "Up until the time this article was written, most analyses and reports have suggested that Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated in Istanbul by a Saudi team that arrived in Turkey to carry out this mission," writes Hassan al-Barari in Monday's Qatari daily Asharq.

If these reports prove to be correct, then Riyadh is sending a clear message that it will show no tolerance towards any Saudi intellectual who expresses a different view to that of the 'hardline' current in Riyadh, and that it is willing to pursue, lure, and assassinate them if need be.

If that is the case, Riyadh may succeed in forcing its Saudi critics to think twice before expressing their views. But it has also left itself vulnerable to the most important commentators in the leading American and British papers, who have begun to wage a campaign to expose Riyadh's inhumane methods of dealing with opponents.

Riyadh's decision-makers seem to be behaving as if the world were so naïve as to believe the official Saudi explanation of Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance and his possible assassination. In fact, however, we believe it this incident is likely to open other dossiers in which Riyadh is implicated and that will be the source of many threats.

The motives for this rash behavior have the following background: Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman's unprecedented yearning to set himself up as king, apparently at whatever price. Consequently he cannot tolerate any criticism. And the Kingdom's hasty attitude towards Canada offers an excellent example of the extent of the Saudi leadership's edginess. In that instance, Riyadh decided to raise hell and would not calm down in response to a simple Canadian Tweet [on Saudi human rights' abuses].

Countries around the world are now clearly monitoring developments in the Saudi scene after Riyadh has suffered a series of regional defeats that have ended in Iran's favor. One U.S. official view is that the Saudi crown prince now needs the U.S. more than at any time before, and the U.S. has begun to blackmail Saudi Arabia as a result, seeking to milk it dry.

Even the crown-prince's American friends have made no secret of their desire to strip Saudi Arabia of its financial resources. President Trump has recently said that he has asked Riyadh to pay billions of dollars in return for U.S. protection, since the Saudi regime would not remain in power for more than two weeks without U.S. support.

It pains us as Arabs to see such American blackmail mixed with condescension that demonstrates not a grain of respect without stirring the Saudi 'hardline' current to do anything other than totally surrender to this American logic. After all, Saudi Arabia is not a weak country; it is economically and even militarily strong, and it can defend its sovereignty and security alone. But that requires determination and resolve, as well as a genuine desire for independence. However, this only works if there is a true leadership that seeks to promote the homeland and its people's wellbeing. Frankly, the Saudi crown prince's statements in response to Trump's speech did not match what one expects from one of the largest and strongest Arab countries.

It remains unclear whether the U.S. administration can turn a blind eye to the Jamal Khashoggi affair. After all, its need for Saudi money may not be sufficient to disregard the scale of this crime against a Saudi citizen whose only fault was to write in The Washington Post and criticize his country's policies from a patriotic perspective.

Moreover, the American media may not give the administration a chance to ignore this incident; they may force it to take a stance on what is happening. But even if Trump chooses not to fan the flames, the damage has been done, and the world can no longer remain silent regarding how matters have developed in Saudi Arabia.

"In short, Saudi Arabia may have succeeded in silencing a free Saudi voice, but this deed is surrounded by great threats as it has severely damaged the crown-prince's image: He who – perhaps without being aware of it – has turned his country into the Kingdom of Fear," concludes Barari.

End…

 

KNOWING KHASHOGGI: "There is no well-experienced journalist who is in this trouble-filled profession who does not know Jamal Khashoggi," writes Saleh al-Qallab in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

I knew him early on when he worked as an itinerant correspondent specializing in covering the Afghani revolution against the Soviet invasion.

All those who knew this Saudi journalist, commentator, and writer respected him and appreciated his creativity, despite disagreeing with many of his views, especially so since they have been and perhaps still are seen to be leaning towards the Muslim Brotherhood. But this may be inaccurate. My knowledge and familiarity with Khashoggi, whether at close quarters or from afar, is that he was most loyal to the Saudi regime for many long years and one of its staunchest defenders, but in a rational and logical manner. This may be further confirmed by the fact that he was close to [former Saudi intelligence head] Prince Turki al-Faisal.

I had heard, but remain unsure, that Khashoggi rode the wave of the so-called 'Arab Spring' in recent years. I was told that he wanted this 'wave' to move on to his country at one go, without first having to pass through the necessary historic stations, since history's course proceeds in a cumulative manner one step at a time, with each step leading to another until the desired aim is achieved.

This brief introduction was necessary in order to get to what must be said regarding Jamal Khashoggi's 'disappearance.' After all, even if he were on his country's wanted list, he would not have gone to its Istanbul consulate for what was in essence a simple matter that he did not have to pursue in person and that he could have asked someone else to do on his behalf. Moreover, he is the Saudi regime's 'son' and is well aware of the methods that it adopts in dealing with its opponents – whether they are serious in their opposition or are mere showmen trying to attract outside attention.

The question that needs to be asked here is this: Does a leading power such as Saudi Arabia, with all its political resources and accumulated security expertise, need to wait until one of its citizens in opposition enters an official building – its Istanbul consulate– in order to detain and hide him, or perhaps kidnap him? After all, it knows that such an act cannot be hidden in security terms and cannot be passed over in silence, especially now that the planet has become as small as an orange thanks to all the latest technological advances.

Saudi Arabia is known to possess a long arm, which it needs because many parties are targeting it continuously. Consequently, it did not have to wait for Jamal Khashoggi or anyone else to enter its Istanbul consulate so as to detain him and make him disappear.

"If it really had to settle its scores with this Saudi citizen, it could have done whatever it wishes in Istanbul's noisy streets, with its more than ten million inhabitants," concludes Qallab.

End…

 

A GROWING MYSTERY: "With each passing day the mystery surrounding the fate of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi grows," writes Hussam Kanafani on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

But there is little doubt, in fact, that the Saudi authorities kidnapped him after he entered his country's Istanbul consulate last Tuesday, even though he was not – and did not consider himself –an opponent of his country's regime. Instead, he chose to be critical and sought to correct the path that Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman has been leading the country down.

But it appears that the current Saudi reign allows no voice to sing to a tune that differs from 'obedience to the powers that be.' Kidnapping and killing is an old Saudi practice; but it used to be confined to the regime's real opponents inside the Kingdom. Today, however, it has become common practice. For, as far as bin Salman is concerned, there is no room for any position that does not sing the praises of the 'corrective measures' that he believes he is implementing, or the 'vision' that is guiding his leadership of Saudi Arabia – a vision that has proven to have failed with the passage of time and by the admission of many Western economic experts.

However, regardless of bin Salman's 'vision – which is not the subject of this article – it is now certain that Jamal Khashoggi has been kidnapped by the Saudi authorities. And it is almost certain that he has arrived in Riyadh, as suggested by reports and Tweets, especially the Twitter account of the 'Saudi prisoners of conscience' twitter.com/m3takl, which has often been the first to expose many detentions in Saudi Arabia, and has also proven to be highly reliable regarding this matter.

But parallel to this public and exposed Saudi act of piracy, the Turkish response to this issue is also remarkable. In fact, one can say that many questions surround this position. Official silence rules the day in Ankara's political and security circles. No Turkish official has said anything regarding what has happened to Jamal Khashoggi. Even after the Saudi chargé d'affaires was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, no statement was issued or public position expressed explaining what has happened. The matter has remained confined to leaks and sources that have insisted on their anonymity. And the same goes for the Turkish security agencies that have so far failed to issue any official statement explaining what measures have been taken to address this issue. Instead, the matter has been confined to an anonymous Turkish police source saying that Khashoggi is still inside Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

This Turkish silence highlights the Ankara authorities' discomfiture regarding what may be viewed as a stark security breach, especially if the reports that Khashoggi is now in Saudi Arabia prove to be true. Moreover, in his interview with Bloomberg, Mohammad bin Salman seems to have to aggravated the Turks' discomfiture by announcing that his country was willing to open up the Saudi consulate for inspection by the Turkish police – an offer that the latter have not taken up so far, expressing no desire to carry out this inspection. But this may stem from the fact that the police have information that Khashoggi is no longer in the consulate, which would be consistent with what bin Salman said when he insisted that the journalist had left the consulate, without making it clear where he headed next.

Behind the scenes, Ankara may be trying to end this crisis at the least possible cost. In other words, it may be trying to contain the security violation and safeguard its reputation as able to protect the refugees on its land, especially since it serves as a refuge for many Syrian and Egyptian opposition figures. Ankara may also be trying not to escalate the crisis, especially since its relations with Saudi Arabia were already at their lowest point even before the Khashoggi affair.

"Between the Saudi kidnapping and the total denial of any information about this in bin Salman's interview on the one hand, and Turkey's silence on the other, the mystery surrounding Khashoggi's fate and what the Saudis have in store for him is growing," concludes Kanafani.

Ends…

 

2-Barkan turning point

 

The attack on Israeli settlers in Barkan signals a new phase in which the West Bank will be the arena for confrontations between Israel and the Palestinian, says Talal 'Awkal in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Yesterday's (Sunday's) attack near Nablus in the West Bank in which two Israelis were killed and a third was seriously wounded represents a turning point for the Israeli army, maintains a Gaza-based Palestinian commentator. Israel will henceforth have to include the West Bank as one of its priorities in addition to the Gaza and Lebanon/Syria fronts.

 

CAUTIONARY MESSAGE: "The 'Barkan' attack near Nablus, which targeted three settlers with firearms, sends a strong cautionary message to the Israeli occupation regarding how matters may develop if the Netanyahu government were to persist with its expansionist schemes and its racist acts of aggression," writes Talal 'Awkal in Monday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Reports speak of a young man of college age (assuming he is in college at all) who managed to escape after carrying out his attack, despite the ongoing security coordination [between the PA and Israel]. So, what should we expect when the PA and the PLO implement the PNC and PCC's [Palestine National Council and Palestinian Central Committee'] resolutions to end this coordination?

The incident sounds a warning that even if there is a delay in implementing the PNC's resolutions, the coming weeks and months will witness further such confrontations, leaving the Israeli army face-to-face with three million Palestinians. Israel knows this; but is most likely ready to pay the price for moving its schemes and policies towards a higher phase of Greater Israel [annexation of the West Bank].

Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to wage war on the Palestinian people, their national institutions, and their rights, egging Israel on to adopt more warlike decisions and measures. It has ended all its aid and contributions to the PA, to civil society organizations, to UNRWA, and to Palestinian hospitals in Jerusalem. It has shut down the PLO's office in Washington. And will subsequently decide to end its financial aid to the Palestinian security agencies. As a result, the U.S. has no arrows left in quiver to pressure and blackmail the Palestinian position regarding the [Washington-sponsored] deal of the century. In fact, what it has done so far goes beyond mere pressure and is tantamount to a declaration of war.

But the White House is not basing its calculations on what the U.S. can lose; for it is Israel that is losing because it is the party paying the price. This is the same policy the administration has been insisting on, choosing to wage wars by proxy where others foot the bill, while it pays not a single dollar.

These measures remind us of a previous policy in the mid-1980s when then U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski announced that the PLO's sources of income would be dried up. But by drying up the PLO's resources this time around, the administration is not aiming at exerting pressure in order to get the PLO to moderate its policies, which, in the 1980s, led it to accept the U.S. preconditions for holding a dialogue with it. This time round, drying up resources aims to 'dry up' Palestinian rights and to continue to exert pressure until the Palestinians submit to the deal of the century.

The policy of blackmailing the PLO previously led to convening the [1991] Madrid Peace Conference that paved the way for negotiations and signing the [1993] Oslo Accords over which the Palestinians were divided. The situation is completely different today. If Oslo was an attempt to secure some Palestinian rights, the U.S.'s current policy leaves nothing of what the Palestinians aspire to other than food and drink, while demanding their total submission to the occupation's policies and schemes.

The Israeli decision to demolish [the West Bank Bedouin village] Khan al-Ahmar is clearly the start of this process and the main signal that we are moving towards the phase of escalation in the confiscation and Judaization of Palestinian lands, and imposing more facts on the ground in preparation for the phase when Israeli sovereignty will be declared on the larger part of the West Bank. In reality, therefore, the U.S./Israeli alliance has declared war, and is already waging it against the Palestinians, their rights, and their very existence. For their part, however, the Palestinians have yet to make up their mind whether to fight this war or not.

The decisions and resolutions which have already been adopted and that still await implementation – which is what we expect the PCC's meeting on October 26th to do – do not amount to a general mobilization to join the confrontation that has been imposed on the Palestinian people.

In this regard, however, we should recognize the importance of Palestinian political and diplomatic activity in the international arena. This highlights the fact that the U.S. is gradually entering a phase of isolation, alongside Israel. The U.S. administration's decision to flee from the International Court of Justice, where the Palestinians have filed a suit against the U.S.'s violations of international law, is not the first of its kind. It has already fled the UN's Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the International Criminal Court, and it is on its way to fleeing many other international institutions.

U.S policies are clearly heading towards changing the nature of international relations and authorities, and abandoning its international commitments, rendering it an outlaw state confronting the international community – like its partner, Israel. For the Palestinian issue is a provocative gateway used by the U.S. to continue to undermine international organizations, which only aggravates the U.S. and Israel's isolation.

The 'Barkan' attack that came against the background of the Israeli security agencies' warnings represents a turning point as far as Israeli army's main fronts are concerned. Israel has been consistently focused on the South (Gaza) and the North (Lebanon and Syria). The latest attack, however, will force Israeli decision-makers to include the West Bank among the dangerous fronts that are a priority.

But just as the U.S. is mobilizing all its resources to back Israel and its schemes, never looking back when it adopts its warlike decisions regarding the Palestinians and their rights, the Palestinians should also reconsider and restructure their own options, since this is an unavoidable issue they must face in preparing for confronting the coming challenge. In this context, the calculations regarding the various [Palestinian] parties' shares of power become meaningless, since the matter now has to do with calculating the means that ensure survival and basic rights.

"For this reason, it makes sense for the PCC to postpone implementing its resolutions until [Fatah/Hamas] reconciliation is achieved – which must be done as soon as possible," concludes 'Awkal.

Ends…

 

3-Unworthy leaders

 

The demonstrations that have broken out against the Syrian opposition's leadership in the areas under their control merely highlight these leaders' unworthiness to lead the people, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Some Syrian opposition leaders' reactions to widespread popular demonstrations against the opposition Syrian Higher Negotiations Committee and the Syrian National Council echo how the Syrian regime once responded to opposition's demonstrations against it, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. This further confirms that the opposition's 'leaders by accident' are unworthy of leading the Syrian people.

 

BUILDING ANOTHER EDIFICE: "Three Northern Syrian governorates have witnessed seemingly large-scale popular demonstration calling for withdrawing recognition from the [Riyadh-based] opposition Syrian High Negotiations Committee, and toppling the political bodies that are leading the current phase because of their structural and constitutive faults that require the development of another political edifice that properly represents the Syrians," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

[Opposition leaders] Nasr al-Hariri and Yahiya al-'Aridi took the initiative in responding to the demonstrators' slogans and demands. The former said that these calls were politicized and incited by Assad. He said that one of his 'agents' inside the regime has informed him that Syrian intelligence has instructed all its allies to back a campaign raising the slogan 'The High Committee Does Not Represent Us.' But he did not forget to express his support for any demonstrations directed against Iran and the regime, describing last Friday as a 'happy day' for the regime.

'Aridi went even further. He described the demonstrators as 'a rabble.' But after a storm of biting criticisms exploded in his face, he denied ever making such statements and directed his ire against the efforts to 'politicize' the demonstrations by a sinister group that had infiltrated them – since the masses that have shaken Assad's throne are 'too noble' to be described as a rabble.

Both men were raised and nurtured in the regime's lap. This is especially true in the case of 'Aridi, who held media and academic positions that were only open to Baathists, of whom he was a member anyway. And both men are reproducing the regime's very same discourse. In fact, they have merely borrowing all the terms used by dictatorial and illegitimate Arab regimes to characterize what is happening.

The masses are wonderful as long as they side with us and raise our names. Their activism is a revolution, an uprising, and the sole source of legitimacy. But when the masses lose their 'faith' in us, and have had their fill of our corruption and futility, and of the fact that our cause is shared by the region and the world's intelligence agencies, they become a rabble, a mob, mere 'hoi polloi,' and all other similarly condescending and authoritarian terms used to describe them. But is this not precisely the essence of the discourse used by the regimes of corruption and tyranny? Are they not the very same terms used by the regime that the 'revolutionaries' in the High Negotiations Committee are tirelessly and indefatigably trying to change?

The masses are with us, and are always with us. For we are legitimacy and we speak in its name. We are the ones who represent and defend their interests. Do we not know their interests better than they do, and are we not closer to their 'beating pulse' than their own jugular?

But when the masses take to the streets and raise resounding slogans demanding that we be toppled, and carry our pictures with a huge 'X' sign drawn on them, and when they cry out that 'the SNC does not represent us,' this popular activism is accused of being 'politicized' – as if there were anything wrong or insulting in being so. For who said that popular activism should not be politicized? What is wrong with popular movements' politicization? After all, is not the entire Syrian scene nothing but politics heaped upon politics?

Here and now, and in a great haste, 'infiltrators' are invoked in order to burden them with responsibility for the worsening relations between the masses (who always broad and large of course) and the 'purely accidental leaders' who have been imposed on the Syrian opposition by the power of money and intelligence agencies. And, moreover, it is this small group (which is naturally neither broad nor large) that is responsible for 'diverting' popular activism away from its proper course. And as for its malignant and hidden aim, it is to misrepresent the SNC and the opposition leaders' image – as if this image requires any more misrepresentation or anyone else to destroy it.

But have we not seen this 'film' before, in the various Arab capitals, and not in Damascus alone? Did the regime say not about you what you are now saying about this 'small band of infiltrators'?

Speaking of the protests' aims, 'Aridi says that they are intended to 'undermine the High Negotiations Committee's credibility.' But does this Committee have any credibility left at all? Is it not in a state of clinical death? Has the stench of its corruption not filled the four corners of the Earth? And what are the Committees' 'achievements,' to use 'Aridi's terms, other than moving from one capital to another, and from one closed luxury hotel room to another's hallway? Are you not ashamed at how you have ended up, and how the people you are supposed to be leading and whose aspirations and yearnings you are supposed to be trying to achieve have ended up?

The two men spoke of 'excess passengers' in the Committee's 'bus,' and of entities and figures that are a burden rather than an asset to the Committee – platforms and figures that are unworthy of Syria, its revolution, and its people's uprising. And both men are promising to start a 'corrective movement' whose aim is to make the SNC leaner and fitter. But the Syrians in Idlib and Hama and Aleppo's countryside have come to realize that their crisis's dossier may be closed before the SNC succeeds in 'cleansing' its ranks, and before its leaders wake up to their failure, before they look into the mirror and see the images of their enemies and foes in Damascus there.

Had these 'accidental leaders' had any influence on the ground in the areas that have witnessed spirited popular activism against them, they would not have refrained from using live and rubber bullets and tear gas against these masses following the 'band of infiltrators' and who represent a stumbling block between the 'Committee' and its 'historic role.'

Unfortunately, however, a 'minion' can never become a 'leader,' and those who have been raised on the culture of exclusion and cancellation of others can never shed their skin.

"And this remains true even if many years have passed since they discarded their function as propagandists for the individual sole leader and the leading party, and as experts in composing odes in praise of the unholy triad: Extension of rule, renewal of office, and handing power over to their offspring after their demise," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

MIDEAST MIRROR 8.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Fear of copycats

 

Israeli security forces on Monday detained the brother and sister of the Palestinian suspected of shooting dead two Israelis and wounding a third in an attack in the Northern West Bank a day earlier, as a massive manhunt for the killer continued. On Sunday morning, Ashraf Walid Suleiman Na'alweh, 23, entered the offices of the Alon Group in the Barkan Industrial Park, near the settlement of Ariel, armed with a locally produced Carlo-style submachine gun, according to the IDF. Inside, the gunman handcuffed Kim Levengrond Yehezkel, 28, and fatally shot her from close range. He then shot a second female victim in the stomach, moderately wounding her and shot and killed Ziv Hajbi, 35. The suspect, from the village of Shuweika near Tulkarem, fled the scene, prompting a large-scale search of the area and a deployment of additional troops to the West Bank to prevent copy-cat attacks, the army said.

Following the attack, members of Na'alweh's family and others were arrested by the IDF and interrogated by the Shin Bet to determine if they assisted him in the attack or in his escape from the scene, the army said. In total, IDF troops arrested 19 Palestinians in predawn raids across the West Bank on Monday. A source in the Palestinian Authority's security forces told Ynet, PA police were participating in efforts to apprehend Na'alweh. The source said PA security officials believed he would prefer to hand himself over to them, out of fear he may be killed during Israeli attempts to arrest him, or due to a belief that the PA would not hurry to turn him over to Israel.

The military launched an investigation of the attack to determine, among other things, how the gun was smuggled into the industrial park and whether the attacker intended to take Levengrond Yehezkel hostage, having used zip-ties to bind her hands. IDF troops set up road closures and checkpoints throughout the area, including at the entrances to some Palestinian towns in the Northern West Bank. IDF Special Forces, including the Oketz K-9 unit, took part in the searches. Two additional infantry companies were deployed to the area as reinforcements, along with a battalion-level command company. According to the IDF, Na'alweh had no history of terrorist activities and was not tied to any terror groups, though several of them applauded his actions. Earlier in the day, he had posted on his Facebook page that he was "waiting for Allah." He had also left a suicide letter with a friend three days ago, according to a television report.

Prime Minister Netanyahu warned ministers Sunday that Israel is preparing for the possibility of a military campaign in the Gaza Strip should the humanitarian conditions in the territory lead to border clashes to spiral out of control, Hadashot reported. Netanyahu spoke of the Palestinian Authority's attempt to "choke" Gaza during the weekly cabinet meeting, and said: "If the civil distress in Gaza is diminished, that is desirable, but that is not certain to happen, and so we are preparing militarily – that is not an empty statement."

Angered by the reported funneling by Qatar of aid to the Hamas-run Gaza Strip, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 'Abbas was said on Saturday to be planning on cutting funds to the coastal enclave. Senior defense officials told Hadashot news that 'Abbas was particularly frustrated with UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Nickolay Mladenov, who facilitated the transfer despite the PA president's staunch objections. The halt of some $96 million that the PA sends monthly to Gaza could drive a desperate and cash-strapped Hamas toward conflict with Israel, security officials told the news channel. Moreover, they expressed concern that the violence may expand into the West Bank.

The Kan public broadcaster reported Saturday that 'Abbas had a tense phone call with Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi in which the latter warned 'Abbas that additional measures against the Strip would endanger the security of Egypt, particularly in Sinai. 'Abbas was said to have responded defiantly by saying, "It is the establishment of a Muslim Brotherhood state in Gaza that endangers the national security of Egypt not me and my policies," in a reference to Hamas. A high-ranking Fatah official has accused Mladenov of working on behalf of President Trump's administration and intervening in internal Palestinian matters. "He is a servant of the American administration," Majed Fityani, the secretary-general of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, told Palestine TV on Saturday evening. "He should… not be intervening in internal affairs. It is not his right or mandate to interfere, but he sticks his nose in everything."

Yedioth Ahronoth reports Israel's national broadcaster is on the verge of losing the rights to broadcast World Cup and Euro 2020 soccer games due to an impasse over transmission to Israelis living in West Bank settlements and East Jerusalem. The national broadcaster Kan reportedly bid €5 million ($5.8 million) for the rights to show Israel's games in the early round of the two international soccer competitions. The contract with the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), however, states that Kan may only broadcast the matches within the so-called Green Line, and not in what UEFA defined as "Palestinian territories." This condition would mean that Israelis living in settlements or in East Jerusalem would be unable to watch the matches – a condition unacceptable to Kan.

In political news, a new party headed by former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz would take 12 parliamentary seats in a general election, according to a poll by Hadashot released on Sunday. Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likud would take 29 seats, while Yesh Atid would be the second-largest party with 13 and Zionist Union would fall to 10 seats in the first election since Avi Gabbay became its chairman, the poll said. If Gantz decides not to run, Likud would take 32 seats – two more than in the last poll conducted by Hadashot. In this scenario, Yesh Atid, led by Chairman Yair Lapid, would be the second-largest party with 18 seats. Trailing behind are Zionist Union with 12, the Joint List with 12 and Habayit Hayehudi with 10. According to the poll, Kulanu and United Torah Judaism would each receive seven seats, while Meretz and a party headed by Orli Levi- Abekasis would each receive six. Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas would each receive five seats. Netanyahu said last month that in the next election, "35 seats would be acceptable and 40 is our aim."

Meanwhile, all three heads of the parties inside Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition attended a meeting with him yesterday. The group emerged convinced that he intends to advance the next election to February or March 2019, sources close to them said. The meeting was attended by Kulanu leader Moshe Kahlon, Shas chairman Arye Deri and Habayit Hayehudi head Naftali Bennett. After hearing Netanyahu speak about how difficult it would be to resolve disputes over conscription and conversion, they got the impression that he would prefer an early election.

In another development, Prime Minister Netanyahu's wife appeared at the Jerusalem Magistrate's Court on Sunday for the opening of her trial on charges of fraud and breach of trust, sitting in the courtroom for the first time as a criminal defendant. Sara Netanyahu, along with Ezra Saidoff, a former deputy director general of the Prime Minister's Residence, face charges of fraud and breach of trust for allegedly overspending roughly NIS 360,000 ($100,000) on private meals at the prime minister's official residence, even when there was a full-time chef on staff. The Netanyahus have denied any wrongdoing, and say they are the victims of a political witch hunt driven by a hostile media. Sitting behind her defense team for the 45-minute long pre-trial deliberations, Sara Netanyahu appeared anxious and at times visibly distressed as the prosecution read from her indictment alleging she had abused her position to purposefully defraud the state.

Finally, Prime Minister Netanyahu said Sunday that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin have agreed to meet soon for the first time since a Russian spy plane was downed over Syria by Syrian forces as they fired on attacking Israeli jets last month.

 

 

NO LONE-WOLF: Yossi Yehoshua in Yedioth Ahronoth affirms the fear in the security system is that the attack yesterday will inspire copycats, which in the prevailing mood in the West Bank will attempt to carry out similar acts.

"Like the terrorists who carried out the terror attacks in Itamar and Halamish, the terrorist who carried out the attack yesterday also had no background in terrorist activity. On the face of it, he has all the characteristics of the lone-wolf terrorist: No organizational affiliations, no prior activities, a work permit, and an employee at an orderly place of work. But in contrast to previous cases, the Barkan terrorist's behavior was professional, and it can be assumed that he received guidance.

The terrorist entered the factory with a rifle in his bag. The initial investigation indicates that the bag he carried passed through the magnetometer at the entrance to the industrial zone, and now they will check if someone assisted him and the rifle was waiting for him after the checkpoint. The fact that the terrorist handcuffed the secretary can indicate that he planned to take her hostage, so that apart from the cruelty that characterized the attack, it must be remembered that it could have ended much more badly.

Immediately following the attack, the IDF and the Shin Bet launched a wide-scale manhunt in pursuit of the terrorist, with the participation of the finest special units. Since the terrorist is armed, the incident might not end in an arrest, but in a shootout, hence the need for action by well-trained units. However, it is quite possible that the terrorist will understand that he is liable to die, and will prefer to turn himself in to Palestinian security and through them to the IDF.

More than 30,000 Palestinians from Judea and Samaria work with permits in the various industrial zones in the territories or in the settlements. To this day only a handful – less than ten – have exploited the situation to carry out terror attacks, including last month's attack in Gush Etzion. The differentiation policy between terror and populace has proven itself, and that is also why we have not seen any closure or siege being imposed on the village from which the terrorist came. In spite of the severe attack, the IDF will seek to maintain this policy and the coexistence in the industrial zones, which help the Palestinian economy as well as the Israeli. But at the same time, it must conduct an inquiry concerning the security arrangements in the industrial zones, in order to prevent such instances from recurring in the future. Although the security checks are carried out by a civilian company, it is the IDF's responsibility to prevent the entry of weapons into the industrial zones.

The fear in the defense establishment is that the attack will inspire copycats, who in the prevailing atmosphere in the territories will try to carry out similar acts. Chief of Staff Eizenkot has already warned that the situation is volatile. Moreover, he raised the issue in the weekly security assessment last Thursday. Yesterday, two regular battalions were added to the Judea and Samaria Division in order to prevent this possibility, but if Abu Mazin continues with his current policy, the incitement in the PA persists, and Palestinian security will not help the IDF thwart terrorism, then the West Bank may go up in flames before Gaza."

Ends…

 

BARKAN TERRORIST MAY ATTACK AGAIN: Yoav Limor in Israel Hayom writes that the IDF and Shin-Bet regard the fugitive terrorist as a ticking time bomb. He may not hesitate to murder again, but despite the will for revenge, it is better to take him alive.

"The terrorist attack in the Barkan industrial zone once again proved how frail and elusive coexistence in Judea and Samaria is: Essential on the one hand, dangerous on the other. Through these industrial zones, in which some 30,000 Palestinians (3,300 of them in Barkan, 250 of them in the factory where the attack took place) work, Israel is trying to enable as many residents of the West Bank as possible to earn a decent living.

Studies show that work that enables a family to make an honest living is the surest way of distancing the average person from terrorism. The defense establishment constantly supports increasing the number of permits for Palestinians working in Israel, based on the premise that more workers mean fewer terror attacks. For this reason, yesterday's attack – just like the terror attack carried out last year at Har Adar, in which four Israelis were murdered – hurts the Palestinians first of all. It reduces Israel's willingness to permit more gestures and relief, and even from the limited perspective of workers in the specific industrial zone in Barkan – it ensures tougher procedures, entailing more checks and less freedom.

It is doubtful whether the murderer, Ashraf Na'alweh, wanted to harm coexistence. If a terrorist organization was behind him, especially Hamas, this would probably have been his specific goal, but a lone-wolf terrorist usually heads for a familiar place. This is what Na'alweh did as well; He arrived at the place where he worked, where he was familiar with the procedures, and knew how to get around them.

This attack requires the IDF and Shin Bet to undergo a long series of self-examinations. Some are obvious: Where did the terrorist get the improvised Carlo rifle; Why was the post he published on Facebook not detected in advance so that he could be stopped in time; Did he share his plans with anyone (given that he left a written will); and mainly – how did he enter the industrial zone in Barkan so easily carrying a weapon, or did he get the weapon in some other way, and if so - who helped him. This question should also be addressed to the private security company responsible for the Barkan industrial zone, which will have to clarify whether its people are not working on 'auto-pilot'.

The investigation is supposed to answer some of these questions, but the key man – the terrorist – is on the run. His conduct during the attack attests to the fact that he apparently did not expect to come out alive; hence it is doubtful he prepared a hiding place in advance, and so it is highly likely he will be captured soon. The gut instinct is to wish that he be killed by those who come to arrest him, but the head prefers detention for interrogation purposes, through which the path he used can be uncovered and the breaches he exploited closed.

Investigating the terrorist will also reveal why he used handcuffs on his victims. Did he intend to take them hostage for ransom and then changed his mind, or perhaps had in mind some terror attack inspired by ISIS? Was there a personal dimension to his actions, despite the fact that, contrary to some of the reports yesterday, Na'alweh was not fired from his job in the industrial zone? He was employed there for about three months, and after two weeks of absence from work, he returned yesterday – and committed murder.

In an attempt to advance the investigation, security forces are operating in the terrorist's village, Shweiki. Some of his relatives and friends have been arrested, but there is another dimension to this activity: Putting pressure on Na'alweh to turn himself in order to reduce harm to his family. Past experience shows that the terrorist is likely to be in an environment familiar to him. If he is now assisted by collaborators, they are probably among his closest circle of acquaintances. Still, he should not be regarded as an escaped convict, but rather as a ticking time bomb.

Another concern is copycats who will want to replicate the 'success'. Forces in Judea and Samaria have been reinforced, and they maintain close contact with Palestinian security forces in an attempt to bring life back to normal as soon as possible. In addition to the desire to prevent further terror attacks, this is due to the notion that in the absence of a political horizon, the economy is currently the most effective 'fire extinguisher' against terror and violence."

Ends…

 

BETTER TO DEAL WITH SINWAR THAN ABU MAZIN: Smadar Perry in Yedioth Ahronoth claims she has spoken with two people in Gaza – a senior official and an academic – and heard from them no complaints about the Sinwar interview. On the contrary, she heard a sigh of relief – finally a Hamas leader proposing a long-term lull.

"Let us compare Abu Mazin and Yahiya as-Sinwar: Who do we get along with? Abu Mazin, however you look at it, is at the end of his career and does not want compromises. Israel is in no hurry: Two more months, another year, two years tops. He himself has announced he will not run in the next elections, if they take place at all. Sinwar, on the other hand, is 55, and if he does not get caught in a fire trap will continue to run things in Gaza.

Abu Mazin is appealing to the International Criminal Court in The Hague against the United States, but he has a bellyful against us as well. He wants negotiations only with an international framework in the middle, and not only the Americans. Who, exactly, will hold the keys? Take note that the current situation in the West Bank suit both sides more.

Here is a key fact: Any solution achieved, whether with Abu Mazin or Sinwar, will no longer link the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The connection no longer exists. Abu Mazin or his heirs will come to the table with solutions for the West Bank, without dreams of entering the Strip. As it looks now, barring any mind-blowing surprises, no solution will be achieved as long as Abu Mazin is in power.

The Gaza Strip is another story: A dense area, in which two million miserable people live in harsh, inhuman conditions. Only a small part runs its life a bit better. Egypt is closing in on them, Saudi Arabia does not have their best interests at heart, Jordan is reluctant, Israel is preventive, and the Palestinian Authority is waging battles on their backs. There is no electricity most of the day, there are no medicines in the hospitals, shops have goods neatly stacked - but who has money to pay?

A peace agreement is made with enemies, and Hamas fits the bill. Sinwar is now starting to speak in a different voice, offering a long-term cease-fire. He is cunning, knows what to sell to the Israeli ear. No one expects generous offers of peace from the enemy. Sit down, talk to him, kick off with mediators, and take your time.

I got a chance to talk with two people in Gaza this weekend: One a senior member of the security forces and the other an academic. I did not hear them attack or slander the Sinwar interview in Yedioth Ahronoth. On the contrary, I heard them express worldviews and a sigh of relief according to which at long last a Hamas leader has stood up and proposed a long-term truce. True, they both said, until it is decided to aim for a solution in Gaza, Hamas will continue to send people and kites to the border fence. But at the same time, a decision is crystalizing in Hamas to try to find another way.

Netanyahu does not have to respond, certainly not publicly. We have enough senior officials calling for dialogue with Hamas. If Sinwar does not really mean it, Israel is strong enough to deal with Gaza. Still, Sinwar proposes to conduct a dialogue, and says that he does not want any more wars. This is the interview's most important message. Of course, in the same breath he makes sure to threaten that if his suggestion is not met – the violence will be escalated. It will be interesting to see if Netanyahu grabs the tip of the tail and goes for it, or will he continue to view Sinwar and the group that surrounds him as eternal enemies, who must be eliminated one way or another."

Ends…

 

DETERRENCE IN GAZA NOT A DIRTY WORD: Yair Sheleg in Makor Rishon argues that it is Gaza's misfortune to be a test case for the credibility of Israel's deterrence, but the current unfortunate Israeli strategy does not permit deterrence.

"For several weeks now, the drums of war between Israel and Hamas have been thundering. Every incident on the border of the Gaza Strip, let alone the death of seven Palestinians at the end of last week, is described as another step towards an inevitable confrontation. Israel's top security commentator explains that although Hamas understands that the balance of power between it and Israel determine that it will receive a very unpleasant blow, still the confrontation is important to Hamas in order to get out of the economic stranglehold it is in and extricate itself from the clutches of Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.

When the initiators of a conflict announce in advance that this is their desire; what they really want is to threaten a confrontation in order to achieve what they want without it. A famous verse in 'The good, the bad, and the ugly' long ago summarized a basic human truth: 'If you want to shoot, shoot, don't talk.' Such prophecies tend to fulfill themselves: The sides warm up in preparation for the expected confrontation, and the heating ignites the required spark.

This pattern is so familiar to us that were it not bound up in human life, it would have been considered quite boring. Hamas experiences some distress – in relations with Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, or any other party – and the tried and right way as far as it is concerned is to ignite a confrontation with Israel. Not in order to defeat it, of course - Hamas leaders understand they have no chance of achieving that - but simply to squeeze some temporary achievements in exchange for a cease-fire. Until the next round. Thus, Israeli citizens find themselves the sitting target ducks of the Hamas' distress.

There is a moral, Zionist and political value in achieving a peace agreement, or even a long-term interim arrangement, with the Palestinians. An arrangement that will enable Israel to stop controlling millions of people without citizenship, will ensure a stable Jewish majority in the territories under Israeli control, and improve our standing in the international community – even at the price of painfully giving up parts of the homeland and some settlements. But the advantages of a deal are not useful if the price is a high security risk. In other words, any arrangement, even unofficial interim situations, should be based on clear Israeli deterrence. I do not presume to know which tactical security option best ensures deterrence. But you do not have to be an expert to understand the basic principle: Deterrence means first of all that the other side has something to lose from a confrontation, and from every day that it persists.

The current Israeli strategy does not allow much deterrence because it makes it clear to Hamas that in any confrontation, no matter how intense, at its end Israel will still be interested in Hamas continuing to rule. The alternative of chaos or the Palestinian Authority frightens Israel more. Apart from the bodies of unfortunate Gazans – who in any case do not interest Hamas too much, and perhaps Hamas even views their deaths as a propaganda bonanza – Hamas has nothing to lose from a confrontation. It will remain in power come what may.

In conclusion, even a dovish political position, and perhaps especially such a position, should be accompanied by a hawkish, and even radically hawkish, security stance. In other words, anyone who wants to reach an agreement with Gaza and is prepared to accept that it will continue to be ruled by Hamas, must demonstrate to Hamas a willingness to endanger its regime, even at a heavy Israeli price. This does not necessarily mean a ground invasion of the Strip, with all that this entails. This should not in any case be a preferred Israeli option, because its price, especially in human life, is indeed expected to be very heavy. But Israel must certainly clarify, and at the moment of truth implement as well, a gradual price tag of air strikes for any harm to its citizens. Obviously not every incendiary balloon is supposed to make us burn down the Gaza Strip, but every step Hamas takes against the citizens of Israel should exact a much heavier toll from the residents of Gaza: From hitting Hamas officials and government systems, to broad attacks on neighborhoods whose residents harm Israeli civilians – including attacks that will endanger the very survival of the Hamas regime. For in the end, the continuation of the Hamas regime cannot be more an Israeli interest than Hamas'.

This strategy is important not only against Hamas in Gaza, whose power is ultimately limited. Behind Hamas' back, Hezbollah and Iran are examining the situation, and their potential for destruction is much greater. They should be impressed that we are absolutely serious when we promise that any harm to us will be met with an infinitely more terrible blow. It is the Gaza Strip's misfortune to be a test case for the credibility of Israeli deterrence. Despite the real sorrow over the loss of human life on the Palestinian side, this credibility must not be harmed. Otherwise it will be forced to repair itself under much more difficult conditions."

Ends…

 

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT COULD IGNITE WEST BANK: Yaniv Kubovich in Haaretz contends that defense officials are loathe to stoke lone-wolf terror attacks like the wave of three years ago.

"The attack that killed two Israelis in a West Bank industrial park Sunday poses a challenge for political and military leaders: How to respond without increasing the risk of a renewed escalation in the West Bank.

Ever since the violent Hamas-led protests began in the Gaza Strip on March 30, the organization has tried by every means possible to get West Bank Palestinians to join in. But so far, even 200 dead Gazans, thousands of wounded, the transfer of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the annual Nakba Day commemorations and the Ramadan holiday have all failed to do so. Hamas' attempts to build up its terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank have also failed, thanks to efforts by both the Israeli and the Palestinian Authority security services.

But now, Israeli intelligence agencies fear the mood in the West Bank could provide fertile ground for lone-wolf terror attacks like the wave that happened three years ago. Starting in October 2015, lone-wolf assailants unaffiliated with any terror group carried out numerous stabbing, car-ramming and shooting attacks that killed dozens of Israelis. They were inspired mainly by social media, where the perpetrators of the attacks were glorified.

An outbreak of similar attacks in the West Bank now could completely alter Hamas' position in its conflict with Israel, because the opening of a second front would pose a much more serious challenge for the Israel Defense Forces than it faces in Gaza. Senior defense officials still believe the Gaza front could be resolved by a cease-fire deal with Hamas. Defense officials have been warning the government for some time now of the possibility of an outbreak of violence in the West Bank. Just last month, IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot told the security cabinet there was a growing risk of violence in the West Bank in the near future, and the previous month, Shin Bet security service chief Nadav Argaman made a similar warning.

While defense officials support a cease-fire agreement with Hamas, they believe Israel's effort to reach such a deal (via Egyptian and UN mediators) over the head of Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas undermines 'Abbas' standing in the West Bank and bolsters Hamas there. Moreover, they say, such an effort makes young Palestinians think that Hamas' terrorism pays.

If the government responds to Sunday's terror attack with collective punishment that hurts all 8,000 Palestinian employees of the Barkan industrial zone, or all 100,000 Palestinians with permits to work in Israel or the settlements, Hamas will be strengthened, and the chances of violence in the West Bank will grow. The defense establishment believes Israel should punish only the terrorist, the people who sent him and the people who abetted the attack. Both the IDF and the Shin Bet argue that preserving calm in the West Bank and security coordination with the PA are more important than collective punishment, which they do not believe does much to deter lone-wolf terrorists.

But after every previous such incident, the politicians have favored collective punishment as a deterrent – often because social media users demanded such action – and have viewed the defense establishment's position as weakness. After last year’s shooting attack in Har Adar, for instance, the government initially wanted to respond by banning all Palestinian workers from the settlement. Today, defense officials consider the situation far more flammable and believe that collective punishment would give Hamas a significant boost among West Bank Palestinians. They are therefore trying to balance the need to respond to the attack against the need to maintain the calm in the West Bank.

Over the past year, the security services have largely managed to keep lone-wolf attacks at bay. For instance, Argaman said recently that the Shin Bet foiled 250 attacks during the first half of this year and arrested more than 400 Palestinians who had been planning lone-wolf attacks. Altogether, the security services arrest some 4,000 Palestinians in the West Bank every year; they also employ sophisticated Cyber-Tech to monitor Palestinian social media. In addition, the IDF has seized 330 guns from suspected terrorists so far this year, one-third of them in the past three months."

Ends…

 

SETTLER LEADERS INSIST COEXISTENCE WILL SURVIVE: Jacob Magid in The Times of Israel claims that while some right-wing activists respond to the Barkan attack with calls to halt Palestinian employment at Israeli factories, most local leaders double down on its importance.

"Settler leaders have long touted West Bank industrial zones as beacons of coexistence, where Israelis hire and work alongside Palestinians, providing them with a decent livelihood. But the gunning down of two Israelis by their Palestinian coworker at the Barkan Industrial Park on Sunday morning threatened to chip away at that narrative, forcing supporters of such partnership to defend the practice. 'We will not let this break us,' said Samaria Regional Council chairman Yossi Dagan, minutes after the terror attack that claimed the lives of 28-year-old Kim Levengrond Yehezkel and 35-year-old Ziv Hajbi. 'The blessed coexistence that takes place here every day will continue,' he added.

Just last month, Dagan talked proudly to members of the European Union Parliament in Brussels about Barkan in particular, where roughly half of the 7,200 workers at the site's 164 factories are Palestinian, and half are Jewish. 'There has never been a terror attack there,' he said at the time. (In 2015, a Palestinian stabbed two Israeli security guards at the gate of a different Northern West Bank industrial zone neighboring Barkan).

Even after Sunday's shooting, Dagan's stance remained firm. Similarly, not a single elected Israeli official in the West Bank took a public position against the hiring of Palestinians at industrial zones. The sites are frequently mentioned by politicians on the right in their rebuttals of peace plans seeking Israeli separation from the West Bank's roughly 3 million Palestinians.

According to the Yesha settlement umbrella council, there are 20 industrial zones throughout the West Bank that employ roughly 28,000 workers, of whom some 18,000 are Palestinian. Supporters of the industrial zones argue that the broad satisfaction of workers there demonstrates that Palestinians are more interested in earning respectable wages than statehood and that efforts to divide Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank will only leave the latter population without a source of a respectable income. Opponents of the settlement movement counter the claim by arguing that Israeli limits on Palestinian businesses in the West Bank stagnate economic growth to the point where many Palestinian workers are forced to rely on Israeli industrial zones for viable economic wages.

In the current government, Dagan and other settler leaders have found a receptive audience to their cause, which has led to the investment of millions of shekels in industrial zones over the Green Line. This was also evident after Sunday's attack, when Economic Minister Eli Cohen arrived at Barkan and pledged to expand the industrial zone by 150 dunam (37 acres), calling the coexistence that they help instill a 'security and economic interest.'

But while no elected officials took the more hawkish stance against the hiring of Palestinian workers, a number of far-right settler personalities voiced frustration over the policy, calling for levels of separation that those on the opposite side of the political spectrum have long backed.

Former director of the Peace Now settlement watchdog Yariv Oppenheimer tweeted, 'There is no coexistence in the settlements. There is an occupier and the occupied. Boss and employees. Whoever thinks this is a recipe for peace is mistaken.' Of all people, Oppenheimer's words appeared to have resonated with Tzvi Succot, the director of the far-right Otzma Yehudit organization, who retweeted the left-wing activist's post, saying that Oppenheimer 'gets it.'

Far-right activist-attorney Itamar Ben Gvir, meanwhile, called Dagan's comments in favor of coexistence following the attack 'mistaken and misleading.' 'That coexistence blew up in Barkan today and only Yossi along with a handful of people in the Eztion Bloc continue to mislead themselves and the public,' Ben Gvir said. He called on settlement heads to conduct a 'serious a follow-up' and demand that Palestinian workers 'pronounce their loyalty to the Jewish state.'

In a conversation with The Times of Israel, Ben Gvir acknowledged that no other regional or local council chairman in the West Bank was taking a similar stance, but he suggested that their motivations were economic, given that the industrial zones draw in significant cash to their settlements. Moreover, the Hebron resident claimed that many others in the settlement movement held similar views.

Yael Ben Yashar, who is running for mayor in the central West Bank settlement of Beit El, toed the line set by other settler leaders and defended the employment of Palestinians in the West Bank. 'The majority of them are interested in simply making a living,' she said, rejecting the implication that the actions of the Barkan terrorist meant all Palestinians should now be banned from Israeli industrial zones. At the same time, she acknowledged that patience for such projects may be running thin. 'We would like to live in coexistence, but every time, the other side breaks our trust,' the candidate and former municipal official said.

That 'trust' that Ben Yashar and other settler leaders have been willing to offer Palestinians at the economic level has never been elevated to the political level. David Ha'ivri, who works with the Samaria Regional to bring hundreds of international groups to the Northern West Bank on tours that regularly stop at Barkan, explained that the issue is 'not with trusting the Palestinian people but rather their leadership in the corrupt Palestinian Authority.'

'There will not be a Palestinian state… and the way to dispel that dream is to allow their economic situation to improve,' argued Beit Aryeh local council chairman Avi Na'im, who suggested that national aspirations and economic ones were inversely connected. As for those that will most directly be impacted by the Barkan attack, there appeared to be widespread consensus among the industrial zone employees — both Jews and Arabs — against altering the status quo there. 'We are shocked, but not afraid,' said Yohan Cohen, a Barkan worker and resident of the Northern West Bank settlement of Bruchin. 'I will continue coming to work here at the industrial zone everyday with my Israeli and Palestinian friends.'

Amjad Mughar, who has been working at Barkan for the past three years, expressed concern over what he expected to be an increase in daily security checks of Palestinian workers, as well as the possibility that he might lose his work permit altogether. 'I do not know how I will be able to support my six kids without this job. I really do not know why someone would do something like this,' Mughar added.

According to Moshe Levran, who works as an export manager at Twitto Plus, one of the Barkan factories, 'The Palestinian employees are more distraught over the incident than the Israelis ones are. I sat them down and explained to them that they might go through an extra security check every day, but that will die down eventually and things will return to normal,' he said.

For now, settler leaders are standing behind what has become a go-to talking point in selling Israeli presence in the West Bank. Even before the two victims were pronounced dead, Dagan pointed out that Sunday's attack had been the first one at Barkan since the site was established in 1982.

With defense officials currently under the assumption that the 23-year-old assailant, Ashraf Walid Suleiman Na'alweh, acted as a 'lone wolf,' supporters of continued Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation in the West Bank appear to have little to worry about. But if copy-cats spring up, calls for the type of separation that is seen in West Bank residential areas will likely overpower those calling for coexistence at the workplace."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 5.10.18, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Self-deception

 

The seemingly inexorable march to war with Gaza is on Israel's mind heading into the weekend, with fears that border violence will ramp up significantly on Friday. Channel 10 reports that the army is expecting some 20,000 Palestinians to protest along the border Friday, with the IDF ordering extra troops to the area to deal with the unrest, including Special Forces and snipers. According to the channel, the army believes that Gazans may also return to shooting rockets at Southern Israel, and if so it will be in "significant volleys." The army has deployed a bolstered Iron Dome presence to the region. Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman on Friday signaled to the heads of Hamas that Israel was prepared to go war. In a Tweet, Lieberman indicated that Israel had been holding back on a harsh response to the near-nightly riots on the border in order to prevent an all-out conflict during the period of the Jewish High Holidays, beginning with Rosh Hashanah on September 9 and ending with Simchat Torah on October 1. "We've been through the High Holidays exactly as we planned, without a flare-up and by exacting a heavy price on the rioters along the Gaza border," Lieberman said, referring to the people killed and injured by IDF troops during the clashes. "The holidays are over, and I say to the heads of Hamas: 'Take that into account,'" the defense minister wrote.

The tensions are serious enough to push Yedioth Ahronoth's interview with Hamas leader Yahiya as-Sinwar off the front page. The paper reports that the army is ready for a significant round of fighting as early as Friday evening, though it notes that area residents have not been given any special security instructions. As is usual for times when war drums are beating, Israelis tend to turn more jingoistic. The headline on Hadashot news's website reads "we're ready, no doubt." Yedioth notes that the troop call-up and extra Iron Dome batteries are not just to protect the border but also to send Hamas a message that "even before an escalation, the army is changing its policies regarding rioters, who have been ramping up the level of violence on the border for several weeks." Israel Hayom's Yoav Limor writes that the army is telling Hamas "do not test us." "Gaza and Jerusalem both understand very well that they are playing with fire, and neither side is interested in a confrontation whose results, in a best-case scenario, will return both sides to where they started (minus the death and destruction)," asserts Limor.

Meanwhile, Yedioth runs its full interview with Sinwar, a day after publishing an excerpt that made a fairly large splash, with the Hamas leader claiming he does not want to fight, just wants Israel's blockade on the Strip to end. Sinwar rejects the idea of Hamas disarming and being protected by an international force, defends suicide bombings as a way to get attention and says arson kites and balloons do not hurt anyone but are just meant to send a message. "The kites and balloons are not a weapon, they are a message: You are stronger than us; it is not even comparable, but you will never, ever win," he says. He also defends using aid and other resources for arms and building military infrastructure, one of the main reasons for the blockade, saying without it "we would all be dead."

In news of Israel's campaign against BDS, Haaretz reports that shadowy right-wing name-and-shame group Canary Mission is being used by Israeli authorities to deport people accused of supporting boycotts of the country. The use of the site, long suspected by activists according to an August Forward report, is confirmed by documents submitted to an appeals tribunal after student Lara Alqasem went to court to fight her deportation. The paper points out several flaws with Canary Mission's claims about Alqasem, and the argument that she would not be trying to study at Hebrew University if she supported a boycott of Israel. The August Forward report on Canary Mission mentioned a Jewish student it accused of anti-Semitism for speaking out against the U.S. embassy moving to Jerusalem at a pro-Israel event. Haaretz notes that in other instances, the government's case against so-called Israel boycotters includes only "superficial Google searches and that the ministry, by admission of its own senior officials, does not collect information from non-public sources."

In the Jerusalem mayoral race, The Times of Israel interviews former Jerusalem mayoral candidate Aziz Abu Sarah, whose campaign to become the city's first Palestinian mayor was abruptly cut short earlier this week. Abu Sarah says Palestinians threatening him played a role in his decision to quit, but he was really forced out when Israel challenged his residency in the city, saying his "center of life" was elsewhere, while the front-runner in the mayoral race, Ze'ev Elkin, only moved to Jerusalem a few months ago for the sole purpose of running for mayor. Now, not only can Abu Sarah not run for mayor, he may be forced to leave the city altogether because of rules stripping residency rights from some East Jerusalem Palestinians. "My lawyer said that what happened is pretty bad. He said if they do not see you as a resident, your first problem is you cannot run for office, but your bigger problem is you may not be able to stay here". Even though he's out of the race, Abu Sarah says he will continue campaigning for the rights of East Jerusalemites: "In coming days, I will be meeting with Palestinians to talk about how we can serve our city outside the municipality."

Meanwhile, campaign posters put up by Likud's Tel Aviv faction in South Tel Aviv ahead of the October 30 municipal elections depicting African migrants and Islamists under the slogan "It's us or them" have drawn accusations of racism and incitement. One poster depicts a split screen, one half with a masked Islamist waving a Palestinian flag above the words "the Islamic Movement in Jaffa." According to the campaign Tel Aviv/Jaffa's choice is that or the image depicted on the other half of the poster – an Israeli flag under the words "the Hebrew city." Along the bottom of the poster the words read "only Likud, the Right of Tel Aviv." Another Likud campaign poster, with the same "it's us or them" slogan juxtaposes an image of African migrants waving an Eritrean flag above the words “city of infiltrators” with the same Israeli flag image and "Hebrew city" banner seen in the other poster.

Police investigators were set to question Prime Minister Netanyahu for the 12th time today in a series of burgeoning corruption investigations. Netanyahu will be questioned at his official residence in an interview likely to touch on recordings and information provided by his former adviser Nir Hefetz, who has been recruited as a state witness. The questioning is set to focus on two separate graft cases in which the prime minister is a suspect – known as Cases 1000 and 2000, according to Hebrew media reports – in which he is suspected of receiving illicit gifts and engaging in illegal quid pro quos. It is not clear if police will also ask Netanyahu about a third affair known as Case 4000, in which police suspect he may have traded favors for favorable media coverage. In Case 1000, the so-called "gifts scandal," Netanyahu is suspected of "systematically" demanding benefits worth about NIS 1 million ($282,000) from billionaire benefactors, including Arnon Milchan and Australian resort owner James Packer, in exchange for favors. Case 2000 involves a suspected illicit quid-pro-quo deal between Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes that would have seen the prime minister weaken a rival daily, the Sheldon Adelson-backed Israel Hayom, in return for more favorable coverage from Yedioth. In Case 4000 Netanyahu is suspected of advanced regulatory decisions as communications minister and prime minister that benefited Shaul Elovitch, the controlling shareholder in Bezeq, the country's largest telecommunications firm, despite opposition from the Communication Ministry's career officials, in exchange for positive coverage from Elovitch's Walla news site. Netanyahu's wife Sara and son Yair are also suspects in that case.

Finally, Iranian forces have started withdrawing over the past couple of days from the T4 military airport, the al-Quds newspaper reported Wednesday, citing Syrian opposition sources. According to the report, the Iranians have started vacating the premises of the base, which is situated on the outskirts of the Syrian city of Homs, to make room for Russian forces who entered the military compound, in order to help complete the transfer of the S-300 missiles. The Russians have also reportedly asked to see Syrian presence reduced in the airport nearby, which is considered to be one of the most highly-guarded strategic sites in Syria.

 

 

ISRAEL AT FATEFUL CROSSROADS: Shimon Schiffer in Yedioth Ahronoth asserts that the IDF's decision to bolster forces on the Gaza border would usually signal a countdown to retaking the Strip, but Sinwar's offer of a truce in return for ending the siege poses a challenge for Israeli decision makers.

"In other times, say 30 years ago, the Chief of Staff's decision to increase the army's deployment around Gaza would have been not only dramatic, but would also have marked an advance in one clear-cut direction: A countdown towards a broad military operation, and possibly even the retaking of the Gaza Strip. But yesterday, following the publication in Yedioth Ahronoth of Hamas leader Yahiya as-Sinwar's offer of 'a cease-fire in return for ending the siege', a difficult political-security challenge has been created for Israeli decision-makers.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman are now required to respond to Sinwar's proposal and decide: An arrangement in return for lifting the siege on millions of Gaza residents - or another round of fighting, which will exact a painful and heavy toll on all sides.

For those still wondering why publish a newspaper interview and grant a stage to a bitter enemy of Israel like Sinwar, an arch-terrorist who was imprisoned for 22 years in Israeli jails for murder, it is essential to mention and clarify one simple thing. The Israeli side is conducting negotiations and maintaining ongoing contacts – albeit indirect – with the Hamas regime in Gaza. This is a fact. and no amount of wording manipulation or evasion attempts, according to which 'we do not talk to Hamas' or 'the talks are conducted through the Egyptians', will conceal the simple fact that Netanyahu's government is talking, with a capital T, with Hamas representatives. Not only is Netanyahu talking to Hamas, and has talked to it in the past, it should be remembered that he is also directly responsible for the release of Sinwar from Israeli prison, with another 1,000 Palestinians, as part of the Shalit deal.

There is nothing wrong with a dialogue with Hamas, which manages the lives of Gaza residents. Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to keep embassies in Moscow and Washington and maintain a hot line between the leaders, while their nuclear missiles were prepped and aimed at each other, poised for mutual destruction. Even Winston Churchill, whose style of leadership Prime Minister Netanyahu wishes to emulate, hinted that he would have been ready to parley with Hitler – had that enabled him to prevent war.

However, we must not get confused: Hamas adheres to a religious and fanatic worldview and will continue to strive to remove Israel from the land that Hamas believes belongs – in its entirety - to the Palestinian people. But that does not mean that we cannot try to reach an agreement with it, even if it is 'only' for five years.

Morning headlines place Israel at a fateful crossroads. Bolstering the forces on the Gaza border in preparation for a military operation or responding to Sinwar's half-hearted call for appeasement and an arrangement. The Prime Minister and the cabinet are now placed with the heavy responsibility of navigating between them and deciding in what direction to head. This is the essence of leadership: To point the way, and successfully lead towards it."

Ends…

 

CHALLENGES OF UPCOMING WAR: Colonel (Res.) Ronen Itzik in Israel Hayom argues that war with Hamas is only a matter of time, and the IDF must prepare for scenarios of large terror squads attacking Israeli civilians, mobs of demonstrators blocking Israeli forces, and a "rain" of incendiary balloons and kites.

"Since March, the pendulum of confrontation between Hamas and Israel has fluctuated between calm and escalation. In recent days it seems that the general direction is pretty clear – a diplomatic arrangement is probably not in the offing. What is the military significance of this situation and is the IDF prepared for the new challenges of Gaza? It is important to assess the situation correctly before embarking merrily on a new campaign.

Since the end of Operation Protective Edge in September 2014, Hamas has been working hard on rebuilding its fighting forces: Bunkers, missiles, rockets, combat tunnels, and offensive tunnels. This effort has encountered counter-efforts by the IDF in the framework of the so-called campaign-between-the-wars, which deals with slowing down the buildup in Gaza. The IDF's efforts are bearing fruit, especially in neutralizing tunnels and reducing smuggling, in parallel to Egyptian pressure. But in some areas Hamas has learned and enhanced its capabilities and the IDF is required to prepare before the next campaign kicks off.

In general, the IDF's challenges in fighting Hamas can be divided into three main categories: The home front of the fighting zone, the line of contact along the fence and deep inside Gaza.

In the home front of the fighting zone, Hamas has improved its Special Forces, an-Nukhba, in a positive lesson from Operation Protective Edge. These forces, which at their basic level of soldiering are roughly equivalent to the lowliest soldier in the Golani Brigade, are not expected to pose significant difficulties for the IDF in its maneuvers on land, but dispatching them to the Israeli home front, into settlements or military bases, may produce surprising moves with great effect. Hamas attempted such moves in Protective Edge. The success was minor, but the potential was dramatic. Try imagining 12 terrorists on a killing spree inside Sderot or Netivot – and you will comprehend the problem.

In addition to an-Nukhba's capabilities, Hamas has developed and enhanced the technique of incendiary balloons, including the establishment of a unit dedicated to the matter. The combination of kites, balloons, and explosive charges can create significant difficulties in the home front, and serve as a platform for quality terror attacks. At the very least, it has the potential to disrupt life on the home front.

The ability to operate deep inside Israeli territory, which Hamas has improved, is combined with a component it recently reinforced on the line of contact at the fence area. Since April, Hamas has realized that the arrival of tens of thousands of civilians to the fence serves its operational and propaganda needs. Massive and incessant demonstrations may weaken the IDF forces through confrontations with civilians, under whose cover Hamas may attempt to 'thread' Special Forces deep into the communities of the Gaza envelope. The civil effort on the fence is likely to serve Hamas in delaying the IDF forces when the troops attempt to cross it. The entry of forces into a mass of civilians poses a significant challenge, which could disrupt the entire maneuver and create a problematic mindset in the media.

There have been no dramatic changes deep inside Gazan territory – Hamas established the fighting tunnels, the bunkers, and the fortified positions. In principle, a thrust deep inside Gaza by IDF forces is not a dramatic challenge – the IDF is trained for combat in such fortified targets, including the development and use of weapons that enable more effective thwarting of the tunnels. But even deep inside Gaza the same potential exists for placing masses of civilians in the face of attacking forces, in a way that will disrupt them, while creating a media consciousness that will pit the international community against Israel. This, too, is not new to the army, but Hamas has recently gained confidence in mobilizing thousands for its benefit regarding IDF forces and this skill will come into play more forcefully.

In conclusion, the significant challenge facing the IDF in the next operation in Gaza focuses on the civilian element on both sides of the fence: On the Israeli side, the ability to strike at the home front coupled with the feasibility of an-Nukhba terrorists infiltrating into the surrounding communities; and on the Gazan side, an enhanced use of civilian mobs both along the line of contact and deep in Gaza, in order to delay the IDF moves, disrupt them and create a situation that would undermine the legitimacy of operating deep in enemy territory. There is no doubt that the IDF can cope well with these challenges – as a result of its training and force. All the lessons of Protective Edge are on the line here, and in the next operation the IDF will have to show that it has learned from its mistakes and ultimately also win."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S SELF-DECEPTION: Amos Gilboa in Maariv contends that he hears time and time again that same old tune, "we are the strongest in the Middle East". But, he asks, will Israel really manage to cope with Hezbollah launching towards it even a mere 5,000 missiles a day?

"It is two days before October 6, the day the Yom Kippur War broke out 45 years ago. I want to expose here an event related to the Syrian front and to examine its lesson, which is relevant to today. It is already known to all that on September 25, 1973, Hussein King of Jordan met with Golda Meir and informed her that the Syrian army was in a position to launch an attack on the Golan Heights. When Golda asked whether Syria would go to war alone, without Egypt, Hussein replied negatively. 'Then there is nothing new in Hussein's words,' was the conclusion the following day after the meeting between the head of Military Intelligence and the top security echelon. An integral part of the view was that Syria would not go to war alone.

After all, we know that Egypt is not embarking on war, but little did we know that shortly after the Golda and Hussein parley, intelligence information was received that the objective of Syria is to reoccupy the entire Golan Heights; the preparations by the Syrian army for the attack and steps taken to quickly complete all these preparations.

The intelligence branch responsible for Syria, headed by Lt. Col. Avi Yaari, immediately prepared a special paper and submitted it for the approval of Military Intelligence. The gist of it was: Syria is completing final preparations before an attack aimed at conquering the Golan Heights. The top intelligence echelon castrated the paper, deleted most of it and decided that the Syrians were actually afraid of us, and clearly would not go to war without Egypt, and Egypt has no such intention.

What is the big paradox? The perception that Syria would not go to war without Egypt was indeed correct. And therefore, if the most reliable information indicates preparations for a Syrian attack on the Golan Heights, and we can see preparations on the ground, the obvious conclusion is of course that Egypt is also going to war. As Sherlock Holmes would say: 'Elementary!' The tragedy is that nothing was 'elementary' at the top levels of the intelligence, security and political establishment.

The root of all evil was in our self-deception: That we have the best air force and the best armor; that we are giants and the Arabs are zeros; that our conscription army can stop the enemy until the reserves arrive; that Egypt is conducting an exercise; that the Syrians are afraid of us. We were under a spell of self-deception.

Which brings me to today. I have a feeling that self-deception has a grip on us today as well, in all levels of the public sphere. I keep hearing that same old tune, according to which 'we are the strongest in the Middle East' and that 'there is no existential threat to us' (and I always ask myself: If we should sustain tens of thousands of dead and wounded, will that be a quarter-existential threat? half-existential?); and stop frightening us with the Iranians and with their rockets and Hezbollah's rockets; we have 'iron dome' and 'magic wand' and 'Arrow' missiles, which will know how to defeat the missiles of our haters; the greatest threat to us is not Iran and Hezbollah, but internal divisions, and so on and so forth.

You cannot ascertain what is truly correct and what is not, but the memory of the 1973 war haunts me. I am not at ease, and I do not know, for example, how the State of Israel will be able to cope if, one of these days, Hezbollah, under Iran's instructions, will launch at us 5,000 rockets a day, for example, some of which will be precise missiles on our hospitals. Are we still under the spell?"

Ends…

 

ABU MAZIN EXPECTED TO RENEGE ON GAZA THREATS: Yoni Ben-Menachem on News1 writes that the PA chairman is supposed to decide this month on disengaging from Gaza and new sanctions, but he is capitulating under international and regional pressure.

"Residents of the territories are very disappointed with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 'Abbas' recent speech at the UN General Assembly. It contained no good news about the crisis between the PA and the Trump administration, the impasse in negotiations with Israel and the achievement of Palestinian unity and reconciliation with Hamas.

In the UNGA the PA chairman raised the issue of the split between Fatah and Hamas and threatened to impose new sanctions against Gaza. In the territories there is criticism that 'Abbas raised an internal Palestinian issue on the international stage, exposing for all what is actually a national shame and a failure of Palestinian factions, who are having difficulty reconciling for 12 years running. The question now is: Where is 'Abbas headed, after successfully booby-trapping himself and thwarting a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel, which would improve the humanitarian situation of the 2 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian expectations were that 'Abbas would announce in his speech at the UN General Assembly the freezing of the Oslo Accords and especially the suspension of security coordination with Israel. This did not happen.

Egypt is trying to prevent an explosion in the Strip and a military confrontation between Hamas and Israel by raising new ideas before a Hamas delegation headed by Deputy Chairman of the Political Bureau Saleh al-'Arouri, which visited Cairo and held talks with senior Egyptian intelligence officials. 'Abbas, for his part, announced that he would convene the PLO's Central Council this month to discuss the overall relationship between the PA and Israel and Hamas and make decisions. Senior Fatah figure Jamal Muheisin said this week that 'Abbas might ask the PLO's executive committee to formulate mechanisms for implementing the decisions of the Central Council against Israel, but senior PLO officials believe that 'Abbas has trapped himself and will not dare to come out against Israel or against Hamas.

Fatah leaders are waiting for the Cairo talks to generate a miracle, and for Egyptian intelligence to succeed in convincing Hamas to agree to convene the PLO Central Council in order to reach agreement on a formula that will enable the PA to return to Gaza with full authority, thus preventing the need to deal with imposing new sanctions on the Strip. Miracles seldom occur, as they have failed to occur in the past in the relationship between Fatah and Hamas, and a breakthrough will not be attained in the Cairo talks. The Hamas delegation will hold consultations with the Hamas leadership and with its Shura Council, 'Abbas will be asked to dispatch a Fatah delegation to Cairo and the discussions will continue for a few more weeks.

'Abbas has opened fronts against the Trump administration, against Israel and against Hamas, and he continues to face challenges on these three fronts because it serves him from a domestic political perspective. Senior Fatah officials believe that the status quo will be maintained on all three fronts. 'Abbas is expected to roll the hot potato into the lap of the PLO's central council to gain time, and then, as is his wont, not implement the decisions that will be made.

The PLO Central Council serves as 'Abbas's rubber stamp. He appointed its members. This is a dictatorial regime in which 'Abbas is the only one who makes the real decisions, not the PLO or Fatah institutions. Egypt and Israel are exerting strong pressure on 'Abbas not to break the rules of the game regarding Gaza and not to impose new sanctions on it. The Fatah leadership believes that 'Abbas fears that he will be accused of inciting a new war between Hamas and Israel, which will have many victims, and therefore he will find the appropriate excuse for postponing the imposition of new sanctions at this point on the 2 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.

'Abbas has brought himself to a crossroads where he must make a decision, but as usual he has defense mechanisms which he keeps for himself to avoid a decision that may endanger his political survival. 'Abbas is an expert in 'dragging his feet' and maintaining the status quo, while spreading threats he cannot implement. He knows full well that a military confrontation between Hamas and Israel will not bring about Palestinian unity, nor the PA's return to control the Gaza Strip. The current Israeli government is not interested in reoccupying the Gaza Strip and bringing down the Hamas regime. Neither will imposing new sanctions on Gaza bend the Hamas regime or instigate an 'Arab Spring' against the Hamas leadership, which has succeeded in channeling the anger of Gazans against the PA. 'Abbas will continue to dribble the ball towards the United States, Egypt, Hamas, and Israel, without making bold decisions and without breaking the rules of the game. Like every Arab dictator whose goal is to maintain his chair, and for who all means for achieving this end are legitimate."

Ends…

 

'ABBAS/HAMAS RIFT THREATENS TO BLOW UP IN ISRAEL'S FACE: Amos Harel in Haaretz claims that while Hamas cells cross into Israel at night and airborne firebombs are still being launched, the real time bomb is the infrastructure in Gaza.

"Once again it is a race against the clock in the Gaza Strip to head off yet another military escalation. As Haaretz reported on Thursday, Qatar agreed – after considerable arm-twisting – to allocate $60 million to purchase diesel fuel for the Strip’s sole power plant. The move, which was negotiated by United Nations Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov, should enable the generating plant to double the number of hours it supplies electricity from a daily average of four to eight, thus easing one of the main factors in the latest flare-up of tensions with Israel.

The Palestinian Authority, however, continues to create obstacles, threatening to block the contracts to purchase fuel from Israel for the West Bank, while further cutting its spending on electricity for the Strip. As such, three tanker trucks carrying diesel oil were turned away from entering Gaza Friday morning. In light of the sensitivity of the matter, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot ordered troops to be reinforced along Israel's border with Gaza. In recent weeks, Hamas has been turning up the heat along the fence with nightly protests and the deployment of new 'night units' to sabotage Israel's construction of its anti-tunnel barrier. It now seems that Hamas' actions could, for the first time, delay the completion of that barrier, even if only slightly.

Media coverage of all of these events has been limited. In the wake of the panic set off by the wave of incendiary balloons launched from the Strip into Israel over the summer, the government and the army are now cooperating in an effort to damp down coverage of Israeli military operations at the border. The decline in reporting has not, however, diminished the growing anxiety in Israeli communities near Gaza, and the nightly attempts to breach the border clearly have the potential to be far more dangerous than the airborne firebombs. The rift between the two main Palestinian camps, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank, draws Hamas closer to a confrontation with the Israeli military. Israel, which has not joined the efforts to rebuild the Strip during the three-and-a-half years of relative calm since the 2014 Gaza war, is now paying the price of a conflict in which its role is relatively small.

In a rare interview with Italy's La Repubblica, Hamas' leader in Gaza, Yahiya as-Sinwar, conveyed complex messages. He is not looking to go to war with Israel, he said, 'but in the current situation, an explosion is inevitable.' It is easy to understand why Hamas is not eager for war. The most recent Israeli operations in the Strip, and especially Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, drove home the fact that the destruction they caused there dwarfed any gains for Hamas. Furthermore, no one is stepping up to bankroll the enclave's rehabilitation.

Even so, Israel's troop reinforcements in the South reflect the depth of its apprehensions regarding an escalation of tensions. The IDF is struggling to come up with an effective response to the nightly outings by Hamas cells East of the border fence, most of which return to the Strip unharmed. Deploying additional forces should contribute to this effort as well. But the real ticking time bomb is the infrastructure crisis in Gaza. If the PA succeeds in peeling off even the tiny bandage that Qatar and the UN placed on a gaping wound, the crisis will continue to worsen. Israel cannot afford to wake up one day to find itself with a Mediterranean Yemen under its nose – a humanitarian disaster zone that the international community has given up on fixing."

Ends…

 

NO QATARI FUEL AID INCREASES DANGER OF VIOLENCE: Avi Issacharoff in The Times of Israel writes that Palestinian sources say Ramallah warned it would boycott Israeli fuel and told fuel workers in Gaza not to show up to work, as 'Abbas tightens the stranglehold on the enclave.

"For the umpteenth time in recent months, Israel has received proof that severed relations between Jerusalem and Ramallah and between Ramallah and Gaza could significantly compromise security on the Gaza border. Palestinian sources said Thursday that threats made by the Palestinian Authority to an Israeli gas company and to UN employees have delayed the planned transfer of emergency Qatari-funded fuel to Gaza. The latest fracas shows how attempts by the U.S. administration and by Israel to deal directly with Gaza – actually with Hamas, the terror group that runs the Strip – are time and again hindered by the PA and its president, Mahmoud 'Abbas.

As Haaretz reported Thursday, in recent days it was agreed in a meeting of donors to the Strip that Qatar would pay for fuel for Gaza's sole power plant, under a UN-brokered deal that seeks to end the severe energy crisis gripping the Palestinian enclave. According to a Palestinian report, Qatar will invest $60 million, which should be enough for six months in which Gazans will enjoy eight hours of electricity every day, instead of the current four. Yes, that still means power for only a third of every day, but in Gaza terms that would be real improvement. Such a step could help calm tensions on the border and reduce the danger of imminent war.

The move was promoted by three men: Qatari envoy to Israel and Gaza Mohammed al-'Emadi, UN envoy to the Middle East Nickolay Mladenov and the head of Israel's National Security Council Meir Ben Shabbat. The diesel fuel was supposed to enter Gaza on Thursday morning through the Kerem Shalom crossing. However, according to Palestinian sources in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority contacted the Israeli gas company that provides diesel fuel to both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and threatened to boycott it and stop all purchases if it transferred the fuel to Gaza. The PA warned it would start buying all its fuel and gas from another country, such as Jordan.

The sources also said PA officials called UN employees in Gaza who were to physically transfer the fuel and threatened that they would pay a 'heavy price' if they showed up to work. In other words, the PA blocked an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, primarily to make clear to the whole world that it must be involved in any step regarding the territory. 'Abbas has repeatedly warned that there can be no two separate entities ruling Palestinian lands, stating that if the PA is not handed complete control of the Gaza Strip, Hamas will have to take full responsibility for the territory.

The PA's actions bring us to Hamas leader in the Strip Yahiya as-Sinwar's interview with Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth through an Italian journalist, in which he said he did not want war with the Jewish state. Predictably, Sinwar's office denied Thursday morning that he was aware he was speaking to Yedioth, saying the interview was given to Italian newspaper La Repubblica and that his staff had checked that the journalist, Francesca Borri, was not Israeli or 'Jewish.' But that trick by Hamas's leaders is old and familiar. At the end of the day, what is important is the message. Sinwar wanted to warn that both sides are on a slippery slope to an inevitable war. Though he urged an end to the blockade to prevent such a war, his message does not necessarily involve a demand for specific action by Israel, but rather that Israel force the PA into relieving its chokehold on Gaza.

Israel maintains the blockade to prevent Hamas from importing weaponry. In about two weeks, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee will convene and possibly resolve to completely halt all its payments to Gaza, which currently stand at $96 million a month. In such a scenario, even the stalled Qatari aid of some $60 million will not stop the Strip's collapse and the war that will follow."

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 5.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Ramallah, Gaza, and Sinwar

2-Loss of reason and the threat to the Arab order

3-Iran 3, the U.S. 0

 

1-  Ramallah, Gaza, and Sinwar

 

Ramallah is concerned about Hamas's negotiations in Cairo aimed at reaching a tahdi'a [lull or calming down] with Israel that excludes the PA, since that would undermine the latter's status as the Palestinians' sole representative. And Gaza believes that Ramallah does not care about it, and that its terms for regaining unity are impossible to satisfy, since accepting them would be tantamount to handing Hamas's neck over to Israel. The search for a solution for the Gaza problem has turned into a resounding scandal for the Palestinians. Accusations and counter-accusations abound, and, meanwhile, a number of facts have been forgotten or ignored. The inter-Palestinian split destroys the Palestinians' national project, leaving them exposed to the Israeli occupation, not in the sense of allowing Israel to free itself of any commitments to the PA, since it needs no pretext to do so, but to allow it to pick on each of Gaza and Ramallah separately: Gaza by maintaining the blockade, and Ramallah by continuing to ignore it. Moreover, the split makes it impossible for the Palestinians to develop a unified strategy to regain their rights, and deprives them of the advantage of highlighting their suffering--Mohammad Yaghi in Palestinian al-Ayyam

Sinwar's confidence in his ability to 'achieve a settlement with Israel' seemed greater than his confidence in his ability to inflict defeat on it. He seemed optimistic about the prospects of reaching an indirect peace agreement with Israel, and he set a date for that: The middle of this month – ten days from now. (In truth, I have no idea where he gets his confidence and optimism from). Moreover, his willingness to respect any agreement with Israel and honor his signature to it appeared to be stronger than his desire to develop equations of 'deterrence and fear,' 'mutual balance,' and 'imposing new rules of engagement'…even when he tried to brandish the card of 'resistance escalation', he used terms totally different from those in Hamas's usual discourse. He said that, if no agreement were reached…Hamas would create anarchy by means of massive demonstrations along the borders between Gaza and Israel. He replaced the word 'resistance' with that of 'anarchy,' which explains some of the unpublicized, or rather passed-over-in-silence, aspects of the 'Great Marches of Return', and what is happening along the bloody border and barbed wire fence. It exposes the true aims and hidden motives behind holding these Marches--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

There may be good reasons for the mutual fear and suspicion between Gaza and Ramallah, but the continued split will end in liquidating the Palestinian cause, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. Both sides must accept a number of facts for an agreement to be possible. While most comments have centered on whether Hamas's Gaza leader Yahiya as-Sinwar knowingly gave an interview to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, the interview's actual content is much more important and revealing, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. It shows that Hamas's discourse and strategy have radically changed under the new leadership, and that the movement has become more pragmatic, focusing on the need to end the blockade on Gaza.

 

CLOSER TO DIVORCE: "For months now, the press and social media have been speaking of a qualitative change in the relationship between Gaza and Ramallah, bringing it closer to a final divorce," notes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Ramallah is concerned about Hamas's negotiations in Cairo aimed at reaching a tahdi'a [lull or calming down] with Israel that excludes the PA, since that would undermine the latter's status as the Palestinians' sole representative. And Gaza believes that Ramallah does not care about it, and that its terms for regaining unity are impossible to satisfy, since accepting them would be tantamount to handing Hamas's neck over to Israel.

The search for a solution for the Gaza problem has turned into a resounding scandal for the Palestinians. Accusations and counter-accusations abound, and meanwhile, a number of facts have been forgotten or ignored.

The inter-Palestinian split destroys the Palestinians' national project, leaving them exposed to the Israeli occupation – not in the sense of allowing Israel to free itself of any commitments to the PA, since it needs no pretext to do so, but in the sense of allowing it to pick on each of Gaza and Ramallah separately: Gaza by maintaining the blockade, and Ramallah by continuing to ignore it. Moreover, the split makes it impossible for the Palestinians to develop a unified strategy to regain their rights, and deprives them of the advantage of highlighting their suffering.

But even more important are the facts that both sides must comprehend if the split is to end:

- The first fact is that Gaza cannot survive under the blockade. Ten years of blockade as well as four wars are more than any human being should endure; in fact, this situation has become intolerable. The choice is between an explosion or an acceptable deal that ends the blockade and preserves the Palestinians' dignity. The PA should not allow Israel to continue to impose this reality.

- The second fact is that Gaza should not be asked to lay down its resistance's arms. Why? Because this would allow the occupation to enter Gaza any time and arrest or kill whomever it wants, as it is now doing in the West Bank. Moreover, it would allow the settlers and the occupation's army to attack Gaza any time they wish. Furthermore, the resistance serves as a card in the Palestinians' hands, without which nothing can be achieved at the negotiating table with Israel. We know this from the precedent of what happened in the negotiations with Ramallah and from the presence of thousands of Palestinians in Israeli prisons who are waiting for an Israeli prisoners' exchange deal with Hamas. There is no need to go into too much detail here because this matter is well understood.

- The third fact is that there will be no Palestinian state in the West Bank. The West Bank is being swallowed up by settlements. Israel is developing its plans for what to do with the heavily populated areas that will remain after it annexes the larger part of the West Bank. So the problem in the West Bank is not Gaza, but the absence of any horizon for the West Bank's transformation (together with Gaza) into an independent state.

- The fourth fact is that a 'state' on Gaza's lands is possible. Israel wants nothing from Gaza except security; and if it gets what it wants, it is willing to give Hamas a state if that is what is desired. And in this regard, we have bear in mind that Gaza's lands are geographically contiguous: It is situated on the sea, which allows it to have a port, and it has land borders with Egypt – along with the possibility that a deal with Egypt could even allow it to expand its lands.

- The fifth fact is that the PA's concerns that the establishment of a state in Gaza is part of a project being prepared by the Trump administration to liquidate the Palestinian cause are legitimate. But we must remember that Hamas's ideology does not permit it accept such a deal, as it would not survive as a political organization with a strong following and fighters. A conflict would erupt within it that would end in destroying it.

- The sixth fact is that Hamas's efforts to reach an agreement with Ramallah whereby the PA takes control of Gaza stems from its desire to end the blockade, not from a conviction that it would be the main winner if unity were to be achieved.

- The seventh fact is that Hamas has been running Gaza for ten years now. It now has an administrative and security apparatus that must be part of any settlement with Ramallah.

"If these facts are understood and accepted, it would be possible to reach a settlement between Ramallah and Gaza. Continuing to deny these facts will only lead to further deterioration in the Palestinian situation," concludes Yaghi.

End…

 

BETWEEN CRITICS AND SUPPORTERS: "Observers and commentators' attention has focused on whether Yahiya as-Sinwar was aware of the identity of the journalist who conducted his latest interview," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Friday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Sinwar's critics faulted him for speaking to Yedioth Ahronoth, viewing this as a detestable case of 'normalization'; and his supporters maintained a suspicious silence until 'the white smoke' rose from his office's chimney. And when he confronted his critics, issuing denials and clarifications, he confined himself to saying that the journalist had hid her identity and that he did not know that she would be 'selling' his interview to an Israeli newspaper. As for the question of content, Sinwar only said that some of the journalist's 'alterations' were intended to make it appear as if an Israeli paper was conducting the interview.

But as regards what he was actually reported as saying – which I believe is the more important matter– not many have addressed this issue, neither among Sinwar's supporters nor his opponents, and nor, in fact, by Sinwar himself in his denial and clarification statement.

I do not fault Sinwar for speaking to an Israeli newspaper. In fact, I believe that that is a point in his favor and not against him, although he and many others are totally opposed to that. Sinwar spent more than two decades in the occupation's jails where he had the opportunity to learn Hebrew and familiarize himself with Israeli ways of thinking. And ever since he became Hamas's leader in Gaza, he has shown greater interest in Hamas's media directed at the Israeli public, and using its language.

What interests me more are the developments and changes in Hamas's discourse, tone, and priorities as revealed in Sinwar's answers to the journalist, and the material that this provides to help us understand how Hamas thinks today, eleven years after it took power in Gaza along with the horrendous punitive measures and blockade that have accompanied them. This is the interview's more important aspect, and not the identity of the journalist who conducted it or how it came to be published in the Israeli newspaper with the widest circulation.

The interview suggest that the man is 'desperate' to achieve a tahdi'a with Israel – any sort of tahdi'a and via any mediator – provided that the blockade on the Gaza Strip is lifted in return. There is no room here for all the talk of resistance, liberation, and 'return' that Hamas's marches have adopted as their title.

It is also worth noting that Sinwar spoke of 'the end of occupation' and not 'the end of the blockade.' This is an important point that clearly reveals the man's thinking. For we have become accustomed to hearing Hamas's claim that the Strip was liberated and is no longer under occupation, and that what took place in 2005 was 'liberation' and not a unilateral – and booby-trapped – withdrawal by Ariel Sharon.

In his name and that of many factions he did not identify, Sinwar promised an absolute calm in return for tahdi'a and lifting the siege. He explained the humanitarian conditions that result from Gazans' suffering. In fact, it seems that most, if not all, of what preoccupies Hamas and tops its list of priorities is to 'end the blockade,' always provided that this does not strip it of the 'de facto authority' it heads in the Strip.

Sinwar is not seeking war; that is what he said. For war is in no one's interest. In fact, he never mentioned the word 'resistance' once, at least,judging from the text I read that was translated by more than one source. But he did say that if Israel were to attack the Strip, he would defend it, and that Tel Aviv would fail to achieve its aims. Moreover, Sinwar dropped the 'boasting' that used to characterize many of Hamas's leaders' statements, when he asked: 'Who wants to fight a nuclear state [Israel] with four slingshots?' The figure cited [four] is his, not mine.

Sinwar's statements reminded me how [former Hamas head] Khaled Mish'al used to be preoccupied with what I referred to as 'the mathematics of resistance and deterrence,' when he said that the proportion of Palestinian to Israeli losses is 2:1, and that in the near future this would be adjusted and become equal. But we now are now dealing with a new sort of discourse and logic. We are witnessing a live example of how power and its demands and calculations can tame resistance with its requirements, discourse, and terms.

Sinwar's confidence in his ability to 'achieve a settlement with Israel' seemed greater than his confidence in his ability to inflict defeat on it. He seemed optimistic about the prospects of reaching an indirect peace agreement with Israel, and he set a date for that: The middle of this month – ten days from now. (In truth, I have no idea where he gets his confidence and optimism from). Moreover, his willingness to respect any agreement with Israel and honor his signature to it appeared to be stronger than his desire to develop equations of 'deterrence and fear,' 'mutual balance,' and 'imposing new rules of engagement.' In fact, had we not known who the speaker was and where the interview took place, we would have said that the man who made these statements (to La Repubblica or to Yedioth Ahronoth, it makes no difference) was one of Fatah or the PA or the PLO's leading figures.

In fact, even when he tried to brandish the card of 'resistance escalation', he used terms totally different from those in Hamas's usual discourse. He said that if no agreement were reached (with Israel in ten days), Hamas would create anarchy by means of massive demonstrations along the borders between Gaza and Israel. He replaced the word 'resistance' with that of 'anarchy,' which explains some of the unpublicized, or rather passed-over-in-silence, aspects of the 'Great Marches of Return', and what is happening along the bloody border and barbed wire fence. It exposes the true aims and hidden motives behind holding these Marches.

Sinwar's statements are worth reviewing and scrutinizing for what they reveal about what is going on inside Hamas and more importantly, about how one of its most prominent leaders thinks.

"And one may agree or disagree with the man; but it would be difficult for any fair and objective person to question his history of struggle and his patriotic commitment," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

2-  Loss of reason and the threat to the Arab order

 

Saudi Arabia has lost its mind and reason as a state. Today, it is being managed with the logic of militias and gangs. And if it does not adjust its policies quickly and radically, it will suffer a major catastrophe – something that no one wishes upon the land of the Two Holy Shrines. I realize that the above has been said as if it were inevitable without placing it in context or leading up to it with an introduction. But this is intentional; for there is no time left to avoid the threat to the Kingdom – and to us Arabs, all Arabs – unless a degree of reason and logic are injected back into Saudi Arabia's domestic and foreign policies. For it would be mere delusion if Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and those who support him were to believe that consolidating his hold on power in this savage manner and creating domestic and foreign enemies will ensure his remaining in power--Osama Abu-Irshaid on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

The official Arab order's involvement in inter-Arab conflicts, futile wars, threats to smaller Arab countries, and the abortion of peaceful attempts at revolution have all prevented it from developing a sovereignty-imposing reaction that spares it public or secret insults. The fact is that it is not the U.S. administration that is responsible for the deterioration and collapse of the Arabs' sovereign reactions; it is the official Arab order that has created the conditions that have allowed it to be insulted and distorted. As long as the Arab political order persists with the same policy of suppressing the Arab peoples and bending over backwards to please the outside world, these public and undisclosed [U.S.] insults will soon develop into direct action that does away with what remains of the requirements for this order's survival. Overcoming inter-Arab disagreements and repairing the Gulf rift as soon as possible offer the sole way out and the means to surmounting the future schemes that are being carefully woven aimed at taking over the region and its riches--Mohammad Huneid in Qatari al-Watan

 

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's disappearance and the suspicion that he is being held hostage by the Saudi authorities further underlines the fact that the regime of King Salman and his son has gone completely haywire, maintains a Palestinian commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. Unless restrained, it is likely to lead the entire region to a catastrophic end. The insulting manner with which U.S. President Trump has recently spoken of the Saudi monarch and the oil-rich Arab countries is really these countries' fault, maintains a Tunisian commentator. But these insults also reveal the true nature of how U.S. administrations view the Arabs and Muslims in general.

 

LOST REASON: "Has Saudi Arabia gone completely mad?" asks Osama Abu-Irshaid on Friday on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.

This question may be too late, and the answer may have become obvious and does not call for much sophisticated discussion: Yes, Saudi Arabia has lost its mind and reason as a state. Today, it is being managed with the logic of militias and gangs. And if it does not adjust its policies quickly and radically, it will suffer a major catastrophe – something that no one wishes upon the land of the Two Holy Shrines.

I realize that the above has been said as if it were inevitable without placing it in context or leading up to it with an introduction. But this is intentional; for there is no time left to avoid the threat to the Kingdom – and to us Arabs, all Arabs – unless a degree of reason and logic are injected back into Saudi Arabia's domestic and foreign policies. For it would be mere delusion if Saudi Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman and those who support him were to believe that consolidating his hold on power in this savage manner and creating domestic and foreign enemies will ensure his remaining in power.

The above has been sparked by Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's mysterious disappearance after visiting his country's consulate in Istanbul to secure some legal documents. His fate remains unknown so far, with conflicting statements between the Turkish and Saudi authorities as to whether he remains inside the building or has left it. The man's friends and devotees are worried that he may have been kidnapped and transported to Riyadh.

The mystery behind Khashoggi's disappearance may have been resolved by the time this article is published. We hope that he returns to his family and devotees safe and secure. But even if the secret behind his disappearance were to be revealed and he reemerges safe and sound, this does not mean that the current that has consolidated its grip on the Kingdom's decision-making has returned to its senses. For Khashoggi's case is only one of a long series of catastrophic policies the Kingdom has been pursuing ever since King Salman acceded to the throne in 2015 and his son's star rose, becoming crown-prince in June 2015 after a palace coup against then crown-prince Mohammad bin Nayef.

Salman initiated his reign by declaring war on the Houthis who had swept over Yemen and captured its capital, Sana'a. As this war began, Mohammad bin Salman was placed in charge of leading it in his capacity as Defense Minister. Most Yemenis and Arabs supported it in the hope of saving Yemen from falling into the clutches of Iranian influence, as in the case of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. But the course of the war and the manner that it has been conducted has turned most Yemenis and Arabs against it.

It has become clear that Saudi Arabia and its Emirati ally were concerned less about liberating Yemen and more about destroying it, partitioning it, and fragmenting its social fabric so as to take control of its resources, islands, coasts, and strategic ports. The two countries established affiliated militias and made it their aim to target the very same 'legitimacy' in whose name they have intervened in Yemen. The result was that this 'legitimacy' was weakened and the anti-Houthi camp was torn apart – in fact, war was declared on some of its constituents such as the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah).

Yemen has thus ended up suffering from famine. Epidemics and diseases are invading it once again, and Saudi and Emirati warplanes are crushing its people and children. Meanwhile, the war with the Houthis is facing a real predicament. Saudi Arabia has itself become a target for ground and naval missiles.

There are those who argue that Yemen's destruction is in bin Salman and the UAE's interest, since they can then tighten control over what they wanted to capture. That would have been true had Saudi Arabia not been mired in a long war of attrition that has swallowed up its cash reserves and undermined its national security, with no prospects of victory.

The fact is that Saudi Arabia today is like an animal riddled with parasites feeding on its blood. The parasites here are the UAE. But the UAE's exploitation of Saudi Arabia under bin Salman is not confined to the Yemeni arena. We have also witnessed this in how it drove bin Salman to impose a blockade on Qatar in June 2017, its escalation against Turkey, and its declaration of war against the Muslim Brotherhood.

This does not mean that Saudi Arabia had clean hands before Salman and his son. It joined and engineered the [post Arab Spring] Arab counter-revolutions and sought to go along with Israel in an attempt to strangle the spirit of change in the region and contain Iran. But Saudi Arabia was a regional power before Salman and his son and it took part in leading the region, while under the current regime, it merely follows the UAE and acts as a minesweeper for the latter's policies.

Even worse is that the Saudi state has become hostage to bin Salman's ambitions to rule and his extreme rashness. In this regard, he is no different from his source of inspiration, Abu-Dhabi's Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Zayed. But once again, there are those who may ask: what's wrong with that since everything is permissible the sake of power? However, the problem is that under Salman and his son, Saudi Arabia has turned into a mere carriage being led by the UAE instead of being the engine that pulls the rest of the Arabs as it was for many long years.

Furthermore, bin Salman's promotion in Washington was not free of charge. For now we have Donald Trump repeatedly reminding Saudi Arabia, its King, and his crown-prince of the price: Pay up, or else! Anyone who believes that Riyadh and Abu-Dhabi's influence in the region is the result of their own power is mistaken; it is the result of their total identification with what Washington and Tel Aviv want.

The rash and tense policies Saudi Arabia has been pursuing domestically and regionally – indeed, internationally, as in the case of its escalation against Canada – will fail to impose Riyadh as a leader in the region, as bin Salman may delude himself into believing. On the contrary, after Al Salman hijacked it via repression and violence, the Saudi regime has lost the legitimacy that Al Saud used to enjoy when ruling the country. No one should believe that Al Saud's branches – assuming some of them survive – will forget what Salman and his son have done to them.

Moreover, by dismantling and weakening the Saudi Wahhabi religious institution and destroying its credibility, bin Salman has removed one of the tools of legitimizing his own power. By dealing violently with religious scholars and preachers, and with intellectuals, journalists, and human rights and women's rights' activists, regardless of their intellectual and ideological beliefs and background, he has also created many enemies in society.

With the Kingdom's continuing economic deterioration due to bin Salman's risky ventures and rash policies, and because of his total submission to Trump's blackmail, he risks exacerbating popular anger, especially among the youth. For the Saudi youth does not only want entertainment, as bin Salman imagines; it also wants employment and economic stability.

To this one should add that Saudi Arabia has widened its circle of enemies, especially in the region, among the Arabs and non-Arabs, as in the case of Iran and Turkey, and among the Shiites and Sunnis. In fact, with its rash and totally unbridled policies, Saudi Arabia finds few willing to defend it, neither at the UN, nor in Europe, nor even in the U.S. In fact, many U.S. decision-making circles have begun to express their unhappiness with it as in the case of Khashoggi's disappearance, and before that with Lebanese PM Sa'd al-Hariri and Jordanian/Palestinian businessman Sabih al-Masri's detention as hostages.

"In short, Saudi Arabia today is acting like a raging bull in a china shop. It is breaking everything around it. But it is also breaking its own horns (or will weaken them at least unless its sane people act to contain matters, and save it and everyone else from this mad desire for the throne," concludes Abu-Irshaid.

End…

 

TRUMP'S REAL VIEWS: "This is not the first time that the U.S. president delivers a speech before his supporters at a rally, reviving his old discourse that reflects how he really views the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf," writes Mohammad Huneid in Friday's Qatari daily al-Watan.

In a speech to his supporters in West Virginia, Trump spoke of a conversation he had with the Saudi king in which he said that Saudi Arabia could not protect itself if not for U.S. forces. There is not much new in this speech; but the public, direct, and offensive manner in which he spoke is new. For no American president has ever addressed the rich Arab countries in this manner, even at the height of the U.S. presence in the Gulf during the [2003] invasion of Iraq, for example.

So, what has changed to bring this about?

- First, the current American discourse is the most daring in revealing how the U.S. really thinks of the Arab countries. Trump's statements, which are often described as rash and lacking in the simplest diplomatic niceties, represent how the U.S. administration truly views the Arabs and Muslims. From this perspective, Trump's statements can be seen as positive, because they lift the veil off the nature of the relationship between the two sides. This is a gain for the Arabs' awareness of Washington's views in general.

- Second, these statements indicate how far the official Arabs' political ability to respond, or impose a degree of international respect, at least, has sunk. For no such statements have been directed against North Korea or Turkey, for example, despite their crises with the U.S. president. America's willingness to insult and repeat its insults in its political discourse reflects a deeply-rooted awareness that the other side is too weak to reject these insults, let alone respond to them.

- Third, the official Arab order's involvement in inter-Arab conflicts, futile wars, threats to smaller Arab countries, and the abortion of the peaceful attempts at revolution have all prevented it from developing a sovereignty-imposing reaction that spares it public or secret insults. The fact is that it is not the U.S. administration that is responsible for the deterioration and collapse of the Arabs' sovereign reactions; it is the official Arab order that has created the conditions that have allowed it to be insulted and distorted.

As long as the Arab political order persists with the same policy of suppressing the Arab peoples and bending over backwards to please the outside world, these public and undisclosed insults will soon develop into direct action that does away with what remains of the requirements for this order's survival.

"Overcoming inter-Arab disagreements and repairing the Gulf rift as soon as possible offer the sole way out and the means to surmounting the future schemes that are being carefully woven aimed at taking over the region and its riches," concludes Huneid.

Ends…

 

3-  Iran 3, the U.S. 0

 

Tehran has succeeded in having its three candidates elected to Iraq's main political posts, all at Washington's expense, says today's pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The election of both an Iraqi speaker of parliament and president, and the latter's appointment of a new PM, all demonstrate that Iran has scored three goals in the U.S.'s net by managing the complex network of relations between Iraq's various political forces, argues the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. This exposes Saudi Arabia's naivety in betting on its ability to influence the Iraqi political situation.

 

END TO LABOR PAINS: "Social media activists in Iraq have traded the hashtag '#Iran-3/U.S.-0' after the very long political labor pains ever since the Iraqi parliamentary elections in May this year have come to an end," notes Friday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi.

These labor pains were concluded in a single day with the election of Barham Saleh as Iraqi president and his selection of 'Adel 'Abdelmahdi to form the next government, after Mohammad al-Halbousi was elected Speaker of Parliament in mid-September.

It seems fairly clear that these three senior state figures' curriculum vitae and their personalities make little difference to the abovementioned assessment [Iran-3, U.S.-0]. When he competed for the presidency in 2014, Barham Saleh, who has high-level degrees from British universities, was unable to win. This was because Iran and its Iraqi allies' calculations at the time decided that the post should go to Fu'ad Ma'sum, who is affiliated with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) of which Barham Saleh was a major figure at the time, instead of going to the party closest to Tehran.

Of course, explaining what happened is easier when it comes to understanding 'Adel 'Abdelmahdi's intimate relationship with Iran. There are photos showing him together with the head of the SIC (Supreme Islamic Council) 'Ammar al-Hakim, training Iranian forces during the [1980/88] war with Iraq. Moreover, Mohammad al-Halbousi was the candidate of the alliance between PMU (Popular Mobilization Units) and its well-known leader Hadi al-'Ameri on the one hand, and former Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki's bloc on the other. In addition to the numerous turnabouts that characterize his political life as an MP and as a governor of al-Anbar, there are strong rumors and charges of corruption against him; moreover, Iran's allies struck mutual deals to ensure that he becomes speaker of parliament.

Iran and its allies used complex means to achieve this result combining displays of force – as it did at the end of August when Iranian officials and sources in Iraqi intelligence announced that certain Shiite groups allied with Iran have received ballistic missiles– with direct intervention in the complex network of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish forces.

But most importantly, according to al-Monitor, it sought to impose its decision on Shiite leader Muqtada as-Sadr via diplomatic means by bringing him together with head of the Qods Force General Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The aim was to ensure that Sadr's two political rivals, Nuri al-Maliki and Hadi al-'Ameri, would be at the forefront, making sure that this seems to be with Sadr's consent.

Of course, this does not mean that Iran managed to bridge all the party-political rivalries and bitter personal animosities between the various Shiite leaders. But it demonstrated that no one has any alternative but to secure Tehran's agreement and win its approval, then pay the price required.

As a result, Halbousi's first statement after being elected was to declare his opposition to the [U.S.] blockade on Iran. Receiving Tehran's congratulations for his election followed. Moreover, Barham Saleh, who is seen as a liberal and close to the West, had renewed his relations with [Kurdish leader] Jalal Talabani's party, which is allied with Iran. This was part of the price he had to pay being elected as president.

But has America's supposedly strong influence in Iraqi affairs been absent?

The latest developments confirm that U.S. influence in determining Iraq's policies is greatly exaggerated. The fact is that Iran's political, security, and financial influence is much greater. In fact, Washington almost seems to accept that it cannot impose the candidates it wants to be elected. The competition was consequently confined to Iran's hardline allies, such as Maliki and 'Ameri, and their less hardline allies, such as Haidar al-'Abadi and Muqtada as-Sadr. In other words, there are no real candidates who can ensure or take U.S. interests into consideration.

In light of the above, there is nothing strange in Republican pundit Walid Pharis's comment on a Washington Post article arguing that the conflict between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq has produced no clear winner, by saying that this conclusion is completely mistaken and that Iran was the main winner in everything that has happened.

"So, now that the effect of the Iranian hat-trick and the U.S.'s 'quadruple' failure are clear, what can we say about Saudi Arabia's naïve wagers that it can influence the Iraqi political scene?" asks the daily in conclusion.

Ends…

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 5.10.18, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

LOCAL POLITICS: Ahmet Hakan sees hope for change in center-right Hurriyet: "The CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] recently held a meeting in which they said that they would henceforth adopt the language of the right-wing. For example, instead of talking about the U.S. consultancy McKinsey issue, which would not even attract the attention of 70 percent of the people and would drown them in technical details, issues such as inflation, cost of living, and unemployment should be stressed. The CHP has been doing exactly the opposite so far, but let us not go back to talking about its 'hopelessness.'"

Sadrettin Karaduman maintains that the government has shifted policies to no effect in pro-Islamic opposition Milli Gazete: "Remember how President Erdogan recently called out the U.S.? Some people nearly jumped out of their skin, wondering what was going on. Well, this only lasted until it evolved into an agreement with McKinsey. Now, tense relations were repaired during the Germany visit. We have gone back to square one in relations with both the U.S. and the EU. In other words, the government has climbed mountains and crossed valleys, but it has gone nowhere fast."

Melih Altinok is unimpressed by partisan attempts to reach out to the public pro-government Sabah: "The other day we read the MHP's [Nationalist Movement Party's] 152-page guidebook on behavior that it has published for its candidates. This includes detailed guidelines and recommends using vitamins and antidepressants before interacting with the public. Yesterday, we also learned about a lecture on 'effective communications techniques' that the CHP deemed necessary in order to emphasize 'its proximity to the people'. One wishes that this education could have been provided at a much earlier stage."

 

KURDISH ISSUE: Yilmaz Ozdil laments the price of war in nationalist opposition Sozcu: "Nearly 8,000 martyrs, more than 20,000 veterans, and 45,000 dead: This is the result of 35 years of struggle. And yesterday we offered eight more martyrs in the Southeastern province of Batman. What was the name of one of them? Suleyman Aydin! In 1984, Suleyman Aydin. In 2005, Suleyman Aydin. In 2015, Suleyman Aydin. In 2018, Suleyman Aydin."

Ahmet Kekec takes aim at the leading Kurdish party in pro-government Star: "The HDP [pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party] has never felt the need to distance itself from the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]. The reason is very clear: The HDP is not a political party, nor is it a legitimate structure created by the 'sociology' of the region. It is a 'fiction'. It emerged as a manipulation of insecurity (during a certain period), and grew under the shelter of tolerance for those who consider the PKK to be just a matter of 'public security'. The HDP's sole objective is to legitimize PKK terror and defend its actions. Therefore, the HDP should never be expected to denounce PKK terror."

 

MEDIA: Emre Tansu Ketene argues that the government has silenced the independent media in pro-Kurdish opposition Yeni Yasam: "Handing the Dogan Media Group over to the pro-government Demiroren Group amounted to a shift from the AKP's [ruling Justice and Development Party] attempt to tame the mainstream media to destroying it. We can now say there is nothing left that can be defined as the 'mainstream media.' Demiroren is a capital group that is stationed as an on-duty guard [for the government], rather than as a patron of the media." 

 

 

Iran media watch

 

(Please note that Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and Channel One (IRTV1) does not air its morning news bulletin.)

 

LEADER'S SPEECH: State radio VIRI led its morning bulletin with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i's speech to a gathering of Basij members at Tehran's Azadi Stadium yesterday. VIRI said Khamene'i's remarks were focused on "the strength of the Islamic Republic" and "the invincibility of the people of Iran". In his speech, Khamene'i said Iran faced a "sensitive time" because of threats from the United States and its own economic problems and that the West was using "dangerous" media to confront Iran.

 

TRUMP'S REMARK ON SAUDI KING: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reacted to President Trump's remark that the Saudi King would not last "two weeks" without U.S. support. English-language Press TV reported on a Tweet by Zarif where he criticized Trump for "humiliating" the Saudis. "This is the recompense for the delusion that one's security can be outsourced," he wrote, adding that Iran extends its hand to its neighbors to build a "strong region".

 

CENTRAL BANK CHIEF IN RUSSIA: The governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Abdolnasser Hemmati, is in Moscow to discuss the prospect of abolishing the U.S. dollar from bilateral transactions with his Russian counterpart. Rolling news channel IRINN and VIRI reported on his trip.

 

U.S. BIOWEAPONS LAB IN GEORGIA: Press TV this morning took part in Russia's intensifying campaign around the U.S.-funded Lugar Center for Public Health Research in Georgia. The report outlined Russia's claims that the center is being used to develop biological weapons and that its location near Russia's southern frontier is significant in this regard. The channel interviewed Gordon Duff, Ohio-based senior editor of the Veterans Today conspiracy website, who endorsed Russia's narrative.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Twitter users have been extensively commenting in Persian and English (over 73,000 Tweets in the last day) as the third round of lorry drivers' strike continues nationwide. According to an unofficial tally, security forces and judicial authorities have arrested over 170 people, mostly on charges of "road disruption" or "banditry". "Iranian truckers began another – longer than usual – nationwide strike to protest rising costs, three months after an earlier lengthy strike drew international support and caused shortages at petrol stations," one user Tweeted in English. "Please be the voice of Iranian truckers on strike. They want nothing but a normal life such as yours," another user wrote addressing foreign activists and social media users. Many pro-regime users highlighted Khamene'i's remarks at Tehran's Azadi Stadium yesterday where he addressed a large gathering of Basij paramilitary forces and spoke of Iran’s glory and defeating sanctions.

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 07.07.17, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKEY/EU: Taha Akyol explains what lies behind the growing EU rift with Turkey in center-right Hurriyet: "One reason for the breakdown in EU-Turkish relations is related to Europe and the growth of the ultra right and Islamophobic populist trends, and the decline in Europe's expansionist dynamic. The second reason is about us: The impression of authoritarianism that emerged before the FETO [Gulen] issue came to light and the fact that this is becoming stronger are fodder for the extreme right and Turkey's opponents in Europe."

Writing in the same paper, Murat Yetkin, sees both farce and tragedy: "The European Parliament's decision is farcical, because the EP does not have binding authority over the European Council in the first place. In fact, EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn was in Ankara when it was clear that the vote would be held that day as if to say 'let us take care of our own business'. Secondly, the negotiations are, de facto, not under way. They are only on paper. But it is tragic from our point of view, because the same parliament that applauded Turkey in 2004 during the period of EU harmonization reforms, yesterday told us that we are not wanted to our face."

Guneri Civaoglu detects a temporary reprieve in centrist Milliyet: "If tensions in the EU-Turkey relationship continue to soar until 2019 [when constitutional amendments take effect in Turkey], this latest tendency towards 'suspension' could penetrate the EU bodies that have the authority to officially suspend the accession talks. For now, Turkey's stance, as EU Affairs Minister Omer Celik has announced, is 'to return the file on the European Parliament's decision without even opening its cover'".

Soli Ozel downplays the problem in center-right Haber Turk: "This decision does not have much significance, in fact, for two reasons: First, the parliament's decision is not binding. Therefore, its decision will not make it possible to suspend negotiations. Second, negotiations are still pending in any case. Both sides for their own reasons, and without having the courage to unplug the life support system and kill the comatose patient, are pretending that the negotiations process, which has de facto ended, is continuing."

Kurtulus Tayiz notes that the Turkish people have turned against Europe in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "The colic in Turkey-Europe relations is undoubtedly not limited to the European Parliament report. Europe has taken many negative decisions regarding Turkey of late. The EP's latest decision will lead to a cooling in attitudes towards the EU in Turkish society, and more radical demands being made regarding relations with the West. Europe must also realize this: The Turkish people long ago gave up on negotiations with Europe, which supports terrorism. It is the government, not the people, that persists with negotiations."

Mustafa Kartoglu examines how the process may develop in center-left, pro-government Star: "The decision is non-binding; the final decision will be made by the EU Council consisting of the leaders of 28 member states. While EP lawmakers' decisions are influenced by their respective domestic politics, the leaders will decide using the current 'state-mind-set'. This is why two issues will be key: Relations at the leadership level; and greater contact with parliamentarians who did not take part in the vote or abstained, and who support the continuation of negotiations with Turkey."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

THE ECONOMY: The head of the IRGC Construction Headquarters (KAHQ) has said that the IRGC undertakes those projects that the private sector cannot do. Commenting on the new major energy deal between Iran and France's Total, he said KAHQ has completed semi-finished projects abandoned by foreign contractors. IRGC commanders have been defending their role in development projects following remarks made by President Hassan Rowhani on their involvement in the country's economy and development projects.

 

G20 SUMMIT: Iranian news network IRINN and English-language Press TV reported on the massive protests staged in Hamburg ahead of the G20 summit. Press TV said the demonstration was dubbed "Welcome to Hell" by the alliance of anti-capitalist groups who organized it. Both agencies showed footage of clashes and the police dispersing protesters with water cannon.

 

SOCIAL MEDIA: Iranian users continue to comment on a social media campaign launched in June against a law that forces women to wear a headscarf as an Islamic dress code under the title 'whitewednesdays'. "The most ridiculous criticism of 'whitewednesdays' I heard on Wednesday is why people use one kind of hijab to fight the mandatory hijab," wrote one user. Another user posted a photo of an alleged Turkish couple in Iran as tourists, where the man is wearing a headscarf. He wrote: "A Turkish tourist who came to Tabriz with his wife was saying that he wore a head scarf to sympathize with his wife since she had to wear one." Another user published a photo showing a number of women with white headscarves sitting next to prominent Tehran-based political activist Mohammad Nurizad. The user wrote: "Nurizad in support of 'whitewednesdays'."  

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.04.17, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

UPCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFRENDUM: Mehmet Tezkan fears a return to a bygone age in centrist Milliyet: "It is said that if the president is also the head of a party, this does not comply with the oath to be 'impartial'. But the government does not think so. They often give the example of Ataturk, and [second Turkish president] Ismet Inonu. Right: Ataturk was president and leader of the CHP [Republican People's Party]. Inonu was also president and CHP leader. But the situation was different then: It was a one-party period. There was a party-led state. There was no separation of powers. More precisely, there was no democracy. We believed that we closed those pages in 1950. But 87 years later, it has returned as a topic of debate."

Bekir Coskun seeks refuge in a 'no' vote in secular tabloid Sozcu: "They [the government] will divide Turkey. The one-man regime is the first step in this direction, because it is difficult to divide a country where there is democracy. Iraq was separated from the Kurdish region because of Saddam. Yesterday, there were press reports that they are dividing Libya into three parts because of Qadhafi. A Kurdish region was established in Syria because of Assad. The only one thing missing was to divide Turkey. This is what will happen if there is a 'yes' vote at the referendum: A regime that can be easily overthrown in the eyes of the world. This is not a problem for a one-man leadership. One-man leaders always have money abroad; they have places to escape to. We have no place to escape to. There is nothing for us to do, but to say 'no' to a one-man regime."

Writing in the same paper, Rahmi Turan accuses the government of exploiting religion: "There is serious pressure on the 'no' camp. They do not even find it necessary to hide it. They have divided the country into 'yes' and 'no' camps. What a pity! They said that the 'no' camp is made up of terrorists, FETO [Gulen movement] and PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] supporters. They have made all kinds of unimaginable accusations. Despite this, 'yes' camp is not doing well, and is slipping! Many people have understood the danger behind the 'yes' vote. When the 'yes' votes failed to reach the level desired by the government, they resorted to religion and sought to deceive the people using God. Those who will say 'yes' were even promised that they would go to heaven. One cannot exploit religion to such an extent. What a shame!"

Ahmet Hakan speaks in the name of one sector of the ‘no’ camp in center-right Hurriyet: "CHP head Kemal Kilicdaroglu has said the July 2016 coup attempt was a 'controlled coup'. For this reason, the government thinks everyone should vote 'yes'. He ran away on the night of 15 July [reference to recently released video of Kilicdaroglu in Istanbul Airport on the night of the attempted coup]. For this reason: All votes should be 'yes'. Okay, but there are thousands of people in the 'no' camp who strongly disagree with Kilicdaroglu's 'controlled coup' statement, but who also attach importance to the mechanism of checks and balances. Those, who make an issue out of his July 2016 escape, but who also advocate the need for the separation of powers. What about these people?"

Mahmut Ovur suggests that the main opposition party is mired in a leadership struggle in centrist, pro-government Sabah: "Troubled days are in store for CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu inside his party. He thinks that all means are permissible to secure a 'no' result at the referendum. But behind the scenes, the CHP is talking day and night about Kilicdaroglu quitting as leader after the referendum not only because of the possibility of losing the referendum, but because of his political incompetence.  Even during the referendum process, the CHP is on the verge of a deep 'civil war'. Nowadays its backstage is engaged more in finding the answer to questions such as 'Who should we make party head?' or 'Who will save us?’ than it is in the referendum'.

Markar Esayan charges the opposition with deceit in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "Can one describe a government system that is elected with a high threshold, is limited to two terms, and is supervised by the parliament and the judiciary, as a one-man regime? Are the United States, France, and South Korea, one-man regimes? But this is what the CHP is saying. Despising the public, they appeal to its fears, not its mind. They attempt to deceive it. This is the CHP. They are always lying."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

Today is a public holiday in Iran marking the anniversary of the birth of the first Shia Imam Ali. Papers did not publish and Channel One (IRTV1) did not air its early morning bulletin.

 

CANDIDATE REGISTRATIONRegistration of candidates for Iran's twelfth presidential election on 19 May started this morning at the Interior Ministry in Tehran. News channel IRINN carried live the official announcement by the Interior Minister, who proclaimed: "With the help of God the Interior Ministry, the Guardian Council (vetting body), and the Majlis (parliament) have prepared the ground for a very calm, lawful, healthy, and spectacular election. The announcement was also highlighted by VIRI radio. International English-language Press TV had a correspondent at the Interior Ministry who said the number of candidates approved to stand would be very small thanks to the "tough and precise vetting process" of the Guardian Council. Registration will last until 15 April. Moderate incumbent President Hassan Rowhani is expected to seek re-election.

 

U.S. MISSILE STRIKES ON SYRIAThe American cruise missile strike on an airbase of the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad on 7 April remains a top story on Press TV. "The years of U.S. intervention in the Middle East, with its deep mess and misery, seems to have no end in sight for the foreseeable future," the channel mused. The administration of President Donald Trump has "no coherent strategy" for handling the Syria conflict, it added. IRINN reports on Trump's phone call to British Prime Minister Theresa May thanking her for UK's support of the missile strikes. They discussed ways to convince Russia to abandon its support for the Assad regime, the channel said. Press TV's lead story was UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the side lines of the G7 summit, where they too discussed Russia's role in the Syria war.

 

SOCIAL MEDIAThe upcoming election in Iran dominates discussion among Persian-language social media users. Conservatives seized on President Rowhani's remark at his televised press briefing yesterday that he never promised to resolve the country's problems within 100 days after his 2013 inauguration. On the other side, reformists promoted their candidate until 1400, a reference to the Iranian calendar year in which a second Rowhani term would end. Reformists also commented on conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi, who appears set to be Rowhani's main rival in the polls. "Now, the conservatives are asking, 'why did you [Rowhani] not resolve the whole mess in 100 days?' I will vote for Raisi to see in how many days he can resolve the mess," a reformist supporter tweeted sarcastically. "It is tragic to vote for Rowhani because you are scared of the presidency of hard-line potential candidates Saeed Jalili and Ebrahim Raisi; a choice between bad and worst," declared another.

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.04.17, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

UPCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFRENDUM: Mehmet Tezkan fears a return to a bygone age in centrist Milliyet: "It is said that if the president is also the head of a party, this does not comply with the oath to be 'impartial'. But the government does not think so. They often give the example of Ataturk, and [second Turkish president] Ismet Inonu. Right: Ataturk was president and leader of the CHP [Republican People's Party]. Inonu was also president and CHP leader. But the situation was different then: It was a one-party period. There was a party-led state. There was no separation of powers. More precisely, there was no democracy. We believed that we closed those pages in 1950. But 87 years later, it has returned as a topic of debate."

Bekir Coskun seeks refuge in a 'no' vote in secular tabloid Sozcu: "They [the government] will divide Turkey. The one-man regime is the first step in this direction, because it is difficult to divide a country where there is democracy. Iraq was separated from the Kurdish region because of Saddam. Yesterday, there were press reports that they are dividing Libya into three parts because of Qadhafi. A Kurdish region was established in Syria because of Assad. The only one thing missing was to divide Turkey. This is what will happen if there is a 'yes' vote at the referendum: A regime that can be easily overthrown in the eyes of the world. This is not a problem for a one-man leadership. One-man leaders always have money abroad; they have places to escape to. We have no place to escape to. There is nothing for us to do, but to say 'no' to a one-man regime."

Writing in the same paper, Rahmi Turan accuses the government of exploiting religion: "There is serious pressure on the 'no' camp. They do not even find it necessary to hide it. They have divided the country into 'yes' and 'no' camps. What a pity! They said that the 'no' camp is made up of terrorists, FETO [Gulen movement] and PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] supporters. They have made all kinds of unimaginable accusations. Despite this, 'yes' camp is not doing well, and is slipping! Many people have understood the danger behind the 'yes' vote. When the 'yes' votes failed to reach the level desired by the government, they resorted to religion and sought to deceive the people using God. Those who will say 'yes' were even promised that they would go to heaven. One cannot exploit religion to such an extent. What a shame!"

Ahmet Hakan speaks in the name of one sector of the ‘no’ camp in center-right Hurriyet: "CHP head Kemal Kilicdaroglu has said the July 2016 coup attempt was a 'controlled coup'. For this reason, the government thinks everyone should vote 'yes'. He ran away on the night of 15 July [reference to recently released video of Kilicdaroglu in Istanbul Airport on the night of the attempted coup]. For this reason: All votes should be 'yes'. Okay, but there are thousands of people in the 'no' camp who strongly disagree with Kilicdaroglu's 'controlled coup' statement, but who also attach importance to the mechanism of checks and balances. Those, who make an issue out of his July 2016 escape, but who also advocate the need for the separation of powers. What about these people?"

Mahmut Ovur suggests that the main opposition party is mired in a leadership struggle in centrist, pro-government Sabah: "Troubled days are in store for CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu inside his party. He thinks that all means are permissible to secure a 'no' result at the referendum. But behind the scenes, the CHP is talking day and night about Kilicdaroglu quitting as leader after the referendum not only because of the possibility of losing the referendum, but because of his political incompetence.  Even during the referendum process, the CHP is on the verge of a deep 'civil war'. Nowadays its backstage is engaged more in finding the answer to questions such as 'Who should we make party head?' or 'Who will save us?’ than it is in the referendum'.

Markar Esayan charges the opposition with deceit in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "Can one describe a government system that is elected with a high threshold, is limited to two terms, and is supervised by the parliament and the judiciary, as a one-man regime? Are the United States, France, and South Korea, one-man regimes? But this is what the CHP is saying. Despising the public, they appeal to its fears, not its mind. They attempt to deceive it. This is the CHP. They are always lying."

 

 

 

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

Today is a public holiday in Iran marking the anniversary of the birth of the first Shia Imam Ali. Papers did not publish and Channel One (IRTV1) did not air its early morning bulletin.

 

CANDIDATE REGISTRATIONRegistration of candidates for Iran's twelfth presidential election on 19 May started this morning at the Interior Ministry in Tehran. News channel IRINN carried live the official announcement by the Interior Minister, who proclaimed: "With the help of God the Interior Ministry, the Guardian Council (vetting body), and the Majlis (parliament) have prepared the ground for a very calm, lawful, healthy, and spectacular election. The announcement was also highlighted by VIRI radio. International English-language Press TV had a correspondent at the Interior Ministry who said the number of candidates approved to stand would be very small thanks to the "tough and precise vetting process" of the Guardian Council. Registration will last until 15 April. Moderate incumbent President Hassan Rowhani is expected to seek re-election.

 

U.S. MISSILE STRIKES ON SYRIAThe American cruise missile strike on an airbase of the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad on 7 April remains a top story on Press TV. "The years of U.S. intervention in the Middle East, with its deep mess and misery, seems to have no end in sight for the foreseeable future," the channel mused. The administration of President Donald Trump has "no coherent strategy" for handling the Syria conflict, it added. IRINN reports on Trump's phone call to British Prime Minister Theresa May thanking her for UK's support of the missile strikes. They discussed ways to convince Russia to abandon its support for the Assad regime, the channel said. Press TV's lead story was UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the side lines of the G7 summit, where they too discussed Russia's role in the Syria war.

 

SOCIAL MEDIAThe upcoming election in Iran dominates discussion among Persian-language social media users. Conservatives seized on President Rowhani's remark at his televised press briefing yesterday that he never promised to resolve the country's problems within 100 days after his 2013 inauguration. On the other side, reformists promoted their candidate until 1400, a reference to the Iranian calendar year in which a second Rowhani term would end. Reformists also commented on conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi, who appears set to be Rowhani's main rival in the polls. "Now, the conservatives are asking, 'why did you [Rowhani] not resolve the whole mess in 100 days?' I will vote for Raisi to see in how many days he can resolve the mess," a reformist supporter tweeted sarcastically. "It is tragic to vote for Rowhani because you are scared of the presidency of hard-line potential candidates Saeed Jalili and Ebrahim Raisi; a choice between bad and worst," declared another.

 

 

 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.02.17, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN: Bekir Coskun portrays an existential struggle in secular tabloid Sozcu: "Are strengthening parliament and the legal system not the two most irrevocable issues for someone who wants to strengthen the Turkish Republic? Yet President Erdogan is demolishing them. If the referendum results in a 'yes', the laws will be made in the presidential palace, which means the end of parliament. If the referendum results in a 'yes', Erdogan will be the legal system, which means the end of law. People should not look at this as a constitutional amendment; rather it is a vote on whether the Republic will exist or disappear. We will say 'no' to those who want to demolish the republic that means enlightenment, civilization and peace."

Emre Kongar details the dangers of a ‘Partisan State’ in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The identification of the state with one party, the handover of the entire state apparatus, together with the judiciary, legislature and executive, to one party is one of the purest forms of fascism. We have already experienced this in its bloodiest form in Europe, in Germany and Italy’s recent history! Unfortunately, the constitutional amendment proposal that will be put to vote in April 16th referendum also contains articles that will end the Turkish republican regime and establish a ‘Partisan State’. First, the president will be partisan, and not just an ordinary partisan figure, of course, but the ruling party's leader and chairman. Second, the partisan president will appoint his deputies, and these appointees will be using the powers of the elected president and managing the people when necessary. Third, the ministers selected by the partisan president will not be accountable to parliament. Fourth, if he does not like the laws adopted by parliament, the partisan president will manage the country by decree."

Mehmet Tezkan points to the Syrian experience in centrist Milliyet: "Let me explain myself: the government says that the important thing is the future of Turkey, its ‘2071 vision’. Fine, but is there any guarantee that in 2045 the excessive powers envisaged by the constitutional proposal will not be passed on to someone who is a fascist, racist or dictator? The government says that it is an insult to the nation to say that it can elect a wrong man, and that this nation will elect the right person. Fine, but Syrian President Assad was also elected. Are our Arab brothers who elected Assad stupid? Are Arabs unable to elect the right man? Have they no ability to elect the right man?"

Emin Pazarci is confident of a ‘yes’ vote in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "Erdogan alone received more than 50 per cent of votes in the last presidential election. At the time, everyone was against him, including the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]. Now, the MHP supports the presidential system. No one should contradict me by saying that the MHP electorate will say ‘no’ at the referendum. This is an insult to the electorate of the MHP, which is an ideological party, and which is paying a high price for supporting the presidential system in the name of this ideology! In addition, the MHP electorate cannot support such entities as the HDP [pro-Kurdish left alliance Peoples' Democratic Party], PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party], and PYD [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party]. Do not say either: 'But FETO [Gulen movement] is working hard for a 'no' at the referendum.' This organization went to every length, including a coup, when it was most powerful, but it failed. It cannot be more effective in its current state today. The same can be said of the HDP. It does not have its former power and reputation. This leaves only the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] that is putting up strong resistance. However, if one looks at its leader Kilicdaroglu's statements, it seems that he is not very hopeful either. This picture is enough to declare the result of the referendum from now!"

 

TURKEY/U.S./RUSSIA: Taha Akyol calls for skillful diplomacy in center-right Hurriyet: "Even though U.S. President Trump is not going to storm around as he did during his electoral campaign, it is clear that his views on the status of Jerusalem as well as Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, have not changed. Turkey is facing foreign policy problems, especially when it comes to Iraq and Syria. Just as we must revitalize our 'alliance' relations with America, we must also establish relations with Egypt in the Middle East, and our relations with Russia must also be developed. It is a thousand times better to influence our relations by talking them through than to strain them by quarrelling. It is necessary to carry out skillful diplomacy, add to the number of our friends, and to avoid adopting a heroic stance in public rallies."

Mehmet Barlas is concerned about the Trump administration’s unpredictability in centrist, pro-government Sabah: "Finally, we saw that the U.S. was supporting the PKK's extension PYD, and that it continued to host FETO despite everything. For this reason, the fact that there is America's finger in the July 15th [2016] coup attempt has gained weight. Now, the new American administration and the American shadow government are confused. The fact that after his improbable election as president, Donald Trump reiterated what he said during his election campaign has confused both his country and the whole world. Organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and NAFTA are in crisis over the fact that they cannot predict what America’s new politics will be. To sum it up, the U.S., which used to guide the whole world, looks like a helpless ship on a journey with no direction."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

MIDEAST MIRROR 17.02.17, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN: Bekir Coskun portrays an existential struggle in secular tabloid Sozcu: "Are strengthening parliament and the legal system not the two most irrevocable issues for someone who wants to strengthen the Turkish Republic? Yet President Erdogan is demolishing them. If the referendum results in a 'yes', the laws will be made in the presidential palace, which means the end of parliament. If the referendum results in a 'yes', Erdogan will be the legal system, which means the end of law. People should not look at this as a constitutional amendment; rather it is a vote on whether the Republic will exist or disappear. We will say 'no' to those who want to demolish the republic that means enlightenment, civilization and peace."

Emre Kongar details the dangers of a ‘Partisan State’ in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The identification of the state with one party, the handover of the entire state apparatus, together with the judiciary, legislature and executive, to one party is one of the purest forms of fascism. We have already experienced this in its bloodiest form in Europe, in Germany and Italy’s recent history! Unfortunately, the constitutional amendment proposal that will be put to vote in April 16th referendum also contains articles that will end the Turkish republican regime and establish a ‘Partisan State’. First, the president will be partisan, and not just an ordinary partisan figure, of course, but the ruling party's leader and chairman. Second, the partisan president will appoint his deputies, and these appointees will be using the powers of the elected president and managing the people when necessary. Third, the ministers selected by the partisan president will not be accountable to parliament. Fourth, if he does not like the laws adopted by parliament, the partisan president will manage the country by decree."

Mehmet Tezkan points to the Syrian experience in centrist Milliyet: "Let me explain myself: the government says that the important thing is the future of Turkey, its ‘2071 vision’. Fine, but is there any guarantee that in 2045 the excessive powers envisaged by the constitutional proposal will not be passed on to someone who is a fascist, racist or dictator? The government says that it is an insult to the nation to say that it can elect a wrong man, and that this nation will elect the right person. Fine, but Syrian President Assad was also elected. Are our Arab brothers who elected Assad stupid? Are Arabs unable to elect the right man? Have they no ability to elect the right man?"

Emin Pazarci is confident of a ‘yes’ vote in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "Erdogan alone received more than 50 per cent of votes in the last presidential election. At the time, everyone was against him, including the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]. Now, the MHP supports the presidential system. No one should contradict me by saying that the MHP electorate will say ‘no’ at the referendum. This is an insult to the electorate of the MHP, which is an ideological party, and which is paying a high price for supporting the presidential system in the name of this ideology! In addition, the MHP electorate cannot support such entities as the HDP [pro-Kurdish left alliance Peoples' Democratic Party], PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party], and PYD [Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party]. Do not say either: 'But FETO [Gulen movement] is working hard for a 'no' at the referendum.' This organization went to every length, including a coup, when it was most powerful, but it failed. It cannot be more effective in its current state today. The same can be said of the HDP. It does not have its former power and reputation. This leaves only the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] that is putting up strong resistance. However, if one looks at its leader Kilicdaroglu's statements, it seems that he is not very hopeful either. This picture is enough to declare the result of the referendum from now!"

TURKEY/U.S./RUSSIA: Taha Akyol calls for skillful diplomacy in center-right Hurriyet: "Even though U.S. President Trump is not going to storm around as he did during his electoral campaign, it is clear that his views on the status of Jerusalem as well as Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, have not changed. Turkey is facing foreign policy problems, especially when it comes to Iraq and Syria. Just as we must revitalize our 'alliance' relations with America, we must also establish relations with Egypt in the Middle East, and our relations with Russia must also be developed. It is a thousand times better to influence our relations by talking them through than to strain them by quarrelling. It is necessary to carry out skillful diplomacy, add to the number of our friends, and to avoid adopting a heroic stance in public rallies."

Mehmet Barlas is concerned about the Trump administration’s unpredictability in centrist, pro-government Sabah: "Finally, we saw that the U.S. was supporting the PKK's extension PYD, and that it continued to host FETO despite everything. For this reason, the fact that there is America's finger in the July 15th [2016] coup attempt has gained weight. Now, the new American administration and the American shadow government are confused. The fact that after his improbable election as president, Donald Trump reiterated what he said during his election campaign has confused both his country and the whole world. Organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and NAFTA are in crisis over the fact that they cannot predict what America’s new politics will be. To sum it up, the U.S., which used to guide the whole world, looks like a helpless ship on a journey with no direction."

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday.

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

1-From today’s Turkish press

IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: Semih Idiz expects greater pressures on Ankara in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "While Turkey has still not managed to escape the charge that it is helping ISIS, the anti-ISIS international front has become much stronger after the deal with Iran. In this case, it is unnecessary to ask the permanent members of the Security Council whom they will trust most in fighting against ISIS - Iran or Turkey. With the Iran deal, Turkey's policy based on toppling Assad by military means has been totally undermined. This deal has increased the probability of finding a diplomatic and political solution for the Syrian crisis. After the deal, the isolation that Turkey has fallen into because of the AKP’s [ruling Justice and Developing Party’s] ambitious and wrongheaded policies will be much more visible than before."

Sahin Alpay hopes for a foreign policy turnabout in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The deal has great benefits for Turkey. Economic relations between the two countries will be rescued from the limitations imposed by the sanctions against Iran. Turkish industry will benefit from the growing Iran market; the flow of Iranian tourists will rise. If the deal makes a political contribution to a solution of the Syrian crisis, as expected, Turkey will be the country that benefits most. The material and non-material burden caused by the Syrian refugees, whose number has reached almost two million, is gradually reaching unbearable levels. The possibility of a political solution in Syria might give Ankara the opportunity to return to the foreign policy that it pursued before 2011 summarized by the slogan 'zero problems with neighbors'."

Dogu Ergil also calls for a foreign policy review in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "Strengthening the Iranian economy will increase the volume of trade with Turkey, but it is also obvious that Iran will be a difficult rival for Turkey in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. As a very active and acceptable actor on the international arena, Iran might nullify Turkey's policies in these regions, whose goals are not properly thought out. From now on, a new game is being established and roles will be re-assigned. Turkey must be prepared for all this. The era of foreign policy based on ideological and personal preferences/desires is coming to an end."

Merve Sebnem Oruc warns of a nuclear catastrophe in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The deal between Iran and the P5+1 has allowed Iran to legitimize spreading non-nuclear weapons across the region. Apart from that, its uranium enrichment activities that are not totally banned but only limited, launch a new era not only for Saudi Arabia and the regional countries, but for the rest of the world, since this establishes a legitimate limit for enriching uranium and developing nuclear technology. From now on, anyone can set up a nuclear centrifuge, enrich uranium and possess nuclear arms technology. Let us hope that the world will not one day see this deal as one of the reasons for starting a nuclear war."

 

COALITION TALKS: Mehmet Tezkan notes the president’s opposition to a coalition in centrist Milliyet: "The AKP-HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] talks were not focused on coalition building at all, but on the Kurdish peace process. There were attempts to melt the ice between the parties. It is known that President Erdogan does not take a positive view of the AKP entering a coalition with the CHP [Republican People's Party]. He is even opposed to it. That is why he says 'if politics cannot solve the coalition crisis, then the nation must solve it through early elections'. He wants to appeal to the nation."

Mustafa Balbay believes the HDP is playing politics in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The result that came out of yesterday's AKP-HDP meeting was not surprising. The HDP wants the AKP and the CHP to enter a coalition, and for it to be the main party that evaluates this government’s record. And, of course, it is calculating the votes that it may receive from the CHP base at the next election [after the CHP is weakened by its time in government]."

Abdulkadir Selvi anticipates early elections in Yeni Safak: "The first round of talks has ended. The prime minister wants to form a coalition. CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu wants to be in the coalition. Both the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] and HDP are against an AKP-CHP coalition. But if one were to ask whether I am optimistic about an AKP-CHP coalition, the answer is no. The pointer seems to be closer to early elections and a caretaker government formed by the AKP."

2-From today’s Iranian press

NUCLEAR DEAL: Conservative Quds reveals Saudi/Israeli cooperation to undermine a deal: "The recent nuclear agreement has been welcomed by most countries as being good for world peace. The Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia, however, had negative reactions. When the negotiations got serious, Saudi Arabia set up a Hebrew/Arab front to undermine the process in cooperation with the Zionist regime. A telephone line was set up between Tel Aviv and Riyadh to coordinate the two regimes' policies." 

Conservative Khorasan expects difficulties for Obama: "Obama believes that he has taken historical measures and reduced Iran's threat to the U.S. and the West. His opponents believe that the nuclear deal has not led to a decrease in Iran's strategic power and that the lifting of sanctions will provide Iran the opportunity to optimize economic conditions and upgrade its defence, security and military programmes. This will have regional and international strategic impact. Obama will face a difficult path ahead in implementing the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action."

Hard-line Javan exaggerates: "The way America is behaving shows that Iran has become a power that the U.S. does not have the courage to resort to the military option against it. The U.S. does not have the ability either to hold negotiation directly with Iran and needs the support of France, the UK and Germany. America does not consider our military power to be mightier than its own, but is afraid of our soft power. The growing power of the Islamic revolution has turned the U.S. from a foolish enemy to a relatively clever one." 

Moderate Iran records new modes: "The nuclear agreement is a new form of statesmanship, in which Iran speaks the language of logic with the world. Iranians want to change their previous pessimism and confusion with competition and cooperation. They do not want any country or government to feel threatened by Iran's growing power."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz looks both ways: "In addition to the establishment of diplomatic and political relations, the conclusion of the talks will have both positive and negative effect on economic ties. After the nuclear agreement, billions of dollars of frozen assets will return to the country, the impasse on oil exports will be resolved and foreign business will exploit the Iranian market. This can improve our economic cycle and pave the way for creating job opportunities. But if investments are made to import foreign goods, domestic production is not taken into account, revenues of oil are spent and the Resistance Economy is ignored, nothing good will happen to the economy." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami is pleased with the new realities: "The resistance of the Iranian nation to secure its nuclear rights finally resulted in a 'win-win' agreement. From now on, Iran is recognized as a nuclear power with a complete fuel cycle and enrichment, where none of the nuclear sites will be shut down and dismantled. Iran's nuclear programme, which for years was unjustly considered a global threat, is now subject to international cooperation." 

Hard-line Keyhan gazes into the future: "Some believe that the nuclear agreement means a strategic turn in U.S. policy away from regime change in Iran. America after 36 years has accepted the reality of an 'Islamic Republic'. President Obama and Secretary Kerry acknowledged in their declarations that the nuclear agreement with Iran was due to urgency and their desperation. If everything goes as on paper, in about a decade the agreement will come to an end. At that time it will not be easy for us to protect our natural and legal rights. If we want to have a better hand in future negotiations, the only remedy is: work, work and work in all fields." 

Conservative Resalat is concerned with different interpretations: "The Iranian fact-sheet of the agreement issued by the Foreign Ministry had significant differences with what President Obama mentioned in his remarks. The Iranian fact-sheet says that Iran's red lines have been observed but the U.S. version claims that Iranian red lines, particularly about the removal of sanctions, have not been observed. The phrases and words used in the declaration contain parentheses, are subject to interpretation, ambiguous or multi-meaning. People expect to see a transparent and clear text that cannot be distorted by the enemy." 

Reformist Sharq asks the government to be prepared: "We should thank President Rowhani who firmly stood against the hard-liners and succeeded in achieving the nuclear deal. People are now waiting for his second page of success in the domestic field. Moreover, the expectations of the people regarding the deal should also be managed. People know that it takes long to resolve the problems that have been created by the hard-liners. Those concerned about the nuclear deal are now preparing to criticize it by asking about its benefits. They will target the vulnerable points of the government through their propaganda tools. The government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supporters of the deal should prepare themselves for a spectacular competition."

Reformist Mardom Salari has high hopes: "The nuclear deal can neutralize the negative propaganda against Iran. The gap with opponent countries will be removed and progress can be achieved in manufacturing, mines and the nuclear industry. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council will come to the conclusion that they cannot hinder this deal and, therefore, they should change their policies regarding Iran. The nuclear deal can be the cornerstone for the establishment of security in the region and the world; replacing conflicts with cooperation."

Reformist Arman is also optimistic: "Following success in the nuclear talks, the countries of the region who opposed this deal, will decide to accept reality and change their stance towards Iran. This victory is a preliminary promise. It is expected that the implementation of the deal in the coming few months, will pass all bottlenecks and barriers without trouble and we will witness positive results." 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: Gonul Tol sounds a cautious note on the Iran nuclear deal in centre-left Radikal: "The results achieved in the Vienna nuclear talks with Iran represent a foreign policy success for the Obama administration. And this compromise can facilitate normalizing relations between the West and Iran in the long run. But in the interim, it would not be realistic to expect the situation in Syria and Iraq to change the way the West wants, and that Iran will give up its aggressive policy in the region for the sake of an engagement with the West. On the contrary, Iran's policy in Syria and Iraq from now on may leave Tehran and the West at loggerheads."

Sami Kohen suggests that Turkey needs to adapt to the new reality in centrist Milliyet: "This historic agreement is a victory for diplomacy first of all. It represents the first time that a state guarantees that it will not undertake any scientific research to produce nuclear weapons. When a country such as Iran, which has challenged the West and the world for years, accepts this commitment, this is a significant development. It is also true that the world has breathed a sigh of relief. In short, and thanks to this deal, we may witness the emergence of a 'new Iran' in the region. And this will affect the balance in the region, which concerns Turkey directly."

Mustafa Balbay examines some possible economic repercussions in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The deal that will be put into practice with the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency will have serious economic consequences. First of all, Iran's money outside of the country will be freed. Iranian oil and natural gas firms will come on to the world scene. One does not need a crystal ball to predict that with time, Iran's limited influence on the region will expand. However, Iran making peace with the world is to Turkey’s benefit as well."

Lale Kemal believes that Turkey needs to reshape its foreign policies in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "What a great irony is it that while Turkey, a veteran member of NATO, is clearly breaking off with the West, Iran is beginning to reconcile with the West. Turkey will be unable to maintain its image, which it has lost not only in the West but in the Middle East as well, merely by using its geographical position as given by God. The Iran factor now forces it to reshape its foreign policy."

Ali Agaoglu calls on Ankara to seize the moment in centrist Vatan: "Unless we make a 100-degree- if not a 180-degree- turn in our foreign policy, we can only be a 'subcontractor' of this historic deal. Yes, since Iran is our neighbor, this deal will naturally have a positive effect due to our logistical advantages especially with regard to border trade. We can still pursue our rivalry with Iran for 'regional leadership'. However, I do not believe that this is an obstacle to developing mutual cooperation. The Iran deal can be a historic opportunity for us as well. This is the moment to adopt a 'reasonable approach' in order to re-gain at least some of the positions that we have lost due to our unfruitful policies; let us not miss it."

Aydin Cubukcu argues that the West will win out in leftist Evrensel: “Putting aside the details, the deal really is a big gain for Iran. With this deal, we can already detect the relief in the 'world markets', the fall in oil prices and invigoration of trade relations in the near future. Thanks to the deal, cooperation with the U.S., which has long been in place with regard to Iraq, has now made way for economic cooperation that benefits the U.S. and the EU (especially Germany). In this respect, Iran's market, which has long been whetting the appetite of Western firms with its population of around 80 million, will now be in Western hands."

Erdal Saglam calls on Ankara to adopt a new approach in centre-right Hurriyet: "Ridding Iran of nuclear arms will first of all alleviate Turkey's security concerns. In addition, the explosive atmosphere of the region will benefit from compromise and from Iran turning into a stable strong country. As far as the economy is concerned, this depends on how the Turkish authorities react. Roughly speaking, when the embargo is lifted, the demand for consumer products in Iran will increase and Turkey can satisfy a great share of this demand due to its proximity. If Turkey wants to benefit from the Iran deal both politically and economically, it should definitely change its recent foreign policy."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR DEAL: Conservative Khorasan contends that Iran has scored whatever happens: "If we had not improved our deterrence, the Americans would have considered all available options. If we had not achieved significant nuclear advance, we would neither have had a strong hand in bargaining nor would the enemy have chosen to talk. Iran's power has been the main reason that forced the world's six major countries to recognize our strength. Even if the talks had failed or if they face future challenges due to U.S. disputes or breach of promise; the world has already accepted a nuclear Iran."

Hard-line Keyhan hopes for one version: "Obama's interpretation of the Vienna document is seriously different in many instances from President Rowhani’s in his statement on television. Nonetheless, in the few days before the final approval of the agreement by the Majlis and the Supreme National Security Council, we hope that the differences in readings are removed and the provisions of the agreement become transparent and not open to interpretation." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reports: "The U.S. claims some points that are not in the text of the agreement or in the joint statement to portray themselves as the winners of this unfair war. Western media and authorities have been trying to depict that they were the victors who have succeeded in inhibiting Iran." 

Conservative Quds waits for the U.S.: "After 22 months of negotiations and consultations, the text of the conclusion came out in Vienna. Let us see whether the West is committed to this deal and whether they will ratify and implement the agreement or not. Experience shows that the U.S. is not reliable, but, if they commit to their promises, we will witness a new way for strengthening Iran in the international arena." 

Reformist Sharq is not elated:" The government has a tough marathon ahead of the implementation of the agreement. The closer we get to the destination, the more difficult the path becomes. The deal will change the behaviour of neighbouring and regional countries towards Iran. Though the agreement is encouraging and inspiring, it is not enough. The U.S. is the same U.S. and Iran is the same Iran. In politics, strategies rarely change, only tactics change." 

Reformist E'temad understands the virtues of diplomacy: "Hostilities between Iran and the U.S. may not end, but it would be possible to sit at the negotiating table with the enemy. Though American and Iranian anger will endure in some issues, hostility has been suspended in the nuclear field. Neither the U.S. intends to stay away from negotiating with Iran, nor would Middle East opponents dare stand against talks. This important nuclear accord could not have happened without understanding the correct virtues of diplomacy." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami writes of a national achievement: "The agreement is a great achievement for the international community and a valuable victory for the Iranian people. What has turned it into a great victory for our nation is the fact that Iranian negotiators could defend the country's rights with logic, reasoning and prudence and have managed to convince the international community of the peaceful nature of our nuclear activities. The complex and sensitive situation in the region reveals another important aspect of this agreement: An unresolved nuclear standoff would have further inflamed the region. The twisted logic and confusion by some should not pollute this great national achievement with factional rivalries. There is no doubt that this success is a national achievement and victory and no one has the right to confiscate it." 

Reformist Mardom Salari expects serious change: "By winning the exhausting nuclear battle, President Rowhani's administration started a new chapter in Iran's relations with the international system. This deal was the victory of resistance over arrogance and the evidence is the Zionist regime's fury about it. This deal will make the Muslim world more determined to reclaim the noble Quds. The power balance in the region will change and as Iran is the harbinger of peace and tranquillity and the symbol of security in the Middle East, the Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia - as the breeders of terrorism in the region - will be forced to change their cruel tactics. There is even a possibility that ISIS will move from Iraq to East Asia. All this depend on the manner of cooperation between Iran and America."

Conservative Resalat distinguishes between the real and the fake: "Linking regional crises to the nuclear talks has been highlighted by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and the European troika for the past 20 days. The core of regional crises and the nature of Iran's nuclear program are, however, quite different. The region's crises are genuine and stem from the terrorist policies of Washington, London and other Western players, while Iran's nuclear dossier is a bogus crisis created by Western propaganda."

Hard-line Javan considers the helpful role of the National Security Council: "We do hope that the joint statement would be the start of a good agreement for the beloved, honourable and strong nation of Iran. Our negotiators did their best to have our redlines taken into account in this deal. Based on Majlis legislation, the National Security Council should approve that the conclusion of the talks complies with national interests. President Obama clearly urged the Congress to review the agreement accurately. Our National Security Council should also accurately and wisely review the deal and thereby, increase the Iranian nation's confidence that it is a good agreement." 

Reformist Arman claims that Israel is the biggest loser of the deal: "With more than a decade of patience, the Islamic Republic showed that lost rights can be regained through diplomacy based on logic, principles and values. What happened has not been favoured by the Zionist regime, in particular Prime Minister Netanyahu; it has made them furious. Undoubtedly, the Zionist regime was the biggest loser of the deal. The remarks by EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini show clearly that the region's situation depends on the effective actions of Iran as the anchor of stability and peace in the region." 

Moderate Iran is hasty in its conclusion: "Various important factors are involved in the substantive change in political dialogue between Iran and Western powers. Their change of policy comes from their assessment that the centres of power, stability and security in the region have changed. The West's 30-year-old partner in the region Saudi Arabia will be ruined or at least will face numerous crises, while Iran is the only stable and powerful option for future cooperation."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

Mr. Zarif’s smile

 

In light of the above, we can say that it is Mr. Zarif's right to smile; that it is Netanyahu's right to be angry; and that it is the right of certain Gulf states to feel shocked. For the agreement signed on 'the Night of Fate' [the holiest day of Ramadan that coincided with the Vienna agreement] was a huge Iranian diplomatic and political success in the full sense of the word, at least so far. Only God knows what may happen next and what developments the future may bring. For Iran has never said it seeks to produce nuclear weapons, but has used its nuclear ambitions as a card with which to bust the blockade that has been imposed on it. And it has ultimately been very successful in doing so--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Even if we believe President Obama's assurances and commitments that no concessions will be made to Iran at the expense of the region's states, the Western governments will be under severe pressure to ensure the agreement's success, and thus to turn a blind eye to Iran's policies that undermine stability, and to its stark intervention in its neighbors' domestic affairs…Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states cannot but welcome the nuclear agreement. As far as it goes, it supposedly shuts one door in evil's face. But the real worry is whether it also flings open other doors to evil. These are doors that Iran has proven adept at knocking at one after the other when it was still under sanctions. What can we expect if it catches its breath again?--Salman ad-Dosari in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

This historic event was the most important victory for logic and reason against the logic of blind force. And it occurs in an era that is haunted by painful conflicts. As President Bashar al-Assad said in his telegram of congratulations to [Iranian supreme leader] Sayyid Khamene'i, it constitutes a major turning point in the history of Iran, the region, and the world. Syria no doubt awaits more resources from Iran in support of its just war against terrorism. In fact, Iran has never lagged in providing such support; but it will now have greater capabilities to employ in achieving the victory against terrorism. Furthermore, Damascus awaits a change in the approach taken by many states around the world towards their relations to Syria, especially by lifting the siege imposed on it and expressing solidarity with it in fighting terrorism--Ass'ad 'Abboud in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Iran is returning to being strong, as it was before the Revolution. But this time round, it is an Islamic Republic that looks at its Arab environment with great interest and takes direct part in its explosive conflicts and extremely complicated issues. The hope is focused on a deep and historic dialogue between Iran and the parties opposing it in the Arab camp. This should lead to negotiations over Iran's role in the region and the rights of the minorities that have sought help and protection from it. The aim is to establish a just and stable order that will serve as the bases for Islamic unity in the face of Israel and all those who harbor designs against Iran and the Arabs--Ghassan al-'Ayyash in Lebanese as-Safir

 

The Iranians secured two main concessions that actually limit the agreement's strategic importance: First, there will be no Western war on Iran (for whatever reason and regardless of what happens on the political arena). Second, there will be no sanctions on Iran (for whatever reason; in fact, the agreement includes clauses that prevent other forms of sanctions from being imposed, and demands that the U.S. refrains from any diplomatic or economic effort to affect the sale of Iranian oil – that is, outside the framework of the sanctions Parallel with a commitment to this agreement, therefore, Iran has ensured that the West will strip itself of the two effective weapons it can use to threaten Tehran with. This immunity is now linked to the nuclear file, and will persist with guarantees, regardless of what happens in the political arena and the arena of regional competition--'Amer Mohsen in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The Iranians have every right to celebrate the nuclear agreement, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. As for the Arabs, they should learn the lesson taught by Iran during the 12 years of negotiations it took to reach an agreement that effectively leaves its capabilities untouched and will transform it into a major regional economic and political superpower. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states can only welcome the agreement since it postpones Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, maintains the editor-in-chief of a Saudi daily. But they cannot but be concerned that having caught its breath, Iran will now persist in undermining the region's stability more effectively. Syria is bound to celebrate Iran’s victory in ending Tehran's international isolation, and freeing its assets and economic potential, says a commentator in an official Syrian daily. And it now expects to receive even greater support from Iran in its fight against terrorism. Iran is returning to the region as a major economic and political power, notes a Lebanese commentator. Its Arab opponents should seek dialogue with it and lay the foundations of a new just and stable Middle East. Iran has preserved and added to its civilian nuclear capabilities as a result of the agreement while relinquishing none of the military dimensions of its nuclear program, notes another Lebanese commentator. More importantly, it has stripped the West of the two main effective weapons against it: The threat of war and that of sanctions.

 

A TRUE ASSESSMENT: ”Three minor side-effects that have nothing directly to do with the substantive clauses and concessions made in the Iranian nuclear agreement with the six major powers, may be sufficient to summarize the true assessment of that agreement,“ writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Wednesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

- First, the very broad smile that took shape on Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's face during the signing of the agreement, suggesting great cunning and astuteness on his part.

- Second, the clear signs of hysteria on Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu's face and his statements that expressed his anger at an agreement he described as a historic mistake.

- Third, the shocked reaction from most Arab capitals and among the U.S.'s very close allies, especially the Gulf states. For ‘a silence of the graves’ has descended upon them as one of the manifestations of this shock and its consequent political and media confusion.

Let us set aside the technical details in the 100 pages of the agreement apart from its annexes and notes. And without belittling their importance, let us focus on the main points that may be gleaned from it:

- First, it does not block Iran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. It merely postpones them and tries to 'manage' them. It is also represents an attempt by both sides to gain time. Iran has preserved its right to enrich uranium, as well as to keep 20,000 centrifuges and all its legal and illegal peaceful and military nuclear reactors complete, with adjustments to some of them.

- Second, Iran will continue to have the qualified human resources and experts who will allow it to resume its nuclear program ten years from now, which is the timeframe for this agreement. It has also managed to impose its prior acquiescence as a precondition for any inspection of its military installations, and to stop the inspectors from interrogating its scientists, thereby preventing a repetition of the mistakes that occurred in Iraq's case – bearing in mind that Iraq was both theoretically and practically under occupation at the time.

- Third, throughout the ten years of this agreement, Iran will remain 12 months, perhaps less, away from producing nuclear weapons. All restrictions on it will be lifted after that 10-year period ends. Since its scientists would still be alive and well then, everything is possible.

- Fourth, Iran will move from being a 'rogue,' 'terrorist,' and 'evil' state to a normal state, perhaps to being Europe and the West's ally.

- Fifth, in a few months’ time, Iran will receive 120-billion dollars of its frozen assets. The economic blockade on it will be lifted, and it will be permitted to export to both West and East. And this means it will become a major regional economic power. Hundreds of thousands of jobs will be created and it will be able to pursue unrestricted trade. After all, oil and its returns constitute only 33% of Iran's GNP, while it constitutes 90% of the Gulf states' GNP.

- Sixth, the camp backing Iran – especially Russia, China, and the BRICS countries – has emerged victorious from this agreement. So have the states and groups that receive Iran’s backing, since it will be politically and economically stronger as a result.

The most pressing question has to do with what has led President Barack Obama's administration to sign such an agreement that represents a retreat from its previous policies that sought to destroy Iran’s nuclear programs, mobilizing aircraft carriers in the Gulf and deploying nuclear submarines and the Marines for that purpose. The answer may be summarized in the following points:

- First, the alternative is war, and the U.S. does not want such a war; nor does it want to bear its consequences. It has been planning a gradual withdrawal from the Middle East region for some time.

- Second, President Obama's administration is tired of backing Arab regimes that cannot protect themselves or defend their own interests. It is tired of fighting proxy wars on their behalf. It places its interests and the lives of its soldiers above any other consideration. At the same time, it is searching for other areas that could provide a future arena for these interests such as Southeast Asia and Africa, especially now that it is self-sufficient in oil.

- Third, President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize at the beginning of his presidency and he wants to justify receiving that accolade. He wants to enter history as a peacemaker. This is why he has adopted a conciliatory approach towards Cuba and has ended the blockade on it. And he is now reconciling with Iran and paving the way for restoring relations with it, as happened with Cuba. But his failure to establish a Palestinian state remains a black mark on his legacy.

- Fourth, the U.S.'s 'real' war in the Middle East is now not with Iran but the Islamic State, which has shown a significant ability to grow and expand. And a conviction is taking clearer shape within U.S. decision-making centers that victory in this war cannot be achieved without cooperation with Iran and its allies.

As for the calculation of loss and gain, it may be said that certain Arab states can only emerge as losers from this agreement; basically four Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and 'half' the UAE. As for the Arab states that have won – or, rather, have not emerged losers – they fall into two camps:

- First, the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirate of Dubai. Ending the economic blockade on Iran will benefit them both. Oman has adopted a neutral stance towards the Iranian crisis. It hosted the secret negotiations that provided the 'nucleus' of the agreement. This will further improve its relations with both Iran and the West in political, military, and economic terms. As for Dubai, it has acted as Iran's vital external economic artery throughout the past years of blockade, just as it was during the [1980-88] Iraq/Iran war. The release of 120-billion dollars of Iran's frozen assets will have positive effect on trade, investment, and property values in Dubai, at a time when Gulf investments there are shrinking thanks to the fall in oil prices to half their previous level.

- Second, there are the states that have been using the Iranian umbrella to protect themselves, such as Syria and Iraq, as well as groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi/Saleh alliance in Yemen. In addition, there are states that have steered clear of hostility towards Iran, such as Algeria and Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Tunisia and Mauritania.

In light of the above, we can say that it is Mr. Zarif's right to smile; that it is Netanyahu's right to be angry; and that it is the right of certain Gulf states to feel shocked. For the agreement signed on 'the Night of Fate' [the holiest day of Ramadan that coincided with the Vienna agreement] was a huge Iranian diplomatic and political success in the full sense of the word, at least so far. Only God knows what may happen next and what developments the future may bring. For Iran has never said it seeks to produce nuclear weapons, but has used its nuclear ambitions as a card with which to bust the blockade that has been imposed on it. And it has ultimately been very successful in doing so.

It is said that this agreement will launch a nuclear arms race in the region, but then again why not? Perhaps such a race will allow the Arabs to regain the prestige they have lost over the past thirty years, and to cut both Israel’s nuclear and conventional capabilities down to size, putting an end to its arrogance and pushing it to recoil upon itself regionally and internationally.

By standing its ground at the negotiations table for 12 years and displaying unprecedented patience and self-control, Iran provides us Arabs, as well as the entire world, with a lesson in resoluteness and negotiations management. This is steadfastness based on power, a state of genuine institutions and true centers of scientific research (not merely formal ones based on fraud, the looting of public funds and links to foreign interests), a state based on genuine direct elections not on policies based on supplication, whim, dictatorship, the absence of institutions, the lack of any social justice, the prevalence of corruption and the reliance on foreign powers.

Perhaps this agreement will 'awaken' the 'People of the Cave' [the Arabs] and stir them to rise from their deep slumber and look at the world with different eyes, steering clear of hurling insults, hiding their heads in the sand, sectarian incitement, and false arrogance.

Let the Iranians celebrate their agreement. For there is no consolation for the weak who have placed all their eggs in the U.S.'s basket and who have never relied on themselves.

„They are now repeating the same mistakes and the same policies, aspiring to replace the U.S. with Israel as a defense partner who provides protection to those panicking because of Iran or other powers,“ concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

‘HAPPY DAY’: „Truly, and as a Saudi official told Reuters 'it will be a happy day if the agreement prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal',“ writes Editor-in-Chief Salman ad-Dosari in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

No one in the region or the world would reject the agreement as long as it succeeds in 'freezing' Iran's military nuclear program and transforming it into a peaceful one. This is what actually emerged from the details of the agreement announced yesterday after Tehran agreed to most of the terms it used to reject in the past. These have resulted in economic sanctions and a freeze on its financial assets for many long years.

Whereas the timeframe needed for Iran to produce sufficient amounts of highly-enriched uranium for making a nuclear bomb –usually referred to as 'the nuclear breakout time' – was assessed at two or three months, the new agreement will extend that timeframe to at least one year. So although it does not put an end to Iran's nuclear ambitions, the agreement has managed to place Iran under the scrutiny of an international monitoring system, allowing for the alarm bells to sound before it makes any sudden move to join the club of nuclear states.

But that leaves the most hotly debated question unaddressed: Is this a good or a bad agreement? In my view, the agreement is wonderful for President Obama's administration that has struggled and fought to reach an agreement by means of which the president may end his second term in office. Yesterday, he went so far as to threaten Congress that he would exercise his veto right should it refuse to endorse it.

It is also a good agreement for the Western powers that do not want a nuclear arms race sweeping over the Middle East, further fanning the flames that are now raging there.

As for Iran, it is back to the same square where it began years ago. It has neither achieved its aim of having a military nuclear program, nor benefited from the leap in the price of oil. Instead, it has faced difficulties stemming from the sanctions that have delayed the economic growth for which it is in dire need. In other words, Iran is among the countries that have lost most as a result of this agreement. It has had to swallow it, despite its bitter taste.

One can ignore here the propaganda of the Iranian media, which was very creative yesterday, going so far as to highlight clauses other than those that were actually signed merely to promote the notion that it represents a success for Iranian policy. The same will be done by the Iran’s fifth column in the Gulf states, which will praise and welcome this Iranian 'victory.'

But if the nuclear agreement between the Western states and Iran has foiled its nuclear capabilities and forced Tehran to submit – at least for now and until it catches its breath – the real concern stems from what will follow after the agreement and what may result from it. The concern also stems from what the Iranian regime will wager on in the coming phase by using the agreement as a political card.

For no sane person believes that Iran will end its policy that aims to undermine the region's stability. These fears were expressed by senior American officials. Former CIA director David Petraeus said that the greatest threat to the region does not come from ISIS but from Iran's militias.

Even if we believe President Obama's assurances and commitments that no concessions will be made to Iran at the expense of the region's states, the Western governments will be under severe pressure to ensure the agreement's success, and thus to turn a blind eye to Iran's policies that undermine stability, and to its stark intervention in its neighbors' domestic affairs. In fact, they will even turn a blind eye to Iran's support for extremist militias such as the [Iraq’s] Popular Mobilization Units. The latter have gradually become a part of the military structure of a state such as Iraq amidst a strange Western silence, laying the foundations for a new policy whose main formula is to strike at terrorism by resorting to similar terrorism!

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states cannot but welcome the nuclear agreement. As far as it goes, it supposedly shuts one door in evil's face. But the real worry is whether it also flings open other doors to evil.

„These are doors that Iran has proven adept at knocking at one after the other when it was still under sanctions. What can we expect if it catches its breath again?“ asks Dosari in conclusion.

End…

 

CONSTANT QUESTION: „Since the war on Syria began and as the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program with the '5 + 1' group were being held, the constant question was this: What impact would a hoped-for-agreement have on Syria?“ writes Ass'ad 'Abboud in Wednesday's official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

No one is unaware or can ignore, the extent of relations between the two states that have existed since the [1979] Islamic Revolution in Iran till today. In fact, these are the longest bilateral relations between any two states in the region that have bypassed all pitfalls and all developments since Saddam Hussein's [1980-88] war on Iran.

The extensive cooperation between the two states throughout that period – close to forty years – was not just an attempt to improve the terms of their diplomatic dealings. Relations took the form of cooperation in all fields and solidarity in all phases, with a shared understanding of the region's problems and issues, including the Palestinian cause, in particular.

Neither Syria nor Iran has ever compromised their relations. As a result, when the Syrian crisis broke out and the global war was waged on it, and when the country was placed under siege, looted, and exposed to slaughter, Iran unhesitatingly stressed the depth of the relations of brotherhood and cooperation in the service of the path of resistance that the two states have pursued and that they insist upon. And that gives legitimacy to the question that we began with.

The true repercussions of Iran’s historic victory resulting from the agreement with the '5 + 1' group go far beyond the fact that Syria is deeply pleased with it because of the undoubted achievement by its foremost and most important ally in the region, and perhaps in the world. Syria can see in Iran’s victory against injustice, siege and unfair economic sanctions, the possibility that the world may head towards a different outlook that seeks understanding, in contradiction with the policy of sanctions and siege.

Furthermore, the agreement signed in the Austrian capital Vienna, represents a victory for diplomatic action and genuine progress against war and the use of force and terrorism to intimidate and subjugate nations. It is not Syria alone that is taking a deep breath as a result of the agreement. All the world's countries that have been burnt by the fire of terrorism along with Syria are waiting to see the region enter a new phase of understanding, solidarity and cooperation in fighting terrorism as a result of liberating Iran’s full potential.

This historic event was the most important victory for logic and reason against the logic of blind force. And it occurs in an era that is haunted by painful conflicts. As President Bashar al-Assad said in his telegram of congratulations to [Iranian supreme leader] Sayyid Khamene'i, it constitutes a major turning point in the history of Iran, the region, and the world.

Syria no doubt awaits more resources from Iran in support of its just war against terrorism. In fact, Iran has never lagged in providing such support; but it will now have greater capabilities to employ in achieving the victory against terrorism.

Furthermore, Damascus awaits a change in the approach taken by many states around the world towards their relations to Syria, especially by lifting the siege imposed on it and expressing solidarity with it in fighting terrorism,“ concludes 'Abboud.

End…

 

NO SURPRISE: „Iran's agreement with the Western states over its nuclear program came as a surprise,“ writes Ghassan al-'Ayyash in Wednesday's left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

It was patently obvious that the U.S. had taken a major strategic decision to reach an understanding with Iran, open up to it, and cooperate with it economically. In fact, the U.S. had often drawn an analogy between the awaited agreement and the historic deal it struck with China half-a-century ago. And just as the earlier deal changed the face of the international political system, the new deal will change the face of the entire Middle East, from the Americans' perspective.

On the other side, and since the end of [former Iranian] president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's term in office, reaching an understanding with the U.S. and the West had become Iran’s sole path out of its economic isolation and the only means for reestablishing control over its natural resources and frozen assets. Therefore, despite the long and exhausting maneuvers, signing the agreement was just a matter of time. The time came, and the deal was struck.

The result is that Iran will return to being strong within its own borders and its regional environment, including our region that is drowning in destructive conflicts and rivers of hatred and blood. Iran is returning, strong in terms of its economy and financial resources, and not because of its nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. The prize Iran has secured from the agreement is the release of its enormous funds and its regained ability to export its oil and receive its due price. The West has bought off Iran's ability to produce a nuclear bomb and given it back its own money as a price for this deal.

In return for the guarantees that the West received that will delay Iran's ability to produce a nuclear bomb, the Islamic Republic has obtained an end to the sanctions imposed on it by the UN, the U.S. and the EU. The American and European sanctions that besiege the financial sector and energy and transportation sectors will have to be lifted early next year, after making sure that Iran has honored its commitments. This will be followed by an end to the UN sanctions within a similar period and via similar measures.

This is a new era for the Middle East and a new order. All eyes are focused on the impact this historic agreement will have on the region and its explosive conflicts. It will either be the key to a golden Islamic age and a lever to lift up the Palestinian people's struggle; or on the contrary, it will be cause for more divisions, fire, and destruction in the Arab East-- in the entire Arab world, in fact.

Iran is returning to being strong, as it was before the Revolution. But this time round, it is an Islamic Republic that looks at its Arab environment with great interest and takes direct part in its explosive conflicts and extremely complicated issues.

The hope is focused on a deep and historic dialogue between Iran and the parties opposing it in the Arab camp. This should lead to negotiations over Iran's role in the region and the rights of the minorities that have sought help and protection from it. The aim is to establish a just and stable order that will serve as the bases for Islamic unity in the face of Israel and all those who harbor designs against Iran and the Arabs.

The alternative to dialogue is to place Iran’s new capabilities in the service of conflict and some of the area’s leading powers. The Gulf will, in return, place its extensive resources in the service of the other parties. In that case, the war to destroy the Islamic world will rage, putting an end to the region and not ending the war. Arab and Iranian monies can be either a blessing, or a curse, to their owners.

„Iran is returning as a strong power; there is no disagreement over this. But reason must be the arbiter and criterion on both sides of the conflict. Reason must decide the course to be taken and the fate that awaits us,“ concludes 'Ayyash.

End…

 

CASTING DOUBTS: „It may not seem desirable for this article to begin by casting doubts in circumstances such as those we are witnessing today,“ writes 'Amer Mohsen in Wednesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

In fact, however, we are forced to admit the limits of what we know of the results of the nuclear agreement and its effect on the region, insofar as going beyond the text of the agreement itself is concerned. Anyone who claims to know for certain the future shape of U.S./Iranian relations would be lying. Anyone who draws a new map for the region in light of the agreement is speaking on the basis of supposition and interpretation, not fact. This to preempt any attempt at the kind of 'definitive' analysis that some Arabs – who only understand Iran from the perspective of their complexes and illusions – regarding the possible changes 'inside Iran' as a result of the agreement.

The answer to many of these questions will become clear with the passage of time. What we have today is the preliminary text of the understanding between Iran and the international community. Its clauses summarize numerous political implications and the long path of collision and negotiations that has led to this agreement. The most important event along this path occurred exactly nine years ago today.

On July 14th 2006, when the Lebanese resistance [Hizbollah] used an Iranian-made missile to strike the Israeli warship INS Hanit, the prospects of war on Iran shrunk and the search for other alternatives began. At that time, one particular knowledgeable person concluded with certainty that 'the idea of striking Iran is over.' This was despite the fact that the drums of war were then being loudly beaten. And the justification for this claim was logical: When it became clear that a missile from Iran’s arsenal could hit an advanced Western warship provided with all the means of protection and defense, this meant that the entire American fleet in the Gulf would face a similar threat.

These are the sorts of signals that army commands and intelligence agencies across the world listen to and on the basis of which they draw their plans. A military experience on the ground – such as in the 2006 Lebanon war and, the struggle against the U.S. in Iraq before that, – is more credible than thousands of wishful-thinking articles and analyses.

Technically, it may be useful to read the agreement on the basis of a distinction between Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. The concessions and the 'voluntary limits' that Iran has committed itself to in the nuclear field are limited to the military dimension. In other words, Iran has committed to what ensures that its program would be unable to produce weapons-grade plutonium, or sufficient amounts of enriched uranium to produce nuclear bombs, or the numbers of centrifuges that would provide a 'nuclear leap' by allowing the enrichment of sufficient uranium to produce a bomb in less than a year.

As for its 'civilian' nuclear program, the negotiators insisted on protecting it. The 'framework' agreement announced months ago included sticking points linked to nuclear research and the quality of centrifuges that Iran can develop. The negotiators insisted on restricting Iranian nuclear enrichment to first generation IR1 centrifuges, and that no more advanced alternatives should be manufactured or designed. Today's agreement gives the Iranians the right to develop centrifuges of all generations, reaching as far as IR8 during the coming ten years, so that these will be ready to replace the current technology by the end of that period.

In fact, the agreement will strengthen Iran’s nuclear program. It includes clauses regarding technical cooperation between Iran and the West in the civilian sector. This is not restricted to lifting the sanctions on importing nuclear equipment and technology; it enumerates a large number of research and scientific activities in which Iran will benefit from the West's knowledge.

According to the agreement, Iran will be able to build whatever nuclear reactors it wishes for the production of peaceful nuclear energy. The imported fuel needed to operate these reactors can go beyond the 300 kilograms of enriched uranium that Iran can keep and store. (The surplus will be sold on the international markets according to the agreement).

In other words, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure – apart from the production of plutonium – will remain in place when the main clauses of the agreement expire in fifteen years' time. This is what former U.S. diplomat Dennis Ross warned against. He drew attention to the fact that the agreement will leave Iran in the position of a 'nuclear threshold' state in a decade's time – and will legitimize that position.

In return for a freeze on their military nuclear capabilities, the Iranians secured two main concessions that actually limit the agreement's strategic importance: First, there will be no Western war on Iran (for whatever reason and regardless of what happens on the political arena). Second, there will be no sanctions on Iran (for whatever reason; in fact, the agreement includes clauses that prevent other forms of sanctions from being imposed, and demands that the U.S. refrains from any diplomatic or economic effort to affect the sale of Iranian oil – that is, outside the framework of the sanctions

Parallel with a commitment to this agreement, therefore, Iran has ensured that the West will strip itself of the two effective weapons it can use to threaten Tehran with. This immunity is now linked to the nuclear file, and will persist with guarantees, regardless of what happens in the political arena and the arena of regional competition. And this was the Iranian negotiators' specific aim from the very beginning. Most of the technical points that analysts amuse themselves scrutinizing in search of political purposes are mere maneuvers and diversions.

It is only natural for some Arabs, whose sectarian obsessions have turned them into tools that wager exclusively on a U.S. strike against Iran, to feel 'disappointed' and 'betrayed.' As a result, these ‘U.S. tools’ are attacking Tehran for negotiating with the Americans or are delving deep into the details of the agreement so as to expose the depth of Iran's 'concessions.' (Had the negotiator been an Arab regime, such as that of Saddam or Qadhafi or others, it would have simply abandoned its entire nuclear effort and we would not have heard of any details or clauses).

„It is both difficult and painful to lose both worlds simultaneously: That of the principled position and self-image, and that of the practical outcome. But the problem of these people – as we have to remind them – is with the U.S. and not with Iran,“ concludes Mohsen.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Done deal

 

Israel's response to the Vienna Agreement, which was finalized yesterday after 12 years of negotiations, is almost exclusively critical. This is reflected in the front pages of the country's two most-read newspapers: Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom. Israel Hayom, which has been campaigning vociferously against the deal all along, goes for a banner headline declaring that the six world powers have signed, 'A deal that will live in infamy.' Yedioth Ahronoth adopts a similarly critical tone: its lead headline claims that, 'The world has capitulated to Iran.' Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post refrain from editorial comment in their respective lead headlines, both simply reporting on the fact that a historic deal was reached.

All the papers' top commentators and analysts have written articles for today's editions and the vast majority of them echo the concerns expressed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In his first post-deal reaction, Netanyahu called the agreement 'a historic mistake,' and accused the world's leading powers of gambling on the common future with Israel in a deal with the main financer and operator of global terrorism. Netanyahu rejected a claim, which he said was politically motivated by his domestic rivals, that his relationship with U.S. President Barack Obama affected the deal.

The prime minister later convened his security cabinet, which – as expected – unanimously rejected the deal reached and determined that Israel is not bound by it. Netanyahu then met with opposition leader Isaac Herzog and updated him on the briefings that were given at the security cabinet regarding the security significance of the nuclear agreement with Iran. Herzog reiterated his earlier remarks that the deal is a bad agreement. Netanyahu said that the fact that there is agreement between the coalition and opposition in Israel regarding the danger that the agreement poses to Israel's security is especially important at this time. He said it is important to show the world a united front on the issue.

On Wednesday, the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee convened to discuss the deal. Committee chairman MK Tzachi Hanegbi (Likud) said that previously the nuclear negotiations had been discussed by the Intelligence and Secret Service Subcommittee, but that now that the deal has been uncovered and is a fait accompli, the full Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee must discuss it and its ramifications.

Before entering the committee room opposition Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid said that this is the greatest foreign policy failure by an Israeli prime minister and called on Netanyahu to resign. Lapid said that Netanyahu is not Winston Churchill before World War II, but rather Golda Meir after the failures of the Yom Kippur War.

In the United States, President Obama said that the nuclear deal reached with Iran will prevent it from arming itself with a nuclear weapon in the coming decade. In an interview with the New York Times, Obama said the deal should be measured by the original premise: that Iran could not get a nuclear weapon. He said the agreement is by a wide margin the most definitive path to achieve this. Obama said the deal is based on a verifiable mechanism, whereby every pathway Iran has to a nuclear weapon is shut off.

The U.S. President noted that he tried to make clear, including to Netanyahu, that in the absence of a deal, the ability to sustain sanctions on Iran was not in the cards. Obama said not just Iran paid a price for sanctions, but China, Japan, South Korea, India — pretty much any oil importer around the world that had previous import arrangements from Iran — found themselves in a situation where it was costing them billions of dollars to sustain the sanctions.

Obama responded to critics who have asserted sanctions relief will give Iran more money to engage in terrorist activity. He acknowledged that possibility, and said the U.S. is going to have to 'systematically guard against that' and work with its allies, the Gulf States and Israel to stop that.

Obama spoke with Netanyahu by phone on Tuesday. He said in the interview that while Netanyahu and other critics prefer that Iran has no nuclear enrichment capacity; that is simply impossible. He said that what was achieved instead was an inspection regime and safeguards and international consensus whereby it's not worth it for Iran to pursue nuclear arms.

Obama said that his administration has strategic upgrades in the works for the country's Gulf allies and Israel. Obama asserted that his administration has done more than previous ones to upgrade Israel's capabilities. He said he is prepared to go further than any other administration has gone before in terms of providing Israel with additional security assurances.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, has rejected Israeli criticism of the nuclear accord with Iran. The ambassador said that Washington can prove unequivocally that the agreement will block any path that Iran could have used to attain a nuclear weapon. Interviewed on Israel Radio, Shapiro conceded that Iran is led by an anti-American, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic regime, but stressed that now Iran will be less dangerous because it won't have a nuclear weapon. He added that Washington has a deep and ongoing commitment to Israel's security, and is willing to deepen the cooperation further.

Germany also criticized Israel's opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that a responsible deal was reached and he urged Israel to take a closer look at it and not criticize the agreement in a coarse way.

 

WHAT ABOUT THE TERROR?: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit says that, while the Vienna Agreement may be satisfactory in terms of how it limits Iran's nuclear program, it does nothing to address the Islamic Republic's role in funding and supporting global terror.

"Israel's security cabinet yesterday unanimously rejected the agreement between the six world powers and Iran. The problem is that the security cabinet of the Israeli government is irrelevant. It's rejection of the Vienna Agreement would have been about as meaningful as voting to relocate Iran to Pluto. Israel finds itself in this embarrassing situation because of the policies of the Netanyahu government. Even the prime minister knows that the jig is up. The agreement is a done deal and even if he somehow manages to convince 13 Democratic senators to vote against their president and to oppose his veto, it would do more harm than good.

Moreover, the Europeans are now extracting their revenge against Netanyahu – and it's a sweet revenge. They have already announced that they will not sit around waiting for the Americans. As far as Brussels is concerned, it doesn't matter what Congress decides to do – they will rush to do business with Iran the moment the sanctions are lifted. If the rest of the world were to start doing business with the Islamic Republic, it would be economic suicide for the United States to maintain its regime of sanctions. That is the price that Netanyahu is now paying for the insane gamble he took several years ago, when he decided to ignore the Europeans, neglect the Democrats and place all of his chips on the Republicans. Well, he lost the bet.

After yesterday's cabinet meeting, Netanyahu addressed the Israeli people – and went on the defensive. He was dragged into an embarrassing web of excuses, designed to deflect the accusation – first raised by Yair Lapid – that the Vienna Agreement is a personal failure for the prime minister. 'The personal relationship between myself and President Obama had no influence whatsoever,' he said. It would have been more accurate to say that he had no influence over the deal whatsoever – because of his terrible relationship with President Obama. And not just with Obama. With the rest of the world, too. Everybody apart from Sheldon Adelson. It's no coincidence that yesterday – moments before the Vienna Agreement was announced – someone leaked a report that Netanyahu has frozen settlement construction in Judea and Samaria. What a pathetic attempt to divert attention away from Iran. It's as if Netanyahu was trying to tell the Israeli people that despite his best efforts – he even agreed to a settlement construction freeze, after all and the bastards went ahead and signed a deal with Iran! It seems impossible that even Netanyahu believes his own spin.

The problem with the Vienna Agreement has nothing to do with Iran's nuclear program; rather, it's a matter of principle. In terms of how it relates to the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, it's a very reasonable agreement. There are holes, to be sure, especially when it comes to inspections, but no one denies that it moves the Iranians further away from obtaining nuclear weapons, rolls back their nuclear program and freezes the status quo for another 15 years. All in all, that's not a bad deal. The problem is that the agreement also gives Iran a license to kill and it cements its role as the leading supporter of global terrorism. Rather than punishing the Islamic Republic for its past crimes, the agreement rewards it.

The Vienna Agreement is a huge victory for the Iranian Revolution at a time when, ironically, many Iranians are fed up with this Islamist regime. The international community now recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran. The international community does not have the ability to deal with ISIS, so it hopes that Iran will do the job for it. Iran is getting itself out of the corner it has been in for years; it is rejoining the family of nations and is transforming itself from the main problem to part of the solution. There is a chance that the West's conciliatory approach to Iran will pay off and will accelerate sociopolitical processes within Iran, which will lead to the eventual collapse of the ayatollah regime. The chances that exactly the opposite happens, however, are much greater.

At yesterday's meeting of the security cabinet, there were no dissenting voices. Even the various representatives of the defense establishment who were present were united in their view that, all in all, the agreement is bad for Israel and bad for the world. Some of these defense officials made a point of singling out parts of the agreement that they are in favor of, but the bottom line is that they all agreed that Iran is now far more dangerous to Israel than it was yesterday. They based that assessment on an overview of the agreement and its presumed ramifications. On the nuclear aspects of the deal, there are some Israeli defense officials who say (albeit quietly) that the overall outcome isn't too bad.

After the meeting, Naftali Bennett said that the upshot of the agreement is that, over the course of the next decade, Iran will increase its support for international terrorism tenfold and, thereafter, it will be able to move quickly toward obtaining a nuclear bomb. Within a few weeks, he warned, Iran could take possession of 20 nuclear bombs. Bennett may be exaggerating the second part of his prediction, but the first part alone should be enough to be a major concern for anyone who is aware of the explosive nature of the Middle East.

We have to conclude that the historic agreement that was finalized yesterday represents one of the most colossal failures of Israeli policy ever. When Netanyahu recorded his address to the nation yesterday, his ashen face said far more than the words he spoke. The prime minister promised to thwart the nuclear deal and said that he would do everything in his power to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. 'In any case,' Netanyahu promises, 'Israel knows how to defend itself.' Compared to some of the eloquent speeches he has delivered over the past six years, yesterday's performance was a pale imitation. All that remains of Netanyahu the warrior against the Iranian nuclear program is a puddle of lukewarm water."

Ends…

 

BAD DEAL, BAD CONSEQUENCES: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yaakov Amidror says that the bad nuclear agreement with Iran will have only bad consequences – including a nuclear arms race, increase in terrorist activity by Iran and more power to ISIS.

"The nuclear deal between Iran and the six Western powers, which was finalized in Vienna yesterday, is a historic moment: the powers effectively legitimized Iran's continued efforts to obtain nuclear capability on condition that it slows down those efforts for the next decade. Thereafter, it will be allowed to do whatever it likes. This, of course, is if we optimistically assume that the Islamic Republic does not violate the terms of the deal beforehand.

I have not had the time to study the full details of the agreement, but as important as the details are (and they are, indeed, important) they cannot cover up the extent of the change in the American position, which has moved from a policy of 'dismantling the Iranian nuclear program' to one of 'inspecting the Iranian nuclear program.' Moreover, sanctions – which brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place – will be lifted (gradually, according to the agreement). This will allow Iran to increase its resilience to any future sanctions. If, at some stage in the future, the West decides that sanctions must be re-imposed – which is not something that it will find easy to do – they will have only a minor impact on the Islamic Republic. In any case, the Vienna Agreement will ensure that Iran becomes stronger economically, politically and militarily.

Given that the foundation of the agreement is so bad, the details take on extra importance – but they cannot alter the fundamentals of the deal. Beyond the nuclear issue, the Vienna Agreement will have an immediate impact on several issues:

-The start of a conventional and nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey have already intimated that they will not accept Iran going nuclear without them acquiring similar capabilities. This will lead to an unrestrained nuclear arms race. Since the agreement puts Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in a difficult position, the United States will want to compensate them and will allow them to purchase pretty much whatever they want. Clearly, Iran will also join this arms race with full energy, after years of being subjected to an arms embargo, with Russia delighted to provide it with whatever military hardware it wants. The result of these two processes will be a massive conventional arms race, which Israel will also be obligated to join – at least on the basis of the American promise to safeguard Israel's qualitative edge in the region.

-Iran will start to intervene more aggressively in regional conflicts, in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere, since now that it is not under any pressure, it will have more spare cash to fund such adventures. It will focus on promoting its regional interests, with the presumed acquiescence of the Americans. In terms of global terrorism, Iran is already a leading force, according to a report from the U.S. State Department. After this agreement, we will see more Iranian activity on this front.

-Paradoxically – which is typical for the Middle East – the agreement could lead to the strengthening of ISIS. The Sunnis across the Middle East could interpret the Vienna Agreement with Iran – which is the leading Shiite superpower – as a Western decision to back the Shiites against the Sunnis. This could lead many Sunnis to conclude that, in order to protect themselves against Shiite aggression, they need to join forces with the strongest Sunni organization in the region. And that organization is ISIS.

This bad deal will have only bad consequences."

Ends…

 

 

THE MILITARY OPTION REMAINS: Writing in Makor Rishon, Amnon Lord says that, since the Vienna Agreement is so full of holes, Israel needs to ensure that the military option is ready and available if it becomes apparent that Iran is still pursuing military nuclear capabilities.

"At the end of the day, another radical and anti-Semitic regime, which has threatened the Jewish people with annihilation, is being recognized as a country on the threshold of nuclear capability. This is a wonderful 'achievement' for U.S. President Barack Obama. He has put the Iranian nuclear program on hold. The Iranians are reducing their number of centrifuges to around 6,500 and they will continue to possess uranium enriched to a level of 3.5 percent. The Americans argue that the Vienna Agreement effectively means that the Iranians are one year away from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Previously, they were two or three months away from this. In Israel, the working assumption is that the agreement distances Iran from a nuclear bomb by no more than a few months.

When Meir Dagan stepped down as Mossad director early in 2011, he said that the Iranians would not be able to manufacture a nuclear bomb before 2015. Thanks to Israeli threats and American diplomacy, the Iranians' progress was halted and Dagan's prediction did not come true. Now, as usual, there will be a domestic political battle waged inside Israel. It appears that Yair Lapid and Isaac Herzog are reading from the same script; instead of attacking Obama for turning his back on Israel, they are attacking Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

In fact, if the Iranians are renewing the nuclear program, the diplomatic passion play will have a few more acts. This, of course, assumes that the Vienna Agreement is approved. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry plan to take their proposal for sanction relief to the United Nations Security Council – again, in a move designed to bypass Congress. The assumption is that Obama's standing among the American people has strengthened in the last month, thanks to domestic issues that have nothing to do with Iran. The Democrats will stand behind him, so it will be almost impossible for opponents of the agreement to drum up enough support to overcome any presidential veto.

All that remains is to ask all those Israelis who admire Obama: If this agreement harms Israel and if we have known this for the past six years, why did you try to convince everyone that Obama is a friend of Israel? After all, the president's strategy has consistently been one of trying to isolate Israel as he went behind our backs to reach a détente with Iran.

In recent years, Obama has managed to create two contradictory axes: on the one hand, the peace-loving moderates, including Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, the United States and the five other world powers; on the other hand, the bad guys, the new axis of evil, which includes Netanyahu and Iranian hardliners.

And there were plenty of people who bought into this. From the outset, Obama easily managed to recruit senior commentators in the United States, such as Tom Friedman from the New York Times and Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, both of whom helped him to launch incessant attacks on Netanyahu on every subject under the sun. Since the leaders of the Israeli media and some of the security establishment elite see anyone who attacks Netanyahu as a friend, Obama was helped out by these useful idiots. They get pleasure from every anti-Netanyahu headline. Netanyahu, for his part, faithfully represented Israel's objections to the nuclear deal, including a controversial address to the U.S. Congress – and he will continue to do so.

The Vienna agreement is full of holes and could fall apart on its own. Within two or three years, it could be dead in the water. Israel will have no choice but to redouble its intelligence-gathering operations in order to discover whether Iran has any secret nuclear facilities. At the same time, Israel cannot rely on Western inspections; it must ensure that it has the independent means of ascertaining whether Iran is working on a nuclear bomb. If we do discover that Tehran – despite the agreement – is actively pursuing military nuclear capability, we damn well better make sure that the military option is readily available."

Ends…

 

A DEAL OF THE BRAVE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Orly Azoulay says that Israel will pay the price for remaining isolated and for its opposition to the Vienna Agreement.

"The United States yesterday reassumed its role as a beacon to the world: it proved that creative diplomacy can be victorious. It proved that it is possible to reach a breakthrough agreement which changes the course of history without resorting to bunker-buster bombs and without cruise missiles. President Roosevelt described U.S. foreign policy as 'speaking softly and carrying big stick.' That's exactly what President Obama did with Iran. In one hand, he held suffocating sanctions and in the other hand he held an entry ticket to the family of nations.

Obama did not waver from the path that he set out when he became president. He promised that he would engage dictators in dialogue if he thought that it was in the interests of the United States to do so; he promised that he would seek to enter into agreements that would make the world a safer place. That is why the American people elected him. He showed them the path to global reconciliation. Most of all, he offered the American people a path that was totally the opposite of his predecessor's. George W. Bush, after all, acted as if he was the global sheriff; he launched an unjustified war on Iraq, which has, in the meantime, become an ISIS stronghold.

Obama brought a very different approach. He opened up America's iron first and extended his hand in peace. In his dealings with Iran, he was simultaneously generous and cruel. The most painful sanctions were imposed by his administration, but, at the same time, the most far-reaching promises were also made by his White House.

Obama came in for harsh criticism from the Israeli right and its supporters in the United States. He was accused of adopting a policy of containing the Iranian nuclear program, that he had come to terms with the Islamic Republic eventually obtaining a nuclear weapon, that his policies were as weak as his personality and that he approached the whole issue like some dusty professor and not the leader of the free world.

Yesterday allowed Obama to raise once again the banner of hope and change: he completed his mission. The obstacles that he has placed in the path of an Iranian nuclear bomb are solid. The agreement isn't perfect, but it contains a great promise for peace. Obama has also promised to use his right of veto to prevent Congress from derailing the deal.

During the course of the exhaustive and exhausting negotiations, Obama managed to ignore the background noise coming out of Jerusalem, from Capitol Hill and from the royal palace in Riyadh. He focused on the job at hand. He got the impression that the Iranian people are more interested in being rescued from international isolation than they are in obtaining a nuclear bomb.

And that will be the next stage: the United States is already planning to reintroduce student exchange programs with Iran, to promote tourism, new economic deals and collaborative ventures in the field of science and technology. A new atmosphere now exists between Washington and Tehran. In contrast, relations between Obama and Netanyahu are still as tempestuous as ever. And that storm is threatening to blow away the most important part of Israel's national security doctrine: relations with the United States.

The train of history left the station yesterday. Instead of clambering aboard for the ride, Israel will pay the price for its isolation. Even after Obama leaves the White House, it is far from certain that the next president will be a Republican (which is what Netanyahu dearly wants). And even if he or she is, the Vienna Agreement is pretty much a done deal. And it's an agreement of the brave."

Ends…

 

LOSE-LOSE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon asks whether Israel will be more or less likely to get what it needs in terms of security guarantees from the U.S. following a bruising battle with Obama in Congress.

"Few prospects are more displeasing to Israeli policy-makers and long-term strategists than the thought of doing battle with a U.S. president in public, and in Congress to boot. One of those more displeasing prospects, however, is the specter of a nuclear Iran. And this is why, over the next two months, Israel will likely wage what is essentially a lose-lose battle to get Congress to reject removing U.S. sanctions against Iran and essentially vote down the Iran nuclear accord agreed upon in Vienna on Tuesday.

Earlier this year, Congress gave itself the power to review the accord and, if it so desires, to vote on it. A vote against removing U.S. sanctions would trigger a presidential veto – as President Barack Obama said clearly on Tuesday – and 67 senators and 290 representatives would be needed to override it. That is a daunting task and – assuming all Republicans voted against the president – would mean having to move 13 Democratic senators and some 50 Democratic representatives over. Congress, historically, has overridden fewer than 10 percent of all presidential vetoes.

Those numbers should be at the forefront of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s mind as he charts his next course of action. Government ministers and sources close to Netanyahu have said in recent days that once the parties in Vienna reach an accord, the battle to scuttle it will not end, but will move to another playing field: U.S. public opinion and Congress.

The reason this is a lose-lose proposition is that even in the unlikely event that the necessary votes are found to overturn the presidential veto, Israel will leave a wounded president who will place much of the blame on Israel for shooting down what he believes is his foreign policy legacy achievement. Granted, Obama will only be in office for another 16 months after the 60-day review period, but that is not an inconsequential amount of time. And during that time, Israel does not need someone in the White House who will not only be openly hostile, but also bear a huge grudge.

Now that the accord has been settled, Israel needs to weigh its course of action carefully. The strategy of going head-to-head with Obama over the issue did not succeed up until now, if one judges success by whether or not an accord was reached. It may well be the case – as Netanyahu’s supporters argue – that had he not railed so hard and so long against the deal, it would look a lot worse than it does. But now there is a deal, which necessitates a rethink.

If going head-to-head with Obama did not prevent a deal the president seemed hell-bent on reaching from the beginning, then why assume this tactic will enjoy any more success now? One of the more unsettling aspects of the accord is that we are moving into an era where old assumptions about Israel’s presumed nuclear superiority may soon no longer be valid. It’s a new world, and it takes a lot of adjusting.

But if Israel has proven itself particularly apt at one thing over the last 67 years, it is adjusting to new realities. While the country does not plan well for the long term, it has shown a remarkable aptitude for solving short-term problems. Throw a problem at Israel, and it does not raise its hands in defeat, but finds a solution. It found a solution to the suicide bombers of the second intifada, it found a solution to the missiles and rockets from Gaza, and it is in the process of finding a solution to the scourge of attack tunnels.

It will also be able to find a way to deal with an Iran within spitting distance of a nuclear weapon. And one way of dealing with it will be trying to reach certain strategic understandings with the U.S. Now that the deal is done, Jerusalem and Washington will discuss 'compensation,' the types of weapons systems and diplomatic understandings that Israel will be provided to give it a sense of security.

One element in this 'compensation package' will surely be some state-of-the art military pieces, but that is only part of the puzzle. Other ideas bandied about range from administration- backed legislation mandating U.S. military action against Iran if it breaches its commitments, to an agreement whereby the U.S. would provide Israel with a 'nuclear guarantee' – meaning it would respond with nuclear weapons if Israel were attacked by a country that had nuclear arms.

Talks toward the latter option took place in a vastly different context back in 2000 at Camp David, where then-prime minister Ehud Barak and then-U.S. president Bill Clinton reached an understanding that if an accord were signed with the Palestinians establishing a Palestinian state, the U.S. and Israel would sign a defense pact similar to one the U.S. has with NATO countries. Under this deal, the U.S. would have provided Israel with a nuclear guarantee.

That pact never went into effect, however, because the accord with the Palestinians collapsed. But that idea was out there then, and will likely be revisited now as a whole new Middle East reality – with a muscular and empowered Iran – begins to set in.

As Netanyahu decides what counter-strategy to adopt, one question he must ask himself is the following: Will Israel be more or less likely to get what it needs in terms of security guarantees from the U.S. following a bruising battle with Obama in Congress – a battle that it appears will be very, very difficult to win?"

Ends…

 

OBAMA'S CHECKBOOK: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that, since military action against Iran is not an option, Israel’s response depends on achieving closer ties with Washington.

"U.S. President Barack Obama achieved his overall goal with the signing of the nuclear agreement between the major powers and Tehran on Tuesday: depriving Iran of a military nuclear capability for the next decade at least. Instead of Iran remaining only about three months away from such a capability, the time span will expand to about a year.

So much the better, but other than this achievement, the agreement signed in Vienna doesn’t give much reason for rejoicing in the West or Israel. At the center of the talks was an effort to balance the oversight of Iran’s nuclear program with the pace of lifting the economic sanctions. The compromise that gives foreign inspectors the right to visit sites only after scheduling the visits with the Iranians provides an opening for delay and deception by Tehran.

And the mechanism for re-imposing sanctions 65 days after detection of an Iranian breach appears convoluted. Recent leaks indicate that there was disagreement over the Iranian demand that the embargo on the sale of conventional weapons to Tehran be lifted. Ultimately it was agreed that the embargo would be extended another five years.

Reports from the final stretch of the talks raise concerns that the American cow wanted to provide even more milk to the Iranian calf than the calf wanted to drink. It’s understandable that achieving an agreement was also an Iranian goal, but all along the way the ideological ambivalence of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was also apparent.

The elderly leader was concerned that the lifting of sanctions, though it would save the country’s economy, would open Iran to the West and let the Americans lead a velvet revolution that would gradually change the face of the regime under pressure from the people. But he signed the agreement despite his reservations and aggressive speech on Iran’s red lines three weeks ago — he apparently felt the deal was too good to pass up.

The agreement between Iran and the world powers is the most important event in the Middle East since the beginning of the Arab Spring four and a half years ago. It comes as the Middle East is riven by wars with a clearly religious component — a Shiite-Sunni split. And Iran has been playing a central role. Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, which are concerned about Shiite Iran and seek to maintain their dominance in the region, may enter the arms race in an effort to become nuclear threshold states — at least. This would accompany their suspicions that Iran will again cheat the West and find a way to bypass the agreement.

And the money that will begin flowing into the Iranian economy as the sanctions are lifted may also expand the resources made available to the regime of President Bashar Assad in Syria, Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Signals from Washington over the past year suggest that the Obama administration has been seeking a kind of détente with Tehran under which the two sides would sometimes cooperate; for example, in the fight in Iraq against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

The serious crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations, at whose heart lies the tense relationship between Obama and Binyamin Netanyahu, has produced a situation in which the prime minister’s influence over the nuclear talks’ final stages was marginal. Now, beyond the criticism that he will level at the U.S. president, Netanyahu is expected to gear up for the battle in Congress in an effort to hamstring Obama. In other words, he will strive to block the administration’s promises to lift Congressional sanctions on Iran.

Despite Netanyahu’s following among Republicans and the fact that the delay of the Vienna signing date added two months to the Congressional approval period, Netanyahu’s success hinges on recruiting 13 Democratic Senators to the nuclear agreement’s opponents. Prospects for that don’t appear high at the moment, despite the agreement’s many flaws.

In any event, the Prime Minister’s Office will invest huge effort in the battle, which will of course also see a sharper tone vis-a-vis Obama and his policies. One would hope that disagreements on principles and personalities won’t burn the bridges that link Jerusalem and Washington. Ultimately, even after the confrontation in Congress, Obama is expected to be waiting at the White House, checkbook in hand, for Netanyahu. He’s expected to put together a package giving Israel generous military compensation for the Iranian agreement.

Obama and his spokespeople will try to promote the deal as a huge American foreign-policy success, as the most important development in the president's two terms. In practice, one could have hoped for a better agreement, but even if the Vienna accord is full of loopholes, it’s close to being a fait accompli. On the other hand, despite the fervent rhetoric of some Israeli politicians, an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites is no longer a relevant scenario.

If, as Obama expects, he overcomes Congressional opposition, we will be left with Iran as a strong regional power with its slew of bad intentions, but at this stage without a military nuclear capability. The Israeli response to this threat depends on achieving closer ties with the United States, enhancing the Israel Defense Forces’ capabilities with American assistance, and strengthening the cooperation with the more moderate Sunni countries in the region. It’s a complicated picture, but not necessarily the bleakest one."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION TALKS: Orhan Bursali takes a cautious view of the first round of coalition talks in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The first coalition talks took place yesterday. This time the parties had a direct exchange of views. The CHP (Republican People's Party) is inclined to form a coalition. This is not unconditional of course. There is hesitation, concern and mistrust."

Mehmet Tezkan has low expectations in centrist Milliyet: "The first contact has been made between the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the CHP. The parties do not trust each other! If the barrier of trust can be lifted, the other barriers will be addressed. The concept of 'exploratory contacts' does not have a positive connotation. In diplomatic discourse, it is the definition of kicking the ball out of court, gaining and wasting time, holding up the opposite side and taking a hard line."

Mustafa Kartoglu emphasizes the need for mutual trust in centre-left, pro-government Star: "The coalition talks suggest a quest for a compromise. Only one pre-condition should be ensured - trust. This is the sine qua non for agreeing on principles as well. The first round of coalition talks is being held in the name of this quest for 'trust'. While the politicians have projected a positive image of the first round of talks, it has also been revealed that a backstage political compromise remains a distant option."

Abdulkadir Selvi believes a coalition may be in the offing in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The will for an AKP-CHP coalition exists. But it is still too early for this to turn into a coalition partnership. The AKP-MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) talks today are very significant. These talks will determine the real road map. The CHP leaders whom I spoke to after the coalition talks also have the impression that the prime minister is primarily interested in talks with the MHP. They believe that the talks with MHP leader Devlet Bahceli will determine how the issue proceeds."

Hakan Aksay portrays the president as the obstacle to progress in independent online T24: "The majority of the AKP (including PM Davutoglu) prefers a coalition rather than early elections. They are not against forming a coalition with the CHP either. Turkey should overcome the obstacle presented by President Erdogan so as to ensure democracy, social peace and economic stability. This could require more than one move; it cannot be done with radical steps and in a short while, but unless he is ultimately overcome, it will be difficult to move on. Because as long as Erdogan wins, Turkey will be unable to win."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist E'temad is quietly jubilant: "The ongoing nuclear talks are perhaps unprecedented in the diplomatic history of the world. Unlike in previous years, our performance in the talks led the other side to respect our demands and accept our suggestions. The negotiators have understood that failure to reach a deal is the worst result and they know that no agreement is worse than other options." 

Conservative Khorasan writes of a new Iran: "The nuclear talks are a turning point and a historical achievement for the Islamic revolution. If we do not make a strategic mistake, Iran is the winner whether a deal is reached or not. We made the super powers of yesterday, who did not want to recognize Iran's power and demands, sit at the negotiation table and we managed to impose our demands on them. Following the Vienna talks the world will see a new more powerful Iran. Our self-confidence and the global recognition of our status are a great victory for the Islamic revolution. Let us have confidence in ourselves."

Hard-line Keyhan identifies a bad agreement: "The only strategy for any negotiations (deal or no deal) is national unity and empathy. The whole country wants a good agreement that will lift the oppressive sanctions and will safeguard our achievements in the field of nuclear technology. It is clear that just any agreement is not good enough. An agreement that maintains sanctions, keeps the path open for excuses, stops progress in research and development and nuclear activities at an industrial-scale or legalizes Western political claims about our nuclear programme is an unwanted agreement, which instead of closing the dossier, provides an extremely threatening dimension to it." 

Conservative Resalat is negatively balanced: "Some claim that we should prepare for celebrations. If talks reach a conclusion and even if our red lines are observed, though none of them have been observed so far by the other side, celebrating is meaningless. We have made some concessions; that cannot be denied. Therefore, celebrating will not be based on truth. It will not, however, make sense to mourn the loss due to these concessions because in return we have disrupted the aggressive strategy of the enemy against the Iranian nation."

Reformist Arman has a rare sympathetic word for Russia: "Now that the nuclear sanctions are to be lifted; Iran expects the arms sanctions to be lifted as well. If Iran succeeds in achieving this, it will be able to boost its military and defence power by purchasing necessary weapons and be more successful in fighting terrorism in the region. The Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia will try through American radicals, to prevent this important move. Russia and China have created gaps among the P5+1 and their unity against Iran has been shattered. Russia's emphasis on Iran's need for the lifting of arms sanction to fight terrorism and establish peace and stability in the region has led the West to consider this point." 

Hard-line Javan considers aspects of a good deal: "There are several indicators of a good deal. Iran's achievements in the field of nuclear technology are part of Iran's revolution and a document of the capabilities of the youth of the Islamic Revolution's generation. Protecting these values regardless of the type of agreement is an inexorable principle. Awareness in drafting the agreement and depriving the other side from using psychological pressure to manipulate public opinion in Iran due to the economic difficulties is another characteristic of a good deal. The protection of Iran's political and economic independence in the implementation of the agreement will also designate a good deal." 

Reformist Sharq is upbeat: "The negotiations showed that trusting the soldiers of the front-line of diplomacy can produce significant achievements, while undermining and sabotaging them can harm national interests. We should accept that the nuclear agreement does not mean that all problems will be resolved immediately. The problems inherited by Rowhani's administration like unemployment, inflation, devaluation of the national currency, organized corruption, etc. require long-term planning. Lifting the cruel sanctions will be a good starting point. Whether we want it or not, our economy relies on oil and our oil industry really needs much investment and modern technologies. With this nuclear agreement the economy will improve. We hope the government will be ready to make use of the positive international atmosphere. In the wild situation in the region, a stable Iran can cooperate with all the countries in the world including America to fight terrorism and promise positive development to the Middle East and beyond."

Conservative Hemayat is a party pooper: "Every country, including the Islamic Republic, has the right to use clean and peaceful nuclear energy. If the talks produce convincing results and our negotiators' are satisfied, it will not mean that the demands of our oppressed people have been accepted by the West led by America. The exploitative and imperialistic nature of America will never go away." 

 

U.S./AFGHANISTAN: Conservative Quds is not hopeful: "Senator John McCain, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, called President Obama's plan for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan a strategic mistake. John McCain's remarks clearly indicate that there are differences in the U.S. about Afghanistan and the region. If Obama withdraws from Afghanistan, it will not mean the end of the war there."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

Expectations of peace and war

 

The region may…enter a new arms race from which the budgets of the weapons-exporting countries will benefit. Certain Arab states will be allowed to purchase ready-made nuclear reactors to produce energy thus becoming 'nuclear' themselves – but with a difference of course. For Washington, with Israel behind it, will not allow a new Iran that has both the knowledge and the ability to enrich uranium to emerge. And as military solutions become more difficult if not downright impossible in files such as Syria and Yemen, and as other complexities take deep root in other countries, the following question poses itself: Is it time for launching an Arab/Iranian strategic dialogue that accepts the reality of the new power in the region instead of remaining trapped in this dark tunnel?--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

Both geography and history impose Iran as a major permanent neighbor of the Arab nation. It would thus be better to manage any conflict or disagreement with it via dialogue and diplomatic means on the basis of good neighborly relations that emphasize common interests, and by building broader systems of regional security and cooperation with it. The nuclear agreement – especially after progress is made in lifting the sanctions on Iran – will launch a new dynamic in Iranian society. The country will be liberated from the 'obsession' of a foreign enemy lying in wait for it for the first time since the Islamic Revolution’s victory in 1979. Iran will face the issues of reform, democratic transformation, and the question of individual and collective human rights--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The marathon negotiations have placed the Iranian nuclear and military programs on the autopsy table, holding every detail under microscopic scrutiny. But the negotiations have ignored the main engine of Iran's influence; that scares its neighbors more than the nuclear program. For the terrifying Iranian 'flame thrower' is not its nuclear program or its ballistic missiles, but its constitution that no one has recalled – neither in Geneva nor in Vienna nor in any of the secret or public negotiations. Its third clause calls for 'absolute support for the weak in the earth.' This is not a 'theoretical' text, but a practical one above all. And Tehran has been implementing it adeptly across the entire Levantine map--Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

If Obama manages to get the agreement through Congress, that would represent a blow to Netanyahu and an important part of the process of reviewing Israel's role in determining U.S. policy. The other Israeli 'loss' stems from the prospect that the Americans will now be free to devote their attention to other dossiers after Iran, including the Palestinian/Israeli problem. This is especially likely given that historical precedents demonstrate that whenever a major Middle Eastern file is conclusively addressed, attention then turns to the Palestinian file, even if the final outcome has been disappointing. The Israelis should now expect international and American demands to resolve the Palestinian problem--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The two sides want to consolidate the agreement. And because the definition of 'extremism' when the issue of 'fighting extremism' in the region becomes a 'catalyst', basically and exclusively pertains to 'the Sunni other,' this entails more misguided wars that will only produce further sectarianism, extremism, and terrorism, especially when Tehran and Washington are part of the same project. And if the agreement holds its ground for a few years, the next phase will be one in which the region will witness larger scale wars because the competition between its states and with time will be at its most intense. The irony is that at the time when the Obama administration argues with its opponents and justifies its behavior by claiming that there is no alternative because the only other option is war, the nuclear agreement will lead to the very war it claims to be seeking to avoid in one way or another--Ali Hassan Bakeer in Qatari al-Arab

 

Today’s (Tuesday’s) nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers will change the face of the Middle East forever, predicts the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. It will consolidate Iran's position as a regional superpower and as the international community's main partner in dealing with the region's issues. This raises the question as to whether it is time to initiate an Arab/Iranian strategic dialogue, rather than remain trapped in the current dark regional tunnel. While it may be rash to make too many predictions regarding the consequences of the nuclear agreement, it seems plausible to expect Tehran's foreign policy to become more moderate as the reformist current gains the upper hand inside the country, suggests a leading Jordanian commentator. But much blood might be spilt in the region before we reach that point. The nuclear deal has already entered into effect in practical terms even though it has not been officially signed, maintains a Lebanese commentator. While it may contain the Iranian nuclear threat, it does not address the issue of Tehran's support for those it deems to be 'weak' and in need of help in the region; on the contrary, it bolsters and extends Iran’s reach. Although the agreement has been portrayed as a serious loss for Israel, Tel Aviv may secure potential gains as well, maintains a Palestinian commentator. Israel will use the agreement to promote an alliance with the Arab states that feel threatened by Iran. Given the justified lack of trust between Iran and the U.S., and given the Iranian regime's tendency to cheat and deceive, it is not true that the Iranian nuclear agreement is the only alternative to war, maintains an Arab commentator in a Qatari daily. On the contrary, the most likely outcome of the nuclear agreement will be wider and more intense wars in the region.

 

HISTORIC PROPORTIONS: "Regardless of how it may be assessed, and whether one is a friend or enemy to its parties, the agreement now within reach between Tehran and the Western powers with the U.S. at their head is of historic proportions, after difficult labor pains that have lasted for 13 years," writes the editorial in Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This is an agreement that will change the Middle East forever. It will restructure certain international alliances and traditional hostilities and priorities. It will also change Iran's image before the world and revise its status in this vital and explosive region as a great power and member of the superpower club after it has secured legitimacy for its nuclear program in an environment that is fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines.

It is not odd for Iranian President Hassan Rowhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to speak of 'a major victory.' Reports meanwhile speak of Iranian preparations for large-scale celebrations as soon as an agreement is announced. From the very beginning, the Tehran regime succeeded in linking the nuclear program to the country’s nationalist spirit, imperial history, and national honor. And there is no doubt that the agreement is also a personal victory for Rowhani and his reformist current, which of course does not mean that the conservatives did not want it as well.

In short, the agreement is a victory for diplomacy, which can spare the world the catastrophe of war if given a chance and if intentions prove to be good. The gradual lifting of the economic sanctions, with a consequent end to the freeze on Iranian assets and pumping these assets back into Tehran's exhausted economy, will amount to an important boost for the regime, both domestically and in regional terms.

It is Iran's right to celebrate the fruits of its patience and steadfastness for the years of difficult negotiations. And this should be a lesson to others [i.e. the Palestinians] who rushed to offer concessions and lost their cards very early on, so much so that their enemy now only wants negotiations for negotiations' sake.

While the world held its breath during the last hours in anticipation of the manner in which certain outstanding issue would be formulated, reviewed by legal experts, translated, and then sent to the concerned capitals to be ratified by their respective political leaderships, it was not strange to hear the U.S. speak of 'continuing disagreements despite major progress.' For the Obama administration is preparing to face a ferocious war led by the war criminal Netanyahu and a Congress dominated by a Republican majority. It may be that the administration did not want to come across as being too lenient, and that it made sure to secure Iranian concessions up till the very last moment.

The clear difference between Washington's position and that of the European capitals taking part in the negotiations may stem from the fact that the U.S. has a hidden Israeli agenda. Israel is not worried about a nuclear bomb that Tehran does not need to maintain strategic deterrence [in relation to Israel]. Instead, it opposes the very existence of a strong country that cannot be neutralized and that refuses to bestow any legitimacy upon its own existence, let alone [formally] recognize it.

Regionally, the agreement goes much further than the nuclear program and lifting the sanctions. It amounts to an implicit declaration of cooperation that borders on a strategic partnership between Iran and the West on a number of issues, with the fight against terrorism as one. After its prediction that the international coalition to fight ISIS would fail has proven to be correct, Tehran deems itself fit to lead the international and regional effort against terrorism and to prevent it from redrawing the Middle East's map. In return, it expects to have a free hand in the region, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

But the inevitable outcome of the agreement is a coincidence between Israel's interests and that of some Arab states who will see a 'nuclear Iran' as one of the greatest threat to their influence, and perhaps to their very existence. As a result, a de facto alliance will emerge between the two sides. And while other Arab states will focus on fighting the terrorist organizations that threaten them with collapse – as the Tunisian president recently put it– the observer can only expect a further retreat for the Palestinian cause, as Israel evacuates the 'enemy' seat in favor of the Islamic Republic in Iran.

The region may also enter a new arms race from which the budgets of the weapons-exporting countries will benefit. Certain Arab states will be allowed to purchase ready-made nuclear reactors to produce energy thus becoming 'nuclear' themselves – but with a difference of course. For Washington, with Israel behind it, will not allow a new Iran that has both the knowledge and the ability to enrich uranium to emerge.

"And as military solutions become more difficult if not downright impossible in files such as Syria and Yemen, and as other complexities take deep root in other countries, the following question poses itself: Is it time for launching an Arab/Iranian strategic dialogue that accepts the reality of the new power in the region instead of remaining trapped in this dark tunnel?" asks the daily in conclusion.

 

PREPARING TO CELEBRATE: "Preparations for celebrating the signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community are almost complete, especially in Washington and Tehran," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad Dustour.

The U.S. secretary of state tried to ensure that the agreement would be announced yesterday (Monday) evening to allow his president and the American people to follow an event that has been eagerly anticipated by the U.S. administration. In Tehran, the security forces have completed the measures that will organize and accompany the celebrations of an event that is eagerly awaited in the Iranian capital as well.

As for the scene in the other capitals, it seems to vary depending on their view of this 'turning point.' There is no doubt that Tel Aviv and Riyadh are unhappy with the news coming in from 'the nights of friendly intimacy' in Vienna that went on much longer than they should have. And now that the agreement has been more or less agreed – and these words have been written before any official announcement has been made – all eyes are focused on what may follow.

There is a flood of questions and queries regarding the post-agreement phase, but two main issues come to the fore because of their importance and urgency: First, how will the agreement affect Iran's behavior and foreign policy? And, second, (which is connected to the first and dependent on it), how will the agreement affect the region’s open-ended crises from Lebanon to Yemen, via Syria, Iraq and the war on terrorism?

As for the first question, we believe it likely that Tehran will try to secure a role for itself as a partner in the political solutions for the region's crises, not as a party to these crises, a 'troublemaker', or a party and cause of its problems.

The Vienna agreement will keep Iran in the limelight and under close observation. And Iran is concerned about making use of the agreement so as to increase its gains. In return for every concession it made to make an agreement possible, Tehran will try to secure many gains and benefits, whether in terms of its domestic economic and social conditions in particular, or in terms of its role in the region.

If an agreement is reached and ratified by the Iranian Shura Council in the coming few weeks, Iran’s moderate reformist current would have scored a point of historic dimensions in its favor against the hard-line current that calls for exporting the revolution. The leaders of the moderate current would win a broad spectrum of support. And this means that Iran may be ruled by the moderates and reformists until further notice.

This current has a more balanced view of the region's files and Iran’s role in each of them. The fact that it may have the upper hand on the domestic Iranian arena requires the Arab countries, especially those 'caught up' in a conflict with Iran, to pause and reconsider their strategy for dealing with Iran in an effort to turn the page and move on to another.

After all, both geography and history impose Iran as a major permanent neighbor of the Arab nation. It would thus be better to manage any conflict or disagreement with it via dialogue and diplomatic means on the basis of good neighborly relations that emphasize common interests, and by building broader systems of regional security and cooperation with it.

The nuclear agreement – especially after progress is made in lifting the sanctions on Iran – will launch a new dynamic in Iranian society. The country will be liberated from the 'obsession' of a foreign enemy lying in wait for it for the first time since the Islamic Revolution’s victory in 1979. Iran will face the issues of reform, democratic transformation, and the question of individual and collective human rights. And it is not possible to predict how this dynamic may develop, or how the regime will deal with it, or what impact it may have on the velayat-e-faqih regime.

As for the answer to the second question, it depends on the direction that Iran will take after the agreement; one that we predict will be characterized by its tendency towards seeking political settlements, moderation and compromise solutions. This is expected to have a positive impact on most of the region’s crises, either immediately or in the medium-term.

Thus, Lebanon may elect a president before the end of the year. Yemen may move from a 'betrayed' tahdi'a [lull or calming down] to the launch of a political process that ends that dirty war and places all parties on track towards compromise and reconciliation. It is also certain that U.S./Iranian cooperation would be within reach regarding Iraq. And as for Syria, the bazaar of initiatives, proposals, and envoys will be open in an unprecedented way.

Nor is it unlikely that Tehran's relations with some Arab states will witness a noticeable development after the international community's reservations and fears are removed, and after the sword of the 'veto' raised in the face of any state that wishes to establish normal relations with Tehran has been lifted. In this regard, Iran's relations with Jordan, the PA, Egypt, and other states may enter a new phase.

What was impossible before the agreement may not remain so after it. But the region's complexities and the intensity of its conflicts do not allow the observer to express much optimism. On the contrary, they require one to be more cautious and wary about offering optimistic speculation. Some time –long or short – will pass before certain parties complete their turnabout and before the maps of alliances assume their new shape.

"During that period, much blood will be spilt on the arenas of confrontation, and the ruins and wreckage left behind by the wars between the brothers/enemies will accumulate," concludes Rintawi.

 

ALREADY IN EFFECT: “The nuclear agreement between Iran and the West has effectively already begun to be implemented even before it has been officially signed," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

Tehran has already broken the sanctions by regaining funds and gold that had long been frozen in foreign banks. It has also secured a certificate of good conduct from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its commitment to the [Lausanne] declaration of principles. The only thing left in the negotiations bazaar is the last moments of buying and selling. The Iranians are good tradesmen, and the five great powers-plus-Germany require no one's testimony as to their adeptness at haggling and the art of securing gain.

Everyone will emerge happy after the final results have been announced and the agreement is signed. The West will get what it wanted, namely, extracting Iran's nuclear fangs from now and until further notice by forcing Tehran to commit to transparency regarding its nuclear program. And Tehran will compensate for this by regaining its frozen monies, reviving its ailing economy and providing money that allows it to buy, not only influence, tons of bombs and usable military capabilities – unlike, the nuclear weapons that would be rusting away in storage facilities.

In the last moments of the negotiations, the West is trying to be ‘too clever by half’ by maintaining restrictions on Iran's armament. It is as if it were trying to reassure those fearful of the agreement, especially the Arab Gulf rulers, that it will not allow their ambitious neighbor to replace its nuclear program (a bird 'on the tree') with a terrifying missile capability (a bird 'in hand'). In fact, however, it may be to Tehran's advantage to steer clear of the arms market out of concern for its economy. For those countries that have grown and developed have spent their monies on infrastructure, factories and universities, and not on tanks and soldiers.

The marathon negotiations have placed the Iranian nuclear and military programs on the autopsy table, holding every detail under microscopic scrutiny. But the negotiations have ignored the main engine of Iran's influence; that scares its neighbors more than the nuclear program. For the terrifying Iranian 'flame thrower' is not its nuclear program or its ballistic missiles, but its constitution that no one has recalled – neither in Geneva nor in Vienna nor in any of the secret or public negotiations. Its third clause calls for 'absolute support for the weak in the earth.'

This is not a 'theoretical' text, but a practical one above all. And Tehran has been implementing it adeptly across the entire Levantine map. Moreover, this support is not provided to any 'weak' party whatsoever, but to those classified as such by the mullahs' regime. In this manner, and in Iran's eyes, the 'weak' may include any mistreated group; but they can also include a mistreated regime if need be. The nuclear agreement does not cancel out any constitutional clause. On the contrary, the wealth it will generate will consolidate this support and extend its ambit to areas that ballistic missiles cannot reach.

"If ending the Iranian nuclear agreement took so many years of negotiating effort, pressures, tensions, and regional turnabouts, by the time an amendment of the constitution is considered, Iran’s 'flame thrower' would have achieved its aims," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

 

ISRAELI ACCOMODATION: "There are indications that the Israeli government, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, has begun to accommodate itself to the idea of an international nuclear agreement with Iran, even if it persists with its campaign against it," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

In this regard, we should not ignore the fact that an agreement of this kind also includes opportunities for the Israeli side, alongside its losses

In any world crisis, politicians seek to secure whatever gains are possible and reduce or avoid losses. While an Iranian/international agreement over Tehran's nuclear program looms on the horizon, part of the Israeli domestic debate has turned to the extent to which the country’s policies towards Iran have succeeded, and what can be done in the coming phase.

For example, Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, Yuval Steinitz said on Monday that a nuclear agreement is imminent. He defended his government's policy, claiming that Israel’s diplomatic efforts were responsible for imposing the sanctions on Iran. He added that Israeli intelligence has succeeded in 'softening' the transitional nuclear agreement with Iran. For his part, the head of the opposition Yesh Atid Party, Yair Lapid said that Israel should now focus on the mechanisms for international monitoring of Iran.

In one form or another, Israel’s losses from a nuclear agreement with Tehran may be seen on a number of levels, the most important of which are the following:

- First, the wrangle over the agreement has exposed the limits of the Israeli government's ability to influence U.S. decisions. Despite Netanyahu's attempts to mobilize American public opinion and American politicians against an agreement with Tehran, U.S. President Barack Obama has succeeded in cutting Netanyahu down to size-- so far at least. If Obama manages to get the agreement through Congress, that would represent a blow to Netanyahu and an important part of the process of reviewing Israel's role in determining U.S. policy.

- The other Israeli 'loss' stems from the prospect that the Americans will now be free to devote their attention to other dossiers after Iran, including the Palestinian/Israeli problem. This is especially likely given that historical precedents demonstrate that whenever a major Middle Eastern file is conclusively addressed, attention then turns to the Palestinian file, even if the final outcome has been disappointing. The Israelis should now expect international and American demands to resolve the Palestinian problem. And linked to this likely loss, is Israel’s diminishing ability to divert the world's attention from its policies towards the Palestinians and direct it towards Tehran's nuclear file instead.

- The third issue that Israelis are believed to be preparing for has to do with Iran's growing freedom of action in backing those groups that are linked to it in the region. Tehran and its allies will continue to use Israel as an essential part of their media and political campaigns to gain popularity and claim revolutionary legitimacy; that of resistance and opposition, which will intensify the incitement against Israel.

On the other hand, Israel is not devoid of potential gains:

- The first is the claim that there is a single enemy and a common concern that brings it together with certain Arab regimes that fear Iranian expansion. Although Arab concerns about Iranian policies are genuine and justified, I believe that the leaks and media reports of a convergence between Arab/Israeli positions regarding the Iranian file contain much of Israel’s usual exaggeration. Many false or exaggerated reports are being leaked regarding an alliance against Iran in order to achieve a number of aims including, first, preparing the climate for such an implicit or actual alliance in the future. Second, pressuring Washington by claiming that there is a coincidence of interests between Washington's Arab allies and the Israelis and that they all are angry with the White House. And third, trying and ensure that the Palestinian problem will be sidetracked in pursuit of common denominators with the Arabs.

- A second point linked to the above, is that certain Arab countries will be preoccupied with the repercussions of the agreement. The ongoing proxy wars between Iran's supporters and opponents in some Arab countries may escalate, while the Arab and Islamic world may be further distracted by the Shiite/Sunni sectarian confrontation that has been deliberately revived and fanned in recent years.

- Netanyahu’s third gain may arise from when he addresses Israel’s public opinion claiming that Israel can only rely on itself for security, and that there is nothing wrong with a degree of tension and disagreement with Washington, especially if U.S. economic and security support for Israel continues even in the international forums.

"A major part of Israel’s assessments of opportunities and threats will also depend upon the Arabs’ calculations and whether they will seek to gain from the Iranian/international agreement and reduce their losses without being dragged into the Israeli camp," concludes 'Azm.

 

TRUST IS NOT AN ELEMENT: "Trust is not an element in Iranian foreign policy," writes Ali Hassan Bakeer in Tuesday's Qatari daily al-Arab.

The Iranian system is not based on any ethical standards, as some may mistakenly believe. A review of the regime's behavior over the last three decades would confirm that the essence of its policy is based on concepts that totally contradict the notion of trust. To cite just one example, it relies on deception, manoeuvring, procrastination, lying, deception, and double-talk.

One does not wish to dig deep into the deep roots and sources of these concepts in the Iranian regime's behavior. What we wish to discuss here is how this relates to the U.S./Iranian nuclear agreement and how that may influence its content and affect the region.

Among the major disasters in this phase is that the agreement that the Obama administration is seeking with the mullahs' regime is essentially based on wishful thinking and supposed unconditional trust. According to the details that have been revealed and that we have discussed in earlier articles, the agreement is not based on any strong and effective mechanism or strict deterrent regime that prevents the Iranian side from trying to cheat, deceive, or play around. If it tries to do this in the presence of such mechanisms or regime the consequences for it would be destructive.

This dangerous equation will ultimately impose itself on the region, because neither party trusts the other. The Iranian side has learnt from the experiences of others in an excellent manner. It has learnt from the Shah's experience, from Saddam and Qadhafi's experience, from North Korea and from many others. And what it has learnt is not to trust the Americans or even its Russian allies.

As for the American side, it knows for certain that the Iranians continue to cheat relentlessly, even after the November 2013 and April 2015 agreements. Recently reports have indicated that Iran is still trying to buy technological elements for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a clandestine and illegitimate way. This is based on a June UN report, as well as another report from German intelligence earlier this month (July) and despite Iran's declaration that it has been committed to the current agreement since November 2013.

The U.S. administration is turning a blind eye to all this for reasons stemming from Obama's personal ambitions, but also because it hopes that an agreement will subsequently change Iran's behavior. On the other hand, the lack of trust in the Iranian regime and its policies shared by most regional states, and as reflected in U.S. President Obama's policies, goes without saying.

There is no doubt that the Iranians will view an agreement as an opportunity to catch their breath, improve their economic conditions, enhance their conventional military capabilities, and develop their nuclear program's size, structure, and abilities, but with Western help. However, because they do not trust the Americans, they believe that the agreement may offer sufficient time for any incoming U.S. administration to prepare for confronting Iran at any phase of the agreement or when its deadlines are reached. And this requires Iran to pursue its own preparations so as to confront such a possibility and not rely on the agreement alone.

On the other hand, it seems obvious that the regional states – especially the Arab countries –will work to speed up their nuclear ambitions during the agreement's ten year timespan in the hope that this will narrow the nuclear gap between them and Iran.

To block the path to such American and Arab calculations, we should keep in mind that historical experience as well as Iran’s past behavior, indicate that the Iranian regime will inevitably resort to cheating and deception. But the extent and nature of this cheating will be gradual in terms of its quality and quantity, so that when discovered (assuming that it is), it would not elicit a destructive reaction, as much as produce confusion and division in the international community.

Questions will be raised: Has Tehran really cheated? Is there any evidence? What party is qualified to prove this? Does the scale of the deception require ending the nuclear agreement? Should Iran be punished for its deception? And so on. Such factors render the outbreak of wars in the region because of this agreement not only possible, but likely, especially during its initial and final phases.

At the beginning of an agreement, each side will try to get close to the other until it is endorsed on the ground and bolstered by common interests. This is the sort of logic we wrote about in previous articles many months ago regarding the behavior of the Obama administration and the Iranian regime. The two sides want to consolidate the agreement. And because the definition of 'extremism' when the issue of 'fighting extremism' in the region becomes a 'catalyst', basically and exclusively pertains to 'the Sunni other,' this entails more misguided wars that will only produce further sectarianism, extremism, and terrorism, especially when Tehran and Washington are part of the same project.

And if the agreement holds its ground for a few years, the next phase will be one in which the region will witness larger scale wars because the competition between its states and with time will be at its most intense.

"The irony is that at the time when the Obama administration argues with its opponents and justifies its behavior by claiming that there is no alternative because the only other option is war, the nuclear agreement will lead to the very war it claims to be seeking to avoid in one way or another," concludes Bakeer.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Deal done

 

Israeli newspapers were in something of a limbo on Tuesday morning, after the long-awaited nuclear deal between Iran and the six Western powers was put on hold on Monday. Nonetheless, all of them lead with the latest news from Vienna, where – after a marathon negotiating session lasting to the small hours – word finally came that an agreement had been reached.

According to the very partial details that have emerged at this time, the deal includes an extension of the United Nations weapons embargo on Iran, which will continue for the next five years. In addition, Reuters reports that, should the Islamic Republic break their side of the deal, UN sanctions could be restored within 65 days.

In his first statement following the Vienna announcement, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that the deal was 'a bad mistake of historic proportions.' Other Israeli ministers were also lining up on Tuesday morning to condemn the deal.

Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely (Likud) described the deal as, 'a historic capitulation agreement of the West to the axis of evil led by Iran. The consequences of the agreement in the foreseeable future are very serious, Iran will continue to spread terror and it will metastasize everywhere, continue to stoke the flames in the Middle East, and worst of all make a huge step towards being a nuclear threshold state.' She went on to say that, 'the State of Israel will work via all diplomatic means to try to prevent the ratification of the agreement.'

Culture and Sports Minister Miri Regev (Likud) also responded to the deal, saying 'Iran today received a license to kill, and it must be revoked before it is too late.' According to Minister Ofir Akunis (Likud), 'the only thing that is certain about the deal with Iran is that it won't be upheld and Iran will continue nuclear development threatening the peace of the entire world.' Science Minister Danny Danon (Likud) looked to the future following the arrangement. 'This is a dangerous agreement for the state of Israel and the entire free world,' he said. 'The funds that will flow to Iran will fuel first of all the terror on the streets of Jerusalem, Washington and London.'

Despite the belligerent rhetoric from Israeli politicians, Yedioth Ahronoth reports that Israel appears to have reluctantly accepted the inevitability of an Iranian nuclear agreement and is now focusing its efforts on stopping the deal's approval in Congress. 'The assumption is that there'll be an agreement,' an Israeli official said and Netanyahu views the U.S. Congress as a 'last line of defense against a bad deal.'

Israel's diplomats were instructed to put an emphasis on the loopholes in the agreement, including concessions made on the number of centrifuges Iran is allowed to keep, research and development, the mechanism of supervision and most importantly, concessions made on Tehran's military program. 'We'll put an emphasis on Iran's conduct - the burning of flags, not meeting their commitments,' the official said. Israel, he said, will warn Congress that 'within 10 years, Iran will have a short nuclear breakout time, and until then it'll continue funding terrorism using the billions it'll get.'

In other news, settler-run news service Arutz 7 reports that leaders of the settler movement claim that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told them Monday night that settlement development has effectively been frozen. The settlers claim the prime minister told them during a tense meeting that, 'the settlements can no longer be developed and we must preserve that which exists.'

Following the meeting, the Yesha Council, which represents the settler movement, issued a scathing statement that, 'a government that does not build loses its right to exist.' The council rejected assertions that a halt to construction would help preserve existing settlements. 'The right way to protect the settlement project is only through development and construction. The best defense is offense.'

The head of the Har Hebron Regional Council, Yohai Damari, also issued a statement according to which 'the prime minister stated his intent to halt the settlement initiative.' Damari said such action would 'desperately hurt many communities.' Both the Yesha Council and Damari called on government ministers to prevent a construction freeze. According to Israel Hayom, however, sources in the Likud have denied that Netanyahu said that there is a settlement construction freeze in place

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called on Palestinians in Gaza with knowledge of two missing Israeli civilians to provide information about their possible whereabouts and conditions. UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric said Monday the secretary-general was also calling for prompt action to facilitate their safe return to their families. Dujarric said Ban 'underscores the responsibility of all parties to protect and respect the rights of civilians,' and will continue to closely monitor developments.'

 

 

POST-AGREEMENT POLITICS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Zalman Shoval comments on the possible ramifications for Israel of efforts to thwart the safe passage of the Iranian nuclear agreement through the U.S. Congress.

"Even though the official and formal completion of negotiations between Iran and the six world powers is delayed, the principles of the understandings between the sides have been finalized. U.S. President Barack Obama wants to present his agreement with Iran as his main diplomatic legacy. The motivation for an agreement with the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program is his desire to bring Iran back into the regional geopolitical equation so that a new balance of power is created between Tehran and Saudi Arabia and to find some kind of answer to the ever-growing rift between the Shiite bloc (headed by Tehran) and the Sunni bloc (under the leadership of Riyadh). In other words, the United States will balance its contacts with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Egypt with an equally close relationship with Iran. The Obama Administration also hopes that a nuclear agreement with Iran will bolster moderate forces inside Iran – despite the fact that many experts predict that it will have exactly the opposite effect.

Washington is ignoring the fact that, by bolstering the standing of Iran militarily, economically and politically, it will almost certainly advance the Islamic Republic's goal of regional hegemony. Washington also hopes – although, at this stage, has not said so out loud – that Iran will spearhead the struggle against ISIS; in any case, assuming a role of this kind is exactly in keeping with the goals of the Iranian leadership, which sees ISIS as a tool in its regional aspirations. One Iranian leader bragged recently that his country already controls four capital cities in the region – Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sana'a. Why, then, should it not have the opportunity to complete the set? Needless to say, Washington is totally ignoring the fact that Iran has declared on many occasions that one of its goals is to destroy the State of Israel and the fact that Iran is the main supporter and perpetrator of terrorist actions across the globe.

The Vienna agreement not only puts Congressmen and Senators in a tight spot, it makes life uncomfortable for presidential candidates too – especially Hillary Clinton. She was secretary of state for four years under Obama and it was on her watch that clandestine contact with the Iranians was resumed. The Republicans, led by Jeb Bush, will not hold back on their criticism of the agreement, but Clinton, of course, does not want to alienate the president, since she would benefit greatly from his open support during the election campaign. So she's walking on eggshells; on the one hand, she says that she very much hopes there will be an agreement, but insists that even a nuclear deal will not solve all of the issues related to Iran's nuclear program in one fell swoop. Even if we should view Clinton's behavior through the prism of an election, it cannot be ignored entirely, since there have been indications in the past that she does not share the foreign policy vision of President Obama.

Prof. Michael Mandelbaum – the director of the American Foreign Policy program at Johns Hopkins University and a leading expert on U.S. nuclear policy – recently leveled harsh criticism against the concessions that have been made to the Iranians. Writing in the prestigious The American Interest journal in April, he wrote that, 'The only certain way to prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons is to destroy its facilities for doing so.'

Israel, of course, does not need convincing that this is a bad and dangerous agreement. However, although Israel has conducted, under the supervision of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, a largely successful campaign to warn the international community and American officials of the danger posed by the Iranian nuclear program, it needs to open a new chapter now. The goal: to nix the safe passage of the agreement through Congress and, if not to convince U.S. lawmakers to reject it, then at least to add some additional checks and balances. Israel, therefore, is now facing considerations and choices that will not only have an impact on the Iranian nuclear program, but also on relations with the United States – both in general and in terms of the Palestinian issue.

Whether Israel gets what it really wants, that is, for Congress to reject the agreement outright, or whether it is approved, we can certainly expect some kind of backlash from the Obama Administration. The question is how Jerusalem should act, given the political and security ramifications of whatever diplomatic, political or other actions it decides to take. These ramifications will no doubt be topmost in the prime minister's mind – and let's not forget that this prime minister has put Iran front and center of his manifesto – alongside the understanding that even once the deal with Iran is in place, Israel will need to be in close contact with the United States and the European Union."

Ends…

 

FIVE COMMENTS: Writing on the NRG website, Amir Rapaport weighs in on the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers – and reveals that not everyone in the Israeli defense establishment opposes it.

"Details of the nuclear agreement that is about to be signed between Iran and the six world powers has yet to be published, but the Israeli prime minister and his defense minister have already declared it is a mistake of historical significance. Regardless of whether they are right or wrong, here are five facts – some more familiar than others – about the agreement that will change the face of the Middle East and possibly the entire world.

1. The agreement is full of holes, like a Swiss cheese. Details of the agreement have not been disclosed, but already the giant holes it contains are well known, and not only through Israeli eyes. For example, the agreement does not include supervision of the nuclear facility in Parchin, where Iranian scientists are engaged in the adaptation of nuclear technology to military capabilities; a nuclear 'atomic' bomb, in fact. Iran could make progress in producing the components of the bomb and its missile program, and could break out with its completed nuclear program whenever it sees fit.

In addition, the agreement leaves over 30,000 centrifuges in Iranian hands, for them to use in due course. The agreement in not open ended and that is a problem too. Assuming that the Iranians will uphold all their obligations under the agreement, they will be able to return to the nuclear program in the next decade.

The Iranians are getting an immediate and significant removal of the sanctions. Chances are that the agreement will receive Congressional approval within 60 days. Even if it will not be approved on the first ballot, President Barack Obama would use his right of veto – and then a 2/3 majority would be required in order to prevent the approval of the agreement. That will not happen.

2. Israel did not really affect the talks. In the past, the Israeli involvement led by Yuval Steinitz was relatively profound. In recent months, however, Israel has been excluded from the negotiations by the U.S. – it was not exposed to most of the details regarding the agreement, and its influence was marginal.

3. Not everyone in the Israeli defense establishment opposes the deal. It is important to know that there are many voices within the Israeli defense establishment who argue that the agreement is merely the lesser evil for Israel, and that it would keep the Iranians away from obtaining a nuclear bomb far better than can be achieved through an air strike, which would postpone it for three years maximum. The same voices claim that using today's advanced intelligence means; it will be possible to track any deviation from the terms of the agreement, which will cause the Iranians an international problem or give Israel justification for a military attack. This is a minority opinion that is not heard in public, because the prime minister and the defense minister are the exclusive spokesmen for Israel's official position that the continuation of sanctions without an agreement is far superior to the bad agreement that is about to be signed.

4. The nuclear agreement brings the war with Iran closer. Stranger things have happened. After all, the determination of the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to reach an agreement with Adolf Hitler in Munich in September 1938 did not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War one year later.

Even if the comparison is exaggerated, the agreement paradoxically creates a situation that is more explosive than the continuation of sanctions without an agreement. Attempting to prove to the world that Iran is continuing its military nuclear program despite the agreement will be a priority for Israeli intelligence in the coming years. If such evidence is found, the West under the leadership of a new American president will be required to determine whether they will attack Iran, or that Israel will recognize a legitimate reason to attack on its own.

5. The arms race has begun. Even if there will be no attack on Iran, the implications of the agreement are the efforts made by countries like Saudi Arabia and possibly Turkey and Egypt in the long run, to reach their own nuclear bomb as a counterweight to Iran. The Iranians, for their part, will exploit the lifting of sanctions for defense procurement deals totaling no less than $30 billion, mainly with Russia. The U.S. will 'compensate' the Gulf countries with transactions of tens of billions of dollars to the delight of its defense industries and throw some sweeteners in Israel's direction, too, as a counterweight to the weapons the Arab countries will receive. Israel, however, will have to increase its defense budget, in light of the arms race that this peace agreement will spark."

Ends…

 

A CAPITAL IDEA: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yoaz Hendel says that a proposal to introduce the death penalty for terrorists has effectively been shelved by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – without any serious discussion of the matter.

"Let's start with the bottom line: Israel will not pass a law mandating the death penalty for terrorists. The conclusions of the committee that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu set up will be ignored, even if the original proposer of the bill – Sharon Gal – is a member of the panel, along with a whole host of other vocal Facebook warriors. If the report that the not-yet-formed committee eventually produces recommends the imposition of the death penalty, someone will simply forget to publish those recommendations. And if the recommendations are somehow published, the government will simply ignore them. If it doesn't, the bill will fail to get past the ministerial legislation committee. This was its fate from the moment that it was launched as a trial balloon for media consumption.

Sharon Gal did not invent capital punishment. Even Netanyahu spoke about introducing the death penalty after the completion of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. The moment that the issue faded from the public agenda, however, he stopped talking about it. Gal can take some comfort from the coverage that his bill got in the media. But anyone who hopes for a serious discussion of the issue, followed by a decision one way or the other, should not hold his breath.

Here is a summary of the problem: our politicians take a serious issue and turn it into a media issue. Sometimes their declarations lead to the establishment of a committee that will not influence anything. After a year or two, the whole issue is forgotten and all that remains in the national memory is a joke. They are serious in their intentions, but every time they raise a weighty issue for discussion, the rest of the country treats them like some political parody lifted straight from the script of 'Yes, Minister.' In one episode of the Israeli version of that classic British comedy, Likud members put forward a proposal for the annexation of Judea and Samaria, only to get cold feet when they realized that there's a good chance their proposal will be adopted.

Reality becomes parody; whether it's about the annexation of the Jordan Valley, the death penalty for terrorists, the Levy Report into the legality of the settlements or the nation-state bill. Whenever there's a serious issue on the table, you can count on someone to convert it into sound bites, declarations, committee and God knows what else.

I am in favor of capital punishment for terrorists, but not just terrorists. Why? Because it's right and moral. A terrorist who kills innocent people as part of a national struggle deserves to be executed. I do not believe that it will deter others, but at least it will prevent anyone feeling that they have missed an opportunity the next time that there's a prisoner exchange deal on the table. We owe it to those who oppose the death penalty to answer their criticism. They argue that it is a cruel punishment; that it is impossible to determine clear criteria for the imposition of the death penalty and, of course, they say that there would be ramifications if Israel were even to use the death penalty. The problem is that there is no one with whom to hold this discussion.

I believe that it is possible to determine when and how the death penalty should be imposed; if we are insufficiently expert in the matter, we can study countries like the United States and learn from their experience. To those who argue that we need a debate on the morality of capital punishment, I would say this: there is no difference between killing a terrorist during an operation and killing a terrorist as part of the system of punitive measures that are at our disposal.

We also need to address the claim that Israel's military courts already have the power to impose the death penalty but that they deliberately do not use it. In order for a military court to impose the death penalty, the legal team must comprise a lawyer who holds at least the rank of lieutenant colonel. The IDF, however, makes sure that in the most sensitive cases, the highest-ranking officer on the legal team is a major – in order to prevent the judges from imposing the death penalty. This is what is happening right now in the trial of the terrorist accused of killing a police officer on the eve of the Passover holiday. The suspect was one of the prisoners released as part of the Shalit exchange deal. His execution would have prevented another murder.

When it comes to discussing the imposition of the death penalty, there are philosophical, moral, legal and diplomatic issues that need to be discussed. However, no one in the government has any intention of asking or answering these tough questions. When it is clear that no such law will be passed, why bother discussing the issue? The most that proponents of the bill can hope for is to make some headlines.

The State of Israel does not have a constitution or a Basic Law that defines it as a Jewish and democratic state. We demand that the international community recognize us as such, but we have failed to pass a law to that effect. The same is true regarding the legal ramifications of construction over the Green Line. No one knows what's legal and what's illegal. It's also the case when it comes to punishing terrorists – irrespective of the death penalty. So what are we left with? Short-lived bills from people like Sharon Gal."

Ends…

 

GRAY AREAS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yifat Erlich says that IDF soldiers should enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for their actions during the heat of battle.

"Soldiers and officers serving in the IDF should go into the field of battle safe in the knowledge that their country is providing them with a legal Iron Dome and that they have full immunity from criminal charges. Our Knesset members enjoy this privilege, even though they are not endangering their lives for us and even though they do not have to deal with an insane reality in which the choice is not between good and bad, but between bad and terrible.

IDF soldiers are the Israeli people's emissaries and, far too often, they pay the ultimate price. Therefore, they deserve special protection. It is immoral and unacceptable that judges, who sit in comfortable offices and who do not know the complexity of any given situation, pass judgment on decisions that were made in the heat of battle. It is immoral to send soldiers into a terrible battle and then to accuse them of criminal activity.

Lawmakers' immunity from prosecution is not absolute and neither should that be of IDF soldiers. In extreme cases, the immunity should be lifted. Any soldier accused of looting, for example, would not enjoy immunity from prosecution. Similarly, any patently illegal act – such as deliberately targeting civilians or shooting when the soldier's life is not in danger – should be prosecuted. Any other case, which falls into the gray area of poor judgment should be investigated and examined within the framework of military justice. If the soldier in question exercised poor judgment, he can be disciplined, demoted or kicked out the army – but should not face criminal charges.

The case of Lieutenant Colonel Neria Yeshurun – who ordered his troops to bombard a clinic in the Gaza suburb of Shujai'iya in honor of Captain Dima Levitas, who was killed a day earlier by shots fired from the same clinic – is a perfect example of an incident that falls in the gray area. This would appear to be a case of poor judgment and not a deliberate attempt to harm civilians. In addition, it is beyond question that, while operating inside Shujai'iya, IDF soldiers' lives were at risk every single moment. Firing shells at a clinic that had been used to shelter terrorists who killed IDF soldiers is an example of the impossible dilemma into which we send our soldiers. But the dilemma was created by Hamas, which fired shots from within the clinic, not by Neria Yeshurun."

Ends…

 

OBAMA VS. NETANYAHU: Writing in Haaretz, Chemi Shalev comments on the battle that is about to be waged in the United States over the Iranian nuclear deal – and warns that Israel stands to lose from any clash between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu views Iran as an incorrigible Great Satan hell-bent on regional hegemony and the destruction of Israel. President Barack Obama sees Tehran as a malevolent Little Satan, but one that can still be redeemed. This – rather than the timing of sanctions, the quantity of centrifuges or the quality of inspections – is the main reason for the impending apocalyptic political war that is destined to break out between Israel and the United States when a nuclear agreement is signed.

The fighting is supposed to be restrained: Both sides seem to have too much to lose. Netanyahu cannot afford a total rupture of his ties to an American administration that still has 18 months in power. Obama has no wish to risk an unprecedented breach, not only with Jerusalem, but with many American Jews who support the Democrats as well. But as the cliché has it, one knows how a war starts but not how it ends, especially for two leaders for whom failure is not an option.

Of course, Netanyahu honestly believes that the nuclear deal reportedly being concluded in Vienna strengthens Iran, brings it closer to a nuclear bomb, rewards terror and destabilizes the Middle East. But he also knows that after being denied influence on the content of the nuclear deal and failing to block it, after poisoning relations with Obama and the American left and putting all his money on Republicans and Evangelicals, losing in the expected campaign in Congress could be one flop too many, even for supporters at home. As he proved with his incendiary exhortations against Israeli Arabs on Election Day, Netanyahu’s self-control tends to dissipate when defeat stares him in the face.

Obama is just as genuinely convinced that an agreement with Iran will contribute to world peace, serve American interests and even strengthen Israel’s security. But he knows full well that his international stature, his personal prestige and his historical legacy will be severely tarnished if Congress rejects his Iran deal. After six years of acrimony, tension and a dangerous accumulation of bad blood, Obama and his advisers would probably rather die than see Netanyahu and his allies in Congress and Las Vegas emerge victorious with wide smiles on their faces.

The 2016 presidential campaign pours tons of highly flammable enriched fuel on this already simmering core. The Republican candidates – all 15 of them, with the possible exception of Rand Paul – may disagree on many issues, but they are united in their admiration for Netanyahu and their disdain for Obama. They will no doubt use the Iran deal in their campaign speeches and in the upcoming GOP presidential debates to bash Obama and, through him, Hillary Clinton as well, during the 60 days now allotted to Congress to reject it.  Republicans might even view such a rebuke as a potential game-winning grand slam on their way to the White House.

The problem is that, just like Netanyahu, Republicans often allow their antipathy towards Obama to cloud their judgment, causing them to bite off more than they can chew. Just as Netanyahu’s speech to Congress in March brought many straying Democrats back to the fold, a coordinated GOP onslaught on Iran could backfire, uniting the party behind Obama and deterring even those Democrats who don’t like the Iran deal or are wary of their pro-Israeli donors. The last thing they will want to face is angry primary voters from the newly militant Democratic left who may not take kindly to Democratic lawmakers seen as sabotaging their chances of keeping the White House in 2016.

Of course, it’s hard to forecast the aftermath of such a total and divisive confrontation. Will things quickly go back to normal – or will the earth remain scorched for many years to come? Netanyahu tends to forget, unfortunately, that the two sides to this conflict aren’t equal: the U.S. will ultimately shrug off any setback. Israel, on the other hand, could come up empty: It could lose the campaign in Congress and alienate half of America at the very time that it has to deal with a resurgent Iran fortified by what Jerusalem considers to be a dangerous agreement.

The only thing that seems even scarier is for Israel to emerge victorious. If Congress stops the deal, humiliating the president while alienating the Democrats, the international coalition that stood up to Iran will fall apart and Tehran will get a carte blanche to race towards a bomb, this time with many frustrated onlookers silently applauding."

Ends…

 

 

DISASTROUS SUCCESS: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Seth Perelman comments on the historical background to the United States' 'disastrous' foreign policy in the Middle East.

"When Bob Dylan sang, 'There’s no success like failure and failure’s no success at all,' he might well have described America’s foreign policy. Before President Obama’s historic errors come to their disastrous conclusion, it might be worthwhile to look back along the path that led us here. It begins long before Obama’s presidency, back in the days when Great Britain ruled a global empire.

By juggling the interests and intentions of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, Great Britain sought to control the Middle East in the 20th century. The British Foreign Ministry’s policy was termed the Triad and was somewhat successful for a time. After the Suez Crisis, when Britain abdicated its prerogatives 'East of Suez' in favor of the United States, the Triad nevertheless remained a policy touchstone. Recently and in essence, Turkey has assumed Iraq’s erstwhile place in the three-legged stool upon which the U.S. State Department continues precariously to balance America.

Originally a notion springing from Metternich’s Europe, this Triad redux like its immediate British antecedent is predicated on the idea that a balance of power in a region assures dynamic stability among the would-be hegemons and allows an outside power leverage with respect to them. In theory, such influence would permit the outside power to rule the region indirectly as it judiciously shifts its support among them. While a brilliant idea in the abstract, the problem with actually trusting such a three-legged stool to bear one’s weight is that its legs are frequently not of equal length and strength. Predictably the stool tips over and its former occupant is then, well, overturned.

The U.S. would be quite unwise to trust its weight to the tripod that it has tried to foster and to preserve in the Middle East. There are a number of reasons for this inadvisability: Regional balances of power, whether in Metternich’s Europe or Obama’s Middle East are more often than not inherently dynamic and thus unstable. It is only when the parties involved seek stability despite conflicting national interests that such arrangements tend to a balance of power. More often that is not the case.

Each party seeks to increase its power to the point of predominance or to switch its alliances so as to protect itself from such an ascendant power. The arms races, geopolitical conflicts and shifting alignments that result are all relatively well predicted by coalition theory. The worst and not uncommon case is a region at war, thousands or (given a nuclear Iran and its stated intentions) millions of deaths. That’s a rather shaky foundation on which to sit.

When serious and potentially decisive imbalances in power occur, then consistent with indirect rule, the outside power must intervene to restore the equilibrium and to deter regional actors from further attempts to gain a decisive advantage. The British followed this course on a number of occasions, as did George H.W. Bush in the first Gulf War. Nowadays, however, there is little likelihood that America has the stomach or even the assured wherewithal for serious intervention.

Sadly, that is the takeaway from the pathetic 'deal' it would strike with Iran conceding eventual nuclear status to the Islamic Republic, touching off an arms race in the region, raising the possibility of nuclear war and, again, abiding millions of deaths.

That raises questions of morality that foreign affairs realists of various stripes may find quaint. In theory, those nations around the periphery of and within the area delineated by the Triad find themselves a battleground for regional conflict. This has already become all too clear in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Yemen, Lebanon, Kuwait and Bahrain. The suffering of these peoples and the threat to their societies represent a moral failure of the Triad Policy and one to which it has proven largely indifferent. It views these conflicts as opportunities, not tragedies.

The U.S. has also been remarkably unsupportive of democratic movements in the region; in Turkey, Iran and, until far too late, Syria. Such movements might have undermined and ultimately replaced more or less aggrandizing regimes. In turn, that might have reduced the level of conflict in the region and quite possibly the needs of its actors for American intervention and/or assistance. Until that happy day, however, it would have alienated regimes on whom the U.S. fancies it can otherwise exert influence. Where the choice was between democracy and national interest, as defined by the Obama administration, America has repeatedly preferred an amoral policy in the Middle East.

As Natan Sharansky recently pointed out in The Washington Post, such an abdication of morality has real political consequences. The U.S. will find it increasingly difficult to persuade potential sympathizers in other nations that it views democracy as a universal entitlement rather than as its own exceptional good fortune. Eventually it will also find it extremely difficult to mobilize opinion and to motivate self-sacrifice among Americans too. Having surrendered the moral high ground, such is the loss of credible principle at home and in the rest of the world.

Finally, not only has the marketplace for ideas like democracy become globalized, so too has the power of even regional hegemons. Followers of Metternich and later those in the British Foreign Ministry could not have foreseen that their theories would no longer be workable in such a world.

There are no longer merely regional players. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, satellite platforms, nuclear weapons, cybernetic warfare have permitted regional hegemons to mount global campaigns as well. North Korea and Iran are the most obvious examples. The upshot is that the stakes for those who would play with balances of power are now intercontinental and incalculably higher.

We are left with the conclusion that the Triad in its current incarnation is an outmoded, amoral, and doomed imperialist policy. The U.S. would be wise to abandon it and instead return to its opposition to aggression through collective security and to its occasionally muddled commitment to democracy. Perhaps America could once again credibly articulate and ultimately aspire to achieve international ideals, but that may be too much to hope."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION TALKS: Murat Yetkin sees benefit in a new (Justice and Development Party) AKP-led coalition in centre-left Radikal: "A coalition with the HDP (pro-Kurdish leftist alliance) will put an end to the unlawful intervention in public security affairs and will reactivate the Kurdish peace process. As urgently as it needs this process, Turkey also needs to take the initiative in dealing with the economy, administrative reform, the judiciary, freedom of expression and the democratization of political life. A coalition with the HDP will speed up these initiatives. An HDP coalition will facilitate the AKP’s efforts in the areas of education and labor, as well as its economic policies."

Nuray Mert lambastes AKP members in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Some AKP members will not stop short of calling those who suggest a coalition traitors! What is their true position on politics and Turkey? Are they Islamists, democrats, conservatives, or what? What are they after? If they do not believe in democracy, why are they talking about a coalition? Let us stop this deceit."

Perihan Cakiroglu hopes common sense will prevail in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "It is naturally difficult for those who got used to one-party rule to form a coalition. But life itself is a coalition. PM Davutoglu will pander to the CHP (Republican People's Party) and the MHP's (Nationalist Movement Party) whims, even if unwillingly. If Davutoglu and CHP leader Kilicdaroglu attempt to act 'strategically' rather than based on common-sense, we can forget about an AKP-CHP coalition."

Abdulkadir Selvi calls on the opposition to open up to President Erdogan in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "On June 7th, our nation showed that it wants a new political discourse. But one cannot say that the opposition has fully understood this. What are the opposition leaders saying? ‘Let us force the republic's president to withdraw within the constitutional remits.’ It would be more productive if the opposition approached the process of forming a coalition not despite Erdogan, but together with him."

Oya Baydar exposes the AKP’s intentions in independent online T24: "Those who were talking quite positively about 'national will', and were interpreting it only as the will of those who voted for them, were not at all happy with the June elections’ results. In the period preceding early elections, they will be carefully calculating how to increase the AKP’s votes and how many MPs were lost with how many votes; how many votes should be stolen or bought there; which measures are needed to determine which candidates should be prevented from running again and where, etc. But the most important thing, of course, is how to ensure that the HDP will be discredited and compromised in the eyes of voters."

 

MIDDLE EAST: Ali H. Aslan argues that Ankara may have lost out to Tehran in the West’s eyes in moderate Islamist, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Turkey was the Muslim country that the international society had chosen as a model for the region in the first decade of the 21st century. If Iran can overcome its nuclear problem and become a constructive player, its star may shine this time round. While there are widespread comments in Washington nowadays about Turkey losing a decade, Iran is causing growing excitement. By losing its breath at the end of the marathon it began at good speed, the AKP has left Turkey lagging behind in terms of its foreign policy. The time to hand the baton over to a new national team has been a long time coming."

Vedat Bilgin offers a stout defense of Ankara’s foreign policy in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "When one takes into account that the Syria issue has targeted Iraq, the Northern Iraqi Kurdish Administration and the southeast of our country with the help of terror organizations such as the pro-Damascus PYD [Kurdish Democratic Union Party] and ISIS, it will become clear that this does not concern this country alone. In this case, the call 'to compromise with Syria' would entail accepting a new Sykes/Picot based on the same Western system in this area. Those who say that Turkey's foreign policy should change are uncomfortable with Erdogan and Davutoglu’s liberalization of this country, and are promoting their own political calculations at the cost of the country’s gains. It is as if Turkey had benefited greatly in the past as a result of its former submissive and reticent policy."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Khorasan cautions not to deviate from the Islamic revolution’s path: "Following a possible nuclear deal, not losing our perspective on the foundations and ideals of the Islamic revolution is crucial. Comparing current Iran to its state before the revolution shows that the value system of the revolution has been effective. Today, no issue in the region is settled without our opinion. We are not an ordinary player and, in order to maintain our position, we must never become an ordinary player. If a deal is reached, it is important that the main orientation of the Islamic revolution does not alter. The smallest change can modify the overall alignment and turn Iran into a dependent country. The prerequisite to prevent this is not to lose the revolution’s path."

Conservative Khorasan believes it is up to the U.S.: "Bringing up national security issues that are beyond the scope of the talks has made the talks more challenging. The Americans are still being obstinate. This can only be resolved if the U.S. retreats from demands that are beyond the nuclear issue under negotiation. The Americans only have two ways: either destroy everything that has been achieved so far or propose an agreement that can entirely change the future of global politics and lead to peace and stability."

Reformist E'temad argues that success will spill over to domestic policy: "The miracle of the talks is Iran's best achievement. The diplomacy of the moderate government of President Rowhani has demonstrated that, with patience and the power of analysis; one can deal with differences and perform tasks very well. With Iran's experience of two years of talks with six world powers, the moderate government will be able to also perform well in domestic policy." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz does not let bygones be bygones: "Some Iranians imagined that after a nuclear agreement and face-to-face talks with the U.S., relations between the two countries will improve. Some even tried to improve the opinion of the public of the U.S. and weaken the "Death to America" slogan. All the Iranian people, including the current generation, are familiar with American crimes, from the downing of the Iranian passenger plane to supporting Saddam Hussein in the war against our country. They will never be able erase these events from history." 

Conservative Resalat writes about Obama’s predicament: "President Obama has a very limited window to make the necessary decision to reach a final agreement with Iran. Obama wants to be remembered as a history making president, not as the one who betrayed George Washington's heritage! He is dying to reach a nuclear deal, but needs to satisfy unhappy senators and the Zionist lobby. The opinions and policies on the nuclear deal of anyone who will succeed him in power in 2016 are not important to him. He wants to be recognized as a symbol of change, but is hesitant to take the required and decisive step." 

Reformist Mardom Salari analyses the French role: "France's power outside the UN Security Council is less than in the Council. So, France wants to gain an upper hand in talks with Iran through the Security Council. It seeks a role equal to America's and views talks with Iran as a place to show its power. By presenting Iran as a threat, France was able to conclude an arms contract of about $30bn with the Arabs. Each of the P5+1 separately seek to penetrate the Iranian market and they have disputes amongst them in this regard. Through its arms sale to Israel and the Arabs, France wants to prevent American and Russian dominance of the arms trade and to express more understanding of Arab and Israeli concern about Iran than the U.S.. France's other goal is to increase its political clout in the EU and with Germany."

For hard-line Javan, the struggle continues: "After a decade, the nuclear negotiations could reach an agreement. If the talks are fruitful and lead to a deal, how will that impact anti-arrogance policies? Some are trying to pave the way for the normalization of relations between Iran and the U.S.; they describe a possible nuclear deal as a starting point for reforming ties. This means that a nuclear deal will put an end to the era of fighting against arrogance and the U.S.. Those who wish for relations to be re-established and speak about reopening the U.S. embassy should take into account that our enmity and friendship with other countries is based on Koranic teachings. We should not focus on the possibility that U.S./Iran relations will improve after a deal and that fighting against the U.S. will come to an end." 

Reformist Sharq explains: "After months of negotiations, the talks have reached their final and fateful stage. A change has taken place in global security so that the U.S. cannot act like it used to in the previous environment. Americans have realized that they will not be able to fully impose their demands on Iran; if they could, they would have already done so. So, they have no other option but to reach an understanding with the new players."

 

DOMESTIC POLITICS: Reformist Arman does not want MPs to resort to unacceptable practices: "MPs are in the Majlis to defend who and what they represent and to protect the country's interests. They should play their role through legal mechanisms. Otherwise, by resorting to other tools, they will not resolve any problems and will also create an unhelpful process. Such circumstances are not defendable and are not legally justifiable. They create instability in the branches of power and the retaliation can endanger the foundation of the three branches". 

 

ECONOMY: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami comments: "Private (bank and non-bank) credit institutions’ debt to the Central Bank has increased more than 275 per cent since last year. There has also been an increase in government and state-owned companies' debt to the banking system in the same period by 21 per cent. The government's overall strategy seeks to find new finance mechanisms – including refining market instruments, attracting foreign investments, facilitating production activities by improving the business environment and increasing the role of capital markets in the economy." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan argues that the Saudis are caught between a rock and a hard place: "The Saudi regime, 108 days since the start of the war, is violating the ceasefire and blaming the Houthis. Both continuing the war and stopping it are dangerous for the Saudi regime. The danger in continuing the war is that the battlefield could expand from Saudi border areas to central regions. The leader of the revolutionary Houthi movement clearly said in his Quds Day speech that they would widen the battlefield and are preparing to use new tactics. The Saudis know perfectly well that that is possible. Ending the war is also risky, because immediately after a ceasefire, the question will arise as to why the war was started and what it had achieved. If Saudi Arabia agrees to end the war, which sooner or later it will, and any of its two demands – the return of the Hadi government and Houthi retreat from Aden and Taiz - are not fulfilled, it will have to accept defeat."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Learning from success, and the price of failure

2-Egypt’s zero-sum game

3-Iran cannot be trusted

4-Amman’s fraught dealings with Tehran 

 

1- Learning from success, and the price of failure

 

Developments have shown that Iran cannot expel the U.S. from the region. The most it can do is to aspire to be the U.S.'s number-one 'dancing' partner there. But dancing has its own requirements, and calls for some painful decisions; it requires that some of the old lexicon be retired. Developments in the region have also shown that Iran cannot be a normal part of the international community without an American certificate of good conduct. Here, Iran should scrutinize the march of Cuban/U.S. relations. Cuba, just like Vietnam, is now dreaming of receiving more American investors and tourists. The Middle East's nations wonder: What sort of Iran will we see after a nuclear agreement? Will it employ the returns it will reap from that agreement – and they are huge – to pursue its policy of conquest?--Ghassan Charbel in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

It goes without saying that [the failure of the nuclear talks] would be a painful option and that its results will be disastrous, or at the very least, very costly to all parties concerned. And its results or consequences would be difficult to predict, as would the balance of power that may emerge at the end of this confrontation. Moreover, the international economic sanctions on Iran imposed within the UN Security Council's framework will not be resumed in the same manner as before the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and the West against the background of the Ukrainian crisis…All this means that the alternative to an agreement is war, anarchy, and attrition; but Iran will not be their sole arena. They will occur deep within the arenas that are part of the U.S.-led Western alliance and Iranian-led counter-alliance, and perhaps Russia as well. This would be akin to a new world war, but under a lower ceiling than that of the two previous wars, and less intense in military terms--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Iran should alter its political discourse if a nuclear agreement is signed, counsels the editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. It needs to abandon its characterization of the U.S. as the 'Great Satan' and learn the lessons taught by the Vietnamese and Cuban leaders who are rushing to make peace with Washington driven by sound and popular economic concerns. Two main outcomes are likely should the Vienna negotiations between Iran and the six major powers fail, predicts a commentator in a pro-Syrian Lebanese daily: Iran will resume its nuclear program at an accelerated pace, and the current conflicts in the region will escalate to unprecedented levels, threatening a form of low-level world war.

 

THE SUPREME LEADER SPEAKS: "Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamene'i has urged a crowd of Iranian students to 'continue the fight against international arrogance,' emphasizing that 'the confrontation with the forces of arrogance will not cease even after the nuclear negotiations with the six major powers,' and stressing that this confrontation 'is one of the founding principles of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and shall never cease to be so'," notes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The supreme leader made his statement as his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was continuing the marathon negotiations in Vienna, and with the 'Great Satan's' Secretary of State John Kerry, in particular. And Khamenei's statements came only two days after hints from [former Iranian president and current Expediency Council Chairman] Hashemi Rafsanjani suggesting that the U.S. embassy in Tehran may be reopened, noting that his country has 'broken its taboos with the West and the U.S.'

The Middle East’s peoples’ preoccupation with their own earthquakes and torn societies often prevents them from attending to some very significant international events. These events should concern these nations, states, and policies, as well question their tendency to use a discourse that invites them to 'sleep on the silk sheets of alleged victories.' I am referring here to a scene that warrants the attention of those caught up in the conflicts in the region – including Khamenei', [Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander] General Qassem Soleimani, and [Lebanese Hizbollah leader] Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.

On July 7th, President Barack Obama received an exceptional visitor at the Oval Office with a mixture of interest and friendliness. His name was Nguyen Phu Trong, the leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The meeting was the first of its kind, twenty years after diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed, and forty years after the visitor's predecessors took control of Saigon, inflicting the harshest military defeat on the U.S. in modern times.

Had the visitor surrendered to the discourse of the past, he would not have ventured to visit the headquarters of those who were his country’s 'Great Satan' and enemy number-one. There is no need to remind anyone that a sea of blood and bitter years of fighting stands between the two countries. In Saigon, the U.S. army was forced to haul down its country's flag and withdraw in a humiliating manner. But the Vietnamese leader uses the lexicon of the present and not that of the past.

The successors to those who fought and humiliated the U.S. want to progress and flourish today; they want stability not victory. And they want victory against the humiliation of poverty and unemployment, and to build modern universities and join the march of scientific and technological progress. The visitor came with the aim of expanding trade and strengthening military cooperation. For the new 'Great Satan' for his country is the Chinese giant with its economic successes and expanding military machine.

Vietnam discovered that future considerations are more important than the past’s wounds, and that economic figures are more important than songs of glory. It has also discovered that it was Deng Xiaoping and not Mao Zedong who reconciled China with the modern age and development. They also discovered that had Mao's country clung to the literal text of the Little Red Book, hundreds of millions of Chinese would have remained without homes, degrees, schools, and cars.

Iran did not defeat the U.S. in the same manner as Vietnam. It humiliated it for a short while during the [1979] U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran; and it sponsored taking American hostages in Beirut. It subsequently sought to implicate the U.S. in an Arab and Islamic Vietnam in Iraq. It tried to encircle the U.S.'s allies in the region via infiltrations on the ground and an arsenal of missiles. But we have to bear in mind that it was the U.S. that prevented Iran from achieving victory against Iraq [during the 1980-88 war], thus forcing Khomeini to 'drink the poison' of the ceasefire with Saddam Hussein's regime. The U.S. has also more recently inflicted pain on Iran via economic sanctions, forcing Tehran to pursue the path of negotiations.

Developments have shown that Iran cannot expel the U.S. from the region. The most it can do is to aspire to be the U.S.'s number-one 'dancing' partner there. But dancing has its own requirements, and calls for some painful decisions; it requires that some of the old lexicon be retired. Developments in the region have also shown that Iran cannot be a normal part of the international community without an American certificate of good conduct. Here, Iran should scrutinize the march of Cuban/U.S. relations. Cuba, just like Vietnam, is now dreaming of receiving more American investors and tourists.

The Middle East's nations wonder: What sort of Iran will we see after a nuclear agreement? Will it employ the returns it will reap from that agreement – and they are huge – to pursue its policy of conquest?

There are those who believe that the current conflagration along the Sunni/Shiite frontlines threatens to transform Syria into Iran's Vietnam before that of Iran's enemies. The truth is that all the arenas where there is Iranian infiltration are on fire or suffering from rifts. Tehran will do well to read the recent statement by former CIA director Michael Hayden. He said: 'Let us face the truth: Iraq does not exist anymore, neither does Syria; Lebanon is a failed state and Libya is likely to be one as well.'

Iran cannot withstand a Sunni Vietnam in Syria. It cannot withstand the sort of large-scale commitments that brought the Soviet Union down. It should read the facts on the ground as well as Hayden's statement. It should look at the image of Obama receiving Ho Chi Minh's successor with interest.

"Most likely, and at the end of the day, the ordinary Iranian wants a normal, stable and flourishing state, which is exactly what the ordinary Chinese and ordinary Vietnamese wants," concludes Charbel.

End…

 

MORE TIME TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES: "The Vienna negotiations between Iran and the '5 + 1' group are facing obstacles that may require more time to overcome," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But the problem does not stem from the obstacles and the need for more time. It stems from the fact that there are parties to the negotiations that refuse the very principle of the proposed solution and that insist on exploiting any opportunity to undermine the very foundations of any agreement. The calculations leading them to this are well known by now: they arise primarily from Tel Aviv’s pressures on the U.S. administration and the harmony between such pressures and the position of certain Western and regional governments, primarily France and Saudi Arabia, that believe that an agreement threatens their political and economic interests.

Against this background, the obstacles that are delaying an agreement are of a political nature and should not be discounted. But what if the Vienna talks, or any other subsequent negotiations in the coming weeks or months in some other world capital, were to fail?

Failure would mean the following: Iran would return to enriching uranium to 20% and perhaps higher levels, and it would add to the number of its centrifuges– which is the exact opposite of what any agreement between Iran and the '5 + 1' aims to reach.

A direct military option on the part of the U.S. and its allies (or Tel Aviv) may not be the anticipated response, given its enormous cost. But that the regional focal points of tension– specifically in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and perhaps Lebanon – are certain to witness an escalation. These conflicts will reach unprecedented levels and may turn into an all-out war as a result of developments in one arena or the other, especially the Yemeni/Saudi and Syrian arenas, and perhaps even Lebanon.

It goes without saying that this would be a painful option and that its results will be disastrous, or at the very least, very costly to all parties concerned. And its results or consequences would be difficult to predict, as would the balance of power that may emerge at the end of this confrontation.

Moreover, the international economic sanctions on Iran imposed within the UN Security Council's framework will not be resumed in the same manner as before the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and the West against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, this option that has been used by the U.S. and its allies will not have similar effect to that of the past few years, especially after the sanctions on Iran were tightened via UN Security Council resolutions.

All this means that the alternative to an agreement is war, anarchy, and attrition; but Iran will not be their sole arena. They will occur deep within the arenas that are part of the U.S.-led Western alliance and Iranian-led counter-alliance, and perhaps Russia as well.

"This would be akin to a new world war, but under a lower ceiling than that of the two previous wars, and less intense in military terms," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

2-Egypt’s zero-sum game

 

Egypt will reap nothing but further violence and a descent into chaos should former president Mursi and his colleagues be executed, warns 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Reports that the Egyptian authorities may carry out the death sentences that have been passed against former president Mohammad Mursi and senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders are alarming, since they suggest that Egypt may slide towards anarchy and a bloody confrontation that could last for decades to come, warns a leading Jordanian commentator.

 

RECALLING SADDAM: "There appears to be a growing tendency towards implementing the death sentences passed against deposed Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and a number of first-ranking leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood that is banned in Egypt," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Some reports suggest that this may take place before the [end of Ramadan feast] 'Id al-Fitr or during its first three days, or possibly shortly afterwards, recalling the execution of the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on the first day of the Adha 'Id.

The issue here is not when or how president Mursi will be executed before, during or after the 'Id. The problem stems from the death sentence itself, especially if carried out. What would be its repercussions, and how would they affect Egypt's future, security and stability? And what impact would this have on the Brotherhood and the regime? And what messages would it send, and to whom?

Whatever the charges leveled at the deposed president, and whatever criticisms may be made of him and his Brotherhood during or after the period he ruled Egypt, it would be wise to pause and carefully consider the consequences of carrying out the death sentence. This is because the moment when the president and his comrades will be executed will draw a line separating between two phases of Egypt's current history: Before and after the execution.

After the execution, and perhaps for one or two decades to come, there will be no prospects for national reconciliation. The relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime will change from one of 'hostility that is difficult to resolve' to one of 'open war.' In that case, the Brotherhood's forces and popular bases will be automatically added to the armies of extremists and terrorists who are now wreaking havoc upon Egypt's security and stability. The country will enter a tunnel of 'uncreative chaos' until further notice.

The post-executions phase will also be different as far as the internal argument within the Brotherhood is concerned. In the pre-executions phase, Dr. Najeh Ibrahim, one of the leading experts on Egypt’s Brotherhood and Islamist movements, predicted that two-thirds of the Brotherhood members and cadres would be ready for national reconciliation. I do not know whether he would make the same assessment should Egypt’s decision-makers to come to the conclusion that it would be easy to carry out the death sentences and hang the country’s first elected president.

The Brotherhood would certainly not remain the same. Most of its popular base and cadres would move towards the extreme right and terrorism. They would move from warfare on the social media to that of actually fighting against the state, the army, and the state institutions. This is a rule of life.

Egypt will make no progress in its war on terrorism if the executions are carried out. And it is worth noting that it has achieved no significant breakthrough in this war so far. Attacks are continuing in Sinai and the Nile Valley. Terrorism is striking in the heart of Cairo. The past few days alone have added new names to the list of victims. This tendency is certain to escalate at an unprecedented and rapidly increasing pace. And Egypt itself will not remain off the list of victims if the current status quo were to continue.

Certain forces are lying in ambush for the country, waiting for it to fall into a quagmire similar to that we have witnessed in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, or – before them all – in Algeria during its [post-1991] 'black decade.' If it proceeds, the decision to carry out the death sentence will drive Egypt further in the wrong direction. It could be the proverbial 'straw' that breaks the back of security and stability. So what wisdom is there in pursuing policies of revenge and retribution rather than reconciliation, containment, and avoiding harm, if it is possible to pursue policies that may actually bring some benefit?

We used to believe that the excessive and strict collective sentences, including death sentences, were merely intended to pressure the Brotherhood into climbing down from the treetops and to lower the ceiling of its demands and expectations, speeding up its reintegration into the political process and the [government’s] ‘roadmap’, but on the appropriate terms.

Today, however, it seems that we may have been mistaken, and that those in charge were serious about these sentences, ready to proceed down the path of confrontation, exclusion, and ostracism till the very end. It may be that Egypt’s ruling elite that the world has begun to accept and deal with and back in its war on terrorism, in fact, has been seized by false and misleading sense of elation, believing that it has secured the international community’s mandate to wage a relentless war on all its enemies, under the guise of fighting terrorism.

If this is its reading, it is totally inaccurate. We have seen how Syria has paid a very high price for reading the situation in a similar manner. It has sought to ‘ISIS-ify’ the various opposition groups and to promote the notion that there is little difference between ISIS on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood and the other various Islamist (and non-Islamist) [opposition] movements on the other.

It is as if we have not learnt the lessons of our own experience and that of others. It is as if we have still not arrived at a situation whereby we acknowledge that no one can totally excise anyone else, and that the time will come when the gains that one camp is achieving at the expense of others will evaporate, and turn into mere 'bills' that must be settled. This is a zero-sum game that no side can win, as long as the price of what one gains today has to be paid many times over tomorrow, and as long as there is no universal conviction that what is necessary is to play a 'win/win' game.

We are still wagering on Egypt's reason and wisdom, and we pray to God that these reports and leaks will prove to be no more than malignant rumors. We do this not out of love for the Muslim Brotherhood or the current regime, or out of our concern for its survival, but out of concern for Egypt itself and fear of what may lie in wait for it. We do this out of hope that it will be able to reap the benefits of its sons and daughters' sacrifices during the two greatest 'hijacked' revolutions in the country's contemporary history.

Since Rabi'a [when Egyptian security forces stormed the Brotherhood's sit-in at Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya Square in 2013], we have been saying that Egypt is not marching in the right direction, and that it is witnessing successive coups against its two glorious revolutions. Today, more than any time before, we are very concerned about the developments unfolding in Egypt. We have lost our faith in the ruling elite’s ability to lead the country and bring it out of its wilderness and lean years.

"May God protect Egypt and its people," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Iran cannot be trusted

 

Moscow’s call to lift the ban imposed on arms exports to Iran disregards what Tehran is doing across the region by spreading chaos in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, says Saudi al-Watan

 

Russia's unconditional support for Iran and its regional policies simply ignores the consequences of Tehran's multiple interventions in the Arab affairs, argues the editorial in a Saudi daily. Moscow’s support for lifting the ban on weapons’ exports to Iran is an invitation to Tehran to continue arming its allies in an attempt to impose its hegemony upon all the states in the region.

 

NON-PEACEFUL INTERVENTION: "No matter how circumstances and conditions may change, Iran remains a state that cannot be trusted because of its persistent practices and threats, and because of its non-peaceful and illegitimate intervention in the affairs of the region's states," writes the editorial in the Saudi daily al-Watan.

It is exerting maximum efforts to take control of the centers of decision-making in neighboring countries. And it has no qualms arming and directing groups that are loyal to it for sectarian [Shiite] considerations in order to achieve this aim. It transforms these same groups into tools whose influence is extended in order to allow Tehran to expand its own influence through them. As a result, the entire state targeted by this intervention becomes subject to Iranian hegemony. And there are many examples of this, such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups as well.

In light of this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement during the BRICS summit in the Russian city of Ufa claiming 'that lifting the ban imposed on arms exports to Iran must be given priority after a permanent agreement regarding Tehran's nuclear program is reached' simply ignores the facts. It disregards what Iran is doing in the region by spreading chaos in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. For the nuclear agreement is one thing, and providing Iran with weapons is a different matter altogether. After all, a large proportion of these weapons will go to the Syrian regime and Hizbollah -God forbid- allowing them to continue repressing the Syrian people, and to the [Houthi] putschists in Yemen so as to back their stance against legitimacy there.

As he called for lifting the ban as soon as possible, declaring on behalf of his country that 'we will back the options proposed by Iran’s negotiators,' the Russian foreign minister seems to have forgotten that his country's political alliance with Iran should not harm other nations’ interests. If Lavrov believes that 'Iran is taking part in fighting ISIS, and lifting the weapons’ ban will allow it to enhance its ability to combat terrorism,' others believe that Iran is in collusion with this terrorist organization whose criminal actions indirectly serve the interests of the Syrian regime, in fact. Indeed, many articles have been written analyzing the links between Iran and the Syrian regime on the one hand, and ISIS on the other.

It is the right of any state to act in its own interests and forge the political alliances it believes are consistent with its policies at any stage. But at the very least, it should take into account the harm inflicted on others as a result, and try to avoid this and prevent it from happening. Its biases should not be blind with no attempt to calculate their effects.

"Russia has to understand that Iran's aggressive practices in the region are not welcome by the region's states and nations," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

4-Amman’s fraught dealings with Tehran 

  

Amman’s dealings with Tehran remain susceptible to pressures and multiple interpretations, says Hazem Mubayidin in today's Iraqi as-Sabah

 

It is still not entirely clear what was behind Jordan's arrest of an alleged Iraqi member of Iran’s al-Qods Brigade who was reportedly preparing to carry out terrorist attacks, maintains a Jordanian commentator in a Baghdad daily. This may have been certain parties’ attempt to prevent any improvement in relations between Amman and Tehran; or it may have been a maneuver by the Jordanian authorities aimed at pressuring the Gulf states into providing more aid to Amman.

 

STATE OF TENSION: "It has become clear that certain forces are working on prolonging the state of tension between Amman and Tehran," writes Hazem Mubayidin in Monday's Iraqi daily as-Sabah.

The Jordanian authorities announced the arrest of an Iraqi member of Iran’s al-Qods Brigade along with 45 kilograms of explosives he was storing in a forested area north of the country with the aim of carrying out 'terrorist' attacks across the border in Israel. It goes without saying that such a report will add to the already tense climate ever since the Khomeini-led Iranian Revolution’s victory in 1979. Since that time, all attempts to reach common ground between the two countries have failed.

For its part, Tehran has denied any involvement in the operation, describing what was published as groundless allegations. It also stressed that Iranian policy is based on full respect for the security, stability, and territorial integrity of all states in the region.

What is noteworthy about the Jordanian account of what happened is that the accused had easily accessed the explosives buried in Wasfi at-Tal Forest years ago, and removed them to the al-'Asfour Gap where he personally hid them again. But when he returned to dig them out and use them months later, he failed to locate them. Yet when he was arrested, he succeeded in identifying that location immediately – all of which adds to the mystery surrounding this story. Moreover, the authorities have banned any further reports regarding what happened so as to mislead the parties behind it.

The question now is this: Is the exposure of this operation intended to drive relations with Tehran back to their previous levels of tension? Or is merely intended as a message to ‘those concerned’ in the Gulf states?

The message to Iran, if there is one, has to do with what has been happening along the Syrian/Jordanian borders, and Damascus and its Iranian ally’s recent accusations that Amman has been helping the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in its battles against the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, there are those in Amman who believe that Jordan has been on Iran’s target list for years, especially as far as the Qods Brigade is concerned.

Some believe that Jordan will respond by striking at Iran’s interests and backing its opponents in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen despite the fact that what was expected was an announcement of a new alliance against ISIS that includes Iran after unconfirmed reports of General Soleimani’s secret visit to Amman where he allegedly met with the Director of Jordanian Intelligence General Faisal ash-Shoubaki.

The Iranians will not forget that the late King Hussein fired an artillery shell at their country from Iraqi territory during the [1980-88] war. But after the emergence of ISIS's threat they have put all this behind them. Tehran recently received the Jordanian foreign minister who was bearing many files concerning the regional situation. This was clearly a consequence of the interests that Iran expected to secure as result of destroying extremism, without securing much in return other than the hope of making use of Jordan's good regional relations in order to alleviate the isolation imposed on Tehran.

After Khomeini's death and signs that Iran was gradually abandoning its attempt to export its revolution, relations between Jordan and Iran began to improve. But that did not go beyond a certain point. Amman continued to restrict the Iranians' visits to the Prophet's companion Ja’far ibn Abu Talib’s [Shiite] shrine and was wary of Tehran's efforts to secure a regional foothold that would enable it to become a major factor in the Middle East conflict at the expense of Jordan's political and security interests.

These fears were crowned by the Jordanian monarch's warnings against Iran's efforts to establish a ‘Shiite Crescent’ that angered Tehran and its allies, but talk of which intensified after Iranian involvement in the sectarian war between the Shiites and the Sunnis in Iraq grew. Demonstrations took to the streets in Amman attacking Iran’s policies, and some Jordanian MPs demanded that their government should sever its relations with Tehran.

Jordanian/Iranian relations have been characterized by deep disagreements over most of regional issues and crises. For Jordan is part of the axis of moderation; it is an ally of Washington and has a formal peace treaty with Israel. It recognizes the PA and views it as the Palestinians' representative. For its part, Iran is the leader of the axis of resistance. It collides with the West and is hostile to Israel. It backs Hamas, while it firmly and forcefully stands with Hizbollah and its allies in Lebanon, whereas Jordan maintains strong relations with the March 14th [Saudi-backed anti-Hizbollah/Damascus] alliance. Moreover, Jordan backs the UAE's rights as regards the three islands occupied by Iran [in 1973] and strongly backs the political regime in Bahrain, while Tehran has offered strong support to the mostly Shiite Bahraini opposition. But while we have grown accustomed to describing relations between Jordan and Iran as lukewarm, they have always maintained a degree of warmth that is sufficient to inaugurate a new and different phase of relations between the two countries.

Despite all the differences, Tehran proposed to supply Jordan with oil free-of-charge for thirty years in return for trade exchanges between the two countries and facilitating religious tourism. This was after the [Arab] Gulf states ignored Amman's desperate calls for help, which raised questions on the Jordanian street regarding the need to diversify the country’s options after it became obvious that it is impossible to resolve Jordan's domestic crisis without success in its foreign policy; one that failed to secure the aid that Jordan needs.

Furthermore, the birth of ISIS has restructured Jordan's regional role via the gateway of the war on terrorism, which creates significant common ground for shared Jordanian/Iranian interests. In addition, we should attend to the fact that Jordan’s position towards Syria is that the solution does not lie in toppling the Syrian regime, and that Amman's relations with Iraq have improved notably and are witnessing major developments today.

"So, are there certain parties that are working to prevent the emergence of any practical common denominators between Amman and Tehran? Or is this a calculated Jordanian maneuver that confirms that the country’s options are open to all possibilities?" asks Mubayidin in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Il momento della verità

 

After weeks, months and years of buildup, Israeli newspapers lead their Monday editions with news that – barring any last-minute hitches – Iran will sign an agreement today in Vienna with representatives of six world powers.

The only newspaper that does not lead with the Iranian nuclear deal is Yedioth Ahronoth, which leads with news that passenger planes flying to the southern Israeli resort of Eilat will be equipped with antimissile defense systems, in response to the growing threat of attacks from Sinai-based terror groups affiliated to ISIS and al-Qa’ida. The order to install the defense systems was given by the Israeli security establishment some two weeks ago, when ISIS claimed a rocket attack against Israel and staged a massive attack against Egyptian army bases in the Sinai.

Haaretz, Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead with Iran. Haaretz reports in its headlines that Iranian President Hassan Rowhani declared Sunday that the final sticking points have been overcome and that a historic agreement will be finalized sometime on Monday. Israel Hayom quotes Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, who also used the word 'historic' – but in a very different context. Not for the first time, Ya'alon said that any nuclear deal with Iran would be 'a historic mistake' – echoing the message from his boss, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

Ya'alon continued with his broadside against the deal on Monday morning, at the start of a meeting of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Noting the proximity of the 'bad agreement,' Ya'alon stressed that Israel must do everything to protect itself from Iran as it inches closer to becoming a nuclear threshold state. 'Iran will become a more significant threat not only against Israel, but against the stability of the entire world. They're entering into a bad agreement, after which we will have to prepare to defend ourselves on our own.'

Speaking Sunday at the start of the weekly cabinet meeting, Netanyahu said that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been quoted as saying that Iran needs to plan to continue fighting the U.S. regardless of whether there is a nuclear agreement. Netanyahu said that all this is happening as the 'parade of concessions to Iran continues in Vienna.' He said the emerging deal in Vienna will pave Tehran's way to many nuclear bombs and gives it hundreds of billions of dollars for its terrorism and conquest machine, thereby endangering the peace of the entire world.

Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz also spoke out on Monday morning, telling Army Radio that the West's agreement with Iran will cause serious damage. 'As it looks at the moment – this is final. We have clear indications that the agreement with Iran will be signed in the coming day,' Steinitz asserted. 'Even if we managed to somewhat improve the agreement in the past year, this is a terrible agreement - they're selling the world's future for the sake of a dubious political achievement.'

In the United States, the top Republican in the U.S. Senate has cast doubt on whether President Barack Obama will be able to win approval in Congress for any nuclear deal now under negotiation with Iran. 'I think it's going to be a very hard sell, if it's completed, in Congress,' Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said in an interview on the Fox News Sunday. 'We already know it's going to leave Iran as a threshold nuclear state.'

However, a top security official told settler-run news service Arutz Sheva that Israelis should not put too much hope in the possibility that the U.S. Congress will not approve the deal. The official expressed satisfaction at McConnell's comments, but said that, in the end, the most likely scenario is that Obama will get his way and the deal will be approved. 'There is no question that Congress sees this deal in a different light than the White House does,' the official said. 'The question is what will happen when the voting takes place. Senators can expect a great deal of pressure to be placed on them.'

Despite the optimism expressed by some members of the various negotiating delegations, a senior Iranian negotiator cautioned that certain issues still needed to be resolved before a deal could be finalized. 'I cannot promise whether the remaining issues can be resolved tonight or tomorrow night. Some issues still remain unresolved and until they are solved, we cannot say an agreement has been reached,' Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in Vienna, according to Iran's Tasnim news agency.

On the domestic political front, most of Netanyahu's rivals in the opposition have been deafeningly silent in recent weeks. On Monday morning, however, Yair Lapid gave an interview to Army Radio, in which he accused the prime minister of failing to prevent the deal. 'The deal is indeed terrible and awful,' he said. 'And if there is a failure – there is someone responsible for the failure: you can't go around all day and say that he will prevent a nuclear deal with Iran - and then when it happens say that he isn't guilty and that it isn't a matter of his responsibility. They refused to listen because Netanyahu has made Israel's relations with the world and the United States worse.'

Finally, closer to home, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas claimed in a recent interview with an Egyptian paper that Hamas, with which he signed a reconciliation treaty early last year, is holding secret negotiations with Israel to establish a state in Gaza. Speaking with the paper Roz Al-Youssef, Abbas criticized Hamas for starting last summer's terror war against Israel, blaming it for the destruction to Gaza.

He said former U.S. President Jimmy Carter had visited him after the war in an attempt to sign an accord on forming a full unity government between Hamas and PA ending the feud between them. Abbas said he had no need for such agreements and instead wanted PA elections held within three to four months. According to him, Carter left at that point and never came back.

 

 

SHAMEFUL: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six Western powers will be one of the most shameful capitulations in history.

"Iran Air – the national carrier of the Islamic Republic – announced yesterday that it will be purchasing 14 new passenger planes by the end of the year. This was one of the main articles on the official Iranian news channels last night. One of Iran's top aviation officials, Hamid Habibi, said that his country plans to spend $20 billion on the new aircraft. He even visited the Paris Air Show at Le Bourget in north Paris.

The report about the new planes sits very well with the nuclear deal that Iran is about to sign with the Western powers: a country that is not subject to any kind of embargo, the moment that the deal is inked, is a country that is open to the world. Aircraft are the perfect means of remaining open. The Iranian economy, which is about to be reopened, is highly attractive. The French, the Germans, the Russians and the Americans all want to sell their goods to Iran. Little wonder, therefore, that the nuclear negotiations have become a Persian bazaar. And this is before we have even mentioned the legacy that U.S. President Barack Obama wants to leave behind him: an alliance with Tehran. Was anyone truly surprised that Iran was allowed to set the pace of the negotiations? Only a country that is genuinely self-assured can negotiate with the Americans while, at the very same time, burn American flags.

According to reports coming out of Vienna yesterday, Iran and the six world powers are likely to sign a deal today. We were informed that 98 percent of the deal was already in the bag. Well, you could have knocked us down with a feather. What an achievement for international diplomacy. What a pity that Obama was already given the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009. Is there no way to give him another one? If and when an announcement is made today, we will be reminded of the previous shows: the interim agreement in November 2013 and the framework agreement that was reached in April 2015. In both cases, there was talk about many obstacles. In both cases, the talks were extended. And in both cases, a deal was reached.

Since the resumption of talks in Geneva in 2009 and the goodwill messages that Washington sent to Tehran to mark the Iranian New Year, the writing was on the wall. The failure of the U.S. administration to get involved in the Iranian protest movement that emerged after allegations of forgeries in the 2009 presidential election was further proof of the American goal: a deal with Iran at any price. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, dictatorial leaders were booted from office the moment that a public protest movement emerged, but Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is still in power, because the Obama Administration needs something to brag about. Sorry, my mistake: because the Obama Administration needs an agreement. And agreements, we all know, are made between enemies. Journalists and commentators will cheer Obama to the rafters today. Historians will put him in his place.

In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, Obama said recently that he's still young and that, 'I’m still going to be around, God willing,' in 20 years. He went on to say that he would not like the agreement to fail by Iran becoming a nuclear power. This seems like an appropriate place to ask: Is anybody in the international community critical of Bill Clinton because of the failed nuclear agreement with North Korea in 1994, or is he still a hugely popular president who is universally loved? People have a shorter memory than historians.

It is possible that, in their Vienna talks, the six world powers delayed the day on which Iran obtains a bomb. Originally, when the talks resumed in 2003, the international community's goal was to dismantle the Iranian nuclear program. This agreement, however, confirms Iran's status as a country on the threshold of nuclear capability. In a few years from now, there won't even be any inspection.

Once the deal is signed in Vienna today, there will be many people who will point the finger at Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and say that he has failed, since he promised to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capability, yet – on his watch – he has allowed just that to happen. That's like saying that Shimon Peres should have resigned as prime minister because he failed to secure peace with the Palestinians. But peace – like the Iranian nuclear program – doesn't depend exclusively on Israel, unfortunately.

If and when the greatest show on earth produces this shameful agreement, we will pin our hopes on the U.S. Congress, since it is our last best hope of thwarting the deal. Some people predicted that this day would come. The Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell, promised that he would not give the agreement easy passage. Let's hope he's true to his word. The U.S. Senate could save Israel from the Iranian nukes, but it can also save the West from one of the most shameful capitulations in history. And the Obama Administration might be able to brag about its legacy, but it can also claim to have written the book on how not to conduct negotiations."

Ends…

 

JUDGMENT DAY: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that today could be Judgment Day for Iran and for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

"Today is likely to be Judgment Day in Vienna. It could also be a fateful day for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. If Iran and the six world powers manage to hash out the details of an agreement and if all of the obstacles are overcome, we will discover that all of Netanyahu's efforts to thwart the agreement, which he started in earnest when the talks resumed some 20 months ago, have failed. However, at the time of writing, it's still not certain that there will be an agreement and, even if there is, it seemly highly unlikely that it will be signed today.

The atmosphere and tone of the Vienna talks reminds me of the big wheel at an amusement park. There have been ups and downs. Over the weekend, there was an atmosphere of cautious pessimism coming out of the Austrian capital. Yesterday, that was replaced by cautious optimism – especially on the part of the Iranian representatives.

Representatives of the United States and the Western powers agreed that further progress toward an agreement had been made, but insisted that not all of the differences had been ironed out. We all know what the issues are: how intrusive inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities will be, whether there will be any warning before these inspections and whether sanctions will be lifted. There is also disagreement over whether the sanctions being discussed include those on weapons sales, which have nothing to do with sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear activity.

Some, if not all, of the problems will be resolved by using deliberately vague terminology. For example, Iran, as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared, is demanding the immediate lifting of sanctions as soon as the agreement is signed. The United States and the West insist that sanctions will only be lifted after the first stage of the agreement and once it is ascertained beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iran is living up to its commitments and has scaled back its nuclear program by dismantling centrifuges, reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium, decommissioned its plutonium reactor in Arak, halted research into the development of advanced centrifuges and so on. Bridging the gap between the two positions must allow Khamenei to maintain his honor and to ensure that it does not like he has gone back on his word. One possible solution is that Iran will start acting in accordance with the agreement, without signing it, and, a few months down the line, once the West is convinced that it is abiding by the terms of the agreement, there will be a signing ceremony – followed by the immediate lifting of sanctions. Then Iran can start celebrating.

There is one basic and fundamental fact that cannot be forgotten: even before signing the interim agreement some 20 months ago, Iran was a country on the threshold of nuclear capability; it was only two or three years away from obtaining a bomb. If it really wanted to, it could have obtained nuclear capability long ago. But it simply didn't want to. If an agreement is reached and signed, and if all sides honor it over the course of the next decade, Iran will find itself at least a year away from being able to manufacture a nuclear bomb. That might not be enough for Israel and for other countries in the Middle East, but it's not nothing. And it could be enough to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region."

Ends…

 

HANG 'EM HIGH: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was right to nix a bill calling for the death penalty for terrorists.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu yesterday managed to bury a bill calling for terrorists to be executed. He did so using the quintessentially Israeli trick of sending the proposed legislation to a committee. That committee, no doubt, will convene for the first time in two or three months from now, and will discuss the issue for two or three years. This is how populist legislation is put on death row before being put out of its misery.

It's not that terrorists do not deserve the death penalty. They do. But it's no coincidence that, thus far, Nazi lynchpin Adolf Eichmann is the only person to have been executed by the State of Israel. Some of the worst terrorists that we have known have been sentenced to decades-long prison terms; some of them were given multiple life sentences. Many of them were eventually freed as part of various prisoner exchange deals.

It is possible, of course, that the threat of capital punishment will deter one or two terrorists from carrying out their plans. But the Arabs who are our closest neighbors, and those who are more distant, are world champions when it comes to executions. When it comes to judicial killings, they are much better than us. The ministers and lawmakers who support the death penalty for terrorists to win votes are experts at talking in theory about executions. But they would be the first to shout 'It's not me' when the first Israeli soldier is publically executed in Jenin or in the alleyways of Khan Yunis. Israelis do not have the heart or the stomach for that kind of spectacle when it comes to IDF soldiers, settlers or civilians, who can easily be kidnapped from any part of the country. Even now, 50 years later, Israelis are still deeply disturbed by photographs of spy Eli Cohen being executed in Damascus.

Netanyahu was right to nip this mad race to the scaffold in its bud. Not that terrorists don't deserve to be executed, but they would be the only ones to 'benefit' from such a law."

Ends…

 

PSYCHO-IRAN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Reuven Berko says that Western powers have become addicted to their own rationalization, self-delusion and wishful thinking – despite the very plain talking from their Iranian negotiating partners.

"There's an ancient Arabic proverb that states that, 'What is written on the forehead, the eyes must see.' But the eyes of the six Western powers in Vienna have failed to see the writing on the wall. Those conducting the negotiations with Iran see the sights and hear the sounds, but they are ignoring reality and are dealing instead with the realms of wishful thinking.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his team are like two-bit psychologists: their negotiations are like therapeutic discussions with the tough-talking Iranians, while the Iranian delegation gets its instructions from a cynical ayatollah who is whispering to his emissaries from behind the scenes. The Iranians are deliberately adopting the manic patterns of behavior: their mood swings are extreme and they are playing the West like a metronome, ticking away between hope and despair.

The West watches on as Iran continues to make massive advances in its ballistic missile program and its nuclear program; the Islamic Republic is deliberately dragging its feet and is progressing steadily toward new and more advanced centrifuges. World leaders hear the threats made by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his cronies, who –morning, noon and night – demand the destruction of the State of Israel. They declare that their national struggle against the 'arrogant' United States will continue and that they will not allow international inspectors to visit the sites where they are developing nuclear weapons. If this is the attitude of the leader, you can be certain that the Iranian people think the same way. Indeed, the Iranian media, the security establishment and the streets of Tehran are full of people indoctrinated to hate the West and who have been brainwashed to demand the lifting of sanctions – while, at the very same time, burning American and Israeli flags.

It would seem that those engaged in negotiations with Iran are using 'denial' and 'repression' as psychological tricks to fool themselves and no one else. In response to the belligerent and threatening statement of the Iranian leader, who announced over the weekend that 'Iran will not give up on its nuclear advances under any circumstances,' the psychological explanation given by the Western experts in self-delusion is that he is merely preparing the Iranian people for the concessions that Iran is expected to make.

Anyone with half a brain can see that the nuclear negotiations with Iran are not working. The lifting of sanctions has just one purpose: to allow Iran to fill its national coffers and to allow it to continue funding terrorist activity in Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. It also hopes to use this money for the procurement of Russian- and Chinese-made weapons. Are the Western powers that are negotiating with Iran capable of admitting that they erred and that they have been lead on a wild goose chase by those masterful diplomats from Tehran? Will they be able to back down and admit that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was right when he described the deal as a disaster? And if we're dealing with deceptions, it seems that Kerry and his team are in a state of cognitive dissonance. They are like the man who thinks that he's bought himself a brand new car, only to discover that the engine is ruined – but who takes comfort in the fact that the horn still works.

In psychological terms, we are on the seam line between the suicidal tendencies of the Shiite collective and the megalomaniacal expansionist urge of the Iranians, who seek to expand their influence – even at the cost of countless human lives. However, in the Persian bazaar, what you see is what you buy. Iran has declared that it will wipe Israel off the map using nuclear weapons. No agreement that is based on falsehoods can change that. Instead of making one simple demand – an end to Iran's nuclear program – the West has become addicted to a process of self-delusion and foot dragging. After all, therapy is supposed to be discreet."

Ends…

 

IRAN HOLDS ITS BREATH: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that parliament in Tehran has already signaled it is ready for the agreement with the West, and even the red lines it charted are fading fast as the final deal gets closer.

"'We will be at the public’s side in the mass celebrations in honor of the signing of the agreement. As long as they are conducted according to law and religious precepts,' the Iranian police spokesman announced on Sunday, explaining that the police were prepared for celebrations on the signing of an agreement between Iran and the world powers over the former’s nuclear program. However, Iranian President Hassan Rowhani was still restrained. 'Even if an agreement is not signed, the world will appreciate Iran’s rational stance,' he said.

Meanwhile, the public and political leadership in Iran are waiting with baited breath for the official announcement. The Iranian delegation to the negotiations even won praise from more than 200 members of parliament for its 'strong stand in the face of the exaggerated demands of the other side' – a clear sign that the Iranian parliament is already prepared for the agreement.

In a signed declaration published Sunday, Iranian parliamentarians reminded Rowhani and the negotiating team of the red lines that could not be crossed: The lifting of the economic and military sanctions, no oversight of military installations, and no interrogation of Iranian nuclear scientists. According to the wording of the declaration, though, it seems that Iran’s red lines are fading ahead of the agreement.

A red line seems to have been crossed by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, former president of Iran and head of its Expediency Discernment Council – perhaps the most important body in the decision-making process. In an interview with The Guardian, Rafsanjani said an agreement that lifts the sanctions would be a 'giant step' and that 'we have broken a taboo' in conducting direct negotiations with the United States. If things develop as they should, Rafsanjani told the British daily, it was 'not impossible' that the U.S. Embassy could reopen in Tehran. Such a statement has not been heard from an official as highly placed as Rafsanjani, and although it has been a few days since he made the remarks, no condemnation or denial has been heard from Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Negotiations with Tehran had long passed the point of no return, after the interim agreement signed in November 2013, which bore Khamenei’s fingerprints. And the principles of agreement read by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry publicly in Lausanne in April showed that neither side was willing to give up on an agreement. The Iranian leadership studied the progress of the talks from two key aspects: the technical details; and the way it would be marketed to the public, the Revolutionary Guards and conservative radical wing.

The technical elements – which included the number of centrifuges Iran could operate, the amount of enriched uranium it could hold onto and the level of enrichment and oversight of the agreement – were actually considered relatively easy to resolve; indeed, some parts were resolved in the early stages of the negotiations.

The talks reached a crisis point when discussion began on the type of sanctions that would be lifted and the timetable for doing so. The Iranian demand was unequivocal: full and immediate lifting of sanctions with the signing of the agreement.

Iran has already embarked on a series of economic steps, such as the signing of future agreements with a number of international corporations and the construction of a contractual infrastructure with oil customers to restore market shares that were taken away due to the sanctions. On the domestic level, Rowhani has ordered broad economic reforms be formulated that already assume that an accord will be signed.

Iran has adopted a public diplomatic strategy intended to point a finger at the West, especially the United States, if a last-minute obstacle prevents the signing. The Iranian parliament has adopted a law requiring the government to safeguard Iran’s interests and rights in the nuclear realm, but it is in fact the U.S. Congress that will be judged by international public opinion and not Iran. That’s because of the option Congress gave itself to scrutinize the agreement and even reject it by legislation.

But even if Congress rejects the agreement and manages to overcome an expected presidential veto, there is no certainty that European countries, Russia and China will continue holding to the sanctions – certainly not after the United Nations passes a resolution to lift them. If things go that way, many of the U.S. sanctions will no longer have the significance relative to their power before the agreement."

Ends…

 

30 YEARS: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that, after three decades of trying, Iran is on the verge of achieving something that the West has – with varying degrees of seriousness – prevented it from getting: military nuclear capability.

"Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons for most of the last three decades. The quest began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, when the Islamic Republic's founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini famously 'drank the poisoned chalice' and accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 that put an end to that eight-year, blood-drenched war. Never again, Khomeini vowed, would Iran drink such poison, and the country’s race for nuclear arms – something that would have precluded the need for what Khomeini viewed as a capitulation – was on.

During the last nearly 30 years the world – with varying degrees of seriousness and intensity – has tried to block that path. For much of that time, the strategy was to kick the can down the road, delay the Iranians, place impediments in their way in the hope that in the interim something would happen: either there would be regime change in Iran, or the Iranian rulers - of their own accord or because of popular unrest - would come to realize that the price of a nuclear bomb was too high, and that if they wanted to save the country’s economy, they would have to scuttle the bomb.

So during this period computer viruses were sent to infect the Iranian computers, some Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers were assassinated or disappeared, and straw companies were set up around the world selling faulty material to the mullahs, so that when they spun their centrifuges, the centrifuges would blow up.

The accord on the verge of being agreed upon in Vienna, the one Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has railed against endlessly, buys the Iranians more time. Ten years of it. During this period the Iranians will be hard pressed to assemble a nuclear bomb. But then the sun will set on the agreement and all bets will be off. Then the Iranians, according to Israel’s reading of the deal, won't have to sneak around to put together a bomb, they will be able to do it in broad daylight.

And there is Israel’s problem. At a time when the Iranians came to the negotiations because their economy was being devastated, the world powers had the opportunity not to just kick the can down the road, but rather to kick it over the fence, deep, deep into one of the neighbor's bushes. Or, to use a boxing metaphor, two years ago the world powers had Iran on the ropes - its economic badly limping, oil prices falling, its legitimacy at a low point. But instead of ratcheting up the sanctions and delivering a knockout blow, the powers let Iran slither off the ropes to come back and fight another round.

And fight they did. As Iranian President Hassan Rowhani was reported to have said over the weekend, 'Twenty-two months of negotiation means we have managed to charm the world, and it’s an art.'

That was then. Now the reality has changed. Now what? The agreement has pretty much put an end to any option of a preemptive Israeli military strike. No one seriously believes Israel would launch a preemptive attack on Iran to push back the program after that country signed an agreement with the world powers, including the U.S.

It is also equally unrealistic to think Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – who has fought the Iranian nuclear program for years - will now suddenly roll over, play dead, and say, 'Ok, you win, I guess now we will have to accept it.' Netanyahu - who has charged that this is a 'very bad agreement and that what happened in Vienna was a foolish 'march of concessions' that amounted to a near total capitulation to Iran - will not now throw up his arms in surrender.

Rather, now his argument will move to Congress, the last place where changes in the accord might possibly still be made. If then ambassador Michael Oren - as he writes in his recent memoir - was given instructions to call congressmen and say 'Israel felt abandoned' after U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech in 2011 adopting an Israeli-Palestinian deal based on the 1967 lines with land swaps, then one can only imagine what Oren’s successor, Ron Dermer, will tell the congressmen when he calls about Iran.

And that type of campaigning in Congress against a policy that Obama sees as his foreign policy 'legacy,' and which U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry views as his possible Nobel Prize winning ticket, is not bound to win Netanyahu any points in the White House, where his credit is already depleted. The final year of the Obama-Netanyahu era, therefore, will most likely be much more fraught than even the fraught seven years that came before.

But Netanyahu will go ahead - feeling duty-bound as a son of the Jewish people so soon after the Holocaust and as the prime minister of the world’s only Jewish state - to do whatever he can to try and override the agreement. If not to stop it, at least change it so that when the history books are written, it will be noted that he – alone among the world's leaders – did whatever he could to keep one of the world's most extreme regimes from getting the world's most lethal weapon."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS: Murat Yetkin finds common ground between the two main political parties in centre-left Radikal: “The AKP [Justice and Development Party] and CHP [Republican People's Party] have strong bases on which to reach a compromise. Yes, both parties' popular bases do not like each other, and they react against one another. But the majority in both parties believe that Turkey needs a new and a democratic constitution. According to the polls, every three of four electors in Turkey want a new, civilian and democratic constitution.”

Mehmet Tezkan detects a divergence between the president and PM in centrist Milliyet: “The Palace’s [President Erdogan’s] advisors want elections and are pushing for that. This is because a coalition will undermine the powers of the presidency. The presidential office heads will sit doing nothing. The standing of the advisors will sink by 50 percent. According to the Palace’s calculations, if the AKP wins back the MPs that it narrowly lost in 18 provinces, it can come to power alone. In contrast, the PM’s [Davutoglu’s] advisors are pushing for a coalition. This is because if there is a coalition their word will be heeded. The Palace’s tutelage will be broken.”

Nuray Mert calls on the president and his supporters to be open about their final goal in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: “If the object is to establish an Islamic state, it is impossible to compromise with those who oppose such a system. But then the whole democratic regime must be rejected. According to this approach, elections as well as other democratic rules and institutions are invalid. Rather than saying this directly, it would be better to say what is meant by an ‘Islamic state' in an open manner and put it to the vote. That would be much fairer at least.”

Mustafa Unal argues that the president is an obstacle to a coalition in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: “Turkey needs a new government. But for some reason, the Palace and the AKP are playing for time. The coalition issue is becoming serious and the government talks will be delayed to the time after Bayram [Muslim 16-19July religious festival]. None of the parties is aching to get closer to the AKP. Everyone is being excessively careful. Neither the CHP [Republican People's Party] nor the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] want to enter a coalition with the AKP and the Palace together. An AKP, which is free from the tutelage of the Palace, can join either the CHP or the MHP.”

Ahmet Tasgetiren argues that the AKP has the upper hand in centre-right, pro-government Star: “At the moment, the opposition bloc cannot form a government. And a government cannot be formed without the AKP. Yes, the AKP cannot form a government alone unless it is a minority government, which will be very problematic and can only be ventured for early election. And no other party has the chance to form a minority government. The AKP’s hand is thus the strongest, no matter with whom it sits at the table.” 

 

SYRIA CRISIS:  Nihat Ali Ozcan calls for more stringent border controls in Milliyet: ‘Ankara has long been criticized for not being able to prevent the passage of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ into Syria. These criticisms have now decreased. Increased border controls have played a very significant role in this development. However, not only foreign fighters, but also Turkish citizens who are heading to Syria to fight must be stopped. As a matter of fact, political sense says that turning a blind eye to the passage of foreigners to Syria is a mistake, while the law says that sending fighters/soldiers to fight in foreign countries and groups is a crime.

Ufuk Ulutas notes a clash of agendas with Washington in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: ‘In short, opposition to the Islamist movements has been one of the main agendas of the U.S.'s Syria policy. And this has been a basic difference between the U.S. and Turkey. That is why Turkey must act with the awareness that in every attempt to coordinate with the U.S. over Syria, the two countries' agendas are different from each other.’

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

  

1- A welcome truce

 -Last of the stable republic 

3-A limited intervention

4-The West’s failure to understand ISIS

5-Taming Hamas

 

1- A welcome truce

 

The UN sponsored truce offers the best hopes for all parties to put a final end to the tragedy in Yemen, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The truce announced by UN Yemen Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad last night (Thursday) and that will last till the end of Ramadan, is in the interest of all parties, with the possible exception of certain terrorist groups and unruly tribes, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. Most importantly, it is also in Saudi Arabia's interest, given the vast price the kingdom' is paying in terms of its image, reputation, and finances.

 

RARE GOOD NEWS: "Good news are rare for Yemen these days, a country once known as Arabia Felix," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Friday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But the five-day truce announced by the UN last night may offer a ray of hope to over 25-million Yemenis, the overwhelming majority of whom are in need of vital humanitarian aid, according to the UN's assessments.

Since Operation Decisive Storm's air raids began more than one-hundred days ago and in which some 175 warplanes are officially taking part within the framework of a pro-forma ‘Arab coalition’ led by Saudi Arabia, the Yemenis have been facing extremely difficult conditions. There is no water, electricity, medicine, or food. Over and above all that, diseases and epidemics are spreading, especially, dengue fever that is stealing people’s lives due to the absence of the necessary medication and a deterioration in the level of the already miserable medical services.

The decision to accept the truce did not issue from [fugitive Saudi-based] President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. He is a mere front man. It came from the Saudi leadership in compliance with a demand from the UN and as a result of international and regional pressures. This is because the continued aimless bombardment is yielding the exact opposite results, and is having a negative impact on Saudi Arabia itself, its reputation, security, and stability.

These international pressures peaked after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon demanded an immediate ceasefire, and stressed that the number of deaths now stands at 2800, most of them civilians, while the number of wounded has reached around 13000.

UN Yemen Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad brought these figures together with a general international mood calling on the Saudi leadership in Riyadh to put an end to this war. The latter has realized that 'obstinacy' is futile and there is no alternative to a truce that alleviates the Yemenis' suffering over the last ten days of Ramadan as a prelude to [end of Ramadan feast] 'Id al-Fitr.

The truce is unconditional and unilateral. In other words, it was the Saudi side, which is largely in charge of the choice of war or peace that took the decision. But its success depends on all parties' commitment to it, especially the Houthi/Saleh coalition that has welcomed it.

Many parties in Yemen are beyond control, such as ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and various unruly tribal militias. It is in the interest of them all, collectively or separately for the bloody anarchy, security breakdown and absence of a central authority to continue.

The prevailing but mistaken impression before the first [Saudi] air raid and missile were launched, was that it would come without any cost and that if there were any dangers – as is normal in all wars – they would be minimal because of the imbalance of power between the two main parties, Saudi Arabia and the Houthi/Saleh coalition. But the hundred days of conflict have demonstrated how wrong that impression was. And this means that all parties now find themselves in a difficult predicament, facing a bottomless abyss.

The response to the [Saudi] carpet-bombing especially in the main Houthi-held provinces of Sa'da and 'Omran, took the form of a ground war of attrition along the Saudi/Yemeni borders. In this war, Katyusha, Scud, and modified Grad missiles were fired at southern Saudi cities such as Jizan and Najran, and other villages in the 'Assir area, killing, wounding and forcefully displacing their inhabitants, as well as shutting down schools and government departments.

The war also came at the wrong time, at least economically and financially, with the collapse in the price of oil to less than half its previous level. The price of one barrel has dropped from $118 to $46. In recent days, it has rallied a little reaching $64; but it may drop again if the ban on Iranian oil exports is lifted as a result of the awaited nuclear agreement.

The cost of the Saudi war on Yemen is very high in material, human, and security terms. Anyone claiming the contrary would be deluding themselves. For the Saudi budget deficit currently stands at over 20% of the GNP. The Kingdom’s national income is expected to reach 715-billion Riyals (around 191-billion dollars) with deficit of some 145-billion Riyals (around 39-billion dollars). The American economic agency Bloomberg has published a report saying that the Kingdom may be forced to issue local currency (riyal) bonds to cover this deficit by the end of the year.

Yet no one is speaking of the cost of the Saudi air raids on Yemen. Or, rather, it is forbidden to mention this issue. It is true that the Saudi defense budget stands at $57-billion, making it the fourth largest defense budget in the world; but the rise in the cost of war will swallow this budget up in just a few months' time. This is especially clear if we realize that the war had cost around $30-billion up to mid-April, and may have doubled by now.

We hope that the latest truce will stand its ground and will not be violated by any party. This is in everyone’s interest. The only exceptions are those who want the war to continue, together with the suffering of the poor and destitute, but proud, and dignified Yemeni nation.

It is the Yemenis' right to enjoy security and stability and to emerge from the difficult conditions they are currently facing with twenty-million of them on the threshold of starvation if not already in the midst of it, as UN Envoy Ould Cheikh Ahmad has said.

Yes, it is a truce for only five days; but it is capable of being extended for weeks, months, and perhaps years. And it can be exploited in the pursuit of serious negotiations with no preconditions in order to reach the hoped-for political solution that would take Yemen out of the crisis.

"We hope that our optimism is not misplaced," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

 

2-Last of the stable republics

 

After sectarian strife between Arabs and Amazigh, Algeria may be the last stable republic to succumb to the fires of the Arab Spring, says Nadia Shehadeh in today's Lebanese al-Bina'

 

This week’s ethnic/confessional disturbances in Ghardaia Province in Algeria pitting Maliki Sunni Arabs against Ibadi Amazigh (Berber) youths, threaten the unity and stability of the last Arab republic that has still not been shaken by the Arab Spring, maintains a commentator in a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. The question now is whether the Algerian authorities can prevent the country from descending into chaos that may lead to its partition.

 

THE TERRORISTS’ OPPORTUNITY: "It is now clear that the so-called 'Arab Spring' revolutions have provided the terrorist organizations with a full opportunity to rearrange their cards and pursue new strategies in the region," writes Nadia Shehadeh in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The targeted states have become important centers for all sorts of terrorist organizations. For after the fall of regimes and state establishments, especially their security institutions, the terrorist groups have proliferated and have sought to implement externally driven agendas. These groups have been deploying every available means in pursuit of this aim, including the confessional and sectarian sedition that was ignited in our Arab world in order to strike at the security and stability of these states and their neighboring countries.

The security incidents that we are witnessing in Northern Africa– from Mali to Libya to Tunisia – are in fact no more than a prelude to striking the national state in Algeria. For the Arab Spring did not reach or set this country alight. But there are many signs that igniting the fire in Algeria is imminent, beginning with a sedition that may lead to civil war.

The security incidents in the cities of Bryan and al-Qarara in Ghardaia Province in southern Algeria, took a sectarian character between Arab and Amazigh citizens. According to security sources, 25 people were killed in and more than 50 were wounded, amidst violence, sabotage, and the burning of shops and homes.

Observers stress that these incidents, that broke out early this week, are the worst for years in this disturbed area in which tensions have been escalating between the Arab Chaanba of the Maliki Muslim school, and the Berbers of M'zab who are Amazigh and belong to the Ibadi school of Islam in North Africa.

These incidents were not the first of their kind. Sectarian confrontations in Ghardaia began in December 2008. Confrontations were renewed in April 2009, and were then seen as the most violent and serious incidents that Algeria has witnessed between Arabs and Amazigh. They resulted in two deaths and over 25 wounded, in the first confrontations of an ethnic and confessional character that the country witnessed since independence.

Since December 2013, Gharadaia Province has been the scene of intermittent acts of sectarian violence between Maliki Arabs and Ibadi Amazigh, resulting in tens of killed and hundreds wounded, and the widespread destruction of private property. These confrontations have taken on the form of repeated skirmishes between youths before expanding into wide scale acts of violence. The authorities have failed to stop the sectarian confrontations despite the presence of over 8000 policemen in the province whose total inhabitants number no more than 380,000, and despite repeated visits by officials to the area.

But the acts of violence that have escalated recently have raised the specter that Algeria is being dragged towards anarchy and sectarian war, something that the majority of imams in Ghardaia Province reject and see as their main job to prevent. But the fact that there have been victims on both sides has complicated their mission and has left the situation more dangerous than before.

What we are witnessing are not mere street confrontations, but terrorism. For this reason, Algerian President 'Abdelaziz Bouteflika appointed a military commander on Wednesday to restore security to the province for fear that the situation may lead to a scenario whereby Algeria would be divided along confessional and sectarian lines. In this regard, the president had earlier warned the Arabs and Muslims against conspiracies that aim to fan sectarian and confessional flames and sow focal points of confessional tension in the region.

Terrorist incidents have recently begun to appear in North Africa. The old sedition in Ghardaia Province has been revived. The head of the Movement of Society for Peace, 'Abderrazzaq Maqari, has warned of the effect that the civil strife in the province’s cities may have on the country's stability and unity, urging the authorities to intervene urgently so as to put an end to the acts of sectarian violence. Meanwhile, dignitaries from both communities are urging the Algerian authorities to act in order to extinguish the fire of sedition and sectarian conflict, promote reconciliation, and consolidate the culture of peaceful coexistence. They have been warning against the threat that these conflicts pose to social unity, as well as against the danger that foreign parties may exploit such incidents and confessional divisions to harm Algeria.

"All of which leads us to the question: What awaits Algeria, the last of stable republics in the region?" asks Shehadeh in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-A limited intervention

 

Ankara is unlikely to go beyond a certain point in seeking to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish entity on its southern borders says Hussein 'Abdelaziz in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Turkey is most likely to refrain from any large-scale military intervention in Syria, even though it is determined to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish entity along its southern borders, suggests an Arab commentator in a Saudi-owned daily. Any Turkish intervention is likely to be limited and confined to specific locations that would prevent the emergence of geographically contiguous Kurdish entity.

 

BROAD DEBATE: "Ankara is witnessing a broad debate over the military operation that the Turkish government plans to carry out in northern Syrian so as to prevent the establishment of a strong and independent Kurdish entity along its southern border, as happened with Kurdistan Province in Iraq," writes Hussein 'Abdelaziz in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

Ankara was unable to affect the situation in northern Iraq at the time because of the different geographical situation and the strength of the American presence there. Today, however, can intervene and alter the situation in Syria, now that the Kurds have become a clear force in the Syrian north after taking control of Tal Abyad, which constitutes a bridge between 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in the Syrian northeast and 'Afrin in the Syrian northwest.

Turkey's supreme national fears stem from the fact that, if this entity stabilizes in northern Syria, it may offer strategic depth to the Kurds in southern Turkey. In that case, it would become the reservoir for human and military supplies for any future moves by Turkey's Kurds. This is especially likely if we take into account the fact that the Kurdish project in Syria is being pursued under the supervision of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) the Syrian branch of the [Turkish] Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

In light of this, Ankara will not accept the establishment of such an entity, which may be acceptable to both Washington and Damascus. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated this openly when he emphasized that his country would never permit the establishment of a Kurdish state.

But a Turkish military operation is no easy matter. It requires significant military capabilities on grounds that are disputed by conflicting military forces and numerous regional and international interventions. Turkey’s military intervention could therefore turn into a nightmare that sucks Turkey into the Syrian quagmire. It may find itself in a confrontation, not only with regional parties, but with international allies such as the U.S. whose political agenda in Syria is totally different from the Turkish agenda. PM Ahmet Davutoglu expressed this complex situation a few days ago when he said that his government would not implicate Turkey in an uncalculated risky adventure.

The U.S.'s primary aim is to fight ISIS, with all the alliances this has required that conflict with those of its traditional allies in the region, such as Ankara and Riyadh. For this reason, Washington has recently provided the PYD with notable military support. This has emerged clearly from the nature of the international [anti-ISIS] coalition’s air raids. Statistics show that around 1200 out of 1800 raids over the past ten months have served the PYD to enable it on the ground. It is as if Washington is punishing Ankara for its refusal to join the coalition.

In light of this, any military operation against the Kurds or one that aims at establishing a buffer zone may have a negative impact on the fight against ISIS. It would place Ankara in direct confrontation with Washington. The statement by the U.S. secretary of state that Washington has no evidence of Turkey's intention to establish a buffer zone may best be understood as an expression of American opposition to the establishment of such a zone, rather than a rejection of military intervention as a matter of principle.

Washington may in fact accept a Turkish military intervention in northern Syria and blocking the establishment of a Kurdish entity provided that would ultimately serve the international coalition's aim of fighting ISIS. This could occur once Washington comes to the conviction that winning the battle against ISIS cannot be achieved without a ground military intervention by Turkey, or without permission for international ground forces to act from Turkish territories.

But the problem stems from the fact that Ankara is not interested in opening two fronts in Syria – with the Kurds on the one hand, and ISIS on the other. Such a battle would be extremely costly. And this is to say nothing of the Syrian regime's exploitation of this intervention to fire its missiles against the Turkish army in an attempt to reshuffle the cards.

For this reason, the situation seems to be heading towards a limited Turkish military intervention that achieves its intended aims without becoming involved in large-scale battles in Syria for the following reasons:

- A military intervention within a limited geographical area would allow Ankara to establish small Turkish military zones that separate the constituent areas of the Kurdish entity from each other. It would also prevent a direct and open confrontation with the Kurds. The city of Jarablus and the area of 'Afrin are the two best venues for such intervention.

- Such limited intervention would not anger the Kurds in Turkey; nor would it threaten the peace process between the Turkish state and the Kurds, now that the latter have become a political force as manifest by the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) performance in the recent June elections.

- Such intervention would forestall the Turkish military establishment's refusal to become directly involved in the Syrian conflict without international cover from the UN or NATO. This is what the Turkish Chief of Joint Staffs General Necdet Ozal has demanded.

-Turkey’s opposition parties, such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) are against Turkish intervention, especially since this will take place during the consultations to form a coalition government, which could have a negative effect on them. Moreover, any operation of this nature would conflict with the political protocol that prevents any strategic steps from being taken during the term of a caretaker government.

- The chances of success for such a limited military operation would be high. Therefore, all Turks apart from the Kurdish constituent would back it.

"In that case, it could be exploited electorally if the Justice and Development Party (AKP) decides to head to early elections," concludes 'Abdelaziz.

Ends…

 

 

4-The West’s failure to understand ISIS

 

The West continues to misunderstand the origins and character of ISIS, as well as the best means to defeat it, says Mohammad 'Akif Jamal in today's Emirates’ al-Bayan

 

The West has failed to address the phenomenon of ISIS in a manner that deals with this organization effectively and that can win the war against it, maintains an Iraqi commentator in a Gulf daily. For one thing, it has failed to take into account the difference between the conditions in which ISIS emerged from those in which al-Qa’ida flourished, continuing to deal with the former in the same manner as it has dealt with the latter.

 

ROAMING FREE: "After ISIS has succeeded in establishing itself firmly in Iraq, Syria, then in Libya, it has begun to roam freely, sowing death in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's mosques, Tunisian tourist resorts, and the French city of Lyon, and then moved on to fight a war against the Egyptian army in northern Sinai," writes Mohammad 'Akif Jamal in Friday's UAE daily al-Bayan.

It is also not unlikely to declare its presence in some other places in the future. For it seems that nowhere is truly immune against hosting this organization.

Although the media has reported all the above mentioned attacks under the rubric of 'ISIS', some of these acts may not in fact be the work of the organization itself, but of parties that temporarily hide under ISIS's mantle for their own security reasons.

This series of terrorist attacks has elicited immediate reactions whose character is closer to that of propaganda or posturing. The Arab League and Arab Parliament have both held urgent meetings to study the repercussions of these terrorist attacks, and Tunisia has declared a state of emergency. The alarm bells have been sounded, yet terrorist attacks around the world have witnessed a steady and notable rise with the expansion of ISIS's attacks in Iraq and Syria.

But it is impossible to understand the motives behind these terrorist attacks and the other inevitable ones in the coming days, in isolation of the ongoing cultural conflict around the entire world. On the other hand, these motives cannot be isolated from the social, economic, and political conditions in the societies where ISIS is nesting.

It is true that ISIS's attacks can occur in numerous areas but their true homeland is the Arab world. The founders of this organization and most of its members come from Arab countries; and its main arenas are in these countries, so much so, that this phase has come to represent a phase of conflict with these terrorist organizations within the Arab world.

There are difficulties reading the ISIS file in a realistic manner or in predicting the course of the war against it because the group's birth and rapid rise allow numerous states in the region, which are riddled with sectarian sedition, to exploit its attacks for their own purposes.

The war on ISIS and on the terrorist groups in general will not be short; nor will it be decided by military means alone. There is need for international and regional political means for dealing with this problem. At the international level, and despite their importance, Russia and China are still far from being preoccupied with this issue. At the regional level, there are some states which, given their current leaders or the policies they are pursuing, cannot be in intellectual, political and military harmony with the international community in the war on these terrorist groups.

The Western circles specializing in this issue have been accustomed to deeming the terrorist phenomenon as the work of jihadi organizations that share a single ideological outlook. This is why they have dealt with these organizations as they have previously dealt with al-Qa’ida, without taking into consideration the differences in thought and practice or in the political circumstances from which the two groups [al-Qa’ida and ISIS] have emerged. In fact, ISIS has displaced al-Qa’ida from people's minds, having gone far beyond the latter in its actions.

Some commentators admit that the West has been unable to defeat this organization's ideas so far, and that it may be simply unable to understand them. For this organization can still attract certain sectors of Western society to its ranks. According to last February’s testimony by the Director of the American National Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen before the U.S. House of Representatives' National Security Committee, more than 20 thousand armed elements from 90 countries have actually joined such organizations.

Perhaps one of the most important mistakes committed by specialists in dealing with terrorism is to deem ISIS as no more than a collection of psychologically disturbed individuals who find in rebellion against the existing regimes and perpetration of the strangest and most savage acts of killing a means of easing the tension in their pathological personalities. But these specialists have failed to scrutinize the intellectual roots that have led this organization to adopt the denunciation of everyone else as a kafir as its creed, and to espouse unprecedented forms of terrorism as its tools.

Moreover, these specialists have not paid sufficient heed to this organization’s mode of operations that make it attractive to certain sectors of Western society. The war that the international coalition has been waging on ISIS in Iraq so far has been confined to targeting the group’s leaders based on precise intelligence effort, and to hemorrhaging its strength by means of a modest number of air raids. But there are no gains on the ground that are commensurate with the size of a coalition that includes sixty states.

"Finally, the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism in the Arab world has exposed the absence of specialized non-government centers devoted to strategic studies, and that can play an important role in drafting policies or adjusting their course," concludes Jamal.

Ends…

 

 

5-Taming Hamas

 

Israel is seeking to break Hamas’s will by offering to alleviate Gaza’s economic plight in return for an extended truce, says Randa Haidar in today’s Lebanese an-Nahar

 

One year after the end of Operation Protective Edge, Israel continues to raise obstacles to the reconstruction of Gaza and persists with its blockade on the Strip, notes a Lebanese commentator on Palestinian affairs. The aim is to domesticate the Gazans and tame Hamas, forcing it into secret negotiations that would produce a long-term truce.

 

THIRD WAR IN NINE YEARS: "At around this time one year ago, Israel launched a new military operation against the Gaza Strip that lasted for 50 days during which the Palestinians suffered the hell of war for the third time in nine years since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Strip," notes Randa Haidar in Friday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

More than 2000 Palestinians were killed, most of them civilians, including a large number of children, while thousands of others were wounded, and tens of thousands were displaced because their homes were turned into ruins.

Exactly a year afterwards, the scene in Gaza's streets has not changed. On the contrary, despair and frustration have intensified, and the people's economic and human hardships have worsened, all in the shadow of an ongoing blockade imposed on the Strip by both Israel and Egypt.

Gaza's 1.8-million inhabitants are living in a large prison. All the doors have been slammed shut in their faces. Students are forbidden from leaving the Strip to pursue their studies abroad. The sick are unable to receive treatment. The level of unemployment stands at 50%. The inhabitants of the homes destroyed by last summer's war are still living amid the ruins. And the monies promised by the donor states are only arriving in dribs and drabs.

It seems clear today that Israel's determined efforts to obstruct Gaza's reconstruction and the return of normal life to the Strip are primarily intended to exploit the results of its latest destructive war in order to break Hamas’ will, as it has done to the PA. Israel’s blackmail of Hamas by tightening the noose around civilian necks and transforming their lives into a living hell are clearly designed to drive Hamas into secretly negotiating with it and agreeing to a long-term truce, in return for economic returns and the facilitation of daily life.

It is worth noting in this regard that it is the Israeli army in particular (the very same force that destroyed Gaza and killed its people last July) that is today advising its government to alleviate the Gazans' humanitarian suffering and is encouraging secret negotiations with Hamas so as to safeguard what the army refers to as the 'achievements' of Operation Protective Edge.

The policy that Israel is pursuing towards Hamas is very similar to that that it previously pursued against the inhabitants of the West Bank after the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield that aimed at suppressing the second Palestinian intifada. That operation had a destructive impact on West Bank society and destroyed the possibility of a new intifada there, opening the door to security understandings between the PA and Israel and ongoing security cooperation between them.

The policy of destruction and excessive use of military force against the Palestinians is part of what the Israelis refer to as 'searing the Palestinians' consciousness' – that is to say, breaking the civilian populations’ will and deterring them from any peaceful or armed popular protest.

"Will Israel succeed in domesticating the Gazans and taming Hamas?" asks Haidar in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

For how long?

 

The lead story in all Israeli newspapers this weekend is the case of Avera Mengistu, who has been missing in the Gaza Strip for the past 10 months. After a long legal battle by Haaretz, a court-imposed gag order on the case was lifted on Thursday morning, unleashing a tidal wave of reporting, commentary, speculation and conjecture over Mengistu's fate, the government's handling of his disappearance and what it is currently doing to secure his release.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon disclosed in a statement that, in a separate incident, a Bedouin citizen from the Negev is also in Gaza. His name, however, is being withheld, despite the fact that foreign news sources have identified him.

On the sidelines of this story there were several ugly subplots: the suggestion in some quarters (including, bizarrely, on Hamas' official Twitter feed) that the government would have handled the case very differently if Mengistu was not an Israeli-Ethiopian; and the not-so-veiled threat by the Israeli official in charge of missing citizens against the Mengistu family, warning them not to publically criticize the government.

Even after the gag order was lifted, however, many questions remain unanswered. Hamas claims that Mengistu had been in its custody, but that he was interrogated and released. The Israeli defense establishment rejects this claim as an attempt by Hamas to dodge responsibility for the man's welfare. An Israeli security source said the Hamas claim is either an attempt to negotiate for the release of prisoners, or an attempt to cover up an incident that may have endangered Mengistu's life. 'Although we have no sign of life, the working assumption is that the man is alive,' the source said.

Since Mengistu crossed into Gaza in September 2014, the Israeli defense establishment has carried out numerous efforts to secure his release, all of which have failed. He was never drafted into the IDF due to medical reasons. Senior defense officials have met with the man's family and his relatives have visited the IDF's Gaza Division where they received the missing man's bag. According to the security source, Mengistu crossed Gaza close to the coast. During his crossing, he ignored calls from soldiers to turn back.

According to the newspapers, Israel has reached out to regional and international bodies in order to gather more information on Mengistu's condition and has demanded his immediate release stating that it will continue all efforts to end this situation and return its citizen back to Israel.

Meanwhile, a senior Hamas official said on Wednesday that Israel had begun back channel negotiations to return the bodies of the two soldiers who were killed in last summer's Gaza war. 'The European mediator sent a message from the government of Israel, who wants to open a channel of communication to bring back the bodies of its soldiers held by Hamas since the last war in Gaza,' the official said. The source added that Hamas refuses to discuss this issue until Israel releases all the detainees who were traded for Gilad Shalit and were rearrested last summer after the murder of three Israeli teenagers near Hebron.

The other major story in the papers focuses on the nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers, which, according to reports from Vienna, appear no closer to a deal. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that the countries with which Iran is negotiating are changing their conditions. He said that the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany are internally split and accused them of using pressure tactics — which, he says, will not lead to a deal. Zarif's comments followed a U.S. warning that Washington is ready to walk away from the talks. The current round is now in its 14th day. The sides have given themselves until Friday to come to an agreement after twice missing previous target dates.

Finally, Interior Minister Silvan Shalom, who was appointed by Netanyahu to be in charge of peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, on Thursday called for the resumption of peace talks. Speaking at a conference of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Shalom said that 'it takes two to tango' and that the PA needs to also show willingness to resume talks. 'We need to resume the negotiations with the Palestinians, even though we don’t see the light at the end of the tunnel,' he said, adding that Israel has publicly announced that it wants to resume the negotiations immediately but that 'desire from both sides' is required to do so.

Shalom addressed in his remarks an initiative by France to coax the sides back to the negotiations, saying it has not received the backing of both sides. 'There is currently a French initiative, which has received a cold shoulder from both parties and there are contacts, but all of those have not yet turned into negotiations,' he said.

 

A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman says that, in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the West, Israel is concerned that other countries in the region will pursue similar capabilities – and that Iran's behavior will change once it has a nuclear umbrella.

"Among the issues that the Israeli defense establishment is addressing, as it prepares for the possibility that Iran and the six world powers reach an agreement, is the potential nuclear arms race that a deal would spark. Jerusalem views this as a potential medium- and long-term threat. There is a very real danger, from an Israeli perspective, that countries like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will pursue nuclear knowhow, in light of the permission that would be granted to Iran to become a nation on the verge of nuclear capability.

There are a lot of myths surrounding this issue, such as the possibility that Saudi Arabia could purchase a ready-made nuclear bomb from Pakistan. The Saudis decided to build 18 nuclear reactors for electricity long before the crisis with Iran. If the Saudis wanted to, they could buy a bomb at the drop of a hat. As for Egypt, it's hard to envisage President Abdelfattah el-Sissi approving funding for a nuclear program when his country doesn't have the money to feed its own citizens. In addition, it would lose American military aid if it started to pursue nuclear weapons. The possibility that Jordan could go nuclear is a particularly interesting joke. The question that remains unanswered is what Turkey will do. In any case, Israel needs to deal with the possibility that its purported nuclear exclusivity in the Middle East could be about to end.

Another issue that is being discussed in the Israeli defense establishment is how Iran would behave if it were to have the protection afforded by a nuclear umbrella. It's doubtful that the rules of the game in Lebanon or the Golan Heights would change if Iran had a nuclear umbrella, but the fact that Tehran has access to nuclear weapons would deter any other country from attacking it.

There are several factors which could mitigate the negative impact of an Iranian nuclear deal on the region. There is the possibility that Iran, which has economic and commercial ties in every part of the world, would see a massive increase in investment by foreign governments and companies, as well as the reopening of embassies and a mass influx of foreigners, would start to act a lot more cautiously than a country which is seen as a pariah state.

Another potentially stabilizing factor is the fact that Israel could forge some kind of informal alliance with other countries in the region to fight a common enemy. If you were to ask the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence services to list the main threats to his country, you would see a lot of the same names that would appear on a list drawn up by his Israeli counterpart. Nonetheless, the Saudis have made it clear to Israel – in closed-door and secret discussions – that it will be very hard to openly and fully exploit these shared interests as long as Israel shows no interest whatsoever in renewing its dialogue with the Palestinians or to recognize the Saudi peace initiative.

Given the very real possibility that the government is about to cut defense spending, IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot plans to find out whether he can transfer funds from the state's massive spending on countering the Iranian nuclear threat to other sections of the army or, at least, to spread them out over several years. In the first few years after an agreement with Iran is signed, it doesn't make sense to touch that funding: Israel does not believe that Iran will live up to its commitments and its ability to attack Iranian nuclear facilities could well be put to the test in the next decade."

Ends…

 

THE JOKE'S ON US: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that the Vienna negotiations between Iran and the six world powers have become a joke – at Israel's expense.

"If the joke was not at our expense, it might even be funny: all of the parties involved in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West want an agreement, but none of them know how to sell it to their respective publics – for the simple reason that it's a bad deal.

The nuclear negotiations with Iran – which are now in their 13th year – deteriorated yesterday into something beyond a farce. After three extensions, the sides have decided to extend the talks a fourth time. What a pity that there isn't a penalty shoot-out to end this whole affair; this would put the poor journalists who have been holed up in Vienna out of their misery and would come as a blessed relief for the tortured and exhausted negotiators. Nobody is keen for the talks to be euthanized. Therefore, there will be a deal at any price. But the Iranians just love giving the international community a hard time.

The American media is now at the stage when its reports from Vienna focus on the amount of junk food being consumed by members of the U.S. delegation. We are more worried about a nuclear-armed Iran. Either way, it's dangerous to be exposed to the nuclear negotiations.

It has been said many times on these pages that the ball is in Iran's court. Yesterday we got further proof of the veracity of this statement. While representatives of the world powers were talking in terms of progress, and Russia's foreign minister even said that an agreement could be reached 'within hours' and commentators were explaining how the Americans want a deal to be finalized before Congress' summer recess (which starts this morning), the Iranians were going round telling anybody who would listen that the talks would likely be extended by three more days, until July 13.

Who's right? The Iranians are dictating the terms of these talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif revealed that he has no problem extending the negotiations for as long as it takes. Let's just hope that he is struck down with a terrible case of homesickness.

During the course of these negotiations, the Iranians have unveiled an upgraded and improved version of the Persian bazaar. Usually, it's the vendor who meets the purchaser halfway by lowering his price. In Vienna, the vendor has already gotten almost everything that he demanded. Now all that remains is to dig in his heels a little more, to refuse to compromise in any way, shape or form – and to return to Tehran with as many Western concessions as possible. The Iranians want to limit to a minimum the 'military dimension of the program.' They're practically saints.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said yesterday that the talks would not continue ad infinitum, but he also explained that the sides would not simply get up and leave the moment the clock shows midnight. In business school, they teach you that the most important part of negotiations is knowing when to walk away. I get the impression that the Iranians think Kerry never went to business school."

Ends…

 

WHAT IS HAMAS HIDING? Writing in Maariv, Alon Ben David says that Israel insists that Hamas frees Avera Mengistu as a humanitarian gesture, but is concerned that he is no longer alive.

"The working assumption is that Avera Mengistu is alive and that he is being held by Hamas. This is the assumption that must guide the government's efforts to secure his release. But Israel is worried that something happened to Mengistu while he was being detained by the organization's security personnel. There is something about Hamas' behavior – denying that Mengistu is being held by them – that raises grave concerns over the fate of the 28-year-old Ethiopian-Israeli.

Hamas is not an organization that tends to deny holding what it sees as an asset – a live Jewish citizen of Israel. Therefore, when Hamas claims that Mengistu was released and has disappeared or that he crossed the border into Egypt, this leads Israel to think that he may have been wounded or worse during his apprehension and that Hamas is now trying to cover this up.

After Mengistu crossed the border into Gaza for the last time, contact with Hamas began via the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. The hope was that Hamas would see him as a humanitarian case and would return him to Israel. The government also exerted pressure on the Hamas leadership, refusing its request for humanitarian assistance for senior officials and their families.

When a Bedouin citizen of Israel also crossed the border into Gaza, Hamas started to demand the release of prisoners in exchange for the return of the two Israelis. Israel insists that, since the two missing men are not healthy, there will be no prisoner exchange deal for their return. Israel also rejected Hamas demand that negotiations also include the terms for the return of two IDF soldiers killed during Operation Protective Edge, whose bodies it is holding.

Therefore, there are currently no negotiations with Hamas. Israel is sticking to its demand that Mengistu and the unnamed Bedouin citizen be released as a humanitarian gesture and not as part of an exchange deal. The Bedouin is alive and held by Hamas; Israel can only hope that the same is true of Avera Mengistu."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU AND CHURCHILL: Writing on the Walla! website, former Netanyahu aide Yossi Levy says that, unlike his role model Winston Churchill, the Israeli prime minister has not translated his accurate warnings about the Iranian nuclear threat into action.

"When it comes to the Iranian nuclear threat, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu believes and means everything he says. The roots of this can be found in the education he received from his late father, the noted historian Professor Ben-Zion Netanyahu. The prime minister inherited from his father a deep sense of concern about the dangers posed to the Jewish people and the historical events that have forged the collective consciousness and, to a large extent, have created the image of the Jewish people in the modern era. Long before he was elected prime minister, Netanyahu held profound conversations with his father on this very issue. And there's no question that the Holocaust is the most formative and influential event for our prime minister.

Netanyahu is utterly convinced that the ayatollah regime in Iran is the modern-day equivalent of the Nazis and that, if Tehran were to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, it would pose a direct and strategic threat to the State of Israel. The Iranians, for their part, have done everything in their power to prove that Netanyahu's concerns have a solid basis; they have not even bothered to conceal the fact that they want to wipe Israel off the map.

Netanyahu knows that the Iranians have not become more moderate. They have merely become more sophisticated and cunning. The Iranian wolf – in the form of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his cronies – has disguised itself as a kindly old grandmother, speaking flawless English. Nazi Germany also boasted many educated intellectuals, writers, doctors, scientists, musicians and artists. Of the 12 leaders of the Nazi Party, no fewer than seven held PhDs. History has taught us that there is no connection between education or culture and unspeakable cruelty. In fact, they often go hand in hand.

It is not by chance that, on Holocaust Memorial Day, Netanyahu always draws a comparison between Hitler and the ayatollahs. The prime minister's view is true and accurate, so he feels he has to shout it from the rooftops. And what about the Western powers? They are somnambulant, hesitant, dragging their feet and screwing things up. In the absence of a stick – the use of military action – all they have to offer is a carrot, which the Iranians are gobbling up like a starving rabbit.

In 2015, the United Kingdom is about as far away from the spirit of Winston Churchill as Manchester is from Bushehr. Cameron is preoccupied with improving the terms of his country's membership in the European Union. The Chinese are sitting on the sidelines drinking tea – and making sure they don't do anything to anger the Russian bear. The Germans are businesslike and reserved. The Russians are behaving like Iran's allies. Only the French are showing any kind of fight and determination which, of course, they sorely lacked in darker times.

And what about the Americans? Well, that's the $64,000 question. The United States and its president are at the epicenter of this crisis and, in the background, it is impossible to ignore the tensions between Barack Obama and Netanyahu. Over the past few years, the Prime Minister's Residence in Jerusalem has become, according to the White House, a republican stronghold. In the summer of 2010, Netanyahu and his then defense minister, Ehud Barak, were on the verge of launching military action against Iran. The prevalent view is that this was not just for show, since billions of shekels were invested in the necessary procurement. Gabi Ashkenazi, Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin were all up in arms over the government's plan – as if Netanyahu and Barak were a couple of cocksure kids who needed to be supervised by three adults.

There are many impediments to an Israeli military strike against Iran. How would the Iranians respond? How would the United States respond? How would the international community react? And how can Israel even attack a large number of nuclear facilities which are spread out over such a large country? At the same time, there is also the spike in tensions between the two leaders. There are those who claim that the main reason for these tensions is the fact that there are no ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and Obama's opposition to settlement construction. The lack of chemistry between the two leaders certainly doesn't help. When the military censor clears Barak's memoirs for publication, they will doubtless shed some light on the issue.

Throughout 2011, relations between Netanyahu and Obama continued to decline. Some people suggested to Netanyahu that, ahead of a presidential election in the United States, Obama would be much easier to manipulate, since he wouldn't dare to mess with Jewish voters.

According to security experts, 2012 was the year that Iran entered the immunity zone – especially in terms of its Fordow facility, which is located deep within a mountain. At the same time, Obama was reelected. Since then, relations have had high points and low points. Who has been fooling whom on the Iranian issue? Leon Panetta believed that Netanyahu and Barak were serious about attacking Iran and he begged them not to.

In the summer of 2012, Obama sent then-National Security Advisor Tom Donilon to Israel, in the hope that he would be able to work out what Israel's real intentions were. Donilon stressed the United States' unwavering commitment to Israel's security. In exchange, he asked for an Israeli commitment not to attack Iran until after the election in November of that year.

It is generally thought that the current bad blood between Netanyahu and Obama is just a preview of the huge confrontation that will take place in the media when the Vienna nuclear deal is brought before Congress.

Netanyahu has spent many days and nights dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat, which he sees as the most important issue facing his country. A nuclear-armed Iran would cast its shadow over Israel; countries like Syria and Lebanon, along with terrorist organizations like Hizbollah and Hamas, would feel much safer under the Iranian nuclear umbrella. It would even have an impact on the Israeli economy and the number of Jews from abroad choosing to immigrate here.

It is thanks to Netanyahu that the Iranian nuclear threat is even on the international agenda. That is not an insignificant achievement. Having said that, 2015 is just around the corner and Netanyahu – as he accurately predicted – will be left to fight this battle alone. He may well sit back this weekend and light a cigar – perhaps to get inspiration from Churchill, whom he sees as a role model and whom he hopes to emulate. Indeed, both Netanyahu and Churchill have the ability to see what the future holds, to recognize the real monster and to warn of threats in plenty of time. They are both great orators who fill their audience with inspiration. There's only one different between them so far: Churchill knew how to turn his concerns into actions."

Ends…

 

A DIPLOMATIC CIRCUS: Writing in Haaretz, Anshel Pfeffer says that the American delegates in Vienna believe that they cannot leave the nuclear talks without a deal.

"In a few years, one of the senior diplomats taking part in the nuclear talks between the powers and Iran will write a memoir recounting the discussions in various luxury hotels across three continents. The book will presumably not become a best seller. Apart from students of international relations, who will be obliged to read the history of the endless negotiations, few will survive it.

As far as the men and women who have devoted more than two years to the process are concerned, spending days and nights in rooms with chandeliers, crème colored walls and heavy red curtains, they are busy making history. If they succeed, they will save the world, or at least their generation. If they fail, it will be no less than a 'disaster,' as an American diplomat said on Tuesday.

Swollen with self-importance, the U.S. delegation members have been amusing themselves imagining which Hollywood stars would play them in a movie based on the talks. But Hollywood producers aren't stupid. None of them would invest money into a production before it is clear how the story ends.

The important thing is not whether the agreement is signed and approved by the U.S. Senate, but whether it achieves the Americans' desired outcomes: curbing Iran's nuclear aspirations and turning it into a trustworthy partner in the war against ISIS (Islamic State) and other radical organizations in the Middle East.

These diplomats will wait to see if Barack Obama's farewell speeches from the White House in 18 months are all about his major legacy in foreign affairs – ending the 36-year confrontation between the U.S. and Iran – or whether they'll instead focus on domestic policy achievements. Then they'll wait to see if the relations with Iran will continue to improve in the next administration as well.

Meanwhile, Obama's envoys in Vienna this week didn't wait for Hollywood's script writers – they were busy writing the script of the day after themselves, while dealing with the last stages of negotiations. They see their personal involvement in the process as career-defining. More importantly, they know that after the signing ceremony at the conclusion of the Vienna talks, if there is one, they still have a difficult battle in the Republican-controlled Senate ahead of them. A majority of senators are expected to blast the deal.

While none of the U.S. diplomats in Vienna relishes the ugly confrontation awaiting them, they will probably make it through the ordeal, even if Obama has to use his presidential veto. The prevailing assumption is that they cannot go home without an agreement. The administration has devoted too much time, effort and prestige to the project. Like the big banks, the Iranian deal is too big to fail.

In the few times he has appeared in public over the last few days, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wore a long suffering, severe expression, and spoke about the many hardships on the way. When Kerry came out to make a short statement to the press on Sunday, he set the tone by saying 'now is the time to strike a deal with Iran' and 'President Obama has always said we're prepared to walk away' – as though at that stage abandoning the deal was an option. Kerry did not orchestrate such a diplomatic circus, which may be nearing its closing act, for two years just to walk away.

The White House helped to build the setting when at dawn on Wednesday, Kerry announced that President Obama had spoken to him and to U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz from the situation room, and given them final instructions ahead of reaching a deal 'in keeping with our demands.' As though up until then they weren't in daily contact.

The photograph provided showed the president sitting in the commander's chair at the head of the table with a room full of serious people. It could not have conveyed more authority and splendor. The stage setting was so meticulous that even the video-conference screen in the background, showing Kerry and Moniz' grim faces, had the blue-gold State Department flag on it. That's how you write history and prepare for the Senate debates simultaneously.

Despite the descriptions of the dozens of kilograms of junk food the delegation members ate when they couldn't go out, as well as the early morning jogs along Vienna's Ringstrasse to relieve the tension, the delegates didn't appear eager to return to Washington. In Vienna, they meet their diplomatic partners, perhaps bargain with them over bothersome clauses, but at least they share a common cause. In D.C., the wolves are waiting. Even when the heat in Vienna rose to 35 degrees Celsius in a rare heat wave, the Austrian capital welcomed them.

The Iranian delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, also made considerable efforts in preparing for the day after the deal. The equivalent discussion on the agreement to be held in the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, will be mainly ceremonial. But the big battle there will be in the regime's real power strongholds between the conservatives, who are suspicious of President Rouhani's attempts to approach the West, and the so-called moderates, who believe Iran can open to the world and remain loyal to the Islamic revolution.

The two sides will continue to compete for the heart of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is suffering from cancer. Meanwhile, on Friday in Tehran, 'moderates' and 'conservatives' will have to march together in Quds Day parades. International Quds Day (Jerusalem Day is an annual event held on the last Friday of Ramadan, initiated by the Islamic Republic of Iran to express solidarity with the Palestinian people and oppose Zionism and Israel's existence. If a nuclear deal is indeed reached on Friday, the myriads calling 'death to Israel' will provide a perfect setting for their ideological loyalty.

Unlike the Americans, who made few statements during the week and tried to lower expectations, the Iranian diplomats gave daily interviews to their state television. They said in turn that due to their adamant, uncompromising stance they are on the brink of an historic agreement under which all Iran's demands will be met and all the vile sanctions will be lifted. While Western diplomats listed unresolved issues, the Iranians said the agreement was already inked.

A large number of Iranian reporters came to Vienna, some as part of the delegation and some exiles. They all support the deal, whether they are for or against the regime. Each reporter represents a different news medium with a different take on internal politics and the Iranian diaspora. The Iranian delegation kept providing them with information, or disinformation, according to each medium's editorial and ideological position."

Ends…

 

SHAM SMILES ALL AROUND: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, David M. Weinberg takes U.S. President Barack Obama to task for consciously 'decoupling' Iran's support for terrorism and its human rights record from the talks over its nuclear program.

"With four deadlines come and gone, it’s probably safe to predict that there won’t be a grand package deal with Tehran this weekend, or at all. Instead, we’ll get a lot of smiles, and agreement to continue talking indefinitely, 'for as long as the talks are useful,' without closure on Iran’s nuclear weapons drive.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khamenei’s centrifuges will continue to spin, Iran’s adventurism in the region will proceed unchecked, and President Obama won’t have to reveal to Congress the deep concessions he has already deposited in Iran’s pocket.

American analyst Michael Ledeen puts it bluntly: Khamenei doesn’t want to sign anything. He has two fixed principles: No 'new relationship' with the Great Satan, and relentless pursuit of the atomic bomb. But since Obama won’t take an Iranian 'no' for a definitive answer, the default American position will be a new form of 'creative appeasement.'

Iran will promise to try really, really hard to be nice, and Obama will pay for this. Iran will continue to get its monthly sanctions relief payoff, while Obama will get Iranian smiles. This will allow Obama to give another interview in which he blathers about meeting Iran’s 'legitimate needs and concerns' and about his hopes that Iran will become 'a very successful regional power.' After all, Obama will yet tell us, Iran 'is one of the oldest and grandest civilizations in the world' – or something obsequious like that.

Who could have imagined, just a few years ago, that the president of the United States of America would wish the mullahs well in their quest for regional hegemony? What strategic thinker would have believed that the U.S. would actively enter a de facto alliance with Shiite Iran (in Iraq, Syria and the Gulf) at the expense of America’s traditional Sunni allies and its ally in Israel? The metamorphosis of Iran, in pro-Obama elite opinion circles, from terrorist state into U.S. partner is a long-brewing triumph for a certain set of pro-Iranian apologists and anti-Israel lobbyists in Washington.

Writing in The Wall Street Journal this week, Sohrab Ahmari showed how the National Iranian American Council advanced the argument that Iran deserves strategic respect, and placed its people in the Obama National Security Council. Indeed, U.S. think tanks played a prominent role in paving the way toward a climb-down from Obama’s declared policy of halting Iran’s nuclear drive.

Start with Thomas R. Pickering, the former undersecretary of state for political affairs (and U.S. ambassador to Russia, the UN and Israel), who showed up in Israel in 2012 as the head of 'The Iran Project.' Peddling a 'nuanced and sophisticated' view of Iran, he counseled an 'engagement' strategy. In a lecture at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Pickering asserted that the U.S. must end its confrontation with Iran over nuclear weapons. Sanctions, he said, were only 'contributing to an increase in repression and corruption within Iran,' and were 'sowing the seeds of long-term alienation between the Iranian people and the U.S..' What about the use of military force to crush the Iranian nuclear bomb program? Well, military force should be the very last resort taken by the U.S., Pickering told us, 'and probably not at all.'

Next was the Center for a New American Security. Its 2013 report, primarily authored by former Obama administration deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East Colin H. Kahl, outlined 'a comprehensive framework to manage and mitigate the consequences of a nuclear- armed Iran.' In other words, stopping the Iranian nuclear effort was already a passé discussion.

Then came the Atlantic Council, which called for Washington to 'lessen the chances for war through reinvigorated diplomacy that offers Iran a realistic and face-saving way out of the nuclear standoff.' That’s diplomatic-speak for a containment strategy.

Then the Rand Corporation concluded that a nuclear-armed Iran would not pose a fundamental threat to the U.S. and its regional allies. 'An Iran with nuclear weapons will still be a declining power,' it said. 'Iran does not have territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations.'

In his last article before dying in 2013, the leading realist theorist Ken Waltz of Columbia University even argued that Iran should get the bomb. It would create 'a more durable balance of military power in the Middle East,' he wrote in the establishment journal Foreign Affairs.

The writing has been on the wall. Both Washington’s retreat from confrontation with Iran and its shift toward appeasement of Iran were there for those willing to see. Obama has even invented a fancy term – 'decoupling' – to obscure the magnitude of American collapse before Iran. 'Decoupling' means that the nuclear talks can take place in a virtual vacuum, without reference to Iranian behavior in any other field or arena – as if Iran were Iceland. There is just no coupling or link between Iran the nuclear power and Iran the aggressive adversary.

Decoupling means that Obama can be forgiven for failing to constrain Iranian terrorism. It means that Iran can get nuclear sanctions relief without having to scale back its hegemonic and subversive muckraking around the region. The suave concept allows Obama to 'decouple' the ayatollahs’ unpleasant anti-Semitic and genocidal rhetorical outbursts from Iran’s 'responsible' (sic) understandings with the West on nuclear matters. It also allows Obama to ignore Iran’s human rights abuses. Decoupling allows Obama to smile and sell sham narratives about Iran, even as Khamenei rebuffs and humiliates America. With a smile, of course."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS: Murat Yetkin suggests that the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] has lost its potential coalition partners in centre-left Radikal: "PM Davutoglu made a significant statement regarding the coalition talks in Van on Tuesday’s evening. He said that the Kurdish peace process could continue on condition that the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] calls on the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] to send its militants out of Turkey, as it has promised. In fact it was clear that Davutoglu would prefer to pursue the Kurdish peace process if he had to make a choice between that and a possible coalition with the MHP. However, it was obvious that the doors to the MHP would be closed when the statement about the Kurdish process was made. The scenarios involving the MHP have ended, not only for the AKP [Justice and Development Party] but for the CHP [Republican People's Party] as well.

Okay Gonensin explains what the MHP’s concerns in centrist Vatan: "Before President Erdogan instructed Davutoglu to form a government, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli closed and even locked the door to a coalition. When Bahceli says why a coalition with the AKP will not come to pass, he is also reflecting his concerns about working with a stronger partner."

Gulay Ozturk warns against high expectations from early elections in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Polls show that the probability of one-party rule after early elections is very low, as can be expected. As nothing has happened to seriously change voting preferences since the last elections on June 7th, almost the same results will come out of the ballot box again. There might be a one or two point rise in AKP votes but this will not be enough to form a government singlehandedly. On the contrary, one should take into consideration that heading to the ballot box once again and facing the prospects of coalition upsets will cause boredom, pessimism and disbelief among voters."

Metin Munir calls for ending the AKP’s rule in independent online T24: "To stop the damage being inflicted on Turkey by Erdogan, the AKP should be removed from power. Voters are not blind. Their eyes are open. They have told Erdogan 'enough' by giving 60 per cent of the vote to opposition parties and denying the AKP a parliamentary majority. The AKP is not blind either. It is aware of what happened to it and it has to hold tightly onto power."

 

 

SYRIA CRISIS: Gultekin Avci predicts the consequences of intervention in Syria in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "Despite its hopes, it transpires that the AKP will lose votes if it intervenes in Syria. 30 per cent of AKP voters say 'we will not vote for the AKP if a military operation is mounted in Syria'. In fact, if there is such an intervention, it will be the AKP that will be defeated. This means that the AKP will have to say farewell to Kurdish voters forever. In such an adventure, the AKP will lose out, while both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism will rise, and it will be the MHP and the HDP that will grow and get stronger."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman is unclear: "Due to the mistrust between Iran and the U.S., the sides want everything to be put, clearly and neatly, on paper. The extension of talks aims to prevent disputes created by different interpretations. The other side expects Iran not to seek nuclear weapons in the framework of a deal. Mechanisms to monitor and prevent the production of nuclear weapons will then be unwarranted. Iran, like other countries, should not face a ban on the production of long-range missiles."

Moderate Iran is inscrutable: "What will a deal look like and who will be responsible for this long-term agreement? There is no doubt that such an important issue cannot be resolved simply. A comprehensive process is the only way to reach a conclusion. The consequences of this agreement cannot be based on partisan claims."

 

QUDS DAY: Conservative Khorasan celebrates Quds day in its own way: "The crimes of ISIS are the latest tool of the Zionist regime: ISIS is battling the Zionist regime's main enemies in the region. Instead of fighting the enemy of Muslims; ISIS helps Israel to achieve significant goals. It distracts from the cause of Palestine and shifts the priorities of the Muslim world from Palestine to ISIS. The nuclear talks do not have any effect on the will of the Islamic regime and the Iranian nation to support resistance in Palestine. The resolution of the Palestine issue and the freeing of holy Quds are key to resolving other problems in the region, from Iraq and Syria to Bahrain and Yemen. Muslims should focus on the fight against the main enemy, the Zionist regime, and avoid conflicts and domestic wars."

Reformist E'temad slaps the enemy: "Global arrogance has spared no effort to isolate Palestine from the attention of the Muslim world. The latest measure is supporting Takfiris, terrorists and tribal groups created by the monarchies in the region and the U.S. and UK intelligence in a bid to preserve their rule. The turnout at Quds Day rallies is a slap in the face of global arrogance. Recognizing an independent Palestinian state and not purchasing Israeli goods are a new phenomenon. They show the world that public opinion has changed towards the oppressed Palestinians and the crimes committed by Israel." 

 

GREECE: Hard-line Keyhan appreciates the gravity: "Perhaps due to the nuclear negotiations, the Greek referendum did not draw the attention it should have. However, it is safe to say that the historic 'no' by the Greek people to the policies imposed by the Europe Union is equivalent to the nuclear issue in terms of importance and consequences. Greece's economic condition after a euro exit is a nightmare that is keeping Western leaders up at night. If, for any reason, Greece gains even a little economic prosperity after its exit; it will become a model for many European countries that are not happy with the euro. Greece's closeness to countries like China and Russia, as well as Latin America can turn the ‘nightmare’ of improvement in Greece's economic condition into a reality." 

 

AFGHANISTAN: Hard-line Javan writes of a window for peace: "After 14 years of war and bloodshed, the Afghan government and Taleban have agreed to hold face to face talks and discuss how to make peace. Can such meetings bring peace for the Afghan nation? It seems that the current members of the Taleban delegation do not represent the entire group, which can create serious doubt that all the Taleban will agree to the results of the negotiations. However, holding talks at this level after 14 years of bloodshed is an accomplishment. At least a window has opened for Afghanistan to find peace."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Algeria faces the fire

2-Washington’s dangerous confusion

3-‘A rock and roll dance’

4-A shameful silence

 

1- Algeria faces the fire

 

Time is running out for everyone, and the fear is that if the situation in Ghardaia is left to its own devices, it may turn into another Der'a [where the current Syrian troubles began] and set the whole of Algeria's body on fire. The decision to authorize the army to bring the situation in Ghardaia under control was the right one, but is insufficient on its own. There is need for real solutions; most of all, for economic solutions that create job opportunities for the members of the [Arab] Maliki Chaanba community who find themselves excluded by the Ibadi [Amazigh/Berber] society. There is also need for social solutions. Family ties need to lie at their heart, for families are no longer in control of their sons and they have allowed hatred between the two sects to exacerbate, leading to an unprecedented loss of life--Hadda Hazen in Algerian al-Fadjr

 

An immediate end must be put to this fighting that serves no one from Ghardaia, whomever they may be. But wisdom and reason require those who believe in them to shed their hatred, loathing and rejection of others. These sentiments and prejudices must be totally erased from everyone’s memories. Although this may seem difficult, the consequences of the latest events are driving all parties towards undertakings that call for an end to acts of aggression and to the senseless killing of people. The authorities who have a good understanding of the nature of this area, its inhabitants and its honorable dignitaries with their sound reason, will not allow those who have awakened this sedition to continue to kill people and undermine stability--Jamal Oukili in Algerian ech-Chaab

 

With up to 30 people killed in one day in a conflict between the town's Arab Sunni Maliki and Amazigh (Berber) Ibadi communities, the situation in the Algerian desert town of Ghardaia threatens to spin out of control, warns the editor-in-chief of an Algerian daily. The state must intervene in force before the town turns into an Algerian version of Der'a where the Syrian troubles first began in early 2011. There is need for a policy that erases the hatred that lies in the hearts of the two communities in Ghardaia, urges another Algerian commentator. Although this may appear to be a difficult task, the large number of deaths should convince everyone to come to their senses.

 

THE STATE MUST BE STRICT: "The state needs to be strict in dealing with this crisis that has taken Ghardaia by storm," writes Editor-in-Chief Hadda Hazen in Thursday's Algerian daily al-Fadjr.

For the state faces a challenge in this fragile part of Algeria. With every Ramadan, Ghardaia witnesses a return to violence and conflict between the Arabs and Ibadis (Amazigh).

Time is running out for everyone, and the fear is that if the situation in Ghardaia is left to its own devices, it may turn into another Der'a [Syria, where the current troubles began] and set the whole of Algeria's body on fire.

The decision to authorize the army to bring the situation in Ghardaia under control was the right one, but is insufficient on its own. There is need for real solutions; most of all, for economic solutions that create job opportunities for the members of the [Arab] Maliki Chaanba community who find themselves excluded by the Ibadi [Amazigh] society. There is also need for social solutions. Family ties need to lie at their heart, for families are no longer in control of their sons and they have allowed hatred between the two sects to exacerbate, leading to an unprecedented loss of life.

The sedition in Ghardaia and the blood that has been shed there are everyone's responsibility, state and civil society alike. The latter has failed to provide a framework for the youth in that area. The political parties meanwhile rush to accuse the authorities for failing to find a solution when these very same parties have failed to penetrate all sectors of society in order to organize them within a framework of respect for law, custom, and tradition. And the family has also failed, as have the dignitaries of both sectarian groups. There is no longer anyone who can contain the street and control the youth so as to prevent further hatred, killings and sedition.

Has cohabitation between the two groups become impossible? Has separation between them become the sole solution?

As the wheel of death spun yesterday at maximum speed – there is talk of 30 people killed – there is no room left for mere palliatives. The state must therefore be strict, as the town's dignitaries have demanded. It must punish all the criminals there, from both sects. After all, those who fell yesterday belonged to both sides – Ibadis and Malikis.

The situation is very delicate. Siding with one side against another would be criminal, and would aggravate the situation further. What we see from the two groups on the social media– the incitement and demonization of the other– is frightening.

Discord between the Malikis and the Ibadis has never been religious or sectarian. The [Amazigh/Berber] Mozabites who live in the northern cities, where they have interests and trade, have never suffered from persecution. The crisis has never been sectarian in nature. The crisis today is caused by wretches and paupers left to their own devices, against the background of the absence of any real presence for the state.

Algeria is passing through a difficult period amidst this crisis-ridden regional situation. Terrorism surrounds us on our southern and eastern borders. The situation in Ghardaia may be exploited by terrorist groups in order to set the country on fire. It may open the door to foreign intervention, as has happened in the Arab countries in crisis.

"Everyone must bear their responsibilities – the state, political parties, society, and the family. The alternative is that we will face disaster!" concludes Hazem.

End…

 

A REAL TRAGEDY: "Events have unfolded rapidly in Ghardaia Province, resulting in a real tragedy," writes Jamal Oukili in Thursday's Algerian daily ech-Chaab.

The number of people killed is totally unacceptable having transgressed all red lines in the attacks on people and property.

We cannot but wonder about what is to be gained from taking so many lives in this ugly manner where bullets were fired at families safe in their homes. Why has the fuse of sedition among the area's people been set alight? Those unhappy at the fact that security has spread in this province's corners are those who have stirred matters up in this manner that has taken everyone by surprise. No one expected the number of people killed to reach this frightening number.

This security situation must come to an end sooner or later, and peace must be restored to the area. This is the deep conviction of all Algerians who love Ghardaia regardless of their creed.

So wisdom and reason must return and replace the sweeping feelings and uncontained emotions that may have dire consequences. An immediate end must be put to this fighting that serves no one from Ghardaia, whomever they may be. But wisdom and reason require those who believe in them to shed their hatred, loathing and rejection of others. These sentiments and prejudices must be totally erased from everyone’s memories.

Although this may seem difficult, the consequences of the latest events are driving all parties towards undertakings that call for an end to acts of aggression and to the senseless killing of people.

"The authorities who have a good understanding of the nature of this area, its inhabitants and its honorable dignitaries with their sound reason, will not allow those who have awakened this sedition to continue to kill people and undermine stability," concludes Oukili.

Ends…

 

 

2-Washington’s dangerous confusion

 

U.S. wagers in the Arab region have mostly failed to pay off; they have usually ended in failure at a very high cost, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The fact that the U.S. sponsored program for training the 'moderate' Syrian opposition has turned out only 60 fighters so far highlights Washington’s confused strategy in the region, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. But another feature of that same confusion is its reliance on the Kurds to fight ISIS-- a wager that is reshuffling all the cards and alliances in the region.

 

YET ANOTHER SCANDAL: "U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's admission before the Senate Armed Forces Committee that the program to train 'moderate' Syrian opposition fighters has begun so slowly that only sixty have been trained so far, represents yet another scandal relating to Washington’s strategy in Iraq and Syria," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Seven thousand Syrians applied to join the program whose aim is to create an army that fights ISIS. Out of these, only sixty have been chosen as adequate for the job at hand. The rest were merely seeking employment and a source of income. They could not be relied upon or trusted, since they could join ISIS even though they were recruited to fight it. At best, they lack 'the will to fight,' like the thousands of Iraqi soldiers who simply put down their arms and fled before firing a single bullet at ISIS forces marching on Mosul, and later on al-Ramadi [last year].

President Barack Obama's administration hopes to train five thousand volunteers every year as part of this program. But such hopes are one thing, and reality is another matter altogether. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) precedent is a clear example in this regard. Most wagers on this 'army' were dispelled, despite the billions of dollars pumped into training and arming it by the Gulf states. Instead, the FSA has shrunk into a few units. There are many reasons for this, including mistrust of the Americans and the desire not to become a sort of Syrian 'Awakening Forces' that fight hard-line Islamist groups, especially ISIS, the Nusra Front, and Ahrar ash-Sham. And if some units are an exception to this rule, they are few indeed.

U.S. strategy in Syria and Iraq is marked by confusion. It moves from one failure to another because it lacks any clear features, and because its priorities are prone to change very rapidly. At one time, the priority is to topple the [Syrian] regime by force; at another, it is to fight ISIS with the aim of ‘degrading’ it as a prelude to destroying it; at yet a third time, the emphasis is on a political solution as the sole way out of the crisis.

But it is also clear that the U.S. strategy is faltering in all three cases. The Syrian regime remains on its feet four years after the war targeting it began with the backing of the U.S. and certain Gulf states (Qatar and Saudi Arabia) as well as Turkey. ISIS getting stronger and expanding as a de facto state in two countries, Syria and Iraq as a first phase, and these territories will be used as a launching-pad for annexing new territories from neighboring countries at later phases, if the situation remains as is.

It is clear that the U.S. has begun to gradually 'wash its hands' of the Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites alike, and is placing all its eggs in the Kurds' basket, providing them with weapons and training. This has begun to translate itself in the form of 'victories' on the ground against ISIS in the Syrian northern and eastern areas – including the capture of the town of Tal Abyad near the Turkish borders – which are semi-contiguous to the self-rule area in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Because of their nationalist aspirations to establish a Kurdish state in northern Syria, northern Iraq, and southern Turkey, the Kurds' will to fight ISIS is strong and guaranteed. And this gives rise to fears of some sort of rapprochement between the four regional states – Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran – leading them to set their difference aside for the foreseeable future.

It is from this perspective that we may best understand the initiative proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which calls for the formation of a four-way Saudi/Turkish/Syria/Jordanian alliance to confront the threat posed by ISIS. It is within this context as well that we may best view Turkey’s military mobilization north of Syria and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statements stressing that his country cannot permit the establishment of a Kurdish state along his country's southern borders. And all this is happening amidst official Syrian silence, which this time round and contrary to previous times, is that of a party that supports what is happening.

Syrian Foreign Minister Mr. Walid al-Mu'allem who was present when President Putin proposed his initiative, described the emergence of such a four-way alliance as 'a miracle' in an age that is not one of miracles. But he did not express any opposition to it at least 'in principle.' Nor have we heard any outright rejection of it from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Turkey, at least until this article was written

The American confusion will continue, and in fact it may be deliberate. The aim may be to gain time while waiting for the positive (or negative results) of the last quarter-hour negotiations in Vienna regarding a nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers. There will be ways of dealing with whatever happens in the appropriate manner afterwards.

U.S. wagers in the Arab region have mostly failed to pay off. They have usually ended in failure at a very high cost. Its wager on the Iraqi opposition may have succeeded in toppling Iraqi president Saddam Hussein; but it produced a failed state that created the environment for the growth of ISIS. The same pattern was repeated in Libya and Yemen. Nor do we believe that the situation will be any different in Syria, especially as regards the wager on the Kurds to fight ISIS. For that policy is reshuffling all cards and may overturn alliances and bring catastrophes upon the Kurds who have accepted to play the same old/new role and trust American promises, even though they have previously ended in disappointment and bloody massacres. And there is nothing to suggest that the present may be any better than the past in this regard.

The region is on the verge of surprising new developments with a change in equations and alliances. Meanwhile, Arab League Secretary-General Nabil al-'Arabi's retraction of his 'documented courtship' of the Syrians and his return to a hard line – because some party has 'pinched his ear' after statements in which he confirmed his desire to meet with Mr. Mu'allem at any time and place specified by the latter – add an Arab dimension to the American confusion. At any rate, we await President Putin's 'miracle' and Erdogan's future steps that will follow the mobilization of Turkish military units north of Syria, one that will decide the features of the region's new map and its alliances.

We and others like us cannot but wait. Last Ramadan, we had the Israeli aggression on Gaza and Mr. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the Caliphate State from the Great Nuri Mosque in Mosul.

"So what surprises will the last ten days of Ramadan or the happy [end of Ramadan feast] 'Id al-Fitr bring us? And will it really be a happy 'Id?" asks 'Atwan in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-‘A rock and roll dance’

 

The region as a whole, and the members of the [Iran/Syria/Hizbollah] resistance and opposition axis in particular, have a rendezvous with exciting developments by the end of July…No political analyst in Europe, the U.S., or the region overestimates the importance of next week, especially as far as expected developments regarding the two main issues are concerned: the Iranian nuclear file and Greece's economic crisis after the referendum supporting the Tsipras government. For it is from Athens and Tehran that coming developments may create a situation in which Iran and its allies will open a ‘fast track’ towards escalating the military campaign against terrorism in Iraq and Syria, with no need for U.S. aerial or any other form of support--Tahsin al-Halabi in Syrian al-Watan

 

We have lost all faith that Washington will seriously attend to any of the region's issues, especially at a time when we imagine Barack Obama doing a rock-and-roll dance to the tune of an Iranian band, drunk on the nuclear agreement that is expected to be signed at any moment. Tehran will be the winner from such an agreement. It will defeat an American negotiator who has presented 'the bomb' to the Iranians, confirming his inherited hatred for the Sunni Arabs, especially after they destroyed the Twin Towers... Washington's attempts to restore some warmth to its lukewarm relations with Saudi Arabia after Iran obtains an agreement that makes it easier to obtain the nuclear bomb in a few years, will fail. Riyadh has already taken hold of one end of the nuclear string that will lead it, the UAE, and perhaps Kuwait and Jordan to obtain a nuclear bomb with Pakistan's help--Mazin Hammad in Qatari al-Watan

 

The continuing nuclear negotiations in Vienna and the European summit that is meant to deal with the Greek crisis will yield results in the coming weeks, which will be crucial for the future of the region and the world, maintains a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. Among other things, these developments will free the Iran/Syria/Hizbollah 'resistance axis' to launch more decisive battles against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Tehran will be the main winner from the nuclear deal now being negotiated in Vienna, maintains a Jordanian commentator in a Qatari daily. This seems to be the consequence of the U.S.'s hatred for the Sunni Arabs after the 9/11 attacks. But it will be resisted by Saudi Arabia and its allies who will seek to acquire their own nuclear bomb, and will not tolerate any Iranian role in resolving the Palestinian problem.

 

EXCITING DEVELOPMENTS: "It seems that the region as a whole, and the members of the resistance and opposition axis in particular, have a rendezvous with exciting developments by the end of July," writes Tahsin al-Halabi in the semi-official Syrian daily al-Watan.

The scenarios of these developments will emerge next week, and most of their main features may be determined before July 20th.

No political analyst in Europe, the U.S., or the region overestimates the importance of next week, especially as far as expected developments regarding the two main issues are concerned: the Iranian nuclear file and Greece's economic crisis after the referendum supporting the Tsipras government. For it is from Athens and Tehran that coming developments may create a situation in which Iran and its allies will open a ‘fast track’ towards escalating the military campaign against terrorism in Iraq and Syria, with no need for U.S. aerial or any other form of support.

Iran’s agreement with the '5 + 1' will open the door for Tehran to regain 100-billion dollars of its assets currently frozen in Western financial institutions. According to David Rothkopf, CEO and editor of the FP Group that publishes Foreign Policy Magazine, Iran's threat to U.S. interests will increase because it will collect 44-billion dollars during the period when the expected agreement is implemented. For this reason, Rothkopf demands that the agreement be blocked, because it will strengthen Iran and Syria's role in ridding Iraq of American domination, as he sees it. The agreement will also consolidate Iran's role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and among the BRICS states, who are in the process of preparing an ambitious global agenda in the coming few days.

It also seems that the EU summit meeting scheduled for a few days’ time will produce one of two results: Either to accept Tsipras' proposals with all their economic and political repercussions for Europe that Germany in particular cannot bear; or Athens will leave the Eurozone and return to the drachma. In both cases, Europe's relations with the U.S. and the Russian Federation will move on to a new situation that will create a great deal of polarization and schisms that are most likely not in the interest of American hegemony.

Therefore, the pressing question on the international arena today is this: What direction will the war on ISIS and similar organizations take in light of these developments?

What can be gleaned from the announcement that the U.S. sponsored program has trained no more than 60 Syrian opposition fighters is that Washington's war on ISIS resembles episodes of a Tom and Jerry cartoon, or some children's game. Meanwhile, the Syrian and Iraqi armed forces and popular mobilization units are achieving successive advances against ISIS and other groups on the ground. It is these Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese parties that are paying the price for terrorism that wants to expand in their states. Meanwhile, Washington has not exacted any price from ISIS; neither have its allies in the region.

This may explain President Obama's announcement that the war on ISIS may last for generations. Had ISIS been targeting the U.S. and its allies in the region, Obama would not have come up with such a notion.

For this reason, analysts in Washington expect the situation in the Middle East to change in a manner that affects U.S. interests and those of its allies, especially now that Saudi Arabia has sunk in Yemen's mountains and sands. Everyone believes that Washington will pay a price in the Arabian Peninsula after supporting the war on Yemen and what has been happening against the Yemeni people since March.

There is no doubt that the European/American agenda regarding Athens and its expected results in a few days' time, and the nuclear issue and the results of the negotiations between the '5 + 1' and Iran, will place the region and the world on the threshold of developments that will lead to numerous options.

"The BRICS states – Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa – are looking forward to exploiting these developments with their regional allies in the Middle East," concludes Halabi.

End…

 

DUST IN THE EYES: "The new U.S. strategy in the Middle East, which The Wall Street Journal claims the Obama administration is in the process of formulating, is no more than an attempt to sow dust in the eyes via vile and sordid hands," writes Mazin Hammad in Thursday's Qatari daily al-Watan.

France has withdrawn its initiative for reviving Palestinian/Israeli negotiations aimed at establishing a [Palestinian] state with East Jerusalem as its capital, for a nation that has suffered a lot under an ugly occupation backed by a veto from the U.S., the Palestinian people's enemy number-one. Now that this has happened, we have lost all faith that Washington will seriously attend to any of the region's issues, especially at a time when we imagine Barack Obama doing a rock-and-roll dance to the tune of an Iranian band, drunk on the nuclear agreement that is expected to be signed at any moment.

Tehran will be the winner from such an agreement. It will defeat an American negotiator who has presented 'the bomb' to the Iranians, confirming his inherited hatred for the Sunni Arabs, especially after they destroyed the Twin Towers. At the same time, the collapse of the French initiative and the civil and confessional fighting in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, and Sissi's Egypt's move to the same square as that occupied by Netanyahu, have all contributed to allowing the Likud's leader to plant his teeth in the Palestinian body with no one to hold him accountable.

Washington's attempts to restore some warmth to its lukewarm relations with Saudi Arabia after Iran obtains an agreement that makes it easier to obtain the nuclear bomb in a few years, will fail. Riyadh has already taken hold of one end of the nuclear string that will lead it, the UAE, and perhaps Kuwait and Jordan, to obtain a nuclear bomb with Pakistan's help.

Palestine will remain the Israelis' nightmare, even if Netanyahu believes that Israel-ization and Judaization of what remains of it will restore some mental balance to his citizens or grant them the luxury of sleeping peacefully and soundly after sixty-five years of rape. Throughout that period, the rapist has not been allowed to enjoy the ecstasy of victory, while the victim has refused to accept the rape. Meanwhile, ISIS, which has already knocked on Egypt's gates and shook its security, will soon knock on Israel's gates, having promised to pull it out by the roots. This is another nightmare that will force the Jews to sleep with eyes wide open.

As for Obama, who has refrained from striking at Assad's regime and resolving the Palestinian problem, he wished to honor his Iranian allies, who will receive 154-billion dollars’ worth of their frozen assets after the nuclear agreement. That will be a first installment that will allow them to bolster their budget and give money and weapons to Hizbollah and the Houthis, and to fight ISIS.

"That is an idea that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council states reject because it amounts to an American license to Tehran to manage the region from a position of strength, including a role in resolving the Palestinian problem," concludes Hammad.

Ends…

 

 

4-A shameful silence

 

The international community and the Arabs have maintained a shameful and hypocritical silence as the Saudi-led assault on Yemen continues, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

More than a hundred days have passed since the war in Yemen began, during which the Saudi-led alliance has killed thousands, wounded many more, displaced millions, and is in the process of destroying one of the world's oldest civilizations, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. But the 'international community' and the Arab world’s reaction has been at best muted, because of the billion-dollars oil, gas, and weapons deals struck with the aggressors.

 

PROFOUNDLY DISTURBING: "The international and humanitarian reports on what is happening in Yemen are profoundly disturbing," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

More than 80% of the people are suffering from difficult living conditions because of the war, bombing, and the tight aerial, ground and naval blockade that has been imposed on the country. More than half the Yemenis lack potable water. Thousands of people have been killed, and many times more wounded, and millions displaced inside their country.

The UN has declared a third-level humanitarian emergency, which is its highest. Only four countries around the world are in the same situation, three of which are Arab – Iraq, Syria, and now Yemen – as well as South Sudan; but no one comes to the rescue.

Roads, bridges, schools, universities, hospitals, public institutions, and government departments – all have suffered air strikes after the [Saudi] ‘target bank’ ran out. The same targets have been struck again and again.

The one-hundred-and-five days so far have caused a humanitarian crisis that is being passed over in silence because of political calculations – or, let us say, fears. No one wants to anger anyone. The 'free' Western world is schizophrenic and hypocritical. It does not cease denouncing the Syrian regimes 'explosive barrels' while maintaining the 'silence of the grave' regarding one of the ugliest humanitarian crises, as the UN reports testify.

All this suffering and pain is being indiscriminately brought down upon the heads of the Yemenis because they are a nation proud of its independence and dignity, one that is fed up of acting as proxy or a backyard for anyone, far or near.

All the ugly violations of Yemeni human rights are being committed in the hope that the white flag of surrender will one morning flutter over the rooftops of houses in Sana'a, Taiz, Sa'da, and Aden. But this has not happened throughout the one-hundred-and-five days of the futile war on Yemen, and it will not happen in the coming days.

The truly sad thing is that the Arab media that has been ‘enslaved’ [by Arab Gulf monies] pays no heed to the chapters and victims of this catastrophe. The focus is exclusively on glorifying the 'victories' and highlighting the manifestations of 'the Arabs' awakening' from among the ruins and human remains.

This is a mark of shame on the record of Arab human rights organizations, civil society, intellectuals, and media. They can see yet another brotherly people led to the guillotine but remain silent, indeed, gloating sometimes. Even Yemen's civilization and historical legacy – the country is the Arabs' original homeland – is being pounded by artillery and missiles and the only reactions are a few reticent expressions by UNESCO. The destruction of Old Sana'a and Shibam proceeds without protest, even though the 'international community' raised hell when the Bamiyan statues were destroyed for example.

It is the same double standards and international hypocrisy. Silence is maintained against a background of collusion in the killing of a nation, the starvation of children, the displacement of women, and the destruction of a human civilization and legacy – all for the sake of oil, weapons, and nuclear reactor deals at astronomical prices.

It is the same submission that we can see among Arab political regimes and governments, and for the same reasons. It is as if abiding by international humanitarian law and the rules of national brotherhood are required only from the poor, while the rich can trample on that law with their soldiers' boots.

This is despite the fact that the Yemenis have never let their Arab brothers down. Sana'a, like Aden, offered a warm lap for the [exiled] Palestinian factions. The Yemeni people made undeniable sacrifices in the arenas of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Yemen’s streets have never rested in support and solidarity with the Arabs' just causes.

And what is really unfortunate is that some Yemenis show little concern for the catastrophe befalling their brothers. They procrastinate about accepting a truce or a humanitarian lull, and boast that they were the ones who issued the decision to go to war and foiled the project for a truce that is not sealed by their signature.

But we know that they are lying. They entered the holy month of Ramadan without batting an eyelid about the fate suffered by their homeland’s children, women, and the poor. These Yemenis do not deserve to rule this country or to lead its people.

We hope that the coming Friday does not come and go without the relevant parties being 'ashamed' of and for themselves, and without allowing the Yemenis to spend what remains of this holy month and the days of the ‘Id [end of Ramadan feast] in comfort and peace – assuming the Yemenis can enjoy comfort and peace any more.

"To hell with power, gains, and thrones if reaching or keeping them requires launching miserable wars of this nature, wars whose fuel are people and ancient homes," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Lost in Gaza

 

Whatever news stories had been dominating the Israeli media before 8:30 on Thursday morning disappeared without a trace when a gag order was lifted on the case of two Israelis who are missing in Gaza and are presumably being held by Hamas.

The first, Avraham Mengistu, crossed the border fence into the Gaza Strip on Sept. 7 last year, nearly two weeks after the end of Operation Protective Edge, according to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. 'According to credible intelligence,' the official said, Mengistu is being held 'against his will' by Hamas. He added that, 'Israel has appealed to international and regional interlocutors to demand his immediate release and verify his well-being.' COGAT said the second Israeli citizen being held in Gaza is an Arab citizen of Israel. Israeli officials provided no further details. A spokesman for Hamas, Salah Bardawil, declined comment. 'We don’t have any information about it. Even if is true, we don’t have instructions to talk about it,' he said.

Channel 2 television reported that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had been in touch with Mengistu’s parents and that Lior Lotan, a retired Israeli army colonel, was handling negotiations to return Mengistu to Israel. The family had been instructed not to speak publicly about the matter, but that news of Mengistu being held in Gaza had spread through Israel’s Ethiopian immigrant community. Channel 10 broadcast an interview with a man it identified as Mengistu's father, holding up a statement critical of Israeli authorities.

In possibly related news, Israel Radio reports that Hamas leader Khaled Mish'al said Wednesday that a European mediator recently contacted the organization at the behest of Israel and requested information on the remains of two Israeli soldiers believed to be held by the organization since last summer's military operation in Gaza – as well as the release of two prisoners being held in Gaza. The two Israeli soldiers – Hadar Goldin and Oren Shaul – were killed during Operation Protective Edge but their remains were not recovered. They were declared by the IDF as fallen soldiers whose burial place is not known.  

 Mish'al said Hamas will not conduct any negotiations or give any information on the fate of the two dead soldiers until Israel agrees to release Palestinians that were released in exchange for Gilad Shalit and later re-arrested.

At a rally in Gaza on Wednesday marking one year since the Gaza war, the spokesman for the Hamas military wing said that the achievements of last summer's war are still open – foremost among them the prisoner issue. Hamas displayed a mock-up of a dog tag belonging to slain IDF soldier Shaul, alongside two other ID tags emblazoned with question marks.

Ynet, citing a Palestinian Authority source in Gaza, said that Mengistu had been released after Hamas' investigations determined he was not an IDF soldier. According to the source, Mengistu left Gaza and headed to Egypt, via tunnels in Rafah. The source confirmed that Israel turned to Hamas regarding Mengistu, as well as the other Israeli captive, by means of a mediator, but refused to go into detail regarding the second captive, a minor, who is seemingly still being held in Gaza.

According to settler-run news service Arutz 7, however, a senior security source said on Thursday that the assumption is that Hamas is lying about the fate and whereabouts of Mengistu. 'We know that Mengistu was arrested, transferred to Hamas for questioning, and since then all traces of him have disappeared,' the source explained, adding that at this time, there is no negotiation process, but that Israel is continuing to attempt to determine Mengistu’s status and condition.

In other news, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, MK Tzachi Hanegbi (Likud), has reacted cautiously to U.S. President Barack Obama's reported remarks that the U.S. would not agree to a nuclear deal with Iran that he considers weak or unenforceable. Speaking on Israel Radio, Hanegbi said that the United States has proven that it does not stand on previous commitments, such as demanding the dismantling of Iran's military nuclear installations and removing all enriched uranium from the country.

Hanegbi was reacting to a report that Obama told a group of Democratic senators that there is now a less-than-even chance of a nuclear deal with Iran. Illinois Senator Dick Durbin told the web site Politico that Obama said he thought the chances of a deal were less than 50-50 at this point, and that he wouldn't agree to something he thought was weak or unenforceable. Durbin added that Obama said that if he does come up with an agreement and it meets his standards, he wants the legislators to take an honest look at it and not prejudge.

 

THE WRONG LESSONS FROM THE SHALIT AFFAIR: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that the fact that Israel slapped a 10-month blanket gag order into the disappearance on an Israeli Ethiopian in Gaza is a manifestation of a very problematic policy.

"The disappearance of the young Israeli-Ethiopian Avraham Mengistu in the Gaza Strip reflects strange conduct by the state and its security arms from the moment Mengistu entered the Gaza Strip in September 2014, through the tardy permit the court gave to release the information on Thursday.

The 28-year-old Mengistu crossed the fence into the Strip about two weeks following the cease-fire that ended the war between Israel and Hamas went into effect. It seemed that the background to the security establishment's controversial decision regarding Mengistu was motivated by events during the war, particularly the abduction of the bodies of Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul by Hamas.

But in fact, the roots of the matter might go back even further to the abduction of the soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas in 2006. In all of the Israel Defense Forces’ previous operations in the Gaza Strip, all actions were handled with determination not to repeat the Shalit affair and not to leave 'assets' in Hamas hands that would allow Hamas to conduct negotiations that would put public pressure on the government, humiliate Israel and lead to the release of hundreds of Palestinian terrorists in prison in Israel.

Therefore, when Shaul’s body was abducted in battle in Gaza's Shujaiyeh neighborhood and Goldin’s body in a battle in Rafah, the army made huge efforts on two levels: First, to stop the abduction itself (mainly in Rafah, where the controversial 'Hannibal procedure' was evoked, if not openly declared) and subsequently, to find any shred of proof that would allow the IDF Rabbinate and medical experts to declare the soldiers dead. The goal of these steps was to prevent Hamas from exerting effective pressure on Israel, which would force it to agree to major concessions in exchange for the release of the bodies.

The considerable and not very discriminating use of means of taking a negotiating card out of Hamas hands regarding soldiers is even more serious when it comes to a civilian, not to mention one who crossed the border into Gaza of his own volition, under circumstances that seem somewhat strange. Here, the security establishment’s unholy trinity was put into action: issuing a blanket gag order on all details of the affair through the courts (this, despite a lively discussion on the matter among forums of Israeli-Ethiopians on social media and in some cases, reports on websites abroad); conveying partial details only to the media; and together with that, a disturbing attitude toward the family of the missing man.

There is, of course, inherent tension between the public’s right to know and the desire of the media to report, on the one hand, and the state’s considerations in negotiating with those who are holding an Israeli soldier or civilian, on the other. The public hysteria over the Shalit talks, which were accompanied by cynical actions on the part of the media and politicians, undoubtedly raised the price that Hamas extracted to push through the deal.

There was logic in the decision to sign the Shalit deal, considering the commitment the state showed to its soldiers. But Shalit’s return had a problematic cost: Not only the release of 1027 terrorists, but the freeing of terror experts like Yahyah Sanwar, now a senior figure in the Hamas military wing and other released prisoners who lead Hamas' West Bank branch, which operates terror operations in the region via a special command headquarters in Gaza.

Still, the 10-month long blanket gag order is a manifestation of a very problematic policy. Once again the courts seem willing to too hastily approve the demands of the security establishment, answering its needs fully. Hovering in the background, the color of Mengistu’s skin cannot be ignored, especially in light of the protests of young Israelis of Ethiopian origin over the past two months. Would the security establishment have dared and succeeded in making a similar move if the family were veteran Israelis like Shalit’s, Ehud Goldwasser’s or Eldad Regev’s? (The latter two are the families of soldiers abducted by Hizbollah at the start of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.)

True, there is a difference. Mengistu, as noted is a civilian, who crossed the border of his own free will from unclear motives. It is also known that he suffered from various personal problems. And yet, not only in any other case would the state have found it difficult to spread such a broad smokescreen over the case, but the public silence - and apparently a certain innocence on the part of the family of the missing man - made it possible for the security establishment to deal slowly with the matter and even to delay the first meeting with the family.

According to Mengistu’s brother, no less than two weeks went by before representatives of the security establishment’s negotiating team met with the family and took down the first details about their missing son. If the brother’s story is reliable, this is an inconceivable gap, which directly connects to the problematic judgment exercised by the political and military leadership throughout this affair."

Ends…

 

HEAVEN AND HELL: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Guy Bechor says that Israel should inundate the United Nations – which has an unhealthy obsession with Israel – with complains and reports about the actions of Arab governments and organizations.

"We are now entering the fifth year of the Middle East's self-destructive phase, which will continue, it seems, for many more decades. And now is the time to say, once and for all, that the United Nations has become an irrelevant organization for every single country but one. Which country? The only one which is a remnant of the old regional order: Israel. Is the UN capable of achieving anything in Syria? How about Iraq or Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Libya? The resounding answer to all these questions is: No. And that's why the UN is focusing all of its attention and energy on Israel.

By concentrating on Israel, the various bodies that make up the United Nations can create for themselves a sense of usefulness and a feeling that they are doing something important. The greater the failure to deal with the broader regional crisis, the more the UN's obsessions with Israel grows. It has become a farce. The more Arab regimes that fall apart, the more the UN's attempts to point the finger of blame and to shine the spotlight on Israel appear desperate and ridiculous.

Israel is on the defensive. It defends itself before the utterly grotesque entity known, without a hint of irony, as the UN Human Rights Council, which is controlled by dictators; it defends itself before the delusional UNESCO and before the Security Council – where there are some members who do not even recognize Israel's right to exist. So maybe now is the time to change direction? Maybe we should change the regional vacuum into something that will help us? It's time for us to use the UN as an offensive weapon and not just one of defense. It's time to take the battle into the enemy's camp.

From now on, Israel must inundate every single UN body with complaints, reports and information about the destruction that is happening all around us. Every day, our diplomats must submit a fresh complaint, must report something new to the media and must ask the UN to pass a fresh resolution. The sheer quantity of submissions would create a critical mass. Even if none of the resolutions are adopted, the impact on public perception would be immense. We need to embarrass the United Nations, just like the United Nations tries to embarrass us.

Every single day our ambassador to the UN and his team of diplomats should report on how armed gangs affiliated to Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas are making mass arrests, torturing suspects, persecuting minorities; we need to remind the UN on a daily basis how the money it has been sending to the Palestinian Authority for years has evaporated into thin air and how the PA continues its racist incitement against Jews and Israelis. The international community is unaware of these facts and the United Nations is the perfect place to share that information. Again, we don't need to be cautious or circumspect: we have to inundate them on a daily basis, from morning to night. We have to industrialize information.

And what about the atrocities that Iran is committing against the ethnic minorities within Iranian society? What about the steady rise in the number of executions and the persecution of gays? Tehran is also sending its henchmen to wreak death and destruction in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. What about the barrel-bombing being perpetrated in Syria by Bashar Assad's regime? What about the support that both Turkey and Saudi Arabia are giving to Sunni jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq?

And how come the United Nations is not inundated with complaints and information about Hamas' terrorist activities? What about Qatar, which has been systematically bribing everyone it can in the West – including, according to some reports, the United Nations itself? How about the terrible state of human rights in the Gulf dictatorships? And then there's Tunisia, which has suspended all human rights in the aftermath of the recent terror attack there? This is just a partial list of what Israel must now turn into its weapon.

Israel cannot afford to be on the defensive; we must attack. This will allow Israel, for the first time in its history, to use the UN in the same way that other countries do: as a bargaining chip. We will be able to lower our level of aggressiveness in exchange for a similar promise from the Arab sides – who know only too well what will happen when the international community is told the truth about them. If the Arabs are preoccupied with Israel, let's turn the table and develop our own obsession.

By making the truth known to the UN – despite the fact that it is a shriveled-up and dying body – we can help the international community to recognize what a fortress of democracy and human rights Israel really is, despite the military and political challenges we are facing and despite ISIS and similar groups, which are the products of radical Islam. This way, the international community will recognize which country is like a haven in the Middle East and which countries are not."

Ends…

 

THE CONCESSIONS MARATHON: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that Western powers have already made every conceivable concession to Iran and that there's nothing left to give.

"The nuclear deal between Iran and the six Western powers – which was due to be signed on June 30, then July 7 and was then extended by another few days – will reach its final deadline tomorrow. Sources in Vienna claim that there will be no further extension of the deadline if a deal is not reached by tomorrow. But, at the same time, there are those who insist that the talks will continue indefinitely if the sides do not manage to resolve all of their differences. Never-ending talks? I'll believe it when I see it.

The nuclear talks were revived by the Obama administration, in October 2009. At first, the Americans were quite opposed to it. The European troika of France, Germany and Britain was managing the negotiation with the Iranians. Those were different days, when Iran was part of the axis of evil, Washington was waging war in the Middle East and the Islamic State group had still not taken the stage. At the time, the West made it clear that under any deal Iran would be prohibited from enriching uranium.

In the meantime, 12 years have passed. The Middle East has changed considerably, and not for the better. The West folded in every new round of talks: once in Switzerland, then in Turkey, again in Kazakhstan. The Iranians even dragged world powers to more talks in Baghdad. Now in the home stretch in Vienna, the West is out of concessions to make -- yet the Iranians remain intransigent. After all, following the interim deal signed in November 2013, it was clear that sanctions would be lifted, centrifuges would be preserved, and Iran would still be able to enrich uranium.

The talks have been like a marathon. After 42 kilometers, we are now in the final 150 meters – but the truth is that we're exhausted from keeping up with all of the West's capitulations, all of Iran's lies and all of the blindness and hypocrisy of the international community. The Iranians are dictating the pace of the talks. If they want to sign an agreement tomorrow, there would be an agreement. If not – we'll just have to wait until someone decides to put an end to this charade. If the Iranian delegation in Vienna decides to sign, it will return to Tehran just in time for the country's al-Quds parade, which takes place on the last Friday of Ramadan. As every year, the parade will include an exhibit of military hardware. On the missiles that are inspected by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, like every year, will appear the words 'The Zionist Entity.'

Here in Israel, we will be able to take some comfort from the knowledge that Iran's nuclear program absolutely does not and never will have a military element, because if these nuclear talks have taught us one thing, it's that one is always happiest when one believes in fantasies."

Ends…

 

DUAL THREATS: Writing in Maariv, Haim Assa explains how Israel can deal with the dual threats being posed simultaneously by Iran and ISIS.

"The sounds of explosions coming from the Sinai Peninsula are a timely reminder for Israel of the war that is raging all around us. It is an open regional conflict, in which there is a new element that we have not encountered before: the ability of ISIS to recruit fighters to its ranks. The bloodthirsty organization which has sprung into the headlines over the past year or so has the ability to recruit volunteers from Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and even Israel and Europe. These volunteers can form terror cells inside Western countries – and every terror expert knows that domestic threats are the most dangerous. The best way to fight this phenomenon, of course, is to win the battle for hearts and minds. In other words, to deny ISIS its recruitment capabilities.

ISIS and Iran are bitter enemies. Iran is Israel's enemy. And ISIS is also Israel's enemy. So we have to ask ourselves the following question: Which poses a greater threat to the security of the Jewish state – ISIS or Iran?

The main existential threat to Israel comes from ISIS, because of its ability to recruit new volunteers, members and supporters inside Israel and across the Western world. The main tool at ISIS' disposal for recruiting new members is its portrayal of operational successes, often accompanied by displays of almost unfathomable cruelty and horror. The organization then translates this to recruits via social media. This is how the organization creates its sleeper cells in every country that it considers its enemy; it takes advantage of the democratic tolerance of these countries. It's only a short distance from here to the launch of a terrorist campaign and bloody guerilla warfare within the United Kingdom, within France and within Israel. In wars of this kind, fighter jets and tanks are of minimal use, since this is first and foremost of war for perception.

Perception is not the same as public relations or public diplomacy. A war for perception is a much more profound and complex struggle, which includes intellectual elements that force all those involved to adopt new and unfamiliar modi operandi in the fields of military practice, diplomacy, psychology and intelligence. So how can Israel best deal with this two-headed threat of Iran and ISIS? The (partial) answer is three-fold:

Firstly, Israel must establish loose coalitions with contradictory elements within them. One coalition would try to counter Iran and would include Egypt, Jordan and Western countries; the second coalition would focus on tackling ISIS and its main member would be the United States, alongside junior members such as Israel and Iran. The nuclear deal that the six world powers are currently negotiating with Iran could serve as bridge between the United States and the ayatollahs and, by extension, between Jerusalem and Tehran. It's a rickety bridge, to be sure, but it's a bridge. It may sound strange, but this is what the new world order will look like. We will live with contradictions, since this is the only way that we can deal with two overlapping yet different threats.

Secondly, we must find some group or organization that has an independent founding ethos and reasonable military capabilities to tackle ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Israel should form a direct coalition with whichever group it locates. This could be, for example, the Kurds.

Thirdly, Israel needs to focus all of its attention on the war over perceptions. This is our real war of existence and the defense establishment must put as much resources into it as it does into the war on cyber terror. In fact, it is even more of an acute problem that the cyber threat. There are two ways to do this. Firstly, on the operational front, Israel should highlight the failures of ISIS and its weak spots. By doing so, we will create the impression of failure and disgrace, which will reduce the enthusiasm of so many impressionable people who seek to join its ranks. On the psychological level, Israel needs to reduce the sense of self-worthless among potential recruits to ISIS. Self-worthless is a concept in social psychology, which deals with individuals' lack of purpose and self-fulfillment.

This is how Israel can deal with the dual threats being posed by Iran and ISIS."

Ends…

 

THE QATARI CONNECTION: Writing on News 1 website, Yoni Ben Menachem comments on the increasingly fraught relationship between Qatar and Egypt, in light of the former's suspected involvement in terrorist attacks on Egyptian soil.

"In the past few days, there have been widespread reports in various Arab media outlets, drawing a direct link between Qatar and the wave of terror that struck Egypt earlier this month.

On July 2, for example, Egyptian television channel El Balad reported on statements by Egyptian security experts, who claimed that the explosives used to assassinate Prosecutor-General Hisham Barakat were delivered to Egypt via the Qatari Embassy’s diplomatic mail.

Meanwhile, Jordanian newspaper Al-Arab al-Youm openly accused Qatar of being behind the attack. In a report published on Sunday this week, the newspaper claimed that Qatar funded the terror attack by the ISIS-affiliated terror group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which targeted Egyptian army units in the Sinai. According to the report, Qatar also allegedly brought terror operatives from Syria, Iraq and Libya to the Sinai, where they had undergone training for the attack.

The report claimed that Qatar had coordinated the media coverage of the Sinai onslaught in the Arab and international media. For example, Al Jazeera, which broadcasts from Doha and is funded by the Qatari government, provided direct coverage of the offensive against the Egyptian army from the moment it began that day at 7 o'clock in the morning. Its cameras lingered long on the raising of the black ISIS flags in the town of Sheikh Zuweid.

These reports are given additional credence by the rising tension between Egypt and Qatar in recent days. Two days after last week’s attacks in Egypt, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry appointed Mohamed Awad – previously its ambassador to Qatar – to the post of Egyptian consul-general in Mumbai, while leaving the Egyptian embassy in Doha without an ambassador.

The Egyptian ambassador to Qatar was recalled in January 2014 to protest 'Qatar’s interference in Egypt’s internal affairs' and has been waiting in Cairo to be reassigned ever since then. Egyptian political commentators view this step as Egypt signaling its displeasure with Qatar, as well as the fact that Egyptian security officials suspect that Qatar was involved in the recent terror incidents. Although Qatar issued a condemnation of the Egyptian prosecutor-general’s assassination, Egyptians have dismissed this statement as a standard denunciation and nothing more than lip service.

The Egyptian Foreign Ministry’s move is similar to one it made about a year ago when, in light of Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Foreign Ministry recalled Ambassador Abd al-Rahman Salah from Ankara and reappointed him as assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.

Egyptian-Qatari relations have been tense since Sissi took office about two years ago. Qatar openly supports the Muslim Brotherhood, finances its activity, and provides political refuge to dozens of its leaders who have fled Egypt since the ouster of President Mohammed Mursi. Al Jazeera regularly berates the Sissi government.

The late Saudi King Abdullah tried to reconcile Egypt and Qatar. After his death, six months ago, his successor, Salman, continued these efforts, as part of his attempt to create a bloc of Sunni countries to counteract Shiite Iran’s expansion in the Middle East. However, Qatar has not honored the terms of the reconciliation that the Saudi king stipulated, and Al Jazeera’s attacks on the Sissi government and incitement against him have only intensified. Qatar’s ties with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been declared illegal, also continue. A few days ago, the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, hosted Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi for a Ramadan fast-breaking meal. Qaradawi, one of the senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled Egypt, has a death sentence hanging over him.

Although Egypt has demanded that Qatar and Turkey extradite the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who found political refuge on their soil, they refuse to comply."

Ends…

 

ARE DEMOCRATS DESERTING ISRAEL? Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Douglas Bloomfield says that Israel’s problem – not just with Democrats or Americans but Europeans as well – isn’t the message, but the policies of the current government and the arrogance of its leader.

"A new poll making headlines in Israel this week declares that the country 'can no longer claim to have the bipartisan support of America' because Democratic elites have deserted the Jewish state. How credible is this poll? Consider this: it was conducted by a highly partisan Republican pollster who surveyed 802 'highly educated, high income... opinion elites' – not rank and file or members of Congress – that he selected to measure partisan American attitudes toward Israel. Not surprisingly, he also found that Republicans are increasingly enthusiastic in their backing for Israel.

The survey was commissioned by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Why would a highly respected, presumably non-partisan organization like JNF order a survey of partisan attitudes toward Israel, and why not pick a pollster with a reputation for balance and non-partisanship? And why send him to Israel to brief political leaders and journalists about his findings? One likely answer: the chairman of JNF is Ronald Lauder, a longtime Republican who is remembered for taking out full-page newspaper ads attacking President Barack Obama for not being sufficiently supportive of the Netanyahu government. In the past five years alone he has given $843,200 to Republican candidates and Super PACs, according to the Federal Election Commission. FEC reports also indicate the president of JNF, Jeffrey E. Levine, gave $20,010 to the Democratic Party in 2011, but none since then.

All the more reason to treat this survey by Republican political consultant Frank Luntz as highly suspect. That’s not to deny that there has not been a growing gap between Republicans and Democrats in their support for Israel over the past several years, but mostly it has nothing to do with 'hostility' toward the Jewish state. Luntz concedes 'policy has something to do' with the drift but his prescription for closing the partisan gap – an 'efficient, effective and unified PR campaign' – is insultingly simplistic and useless.

Israel’s problem – not just with Democrats or Americans but Europeans as well – isn’t the message but the policies of the current government and the arrogance of its leader, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who has done more to isolate Israel than any of his predecessors.

Hawkish Israeli security 'rhetoric' appeals to Republicans, Luntz notes, but he recommends the message for Democrats 'underline Israel’s role in protecting human rights and promoting equality.' He misses the message of his own findings. The bottom line is the policy and its implementation, and no amount of polishing by high-priced consultants can fix that.

Among Luntz’s findings: Three quarters of Democratic 'opinion elites' believe Israel has 'too much influence' on U.S. foreign policy; almost half consider it to be a racist country; fewer than half believe Israel actually wants peace with the Palestinians and only 46 percent of Democrats vs. 88% of Republicans consider themselves 'pro-Israel.'

Leave aside the matter of skewing the questions to produce a desired outcome, and look behind Luntz’s message. 'Israel has won the hearts and minds of Republicans in America while at the same time Israel is losing the Democrats,' the Republican pollster told The Times of Israel. 'The Israeli government and U.S. Jews have to focus on repairing relations with the Democrats.'

This is not a simple PR problem, as he suggests. It is much more fundamental. It goes where Luntz and JNF and Lauder fear to tread: the prime minister’s doorstep.

No one has done more to drive Democrats away from Israel than Netanyahu. His partnership with the Republicans to undermine Obama, especially on Iran and peace with the Palestinians, has been a disaster for Israel’s longtime bipartisan support. Many Democrats see in Netanyahu an ally who has no interest in acting like an ally.

Luntz contends nearly half of the Democrats say Israel is racist. He offers no comparison to how they see their own country or any other country. His finding reflects the feeling on the part of many African Americans that Netanyahu’s unconcealed animosity toward Obama and his congressional speech attacking the administration’s Iran policy as disrespecting the nation’s first black president.

Luntz’s findings reflect a GOP strategy designed to use Israel as a wedge issue to increase donations by wealthy single-issue pro-Israel campaign givers, not to attract the GOP Jewish voters, who remain firmly entrenched on the Democratic side of the partisan divide. Republicans have raised a lot of Jewish money in their campaign to transform Israel into a partisan wedge issue, replete with painting Obama as an enemy of the Jewish state, and Netanyahu’s prominent role in that effort has helped turn away many Democrats.

No issue is more critical for Israel right now than the nuclear agreement with Iran, yet Netanyahu has squandered any influence he may have had in shaping the administration’s positions by mounting a full frontal assault on the integrity and intentions of the American president and by colluding with a GOP leadership determined to use the issue as one more weapon in their anti- Obama campaign.

Yair Lapid, leader of Yesh Atid and a former Netanyahu coalition partner said the prime minister’s strident rhetoric and confrontational rather than cooperative strategy on the Iran issue has cost Israel influence in the negotiations. 'His approach led us to a situation in which the American administration isn’t willing to listen to our positions. His approach led not only the United States but also the other five powers involved in the negotiations... not to take into account Israel’s concerns over the deal, concerns which are right and justified.'

Luntz suggests the Democrats are deserting Israel, but a fair-minded analyst might conclude that the reverse may be more accurate. Democrats voted for Obama in large numbers because he promised to end Bush’s costly and futile wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now they see Israel’s government trying to push America into another war it doesn’t want and can’t afford.

Luntz found that fewer than half of what he called Democratic 'opinion elites' believe Israel under Netanyahu wants peace with its neighbors. I suspect the majority of Israelis feel the same.

Republicans may be having great success with their wedge strategy when it comes to pro-Israel big givers, but their efforts are unlikely to change many Jewish votes in 2016, and they are bad news for Israel. Netanyahu cannot afford his legacy to be Israel’s loss of bipartisan American support."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION DEBATE: Melih Asik asks and answers the question as to what the ruling party is up to in centrist Milliyet: "Why are President Erdogan, the speaker of parliament and the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) dragging out the process of forming a new government to such an extent? First, because power is already in their hands. Second, and since they have no sense of political restraint, they are making appointments in the manner they want. Third, they think that they are sending the public the message 'look, the coalition is not working in this country'. They are not in a rush!"

Mehmet Cetingulec suggests that the AKP does not want a peaceful Kurdish partner in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The AKP is acting as if it has just heard about the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] link to the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] with whom they have been negotiating on the Kurdish peace process. They are taking every opportunity to link 'terror' to the 'HDP'. Please note that it is the 'HDP', not the 'PKK' that is being linked to 'terror'. However, what should be done is to bring forward the HDP and put an end to the PKK; but if the AKP could, they would want to see the HDP fall below the 10% election threshold once again and push it out of parliament."

Writing in the same paper, Mustafa Unal, concludes that early elections are likely:  "There will be a third partner to a coalition, and that is the Palace [Erdogan]. He is not a neutral observer. He is the most important party to any government formula. Current PM and AKP leader Ahmet Davutoglu cannot make a move without the Palace’s approval. The coalition quest will definitely move at the pace chosen by the Palace. With this in mind, one does not need to be a political expert to say that the probability of early elections is gradually getting stronger."

Yasar Sungu warns of the price of blocking a coalition in moderate, pro-Islamic pro-government, Yeni Safak: "The party that opposes a coalition puts the process into a difficult position. But this party will fail in early elections. The public will punish whichever party prolongs the process to form a government and does not move closer to an agreement in the next election. No one can claim that they were not warned. Everyone should be aware of this."

 

SYRIA CRISIS:  Ibrahim Karagul believes a new regional map is being devised in Yeni Safak: "A new map is being drawn. Kurds are being settled in the buffer zone. The real object is to divide the area into two camps. That is to say to determine the boundaries of Arab-Turkish division with bold lines by using the Kurds. And to turn the Kurds into the enemies of both Arabs and Turks. To cut Syria from Turkey, and to imprison Turkey into Anatolia. That is the plan."

Halime Kokce blames the PKK/PYD for foiling the Syrian revolution in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Establishing de facto cantons in the north of Syria has been used as one of the means to nullify the Syrian revolution. Everything is happening before our eyes. Saleh Muslim, the leader of the PKK's Syria branch, has preferred to be a part of Assad’s plan, despite all of Turkey's efforts. Because if the Syrian revolution turns into a civil war this would give the PKK-PYD the opportunity and power that they have never had before. The PYD has acted opportunistically and eliminated the Kurdish groups that thought differently one by one, exiled them and killed their leaders, as a classic PKK maneuver."

 

 

The Iranian press quotes will not be published on 8 July due to public holidays in Iran on the occasion of the death anniversary of first Shiite Imam Ali

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- A lesson in the art of negotiations

2-Syrian realities

3-Ankara’s threats

 

1- A lesson in the art of negotiations

 

Writing about Iran or anything having to do with it – particularly in light of its military intervention in favor of the Syrian regime and its support for the Houthi/Saleh coalition in Yemen – may seem to be a serious transgression in many people’s eyes. This is especially true for those who hate the followers of the Shiite creed for sectarian reasons, or those who are hostile to the Persians on nationalistic grounds. But this will not prevent us from saying that the Iranian negotiators who stood their ground throughout the past five years of difficult marathon negotiations with the five major powers plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program, deserve a different view from us as Arabs and Muslims. This is because they have provided us with a lesson in the art of negotiation, one that we need to learn, steep ourselves in and absorb the moral hidden between its lines--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Relations between Washington and Tehran will not return to where they were before the February 1979 Iranian Revolution, immediately after a nuclear agreement. The process of normalizing relations between two nations and two political leaderships that have been intensely hostile to each other for many long decades in which harsh positions and measures were adopted, will take a long time. It will also require the presence of significant common interests that far outstrip the expressions of good will manifest in the two countries' foreign ministers current flexible attitude towards each other. Moreover, it is clear that Israel and other countries in the region will not only oppose the agreement between the '5 + 1' and Iran; they will do everything possible to obstruct its implementation in order to ensure that normalization between the two countries will take a long time before it is realized. --'Abdullah BouHabib in Lebanese as-Safir

 

Obama subscribes to an idea that derives from the realist school in international relations. According to this idea, the best way of dealing with aspiring and rising states consists of the great powers negotiating with them, trying to contain their demands and to convince them to accept the unequal status of international power. This should curtail their global aspirations and their rebellion against the international order. In return, they will secure some gains, but within containable limits. In other words, there will be a relative adjustment to their status, instead of going to battle with them. This is the exact opposite of what the Republicans want. They are advocates of the school of preemptive war, even if waged by the U.S. alone, in order to prevent any change in the international system that would threaten Washington's status as the world's leader--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Whatever the outcome of the nuclear talks, Tehran’s negotiators have taught the Arabs a lesson in negotiation and steadfastness, which contrasts with the easy concessions made at the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel and the 1993 Oslo negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, maintains the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily.  A nuclear agreement with Iran, which now seems inevitable, will prove to be of greater benefit to Tehran and the Western European states than to the U.S., maintains a former Lebanese ambassador to Washington. But since the agreement's positive impact on the region's problems will not materialize in the short-term, no one – and especially not the Lebanese – should wager on it to resolve their current problems. The current disagreement over Iran's ballistic missile program will not prevent an agreement over its nuclear program, maintains a Palestinian commentator in a Jordanian daily. U.S. policy appears to be based on seeking to contain Iran and moderate its ambitions by negotiating with it and granting some of what it wants, but less than what it aspires to.

 

A SERIOUS TRANSGRESSION: "Writing about Iran or anything having to do with it – particularly in light of its military intervention in favor of the Syrian regime and its support for the Houthi/Saleh coalition in Yemen – may seem to be a serious transgression in many people’s eyes," writes Wednesday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This is especially true for those who hate the followers of the Shiite creed for sectarian reasons, or those who are hostile to the Persians on nationalistic grounds. But this will not prevent us from saying that the Iranian negotiators who stood their ground throughout the past five years of difficult marathon negotiations with the five major powers plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program, deserve a different view from us as Arabs and Muslims. This is because they have provided us with a lesson in the art of negotiation, one that we need to learn, steep ourselves in and absorb the moral hidden between its lines.

The cursing and insults that we encounter in most of our newspapers, websites and social media from many Arabs and their armies of electronic warriors will do us no good. It only reveals our utter ignorance and lack of understanding. After all, nations do not base their civilization and progress or lay the foundations for their revival via such methods that are at once excessively facile and naïve.

The Arab negotiators-- the Egyptian and Palestinians, the former at Camp David (that lasted for only two weeks) and the latter at Oslo (which lasted for two months)-- exposed how easy it is to deceive them, how quickly their patience runs out, how readily they surrender to American and Israeli pressures, and how willing they are to make huge strategic concessions whose price is paid by the Arab and Islamic nations later on.

The Iranian nuclear agreement with the six major powers is now facing its last quarter-hour difficulties in Vienna. Each side is trying to twist the other's arm and secure the maximum concessions. This is why one extension will be followed by another, as each side clings to its position till the very last moment. This is especially true of the Iranian side, which is supposed to be the weaker and besieged party.

Numerous problems remain as meetings are held behind the scenes between foreign ministers – whether those of the major powers or between them and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The main points of disagreement concern a total and immediate end to the military and economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and Iran’s refusal to accept an automatic ‘snapback’ of the sanctions without a new UN Security Council resolution, as Tehran is insisting.

The U.S. and its allies believe that what is more important than reaching an agreement is a total commitment to mechanisms that will ensure its immediate implementation. They insist that there should be an automatic snapback should Iran raise any obstacles to the implementation of the agreement. This is because, as their representatives say, the six major powers' trust in Iran is almost nil. For they have been deceived on more than one occasion and do not wish to be 'stung from the same snake-pit twice' and wake up one day to find Iran armed with nuclear warheads.

There is one Iran at the negotiating table represented by one negotiator, Mr. Zarif. But there are six negotiators and six foreign ministers on the other side. Some, like France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, are hard-liners, while others – like the Russian and Chinese  – support the Iranian side. And there are those trying to occupy center ground like the German negotiator.

Because of the number of negotiators on the other side, disagreements are rising to the surface over an automatic snapback of the sanctions as the U.S. and France are insisting on, and on the need to revert to the UN Security Council, as China and Russia are demanding, both of which have veto rights at the Council which can function as a safety net for their Iranian ally.

There are other technical disagreements over adjustments to Iran’s Fordo and Arak nuclear reactors so as to ensure that they cannot turn to the production of nuclear warheads. But these disagreements remain less difficult than the political dimensions that pertain to the mechanisms for lifting the sanctions, and possibly other mechanisms having to do with the Syrian, Yemeni, and Iraqi files as well.

The Iranians do not wish to commit the same mistakes as Iraq when it allowed the Americans unfettered inspection rights and to meet with Iraqi nuclear scientists and experts [after 1990]. That was a labyrinth that ultimately ended in denouncing Iraq as an outlaw state, the assassination of its scientists, and an invasion under the false pretext of weapons of mass destruction. And this is to say nothing of the Camp David deception that has shackled Egypt with agreements that put paid to its sovereignty over the Sinai Desert and removed it from Arab ranks. It is also to say nothing of the Oslo deception that gave the Israelis all the recognition and security they were seeking and left the Palestinians naked without so much as a fig leaf.

The coming round of last-minute meetings will be decisive. But what is certain is that all parties are in agreement on a single matter, namely, that these meetings should continue. This is because the alternative is war.

"And this is unacceptable because of its enormous cost, and because its outcome is not guaranteed," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT: "There will be an agreement on Iran's nuclear program," writes 'Abdullah BouHabib in Wednesday's left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

The Geneva and Vienna talks will continue until an agreement is reached, and until the disagreements between the Western states and Iran are resolved. This will provide the gateway for Iran's re-entry into the international system and its political, diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement with it.

Although the U.S. is not the main beneficiary of this agreement, it will reap many gains. The first is that Tehran will re-join the international community. Once that happens, the many outstanding problems with it will be addressed at meetings, discussions and contacts between the two countries' officials, and not by proxy or in the media. The pressure on Washington to keep Iran in international isolation or to prevent it from enriching uranium for peaceful purposes will also cease.

The U.S. will not benefit from an end to the sanctions as much as the other Western countries in economic terms. The numerous sanctions imposed by Congress on American companies, banning them from working in Iran, will take a long time to be removed thanks to the strong domestic opposition that is meant to prevent U.S./Iranian relations from being normalized at the pace that President Barack Obama desires.

In other words, relations between Washington and Tehran will not return to where they were before the February 1979 Iranian Revolution, immediately after a nuclear agreement. The process of normalizing relations between two nations and two political leaderships that have been intensely hostile to each other for many long decades in which harsh positions and measures were adopted, will take a long time. It will also require the presence of significant common interests that far outstrip the expressions of good will manifest in the two countries’ foreign ministers’ current flexible attitude towards each other.

Moreover, it is clear that Israel and other countries in the region will not only oppose the agreement between the '5 + 1' and Iran; they will do everything possible to obstruct its implementation in order to ensure that normalization between the two countries will take a long time before it is realized.

On the other hand, the Western European states will not need that much time. Their relations with Tehran did not deteriorate to the same extent as relations between Tehran and Washington. In fact, most of these states have maintained some form of diplomatic relations with Iran. Consequently, most European companies, aided by their governments, are already contacting the Iranian government, and its trade and development companies so as to commence working in Iran after the relevant states’ institutions, the UN Security Council, and the EU endorse the agreement.

Iran will be the main beneficiary from the agreement in terms of its economy, diplomacy, and influence. First, it will free most of the frozen assets that the Shah had deposited in the U.S. Moreover, the financial and trade restrictions imposed on it will be cancelled, allowing it to regain its role in international trade and oil exports, which may reach three-million barrels a day--with the possibility of a major increase in production in the coming years.

Furthermore, Iran and Iraq's combined production of oil will equal that of Saudi Arabia’s before the end of the decade. In fact, Tehran's non-oil exports to Western markets may head the list of Iranian exports after being denied access to these markets for years. And in the absence of an OPEC agreement to control prices and export levels, an increase in Iran's oil exports could bring down oil prices. That would help the importing states, especially the EU countries that have been facing major economic problems for years.

Moreover, lifting the economic sanctions will provide Iran with the financial prosperity that will allow it to continue to bolster and expand its influence in the Arab world and elsewhere. That prospect angers its regional opponents, especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Israel.

In diplomatic terms, Iran which today is negotiating with the '5 + 1' will become the focal point for resolving the Middle East’s deep problems, starting with Yemen, and leading up to Syria and Lebanon. Naturally, Iran will not have exclusive monopoly over these issues; Saudi Arabia will be a significant party to the attempt to address the regional problems. The U.S. will not abandon its friendship with Saudi Arabia no matter how emotional the reaction of the Kingdom's rulers may be towards Washington and President Obama.

Here, it is worth noting that there will be no immediate resolution of the region's problems after reaching a nuclear agreement. The prospects of resolving these problems will improve as a result of the rapprochement between Washington and Tehran; but such a resolution depends above all on the regional states, especially on cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran. But these two countries' current respective attitude towards these problems is not amenable to finding a solution. The discrepancy between their positions is growing every day in fact. For example, Saudi Arabia still believes that Iran has no role to play in Arab issues, and that its intervention in these issues is the cause of most current problems.

For this reason, it would be advantageous for Lebanon and its stability, if its politicians, whatever their affiliations, did not wager on what the agreement may produce because its positive consequences for the region will not materialize in the short-term. In fact, the agreement may create greater disturbances in light of the differing regional attitudes towards it. Moreover, Lebanon's problems remain relatively simple compared to the other problems in the region.

"Thus, it is not just that the concerned states will not set up a workshop dedicated to resolving Lebanon's problems; they view our artificial disagreements as pathetic," concludes BouHabib.

End…

 

NO REAL DISAGREEMENT: "Practically speaking, there are no longer any real points of disagreement over the essence of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany (the '5 + 1' group)", writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

By the time this article is published, the time set for reaching an agreement would have passed and we would either have an agreement or another extension. But whatever happens, the Iranian/U.S. negotiations open a door that could lead to a new chapter in international relations, its theories and its history.

To understand the issues of the last quarter-hour of negotiations, we should remember that Iran has managed to develop its uranium-enrichment abilities over the past 15 years. Since 2012 at least, the CIA has publicly acknowledged that Tehran has acquired the necessary knowledge to produce nuclear weapons. But despite its importance, having the know-how is not the same as actually producing a nuclear warhead.

Moreover, Iran claims that it has no plans to acquire such weapons. Producing a nuclear bomb is a political step that Tehran may take; but even more important is the fact that a nuclear bomb in itself may not constitute a major strategic threat in Tehran's hand. This is because the process of delivering and using such a bomb is complex. The situation would be different if Iran acquires the ability to place nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles that can reach U.S. bases, the West, and Israel. But apart from a political decision, that requires the possession of the required technology, equipment, and know-how. At the final stage of the current negotiations, lifting the ban on ballistic missiles and other conventional weapons was a disputed Iranian demand. Its threat stems from the fact that it may pave the way for Iranian nuclear-armed missiles.

If the White House presents a draft agreement to the U.S. Congress before Thursday [tomorrow] it will be subjected to review, and will be either endorsed or rejected within 30 days. If it is delayed beyond this date, then the review process may take 60 days according to Congressional procedures. Since rejecting the agreement requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and since the Republican majority has less than two-thirds of the seats, members of President Barack Obama's Democratic Party will have to join the Republicans to reject the agreement. The 60-day period will improve the chances of mobilizing public opinion and exerting pressure on the Democrats.

What is happening in effect is that the Republicans, together with the Israelis, want to totally dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. As for the Democrats, and specifically President Obama and his team, they want to restrict this program, monitor it and contain it beneath the point at which it may take on a military character. This is based on a principle that Obama subscribes to, namely, that the U.S. is strong enough to monitor, pursue, and punish Iran should it violate the agreement. As for the Iranians, they want a complete restoration of trade and a full return to the international arena, including an end on the ban on their conventional armament.

Obama subscribes to an idea that derives from the realist school in international relations. According to this idea, the best way of dealing with aspiring and rising states consists of the great powers negotiating with them, trying to contain their demands and to convince them to accept the unequal status of international power. This should curtail their global aspirations and their rebellion against the international order. In return, they will secure some gains, but within containable limits. In other words, there will be a relative adjustment to their status, instead of going to battle with them. This is the exact opposite of what the Republicans want. They are advocates of the school of preemptive war, even if waged by the U.S. alone, in order to prevent any change in the international system that would threaten Washington's status as the world's leader.

Obama wants to institutionalize the negotiation and monitoring process in dealing with aspiring rising powers. If an agreement is reached with Iran now, committees and monitoring units will be established to keep an eye on Tehran. That would set a precedent for dealing with other aspiring and mutinous states. But this manner of addressing the issue is not to the Israelis’ satisfaction; they prefer the neo-con approach that aims at the total destruction of aspiring rebellious forces.

At the Arab level, there is anxiety at the prospect that Iran will no longer be under siege. This is a totally justifiable concern in light of Iran's record of exporting revolution and sectarianism. But the solution also lies in coordinating positions and pressures, and in imposing them on the international negotiating agenda. This is especially necessary since the military option against Iran is not in these states' interest. In fact, maintaining the siege of Iran harms and annoys some of these Arab states, even if it is to the liking of others.

"Be that as it may, we do not expect the current disagreement over the issue of ballistic missiles to prevent a subsequent accord," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

2-Syrian realities

 

The U.S. administration insists on avoiding the details of the bloody battles in Iraq and Syria. It insists that the war on ISIS and similar organizations will take a long time. In other words, the administration will continue to refrain from striking at both these organizations and at the Assad regime. The only thing that concerns President Obama is to implement the doctrine that bears his name based on pursuing a rapprochement with Tehran and that makes every effort not to block the road to it. The object is to create new balance that only the current U.S. administration has any faith in--Saudi al-Watan

 

Anyone observing the Syrian scene cannot ignore two facts:  The first is that the various institutions of the Syrian state– especially its military and security arms – are playing the main role in the war on terrorism. Had it not been for the Syrian state and its institutions, specifically the Syrian Arab Army, the terrorist organizations, ISIS and the Nusra Front in particular, would have shared control of the whole of Syria and expanded into other states. The second fact is that no person or party-political formation in Syria can replace President Bashar al-Assad, either in terms of popular support or the extent to which state institutions are ready to rally around them. Therefore, the [U.S.] demand to exclude President Bashar al-Assad entails an insistence on pursuing the military option and a rejection of a political solution--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

U.S. President Obama’s latest statements on the situation in Syria and Iraq are no more than an expression of Washington's commitment to the Obama Doctrine that insists on rapprochement with Iran, claims the editorial in a Saudi daily. This is the real context in which to understand the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The president's recent statements that exclude any role for Syrian President Assad in the war against terrorism indicate that Obama continues to insist on a military solution that would topple the Syrian regime, claims a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. That amounts to a slap in the face to the Russian leadership’s peace initiative to which it can only respond by increasing its military aid to Syria.

 

UNDERSTANDING OBAMA: "The implications of President Barack Obama's recent statement regarding the situation in Syria can best be understood in the context of the nuclear talks between the '5 + 1' group and Iran," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

Obama repeated his commitment to supporting the moderate Syrian opposition. He said: 'At present, we continue to intensify our training and support for the local forces that are fighting ISIS on the ground.' This is the U.S. president’s customary message to Tehran, not to Damascus or to the moderate Syrian opposition. The main audience of this message is the Iranian regime, even though Tehran also realizes that Obama promises are no more than futile gestures.

Obama's statement regarding the situation in Iraq is another message to the Iranian regime. The U.S. president said: 'We are speeding up the training of the forces fighting the Islamic State, including volunteers from Sunni tribes in Anbar Province.'

The U.S. administration insists on avoiding the details of the bloody battles in Iraq and Syria. It insists that the war on ISIS and similar organizations will take a long time. In other words, the administration will continue to refrain from striking at both these organizations and at the Assad regime.

The only thing that concerns President Obama is to implement the doctrine that bears his name based on pursuing a rapprochement with Tehran and that makes every effort not to block the road to it. The object is to create new balance that only the current U.S. administration has any faith in.

Be that as it may, any U.S./Iranian agreement will come at the region's expense. At the very least, it will have consequences that will serve Iran's regional interests. This is the truth. For Iran will concede nothing, and all that is taking place is mere 'talk.' And if Tehran were to concede anything, it would only be in return for other opportunities and additional regional demands that the '5 + 1' will accept in favor of the velayat-e-faqih state.

The Syrian crisis and the situation in Iraq will be at the heart of the nuclear agreement's agenda. As for Yemen, it has – thank God – been removed from this equation thanks to [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm.

"That is to say, thanks to Saudi Arabia and the coalition’s member states that have blocked the path before any political haggling over this Arab country," concludes the daily.

End…

 

OBAMA’S SOLUTION: "In his latest statement on the situation in Syria, U.S. President Barack Obama said that the only solution for terrorism lies in forming an alliance that includes a Syrian government of which President Assad is not a member," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Wednesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

This statement came from the highest level of decision-making in the U.S., and only a few days after President Putin launched his initiative for a regional and international coalition in which the U.S. and the Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, would take part.

It goes without saying that the fact that the U.S. president has insisted that any anti-terrorism coalition should include a Syrian government that President Assad neither heads nor is a member of, clearly means that Obama also insists on a military solution and refuses to adopt a realistic policy.

For anyone observing the Syrian scene cannot ignore two facts:  The first is that the various institutions of the Syrian state– especially its military and security arms – are playing the main role in the war on terrorism. Had it not been for the Syrian state and its institutions, specifically the Syrian Arab Army, the terrorist organizations, ISIS and the Nusra Front in particular, would have shared control of the whole of Syria and expanded into other states.

The second fact is that no person or party-political formation in Syria can replace President Bashar al-Assad, either in terms of popular support or the extent to which state institutions are ready to rally around them. Therefore, the demand to exclude President Bashar al-Assad entails an insistence on pursuing the military option and a rejection of a political solution.

The U.S.’s policy towards Syria – whether it heads towards a political solution or maintains the war of attrition – is one that the region's states and the Western states that turn in the U.S.'s orbit will abide by. No state in the region will diverge from this strategy if set by the U.S.

The above implies that President Vladimir Putin's proposal that he presented to Syrian Deputy-PM and Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem is not based on any firm grounds; or on promises that were closer to deception than anything else. Mu'allem was thus right to say that a miracle was necessary for President Putin's efforts to be crowned with success, and that this is not the age of miracles.

President Obama's latest position regarding the solution of the crisis in Syria was a slap in the face to Russia and President Putin in particular. It resembles the successive slaps that the U.S. administration has been delivering to Moscow in the Ukraine by refusing to cooperate actively in finding a political solution for the war there. It has been insisting on sanctions instead, and on dealing with Russia as a minor player, showing contempt and disrespect for its international status instead of cooperating with it.

If Russia and the Russian leadership in particular wish to fight terrorism, it has now become incumbent upon them to raise the level of military support for Syria so as to enable it to put an end to the U.S.'s dreams of overthrowing the regime. For that is the shortest path to a situation that convinces the U.S. to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.

"Anything less would mean that Russia's policy was akin to ploughing the sea," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

3-Ankara’s threats

 

Turkish President Erdogan’s constant threat to intervene in Syria seems to be aimed at enhancing his political position at home, says Mona-Lisa Freiha in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Turkish President Erdogan's threats to intervene in Syria give the impression that Ankara has finally made up its mind to establish a buffer zone there, notes a Lebanese commentator. But these threats are more likely to be part of Erdogan's attempt to put his domestic political household in order after his party lost its absolute majority in last month’s parliamentary elections.

 

LONG STANDING CALL: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been calling for the establishment of a buffer zone along the borders with Syria ever since 2011," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

He formally proposed his idea in the UN Security Council, only for Washington to shoot it down. After the formation of the international anti-terrorism coalition, he called for the same again, making his cooperation with the coalition dependent on a positive response to his demand. He has repeatedly threatened military intervention to establish such a zone by force, and the media has leaked reports that the Turkish Armed Forces are working with the concerned institutions on preparing for such a zone logistically, militarily, and legally.

Ever since Kurdish forces and Syrian opposition factions expelled ISIS from Tal Abyad, Erdogan's media machine has revived the same mantra. Turkish press reports have warned that the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) pose a greater threat to Turkey than ISIS; that they are engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Arabs and the Turcoman; and that they are trying to link the Kurdish areas in northern Syria to each other, thereby establishing a continuous corridor along the Turkish borders.  Erdogan himself has warned that Turkey would not permit the establishment of a Kurdish state to its south 'whatever the price.' And these warnings have been issued in tandem with reports that the government has asked the army to take the necessary measures to confront the threat from Syria.

The constant beat of war drums has created the impression that Ankara has finally made up its mind and decided to enter Syria. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) may have concluded that the time has come to weaken the Kurds, whom it has always feared would be the main beneficiaries of the war on ISIS after they have received advanced weapons and drawn close to establishing a Kurdish province in Syria that is geographically contiguous to Iraq and Turkey's Kurds.

But beating the war drums in this manner may have another aim--less to prepare for entering Syria as much as to deal with the Turkish domestic political scene that has radically changed since the June 7th elections in which the ruling party AKP lost its absolute majority after almost 13 years in power.

Erdogan is not the sort of person who can rule within a coalition government. He is too canny to risk early elections before he can ensure broader support for his party. This seasoned politician may have concluded that threatening to go to war offers a way out of this crisis. For the spectre of war causes panic in financial markets, and a few shells here or there would deepen the Turks' feelings of concern and instability. Such a situation would be in Erdogan's favor and add to the credibility of his claim that the country needs the iron fist of one-party rule.

The constant beat of war drums also sends a clear message to Washington and its new alliance with Syria's Kurds. By threatening to intervene in Syria, Ankara aims to pressure Washington into reconsidering its 'Kurdish policy’, which is inconsistent with Turkey's interests.

“Thus a Turkish intervention in Syria may theoretically appear to offer Erdogan many advantages. And in practical terms, the past four years have proven that Erdogan is willing to resort to anything, including using his country's foreign policy in order to put his domestic house in order," concludes Freiha.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

One year after

 

Military matters dominate the front pages of most Israeli newspapers on Wednesday.

Israel Hayom leads with the publication of video footage taken from the helmet-mounted camera of an IDF soldier who was killed during 'Black Friday,' as events in Rafah during last year’s war in Gaza on August 1, 2014 have become known. The video and audio released show that, as soon as it became apparent that an Israeli soldier was in danger of being taken captive, the IDF implemented the Hannibal Procedure, which allows for massive, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of firepower – even at the risk of killing large numbers of civilians and the kidnapped soldier. Use of this procedure was one of the main criticisms that were leveled against the IDF in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge.

Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post focus on the conclusions and lessons that the IDF learned from last summer's conflict.

The Jerusalem Post headlines the IDF's new combat doctrine to deal with Hamas, which is based on the destruction of the organization's military wing. According to this version of the briefing, the IDF has concluded that any future objective would be to shorten the length of any future engagement with Hamas. The new concept, created together with the Shin Bet, calls for eliminating the Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades if war erupts again in the South. 'We have new components and an approach, which was shown to the chief of staff and received his approval,' a senior IDF source said. 'There will always be a need for adjustments to fit [future] circumstances, but we have a concept, and we have plans.'

In contrast, Haaretz's lead headline focuses on a recommendation by senior IDF officers to Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, calling on him to open the border crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Exactly a year after the Gaza war, the IDF says that Hamas has been left without real achievements from the fighting and is politically isolated, with its ties with Egypt strained. Precisely for these reasons, Haaretz writes, senior defense officials believe that Israel could help achieve relatively long-term quiet by easing economic restrictions and some limitations on the passage of people and goods from the Gaza Strip.

One recommendation would allow thousands of Palestinians to travel abroad by entering Israel via the Erez crossing and leaving the country to Jordan via the Allenby Bridge. Another would permit merchandise into Gaza through the Karni crossing and expand use of the Kerem Shalom crossing. In addition, permits would be issued for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to work in Israeli communities near the border. President Reuven Rivlin, speaking Monday at a memorial ceremony for those killed in last summer’s war, said that, 'The rehabilitation of Gaza is also an Israeli interest, but the only condition for this rehabilitation is that Gaza ceases being a front for attacks on Israel.'

Meanwhile, a senior Hamas official said the organization has a vested interest in maintaining the shaky clam with Israel. Speaking to Israel Radio, Hamas deputy foreign minister Ghazi Hamad said that Hamas 'doesn’t want another war' and has 'an interest in keeping the calm in Gaza.' Hamad claimed that there was no chance that Hamas' military wing would work to escalate the situation.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, the papers report that Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister, Riad al-Malki, said Tuesday that a French diplomatic bid to advance a United Nations resolution to restart the peace process between Israel and the PA has been abandoned by France. However, senior PA officials in Ramallah later told Haaretz that al-Malki's comments were not entirely accurate, and were based more on his analysis of the updates he had received on the matter than on official information from Paris.

In other news, Iran is still a front-page story for most of the papers. As the deadline for reaching a deal in Vienna was extended for another 48 hours, attention shifted – almost inevitably – to the tensions that the negotiations are creating between Israel and the United States. Citing a report that originated in the Boston Globe, Israeli papers report that senior American officials said Tuesday in a briefing to reporters in Vienna that, over the last 10 days, the head of the U.S. negotiating team had tried three times to contact Israel's national security adviser to update him about progress in the negotiations. According to the officials, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman had not managed to reach National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen due to scheduling constraints, but added that she planned to brief him in the near future.

Sherman had updated her Israeli counterparts the day she arrived in Vienna two weeks ago, and planned to talk to Cohen in the near future. A senior official in the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem said that Sherman's last update was indeed received by Israel some 12 days ago, but denied that there had been American attempts to relay further updates. 'Since the last briefing 12 days ago, we have not rejected any proposals for additional briefings,' the official said.

The American remarks follow a report in Haaretz earlier Tuesday, in which Israeli officials were quoted as saying that the government in Jerusalem had a fragmented picture of what has happened in the negotiating rooms in Vienna over the last 10 days. The Israeli officials said that over the last few weeks there has been very little contact between Netanyahu and senior advisers in the Obama Administration regarding the nuclear issue. Since this round of talks in Vienna began, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had not spoken with Netanyahu on the telephone even once.

Finally, Netanyahu used the occasion of the official memorial ceremony for Theodor Herzl to speak out against the deal. Israel, he said, is 'preparing for any scenario, determined to defend ourselves from danger.' Netanyahu went on to quote exiled Iranian film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, who once described Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as 'worse than Hitler.' 'If he could,' Netanyahu quoted Makhmalbaf as saying, 'he would destroy the world.' Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, the film director said, was 'without power, only the spokesman of the Supreme Leader.'

 

OUR INTERESTS, THEIR INTERESTS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Giora Eiland says that Israel's interests regarding the Gaza Strip do not necessarily negate the possibility of a long-term truce with Hamas – and that Israel should incentivize Hamas to abide by the terms of any such agreement.

"Some of the key lessons of Operation Protective Edge would have been learnt during the fighting itself or in the immediate aftermath of the 50-day conflict. Still, exactly one year after the outbreak of hostilities, there are some lessons that are better examined with the benefit of hindsight.

There are two classic mistakes that keep on being repeated – and not just here. The first mistake is to incorrectly describe the situation or to misread the narrative. Israel has consistently misread the situation in Gaza since 2006. The narrative, as we see it, is as follows: Hamas is a terrorist organization that grabbed control of the Gaza Strip in a violent coup and, as such, its regime is illegitimate. It rules by force over 1.8 million poor and impoverished civilians. This being the case, Israel must boycott anyone who talks with Hamas. Since Hamas is a rather weak terrorist organization, it can be defeated militarily without too much fuss.

But the real situation in Gaza is rather different. The Strip has become a de facto independent state in every respect. Hamas is not a terrorist organization in the same way that al-Qa’ida is; rather, it is a movement that was elected in a (more or less) democratic process, it faithfully represents the views of the population it rules over and it has their support. If this were not the case, Hamas would not have been able to usurp all of the national resources of the Gaza Strip to build up such an impressive military arsenal and such a threatening network of tunnels.

The second mistake is an ill-defined map of interests. The national interest of the State of Israel is not some utopian dream; it is something that is important enough that we are willing to pay a price to achieve. When it comes to the Gaza Strip, we only have security-related interests: we want to ensure that rockets are not fired at our towns and cities and we also want to ensure that Hamas' military capabilities are eroded in the future. We do not have any territorial, economic or political interests. Although Israel and Hamas remain enemies, this does not mean that there is a total and complete clash of interests between us. This means that Israel can afford to allow Hamas to get what it wants – in exchange for a long-term truce.

The stubbornness that has characterized Israel's policies regarding Gaza since 2006 and until just recently, which dictates that it is in our interest to promote the presence and influence of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, not only fails to serve any of our interests, but also fails to achieve our primary goal – which remains security-related.

The rocket fire by Hamas which sparked Operation Protective Edge was, first and foremost, the result of frustration over the halt of money transfers to Gaza and Israel's 'success' in preventing various parties from donating money to Gaza. If Hamas sees the establishment of a sea port as the most important symbol of independence, Israel should agree to let this happen in exchange for Hamas agreeing to stop developing long-range missiles. If Hamas rejects this proposal, we have lost nothing and have won one round in the international battle over Israel's 'blockade' of the Gaza Strip. If Hamas does agree, Israel enjoys a two-fold victory.

Some people argue that a sea port in Gaza would pose a threat to Israeli security. But the level of threat is not determined by whether or not Gaza has a sea port; what matters are maritime inspections. It should be relatively easy to reach some kind of agreement that would answer all of Israel's security concerns. And let's not forget that it will take years for construction of the sea port to be complete, which would incentivize Hamas to maintain the quiet.

In retrospect, there's no question that Operation Protective Edge created an effective deterrence. When the fighting ended, Hamas had less than a third of the number of rockets it did before the operation and now it is finding it hard to replenish its arsenal, its military leadership was significantly reduced and the massive destruction that Gaza sustained obligates Hamas to focus its attention on rebuilding, rather than launching any new military adventure. Long-term quiet is achievable if, in addition to an effective deterrence, we create some kind of incentive for Hamas to refrain from attacking us. Such an incentive does not necessarily run contrary to Israel's vital security needs."

Ends…

 

FAR-REACHING CONCESSIONS: Writing in Maariv, Alon Ben David says that, even before Iran and the six world powers finalize the nuclear deal in Vienna, the Islamic Republic is expanding its influence across the Middle East and is enjoying an economic boon.

"The most significant development in the Middle East, which will affect the future of the entire region, is happening right now in Vienna. The reports that Israel is getting about the negotiations between the six world powers and Iran are far more worrying than the possibility that ISIS is establishing a presence along our southern border. It seems from here that the United States is, step by step, capitulating on all of its negotiating principles and is giving the Islamic Republic its dream deal and giving Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei everything that he has demanded.

From what we are able to glean, it appears that the United States will allow Iran to keep its underground reactor in Qom in such a state that it could, within a matter of weeks, become a military facility for enriching uranium. The U.S. has also backed down from its demand that Iran allow intrusive inspections of its military installations – including those that are not officially linked to its nuclear program. France – which is the last righteous man in the Austrian version of Sodom and Gomorrah – opposed that concession. This bad deal will leave Iran within touching distance of a nuclear bomb the day after the agreement expires – or when Tehran decides that the time has come to violate the terms of the deal.

The Obama Administration has gone so far in making concessions to Iran that the likelihood of the deal being torpedoed – either by the U.S. Congress of by one of America's European partners – increases with every day that passes. That would be the ideal scenario from an Israeli perspective. The far-reaching American concessions, coupled with a new deadline for reaching an agreement, has merely increased the Iranians' appetite.

But the U.S. has made concession on other issues, too, apart from the nuclear issue. The Vienna talks are like a game of water polo: all we can see is what is happening above the waterline; below the surface additional negotiations are being held, in which the United States is turning Iran into its regional ally. It is providing the Islamic Republic with a stage in what used to be Iraq; it accepts the Iranian presence in Yemen, which provides Tehran with a strategic foothold on the Red Sea; and it has no problem with continued Iranian support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Hizbollah or even Hamas.

Despite the Sunni-Shiite war that is splitting the Middle East into two clear camps, Iran has managed to renew its relationship with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and has started supporting it materially as well. Iranian money now makes up 60 percent of the budget of Hamas' armed wing. Since he who pays the piper calls the tune, commanders in Hamas' armed wing are now taking orders from Tehran.

For the time being, the head of Hamas' armed wing, Mohammed Deif, is accepting the authority of the organization's political leaders, who are keen to maintain the quiet with Israel and to examine the Qatari proposal for a ceasefire. But he, along with the rising star of Hamas, Yihya Sanwar (who was one of the founders of Hamas' armed wing, was involved in the kidnap and murder of Nachshon Wachsman and who was freed as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal), is also pressing for a resumption of hostilities with Israel.

Iran's control of Hizbollah is much tighter. In recent years, Hassan Nasrallah has become merely something of a figurehead leader. The person who is really calling the shots and who really decides what Hizbollah does is Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force.

Iran is satisfied with the events of the two years since Hassan Rouhani was elected president. Last year, despite the sanctions and the plunge in oil prices, Iran's economy grew by 1.5 percent. Compared to other countries in the Middle East, this is an impressive level of economic expansion. Within the next few days, Iran will also be handed an agreement that recognizes its nuclear capabilities and allows it to resume trading with the rest of the world. Its economy will grow even more.

From the moment that a deal is signed, Iran will start to earn an awful lot of money and the chances are that it won't use this money for charity. It will establish itself as a regional superpower and will continue to expand its influence over the region during the 19 months that U.S. President Barack Obama has left in office – safe in the knowledge that no one will try and stop it.

What can Israel do in light of this agreement? It's worth keeping an eye on the findings of the Locker Committee, which examined Israel's defense budget and which is due to submit its recommendations next week. Yohanan Locker spent almost three years serving as Binyamin Netanyahu's military secretary and the prime minister's worldview will doubtless be reflected in Locker's recommendations. Netanyahu wants to maintain Israel's ability to launch military action against the Iranian nuclear program and it seems inconceivable that he would agree to cut defense spending. If anything, he will want to increase the budget."

Ends…

 

REASONS TO BE WARY: Writing in Israel Hayom, Ronen Yitzhak lists five reasons why a fresh round of fighting between Hamas and Israel is more likely than most people admit.

"According to Hamas' prime minister in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniyeh, 'we will continue to fight the occupation and will lead the Palestinian people's resistance.' Haniyeh was speaking to Arab journalists two months ago, during a briefing on the organization's operational capabilities. Indeed, since the end of Operation Protective Edge, Hamas has focused on repairing the damage that Israel caused it, on raising morale and motivation among its fighters and improving their operational expertise. Hamas plans not only to kidnap soldiers in the next conflict; it wants to capture an IDF position and to use drones and other advanced weapons. It is also preparing itself for a long and continuous bombardment by the IDF.

While no one knows what will lead to the outbreak of fresh hostilities between Israel and Hamas, the political realities of the Middle East mean that it will happen sooner than anyone thinks. First of all, Hamas’ status in Gaza since the end of Operation Protective Edge has been in steady decline. Not only has it been unable to point to any concrete achievements, its main demand- the establishment of a sea port in Gaza – has not been met. This is harming Hamas standing and prestige.

Secondly, the rocky relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority is pushing the former onto the sidelines. The dismantling of the Palestinian unity government, the arrest of Hamas activists in the West Bank and the increased pressure on Hamas from the Palestinian security forces are having a negative impact on the organization. The rebuilding of Gaza, which is on hold since most of the $5.5 billion that was pledged last year has not been delivered – leaves thousands of Gazans without permanent homes, suffering from massive unemployment and getting increasingly desperate by the day. All of this has intensified pressure on the Hamas regime there.

Thirdly, Israel's shaky international standing could encourage Hamas to launch attacks. Although Israel went some way to restore its deterrence capabilities by the end of Operation Protective Edge; international criticism – both political and military – could erode that deterrence. This could lead Hamas to believe that Israel would not have international backing for military action against Gaza and could spur it to renew hostilities, on the assumption that Israel's reaction would be far more muted than last summer.

Fourthly, Hamas wants revenge. Even though it seemed at first that Mohammed Deif had been killed in an airstrike on his home in late July last year, there is increasing evidence that he survived and has resumed his role as Hamas' main military commander. His desire to reassume control of Hamas' armed wing – and his desire to avenge the death of his wife and son in that Israeli airstrike – could motivate him and his organization to launch a new offensive.

Finally, there's Hamas’ tense relationship with Egypt. Reports of cooperation between Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which is attacking Egyptian forces in the Sinai, could force the Egyptian army to take direct action against Hamas and to try and clip its wings within Gaza itself. Under these circumstances, whereby Hamas has nothing to lose, it could renew hostilities with Israel in order to win popularity among the Palestinian people and alleviate pressure from Egypt and the Palestinian Authority."

Ends…

 

DON'T FORGET THE WEST BANK: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yossi Beilin says that, if Israel agrees to a long-term truce with Hamas in Gaza, it must, at the same time, open dialogue with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

"A long-term ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, in exchange for the opportunity to rebuild and develop the Gaza Strip, is the most reasonable proposal under the tough circumstances that have emerged. Peace is impossible at the moment from Hamas' perspective; the organization is not ready to make an ideological concession and to forswear the use of weapons in order to achieve its goal. In contrast, it could – based on countless historic precedents of Islamic leaders reaching limited-term agreements with their enemies – agree to a long-term truce.

As far as Israel is concerned, a long-term truce would provide a very welcome period of quiet in the south and, if Hamas does not abide by the terms of an agreement, Israel would be entitled to rescind anything that it has done as part of the deal. But without addressing the problem of the West Bank, any ceasefire between Israel and Hamas could lead to an increase in violence by Hamas in the West Bank and could undermine Israel's security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.

Just as it was a mistake for Ariel Sharon to make do with a withdrawal from Gaza and a symbolic withdrawal from part of the West Bank, while ignoring the new regime established by Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas; it would be a mistake for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to ignore Ramallah. He would end up losing everything that he gained in Gaza on fighting in the West Bank.

If it is true that indirect contacts are being held with Hamas over a ceasefire and normalization of relations, Israel must simultaneously engage the Palestinian Authority in talks. It is clear that the PLO is not happy with rumors that Israel and Hamas are close to a long-term truce deal. It sees this as part of an Israeli policy of divide and conquer and as a reward to terrorism. It also accuses Israel of ignoring the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which has been coordinating security matters with Israel for years and which operates primarily on the diplomatic stage, while eschewing terrorism. Even if Israel doesn't like this Palestinian campaign of 'lawfare,' it should 'reward' the Palestinian Authority for forswearing violence.

Israel must keep the PLO in the loop regarding its contacts with Hamas (which, it seems, are indirect); if possible, it must also seek to reach understandings with Ramallah about a ceasefire, since the PLO – not Hamas – is Israel's official partner for political agreements. An agreement with the PLO – even a partial one – is important in and of itself, and in order to ensure that a ceasefire in Gaza is viable. An agreement with Hamas which bypasses the Palestinian Authority would be convenient for the current Israeli government. After all, even some of the more right-leaning members of Netanyahu's coalition have expressed their support for a more liberal policy regarding Gaza. Israel has already left the Gaza Strip and, if Hamas promises a period of quiet, it might just be possible for Israel to convince the international community that we are not responsible for the fate of 1.5 million Gazans.

But there's a down side: A ceasefire in Gaza could lead to an increase in Hamas activity in the West Bank, if only to justify to its supporters its willingness to enter into a truce with Israel. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority – under the impression that Israel prefers an agreement with Hamas over dialogue with Ramallah – could scale back security cooperation. That would be the downside of what we all agree would be a positive deal with Hamas."

Ends…

 

 

MUTUAL MISTRUST: Writing in Haaretz, Chemi Shalev says that any nuclear deal with Iran would have created friction between the U.S. and Israel, but with Netanyahu and Obama at the helm, this agreement is even more risky.

"From an Israeli point of view, a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran was going to be a hard sell in any case. Even if such lovebirds as George Bush and Ariel Sharon or bosom buddies like Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin were leading America and Israel right now, a nuclear accord with Tehran would have tested the U.S.-Israeli 'special relationship.' Iran is too fanatic and formidable and Israel is too experienced and apprehensive for it to be otherwise.

But with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and President Obama going head to head, the danger is that the special ties between the two countries will suffer extensive damage as well. Their mutual lack of trust and their sincere belief in each other’s bad intentions can only inflame an already volatile bilateral confrontation.

Of course, it can be argued that any agreement negotiated while the Bush/Sharon or Clinton/Rabin duos were in power - as well as Clinton/Barak or Bush/Ehud Olmert - would have looked completely different at this stage anyway. Sharon and Rabin would have used their personal sway in the White House in order to have a say in the contents of any agreement, and Bush or Clinton would have heard them out and taken their suggestions into consideration, at the very least. Their basic trust in each other’s personal sincerity and commitment to bilateral ties would have safeguarded the overall relationship from any general harm.

But with the dialogue of the deaf that goes on between Netanyahu and Obama, with their increasingly shrill public discourse and with their mutual suspicions disabling their ability to lend an attentive ear, Israel has been effectively shut out of influence in the place where it matters most, the White House.  Rather than devote their energies to a constructive give and take over the past months, both leaders have been sniping at each other while amassing reservoirs of pent up anger and frustrations that will be unleashed in one dangerous burst, if and when an Iran agreement is signed. And while both men obviously share a rational appreciation of the ties that bind their countries, the past six years have shown that it is their mutual and arguably irrational mistrust that often determines their behavior.

Netanyahu subscribes to the Michael Oren view of Obama that sees the U.S. president as inherently hostile to Israel in general and to Netanyahu in particular. Whether it is Obama’s Muslim background, his Third World identity, his liberal upbringing, his Jewish-leftist indoctrination or any combination thereof; Netanyahu does not believe that the President has Israel’s best interests at heart. Famously asked by CNN’s Jim Costa a few months ago whether he trusts Obama, Netanyahu pointedly replied: 'I trust that the president is doing what he thinks is good for the United States.'

Obama’s view of Netanyahu isn’t any better. In his eyes, the Israeli prime minister’s policies endanger Israel’s Jewish identity and international standing and often force the U.S. into un-splendid isolation at world forums. Whether it’s his Likud upbringing, his conservative worldview or the cumulative effect of Sheldon Adelson’s influence and largesse, Netanyahu has repeatedly and openly sided with Obama’s political enemies and has often seemed to be gunning for Obama because of who and what he is, rather than the specific policies that he pursues.

The animosity and mistrust between the two has led to what some international relations experts describe, in a slightly different context, as a 'spiral model' of deteriorating ties: Steps taken by otherwise trustworthy countries are misinterpreted as manifesting hostility, leading to countermeasures that produce similar reactions on the other side.  In his book 'Trust and Mistrust in International Relations', University of Wisconsin’s Andrew Kydd highlights a factor of spiral models that seems particularly pertinent where Netanyahu and Obama are concerned: 'The tendency of actors with benign self-images to believe, without justification, that others share this benign image, so that if others engage in hostile behavior it must be a result of malevolence on their part.'

Thus, Netanyahu’s virulent opposition to the Iran deal and his willingness to delve in internal U.S. politics to block it are interpreted in the White House as manifestations of the Israeli prime minister’s personal animus and not of his conviction that the deal poses a truly existential danger. Similarly, Obama’s very willingness to engage with Iran as well as his support for Palestinian statehood aren’t simply an expression of American interests, as he sees them, but concrete proof of sinister intent.

A nuclear deal with Iran, if signed, would be an earth-shattering addition to this already quaking Middle East landscape. The fight for its approval in Congress, intertwined as it has become with election year politics, will be nothing short of furious. Nonetheless, under other circumstances, and with other leaders, there would be little doubt that the bedrock of U.S.-Israeli ties is strong enough to sustain it. With Netanyahu and Obama at the helm, there is a far greater danger of sustaining lasting damage.

And even if one ascribes equal blame to both leaders for the state of their union, in the end, only one of them is a superpower, and the other a strong but nonetheless utterly dependent ally. As Clinton once said, Netanyahu often seems to forget which is which."

Ends…

 

7/7 AND PROTECTIVE EDGE: In its editorial on Wednesday, The Jerusalem Post says that last summer's Gaza war and the terror attacks in London a decade ago help to illustrate the common threat Israel and other Western states face today as they come under attack by radical Islamists.

"Just one day after Israelis gathered on Jerusalem’s Mount Herzl Military Cemetery to mark a year since Operation Protective Edge, Britons held their own memorial service in London on Tuesday to commemorate the 10-year anniversary of a series of terrorist attacks on London’s Tube and bus networks.

These two seemingly arbitrary dates help to illustrate the common threat Israel and other Western states such as Britain face today as they come under attack by radical Islamists. France, Australia, Canada and Belgium have all seen acts of extreme violence that were directly or indirectly inspired by the ideology and aims of a violently reactionary stream of Islam.

A cult of death, a racist hatred of Jews, Hindus, Christians and 'unbelievers' and the desire to restore a long-vanished, despotic empire ruled by a medieval Muslim jurisprudence are the common features of the groups that carry out these attacks. In this sense, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are no different than Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra or other al-Qa’ida-affiliated organizations in the Middle East, Europe or elsewhere.

It is common for the news media, foreign political leaders and other shapers of world opinion to attempt to 'contextualize' the terrorist attacks directed at Israelis by Islamist groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. When Palestinians target civilians in drive-by shootings or ambushes and when they fire rockets and mortar shells at residents of the South, the aggression is framed within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For instance, an Agence France-Presse story on the Rosenfeld murder opined that 'West Bank settlements are considered illegal under international law and Israelis have been attacked previously in and around them, as well as in annexed east Jerusalem,' as though this somehow explained the reasoning behind it.

But this is a slippery slope. For if we are to buy in to the view that Jewish settlements are the root cause of Palestinian terrorism, or that the creation of a Jewish national homeland on 'Muslim land' in the wake of the Holocaust is the Jews’ original sin that justifies Palestinian retaliation, what is to prevent us from making similar causal relations between 7/7 and former British prime minister Tony Blair’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan or between 9/11 and U.S. imperialism or between the 2004 Madrid train bombings and Spain’s foreign policies? From the point of view of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, the dismantling of settlements in Judea and Samaria and the expulsion of Jews from the West Bank will not resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only the eradication of the Jewish state will. And even this will not bring about a change in Hamas’s charter, which includes The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Similarly, there is nothing short of a complete capitulation to Islamists’ dictates – the transformation of Europe into a caliphate, mass conversion, application of Shari’a law – that will appease the terrorists who carried out the attacks in London in 2005 and in Sousse less than two weeks ago.

The only reasonable option is to stand and fight for Western values, whether you find yourself in Jerusalem or London, Paris or Brussels. Those who look for 'root causes,' in contrast, will be doomed to make increasingly shameful capitulations.

At the same time, every effort should be made to search out and forge ties with any moderate elements in Palestinian society and in Israel’s Arab neighbors who realize the grave threat that Islamic State poses for them. A unified front against extremism is the only way to keep this side of the world safe and minimize the chances of another war in Gaza or another terrorist atrocity abroad."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION CRISIS: Serkan Demirtas believes that President Erdogan has stymied the political process in centre-left Radikal: "By failing to order the formation of a new government, President Erdogan has retained control in his hands. If he had issued a government formation mandate after June 18th or 23rd, he would have granted the parties a chance to compromise while they were still at the phase of digesting the election results in a moderate and self-questioning mood. Erdogan, who postponed this mandate till after the election of a parliament speaker, did not put this post up for bargaining and consequently opened up a deep rift between the parties."

Orhan Bursali argues that Erdogan is seeking the impossible in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The president of the republic is not ordering coalition talks to begin. He is making his calculations about early elections and the prospects of establishing a majority in parliament once again. This may lead him to adopt a phoenix-like mood. But as I see it, he wants the impossible-- looking for it and trying to get it. But for now, every path looks like a blind alley."

Mehmet Tezkan suggests that MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) leader Devlet Bahceli is playing a political game in centrist Milliyet: "Bahceli has not only rejected the CHP [Republican People's Party] but the AKP [Justice and Development Party] as well. He has put forward impossible conditions. For example, he has asked the president to vacate the [newly-built] palace in Bestepe. In short, Bahceli has said that he will not come to power. What does he actually want? Let us look for a possible answer. One: he may want to stay in opposition. Two: he may be playing for early elections in November. Three: he is demonstrating that he is not easy game. I believe that he will offer a compromise to the AKP at the very last minute, and join a coalition."

Fadime Ozkan predicts an AKP-led coalition in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The AKP, which the president is going to ask to form a government, has been sending the message that it is aware of its responsibility ever since the June 7th election. And there will be a coalition with the party that the AKP finds most common grounds with."

 

GREEK REFERENDUM: Oral Calislar reads a symbolic message into the results of the Greek referendum in Radikal: "The fact that more than 60 per cent of the Greek people have rejected the EU-enforced debt payment system points to a particular attitude and stance. This preference already began to manifest itself when voters supported Syriza led by Tsipras a couple of months ago. Can the Greek uprising be understood as the entire poor world asserting itself in this symbolic clash? Perhaps. Our heart is with our Greek neighbors."

Sami Kohen also detects a symbolic stand in Milliyet: "The message from the results of the Greek referendum is clear: the people object to the new austerity measures that Europe is trying to dictate, and they are challenging their creditors. In fact, the referendum was presented to the Greeks as a stick with two dirty ends. Regardless of whether it said ‘no’ or ‘yes’, the country would be unable to easily pull back from the edge of bankruptcy and the miserable situation of the people would continue. Thus, a significant majority acted on the idea of 'let us salvage our honor no matter what happens', and ultimately preferred to vote 'no'."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist E'temad wants to move forward: "As talks move towards the deadline, sanctions are still a point of contention. Their status is expected to be clarified by Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Sanctions are not the issue where Iran can be flexible. But, overcoming doubts and mistrust is not an easy task. In order to cross this stage and reach a brighter future, Iran and the U.S. should drop some of their not crucial demands and open a way forward."

Conservative Resalat contends that the ball is in the U.S. court: "The talks have reached a decisive stage. There are reports that an agreement is going to be reached soon, but the situation still remains unclear and ambiguous. The reason is the change in the positions of the other side. The United States has the largest share in this game and the ball is obviously in the U.S. court. No agreement will be reached unless Obama makes a final decision to resolve the differences."

Reformist Sharq puts an agreement in its appropriate place: "The nuclear agreement is not like Moses's wand that can produce miracles for Iran's economy by reducing the inflation rate, creating jobs for 6m jobless, overcoming chronic corruption, etc... The agreement cannot instantly improve our relations with some neighbouring countries or create a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. However, the agreement is a historic turning point not only for Iran, but also for the whole world. Many Western commentators already describe it as one of the greatest, most complicated, and most successful negotiations since World War II. If we can reach an agreement on difficult and complicated nuclear issues with the U.S., is it not possible to reach an agreement in other fields as well?" 

Conservative Hemayat does not believe that the West wants to conclude "The West wants the talks not to end. They want a situation, where Iran remains under cruel pressure and not reach results. The current situation is very desirable for them, so they speak about the extension of talks and intend to continue bluffing. They say that if an agreement is reached, they will not sign it because this will not be a treaty or pact. They will not be happy if this file is concluded and stabilized."

Conservative Quds is not pleased: "It is not clear whether the agreement is going to be a statement or signed by the parties. According to what Iranian senior negotiator Abbas Araqchi told the media, it seems that the parties have decided not to sign. This model of a final deal is not free of problems and is open to criticism."

Reformist Arman points to some difficulties: "It is necessary to remember that the final text is being prepared under circumstances where the sides do not fully trust each other. They have demands that are often irreconcilable. Moreover, in Congress and among the countries of the region, there are opponents that act as pressure levers. There are also groups inside Iran that want maximum firmness; a paradigm that is not compatible with the complicated reality of the case. In order to be resolved, the nuclear case needs more flexibility. Another significant issue is how disputes will be resolved. The best option is an impartial committee that is trusted by the sides and is based on non-political legal data."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz writes of an intermediate agreement: "The ups and downs in the talks indicate the political will of the parties to conclude and achieve a reasonable and acceptable agreement. This spirit has not been created due to desire, willingness, or acceptance, but rather out of the desperation of being forced to accept Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Steadfastness in the face of their excesses and breach of promises led to their retreat from incorrect positions and a revision of their demands. From a realistic perspective, an intermediate agreement, neither good nor bad, is expected to be reached at the end of the talks."

Conservative Khorasan considers differences in the opposite camp: "Europeans do not want to be part of the domestic conflicts between the Obama administration and Congress. They are in a hurry to lift sanctions. They have no patience to wait for Congress to express its opinions on a possible deal. Moscow and Beijing also disagree with the U.S. on the issue of arms sanctions. The Americans want to maintain the ban on the sale of conventional weapons to Iran for a long time, but Russia and China will start significant security-strategic cooperation with Iran after the presumed deal. Little by little the veil of infinite optimism and unreasonable pessimism about the talks is dropping."

 

QUDS DAY: Hard-line Javan has high expectations: "The presence of millions of people at this year's Quds Day rallies on Friday July 10 has a different meaning than in the past. It is a day that will switch attention from minor fronts to the Zionist regime and world arrogance which are the Muslims' main front. It will manifest unity and national cohesion against arrogance at the nuclear talks. This great participation invalidates the enemies' illusion that sanctions can defeat the will of the Iranian nation. It will also support our diplomats on the frontline to stand against the excessive demands of the arrogant to be able to reach a good deal that will pave the way for strengthening the central front of the Muslim world."

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN:  Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami blames Israel: "The Saudis have been bombing Yemen for 103 days now, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching people affected by the war. Yemeni children are suffering before the eyes of the world, but the United Nations is doing nothing to stop this unjust war. Everyone knows that the Zionist regime and international Zionism are behind the Saudi ruling family and UN resolutions. With its clout in the U.S. and at the UN, the Zionist lobby started the war in Yemen to suppress the Yemeni people's revolution. It was to be done by the Al Saud family, who has had an insatiable appetite to devour the land of Yemen for many years. The Zionists want the world to forget the important issue of Palestine by engaging the minds of Muslims in the Yemeni war and the atrocities of Takfiris in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Afghanistan; to give the Zionist regime a new opportunity to triumph."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Fear of failure, the danger of success

2-Flawed logic

3-Time for Amman to decide

 

1-Fear of failure, the danger of success

 

We are witnessing a game of cautious statements that reveal the legitimate fear of last-minute failure. This is not merely a case of wariness at the possibility that 'the devil lies in the details.' That devil has been lying there all along in the most minute details that the Iranians are adept at scrutinizing, analyzing, and extracting the implications of their comas, full stops, and semi-colons – unlike the Arabs who do not concern themselves with such unimportant issues… The fear of last-minute failure also stems from the fact that there are those lying in wait for this agreement, whether imminent or unlikely. They begin with [Israeli PM] Netanyahu who has already brought us the glad tidings of the great powers' 'collapse' before Iran. And they do not end with the U.S. Congress and its two Republican houses, as well as with numerous regional capitals that are still waiting to find out what this final Tuesday will produce, without holding a single card or having any political or geopolitical credit with which to 'fight' or threaten a likely agreement they believe will expose their interests to danger--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The American elite that spins in Obama's orbit is stressing that the agreement will alter Iran's behavior for the better. It will also open broad horizons for bilateral cooperation between the two countries, adding that trade and investments will impel the Iranian regime to abandon its expansionist dreams of empire and force it to focus more on domestic affairs. This view – which continues to lie at the core of the Obama administration's logic when discussing the threats that may arise from its agreement with Iran – is both exceedingly idealistic and naïve. Historical precedents with other countries have demonstrated how wrong it is. Similar things were previously said about China, Russia, and North Korea; but the result is what we see in the world today: greater intransigence, more internal repression and further external expansionism. To assume otherwise is to disregard the nature of these regimes and the fact that this cannot be changed by wishful thinking, but by action on the ground--Ali Hussein Bakeer in Qatari al-Arab

 

The coming hours are of historic proportions, as the Vienna talks on Iran's nuclear program reach their conclusion, says a Jordanian commentator. While there are signs of an imminent agreement, there is good reason for caution because many parties around the world have an interest in blocking it. An agreement will be catastrophic for the region and will only pave the way for a more aggressive and expansionist Iran that is closer than ever to acquiring a nuclear bomb, claims a commentator in a Qatari daily. And this is all the fault of the Obama administration.

 

THE SEVENTH DAY OF THE SEVENTH MONTH: "Today, the 7th day of the 7th month of 2015, will enter history through its widest gates," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

It will do so whether the participants in Vienna's long nuclear marathon reach an agreement, which will be described as 'historic,' or if the hard-liners and the advocates of military solutions and preemptive strikes defeat those seeking to spare the region (and the world) the catastrophic consequences of beating the war drums.

The latter prefer the diplomacy of warships and stealth fighters and fleets that sail the Gulf waters. These waters are already teeming with naval mines, suicide attack boats and aircraft carriers, just as they are teeming with tankers carrying oil and gas extracted from Arab lands whose returns are being consumed in the Arabs and Muslims' internal wars. They end up, in fact, in the hands of those who hold the keys to coffers and sovereign funds, and consequently to the future of the region's rulers. For they are the ones who decide on the candidates to succeed these rulers or to topple them and hold them behind bars – or bury them, six feet under.

Early today or perhaps, the sunset hours, will be decisive for knowing whether the long years of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program will reach a 'happy' conclusion, or whether they will drive the '5 + 1' foreign ministers, who rushed back to Vienna, to pack their bags and leave the famous hotel hosting the shuttle negotiations, with frowns on their faces.

For a moment yesterday, these same faces seemed to be smiling after statements by [Iranian FM] Zarif, [U.S. Secretary of State] Kerry, and Mogherini spread a climate of optimism. For it is no simple matter for EU Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini to say that agreement was 'imminent.' John Kerry subsequently emerged, put his crutches aside and addressed the media succinctly, but with clear implications: The time has come for the negotiations to reach an end. This was especially significant since he said this immediately after 'agreeing' with Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif's statement that 'we are now closer to an agreement than at any time before.'

We are witnessing a game of cautious statements that reveal the legitimate fear of last-minute failure. This is not merely a case of wariness at the possibility that 'the devil lies in the details.' That devil has been lying there all along in the most minute details that the Iranians are adept at scrutinizing, analyzing, and extracting the implications of their comas, full stops, and semi-colons – unlike the Arabs who do not concern themselves with such unimportant issues. (We have in Sadat's Camp David and 'Abbas's Oslo [1979 and 1993 agreements with Israel], the best examples of this Arab mentality that is exhausted by details, is unconcerned with national sovereignty, and is uninterested in reading between the lines).

The fear of last-minute failure also stems from the fact that there are those lying in wait for this agreement, whether imminent or unlikely. They begin with [Israeli PM] Netanyahu who has already brought us the glad tidings of the great powers' 'collapse' before Iran. And they do not end with the U.S. Congress and its two Republican houses, as well as with numerous regional capitals that are still waiting to find out what this final Tuesday will produce, without holding a single card or having any political or geopolitical credit with which to 'fight' or threaten a likely agreement they believe will expose their interests to danger.

Most of these (mostly Arab) capitals are relying on rusty but dangerous tools, namely, sectarian and confessional incitement without realizing that they will turn against them and prove more harmful to them than to others. That truly requires them to reconsider their policies and strategies (if any), and to redefine their enemies and revise their priorities.

Last minute haggling is common in diplomacy and in negotiations between friends, but especially between enemies. They are common whether the antagonists have just emerged from long and destructive wars, or have veered towards the option of negotiations before the warplanes are launched and the fire breaks out. This is why the Iranians are displaying a sort of calm that tries to disguise a clear concern that is evident on the faces of the Iranian negotiating team, despite the smiling face of the head of Iranian diplomacy, Zarif.

For Tehran realizes that there are those who wish to destroy all the 'achievements' accumulated by [Iranian President] Rowhani and Zarif ever since the former came to power. It realizes that there are those lying in wait for this duo both inside and outside Iran. And this requires the Iranian negotiating team to exert greater efforts to prevent the talks from collapse, and to display some flexibility, relative of course, regarding some of the details that the American and French sides are insisting on (even though the French want a slice of the Iranian cake for themselves, and do not want to cause the negotiations to collapse).

Such details include unconditional visits by international inspectors to Iranian military facilities, the interrogation of Iranian nuclear scientists, and other technical issues that Tehran fears are just a pretext used to destroy its (peaceful) nuclear program or to spy on it and discover the identity of its scientists, exposing them to assassination as happened to some of their colleagues in the past.

No qualitative breakthrough has been achieved in the Vienna talks yet, even though everyone is speaking of the emergence of a suitable basis for 'understandings'. And this leads us to the conclusion that the '5 + 1' group, as well as Iran, will not risk closing the door to negotiations once and for all, even if this leads to a limited and final extension, and especially since the Iranians continue to declare that they 'will not bind themselves to any specific time for reaching an agreement.'

"Do the Americans accept this 'logic'? The coming hours will tell," concludes Kharroub.

End…

 

HEADING TO DISASTER: "With each passing day, it is becoming more and more certain that we are heading towards disaster, thanks to Obama's policies and the now imminent agreement with the mullahs' regime," writes Ali Hussein Bakeer in Tuesday's Qatari daily al-Arab.

This is the same regime that the U.S. State Department's report says is pursuing and backing terrorism in various areas of the region and the world.

In an article a few days ago in The Washington Post entitled 'The Worst Agreement in U.S. Diplomatic History,' [U.S. columnist] Charles Krauthammer provides an excellent summary of the expected results of the U.S./Iranian nuclear negotiations and the agreement that will soon be born. He writes: 'Obama will get his ‘legacy’, Kerry will get his Nobel, and Iran will get the bomb.'

Until then, many people wonder how the agreement will affect Iran and its behavior. The American elite that spins in Obama's orbit is stressing that the agreement will alter Iran's behavior for the better. It will also open broad horizons for bilateral cooperation between the two countries, adding that trade and investments will impel the Iranian regime to abandon its expansionist dreams of empire and force it to focus more on domestic affairs.

This view – which continues to lie at the core of the Obama administration's logic when discussing the threats that may arise from its agreement with Iran – is both exceedingly idealistic and naïve. Historical precedents with other countries have demonstrated how wrong it is. Similar things were previously said about China, Russia, and North Korea; but the result is what we see in the world today: greater intransigence, more internal repression and further external expansionism. To assume otherwise is to disregard the nature of these regimes and the fact that this cannot be changed by wishful thinking, but by action on the ground.

Some officials close to Obama have already begun to sense that this assessment is correct. Numerous articles have been written by distinguished figures, and statements have been issued by former senior members of the Obama administration, warning that the agreement in its current form would be a catastrophe. It would lead to an Iran that is more savage and aggressive in its regional foreign policy; one that is more supportive of terrorism and terrorist attacks, as well as being more immune to any foreign pressure or sanctions. At the same time, Iran will maintain a huge industrial nuclear program. Moreover, the agreement does nothing to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and remains full of loopholes, in the absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the regional threats that Iran poses.

In his statement at the end of June before the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, Ray Takyeh – an Iranian/American Middle East scholar and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations – said that the agreement is most likely to lead to the birth of an extremist theocratic regime with an industrial-scale nuclear program. In his testimony, Takyeh says that Khamene'i will have enough time to rearrange the domestic scene; for he is only interested in Iran’s economic welfare inasmuch as it serves his divine mission of protecting and exporting the Iranian Revolution that recognizes no borders.

The irony here is that a number of experts on Iranian affairs are still claiming that the agreement could strengthen what they refer to as the 'moderates' in Iran. But they do not realize that the Iranian classification of currents that belong the same spectrum into 'moderates,' 'conservatives,' and 'extremists' has no real value. It only has value insofar as it serves the aims of the supreme leader and allows Iran to persist with its domestic and foreign strategy of distributing roles and blocking the path before any real opposition.

In this regard, some are forgetting – or pretending to forget – that Rowhani and his negotiating team would not have been in power or in the nuclear negotiations had the supreme leader [Ayatollah Khamene’i] not allowed it. From this perspective, those whom some describe as 'moderates' are only there to serve Khamene'i. As soon as their role in securing a nuclear agreement in accordance with Khamene'i's criteria ends, they will be dropped.

For reaching a nuclear agreement will improve the extremists’ chances because Khamene’i will need a hard-line team to defend the agreement later, and to expand in the region in anticipation of any American retreat.

"After the moderates' mission ends, Iran will be closer to a nuclear bomb than any time before," concludes Bakeer.

Ends…

 

 

2-Flawed logic

 

President Putin’s suggestion for a new regional anti-ISIS coalition makes perfect sense but for the fatal flaw of including the Syrian regime as a partner, says 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in today's Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

The Russian proposal to form a regional alliance to fight ISIS would have made perfect sense had it not included the Syrian regime, argues a veteran Saudi commentator. For it certainly makes more sense to rely on moderate Sunnis to fight extremist Sunnis, than to rely on extremist Shiites such as Iran to fight extremist Sunnis, as the Americans are proposing.

 

‘A VERY LARGE MIRACLE’: "What the Syrian foreign minister said in response to a proposal by the Russian president a week ago is correct," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Walid al-Mu'allem said: 'I know that Russia is a country that performs miracles; but for us to form an alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the U.S. – that calls for a very large miracle.'

I also believe that President Vladimir Putin was right in believing that only such an alliance can defeat ISIS. My only objection is that the inclusion of the Syrian regime in its present form will foil the proposal. Russia can perform a great miracle if it pushes for a Syrian regime without Assad, based on the [June 2012] Geneva-1 Conference. It can build an alliance that includes the Gulf states, Turkey, and Jordan to combat ISIS. With such a bloc, I am sure that it will be possible to destroy terrorism and to ensure Syria's stability and the region and the world's safety.

The problem with the Russian project as explained by President Putin stems from the belittlement of the disagreement with Assad. Putin believes that the war in Syria is a mere misunderstanding between neighbors, and that they can reconcile and cooperate in order to fight international terrorism – i.e., ISIS. Putin specified the states he has in mind as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan.

The problem is not in the idea, but in the list of states eligible to join the alliance. The problem is not one of misunderstanding. We know each other very well. We tolerated the Syrian regime when in the past decade it killed Lebanon's former PM Rafiq al-Hariri as well as twenty other Lebanese leaders. But after it has killed over a quarter-of-a-million Syrians and displaced another nine million over the past four years, the relationship with the regime was completely destroyed. It is no longer possible to mend the broken glass. Reconciliation is not just difficult; it is impossible. It will aggravate the disturbances in the region and keep the ISIS fire burning.

The other point, and steering clear of any hatred, is that we need to understand the geopolitical changes that are occurring. We are dealing a region whose map is being formed. Washington is submitting to the new reality that Iran is imposing via its nuclear project and the expansion of its geographical domination of Syria and Iraq. This threatens the very existence of the Gulf states, Turkey, and Jordan. It dangerously upsets the balance of power with Egypt that has been in place for half-a-century.

The Iranians today are administering the regimes of two major countries, Iraq and Syria. If Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were to ally with Assad, that would amount to recognition of Iran's domination of Syria! It is too dangerous for the Gulf states and Turkey to ignore Iran’s march and view the problem from a single angle, that of terrorism and ISIS in particular. Iran's threat is greater than that posed by ISIS. This is a fact that should always be taken into consideration.

Although the regional Assad/Saudi/Turkish/Jordanian alliance proposed by the Russians is a good idea in its choice of the states that can confront ISIS, pitting the moderate Sunnis against the extremist Sunnis, including Assad ruins this religious/political equation.

In fact, however, what the Russian president is proposing is more logical than what the American officials have been suggesting. The latter have demonstrated that they do not distinguish between sects and do not understand the region’s complex history. Putin is asking the Sunnis to fight the Sunnis. He is asking the 'Sunni' states, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan to fight the Sunni terrorist group, ISIS. The Americans by contrast, are asking for the help of the Iranians, the extremist Shiites, to fight the Sunnis' extremists. This is a terrible mistake because it will enhance ISIS's power not decrease it. Sunnis from around the world will rise to back their co-religionists. And since the overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnis, the threat will multiply.

It is a grave mistake for the Americans to be seeking the Iranians' help. This will not enable them to destroy religious terrorism in the region; it will simply add fuel to its fire. For al-Qa’ida and ISIS's entire concept is based on stoking a historical confessional conflict led by extremists, resembling the Thirty Years War between the Protestants and the Catholics in mid-17th century Europe that brought destruction, famine, disease, and bankruptcy in its wake.

In the past decade, Saudi Arabia succeeded in defeating al-Qa’ida after a bloody war. The Americans also succeeded in defeating al-Qa’ida and its [Iraqi-based] leader az-Zarqawi, only after seeking the help of the Sunni clans. Fighting ISIS and religious extremism may take longer or shorter. It may take twenty years, which is how long the war with al-Qa’ida has lasted, since 1996. And it may take only three years.

"The matter depends entirely on who is fighting terrorism – on whether it is the Assad regime and the supreme leader's regime in Iran, or whether it is Turkey together with Saudi Arabia and Jordan!" concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

3-Time for Amman to decide

 

It seems that Jordan’s political decision is now tending towards an urgent return to the axis to which Jordan has traditionally belonged; one that does not view itself as far from the Saudi axis. But we should also not ignore a logical analysis of the three Jordanian messages: First, the hint at intervention in the Syrian south (at least via arming the Syrian [Sunni] clans). Second, the message implicit in hosting those taking up arms against the Syrian regime. Third, the message that undermines the suggestion of a rapprochement with Tehran by announcing that a terrorist cell linked to the Qods Brigade has been arrested, and the symbolism implied by the fact that the ring-leader is Iraqi. All three messages suggest that Jordan wishes to line up with the Saudi-led axis by expressing hostility to Riyadh’s enemies, and moving harmoniously in tandem with the changes in Riyadh’s position--'Amer as-Sabaileh on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Nothing is left for the Arab/international [Syrian opposition] intelligence room to do in Amman. Wisdom requires its immediate disbandment and the initiation of serious contacts between Amman and Damascus. The aim should be the following: First, ending the political estrangement and the beginning of a process of dual and tripartite coordination (with Iraq) in order to agree on a common political and security vision. Second, the formation of a joint Jordanian/Syrian/Iraqi security operations room to confront terrorist expansion, and prepare a united plan to liquidate the armed and terrorist groups operating in southern Syria and al-Anbar, preventing their expansion towards Jordan. Third, making a start in resolving the Syrian refugee problem via cooperation between the two countries’ interior ministries, and in tandem with the operations that are meant to restore security in southern Syria--Nahed Hattar in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The assault on the Syrian regime in the Jordanian media and the announcement that an Iranian-linked terrorist cell has been uncovered in Amman, are intended as messages to Riyadh indicating that Amman wishes to realign itself with the Saudi-led axis, maintains a Jordanian commentator.  The failure of the opposition’s offensive in southern Syria that was planned and coordinated by a joint operation room in Amman has exposed the tension between two wings of the Jordanian state, claims another Jordanian commentator. One camp that includes the King and some of his neo-liberal cohorts supported the attack; and the other that includes the state bureaucracy has opposed it. It is time for Amman to take the initiative and reconcile with Damascus.

 

SAUDI TURNAROUND: "The region is witnessing major developments and transformations resulting from the pace and dynamism of events in general, and in the Syrian situation in particular," writes 'Amer as-Sabaileh on Tuesday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The Saudi turnaround, as manifest from the results of the visit to Moscow by [Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister] Mohammad bin Salman, the strongest and most youthful figure on the Saudi scene, and in his meeting with President Putin, represents a major turning point in the manner with which the most important crisis in the region – the Syrian crisis – will be addressed.

A few days after Mohammad bin Salman's visit, and during a meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem, President Putin decided to erect a ladder for everyone to climb down, by proposing to form an anti-terrorism alliance. President Putin said that ISIS targets everyone and that it is therefore possible for it to serve as the common denominator between all the countries that are currently fighting it out in the region.

On the other hand, this initiative should not be viewed as the mere 'ruminations of a dreamer.' It was proposed by no less a person than President Putin, and only a few days after meeting with the Saudi prince. On the other hand, the Russian/Turkish Stream Project [natural gas pipeline] has now moved to the phase of implementation, which means that the two parties to the conflict in Syria – Turkey and Saudi Arabia – are now closer to Moscow than at any time before.

To this one should add the extensive crisis now facing Europe and those countries that are obstructing a political solution in Syria as a result of the Greek crisis, Moscow’s clear support for Greece, and the Turkish Stream Project that is on its way to the region. All these factors offer Moscow new strategic cards. They undoubtedly place the Syrian crisis back on track towards a solution. And this means that many parties will need to reconsider their positions and policies.

At the Jordanian level, there have been recent attempts to deal with these transformations by restructuring many outstanding issues, especially those that have to do with alliances and their future shape.  Those observing Jordanian activity can conclude that its character is the product of an exceptionally bureaucratic- and security-oriented mentality. The Jordanian state is apparently trying to rearrange its historical alliances, especially after a phase of wildly divergent options and a cooling down of the country’s relations with certain countries.

The recent weeks have witnessed noticeable escalation against the Syrian regime in the Jordanian media. This was followed by the appearance of [hard-line Saudi Sunni cleric] al-'Arifi in northern Jordan. This cannot be viewed in isolation of Jordan’s re-positioning strategy. The message is political in nature at two levels – that of media escalation against Syria, and that of reassuring Saudi Arabia.

But the most important message was the announcement that a terrorist cell linked to the Iranian al-Qods Brigade that was allegedly planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan has been uncovered. In political terms this means that any previous or subsequent attempts to achieve an Iranian/Jordanian rapprochement have been undermined, at least for the short term.

Well-informed sources confirm that Jordan’s move towards Tehran was not serious to begin with. It was more of a tactic meant to stir up some of the stagnant files in the region. People close to Saudi decision-making circles said that [Jordanian Foreign Minister] Nasser Judeh's visit to Tehran without prior Saudi/Jordanian coordination fell like a clap of thunder on the new Saudi administration. And this is to say nothing of the absence of personal chemistry between the figures of the new Saudi administration and most former Jordanian envoys to Riyadh – which explains the powerful reemergence of Bassem 'Awadallah, the former head of the Royal Court, in dealing with the crisis of Jordanian diplomatic representation that can no longer be disguised.

The attempt to emerge from the condition of 'zero-gains' today is taking the form of steps that precede a Jordanian turnaround. This will not stop at the point of the implicit messages in the media [attacks on Syrian regime] or security [busting the Iranian cell]. It must be followed by some fundamental changes that will restore the Jordanian administration's political prestige and reorder its strategic alliances.

It seems that Jordan’s political decision is now tending towards an urgent return to the axis to which Jordan has traditionally belonged; one that does not view itself as far from the Saudi axis. But we should also not ignore a logical analysis of the three Jordanian messages:

- First, the hint at intervention in the Syrian south (at least via arming the Syrian [Sunni] clans).

- Second, the message implicit in hosting those taking up arms in Syria against the regime.

-Third, the message that undermines the suggestion of a rapprochement with Tehran by announcing that a terrorist cell linked to the Qods Brigade has been arrested, and the symbolism implied by the fact that the ringleader is Iraqi.

All three messages suggest that Jordan wishes to line up with the Saudi-led axis by expressing hostility to Riyadh’s enemies, and moving harmoniously in tandem with the changes in Riyadh’s position.

"But the content of these messages confirm that a return to Saudi Arabia can only be achieved via a single gateway, namely, that of security. For the security message succinctly says that political relations can only be addressed from a security perspective," concludes Sabaileh.

End…

 

DEFINITIVE STATEMENT: “‘We will not intervene militarily in Syria, not today and not tomorrow’: This is how Jordanian PM ‘Abdullah an-Nsour settled the matter in a definitive statement,” writes Nahed Hattar in the left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

It is as if the defeat suffered by the Military Operations Center (MOC) groups was also inflicted upon Nsour’s local opponents – liberals and others. These have now gone silent and the voice of the state bureaucracy representatives has risen, after keeping silent while waiting for the outcome of the adventure in which the Palace, the liberals linked to the American neo-cons and their Israeli and Arab Gulf allies insisted on pursuing in southern Syria.

There is much talk of Jordanian security leaks that were passed on to the Syrian army, enabling the latter to expose the details of Operation Southern Storm even before it was carried out. At the very least, there are those who assert that the coordinates of the meeting-place of the Nusra Front leaders and those of other terrorist groups allied to it in the ‘evil storm’ were passed on to the Syrian side by the Jordanians. If true, this explains the Jordanians silent welcome for the Russian initiative calling for an alliance with the Syrian regime to fight terrorism.

It is worth noting that [last week’s] report of the details of that adventure published by the Financial Times is old. It was written on the eve of Operation Southern Storm and not after its failure. It spoke of the Kingdom’s plans to follow in the terrorists’ footsteps after they succeed in taking control of the ground in southern Syria and establish two areas: One for housing refugees, and another as a buffer zone that would separate Jordan from ISIS which, in Tadmur [Palmyra], is only a few tens of kilometers away from the Jordanian borders.

The Royal Palace – and its supporters – headed towards a risky adventure that only lasted for days, even though it had been prepared for months, with the banners of the Arab Hashemite Kingdom raised high and with heated statements. All that evaporated in 24 hours, not only because the Syrian army and the resistance [Hizbollah] were lying in wait for the invading terrorist groups on both the Hadar/Suweida’ front and Der’a fronts. It was also and fundamentally because the local societies in both these invaded areas displayed their loyalty to the Syrian national state and turned the plans for partition into dust.

The Saudis and Turks also failed to inform Amman of their contacts with the Russians regarding reconciliation with Damascus. As a result, King ‘Abdullah II and the leading Court figures found themselves isolated at the Jordanian, Arab, regional, and international levels. They therefore had no option but to climb aboard the train.

Had the late King Hussein been in power, with his famous political sensibility, it would have been only a matter of hours before he piloted his own plane to Damascus. But the current King, ‘Abdullah II, is weighed down by heavy domestic shackles. He will wait until Washington and Riyadh raise their heads from the sand, before he makes a 180-degrees turn, picks up the phone, and asks to coordinate with President Bashar al-Assad. In other words, King ‘Abdullah II will wait to see in which direction the Americans and the Saudis will head.

Those willing to forget the socio-political history of countries can say whatever they like about King Hussein’s policies. But they still have to acknowledge two things: First, that the periods of friendly Jordanian/Saudi relations were limited and always superficial; and, second, that King Hussein pursued relatively independent policies from the U.S, as in his opposition to the [Egyptian-Israeli 1979] Camp David Accords and siding with late president Saddam Hussein in 1990. King Hussein hated the Saudis, and the feeling was mutual. Before the unfortunate 1994 Wadi ‘Araba Accord [Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty] Jordanian policy kept shifting within an eastern Arab framework in tandem with Syria and Iraq.

In the mid-1980s, when the late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad had already won the main round against the Muslim Brotherhood gangs – some of whom had trained and armed themselves in Jordan – the King appeared on TV and publicly apologized to the Syrian president and to Syria. That occurred prior to Arab and international reconciliations with Damascus. So, has the time come for King ‘Abdullah II to do the same, and to offer the required apology?

President Hafez al-Assad’s policies towards Jordan were always grounded in a realistic outlook. Since 1970, he opposed any political change in the country no matter how glittery its slogans, since that would have created a situation where Jordan could have fallen into the trap of the plan for an ‘alternative homeland’ [for the Palestinians]. President Bashar al-Assad inherited and pursued the same policy, despite the fact that the Kingdom’s decision-makers did not manifest the same sense of responsibility. Therefore, Damascus will continue to open its arms to reconciliation with Amman, despite all the harm done to it.

Nothing is left for the Arab/international intelligence MOC room to do in Amman. Wisdom requires its immediate disbandment and the initiation of serious contacts between Amman and Damascus. The aim should be the following:

- First, ending the political estrangement and the beginning of a process of dual and tripartite coordination (with Iraq) in order to agree on a common political and security vision.

- Second, the formation of a joint Jordanian/Syrian/Iraqi security operations room to confront terrorist expansion, and prepare a united plan to liquidate the armed and terrorist groups operating in southern Syria and al-Anbar, preventing their expansion towards Jordan.

- Third, making a start in resolving the Syrian refugee problem via cooperation between the two countries’ interior ministries, and in tandem with the operations that are meant to restore security in southern Syria.

If Dr. ‘Abdullah an-Nsour’s government, the Jordanian state’s civilian and military bureaucracy and the clans prove unable to impose this soon, Jordan will be confronting three major disasters:

“First, it will have to simply follow in the footsteps of the Arab and regional reconciliation [with Damascus] without receiving anything in return and without being at its vanguard; second, a terrorist explosion with the infiltration of Jordanian territories by terrorist groups, and, third, preparation for the resettlement of no less than one-million Syrian refugees permanently [in Jordan],” concludes Hattar.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Waiting for the deal

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Tuesday editions with the announcement Monday that the IDF is establishing a new Commando Division, which will institute new training protocols and missions for some of the army's elite units: Duvdevan, Maglan, Egoz, and Rimon. The new division will incorporate the special skills of each of the units – for example, elite Duvedvan fighters specialize in urban combat, while Egoz troops specialize in anti-guerilla warfare in all settings – designing missions that will further enhance the capabilities of the army, especially in emergency situations.

The plan was announced by IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot. The new division is part of a reorganization of the army, which the IDF is undertaking in order to more effectively respond to new threats, a spokesperson said. Commanding the division will be IDF Reserve General Ofer Winter. Winter achieved media notoriety last year when, speaking to soldiers who were on their way to the front in Operation Protective Edge, said that, 'We are now setting off to fight the terrorist enemy in Gaza, who curses and stamps their feet at the God of Israel.'

Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post lead with Iran. Both papers headline the fact that Tuesday’s deadline for an agreement between Iran and the six world powers now seems unlikely to be met, after the world powers objected to some of Iran’s new demands Monday – including a call to lift an arms sales ban on the Islamic Republic.

According to Haaretz, however, a deal is still widely expected to be reached by this weekend, since negotiators view the latest Iranian moves as mere brinkmanship. Despite declarations on both sides that they are ready to walk away – which may be intended in part to help market the agreement to both Iranian and American public opinion – neither wants to be the one who actually prevented a deal at the last minute, Haaretz says.

Responding to the latest developments in Vienna, the White House announced on Monday night that a lasting agreement with Iran must proceed along the lines of the framework, signed in April. According to the framework agreement, Iran's military installations would be placed under international supervision and sanctions against the Islamic Republic would be ended gradually. According to Ynet, an unnamed German diplomat has stated that the nuclear negotiations may still end in failure. 'We should not underestimate important questions that remain unresolved. There will not be an agreement at any cost. If there is no movement on decisive points, a failure is not ruled out,' he said, anonymously.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that there is no breakthrough in the Iran nuclear talks, but a breakdown. In remarks at a meeting with the visiting Greek foreign minister, Netanyahu said that it is better not to reach a deal at all, than to sign on a bad one. Haaretz also adds that that Netanyahu is now readying himself for an all-out war on the nuclear deal – with the focus of his attention on Capitol Hill in Washington. Barak Ravid says that Netanyahu's goal was and remains to enlist enough members from both houses of Congress to vote against the nuclear deal with Iran when President Obama puts it on the docket. And according to the report, the prime minister seems optimistic about his chances. One source told the newspaper that Netanyahu recently told Jewish-American leaders that the battle is not lost.

Finally, the papers report on the arrest of six residents of the Bedouin town of Hora, in the Negev, for allegedly supporting ISIS. Of the six, four are teachers who are suspected of exploiting their position to spread ISIS ideology among their students. Allegedly, some of the suspects had planned to travel to Syria to join Islamic State. The Shin Bet has questioned other teachers who are believed to have been aware of their colleagues' activities, and a school principal who is suspected of looking the other way, instead of cracking down on the activities of the teachers.

 

 

THE SCIENCE OF SELLING: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman says that the nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers comes down to the Americans marketing an Iranian plan for regional domination.

"In Washington, they have already written the speech that U.S. President Barack Obama will deliver once the nuclear agreement with Iran is signed. The agreement stands on two legs, both of which are extremely precarious. The first leg determines that Iran will remain a year away from the breakthrough point when it has enough enriched uranium to manufacture a nuclear bomb. The second leg deals with the tight regime of inspection on the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities, which will last around a decade. All the rest – how inspections will take place in the future, what Iran will be obligated to reveal about its past nuclear activities, when sanctions will be lifted and under what circumstances they will be imposed anew – is a mixture of legal jargon which will, over time, wipe out any of the achievements that the White House thinks it has made.

The Iranians continue to drive the Americans crazy right up to the last moment. Earlier this week, they made a new demand that had not been part of the negotiating process thus far. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif demanded out of the blue that all limitations on Iranian production of ballistic missiles be lifted. This is a total violation of all of the understandings that were reached over Iran's agreement to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. Until yesterday, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, along with the German representative to the talks, tried to understand whether this was a genuine demand from the Iranians, or whether it was merely another attempt to extract concessions from the Western powers. The Iranians are continuing to exert pressure and they will do so right up to the deadline for signing an agreement – and maybe even afterwards. Why? Because they can.

On July 9, the U.S. Congress will go on its summer recess. By July 8, the Obama Administration must present Congress with the detailed agreement, including all and any appendices. According to the U.S. Constitution, Congress has 30 days to inspect and approve the document. If the agreement is submitted after July 9, the whole deal will be put on ice for at least two months. The Obama Administration rightly believes that two months is too long and that opponents of the agreement in both houses will have an opportunity to try and nix it. If, however, the agreement is submitted for Congressional approval now, the administration has the requisite majority needed to approve it. That is why experts in Jerusalem are convinced that the deal will be signed this week.

In this campaign, Israel – which has been waging a 15-year rearguard action – has lost. The Israeli defense establishment is already dealing with the day after: what bundle of compensation will Israel demand from the United States, what strategy will Israel adopt in this new era and how much money will be invested in dealing with the Iranian threat. It is highly likely that Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, who is in Italy this week, will share with his hosts Israel's concerns about the agreement.

Last weekend, the United States and the Europeans overcame one of the last major hurdles by establishing a path that bypasses the Security Council. The Iranians were keen that any alleged violation of the agreement on their part be taken directly to the Security Council, where they would enjoy the automatic veto power of the Chinese and the Russians, which would ensure that sanctions are not imposed anew. But the Western powers managed to pass a resolution that established a seven-member committee, on which the Americans have a permanent majority of four. This committee would have the power to determine whether Iran has violated the terms of the agreement and whether sanctions should be re-imposed. However, the Iranians would also have the right to submit as many complaints as they like if the Western powers were to fail to abide by the timetable and terms of the agreement – which would inundate and paralyze the committee.

The Americans have put all of their eggs in the International Atomic Energy Agency basket. The IAEA is supposed to examine what Iran is up to in terms of its nuclear-military activity and it is also supposed to keep close tabs on whether Iran is living up to its future commitments. Thus far, however, the Iranians have not allowed a single IAEA inspector to visit their military facilities and to examine its past activities. As for the future, the Iranians continue to insist that any 'spontaneous' visit to any of its military facilities be coordinated in advance with Tehran.

As soon as the agreement is signed, the Iranians will get $150 billion that have been frozen in western banks. Now they are also demanding the immediate cancellation of all the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the lifting, within six months, of sanctions imposed by the U.S. Congress. The Americans have responded: Iran can get the money, but the Security Council sanctions and the Congressional sanctions will only be lifted once the International Atomic Energy Agency files its report on the Islamic Republic's previous attempts to obtain military nuclear capability. That should happen within six months. And what about future inspections? Here, too, the sides are working to find a solution and have been trying to come up with some formulation that President Obama can sell to Congress. In fact, every decision that the Americans have made over the past few days have been marketing decisions – how to get Congress to approve the deal. If the Obama Administration had been in power in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union would now be running the world.

The Obama Administration is worried that the shameful scenes that we saw when the interim agreement was signed in Lausanne in March will repeat themselves. At the time, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry presented the outline of the agreement and the Iranians claimed that it did not reflect their discussions. This time, therefore, the Americans are insisting that everything is signed, sealed and delivered – so that the negotiating parties can sell the deal to their respective purchasers in Tehran and Washington. The Americans invested in the science of selling. So, in the end, we will have an Iranian product that will alter the balance of power in the Middle East, and the Americans will aggressively market it."

Ends…

 

BLAME BIBI: Writing in Israel Hayom, Haim Shine says that it is inconceivable that some Israeli politicians are blaming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for failing to prevent the Iranian nuclear deal, when he has spent the past few years warning the world time and time again.

"The United States and the so-called European powers have decided to give in to the Iranians' demands. They don't have the energy or the will to confront the world's leading terrorist nation. The West is tired and exhausted; it has lost its vitality and its vigor. With their national anthems playing in the background – music that once represented a greatness of spirit and courage – they are folding up their flags. U.S. President Barack Obama, who is in the final stages of his presidency, is preoccupied with the legacy he hopes to leave behind him. There is none of the sense of responsibility that one could expect from the leader of the free world. His historic perspective is limited to the last day of his tenure. A nuclear-armed Iran will be a problem that he leaves for whoever comes after him. Obama and the representatives of the other nations have, it seems, decided to turn the West into a Persian carpet – and the ayatollah from Tehran are about to march all over it, with nuclear weapons in tow.

Obama's capitulation is reminiscent of a different but equally shameful one, on a bitter and fateful night in September 1938. That was the night Neville Chamberlain, the prime minister of Great Britain, and Édouard Daladier, his French counterpart, signed the Munich Agreement with Adolph Hitler. That was an agreement that will live on in infamy.

When Chamberlain returned to Britain, he gave an impassioned speech in front of an enthusiastic audience; he waved a piece of paper and explained that he had secured 'peace in our time.' Many people, including the U.S. president and the Pope, praised the agreement. Chamberlain's popularity reached new heights. Only Winston Churchill, sitting on the opposition benches, was a dissenting voice. 'You were given the choice between war and dishonor,' he told the prime minister. 'You chose dishonor and you will have war.' Is it conceivable that Churchill would take the blame for Chamberlain's great mistake? Not in Britain.

In Israel, Yair Lapid is rubbing his hands in glee. Once again, he has the opportunity to blame Binyamin Netanyahu for something that the prime minister is not responsible for. Without batting an eyelid, Lapid and his cronies have declared that Netanyahu has failed. As if our prime minister were in charge of the West's negotiating team; as if the Israeli leader were about to sign this shameful agreement. Instead of accusing the leaders of the Western nations of weakness, Lapid and his allies prefer to make a small political gain out of Israel's most pressing strategic threat. They will be surprised to discover that the Israeli public knows how to recognize responsibility and that it despises petty politicking.

Wherever he went in the world, Netanyahu warned against the Iranian nuclear deal. Many political figures in Israel criticized him, saying that he was merely scaremongering. And now – I can hardly believe the cynicism – they are blaming him for the fact that Western leaders aren't heeding his warnings."

Ends…

 

ISRAELIS AND ISIS: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman calls on leaders of the Israeli-Arab community to be part of the effort to ensure that young Arab citizens of Israel are not tempted to join the ranks of ISIS and al-Qa’ida.

"The indictment filed against several residents of the Bedouin town of Hura in the Negev, who are suspected of belonging to and supporting ISIS, should be a major cause of concern for all of us. It should worry not only the Shin Bet, but also the Israeli police and other law-enforcement bodies. But more than anything else, it should set off the alarm bells for leaders of the Israeli-Arab community: Knesset members, council leaders, journalists and intellectuals.

The suspects who have been charged are teachers who worked in Hura and Rahat and who inculcated in their students the philosophy and ideology of ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Young Muslims, often so young that they are still in middle school, are an important target for the digitalized propaganda of the murderous terrorist organization that now controls large parts of Syria and Iraq. Every day, fresh photographs of children carrying weapons are uploaded onto the Internet. These children are especially susceptible to brainwashing. In the past, there have also been horrifying photographs of children decapitating prisoners who fell into ISIS' hands.

This is not the first time that Israel has filed indictments against Arab citizens who organized and established secret cells and who planned to join the ranks of ISIS. Some of the members of this new organization planned to leave Israel on a pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia – and from there to try and contact ISIS. Among the members of pervious groups that were arrested were not just young, frustrated and unemployed youths; there were also teachers, a doctor and even a lawyer. According to Israel's defense establishment, 47 Arab citizens infiltrated Syria and joined ISIS or al-Qa’ida. It seems that the number is steadily rising. Of the few who returned to Israel, all have been put on trial and sentenced to lengthy terms behind bars. The absolute number is small – no more than 100 Arab citizens of Israel have been won over by the ideology of hatred and death that ISIS represents. That is a negligible fraction of the total number of Israeli-Arab citizens, of whom there are around 1.5 million.

In order to prevent these isolated incidents becoming a broader phenomenon, the leaders of the Arab community in Israel must act quickly and responsibly. They must unequivocally reject the phenomenon without stuttering, without hesitation. They must also engage in a serious campaign of education. It is not enough for the Shin Bet to keep close tabs on social media. The Shin Bet is designed to prevent rather than discourage. Israeli Arab leaders must be part of the effort to ensure that their people do not go down this slippery slope."

Ends…

 

JORDAN CLEANUP: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein says that, if an ambitious plan for the resuscitation of the Jordan Valley is adopted, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority all stand to gain.

"EcoPeace Middle East – formerly known as Friends of the Earth – has branches in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Two weeks ago, it held a conference on the eastern banks of the Dead Sea, at which it presented its master plan for reviving the Jordan River, which has been suffering from criminal neglect for many years and has dangerously dried up.

The plan was drawn up by Dutch civil engineering firm DHV, which is one of the largest in the world. It was financed by the European Union. The ecological and economic ramifications are important for all three entities: Israel, Jordan and the PA.

The Jordan Valley is home to some 600,000 people. Most of them – around half a million – live in the central part of the Jordan Valley, which is Jordanian territory; a minority, some 50,000 Israelis and 56,000 Palestinians, live in the Western section of the Jordan Valley, which is part of Israel and the West Bank. In the not-so-distant past, some 1.3 billion cubic meters of water flowed from the Sea of Galilee and the tributaries of the Jordan River. In recent years, however, the river has become a filthy channel of sewage. The current situation has given rise to a whole host of proposals for ecological and economic infrastructure that has been neglected this far. The EcoPeace conference has created an opportunity for political cooperation between the three countries with a vested interest in the Jordan Valley.

In order to resuscitate the Jordan River, water must be allowed to flow from the Sea of Galilee. In 2013, Israel reopened the sluices after a 50-year hiatus. Since then, some 9 million cubic meters of water flows into the Jordan every year.  This has been made possible by the fact that Israel has drastically reduced the amount of water that it pumps out of the Sea of Galilee into the national water pipeline. Although this is a relatively small amount of water – compared to the 650 million cubic meters that once flowed southward out of the Sea of Galilee – it is augmented by the water that flows from the Jordan's tributaries. In addition to increasing the amount of water, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority must also tackle the problem of pollution, which gets worse the further south one gets. According to the EcoPeace plan, these three countries would have to coordinate treatment at the source of the pollution, as well as water management and other developments along the course of the entire Jordan Valley.

In the short term – five years, say – the EcoPeace plan will require an investment of $495 million, which will be provided by global bodies such as the International Monetary Fund. Of this, $330 million would be earmarked for economic projects in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, including agriculture development, greenhouses, irrigation systems and expanding the marketing of produce to the West Bank, Israel and perhaps even the Gulf States. There is also huge potential in tourist sites in ancient Jericho, the baptismal sites on the northern banks of the Dead Sea and in eastern Jordan. According to the EcoPeace plan, some $165 million will also be spent on Israeli projects, including tourist sites and sporting venues in the Jordan Valley. This would also include the rehabilitation of Ottoman structures in the Old City of Beit She'an. If the plan is adopted and implemented, everyone stands to gain."

Ends…

 

THE GAZA QUAGMIRE: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Naomi Chazan says that now is the time to end the cycle of violence and despair in the Gaza Strip.

"Gaza is, once again, on one’s mind. Between the renewal of rocket attacks, another thwarted flotilla, the UN Human Rights Council’s report on last summer’s Gaza war, the first anniversary of that operation this week, the commemoration of ten years since Israel’s Gaza disengagement and intense IS activity in the Sinai with multiple ramifications for Hamas hegemony in the area, it could hardly be otherwise.

But unless the current preoccupation with Gaza is utilized to take a hard look at Israel’s approach to the Gaza conundrum, the situation will only yield more of the same — or worse. After years of replicating and then multiplying the same mistakes, Israel must now revise its policies or prepare itself to senselessly repeat past patterns at an even greater cost to all concerned.

The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 was designed to externalize the task of maintaining control over one of the most impoverished and densely populated areas of the world by shifting this burden to the Palestinians. The disengagement, however, was not complete. Israel continued to control all points of access in the Strip. No arrangements were made for a transfer of power, thus creating a political vacuum which was quickly filled by Hamas — whose hegemony was confirmed barely six months later following its overwhelming victory in the January 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Assembly. The subsequent blockade on Gaza imposed by Israeli authorities was intended to create a popular groundswell against the fundamentalist regime. It simultaneously sustained the divide between Gaza and the West Bank and perpetuated the myth that the Palestinian Authority, unable to oversee events in its bifurcated territory, could not be considered a viable negotiating partner.

In what rapidly became a self-fulfilling prophecy, Hamas curtailed all domestic dissent as economic conditions deteriorated rapidly. Its militants showered invectives on Israel and on the Mahmoud Abbas government in equal measure, while building up their military capacities with the aid of their Syrian and Iranian patrons. When rocket attacks on Israel intensified, then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert launched Operation 'Cast Lead' in late 2008. This offensive temporarily reduced Hamas military capacities, but — by not offering any alternative — did nothing to undercut its popular support. The tightening of the siege merely triggered local ingenuity (most notably tunnel construction), along with growing international distress over an ever-growing humanitarian crisis.

Two further rounds, in 2012 ('Pillar of Cloud') and 2014 ('Preventive Edge'), yielded little but successively shorter periods of calm between increasingly destructive and indeterminate armed confrontations. Sections of Gaza are still totally pulverized, the security of Israeli civilians on the Gaza border has not improved, and both populations remain traumatized. Something in Israel’s handling of Gaza affairs is unquestionably amiss.

A thorough reassessment of the working premises that have guided all Israeli government approaches to Gaza during the past decade is long overdue. In the first instance, the assumption that isolating the Gaza strip would lead to a popular uprising against its Hamas rulers has been disproven time and again. In fact, the solidarity wrought by Israel-induced victimhood has enhanced identification with the extremist organization against a common Israeli foe. Second, the related notion that the employment of superior force would create a breach with Hamas militants has backfired. The ongoing suffering of large segments of the population has forged a common denominator that, far from mitigating the use of force, has reinforced the link between extreme vulnerability and the widespread resort to violence.

Third, the idea that Hamas could be marginalized without strengthening the secular elements of the Palestinian national movement (especially Fateh) has indirectly fortified Hamas rule in Gaza (and possibly in the West Bank as well), thus exacerbating the discord between the various factions. Indeed, as time has progressed, it has become apparent that Israel’s one-dimensional depiction of Hamas prevented it from anticipating the even more extremist threats posed by Jihadists, Salafists and, most recently, the local representatives of IS.

Finally, as a result, Israeli options have narrowed. Bravado aside, it makes absolutely no sense to recapture the Gaza strip: the human, moral and international — let alone defensive — costs of subduing Hamas militarily are incalculable. A further Israeli-Egyptian stranglehold of Gaza has merely aggravated what is undeniably a monumental human tragedy. Clearly the time has come to explore other, less forcible and perhaps far more constructive, options.

There is already quite a bit of movement in this direction. Much has already been written about a German-mediated initiative, backed by Qatar and Turkey, regarding a potential long-term ceasefire. Reports of discussions in Jerusalem and Cairo in recent months persist. Senior officers in the IDF have publically expressed support for a more pragmatic approach to Gaza (General Sammy Turjeman, the Chief of the Southern Command, along with the Head of Military Intelligence, General Herzi Halevy). Minister of Education Naftali Bennett, in a sharp deviation from past statements, has come out in favor of active Israeli support for the reconstruction of Gaza. And, even though the Prime Minister, with the urging of the General Security Services, has resisted such a move, there are indications that the door for reconsideration has been opened.

A new Israeli policy towards Gaza, in stark contrast to past approaches, should be predicated on civilian rehabilitation. Its centerpiece must be the removal of the siege on Gaza, in all probability best effected through the creation of an internationally — supervised floating seaport which will enable the direct movement of people and goods into and out of the Strip (some reports discuss a first-ever NATO oversight of such a construction).

Other possible steps involve the reconstruction of neighborhoods destroyed during the latest Israeli operations (and especially during 'Preventive Edge') through direct Israeli inputs and the encouragement of external investments. The implementation of new housing plans promises to provide some work for income-impoverished residents of Gaza. Another approach to dealing with overwhelming unemployment (and the desperation that goes with it) is to explore the possibility of the renewal of job opportunities within Israel (in itself a barrier to violent resistance).

A shift to such an approach nurtures development prospects and expanding horizons that are neither dependent on Hamas handouts on the one hand nor on the promotion of violence on the other hand. It offers an alternative to the ongoing cycle of armed outbursts and offers substantial incentives to the maintenance of a modicum of law and order. Although it may not eradicate Hamas rule, it has the added advantage of marginalizing its power and perhaps laying the groundwork for the political rehabilitation of the Palestinian institutional infrastructure so critical to the solidification of governance today and state capacities in the future. Above all else, a revised strategy may do far more for Israeli (and Palestinian) security than the obstinate insistence on the ongoing use of force that to date has only yielded more and more immiseration.

Now is precisely the time to break with the spiral of violence, destruction and radicalization that has marked Israel-Gaza relations. By changing the parameters of Israel’s Gaza strategy and introducing new variables, it might be possible to embark on a new direction which, by lifting Palestinian residents of Gaza out of their hopeless stranglehold, might yet provide the way to extricate all involved from the clutches of what has become a deepening Gaza quagmire."

Ends…

 

WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?: Writing on the website of settler-run news service Arutz 7, Noah Beck questions whose side U.S. President Barack Obama is really on.

"Much has been written about just how bad the proposed Iranian nuclear deal has gotten. This outcome is hardly surprising after Israel’s former ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, bravely published Ally, his memoir detailing Obama’s hostility towards Israel. But even without Ambassador Michael Oren’s personal testimony, there is overwhelming evidence that – on the issue most important to global security and Israel’s very existence – Obama has been, at best, reckless and, at worst, treasonous.

Obama’s administration has shown a breathtaking readiness to cover for a wide range of abuses and violations by the same Iranian regime that seeks international acceptance of its nuclear activities. U.S. Senator Ted Cruz recently noted that the State Department was illegally delaying the publication of a report on Iranian human rights violations, which was due last February, to avoid adversely affecting the talks with Iran on its nuclear program.

According to a report by the Institute for Science and International Security, a non-proliferation think tank, Iran has violated the current interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). The president of the institute, David Albright, noted that 'When it became clear Iran could not meet its commitment to convert the LEU into uranium dioxide, the United States revised its criteria for Iran meeting its obligations.' Such leniency on a crucial compliance issue suggests that the world powers negotiating with Iran (the 'P5+1') will ignore or explain away Iranian violations of any future agreement over its nuclear program.

In another breach of the JPOA, Iran continues trying to acquire nuclear-related materials – some of which would be prohibited under the emerging deal. Reuters reported last May that the Czech government had uncovered an Iranian attempt to purchase a shipment of compressors from a U.S.-owned company based in Prague. These parts can be used to extract enriched uranium directly from the centrifuge cascades. In April, the British Government reportedly informed a UN panel about an illicit Iranian nuclear procurement network involving two firms under sanctions for suspected links to Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran fed uranium hexafluoride gas into an advanced centrifuge, yet another violation of the JPOA. In April 2014, Reuters reported that Iran’s oil exports were well above the monthly 1 million barrel-per-day limit imposed by the JPOA. If the P5+1 countenanced all of these Iranian violations of the JPOA, why would they be any more forceful when an even stronger Iran violates a permanent nuclear accord?

The news outlet Al-Monitor reported that the U.S. State Department is three years late in applying certain sanctions on Iran. The report provides more proof that the State Department is intentionally delaying sanctions on Iran in its quest to close a nuclear deal. The Wall Street Journal reported that the administration has pressured the CIA so that its analysts are now in an 'impossible position regarding analysis of Iran’s nuclear program.'

Not only has the Obama administration ignored Iranian violations, it has also disregarded evidence that sanctions relief will only support Iran’s most dangerous policies. Under Iran’s 'moderate' President Rowhani, spending on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the entity tasked with spreading Iranian influence abroad while suppressing dissent at home, has increased by 48%. Iran spends approximately $200 million per year on Hezbollah and up to $15 billion per year to support the Assad regime in Syria. Apparently the Obama administration sees no contradiction in calling for Assad’s ouster while helping Iran to fund him by removing sanctions. Former Senior Advisor on Iran at the State Department, Ray Takiyeh, has warned that the 'massive financial gains from [a sanctions-lifting nuclear] deal would enable [Iran’s] imperial surge.'  Iran is now the main power broker in four Arab countries (Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). So how much more powerful and aggressive will Iran become when sanctions are lifted and billions of dollars flow into its economy?

Obama has also disregarded his own former Iran and nonproliferation experts, who last month signed on to a letter warning that the emerging Iran deal may 'fall short of the administration’s own standard.' Signatories include the White House’s former chief weapons of mass destruction advisor, Gary Samore, the Department of State’s former principal nonproliferation advisor, Robert Einhorn, the former director of the CIA, David Petraeus, the former special advisor on the Persian Gulf, Dennis Ross, and other notable officials and analysts. The letter asserts that the emerging deal will not dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and outlines the elements of a good deal. These include unlimited inspections, including military sites; strict limits on centrifuge R&D; disclosure of Iran’s past nuclear military work; phased sanctions-lifting that is tied to Iran’s compliance with the deal; and the creation of an effective mechanism to re-impose sanctions automatically in the event of an Iranian violation.

Iran’s breakout time under the emerging deal would be far less than the Obama administration’s estimate of one year, according to one proliferation expert and the former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In pursuit of this bad deal, Obama has not only covered for Iranian violations and ignored Iran’s continued ballistic missile developments; he has actually offered the Iranian regime nuclear technology. On what basis does Obama so trust a regime that, for decades, has been one of the most dangerous on the planet, and an arch foe of the U.S. and its closest Mideast allies? In another shocking example of that misplaced trust, the U.S. is sharing a base in Iraq with Iranian-backed Shiite militias, who have killed American soldiers in the past, despite concerns that doing so puts American soldiers at risk by allowing the militias to spy on U.S. operations at the base.

The overwhelming evidence all points to the same troubling question: in the nuclear faceoff between Iran and the West, whose side is Obama on? He may get his 'legacy deal,' but it will include nuclear proliferation across the Middle East, an Iranian regime much more able to support terrorism and hegemonic policies, and the far greater prospect of nuclear terrorism and/or doomsday in the world’s most unstable region."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS: Tarhan Erdem cautions against squandering the current parliamentary moment in centre-left Radikal: "As the various government formulae involving the current parliamentary picture are self-evident, heading to 'early elections' by closing the door to any coalition via irresponsible words and aspirations entails a new adventure. Our current parliamentary structure offers us a special opportunity; the problems that cannot be resolved by a one-party government can be addressed by this parliament. We should make sure that we do not lose this parliament. We can solve our problems with it."

Mehmet Tezkan explains President Erdogan’s opposition to a new coalition in centrist Milliyet: "If a coalition is formed, President Erdogan will be unable to practice a 'de facto presidency'. The power of Bestepe [the new presidential palace] will be nullified because Bestepe does not square with a parliamentary system! The president wants early elections for that reason. He believes that the people will return the AKP (Justice and Development Party) with a majority. Unless the president approves, PM Davutoglu's AKP cannot enter a coalition with any other party. It cannot do so against the president's will."

Orhan Bursali believes the PM’s political future is at stake in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The election results have given power to Davutoglu to become a leader. Either a Davutoglu-led coalition will be formed or there will be an Erdogan early-elections government. If the latter materializes, the Davutoglu era might come to an end. He knows that! The coalition talks will have such significance for Turkey! The other parties should be aware of this as well."

Seyfettin Gurel makes a similar point in moderate pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Both the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] are strongly opposed to the president sharing executive power. To offer concessions on this issue would be against their nature. On the other hand, it is also impossible for President Erdogan, who has openly declared that 'he would not give up serving the people', to allow the AKP to establish a coalition government by offering such a concession. As Erdogan continues to be the indisputable leader of the AKP, it is very hard for Davutoglu to build a coalition under these circumstances, even though he may want to do so."

 

GREEK REFERENDUM: Gungor Uras maintains that the results of the Greek referendum will not stop the bargaining process with the EU in Milliyet: "The 'No’ votes represent votes of confidence given to Greek PM Tsipras. They represent a green light for Tsipras to continue to bargain with the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank. The ‘No’ votes are not intended to help the Greeks leave the EU and drop the euro in favor of the drachma. They represent a 'No' to the austerity terms demanded by the EU, IMF and European Central Bank! Despite the 'No', the talks between Greece and the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank will continue. Both sides will offer concessions."

Unal Cevikoz argues that a good agreement will serve Turkey as well in Radikal: "The 'No' vote does not entail a total rejection of the austerity policy. Under any circumstances, an agreement on a new debt structure will be required. While the EU will have to soften its terms, the Greek people will have to accept that a much more disciplined, restrained and stressful life is inevitable. If Greece remains in peace and stability as a proud neighbor that defends both Europe and its own future rather than becoming a divided and polarized society as a result of the referendum, this will also offer Turkey some relief on its way to the EU."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Khorasan comments on John Kerry's remarks: "As people waited for good news about the talks, they, instead, had to contend with John Kerry's remarks. If the Americans and their partners fail to provide the necessary guarantees for the time and mechanism of lifting sanctions; if the UN resolutions are not clearly annulled with the first steps; if the IAEA still wants to talk about Possible Military Dimension of our nuclear programme; a good deal would not be achieved for Iranians. If a good deal is not achieved, we will be upset, but the world will not end. John Kerry’s remarks were not only a response to those who are overoptimistic about the Americans and those who are overpessimistic about our negotiating team. They were also a reaction to Foreign Minister Zarif's video message. At a time when Europe is looking forward to lift the sanctions, when Moscow – after the Ukraine crisis - does not have to tolerate Washington, when America does not have a lot of time to honourably lift the sanctions; John Kerry's threat is just the outcry of a negotiator, who has to make difficult decisions."

Hard-line Keyhan repeats: "The P5+1, especially the U.S., have shown that they rank first in fraud and deception. Our opponents are pursuing the same tricks they used on numerous occasions and are trying to impose their illegal demands through a maze of texts. In order to reach a good deal, there are clear and unambiguous criteria. We will accept an agreement only when these criteria are strictly adhered to. Any agreement that does not observe our red lines is unacceptable and will be rejected." 

Moderate Iran sounds hopeful: "There are two major differences and a short time to conclude the talks. The first difference relates to the timing of the UN Security Council resolution that will be passed if an agreement is reached. The second has to do with the time frame for removing sanctions. The possible military dimension and the reversibility of sanctions have already been resolved." 

Conservative Hemayat is not buoyant: "The nuclear talks are close to the final step, even though issues, like the Possible Military Dimension, supervision of the IAEA and the Western insistence on an agreement without a signature, are still a challenge. The West wants to maintain the status quo where Iran is under brutal pressure and the talks do not achieve any results. The current situation is highly desirable for them, which is why they speak about extending the talks and intend to continue the stalemate." 

Reformist E'temad considers the domestic dimension: "Our domestic policy towards the imminent agreement is important. To maintain calm at home is no less a challenge than reaching a final deal. The two areas are inseparable and parallel. Preserving a possible nuclear agreement requires national determination." 

Hard-line Javan writes about Western games: "A collection of complicated components has resulted in an unclear atmosphere at the talks in Vienna. This is part of the West's intricate games against Iran in the talks. It is very clear that the West uses psychological tactics in order to exert more pressure on our negotiating team." 

Reformist Mardom Salari implies that the West has no option but to reach an agreement: "In the Middle East, with the exception of Turkey - whose foreign policy in the region is based on support for opposition groups, from the Muslim Brotherhood to ISIS - Iran is the only country not facing a security challenge. Even Turkey is involved in a war on its southern borders. Iran is a balanced and stable player in the region and is one of the leaders of the fight against Takfiris and extremist Salafis. The West knows very well that Iran's nuclear knowledge will not be destroyed by bombs. The imposition of strict sanctions did not stop our peaceful nuclear activities; they grew with greater speed. The only way left for the West is to talk, with the goal of reaching an agreement."

Reformist Sharq explains why the U.S. is being strict: "Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and member of the American negotiating team Wendy Sherman has said 'We know that deception is part of the Iranian DNA'. This is the American view of Iran; nonetheless, they expect us to trust them! The Americans have decided not to trust the Iranian side and, therefore, they have gradually created stricter conditions for an agreement." 

Conservative Resalat hopes the West will cooperate: "U.S. diplomacy is focussed on interrupting the concentration of our negotiating team and manipulating our public opinion. So far the resistance and the vigilance of our negotiating team have overcome these attempts. Our hardworking and revolutionary negotiators have made every effort to prove the goodwill of our country in the talks. It is time for the West to apply its political will to reach a final agreement. It is clear that the responsibility for the consequences of the West's insistence on irrational stances will fall on the U.S. and its allies."

 

RUSSIA/IRAN: Reformist Arman is offended: "A Russian official has announced that following a nuclear deal with Iran, there will no longer be any justification for an American missile shield on Russia's borders in Eastern Europe. The Russians are using the Iran card. Iran has never been a threat to Europe and our defence doctrine is not offensive. The Russian position implicitly states that Iran was a threat to Europe. Our officials should take a stance against this position and state, once again, that Iran has never been a threat to any country."

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami paints a dire picture for the Saudis: "In a strategic mistake, the Saudi regime trapped itself in the Yemeni quagmire and it sinks deeper with each passing day. Riyadh will resort to anything that will result in an honourable exit from this swamp. The Saudis face bitter realities that would have remained veiled, if this war did not happen. The Yemeni war showed that Saudi policy of relying on supporters and allies is mistaken as witnessed in the Pakistani refusal to Riyadh's request to participate in the war. The revelation of severe weaknesses in the Saudi military, especially in ground combat, has increased the concerns of the ruling family. Even though Riyadh has a variety of advanced military equipment, it failed to deal with the Yemeni army and the people's militia, who have limited resources."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Iran and the Arabs: The day after

2-Defense and offense in Syria

3-Essebsi is right

 

1-Iran and the Arabs: The day after

 

The Americans are not so stupid as to believe that the agreement will prevent Iran from producing atomic weapons. The nuclear program will proceed, perhaps at a slower pace. But Washington is not bothered by Iran getting atomic bombs because they pose no threat to it and Iran's possession of the bomb is in no way different from India and Pakistan's. As for Israel, it has sufficient deterrence power to prevent Iran from engaging in any risky adventures. The coming Iranian bomb is not for use, but for imposing Iranian influence in the region. And if Egypt and Saudi Arabia are going to join the nuclear race, then the appropriate time for doing so is today, if not yesterday--Fahd al-Fanek in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

Regardless of how the nuclear negotiations may end in an agreement as expected, or whether they are extended once again, the region's issues and files will witness important developments and possible changes. And the Arabs need to be aware that these developments will necessarily be linked to the result of the talks. In other words, Iran’s current inactivity will not last long. As soon as the 'zero-hour' is reached – today or soon – Tehran will emerge to address the region with a policy that will be even more vigorous, perhaps more aggressive. Unless the Arabs are politically and psychologically prepared for that moment, Iran’s gains from any agreement with the West will increase, perhaps even more than the Iranians themselves may hope for--Sameh Rashed on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

The Iran nuclear deal now being negotiated in Vienna is inevitable, even though Washington recognizes that it will not prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability, maintains a veteran Jordanian commentator. But Iran's bomb poses no threat to the U.S. and will be used to extend Iran's influence on the area east of Suez with Washington’s compliance. Iran has kept a low profile in the region's crises over the past few months during its nuclear negotiations, notes an Egyptian commentator on a pan-Arab website. But this quiescence will end as soon as the negotiations have been concluded, and Tehran will adopt a more vigorous and aggressive policy towards the region for which the Arabs had better be prepared.

 

VIENNA MANEUVERS: "The maneuvers we are witnessing between Iran and the '5 + 1' in Vienna and what seems to be intransigence or inflexibility of one side or another, are actually no more than tactical moves by each side intended to improve their terms in the negotiations," writes Fahd al-Fanek in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

This is also true of [Ayatollah Khamene’i] the Iranian supreme leader’s alleged red lines, who gave a green light to proceed towards signing a final agreement.

There will be such an agreement between Iran and the six states in fact. This goes without saying and the reason is simple: The Iranian and American sides are both yearning for it. Iran wants it to lift the economic sanctions and release its frozen assets; and the U.S. is seeking an achievement for President Obama whose second term in office is about to end with no historic achievement to his name.

The region's states that are likely to be affected by the repercussions of the nuclear agreement would do well to prepare for its results and consequences in advance. Foremost among them are those Arab states that lie east of Suez that are now candidates for becoming areas of Iranian influence.

After the agreement is signed, Iran will regain the role played by the Shah as the Gulf's policeman and as a tool of U.S. policy in the region. Iran's real enemies have no faith that the agreement will prevent it from producing an atomic bomb. On the contrary, they believe that Iran will be given a big push, allowing it to expand westward at the expense of the Arab Gulf and Fertile Crescent states.

As soon as the agreement is signed, a president will be elected for Lebanon and a peaceful solution will be found for the Yemen crisis. Iran will become the stick that the U.S. will use to strike at the governments that may seek to disobey it. It will also be used to strike at the terrorist movements, and Iran will cooperate with the U.S. in doing so, not because the organizations that will be struck are terrorist, in fact, but for sectarian [Shiite] motives.

The Americans are not so stupid as to believe that the agreement will prevent Iran from producing atomic weapons. The nuclear program will proceed, perhaps at a slower pace. But Washington is not bothered by Iran getting atomic bombs because they pose no threat to it and Iran's possession of the bomb is in no way different from India and Pakistan's. As for Israel, it has sufficient deterrence power to prevent Iran from engaging in any risky adventures.

"The coming Iranian bomb is not for use, but for imposing Iranian influence in the region. And if Egypt and Saudi Arabia are going to join the nuclear race, then the appropriate time for doing so is today, if not yesterday," concludes Fanek.

End…

 

NO LOGICAL EXPLANATION: "There is no logical explanation for the stalemate that has afflicted most of the region's crises for a number of weeks now other than that everyone is waiting for the results of the nuclear negotiations whose final extension is supposed to end today [Monday]," writes Sameh Rashed on Monday's Qatari-owned pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

The ongoing conflicts in the region witnessed a notable and unexpected escalation as soon as the framework understanding between Iran and the West was announced at the end of March [2015]. The Syrian regime intensified its military operations, and succeeded in regaining areas that had been outside its control, and in slowing down the opposition forces' offensives against other strategically important areas.

In Yemen, the Houthis and [former president] Ali Saleh took the initiative and repeated their attacks on targets inside Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the pace of attack and retreat intensified between ISIS forces on the one hand, and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) militias and Kurdish forces, on the other.

Throughout this phase, the Iranian factor was present in all issues. Iran's desire to display its regional cards and pressure Barack Obama's administration was also evident. For his part, the U.S. president was unable to hide his intense desire to reach a nuclear agreement that would count in his favor before he leaves the White House.

At the same time, all parties were trying to precede the agreement by escalating the situation and driving Iran into a corner, making use of the awkward situation in which it found itself as a result of being in the midst of negotiations with the West. All wagers were on escalation and intransigence– even though the objective conditions were not sufficient for the situation to develop in such a manner.

As soon as the March framework agreement was reached, that upsurge receded simultaneously and on all files. The situation tended towards calm, with all files shelved at the same time, for the moment as well.

In Syria, the balance between Assad's forces and the opposition has remained the same. The Americans enthusiasm for the idea of training 'moderate' Islamist opposition forces has cooled. Ankara continues to explore the possible reactions to establishing a buffer zone. As a result, the Syrian scene has been deferred, while all parties are waiting to see how matters will develop.

In Yemen, the pace of military operations by both sides has also slowed down. Each side has entrenched itself behind its positions without displaying any real flexibility or willingness to budge, either on the battlefield or the political track. As a result, the Geneva [Yemen] conference was first postponed and then held without producing any result or change – as if it had never been held.

In Iraq, the focus has shifted to domestic disagreements between the various leaders ([former PM] Nuri al-Maliki's trial) and a reconsideration of the means to be used against ISIS.

Again, there seems to be a strong link between that simultaneous calm on the various fronts and the approaching end of the Iranian/Western negotiations. For Iran is both the common denominator between all these issues, and the main party to them. But since the nuclear agreement that will supposedly be final and include all outstanding points between Tehran and the West, and given Israel’s incitement against it and the doubts raised by some Western circles as to Iran’s future intentions regarding the region and the world, it was only logical for Tehran to directly or indirectly seek to calm down the region's files and crises. But it will no longer be logical for Iran to maintain this same situation, for it will no longer be forced to abide by it once the negotiations end.

Regardless of how the nuclear negotiations may end, in an agreement as expected, or whether they are extended once again, the region's issues and files will witness important developments and possible changes. And the Arabs need to be aware that these developments will necessarily be linked to the result of the talks.

In other words, Iran’s current inactivity will not last long. As soon as the 'zero-hour' is reached – today or soon – Tehran will emerge to address the region with a policy that will be even more vigorous, perhaps more aggressive.

"Unless the Arabs are politically and psychologically prepared for that moment, Iran’s gains from any agreement with the West will increase, perhaps even more than the Iranians themselves may hope for," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

2-Defense and offense in Syria

 

Turkey will not permit the encirclement of the opposition and severing its lines of contact with the Turkish borders and crossing points. The concerned circles in Ankara have deemed the expulsion of opposition fighters from [Aleppo] or its complete fall into President Bashar al-Assad's regime's hands, as tantamount to the fall of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own regime! This is why Erdogan has showed no flexibility in consolidating the opposition's situation on the ground. But this commitment has not reached a point where the lines drawn by the U.S. administration for its Syrian crisis policy have been crossed. In other words, the Turkish president's position was and remains primarily defensive--George Sam’an in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Moving from a war of attrition to a decisive war, and from steadfastness and defense, to the offensive, is a political transition imposed by the developments that have accompanied the war on Syria. In this war, Syria's calculation was to allow the war, its fuel and timespan to run their course until they reached a point after which it would no longer be possible to await for the results of the deluded tests set by some of that war's obsessed parties. At that point, the war's human and political fodder would have all been consumed, which is what is happening now. The assumed time span of the war, which has been linked by the U.S. to the nuclear agreement with Iran, is reaching its end, and the supposed point where the fear stirred by the terrorist groups brought in to topple Syria takes deep root is also being approached --Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Having failed to reap any real political gains from the Islamist Syrian opposition’s capture of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, Turkish President Erdogan may now believe that his only chance to secure a place for himself in the new Middle East is by capturing Aleppo, argues a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi owned daily. The question is whether he can achieve his goal. The battle for al-Zabadani represents a critical turning point in the Syrian war, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. It is the point at which Syria and its allies abandon the strategy of steadfastness and containment and move on to the offensive, with the aim of regaining control over the entire country by fall this year at the latest.

 

THE BATTLE FOR ALLEPO HAS BEGUN: "The battle for Aleppo has begun, and the coming days will show how it will end," writes George Sam’an in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Will it achieve its aims? Will it be decided quickly like what happened in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour?

The fact that these two positions fell in the hands of the Islamist Jayshul Fateh represented a major battlefield development; but it was not translated into political terms in favor of the opposition or the [‘moderate’ Turkish-backed] Syrian National Coalition (SNC). That is to say, it did not shake the regime's foundations or revive the prospects of a political solution. Nor did it yield any results in favor of the opposition's regional sponsors, especially Turkey, as much as it raised the fears of Damascus's friends and enemies alike who did not like this move that almost changed the rules of engagement and the regional and international political game. Everyone expressed their concerns that such an operation should not be repeated. And this explains the noise that was raised some days ago, threatening a decisive battle to liquidate the regime's presence in Der'a in the south.

It is as if a green light has not been given. There will be no permission for any advance in the south, which has been the regime's Achilles' heel historically. A decision taken 'up high' has prevented the battle from being pursued there with the momentum required to achieve a breakthrough similar to that in the north. But this is not the first time that the major outside players have set limits to an uncalculated push that could force them to alter their calculations.

The Idlib battle was cause for great concern among many who have been asking about the 'day after' the regime falls from the very first days of the crisis in Syria: What is the alternative? And what fate awaits the minorities?

In fact, setting limits to the opposition factions' thrust on the southern front is not the only case in point. There have been previous similar precedents in the north of the country, where the opposition was prevented from pursuing the battle till the end. This was achieved via pressures and threats to sever aid, arms, and similar supplies.

There had been endless talk of the 'battle of the south' over the previous months, especially after the opposition fighters in that area received special training supervised by the Americans and others. A semi-regular military structure was established for them that met many of the required preconditions.

In fact, there are those who claim that the 'southern front,' which was being managed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was supposed to stop at the gateway to Damascus last April 7th, the official anniversary of the founding of the ruling Baath Party. The aim was to suggest to those who hold the keys to a political solution and those who insist on a decisive military victory, that the regime was just a stone's throw away and that urgent action should be to arrange for its departure and achieve the required change.

A few weeks before that date – that is at the beginning of the year – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard mobilized in force on that front so as to prevent such a major breach. Something similar occurred on the northern front, and the opposition was prevented from advancing beyond certain ‘impermissible’ lines and the coast or sensitive sites that could undermine the 'rules of the game' being played primarily by foreign powers.

Will the Aleppo battle be like what is happening on the southern front, or will it be a repetition of what happened in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour but this time with repercussions that cannot be ignored?

Jayshul Fateh’s success in northern Syria was achieved with clear backing from Turkey, which itself intervened more than once to prevent the regime from tightening its encirclement around the northern capital. Turkey will not permit the encirclement of the opposition and severing its lines of contact with the Turkish borders and crossing points. The concerned circles in Ankara have deemed the expulsion of opposition fighters from the city or its complete fall into President Bashar al-Assad's regime's hands, as tantamount to the fall of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own regime!

This is why Erdogan has showed no flexibility in consolidating the opposition's situation on the ground. But this commitment has not reached a point where the lines drawn by the U.S. administration for its Syrian crisis policy have been crossed. In other words, the Turkish president's position was and remains primarily defensive. He has threatened and issued warnings on countless occasions; but he has not carried out any of his threats. This is exactly what he did in his battle with Israel over the siege of Gaza: Fiery rallies and speeches but with no practical translation on the ground.

Nothing has occurred on the political scene that would lead to the belief that Turkey has moved from its defensive position on the Syrian crisis towards a more offensive posture, or that it has rebelled against the U.S.-imposed rules. On the contrary, the latest developments have rendered President Erdogan's position even weaker. The June parliamentary elections did not grant his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) the absolute freedom of action it has enjoyed for over a decade. In addition, there is the rising threat that Syria's Kurds now pose in pursuit of their aim of achieving something resembling self-rule in their areas in eastern and northern Syria.

Despite the large-scale mobilization of Turkish forces along the country's southern borders, the Turkish president realizes that direct involvement in the Syrian war will produce a fatal threat to the Turkish interior in political, economic, social, and security terms. It would mark the beginning of Ankara's drowning in the Syrian quagmire. And, quite naturally, this is not what Erdogan wants. In fact, PM Ahmet Davutoglu has clearly stated that despite its major military preparations, his country does not intend to carry out a major military operation in Syria 'overnight.'

Turkey has been pursuing exactly the same method as Iran in its intervention in the region's affairs, relying on its local extensions in some country or another. Ankara is pursuing the same approach, relying on numerous Islamist factions in Syria. It has even turned a blind eye to the Nusra Front and ISIS's moves if they serve its aim of fighting President Assad's regime and containing Kurdish aspirations – provided that these two organizations do not get close to its borders beyond the limit set for them.

But Turkey, which was irked by the fact that the outcome of the Idlib battle was like 'striking water with a stick,' may still push the 'conquerors' of Jayshul Fateh to bring down the northern capital [Aleppo]. This time round, it would be using its stick to strike at two targets at once: Iran, which has already warned Turkey against any intervention on the ground; and the U.S., which has not forgiven Turkey for providing the conditions that have allowed the Islamist factions to secure some gains in the Syrian north, nor for trying to promote these factions as a readymade and strong alternative on the ground to fight both ISIS and the regime in Damascus.

Like the concerned Arab capitals, Ankara is worried at its marginalization and shrinking role as a result of the relationship that Washington is building with Tehran at the expense of all the region's nations – with the exception of Israel, of course. It cannot simply sit back and confine itself to watching. It does not want to lose all that it has dreamt of and worked to achieve over the past ten years – its attempts to achieve 'zero problems' with the region's peoples in order to return among them victorious and in their hearts.

For this reason, Ankara may try to achieve in the battle of Aleppo what it failed to achieve after the battles of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour – in fact, what it has failed to achieve ever since the international coalition was formed to fight 'the Caliphate State.' It joined that coalition but did not take part in its military operations. It set a number of preconditions, foremost among which, as is well known, was to strike at both the terrorist organization and President Assad's regime simultaneously and contain the Kurds' impetus and the Kurdish People's Protection Units' (YPG) push to establish a self-ruling entity that would add to the complexity of the Kurdish problem that has been troubling it for so long.

Ankara is trying hard to return to the heart of the political scene. The matter is not confined to its major competitors in the region, from Israel to Iran. It wants a share that equals its weight and political and geographical role and position; indeed, its Sunni religious position, especially since it seems impossible for the Arabs who are busy dealing with their crises and are drowning in a sweeping chaos, to secure a seat that corresponds to their demographic and economic weight.

Ankara is unhappy at being excluded from what Washington and some of its partners are scheming with Tehran. It wants to join the bazaar, which is drawing close to reaching its peak as the nuclear talks between Iran and the six major powers approach their end.

"It may be that President Erdogan is wagering on Aleppo as the 'Trojan Horse' he can use to enter the heart of the major political game. But will his [Jayshul Fateh] 'conquerors' succeed in opening the gates of Aleppo, thereby flinging open the gates of both Washington and Tehran?" asks Sam'an in conclusion.

End…

 

A MODEL BATTLE: "One of the commanders taking part in the Zabadani operation told me that what the world will witness in this battle is a model of what it will see from now on on the various battlefronts involving the Syrian army and its allies [primarily Hizbollah]," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The fighting will take on a different pattern. The units will be fully and qualitatively equipped. The firepower at their disposal will be intense. The coordination and effectiveness between the various units will be well calculated and accurately and professionally calibrated. This is not because new elements are now present that were not there before. Many of the weapons and ammunition needed for this new phase were hidden and kept for this precise moment. Similarly, some units were also held back and prepared for this phase. The difference is in the timing. The war of attrition has ended, a war whose consequences Syria was bearing, resorting to retreats and advances and avoiding some confrontations so as to prevent its forces from being lured into confrontations whose timing had not come. Now, the battle to liberate Syria’s soil from terrorists has begun on all fronts.

The battle of Zabadani is the second part of the Qalamoun war, and the Qalamoun war meant to cleanse the Lebanese/Syrian borders from some 15,000 Nusra Front fighters. These represent that organization’s elite fighters equipped with the most advanced weapons. Their job is to protect the opposition’s lines of supplies to all the Damascus and Homs's countrysides, up to and reaching the Mediterranean. They are fighters who have been set aside by al-Qa’ida’s leadership for two strategic missions:

- First, to link al-Qunaitra to the Homs's countryside, and from there to the Mediterranean and the Lebanese/Syrian border crossing of al-'Arida; and to link the area to the Syrian/Jordanian borders so as to establish a security zone for Israel that would constitute the Nusra Front's mini-state under Israel’s banner. Zabadani would be this mini-state’s capital parallel to a similar project in the north to establish an emirate whose capital would be Idlib – to say nothing of ISIS's mini-state.

- Second, to undermine the balance of deterrence established by the resistance [Hizbollah] against Israel by severing Syria from Lebanon along the latter’s eastern and northern borders, thereby depriving the resistance from its Syrian depth and lines of supply. The ultimate aim is to hemorrhage the resistance and expand into the Lebanese geography by leaping into the northern Bika’a Valley, and from there to the Dinniyyeh area and the Lebanese coast. That has been al-Qa’ida’s primary project since 2000, linking Afghanistan to the Mediterranean via a line that extends via the Kurdish areas in Iran and Iraq, via al-Anbar, Tadmur [Palmyra], Qalamoun and to the Mediterranean.

Once the Qalamoun war ends in a victory for the Syrian army and the resistance, and once the armed groups are eliminated from the entire border line, once all its chances of expanding southward towards the foot of Mount Hermon to reach al-Qunaitra are undermined, a rolling military line will be established for the alliance between the army and the resistance. This is a line that extends from north of Homs to south of al-Qunaitra, and extends eastward to Tadmur and the Nasib border crossing with Jordan.

That means that, within a few and harsh months, all the Damascus countryside, its deserts and hills will be cleansed. A force estimated at 50,000 soldiers with all their equipment and firepower will be freed for deployment and dealing with more than a hundred military pockets of various sizes – from towns like Daraya to cities like Duma, to desert towns like Tadmur.

Part of this force will move to bolster lines in the north and the east, after which it will meet up in three advancing lines: One with the Iraqi army and the PMU towards the Syrian borders; one with the army forces from inside Deir az-Zour and al-Hasaka towards Homs; and a third for the army units deployed in Aleppo and its countryside, Idlib and its countryside, and Latakia. The ultimate aim would be to liberate Aleppo's neighborhoods, Idlib, and Jisr ash-Shughour. And by the end of the summer, or perhaps by mid-fall, the army, the resistance, and Popular Committees' lines of fire will converge and finish off the remaining pockets across the entire Syrian geography.

Moving from a war of attrition to a decisive war, and from steadfastness and defense, to the offensive, is a political transition imposed by the developments that have accompanied the war on Syria. In this war, Syria's calculation was to allow the war, its fuel and timespan to run their course until they reached a point after which it would no longer be possible to await for the results of the deluded tests set by some of that war's obsessed parties. At that point, the war's human and political fodder would have all been consumed, which is what is happening now.

The assumed time span of the war, which has been linked by the U.S. to the nuclear agreement with Iran, is reaching its end, and the supposed point where the fear stirred by the terrorist groups brought in to topple Syria takes deep root is also being approached. These groups have begun to turn into an organized network with their own special project in the Arab countries and Europe. Events have now gone beyond that assumed time span; in fact, the situation now is fully mature.

And as time and the war's fuel begin to run out, the offensive begins. The task of the war changes from that of standing ground to moving on to decisive victory. The escape routes before the armed elements are being shut down and their only option now is death or surrender.

Syria now no longer awaits any [political] settlement despite its openness to every opportunity that allows those implicated in the war on it to back down, and despite clinging to the possibility of dialogue with those opposition parties that desire a democratic solution that accepts the verdict of the ballot box under the banner of continuing the war that unites all Syrians against terrorism.

"Al-Zabadani is a point of separation and connection between two geographies, two strategies, and two phases," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

 

3-Essebsi is right

 

Tunisia’s President Essebsi was right to declare a limited state of emergency, since a return to authoritarian rule is precisely what the terrorist groups want, says Fahd al-Khitan in today's Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Tunisia’s President Essebsi was right to resist declaring a state of emergency since this is exactly what the terrorist groups want; agreeing to it only if limited to a single month, maintains a Jordanian commentator. For Tunisia has been the exception that vindicates the choice of a democratic path and that proves that coexistence between Islamist and secular currents is possible.

 

STRANGE OPPOSITION: "It seems very strange for an Arab leader to oppose declaring a state of emergency in his country," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

The custom has been for Arab leaders to exploit exceptional situations in order to impose their absolute power over the country. But according to press reports, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi initially opposed declaring a state of emergency, and only agreed to impose it for one month after the security and military commanders insisted that this was necessary for a limited period of time.

Essebsi's opposition stems from his concern that Tunisia may appear to have joined the ranks of the Arab states where anarchy rules supreme. These are states that besiege the Tunisian model that has proven the exception to the rule.

Tunisia has succeeded in neutralizing the role played by regional and Arab powers that sought hard to drag it into the quagmire of anarchy. The Tunisian democratic experiment stood its ground in confronting the consequences of the current desolation in neighboring Libya. But the terrorist groups would not leave Tunisia to deal with its own affairs. When they failed to abort the process of democratic change, they decided to punish the Tunisians for clinging to the option of democracy by undermining their security and livelihood, and struck at the tourist sector that is one of the country's main sources of revenue. They also tried to incite public opinion against the government and undermine the experiment in democratic coexistence between Islamist and secular currents.

The Tunisian experiment's success proved lethal to the terrorist groups. These groups were confused by the 'Arab Spring' that confronted their violent discourse and methods with a historical predicament. They succeeded in ruining the 'Arab Spring' states' experiments and in dragging them towards civil wars and religious and sectarian conflicts that provide them with an ideal environment. But they came up against the Tunisian model and came to fear its success. This is why they have tried very hard to foil it.

In Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and most recently Egypt, the terrorist groups hide behind a narrative of the general situation in these states as a means of justifying their presence and role. But in the Tunisian case, there is no genuine basis for the presence of ISIS, other than the desire to nip democracy in the bud as a choice for the Arab peoples.

In this sense, ISIS and other extremist groups are not a mere expression or reaction to sectarian persecution or the regimes of political tyranny; they are more than that. They are the ideological and cultural enemies of societies aspiring to freedom and democracy, and the other face of the tyranny that exists or was in place in more than one Arab country. All that these groups want is to replace the existing dictatorships with other religious dictatorships that engage in even worse forms of tyranny, but in the name of religion as interpreted by them. They are the logical antithesis of the people's right to live, choose, and enjoy the gains of world civilizations.

Tunisia today is more important to ISIS and its various clones than Syria, Iraq or Libya. In these states, ISIS has already achieved its mission, with much help from the evil regimes and forces in the region. But the Tunisians have proven to be more determined than their Arab brethren; they have resisted the Dark Ages model and offered a renewed hope of life to the Arab peoples. They have united in the face of the takfiri groups, despite the enormous sacrifices they have had to make.

It is this steadfastness on the Tunisians' part that has really angered the terrorists. As a result, they have wickedly and basely rushed to strike any easy target they could reach – foreign tourists, individual members of the security forces, and ordinary members of the public.

For these reasons, the Tunisian president was right to express his reservations regarding the option of a state of emergency, since that would send the signal to the terrorists that Tunisia is on its way to turning back. And that is exactly what the terrorists want.

"Let that emergency last for a month and be over, after which Tunisia can return to the future," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Gaza/Sinai/Gaza

 

Two stories dominate the front pages of Israeli newspapers' Monday editions: the suicide of the country's top fraud squad detective and the Greek referendum result.

All the papers lead with the suicide of Deputy Commissioner Ephraim Bracha, whose name had been linked to that of serial briber Rabbi Yoshuha Yosef Pinto. According to a recently filed indictment against Pinto, the rabbi – who is based in the United States and Israel – offered Bracha a $200,000-bribe in exchange for information about a criminal investigation into a foundation Pinto was running. Bracha reported Pinto's actions to his superiors and then continued with the investigation. Since then, sources close to Pinto – including former and current police officers, as well as journalists and politicians – have been casting aspersions on Bracha's integrity, despite the fact that he had been considered one of the 'cleanest' officers on the force.

The newspapers also report that the Greek people voted 'No' in a referendum on Sunday over whether to accept the terms of a bailout package.

With little movement in the Vienna nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers, the Israeli press is forced to resort to quoting warnings from Israeli officials – named and unnamed – over the deal with the Islamic Republic. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu set the tone at the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday. 'What's coming out of the nuclear talks in Vienna is not a breakthrough, it's a breakdown,' the prime minister told ministers, adding that the world powers were conceding more and more with each passing day. The emerging deal 'will pave Iran's way to produce the cores of many atomic bombs and it will also flood Iran with hundreds of millions of dollars that will serve it in its aggression and its mission of terror in the region and the world,' the prime minister warned.

Netanyahu claimed that the emerging deal with Iran was worse than the nuclear deal that had been signed with North Korea which led to Pyongyang obtaining an arsenal of nuclear weapons. 'However, here we are talking about a very big conventional and non-conventional threat against Israel, against the countries of the region and against the world,' he stated.

Yedioth Ahronoth adds that, working under the assumption that a deal will be signed, Jerusalem is preparing for its next battle: preventing congressional approval for the deal. Officials in Jerusalem are preparing to exert pressure on the U.S. Congress to prevent it from signing the deal. If a deal is submitted to Congress before July 9, the vote would be held within 30 days due to the upcoming congressional recess. If the deal were to be submitted after July 9, the vote would only take place after 60 days. If a majority votes against the Iran deal in Congress, President Obama can veto the move. If the president does use his veto, however, it would allow him to decide when to return the motion for a revote in Congress – in which case a two-thirds majority in both houses would be needed to bypass the presidential veto.

Israel is pressuring Congress members to scuttle the deal in the first vote. If the deal goes to the floor, Israel will make a concerted diplomatic effort to achieve a two-thirds majority in order to bypass a possible veto. Officials in Jerusalem estimate that Obama will have enough support to approve the measure in the first vote, thanks to fears among members of Congress that denying the measure while other powers begin trading with Iran will come at a great economic cost to U.S. industry. There are, however, officials in Israel who believe the battle is not over yet, and that with the right work a majority can be achieved against the measure in the first vote.

Finally, Israel Radio reported Sunday that the Palestinian Authority claims that its security forces apprehended a large Hamas cell that was planning attacks against the Palestinian security apparatus. Palestinian Security Forces spokesperson Adnan Dhamiri said that Hamas had established a cell in the region to undermine security, according to the report. Dhamiri added that members of the cell – who were arrested in the northern West Bank, most likely near the PA governmental seat of Ramallah – admitted to planning an attack and training to be able to carry it out.

Hassan Yousef, a senior Hamas member in the West Bank who was recently released from jail by Israel, denied the claims.

 

 

THE EGYPTIAN TEST: Writing on the News 1 website, Dvir Mor warns that Egypt's helplessness and inability to tackle ISIS and other terror groups in the Sinai is becoming a major concern for Israel, which is worried that the Gaza Strip will fall into even more fundamentalist hands.

"Many Knesset members, especially on the left of the house, have their heads firmly in the sand; they are not willing to see the grave dangers to Israel's security posed by handing over the Gaza Strip and its environs to the PLO. They keep their heads in the sand and say: 'We had to try; we had to give Gaza back to the Arabs.' But none of them is willing to talk about the price of that mistake. None of them takes into account the fact that it was an irreversible step.

Speaking in 1994, a decade before the disengagement, Pini Badash – mayor of the Gaza-envelope town of Omer and former Knesset member – asked whether Israel would ever be able to retake the Gaza Strip if the need arose. 'I am not talking about whether Israel has the military means,' he clarified. 'I am talking about whether the international community would ever allow us to retake Gaza. And the answer is no. The vast arsenal that Hamas has amassed there will be a major problem for Israel in the years to come. If we withdraw from Gaza, I promise you that we will live to regret it.'

Until Israel handed over responsibility to the Palestinian Authority in November 2005, as part of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, the Rafah border crossing was controlled by Israel. A decade later, ISIS is threatening to capture the Gaza Strip and liberate it from Hamas.

The terrorist attacks committed by ISIS in the Sinai, in which at least 60 Egyptian soldiers were killed, were the worst such incidents that the province has known in recent years, perhaps ever. Even the rapid response of the Egyptian army, which was already deployed in large numbers in the northern Sinai, was unable to prevent it from happening. This state of affairs obligates Israel to seriously weigh up all its military and strategic options. Reports in the foreign press suggest that the motivation behind last week's attacks in the Sinai was, in part, to allow ISIS easier access to Rafah and to the Gaza Strip. ISIS wants to 'liberate' Gaza from Hamas, which it sees as an infidel movement that does not adhere to the strict rules of Sharia law.

The Egyptian troops in the Sinai have been failing to do their job since 2011 and have allowed countless incidents to occur: the pipeline transporting gas from Egypt to Israel and Jordan has been attacked many times by jihadi groups; terrorist raids and guerrilla operations have inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptian forces.

According to the peace deal between Israel and Egypt, Cairo is obligated not to deploy troops in the Sinai, which is supposed to be a demilitarized zone. The only forces Egypt is allowed to deploy there are police officers. That relevant clause of the peace deal was altered in the aftermath of the disengagement, allowing Egypt to deploy 750 troops along the Philadelphi Route between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai.

The erection in 2010 of a border fence between Israel and Egypt – ostensibly to tackle the problem of illegal migrants from Africa entering Israeli territory – is also supposed to prevent terrorists crossing the border. Unless Egypt gets to grips with the Sinai-based terror organizations, it will be easy for them to reach and then cross the Rafah border and to enter Gaza.

Since the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord almost four decades ago, the Sinai border has been relatively quiet. Until the revolution in Egypt, the regime in Cairo took great pains to abide by the demilitarization terms of the peace agreement. Egyptian troops were kept out of the Sinai and there was close cooperation with the IDF. There have been countless breaches of the border by smugglers, terrorists and asylum seekers – which taught Israel that it could not rely on Egyptian security forces, which were overly complacent about the situation in the Sinai.

The best example of Israeli antiterrorism activity along the border with Egypt came in August 2012, when there was a cross-border attack involving Egypt, Israel and the Gaza Strip. During the course of the incident, armed jihadi terrorists wearing explosive belts entered Israeli territory on an armored personnel carrier that they had obtained after attacking an Egyptian army position close to the border, killing 16 soldiers who were stationed there. Almost immediately after they crossed the border, the terrorists were killed in an Israeli airstrike, backed by artillery fire and ground forces.

The 2011 revolution in Egypt was followed by a tacit agreement between Cairo and Jerusalem, which allowed the Egyptians to increase their troop presence in the Sinai. Nonetheless, the Egyptians failed to stamp out terrorism in the Sinai, in large part because the measures that they implemented were worthless. In fact, even today the main thrust of Egypt's counterterrorism activity is to increase the number of roadblocks on the northern coastal road. In practice, top officers remain safely ensconced in their headquarters, while the roadblocks are manned by NCOs who cower behind military vehicles. The Special Forces which the United States funds and arms with advanced weapons are only deployed in and around Cairo.

The troops that Egypt has sent to the Sinai are those that were previously stationed in the Nile Basin. They are equipped with outdated weapons, old APCs and antiquated tanks manufactured in the former Soviet Union. It is easy for a well-trained jihadi cell to take control of an Egyptian APC and to start driving toward the Israeli border.

In addition to ISIS fighters who have set up shop in the Sinai, there are also local Bedouin tribesmen, with occasional reinforcement from members of the Muslim Brotherhood – who would be delighted to extract revenge against Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi for overthrowing Mohammed Mursi as president. These terrorists are better acquainted with the topography and geography of the Sinai than the Egyptian troops. They withdraw quickly back into the depths of the desert after each attack and they find shelter in the Bedouin encampments until the storm passes.

The Egyptian army must rethink its strategy regarding Sinai – otherwise it will continue to lose soldiers, terrorist entities will strengthen their grip on the area and – if the worst happens – ISIS will take full control of the peninsula. If Egypt remains helpless, Israel will have to ready itself for the possibility that ISIS and its affiliated terrorist organizations will enter the Gaza Strip, from where they will pose an even greater threat to the security of the Jewish state."

Ends…

 

FATEH VS. HAMAS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Reuven Berko says that the rift between Fateh and Hamas is growing wider – especially in the aftermath of the weekend's mass arrest of Hamas activists by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

"There's a proverb in Arabic that goes like this: Strike a scoundrel with another scoundrel and no scoundrel shall prevail.

Over the weekend, the Palestinian Authority conducted a series of arrest raids, in which more than 100 Hamas activists in the West Bank were arrested and interrogated. Among those detained were some Hamas members recently released from Israeli prisons. The arrest operation took place shortly after a Shin Bet operation in Nablus a few days earlier, which came in response to a series of terror attacks against Israelis, in which two people were killed.

During the course of the Palestinian security forces' operation, dozens more Hamas activists were arrested and questioned – and a broad network was uncovered. That network contains an advanced local hierarchy, the goal of which was to undermine Israel's presence in the West Bank and, at the same time, to assume greater control over the Palestinian territories.

According to Israeli sources, this massive terrorist network got its instructions from two sources – Turkey and Qatar – which are jointly directing and funding the wave of terrorist attacks against the Egyptian government, as well as the Islamist terror organizations in Syria and Iraq. According to one senior member of the Palestinian security forces, Adnan al-Dhamiri, this terrorist Hamas network planned to attack the Palestinian Authority and to use the infrastructure it had established to drag the PA into a pointless and destructive conflict with Israel.

'We will not allow Hamas to turn the relatively normal live that we are living – despite the occupation – into a living hell,' al-Dhamiri insisted. 'They will not be allowed to do in the West Bank what they have already done in Gaza.'

In response to the arrest of so many Hamas members in the West Bank, senior Fateh officials in Gaza were summoned for questioning by Hamas officials. A spokesman for Hamas, Mushir al-Masri, slammed the PA and claimed that the security apparatus in the West Bank was being used – once again – to do the dirty work of the Zionist enemy. According to one member of Hamas political wing in Gaza, who also criticized the Palestinian Authority, the arrest of Hamas members was a response to Israel's allegations that Hamas is behind the recent spate of attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Therefore, he said, 'it is a stab in the back – during the holy month of Ramadan – and it serves the interests of the occupation.'

Despite the fact that Hamas has been deterred from launching attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip, it has claimed responsibility for the attacks against Israeli civilians in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria. This is part of its efforts to replicate the conflict with Israel to the areas controlled by the PA, to critically damage the rule of the PA and to destroy it – as it did in Gaza in 2007. The arrest operations over the weekend by the PA has thwarted Hamas' renewed efforts to carry out a putsch against Fateh – which is exactly what Hamas planned to do before Operation Protective Edge, when it established a fictitious unity government with Fateh and then kidnapped and murdered three Israeli youths.

The Palestinian Authority is learning the lessons of Operation Protective Edge, too, and this is what has created an inevitable coming together of interests between Israel and the Palestinian security forces regarding the need to eradicate Hamas' terrorist presence in the West Bank. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas and his people don't dare to return to Gaza, since they know that their lives would be in danger. And since the PA has no influence over events in Gaza – and is unlikely to have any such influence in the foreseeable future – Abu Mazin is now busy putting together a new government, to the chagrin of his erstwhile partner Hamas. Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Malaki even went so far as to accuse Hamas of helping ISIS kill Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai."

Ends…

 

BIBI'S WAR: Writing in Maariv, Karni Eldad says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is continuing to fight against the Iranian nuclear program, in the hope that he can win with words, rather than turn to the military option.

"According to reports coming out of the nuclear talks in Vienna, both sides have expressed optimism that a deal can be reached. For U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the optimism is cautious; for his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the optimism level is sky high.

As much as we would like to join the party, we Israelis have too much experience with making deals with bitter enemies; we know that 'optimism' usually means that big trouble is heading our way. We will have to turn down the invitation to the Viennese cocktail party, thank you very much.

What we want to see is a lot of worried faces; we want people to bang their fists on the table. We want wall-to-wall pessimism. If that were to happen, there would be no deal. And don't believe Kerry when he says that the United States will not allow a bad deal to be reached, because, at the moment, the only thing on the table is a bad deal. It's all a question of perspective. The difference between us and the six world powers that are negotiating with Iran is that when we look at the proposal on the table, we see a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead coming our way. They don’t.

In September 2012, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations and displayed a diagram highlighting just how close Iran is to obtaining a nuclear bomb; he spoke at length about what the international community must do to prevent that from happening. Netanyahu's gimmick got the message across, but no one was very impressed. Netanyahu, however, did not give up; he still hasn’t given up.

This is Netanyahu's war and he is running it. He may be using diplomatic means, but he is fighting tooth and nail. I don't know what the prime minister is thinking. Maybe he assumes that Israel can always launch military action against the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, but he prefers to rely on rhetoric for the time being. Maybe he thinks that he can still win this war using words, rather than bombs. I certainly hope he's right."

Ends…

 

SATISFACTION: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini says that, one year after Operation Protective Edge, Israel can and should be satisfied with the outcome.

"Many countries in the world are currently dealing with terrorist organizations or paramilitary groups. Pakistan and Afghanistan are fighting against the Taliban, Nigeria is trying to deal with Boko Haram and it seems that half the world is currently fighting against ISIS. Israel, for its part, has a headache known as Hamas. Has any sovereign state ever managed to defeat organizations of this type in the past few decades? Sri Lanka is the only country that can claim to have defeated a terrorist organization – the Tamil Tigers. The price it paid was 40,000 fatalities and almost total destruction. Russia failed in Chechnya, the United States failed in Fallujah. And those are the two largest powers on earth today. Israel cannot emulate Sri Lanka – and thank God for that. Despite the patently false and biased reports that have been published against Israel, and despite the dubious evidence provided by Breaking the Silence, morality on the battlefield is an integral part of the Israeli story.

This means that 'victory' in the battle against terrorists – in which the rules of moral combat are observed (at least on the Israeli side) – can never be absolute. There were those who, in the days and weeks before Operation Protective Edge, demanded that the government allow the IDF to 'crush' Hamas. Following Sri Lanka's example, that could have been done. But it was never really an option for us. Given the circumstances in which the IDF fought Operation Protective Edge, the results of that campaign can be seen as largely positive for Israel.

At the moment, Hamas is fighting with all its might to prevent rival groups from firing rockets at Israel. Who would have believed that? The organization's leaders hoped – they were praying, in fact – that Israel would kill far more civilians than it actually did. That would have turned Israel into a pariah state. But their hopes were dashed. True, the David Commission – which was established by the least enlightened organization in the world, the United Nations Human Rights Council – published a fallacious report accusing Israel of committing war crimes. Within a week, that report was largely forgotten. It certainly did not create the kind of international backlash that the previous report, compiled by Goldstone and his cronies, created. On this issue, too, Hamas failed to achieve its goals.

The significant blow that Hamas was given during Operation Protective Edge has left its mark. Hamas hoped for massive international aid. Most of the promised money remains just that: a promise. The current Egyptian regime despises Hamas. Indeed, all the talk of a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas is the direct result of the battering that Hamas was given during Operation Protective Edge. The age of victories like the Six-Day War is over. In this new and tough era, the events of the past year prove that Israel should be satisfied with the outcome of Operation Protective Edge."

Ends…

 

A BIRD IN THE HAND: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Dan Feferman says that, despite his best efforts, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was not successful in convincing the U.S. to regroup and return with an aggressive agenda aimed at dismantling Iran’s very capability to produce a nuclear weapon.

"Since the interim framework deal between the U.S.-led P5+1 and Iran was announced in April, Israel has come out strongly against what it views as a 'bad deal,' one that grants international legitimacy to Iran’s nuclear program. As Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu remarked time and again, Israel is not against a diplomatic solution. In his speech in March to Congress, Netanyahu noted that 'the alternative to this bad deal is a much better deal' and that 'no country has a greater stake than Israel in a good deal that peacefully removes this threat.' Rather, Israel sees in the emerging deal a capitulation to Iranian bargaining tactics when the U.S. position was at its strongest, and a grave misunderstanding of the Iranian regime’s intentions.

Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu was not successful in convincing the U.S. to regroup and return with a more aggressive agenda aimed at dismantling Iran’s very capability to produce a nuclear weapon. Although the June 30 deadline has passed, an agreement is expected within the course of the next month. The details of the impending deal are mostly familiar by now.

As retired Israeli general Mike Herzog noted in the Financial Times, 'The choice [now] is not between a good deal and a bad deal. A good deal – permanently rolling back Iran’s nuclear capacity... is no longer possible.' Herzog and others go on to say that what is left is the choice between an 'acceptable' deal and an outright 'bad deal.'

To be fair, the American negotiators were more determined and sober than most critics expected. Despite its flaws, the emerging deal does have some positive elements, which include a far-reaching verification and inspection regime, removal of most of Iran’s enriched uranium with a limit on future enrichment (at least for the next decade), a freeze on roughly half of Iran’s 10,000 working centrifuges (20,000 total) and the neutralization of Iran’s nascent plutonium track in Arak. Moreover, U.S. President Barack Obama made clear he will 'snap back' sanctions if Iran is found to be violating its end.

At this point, it is far too late in the game for Israel to influence the outcome of the agreement. To be sure, insiders involved in Israel’s efforts against Iran’s nuclear program over the past decade believe the U.S. folded too soon to Iran’s bluff. However, given the lack of resolve in Washington, Israel would be wise to make the most of the current situation and take the bird in the hand rather than look for that elusive second bird in the bush. This means working closely with the U.S. to help maintain a broad and galvanized coalition to enforce the agreement over the next 10-15 years. Easier said than done.

So what will this include?

Proper verification: Obama talked a tough game regarding the inspection regime, but as those of us who’ve done this professionally know, it’s really hard, and the Iranians will inevitably cheat. The U.S., UK, France, Canada, Germany, Israel and others, who worked to build the pressure on Iran, must stay the course as far as inspections and continue to produce detailed intelligence to expose Iranian foul play.

Stand strong with sanctions: The carefully crafted linchpin of the Obama-led soft war to pressure Iran to the table is the only leverage left (military action being off the table). The U.S. must insist sanctions only be lifted pending real cooperation and progress by Iran in fulfilling its part of the deal.

Snap-back sanctions: 'Snapping back' sanctions will be much harder than it sounds. The U.S. should devise a process now, together with allies, to be able to put sanctions back in place on three levels should Iran be caught cheating: the unilateral U.S. level, which were the most biting; the multi-lateral level led by America’s key allies around the world, also highly effective; and the UNSC level, which gave legitimacy for the other two levels. This will be difficult to achieve with China and Russia involved.

Rebuild deterrence: The U.S. must rebuild a credible military deterrence, eroded by President Obama’s own policies and rhetoric. If the U.S. isn’t willing to consider a strike, Israel should convince the U.S. to float its own military option, a 'good-cop/ bad-cop' routine used with great utility by previous U.S. administrations.

Re-build U.S.-Israel relations: Relations between the two countries were severely damaged on a strategic level by both sides. Israel serves as a natural balance against Iranian aggression in the region and Israel was crucial over the years to helping the U.S. prevent Iran from producing a bomb. If the two countries have any daylight between them, Israel loses influence over U.S. policy and the U.S. loses a crucial ally that supplies significant intelligence, interception capability and creative ideas adopted by the U.S. over the years to counter Iran.

If Israel works on these levels with the U.S., the current Iran deal, which may never be two birds, can at least be a bird in the hand and not just a few tail feathers."

Ends…

 

LIMITED WAR WON'T DETER HAMAS: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that terrorism can only be halted by destroying the ability to commit terror acts – therefore disarming Gaza’s terror groups must always be on the table.

"It is now almost 10 years since the tragic uprooting of 10,000 Israelis from Gush Katif in southern Gaza, from the settlement bloc at the Strip’s northern tip, and from the settlements in northern Samaria. Over the following 10 years, the move brought in its wake three major operations by the Israel Defense Forces.

It is one year since the last of these operations, Operation Protective Edge. It’s time to take stock of a policy that violated the civil rights of thousands of Israelis, ended up bringing most of Israel under rocket fire from Gaza, and resulted in extensive loss of life in both Israel and the Strip.

Ariel Sharon, who launched these developments with the uprooting of Israeli settlers, claimed that this move would 'improve Israel’s security.' He found a sufficient number of MKs, including some Likud members, to win the Knesset’s approval for his 'disengagement plan.' Even the Supreme Court went along with this unparalleled violation of the settlers’ civil rights.

A radical move advertised as improving Israel’s security resulted in a drastic deterioration of Israel’s security. Already a day after the completion of the disengagement, rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel. It foreshadowed what was in store for Israel’s civilians in the coming years.

It was left to Sharon’s heirs, Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni, enthusiastic supporters of his fatal mistake, to deal with the consequences. Less than three years after the disengagement, persistent rocket launches against Israel from Gaza forced the Olmert government to react with Operation Cast Lead, which lasted 22 days and saw the IDF enter Gaza. During that operation, over 750 rockets and mortar rounds were fired on Israel from Gaza, some reaching as far as Be’er Sheva, Ashdod, and Gedera.

The operation resulted in the death of over 1,000 Palestinians and 13 Israelis. It ended with the withdrawal of Israeli forces and a unilateral cease-fire declared by Jerusalem. Olmert was under the impression that this demonstration of military might would be sufficient to deter Hamas from renewing its attacks against Israel. He was mistaken.

Less than four years later, in November 2012, it was Binyamin Netanyahu’s turn to deal with the attacks from Gaza against Israeli civilians; he launched Operation Pillar of Defense. During an operation that lasted eight days, over 1,500 rockets were fired at Israel, some reaching as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Over a hundred Palestinians and six Israelis lost their lives. Israel’s strategy was the same: Give them a good dose of air power and they’ll understand that these rocket attacks on Israel have to cease.

It didn’t work, terrorist rocket attacks continued. A year ago the Netanyahu government launched Operation Protective Edge, a 51-day operation against Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza involving ground troops, tanks, aircraft and ships. Over 4,500 rockets were launched against Israel, Ben-Gurion Airport was closed for a day, millions in Israel ran for shelter, and 72 Israelis and more than 2,000 Palestinians lost their lives. When it was over, Netanyahu declared victory, convinced that this time the Gaza Palestinians had been taught a lesson and Israeli 'deterrence' had been restored. Now a year later it’s not at all clear that this objective was attained.

The time has come to reexamine the theory that terrorists can be deterred and that therefore there is no need for the IDF to enter Gaza and disarm the terrorist organizations there. With this theory proven wanting three times, it should be clear that deterring terrorists is in the realm of wishful thinking. Terrorists can be halted only by destroying their ability to commit acts of terror. Entering Gaza to accomplish this task is preferable to having all of Israel’s civilian population living under the threat of rocket fire."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS: Oral Calislar says that compromise offers the only path to a new government in centre-left Radikal: "The composition of parliament after the last elections dictates a compromising discourse and a problem-solving approach. Let us leave aside the probability of 'early elections' for the moment; it seems impossible to secure any result other than by compromise. The perception that all the votes other than those that went to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have united around the same goal, has hit the wall once again. The fact that 41 per cent voted for the AKP is quite clear."

Mehmet Tezkan argues that the AKP has good reason to push for a minority government in centrist Milliyet: "If the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] will say 'no' to whatever the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] says 'yes' to from now on, the AKP can start dancing already because this means a visa to an AKP minority government. It means telling the AKP 'form the government; we are behind you'. If I were an AKP leader and in PM Ahmet Davutoglu's shoes, I would soon make the list of ministers, form a minority government and bring it before President Erdogan for his approval."

Ali Sirmen sees a loss for democracy in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Just three weeks after June 7th, the presidency of the republic, the prime ministry and the head of parliament are all in Erdogan’s hands again. The dreams of a government without the AKP have evaporated. It has become clear that the AKP and MHP together have a majority in parliament and that MHP leader Devlet Bahceli will continue to support the AKP (or more precisely Tayyip Erdogan) as in the past. The June 7th elections democracy-healing properties have been nullified."

Mustafa Unal predicts early elections in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The first phase of the political equation with multiple variables (electing a parliament) is over. It is now the turn of coalition and early election scenarios. The election of a parliamentary speaker has neither brought forward any new model nor killed any formula. A government with the AKP is sure. The options are limited. CHP or MHP (as coalition partner). If not, the remedy is an election in November."

 

SYRIA CRISIS/KURDS/ISIS:  Kurtulus Tayiz proposes a more active role against ISIS in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Ankara is ready to join a coalition with the rest of the world against ISIS. The option of a Syrian buffer zone is still on the table. Cooperation with the U.S. on training and equipping the moderate Syrian opposition can be taken to a higher level. Ankara can open Incirlik base to hit ISIS provided it is based on common planning with the U.S."

Sibel Eraslan believes the Kurds are on their way to achieving the goal in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The civil war in Syria and the power vacuum that has arisen as a result have presented the Kurds with significant opportunity to achieve their goal of 'Kurdistan' via their experience in Rojava [northern Syria]. With the strength derived from international support as well, we are facing a new Kurdistan map that is cleansed from the Arab and Turcoman populations. The positive contact between the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]/PYD [pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria] and the West via the war against ISIS has secured de facto recognition of these organizations that have long been isolated on the grounds of terrorism."

Ibrahim Karagul suggests that others are exploiting the war against ISIS in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Soon after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa'ida emerged. It was marketed to the whole world as violence and fear. Now, ISIS is being turned into a power that extends beyond countries, borders and regions. It is becoming organized in every country from Tunisia to Syria, from Afghanistan to Iraq. It is being served to the world as a new face of fear and violence. Countries are being dragged into civil wars, ethnic and sectarian clashes are being subcontracted through such organizations."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Egypt’s dark tunnel

2-Signs of a Saudi shift on Syria

3-Erdogan’s dangerous game

4-A win for Tehran

5-Anarchy and confusion in the PA

 

1- Egypt’s dark tunnel

 

The nature and scale of the attacks, from the assassination of officials to major terrorist operations in Sinai, suggest that there are forces and groups allied to the armed Egyptian opposition that wish to topple the current regime. These groups believe they can overthrow Sissi's state by creating the greatest degree of chaos, and that such unrest will drive the people onto the streets to demand change. Such things may happen in other states. But there are old institutions in Egypt, the most prominent of which is the army. And no other force can control the street, nor take hold of Sinai or any part of it. Moreover, there are no separatist forces in Egypt, or local or sectarian forces, as in the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Sudan--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

Today, when Egypt is on the threshold of a dangerous path in which no voice will be louder than that of violence, the current military regime cannot shirk its responsibility for dragging the country into a dark tunnel. For this regime lacks any legitimacy and the only tool it has in its hand is that of force. Any institution that cancels the verdict of the ballot box by force and allows itself to respond to its opponents with death and life sentences has no right to complain if this were to produce general chaos and terrorism. It is true that terrorism is a condemnable, nihilistic, and dead-end road that opens up no horizons. But the party that places its foot on this road first would have brought that curse down on itself--Bashir al-Bakr on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

There is a general sense in Egypt that there are forces behind the terrorist groups that are waging attacks on public officials and the army, claims a veteran Saudi commentator. These forces are using Libya as the gateway through which weapons are being smuggled into the country. Egypt is rapidly sliding towards the situation that Algeria found itself in the 1990s when the military staged a coup against an Islamist movement that had legitimately won free and open elections, warns a Syrian commentator on a Qatari-owned online daily. In Egypt's case, the army will be responsible if the country descends further into violence and terrorism.

 

RUINED CELEBRATIONS: "The terrorists ruined the celebrations of 'Abdelfattah' as-Sissi's first anniversary of coming to power; the Egyptian media was busy covering the assassination of the public prosecutor and the subsequent bombings in Sinai, instead," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The question after this series of bloody events is this: Were these events just a passing storm or is this the start of a major war?

From our knowledge of Egyptian civil society, violence never wins. As for the state, it will not be blamed if it wages a large-scale war against the armed opposition and other oppositions linked to it. For voices are rising demanding that the death sentences [passed against Muslim Brotherhood leaders] should be implemented.

Despite the violence we have witnessed over the past period – the fifty years from the era of 'Abdel Nasser till today-- the armed groups have never won, regardless of successive governments and the different identities of the various opposition groups. It is certain that the 'salafi jihadi' groups and the armed Brotherhood branches will fail as well. But no one seems to learn from the lessons of the near past and, sadly, much blood will be spilt across Egypt in the struggle for power.

The nature and scale of the attacks, from the assassination of officials to major terrorist operations in Sinai, suggest that there are forces and groups allied to the armed Egyptian opposition that wish to topple the current regime. These groups believe they can overthrow Sissi's state by creating the greatest degree of chaos, and that such unrest will drive the people onto the streets to demand change.

Such things may happen in other states. But there are old institutions in Egypt, the most prominent of which is the army. And no other force can control the street, nor take hold of Sinai or any part of it. Moreover, there are no separatist forces in Egypt, or local or sectarian forces, as in the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Sudan.

Throughout its history, Egypt has remained a single state on both banks of the Nile, administered from the center, Cairo. The unity of its social fabric and the steadfastness of its military establishment will undo any wager on change in Egypt. The only thing that can be achieved is to provoke the state, inflict pain on ordinary citizens, and damage people's livelihood, the economy, and investment in general.

The Egyptian government will not surprise us if it were to take stricter measures against the opposition because there is a feeling that what is happening is no mere terrorist action by mentally unbalanced groups, but that certain forces are setting them in motion and that their project is to topple the Egyptian regime and take over power.

We do not know if such charges are mere delusion or based on fact. But the general sense is that this is a battle for survival, and the Egyptian state will not refrain from pursuing the extremists beyond its borders. And beyond these borders there is a regional situation that is on fire that threatens to set all states alight.

"For Libya is the broad gateway through which the extremists are infiltrating and weapons are being brought in to Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

CLEAR SIGNAL: "The latest developments that began with the terrorist attack that killed Egyptian public prosecutor Hisham Barakat, send a clear signal that the general situation in the country is threatening to slide towards what is much more dangerous than what we have been witnessing in Cairo and Sinai so far," writes Bashir al-Bakr on the Qatari-owned pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

The car bomb that targeted Barakat was planted in a well-guarded security zone. The victim was no ordinary person, but one of the regime’s main figures who had stirred much anger against him because of his role in consolidating President Sissi’s July 2013 military coup. It was Barakat who set in motion the judicial machine that legitimized the massacre [of Muslim Brotherhood supporters] in Rabi'a Square, and the subsequent arbitrary arrests, and the harsh and shameful sentences passed against leading political figures – death and life sentences based on flimsy charges – foremost among them, elected president Mohammad Mursi.

From the very first day of his election, Sissi borrowed the model used by the Algerian army in 1992 when it cancelled the legislative elections that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had won, and imprisoned its leaders amidst French and international support. The result was that a gate was opened that no one had taken into consideration before; that of violence that developed into a civil war that lasted some ten years and in which around one-quarter-million Algerians died, not to mention the psychological and economic consequences that are still plain for all to see.

FIS leaders at the time did not urge the movement's public and supporters to resort to violence.  Instead, young leaders emerged and took up weapons, dragging broad sectors of the public behind them. These included certain sectors that had historically suffered from one-party rule, marginalization and exclusion, as well as other circles that had lost any hope of peaceful change and found an effective solution in the resort to force. But the result was that everyone lost, Algeria before all, which squandered its chance for a pluralistic democratic experiment based on the peaceful transfer of power via the ballot box.

Today, 23 years after the bitter Algerian precedent, its lessons remain plain to see, especially if coupled with the popular revolutions that have broken out in a number of Arab countries demanding an end to the corrupt and repressive regimes ruling them. Among these revolutions, whose winds blew from Tunisia in late 2010, the Egyptian January 25th [2011 anti-Mursi] Revolution continues to occupy a special place in people's political consciousness because it paved its own special path that led to the election of a new parliament and a new president [Mursi].

That, in turn, spread the hope in the Arab world that Egypt could act as a lever to transform the Arab situation, and act as a supporter of the revolutions in Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. But the military's winds pushed Egypt in a different direction. The military staged a counter-revolution without learning from the developments in Syria that had plunged into a civil war because of Bashar al-Assad's regime's insistence on confronting the people's dreams of freedom and dignity with bullets.

Today, when Egypt is on the threshold of a dangerous path in which no voice will be louder than that of violence, the current military regime cannot shirk its responsibility for dragging the country into a dark tunnel. For this regime lacks any legitimacy and the only tool it has in its hand is that of force. Any institution that cancels the verdict of the ballot box by force and allows itself to respond to its opponents with death and life sentences has no right to complain if this were to produce general chaos and terrorism.

It is true that terrorism is a condemnable, nihilistic, and dead-end road that opens up no horizons. But the party that places its foot on this road first would have brought that curse down on itself.

"This is why Egypt today needs those who will raise the voice of reason high and push this bitter cup away from its lips – before the temple is brought down on everyone's head," concludes Bakr.

Ends…

 

 

2-Signs of a Saudi shift on Syria

 

Riyadh may be coming around to Egypt’s view that the priority should go to confronting ISIS rather than overthrowing the Syrian regime, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

There are growing signs that Saudi Arabia is drawing closer to Egypt’s view that the main threat in the region today comes from ISIS, and that other issues such as the Syrian crisis should be set aside for the moment, argues the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily. The most recent such sign was the exceptionally strongly worded telegram of condolences sent by the Saudi monarch to the Egyptian president after this week’s ISIS attacks in Sinai.

 

EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY: "Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz has stressed that his country stands at Egypt’s side in its confrontation with anything that targets its security and stability," writes Friday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This expression of solidarity was in a long 'condolences' message sent to Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah Sissi in response to the attacks by ISIS’s ‘Sinai Province’ on six Egyptian army checkpoints on Wednesday in which 70 people were killed, including 16 officers and troops, according to official statements.

This message, which can be described as ‘warm and sympathetic’ comes at a time when Saudi/Egyptian relations have cooled after the change in Riyadh’s attitude towards Egypt resulting from the Saudi leadership's noticeable rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood and its decision to join the Turkish/Qatari axis. That axis has no love for Egypt and is strongly opposed to its ferocious war against the Islamists, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, and it is working to topple the regime in Cairo on the grounds that it is 'illegitimate.'

There have been successive signs indicating that the Saudi leadership has begun to reconsider its policies towards the Syrian file. It is drawing closer to Egypt’s view of giving priority to the fight against ISIS after the latter has targeted the Saudi domestic front by bombing Shiite mosques in al-Qatif and ad-Dammam, and in Kuwait as well.

Reports suggest that this change in the Saudi position was manifest during Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman’s visit to Moscow two weeks ago, during which he signed contracts for building nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia and concluded deals for advanced Russian weapons to the tune of 12-billion dollars. Some reports spoke of a Russian/Saudi meeting of minds over the Syrian file, as well as other files having to do with oil and armament, with Saudi Arabia backing down – if only temporarily – from the goal of toppling the Damascus regime.

It is true that the Saudi authorities did not officially welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to form a four-way alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria with the object of combating ISIS. But it was also notable that Riyadh’s reaction to this proposal did not amount to a decisive rejection. It left the door slightly open, contrary to the Syrian position as expressed by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem who visited Moscow to discuss this proposal. Mu'allem expressed his astonishment at the prospect of his country joining an alliance with states that have been trying hard to destroy Syria and are backing the 'terrorism' that is targeting it – as he put it. He described the emergence of such a four-way alliance as a 'miracle' given the blood feuds between Syria and each of the other three states.

But ISIS’s 'expansion' and its escalating attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, and most recently Sinai could lead – and may already have done so in fact– to a convergence of views between many of the region's governments for fear of this violent terrorist phenomenon and its threat. Egypt and Saudi Arabia head the list of these governments.

Unfortunately, there is likely to be an intensified exchange of messages of 'condolences' in the coming month if the bloody acts of terrorism and bombings were to continue, such as the attacks on mosques, checkpoints, and other military targets, as is happening now in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Mending Egyptian/Saudi relations, whose first signs we could detect from Saudi Foreign Minister Khalid al-Jubeir’s visit to Cairo a month ago, and from the Saudi monarch's message to the Egyptian president that departed from their traditional 'courtesy' character, has been prompted by the common denominator shared by the two countries, based on the fear and concern at the growing ISIS threat and at its future impact on their security.

"And they have much to be concerned about," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Erdogan’s dangerous game

 

The Turkish president’s frustrated ambitions risk stirring a hornet’s nest along the borders with Syria, says Mohammad Noureddin in today’s Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing a dangerous game by threatening to establish a buffer zone in northern Syria, maintains a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. Part of his aim may be to prevent the Kurds from taking full control of Syria's borders with Turkey, while another part has to do with his hopes of reversing the results of the recent parliamentary elections that cost his AKP (Justice and Development Party) its exclusive hold on power.

 

THE MAIN TOPIC OF DICUSSION: "Turkish intervention in Syria has been the main topic of discussion for days now in Turkey," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

There are those who trace the sudden emergence of Turkey's efforts to intervene in Syria back to mid-May [2015]. At the time, there was no reason to implement this step. But Turkish Chief of General Staff General Necdet Ozal refused this intervention and used the pretext of his own health and entering hospital to ask for a postponement of discussion of the matter for at least two weeks.

Then came the June 7th parliamentary elections and the resulting defeat for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which failed to maintain its exclusive hold over power, and has been forced to search for a coalition government that has yet to be born.

During this period, there were military developments in northern Syria after the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) succeeded in capturing the town of Tal Abyad and liberating it from ISIS. The battle of Tal Abyad was a qualitative achievement in the Kurds' favor. At this point, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised his voice high warning that the town’s fall into Kurdish hands constitutes a threat to Turkey.

According to Erdogan, this threat stems from the fact that the fall of Tal Abyad has created a geographic link between the Kurds' two cantons in al-Jazeera and 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani). This means that the entire area extending from the Iraqi borders to 'Ain al-Arab, and across from the Kurdish borders, is now in the hands of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) which supports Abdullah Ocalan’s Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This border area stretches for around 500 kms, that is to say, more than half the length of Syria's borders with Turkey.

Here, Erdogan declared that he would not permit the establishment of Kurdish border strip to the south of the Turkish borders. Turkish fears stem from the prospect that the Kurds could later – even if years from now – succeed in taking control of the 90 kms that separate 'Ain al-Arab from a Kurdish 'Afrin canton to the West. If that happened, the Kurdish areas would be geographically contiguous and all of Turkey's southern borders would be in the hands of the Kurds. The result would be that Turkey would be totally severed from its Arab space, especially if the Kurds were to subsequently succeed in reaching the Mediterranean.

There are many sensational scenarios that defy imagination. But the situation in Syria over the past two years has also turned into something that defies the imagination and any such predictions.

The din of war rose and Erdogan beat the war drums. The country tensed up with talk of serious Turkish preparations to enter northern Syria in the area between Jarablus and 'Afrin, so as to establish a buffer zone under the Turkish army's control in order to prevent the Kurdish areas from linking up to each other.

This is the first aim of all of this hubbub and racket. The irony is that, amidst all this commotion, PM Ahmet Davutoglu has been either absent or has remained in the shadows. At any rate, Erdogan seemed to be the final arbiter and decision-maker, and not Davutoglu.

The other aim behind whipping-up this tension, stems from the fact that Turkey wants to prevent ISIS from taking control of the border areas that are held by the armed [Syrian opposition] groups that are backed directly by Turkey such like Jayshul Fateh and the Nusra Front. That would sever Turkey's direct supply lines to these groups, and thereby weaken them.

As for the third aim, Erdogan is playing a domestic game after losing his dreams of establishing a presidential regime –failed in fact to ensure that he would continue to have the only say in Turkey's foreign and domestic policies given Davutoglu's willingness to remain in Erdogan's shadow, even though the executive powers and the first word should go to the prime minister.

Erdogan's plan is to enter Syria and have the Turkish army directly establish a buffer zone on the ground there, or establish such a zone indirectly via the army’s firepower and warplanes from behind the borders, or by any other means. Erdogan would thereby regain the prestige he has lost, that he can then employ (after obstructing the formation of a new government) in early parliamentary elections in the belief that they would be in the AKP's favor. He would thereby compensate for at least part of the defeat he suffered by ensuring that the AKP would re-establish its exclusive hold on power, even if with a majority of one. This would then allow Erdogan to continue to monopolize the government and the state's decision by virtue of his monopoly over the AKP's decision.

These are the many aspirations of a man who has become a lame duck. But heading to war in Syria is not just a game or picnic that will end according to his plans. Even if we do not mention Russia and Iran, it is enough to note that Washington opposes these plans and realizes the depth of the predicament that Erdogan may face if he refuses to confront the facts and insists on pursuing a risky Syrian adventure.

"And if we were to count the hornets that would emerge from the nest, we cannot but feel pity for Turkey, both domestically and along its borders, due to the futile adventures in the last quarter-hour of extra time before Erdogan's hands are shackled by a new coalition government," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

4-A win for Tehran

 

Regardless of the final outcome of the nuclear negotiations, Tehran has already achieved its major goals without having to alter its regional behavior, says Hisham Milhem in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Regardless of the final result of the '5 + 1’ nuclear negotiations with Iran, Tehran has already succeeded in its main objective of securing international recognition of its right to have a nuclear program and rejoining the 'international community,' maintains a commentator in a Lebanese daily. And it has done so without having to change its negative role in a number of regional files.

 

PUBLIC ESCALATION: "Negotiations between Iran and the '5 + 1' have entered their final round after being extended till July 7th," writes Hisham Milhem in the Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

This has occurred amidst the escalation in Washington and Tehran's public positions and against the background of signs that the two sides have invested too much effort, time, and political prestige to retreat at this late juncture – especially, since the domestic price of failure would be very high for both sides, regardless of which one of them may be responsible for the talks’ failure.

President Obama's administration claims that the negotiations' collapse would drive Iran into moving closer to developing nuclear weapons. But many observers doubt this because that would drive the Arab states and Turkey to enter a nuclear arms race with Tehran. They also believe that Iran's negative influence in the region poses the more important threat to the U.S.'s interests and that of its friends in the region. And this assessment is consistent with that of the Iranian threat by some Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

The Iranians claim that the U.S. wants the agreement more than they do, and the Americans claim that Iran yearns for an agreement because of the pressures of the sanctions. But the fact is that both sides want an agreement they can sell domestically.

Iran’s main aim is to lift as many as possible of the sanctions imposed by Washington and the UN, and regain between 100 and 150-billion dollars of its frozen monies. The fact is that it returned to the negotiations because the harsh sanctions cut its currency's value and its oil exports by half, which, in addition to its investment in the Syrian war to shore up the Assad regime, have left it with no other choice. Freeing Iran from the sanctions will help bolster its economy. At the same time, it will help finance its regional policies that are opposed to Washington's policies and those of its Arab allies and Israel.

For the U.S., the agreement will permit Obama – who has had no tangible achievement in the Middle East during his two terms in office – to tell his critics that he achieved his main regional goal by opening up to Iran and freezing its nuclear program for ten or fifteen years without the use of military force.

From the perspective of history, it is possible to say that regardless of the negotiations’ results, Iran has achieved its ambition to build a nuclear infrastructure with its human assets, secured the great powers’ acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium (albeit at low levels) and has effectively rejoined the 'international community' by way of negotiations.

"From the start of the negotiations, Iran has succeeded in separating the nuclear file from the other urgent files, most importantly its negative role in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen. And this negative role will not be affected by the outcome of the talks," concludes Milhem.

Ends…

 

 

5-Anarchy and confusion in the PA

 

The PA has been appointing and dismissing leaders seemingly arbitrarily and with no institutional oversight, notes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The dismissal of PLO Executive Committee secretary Yasser 'Abed-Rabbo reflects a pattern of appointments and dismissals in Palestinian institutions that lack any clear basis, argues a Palestinian commentator. This is largely the result of failure to revive the PLO and hold Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections.

 

MANY QUESTIONS: "The fact that Yasser 'Abed-Rabbo occupied the position of the second man in the PLO (the Secretary of its Executive Committee), i.e., in the Palestinian leadership, raised many questions and was the subject of wonder and puzzlement," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

But his dismissal from his position now via a decision that the media say was issued by the PLO Executive Committee, and after 'Abed-Rabbo's absence from many Committee meetings, has also raised many questions and is the subject of further speculation and puzzlement. In fact, it is not possible to separate this decision from a series of recent events concerning certain figures who were at the center of events until the near past. For it is not possible to separate what is happening with 'Abed-Rabbo today from what happened with [former PA PM] Salam Fayyad, [former Fateh Security official] Mohammad Dahlan, and Bassam Zakarneh, and in my opinion also what happened to [former PA PM] Ahmad Qurei’ and others.

The puzzlement at 'Abed-Rabbo's leadership post stemmed from the fact that he had no significant popular base. He first became an Executive Committee member as the representative of a very small faction, but he left that faction and kept his post; in fact, his post was strengthened. Therefore, the question was whether he deserved to be where he was in light of the fact that had no representative standing.

But without necessarily working together, 'Abed-Rabbo, Dahlan, and Qurei' constituted the main pillars of the first years of President Mahmoud 'Abbas's presidency. Qurei' (the first PM under President 'Abbas) went out, largely because of his defeat in the [2009] Fateh Central Committee elections, and Salam Fayyad joined during the phase that followed the [2007] split between Gaza and the West Bank. Bassam Zakarneh’s star rose as head of the government employees' union who carried the banner of social and economic protest against Fayyad's government, and as the spokesman of a considerable part of Fateh that disagreed with Fayyad.

Qurei' joined the PLO Executive Committee on the independents' 'quota' but in a strange manner that conflicted with his past and present in Fateh. Dahlan faced different charges and was taken to court. He was also publicly attacked by the Fateh Movement. But the irony is that the charges leveled against him – and they all undoubtedly deserve to be pursued and should not be ignored – were raised before he was elected as a member of the Fateh Central Committee [in 2009].

Furthermore, it later became clear that the government employees' union, which for years determined the pace of life for days and weeks, was operating without any legal basis, as if it were some personal project. Its head and his deputy were both arrested and it was suspended.

Then there were lawsuits against the non-profit Filastin al-Ghad Company managed by Salam Fayyad, which was concerned with civilian developmental programs, but with no official explanation of what lies behind this action. The clearest thing we have in this regard, which also reveals part of what is happening, is something that harks back to 2014 when journalist Maher ash-Shalabi attacked Dahlan, Fayyad and 'Abed-Rabbo on a TV program, accusing them of meeting in the UAE to coordinate their actions [against the PA presidency]. 'Abed-Rabbo responded with an angry statement denying Shalabi’s claims at the time.

Meanwhile, and on Shalabi's program and around the end of 2014 as well, a major dispute broke out between Fateh Central Committee member 'Azzam al-Ahmad and [PA PM] Rami Hamdallah as to how the minister of education had been appointed, with accusations that there had been personal dimensions to the matter.

The question raised by all the above is not ‘what really happened then and what is behind what is happening now’? The question is: How can the right thing happen, at the right time, and for the right reasons? And more importantly, how can everything happen in a transparent and institutional manner?

When anarchy and confusion reach this point and when yesterday's leaders and institutions are pushed out of the picture, or when people are strangely appointed in certain posts, the best answer would be to step back and carry out a comprehensive review. There is need for a comprehensive change on constitutional, legal, and transparent bases, free the intermittent and gradual opening of mysterious and ambiguous files. These bases must clarify how persons are appointed or dismissed from certain positions, and how and why they are removed from them. And they must make this transparently clear and via the agencies in charge of accountability.

Foiling the reactivation and modernization of the PLO, and blocking PLC elections, are the main reasons for the absence of mechanisms for accountability, oversight and review, and perhaps for the presence of Yasser 'Abed-Rabbo and others in decision-making posts as well.

"At least, they are the main reason why there is no clear and undisputed legitimate framework that explains both their previous presence and their subsequent removal from these posts," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Fighting on two fronts

 

Haaretz leads its weekend edition with a political analysis of the gas monopoly story; Yedioth Ahronoth headlines Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon's plan to introduce American-style credit ratings for all Israelis and The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom continue to lead with this week's bloody events in the Sinai.

According to the Post, Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Major General Yoav Mordechai, said Thursday that Israel has new clear information that Hamas is helping the ISIS-affiliated group that carried out the attacks against the Egyptian forces in Sinai. Interviewed on Al Jazeera, Mordechai gave specific examples with names of Hamas military commanders whom he said were involved in organizing and supplying the attacks in Sinai.

'We have examples of Hamas commanders actively taking part in this assistance,' he said. 'Wael Faraj, a battalion commander in Hamas’s armed wing, smuggled wounded [fighters] from Sinai to the Gaza Strip.' Mordechai gave a further example of the Hamas coordination with Sinai Province, saying that 'Abdullah Kishti is a senior training officer in Hamas’s armed wing and he has trained members of the Sinai Province group. Hamas’s armed wing has ties to ISIS; ties in the fields of logistics and weapons. I am convinced of this and I have proof.'

The Post adds that, according to Cairo-based Al-Shourouk newspaper, which in turn cited unidentified sources, fighters infiltrated from Gaza through tunnels to Sinai to participate in the terrorist attacks on Wednesday. The attackers included Palestinians, Afghans, and other foreigners, the source added.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has extended condolences to the Egyptian people. In remarks during a visit to Be'er Sheva, Netanyahu noted that up until several months ago, when Israel said that ISIS was carrying out actions on its borders, people were skeptical. 'And here we see before our very eyes ISIS operating with unusual brutality on both our northern and southern borders,' Netanyahu said. He added that the actions seen from ISIS are nothing compared to the capabilities being built by the Iranian regime, and for this reason it is especially important to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

According to the lead headline in Israel Hayom Israel has closed traffic on Highway 12 – which runs along the border with Egypt – due to the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula. The IDF stressed that the move is a temporary measure.

Elsewhere, Army Radio reports that Palestinian Authority forces arrested 100 Hamas members in the West Bank in the biggest raid of its kind in years. It was the biggest mass arrest in one night since 2007 when Palestinians split after Hamas violently ousted the forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas from Gaza, leaving him governing just parts of the West Bank.

Hamas spokesman Husam Badran said in a statement that the arrests were meant to stop the recent spate of deadly Palestinian attacks against Israelis. He accused Palestinian Authority security forces of working for Israel, and said that Hamas holds President Abbas personally responsible, adding that Hamas will continue attacks against Israelis in the West Bank. There was no immediate comment from the Palestinian Authority.

 

 

LINES IN THE SAND: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman explains why, despite the declarations and promises of Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, the Egyptian army has not managed to wipe off the Salafi terror groups in the Sinai – and what this means for Israel.

"Yesterday morning, the Egyptian army held a parade of bodies. The blood-soaked bodies of some 60 ISIS fighters were brought from all part of the Sinai and laid out in rows in an empty swimming pool in el-Arish. At the shallow end of the empty pool, the army placed dozens, if not hundreds, of weapons that the terrorists had been carrying. What stood out in this pool of death was the fact that most of the dead terrorists were wearing full military uniforms; some of them even had flak jackets and other military equipment.

The fighting between el-Arish and Rafah ended yesterday afternoon. Now they are counting the bodies. Several dozen Egyptian soldiers were also killed in the battles. The Sinai branch of ISIS tried and failed to capture a built-up part of the Sinai. But the battle for public perception is still raging: who won and who lost. The Egyptians played their card – displaying dozens of bodies – while ISIS can boast that it shocked the Egyptian public with its well-coordinated attacks in the Sinai and in Egypt itself.

It's hard to say whether the battle for this coastal strip of Egyptian land is over or whether this is merely a lull in the fighting, since the recent war between the Egyptian army and ISIS has been taking place under a blanket of intelligence ignorance. The IDF, which raised its level of alert as soon as word came through about the fighting on Wednesday morning, took into account the possibility that it, too, was suffering from a lack of intelligence which could see the fighting cross over the border into Israel. That is why it bolstered its presence along the border and sought deeper intelligence. On Wednesday evening, it became clear that ISIS was not planning to cross the Israeli border, but the alert level remained high.

If the ISIS assault had been more successful, it is conceivable that it would have attempted to turn its attention to Israel. There is also concern among Israeli defense officials that Salafi groups in the Sinai will take advantage of the situation to open a new front against Israel. No one knows which direction this snowball will take.

Israel, once again, was given a clear strategic warning. The terrorist groups operating in the Sinai are just as well organized as anything that the world witnessed in Afghanistan, Syria or Iraq. We are no longer talking about gangs of armed Bedouin tribes attacking Egyptian army outposts from time to time or blowing a hole in the gas pipelines. These are now Egyptian Bedouin who have adopted a jihadi ideology, alongside foreign fighters who have set up shop in the Sinai and who have become a well-regulated military force over the past year.

More than 100 ISIS fighters took part in this week's attacks, which targeted a number of positions along a 25-kilometer area. Carrying out an attack of this kind needs detailed preparation, training, logistics, control and command. In order to show the world that ISIS is behind these attacks, the organization has started to use its trademarks in the Sinai, where several headless bodies have been discovered over the past six months. The victims had been accused of collaborating with the Egyptian army or of being Israeli agents.

The Achilles' heel for the Egyptian army is intelligence. Cairo was supposed to set up an invincible intelligence network in the Sinai, which Israel could also benefit from. However, the situation on the ground is exactly the opposite. Egypt is not providing Israel with intelligence information, which means that if the IDF wants to get something done it has to do it itself. After the events of this week, Israel must redouble its investments in establishing an intelligence network in the Sinai.

When it comes to preventing weapons from entering the Gaza Strip from the Sinai – as part of the IDF's plan to dry out Hamas' arsenal – Israel is perfectly capable of obtaining the requisite intelligence. And these efforts have borne fruit. The Shin Bet and the Border Administration is under orders to inspect even the smallest item entering Gaza. Anything that can be used to build tunnels is confiscated.

Indeed, in recent months, Hamas' tunnel-building teams have been unemployed. There is not enough equipment and kilometers of electric cable have been seized at the Kerem Shalom border crossing. One year after Operation Protective Edge, Hamas had hoped to reach a certain number of operative tunnels, but failed to meet its own goal. The moment that construction equipment starts arriving in Gaza again – such as cement from Qatar, which Egypt allows to cross over via Rafah – tunnel building resumes. This is the focus of Israel's intelligence-gathering operations – and the results are there for all to see, including a drop in the number of rockets being manufactured in the Gaza Strip.

However, various organizations in Gaza, including Hamas, have, over the past year, conducted tests of new rockets with a range of between 80 and 150 kilometers. Israel is making every effort to thwart production of these rockets and searches every truck entering Gaza for material that could be used. But Hamas has built several new tunnels along the Philadelphi Route, between the Egyptian side of Rafah and the Gazan side, which bypass the Egyptian buffer zone. There is a commercial-level amount of earth-moving material entering Gaza. The only consolation for Israel is the fact that the price of such material has skyrocketed in recent months.

When it comes to the Sinai, however, intelligence gathering is of secondary importance – despite the fact that it is becoming increasingly clear that ISIS is setting up shop on Israel's southern border. This is just as worrying – if not more so – than the fact that ISIS is already present on the northern border, where it is engaged in the battle to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi might well decide to launch some show operation in the Sinai, but Egypt's strategy regarding the Salafi organizations will not change. Sissi may have defined the Sinai as the main mission facing him and, unlike his predecessor; he has given the army responsibility for cleaning up the peninsula and has given his military commanders all the means that they could possibly need to do the job – including tanks and attack helicopters. Little wonder, then, that Israel expected the Egyptian army to do a better job of eradicating the terrorists from the Sinai and of isolating the Gaza Strip from the northern part of the peninsula. But, as the events of the past few days prove, the Egyptians are not there yet."

Ends…

 

THE PRIDE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY: Writing in Makor Rishon, Assaf Gavor says that the Egyptian army has failed to eradicate terrorism from the Sinai Peninsula because it is too proud to take advice and assistance from the IDF, which has years of experience in counterterrorism operations.

"The Egyptian army is large and strong – but it doesn't know how to fight terrorism. That is the obvious conclusion from the events of the past few days in the Sinai. More than 75 armed militants carried out a series of well-timed and well-coordinated attacks, killing more than 60 Egyptian soldiers.

This week's attacks are further proof of the abject failure of the antiterrorism activities of the Egyptian army and the Egyptian intelligence services. The fact that the alert level had been raised across Egypt, ahead of the second anniversary of the coup lead by Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, merely adds to the embarrassment. Sissi's promise to clamp down on terrorism – made during the funeral of Egypt's prosecutor general, who had been assassinated a few days earlier – was mocked by media outlets across the Arab world.

Until just a few years ago, Israel was equally guilty of neglecting the Sinai. As a result, Israel's defense and security establishments created a massive black hole in terms of their understanding of what was happening on the other side of the border. A lack of manpower and a focus on other, allegedly more pressing fronts created a situation in which Israel possessed precious little intelligence about what was happening in the Sinai.

The warning lights started to flash for defense officials after a Qassam rocket – smuggled into the Sinai from Sudan – was fired at Eilat. Terrorists returned from training camps in Iran to the Gaza Strip and a system was developed for smuggling infiltrators into Israel via the Negev. In response, Israel revitalized, expanded and upgraded its intelligence-gathering apparatus in the Sinai and started work on a border fence to prevent smuggling. In addition, cooperation and coordination with the Egyptian security forces was significantly bolstered.

Since Israeli decision-makers assume that Egyptian control over Sinai and a sense of security in the peninsula serve Israeli interests, too, the IDF allowed Cairo to violate the terms of the peace deal between the two countries and to send in massive numbers of troops and weapons. Sissi, who declared war on the armed groups prowling the Sinai back when he was defense minister, took forceful action to clip the wings of these radical organizations, which took advantage of the fact that no one appeared to be ruling over the Sinai. As part of a broad strategic maneuver, troops, attack helicopters, tanks, APCs and even gunboats were redeployed to the Sinai. The media gave the operation widespread coverage, hoping to prove to the Egyptian people that, after years of neglect, somebody was taking control of the Sinai and planned to impose order.

The proud Egyptian army entered the Sinai with its head held up high and with the goal of eradicating terror, but it was not adept at this kind of fighting. It is more used to fighting against regular armies and all of its training exercises in recent years focused on fighting off foreign armies that might invade Egypt. As part of these exercises, Egyptian forces practiced fighting alongside troops from other branches of the military, including the air force and the navy.

But dealing with small terror cells, which took advantage of their relative speed and their knowledge of the local terrain, was something that the Egyptian army was not accustomed to. In addition, it was unfamiliar with ongoing security work aimed at preventing terror attacks. Over the years, Israel developed a strategy for dealing with threats of this kind, thanks to being forced to deal with Palestinian terrorists, Hizbollah fighters and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF expressed a willingness to share this knowledge with Cairo as part of the cooperation that has developed between the two countries, but there was one problem that got in the way: Egyptian pride. Egyptian army commanders in the Sinai refused to cooperate and so did not study the strategy for fighting terrorism that Israel developed, which means that these agile and small cells enjoy a relative advantage over the massive presence of Egyptian troops.

International terrorism, which is spreading across the entire region by ISIS, is a major military challenge. Brig. Gen. Nimrod Sheffer, the head of the IDF's Planning Directorate, spoke about this very issue during the Herzliya Conference last month. He spoke about the vital need for the army to identify changing trends and to be more flexible in terms of its strategy and its tactics on the ground. He even praised the Egyptians for joining forces with Hamas to tackle terrorism in the Sinai. Responding to reports of a rapprochement between Cairo and Gaza, he said that, 'if this leads to the creation of an apparatus for tackling the Salafi terror groups in the Sinai, then it is to be welcomed.'

After two years of antiterrorism activity in the Sinai, Cairo needs to learn one simple lesson: if it does not change its way of thinking and if the Egyptian army does not agree to accept the advice of Israel – which has plenty of experience in the area – blood will continue to flow in the Sinai."

Ends…

 

OPERATION DOUBLE SUCCESS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that Operation Protective Edge and Operation Cast Lead were a success for Israel, despite what its many critics would have us believe.

"Operation Protective Edge was, it seems, the first of Israel's wars that was commanded over by frontline officers and lawyers who were trying to ensure that the IDF met the demands of international law. This is a reason for us to be proud of ourselves, but it does not grant us any political credit in the international community. Even a fair-minded periodical like The Economist wrote this week that the ratio of Israeli to Palestinian civilian fatalities was 1:1,462 – as if the life of an Israeli soldier counts for nothing and doesn't even deserve to be counted; as if there were no terrorists killed on the Palestinian side. This is the fate of the Jewish people and it is Israel's duty to argue with the world until the truth reaches all four corners of the globe.

But this is first and foremost an internal discussion. Hamas murdered three boys and Israel went above and beyond the call of duty in its efforts to exercise restraint. Israel wanted to avoid battles and wanted to refrain from giving Gaza the punishment it deserved – not only at the start of the operation but throughout all 50 days of fighting. Israel was the only side that agreed to an Egyptian-backed ceasefire agreement. These are facts that we should constantly be reminding all those liars at home and abroad.

We should also remind them about the deafening argument between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon on the one hand, and Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett on the other hand. It was an argument between those who understand the limitation of force and those who wanted the kind of resounding victory that only exists in the movies.

There is no point in operations that try to resolve all problems. Netanyahu and Ya'alon, like Ehud Barak and Gabi Ashkenazi before them, understood something that does not play out well on television screens: they understood that operations like Operation Protective Edge never end with the total defeat of the enemy. At best, they end in interim victories, designed to achieve a temporary cessation of hostilities. The only way to ensure long-term quiet would have been to retake the Gaza Strip.

During the Second Lebanon War, Israel sustained unnecessary casualties. In Operation Protective Edge and Operation Cast Lead, there was no choice. If Netanyahu and Ya'alon had not acted with an abundance of restraint, there would have been far more casualties – without improving the final outcome. In practice, without re-occupying Gaza, Israel could not have hoped for a better outcome.

Proof of this can be found in the massive effort that Hamas' Gaza-based leadership is making (thus far) to prevent other radical organizations from firing rockets at Israel. Their aggressive tendencies are – for the time being – focused on fighting alongside ISIS against the Egyptian army in the Sinai – and they know why.

Israel's critics refuse to be convinced. But if it is confirmed that Hamas is currently negotiating with Israel over the terms of a hudna – a long-term cessation of hostilities – then maybe even they will recognize that Operation Protective Edge and Operation Cast Lead were a two-fold success story for the IDF."

Ends…

 

SISSI'S CHALLENGE: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben Menachem says that Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi must fight terror on two fronts – the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS – if he is to survive in power.

"Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi has been ruling Egypt for just two years. He assumed power over an Egypt burdened with major security and economic problems and with complex relations with radical Islam. He needs to fight terror on two fronts: the attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood within the cities of Egypt and ISIS terror in the Sinai.

An Egyptian police force raided a Muslim Brotherhood hideout in Cairo on July 1 and killed nine terrorists, according to police and Brotherhood spokesmen.  They were wanted for acts of terror and may be tied to the assassination of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat. Police found in the apartment weapons, explosives, large sums of money, and e-mail correspondence with Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Qatar and Turkey. Police also said they found a hit-list of Egyptian political figures.

The war on ISIS is one that has been imposed on Egypt, as it has been imposed on other Arab states, and Sissi will have to find the right military formula to defeat the group in Sinai.

Sissi based his government’s legitimacy on animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood, which, when it took power about three years ago, aroused loathing among the Egyptian population. He adopted the same measures that previous Egyptian presidents, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, used to fight Muslim Brotherhood terror. Among other things, its leaders have been tried in civilian rather than in military courts, and many have been given death sentences that so far have not been carried out.

When he began serving as president, Sissi was prepared to consider mediation by Arab states to help reach a 'national reconciliation' with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, as the movement ramped up its terror attacks, reconciliation ceased to be a possibility from Sissi’s standpoint. Some in the Egyptian media speak of 'uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood' and oppose reconciliation with the movement.

On June 30, Sissi announced that, in light of Barakat’s assassination, he seeks to hasten the implementation of the death sentences and life-imprisonment sentences that have been meted out to Muslim Brotherhood leaders.

It appears that Sissi, in light of security considerations and the huge efforts to salvage the economy, is opting for an iron-fist policy against the Muslim Brotherhood. The bloody conflict with them, therefore, looks likely to continue.  The latest wave of terror leaves Sissi no option; his battle is a battle for survival, and he is not prepared to surrender to terrorism."

Ends…

 

POINTING THE FINGER: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el explains that Egypt isn't trying to link Hamas to this week's terror attacks in the Sinai, since it prefers to focus on the Muslim Brotherhood.

"'The Egyptian army controls all of northern Sinai,' army spokesman Brig. Gen. Mohammed Samir proclaimed on Thursday. 'Now the investigations will begin into where the terrorists came from, who helped them and how they obtained uniforms similar to Egyptian army uniforms.'

After 24 bloody hours in which at least 17 soldiers and some 100 militants were killed from Wilayat Sinai (formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis before affiliating with Islamic State), the Egyptian army is indeed present in northern Sinai, and the fighting has died down. But its claim of 'control' is debatable.

Nobody knows how many terrorists participated in the coordinated attack that stunned the army on Wednesday by assaulting 15 military checkpoints and facilities simultaneously. And no one knows how many are in Sinai. Two years ago, the Egyptians estimated that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis had some 4,000 fighters, mostly Egyptian and some foreign. But many of the latter left for Libya to establish a base for ISIS in that country.

When it was first founded and prior to joining ISIS, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis focused more on attacking Israeli targets – including the pipeline that used to carry Egyptian gas to Israel. But it has always attacked the Egyptian police and military as well. The group is just one of about a dozen militias operating in northern Sinai and the rest of Egypt. Others have also perpetrated murderous attacks, such as the killing of 16 Egyptian soldiers in Sinai in August 2012.

That was long before the Egyptian counterrevolution toppled President Mohammed Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood in June 2013. But the wave of terror intensified greatly after current President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi ousted Mursi. Sissi has waged war on the Muslim Brotherhood – including declaring it a banned terrorist organization – and both the government and media blame it for the violence in Sinai.

Nevertheless, Sissi’s uncompromising war hasn’t reduced the terror. Moreover, the connection the government makes between the Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbollah and jihadi militias in Sinai has created the impression that it’s looking for excuses to justify its battle against the Brotherhood. There is no real proof of any military connection between the Brotherhood and the others.

Granted, Hamas is an ideological offshoot of the Brotherhood, and it once cooperated routinely with both Hizbollah and the Sinai jihadists. The latter let Hamas use their smugglers and arms stockpiles; in exchange, Hamas provided safe haven to jihadists pursued by Egyptian security forces.

But circumstances have changed. Hamas severed ties with Syria, Iran and Hizbollah over the ongoing Syrian civil war, and its forces in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee camp have even fought the Syrian army and Hizbollah there.

Though Qatar and Turkey replaced Iran as its financial patrons, this did Hamas little good. Egypt closed its Rafah border crossing with Gaza and destroyed most of the smuggling tunnels to Sinai, while Israel maintained its naval blockade of the Strip, severely restricted access from Israel and pressured Palestinian banks not to transfer funds to Hamas. This joint Israeli-Egyptian blockade seemingly left Gaza an isolated, neutralized island incapable of harming anyone.

In January, when King Salman ascended the throne of Saudi Arabia, things changed. Salman saw Hamas as a card to play in his battle against Iranian influence. He pressured Egypt into rescinding Hamas’ designation as a terrorist organization, just two months after a court announced it; Egyptian officials began meeting with Hamas representatives; senior Egyptian officers praised Hamas in the media for its efforts to prevent cross-border infiltrations in both directions; Egypt approved a limited reopening of the Rafah crossing, which, for the first time, included goods as well as people; and there were rumors of indirect Hamas-Israel talks on a long-term cease-fire.

Consequently, though Egyptian officials hastened to tie Hamas to Sinai jihadists after previous attacks in the peninsula, this time, neither military officers nor government officials linked Hamas to the Wilayat Sinai attack. Pundits, researchers and some civil-society organizations did accuse Hamas – not of cooperation with Islamic State, but only of cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thus, contrary to Israeli predictions, it seems Cairo intends to preserve its ties with Hamas, distinguish between Hamas and Islamic State, and even treat Hamas as if it weren’t part of the Brotherhood.

Indictments against several senior Brotherhood officials that were published last week quote wiretapped conversations showing that Hamas members, at the Brotherhood’s behest, came to Egypt on the eve of the 2011 revolution to help break Brotherhood activists out of jail. Yet Egypt hasn’t indicted senior Hamas officials or demanded their extradition; evidently, it prefers not to upset its ties with the organization.

Indeed, Egypt’s main problem isn’t Hamas, but Islamic State and other jihadi groups in Sinai. Even though the army claims to uncover new terror cells or weapons stockpiles every day, the frequency, scope and targets of the attacks show both the weakness of Egyptian intelligence and the strength of the militias’ logistical infrastructure.

Egyptian experts now expect the security services to take the gloves off against the Muslim Brotherhood – which they certainly did on Wednesday when they assassinated nine Brotherhood activists meeting in Cairo, rather than arresting them. The government might also execute senior Brotherhood officials, including Mursi. But such steps are unlikely to have any effect on the behavior of the jihadi groups. Just two months ago, those groups blamed the Brotherhood’s plight on its decision to abandon jihad in favor of 'democracy and reconciliation'."

Ends…

 

ANOTHER WAR?: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman looks back on Operation Protective Edge and says that it will only be judged a success if Israel's southern border remains quiet in the long term.

"A year ago this week, Israel launched its third war in Gaza in less than seven years. The first was in December 2008 and the second in November 2012. Simple calculation shows that the time elapsed between the first and second campaign was nearly four years. While the cease-fire between the second and third wars lasted just 19 months, on average it can be calculated that every 22 months Israel has found itself facing the same problem in Gaza. So, with the same calculation, Israel can expect another round in Gaza in the spring of 2016.

But Middle Eastern realities are not mere products of statistics. They don’t necessarily adhere to the scripts written by the planners. Sometimes the military battles generate surprising twists in the drama.

The last war, codenamed by IDF computers 'Protective Edge,' could be one of these unexpected events. It has the potential for a long-term tacit or formal arrangement between Israel and Hamas, one that could put an end to the rocket launching, sporadic or systematic, from Gaza and could bring quiet and tranquility for the residents of southern Israel.

In that sense, the last Gaza war could turn out to be a mirror image of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. That war exposed many tactical weaknesses of the Israel Defense Forces but, on the strategic level, empowered Israeli deterrence. The inhabitants of northern Israel have for nine years since enjoyed and benefited from a peaceful border as Hizbollah is deterred from attacking Israel. Something similar can emerge in the South. The situation Israel has witnessed in the last 12 months on the Gaza front is complex; alongside hopes, it contains risks and danger that another war is on the horizon.

What were the war’s flaws and weakness? It lasted 50 days and was not only the longest of all three Gazan campaigns, but also the second- longest war in the history of the State of Israel after the 1948 War of Independence. During Protective Edge, Israel was bombarded with nearly 5,000 rockets, more than in any other of its military clashes, including the two previous Gaza wars and the Second Lebanon War.

For its critics, the war was also too long. But there was a reason for it. The political echelon led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, as well as the IDF leadership, were concerned about reducing Israeli casualties, which due to the urban and densely populated terrain could have been higher than the 67 soldiers who died in battle.

It was also said that Israeli intelligence failed to have accurate information about the number, size and spread of the tunnels Hamas had dug to be used as a surprise weapon. But this claim is not true. Based on military sources, this writer wrote in October 2013 – nine months before the war – that Hamas had built 20-30 tunnels. Surely, IDF Military Intelligence and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) did know that Hamas had dug 30 tunnels leading in the direction of Israel. And, indeed, during the war the IDF found and destroyed all of them. The problem, however, was that, even though the information was conveyed to the government, neither the IDF’s top generals nor the cabinet ministers fully grasped the full strategic meaning before the war.

Still, the war results, as we analyze them today, are satisfactory. It was a limited war because the declared goals were limited. Israel didn’t wish to topple Hamas because that would have meant once again conquering Gaza, which is a small territorial enclave with a big but very poor population of 1.8 million inhabitants. Conquering Gaza – which from a military point of view could have been achieved within days – would have resulted in many casualties to both IDF troops and Palestinians. And it would have forced Israel to once again be the occupier and daily provider of Gaza. Israel did not want to be in this position.

Bearing in mind that Israel had no serious alternatives other than to end the war the way it did, its achievements were numerous. A growing wedge was created between Hamas and Egypt, which perceives the Islamist organization as a threat to its own national security and accuses it of supporting and collaborating with the terrorists of Islamic State in Sinai. The security cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo has reached unprecedented levels. Both countries are partners in the war against terrorism, which this week in Sinai caused the Egyptian Army heavy casualties by the hands of Islamic State and showed how painful and formidable a task it is.

There is no military solution to Gaza. The third Gaza war will be judged successful only if the southern border is truly peaceful. This is only possible if a long-term agreement is reached among Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – with financial support from Qatar to rebuild and help Gaza normalize the life of its inhabitants. Without a deal that will politically and economically regulate and administrate life there, Gaza will never be rehabilitated. Even worse: The situation will deteriorate and Israel will be confronted with Islamic State, a worse and more brutal enemy."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

ELECTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER: Cengiz Candar suggests that the choice of a new parliamentary speaker may augur early elections in centre-left Radikal: "Given that MHP [Nationalist Movement party] presented the post of head of parliament to the AKP [Justice and Development Party] 'on a golden platter' and that a CHP [Republican People's Party] spokesman called the MHP a 'chair provider', one cannot fail to detect the MHP's major role in AKP member Ismet Yilmaz's election as head of parliament. Nonetheless, comments to the effect that the likelihood of an AKP-MHP coalition has increased may be hasty and careless. With yesterday’s developments, paradoxically, we may say that the probability of an early election in November has become much stronger."

Mehmet Tezkan castigates the MHP for its position on the Kurds in centrist Milliyet: "What does the MHP want? It seems that that MHP’s stance that the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] is null and void will stop the MHP from becoming an all-Turkey party. This is because ignoring the HDP means ignoring the great majority of Kurds. It means forgetting about the entire southeast. It means rejecting the Turkish reality".

Aydin Engin anticipates a nationalist anti-Kurdish coalition in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "I guess the MHP and the AKP have conducted a religious marriage ceremony behind closed doors. It is now time for an official ceremony. And for that, a head of parliament had to be chosen, the president needs to give [AKP] PM Ahmet Davutoglu the mandate to form a government and he will then knock on the door of MHP leader Devlet Bahceli. This is coming soon. I think an AKP-MHP coalition will happen soon. This is harmonious since both parties are purely nationalist. The most significant force driving them towards a coalition is clear: enmity towards Kurds."

Abdulkadir Selvi sees the opposition in retreat in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The roof of the opposition has collapsed. It has not only suffered the pain of losing the parliament speaker’s election. It has become evident that a head of parliament cannot be chosen and a government cannot be formed without the AKP. The vote for the head of parliament has not only strengthened the probability of a coalition with the MHP, but that of an early election as well."

 

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: Unal Cevikoz claims that the Turkish people oppose any military intervention in Syria in Radikal: "An intervention in Syria concerns all the Turkish people. And the people are a whole, with all their ethnic, religious and sectarian elements, and they do not feel any grudge or enmity towards any element of the people of Syria. That is why, if Turkey ends up in war against Syria, this war will not be a war of the people of Turkey."

Ali Sirmen argues that Turkey will confront a host of enemies in Cumhuriyet: "Iran, Russia, the U.S. and the coalition forces are all against Ankara's attempt to establish a buffer zone in the north of Syria. All parties, which are struggling in the Syria quagmire, and which Ankara is trying to dive into head-on, will clash with the Turkish Armed Forces if there is such an intervention."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Hemayat writes of a new final phase: "After a seven-day extension, the talks are taking a new form and colour. New diplomatic moves are underway. The conclusion of the negotiations is vitally important for all. The other side uses all its media capacities and psychological methods to achieve its goals. The Western approach to negotiations is nothing new for our people and officials. The Iranian nation is expecting results based on the Islamic revolution and the interests of the current and next generations." 

Conservative Khorasan looks beyond: "Our nuclear team and media should behave in a way that prevents the other side - which is equipped with a vast media empire and has experience and expertise in processing and embellishing lies – from blaming Iran for deadlock or failure. If our negotiators pursue the nation's demands through the spirit and traits attributed to them by the Supreme Leader, regardless of the outcome; the leader and the people will view them as heroes in a diplomatic battle against a deceitful, greedy and untrustworthy opponent. The redlines of a good deal, as stipulated by the Supreme Leader, protect and promote the Iranian nation's dignity and development. This is not limited to the nuclear case. Although the talks concern the nuclear issue, this is the first time, since the revolution, that the talks are held at this level. The basis and principles established in these talks can become the basis, pattern and practice for any future engagement". 

Reformist Arman implies that responsibility for failure is shared: "If talks fail, none of the parties will blame themselves; each will try to pass the buck to the other side. But, it is natural that ultimately both sides should accept responsibility for the consequences of their failure. With psychological warfare, both sides will accuse each other and use this to gain support in public opinion."

Moderate Iran interprets Amano’s visit to Tehran: "The presence of IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, in Vienna and his meeting with foreign ministers, as well as his visit today to Tehran, cannot denote that he is participating in the talks. However, the timing of his visit to Tehran and the meetings that he will have with the president and the secretary of the National Security Council suggest positive developments in the negotiations. The purpose of Amano's visit is to create greater coordination to help the talks reach an agreement. Both sides have concerns over the nature of the agency's access to Iran's nuclear programme based on what is in the additional protocol."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami reminds: "This is a decisive moment. The Iranian delegation has stressed that achieving a good deal is more important than adhering to a stipulated deadline. Vienna can become the place where a nuclear deal is announced and years of nuclear tension with the West could end. Nevertheless, until the final moment, no one should forget Western selfishness and breaches of promises." 

Hard-line Keyhan is clear: "The text of the draft is so complex and multi-layered, that its violation of Iran's declared red lines is not clear. If we accept the draft of a ‘bad deal’, it means that we have surrendered. If we reject it, there will be a campaign to suggest to the world and possibly a part of the Iranian people - that Iran is responsible for the breakdown of talks. Our negotiation team has gone to Vienna with sufficient authority and has the power to say either 'yes' or 'no'. When they see that the red lines have not been adhered to in the proposed deal, their duty -meaning their definite and immutable obligation - is a clear declaration of opposition to the text and a definitive 'no'." 

Conservative Resalat calls Obama’s bluff: "Threats by President Obama to leave the talks are intended to influence the negotiations. Obama's recent position is a tactic to improve U.S. bargaining. Obama himself has repeatedly acknowledged that he has no alternative to the negotiations." 

 

ECONOMY: Hard-line Javan analyses: "Strengthening the economy is not limited to only sanctions; there are long-term requirements and the need for the right policies too. Our unseemly economic structure is related to the architecture of planning and the state of the country before the Islamic revolution. Relying on oil revenues, which has been the natural result of years of a single-product economy as well as mismanagement are not related to foreign sanctions. Of course, sanctions have caused harm and have had a negative impact; but their cancellation alone cannot resolve the economic problems of the country; the solution is somewhere else. It can be resolutely stated that the Resistance Economy is our choice whether a nuclear deal is reached or not." 

 

HAMAS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reminds Hamas of the fate of Fatah: "Terrorism and security have marginalized the issue of Palestine and removed it from the agenda of the Muslim world, which created a good situation for the Zionist regime. It allowed the continuous occupation of Palestinian territories and the siege of Gaza. News comes that Hamas is ready to agree to a 10-year cease-fire to break the siege of Gaza. The main focus of the cease-fire, however, is to disarm the Palestinian groups in Gaza. The plan is a deception with false promises. Hamas, by considering the plan, will face the fate of Fatah and will not achieve any other results. The Palestinian nation does not accept currents that compromise. They see resistance as their sole option."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Into the vortex

2-Treating the ISIS headache

 

1- Into the vortex

 

Egypt today, and until further notice, is paying the price of giving priority to the policies of exclusion and mutual violence pursued by the regime and the Brotherhood, and of the absence of channels of communication, dialogue, accord, and containment. The regime has also failed to pave the way for an inclusive process of political accord that brings the country out of its difficulties; and the Brotherhood has not carried out the required review after the collapse of its experiment in ruling the country. Instead, it has continued to live in a state of denial in dealing with all the developments that followed upon Mursi's removal from the presidency. And it did not refrain from extending a hand of cooperation to self-proclaimed terrorist jihadi groups, until it began to apparently slide into the vortex of killing and violence itself--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The first and definite precondition for reopening the doors to dialogue is for everyone – the regime, the parties, and the various currents – to promise to listen and debate, instead of repeating the same old mantras that accuse others of treason, apostasy, deception, and violence. For as long as there are those who claim sole access to absolute truths, or the right to accuse others of apostasy or exclude them, more mines will be sown in the state's body, and more crossing points will be opened for ISIS's infiltration into the country. The biggest such crossing point is the conflict between the state and the Brotherhood. Everyone's neck is on the line under the sword of violence. But in order to overcome the shock of Sinai and the project to commit collective Arab suicide, is it enough to curse the conspiracy then simply sit back and watch it unfold?--Zuhair Qussaibati in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Egypt now is like a huge and heavy truck that is rushing towards a deep abyss of bloody violence, and whose driver is slowly but surely losing control over its brakes and can only scream for help; but no one is answering. What Egypt needs to emerge from its crises are not the Gulf's monies, or Russian and U.S. weapons, or war on the Brotherhood and terrorism. What it needs is the 'third option' that may offer sole remedy that mends the national fabric and achieves national reconciliation, ending the current and future bloodshed, renewing the Egyptian national project, and reviving the country's correct fighting doctrine. For the Egyptians are good people known for their forgiving character in the interest of their country, its security, and its stability. Only one side can produce this 'third option,' namely, the Egyptian army--'Abdelbari 'Atwan in pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Coming in the wake of the assassination of the Egyptian public prosecutor, yesterday’s (Wednesday’s) attacks on Egyptian army posts in Sinai have placed the country and the region at a critical crossroads, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. Egypt’s only hope is for reconciliation between the regime and the Brotherhood; but there are no signs that either party is willing to tone down its belligerence towards the other. Yesterday's attacks are a result of the major conflict between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, even if the Brotherhood is not implicated in the violent attacks, warns an Arab commentator. The only way of preventing the situation from deteriorating further is to seek national reconciliation and refrain from claiming the right to exclude others from the public sphere. Yesterday’s Sinai attacks are reminiscent of ISIS's attacks in Iraq and Syria last year, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. But it would be a mistake for the Egyptian state to react by speeding up the execution of Muslim Brotherhood leaders since that would only push the country into a bloody abyss. The solution lies with the Egyptian army.

 

END OF THE THREAD: "The applause and shouts of 'Allahu Akbar' from prisoners belonging to the [jihadist] ‘Peninsula Lions’ organization in a Kuwaiti prisons were sufficient to reveal the end of the thread that led to the dismantlement of the terrorist cell responsible for bombing the [Shiite] Imam as-Sadiq Mosque in the Kuwaiti capital," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The manifestations of gloating, satisfaction, and delight that distinguished the reactions of Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt in response to the 'qualitative' terrorist attack that killed public prosecutor Hisham Barakat were sufficient to create a general impression that the Brotherhood was connected to this crime in one way or another. They fortified the suspicion in many minds that the Brotherhood is implicated in the violence and terrorism that is striking at Egypt, from its desert to its Nile Valley.

In his speech at the funeral of the assassinated public prosecutor, President Sissi pointed the finger directly at 'those [Muslim Brotherhood leaders] who issued the orders to kill from their prisons.' He threatened and promised to give the security forces a free hand in seeking revenge and achieving deterrence.

Egypt seems to have entered a phase of an open war, one in which torrents of blood will be spilt. Egypt after that crime is not what it was before, as many analysts and observers agree. Egypt is on the verge of a harsh decade that may resemble that decade that struck Algeria [after 1991]. Egypt is already preparing to cross the threshold of the 'Algerian scenario'; it may have crossed it already in fact. For while eyes were turned to the 'professional' crime that took away the life of the Egyptian prosecutor, Sinai was the arena for a bloody battle that killed and wounded tens of soldiers, civilians, and terrorists – terrorists who, every time we think they have been weakened, surprise us by their ability to commit more crimes.

We still do not know how the Egyptian state agencies will implement President Sissi's statements and his hints regarding 'shackled hands,' 'fettered laws,' and 'the infliction of just and deterrent punishment,' or his reference to 'those who issued the orders from their prisons.' Will the authorities carry out the death sentences against the Brotherhood leaders? Former Muslim Brotherhood general guide Mohammad Habib was clearly extremely pessimistic in his assessment of the consequences of the terrorist attack on the public prosecutor for the Brotherhood. Will Cairo erect the gallows from which tens of death sentences will be carried out, from the president to the General Guide, to other senior Brotherhood officials? Will the regime declare a state of emergency and freeze the remaining phases of 'the roadmap to the future,' specifically the parliamentary elections that have been promised before the end of this year?

These questions dominate the minds of those who observe the development of the Egyptian domestic scene with concern. This is a scene characterized by the faltering political process, the diminishing chances for national reconciliation, the spread of terrorism and its proliferation across the entire country, the growing currents of extremism and fanaticism inside the Brotherhood which is now under the control of its most extreme main figures, and by the regime's failure to restore security and stability and to place the country on track towards national accord, reform, and modernization two years after the [2013 anti-Mursi] June Revolution.

Egypt today, and until further notice, is paying the price of giving priority to the policies of exclusion and mutual violence pursued by the regime and the Brotherhood, and of the absence of channels of communication, dialogue, accord, and containment. The regime has also failed to pave the way for an inclusive process of political accord that brings the country out of its difficulties; and the Brotherhood has not carried out the required review after the collapse of its experiment in ruling the country. Instead, it has continued to live in a state of denial in dealing with all the developments that followed upon Mursi's removal from the presidency. And it did not refrain from extending a hand of cooperation to self-proclaimed terrorist jihadi groups, until it began to apparently slide into the vortex of killing and violence itself.

The developments that Egypt is witnessing will be disastrous for all parties. The regime will not achieve calm and development without an all-inclusive political process that proceeds hand-in-hand with anti-terrorism measures. And the Brotherhood will suffer backbreaking blows in comparison to which the events of Rabi'a Square [police repression] and the [2013] 'coup against their legitimacy' will seem like a short picnic. Most likely, having suffered a real haemorrhage via imprisonment, killing, forced displacement, resignations, and splits, the Brotherhood will witness more of the same, but at a greater pace and a further extent than expected. This is inevitable especially if the investigations reveal some direct or indirect link to connect the Brotherhood to Barakat’s assassination.

And the pressing and explosive domestic situation in Egypt will have a direct impact on the country's regional role and foreign policies. We are likely to witness a shrinkage in this role and an erosion of these policies. Experience has taught us that states that are not stable at home cannot play any significant foreign role, even if they are of Egypt's size and stature.

Just look at the erosion of what used to be an active Algerian diplomacy after its black decade and at the shrinkage in what used to be an active Kuwaiti diplomacy after the [1990] Iraqi invasion. Some Arab arenas riddled with crises will lose an Egyptian role that could have saved them after the management of these crises has been monopolized by small and marginal states armed to the teeth with the desire for revenge and confessional agendas.

"Egypt is at a critical crossroads, and so is the region," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

VARIATIONS ON A THEME: "The massacre committed by ISIS in Sinai yesterday recalls what had happened in Iraq’s Anbar Province," writes Zuhair Qussaibati in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

But all the massacres that this organization has been perpetrating seem more like variations on a theme whose main aim is one and the same: Undermining the Arab states, destroying their social fabric, and leading them towards endless massacres and total destruction.

There is no point repeating the old/new questions here: Who is ISIS? Who planted it? Who trained it and armed it to pounce on the Arab armies and states they choose according to their timetable? While it is likely that the source of the bombs and rockets used by ISIS in Sinai is Libya, where anarchy and chaos rule supreme, it would be terrifying if the massacre were to repeated – one that Egypt, its army, and its people are paying the price for, darkening the country's horizon and rendering the task of restoring stability to that country a difficult mission.

Egypt is not Iraq, where sectarian share-distribution has booby-trapped the project to rebuild the state. And Egypt is not Yemen, where the infiltration of Iranian fingers enticed the Houthis into risky adventures that were then exploited by a deposed president [Saleh] who continues to deceive everyone in revenge for being forced to step down from his throne.

But a question must be raised concerning ISIS's ability to infiltrate into Egypt. This is manifest in the bombings and assassinations the most recent of which targeted public prosecutor Hisham Barakat. And there is also the worsening conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood; a conflict that the regime insists on addressing via security solutions alone, while the Brotherhood does not publicly denounce violence, even though what the terrorist organizations have done may have nothing to do with it all.

It is well known that there is a Brotherhood current that insists on fanning the flames of the conflict on the street and on confronting the state and all its symbols in response to its resort to a security solution and the severe judicial sentences passed against Brotherhood leaders. On the other hand, it is also clear that President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's call for speeding up the implementation of these sentences (which include death sentences) is unlikely to calm down the conflict. In fact, from that call's gateway and windows, the winds of violence will sweep into Egypt to inflict even greater harm on the state and its ability to stand its ground in the face of trans-border terrorism.

Once again, on Sinai's sands, in al-Giza, and in the October 6th neighborhood, the black lines of a conspiracy are taking shape, one that we can speculate about but whose chapters we cannot predict. One year has passed since ISIS established its state in Mosul. During that time, it has expanded, reshuffled all the cards, and struck left and right, from Iraq to the Gulf to Tunisia. And on a black Wednesday, it shook Egypt.

There are no sectarian or confessional fanaticisms in Egypt. For this reason, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi's organization [ISIS] accuses the largest Arab army of 'apostasy,' an army that was supposed to be the vanguard of the 'joint Arab force' to confront the terrorism of the failed states in the region.

Tens of people fell victim on Black Wednesday, mown down by ISIS's bullets and shells. But while it was not strange to see some parties or currents in Egypt holding the regime and the failure of its security solution responsible for ISIS's infiltration and its defiance of the Egyptian army, it is also true that all political parties and forces are responsible for failing to formulate a project for national reconciliation.

Only such a project, which will not push any party to wager on bringing the state to its knees by means of violence – even if it does not engage in such violence itself – can correct the path of the security solution, ensuring that it does not turn into a war of attrition that will haemorrhage Egypt and its army, and into a daily bloody confrontation meant to bring the country down to its knees via al-Baghdadi's shells and rockets.

But the first and definite precondition for reopening the doors to dialogue is for everyone – the regime, the parties, and the various currents – to promise to listen and debate, instead of repeating the same old mantras that accuse others of treason, apostasy, deception, and violence. For as long as there are those who claim sole access to absolute truths, or the right to accuse others of apostasy or exclude them, more mines will be sown in the state's body, and more crossing points will be opened for ISIS's infiltration into the country.

"The biggest such crossing point is the conflict between the state and the Brotherhood. Everyone's neck is on the line under the sword of violence. But in order to overcome the shock of Sinai and the project to commit collective Arab suicide, is it enough to curse the conspiracy then simply sit back and watch it unfold?" asks Qussaibati in conclusion.

End…

 

ANOTHER ANBAR: "When bombings reach the heart of Cairo; when car bombs target the public prosecutor Hisham Barakat and his convoy even though he is supposed to be the best protected man in the country; and when advanced American F-16's are used to bomb armed cells of the ISIS 'Sinai province' after attacks in which over seventy Egyptian solders, policemen and civilians as well as over 38 Islamist armed elements were killed – when all this happens, this means that Cairo is gradually turning into another 'Aleppo', and Sinai where the battles are raging is turning into another 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) or even a Fallujah, if not another Anbar," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan in Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

It is not unlikely that we may soon, perhaps before the [end of Ramadan Muslim feast] 'Id al-Fitr, wake up at dawn to the news that the death sentences passed against [former Egyptian] president Mohammad Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide Mohammad Badi'e, and a number of other leaders have been carried out. For the decision that has already been taken to accelerate the judicial procedures regarding the implementation of the death sentences points in this direction.

Egypt is speeding down the same path that Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya have taken before – namely, towards destruction, bloody anarchy, and perhaps partition and fragmentation. This is what the Turkish deputy-president predicted in an interview two weeks ago when he said that a new 'Sykes/Picot' was marching on the region.

On Wednesday evening, the official Egyptian Middle East News Agency confirmed that a new anti-terrorism law has been enacted. In particular, the law calls for the speeding up the appeals procedures, and President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi is expected to sign the law in the coming few hours.

The execution of former president Mohammad Mursi would light the fuse of violence and terrorism in Egypt and lead the country into a dark and bloody tunnel. It could dispel all hopes of security and stability, both of which are necessary for bringing the Egyptian economy out of its suffocating crises.

The late Egyptian president Jamal 'Abdel Nasser fought the Muslim Brotherhood and executed some of their leaders (Sayyid Qutb, for example). But he did so within the context of a solid political and economic program and total bias in favor of the poor and destitute, and via an agricultural reform law and by destroying the feudal system. But the new Egyptian regime does not appear to have a similar and comprehensive project; all we see are wars and security solutions in every direction.

President Anwar as-Sadat did the exact opposite. He allied himself with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to strike at the left and the Arab nationalist current, as well as the jihadi political Islam groups in the 1970s and 1980's. He fought the October [1973] War against the Israelis with the aim of liberating Sinai after a war [the 1969-1970 War of Attrition] that had exhausted the Israeli enemy. But we do not know who the allies of the ruling regime in Egypt are, even though we know who are its enemies. Sadly, Israel is not among them; or so it seems at this point at least. In short, it is difficult for us to determine the current regime's project or identity.

The greatest threat to the Egyptian regime is not the Muslim Brotherhood, whose president was toppled and is still being subjected to all forms of marginalization, exclusion, and death and life sentences. The greatest threat to the regime comes from ISIS, which now has the upper hand in the Sinai Peninsula and is expanding in all directions. It is ironic that ISIS hates the Muslim Brotherhood more than it hates the Egyptian state and deems them to be an apostate group.

On Wednesday (yesterday), ISIS stormed six Egyptian army checkpoints, killing 70 people, most of whom were soldiers. It captured a pocket in the city of Sheikh Zuweid, close to the borders with the Gaza Strip. This was an unprecedented step that reminds us of the capture of eight Iraqi and Syrian cities a year ago. At the same time, it is threatening to topple the Hamas Movement from the Gaza Strip because it 'is not implementing the shari'a and is not upholding God's law.'

The assassination of the Egyptian public prosecutor by means of a car bomb is a crime whose perpetrators deserve punishment, just as those who did not prevent it also deserve severe punishment. But passing legislation that speeds up the death sentences is an ill-considered emotional reaction that may lead to a catastrophe for Egypt because of its serious consequences. Most prominent is the possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood may openly abandon the 'peaceful' character of its protests and go underground, resorting to arms. For these executions will promote the hard-line wing in the Brotherhood at the expense of the moderate wing or what remains of it.

We cannot deny that killing the public prosecutor, who passed these 'fabricated' death sentences, represents an assassination of the state's authority and its security and political institutions – assuming that authority was in fact in place and has not been assassinated months or even years ago due to hasty emotional decisions and policies.

Egypt now is like a huge and heavy truck that is rushing towards a deep abyss of bloody violence, and whose driver is slowly but surely losing control over its brakes and can only scream for help; but no one is answering.

What Egypt needs to emerge from its crises are not the Gulf's monies, or Russian and U.S. weapons, or war on the Brotherhood and terrorism. What it needs is the 'third option' that may offer sole remedy that mends the national fabric and achieves national reconciliation, ending the current and future bloodshed, renewing the Egyptian national project, and reviving the country's correct fighting doctrine. For the Egyptians are good people known for their forgiving character in the interest of their country, its security, and its stability.

"Only one side can produce this 'third option,' namely, the Egyptian army. It was and will remain, the backbone and sole guarantor of Egypt's security, stability, and collective identity, just as it continues to have the ability bring about change," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

2-Treating the ISIS headache

 

Now there are international and regional powers, acting in cooperation with local forces that are working hard to implement this project of fragmentation. They are sending our youth to their death. They are establishing death squads in a number of Arab states, financing, training, arming them, and providing them with logistical facilities. Solutions cannot be sought in vacuum. The parties that back terrorism are known to anyone with a mind to think and eyes to see. What is required is to dry up the sources of terrorism and hold those parties – states or institutions – accountable, since they are directly charged with committing war crimes against humanity--Yusif Makki in Saudi al-Watan

 

The near future will witness a reduction in the level of confrontation with nuclear Iran on the one hand, and a retreat in the plans of aggression against Syria, making room for a political solution, on the other. For the extremist organizations, with the vast resources at their disposal, are expanding the ambit of their attacks and marching on to new arenas... The ISIS headache will be painful to all and will push everyone to treat it in accordance with the Russian prescription [to the Gulf states]: ‘Pray that Assad remains in power.' This will be necessary if they are not to be the next target of an extremist organization that is good at only one thing – killing and being creative in doing so-- Basimah Hamad in Syrian al-Watan

 

Some have focused on the cultural dimensions of the global terrorism whose center of gravity is the Arab region while others have concentrated on social factors. But one important factor has not been addressed, argues a veteran Saudi commentator.  This is that the international and regional states that have been fostering, financing, training, arming, and generally backing this terrorism must be stopped and held accountable, if it is to be addressed. The spread of ISIS's terrorism to new arenas including the countries that were supporting it is likely to change the nature of the conflict in the region and push for new alliances that focus on fighting the terrorist groups, argues a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. It is becoming clear to everyone that President Assad is the main guarantor of their safety from the ISIS threat.

 

TRYING TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE: "Every time a bombing occurs, carried out by terrorist elements from ISIS and its sister organizations, commentators review and analyze," writes Yusif Makki in the Saudi daily al-Watan.

They search for means of solving the puzzle, sometimes by holding society's culture responsible, and at other times by holding social conditions, unemployment, and illiteracy as causes for the bombings and takfir.

It is not this article’s intention to belittle the importance of culture or the education curricula in shaping minds, or to deny the influence of social factors and unemployment in proliferating the signs of frustration resulting from the failure to secure basic human needs. The incident in which [street vendor] Bou 'Azizi committed suicide [in 2011] ignited the Tunisian Revolution and the general course of history prove that the most violent of revolutions are those staged by the poor.

But our concern here is with something else – namely, the terrorism that has spread across the globe and whose center of gravity has become our Arab world. For this terrorism, in its current form, is no longer a matter of car bombs or explosive belts. It now has armies and institutions, as well as areas that it occupies and in which it manages everything. Its actions have caused the collapse of national entities. And it is no secret that it is backed by certain international and regional powers.

Terrorism works in different climates and conditions, which renders the reasons behind its proliferation complex, and difficult to be reduced to a single cause. In Tunisia for example, a secular regime dominated the country for more than half-a-century. That regime began with Tunisia's independence and continued until the so-called Arab Spring broke out in late 2010. In fact, Tunisia is the only country in which the process of peaceful political transition towards a democratic regime has succeeded. Despite this, Tunisian youth have been the most widely implicated in terrorist activities in the region!

Tunisian extremists now fight in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, and are threatening Tunisia's own security and stability. Moreover, Tunisia is not one of the poorest African countries. Its educational curricula and its media policies have never encouraged extremist ideas. Its people were not extreme in their struggle against French colonialism. Yet this has not prevented a large number of its youths from taking part in extremist actions and terrorism.

Differing social environments are also clear if we consider Syria, Iraq, and Libya – all of which lived in the shadow of revolutionary regimes for more than five decades in the case of Syria and Iraq and four decades in Libya's case – and compare them to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that have enjoyed enviable political stability. Still, that did not prevent terrorist activities; nor did it prevent their youth from taking part in extremist acts and terrorism on a large scale. In fact, it is difficult to find any difference between the Gulf states and Syria, Iraq, or Libya as far as the participation of their youths in such activities is concerned.

The terrorist attacks this week corroborate this reading of the situation. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ISIS committed the second largest massacre in Syria during an attack it waged on the town of Kobani ['Ain al-Arab] at the Turkish borders, and in the nearby village of Barkh Botan, killing 146 civilians in the process. At the same time, the UN has noted a separate ISIS attack on the areas under the Syrian government's control in al-Hasaka in northeastern Syria, forcing around 60-thousand people to flee their homes. The UN has warned that this number may reach 200-thousand people in the coming days.

In Tunisia, where peaceful democratic transition occurred, the attack was in Sousse Province on the Mediterranean coast. It was carried out by a terrorist carrying a Kalashnikov rifle who killed 39 people, including foreign tourists.

And there is no need to mention Yemen – and God knows what Yemen is like – where the bloody conflict there has changed from its characteristic tribal form into a detestable sectarian [Sunni/Shiite] form, adding a new, harsher, and more bitter chapter to the Yemenis' suffering.

Here, in the Arab Gulf, Kuwait witnessed a terrorist crime for the first time in its modern history. The Imam as-Sadiq Mosque was targeted in the same manner in that the Imam Ali Mosque was targeted in the [Saudi] town of al-Qadih in al-Qutaif, and in which Imam Hussein in al-'Anoud neighborhood in ad-Dammas was targeted. More than 30 people fell victim to the attack, all of whom we hope have risen to heaven.

What we are claiming here is that all attempts that have been made to solve the puzzle of terrorism have ignored one important factor. This is that all these organizations were formed and prepared to pursue the aim of dismantling national entities and divide the region in accordance with plans that began to be publicly debated in the mid-1970s. They were reaffirmed at the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in 1991, and intelligence reports began to openly speak of a new shape for the Middle East in which the Zionist entity would be the centerpiece.

When some tried to raise this issue and talk of these schemes, a form of intellectual terrorism was exercised against them. For the charge of believing in conspiracy theories is leveled against anyone who speaks of projects for partitioning the region. Even the open declaration of the intention to break down the region's states, and the coincidence of the publication of the Rand Corporation's report concerning the major strategy for reshaping the Middle East's via what was referred to as the 'global war on terrorism' at the time, was not sufficient to sound the alarm bells. We continued to live in the illusion that the region was being 'democratized,' which Uncle Sam was going to achieve by force of arms and direct occupation.

Now there are international and regional powers, acting in cooperation with local forces that are working hard to implement this project of fragmentation. They are sending our youth to their death. They are establishing death squads in a number of Arab states, financing, training, arming them, and providing them with logistical facilities.

Solutions cannot be sought in vacuum. The parties that back terrorism are known to anyone with a mind to think and eyes to see. What is required is to dry up the sources of terrorism and hold those parties – states or institutions – accountable, since they are directly charged with committing war crimes against humanity.

And at the Arab level, we should return to the conventions that used to govern Arab action for many long decades. Foremost among them are non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other Arab countries, the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, and confrontation of terrorism.

"But that is a painful subject that calls for more analysis and discussion in future articles, God willing," concludes Makki.

End…

 

THE MOST DANGEROUS CHALLENGE: "The latest terrorist attacks in Paris, Tunisia, and Kuwait have increased the world's worries and intensified the questions concerning the practical steps necessary to confront ISIS as the most dangerous current challenge," writes Basimah Hamad in the semi-official Syrian daily al-Watan.

In one single day, the terrorist organization succeeded in waging bloody attacks on three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia), thereby confirming its presence and its 'trans-border global' message. But this time round, it may be that the ‘international community will not accept this ‘three-dimensional’ blow passively.

Together with many regional and Western governments, Washington has long continued to 'spin around itself' in response to this proliferating jihadi phenomenon, confining itself to counting and documenting, without offering any radical and serious solutions to destroy it. But after the suicide bombing in the Imam as-Sadiq Mosque in Kuwait, and the Sousse hotel scene and the flight of foreign tourists from Tunisia, it may have become more convinced of the need to put an end to the political exploitation of a dangerous affliction that has spun out of control of those who created it.

The confrontation with terrorism may enter a new practical phase that goes beyond statements of denunciation, condemnation and criticism, in the shadow of a new global reality in which takfiri thought has become a destructive force that attracts more supporters around the world. For as the French president said in commenting on the attack on the gas factory [in Lyon], 'expressions of sympathy' are really 'inadequate to fend off the threats of terrorism.'

In this regard, it is not unlikely that developments and changes may emerge that could change the scene in the following manner:

- First, there will be serious efforts to limit the influence of the extremist ideologies and the discourse of hatred and sectarian and confessional incitement. As an example of such efforts, it was worth noting that the Tunisian authorities have shut down eighty mosques that operate outside the state's authority, and that the Kuwaiti authorities shut down the Wissal television station known for its sectarian [anti-Shiite] leanings.

- Second, the Washington-led coalition may now move away from the track it has been pursuing in its war on ISIS where most of its operations are for mere show, and take on a more effective course. This is because ISIS has violated the American instructions that it should confine itself to acting in the area between Syria and Iraq. It has emerged in unexpected areas such as Kuwait, one of the oil-rich countries that is an important base for U.S. interests in the Arab Gulf. (ISIS was planning to capture the oil wells in Kuwait, demolish its regime, and turn it into a launching pad for its operations against the other Arab Gulf states).

- Third, new regional alliances will emerge that will necessarily require well-studied and genuine coordination with Syria and Iraq, the two states that are the qualitative center of 'Baghdadi's Caliphate's' power. These are also the two states that have the genuine will to fight and have an exceptional experience in combating terrorism.

- Fourth, many of the regimes involved in backing terrorism are now reconsidering their foreign policies. Here, two important indications are worth noting: First, the Turkish army's refusal to go along with the government's plans to intervene in Syria militarily because of the uncertainty regarding President Assad and his allies' reaction; and, second, Saudi Arabia's readiness to accept Russia’s position that backs President Assad. For according to the famous Saudi 'tweeter' Mujtahid [Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince] Mohammad bin Salman told President Putin during his recent visit to Moscow that his country 'does not want to topple the Syrian president because he helps to prevent the empowerment of what he described as the jihadi groups.'

What is important is that all the above indicates that the near future will witness a reduction in the level of confrontation with nuclear Iran on the one hand, and a retreat in the plans of aggression against Syria, making room for a political solution, on the other. For the extremist organizations, with the vast resources at their disposal, are expanding the ambit of their attacks and marching on to new arenas. Meanwhile, they continue their recruitment and illegal smuggling into Europe, as well as stirring sectarian sedition inside the countries backing them.

"The ISIS headache will be painful to all and will push everyone to treat it in accordance with the Russian prescription [to the Gulf states]: ‘Pray that Assad remains in power.' This will be necessary if they are not to be the next target of an extremist organization that is good at only one thing – killing and being creative in doing so," concludes Hamad.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Trouble in Sinai

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Thursday editions with events in the Sinai on Wednesday, where dozens of Egyptian soldiers were killed in a series of coordinated attacks by Salafi terrorist organizations. The main thrust of the Israeli coverage, beyond reporting on what happened and what is, apparently, still happening, focuses on when and if the ISIS-affiliated terrorists will attempt to cross the border into Israel's Negev.

According to Army Radio, the Israel Defense Forces beefed up their presence along the border with the Sinai Peninsula on Thursday and remain on highest alert along the southern border monitoring the fighting using UAVs. Security sources say that while the current tensions are an internal Egyptian affair, the IDF is prepared for any development, including a spreading of violence into Israel. Military sources say the army must be prepared for any scenario, including an infiltration, abduction or strike on aircraft. The Kerem Shalom border crossing, which was temporarily closed yesterday due to the heavy fighting, was reopened on Thursday morning.

According to Haaretz's Zvi Bar'el, an Egyptian source familiar with the country's decision-making process told Haaretz that if Islamic State comes near Gaza, President Abdelfattah al-Sissi may 'invite' the IDF to act against it. This will not be seen as an Israeli breach of Egypt’s sovereignty, because Gaza falls under Israel’s responsibility. 'The two armies may already be coordinating in preparation for such a possibility,' the source said. 'The Egyptian problem is that a military campaign inside Gaza could lead to breaking down the fences and a mass flight of civilians from Gaza to Sinai.' Haaretz also reports that Israelis security officials have accused Hamas of aiding and abetting the Sinai terror organizations.

Back in Israel, the papers report on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's visit to one of the people injured in a spate of recent terror attacks across the northern West Bank. Netanyahu said that terrorists and their dispatchers will continue to pay a heavy price and that security forces will track down the murderers responsible for the recent attacks in which Malachi Rosenfeld and Danny Gonen were killed.

Meanwhile, it was revealed yesterday that the Shin Bet has, with the help of the IDF and Israeli Police, uncovered over the last few months a large Hamas cell active in the city of Nablus and surrounding towns. According to details cleared for publication, some 40 alleged cell members, including senior Hamas members, were detained. The network sought to renew Hamas activities in the Samaria area, and had smuggled gold and jewelry from Jordan to sell in order to finance its operations. The cell members were in direct contact with Hussam Badran, a Hamas spokesman based in Qatar.

Finally, in other news, Netanyahu was at an Independence Day reception at the home of the U.S. Ambassador on Wednesday night, where he declared that Israel has no better friend than America, and America has no better friend than Israel. In an obvious effort to put years of antagonism between his government and the White House behind him, Netanyahu expressed explicit appreciation of U.S. President Barack Obama, the U.S. Congress and the people of America for their continual support of the state of Israel.

 

GETTING CLOSER: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman warns that, unless Egypt manages to drive a wedge between Hamas' armed wing in the Gaza Strip and the Salafi organizations in the Sinai, the problem will sooner or later reach Israel's borders.

"In less than an hour from the moment that the Sinai branch of ISIS launched its offensive against the Egyptian army in the Sinai yesterday, the IDF's Southern Command went on high alert. There was a sense of déjà vu. Memories of the terror attack in August 2012 are still very fresh among officers stationed in Israel's south.

The reports that were coming out of the Sinai – almost in real time – said that members of ISIS had captured heavy military hardware including at least one tank. Three years ago, too, the incident also began when Salafi terrorists butchered 16 Egyptian police officers and took two military vehicles. They broke through the border and moved several kilometers into Israeli territory; only by some miracle were they halted before managing to carry out a mass-casualty attack inside Israel.

The same Salafist terrorists were behind yesterday's attacks; most of them are Egyptian residents of the Sinai. In 2012, they operated under the auspices of the global jihad movement and under the name Ansar Bait al-Maqdis; this time, they have switched ownership, so to speak, and are part of the ISIS' Sinai branch.

Not only are the aggressors the same aggressors as last time, the timing of the attacks was also similar: close to the 17th day of Ramadan, which is the anniversary of the Battle of Badr – one of the most famous battles in Islamic history. As far as the Salafi organizations are concerned, this is the perfect time for such attacks against Islamic enemies. In fact, it's almost a religious edict. The Egyptian army, therefore, should not have been taken by surprise – especially since yesterday's attack also fell close to the anniversary of the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo.

The fact that the Salafi terrorists are now part of ISIS makes the potential threat they pose – a threat that is located just over Israel's southern border – far more dramatic. Even the videos that these terrorists are filming and posting online have changed: six months ago, they showed local Bedouin tribesmen carrying Kalashnikov rifles; now, these same terrorists are wearing uniforms with ranks, flak jackets and advanced military equipment.

The Sinai-based terrorists are now a highly organized and well-equipped army with advanced weaponry. Yesterday, they attacked six Egyptian military outposts within a 25 square kilometer area, including the main military camp in Sheikh Zuweid. The operation was meticulously planned and executed and followed patterns that ISIS has already used in Iraq and Syria. At around noon, the organization distributed flyers in el-Arish, calling on the local population to leave the area ahead of a takeover of the town. Indeed, the battle for the road between Sheikh Zuweid and el-Arish is far from over and the Egyptian army is now preparing to defend its strategically important positions in Sheikh Zuweid, el-Arish and Rafah – which are the main areas of fighting.

In the first wave of yesterday's attack, some 70 to 100 Salafi terrorists were involved. Some of them were equipped with antitank missiles. Just two weeks ago, they used a Kornet missile for the first time against an Egyptian tank and yesterday dozens of such missiles were used. Behind the story of these antitank missiles is one of the main oxygen supplies to the Sinai-based Salafi terrorists: the armed wing of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The person responsible for training them in the use of these missiles is none other than Abdullah Kishta, Hamas' missile expert in the Gaza Strip.

This is not the only military link between Hamas and the Sinai Salafis: some of the funding for the Salafi organizations comes from Hamas' already depleted coffers. Hamas, however, keeps this a closely guarded secret, since it knows that if the hungry people of Gaza were to discover that their government is sending money to Sinai, there would be outrage. Hamas also wants to avoid angering Iran, which is waging war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Hamas pays these Salafis to safeguard its stockpile of weapons in the Sinai and to refrain from interfering with its smuggling operations. At the same time, it provides medical treatment to ISIS fighters and shares military and logistical knowhow with them. Indeed, Hamas sees ISIS' Sinai branch as an allied force, which it can use to attack Israel from Egyptian soil. During Operation Protective Edge, for example, these organizations helped Hamas by firing rockets at Eilat.

So now we are waiting to see what Egypt will do. Israel has lived up to its side of the agreement and, in contravention of the peace accord, has allowed Egypt to send military equipment into the Sinai – including fighter jets, attack helicopters and tanks. Israel agreed to everything that the Egyptians requested. The problem is that the Egyptian strategy of trying to isolate the Salafis from the local population has failed. The Egyptians have also failed in their efforts to isolate Gaza and to drive a wedge between Hamas' armed wing and the Salafi terrorist organizations. As things currently appear, unless the Egyptian army manages to neutralize the ISIS threat and to sever its financial and military lifelines, and if it fails to hermitically seal off Gaza from the Sinai, the problem will eventually reach our border."

Ends…

 

WAITING FOR SISSI: Writing on the Walla! website, Ehud Eilam says that, in order to help Egypt tackle its terrorism problem in the Sinai, Israel must share intelligence, allow the Egyptian army to send troops there – and must encourage the United States and other Western powers to invest in the Sinai.

"The Egyptian security forces sustained heavy losses in yesterday's terror attack in the Sinai Peninsula, not far from the border with Israel. This is another example of the all-out war that is going on inside Egypt – especially in the Sinai – between the Cairo regime and security forces against guerillas and terrorists.

Following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, there was a marked deterioration in the security situation and the economic situation in Egypt. Abdelfattah el-Sissi, who came to power in July 2013, has been trying ever since to get his country back on its feet. One of the key challenges that he is facing is to stamp out terrorist activity in the Sinai. The Sinai might be a desert in terms of its topography, but it's a jungle when it comes to the terrorists and guerillas who use it as a base to spread their violence across the entire country – violence which will only intensify. Just a few days ago, Egypt's prosecutor general was assassinated in a car bomb attack outside his home. In the Sinai itself, Egyptian security forces have lost around 1,000 men since May 2011.

Sissi is desperately trying to strengthen the Egyptian economy by inviting investors, by planning a second canal to increase income and by other means. One of the main branches of the Egyptian economy, which has taken a near fatal blow in recent years, is tourism. The Sinai was once a popular destination for foreign tourists. It's not unheard of for tourists to visit the site of famous battles, but not while the bullets are still flying. The almost daily reports of attacks in the Sinai are making sure that tourists will not return to the peninsula any time soon.

In order to encourage tourists, Egypt first needs to reassure them that they will return home safely. The anarchy in the Sinai is attracting all kinds of guerilla fighters and terrorists – not the kind of people that Egyptian tourism officials wanted to bring. In theory, Egypt could focus all of its attention on those areas of the Sinai which have traditionally attracted tourists, but if there were to be a terror attack elsewhere on the peninsula, tourists could conclude that the whole region is unsafe. Any potential tourist considering a vacation in the Sinai who hears about a terror attack there isn't going to take the trouble to find out how close it is to his hotel. Incidentally – this is a problem that Israel also suffers from. All it takes is one terror attack to convince tourists from overseas that the whole country is under constant attack from terrorists.

Mohammed Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, served as Egypt's president for a year – from the end of June 2012 to early July 2013. At first, he tried to quell the fighting in the Sinai by means of dialogue; when that failed, he used force. Sissi, a former general, adopted the Israeli approach of fighting the terrorists without taking into account the rule of law and without listening to the complaints of human rights organizations. But this aggressive approach only encourages the people of the Sinai to support the terrorists. Most of the people in the Sinai, from various Bedouin tribes, have been discriminated against for years and their basic needs have been overlooked.

If Egypt wants to defeat the Sinai-based terrorists, it must create a situation whereby the Bedouin are not forced to earn a living by helping those organizations behind the violence. But Egypt, which is suffering from a severe economic crisis, is finding it hard to transfer funds to the Sinai – despite the fact that it got a generous multi-billion dollar handout from the Gulf States, specifically for this cause.

As far as Israel is concerned, Sissi is a friendly pharaoh. That is why Israel is helping him to quash the terrorist activity in the Sinai. Not only does this help bring stability to Egypt, thereby safeguarding the peace agreement that the two countries signed almost four decades ago, it also ensures that terrorists do not cross over the border into the Negev. Therefore, Israel allowed Egypt to violate the terms of the peace accord, which defined the Sinai as a demilitarized zone. Ironically, in order to protect the peace agreement, Israel (temporarily) allowed the Egyptians to send large numbers of troops into the Sinai, to fight against terror and for peace.

Israel must maintain a top level of alert on the border with Egypt, especially near those small communities located close to Eilat, which is the Israeli city closest to Egypt. In addition, Israel must do whatever it can to help Egypt tackle the terrorism problem – militarily and economically – by sharing intelligence and encouraging the United States and other Western powers to invest in the development of the Sinai."

Ends…

 

IF EGYPT FAILS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yoav Limor says that, if Egypt fails to defeat the terrorists in the Sinai, they will soon turn on Israel.

"Egypt suffered one of the worst terrorist attacks in its history yesterday: dozens of soldiers were killed and the timing of the attack – during the holy month of Ramadan – was particularly painful.

The attack, which targeted at least 10 Egyptian army outposts between el-Arish and Rafah, was well coordinated and involved dozens of terrorists, including suicide bombers. They used advanced weaponry, including Kornet antitank missiles, which were delivered to the Sinai several years ago, as part of efforts by Gaza-based terrorists to upgrade their arsenal. The Egyptian forces, which intensified their operations in the Sinai recently, were caught unprepared and large numbers of troops were redeployed from other parts of the Sinai throughout the course of the day. Their mission was to rebuff the terrorists and to retake the outposts that had been captured.

In recent years, Salafi terrorist organizations in the Sinai have grown in strength – thanks to the help of local Bedouin tribes and the 'import' of terrorists from other countries. Most of them operate under the flag of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, the organization that was responsible for firing several rockets at Eilat. Last year, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis swore allegiance to ISIS and started to get funding and instructions from it. Three years ago, members of the same organization carried out a similar attack, in which 17 Egyptian soldiers were butchered on a military base in the Sinai during Ramadan. The terrorists hijacked Egyptian military vehicles, crossed the border into Israel and were taken out in a series of airstrikes.

That attack is viewed in Egypt as a milestone in the war on terror. It was followed by a massive bolstering of troops in the Sinai and Israel even gave Cairo the green light to send Special Forces into the area – in violation of the peace deal between the two countries.

The events in the Sinai yesterday grabbed the attention of senior Israeli political and military figures, despite the fact that the prevalent opinion at this stage is that the terrorist organizations there have no intention of trying to cross the border into Israel. The main concern is that Egypt will lose total control of the Sinai and, as a result, the terrorists there will become even more daring. Special concern is reserved for the Gaza Strip, since the Salafi organizations in the Sinai have close ties with their counterparts in Gaza and because all of the recent rocket fire from Gaza has been the handiwork of these Salafi organizations – some of whom are trying to undermine Hamas' regime in the Strip.

It is impossible to comment on the Sinai terror attacks without relating to other attacks on Egyptian soil. Earlier this week, Egypt's prosecutor general was assassinated, presumably by Muslim Brotherhood terrorists marking the second anniversary of the ouster of Mohammed Mursi. This forced the government to move troops from the Sinai into Egypt itself, which, in turn, allowed the terrorists to carry out yesterday's attack.

Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi has already proved that he is determined to wage all-out war against terrorism, since he knows that, if he does not, he will be overthrown by it. If asked, Israel will give Egypt whatever help it needs to fight the terrorists, since Jerusalem knows that, if Cairo fails, the terrorists will sooner or later start moving toward Israel."

Ends…

 

HELPLESS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Shimon Shiffer says that West Bank settlers deserve the same kind of government protection as residents of Tel Aviv.

"The Pavlovian response of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon to the recent wave of terror attacks in the West Bank was to demand – for umpteenth time – that Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas condemn the killings and promise to take firm action to apprehend the perpetrators. This is an empty response: The Israelis who live in settlements close to the scene of these attacks are not waiting for Abu Mazin to speak out; they know that sole responsibility for their security rests with Netanyahu, Ya'alon and the other members of this government.

In recent years, there have been no meaningful negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the Israelis who live in the West Bank expected the governments that Netanyahu has headed to ensure their safety under such sensitive conditions. This has not happened: Netanyahu preferred to focus on the Iranian threat and has failed to give appropriate attention to the sporadic outbreaks of violence among the Palestinians, which has claimed the lives of many Israelis.

It seems, therefore, that the overriding preference of the Israeli leadership is to refrain from making any decision one way or another: there's no progress toward any kind of political agreement and there's no decision to launch a major antiterrorism campaign, along the same lines as Operation Defensive Shield from 2002. Unilateral measures, such as annexing territories, withdrawing from certain areas and concentrating the settler population in the blocs that were recognized by George W. Bush, are also not on the agenda. In any case, they could not be an alternative to progress on the diplomatic front.

We cannot and must not emulate Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, who announced this week that the death sentences passed against leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood would be carried out. Sissi is fighting an all-out war against terrorists in his country, but he is using the kind of brutal tactics that are not fitting for a democratic country which sees itself as an enlightened Western-style regime.

And yet, we have the right and the duty to demand that our government and our prime minister take decisive action against anyone who attacks Israelis – no matter where the attacks take place. The same protection that the government affords to residents of Tel Aviv must be afforded to residents of the West Bank. Our leaders must give the settlers the protection they need, rather than just appear at the bedsides of people injured in terror attacks for another photo-op. It's not enough for them to talk about the dangers lurking in every corner of the Middle East – they must act."

Ends…

 

TRUCE OVER: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that recent events in the Sinai likely signal the end of the brief truce between Egypt and Hamas.

"The assassination of Egypt’s top prosecutor Monday turned out to be the opening shot of an attack by Islamic groups on the generals’ regime in Cairo. Wednesday's deadly and audacious onslaught in Sinai — whose timing around the second anniversary of Egypt’s military coup is no coincidence — poses a hefty challenge to the Egyptian government.

Arab media attributed the coordinated attacks in Sinai to Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. It seems they were carried out by a faction known as Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai), the largest Islamic group in the peninsula. It has been fighting the Egyptian regime for years. In its previous incarnation, the group was known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, but toward the end of last year, following Islamic State’s huge and unexpected military victories in Syria and Iraq, the group changed its name and transferred its allegiance from Al-Qaida. In return, it received a new ideological umbrella and financial aid from the enormous profits Islamic State has reaped since it seized Iraqi oil fields.

In numerical terms — the number of fighters compared with the number of losses inflicted — the Sinai group is the most deadly Islamic State faction in the Middle East. In March, Israeli intelligence estimated that Wilayat Sinai had only a few hundred fighters, but within a year and a half it killed more than 300 Egyptian security personnel in Sinai. Wednesday that number rose by several dozen; according to reports in the afternoon, at least 64 Egyptian soldiers and policemen had been killed in attacks on military checkpoints and police stations.

Wilayat Sinai also suffered losses, but it seems that in the image war — vital to a terror group seeking to undermine a regime — the terrorists came out on top. Based on experience, we can assume the group documented the attacks. Those videos, if and when they are posted, will have an effect on morale.

The militants simultaneously attacked 15 security positions and checkpoints from Rafah and El-Arish in northern Sinai to the town of Sheikh Zuweid to the south. They used advanced Kornet antitank missiles, car bombs and suicide bombers. According to an unconfirmed report, they even downed an Egyptian Apache helicopter. In battles that raged late into the night, the Egyptian military responded largely with F-16s and attack helicopters.

Also, following a report that Islamic State had snatched an Egyptian armored personnel carrier, Israel closed the crossings at Nitzana and Kerem Shalom for fear terrorists would try to use the vehicle to breach the border, similar to an effort at Kerem Shalom in 2012. The Israel Defense Forces believes that though Islamic State’s Sinai efforts are designed to help overthrow the Egyptian government, the group sees Israel as a secondary target. This contrasts with the extremist factions in Syria like the Nusra Front, which refrain from attacking Israel on the Golan Heights.

In any case, the terror wave in Egypt didn’t come out of nowhere. Every day there are at least three or four terror attempts by Islamic factions in Sinai or mainland Egypt. At the beginning of the week three Egyptian road workers were killed in such an effort. But the killing of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat shows that even President Abdelfattah al-Sissi may not be immune to the fate of one of his predecessors, Anwar Sadat, who was killed by Muslim extremists after reaching a peace treaty with Israel.

Israel was very pleased with the military coup two years ago that brought down the man it considered a problematic partner, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Mursi, and ushered into power generals who don’t hide (at least in private meetings) their admiration for Israel and their view of Israel as a partner in the war on terror. Sissi, unlike Mursi, keeps his distance from Hamas in Gaza and has often put greater pressure on the Strip than Israel has.

But the military coup came with a heavy price. As analyst Mohamad Bazzi noted in a Reuters column, the generals’ regime has apparently brought some stability to Egypt and relieved it of the Muslim Brotherhood’s amateurish economic management. But it has also created tremendous frustration among Brotherhood supporters because the first president elected in a free and fair election was toppled. According to Bazzi, the coup also reinforced the notion that the only way to achieve political power in Egypt is violence. The show trials for Muslim Brotherhood leaders, the wholesale death sentences for members of the movement, including Mursi, and the military's killing of 1,000 pro-Brotherhood demonstrators in August (which Israel has forgotten) only strengthen that impression.

Israel will certainly help Egypt fight terror in Sinai, albeit indirectly and with a low profile. But what might be more important for Jerusalem is Sissi and the generals’ relationship with Hamas. Though Cairo has long accused Hamas of aiding the Sinai extremists, the relationship between the generals and Hamas thawed somewhat after Saudi Arabia asked Egypt to reduce its pressure on Gaza (and perhaps also because Hamas was forced to rein in Salafi groups in Gaza that were firing rockets at Israel).

Now it’s reasonable to assume this truce is over. Egypt knows that Hamas needs the Sinai Islamic groups because they’re the desert rulers, the ones who control the area containing arsenals and the few smuggling routes left between Sinai and the Rafah smuggling tunnels. If Cairo accuses Hamas of supporting Sinai groups, it may well consider punishing Gaza. This may seem unlikely, but in an extreme scenario even an Egyptian airstrike on 'terror targets' in southern Gaza is possible."

Ends…

 

TROUBLE IN THE SINAI: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Zvi Mazel says that U.S. President Barack Obama, who has not severed his links with the Muslim Brotherhood, is apparently not giving enough weight to the decisive role played by Egypt in the fight against radical Islam.

"Fighting broke out Wednesday morning in the northeastern section of the Sinai Peninsula as the local branch of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, an organization that has sworn allegiance to Islamic State, simultaneously targeted a number of military targets in what was undoubtedly the largest attack ever in the region.

By evening the battle was still ongoing, and the Egyptian military already had suffered double-digit casualties, with expectation of more. Incredibly, the all-knowing security services had no advance warning of a major concerted operation that must have involved considerable planning: preparing arms and ammunition; vehicles; surveillance; as well as communication channels to coordinate the moves.

The thousands of Egyptian soldiers stationed in Sinai heard and saw nothing; the roadblocks reported no suspicious traffic. Apache helicopters crisscrossing the skies were unaware of what was happening. Perhaps worse, the surprise was such that soldiers reacted sluggishly and only after having suffered significant losses.

Egypt is still trying to find a fitting answer to a complex situation. It does not lack troops on the ground – Israel has agreed to let it move as many soldiers into Sinai as is needed to fight terrorism. The problem is that the Egyptian Army lacks special forces trained to fight in the desert and mountainous regions where terrorists are probably sheltering and getting organized.

Furthermore, those terrorists are aided and abetted by the Bedouin population. Neglected for decades by the Cairo government, the Bedouin were easily swayed by elements of radical Islam trying to infiltrate the area and prepared to pay well for their assistance. It started some 15 years ago, as Bedouin helped smuggle missiles and explosives dispatched by Iran into Gaza, using the hundreds of tunnels Hamas had built under the Egyptian border.

Then-Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak turned a blind eye, believing it was 'not his job' to supervise what was getting inside Gaza and he did not foresee the danger for his country in spite of Israeli warnings. His fall was a near fatal blow to the security apparatus of Egypt, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, where it has yet to recover.

During his short tenure, 2012-2013, president Mohamed Mursi, a dedicated Muslim Brother, gave radical organizations in Sinai a free reign and deliberately prevented the army – led by general Abdelfattah al-Sissi, whom he himself had appointed minister of defense – from acting.

Today, Egypt is facing a well-organized terrorist force familiar with the area, which has the support of Bedouin, elements from Gaza and even from Libya, where Islamic militias are active and infiltrate arms and militants into Egypt. The ouster of Mursi and of the Muslim Brotherhood energized Islamic movements that are receiving information and intelligence from the Brothers regarding suitable targets to damage Egyptian infrastructure and economy.

President Sissi had intended focusing all his efforts on economic development to lift Egypt out of its catastrophic situation. He has met with no little success – he is about to open a second Suez canal, which will halve the time needed for the crossing and triple revenues. He has increased electricity production and canceled 80 percent of energy subsidies. The International Monetary Fund has applauded the beginning of a modest economic growth – 3 percent.

The president has many other projects, but is thwarted by terrorism not only in the peninsula but in the whole of the country – from Cairo, where the public prosecutor was assassinated two days ago, to distant provinces. He also is working to reform the way Islam is taught. Yet, the Egyptian president is not getting any help from the United States or Europe, both still calling him a military dictator who forcibly ejected a democratically elected president. Neither understood that Mursi was about to set up an Islamic dictatorship.

U.S. President Barack Obama, who has not severed his links with the Muslim Brotherhood, is apparently not giving enough weight to the decisive role played by Egypt in the fight against radical Islam. Far from granting the country the military and economic assistance it needs, he only recently restored the supply of a measure of military assistance, while still refusing to let Egypt get sophisticated equipment that would make it easier for the army to engage in guerrilla-type warfare in the difficult Sinai terrain."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.07.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: Ezgi Basaran denies that Turkey has grounds for a humanitarian intervention in Syria in centre-left Radikal: "A 'humanitarian intervention' is universally considered to be legitimate when it follows violence, such as genocide or a massive massacre. For example, if Turkey had entered Syria to rescue the Yezidis who were being massacred, this could have been a credible explanation. But one cannot talk of a 'humanitarian intervention' while saying 'we will establish a buffer zone for ourselves'. Getting into Syria to establish a buffer zone is against international law. It is illegal. Do not drag this country even further into the Syria quagmire."

Writing in the same paper, Cengiz Candar argues that Ankara is fixated on Assad and the Kurds rather than ISIS: "President Erdogan and PM Davutoglu’s approach to Syria was never 'ISIS first', but 'Syrian President Assad’s regime first'. That is why, regardless of their statements to the contrary, the AKP [Justice and Development Party] government conducted a policy that tacitly backed ISIS. Erdogan's problem is not about Jarablus ending up in the hands of ISIS or Azaz [in Turkey] being under the ISIS threat, but the probability that the region between Kobani and Afrin cantons may gradually get under the control of the PYD [pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party]."

Melih Asik warns against a potential disaster in centrist Milliyet: "Assad has not yet been toppled. He is defending his country like a man. We stopped pursuing Assad a long time ago. The PYD-PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and ISIS are fighting each other on our border, seeking to take control of the region. There are reports that there will be a military operation against Syria. Whom will we be fighting after we enter Syria? Assad, the PYD, ISIS and the Nusra Front will all be against us. If Ankara is not bluffing, a military operation against Syria will be the final point in Turkey's disaster."

Ozgur Mumcu charges the president and government with playing with war in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The president of the republic who is not the President [as in a fully presidential system] and the government that is not permanent are playing a war game. The president whose legitimacy has been stripped away and the government that will soon depart if a coalition is formed are seeking to take up arms to extend their power. They are dreaming of a military operation that is being presented internally as one against the PYD (PKK) and externally as being against ISIS. The goal is to establish a buffer zone. A dream of war, which has no real legal, political or economic basis, is being enacted."

Mehmet Cetingulec calls for a referendum in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Turkey is discussing an operation to establish a buffer zone and enter Syria, which will have significant economic and social consequences. To do that, a new government must be first formed and the new parliament must approve it. Moreover, why not ask the nation before making a decision that might cause a war - our neighbor Greece is even taking the EU debt bargaining to a referendum? An incursion into Syria is not a simple matter."

Beril Dedeoglu suggests that Turkish intervention is in the offing but its framework remains undecided in centre-right, pro-government Star: "ISIS is putting Turkey in a difficult situation and threatening France. Only France and Turkey have openly taken a stand against Assad. In the end, ISIS is forcing Turkey and France to go for a joint operation. Since there is also the U.S., which is bombing various areas in Syria, such a coalition will probably be under a NATO umbrella. Yet if Turkey intervenes, it is unclear what the framework for this intervention would be."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz repeats: "The West and, in particular the Americans, prefer any agreement to not signing one. The U.S. sole option is an agreement; it does not have any other options. The talk of a military option is a bluff since Americans are well aware of Iran's defence capabilities, even though they lack essential information. In fact, their insistence on gaining access to military sites is an attempt to obtain vital information about our armed forces. For Americans, the failure of the negotiations is not an option, because they do not have any other options. Military threats are a form of psychological warfare and political bluff." 

Hard-line Javan defines a good agreement: "All parties speak about a good agreement. Some contend that the extension of talks for a few days is fine in order to reach a good agreement. Each side has its own interpretation of a good agreement. The main, and the most important, objective is to preserve our nuclear industry; that is the fundamental pillar of a good agreement." 

Reformist Mardom Salari is both suspicious and hopeful: "It is most important to achieve an unambiguous, transparent and permanent text because the West is deceitful and easily resorts to duplicity. It is also necessary for legal advisors to be extremely precise in formulating the articles of the agreement to prevent Western misinterpretations. The lifting of sanctions should occur immediately after a UN resolution. We hope that by reaching a final deal and lifting sanctions, we will make peaceful use of nuclear energy and trust towards Iran will form in international public opinion. The West believes that by lifting sanctions they will gain a great opportunity to make investments in Iran. That is why France's investors have strongly criticized French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius for taking a hard line and not paying attention to French economic interests."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami is realistic: "On the eve of the deadline, the main concern of people is whether an agreement and the lifting of sanctions will improve the economy and their livelihoods. We should not expect the economy to experience any extensive and rapid changes, even if all sanctions are removed. The fact is that the factors that affected the economy over the past several years have caused great harm. To compensate for the losses, a lot of time and work is needed. The lifting of sanctions would make the necessary work easier and quicker. However, removing sanctions alone is not sufficient, since a large part of the preliminary work is related to changing unhealthy habits, both in the economy and lifestyle." 

Hard-line Keyhan is despondent: "The nuclear negotiations have reached the final station. Over the past 12 years, public opinion has grown familiar with this regularly repeated mantra. Iranian negotiators - from Hassan Rowhani to Ali Larijani, from Jalili to Zarif - have gathered quite valuable experience about the malice of the U.S. and the West. After 12 years of confidence-building and voluntary restrictions, trust in us remains suspended. After 12 years of unprecedented inspection, the International Atomic Energy Agency is still not willing to admit the absence of violations in our nuclear programme. Is a good and dignified deal, based on our national interests, possible? Is any agreement that our team accepts good - and do they have the confidence of the blank cheque of support from the Leadership?" 

Reformist Arman targets France: "France tries to fill the Zionist regime's empty seat in the talks. At the same time, France's few billion dollars’ worth of deals with Saudi Arabia have caused the French to lobby for Saudi Arabia's positions in the talks. These relations have led France to play a negative role in the talks. But if a deal is reached, it is unlikely that France will be able to disturb it."

Reformist Sharq comments: "In the last week of talks, there are still differences between the two sides. An agreement could be at risk if one or both sides do not retreat from their contentious positions. Europe lacks its previous competence due to the presence of the U.S.. The European economy has been vulnerable, weak and affected by the U.S. economy; it is not ready to compete with the American economy. The U.S. is the main side in the current talks, but it also has a lot of problems in foreign policy and needs Iran's help." 

Moderate Iran berates domestic opposition: "Instead of being concerned about threats and pressure from the opposing side, Foreign Minister Zarif and his assistants have been much more worried about the false attacks of domestic opponents. After 20 months of talks, the Iranian diplomatic team can claim that it has been able to clean up most of the negative positions and dark PR of the outside world about Iran. But, none of these changes have had any impact on the attitude and behaviour of domestic opponents. This inflexible and hard stance by a domestic minority opposed to the nuclear talks is a strange mystery."

Reformist E'temad is pleased: "A nuclear agreement is a victory for the stability of Iran and the region. One implication of a deal is that the world's major power recognizes Iran's role in regional stability and the peaceful orientation of Iran's foreign policy, which does not seek to dominate the region." 

Conservative Khorasan urges more attention to NGOs: "The challenging nuclear talks with the six major world powers, who collectively have countless more hours of experience in negotiations, bargaining and the use of complicated techniques - in complex international and strategic areas - reveal the need for Rowhani's prudence and hope government to pay more attention to non-governmental professional organizations than before." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-A new level of confrontation

2-Turkey’s false pretexts

3-Common denominators

4-The need for national unity

 

1-A new level of confrontation

 

What I fear most is that the political decision will be influenced by this media madness, as a result of which Egypt may slide towards repression with all its ensuing repercussions. We would be entering a tunnel from which we would not know how to emerge. And we may yet clone other precedents in the region that we believed or hoped were inapplicable to Egypt. But the circumstances of the public prosecutor's assassination draw our attention to the fact that this possibility is not totally out of the question. For this reason in particular, I claim that this crime warrants special scrutiny that is guided by reason and that rises above tense reactions inasmuch as we refuse to surrender to the desire for revenge and to hatred--Fahmi Houeidi in Egyptian Ashurouq

 

Although Sissi's hard-line policies have caused many Egyptians who were supporters of the June 30th Revolution that brought him to power to recoil from him, and although the judiciary’s sentences – especially against leftist activists who dared to raise their voice against the regime – have infuriated many Egyptians, the Egyptians have been pouring their anger on the Brotherhood since Monday. Since Monday, the confrontation between the government and the Brotherhood has automatically moved to a new level. This is open to various possibilities, not the least likely of which is a growing number of arrests and prison sentences, that have recently numbered in the hundreds. And it is most likely that we will reach a phase in which gallows will be erected and the postponed death sentences will be carried out--Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The reactions to Monday’s assassination of Egyptian Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat have been unbalanced, notes a moderate Egyptian Islamist, with some urging the government to adopt harsher measures in dealing with the Brotherhood, and others applauding what has happened and gloating over it. But this can only lead Egypt towards greater chaos and repression. Barakat’s assassination has taken the confrontation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood to a new level, maintains a Lebanese commentator. The regime is now likely to pursue an even harsher campaign against the Brotherhood, possibly implementing the death sentences that have already passed against some of its senior leaders.

 

[AP reports Islamic militants unleashed a wave of simultaneous attacks today (Wednesday), including a suicide car bombing, on Egyptian army checkpoints in the north of the Sinai Peninsula, killing at least 30 soldiers, security and military officials said. The attacks took place just south of the town of Sheikh Zuweid and targeted at least six military checkpoints. At least 40 other soldiers were wounded, the officials said. The attacks came just two days after the assassination in Cairo of the country's top prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, and one day after President Abdelfattah el-Sissi vowed to step up a two-year crackdown on militants. Last week, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani called in an audio message on ISIS followers to launch massive attacks during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which is now entering its third week. Wednesday's attacks came in swift response to el-Sissi's pledge the previous day to carry out justice for the prosecutor general's assassination — and possibly move to execute Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Sissi said the government was ready to brush aside criticisms and free the judiciary's hand for a "battle" the country is prepared to wage. Action will be taken within days "to enable us to execute the law, and bring justice as soon as possible," he said. "We will stand in the face of the whole world, and fight the whole world." In a thinly veiled reference to jailed members of the Brotherhood, Sissi blamed the violence on those "issuing orders from behind bars," and warned: "If there is a death sentence, it will be carried out."

 

MENTALLY UNSTABLE RESPONSE: "As soon as the news of the assassination of the Egyptian public prosecutor was announced, the sounds of a mentally unstable and extreme response rose high," writes Fahmi Houeidi in Wednesday's Egyptian daily Ashurouq.

The madness we heard was that of inciters and cheerers. The former called for setting up the gallows, and the latter wished for more graves to be dug. Despite the conflicts and hostility between them, they both agreed on one thing, the desire to spill more blood, fan the fire and ensure that it spreads. For we have surrendered to the desire for revenge and feelings of hatred; as a result, each side can only see its vendettas, but the country's wellbeing never crosses its mind.

The man's blood was still wet on the ground; his body had still not been removed from the operations room; the criminal investigation experts were still examining the site of the crime; an investigation had still not begun, and witnesses had yet to be cross-examined. And tongues were tied from the shock and horror of the tragedy. Despite this, the voices of madness were reverberating in space. The inciters were mobilizing and stirring up, and the cheerers were gloating and reveling. The former took up their usual positions on the TV screens, and the latter held their celebrations on the social media.

The inciters explained their position as follows: The Brotherhood is the perpetrator; repression is the solution; the security forces should be mobilized and adopt stricter measures; the emergency laws should be activated; the death sentences [on Muslim Brotherhood leaders] should be carried out; and all talk of an ease in tension or of understanding should cease.

As for the cheerers, they deemed what happened as a punishment inflicted by fate to avenge their victims. They claimed that what happened was a sign of the regime's weakness and of its imminent fall, as well as a victory for the policy of violence that will deter their opponents.

If I may summarize the echoes of what happened as I managed to observe them, I would say that the voice of extremism on both sides was loudest – the extremist inciters who coiled up and continued to insist on greater repression, and the extremist cheerers who justified the crime and celebrated it. To be fair, however, I heard an exceptional voice that 'sang out of tune' with the flock of madness, deployed the discourse of reason, and said that the law was the proper resort. This was the head of the People's Alliance Party and Deputy-President of the National Council for Human rights Mr. 'Abdelghaffar Shukr. Asked in a television interview about the need to enact the terrorism law as the inciters have been demanding, he denied the need for exceptional legal measures and deemed implementation of the present criminal law to be adequate to the task.

I am sure that there are others besides Mr. Shukr who have maintained their mental balance and have not joined the flock of madness; but the fit of madness and the media clamor has swamped their voices. What I fear most is that the political decision will be influenced by this media madness, as a result of which Egypt may slide towards repression with all its ensuing repercussions. We would be entering a tunnel from which we would not know how to emerge. And we may yet clone other precedents in the region that we believed or hoped were inapplicable to Egypt. But the circumstances of the public prosecutor's assassination draw our attention to the fact that this possibility is not totally out of the question. For this reason in particular, I claim that this crime warrants special scrutiny that is guided by reason and that rises above tense reactions inasmuch as we refuse to surrender to the desire for revenge and to hatred.

Our analysis of the case should begin with specifying the perpetrators on the basis of a free and fair investigation. That should provide us with evidence that would allow us to understand the turning point that we are heading towards. In this regard, I hope that we will avoid the error we committed when the Dakahlia Governorate's security directorate was bombed on December 24th 2013. The council of ministers met the very next day and declared that the Brotherhood was responsible for the attacks. On that basis, the Brotherhood was proclaimed to be a 'terrorist organization' in a statement announced by then PM Dr. Hussam 'Issa. Later, however, the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis [jihadist organization] published a videotape of the attack in which it claimed responsibility for it and offered the name of the suicide bomber who carried it out (Abu Mariam). The result was that the security forces' eyes were focused on pursuing the Brotherhood, leaving Ansar Beit al-Maqdis to revel savagely in Sinai. Political accounts were settled at the expense of security stability.

Parallel to this, a review is necessary to ensure the safety of officials. It is also necessary to review the consequences and results of the security policy that has been pursued so far and that has not succeeded in combating terrorism over the past two years. And what is no less important is the need to discuss the factors that have led terrorism to target the army, the police and the judiciary, and these agencies relationship to the political conflict raging in Egypt. And any review would be inadequate if it did not include other issues that are fundamental for achieving stability such as easing the political tension, an end to the violation of human rights, respect for the constitution and the law and other such factors that would help absorb the anger, end the bitterness and hatred, and revive the hopes for political reform and peaceful solutions.

The cheering of the gloaters is condemnable and politically and morally unacceptable. As for the calls from the advocates of repression, I have but one comment to them that I borrow from what the [Umayyad] Caliph 'Omar bin 'Abdelaziz told one of his walis who urged him to be harsh in dealing with his subjects.

"His answer consisted of five words: ‘Fortify your land with justice’," concludes Houeidi.

End…

 

RENAMING THE SQUARE: "Hours after the assassination of the Egyptian prosecutor general, Rabi’a al-'Adawiyya Square [former Cairo scene of widespread Muslim Brotherhood protests and police violence] was renamed as the Martyr Hisham Barakat Square," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

'Execute the Brotherhood' invaded Twitter and became its most popular hashtag. The calls to hang the Brotherhood's leaders, including General Guide Mohammad Badi'e and deposed president Mohammad Mursi, have fanned the already soaring flames on the various social media.

The only thing Egypt needed to add to its boiling climate was an assassination of this magnitude. For the past two years, the country has been in the midst of a wave of violence and instability, unprecedented since the 1980s. The dreams of change fostered by the two [2012/2013] revolutions are now further away than ever before. After what happened on Monday, the most optimistic prediction still anticipate a new wave of disturbances and repression, further exacerbating the country's crisis instead of resolving it.

Violence in Egypt only brings more violence in its wake. The bloodshed that has not ceased since Mursi was toppled has fueled society's divisions and polarization. The targeting of judges by the Islamists has left their already black record even blacker. There is no doubt that their success in assassinating a figure of Hisham Barakat's standing will add to their momentum and terrorism. They have succeeded in striking at a senior government figure for the first time since their assassination of parliamentary speaker Rif'at al-Majzoub in 1990.

It would be deluded to believe that Sissi would receive such a blow calmly or that he will loosen the iron fist with which he has been confronting his enemies. The assassination of the 'military's public prosecutor' in his stronghold before the Military Academy by what he claims are the 'Brotherhood', and on the eve of the June 30th [anti-Mursi] Revolution's anniversary represents a stark defiance of his regime. Sissi, who has simply turned his back on the international charges of repression leveled against him, will not go soft after what has happened.

Ever since they were removed from power, the Brotherhood refused to give in. Their leadership urged them to fight till 'martyrdom' to regain the 'throne.' When these leaders were arrested and many were sentenced to prison, some of them emerged to publicly and fearlessly call for the assassination of judges.

Although the Brotherhood did not officially adopt Barakat's assassination, there is much suspicion that it was responsible. The fact that it has gloated over a crime as terrible as this has been sufficient to denounce it. But what the Brotherhood has failed to realize is that Barakat's assassination will not restore freedom to those behind bars or suspend the prison and death sentences passed against their leaders.

Barakat's blood will only create more hatred, vendettas, and blood. Although Sissi's hard-line policies have caused many Egyptians who were supporters of the June 30th Revolution that brought him to power to recoil from him, and although the judiciary’s sentences – especially against leftist activists who dared to raise their voice against the regime – have infuriated many Egyptians, the Egyptians have been pouring their anger on the Brotherhood since Monday.

Since Monday, the confrontation between the government and the Brotherhood has automatically moved to a new level. This is open to various possibilities, not the least likely of which is a growing number of arrests and prison sentences, that have recently numbered in the hundreds.

"And it is most likely that we will reach a phase in which gallows will be erected and the postponed death sentences will be carried out," concludes Freiha.

Ends…

 

 

2-Turkey’s false pretexts

 

Turkey’s pretexts for creating a buffer zone in northern Syria are not credible in light of Ankara’s support for ISIS and the Iraqi Kurds, says today’s Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Turkey's pretexts for intervening in Syria are not credible, maintains the editorial in an Emirati daily. The main pretext – to forestall the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria – is belied by the fact that the Syrian Kurds have not said they wish to secede while Turkey has maintained excellent relations with Iraq's Kurds who have publicly declared their desire for independence.

 

IN A TIGHT SPOT: "After Turkey found itself in the tight spot because it has been able to implement its schemes and achieve what it had been seeking throughout the years of its involvement in the Arab region – after intervening in many Arab states, using the Brotherhood as its spearhead, and sponsoring and backing terrorist groups – it is now resorting to even more dangerous options by heading towards direct military intervention [in Syria] based on the pretext of defending Turkey's interests and security," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Emirati daily al-Khaleej.

The justification provided by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his PM Ahmet Davutoglu cites their concerns regarding the establishment of a 'Kurdish state' in northern Syria after the victories achieved by Kurdish fighters against ISIS terrorists in 'Ain al-Arab [Kobani], Tal Abyad, and other areas. But in fact, the Turkish reaction came after the failure of ISIS's attempt to reoccupy 'Ain al-Arab in an offensive they launched from inside Turkish territories, backed by the Turkish army, with the aim of defanging the Kurds and keeping ISIS in the area as a means of pressuring both the Kurds and the Syrian regime.

Confusion and tension have apparently begun to characterize Turkey’s steps after the failure of everything that Ankara was wagering on by using the card of the Brotherhood and the terrorist groups in Syria and the region in order to fulfill Erdogan's 'Ottoman dream.' Confusion and tension were also the result of the failure of Ankara’s determined efforts to establish a 'buffer zone' in the Syrian north similar to what Israel did in south Lebanon [between 1982-2000].

Turkey's direct military intervention in northern Syria on the pretext of preventing the Kurds from establishing a 'state' would represent a direct assault on a neighboring Arab country and a violation of international law. It also confronts the region with new threat to be added to those posed by the terrorist organizations because this justification is unrealistic and lacks any credibility. The Kurds in Syria have not proposed to establish a 'state.' Moreover, Turkey is allied with the Iraqi Kurds at every level, and it is the latter who have been speaking publicly of their intention to secede from Iraq and establish an independent state. Why go then for a military intervention in Syria where no threat exists to Turkey's interests and security?

It is clear that there are other motives behind this direct military intervention beyond the pretext of the Kurdish question. Some are domestic and have to do with the need to extract Turkey from the peace agreement with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) headed by Ocalan on the grounds that the Syrian Kurdish party is the PKK's other wing. It is therefore only natural for a Turkish intervention against Syria's Kurds to have negative repercussions on Turkey’s Kurdish areas, undermining the entire peace process that is meant to end the historical Kurdish crisis inside Turkey.

Perhaps the questions that need to be raised here are the following: Would any direct military action inside Syria not be in the interest of the armed terrorist groups that enjoy Turkish backing? Would such an action, if carried out, not reshuffle the cards in the region, rendering it even more explosive? Is this what Turkey is seeking?

"We hope Erdogan will reconsider his calculations and retreat from proceeding with his mistakes, thereby sparing Turkey and the region further disasters," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Common denominators

 

One thing that last week’s wide ranging ISIS attacks had in common was that the targeted countries have offered a welcoming environment to extremist thought, notes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in today’s Lebanese al-Bina'

 

One ignored common denominator shared by last week’s terrorist attacks in Kuwait, Tunisia, and France is that these three countries have, in one way or another, provided backing and support for terrorist groups, especially those fighting in Syria, notes a commentator in a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. This should highlight the fact that terrorist groups will not be restrained by the fact that a particular state or a group backs them or politically agrees with their aims.

 

THE DOMINANT IMPRESSION: "The dominant impression that all the analyses have focused on is correct, even though it is not the only such impression," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Wednesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

What is common between the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Kuwait, France, and Tunisia is that ISIS was responsible for these criminal acts, and that they manifest the power, capability, and freedom of movement that this organization now enjoys, going far beyond what al-Qa'ida has achieved since it was established.

Although the perpetrator behind the three attacks on three major continents – Asia, Europe, and Africa – is one and the same, these attacks targeted the Shiites in Kuwait, the Sunnis in Tunisia, and the Christians in France. In other words, terrorism does not target any specific confessional group or sect to the exclusion of others. It targets any group that disagrees with it, even if of the same religion and confessional affiliation as the terrorist group itself, and even if that group shares many of ISIS's terrorist ideas and conceptions. In fact, this is what explains the bloody conflict between terrorist ISIS and the terrorist [Qa’ida-affiliated] Nusra Front.

But there is another common denominator ignored by the dominant analyses and not mentioned in the various media reports, coverage or political statements. This lies in the fact that the attacks occurred in three states that have, in one way or another, provided an environment that embraced terrorist groups as a result of the policies pursued by these states' governments.

France’s current government, for example, has provided all forms of backing to terrorist groups active in Syria, ignoring all the warnings regarding the dangers that may ensue. Some such warnings came from French security agencies. Reports have revealed that the perpetrator of the attack in France was known to be a terrorist; but the French government turned a blind eye to his activities, and the activities of others, because of its conviction that these terrorists were recruiting more fighters and sending them to Syria to strike at the Syrian state. These terrorists therefore were an indirect expression of the French government's aspirations to topple the regime in Syria.

Tunisia also, and until very recently, was a state that embraced the terrorist groups, or the groups that adopt ideas and conceptions that nourish terrorist thought and encourage its proliferation. Over a period of four years, Tunisia provided a safe haven for the terrorist groups during the period when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power under the name of Ennahda Movement in Tunisia. But even if the government now is in the hands of Nida' Tunis, this does not mean that this party, which insisted on forming a coalition government with Ennahda, can simply eliminate Ennahda's legacy without waging a relentless war that will incur a heavy cost in order to pull out this shameful legacy by the roots.

As for Kuwait, it is an inseparable part of the Gulf state system. The government of Kuwait – after the Sultanate of Oman – may be the least involved among the Gulf governments in the protection of terrorism, in fact. It has adopted a clear position in this regard. But it has provided an environment that embraces the terrorists in one form or another. Nothing demonstrates this better than the fact that the Kuwaiti government did not shut down the Wissal TV channel that backs terrorist takfiri thinking except after the suicide attack on a mosque in the capital, Kuwait.

"For that attack has posed a direct threat to Kuwait's stability and national unity," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

4-The need for national unity

 

What the Palestinians want is not just a government reshuffle but genuine national unity and a new political program, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The PA leadership’s insistence that all parties to any Palestinian national unity government should abide by the International Quartet's requirements is a mere pretext whose aim is to exclude Hamas, since both the Quartet and Israel have effectively disregarded them, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. In fact, talk of a national unity government appears to be a mere reaction to the progress in the talks between Hamas and Israel over a long-term truce in Gaza. What is required is a genuine national unity government and a restructuring of the PLO in the service of the Palestinians’ national aspirations.

 

DEADLINE EXPIRED: "The deadline set by the PLO's Executive Committee for reaching an [Fatah/Hamas] agreement on the bases for a national unity government has expired," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

The president has threatened that he would reshuffle the current government with or without Hamas's consent. He has stressed that the incoming government must abide by his program, and that every minister should personally commit to that program, in fact. And this has elicited a response from Hamas in which it has stressed its own demands (or preconditions) for agreeing to take part in the proposed government.

The first point worth noting is that the drive towards forming a national unity government was not in response to any particular threat or danger. It was a reaction to the progress in the tahdi'a [lull or calming down] negotiations between Israel and Hamas, and the disagreements within the [resigned] national accord government and its inability to take off.

Instead of returning to the signatories to the [2014 Fatah/Hamas] reconciliation agreement, the initiative to form a new government came from the PLO's Executive Committee, despite the fact that it does not include Hamas or Islamic Jihad representatives. The aim is to pit the PLO against Hamas. This is contrary to what had been customary. In the past, Fateh and Hamas used to reach bilateral agreement, after which the other factions and the PLO would accede to it. This is what happened to the Cairo Agreement and the ash-Shati' declaration – even though the latter was agreed via the facilitation of a PLO delegation.

Despite the importance of all this, the identity of the parties that will discuss the bases of the new government is not an issue that should derail its formation. No accord or national unity government can see the light of day without Fateh and Hamas's acquiescence because they are the largest factions, having secured the largest number of votes in the [2006] Palestinian Legislative Council elections, and because – and this is the more important point – each of them controls either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, directly or in a disguised manner.

The second point worth making has to do with exaggerating the importance of reaching an agreement on the government's political program by insisting that it should be the same as that of the PLO.

Certain figures who are perceived to be members of the president's [Abbas’s] camp appear to be 'more royalist than the king' on this issue. They insist that the next government should commit to the PLO's program, and specifically to the International Quartet's preconditions. And they totally ignore the fact that the Quartet has died, as evident from its failure to hold any meetings for a long time; moreover, even when it does meet, it agrees on nothing. Its representative Tony Blair has resigned, and it has decided not to appoint a successor. Before he tendered his resignation, the Quartet asked him to hold two meetings with Hamas's Politburo head Khalid Mish'al to reach an agreement on the terms for a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas. That represents a fundamental and practical disregard of the Quartet’s own terms, which require Hamas to recognize its preconditions if the movement is to be recognized or dealt with, or if any PA government in which it takes part is to be recognized.

Moreover, successive Israeli governments, including Netanyahu's current government, have ignored the Quartet's preconditions by negotiating with Hamas indirectly and concluding numerous tahdi'a and prisoner exchange deals with it. In fact, the Israeli government is currently negotiating with Hamas. And this means that the PA’s insistence on adopting the Quartet's preconditions by invoking the threat of being boycotted is a mere pretext, and is intended to serve the interests of certain influential circles that do not want the national unity government to see the light of day.

The Palestinians need a national unity government headed by the president, as required by the Doha Declaration, and that includes [Gaza-based Hamas PM] Ismail Haniyeh and the most senior representatives of the other factions, as well as weighty national figures. This is necessary if it is to be strong enough to face up to the enormous challenges that confront us. If the president and other leading figures remain outside the government, it will become no more than yet another center of power among others, whereas it should be the center of decision-making that is capable of implementing its decisions as well.

Since the president has announced (and as has been confirmed by the PLO Executive and Central Committees) that it has become necessary to reconsider the relationship with the occupation and reevaluate the agreements concluded with it in order to put an end to the situation where there is 'a Palestinian Authority without authority,' a 'comfortable occupation,' and a 'separation of Gaza from the West Bank' – to the point that the Central Committee has taken a decision to end security coordination with Israel –there is no justification for those who wish to take us backwards and insist that the incoming government should commit to the International Quartet's preconditions.

The next government's program should be the same as that of the PLO that calls for the right of return, the right of self-determination and national independence; that is to say, as it was before the concessions that brought it down and turned it into a different program.

We need a unity government whose program is totally clear regarding negotiations and resistance, and the need to reconsider the PA's structure, tasks, and commitments. We want a government that both satisfies the requirements of international recognition and the new challenges facing us. Its program must be clear regarding the tahdi'a. It should not be a government that consolidates the current [Gaza/West Bank] division and transforms it into permanent secession in return for a mere gradual or even total end to the [Gaza] siege and the establishment of a floating seaport under Israel's control with international cover; instead, this should be part of a political process that will end the occupation and achieve freedom, the right of return, and independence.

The government's program must be clear on the question of security, uniting the security forces on patriotic and professional bases, free from factionalism and polarization. It should also be committed to resolving the problems of state employees, to ending the siege and reconstructing the Strip, to address the problem of taking control of the crossing points, and put a final end to the split instead of managing it, taking into consideration the difference characteristics and circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza.

We want a government committed to an accord democracy that includes new elections provided they are free and open, and their outcome is respected. These elections should not be treated as a means to monopolize power or exclude or dominate others. The object should be to consolidate fair competition within a framework that deepens national unity so as to ensure that we do not bring our differences to it and thereby paralyze it. We need a government that translates international recognition of the Palestinian state on the ground, not only on that exists in the UN corridors. This means that we should liberate ourselves – even if in a gradual but well-studied manner – from the previous commitments and agreements [with Israel] that cannot rule us forever.

We also want the coming government to be able to unify our political regime and to end every aspect of the split, including domination of the PLO and the PA, and Hamas's control of Gaza. This government should serve the national interest and act as a tool in the PLO's hands after its institutions, which have grown old and derelict, have been rebuilt.

We want a government that does not help return to bilateral negotiations under exclusive American sponsorship with merely formal international participation. Instead, we want a government that shuts the door once and for all in the face of this prospect. We want a government that respects human rights and equality among all citizens regardless of gender, religion, color, or party affiliation. We want a government that fights the rise in prices, monopolies, corruption, nepotism, exploitation, and the neoliberal free economy that grinds down the poor and impoverishes them further while serving the interests of the rich and making them richer.

If this is the government that we want and need, can it be achieved? Or is the call for it no more than a ploy as evident from the mutual preconditions, using the deadline for forming it as a threat, and the wager on time and certain parties and developments for such an initiative to resume the negotiations, or waiting for Hamas's collapse, or the improvement of Hamas's relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or a long-term tahdi'a agreement with Israel?

The preliminary answer to this question is evident from the failure to achieve any real breakthrough in the dialogue over the bases of the government so far. The final answer will emerge in a few days or a few weeks’ time at most.

If the formation of a unity government fails, what kind of government will be formed instead? An accord government such as the present one; a colorless, tasteless, odorless government that has no power, not only in the Gaza Strip, but in the West Bank as well? This is because it is a government that does not rule; the occupation is the master here. It is the occupation that grants the PA some limited authorities and powers- sometimes expanding and sometimes narrowing them as is happening today in an attempt to subjugate the president to the occupation's endless and continuous demands and preconditions.

Or will it be a government but without national accord, one that will consolidate the split even if it does not lead to the formation of another government in the Gaza Strip, one that will have to bear full responsibility for what happens if Hamas absolves itself from it?

The path to national salvation requires more than an agreement on a government while disregarding the national program and the PLO, which represents all the Palestinians.

"Rebuilding the PLO's institutions and revamping the organization to include all shades of the spectrum is the natural gateway towards ending the split. The PLO must be enabled to do everything possible to protect the Palestinian people wherever they are located, and to improve their living conditions, and pave the way towards realizing their national aims and dreams," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.07.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Trouble in the West Bank

 

Haaretz and Israel Hayom lead their Wednesday editions with the ongoing saga of the government's efforts to bypass antitrust regulations for the companies operating the national gas reserves. According to Haaretz, companies involved will enjoy a 10-year exemption from laws designed to prevent a monopoly. Israel Hayom, quotes Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's promise to the people of Israel that the plan his government is cooking up is 'good for the country' and his vow that he will fight to pass it.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the news that one of the four people injured in a West Bank shooting attack on Monday night has died of his wounds. The paper reports that Malakhi Rosenfeld died 13 years after his brother, an Air Force pilot, was killed during his military service. The Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, claimed responsibility for the shooting on Monday night. The Al-Qassam Brigades said that the attack was part of "a series of quality operations" carried out by the group's members in recent months, and that the attackers opened fire at point-blank range on a car of settlers before managing to escape safely.

Speaking at Rosenfeld's funeral on Wednesday, Education Minister Naftali Bennett said, 'I tell our very enemies, that from day to day their makeup fades from their faces. You are a terror organization; that’s what you are. Your charade is up. This land will remain Jewish. We have been here for 3,800 years and we are here to stay. Enough time has passed. Let it sink in. when you murder, we build.” Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said that the recent terror attacks have been sanctioned by Hamas' international headquarters in Istanbul and funded by Iran.

Netanyahu, speaking during a meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentilloni on Tuesday, slammed the Palestinian Authority for failing to condemn the recent wave of terror attacks, which he said stemmed directly from territory under its control, since Ramadan began earlier this month. "The fact that up until now, the Palestinian Authority has not condemned these attacks needs to bother not only us, but also the international community as a whole," the prime minister said. "Those who do not take an unequivocal stand against terrorism cannot wash their hands."

Netanyahu noted that while the global community is on alert about Islamic State (ISIS), it is ignoring the much larger threat of Iran. "Why would anyone consider giving the Islamic state of Iran - which is a lot more powerful than ISIS and acts with much greater power than ISIS - the additional power of nuclear weapons?" he asked. "That's a mistake." "We need a better deal. This deal shall not pass."

Also speaking on Tuesday, the head of the Shin Bet, Yoram Cohen, said that security forces managed to prevent most terrorist attacks by organized groups, but were less successful in stopping individual attackers. Speaking to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Tuesday, Cohen said that in 2014, the number of attacks by individuals have nearly tripled since 2012. The figures include instances of rock-throwing, Molotov cocktails, stabbings, and other types of attacks. The Shin Bet stopped 130 terrorist cells in 2014 and 60 in 2015 so far, most of which were part of Hamas.

Speaking at a meeting that was closed to the press, Cohen explained that terrorist organizations have difficulties attacking, because the Shin Bet and IDF successfully stopped them so many times, and most of the attacks were by individuals or unorganized groups.  He also said that cooperation with the Palestinian Authority on security is what allows the PA to survive, despite Hamas activity.

Cohen warned that Hamas is improving its military preparedness for the next possible conflict with Israel. He added, however, that the militant group's control of the Gaza Strip is eroding, though it is maintaining control either out of the people’s fear or for lack of good alternatives. According to Cohen, residents are still economically dependent on the group.

In other news, the papers report that Israel has deported a group of pro-Palestinian activists, including a former Tunisian president, who tried to breach its naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. Interior Ministry spokeswoman Sabine Haddad said among those sent home Tuesday was former Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki. Another 14 people on board the activist boat, which was peacefully intercepted early Monday, will be deported in the coming days.

In other news on the Palestinian front, Army Radio – quoting a report from the Ma'an news agency – says that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas fired Yasser Abed Rabbo from his position as Secretary of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s Executive Committee on Tuesday. The sources added that Abbas will serve as the committee’s secretary until a new secretary is appointed.

All of the papers report that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met Tuesday in Vienna with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif. The State Department announced that the meeting was “productive.” Speaking in Washington, U.S. President Barack Obama said that, if negotiations with Iran do not ensure that Tehran is prevented from attaining and obtaining nuclear weapons, no deal will be reached. “At the end of the day, it is up to the Iranians if they agree to meet all of the demands of the international community,” Obama told the press.

 

MOW THE LAWN IN THE WEST BANK: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yossi Yehoshua says that IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot must employ the same kind of tactics that he used during the second intifada to stamp out the recent wave of West Bank terrorism, which has claimed two lives in as many weeks.

"The recent wave of terror attacks in the West Bank, which has claimed the lives of two Israelis in less than two weeks, found the security establishment not only helpless and clueless, but also caused it to send out very mixed messages. While officials in the IDF and the Shin Bet have been unable to find a link between any of the recent incidents, which all took place in the Binyamin district of the West Bank, they have also been unable to locate and apprehend the perpetrators.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon surprised everyone yesterday, when he told a press briefing in the north of the country that the recent shooting attacks in the West Bank were carried out by Hamas' overseas organization, which has its headquarters in Istanbul. He said that the money which is funding Hamas operations in the West Bank comes directly from Iran and he named the attacks which this Iranian-backed cell has carried out in recent days, including the fatal attacks in Shvut Rachel and near Dolev, in which Malakhi Rosenfeld and Danny Ganon were killed. According to Ya'alon, these attacks are being coordinated by Hamas overseas leadership from Istanbul, after it was unceremoniously evicted from Damascus.

Several hours after Ya'alon's briefing, a senior IDF officer spoke to military correspondents and claimed exactly the opposite. He said that the recent spate of attacks was the result of localized organizations and that there was no connection between them. There is no terrorist infrastructure in the Jordan Valley, near Dolev, at Rachel's Tomb or in Qalandiyah, he insisted, although Hamas has established a permanent and prominent presence in the West Bank. It is clear that the attack two days ago close to Shiloh is not part of what the defense establishment refers to as 'lone-wolf attacks.' It is obvious that, in order to carry out a shooting attack from a moving vehicle and to ensure that the perpetrator has a choice of three possible escape routes, the terrorists would need planning and organization – even if they did not get this from a formal organization such as Hamas.

Now is the time for the people of Israel to demand that the IDF and the Shin Bet deal more effectively with the lone-wolf terrorists, since such attacks cannot become a matter of routine. Both these organizations have already proved, at the height of the second intifada, that they are more than capable of dealing with far greater threats than individual terrorists; they managed to destroy the infrastructure of terrorist organizations that carried out nearly daily suicide bombings and turned the main road in Judea and Samaria into bloodbaths.

During the time of the second intifada, such security operations were referred to as 'mowing the grass.' This phrase was coined by the then head of the IDF's Central Command, Moshe Kaplinsky. The officer in charge of carrying out the instructions was a young man called Gadi Eisenkot, who was then head of the IDF's Judea and Samaria Division. Now Eisenkot must demand of his subordinates, and of the Shin Bet, the same kind of creativity in coming up with a new plan to halt this wave of terrorism. It is not, after all, predestined."

Ends…

 

DON'T SAY INTIFADA: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that, given the lack of a peace process, all the Israeli security forces can do is put out localized fires and hope that the situation in the West Bank does not escalate into an intifada.

"During the past week, there have been 11 terror attacks or attempted terror attacks in the West Bank. The situation could be inestimably worse, had the Shin Bet not managed to thwart more than 100 planned attacks by Hamas over the course of the past 12 months.

Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen admitted yesterday at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that, since 2014, there have been more than 1,800 incidents of stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails, stabbings and shootings in the West Bank. In 2012, the Shin Bet documents fewer than 700 such incidents. Clearly, the situation on the ground is heating up, but the IDF and the security forces prefer to talk about a 'series of incidents' and 'lone-wolf attacks.' They say that the atmosphere for the holy month of Ramadan might be encouraging Palestinians to carry out self-motivated terror attacks against security forces and settlers.

In any case, the defense establishment is careful not to use the word 'intifada.' It is true that recent events do not constitute a popular uprising of the kind that we have experience twice before – at the end of the 1980s and early in 21st century. There's no question that the situation today is fundamentally different. This time, the Palestinian Authority and its various branches are not behind the events or those carrying them out. Palestinian officials oppose such violence and continue to cooperate with the IDF and the Shin Bet in their counterterrorism efforts.

But it would be a mistake to look at the situation that is emerging in the West Bank through the prism of the past. This is the same mistake that generals everywhere are accused of making: they prepare for future wars based on their experiences from past conflicts.

The terminology isn't important. What's important is what is actually happening and we must look at recent events logically. The Palestinians in the West Bank oppose the Israeli occupation – 48 years after the Six-Day War – and they refuse to accept a situation whereby Israel continues to expand settlements, expropriate land, set up roadblocks and impose limitations on people who are being treated as second-class citizens or worse.

True, the Palestinian education system does nothing to promote the ideals of coexistence and peace and the Palestinian media is conducting a concerted campaign of incitement against Israelis and Jews. But the root of the problem is the lack of a political horizon and the total absence of any glimmer of hope for a better future. There will be no Israeli-Palestinian peace process when the defense minister doesn't believe in it and when the prime minister, who has committed himself to the two-state solution, is doing everything in his power to thwart it.

Under these conditions, all that remains for the IDF and the Shin Bet to do is to walk on eggshells – to use intelligence, to bolster troop levels, to identify and arrest potential terrorists. But it must do so in a balanced and cautious manner, so that life for the Palestinian residents of the West Bank can maintain some semblance of normality. Until the next terrorist incident. Or, god forbid, until the next large-scale escalation."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL VS. ISIS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Ze'ev Jabotinsky says that Israel must stamp out any signs of solidarity between Israeli Arabs and ISIS, or risk see the barbaric phenomenon spread to within its borders.

"In the past 10 days alone, there have been five terror attacks. Some commentators have tried to explain that the reason for this trend is the lack of a political horizon for what they refer to as 'the Palestinian problem,' but this is a superficial explanation from people who live in the past and who refuse to see what is happening to our north and east.

First of all, these attacks are not cut from the same cloth. In Samaria, there appears to be an organized terror cell on the loose, carrying out attacks against Jews. This is something for the security forces to deal with, since they have the tools to identify and locate the perpetrators. The rest of the attacks, which do not appear to have anything in common, are what is referred to as 'lone wolf' attacks. These are a lot harder to thwart, but are usually carried out by people with far less experience. The motivation behind such attacks is usually religious and/or ideological.

It should be clear to anyone who is not deliberately blinkered that the stream of radical Islam that is getting stronger – and I am referring primarily to ISIS – is creating far-reaching changes in the Arab world, which obligate us to fundamentally rethink our strategy. Concepts that were valid until recently will soon become obsolete, just as the dream of peace with Syria and Israelis eating hummus in Damascus, which almost cost us the Golan Heights, no longer exists.

ISIS is far more than a collection of murderous lunatics; it is the realization – albeit the barbaric and bestial realization – of the Muslim world's aspiration to return to the days when Islam controlled significant portions of the world. All attempts to achieve this dream by peaceful means have failed and, since the Western powers have been hesitant to eradicate this phenomenon, it is putting down roots in the minds of a growing number of Muslim youths. Even if they were educated in some of Europe's best schools, the ISIS ideology is now almost ubiquitous. That would explain why there was a decapitation attack in France this week, when a Christian was killed by a Muslim, and that was a continuation of last week's bloody events.

It is only natural, therefore, that some Palestinians in Judea and Samaria will be influenced by these trends. And this influence is intensified by the fact that Muslims are currently marking the holy month of Ramadan. This means that, on the Israeli left and right alike, we must alter our approach entirely.

According to ISIS' philosophy, all secular Muslims are infidels who deserve to be killed. This is also true of Muslims who are not, according to ISIS, religious enough. Only a very small percentage of Israeli Arabs are not considered infidels by ISIS. That is why there have been signs on the Arab street of a growing affinity to the State of Israel, since they know that only Israel will protect them from the atrocities of ISIS. Israel must take advantage of this to engender a genuine coming together between Israeli Arabs and the state. This is exactly the window of opportunity that can create a genuine sense of equality for the Arab minority. But, like all windows of opportunity, it will not be open for very long. We must reach out our hands to all those who understand that the situation is changing and who want to strengthen the State of Israel ahead of an inevitable clash with ISIS.

At the same time, Israel must declare all-out war on any signs of identification with ISIS among Israeli Arabs – and the best way to do this is to pass legislation that would protect the State of Israel from this dangerous tidal wave. Failure to take action is an invitation for increased terror activity, irrespective of Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas and his cronies, who are also seen as infidels by ISIS. Even they must realize what would happen to them if it were not for the State of Israel."

Ends…

 

RAMADAN VIOLENCE: Writing on the NRG website, Assaf Gavor says that the Palestinians are taking advantage of Israel's good-will gestures for Ramadan, which is why there has been a spate of terror attacks across the West Bank in the past 10 days.

"Two weeks ago, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Yoav Mordechai, announced a series of good-will gestures for the Palestinians, ahead of Ramadan. The minimum age of worshipers allowed to enter the al-Aqsa Mosque was reduced, the number of permits issued for Palestinians wanting to visit family inside Israel was increased and some of the restrictions on Palestinian travel in the West Bank were lifted. In addition, the government approved several other measures which Israel hoped would contribute to the positive atmosphere during the holy month.

One of the main reasons for these concessions was a sense in Israel that the Palestinians must be allowed to enjoy a different kind of Ramadan. Officials in Jerusalem were well aware of the events of last Ramadan, which started with the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli youths and ended with Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. Straw polls conducted by the Palestinian media found similar attitudes. Most of those asked wished for themselves and for the Palestinian people a freer and better Ramadan than last year. Alongside the announcement of these gestures, Mordechai also warned Palestinian terrorists not to take advantage of the situation – but his warning was a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy.

Since the start of Ramadan, there have been at least six incidents: the murder of Danny Gonen near Dolev; the stabbing of a Border Police officer close to Nablus Gate; the thwarted attack at a checkpoint in the Jordan Valley; the shooting attack against an ambulance near Beit El; another stabbing, this time in Bethlehem; and Monday's shooting attack. In addition, there have been dozens of cases of stone-throwing and Molotov cocktails hurled at Israeli cars and buses. The defense establishment says that this is a particularly fraught time of year in terms of terror attacks.

During Ramadan, the 'regular' incitement against Jews is augmented by religious extremism and sermons in mosques against the 'Zionist enemy.' These are relayed via official Palestinian media outlets to the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On social media, the incitement is even more disgusting.

When Israel announced that some of the measures that were implemented for Ramadan were being overturned, in response to the violent events of the past 10 days, the Palestinian media reported it. When a rocket was fired from Gaza at southern Israel some two weeks ago, for example, Israel rescinded the permits of 500 worshipers from Gaza who were supposed to make the trip to Jerusalem to visit the al-Aqsa Mosque. This was reported in the Palestinian media as an Israeli attempt to stifle freedom of worship and the continuation of the Israeli occupation and blockade of the Gaza Strip. Unsurprisingly, no one mentioned the real reason for the Israeli decision. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has not said a word about the recent spate of attacks. He is too busy preparing the Palestinians' next move against Israel in the United Nations Security Council and his main concern is that Israel is about to sign an agreement with Hamas behind his back.

The last Fridays of Ramadan are considered especially important and are usually marked by an increase in the number of worshippers attending prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque. Because of recent events, Israel is reconsidering some of the good-will gestures it introduced two weeks ago. The working assumption is that, since this is a relatively quiet period, any untoward incidents should be dealt with individually. It is possible that an Israeli response which amounts to collective punishment would merely exacerbate the situation even more and would lead to more attacks. Nonetheless, the fact that there have been half a dozen attacks in 10 days cannot be ignored by the Israeli government, which must respond in some way."

Ends…

 

TRAPPED IN GAZA: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that Israel has effectively placed the whole of the Gaza Strip under administrative detention – just as it did to Islamic Jihad militant Khader Adnan.

"'Terror wins. Khader Adnan to be released,' said the headline on some websites covering the 'agreement' between the Shin Bet security service and the prisoner on a 55-day hunger strike. The headline got it wrong. Terror lost. The legal terror that gives an army officer the authority to detain someone without trial — 'administrative detention' — without evidence, due process or a time restriction is a terror-inducing process from which no Palestinian or Israeli is immune.

Adnan, an Islamic Jihad militant from the town of Arabeh near Jenin, already 'defeated' this legal terror three years ago, when he went on a 66-day hunger strike. Then, too, it was hunger that tilted the scales of justice. Administrative detention isn’t prohibited by international conventions, but it’s only supposed to be used in very exceptional cases.

In Israel, 'exceptional' cases are the norm; only when there’s an international outcry or when an agreement with Hamas, Hizbollah or Fateh requires it, does Israel suddenly discover that even tried and convicted terrorists, not just administrative detainees, can be released.

The problem with administrative detention is that it obliges the public to believe in 'the system' and not the courts — just as it was designed. But in Israel this isn’t really much of a problem because of the blind faith in the Shin Bet. If anything, the complaint is that the Shin Bet doesn’t make enough of these arrests. In other words, every Palestinian is basically an enemy, and if he doesn’t know why he has been arrested, he’ll know soon enough.

It’s not just the Shin Bet that knows what it’s doing here, but also the Prison Service, which handcuffs a dying prisoner to his bed. The doctors who support force-feeding or remain silent about it also know what they’re doing.

In a country where most government agencies seem to haplessly go about their work, where the army is still licking its wounds from the Gaza war and there’s so much rot at the police, it’s hard to figure out why, when it comes to administrative detention, all these government agencies enjoy complete trust. Except for a few human rights groups like Doctors without Borders and those other traitors funded by Israel’s enemies, the consensus remains solid.

It’s the same consensus that supports the administrative detention of Gaza. It’s okay to harass the prime minister over his natural-gas policy; it’s okay to hurl slings and arrows at Likud’s Miri Regev simply because she’s Miri Regev, and war is sure to be waged over the housing issue. But when it comes to Gaza, the government sure knows what it’s doing.

As far as Israelis are concerned, what goes for Adnan, the lone administrative prisoner, goes for Gaza, the collective administrative prisoner. Yes, everyone is in favor of Israel transferring food, medicine and building materials to Gaza piecemeal. But freedom, lifting the sanctions, ending the naval blockade — not, heaven forfend, a port — or letting Gazans travel to the West Bank or freely export their crops — none of that. For eight years now, 1.8 million people have been trapped there in collective administrative detention — and as with Adnan, they merely need to be kept alive. Nothing more.

When you think about it, nothing very dramatic happened. Adnan will go free in July after just a few more days of suffering, the Gaza flotilla politely retreated before the naval commandos, and the consensus is alive and well. What a relief. Allah is clearly on our side.

As one hears when a missile misses its target, 'by a miracle, a disaster was averted.' For Adnan could well have died just before the agreement was signed, and the flotilla could have been much more violent. Just think of the pounding this government would have taken if these miracles hadn’t occurred. How fortunate we have a government that knows exactly when to stop."

Ends…

 

THE IRAN DEAL AND DEMOCRACY: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Baruch Stein says that the countries that are most threatened by an Iranian nuclear program are not represented at the talks with Western powers – which is why Israel and the Sunni Gulf States are highly skeptical about the whole process.

"American involvement in the world has often been viewed by others to be arrogant, self-serving, imperialistic and ethnocentric. President Barack Obama, however, is known for having a softer approach to foreign policy than that of previous presidents, one that is more accepting of non-American interests and beliefs.

Democracy, after all, is rooted in the idea that the use of political power is legitimized by the consent of those who are subjected to it. When America gets involved in activities in other countries that may not accord with the desires of local populations, it is being undemocratic. Coming from 'the leaders of the free world,' it is also being hypocritical. What could be a bigger ruse than projecting political power upon non-consenting people from other cultures and religions in the name of 'freedom' or 'democracy?' It is easy to see how those in other countries subjected to American policies that they themselves might not support might regard the United States negatively and consider it a colonialist aggressor.

For Western countries to force upon the Islamic Republic of Iran their own ideas about how Iran should or should not generate electricity, while they themselves possess nuclear weapons, is the height of hubris, and anti-Islamic imperial domination.

Well, except for the fact that Iran has overtly threatened to exterminate other countries and populations, and actively pursues its own colonial expansion throughout the Middle East. Forcing political policies on unwilling foreign populations might be undemocratic and may rouse a reasonable sense of dissatisfaction among non-consenting individuals subjected to those policies, but self-defense is generally considered legitimate.

So the Iran talks are based on the idea that by providing verifiable assurances that the Iranian nuclear program is peaceful they are protecting other countries, and preventing World War Three and a nuclear arms race. Iran does have a legitimate right to produce its own electricity in accordance with its own policies, but providing verifiable assurances that its program is peaceful is necessary.

But to whom are those assurances being provided? The talks do not include a single representative from any of the countries considered to be the most threatened by the Iranians, namely the Sunni states and Israel. Both the Sunni states and Israel have expressed their reservations that the framework released in April does not sufficiently ensure that the Iranian nuclear program is peaceful. That many of the limitations specified in the agreement expire in 10 or 15 years, at that point allowing Iran a nuclear breakout time of less than two to three months with the legitimacy of this agreement, makes their skepticism understandable.

Despite the objections of the countries most threatened by Iran, Obama and other leaders of the P5+1 and EU consider it their duty to set policy for the entire world. They consider it their responsibility to dictate what will be held as 'international law.'

How should I as an Israeli whose life and country have been overtly threatened by the Islamic Republic feel about the P5+1 and EU taking it upon themselves to decide that in 10 to 15 years it will be fine for Iran to have a nuclear breakout time significantly less than two or three months, without Israel or the Sunni states having any direct representation in the process? It is hard to consider as binding negotiations over a major conflict in which none of the primary actors on one side are represented. It is impossible to expect countries under nuclear threat to abide by such an agreement. Do not look now, Mr. President, but you are an imperialist aggressor."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: Ezgi Basaran argues that Ankara has no legitimate grounds for military intervention in Syria in centre-left Radikal: "Is the Syrian operation that the government has ordered the Turkish army to launch legitimate? No it is not. Saying 'we will enter Syria and create a buffer zone because of ISIS activities' is not self-defense but occupation. A 'preventive operation', will also be considered to be like the 'preventive strike' that former U.S. president Bush worked hard to justify but could not turn into something legitimate. Moving onto the territory of another country while claiming a possible attack from the other side is considered to be occupation. This is an attack. This is an occupation. Full stop."

Nazli Ilicak takes a similar line in centrist, pro-Gulen, Bugun: "Turkey is seeking to establish a buffer zone in the region to the west of Kobani. Such an action will confront significant problems. A government that has lost an election cannot take this decision. The claim that this measure is aimed against ISIS militants is not convincing as they have been crossing the border quite easily and have been protected up until now. Syria is a state and Turkey moving onto its territory might mean an occupation in international law. Have the UN and the West been persuaded of this issue?"

Mehmet Tezkan warns against war fever in centrist Milliyet: "The atmosphere in Ankara has changed. Suddenly the war drums have begun to beat. Some say 'let us enter Syria soon'. It is easy to enter, but hard to get out! On how many fronts will we fight, and against how many organizations? What will be our aim even if we do fight? We cannot occupy half of Syria. We cannot conquer Damascus. This government is lame duck. There is no emergency; it cannot give the order to go to war!"

Writing in the same paper, Ergun Babahan charges the government with acting in its own narrow interests:  "The whole world knows that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government is supplying arms to radical elements including ISIS and making it easier for them to cross the border. For this reason, no one will be deceived if the government were to enter Syria while claiming that this is meant to combat ISIS. There can only be one reason if no one objects: this will be because they want Turkey to enter and face the outcome. We are dealing with the AKP’s mentality that is getting ready to cast the country into the furnace in order to serve its own ambitions."

Okay Gonensin does not believe that this is the moment for military action in centrist Vatan: "While Turkey's intervention in the region is being discussed, the desire to eliminate the PYD [pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party in northern Syria] by using the ISIS excuse is also being revealed. Turkish military intervention in this complicated region should without doubt be viewed as a last resort. It is very easy for the Turkish army to enter Syria but it is always much harder to get out."

Mustafa Balbay detects a classic political ploy in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "This is a classical case; a leader who is cornered inside the country produces a foreign policy problem and then drags attention towards it, which means that he is looking for ways to enhance his position. This is the first thing that comes to mind after the AKP has invented a big threat in Syria and asked to move to eliminate it. The Syrian problem was not born yesterday. It has been in place since 2011. The AKP has brought matters to this point by sitting right at the centre of the problem. Put aside losing out in Syria, President Erdogan does not even want to share power at home. To that end, he will do anything he can."

Abdulkadir Selvi believes that military action is inevitable in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Are we getting into a war against Syria? No. Are we getting into a war against ISIS? No. Are we getting into Syria? I guess we are. What will we do? We will establish a buffer zone. If we return to the question as to whether Turkish troops should cross the border, the answer is: ‘it would be better not to need to cross the border’. But looking at the situation as it stands, this does not seem possible."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan believes that basic conceptual differences will make reaching a deal impossible: "Throughout the 12-year old nuclear challenge, we and our rivals have been pursuing a good deal preferring no deal to a bad deal. The difference is over how we define a good deal. In our view, a good deal is one that allows our nuclear industry to continue to function. We are willing to agree to some concessions in the give and take of negotiations. If the outcome of negotiations is not the lifting of all sanctions and the continuation of our nuclear industry, the talks lose their legal and political meaning. The other side has another notion of a good deal, which is totally contradictory to our view. In the eyes of the U.S. and its allies, a good deal is an agreement that results in the total dismantling of our nuclear industry and its irreversible destruction. As long as the problem persists in its current form, reaching an agreement will be impossible." 

Reformist Sharq is upbeat: "Even though Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's return to Tehran was pre-planned, some linked his consultations in Tehran to the latest decisions to be made in Vienna. This could indicate that the parties are close to reaching a final deal. There is little chance that Zarif's return was due to the emergence of a serious deadlock. With the exception of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, foreign ministers from other countries at the talks also returned to their capitals. It can be concluded that the joint action plan and its annexes are almost ready and the foreign ministers of seven countries have gone to their countries for the final approval of their respective governments." 

Conservative Khorasan is cautious: "In the final hours before the deadline, reports indicate significant obstacles. It is clear that lifting the sanctions can create economic opportunities in Iran. But with this psychological atmosphere, as well as the clever American network created for the continuation of sanctions, is any commercial entity in the world ready - on the assumption of a deal - to think that America's problems with Iran have been resolved and economic ties with Iran can be resumed? We should not expect the immediate removal of the complex sanction structure. The government should think about resolving our current economic problems irrespective of a deal. If a good deal is reached; it will be a bonus."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz considers Amano’s attendance a bad omen: "The nuclear negotiations will resume today when Foreign Minister Zarif returns to the talks. The West seeks to hide its destructive role in the failure of the talks and portray Iran as the guilty party. The attitude of IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano should also be considered. For the first time, Mr Amano was present at the negotiations for two consecutive days and, yesterday, he met U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry." 

Hard-line Javan is deeply doubtful: "America's main goal in the negotiations is Iran's humiliation and surrender. An agreement on the technical aspects of Iran's nuclear programme is a small matter for them. By imposing a deal on Iran, they want to declare that, after 36 years, they have managed to defeat Iran's revolution." 

Conservative Resalat is also suspicious of Amano’s role: "Yukiya Amano is trying to play a significant role in the Vienna talks. His record of misconduct suggests that we cannot be optimistic about his role. Amano has often been silent on the issues and disputes that have recently been discussed and does not adopt clear stances. For example, the statutes of the IAEA, the NPT and even the additional protocol are not his guidelines in determining inspections. His behaviour in recent years has been determined by the concerns and objectives of the arrogant powers led by the U.S.. If Amano wants to continue playing his hindering role, he will be a factor in the failure of the talks."

Reformist Arman looks around: "We are close to the deadline and extremists are screaming to prevent a deal. The Zionist regime is on the first line of confrontation. American radicals, who do not know where Iran is located, are in tow. The reaction of the German Foreign Minister, on the side lines of the talks, was more encouraging. The British Foreign Secretary's reaction was conservative; the British consider themselves less interested in the talks than Germany."

 

ECONOMY: Reformist Mardom Salari looks forward: "Either we remain isolated and have a self-financing economy, moving closer to North Korea or, by understanding the conditions of global competition, link ourselves to this changing world and benefit from its development. In one of the clauses of the Lausanne agreement it is stated that, following a possible final deal, the U.S. will not hinder Iran's membership of the World Trade Organization, which is our rightful demand. If the government resorts to price controls to regulate inflation; that would be contrary to joining the global community."

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami argues that the Saudis will face definite defeat whichever way they turn: "At the beginning of its aggression against Yemen, the Saudi royal family was confident about winning the war. They thought that, by endless bombing, they would destroy all the military capabilities of Houthi rebels and Yemen's economic infrastructure. Al-Qa’ida forces from the southeast, and the supporters of Mansour Hadi from the south, would finish the job. But the exemplary zeal of the Houthis and the heroic resistance of the Yemeni people have foiled all of Saudi Arabia's calculations and dreams. They have just two options now: accept military defeat with all its consequences and, to protect their throne, acquiesce to a political solution, or in addition to their criminal and crazy air attacks, bring in the army. That, of course, will eventually lead to nothing but a bigger and more disdainful defeat and the definite fall of the ruling family." 

 

GREECE: Moderate Iran considers grim prospects for the future of Europe: "Greece's exit from the euro zone will be the first crack and rupture in the unity of Europe. This will make Britain even more determined to withdraw from the European Union. It will also contribute to the campaign for the Austrians' exit from the Union. If the European Union cannot solve Greece's problem with banknotes and cheque books, then its collapse will start from the southeast. The only thing that will remain of the desire for a united Europe will be memories." 

 

TURKEY/SYRIA: Reformist E'temad counts on the army and public opinion: "It has been reported that the Turkish government has ordered the army to enter Syria, but it seems impossible that the army will obey the order. A Turkish attack on Syria would be a violation of Syrian sovereignty and would certainly be condemned by other countries in the region and the world. The opposition and public opinion in Turkey strongly opposes the move, even though Turkey has supported terrorists over the past years."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Yesterday’s enemies, today’s allies

2-Talking of Turkish intervention

 

1-Yesterday’s enemies, today’s allies

 

 It is not unlikely that yesterday's enemies could become today's allies, fighting in the same trench against a new tsunami that threatens to sweep all the regimes that lie in its path. Its name is the 'Islamic State' that the sixty-strong U.S.-led coalition, its warplanes and air raids over a year, have failed to weaken or halt in its tracks, let alone destroy. The mission facing the 'new quartet,' assuming it comes into being, will not be easy; it is extremely difficult, in fact. It may require the deployment of ground forces in addition to air raids. The question is this: will Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia deploy their forces to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army, which all three countries have been fighting against so far? And what about the armed Syrian opposition fractions that have been fighting to topple the regime for the last four years?--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

There is therefore a point in the middle of the road towards a solution, and it has to do with Assad's fate. It seems that his presence during a transitional phase may be part of the solution and the main part of the ‘deal’. But his prospects of ‘remaining in power forever’ – to quote the famous regime slogan raised in Damascus – have become a thing of the past. So far, however, we still do not know exactly how Iran will act on this issue after it signs its nuclear deal. Will it meet the international powers halfway, or will it prefer the option of confrontation? Iran itself does not speak a simple language in this regard; and the future of the Syrian crisis may depend on the balance of power between Iran's hard-liners and reformists--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu’allem’s latest visit to Moscow and the statements made by Russian leaders, suggest that Moscow is mediating in the formation of a four-way anti-terrorism alliance that will include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, in addition to Syria, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. This alliance is now possible because of ISIS’s advances and the predicament that each of its prospective members is now facing. The Syrian crisis seems to be at a crossroad, with the genuine prospect of some kind of accord between the regime and its allies on the one hand, and the opposition and its allies, on the other, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. While the main contours of a political settlement may have emerged, much depends on Iran's behavior after its nuclear deal with the '5 + 1.'

 

UNEXPECTED VISIT: "Mr. Walid al-Mu'allem, the 'doyen' of Syrian diplomacy, never visits Moscow unless there is some major political or diplomatic project underway, or in order to pave the way for strategic decisions, as in the case of Syria's decision to hand over its chemical weapons, to cite but one example," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Tuesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This, in turn, leads us to inquire into the reasons for his unexpected visit to Moscow, where he met directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The issue this time round has nothing to do with chemical weapons or finding a political solution for the Syrian crisis but with something much more serious. It has to do with the Russian leadership's informing Mr. Mu'allem of an imminent change in the existing political and military equations, not only as regards the Syrian file, but the entire map of regional alliances. This is thanks to ISIS, whose 'expansion' and bloody attacks that are threatening the entire region's stability, have now become a nightmare that is driving the region's governments to rethink their priorities.

The most important point to emerge from Mr. Mu'allem's meeting with the Russian leadership consists of what President Putin said regarding a new Russian plan that is meant to bring Riyadh and Damascus together in a broad alliance against ISIS, and that may include Turkey and Jordan as well. As reported by the Russian News Agency, the Russian president said that Moscow's contacts with the countries in the region, including Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, 'demonstrate that everyone wants to contribute to fight this evil,' he said, referring to ISIS militants.

The Russian president would not have resorted to this proposal – the establishment of a four-way Syrian/Saudi/Turkish/Jordanian coalition to confront ISIS – and would not have invited Mr. Mu'allem to Moscow to discuss it unless he had received official and serious requests from the three states concerned to convince Syria to join this new alliance.

In other words, it is possible to claim that the three states, that have begun to sense the threat posed by ISIS, have come to accept President Putin's view that war on this 'State' cannot succeed without the Syrian regime's active participation.

About a week ago, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Yevgeny Lukyanov, took everyone by surprise with a statement urging the Arab Gulf states to pray that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would remain in power, since he alone can stop ISIS and halt its advances. He said: 'If Assad's regime collapses, Riyadh and the other Gulf capitals will be the next targets for the Islamic State. This is because there are some 5000 Saudi subjects fighting in its ranks and they will return to their country after the confrontations end. And all they know how to do when they do return, is to kill.'

Nothing happens by coincidence in Moscow. Such momentous statements from the second highest ranking official in the Russian national security leadership were intended to pave the way for the new Russian map of alliances. This brings together under a single umbrella those currently fighting it out in Syria, setting their disagreements and wars aside, and choosing cooperation so as to confront the major danger that threatens them all – ISIS.

The bombings in Kuwait, Tunisia, and Lyon, for which ISIS has claimed responsibility, appear to have confirmed the senior Russian official's prediction, especially since most expectations are that other bombings are on their way, with Bahrain as the most likely next venue.

The Kuwait bombing that led to the death of 27 worshippers in a Shiite mosque was meant as a strong message to all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. This message said that the fire has begun to strike at your heartlands. The attack in which a young man stormed hotels hosting foreign tourists in the Tunisian city of Sousse and opened fire killing 38 and wounding 200 of them, sends an even more serious message. It is directed at Turkey and its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in particular. It says that ‘we (ISIS) can repeat the same scenario and destroy the Turkish tourist season that brings more than thirty billion dollars into the Turkish coffers every year’.

The latest advances in northern Syria by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) that is close to the Turkish opposition Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and President Erdogan's threat to intervene militarily to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state, confront the Turkish president with a difficult choice, now that Turkish national security itself is under threat. His first choice is to ally with ISIS, and the other choice is to ally with the Syrian regime. He is most likely to lean towards the second option. And it is not unlikely that he may have asked for Moscow's help in facilitating a move towards this second option in light of its good relations with Damascus.

Saudi Arabia is also facing a similar situation. It senses that its national security is under threat from the same source. A number of reliable sources have reported that during Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince and Defense Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent visit [to Moscow], he told the Russian leadership of his country's desire to back away from its Syrian policies, and to open channels of communication with the Syrian regime. We believe it is thus not unlikely that Prince Salman and the messages he carried to President Putin from his father the king are the main motive behind Moscow's talk of a possible new four-way alliance.

Politics is not based on principles, but on interests. It is not unlikely that yesterday's enemies could become today's allies, fighting in the same trench against a new tsunami that threatens to sweep all the regimes that lie in its path. Its name is the 'Islamic State' that the sixty-strong U.S.-led coalition, its warplanes and air raids over a year, have failed to weaken or halt, let alone destroy.

The mission facing the 'new quartet,' assuming it comes into being, will not be easy; it is extremely difficult, in fact. It may require the deployment of ground forces in addition to air raids. The question is this: will Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia deploy their forces to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army, which all three countries have been fighting against so far? And what about the armed Syrian opposition fractions that have been fighting to topple the regime for the last four years?

The lesson is over, and may God have mercy on the souls of the 300,000 Syrian martyrs who have fallen in one big swindle, as well as the four million displaced and the destruction of more than half the country in a bloody 'game of nations.'

"The Arab region has become the arena for bloody experimentation, and the Arab people have become its lab mice. We say this with a lump in our throats," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

FORK IN THE ROAD: "The Syrian crisis is gradually approaching a decisive 'strategic' fork in the road," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The options seem to vary widely, from de facto partition into principalities based on sect, confession, and ethnicities, perhaps as a prelude to final determination of borders, to the scenario of a 'political settlement' that will place the war raging in and over Syria on another track, but one that we do not claim will represent a final resolution of all these wars.

But the bad news from Syria is that not even the most optimistic of these scenarios will end the killing, destruction, and desolation in the immediate or foreseeable future. For Syria's road to security and stability is still long, thorny, and bloody.

Syria's geography is scattered over numerous maps and fronts, with each 'part' controlled by different forces. 'Useful Syria' is under the control of the regime and its allies. It basically consists of Damascus, Homs, and Hama up to the coastline, with sites that are still important in Aleppo, the southern provinces and parts of al-Hasaka. This area constitutes around one-third of Syria's territory and is where more than half the population resides.

Half of Syria's total area is controlled by ISIS, with the remainder controlled either by the YPG, or the Nusra Front, or by the remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with its various and conflicting factions and alliances, and their various and conflicting operations rooms.

Militarily, and after a series of breakthroughs achieved by the Syrian army and its allies late last year and early this year, the picture seems to be in the process of being reversed. The army has lost Tadmur [Palmyra] and northwestern Syria [Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour], and is in a difficult situation in the three southern provinces (as-Suweida', Der'a, and al-Qunaitra) and in parts of the Damascus Countryside Province. Moreover, the advances by the army and Hizbollah do not mean that the battle for Qalamoun and Anti-Lebanon mountain range has ended.

Furthermore, 'useful Syria' is itself still 'booby trapped' with many pockets and areas outside the regime's control and writ. Perhaps the most dangerous are those that lie between Jobar and Duma, not to mention al-Yarmouk and al-Hajar al-Aswad at Damascus's gateways.

Militarily as well, and as far as the balance of power is concerned, four main forces now control the largest parts of the zone of military operations: The army and the militias allied to it; ISIS in the northeast, which is expanding; the Nusra Front and the Islamist and jihadi factions allied with and are not that different from it –within the framework of Jayshul Fateh which is backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar; and, finally, the Kurdish YPG which has displayed such ferocity in fighting from 'Ain al-Arab to Tal Abyad. As for the FSA, its influence is not worth mentioning, except on the 'southern front' where the conditions are still shifting and have not stabilized in any definite shape or form.

The map of competing forces, areas, and 'emirates' is causing fear among many regional parties, specifically, the neighboring countries. Turkey does not want a 'Kurdish state' in northern Syria. [President] Erdogan has been threatening to take all necessary measures to prevent such a state from coming into being, while Ankara's press has been speaking of plans to carve out a buffer zone that may be 30-to-50 kilometers deep into Syrian territories and may stretch to no less than 110 kilometers along the borders.

Jordan wants neither ISIS nor the Nusra Front to take up position along its northern borders. This is why it has been speaking of 'backing and arming the [Sunni] clans' and why it has unofficially adopted the 'southern front.' Reports speak of [Jordanian] military reinforcements along the northern borders, while scenarios regarding the creation of a buffer zone in the south are in the air in tandem with the reports of a northern 'buffer zone.'

In response to this situation, certain regional and international parties are expressing their concern and wariness as regards the coming challenges and threats. Russia continues to speak of its support for the regime and its president. This was most recently confirmed in the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Walid al-Mu'allem.

For its part, Iran has been speaking of a qualitative strategic step that will bring a new anti-terrorism coalition to the forefront – namely, an Iranian/Iraqi/Syrian coalition, together with the 'sub-state' forces that are affiliated to this coalition: Hizbollah, the Iraqi [Shiite] militias, and the Houthis. This coalition is most likely to emerge after the Iranian nuclear agreement has been signed and not before. Meanwhile, [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander] Qassem Soleimani has spoken of an army of 150-thousand fighters that will be deployed across this entire axis under the banner of fighting ISIS and terrorism.

There have been ceaseless reports that the Russian and U.S. positions have drawn close to each other. Some reports claim that there is a U.S./Western acceptance – opposed by the regional (Saudi/Turkish/Qatari) triangle – of Assad remaining in power for a transitional phase, with a government that has broad powers and in which the regime and the opposition are brought together. Other reports speak of Russia’s readiness to discuss Assad's future 'after the transitional phase.' Both approaches are grounded in a recognition of the need to preserve the state and its institutions so as to ensure that Syria as a whole does not fall into the clutch of extremism and terrorism.

The Syrian political opposition tailored its Cairo program to suit the points of agreement between Moscow and Washington. It issued its view of a solution; one that accepts dialogue and negotiation with the regime, and does not require Assad's removal from power or him stepping down as a precondition for initiating a dialogue and negotiations, but as the potential final outcome of the transitional path.

As for the Istanbul-based opposition, it is in the process of holding new elections with a new round of Saudi/Turkish/Qatari competition to dominate the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC). Today, Turkey holds this coalition’s reins via its president who is close to (and allegedly a member of) the ruling Turkish AKP (Justice and Development Party). But whatever the outcome of these elections, there is no cause for optimism that a fundamental change is in the offing in the SNC's position. The SNC has completely tied itself to the shifts within this Gulf/Turkish coalition and its balances.

There is therefore a point in the middle of the road towards a solution, and it has to do with Assad's fate. It seems that his presence during a transitional phase may be part of the solution and the main part of the deal. But his prospects of ‘remaining in power forever’ – to quote the famous regime slogan raised in Damascus – have become a thing of the past.

So far, however, we still do not know exactly how Iran will act on this issue after it signs its nuclear deal. Will it meet the international powers halfway, or will it prefer the option of confrontation? Iran itself does not speak a simple language in this regard; and the future of the Syrian crisis may depend on the balance of power between Iran's hard-liners and reformists.

"And this represents an additional opportunity in a region whose contemporary history seems to be that of its offensive paradoxes," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Talking of Turkish intervention

 

The West has no better option than Turkey. It realizes that it can deploy its forces to Syria, and it can see how the terrorist organizations have grown and how they have come to pose a threat to the world at large. At the same time, it has become clear that the Syrian regime has become so weak that it is impossible for it to continue to fight, while the militias that follow Iran have failed in their mission, despite their enormous numbers. Turkish intervention does not mean that the Turks would go far and reach the Syrian capital or any of the major cities. The talk is of a zone that is fifty kms deep, according to the Turkish press. That would secure the safety of the borders, push back ISIS's fighters, and prepare the political climate for a new round of negotiations to decide the fate of the regime in Syria--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

Any [Turkish] intervention will clash with the Kurds and with the Syrian state and army. It will drive the YPG and the Syrian army towards greater common action, which may have a negative impact on the West's strategy that is based on cooperation with the YPG against ISIS, as an alternative to cooperating with the Syrian army and state…the results of the recent Turkish elections and the political and popular balance that they reflect have strengthened the hand of the Turkish army’s commanders vis-à-vis the attempt to implicate the country’s armed forces in any risky and uncalculated adventures…any clash with the Kurds and the Syrian army bears the severe risk of developing and extending inside Turkish territory…All these factors together not only render any decision in favor of a direct military intervention unlikely, but a form of suicide that Erdogan and his crowd will not be allowed to implicate Turkey in--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Talk of a Turkish military intervention in northern Syria now seems more credible than ever before in light of the growing threats posed both by Kurdish separatism and ISIS terrorism, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. Most regional and international players, moreover, would welcome such an intervention. It would then set the scene for a political settlement of the crisis. There are many reasons why it is extremely unlikely that Turkey would resort to direct military intervention in the Syrian crisis, maintains a commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Such intervention will need international and regional cover, which is not forthcoming; will undermine the West's strategy for fighting ISIS; will run counter to the popular mood in Turkey as revealed by the recent elections; and would threaten to bring the war into Turkish territories.

 

WHAT ANKARA IS THINKING: "There has been repeated talk of Turks' plans to enter northern Syria ever since the Syrian revolution began four years ago," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

But events have shown that all that has been said about this issue did not correspond with what Ankara was thinking, contrary to the hopes of Syrians, who have sought the Turks' help against the violence of the Assad regime and the regional powers competing with Ankara and are wary of its ambitions.

This time round, the talk issued from Turkey itself and it was frank. Ankara has threatened that it will not permit the establishment of a Kurdish zone along its borders inside Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Turkey will not remain silent in response to the demographic changes in Syria. PM Ahmet Davutoglu has threatened that his country will protect its borders. And all this din emerged after a meeting of senior civilian and military state leaders that discussed the developments resulting from fighting between the groups across the Turkish borders, as a result of which Turkey now has two neighbors, both of which are expanding on the ground and gaining in strength – ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish militias.

Turkey's entry into Syrian territories now seems acceptable to many powers, including NATO, of which Turkey is a member. This time round, the Turks have sufficient incentives to drive them to carry out the invasion that has been expected for years. The main reasons for the Turks' hesitation in this regard are domestic and foreign. Syria is changing and taking new demographic and geographical forms. Meanwhile, Turkey has stood on the sidelines, watching, even though it is the main loser from what is happening in its southern neighbor where forces hostile to it have emerged –Kurdish, such as the PKK, and Islamist, such as ISIS. This is in addition to the displacement of more Syrian refugees into Turkey in huge numbers that threaten the country’s security, resources, and its demographic makeup, of course.

Who wants Turkey to intervene?

Almost all shades of the Syrian opposition spectrum hope for such an intervention except for ISIS. The opposition views Syria's northern neighbor as the sole power that can change the balance of power in the opposition's favor. It now also appears that the U.S. does not object to a Turkish intervention that is directed at ISIS. The project may develop into the establishment of a buffer zone on the Syrian side of the border where the refugees can relocate.

As for those opposed to Turkish intervention, they include the Syrian regime and its Iranian ally. This is despite the fact that Iran has over thirty-thousand fighters on Syrian territory that are fighting under the banner of Lebanese, Iraq, Iranian, and Afghani extremist Shiite militias. Iraq also is opposed to any Turkish intervention.
It is worth noting, however, that this time round, Iran sent an unprecedented positive hint with a statement from one official a few days ago who said that Turkey has the right to enter Syria so as to prevent the establishment of the Kurdish corridor. For the Iranians, like the Turks, are wary of the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity that would threaten the unity of all three countries – Iran, Turkey, and Iraq.

The Kurdish Syrians have grown in strength. They now control wide areas of the borders with Turkey, especially after their victory at Tal Abyad, which took the Turks by surprise. The second threat comes from ISIS, which may succeed in recapturing Kobani, another border town neighboring Turkey. And between the Kurds and ISIS, the threats to Ankara have doubled, especially because many Western governments have warned their citizens against traveling to the country in anticipation of attacks by the terrorist organization. Such a warning was issued one day before ISIS's attack on the Tunisian summer resort in which twenty-seven people were killed. Anyone following the social media would find it brimming with threats by ISIS supporters against the Turkish government, with violent attacks on Erdogan in person.

If the Turks were to make up their minds and enter northern Syria, this is most likely to be supported by most Arab states and a number of Islamic states, and perhaps also by the U.S. if Turkey agrees to involving the anti-terrorism coalition which would then support it by controlling the aims of its military campaign. For the West has no better option than Turkey. It realizes that it can deploy its forces to Syria, and it can see how the terrorist organizations have grown and how they have come to pose a threat to the world at large. At the same time, it has become clear that the Syrian regime has become so weak that it is impossible for it to continue to fight, while the militias that follow Iran have failed in their mission, despite their enormous numbers. Turkish intervention does not mean that the Turks would go far and reach the Syrian capital or any of the major cities. The talk is of a zone that is fifty kms deep, according to the Turkish press.

"That would secure the safety of the borders, push back ISIS's fighters, and prepare the political climate for a new round of negotiations to decide the fate of the regime in Syria," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

RENEWED DEBATE: "The Turkish media has leaked reports that a debate has been underway in the military and political decision-making circles so as to decide whether or not Turkey should resort to direct military intervention in Syria," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in the pro-Damascus Beirut daily al-Bina'.

This debate has been renewed in light of the advances made by YPG units along most of the border strip between Syria and Turkey from al-Qamishli in Hasaka Province to 'Ain al-Arab in Aleppo Province. In fact, most of the Syrian/Turkish borders now are under the control of these units that are, in effect, the military and political arm of the PKK in Turkey.

These latest advances have produced results that Erdogan hopes to exploit in order to secure permission, or at least to renew his demand, for direct Turkish military intervention in Syria. That has been his unchanging dream ever since the beginning of the Syrian crisis till today.

The first of these results is that they hinder Turkey's ability to intervene in wide areas of the Aleppo, al-Raqqa, and al-Hasaka provinces. Ankara has played a major role via al-Qa'ida and ISIS as well as other armed factions in all three provinces. All these factions act in cooperation and coordination with the Turkish government, which has consolidated Turkey's influence in northern Syria. And it is via this growing influence, that Ankara's influence in the overall Syrian situation has grown as well.

The second result is that the force now deployed along the longest stretch of the Turkish/Syrian borders is the ruling AKP's enemy number-one. There are many reasons for this, some political, some ideological, some having to do with the Turkish situation in general, and some having to do with Turkey's influence in Syria and Iraq.

But can Turkey take a decision to intervene militarily in Syria? And can the outcome of the latest reported consultations be a decision that directs the Turkish army to deploy its ground and air forces into the Syrian territories?

This is very unlikely, almost impossible in fact, in light of the following factors:

- First, crossing the Syrian borders requires international and regional cover. It is clear that this was not available in the past, and is not available today. The Turkish government will be unable to take a decision that would represent a serious problem in the absence of such cover. In fact, this may best explain the failure of Erdogan's former attempts throughout the Syrian crisis.

- Second, any intervention will clash with the Kurds and with the Syrian state and army. It will drive the YPG and the Syrian army towards greater common action, which may have a negative impact on the West's strategy that is based on cooperation with the YPG against ISIS, as an alternative to cooperating with the Syrian army and state.

- Third, the results of the recent Turkish elections and the political and popular balance that they reflect have strengthened the hand of the Turkish army’s commanders vis-à-vis the attempt to implicate the country’s armed forces in any risky and uncalculated adventures. This means that the situation today is more difficult than before as far as any decision that Erdogan may hope to obtain.

- Fourth, any clash with the Kurds and the Syrian army bears the severe risk of developing and extending inside Turkish territory. This is because the border area where the YPG is deployed runs parallel to those areas inhabited by a Kurdish majority inside Turkey.

"All these factors together not only render any decision in favor of a direct military intervention unlikely, but a form of suicide that Erdogan and his crowd will not be allowed to implicate Turkey in," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The moment of truth

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with the spate of terror attacks across the West Bank over the past 24 hours. Late Monday night, four people were wounded in a shooting attack near the West Bank settlement of Shvut Rachel. One of the victims was reportedly in serious condition. The incident came just hours after a female IDF soldier was wounded in a stabbing attack at Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem. In addition, the papers point out, terrorists opened fire on a civilian ambulance as it was driving along a road adjacent to Beit El, also in the West Bank.

Responding to this spate of attacks, Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely accused the Palestinians of 'playing a double game of hypocrisy. They are enflaming the area and inciting terrorism, while turning to international bodies under the guise of morality and justice. We must restore security to the citizens of Israel at all costs,' she said.

According to settler-run news service Arutz 7, the IDF and the Shin Bet have moved away Tuesday from the 'lone wolf' explanation that they used for a recent spate of terror attacks, and have now admitted that a terror cell appears to be at large in areas of the West Bank north of Jerusalem. Sources in the security establishment said that, according to information in their possession and following an initial inquiry, it can be determined that there was more than one terrorist involved in Monday night's shooting near Shvut Rachel, and that there certainly may be a terror cell at large in the region. The sources said that the cell may have been responsible for the gunfire at an ambulance Saturday evening, and that it fired at a civilian vehicle before shooting at the ambulance. The cell may also be connected to the murder of Danny Gonen, near Dolev, 11 days ago.

IDF Judea and Samaria Division Commander, Tamir Yadai, held several discussions Monday on the matter, and the conclusion is that these are not 'lone terrorists' but a phenomenon that is 'gathering steam.' The security establishment noted that more than 25 bullets were fired at the vehicle – indicating that there were several terrorists involved, and that they switched cars and escaped into one of the local villages. The security establishment sources added that Tuesday is the anniversary of the murder of Mohammed Abu Khdeir and that there are alerts regarding possible revenge terror attacks.

Elsewhere, many of the papers carry a report from the AFP news agency, according to which France wants a new international group made up of the United States, European powers and Arab countries to be set up to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said Monday. 'It could be a sort of Quartet-plus,' Fabius told reporters. He added that the inclusion of Arab states 'makes sense,' because they have a role to play in the peace process and have put forward a plan in 2002 that the foreign minister described as 'interesting.' 'It will be necessary to have an international accompanying body,' Fabius told reporters in New York where he was to attend a United Nations meeting on climate change.

According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Fabius appeared to be taking a step back from France's proposal to present a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that would set a timetable for reaching a final Israeli-Palestinian deal. 'The resolution is a tool, not an end in itself,' he stressed. 'The first thing is this question of getting back to negotiations and having this international accompanying body and if a resolution - if and when is necessary - we will think about it.' Fabius had said in late March that France would begin talks on a draft resolution but a question mark remained over whether the United States, Israel's closest ally, would back such an initiative. 'France is keen about not abandoning this problem,' he said, adding that the risk of an 'explosion' in the region was real.

Meanwhile, the papers report that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been forced to postpone a Knesset vote that would have allowed the government to ignore objections from the anti-trust commissioner to an agreement between the state and the companies operating Israel's offshore gas platforms. Netanyahu, who heads a narrow 61-member coalition, was unable to muster the requisite majority to pass the decision, despite the security cabinet declaring that Israel's vital national security interests would be affected by the decision.

Finally, Haaretz reports that, more than 15 years after sites on Temple Mount were closed to non-Muslim visitors; Israel and Jordan have been negotiating reopening them. Israel, which controls security on the mount, including entrance to it, believes that opening the mosques to paying visitors would give the Muslim Waqf, which manages the site’s day-to-day religious affairs, an incentive to keep the peace on the mount.

Some details of the negotiations were revealed in a report by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based NGO, which is slated for publication on Tuesday. After meeting with decision makers in Israel, Jordan and the PA, the report’s authors concluded that such a move could indeed help keep peace on the mount. But they warned that Israel’s new government might make a deal harder to achieve. An official in the Prime Minister's Office, however, stated, 'There are no negotiations and no change in the status quo at Temple Mount.'

 

 

ON THE PATH TO A NUCLEAR DEAL: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yaakov Amidror comments on the progress of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the six world powers, saying that, in the end, the United States will find an 'elegant' way to agree to the Islamic Republic's demands – no matter how outrageous.

"If someone had asked me two weeks ago whether there would be a nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers, I would have answered in the affirmative. The Americans very much wanted an agreement – more, in fact than the Iranians appeared to want one, and they need one desperately. The United States is currently far from the formula that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry determined when he said that no deal is better than a bad deal. Right now, the Americans are of the opinion that any achievable deal would be better than no deal. That is why they are willing to be flexible on almost every demand that the Iranians are making. The Iranians, for their part, have taken full advantage of this and are pushing up their price. They are certain that Kerry will agree, because he doesn't want to see the Iranian backtrack on things they have already agreed to.

But the United States is a democracy and Congress has forced itself into this process; the agreement will have to be brought before lawmakers for inspection and approval. The public discourse that is going on allows professionals to have their say and one of the most important contributions to the debate came from the Washington Institute, which issued a public statement, signed by experts from both parties, including academics and specialists who have been keeping close tabs on the negotiations or who were involved in the issue in previous administrations. They, therefore, have a greater understanding of the nuclear issue and represent years of cumulative American experience from the United States' failure to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear capabilities. In their statement, they stipulated several conditions that any nuclear agreement with Iran must meet if it wants to meet even the low standards set by the White House as to what constitutes a 'good deal' – and they hinted that, in their opinion, the Obama Administration has set a very low bar indeed.

In the statement, these experts explain that the Iranians must be obligated to allow their military installations to be inspected and that sanctions must be lifted gradually and at a pace that will be determined by how well the Iranians are implementing the agreement. This will be determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. They also proposed that the United Nations should have no say in whether or not sanctions are imposed anew further down the road. The Iranians, for their part, are trying to obtain more sanctions relief as part of the agreement and have announced that they will not open their military sites to inspection. They also want the vast majority of sanctions lifted almost automatically when the deal is signed.

I do not know whether the Iranians will dig their heels in during the final few days of negotiations. It is possible that they only made their new demands in order to be able to back down and that what they have already achieved goes far beyond their wildest dreams. So now they will 'make concessions' and drop demands that they never really thought would be granted. This will allow the Obama Administration to present Congress with an achievement when, in fact, Obama's negotiating team achieved nothing.

If the Iranians dig their heels in, they could end up making the classic mistake that dictatorships always make when dealing with democracies. Democracies always strive for peace and stability; they are reticent about going to war, which they see as the last resort. But if they are pushed into a corner, if they feel that they have made every reasonable effort but that their dictatorial interlocutor is not making the requisite concessions, they can often responds with attacks that take the other side by surprise.

I do not know what the Americans' red line is. There are those who argue that the Obama Administration doesn't even have one and that, in the end, his negotiating team will capitulate since it has lost its backbone. I hope they are wrong. I hope that, when the Americans realize that the agreement does not even meet the minimum demands they have set and that were stipulated in the Washington Institute's statement, they will come around. Then they will be faced with the question of how to respond – and there's no easy answer to that. If they want to continue with sanctions, they would have to convince the Europeans, the Chinese and the Russians, none of whom will be happy. If the United States decides to use military force – and there's no question that it possesses the ability to do so – it would entail going against the fundamental principles and instincts of the Obama Administration. The Americans are terrified of having to make that decision.

Therefore, I  believe that Kerry and his team will do anything and everything in their power to reach an agreement and that the Iranians will only manage to derail an agreement if their demands are patently excessive, in which case, even the most ardent supporters of Obama's policy of flexibility will be unable to justify an agreement. It is true that the Iranians would have to be utter fools to act in this way, but it is possible that American manifestations of weakness will tempt the Iranians to act in this way. So I cannot say what will happen in the end. But if I was a betting man, I would wager that the Americans will find a way to agree to Iran's demands and that there will, in the end, be an agreement."

Ends…

 

THE MOMENT OF TRUTH: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman refuses to be drawn on whether or not Iran and the G5+1 will reach a deal and says that Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's return to Tehran this week proves that even he does not know how Spiritual Leader Ali Khamenei will rule.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu should be rubbing his hands in glee. Thanks to what has been blamed on Israeli intelligence, the negotiations over a nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers will not be reached by today's deadline. It is now clear that a deal will not be inked by the long-standing deadline and every day that passes without an agreement is an achievement for Netanyahu and everyone who opposes the deal in the first place.

Even though the negotiations have been extended, it is clear to everyone that they cannot go on forever. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is desperate to finalize the deal before July 4th, when the American people celebrate Independence Day. If that happens and the deal is finalized by then, Congress will have only 30 days to inspect and perhaps even delay the agreement. If the agreement is only finalized after July 9th, Congress will have 60 days to inspect the agreement – and who knows what could happen in that time?

After three marathon meetings with his American counterpart this week, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif left Vienna for Tehran, for consultations with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – the man who will determine, in the end, whether or not there is an agreement. Zarif jetted back to Tehran because he and his team are worried that they are being eavesdropped on and they cannot even trust their own communications systems, which were supposed to allow them to talk freely, without concern that their conversations would be deciphered. Just a few weeks ago, after all, there were reports in the international media and from cyber security companies that Israel's intelligence services had infiltrated viruses into the computers of the hotels where the talks were taking place.

Zarif's return to Tehran also proves that he has not been given a mandate by the Supreme Leader to finalize a deal and that he must schlep back to Iran to get Khamenei's blessing before signing any deal. If past experience of how Iran has negotiated with the world powers over the past decade is any indication, the Supreme Leader would not give advanced approval of any deal. His approach is this: First of all, sign the deal – and then we'll decide whether to honor it. And let's not forget that Khamenei has already nixed one signed, sealed and delivered nuclear agreement.

One would have to be either extremely foolish or extremely brave to predict whether the negotiations will end with an agreement. The gaps between the sides remain wide, according to a statement from the British, French and Germany foreign ministers. The same issues that have always been contentious remain unresolved today: the West's demand that international inspectors be allowed access to Iran's military installations, the demand that Iranian scientists who worked on the country's military nuclear program make themselves available to answer international inspectors' questions, the demand that Iran finally come clear about its past efforts to obtain nuclear capability and the disagreement over how and when sanctions should be lifted – and how they should be imposed anew if Iran violates the terms of the agreement.

In short, it's impossible to predict whether there will be a deal. Logic says that Iran needs this deal far more than anyone else. The Obama Administration is desperate for an agreement to be reached. Yet it remains unclear whether or when the sides will reach a deal. Everything remains open – perhaps because the moment of truth is rapidly approaching."

Ends…

 

NOT JUST DEFENSE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, former Interior Minister Gideon Sa'ar warns that, if the government fails to divert funds away from the defense establishment and into civilian projects, it risks creating a massive social protest that will undermine national security.

"What is the common denominator between the massive social protests of 2011, this summer's protests against overcrowding in classrooms and a host of other protests like them? They are all the desperate attempt of Israeli society to tell the country's leaders that the citizenry is extremely worried about the social and civilian services that the state provides and the quality of these services.

What do Shinui (2003), the Pensioners Party (2006), Yesh Atid (2013) and Kulanu (2015) all have in common? According to veteran political parties, they were all established to reflect the mood of the people at the time. These parties do indeed rise and fall with each election, but the mood of the people remains constant – and it is a mood of dissatisfaction.

Israeli governments have always known how to provide tactical responses to public storms. Sometimes the responses were successful, sometimes less so. There were and still are ministers who do their very best and who introduce important and significant reforms to their areas of responsibly. However, no government has ever really carried out ambitious and comprehensive strategic reforms that would fundamentally benefit the people of Israel. Even today, there are no such reforms on the horizon.

There have been contradictory reports about the recommendations of the Locker Commission – which has been examining the size and nature of the defense budget. The committee, headed by the former director general of the Prime Minister's Office, Harel Locker, has yet to publish its recommendations. On the one hand, according to some reports Locker and his colleagues will recommend that the defense budget be set for several years at a time and that it be increased by 58 billion shekels. Then again, there have been noises coming from within the defense establishment, which would indicate that they are not happy with the committee findings. If rumors about Locker's conclusions are correct, the gap between the investment in the military and investment in civilians will widen. Even now, the defense establishment enjoys privileges that the education system and the health system can only dream of. For example: the defense budget is only a recommendation. Expenditure by the defense establishment in practice is always several billion shekels more than the approved budget. In retrospect, the government always finds the extra funds to cover the shortfall.

Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, it has had massive security needs and faced huge challenges. Even if the entire state budget were spent on defense, it is doubtful whether it would be enough to meet all of those challenges. But not every increase in the defense budget will bring greater security. Investment in education, science, research and academia and narrowing the gaps between the richest and the poorest members of Israeli society will also contribute to our national security. In fact, they would do more to bolster security than an increase in the defense budget.

When I was a member of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's third government, I asked, on more than one occasion, the following question: Why does the defense budget need the security of a two-year budget any more than the education system?

One key condition for meeting the national security challenges facing the State of Israel is maintaining our qualitative edge – as well as safeguarding our free economy from radical populism and ensuring that Israeli society remains strong, progressive and just. Our ability to meet these challenges depends very much on the performance of the civilian government ministries.

Since real life is a zero-sum game and since we live in a world with limited resources, decisions must be made. Without recognizing the need to reign in the exponential increase in the defense budget, we will not be able to stand up to the national security challenges we are facing. Israel could fail to achieve things that should be well within its reach and which depend more on our own behavior than on external factors.

The political system will soon face a new test, when the time comes to pass the budget for 2015-2106. If the government fails, the outcome could be a social and political earthquake far greater than anything we have seen in the past."

Ends…

 

LET THEM DOCK: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ariela Ringel Hoffman says that Israel should let the next flotilla dock in Gaza – but only after its cargo has been thoroughly inspected for contraband.

"Israel should have not prevented the latest flotilla of ships from breaking the blockade of the Gaza Strip and reaching shore. Why? Because doing so is the classic definition of insanity: repeating the same action time and time again – and expecting a different outcome. It's time that the government realizes that using force to prevent these ships from reaching Gaza is not the solution, it merely exacerbates the problem. And this is before we even touch on the moral elements of this affair, the difficulty that we face in justifying the blockade itself – both on the international stage and now even domestically. More than two million people are living in intolerable conditions and they are utterly dependent on the decisions and whims of the Israeli government, which has the power to tighten or loosen the chains.

The flotilla that Israel intercepted yesterday is not the last one. It will be followed by more and it is likely that the frequency of these flotillas will increase. At the same time, the legitimacy that the international community grants Israel to carry out various operations will not increase. The opposite is true: every additional flotilla will erode a little more of this legitimacy. In other words: even though the operation to take control of the flotilla was quick and elegant, even though the passengers were detained without incident – we will lose the battle in the end.

The argument that these vessels are carrying weapons is not totally unfounded, but that is a risk that Israel has to take. We have to understand that the problem is not whether Hamas has a hundred more missile or a hundred fewer missiles; the problem is the motivation of the organization to launch them and our ability to take out those responsible for the rocket attacks in real time.

Therefore, the solution must be found elsewhere. Israel must demand, for example, that some international player ensure that the equipment on board is, indeed, humanitarian in nature. We have to trust that our diplomats are capable of setting up such a system of inspection. And let's not forget: if it were to be discovered that one of these ships is carrying, say, a cargo of missiles – Israel's hasbara machine would have a field day.

Israel must also make it clear that the decision to allow future flotillas into Gaza is a conscious one and not a response to outside pressure. We must make sure that the world knows that we are trying to alleviate the situation in Gaza, to restore some degree of normality – in the belief that the other side also recognizes that this is the only way for both Israel and the Palestinians to live side by side."

Ends…

 

FUTILE FLOTILLA: In its editorial on Tuesday, The Jerusalem Post says that Israel was right to block the flotilla that tried to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip, saying that its sole purpose was to delegitimize Israel, not help the Palestinians.

"The Swedish-registered Marianne of Gothenburg, one of several ships making up the 'Freedom Flotilla III,' was boarded by Israel Navy commandos without incident. The vessel was towed to Ashdod Port and those on board will be deported. To their credit, the activists on the Marianne stood by their promise not to use violence against the commandos.

But the broad support for this so-called 'Freedom Flotilla' – ostensibly organized to improve the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinians living in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip – raises questions about the world’s prejudiced views toward the State of Israel. Listening to the activists, it's as though Palestinians’ suffering was solely the product of Israeli sadism, not the by-product of a sustained attempt by Israel to defend itself from a Palestinian terrorist group that has no qualms about causing immense suffering to its own civilian population in the name of a distorted interpretation of Islam – indeed cynically seeks that suffering as a means of disparaging Israel in the eyes of the world.

Many of the activists who took part in the flotilla were respectable politicians. Former Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki was on board one of the ships, as was Spanish EU parliament member Ana Maria Miranda Paza. Bassel Ghattas, a Knesset member from the Joint Arab List also took part. And while UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has publicly opposed using flotillas to break the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza since 2009, he nevertheless adheres to the stance taken by the UN Human Rights Council that, while it is 'fully aware of the need for Israel to address its security concerns,' there must be a 'full and immediate lifting of the blockade.'

Yet, as dozens of respectable world leaders demand that Israel immediately end the suffering of the Palestinians living in Gaza by removing all restrictions on the movement of goods and people to and from the Strip, Hamas continues to channel the few material resources at its disposal into preparations for another terrorist attack on Israel.

On Sunday, Hamas commanders bragged to Iranian TV that they have just finished the building of a new fortified tunnel that reaches into Israeli territory. Hamas troops, within clear view of the border between Gaza and Israel, are carrying out military maneuvers or training in camps like the one established on the ruins of Dugit, one of dozens of Jewish settlements abandoned by Israel as part of the 2005 evacuation of all Israelis from the Gaza Strip. And while it is not clear that Hamas was directly involved in the June 19 murder of Danny Gonen in a shooting attack near Dolev, it is clear that the terrorist organization is intent on extending its influence to the West Bank.

However, instead of denouncing Hamas for devoting so much of its energies to violent resistance and enlisting its very limited resources for the building of terrorist tunnels and rockets and for training terrorist militias, the world continues to denounce Israel for defending itself through measures such as a naval blockade designed to stop ships carrying weapons for Hamas – like the SS Francop and the Klos-C – and border restrictions at the Erez crossing designed to stop the smuggling of arms or materials that could be used to attack Israel.

Strangely, Egypt, which has maintained a much stricter closure of its Rafah crossing with Gaza as part of its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, has not been subjected to the sort of condemnation reserved for Israel. Indeed, since Egypt has more aggressively combated smuggling via tunnels operated by Hamas, the vast majority of goods that make their way into the Strip get there through the Israeli- run Erez crossing.

There is a very simple solution to Palestinian suffering in Gaza: political change. One possibility is that Hamas will accept the three conditions set down by the Mideast Quartet – the UN, the EU, the U.S., and Russia. First, it will recognize the State of Israel and repeal Hamas’s charter, which includes among other gems the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Second, it will abandon terrorism and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. Third, it will recognize the agreements and understandings that Israel has reached with the Palestinian Authority.

The other possibility is that the Hamas regime will be replaced by a leadership willing to accept these basic conditions. Until this happens, Israel cannot allow itself to remove the naval blockade or the restrictions it imposes on imports and the movement of people. Doing so would be a dereliction of duty to millions of Israelis threatened by Hamas’s terrorism.

So-called Freedom Flotillas do nothing to advance the rights of Palestinians living under Hamas’s Islamist regime. Their real goal is the delegitimization of Israel and its right to self-defense."

Ends…

 

YA'ALON'S ARROGANCE: In its editorial on Tuesday, Haaretz accuses Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon of helping erode the firm alliance between the Pentagon and defense headquarters in the Kirya – which it describes as Israel's most vital strategic asset.

"Briefing correspondents on Monday, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon provided yet more evidence of the shallowness of the leadership in Israel. Ya’alon may have been careful this time not to slander anyone, after being burned by his gross attack on U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who he called 'messianic' and 'obsessive,' but the address of his criticism remains the American administration.

On the eve of an expected agreement between Iran and six world powers, the goal of which is to stop Iran’s progress towards developing nuclear weapons, Ya’alon said that the 'Americans have an alternative story on the Iranian issue that I’m not buying,' and described the disagreement between Israel and the United States in black and white terms: The American administration sees in Iran a solution, while the government of Israel sees it as a problem.

Ya’alon continues to demonstrate the superficial approach that has characterized him throughout his entire term, as if he has not learned much in his senior positions over the past two decades – as head of Military Intelligence, IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister. A change in Iranian policy is definitely one of the key conditions for replacing the culture of conflicts and wars in the Middle East with sustainable agreements. Israel, too, is an interested party.

Without Iranian aid, Hizbollah would be transformed from a significant enemy into one of many organizations in the Lebanese political arena, with the danger of war in the north receding as a result. The possibility of achieving successful coexistence with the Hamas government in Gaza, or at the very least of preventing repeated rounds of violence, is dependent on Iran’s willingness to cooperate with such a trend, and not prevent it through militant elements in Hamas or other factions, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. An agreement that will prove to the Iranian population, who are thirsting for economic rehabilitation, that moderation pays off will be a step in the right direction and will benefit the entire region, including Israel.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s governments cannot present an impressive list of achievements in the area of diplomatic wisdom. Those who have mostly excelled at not reaching agreements, and in so doing dragged Israel into bouts of violence and diplomatic isolation, cannot preach to others how to achieve a wise and beneficial agreement. The arrogant approach toward the American administration, represented by Ya’alon and rife in the cabinet, attributes great naiveté and a lack of understanding to Washington, but it is not based on any diplomatic or security achievement on the part of its critics.

Israel is entitled to protect its supreme security interests, which, as opposed to Ya’alon’s position, do not include worshipping the settlements and a lack of belief in a diplomatic agreement. The arrogance toward Obama, as demonstrated by Ya’alon and MK Michael Oren (Kulanu), harms Israel and erodes its most vital strategic asset – the firm alliance between the White House and the Prime Minister’s Office, and between the Pentagon and defense headquarters in the Kirya in Tel Aviv."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: Kadri Gursel warns against a government ploy in centrist Milliyet: "The only thing that those who have become stuck in the quagmire after seeking to topple the Assad regime in 2011 have not done so far is to send the Turkish Armed Forces into Syria. And in the last couple of days, their media has begun to scream out: 'Let the army enter Syria'. But their real problem is neither Syria nor Assad. Their current problem is to win back the power they lost in the June 7th parliamentary elections. If they can manage to send the army into Syria as a fait accompli before any coalition government is formed, they will put in motion their plan for early elections as well."

Writing in the same paper, Murat Aksoy, accuses the ruling party and its leader of warmongering: "This potential war is not that of Turkey, but of President Erdogan, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and their supporters."

Ibrahim Kiras argues that the Kurds have shifted the goal posts in centrist Vatan: "The Syrian civil war and the subsequent opportunity that has presented itself to the Kurdish political movement have turned the Kurdish peace process into something totally meaningless. They believe that they now have an opportunity to create the independent Kurdish state they have long been dreaming of. They no longer need the Kurdish peace process whose only benefit would be to ‘grant democratic rights to the Kurds in Turkey’."

Aydin Engin envisages a nightmare scenario in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The Kurdish cantons ruled by the PYD [pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria] are being joined together. As far as I am concerned, a buffer zone is being established on our Syrian border against the ISIS and similar fundamentalist terrorist organizations. However, for the AKP and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party], this poses a danger that openly threatens Turkey's national security along the Syrian border. An AKP-MHP coalition will inevitably be a war government. This coalition will fight against the PKK at home, and against the PYD beyond the border and in Syria as well, and will cast Turkey full length into the Middle East quagmire. If this is not a nightmare, what is it?"

Ali H. Aslan relies on the good sense of the military and state bureaucracy in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Fortunately, the army and the foreign affairs bureaucracy who can see the big security and diplomacy risks in such a military intervention are putting on the brakes. Otherwise, this insane neo-unionist mentality will lead Turkey into a quagmire in Syria at the last moment. The Turkish Armed Forces cannot be used as a means for President Erdogan to secure the title of 'commander in chief'. Full stop."

Ardan Zenturk sounds a cautious note in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The latest developments on our border with Syria offer clear evidence that we cannot trust the U.S. administration in the 'fight against global terrorism' anymore. Turkey, which is a pioneering democracy in the Muslim world, needs new alliances not only politically, but militarily as well. The main basis for this alliance is democracy in Muslim societies. ISIS is a fascist establishment that has been planted inside the Muslim world by imperialism. It would be a mistake for the Turkish Armed Forces to enter Syria on their own; we may not be able to find our way back."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz has no faith in the West: "As the deadline for the nuclear negotiations looms; the negotiators are focusing on the export of Iran's enriched uranium. Currently, Iran has eight tonnes of five per cent enriched uranium. This should be reduced to 300kg according to the Lausanne Declaration. The sides are studying options as the deadline approaches. Options include changing uranium to a form that cannot be used for military purposes or moving the uranium to a foreign country. The negotiations are at a sensitive stage. Western attitudes, however, indicate that President Obama has not abandoned his dream for excessive demands nor has the West abandoned wanting to delay and close down Iran's nuclear programme." 

Hard-line Keyhan is hard on those who favour a deal: "With the nation's support, the soldiers of diplomacy are sitting in front of our number one enemy, the U.S. Instead of expressing sympathy, some are playing a different tune. With their rough music, they are trying to put society to sleep, to give wrong signals to our soldiers and ultimately to prevent the commander from making a decision in accordance with national interests! Instead of recalling the crimes of the U.S., they want to project the evil Great Satan as a soft and affectionate angel! They say sanctions are affecting people but do not want to tell the people that the oppressive sanctions have been imposed by the U.S.! Who are these people and what is their objective? Their mission is evident in the media that are linked to the enemies of the Revolution. By sending the wrong signals, they want to influence our negotiating team. They are pursuing three objectives: To intimidate the team with the U.S.; to show that the U.S. is reliable and wishes us well and, by highlighting economic opportunities with the U.S., to create a false impression: acquiesce to the oppressive and inhuman desires of the U.S. for the sake of people's welfare!" 

Conservative Resalat denounces Yukiya Amano: "International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano has not had a constructive role in the talks. This has been visible in his positions, remarks and reports. During the recent talks in Vienna, Amano failed to play an effective role in reducing differences between the sides. Not only had he no positive role in this regard, but he has joined one side. The agency could play an important role in resolving differences, but because Amano is not observing his institution's part in defending the legitimate rights of IAEA members, this has become impossible." 

Reformist Arman expects trouble ahead: "The majority in Congress is in the hands of the Republican Party. There is a large Israeli lobby in this organization that works against Iran. If a nuclear deal is signed, there will be a great debate in Congress related to sanctions. The Iranian negotiating delegation who, according to the eminent leader Ayatollah Khamenei, is faithful and revolutionary, should consider a way to deal with American measures."

Hard-line Javan contends that the West wants to bypass the Majlis: "The West is not happy with the Majlis bill that obliges the government to protect Iran's nuclear achievements. They are trying to bypass and foil the right of our country's legislative power to inspect the agreement and want to make the implementation of their general and ambiguous commitments impossible. The West also seeks to use the UN Security Council as a tool to exert pressure on Iran to implement one-sided commitments." 

Moderate Iran is upbeat despite difficulties: "We should not forget that, in addition to the substantial pressure of negotiating with the world's most influential players, the Iranian team has also experienced considerable domestic pressure. The team has carried on its shoulders the heavy shadow of the intolerable pressure of sanctions as well. Nobody had even hoped that negotiations would continue and end. We should not forget that Vienna is not the end of the process. The Iranian side is obliged to review the opposite side's demands. The structure of the additional protocol and the increase of domestic pressure in Iran and the U.S. are endangering what has already been achieved. However, if previous experience and both sides' urgent need for success are taken into account, there is no doubt that reaching an agreement is achievable."

 

REGIONAL CONFLICTS: Reformist E'temad hopes for more cohesion: "Iran is trying to settle crises in the region and push back the terrorists using diplomacy and consultation. However, the Turks and the Saudis are trying to undermine Iran's efforts by providing financial and logistical support to the perpetrators of insecurity in the region. Extremist groups will wane if there is more consensus among regional countries about effective confrontation of the evil phenomenon of terrorism." 

 

GREECE: Conservative Khorasan reveals Greece’s negotiating strategy: "Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras knows that his country's withdrawal from the Eurozone means the failure of the EU project. Greece can hardly protect EU borders and there is no guarantee that its crisis will not overflow, in some form, into neighbouring countries. Political and social instability in Greece, which is a member of NATO, will have many consequences. Greece's substantial financial needs if it leaves the EU can push it, for instance, due to cultural and religious closeness - toward EU rival Russia. Moscow could befriend or form an alliance with Greece in the heart of Europe - adding to its current allies Serbia, Hungary and Cyprus. A Greece allied to Russia, inside NATO, will also have a role different than it does currently. Greece is convinced that the EU will back down at the last moment."

 

U.S./TURKEY: Reformist Sharq anticipates trouble for Erdogan: "The recent victory of Syrian Kurds against ISIS and U.S. cooperation with the Kurdish People's Protection Units has been a clear message to Ankara. It means that in the fight against ISIS, the U.S. is investing in Kurdish forces and has chosen a new ally. This can substantially decrease American demands on Turkey. This choice and the change in the balance of power in the region will have a high cost for Ankara's government and President Erdogan himself. The U.S. is circumventing Turkey in the region and the current domestic situation in the country puts the existence of Erdogan's Islamic government in question."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- When massacres occur

2-The curse of Syria

3-The failure of ‘Plan-H’

 

1- When massacres occur

 

When massacres occur, silence is the ally of the murderers. Do not try to find excuses for the perpetrators by opening up the history books and reading about what the colonialists perpetrated in previous eras. Do not try to justify the crime by saying that it is the work of marginalized poor people who are easy prey to fanatics in their moment of weakness. Do not rush to put the blame on some previous dictator. Do not find excuses. Anyone who accepts the murder of an innocent person at the furthest point of the globe accepts the murder of all innocent people. Anyone who gives a single inch will give up an entire country. Anyone who is ready to relinquish a single sheaf of wheat will easily relinquish an entire field--Ghassan Charbel in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The states that head the list of exporters of terrorism in fact are those that have failed to reform their educational, religious, political, and media institutions. They are those that have left their domestic societies at the mercy of the extremists and their discourse. Consequently, they must be pressured to implement radical and resolute reforms. If they refuse to accept, then the option of imposing international sanctions on them must be considered until they comply with the criteria capable of liberating their societies from the domination of extremist ideas and that render them ready to accept the values of human coexistence among nations--Fahd al-Khitan in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Last Friday's terrorist attacks in Kuwait, Tunisia, and France should drive home to everyone the fact that the current battle with ISIS and its terrorism is everyone's war, urges the editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. The future will depend on its outcome, and no one should fool themselves that they can remain neutral in it. The war against ISIS has been confined to fighting that organization in Iraq, Syria, and Libya so far; but the more important confrontation is against the 'ISIS-like states' that produce and export terrorists to the three countries, insists a Jordanian commentator. Educational and religious reforms must be imposed on these states, with a resort to strict sanctions if they fail to comply.

 

DO NOT SAY: "Do not say that Tunisia is far away and that the Libyan winds have blown on it, as well as the old Algerian winds and those of the thousands of their youth who have joined the wars raging on Iraq and Syria's lands," writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Do not say that your country is safe from what is happening, and that the fire will not reach it. Do not say that Kuwait is far, and that the massacre there will not be repeated in your capital. Do not say that France is far and that the circumstances of the attack there do not exist in your own society. Do not hide behind your finger. Do not try to evade the facts. The situation is much more dangerous than you think. ISIS is on your borders or has already arrived.

This is not a war among others raging on the lands of others. Do not suppose that your innocence will protect you and that your distance will ensure that the fire will not reach you. This is an itinerant massacre from which no one is safe. This is a war that concerns you and your children. It concerns your homeland's safety, your way of life and your grandchildren's welfare long after you are gone.

Do not wash your hands of the entire matter because those who died are not from your country, your religion, your sect, or your color. When massacres occur, silence is the ally of the murderers. Do not try to find excuses for the perpetrators by opening up the history books and reading about what the colonialists perpetrated in previous eras. Do not try to justify the crime by saying that it is the work of marginalized poor people who are easy prey to fanatics in their moment of weakness. Do not rush to put the blame on some previous dictator. Do not find excuses. Anyone who accepts the murder of an innocent person at the furthest point of the globe accepts the murder of all innocent people. Anyone who gives a single inch will give up an entire country. Anyone who is ready to relinquish a single sheaf of wheat will easily relinquish an entire field.

Do not say that the matter does not concern you. Do not close your eyes. Do not speak of a half-massacre because its victims are not your people. Do not try to hold foreign intelligence services responsible for producing those who violate maps, cities and homes and are jubilant at the beheading of citizens and entire states. There are intelligence services that are trying to 'fish in murky waters.' This may be true. But do not evade the real issue.

These monsters came from the next-door apartment, or nearby neighborhood, or from a close city, or a neighboring country. They grew up in homes that resemble ours. They prayed in mosques that resemble those of our neighborhood. The real and burning question concerns what they have learnt, what books they have read, what these books told them, and what those who attracted, incited, and dispatched them after brainwashing them said. It is a question about what they have learnt about the ‘other’, about the right to differ and about those who do not 'drink from the same well' and do not accept to denounce all others as apostates or infidels, and do not sanction killing them.

Do not wash your hands of what is happening. These itinerant massacres are more dangerous that 9/11. ISIS is more dangerous than al-Qa'ida. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi is more dangerous than Osama bin Laden. ISIS's power of attraction exceeds that of its predecessors. It is a 'state' with a 'caliph,' oil and taxes. It is a savage entity that swallows up borders and goes to creative extremes in its executions. It distributes fear and disperses armies. It toys with the map, with history, with the future, with books, with different ways of life, and with your children's fate. It is the age of darkness and the temptation to return to the Stone Age.

Do not claim neutrality in this war. You are a part of it whether you want it or not. On its outcome, the future of our states, nations, lifestyles, relationship to the modern era, technology, progress, universities, and research centers will turn.

This war is an open-ended one. It is long and bitter. It is an open war that rages inside our homes, schools, universities, and in the mosque and its environs. It rages in religious establishments and school curriculums.

You are part of this war and have no option but to side with the camp of moderation. Your only option is to accept the painful decisions that winning this war requires, and accept the need for deep reforms or a comprehensive intellectual revolution. This is the sole means of saving your homeland and children from a fate similar to those who fell in Tunisia or Kuwait or other areas.

"Do not try to evade, dodge, or shirk. Do not wash your hands of what is happening," concludes Charbel.

End…

 

NOT FROM MOSUL OR RAQQA: "We have never heard of a terrorist who hails from Mosul or al-Raqqa carrying out a terrorist attack in an Arab state," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

The terrorists who carried out the attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Egypt's Sinai came from these same countries. The information we have confirms that most of them have never fought in the areas controlled by ISIS, and that they do not know al-Baghdadi, al-'Adnani, or any other terrorist groups’ leaders. Some, like the perpetrator of the attack on the hotel in Sousse [Tunisia], have no previous criminal record.

The hundreds or thousands of youths from these states would never have joined ISIS without some domestic cultural incentive, and not only because of ISIS's ability to attract them to Syria or Iraq. In this sense, ISIS is not merely a state that is tightening its control over large areas of Syrian and Iraqi territories; there are existing ISIS-like societies and states that are no less dangerous

It is unfortunate that the international community is focusing its efforts on fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, while disregarding the danger posed by these other ISIS-like states. Many states have become akin to hatching grounds for extremist forces. They nourish these forces culturally and provide them with fighters and donations. As the phenomenon of foreign fighters and terrorist attacks around the world exacerbates, these states have become a major source of threat to security in the region and the world, one that should not be passed over in silence.

The current international approach to this threat based on raising the level of security coordination, and exchanging information and border controls in order to stem the flow of fighters to the areas of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Libya, has proven to be a failure. This is evident from the fact that hundreds of youths are still able to reach the war zone in Syria. And outside the immediate area of conflict, the terrorists have improved their abilities to carry out lethal attacks inside their respective countries.

The problem lies in these latter countries. If their governments are unable or unwilling to confront the extremist currents that have infiltrated their societies, then the international community should take upon itself to fulfill that task.

The states that produce terrorism, sell it in its markets, or export it outside, should be subjected to obligatory reform programs exactly the same as the reform programs imposed by the international financial institutions on states that have failed economically, or that face domestic financial crises that their institutions are unable to deal with.

The international coalition may succeed in destroying ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya within a few years, especially if a fair political solution for these states' problems is in the offing. But how can the international community deal with the ISIS-like states that have spread their authority inside the states that already exist?

The overwhelming majority of foreign fighters in the states that are witnessing domestic wars have come from a limited number of Arab countries, while no more than 30% come from Western countries. The states that head the list of exporters of terrorism in fact are those that have failed to reform their educational, religious, political, and media institutions. They are those that have left their domestic societies at the mercy of the extremists and their discourse.

"Consequently, they must be pressured to implement radical and resolute reforms. If they refuse to accept, then the option of imposing international sanctions on them must be considered until they comply with the criteria capable of liberating their societies from the domination of extremist ideas and that render them ready to accept the values of human coexistence among nations," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

 

2-The curse of Syria

 

If implemented, this decision [to create a buffer zone in Northern Syria] would mean that the Turkish 'deep state' senses an enormous existential threat to the fabric that constitutes Turkey. It also means that there is a growing regional and international conviction concerning Turkey's right to defend its existence. That would not be to the liking to the [Syrian Kurdish] PYD or the Syrian regime. In fact, there are numerous signs that the regime is leaning more and more towards withdrawing into a coastal 'mini-state.' It would also anger ISIS, which feeds on the Muslims' pains, and transforms them into a project for blind revenge and globalized political suicide. Ankara faces a major and difficult decision. Will it be able to implement it?--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

Syria has become a tightly woven trap that President Erdogan and his party have fallen into. It has thereby put paid to the political model he offered and that had gained widespread admiration because of the manner in which it married Islam and democracy, achieving very high levels of economic growth and turning Turkey into one of the twenty strongest economies in the world. The curse of Syria has begun to burn the fingers of all those who have intervened militarily and politically in its affairs--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Reports that Turkey has asked its army to draft plans to establish a buffer zone in northern Syria so as to pre-empt the establishment of a Kurdish entity along the country’s southern borders, raise many important questions, says the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. For one thing, it is not certain that Ankara can take such a decision without coordination with the U.S., which has been helping the very same Kurdish forces that such a decision would target. The situation in northern Syria and the Kurds' moves towards a form of independence have put paid to Turkish President Erdogan's projects and aspirations, turning him into a 'lame duck', maintains the editorial on an online pan-Arab daily. The latest sign of this is the Turkish army chief’s refusal to comply with Erdogan's orders to intervene in Syria by land and air.

 

AGAINST ISIS AND THE KURDS: "Three leading Turkish newspapers have reported that Ankara has instructed the army to make plans to establish a 110 kilometres long and 35 kilometres deep buffer zone inside Syrian territories to confront the growing threat from ISIS on the one hand, and prevent the establishment of a Kurdish entity along the country's borders, on the other," writes Monday's editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This coincided with recent intensive meetings between the country’s senior security and political figures and with a statement from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that his country will not allow the establishment of a Kurdish entity along the borders with Turkey, accusing the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – the Syrian branch of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) – of wanting 'to alter the demographic makeup' of the areas that it has brought under its control.

But what has happened to make this decision (which the Syrian opposition has been beseeching the world to take for more than four years) possible today, when it was previously unachievable for international, American, and regional reasons?

This latest decision not only stems from the serious military developments along the Turkish borders with Syria. It is also linked to the results of the recent Turkish elections in which the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which is seen as the PKK's public political front, won 80 parliamentary seats. This is capable of provoking Turkish ethnic sentiments among all Turkish currents, whether nationalist, Islamist, or even secular.

The Turkish political and military authorities are fully aware that the PYD’s Kurdish People's Protection Units' (YPG) operations in 'Ain al-Arab [Kobani], al-Qamishli, al-Hasaka, 'Efrin, and Tal Abyad are meant to create a continuous strip that brings together Syria's Kurds within the framework of what is known as 'Western Kurdistan.' But this project can only be achieved by committing massacres and forcefully displacing the Arabs and other minorities from these areas

It is obvious that the U.S.-led international coalition's air raids on Syria are being carried out in coordination with Kurdish commanders on the ground. And this raises important questions such as:

- Why are the Americans helping the PYD to establish a Kurdish 'state' in Syria, despite the severe threat that such an outcome will pose to Turkey?

- Should Ankara’s decision be seen as the Turkish state's response to Washington's disregard for Ankara's strategic interests?

- Can Turkey, which is a NATO member, take a military step of such magnitude without first securing the U.S.'s consent?

These questions expose the complex problems created by the disastrous international and regional policies towards Syria that have transformed what was a peaceful popular revolution against a tyrannical regime into an arena for minor and major wars whose terrible price is being paid by the Syrian people.

If implemented, this decision would mean that the Turkish 'deep state' senses an enormous existential threat to the fabric that constitutes Turkey. It also means that there is a growing regional and international conviction concerning Turkey's right to defend its existence.

That would not be to the liking to the PYD or the Syrian regime. In fact, there are numerous signs that the regime is leaning more and more towards withdrawing into a coastal 'mini-state.' It would also anger ISIS, which feeds on the Muslims' pains, and transforms them into a project for blind revenge and globalized political suicide.

"Ankara faces a major and difficult decision. Will it be able to implement it?" asks the daily in conclusion.

End…

 

WORRIED AND CONFUSED: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is worried and confused these days because of the advances made by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) that belong to the [Syrian Kurdish] Democratic Union Party (PYD)," writes Monday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

According to the news agencies, the YPG has been forcefully displacing the Arab and Turcoman population from these areas as a prelude to establishing a Kurdish state along Syria’s northern borders with Turkey.

 President Erdogan's concern stems from two sources: The first is what he believes is the link between the YPG and the Kurdish People's Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey; the second is the fact that the independence of Syria's Kurds would encourage their counterparts in Turkey to do the same, whether in the form of self-rule or total secession – especially since this Syrian Kurdish area will be connected to the existing semi-independent Kurdistan Province in Iraq.

What is puzzling is that Mr. Erdogan, who has stressed that he will never permit the establishment of a state for Kurds in northern Syria, has close economic and political relations with Mas'ud Barzani, the President of Iraq’s Kurdistan Province. This highlights a major contradiction in his position, rendering it incomprehensible, especially since he strongly supports the armed Sunni opposition groups that aim to topple the Syrian regime and that has prevented the establishment of any Kurdish entity in northern Syria.

For if Mr. Erdogan really fears the secession of Syria's Kurds because of the potential threats to Turkey's territorial integrity and stability, why did he not take this into consideration when he facilitated the passage of fighters and weapons to back the armed opposition and thereby weaken the Syrian regime? Many observers have raised this question.

Mr. Erdogan is also sure to be confused because of the failure of his project in Syria after four years of indirect military intervention in the country, the growing opposition to this intervention inside Turkey, the loss of his absolute parliamentary majority in the recent Turkish elections, and the collapse of his aspirations to change the constitution and transform the Turkish political regime into a presidential one similar to the French and American systems, granting him absolute executive powers as president.

But what have exacerbated his situation further are the early signs of defiance against his rule from the Turkish military establishment. The head of the Turkish Armed Forces General Necdet Ozel has turned down Mr. Erdogan and his PM Ahmet Davutoglu's request for aerial and ground military intervention in Syria on the pretext that the international climate is not appropriate for such a move and the need to take the Syrian, Russian, and Iranian response to such a step into consideration. This is the clearest sign of an unprecedented mutiny in Turkey.

Erdogan has become a 'lame duck' president – one without any real powers. His effort to form a coalition government have collided with the almost impossible preconditions demanded by the three main opposition parties – the People's Republican Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the [Kurdish-led] Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). His strong grip on the military establishment has loosened, which gives an idea of the scale of his current crisis. This is especially true since his call for early parliamentary elections may yield the exact opposite results, with a further drop in his Justice and Development Party's (AKP’s) parliamentary seats, as some Turkish political commentators have predicted.

Syria has become a tightly woven trap that President Erdogan and his party have fallen into. It has thereby put paid to the political model he offered and that had gained widespread admiration because of the manner in which it married Islam and democracy, achieving very high levels of economic growth and turning Turkey into one of the twenty strongest economies in the world.

"The curse of Syria has begun to burn the fingers of all those who have intervened militarily and politically in its affairs," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

3-The failure of ‘Plan-H’

 

The Western/Arab designed Syrian opposition’s offensive in Southern Syria has been foiled with implications for the battle across the rest of the country, says Ibrahim al-Amin in today’s Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The Syrian opposition’s recent offensive in southern Syria, which was managed by a dedicated multi-national operations room in Amman, seems to have failed, claims the editor-in-chief of a left-leaning Lebanese daily. While this does not mean that the situation in the south will now calm down, the opposition and its backers’ defeat will have major repercussions on the war in that area and in Syria as a whole.

 

GREAT IMPACT: "This time round, the failure of the attack on Der'a will have a great impact on the plan that the anti-Damascus Western/Arab alliance has been pursuing," writes Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Monday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

This does not stem exclusively from the latest failure to achieve a breach on the ground that would bring the whole of southern Syria under the opposition’s control. It also has to do with the political, security and military management of the Saudi/American axis's last 'moderates' among the armed [Syrian opposition] groups.

What happened was that the Military Operations Command (MOC) – which includes American, Jordanian, Saudi and other officers – had been working under direct American supervision throughout the second half of last year [2014] and up until a few weeks ago on creating a new reality for the armed groups.

The most important lesson as far as the MOC was concerned was the need to subjugate all the factions active in that area to a single and united security and military authority. We are talking here of 18 major factions that include the remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), bearing in mind that the notion of having a single authority for all these factions does not affect their internal working mechanisms. But this decision allowed for what they refer to as 'cooperation' with the Nusra Front, which is strong in the Syrian south.

The MOC's idea basically focused on subjugating all the armed elements to a single command during the battle, with the MOC responsible for distributing the pickings between them later. This effort was accompanied by the most wide-ranging 'qualitative' training operations as part of a program to deploy five-thousand well-trained fighters who would carry out a decisive offensive that would bring the whole of the Syrian south under their control and reconnect Damascus's southern countryside with its western and eastern countrysides, as a prelude to advancing towards the Syrian capital itself. Moreover, this called for another level of cooperation that included Turkey this time round, so as to deal with the fact that Jayshul Islam leader Zahran 'Alloush, who works under direct Saudi supervision, would play a decisive role in the Damascus battle.

But this famous plan, known as Plan-H, which was exposed by the Syrian army and its allies, failed to achieve its aims. On the contrary, the Syrian army and Hizbollah took the initiative in February and waged a battle to consolidate a 'defensive line' that would protect the Syrian capital. The real object was to prevent the armed groups from linking up with each other on the battlefield in a manner that would facilitate taking control of areas in the south and advancing towards Damascus. This operation secured a military deployment and created a geographical protective line and means of control by fire that prevented the plan to capture the whole of the south and threaten Damascus from being implemented.

The February battle effectively introduced some basic changes to the confrontation on the ground. It is enough to note, for example, that during the period between May 31st and December 31st 2014, the armed groups lost at least 1105 fighters (their names and additional details were made available.) The armed groups subsequently admitted that 1215 of their fighters had been killed during that same period. In addition, 3000 were wounded, of whom 1200 received medical care in the [Israeli] enemy's hospitals in occupied Palestine, while the rest were treated in Jordanian hospitals. We should also bear in mind that traditionally, the Nusra Front for example, does not announce its losses, except for leadership cadres. Over the past year – from May 31st 2014 to May 31st 2015 – the number of armed elements killed exceeded those killed the previous year, reaching a total of 1977 dead and over 3000 wounded.

The MOC command had no option but to continue with local military operations that meant to counter the results of the [regime/Hizbollah] 'defensive line' operation. The armed elements took control of Bosra ash-Sham, the then headquarters of the [Syrian Army’s] 52nd Brigade where they lost 46 people. On the eve of this attack and subsequently, they launched a propaganda campaign portraying what had happened as a major achievement that would lead to a major political breakthrough by forcing Suweida' and the entire Druze villages including those in the Qunaitra area to fall, and create a different climate the would permit other similar breaches. The main object behind these attempts was to take control of Der'a and the entire Qunaitra District, and to reach the Der'a-Damascus road, of course.

It is certainly in no one’s interest to belittle the importance of the 52nd Brigade. But it is a fact that this brigade is a large force and is deployed in all the Syrian provinces. What remained at its HQ within an area of 3 square kms was a conventional formation referred in army parlance as a ‘rear-guard’ force because it cannot engage in major operations. Moreover, the HQ was surrounded by 'negative' geographic points. When the armed elements succeeded in breaching the HQ, the brigade's units immediately redeployed, withdrawing all their heavy weaponry. (At the time, pro-Israeli groups in as-Suweida' emerged to speak of the army abandoning the city and the villages around it). It later emerged that the armed groups were prevented from taking control of the central point of al-Thula Airbase that is subject to special measures.

What the Syrian army and Hizbollah did in a previous phase was to consolidate their areas of deployment and pursue the armed groups and strike at a number of opposition armed columns. When the march from the western side on Damascus ceased, the armed elements tried a number of times to attack the towns of Qarfa, al-Fuqa'ia, and al-Mahajja. The area of Jidya also witnessed an epic fight against the armed elements.

Recently, and as the opposition armed elements succeeded in affecting breakthroughs in Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, and Tadmur [Palmyra], the MOC was preparing for a major strike in the south. Those in charge hoped that the measures they had taken would secure major results. For this reason, thousands of fighters were mobilized and armed with different weapons, and a network of information was provided to them based on cooperation between Israel, Jordan and Turkish and American intelligence. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Qatar increased their financing.

The attack, which was named Operation Southern Storm in emulation of the Saudi Operation Decisive Storm against Yemen, was launched. But what happened was that the measures to 'firm up' the defensive lines, that had improved considerably over the past few months and were consolidated after the battles near as-Suweida', allowed the Syrian army and Hizbollah to deliver some very harsh blows that not only foiled the attack, but also destroyed the opposition factions’ collective military command, leading to a security operation that targeted field commanders. The result was that disagreements between the factions emerged in public. But the MOC, which has been suffering as a result of this defeat, insists on waging more attacks. There is now another attempt to strike at the town of Hadar in al-Qunaitra.

No one concerned with the battle in southern Syria really believes that the situation there will improve any time soon. What is certain is that the defeat suffered by the opposition factions, the huge losses suffered by the well-trained assault forces, and the disagreements that have re-emerged among the leaders of the military groups may create a different reality.

"And this, incidentally, is a reality that will have consequences for other areas in Syria, where all the attempt to dismiss the [Hizbollah-led] Qalamoun battle as insignificant will soon prove useless in confronting what is being prepared soon – namely, qualitative operations intended to cleanse the remaining Lebanese/Syrian borders of the terrorists," concludes Amin.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Deal or no deal?

 

The main news story of the day – Israel's successful and peaceful operation to take control of a flotilla of ships aiming to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip – happened in the twilight zone between the time when newspapers are sent to print and the time they arrive on doorsteps. This rendered useless all the preemptive news coverage of the event and the analysts' advice on how best to carry out the operation.

According to Army Radio, IDF forces boarded the Gaza-bound protest vessel Marianne in the early hours of Monday morning. There were no reports of any casualties. The IDF spokesman said in a statement that, in line with the decision of the political leadership, and after all appeals via diplomatic channels to prevent the boat from reaching the coastal territory were exhausted, Israeli naval forces intercepted the ship and boarded it. The takeover process was brief with no reports of any confrontations or injuries. The decision to seize control of the Swedish-owned vessel was made after numerous requests to reroute to Ashdod port were rejected by those onboard.

A spokesperson for flotilla said earlier this week that activists onboard had taken an oath not to engage in violence by signing contracts that they would resist confrontation in a passive, non-violent manner. The Marianne was carrying solar panels and medical supplies in its cargo hull.

The Israeli government stressed repeatedly in recent days that it will not allow unauthorized boats to enter its territorial waters and that there are numerous channels to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. Jerusalem has said it views these types of flotillas solely as a means for provocation.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu praised Israeli forces for their 'determined and efficient' action in detaining the passengers of the Gaza flotilla, which he said tried to reach the coast in contravention of the law. Netanyahu said the flotilla is nothing but a demonstration of hypocrisy and lies; that it only assists Hamas terror and ignores all of the horrors of the region. Netanyahu said Israel is not prepared to accept the entry of war materiel to the terrorist organizations in Gaza as has been done by sea in the past. He stressed that there is no siege on Gaza, and that Israel assists in transferring goods and humanitarian equipment to the territory.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon also praised the actions of the navy. 'I congratulate the navy at the conclusion of their taking control of the ship the Marianne,' said Ya'alon. 'This flotilla is not humanitarian and doesn't care about the welfare of anyone; the desire of the participants on it is to continue its delegitimization effort against the State of Israel.' Ya'alon said the flotilla 'is part of a demonstration of hypocrisy and lies by various sources in the world who prefer to strengthen and support a relentless terrorist organization like Hamas, which instead of taking care of the citizens of Gaza tries to smuggle weapons into the (Gaza) Strip to use them against the state of Israel and its citizens.'

The ship is to be taken to Ashdod Port where its contents will be inspected, as Israel maintains that its maritime blockade is meant to prevent Hamas from rearming via sea routes.

Perhaps wary of being overtaken by events, none of the Israeli newspapers led their Monday editions with the flotilla. Haaretz and Israel Hayom lead with a preview of today's cabinet vote on allowing the government to bypass antitrust laws in cases of national security or foreign policy. Specifically, the vote would allow the government to get around the antitrust commissioner’s opposition to the emerging agreement between natural gas companies and the government. Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the financial crisis in Greece, reporting that the entire country is on the verge of bankruptcy. 

           In other news, Netanyahu said at a meeting of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Sunday that the nuclear agreement-in-the-works with Iran is going from bad to worse day by day. Netanyahu maintains that Iran's demands are growing while the concessions by the world powers are also growing. The prime minister said that the agreement would set the stage for Iran to become a superpower with the nuclear arsenal within a decade, and would allow Tehran to manufacture an atom bomb even earlier.

          Speaking to journalists during a press briefing at his office in Tel Aviv, defence minister Ya'alon said "the U.S. has a narrative on Iran that I don't buy," adding that the primary disagreement is about whether Iran is the problem or the solution. According to Ya'alon, Israel and the U.S. disagreed in choosing between pursuing an agreement at this stage, or increasing pressure on the Iranians. "We claimed that ramping up pressure would bring the [Iranian] regime to a dilemma: Either the bomb, or survival," said Ya'alon, adding, "but the way negotiations were conducted allowed the Iranians to avoid that dilemma. Because it went that way, we still find ourselves divided on the issue." 

The defence minister added that Israel doesn't believe that an immediate strike on Iran is the best course of action, but rather increasing pressure on the regime in Tehran should be top priority. "This pressure brought Iran into talks with America. But today there is no military threat on Iran, no diplomatic isolation, and there's been more talk of easing economic pressures since the interim agreement was signed. For all those reasons, Iran also has no fear of an internal uprising. The issue was decided among the West against Israel's wishes."

Ya'alon noted that Iran and the world powers are not headed for a breakdown, and that they will ultimately reach an agreement in the near future, even if they don't manage to do so by the deadline of June 30. According to Ya'alon, the emerging agreement is not good, and will only increase the danger posed by Iran. "The agreement will create a reality in which Iran is a nuclear threshold state, even if there is a 10-year freeze on certain parts of its nuclear program," added Ya'alon.

In Vienna, meanwhile, a senior U.S. official has acknowledged that the talks with Iran will go past their June 30th target date. The comment came as Iran's foreign minister was preparing to leave the talks in Vienna to travel to Tehran for consultations before expecting to return to Vienna for a final push for a breakthrough. Iranian media said that Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's trip back to Tehran had been planned in advance.

Elsewhere, a senior Islamic Jihad prisoner held in administrative detention by Israel has agreed to end a 56-day hunger strike, following assurances he would be released next month. The head of the Palestinian Prisoner Society, Qadura Fares, said that the prisoner, Khader Adnan, agreed to end the protest hunger strike after being told he would be released from jail in two weeks. Israel has sought to prevent hunger strikes by introducing legislation to permit prisoners to be force fed – but the measure has been met with opposition from Israeli doctors' associations, which say the practice contravenes ethical commitments.

Finally, Haaretz reports that Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades is trying to get Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu invited to address the heads of the 28 European Union nations at one of their upcoming meetings in Brussels. Anastasiades would also like to invite Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to make a similar speech at a separate event. The Cypriot president discussed the possibility with Netanyahu during his visit to Israel on June 15 and with Abbas in a phone call on June 19.

 

ISRAEL'S DRUZE DILEMMA: Writing in Maariv, Alon Ben David says that Israel's policy of noninvolvement in the Syrian Civil War could be sorely tested, if rebel forces attack the Druze communities on the Syrian side of the border.

"Much has been written over the past seven days about the attack on an Israeli ambulance on the Golan Heights, in which an injured Syrian rebel fighter was beaten to death by a mob of Druze from the town of Majdal Shams. Even without this very serious incident, Israel is rapidly approaching the moment that it must make a decision: will it continue its policy of remaining firmly uninvolved in the Syrian Civil War – even if we start to witness a massacre just across from our northern border?

There is no need to expand at length on the vile nature of last week's attack, or the negative impact it could have on the rebels' attitude toward the Syrian Druze or even toward Israel. The attack came, ironically enough, after Israel had reached a quiet understanding with the rebels that the Druze village of Khader would not be attacked and its residents left unharmed. We can only hope that the attack did not nix that understanding.

The rebels made it clear that the goal of their recent offensive was to take an outpost belonging to the Syrian army, located southeast of Khader, and that they had no intention of attacking the village. Their operational goal at the moment is to take control of the area near to Mazraat Beit Jen, which would give them territorial contiguity with the areas they have already taken in the central Golan Heights. >From there, they can more easily attack the Quneitra-Damascus road.

Israel, aware of the sensitivity of the Druze population to what could happen to their brethren over the border, relayed a warning to the rebels not to enter Khader – despite the fact that terrorists from the same village were responsible for detonating a roadside bomb close to an IDF patrol on the Golan several months ago. At the same time, Israel recognizes that the Syrian Druze have little choice but to support Bashar al-Assad's troops and Hizbollah, who – ironically – are protecting minorities. By the same token, there are those inside Khader who insist that, even if they were to come under attack, they would not accept Israeli help.

Every few days, the rebel forces drop off their wounded close to the border fence; most of them are seriously wounded and Israel treats them irrespective of the organization that they belong to. One senior officer told me that, 'Even if Assad himself turned up at the fence wounded, Israel would treat him without asking any questions.' Thus far, Israel has treated some 1,500 injured Syrians and, in most cases, saved their lives.

When asked why Israeli taxpayers' money is being used to treat wounded Syrians, the army's answer is always the same: Anyone who spends six months in an Israeli hospital and who owed his life to Israelis is unlikely to forget that and will help Israel in the future. This is one of the wiser investments the government has made, along with its decision to refrain from engaging in the Syrian Civil War. If Israel were to get directly involved in the fighting, all of the combatant factions would unite against us.

This policy could be severally tested, however. When 300,000 people were massacred in fighting in Syria, the world stood silently by – but if the massacres get closer to our borders, we will have to make a decision. Can we – descendants of people who were victims of genocide while the world remained silent – not act if we witness a massacre taking place just over our border? There is no easy answer to that question and it is clear that there will be political considerations to be borne in mind – but the moral question is a profound and complex one.

Some 15,000 Druze live in the northern Golan Heights. If they come under attack from the rebels, Israel will have to decide whether it opens its borders to refugees or whether it tries to establish a safe zone on the eastern side of the border. It would be hard for Israel to do nothing.

At the moment, there is no such imminent threat and the more significant concern for the Druze is focused on their largest population center – Jabal al-Druze – where they number some 500,000. Forces from ISIS and the al-Nusra Front are closing in on them. Israel, which is just 50 kilometers away, cannot really help them. The Jordanians, who can help them, are doing so. For Jordan, supporting the Druze helps create a buffer zone between the territory of the Hashemite kingdom and areas controlled by ISIS, which also has aspiration of moving southward.

The Druze have never had nationalist aspirations. As an eternal minority, their ethos calls on them to identify with whichever country they are in and to enjoy the protection of the ruling regime. But what used to be Syria can no longer be considered a regime and will not return to being one. We have witnessed the demise of a central regime in Damascus ruling over Syria in its current borders. Syria as we know it has disintegrated into cantons. Jordan can help the Druze bring stability to their little canton."

Ends…

 

FIGHTING ISIS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Eyal Zisser comments on the American new strategy for fighting ISIS – involving Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and various local militias – and says that Israel must be wary.

"During the course of the past year, American officials have declared ISIS is close to being defeated on several occasions; on the ground, however, it is very much alive and kicking. In fact, it seems that it has never been in better shape – and not just in Syria and Iraq. Over the weekend, ISIS sent a Ramadan greeting, a reminder that it still exists, to the entire world. The message was delivered in Tunisia, in France and in Kuwait. Even in Jerusalem there were flyers bearing the name of ISIS, calling on Christians to leave the city and to stop sullying it with their presence during the holy month.

In Washington, they have long realized that the American strategy for dealing with ISIS has failed and that airstrikes alone will not bring the organization to its knees or even do it significant damage. The Americans, therefore, are now promoting an alternative strategy, whereby they seek to recruit local allies – such as the Kurds in northern Iraq and eastern Syria – as well as Shiite militias in southern Iraq. The Kurds and the Shiite militias have an existential interest in fighting ISIS in order to protect their homes and, with American help, they are proving themselves to be determined and effective fighters. The Americans would be well advised to expand this policy to include Jabal al-Druze in southern Syria.

These ethnic forces can, in the meantime, protect their homes from ISIS, but they do not have the ability or desire to retake the vast areas of land that the organization has already captured from Syria and Iraq, in which there is a Sunni majority. In order to do this, they would need political power, which is sorely lacking because of the political disintegration of both countries.

The Americans tried, of course, to create a Sunni coalition to fight against ISIS, but it was a coalition that existed on paper alone and, in any case, it proved to be ineffective. Saudi Arabia was preoccupied with its operations in Yemen, while Ankara has no real desire to fight ISIS. After all, most of the volunteers who have joined ISIS have travelled through Turkey. Meanwhile, the Sunni rebels in Syria see Bashar al-Assad as their main enemy. Indeed, if Assad were to fall one day, it's hard to see how the militias will be able to fight ISIS. Any time ISIS has fought against one of these groups in the past, it has always come out on top.

Given all of the above, it is easy to understand why the United States is so keen to recruit a new ally in its war against ISIS: Iran, and, indirectly, the Assad regime and Hizbollah. After all, the Shiites in Lebanon and the Alawites in Syria could, by the same logic as the Americans are applying to the Kurds, become another layer in the war against ISIS, while Iran would provide the political clout that is lacking in the battle against the organization today.

In Iraq, an alliance of this kind already exists and, in practice (although not directly or openly) Washington and Tehran both support the Shiite militias that are fighting ISIS. Syria could be the next country in which this happens. It is little wonder, incidentally, that some people have already suggested that, once Assad falls and ISIS sets up shop in Lebanon's back yard and on the Golan Heights, Israel and Iran will renew their alliance from the days of the Shah and will join forces to fight a common enemy. This, however, remains a delusional and fantastical vision.

Although an Israeli-Iranian alliance against ISIS is not realistic, the penny has dropped already in Washington and, because of the threat that ISIS poses to American interests, the administration is willing to hand over control of the Middle East to Iran. In this respect, the nuclear deal is just the first stage. Iranian arms and advisers are already flowing freely into Iraq and Syria and the next stage could see Iranian troops dispatched – as well as volunteer fighters. Even if such a move is sanctioned by the United States, Israel must oppose it vehemently. Even if we would be happy to see the Islamic Republic's troops sinking into the Syrian quagmire, we must not allow it to establish a presence on our border – unless it is coordinated in advance with Jerusalem.

Either way, the Obama Administration wants to reach the end of its tenure in November 2016 without incident. The problem is that once Obama leaves the stage, we in the Middle East will be left to clean up the mess."

Ends…

 

SAUDI STRATEGY: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben Menachem says that the West's nuclear deal with Iran is leading to a regional arms race – as witnessed by deals reached recently by Saudi Arabia with France and Russia.

"The ruler of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, continues with his policy of defiance toward the United States, in protest at the nuclear deal with Iran that seems certain to be signed in the coming days and weeks. Having already sent his son, Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, to Russia 10 days ago, to finalize the details of a strategic alliance with President Vladimir Putin, he subsequently sent him to France on a similar mission.

When it comes to the most important issues in the Middle East, France's positions are very similar to those of Saudi Arabia: it is hawkish when it comes to a nuclear deal with Iran, it supports the ouster of Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad and it backs Saudi Arabia's initiative on the Palestinian issue.

This new Saudi policy is highly pragmatic; it is based solely on protecting the interests of the kingdom. It seeks to create strategic new alliances beyond the alliance with the United States, after it discovered to its shock and dismay that the pact with Washington was not as strong as Saudi Arabia believed. The final proof of this, as far as Riyadh is concerned, is the nuclear deal with Iran.

A few weeks ago, the Saudi monarch boycotted a summit that U.S. President Barack Obama hosted at Camp David with leaders of other Gulf States. Obama used the occasion to try and convince his guests to accept the deal with Iran; he told them that the United States' support for the Gulf States remains as strong as it ever was.

Prince Mohammad, meanwhile, has met with French President Francois Holland and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius; he signed a series of deals with them, valuing a staggering $12 billion. Among the deals signed was one for the construction of two nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia, one for the purchase of 23 French helicopters, another for the purchase of civilian Airbuses and a whole host of infrastructure projects.

Anyone who was afraid that the Iranian nuclear deal would signal the start of an arms race in the Middle East can now feel vindicated: Saudi Arabia has launched a full-blooded arms race and is making no effort whatsoever to conceal its intentions.

Prince Mohammad is considered the rising star of the Saudi royal house; he is also the heir apparent. Some 10 days ago, when he met with Putin in Moscow, he agreed with the Russian president on six strategic agreements. The most significant of these was the signing of an agreement whereby the two countries would cooperate on nuclear issues. Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear reactors – for peaceful purposes. Russia is supposed to build and operate most of them. The rest of the agreements between Moscow and Riyadh deal with the procurement of arms, construction projects, energy, agriculture and investment. It's worth remembering that Russia sold Iran its nuclear reactor at Bushehr, as well as the technological knowhow needed to operate it. Now Saudi Arabia is marching down the same path.

By signing the agreements with Russia and France, the Saudi ruler is sending a clear message to President Obama, that the nuclear deal with Iran grants other countries in the Middle East – including Saudi Arabia – the right to pursue nuclear technology and the right to enrich uranium. One of the agreements that Prince Mohammed reached in Paris was for the purchase of attack helicopters. His visit to Moscow also dealt with weaponry – specifically the purchase of Russian T90 tanks and 9K720 Iskander missiles.

The message that Saudi Arabia is sending to the Obama administration is clear: the United States and its weapons manufacturers no longer enjoy precedence when it comes to selling arms to the kingdom and Saudi Arabia has the right to seek out new sources of weapons in order to safeguard its national security. Saudi Arabia is considered the leading Gulf State and it is safe to assume that the other countries will adopt this new Saudi strategy and will follow in Riyadh's footsteps. The Middle East is on the verge of a new and dangerous era, which is the direct result of the Iranian nuclear deal and which will see the Gulf States – followed by other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan – engaged in an arms race.

Rather than calming the region and reducing tensions between Iran and other countries in the region – as the United States hopes – the nuclear deal with Iran is increasing tensions and concerns, and is creating a dangerous race to obtain conventional weapons. This could easily change into a nuclear arms race, in which Arab countries seek to maintain a strategic balance with Iran.

This arms race has security implications for Israel, too. Israel cannot afford to lose its qualitative edge over Arab armies, especially given the new and dangerous situation in the region, when countries are disintegrating and their weapons are falling into the hands of radical Islamic groups. The United States understands the dangers, but it appears that President Obama has decided once and for all to prioritize the nuclear deal with Iran – even though this entails main dangers and potentially dangerous ramifications."

Ends…

 

THE LAST LAP?: In its editorial on Monday, The Jerusalem Post warns that, with nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime would likely feel free to act without fear of any consequences from the West.

"The deadline for the nuclear talks between the great world powers and Iran was supposed to be on Tuesday, June 30. It has now been extended by several days.

Many have wondered why the U.S. and other Western nations are even talking to the Iranian regime about its nuclear weapons programs at a time when it is sponsoring terrorism abroad and suppressing dissidents at home. The Iranians are not being asked, as part of the negotiations, to curtail their sponsorship of Hizbollah or terrorist groups operating in the Gaza Strip; to scale back their support for the Assad regime in Syria; to stop destabilizing Yemen through their support for the Houthis.

No demand has been made of them to release any of the American citizens in their country’s prisons, such as Jason Rezaian, a Washington Post correspondent; nor have they been asked to end the six years of house arrest imposed on the leaders of the 2009 Green Movement, such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi.

Some have likened the U.S.’s approach to Iran to the Cold War era, when America pursued nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union at a time when it was imprisoning dissidents at home and undermining Western-backed governments abroad. No linkage was made between the nuclear arms talks and the bad things the Soviets were doing, because the nuclear issue was prioritized.

Similarly, nothing the mullah regime in Iran does – no matter how bad – is perceived to be as important as preventing it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Any attempt to reach a broader deal with the Iranian regime – to change its policies at home or abroad – would almost certainly fail, not least because its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has ruled out talking about anything else. The best strategy is to focus on the biggest threat – a nuclear- armed Iran.

The parallel drawn between present talks with Iran and the negotiations that went on in the 1970s and 1980s between the U.S. and the Soviets makes some sense. But this does not explain the U.S.’s failures on the nuclear front. The U.S. and other Western nations have caved in on a few basic principles that essentially pave the way for Iran to become a threshold nuclear state. It is imperative that they change tack before it is too late.

First, the U.S. must ensure that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are permitted to effectively monitor compliance with the agreement. That means IAEA inspectors must be given timely and effective access to any sites – including military sites – in Iran they need to visit in order to verify its compliance with the agreement. The inspectors must be able to take samples, to interview scientists and government officials, to inspect sites, and to review and copy documents as required for their investigation of Iran’s past and any ongoing nuclear weaponization activities. All this must be accomplished before any significant sanctions relief is permitted.

Second, the deal must establish strict limits on advanced centrifuge R&D, testing, and deployment – at least in the first 10 years. The goal must be to push back Iran’s deployment of advanced centrifuges as long as possible.

Third, sanctions relief must be linked to Iran’s implementation of its obligations. Sanctions must not be lifted before the IAEA confirms Iran has complied with the agreement’s requirements.

Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. must go on record, again, that it is committed to using all means necessary, including military force, to prevent Iran from producing enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon.

Just last week, Khamenei ruled out foreign inspections of the country’s military nuclear facilities. There is real danger that because the Obama administration is so intent on reaching an agreement, it will cave in to Khamenei’s dictates.

If the Iranians manage to build a nuclear weapon because the U.S. and other world powers rushed into signing a bad deal, Iran’s pernicious influence in the region and in the world will only grow. With nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime would likely feel free to act without fear of any consequences from the West.

The U.S. has decided to ignore Iran’s support for terrorism abroad and its suppression of political opposition at home, in an attempt to focus on the truly important issue of nuclear weapons control. That is a defendable position, but only on condition that the deal signed with Iran contains the requisite elements for preventing it from achieving nuclear capability."

Ends…

 

TREADING ON ISRAEL'S SACROSANCT PRINCIPLES: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that there are elements in Israeli society who are riding roughshod over our most sacred tenets.

"Sometimes your blood boils when you see someone trampling on a sacrosanct principle. This occurred last week when Yaron Mazuz called out to Arab Members of Knesset that 'we' were doing them a favor by issuing them Israeli identity cards and allowing them to sit in the Knesset. This outrageous statement was not made by somebody who had never gone to school and might be excused for having no understanding of the functioning of a democratic society. It was made by none other than the deputy minister of the interior, addressing the Knesset in the name of the Minister of Interior Silvan Shalom.

All of Israel’s citizens have the right to vote and to be elected to the Knesset regardless of gender, ethnic background, religion, and not least important, regardless of political opinion. If the deputy minister of interior does not know this or prefers to disregard it, he cannot continue to hold that office.

It was a bad week for sacrosanct principles. The attack carried out by a mob of over a hundred Druze, who ambushed an ambulance carrying wounded who had escaped the fighting in Syria to hospitals in Israel, was an abhorrent crime. No explanations regarding the presumed affiliation of the wounded, or the Druze belief in the transmigration of souls, can excuse this barbaric act. The victims of the attacks were injured, in need of medical attention, and were unarmed and defenseless.

One can understand the strong feeling of concern of Druze living on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights for their brothers and sisters in danger as a result of the fighting across the border in Syria. One can even understand their feelings of loyalty to Bashar Assad, the butcher of Damascus, who they believe will protect the Druze community in Syria. But one would have expected that the belief in the sanctity of human life would be part and parcel of their value system, a sacrosanct principle, especially after having grown up in Israel for the past 48 years. Something is amiss in their continued estrangement from Israeli society and its values, which has been ignored for too long by Druze religious leaders and by Israeli authorities.

So now we go back 10 years to the forcible eviction of Israeli citizens from their homes in Gush Katif in 2005. Evicting people from their illegally built homes is a painful process, which becomes unbearable if they have been living in those homes for many years. But the families of Gush Katif did not build their homes illegally. They were encouraged to settle there by the Israeli government and had been living there for more than 20 years. Their forcible eviction was a gross violation of their civil rights, it was a crime.

Although the decision to uproot them was taken by the government headed by Ariel Sharon, the ultimate responsibility for this crime rests with Israel’s High Court of Justice which gave its approval. It is supposed to be the last resort for those citizens seeking to prevent such a violation of their rights by the government. In this case, it failed miserably. Nothing can excuse it. Those who are charged with protecting our rights failed to do so and instead trampled on a sacrosanct principle they are charged with defending.

As our deputy minister of interior, Yaron Mazuz should have known that voting in elections is not a privilege which the government can award or deny to Israeli citizens. It is a basic inalienable right of every citizen and brooks no interference by the government or the Knesset. It is a sacrosanct principle.

And yet over 150,000 Israel citizens who happen to be abroad on Election Day are denied that right. Those who are travelling abroad after serving in the Israel Defense Forces, professors on sabbaticals, students who are studying abroad, tourists who happen to be overseas, Israelis working for Israeli companies abroad — they and many others have their basic civil rights violated by being denied the right to vote.

Democratic countries around the world have solved this problem, universally common in the age of globalization, by allowing for an absentee ballot. But not Israel. A sacrosanct principle, the right of citizens to vote, is being trampled. It is time for a change."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

ISIS/KURDS: Fehim Tastkin reveals ISIS’s objective in centre-left Radikal: "ISIS, which has lost Tal Abyad and Ayn al-Issa to pro-Kurdish forces, has attempted to take its revenge in Kobani. The latest attacks do not seem to be the product of a strategy that is meant to retake Kobani. The aim could be to undermine the prestige of the YPG [People's Protection Units, the armed wing of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)] that is growing like a snowball. ISIS has received the biggest blow on the Iraqi and Syrian fronts from the Kurds. To deflate the YPG myth, ISIS wanted to show that it can hit the Kurds in their home base if it wants to."

Sami Kohen has more to say about ISIS’s goal in centrist Milliyet: "The biggest surprise and most serious shock for the Kurds was that of ISIS militants wearing YPG uniforms, penetrating into Kobani and murdering and wounding many people there with their bombs. Kobani, which has almost turned into a symbol after its brave resistance against ISIS last year, has become a target for ISIS just as it was returning to normal life, and the goal is to demonstrate that peace and stability cannot be secured on this front even with military victories."

Writing in the same paper, Murat Aksoy charts Turkey’s most desirable future course: "It is necessary for Turkey to pursue normalization, democratization and liberalization at home, and peaceful mediation abroad. For that reason, the HDP should not be isolated politically, but made a part of Turkey's normalization. This is one of the conditions for resolving the Kurdish problem and Turkey becoming an actor in the Middle East. No matter which coalition may be formed in Turkey, its priority should be to normalize its domestic policy and get rid of the dreams of [Sunni] 'sectarian fraternity' while embracing the EU and universal values."

Ibrahim Kiras warns of a danger that may have escaped others’ attention in centrist Vatan: "I do not know whether anyone is aware of this, but yesterday Turkey pulled back from the verge of a new October 6-7 [2014] savagery [when HDP supporters clashed with security forces over the Kobani battle between ISIS and the Kurds]. The statements made by the leaders of the HDP, which claims to be a Turkish party, were irresponsible, provocative, and frankly, ill-intentioned even from the very start. Thus, if the charge that yesterday's ISIS attack was committed from Turkish territory is not disproved in front of the cameras, there could be new 6-7 October savagery."

Ahmet Kekec adopts a threatening tone in centre-right, pro-government Star: "This was a familiar ISIS attack. Let the HDP pursue the same intrigue. Let them try a new disgrace. Let them pour the masses onto the streets. We are waiting."

Ibrahim Karagul lambastes the government’s critics in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The ISIS forces came to Kobani with a convoy of vehicles and launched a couple of attacks. Then an unbelievable campaign began. An ugly model, which transcends the borders of the country, is being presented by talking about 'terrorist Turkey'."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Yemen’s forgotten war

2-Riyadh opens up to the Brotherhood

3-Israel’s Druze dilemma

4-Turkey: the Kurdish factor

 

1-Yemen’s forgotten war

 

The debate in Houthi circles now is over two main points: Should they continue their shelling of Saudi towns and cities with Katyusha and Grad rockets, or should they resort to their longer-range and more destructive Scud missiles? And how would the Saudis react if they were to resort to the latter? And there is another related point: Would it be useful to infiltrate deep into Saudi territories and occupy villages and cities, as ISIS is doing in Iraq and Syria despite the American aerial bombardment? And how would Saudi Arabia react in that case? We do not know what these debates may produce or what the Houthis and their allies' final decision may look like. But what we do know is that the ground war of attrition along the Saudi/Yemeni borders will escalate, as will the number of people killed on both sides--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

No one gains in this chaos. With the passage of time, and if the Yemeni parties fail to reach an agreement, the Yemeni conflict will turn into a forgotten war, as is the case in Somalia. It is a great lie to delude the Yemenis into believing that the world is concerned about them and wishes to find a peaceful solution for their problem. The region is rife with crises and fires. It is also a great delusion for anyone to believe that the various parties – Iranians, Russians, or Westerners – will continue to back Yemen forever. If the crisis lasts for a year or two or more, the Yemenis will discover that everyone has turned their attention to other issues, and that even the UN secretary-general and his envoy will no longer respond to their phone calls. This is what the Somalis have come to realize in their endless quarter-of-a-century-long war--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

The major new development in Yemen is the announcement of the death of an Emirati soldier in the fighting with the Houthis and their allies, notes the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. This indicates that the UAE's participation in the war is not confined to aerial bombardment. Meanwhile, the war of attrition along the Saudi/Yemeni borders is likely to escalate against the background of a possible famine in the country. Yemen's war threatens to turn into a long and extended confrontation that the world will forget about, similar to what is happening in Somalia, warns a veteran Saudi commentator. The only way out is for all Yemeni parties to come together and agree on a viable political system in which everyone has equal rights.

 

NO NEWS: "Reports regarding the developments in the war in Yemen have become routine and repetitious," writes Friday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

It is in fact difficult to find a new angle that would add any new information to the readers, who have begun to be bored by following the news. After three months of continuous aerial bombardments by Operation Decisive Storm's warplanes, the Houthi/Saleh alliance has not surrendered or raised the white flag, while the Storm's warplanes have not grown tired of their constant attacks despite the fact that their 'target bank' has run out. After all, Saudi Arabia’s arsenals are brimming with bombs and missiles of all shapes and sizes.

Yesterday, this toxic routine was broken. The international news agencies carried reports of two developments that would whet the appetite of any journalist looking for something new to report to the thirsty and greedy reader:

- First, there was a Saudi statement admitting that three Saudi soldiers had been killed by a shell fired by the Yemeni coalition from the other side of the border, as well as that an Emirati soldier was killed in clashes with the Houthis in the 'Assir area.

- Second, the new UN Yemen Envoy Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed stressed that Yemen was on the verge of a famine because of the dearth of basic food supplies as a result of the siege imposed on its ports and airports, the ongoing war, and the failure to agree on a truce during the month of Ramadan.

The death of Saudi soldiers along the borders with Yemen is not a hot news item; but the death of an Emirati soldiers is. The common impression was that the Gulf states' participation in the Saudi war on the Houthis and their supporters from the army units loyal to former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, was confined to aerial operations. This is the first confirmation that armed Emirati forces are deployed on the Saudi side of the southern borders with Yemen.

The second point, namely, Ould Cheikh Ahmed's assertion that Yemen is on the verge of starvation, warrants attention because it was made by a UN mediator. But Ould Cheikh Ahmad only uttered half the truth. Yemen entered the famine zone weeks ago. It no longer has anything to eat thanks to the siege imposed on it. This nation was hungry, poor, and destitute even before the war began. What can we expect now that that has been going on for three consecutive months, with a suffocating air, sea and ground siege imposed on all its seaports, airports and border posts by those behind Operation Decisive Storm?

As confirmed by raialyoum’s sources, the Houthis are betting on a long war of attrition against Saudi Arabia. They believe that the front for this war is Yemen's northern border and Saudi's southern border. Since their primitive rockets cannot down the very advanced Saudi warplanes, they will aim them at the Saudi border villages and cities and 'down' ground troops instead. And this is what has been happening.

A ground war is what the Houthis and their ally former president Saleh are good at; at least they can stand their ground in such a conflict. After all, they do not have much to lose. Sa'da – their city or, rather, their capital – has been totally destroyed, as has its neighboring city 'Omran, together with the entire Yemeni infrastructure, including football stadiums that had allegedly been turned into arms depots.

The debate in Houthi circles now is over two main points: Should they continue their shelling of Saudi towns and cities with Katyusha and Grad rockets, or should they resort to their longer-range and more destructive Scud missiles? And how would the Saudis react if they were to resort to the latter? And there is another related point: Would it be useful to infiltrate deep into Saudi territories and occupy villages and cities, as ISIS is doing in Iraq and Syria despite the American aerial bombardment? And how would Saudi Arabia react in that case?

We do not know what these debates may produce or what the Houthis and their allies' final decision may look like. But what we do know is that the ground war of attrition along the Saudi/Yemeni borders will escalate, as will the number of people killed on both sides.

"And we also know that the generous, patient, and chivalrous Yemeni nation no longer has any option other than to die from the bombardment, or from starvation – or both," concludes the editorial.

End…

 

LOW EXPECTATIONS: "From the very beginning, we did not expect much from the Geneva Yemen conference held under the UN's sponsorship and at its general-secretary's insistence," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The meeting was restricted to the Yemeni forces struggling for power, while the representatives of the concerned states sat outside the meeting hall.  The opposition – specifically the Houthi rebels and the supporters of deposed president Ali Saleh – viewed the meeting as an opportunity to secure international recognition as legitimate parties. As for the legitimate [Hadi] Yemeni government, it found it had to appease the UN because it will be in dire need of it later.

But Geneva does not influence Sana'a. It will not stem the Yemeni state's collapse. This fragmentation, which is the result of the multiplicity of forces and the conflict among them, as well as the political vacuum and absence of a central government on the ground, will push the country towards a Somali-like situation: A civil war against the background of conflict between foreign powers.

The Somali war began in 1991 and it rages still. Neighboring countries have joined it, and the U.S. sent its forces, but the result was not decided. Finally, all parties abandoned it, and no one cares much about it anymore except Somalia's people who are being scorched by the fire of war on a daily basis.

Yemen will only slide towards the worst if the forces fighting it out do not accept a political solution that brings them together in a single system with equal rights. This is the same Gulf/European proposal that the Yemenis accepted three years ago, and that the Houthis later turned against incited by Iran. Despite the fighting we are witnessing today, there are many forces in Yemen and most have not committed to the battle in force, while some have not joined in at all.

There are separatist Southern Yemeni forces, and other Southern Yemeni forces that are opposed to them. There are tribal Northern Yemeni forces. And then there is al-Qa'ida, of course, which lies in wait and will try to capture areas on which it can establish its rule – as its sister organization ISIS has done in Syria and Iraq. And this is all in addition to the three main forces fighting it out – the Houthis, Saleh, and the legitimate government.

The Houthis and Saleh alike will lose the chance to rule Yemen as a result of the ongoing fighting. But each party will initially believe that it has won simply because it has denied the other party the chance of ruling. The Houthis in particular had privileges in the previous government – before the coup. They had influence that far exceeded their political weight. But their part in the coup game and their greed for power have ruined that dish for them.

No one gains in this chaos. With the passage of time, and if the Yemeni parties fail to reach an agreement, the Yemeni conflict will turn into a forgotten war, as is the case in Somalia.

It is a great lie to delude the Yemenis into believing that the world is concerned about them and wishes to find a peaceful solution for their problem. The region is rife with crises and fires. It is also a great delusion for anyone to believe that the various parties – Iranians, Russians, or Westerners – will continue to back Yemen forever. If the crisis lasts for a year or two or more, the Yemenis will discover that everyone has turned their attention to other issues, and that even the UN secretary-general and his envoy will no longer respond to their phone calls. This is what the Somalis have come to realize in their endless quarter-of-a-century-long war.

We address all of Yemen's various leaders, legitimate and rebellious and beseech them to think of the day after today. We warn them against the threat of a permanent slide and call upon them to seek a political solution that brings them together within a system that is viable and sustainable.

"Apart from that, it would be difficult to repair a relationship that is akin to a glass pane that has been shattered," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

2-Riyadh opens up to the Brotherhood

 

Riyadh has moved towards reconciling with the Muslim Brotherhood as part of its new regional policy, the main problem stems from the continuing antagonism between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime, says Mohammad Yaghi in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

One of the most important policy changes in Saudi Arabia under the new monarch has been its openness to the Muslim Brotherhood and its attempt to unite all 'Sunni' forces in a battle against Iran, argues a Palestinian commentator. The main obstacle to this policy remains Egypt, more specifically, the person of Egyptian President Sissi.

 

UNWISE DECISION: "There has been a new development in Saudi Arabia's policy since the death of King 'Abdullah," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Unlike his predecessor, the new King, Salman, believes that the decision to 'crush' the Muslim Brotherhood that was taken after the [2013] coup against Egyptian president Mursi was not a wise one. Classifying the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in Egypt, marginalizing the [Muslim Brotherhood] Islah Party's role in President Hadi's Yemeni government, classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization, hostility towards Libya's Brotherhood – all these have only promoted Iran's interests in the region, in the view of the new Saudi administration.

Hamas's military wing, for example, expressed its deep gratitude for the Iranian aid it received that allowed it to stand its ground in the face of Israel’s assaults on Gaza. Weakening the Yemeni Islah Party enabled the [Houthi] Ansarullah, who are Iran's allies, to extend their control over most of the country. The only reason that Egypt and Libya's Brotherhood did not turn to Iran was because Qatar continues to help them. Escalating the disagreement with Qatar over this issue, and forcing it to abandon the Brotherhood could drive the Libyan Brotherhood into Imam Khamenei’s lap in the absence of a state that 'finances' them and provides them with the 'media support' that embraces their cause.

The attempt to crush the Brotherhood under the late Saudi king also complicated the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari alliance in Syria. On one side, Turkey and Qatar want the Brotherhood's military wings to play the most prominent role in the confrontation with the Syrian regime. The two countries hope to domesticate the Qa'ida-affiliated Nusra Front so as to work closely with the armed Brotherhood factions in Syria. The decision to crush the Brotherhood led Turkey and Qatar to be more hesitant about coordinating their positions and policies with Saudi Arabia over the Syrian file. This was evident from the conflict between the two camps over the presidency of the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and its government in exile.

The new Saudi king has adopted a more astute line: Why should we be hostile towards the Brotherhood and drive them into the enemies' lap if it is possible to tame them and involve them in the battle against Iran on the Kingdom's side?

The whole thing began with an article in [Saudi-owned] al-Hayat on March 7th 2015 by Jamal Khashogji, who is close to Saudi Arabia’s decision-making circles. He wrote: 'Dragging the Brotherhood factor into the plans for confronting the setbacks of the last two years only made the situation worse. Those who insisted on excluding them from the formulae to bring about change foiled Saudi/Turkish cooperation, which is the only form of cooperation that can end the setbacks in light of the two countries' stability and strength. And the worsening situation in Libya, Yemen, and Syria has also ended up threatening stability in other countries.'

This article, that hinted at changes in Saudi policy, was followed by [Saudi] pressure on Egypt in two directions: Towards reconciliation with the Brotherhood, and reconciliation with Hamas. These pressures have now apparently borne fruit after the Egyptian judiciary has dropped the charges of terrorism against Hamas and in the partial reopening of the Rafah crossing, and the restoration of security coordination between Hamas and Egyptian intelligence.

Parallel to this, Qatar and Turkey have been exerting intensive efforts to secure a 'long-term' truce between Hamas and the occupation state [Israel] in return for allowing reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and ending the siege imposed on it. The aim is to push Gaza out of the limelight and focus on the conflict with Iran, removing any 'effective Sunni factor' from the scene that could obstruct the conflict with Iran under the cover of resisting the [Israeli] occupation.

As for the first issue [reconciliation between Egypt and the Brotherhood], which is the more important one, it remains unclear whether there has been any breakthrough so far. What is clear, however, is that Saudi Arabia wants this file to be closed at any price and in any way possible. It is even ready to back Turkey’s position on this issue in particular, given the country’s long borders with Syria and its wide-ranging relations with the Brotherhood, the Nusra Front, and even ISIS. Turkey represents Saudi Arabia's most important gateway for influencing the Syrian file, and hence the conflict with Iran.

There are two problems with this issue:

- The first has to do with the ruling Egyptian regime, which has based its entire legitimacy on toppling the Brotherhood's rule, and has subsequently demonized and legally excluded them from political life, accusing them of terrorism. It is therefore difficult for the Egyptian regime to simply cancel out the most important pillar of its legitimacy via reconciliation with the Brotherhood, unless the latter accept the results of the July 2013 events – i.e., all the consequences of ending Mursi's rule. In other words, the Brotherhood will have to accept Mursi's overthrow, the new president’s [Sissi’s] legitimacy and the new constitution, and agree to take their conflict with the regime back to parliament by being allocated only a specific number of ineffective seats there.

In fact, the Egyptian judiciary’s policy of passing collective death sentences against hundreds of leading Brotherhood figures and members is meant to force the Brotherhood to accept the preconditions for reconciliation as the new Egyptian regime views them. Some of these sentences may actually be carried out so as to ensure that the Brotherhood’s leaders believe that the regime is serious about its demands.

- The second problem has to do with the Brotherhood itself. It is difficult for the Brotherhood – now that it has its own 'Karbala' in [Cairo’s] Rabi'a Square where hundreds, maybe even thousands, of its members were killed to accept reconciliation with the Egyptian regime as long as Sissi remains president. After the 2013 coup, the Brotherhood based its policy on Sissi’s illegitimacy by insisting that Mursi was the legitimate president, and that the path to achieve the aim of upholding this legitimacy was to continue to stage and escalate their popular protests. To accept reconciliation with the present regime would be tantamount to suicide for the Brotherhood, leading to its fragmentation and break up. Some of these breakaway groups will take their cause away from politics; some will find what they are seeking in ISIS's state and the Nusra Front; some will persist with the Brotherhood's current policies; and some may accept reconciliation with the regime.

The important thing is that the Brotherhood will end in its current form, along with its popular base, and its future prospects. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that its leadership would accept reconciliation with the current regime in such circumstances.

The solution to the problem of domesticating the Brotherhood via the gateway of reconciliation has apparently been created – always in Qatar and Turkey – by the letter sent by the Brotherhood's international organization's member Yusif Nadda. Earlier this month, he delivered a message to 'the sincere soldiers in the Egyptian army' in which he said: "If there are those among you who wish to rearrange the cards and comply with this nation's rights and interests, there is no legitimacy that can obstruct or oppose this. There must be many ways of upholding legitimacy that differ from the ways used in other periods.' And he concluded with a verse from the Qur'an saying that 'if they veer towards peace, you also veer towards it and rely on God.'

The essential point in Nadda's message was clear: The army can replace Sissi, after which there will be no problem as to who will rule Egypt or for reconciliation. So, the Brotherhood's leaders and their allies have found what they have been seeking: The problem is not with the Egyptian state, its army, its judiciary, and its institutions. The problem is with Sissi personally. Let the army remove Sissi away from the scene, and it would be possible to fulfill King Salman's desire to end the struggle for power in Egypt, allowing everyone to focus on Iran.

This proposal definitely has its own problems, most importantly, whether there is anyone among the Egyptian army's senior officers who is willing and able to do what Nadda is urging them to do. The second problem, is that a broad section of young Brotherhood members are opposed to reconciliation and view their conflict as one with the entire regime, not just with Sissi personally. In other words, even if Nadda and those who asked him to write his letter do get what they want, the threats of a splits within the Brotherhood’s ranks would remain highly probable.

But the most important thing about Nadda's letter in fact is not its content, but its implications. The Brotherhood’s historic and traditional figures have been open to bending with the wind. They believe that it is this in particular that that has allowed them to survive and expand over tens of years, and that abandoning this policy was what led them to their current situation.

The statements by Hammam Sa'id, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Sheikh Rashed al-Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, may suggest a readiness to compromise. Said blessed [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen and asked Saudi Arabia to extend the ‘Storm’ to Syria, while Ghannouchi expressed his readiness to mediate in favor of reconciliation in Egypt on the grounds that no force should be excluded from participation in government.

"In short, King Salman's policy of pulling all the strings and knotting them together so as to deal with the confrontation with Iran is falling on Brotherhood ears that are both heeding him and supporting his calls. But the events of Rabi'a Square and their consequences remain an obstacle, adding the Egyptian string to this bundle," concludes Yaghi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Israel’s Druze dilemma

 

Israel is facing a difficult choice between supporting its Druze citizens or maintaining its policy towards the Syrian opposition; it is most likely to opt for the latter, says Randa Haidar in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Israel's policy in the Syrian Golan Heights is confronting an apparent dilemma, maintains a Lebanese commentator on Israeli affairs. It must either continue with its aid and backing for the extremist Islamist organizations fighting against Assad and Hizbollah's forces, or comply with its Druze citizens' demands to put an end to this aid. It is clear, however, that Israel will opt for the former.

 

WHAT IS THE TRUTH?: "What is the truth about the Israeli role in the conflict raging in the Golan Heights?" asks Randa Haidar in Friday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

To answer this question, we need to view the matter from the perspective of Israeli security interests and the threats they may face in the short- and long-terms.

From this perspective, and after the collapse of the Syrian army, the breakdown of the central state and its shrinking control over its part of the Golan Heights that is now confined to a pocket linking the Heights to Damascus, the immediate danger facing Israel from this area today stems primarily from Hizbollah and its fighters who have been deployed in those areas that are still loyal to Assad's regime. Backed by the Iranians, the party has been trying to establish a military infrastructure similar to that in place in South Lebanon, and to link the Syrian Golan front to the southern Lebanese front.

Based on this assumption, Israel has adopted a policy that is intended to foil this effort, whether by carrying out localized assassinations – as happened earlier this year with the assassination of [Hizbollah military commander] Jihad Mughniyeh along with some other senior officials and a number of Iranian officers, or by establishing channels of communication with the moderate parties of the Syrian opposition that are fighting Assad and Hizbollah in the Golan by offering them humanitarian and medical aid.

As for the long-term threat that lies in wait for Israel, it stems from the extremist jihadi organizations such as ISIS and the Nusra Front, both of which now control wide areas of the Heights on the Syrian side, and both of which are now close to the border fence.

From Israel's perspective, a policy of building bridges to these organizations via friendly local Syrian parties should be sufficient to contain them for the moment, and to exploit the conflict now raging between them and Assad and Hizbollah's forces so as to promote its interests. This is despite Israel's conviction that these jihadi organizations will turn their guns towards it if they manage to control the entire Syrian Heights.

In light of this complex equation, Israel is managing the network of relations it has built with elements of the Syrian opposition that are no longer a secret to anyone. In doing so, it is trying to secure two objectives: To restrain its immediate enemy Hizbollah, and to contain its long-term enemies ISIS and the Nusra Front – all without becoming involved in the conflict in Syria.

However, the Israeli Druze community’s moves in solidarity with their brothers in Syria have confounded Israel's schemes. They have embarrassed it, provoked it, and confronted it with a difficult choice: Either to expresses solidarity with an important sector of its citizens; or to continue to offer aid to those whom the Druze in Israel view as their enemies so as to uphold its security interests.

"It is not difficult to know what Israel will choose. For no matter how important the 'alliance of blood' that ties it to its Druze community may be, it is not more important than its security interests," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

 

4-Turkey: the Kurdish factor

  

The debate over Syria dominates the deliberations over forming a new Turkish coalition, but perceptions of the ‘Kurdish threat’ could yet produce unlikely bedfellows, says Mohammad Noureddin in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Developments in Syria, especially in light of the Kurdish forces’ advances near the Turkish borders, are having a direct impact on the debate over forming a coalition government in Turkey, notes a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. Concern about an alleged 'Kurdish threat' could drive the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) into coalition with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which would inflict severe damage on the MHP's image with its own supporters.

 

INAGURATING A NEW PHASE: "This month’s elections in Turkey ended a phase and inaugurated a new one," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

The AKP failed to maintain its exclusive hold on power, and as a result, [President] Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to achieve his dream of changing the Turkish system from a parliamentary to presidential one. The focus has now shifted onto the likely form that a new coalition government may take.

From what the various parties have said, it is clear that the MHP rejects any form of cooperation with the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP); each of the two parties has eighty seats in parliament. The result is that opposition has no chance of forming a government coalition, whether the AKP joins it or not. Therefore, all eyes are currently focused on [AKP head and] PM-designate Ahmet Davutoglu to find out what form a coalition may take and the identity of the party that may form its basis.

But more important than all of this are the preconditions   necessary for any government coalition in light of the various parties’ declared positions. Right from the start, all the evidence suggested that any government headed by the AKP would be more harmonious if it included the MHP given the overlap between the two parties' popular bases, especially when it comes to their hard-line nationalist ideology. However, such a coalition must satisfy certain conditions, including the MHP’s demands to open up the [AKP government’s] corruption file, prevent Erdogan from intervening in the government's actions, and alter Turkey's policy towards Syria and the region.

Based on what the pro-AKP press is saying, a coalition with the Kurds or the [main opposition] Republican People's Party (CHP) is unlikely, and the more likely prospect is that of a coalition with the MHP. But the real reasons for this stem from the latest developments in the Kurdish question in Syria. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which supports the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), has succeeded in defeating ISIS in the town of Tal Abyad. The PYD now controls a border strip with Turkey that is more than 400 kms long. This has led one of the pro-AKP newspapers to declare in its main headline: ‘Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) Much More Dangerous Than ISIS’. The manner in which the parties to the conflict in Syria are viewed has changed radically. ISIS is now seen as less threatening than the Kurds. And this is leading to changes at the heart of the domestic debate in Turkey, at least within the AKP.

The pro-AKP media is waging a war in which it is exerting enormous indirect pressure on the MHP. Before the last parliamentary elections, AKP officials and papers spoke of a Western conspiracy intended to topple the party in order to alter the region's map, isolating Turkey and imprisoning it inside Anatolia. One of this conspiracy’s tools was to change the demographic identity of northern Syria by establishing a Kurdish zone along the borders with Turkey. But the fact of the matter is that this area has always had a Kurdish majority, especially in the area along the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey.

The AKP describes the PYD as a terrorist organization, similar to the PKK. And just as Erdogan refuses to find a radical solution for the problem of Turkey's Kurds and continues to manipulate their cause, he is opposed to any form of self-rule for Syria's Kurds. Erdogan and Davutoglu are pulling the strings of a tribalist Turkish national identity, exaggerating the threat of Kurdish national identity. Their aim is not only to forestall 'the Kurdish threat' and its border strip; it is also, and more importantly, to remain in power, even as partner to another party. In this way, they can block the corruption files from being opened and prolong the AKP's life, allowing it to benefit from the advantages of being in power, in preparation for early elections that they believe bear the hope that the party would return to power alone, even if held one year from now. And the fact is that the MHP's nationalist fanaticism may drive it into the AKP's trap, especially if it offered major portfolios, such as foreign affairs and the economy.

There is no doubt that this will confront the MHP with challenges that far outstrip those posed by the alleged 'Kurdish threat'. These challenges will undermine the party’s credibility and promises, on the basis of which the voters have granted it their vote – namely, in protest against the AKP's policies. And this will have negative impact on the MHP image after the first post-election hurdle is addressed.

Be that as it may, such a coalition will not protect Turkey against the Kurdish threat in Syria. It will not resolve the Kurdish problem in Turkey; in fact, contrary to common belief, it will only exacerbate that problem and take it to more serious levels, especially if nationalist extremism and folly will drive matters towards a major clash.

"In light of the madness that the Middle East has witnessed for more than four years, one cannot dismiss this as mere exaggeration," concludes Noureddin

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Back to Iran

 

Israel Hayom leads it weekend edition with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's latest warning about the nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers. Speaking at a passing out ceremony for new pilots, the prime minister said that the Air Force would be at the forefront of safeguarding the Jewish state. 'Foremost among the threats endangering our security is the Iranian effort to arm itself with a nuclear weapon,' a statement from Netanyahu's office quoted him as telling newly-graduated pilots receiving their wings. 'Whatever may be, Israel will always defend itself and in that, the part of the air force is a major one,' he said.

Haaretz described Netanyahu's remarks as 'an implied threat to bomb Iran,' as the June 30 deadline for a nuclear deal looms. 'This agreement is fundamentally damaged,' Netanyahu said in Hebrew. 'It leaves in Iran's hands the path to achieve a nuclear arsenal within a decade.'

The Jerusalem Post leads with news that, after six months of government-corporate disputes that have stymied the natural-gas sector, the security cabinet voted unanimously on Thursday to deem development of the resource an issue of national security. This means that a compromise outline among government officials and the natural gas companies will be conveyed to the full cabinet for final government approval. For the security cabinet decision to act, the government invoked for the first time in the state’s history the Antitrust Law’s Article 52, under which the antitrust commissioner can be prevented from interfering in a 'restrictive agreement' due to reasons of foreign policy or state security.

Haaretz also has a gas-related lead story: according to investigative reporter Uri Blau, Sheldon Adelson – the casino tycoon, Republican mega-donor and staunch Netanyahu supporter – sent the prime minister a letter at the height of last summer's Gaza war, in which he urged, on behalf of a group known as the U.S.-Israel Business Initiative, the government to streamline gas regulations. One of the members of the USIBI is Noble Energy, which has a vested interest in the outcome of the ongoing debate in Israel over how to divvy up revenue from the gas reserves.

In other news, all the papers report that the Palestinian Authority presented the International Criminal Court on Thursday with its first documents claiming Israeli crimes under international law in regards to settlement construction, Israel's policy in the Gaza Strip, and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, while the information presented by PA representatives does not constitute an official complaint against Israel, the Palestinians hope that the documents will convince ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda to open an investigation against the Jewish state.

Foreign Minister Spokesperson Emmanuel Nahshon responded to the step by the Palestinians saying, 'This step is nothing more than provocation and manipulation of the court in the Hague. We hope that the attorney won't fall for this trap.' Yisrael Beiteinu chairman and former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, meanwhile, called for a 'diplomatic war' against Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas.

Lieberman called the Palestinians' ICC move 'additional proof, to those who still needed it, that Abbas is not a partner and isn't interested in a peace deal with Israel but rather in clashes and an attempt to force a unilateral agreement via diplomatic terror. Everyone who insists on closing their eyes should open them and understand that as long as Abbas is the leader of the Palestinians there's no chance for an improvement in relations between Israel and the Palestinians,' he added. He called on Israel to treat Abbas as an enemy, and 'to respond with intense diplomatic warfare on all the diplomatic fronts.'

The White House described Palestinian efforts to have Israel charged with war crimes at the International Criminal Court as 'counterproductive' and vowed that they would be opposed by Washington. The United States has 'made clear that we oppose actions against Israel at the ICC,' National Security Council spokesman Alistair Baskey said. 'We do not believe the Palestinians are eligible to accede to the Rome Statute and join the International Criminal Court.'

Finally, elsewhere on the Palestinian front, a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip set sail from Crete overnight Thursday, the Palestinian news agency Ma'an reported. On board the Swedish 'Marianne av Göteborg' boat are Joint Arab List MK Basel Ghattas and former Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, alongside 70 other activists and crew. The flotilla is due to arrive in Gaza on Sunday or Monday, but it seems unlikely Israel will allow it to reach the Gaza coast.

 

 

NOTHING HAPPENING: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's talk about bringing the Labor Party into his coalition is as realistic as his talk of advancing the two-state solution.

"According to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Isaac Herzog will finally agree to bring the Labor Party into the coalition during the Knesset's summer recess. Netanyahu has said as much to Moshe Kahlon and Aryeh Dery, both of whom feel uncomfortable with his 61-member narrow coalition. He has also told foreign visitors the same thing. It will happen, he believes, even before his government has to pass next year's budget; in fact, he thinks that it will happen before the next gathering of the United Nations Security Council in September, at which the Palestinian issue is due to be discussed at exhausting length. Israel, he hopes, will be represented at those discussions by a broad, pragmatic government – a government that represents the national consensus.

When one of those foreign leaders asked him what he would be willing to give in order to lure Labor into the government, he replied that he would be willing to renegotiate his coalition's operational guidelines. He would explicitly commit to the two-state solution. That, according to Netanyahu, will be enough for Herzog; in fact, he might even settle for less. The prime minister believes that Herzog is desperate to join the government. If he remains in opposition, he will be eaten alive by members of his party. There's even a chance that Yair Lapid and Shelly Yachimovich could be persuaded to join the coalition. After all, Netanyahu says, I am on excellent terms with everyone.

Netanyahu is also certain that Bennett won't bolt the coalition. After all, what could he possibly stand to gain from doing so? Habayit Hayehudi can live with the new coalition guidelines. And if not, Netanyahu will not impose the coalition whip; they can vote against the government if they want. On matters relating to the settlement enterprise, they can vote against him. Even without them, Netanyahu believes that he would have a majority to push through any deal with the Palestinians.

Ministerial portfolios will also not be a problem. Herzog would make an excellent foreign minister; maybe even defense minister. A senior position in the cabinet would be a major step for him. And Netanyahu knows exactly how to handle his own Likud lawmakers. None of them would dare to rise up against him. After the last election, the prime minister knows that 'Je suis le Likud.'

The only thing that's not on the table in negotiations with Herzog is a power-sharing deal, whereby the Labor leader would take over as prime minister during the last portion of Netanyahu's tenure. Netanyahu is adamant that Israel has only one prime minister – period. He's not willing to open that can of worms under any circumstances.

When Netanyahu says these things, he sounds forceful, convincing and convinced. Whomever he is talking to gets the impression that he is being let in on a great secret and that he's being given a glimpse of a historic political move. There's just one problem: for the time being, Netanyahu's rhetoric is totally disconnected from reality. Netanyahu is bringing Labor into his government in exactly the same way that he is advancing the two-state solution. It's just an attempt to make certain people happy, but it isn't really happening.

In the meantime, Netanyahu is using Herzog to fan the flames. He is fanning the flames within his own coalition, with his Likud ministers and with foreign leaders. Herzog, of course, denies everything: there's no deal. He insists. There isn't even any talk. But members of the Labor Party still believe Netanyahu over their own leader.

While it is true that the coalition has just 61 members, it is not true that there are 59 lawmakers in the opposition. Avigdor Lieberman has convinced himself that the government will fall during the course of the summer, so he has no choice but to position himself on the right of the political map. He refuses to cooperate with the Arab parties in the Knesset. The Arabs themselves, meanwhile, are split into two factions, which are at each other’s throats the whole time. Lapid and Herzog attack each other, as both of their parties try to shake off their image of being too left wing. This week, the opposition parties found one issue that they could unite over: the demand to establish a state commission of inquiry into the government's handling of the protests by Israelis of Ethiopian descent. Their proposal was rejected by two votes, after Sharon Gal – a member of Yisrael Beiteinu – decided to support the government. And that, in a nutshell, is exactly the problem that the opposition will face in the coming four years."

Ends…

 

FRENCH DREAM, ISRAELI NIGHTMARE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Shlomo Cesana says that, as far as the Europeans are concerned, Israel is the stronger side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, as such, it should make all of the necessary concessions.

"Before he formed his fourth government, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that he did not believe that an agreement would be possible with the Palestinians during his tenure. Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon went even further, saying that there would be no peace in this generation. But if you ask French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, he'll tell you that Israel and the Palestinian Authority are well on the way to an agreement. Fabius is the architect of the French initiative, according to which negotiations between Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas will resume and will be given an 18-month framework for finalizing a deal. At the end of that period, according to the French plan, the United Nations Security Council will officially recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Fabius visited Jerusalem this week, and spoke with the prime minister. During a conversation with reporters, he made several comments that stepped outside the bounds of normal diplomatic behavior. 'I have spoken with Abu Mazin,' he said, 'and he has agreed to resume negotiations. I also spoke to Netanyahu and he also – believe it or not – told me Yes.' In this one sentence, Fabius encapsulated the whole of the European approach to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process: they believe that the solution to the conflict is in Israel's hands, since Israel is the stronger side and Israel can end the conflict by simply conceding to all of the Palestinians' demands.

At the same time, Fabius said that he does not see himself as some quixotic figure; if the sides don't want to resume negotiations, he said, France would not force either side to do anything. As far as Israel is concerned, Fabius' plan is a disaster. Jerusalem does not want to internationalize the conflict and certainly does not want to set a rigid timetable.

'Last year, the Palestinians slammed the door on Secretary Kerry’s framework for negotiations,' Netanyahu told his French guest. 'They slammed the door on Prime Minister Barak. They slammed the door on Prime Minister Sharon. They slammed the door on Prime Minister Olmert. They slammed the door on me.'

Netanyahu's fourth term of office has been characterized, thus far, by efforts to describe the situation as it really is – and to pull no punches in telling foreign leaders exactly where Israel stands. 'Six years ago at Bar Ilan,' Netanyahu continued, 'I spoke about my vision of a demilitarized Palestinian state which would recognize the right of the Jewish state to exist. It is inconceivable that, while the Palestinians expect us to recognize their national homeland, they refuse to grant us the same right – recognition of Israel and the national homeland of the Jewish people. As long as no one can provide me with a guarantee that the territories from which Israel withdraws are not overrun by Iran or ISIS, any attempts to make peace will fail,' he concluded."

Ends…

 

IRAN'S INTENTIONS ARE CLEAR: Writing on the News 1 website, Ami Dor-On says that it should be crystal clear what Iran's intentions are – both in terms of the nuclear negotiations with the six world powers and in terms of attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip.

"Anyone who was hoping that we were on the verge of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers got a lesson this week in the Islamic Republic's negotiating tactics. Spiritual leader Ali Khamenei gave an address to Iranian radio ahead of the deadline for reaching an agreement, and said that his policy was simple: No, no, no. Iran, Khamenei said, would never agree to suspend its nuclear program – even temporarily. The United States, he argues, wants to destroy his country's nuclear capabilities – and he will never let that happen.

Khamenei explicitly declared that, 'Unlike the insistence from the Americans, we do not accept long-term limitations of 10, 12 years, and we told them how many years [of] limitations we are ready to accept'. He also said that 'inspection of our military sites is out of the question and is one of our red lines'. He also said that, 'All financial and economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. Congress or the U.S. government should be lifted immediately when we sign a nuclear agreement.' Finally, the Supreme Leader insisted that Iran would not allow inspection of Iran's military facilities. That, he insisted, 'is out of the question and is one of our red lines.'

What message, then, was Khamenei seeking to relay to the international community? The unequivocal warning that he issues is that, even if a nuclear agreement is signed some time with the G5+1 group, it is far from certain that it will ever be implemented. The fact is that everything that Iran is doing on the regional and global stage points to a completely different trend. Iran is not looking for peace; it wants war and bloodshed. Like molten lava before an eruption, Iran continues to encourage and support Palestinian terror organizations' plans for an all-out war aimed at destroying the Jewish state.

Under the camouflage of 'humanitarian aid,' Iran is funding and dispatching delegations of Islamic organizations to the Gaza Strip, ostensibly carrying food and medicine for the many needy people there. The Egyptian army, which is nominally responsible for monitoring the southern borders of the Gaza Strip, does not bother to examine the shipments arriving from Iran; after all, if it says 'Humanitarian aid' on the containers, then that must be what's inside. In practice, these shipments contain advanced weapons and ammunition, explosives, and antitank and antiaircraft missiles. Slowly but surely, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai are becoming one massive Iranian arsenal. And these weapons have only one purpose: to destroy the Zionist entity.

But it's not just arms and ammunition that are pouring into Gaza. Iran – which acts as the Islamic world's main terrorist banker – is smuggling experts in terrorism, explosives, rockets and tunnels into Gaza. These experts are described officially as teachers, nurses, physicians and agricultural advisers. Iran has been praised for the efforts it appears to be making in Gaza and its purported attempts to 'restore some level of basic human existence to the Gaza Strip.' As always, however, the world does not know – or does it want to know – the truth. The truth is that Gaza is slowly becoming the southern equivalent of Hizbollah's buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. It is a strip of land that is supported, funded and operated by Iran – which is rapidly approaching the point where it is a nuclear-capable nation.

At this stage, with the nuclear horses already having bolted the stable, despite the fact that negotiations have not reached an end, Israel's position is one of a 'balance of terror' – and that's not good for us. If Israeli communities close to Gaza come under attack, Jerusalem would seek to respond by sending its armored forces back into the Strip, in an attempt to eradicate once and for all the threat posed by missiles. If that were to happen, Hamas – after coordinating with Iran – would warn Israel that, if the IDF does not withdraw immediately, it will launch attacks on the center of the country, using rockets that would make last summer's war look like a picnic in comparison.

Anyone who believes that Iran is interested in committing to any kind of agreement over its nuclear program simply doesn't understand that, from an Iranian point of view, any agreement would obligate only the other side. Khamenei’s crystal clear comments on this matter leave no room for doubt."

Ends…

 

OREN RESPONDS: In Israel Hayom, former Israeli ambassador to the United States Michael Oren, tells interviewer Shlomo Cesana that the Obama Administration is not necessarily bad for Israel, but that it poses many challenges to the strategic relationship between the two countries.

"Dr. Michael Oren – Israel's former ambassador to the United States and now a Knesset member in the Kulanu Party – published a new book in the U.S. this week, and also managed to attract the kind of attention that most writers can only dream of.

Ahead of publication of his book – 'Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide' – Oren started with a series of articles and speeches, which piqued interest in his memoirs, covering his four years in Washington in general and relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in particular. The article that Oren wrote in the Wall Street Journal, in which he accused Obama of deliberately turning his back on Israel, raised the hackles of White House officials and American diplomats in Tel Aviv – especially Ambassador Dan Shapiro, who accused Oren of lying and described his book as fiction.

Oren spent the last week in New York, but he took time out of his book promotion duties to give Israel Hayom a telephone interview, in which he explained that he saw writing his book as a mission. 'My book is very balanced and very fair,' he told me.

Why do you think you have come under attack?

'I obviously touched on a raw nerve. I presented the truth and the truth isn't easy to swallow. But what choice do we have? We have to deal with the truth. People say that I didn't tell the truth in my book – but it's undeniably true that the United States conducted secret negotiations with Iran for seven months without informing Israel. There are some things that they cannot deny.'

You have said that the timing of your book's publication was aimed at provoking public discourse about the Iranian nuclear deal. How can that help thwart a bad deal with the Islamic Republic?

'We can start to discuss the nature of the agreement and what led to it. There are some here who believe that it all started with the prime minister's speech to Congress. That's patently wrong. There are deep roots behind the situation we currently find ourselves in.

But in order to move forward, we have to understand the past. In my book, I examined the situation and I kept on returning to Obama's Cairo speech. That was the first indication that he planned on reaching some kind of deal with Iran. In that speech, he said that Iran has the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. No previous American president had said anything like that before. It was revolutionary.'

So the bottom line is that Obama is a bad president and a major problem for Israel?

'In Israel, people only hear about the criticism from the left, not the criticism from the right. In the United States, there are those who believe I am too complimentary to Obama. I write very clearly that I do not see him as anti-Israeli. He helped us in critical hours. Take the Carmel Forest fire, for example. There's a very moving section of my book when I describe how he helped us then. But…'

But on critical issues he's on our enemies' side?

'Wait – I want to complete my sentence. Obama is a president with a very different worldview to what we are used to. We never have had to deal with a president with a worldview like his. It is a worldview that challenges the government of Israel. It would even challenge a center-left government; on the Iranian issue as well as the Palestinian issue.

The Obama Administration does not differentiate between some minor construction work in Gilo and a new neighborhood in a West Bank settlement. It's true that the personal chemistry between Obama and Netanyahu did not contribute to relations, but people often forget that Israeli and American leaders haven't always slept in a bed of roses. But the alliance between the two countries remains strong, serious and real. It is an alliance between nations, not just between leaders. But it is a challenge.'

You haven't said whether you think the Obama Administration is bad for Israel.

'It's a challenge. What is 'bad,' anyway? The Iranian issue is highly problematic. It's not a question of legacy and respect. It's a question of our future'."

Ends…

 

BARAK IS WAITING IN THE WINGS: Writing in Haaretz, Yoel Marcus says that, judging by a recent speech, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak is planning a political comeback – just don't expect to hear it from him.

"At the annual Herzliya Conference, when the great and good of politics, security and economics past and present come to state their views or personal philosophy, the most important thing for the cautious listener is to sit in the front row, as close as possible to the stage, so the speaker will see him and not say anything against him personally. In our little country, a guest or attendee would be advised to take a seat at the table; otherwise, he’s likely to find himself served up as the main course and eagerly devoured.

Ehud Barak’s meticulously composed speech at the conference two weeks ago had that election smell about it, even while the kingdom has yet to heal from the stresses of cobbling together a coalition and still teeters on the edge of a single Knesset vote. Although Barak has long-since realized his dream of becoming a millionaire, he’s worried about what’s going on in the country and where the present leadership is taking us.

'I have an interest in what’s happening here. I have children and grandchildren here,' he said, in a rare display of tenderness. Be assured, though, that sentimental thinking has never gotten in the way of his analytical mind, whose glorious reputation precedes it when it comes to pursuing convoluted and puzzling moves. When he served as defense minister in the Ehud Olmert government, it took the signatures of 53 retired generals on a public petition to convince Olmert to appoint him to the coveted post.

As a civilian and millionaire, Barak’s appearance at the Herzliya Conference was brilliant, both in terms of the content and the timing. 'You could write a piece and call it ‘Return of the Pianist,’' another attendee whispered to me, hinting at the two grand pianos Barak had in his luxury digs. This was a speech designed to exude leadership, one that essentially boiled down to: 'If you call me, I will come.'

Indeed, this was perhaps the biggest takeaway from the speech: Barak wants to return. One of the people closest to him wondered after the speech, 'Is this talented-but-not-without-problems person on his way back into politics?' Barak will not confirm this, but from off-the-record conversations, it seems clear that if called upon, he would say yes. The same political insider also noted, 'Barak is the only one among us who has defeated Netanyahu.'

Barak himself clearly attached great weight to his Herzliya speech. Video copies were distributed to dozens of political and party figures. The general impression among those who received the copies was that he looked and sounded sharp and focused, and sure of himself. 'He won’t be beating himself up if he decides to return to the political arena,' goes the uncensored rumor. He’s already there, essentially. 'Barak’s always had a certain detachment and killer instinct,' added the same close associate. Asked if this means that Barak is officially returning to politics, his answer was, 'Everyone can think whatever he wants.' Will there be a situation soon where we’ll have to do so? 'Only time will tell.'

At 73, and making good money selling his strategic analyses to international companies – following the formula invented by Henry Kissinger after his retirement from government – Barak is still, in his own mind at least, at full strength and able to return to power. With whom? For what? That’s less important. What’s more important is that Barak sees a great opportunity for a comprehensive regional accord, an opportunity that only comes along once in a generation.

'For over four years I found myself warning, over and over again – in the cabinet, the security cabinet, the government and to the public – that a diplomatic tsunami is approaching,' stated Barak, implying just whom he thinks is the only one who can halt the slide down the slippery slope to a single binational state. It’s obvious what he’s aiming at. His appetite to be elected has returned. In his way, he’s revving his engines. Just as long as it doesn’t come straight from him."

Ends…

 

THE IRANIAN-AMERICAN NUCLEAR PROJECT: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick says that, to convince fence-sitting Democratic senators to vote against Obama’s Iran deal, Israel should expose all the details of the nuclear agreement and not worry about upsetting a president who has thrown us under the bus.

"Under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has implemented policies toward Iran that are catastrophic for Israel specifically, for U.S. Middle East allies more generally and for U.S. national security itself.

Consider, first, the known details of the soon-to-be-concluded nuclear deal. In an article published by The New York Times this week, Prof. Alan Kuperman explained that Obama’s central justification for the agreement – that it will lengthen Iran’s breakout time to the bomb from the current two months to 12 months – is a lie.  Based on nothing more than the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to possess and the amount of enriched uranium necessary to make a nuclear bomb, Kuperman demonstrated that far from prolonging Iran’s nuclear breakout time by 10 months, the deal will only prolong its breakout time by one month. In other words, the deal is worthless.

Because the U.S. agreed that Iran can continue to enrich uranium, perhaps the most critical means of preventing Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities involve requiring Iran to expose all of its previous nuclear work that is still unknown, and requiring Iran to agree to unfettered inspections of its nuclear work and access to its personnel involved in its nuclear work on the part of UN nuclear inspectors.

Clearly, without meeting both requirements, Iran will be able to breach its commitments easily and the agreement will be worthless. Due to the general understanding of these requirements, the administration’s public position has been that it will require Iran to both expose its previous nuclear work with possible military dimensions and permit the U.S. unfettered access to all its nuclear installations.

For its part, Iran refuses to accept either demand. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated this refusal on Tuesday. Rather than present Iran with an ultimatum that it either abide by these basic requirements or receive no nuclear deal, the administration abandoned its position. Last week, Secretary of State John Kerry insisted that there is no reason for Iran to expose its previous nuclear work because, 'We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in. What we’re concerned about is going forward.'

This statement is a lie. As Yukiya Amano, the head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog IAEA, reiterated just weeks ago, 'We don’t know whether they have undeclared activities or something else. We don’t know what they did in the past. So, we know a part of their activities, but we cannot [say] we know all their activities. And that is why we cannot say that all the activities in Iran [are for] peaceful purposes.'

Another key position that the Obama administration has staked out on behalf of the nuclear deal is that the sanctions that would be canceled under the deal are limited to those that were instituted in retaliation for Iran’s illicit nuclear program. The other sanctions, levied due to Iran’s illicit work on ballistic missiles, its support for terrorism and its human rights abuses, would remain intact. But, on June 10, AP reported that the administration intends to cancel both the nuclear-related sanctions and those imposed due to Iran’s illicit ballistic- missile development. As a consequence, tens of billions of dollars will become available for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Then, there are Iran’s repeated breaches of sanctions restrictions. Under the Iran-North Korea Sanctions Act of 2006, the State Department is supposed to submit a report of sanctions violations to Congress every six months. This week Al-Monitor reported that the General Accounting Office issued a report blasting the State Department for failing to uphold its legal commitment. The last report submitted was in 2014 and its reporting covered the period up to 2011. The previous report had been submitted nearly two years earlier.

The nature and scope of the Obama administration’s collusion with Iran require us to draw a number of conclusions. First, from an American perspective, under the Obama administration, the U.S. has destroyed its reputation as a responsible and trustworthy ally. It has endangered its allies, its armed forces and its own national security. The U.S. alliance system in the Middle East has collapsed.

In the short term, all that Congress can do to check Obama is reject his nuclear deal with Iran with a two thirds majority. Although the possibility that a sufficient number of Democratic senators will oppose the deal to override a presidential veto is remote, it is critical that every resource be used to convince them to do so.

In the medium term, in order to secure U.S. national security, the next president will have to cancel U.S. acceptance of the nuclear deal with Iran. To this end, U.S. Jewish groups and other organizations must demand that all presidential candidates – including Hillary Clinton – commit themselves to canceling the agreement in the event they are elected.

If the U.S. fails to reverse Obama’s policies toward Iran in the next two years, it is hard to see how it will be able to rebuild its strategic posture in the future. The pace of change in the region and the world is too rapid today to rely on past achievements as a basis for future power.

As for Israel, it is now clear that there is no 'crisis' in Israel-U.S. relations. The Obama administration is betraying Israel. The centerpiece of Obama’s foreign policy is his desire to transform Iran’s illicit nuclear program, which endangers Israel’s existence, into a legal Iranian-American nuclear program that endangers Israel’s existence.

Consequently, the last thing Israel should worry about is upsetting Obama. To convince fence-sitting Democratic senators to vote against Obama’s Iran deal, Israel should expose all the ruinous details of the nuclear agreement. Israel should let the American people know how the deal endangers not just Israel, but their soldiers, and indeed, the U.S. homeland itself. By doing so, Israel stands a chance of separating the issue of Democratic support for Obama from Democratic opposition to the nuclear deal. Obama wants this deal to be about himself. Israel needs to explain how it is about America.

At the end of the day, what we now know about U.S. collaboration with Iran brings home – yet again – the sad fact that the only chance Israel has ever had of preventing Iran from getting the bomb is to destroy the mullahs’ nuclear installations itself. If Israel can still conduct such an operation, it makes sense for it to be carried out before Iran’s nuclear program officially becomes the Iranian-American nuclear project."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 25.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS/EARLY ELECTIONS: Cengiz Candar puts Syria at center stage in centre-left Radikal: "Can a coalition, which will not accept to alter Turkey's Syria policy from top to bottom, be formed? Can the CHP [Republican People's Party] take part in such a coalition? Can the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] support it? If the AKP [Justice and Development Party] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] unite around the priority of 'opposing the Kurds in Syria', will they be able to rule Turkey despite the balance of power that was created by June 7th general elections? Unless these questions find their right answer, a permanent coalition cannot be formed."

Melih Asik argues that only one coalition option is possible in centrist Milliyet: "What kind of a compromise did the nation suggest with the election results? It is very clear: a compromise on a government in which the AKP does not take 60 percent. However, neither the CHP, nor the MHP are inclined towards such a partnership. Both party leaders did away with coalition alternatives without the AKP, even before the MPs took their oath. They prepared themselves for a coalition offer that would come from the AKP."

Mustafa Balbay notes a conflict between the president and the PM in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "With the new parliamentary era, Erdogan's dominance in the AKP has decreased. He still has some weight, of course, but the ease with which he could materialize the decisions he wants is no longer there. PM Davutoglu can rescue himself and his party from Erdogan’s tutelage and provide for the establishment of a new government. The climate being created by Erdogan and his close circle against Davutoglu’s approach is based on the following: The electorate is not happy with what is happening; the votes that left the AKP might return if there is an early election."

Writing in the same paper, Ahmet Tan looks at what may happen next: "The election of the parliamentary speaker represents the most important step for any coalition. It suggests that former CHP head Deniz Baykal and current head Kemal Kilicdaroglu are in a way uniting their fate. Baykal’s election would mean that Kilicdaroglu would be deputy prime minister of an AKP-CHP government. In this way, Kilicdaroglu's CHP leadership will also be consolidated. But what will the future of the country and his party be? The whole nation will have to wait and see."

Ali Yurttagul is disturbed by the prospect of an AKP/MHP coalition in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The parliamentary arithmetic and all the evidence show that we are moving towards an AKP-MHP coalition. With the MHP, democracy, freedom and the probability of returning to the EU track that symbolizes the AKP's rise, will be very difficult. Without moving forward on the Kurdish issue, which is the mother of the problems of democracy and freedom, it will not be easy to progress. It would be naive to expect a 'dialogue' on the Kurdish issue from an AKP-MHP coalition."

Halime Kokce sends a message to the opposition in centre-right, pro-government Star: "What is the AKP’s best option? There is no doubt that early elections serve it best. The opposition parties that sit at the table with their red lines regarding the effort to form a coalition should know that if a bargain were to be made, it is the AKP that holds the best card. That is to say that the AKP will gain most from an early election. Those who play hard to get, or who show disrespect for the president himself or his post as a matter of political posturing, should know that."

Abdulkadir Selvi bets on an AKP/CHP coalition in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "MHP leader Devlet Bahceli is trying to make it harder and CHP leader Kilicdaroglu is trying to make it easier to form a coalition with the AKP at every opportunity. A coalition with the CHP preserves its significance since it will be based on broad social grounds, might end the tension in society and is the preferred option of the business world. Having the Kurdish peace process on the table and avoiding the risk of losing the Kurdish votes are also among the pros of an AKP coalition with the CHP. Early elections are a distant possibility and a coalition is more probable." 

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan lambastes the U.S.: "The Supreme Leader's precise remarks in a meeting with senior government officials once again upset the American game in the negotiations. In a multi-layered strategy, the U.S. seeks to turn the strengths and capabilities of Iran into weakness. Contrary to some domestic optimism regarding a deal, the Americans are determined to secure great privileges at our expense. They hope to convey a message to those who have been inspired by Iran over the past three decades that Iran has now been defeated. Those who glorify the U.S. should explain how a country that downed an Iranian passenger plane in 1988 and imposed sanctions on the purchase and use of civilian planes can be the nation's friend?" 

Conservative Resalat insists that lines ought to be drawn: "In the nuclear negotiations, U.S. strategists, diplomats and politicians are taking strong positions against our country's red lines. The U.S. wants to expand the talks away from any rules and regulations so that any behaviour, conduct and strategy can be justified. Insistence on our red lines will lead to the demarcation of the negotiations and would neutralize the enemy's game. The secret of Iran's success in the talks has been our insistence on these red lines and the emphasis on a demarcated field." 

Conservative Hemayat knows how to get there: "Nobody has any doubt about how a good deal can be reached. Observing the red lines set by the Supreme Leader is the way to do this. On some occasions, sanctions have strengthened the foundations of the country and should be welcomed. Our objection is that some cruel sanctions have limited world access to our domestic markets. It is our right that sanctions be removed on the day of signing rather than during implementation. The negotiating team's role is sensitive, because we face an arrogant culture that has opposed the foundation of Islamic Iran from the beginning. Our team should not be deceived by the enemy's smiles and false promises." 

Moderate Iran calls on the Supreme Leader to be decisive: "The fact is that President Rowhani's administration has faced domestic opposition from the beginning in pursuing its policy of resolving nuclear disputes through negotiations. When Rowhani was attacked by radicals at the airport after his return from the New York UN trip in September 2013, it became clear that the important nuclear talks faced opposition from hidden layers of Iranian power structure. This needs to be decisively brought under control by the regime's top authority."

 

U.S. SPYING ON FRANCE: Conservative Khorasan is not surprised: "Despite the remarks by the French government, it is not so difficult to understand why spying is so prominent in a world ruled by the logic of the jungle. Is it not true that their principle of national interests stipulates that in foreign policy there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests'? A clearer explanation for this logic can be found in the wolf's behaviour in the jungle."

For hard-line Javan U.S. spying is normal: "The U.S. regards spying on other states - even on its closest allies - as its right. The documents show that America's spying does not have any connection to the fight against terrorism. American spies focused on issues such as the policies of French presidents towards the EU and the EU's financial crisis as well as the internal affairs of the union. WikiLeaks announced that it would release more documents. But, it is clear that releasing more documents will not bring a change in U.S. behaviour. This matter will eventually face a similar fate to that of U.S. eavesdropping on Angela Merkel's telephone conversations." 

 

VOLLEYBALL DIPLOMACY: Reformist Mardom Salari writes about the role of sports in support of diplomacy: "Statements and remarks by the U.S. volleyball team about their impressions in their trip to Iran can neutralize the political and media plots of our enemies. The concerns of those who traffic in sedition should be ignored and greater cooperation between Western civil societies and our own civil society should be encouraged, in order to use public diplomacy to support official diplomacy."

 

TURKEY/SYRIA: Reformist Sharq expects a less interventionist Turkish policy in Syria: "Turkey's policies in Syria, particularly support for ISIS terrorists played an important role in reducing the Justice and Development Party's share of the votes in the recent elections and its failure to win a majority of parliamentary seats. The turbulent situation in Turkey following the recent elections, and the entry of the Equality and Democracy Party (EDP) as the ally of the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] made circumstances inside Turkey more difficult for the ruling current. The EDP, together with other Turkish parties, is against the interventionist policies of the previous government in Syria."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 25.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Parallel alliances

2-Israel faces accountability

3-New tactics, new strategies

4-Erdogan’s inevitable meltdown

 

1-Parallel alliances

 

There is no doubt that the Saudi move to open up to other sources of armament away from the American monopoly on its arms purchases is both bold and brave. But at the same time, it is rife with danger if it paves the way for an outright divorce with the U.S. administration in the medium- and long-term. The arms race in the region has taken off sooner than all expectations, especially in its nuclear dimension. It is now clear that the Iranian/U.S. rapprochement is not only intended to ensure that Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain peaceful, but to establish a political, military, and security Iranian/U.S. alliance. This conclusion is justified by the growing Saudi 'panic' as reflected in its arms deals and parallel alliances with Russia and France, and perhaps with China as well--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

[After the Iran nuclear deal] strategic coordination and cooperation between the various elements of the Damascus/Baghdad/Tehran axis will be deepened in order to confront Western schemes, especially in the field of combating terrorism…a Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian meeting will soon be held in Baghdad with the object of 'strengthening cooperation between these states and paving the way for opportunities for joint action.' This tripartite meeting will also pave the way for attracting other Islamic states that are confronting this dangerous phenomenon via exchanging information and expertise based on Syria and Iraq’s successes in containing the terrorist expansion. And that means that most of the region's states will recognize the importance of what these two countries are doing to defeat extremist organizations such as ISIS, the Nusra Front, and other such groups that are posing an existential threat to many of them--Basimah Hamad in Syrian al-Watan

 

The Saudi deputy crown-prince’s visit to France and the arms deals he concluded there represent one of consequences of the imminent deal over Iran's nuclear program, argues the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily. Riyadh is diversifying its sources of armament, starting its own nuclear program with French help, and forging new alliances with Paris and Moscow away from its traditional reliance on Washington. One of the developments that will follow a deal on Iran's nuclear program is the emergence of a tripartite Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian alliance with a meeting to be held in Baghdad next week for this purpose, notes a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. The region seems on the verge of major settlements whose price will be paid by Riyadh and its allies.

 

SIGNS OF ‘STRATEGIC DIVORCE’: "The signs of a 'strategic divorce' between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have received further confirmation," writes Thursday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This can be gleaned from Wednesday's visit by Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman to Paris to attend a meeting of the joint Saudi/French Committee (the French side was headed by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius) to discuss economic and security cooperation between the two countries.

The young Saudi prince – whom some Arab and Western diplomatic circles see as most likely to be the next Saudi king because of the strong powers vested in him and the unlimited backing he receives from his father, the current Saudi monarch – arrived in Paris after visiting Moscow two weeks ago. That visit was said to have represented a strategic coup in Saudi/Russian relations because of the agreements it reached in nuclear, military, and oil sectors.

The new Saudi administration policy seems to be heading towards breaking the 'Anglo-Saxon' monopoly and opening the horizon up for a strategic alliance with other great powers, such as France and Russia. Prince Mohammad bin Salman appears to be the spearhead of this new Saudi policy.

It was worth noting that the first of the fruits of the Saudi prince's visit to Paris was an agreement whereby France would build two nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia. Other agreements included a Saudi purchase of 23 helicopters to the value of 500-million dollars, with other contracts worth over 12-billion dollars and 20 infrastructure projects to build railroad lines and in the field of solar energy, as well as updating the Saudi civilian air fleet with tens of French-made (Airbus) aircraft of various makes.

French President Francois Hollande, who received the Saudi guest in the Elysee Palace, succeeded in winning the Saudi leadership's minds and hearts when he took a firm 'hawkish' stance on the Syrian and Iranian files. Hollande still clings to the view that the Syrian regime’s fall is inevitable; and he insists on the need to subject Iranian military and civilian reactors and installations to strict inspections to prevent the production of any nuclear warheads.

President Hollande's attendance at the May consultative Gulf summit that was held in Riyadh was a clear sign of the Saudi/Gulf trend towards forging an alliance with France. That remarkable attendance was followed by Qatar's purchase of French Rafale fighter aircraft to the value of 15-billion dollars, with the UAE following suit.

The U.S. is certain to be monitoring these Saudi moves and understands the message that Saudi Arabia intends to send. The main question concerns how it will react. There are two basic explanations of these Saudi moves in the U.S. and other Western countries:

- The first explanation claims that Riyadh is angry at the U.S./Iranian rapprochement as manifest in the nuclear agreement that is expected to be signed by the end of this month. It has therefore decided to express its anger by opening up to France and Russia and dismantling its strategic alliance with Washington.

- The second explanation insists that Saudi Arabia continues to cling to its strategic alliance with the U.S., which is over 85 years old, and whose foundations were laid by late king 'Abdulaziz Al Saud the founder of the Kingdom in his famous meeting with U.S. President Roosevelt in 1945. This opening up to Russia and France is only by way of expressing anger or to remonstrate with, Saudi Arabia's 'first love.'

There is no doubt that the Saudi move to open up to other sources of armament away from the American monopoly on its arms purchases is both bold and brave. But at the same time, it is rife with danger if it paves the way for an outright divorce with the U.S. administration in the medium- and long-term.

The arms race in the region has taken off sooner than all expectations, especially in its nuclear dimension. It is now clear that the Iranian/U.S. rapprochement is not only intended to ensure that Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain peaceful, but to establish a political, military, and security Iranian/U.S. alliance.

"This conclusion is justified by evidence of a growing Saudi 'panic' as reflected in its arms deals and parallel alliances with Russia and France, and perhaps with China as well," concludes the editorial.

End…

 

‘IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT’: "[Iranian FM] Ali Akbar Velayati did not reveal the nature of the 'important' development that Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian relations will witness next week," writes Basimah Hamad in Thursday's semi-official Syrian daily al-Watan.

But it is clear that the advisor to the leader of the Islamic Revolution and one of the most prominent shapers of Iranian foreign policy is linking this step to the June 30th date of the expected international event of signing the final agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear file.

As negotiations between Iran and the international sextet approach their end, Tehran is likely to have become more decisive and effective in its choices than before. If an agreement is reached – and this is the most likely outcome – Tehran will be liberated from the financial sanctions, economic siege and the many political pressures that prevent it from fulfilling its regional role in the required manner. This will redraw the regional scene in the following manner:

-The extent of strategic coordination and cooperation between the various elements of the Damascus/Baghdad/Tehran axis will be deepened in order to confront Western schemes, especially in the field of combating terrorism. The latter is the West's savage tool meant to distort Islam's image and protect the Zionist entity; it is the gravest of all the current challenges.

It is worth noting in this regard that the Iranian Foreign Ministry has announced that a Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian meeting will soon be held in Baghdad with the object of 'strengthening cooperation between these states and paving the way for opportunities for joint action.' This tripartite meeting will also pave the way for attracting other Islamic states that are confronting this dangerous phenomenon via exchanging information and expertise based on Syria and Iraq’s successes in containing the terrorist expansion. And that means that most of the region's states will recognize the importance of what these two countries are doing to defeat extremist organizations such as ISIS, the Nusra Front, and other such groups that are posing an existential threat to many of them.

This will have positive political and security consequences for the overall situation in Syria, especially if it assumes diplomatic form. This is despite the attempt by the forces that support terrorism to obscure this fact by reviving their talk of the [Syrian] 'regime's fall', and the alleged negotiations with factions within the regime in preparation for a political solution that 'excludes President Assad'.

- The U.S. and Western rapprochement with Iran and Russia will cast its shadow over the international scene. The [Iran/Syria/ Hizbollah] resistance axis will be recognized as a deep-rooted force that cannot be ignored, and as a major partner in confronting terrorism, extremism, illegal immigration, smuggling archaeological relics and drugs, and organized crime.

- The 'international community' will also head towards holding the regimes that sponsor this cancerous growth accountable. This, at a time when the Saudi/Qatari/Turkish axis is facing further fragmentation, failure and isolation as a result of its accumulating erroneous calculations.

There are two important indications confirming that the time of accountability has arrived in fact: The release of videotapes incriminating [Turkish President] Erdogan and his party in backing armed elements in Syria in tandem with the resounding collapse of his 'Brotherhood' project; and the publication of the Saudi WikiLeaks documents that prove the ruling family's involvement in the 9/11 attacks, as well as the corruption, ugliness, and savagery of the Wahhabi creed of the West's most prominent Gulf ally. This is the ally that [WikiLeaks founder] Julian Assange has described as 'an erratic and secretive dictatorship that has also become a menace to its neighbors and itself.'

All this confirms that while the possibility of war remains on the cards in light of Israel’s intransigence regarding the Palestinian cause and after the Zionist entity has now joined the fray in Syria – the region will enter a phase of political settlements for the complex crises in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. The price for these settlements will be paid by the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari/Israeli alliance, because it has failed to create the changes demanded by the U.S. as part of the Greater Middle East project.

"It has also failed to bribe Russia to change its position on the Syrian file," concludes Hamad

Ends…

 

 

2-Israel faces accountability

 

The UN Independent Commission of Inquiry’s report into last year’s Gaza war may open the door to holding Israel’s political echelon accountable for war crimes, says Hani Habib in Palestinian al-Ayyam

  

Even though the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry’s report into possible violations committed during the (2014) Third Gaza War denounces both Israel and Hamas for committing war crimes, Hamas has welcomed it since it views it as imparting legitimacy to its tunnels as a 'defensive tactic' against Israel, notes a Palestinian commentator. Meanwhile, the argument is raging in Israel on the report's consequences since it holds the political and security echelons responsible for these crimes, rather than the soldiers who were merely carrying out orders.

 

THREE MONTH DELAY: "After a delay of three full months, the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry's report on the Israeli war on Gaza has paved its way to the media and the various parties concerned," writes Hani Habib in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

The report was supposed to be issued in March, but after Israel’s systematic campaign against the commission's head, William Schabas, it succeeded in forcing him to resign. The inquiry was re-launched, which extended the period needed to complete it.

It is worth noting that even though the media headlines stressed the report's 'denunciation of both sides' for committing war crimes, Hamas’ leaders and spokesmen have praised it. Theoretically, this may be because (according to the al-Hadaf News Gateway) the Commission has distributed different translations and excerpts to the parties. The Gateway reports Israeli sources as saying that the Hebrew version included criticisms and denunciations of Hamas, particularly because it executed 21 suspected collaborators, while these denunciations and excerpts did not appear in the Arab or English versions.

But the most important aspect of Hamas's praise of the report stems from the fact that it has effectively legitimized the movement's tunnels. The report has deemed them to be 'a defensive tactic,' contrary to what Israel has been trying to convince world public opinion of– namely, that their mission is offensive and that they expose Israeli security to danger. Hamas, on the other hand, saw this report as imparting international legal legitimacy to these tunnels. At the very least, it believes that digging such tunnels would not contradict the requirements of international law, which will encourage it to build more tunnels to be used as a 'defensive tactic,' according to the commission's report.

Also noteworthy, is that contrary to all previous commissions of inquiry, this report has held Israel’s political and security leadership responsible, rather than the soldiers who carry out its orders. The report holds each party that issued orders in either camp to account. This means that the PM and the ministers of war and security in the Hebrew state, as well as the political and security leaderships – especially the 'kitchen cabinet' that directed the Israeli aggression machine in the Gaza Strip – are to be held accountable for the violations that occurred.

After the report was issued an argument has broken out in Israel as to whether Netanyahu and his cabinet– especially the members of the ‘inner cabinet’ – will be able to evade responsibility after being denounced by the commission, and whether it would be possible to avoid restrictions on their movements outside the Hebrew state.

Israeli army commanders have expressed their concern at the political and security leaderships' avoidance of responsibility, and at holding them (the military commanders) responsible for the army's massacres and destruction of infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. They are concerned that the commissions of inquiry, including that formed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) would investigate them alone, after the senior officials of the Hebrew state have sought to evade their responsibility for issuing orders and instructions to army commanders during the Third Gaza War a year ago.

But will this report have any influence on the ICC investigations into the Third Gaza War? This is a legitimate question, because the report indirectly addresses the ICC in The Hague by saying that after the failure of all attempts to investigate what happened during the war in a clear and certain manner, the ICC may be the sole means of deterring both sides from entering a new round of conflict.

The UN Independent Commission’s report has revived the war of words within political and media circles in Israel. Some had already criticized the government’s refusal to cooperate and receive the commission. Moreover, Israel was unable to form an independent commission of inquiry; it formed a government commission that raised serious doubts about the results of its investigations.

For this reason, there are those who claim that Israel should pursue a different policy by establishing an independent fact-finding commission that is sufficiently transparent as to be recognized. Then, and only then, can the ICC turn a blind eye to the Independent Commission of Inquiry's report. This is because the ICC's law allows it to refrain from investigation if it proves legally possible for the concerned parties to carry out an independent and transparent self-investigation.

"Short of this, the results of the UN's Independent Commission of Inquiry's investigations listed in the report will contribute to the ICC's decision to initiate an international investigation, one that the Palestinian side is trying hard to use to make up for Israel's success in raising obstacles in the face of serious and fruitful negotiations," concludes Habib.

Ends…

 

 

3-New tactics, new strategies

 

Israel seems to be pursuing a series of new tactical and strategic approaches to its regional environment, notes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

A number of recent Israeli moves suggest that Tel Aviv is adopting new tactics and strategies in dealing with various regional issues, from the situation in Syria to its relations with Ankara, maintains a Palestinian commentator in an Amman daily. In fact, we may be witnessing a coordinated Israeli campaign whose ultimate aim remains unclear.

 

BEYOND PR: "If we accept reports published in the Israeli press, one may conclude that what the Israelis are doing silently goes beyond a PR campaign in which they address the media and diplomats and offer alleged 'facilities' to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

What they are doing seems more akin to major or minor, strategic or tactical 'schemes' regarding their regional surroundings – for example in Syria, Turkey, Gaza, and Egypt.

On Tuesday, the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth published two reports. The first included a reference to the 'rebels' fighting in Syria who are receiving medical care in Israeli hospitals. The second spoke of secret meetings held in Italy aimed at normalizing relations with the Turkish regime, and perhaps coordinating something for the future.

The presence of Syrians receiving medical care in Israeli hospitals may not be a secret. But it was previously emphasized that the Red Cross had brought them there and that they were civilians in need of emergency treatment. Earlier this year, for example, the BBC broadcast a report claiming that at least 1500 Syrians have received treatment in Israeli hospitals, most of them from the Der'a and Golan areas. The BBC spoke of specific cases, including the use of advanced and sophisticated technology to repair the face of one of the patients that had been badly mangled during the war. He was supposed to return to Syria after he ended his treatment. Last year, the Israeli daily Haaretz estimated the number of those who received treatment in Israeli hospitals at around 700 patients in 2013.

A number of Palestinians have volunteered to help the Syrians who are receiving treatment. I tried to contact them about two years ago to understand what was going on, but they always denied that those receiving treatment were fighters. They stressed that the patients were mostly children and ordinary folk. But they did not have clear answers as to how and why these patients were arriving from Syria.

Last month, the UK daily The Independent published a report that included a reference to a fighter whom the paper believed was a member of the 'Nusra Army,' whereas he claimed to be a member of the [‘moderate’] opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA). But the other cases the paper referred to were women and children. It asked an Israeli doctor whether he believed them to be fighters, to which he answered: 'Perhaps; I do not know their background.' But he added, revealing one of the likely aims of the entire operation: 'These people were brought up to believe that the Israelis have horns and tails and drink children's blood. They came to us and found what we do to our natural enemies.'

The Yedioth Ahronoth report says that 150 Druze in the Golan threw stones at military ambulances carrying 'rebels' from Syria that led to the death of one of them. It quotes the [official] Syrian News Agency as saying that these 'rebels' are members of the Nusra Front. The Syrian regime and its supporters claim that this is part of a larger scheme that includes a coalition between the Nusra Front and the Israelis. In fact, things have gone so far that the regime and its supporters have claimed that these 'rebels' will form another 'Lahd Army' along the lines of the militias that allied themselves to the Israelis in South Lebanon in the late 1970s to establish a buffer zone. Although it is difficult to be sure about what is happening, there is some mystery as to why the Israeli hospitals are being opened up to these 'rebels.' This may be a possible gateway to many different Israeli schemes.

As for the aim of the secret negotiations with the Turks in Rome, the object is to get over the Freedom Flotilla incident five years ago when Israeli forces attacked ships carrying Turks expressing solidarity with the Palestinians on their way to the Gaza Strip, and to normalize relations between the two states. Here, a question may arise: Are both sides coordinating now to avoid a repetition of the same incident with a new relief fleet that is believed to be already on its way to the Gaza Strip? Is this a new Israeli policy? And is it related to the reports of Turkey’s mediation role that is intended to reach a truce [with Hamas] that reduces or ends the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip?

There is no doubt that the Israelis have faced numerous criticisms recently. In fact, steps towards a serious economic and academic boycott have already begun to be taken in some Western states. But if we link these files to each other – starting with the (old/new) file of wounded Syrian 'rebels,' moving on to the negotiations with Turkey, the Israeli army's PR campaign on the occasion of Ramadan, the Egyptian ambassador’s return to Israel after three years of absence, and the talk of a truce in Gaza via European and Turkish mediation – one may detect a systematic plan to move in a number of different directions.

"The goal is to rearrange Israeli policy's cards and adopt new policies (or tactics) having to do with various files surrounding that policy," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

4-Erdogan’s inevitable meltdown

 

A democratically elected government in which the public sphere enjoys freedom of access to information, cannot play a revolutionary role outside its borders by backing armed groups rebelling against the regime in a neighboring country, says Bakr Sidqi in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Turkey’s role in the Syrian revolution has suffered a major reversal due to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader President Erdogan’s electoral setback, argues a Syrian commentator in a Saudi-owned daily. This may have been inevitable in a country such as Turkey if it were to preserve its democratic traditions, which is why Erdogan was seeking a regime that would have made him an absolute ruler.

 

DESERVED INTEREST: "The June 7th Turkish general elections elicited widespread interest, which they deserved," writes Bakr Sidqi in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

But the relative change produced by its outcome deserves further analysis. We will deal here with those aspects having to do with the Syrian revolution and its cumulative overall impact on political life in Turkey, including the drop in the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's relative popularity.

One can say that all the important political events in Turkey since 2011 have borne some direct or indirect relationship to what has been happening in Syria and with the Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian domestic conflict. The approach to this involvement has been one of the most important subjects of debate in the electoral battle between the ruling party and its political opponents.

The Republican People's Party (CHP), which represents the secular Kemalist current, opposes all aspects of the government's policy and finds itself closer to the Damascus 'chemical' regime [due to its alleged use chemical weapons against its opponents]. Meanwhile, the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which represents the aspirations of Kurdish nationalism and is the political arm of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), entered into an open conflict with the government during the Kobani battle and its supporters took to the streets and clashed with the police last fall, with the result that more than forty people were killed.

Even the ferocious clash between Erdogan and [Islamist Gulen movement leader] Fethullah Gulen which has been going on since late 2013, is not free from aspects having to do with Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, more specifically, with a delicate matter in this regard that has to do with the role played by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in delivering weapons to the armed groups in Syria.

On more than one occasion, the Turkish police seized large trucks filled with weapons and equipment heading to the Turkish/Syrian borders, protected by the MIT that is known for its direct loyalty to Erdogan. On the other hand, the police, who searched these trucks, are associated with Fethullah Gulen's network of supporters who have infiltrated the state's institutions and apparatuses during the AKP's years in power. In fact, matters went so far that Erdogan has described the Gulen network as 'a parallel entity,' in effect, a state within the state. The policemen who searched the arms’ trucks were taken to court and expelled. Furthermore, thousands of policemen suspected of loyalty to Gulen were purged from the force.

But perhaps the more important aspect of the Syrian revolution's effects on Turkey stems from the sweeping authoritarian tendencies revealed by Erdogan, leading him to seek a presidential regime in which he would gather absolute power in his hands. This was most evident in his decision to move the seat of the presidency from the famous Cankaya Palace, which goes back to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, to the opulent newly-built White Palace with its more than one-thousand rooms and wings. In fact, the Palace's name (AK Saray) combines the rich implications of similarity to the headquarters of the U.S. presidency (the White House) with hints at the ruling party's name – 'AK Parti,' which means the 'pure party.'

Many analysts have linked Erdogan's desire for a presidential regime similar to the American one to the corruption case that involved him personally as part of his conflict with Gulen. They claim that Erdogan's goal is to protect himself from accountability by securing a strong presidential immunity that lasts for two terms – up to 2024. This may be the personal factor that explains Erdogan's authoritarian cravings, and further credence is lent to this by his paranoid behavior ever since the Gezi Park revolution [2013 anti-government protests] and the corruption case.  For, ever since that time, he began to see any social protest or political opposition as 'an international conspiracy by means of local tools,' one hatched 'against Turkey's role, its regional and international weight, and its development miracle,' as he put it. And he went so far as to accuse all his opponents of 'national treason' – something that we [Arabs] have been accustomed to in the discourse of dictatorial Arab regimes and their 'resistance' extensions, such as the Lebanese Hizbollah for example.

But is there no objective factor that leaves Erdogan and the Turkish government with options other than that of building a regime that mimics those dictatorships that were swept away by the winds of the Arab Spring? Can a Turkish government that is subject to a strong parliamentary and media supervision become involved in an armed conflict in Syria effectively? Can MIT deliver weapons to the Syrian rebels other than within the confines of a strict police state that keeps a tight lid on its actions and imposes strict censorship on the media?

It is perhaps this contradictory position that has led to the collapse of the AKP's status, with Erdogan's popularity at its heart. As a result, he has lost the absolute majority in parliament and, with it his monopoly over power. By 'contradictory position' I mean that a democratically elected government in which the public sphere enjoys freedom of access to information, cannot play a revolutionary role outside its borders by backing armed groups rebelling against the regime in a neighboring country.

This is the role we have become accustomed to by the Assad regime or the mullahs' regime in Iran. But it is impossible to imagine this same role being replicated in a country such as Turkey whose traditions of pluralistic democratic elections and freedom of the press go back to 1950, despite all the shortcomings that can be registered against the 'Turkish democracy' model that has carved its own difficult course through a legacy of military coups.

It may be that what attracted Erdogan to the American presidential system specifically is the known role of the American intelligence agencies – especially the CIA – in 'revolutionary' operations against regimes opposed to the U.S. in foreign countries (Cuba for example.) For, despite repeated criticisms of these dirty operations by CIA agents outside the U.S., the concept of 'the U.S. national interest' has been sufficient to protect these agents against judicial accountability.

A similar model would be alluring to a charismatic leader such as Erdogan, who dreams of reviving the glories of the Ottoman Empire in the East. He believed that he saw a golden opportunity to realize these dreams in the Arab Spring revolutions, especially in light of the strong role played by political Islam in leading some of them. That offered Erdogan the prospect of an ideological partnership with the supposed future rulers in the Arab Spring countries.

"But this ideological zeal and revolutionary Ottoman drive have rebounded on him in the form of an electoral failure that may force him to review his calculations both inside and outside Turkey," concludes Sidqi.

Ends… 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS: Cengiz Candar portrays a perfect political circumstance in centre-left Radikal: "The Kurdish political movement has now been integrated into Turkey's parliamentary system as an influential, and more importantly, a 'constructive' player, making it a part of Turkey's political regime. With the HDP [pro-Kurdish left alliance], the parliamentary system has been strengthened, the legitimacy of the Turkish parliament has been reaffirmed, and its credibility has been restored. Similarly, through the HDP, the Kurdish political movement now has the opportunity to gain the status of a legitimate and non-violent political actor in Turkey. This is the perfect situation for political and social peace in Turkey and for a resolution of the Kurdish issue."

Mehmet Tezkan notes a divergence between the PM and the president in centrist Milliyet: "Coalition scenarios are being discussed. The possibility of forming a minority government is on the table. Moreover, a change in the parliamentary arithmetic is also being discussed. According to leaked reports, PM Davutoglu’s priority is a coalition. He is right. A coalition would be beneficial to him. If a coalition is formed, the tutelage of the president will be ended. The prime minister will start being prime minister. But there is a sense that President Erdogan’s goal is another [early] election."

Cigdem Toker sets the new parliament’s order of priorities in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The Turkish parliament has convened without a dominating majority for the first time in 13 years. The system in which there was no separation of powers and in which the legislative and executive branches became intertwined in order to limit basic rights and freedoms, does not exist anymore. All opposition MPs who took the oath and began fulfilling their duties yesterday, should focus first on changing the legal order constructed by this failed 'system'."

Mustafa Unal suggests that the former ruling party has yet to learn the lesson in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "No matter how one may see it, this is a new era in politics. Despite the election outcome, the AKP [Justice and Development Party] is not having the chance to ask 'Where were we?' The old status quo does not exist. The party must play politics in the new situation, adapting to the new reality. The past two weeks have shown that it would be quite hard for the AKP to get used to the new situation. Neither Erdogan nor Davutoglu were prepared for this defeat." 

Nazli Ilicak detects a sense of relief in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "No-one but Erdogan talks of early elections. Coalition talks have not even officially begun yet. Different solutions are possible. But the president uses every opportunity to threaten an early election. There is no crisis in Turkey. On the contrary, there is a sense of relief as Erdogan withdraws into the borders of his palace."

Fehmi Koru strikes a positive note in centre-right, pro-government HaberTurk: "If one observed the first parliamentary session of the new era, one could see an interesting picture. Almost all shades present in Turkey are represented in this parliament. The opposition parties can agree among themselves and establish a coalition government, forget about the past and pursue a new policy. However, if a new government includes the AKP, I guess it will only be logical for it to join a party with which it can agree on the economy, foreign policy and the Kurdish 'peace process'."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz defends a new parliamentary law setting the terms for a nuclear deal: "The government should support and defend the Majlis' resolution, which will now be sent to the Guardian Council for approval. Even though the government's representative in the Majlis has voiced some disapproval of the plan, the government’s best option is to accept the law after the Guardian Council has approved it. The Majlis’ act does not contradict the Higher National Security Council’s decisions. In addition, this act has been codified and endorsed based on the regime’s red lines, and it includes nothing extra. Even though this law has already been endorsed, the Americans have continued their deceit and deception, as well as their excessive demands. America’s only option is to abandon these demands. Moreover, the other points included in the Majlis' act should be included in the final nuclear agreement, or no agreement will be signed."

Conservative Khorasan suggests that the new law will serve Iran’s negotiators: "First, it was necessary to respond in an equivalent manner to the excessive demands that the Americans have introduced into the talks in the form of a U.S. Congressional bill on verifying a possible nuclear deal. Second, the Majlis bill allows Iran's negotiating team to resist the American pressures and excessive demands at the negotiation table by relying on the country's legislative body, which is strong due to the people's support. Assuming that a nuclear deal is finalized and that it subsequently becomes clear that there are some dark and unclear points that can provide America with an open hand to make excessive demands, the existence of this Majlis bill will help the government. By relying on it, the government can demand to change any unclear articles and will have legal justification for amending those articles that are unacceptable to the Islamic Republic, at no cost to the government or the negotiating team. From this perspective, this bill will act as the negotiating team's legal support".

Reformist Sharq sounds a relatively optimistic note: "The positions of all the parties involved in the nuclear negotiations have helped to strengthen the optimistic view that a comprehensive agreement can be reached. The negotiating teams will be facing a very difficult week ahead as they prepare to reach a final agreement, and it remains too soon to predict the final result. But for the moment at least, it can be said that none of the parties have adopted a harder stance. My optimism over the prospects for a comprehensive nuclear agreement stems from all the parties’ political will to resolve the issue. I believe that Iran and the other parties are in a position to choose an agreement as the only available option."

Hard-line Javan claims that the sanctions are not to blame for the country’s economic woes:" Due to the Iranian economy's flawed structure and the continued expansion of government agencies and institutions that in all likelihood will have little to do in the coming years, the economy has somehow become deadlocked and is functioning below its true capacity. Therefore, even if the sanctions were to be lifted one day, we should not expect any economic miracles. With the possible end of sanctions, the economy will return to its pre-sanctions level in two years. That means sanctions are not the cause of Iran's economic problems; rather, the problem stems from the country's economic structure."

Reformist Mardom Salari explains what lies behind the Majlis bill: "The bill obliging the government to safeguard Iran's nuclear achievements and rights has become cause for conflict between the government and the Majlis. On the one hand, some people believe that this bill will constrain the negotiating team and that such issues should not be put forward at this juncture when Iran and P5+1 are reaching a final deal. On the other hand, some people have yet to trust the negotiating team, and are trying to place legal obstacles before the negotiating team's path".

Reformist Arman offers a way out: "Iran's government spokesman has claimed the bill urging the government to protect its nuclear achievements contradicts the country’s constitution. That part of the bill which is in line with reinforcing national interests and facilitating the negotiating delegation's positions, should be deployed as a strong lever in the talks. However, a comprehensive approach based on the need for presenting reports and the Majlis' continuous monitoring will both provide the Majlis with a supervisory role and not contradict the confidentiality of the measures taken during the nuclear talks".

Moderate Iran seeks to defend Iran’s interest: "In most media circles, the additional protocol has become the main topic for debate in matters pertaining to the nuclear negotiations. At the core of the debate and at the center of all countries’ concern, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, is the interventionist approach or misusing the inspections, which is a valid concern. Our country should adopt all the necessary precautionary measures to protect its important commercial, economic, technical and military information. The additional protocol as well as the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement based on the principles of managed access, provides the country with the ability to protect confidential information."

 

WIKILEAKS SAUDI ARABIA REVELATIONS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami draws satisfaction from Riyadh’s embarrassment: "The latest documents released by WikiLeaks yesterday regarding Al Saud’s treachery reveal that Saudi Arabia’s rulers prevented humanitarian and military assistance from reaching the people of Gaza within the context of cooperation with the Zionist regime in the attack on the Strip. This setback for the Saudi regime's dignity and its intelligence services via the release of half a million secret diplomatic documents of the country's foreign ministry is even more painful since this leak is believed to have been orchestrated by the Yemen cyber army after Saudi Foreign Ministry officials admitted that some archived documents were stolen last month. Even as the Saudi regime continues its air strikes and the destruction of the infrastructure of a proud Arab country in Yemen, it is well aware that the ominous storm it has created and the aggressive acts it has committed will not bring the conflict to an end. Rather, it is the fighting Yemeni people who will determine this end."

 

DOMESTIC POLITICS: Hard-line Keyhan argues that the government has failed to improve the economy: "The Rowhani government began its official activities about two years ago with the slogan 'Others do not know but we do' and, as its main campaign slogan, it promised to improve the country's economy in 100 days. However, over the past two years, due to its suspect economic policies and the evident differences between the government ministries, the country, which was on a path of independence and self-sufficiency following the imposition of sanctions, has become much more vulnerable in various fields, including agriculture and industry."

 

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS; Conservative Resalat bets on a Clinton win in the next U.S. elections: “If Hillary Clinton wins this coming round of the electoral campaign, she will be the first woman in U.S. history to be elected president. In this context, her main concern is to stand against the Republicans, because she perceives no competition from amongst the Democrats. It should be easy for her in the Democratic party's primary elections, and she should ultimately stand against her main rival. This is happening at a time when the Republicans are experiencing internal conflicts over candidates whose failures are already clear."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Apart from the nuclear file

2-Riyadh appeals to Moscow

3-The best scenario

 

1-Apart from the nuclear file

 

Washington may strike a deal with Tehran, whereby Assad would be set aside and replaced by someone else who would be Iran's ally. This is because Assad's regime may no longer be useful to Iran's regional interests if Tehran reaches an agreement with the U.S. For a nuclear agreement would effectively hand the region over to it and provide it with greater financial resources with which to back and help the saboteurs and those who are suspending political progress in the region – from the Houthis to Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq…The nuclear agreement with Iran will pave the way for handing over some of the areas where its agents have the upper hand to Tehran. But what is worse will follow if the next U.S. administration were to continue down the same path as Obama--Randa Taqiyyiddin in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Aside from the nuclear file but not far from the maneuvers surrounding it, Iran is proceeding with its foreign activities, by which it defies the region's states and the West alike. After Syria and Lebanon, and in addition to Iraq and Yemen, Iran is apparently active in mobilization and training in Afghanistan. Of course, Iran's support for its enemy's enemy is nothing new; and there are many reports of the international forces in Afghanistan seizing shipments of Iranian arms on their way to the hard-line militias. Some go back to 2007. But the latest reports are worrisome indeed. For by arming the Taliban, Iran is aiming less to strengthen the movement as much as it aims to undermine U.S. influence in Afghanistan and pre-empt ISIS's expansion there. This is happening in Afghanistan. As for Iraq, it is no secret that Iran is seen as one of the main beneficiaries of coordination with Washington against ISIS--Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

It is not clear why the Americans are so desperate to stop the Iranian nuclear program. After all, they know that many of this region's countries now have the bomb – Pakistan, India, and Israel. They also know that none of these states can even think of using it, which has only been used once since it was invented, namely, when the U.S. dropped it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during World War II…the Americans must know that what concerns us Arabs as far as these negotiations are concerned is that we should not pay their price in our children's blood. This means that our concern is that Iran should not be offered vital areas in our Arab region as a result of the negotiations. Moreover, Washington should not 'grant' the Iranians their occupation of Iraq and Syria, and their extensive intervention in Yemen. This is what concerns us. Apart from that, they can negotiate till Kingdom come-- Saleh al-Qallab in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

As the nuclear talks between Iran and the '5 + 1' group approach their final deadline at the end of this month, it is clear that such an agreement would radically alter the region, argues a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. The U.S. is likely to 'hand over' some areas to Tehran, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Yemen where Iran's agents have the upper hand. It is clear that Iran is keeping its options open, giving with one hand and taking with the other, maintains another Lebanese commentator. This has emerged from its recent actions in Afghanistan, where it backs the Taliban and anti-U.S. forces, and in Iraq, where it is coordinating its actions with Washington against ISIS. The Arabs' main concern about Iran's negotiations with the U.S. is that each side is trying to improve its position via their proxy wars in the Arab countries, where Arab blood is being spilt, argues a former Jordanian information minister. Moreover, the Arabs are worried the U.S. may agree to Iran's occupation of countries such as Iraq and Syria, as well as its extensive intervention in Yemen.

 

THE FINAL EPISODE: "Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's talks with his six counterparts in Vienna this week are supposed to represent the final episode before reaching an agreement that aims to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons," writes Randa Taqiyyiddin in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

But many people well-informed about what is going on cast doubt on the possibility of reaching an agreement by June 30th. [U.S. Secretary of State John] Kerry is expected to meet with his Iranian counterpart before the meetings with the other foreign ministers this Friday. Sources close to the U.S. administration say that an agreement is imminent. Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius is insisting on a firm agreement with an extensive verification regime that includes searching military sites if need be. Paris also wants a mechanism by which there will be an automatic return to sanctions if Iran violates its commitments.

For its part, the Iranian nation is eagerly looking forward to lifting the sanctions. It realizes that the nuclear agreement with the six states will end its isolation, fling the country’s doors open to businessmen and stimulate the Iranian markets. But at the same time, such an agreement will provide the regime with more monies to spend on its agents in the region – from Hizbollah, to Bashar al-Assad, to the Iraqi militias that are Iran's lackeys, to the Houthis and Ali 'Abdullah Saleh [in Yemen]. As soon as the sanctions are lifted, 145-billion dollars’ worth of Iran's frozen assets will be at the regime's disposal, allowing it to engage in further sabotage in the region.

Moreover, if the Obama administration reaches an agreement with Iran, it will seek to normalize relations with Iran's ally in Lebanon, Hizbollah, which it now classifies as a terrorist organization. For Israel's alliance with the U.S. will not influence Obama's diplomacy regarding the Iranian file. The U.S. administration may see an interest in forging an alliance with Hizbollah as long as the latter is fighting a war with the U.S.'s number-one enemy in Syria, ISIS. Furthermore, Hizbollah may have much to offer the U.S., which is not interested in Lebanon and its fate and whether the country elects a new president or not; nor, for that matter, is it interested in Syria whose people are being killed and forcefully displaced at the hands of its president with the help and backing of the very same Iranians with whom Mr. Obama wishes to normalize relations with after the nuclear agreement.

The regional map, which reflects a great deal of confusion and tension today, will change radically if relations between Iran and the U.S. administration are normalized. In Lebanon, Hizbollah is currently the strongest force on the political arena, and it will control more of the country’s political life via its Christian allies, and with an undeclared green light from the U.S. administration.

As for Syria, Washington may strike a deal with Tehran, whereby Assad would be set aside and replaced by someone else who would be Iran's ally. This is because Assad's regime may no longer be useful to Iran's regional interests if Tehran reaches an agreement with the U.S. For a nuclear agreement would effectively hand the region over to it and provide it with greater financial resources with which to back and help the saboteurs and those who are suspending political progress in the region – from the Houthis to Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

Some [Lebanese] optimists believe that if the nuclear agreement is reached with the six states, it will become easier to elect a new president for Lebanon [suspended since last September]. But were this to happen, it would favor a president from among Hizbollah’s close allies –the same party that is blocking the presidential elections in Lebanon today.

"The nuclear agreement with Iran will pave the way for handing over some of the areas where its agents have the upper hand to Tehran. But what is worse will follow if the next U.S. administration were to continue down the same path as Obama," concludes Taqiyyiddin.

End…

 

VOLLEYBALL DIPLOMACY” "Last Friday and Sunday, the U.S. and Iran faced each other in two international volleyball games in Tehran," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

In both games, where women were banned from attending and that were watched by twelve-thousand viewers, the Iranian team crushed its opponents 3-nil, despite the fact that the coach of the host team admitted that the American team is 'the best in the world.' Before the games began four Iranian youths carried a large American flag onto the center of the court to the tune of the American national anthem. The official TV station, which broadcast the two games live, saw it fit to show the flag but without broadcasting the tune of the Star-Spangled Banner.

If this confrontation on the sporting field indicates anything, it is the fact that Iran is still sending conflicting messages to the West. These reflect Tehran's policy of keeping different balls in the air and are an indication of the concerns that still bother many Iranians regarding any agreement with the West.

The same day that the Iranian team was confronting the American side in the final game, the Iranian Shura Council was discussing a draft resolution – that was passed yesterday [Tuesday] – preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from entering any military or security sites, or examining any scientific documents or sensitive sites as part of the supposed agreement with the West. To the sound of shouts of 'Death to America', the MPs voted in favor of the resolution, which also calls for all sanctions imposed on Iran to be lifted. These hard-line restrictions may evidently complicate the negotiations that are still faltering over the issue of transparency and the ability to confirm that Iran is abiding by the international restrictions on its nuclear program.

On the other hand, the Shura Council’s resolution limited the intervention of Iranian bodies in the nuclear negotiations and reduced the MPs' ability to undermine the agreement by granting the Supreme Council for National Security the authority to give final consent to the agreement. This seemed to mimic the U.S. Republican and Democratic congressmen’s withdrawal of harsh demands that would have obstructed any nuclear agreement.

Meanwhile, aside from the nuclear file but not far from the maneuvers surrounding it, Iran is proceeding with its foreign activities, by which it defies the region's states and the West alike. After Syria and Lebanon, and in addition to Iraq and Yemen, Iran is apparently active in mobilization and training in Afghanistan.

Of course, Iran's support for its enemy's enemy is nothing new; and there are many reports of the international forces in Afghanistan seizing shipments of Iranian arms on their way to the hard-line militias. Some go back to 2007. But the latest reports are worrisome indeed. For by arming the Taliban, Iran is aiming less to strengthen the movement as much as it aims to undermine U.S. influence in Afghanistan and preempt ISIS's expansion there.

This is happening in Afghanistan. As for Iraq, it is no secret that Iran is seen as one of the main beneficiaries of coordination with Washington against ISIS.

"Perhaps the most recent manifestation of this coordination was reported by the Bloomberg View website, namely, that fighters being trained by Iran share the same military base with U.S. forces in al-Anbar," concludes Freiha.

End…

 

RAGING FIRES: "The problem with the U.S./Iranian nuclear negotiations is that every time they appear to have drawn to a close, they start again, perhaps from square-one," writes Saleh al-Qallab in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

And all this happens in a region where the fires are raging more fiercely, and the number of people killed and the scale of destruction and devastation grows with each day of delay. But it is well-known that the negotiators are not bothered by the blood that is being spilt in many Middle Eastern countries that have been afflicted by violence, turning into nothing more than 'loose change' in Washington and Tehran's calculations. They are much more interested in serving their interests and what each side can wrest out from the other.

The negotiations are supposed to end by the end of this month. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who is impatiently hoping to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, does not seem to mind going along with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's wishes. Zarif said: ‘What reason is there to prevent the negotiations from being extended for a few more days if this makes it possible to reach a good agreement?’

The fact of the matter is that for us, Arabs, there would have been no harm if the negotiators were to continue to negotiate for twenty or more years had it not been for the fact that the blood being spilt in Iraq and Syria, but in Yemen as well, is Arab blood. And all this lost blood is a result of these lengthy negotiations, stemming from the fact that each side– the U.S. and Iran – is seeking to improve its negotiating position by pressuring the other side in the arenas of conflict that have spread across most of the region's states. It is we, Arabs, who are paying the price for the extension of these negotiations, while the sole beneficiary is Israel, which is following developments happily and comfortably, as if it were watching a friendly football or ping pong game.

If we exclude the Israeli factor, it is not clear why the Americans are so desperate to stop the Iranian nuclear program. After all, they know that many of this region's countries now have the bomb – Pakistan, India, and Israel. They also know that none of these states can even think of using it, which has only been used once since it was invented, namely, when the U.S. dropped it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during World War II.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Israel built its Dimona reactor around half-a-century ago, and that it is still the first state to possess a nuclear bomb in this region that spreads from the Mediterranean's shores to the Great Wall of China. Despite this, Israel could never consider using the bomb unless it faced the threat of total annihilation, which is not possible, in fact. Moreover, even if it were, the U.S., together with all the superpowers has the sufficient means of deterrence to render this impossible.

Finally, the Americans must know that what concerns us Arabs as far as these negotiations are concerned is that we should not pay their price in our children's blood. This means that our concern is that Iran should not be offered vital areas in our Arab region as a result of the negotiations. Moreover, Washington should not 'grant' the Iranians their occupation of Iraq and Syria, and their extensive intervention in Yemen.

"This is what concerns us. Apart from that, they can negotiate till Kingdom come," concludes Qallab

Ends…

 

 

2-Riyadh appeals to Moscow

 

The Saudi defence minister’s recent trip to Moscow may have been motivated by the desire to find a way out in Yemen, says Hamza al-Khansa on today’s Lebanese www.alahednews.com.lb

 

While on the surface, Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent visit to Russia resulted in signing important economic cooperation deals, behind the scenes, the visit's main aim was to ask for Moscow’s help in extracting Saudi Arabia from its predicament in Yemen, claims a Lebanese commentator on a pro-Hizbollah website. Russia showed its willingness to comply, but at a price that will not be easy for Saudi Arabia to pay.

 

APPLAUSE AND CHEERS: "The Saudi media applauded and cheered the visit by Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman to Moscow, where he met senior officials headed by Russian President Vladimir Putin," writes Hamza al-Khansa on Wednesday on the Hizbollah-affiliated Lebanese website www.alahednews.com.lb.

The Saudi media spoke at length of bin Salman's 'achievements' in Russia, highlighting the details of the agreements he concluded with the Russian side. On the other hand, people in the know speak of other dimensions to the visit. One is on the surface, and consists of the announcement of 'strategic agreements' ranging from the nuclear field to agriculture and education. The other aspect took place behind closed doors, with the Saudi predicament in Yemen as the main item on its agenda. This side to the visit was made all the more credible by the fact that bin Salman is leading his country's wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, and is also responsible for the Kingdom’s relations with Egypt and the Gulf states, and – most importantly – for the oil dossier in his capacity as the head of the Supreme Saudi Economic Council.

The visit occurred at this particular point in time in order to address an urgent Saudi need imposed by the uncertain horizons confronting the Kingdom against the background of its failure to deal with more than one regional file, most importantly, in Yemen and Syria. Four main Saudi concerns dominated the visit:

- First, the fear that an agreement will be reached between Washington and Tehran on June 30th regarding the Iranian nuclear file, especially in light of the growing positive signs that this is likely. Consequently, and via bin Salman's visit to Moscow, Riyadh wants to tell Washington that the price of any rapprochement with Tehran that comes at its expense, will be a Saudi-Russian rapprochement equal in size and extent to the U.S./Iranian rapprochement. But this Saudi effort remains dependent on Russia's position and attitude towards it.

- Second, the Syrian and Yemeni crises, where Saudi failures are accumulating. This is especially true of Yemen, after the blow that Saudi Arabia has received due to its failure to decide the military confrontation quickly, as it had promised the U.S. administration before the aggression. And what has made matters even worse for Saudi Arabia regarding Yemen is that neither Egypt nor Pakistan – both of which are its main allies—have refused to be involved in an uncalculated military adventure, especially when it comes to ground intervention in Yemen. This has begun to pose serious questions regarding the nature, effectiveness and point of the Riyadh-led 'coalition,' especially since its members' role is now restricted to logistical support.

- Third, the loss of the Turkish card after the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to win the majority it needed in the recent legislative elections that would have allowed it to introduce the constitutional amendments necessary to set up President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as absolute ruler of his country. As a result, Saudi Arabia lost an important card on which it has been wagering to change the rules of the game in Syria and increase the military pressure on the Syrian army in an attempt to tip the balance in favor of the armed opposition groups backed by the Saudi/Qatari/Turkish trio. It is worth noting in this regard, that Saudi Arabia had achieved reconciliation with Turkey and Qatar, and that all three had agreed to change the situation on the ground in Syria. But that was before the recent Turkish elections.

- But the fourth and main Saudi concern stems from the great fear of the drop in oil prices and their returns at this difficult time of regional crises. Economic reports suggest that the Saudi budget has lost around half its revenue as a result of the game of raising OPEC's production and lowering the price of oil. As a result, the deficit in the Saudi overall budget has reached 150-billion dollars.

In this regard, we should not disregard the 'tweets' by 'Mujtahid' regarding bin Salman's visit and its aims. 'Mujtahid' who, according to some reports, is a member of the ruling Saudi family but lives outside the country, has proven to be generally accurate. In a series of reports, the famous 'tweeter' has revealed that Mohammad bin Salman is visiting Russia 'to beg Putin to use his influence to convince the Iranians and the Ansarullah Movement to stop the war in Yemen without a Saudi apology [for launching it].' He added that Russia 'will not do this unless it receives the following in return; 1) raising the price of oil; 2) endorsing an arms deal (to the value of 10-billion dollars) that had been stopped by Saudi Arabia; and 3) endorsing an arms deal for Egypt (to the value of 7-billion dollars) paid for by Saudi monies that had been frozen.'

"But he suggests that 'the most difficult demand is that of raising the price of oil by reducing Saudi Arabia's production, which it had intentionally increased in order to compel Iran to sign the nuclear agreement and force Russia to leave the Ukraine'," concludes Khansa.

Ends…

 

 

3-The best scenario

 

There are a number of scenarios for a new Palestinian government, but the best option would be that of national unity, particularly after Israel has shown that it is ready to deal with Hamas, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

There are three possible scenarios for the shape that the next Palestinian government may take, with that of a real national unity government offering the best chance of securing Palestinian rights, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. Moreover, while the obstacles facing this scenario may seem formidable, but are surmountable given that Israel has been negotiating with Hamas over a long-term truce in the Gaza Strip.

 

RAMADAN RIDDLE: “The formation of the government has become akin to a Ramadan riddle,” writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

The story began shortly after the formation of the last [national accord] government [in April 2014] when it became clear that it could not take off because of disagreements within it, the existence of a parallel [Hamas] government in the Gaza Strip, and because no government under occupation can rule in light of the unfair restrictions imposed by the [1993] Oslo Accords. It is the occupation that rules, and the remaining dregs of ‘administrative and service matters’ are left for the PA president to decide, and not the government. The government, in fact, is just a façade.

Rather than facing the truth and dealing with the reasons that prevent the government’s success, [outgoing PA PM] al-Hamdallah asked to change the ministers that are not in step with him – especially since the government line-up was imposed on him, as he himself openly admitted on TV. This time, he wanted to add ministers that are on the same wavelength as him, or to form a government that is in line with its PM.

President Abu Mazin [Mahmoud Abbas] then asked him to wait for a number of reasons until the picture gets clearer after the Israeli [March 2015] elections, and to see whether there will be any political movement to revive the so-called ‘peace process.’ Moreover, any government reshuffle or change would require an agreement with Hamas.

We then witnessed new chapters of the story in the government’s ‘peripatetic’ journeys aimed at asserting its presence in the Gaza Strip. These ended with ministers being besieged and their movements restricted against the background of the disagreement over PA employees who are refraining from going to work and those employees appointed by Hamas. This continued until the deputy-PM and minister of the economy tendered his resignation, while the other deputy-PM absented himself from numerous meetings (but without resigning) after his efforts to reconcile the government with the parallel government failed. The story then reached a new peak with a verbal exchange between the PM and the minister of education who stormed out of the meeting after announcing that she would remain in the cabinet.

Later, we witnessed yet new chapters of this saga when the president announced during the [Fateh] Revolutionary Council meetings that the government would resign in the following twenty-four hours. The following day, his advisor announced the resignation of the Hamdallah government, adding that the president had asked Hamdallah to form another government. But the president’s official spokesman denied that the government had resigned and announced that the entire matter had been referred to the PLO’s Executive Committee to decide. But what new thing has occurred for the PLO Executive Committee to decide such an important matter, when it is usually the last to know what is going on, and when its role has been restricted to either endorsing or keeping silent about whatever the president decides?

In light of all the above, there are numerous scenarios regarding the form of the next government:

- First: The government remains in its current form, but without the ministers that disagree with al-Hamdallah and new ministers added to end a situation where some ministers are in charge of more than one portfolio. This scenario is achievable because the current government remains in place, has not been disbanded and has not resigned – as has now become clear after the initial confusion.

The obstacles facing this scenario arise from the fact that it requires Hamas’s consent, because if the government were reshuffled without its agreement, we would be back to square one. In that case, Hamas would form its own government or some national body to administer the Strip. That would make way for transforming the inter-Palestinian split into an inter-Palestinian secession. It would also increase the likelihood of the establishment of a ‘mini-state’ in Gaza, and the chances of a security deal and a long-term truce [with Israel] in return for lifting the siege [on the Gaza Strip]. But Hamas’s consent remains possible if it is offered some incentive, such as paying the salaries of its employees and merging them into the PA’s employment structure.

- Second: A government is formed from the PLO with the participation of some independents. This means that Fateh’s role in the government would grow. In this case, the government may play a larger political role – for example in the negotiations, if an agreement is reached to resume them, especially after Hamdallah has expressed more flexible terms for their resumption.

The obstacle facing this scenario stems from the fact that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and possibly the Democratic Front (DFLP) as well as the People’s Party [Hizb ash-Shaab] will not agree to take part in this government, having called for a national unity government instead. Should they maintain this stance, it would strip the government from its political cover and sow disagreement between the PLO’s member organizations. It would also isolate Fateh, which would find itself on one side together with factions that have no significant presence on the ground. Moreover, this scenario would deepen and consolidate the inter-Palestinian split, taking matters back to square one or perhaps even what is less.

- The third scenario: A strong national unity government is formed. If headed by the PA president, this would be even better. Such a government would be more effective than any other option if it comes into being within the framework of a vision that aims to totally change the track that has been pursued so far, rather than merely patching it up or improving it. It would also be much better placed to deal with foreign and domestic challenges and make use of opportunities while cutting its losses and costs. In addition, it would block the way before the establishment of a ‘mini-state’ in Gaza and a ‘provisional’ state in the West Bank.

But what prevents the formation of such a government is the commitment to the International Quartet’s terms [imposed on Hamas] as well as the PA president’s insistence – as he told French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius – that the government would not ‘include any parties that do not recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept the Quartet’s preconditions; therefore, the government will not include Hamas.’ In short, the government will have to be his government, in the sense that its program should be his program.

Despite this, Fabius said that President Abu Mazin told him that he would try to form a national unity government. Therefore, the issue of relations with this government can still be raised; that is, if the factions accept the Quartet’s preconditions, the government will be a national unity government.

But the president does not seem to have such a strong argument; i.e., that a government that does not accept the Oslo commitments and does not abide by the Quartet’s preconditions would suffer international, U.S., and perhaps European boycott. It may also be subject to Israeli sanctions and aggression. But that argument collapses when we note that fragmentation and gradual collapse will be the PA’s fate if it sticks to Oslo’s evil commitments. In fact, the latest evidence that the Palestinian Authority lacks all authority is the manner in which the occupation authorities have been dealing with the issue of facilities and permits [for the Palestinian population under occupation], where the PA has come across as a mere secondary agent that does not know what is going on and has no ability to protest against what is decided on its behalf.

Abu Mazin has a very strong argument he can use to defend the formation of a national unity government if he wishes to do so, namely, that Israel has concluded a prisoners-exchange deal and tahdi’a [lull or calming down] agreements with Hamas. Moreover, negotiations have been underway between Hamas and Israel for some time now – even if indirectly and via third parties – to reach an agreement on a long-term truce in return for lifting the siege on Gaza. Thus, and since Hamas is negotiating with Israel, we should not give in to Israel’s demand that Hamas not take part in the government, given that the Palestinian national interest requires this. Furthermore, neither the international community nor the U.S. nor of course Europe would be able to boycott such a government for too long since they would be effectively boycotting all the Palestinians and would be driving the region over the abyss and into the unknown.

To contain any possible reactions, the unity government’s program could include terms, which, in addition to insisting on Palestinian national rights, commit it to international law and UN resolutions.

The national unity government could constitute the government of the Palestinian state that the world has recognized. It can help end the split if formed as a step in the context of a comprehensive implementation of the [Fateh/Hamas] Cairo Agreement. For there would then be a single body that speaks in all the Palestinians’ name, which would strengthen the Palestinians at every level, whether in confrontations or negotiations.

Establishing a national unity government is difficult because it threatens those groups that have an interest in the persistence of the inter-Palestinian split. These groups have grown, developed, and became more influential and enriched as a result. Moreover, such a government would harm the pattern of relations that link the Palestinian parties to the various Arab, regional, and international parties, axes, and groups. It would threaten the regime of absolute individual control over the various elements of the Palestinian political system in light of the absence and absenting of all the PA and PLO’s official bodies.

“In addition, this is a political system that has lost its legitimacy because the legal mandate of the various elected institutions has expired, and because resistance and national accord have not been chosen as the basis for partnership, and while the other PLO institutions have not been renewed until it becomes possible to hold elections,” concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Retort to the Report

 

Israel Hayom and Yedioth Ahronoth lead their Wednesday editions with the accident at a wedding hall in central Israel on Monday night, when a light fixture fell from the ceiling, killing one woman.

Haaretz leads with an interview with former New York Supreme Court judge Mary McGowan Davis, who headed the United Nations Human Rights Council's investigation into Operation Protective Edge. Haaretz headlines Davis' assertion that, from her perspective, the central message of the report that her commission published on Monday is that 'it's not okay for Israel to drop a one-ton bomb in the middle of neighborhood.' She went on to say that members of the commission 'wanted to make a strong stand that the whole use of explosive weapons in densely populated neighborhoods is problematic and that the policy needs to change.'

McGowan Davis also said that the report she co-authored 'certainly … would have been different if Israel had cooperated. We could have met with Israeli victims and seen where rockets landed, talked with commanders, watched videos and visited Gaza. We talked to a lot of witnesses but of course an investigation needs to be as close to the scene as possible and it would have looked different.'

Meanwhile, Yedioth Ahronoth reports that the United States does not support sending the UN Human Rights Council’s report to the Security Council, State Department spokesman John Kirby said on Tuesday. Speaking with reporters, Kirby reiterated, as he had done on Monday, that Washington rejected the foundation of the report because of the Human Rights Council’s bias against Israel.

'We challenge the very mechanism which created [the report],' Kirby said. 'And so we’re not going to have a readout of this. We’re not going to have a rebuttal to it. We’re certainly going to read it, as we read all UN reports. But we challenge the very foundation upon which this report was written, and we don’t believe that there’s a call or a need for any further Security Council work on this. We do not support any further UN work on this report,' he added, explaining that the United States objects 'to the foundation upon which the commission was established, and therefore the product that resulted from that work.'

Haaretz adds that Israel will focus its campaign against the report on European Union countries. The Israeli campaign will focus on enlisting the support of European states that serve on the UN Human Rights Council, and convincing them to vote against formally adopting the report at a council meeting scheduled for the end of this month in Geneva. Aviv Shiron, the Foreign Ministry’s deputy director general responsible for European relations, sent a message to all Israeli embassies in Europe on Monday, instructing them that diplomatic and media efforts aimed at refuting the UN report should be made priority number one ahead of the Geneva meeting, set for June 29.

Although the UN report does not appear on the front pages of any of the other newspapers, the opinion sections are still dominated by it.

One Gaza-related story that does appear on all the papers' front pages is Tuesday night's rocket attack. For the fifth time in recent weeks, a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip exploded in southern Israel. Just after 10 PM, the Israel Defense Forces said that they identified a rocket being fired from the northern part of the coastal territory. The rocket struck an open field between two communities in the council. There were no reports of damages or casualties.

In response to the shooting, an Israel Air Force aircraft struck a target in the northern Gaza Strip, the army said. According to a statement published by the Spokesperson's Unit, the rocket launcher that was used to fire the rocket late on Tuesday was hit in the attack. The military sees Hamas responsible for the shooting, it added. The IDF's Gaza Division said it believes the rocket was launched by Salafi groups, like in the previous incidents over recent months. No group has claimed responsibility for Tuesday's fire yet.

Responding to the rocket attack, form Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman – now the most vocal opposition to the Netanyahu government – said that 'a government which is ready to accept this situation, less than a year after the military operation in which we paid a high price in the lives of soldiers and the disruption of life in the entire country for two months, has no right to exist.'

Finally, all the papers report that Israel has arrested 10 people suspected of involvement in two attacks earlier this week on military ambulances transporting wounded fighters from Syria for treatment in Israel. Early Monday morning, an IDF ambulance transporting wounded Syrians was attacked in the Druze local council of Hurfeish. One of the rioters was run over by the ambulance and taken to a Nahariya hospital for treatment.

 Late Monday night, another ambulance was attacked in Majdal Shams. The ambulance managed to flee the lynch mob but attacked again in Neve Ativ, where one of the wounded Syrian rebels it was transporting was killed, while the other was critically wounded. An IDF doctor and another soldier were lightly wounded in the attack.

In related news, The Jerusalem Post leads with a report that, following Monday’s attack, the IDF is instituting operational changes to further prevent such incidents. The IDF plans to continue transporting people wounded in Syria’s civil war for treatment in Israeli hospitals, in line with government policy. From now on, however, its ambulances will be escorted by police, and evacuation techniques will be changed.

 

OUR RETORT TO THE REPORT: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Giora Eiland says that accusations that the UN Human Rights Council is fundamentally biased against Israel should be the conclusion of the government's efforts to discredit the Gaza report – not the essence of its arguments.

"Israel is absolutely right to criticize the findings of the United Nations Human Rights Council's investigation into Operation Protective Edge. But sometimes it's not enough to be right; sometimes, we need to act more intelligently, too.

Israel's fury over the fact that the UN treats us – a law-abiding country – in the same way that it treats a terrorist organization like Hamas is totally understandable. But in this case, it would be wrong to be insulted. The right response would be to demand equal criteria for judging both sides. The Gaza Strip has long been a de facto state. It has all the characteristics of a state: a defined territory, a central government, independent foreign policy and, of course, an army. The international community recognizes that terrorist entities like al-Qa’ida, ISIS and their ilk have lower moral standards. If they relate to Hamas like a terrorist organization, then they cannot expect anything from it and will not put it under any pressure. It would be better for Israel if the international community were to treat Gaza like any other country and were to demand that it bear the same responsibilities as a state. Drawing a parallel between Israel and Hamas is welcome, since it will highlight the measures that Israel takes as a law-abiding country, compared to the de facto state of Gaza, where the regime executes dozens of people in extrajudicial public killings.

The preemptive report that Israel complied and published ahead of the HRC report does not help our cause at all; in fact, it merely harms it. By its very nature, it is full of self-praise and, as such, it is not seen as credible by the international community – even though the facts it presents are accurate. It would have been better (and still is better) to wait for the group of European, American and Australian generals, who visited Israel recently and who conducted an independent investigation into Operation Protective Edge, to publish their report. Despite rumors to the contrary, they have not yet published their official report. After all, as it says in the Book of Proverbs, it's better for a stranger to praise you than to praise yourself.

Instead of repeating ad infinitum that the Human Rights Council report is biased, politically motivated and anti-Semitic, Israel should focus on the significant flaws in the report. It was a superficial and unprofessional report and it's not hard for Israel to prove this. The report claims, for example, that Israel used excessive force and that many civilians were killed. The question that must be asked is: 'Excessive' and 'many' compared to what? The authors of the report, like those who compiled the Goldstone Report, did not bother to compare the death toll and the damage from Operation Protective Edge with operations by other countries in densely populated areas. In the allied forces' operations in Iraq, the ratio between civilian causalities to military fatalities was around 5 to 1 – five times more civilians were killed than combatants. In Operation Protective Edge, the ratio was 1 to 1. Any objective and professional observer could only praise Israel for this.

The report makes do with merely describing the outcome of the fighting (the number of fatalities, the number of buildings destroyed and so on), but totally ignores several parameters that could explain the outcome. The first such parameter is the circumstances and the conditions that existed at the time including the size and density of the population. The second is the enemy's strength. It is obvious that the stronger the enemy is – the more fighters it has, the more rockets and antitank missiles it possesses, the more tunnels it has dug – it will take more firepower to achieve the stated goals of the operation. This will necessarily lead to more fatalities. Any professional and balanced attempt to determine whether excessive or disproportionate force was used must therefore take into account the strength of the enemy; otherwise any comparison is like comparing apples to oranges. The Human Rights Council did not do this. The third parameter that must be applied is the enemy's code of behavior. When the enemy deliberately operates from within schools and hospitals, when it uses civilians as human shields and prevents them from fleeing areas under attack, the outcome will be more civilian deaths.

The authors of the report ignored any professional, military parameters that would have allowed it to compare Operation Protective Edge to other operations and their conclusions were not based on any solid facts. Our government always prefers to use arguments that convince no one but us. It calls the HRC a fundamentally anti-Israel body. That may be true, but that should be the conclusion of our attempts to discredit the report, not the reason to discredit it. Israel must work with more objective elements, such as the defense establishments of Western nations or the U.S. Congress. That entails more effort, but it's something that we must do."

Ends…

 

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: Writing in Globes, former Israeli ambassador to the UN Dan Gillerman says that Israel's response to the UN report into Operation Protective Edge must not be defensive and that it provides us with an opportunity that we cannot let slip.

"The UN report into Operation Protective Edge did not surprise me. Given that it was created by the Human Rights Council, it was inevitable that it would be biased. The UNHRC was established in 2006, while I served as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Even then, I warned against the formation of such a body. In my speech to the General Assembly, I warned that the UN was setting up a monster that would take the duplicity and the double standards of the UN to new levels. In fact, the UN is guilty of triple standards: one rule for dictatorial regimes, one rule for democracies and another rule altogether for Israel.

Apart from me, the only other envoy to the UN who voted against the establishment of the HRC was my American counterpart at the time, John Bolton. Both Israel and the United States announced that they would not be members of the Human Rights Council. Unfortunately – but not surprisingly – we were right. From the day of its inception, the UNHRC has served as a one-sided, distorted and blatant platform for Israeli bashing. The vast majority of the body's resolutions have been anti-Israeli, yet it has turned a blind eye to human rights violations in countries that regularly and systematically abuse their citizens (perhaps because some of the worst offenders are actually members of the HRC). The HRC has not passed a single resolution condemning Sudan, Zimbabwe or Syria; it has focused obsessively on Israel.

Just recently, the UN Human Rights Council slammed Israel's treatment of women, despite the fact that Israel has had a female prime minister, has seven women serving as ministers in the current government, and has a female chief justice, a female central bank governor – and despite the fact that three of the country's main banks are headed by women. At the same time, the HRC ignored the fact that in Saudi Arabia women are not even allowed to drive.

For these depressing reasons, the HRC report into Operation Protective Edge did not surprise me. But, even when it is the work of such a biased and flawed organization – the report is infuriating. It draws a moral parallel between a terrorist organization that seeks to kill innocent civilians, including women and children, and a sovereign state that is protecting the lives of its citizens. It demonstrably ignores the fact that Israel made massive efforts to avoid civilian casualties, while Hamas used civilians as hostages and human shields. Hamas may even have hoped that civilians would be killed, in order to use their deaths for propaganda purposes.

The authors of the report failed to admit that, for Israel, every Palestinian child killed is the result of a terrible mistake and is a human tragedy, while for Hamas, every Israeli child killed is a victory and reason to celebrate.

The report that was published on Monday was biased, superficial, one-sided and fundamentally flawed. Its recommendations are grave and hostile and could do severe damage to Israel. The call on the International Criminal Court in The Hague to consider war crimes charges against Israel is malicious and hypocritical. Therefore, Israel must fight against the report and its recommendations in any way possible; we must recruit our best and brightest minds to the cause. While the government was right to refuse to cooperate with the report in any way, shape or form – since it correctly assumed that it would not be able to influence such a hostile body – it could have done more on the diplomatic front to create a more positive public reaction once the report was published.

The huge effort made by the Israel Air Force and other branches of the military to avoid civilian deaths must be brought to the attention of the public and the media. We must prove to the world that Israel acted morally, which Hamas was anything but.

One possible platform for getting this message across is the UN General Assembly – the same body that created the Human Rights Council – which will be held in September. But we must not wait idly until them. We must start initiating personal meetings with opinion-shapers and influential organizations; we must organize international events to present our case to the world. We must do so not from a position of defense, but out of conviction that we are right.

In order to do this, Israel must recruit the most eloquent and respected supporters of the Jewish state – people like Bernard-Henri Lévy and Elie Wiesel – to argue Israel's corner. It is also important to understand how Israel's position in the geopolitical world influences international responses to the report. It would be easier for Israel to deal with this report if global public opinion were more positive, if the government's policies were clearer and if it was perceived as a country that wants peace. In this context, it is worth remembering how, immediately after Operation Cast Lead, six European leaders stood beside then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in his Jerusalem residence in order to express their support for Israel after a bloody war, in which many civilians were killed. While it is true that Olmert's Gaza war lead to the publication of the Goldstone Report, the international atmosphere and support for Israel allowed us to deal with it more effectively.

Despite the report – and perhaps because of it – Israel must take the initiative. We must stop being responsive and defensive and must start to take a leadership role. Ironically, Operation Protective Edge created unprecedented opportunities for Israel to reach understandings with many Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. It allowed us to promote a solution to the Israel-Arab conflict not based on the two-state solution, but on the 23-state solution.

Israel's answer to this wretched report must not be solely political. Its answer must also be diplomatic; it must be played out in the international media and on the hasbara front. Even if we do not manage to change the twisted thinking of those who compiled the report, we can – and must – change the way that world leaders relate to it. Given the alarming rise in regional terrorism, the Iranian threat and the danger of isolation and boycott, we must act now to create a new regional reality and a better future.

Even though this distorted report is not deserving of a response from Israel, its extremism and its blatant falsehoods could provide us with a golden opportunity. This is the not the time for our leaders to be split into government and opposition. This is the time to national unity, for creativity and for leadership."

Ends…

 

A PURELY POLITICAL REPORT: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that, while the Human Rights Council's Gaza report – like the HRC itself – is biased, distorted and misleading, it does contain some accusations that Israel would do well to address.

"The outcome of the United Nation Human Rights Council's investigation into Operation Protective Edge was predetermined. There was no way on earth that the HRC could produce a report that was anything other than highly politicized and highly biased. For years the HRC has been gunning for Israel; it has spent more time discussing and besmirching Israel than any other country on the planet. Its political slant is determined in advance by its composition; members of the council are mainly third-world countries, where human rights are more honored in the breach than the observance and where tolerance and democratic values are an anathema.

This does not mean, however, that we should automatically reject everything that appears in the report, which does contain some salient and tough points that have a foundation in reality. One such element is the assertion by the head of the committee, former New York Supreme Court judge Mary McGowan Davis, that when the life of an Israeli soldier hangs in the balance, all of the rules go out the window. This assertion is certainly backed up by the events of August 1, 2014 in Rafah – known here as Black Friday – following the killing of an IDF soldier and the abduction of his body into Gaza. Even now, the IDF's Military Advocate General has yet to file its conclusions into what happened there. The report was also accurate when it claimed that 'children on both sides suffered from bed-wetting, shaking at night, clinging to parents, nightmares and increased levels of aggressiveness' and that Israel adopted 'new patterns, notably attacks on residential buildings resulting in the death of entire families.'

It is also true that – as the report concludes – both sides in the conflict, Israel and Hamas, committed war crimes; at least, in terms of the outcome of their actions. Of course, the important question is whether Israel deliberately committed war crimes. The answer is, obviously, that it did not. The IDF makes every effort to avoid civilian and noncombatant fatalities. Hamas, in contrast, has no such compunctions. In criminal law, there is a concept known as intent, which courts take into account when passing sentence. The HRC did not do so.

It is the moral equivalency that the report draws between Israel and Hamas that has got Jerusalem so hot under the collar – and for good reason. Still, it's a shame that the government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did not agree to cooperate with the commission. Every public relations expert will tell clients who are afraid of negative reporting in the media that, despite their concerns, it’s always best to cooperate and to present their side of the story. In this case, and in most such cases, that version will create a more complex and nuanced picture. If the IDF and the government of Israel had cooperated with the authors of the report, they would not have been more denigrated by the contents of the report and may have even succeeded in making it more moderate. But Israel's political and military leadership decided not to cooperate. Such decisions are grounded in domestic policy. It's all politics and it's all predetermined.

What is really important is that the IDF conduct a serious and thorough investigation into every suspicion of harm to innocent civilians, that it ensure that its soldiers are well versed in the rules of warfare, that it reconsider its excessive use of firepower in the battlefield and that it genuinely probes accusations of criminal activity. It must do all of this in order to lift the cloud of suspicion that such internal investigation merely pay lip service to the truth and verge on whitewashes.

Incidentally, I wonder whether Netanyahu has read the report. After all, he said ahead of its publication that it would be a waste of time even reading it. But once it was published, he said that the Foreign Ministry would study the report before responding. And who just happens to be the current head of the Foreign Ministry? Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu."

Ends…

 

THE LAST LAP: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Mort Zuckerman highlights the five key issues on which the six world powers must hold fast in nuclear negotiations with Iran.

"The great showdown between Iran and the Western powers is supposed to result in final nuclear agreement by June 30. By July 1, Iran will have clearly, firmly and irrevocably committed to forsaking its long-denied ambition to build nuclear missiles and the U.S. and its five partners (Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany) will have agreed to end sanctions. Or not.

Nerves are frayed. Israel fears it will be betrayed by U.S. President Barack Obama’s eagerness to have Iran come in out of the cold to be 'a very successful regional power.' Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., expressed the anxiety in a preview in The Wall Street Journal of his forthcoming history of U.S.-Israel relations.

Maybe there is a bout of nerves in Tehran, too, newly inflamed by the revelations that someone bugged all the hotel rooms in Lausanne, Switzerland where Iranian negotiators conferred. We don’t know what the spooks learned, but it may well have unnerved Iran’s leaders.

The dilemma we always had with Iran is whether to take its leaders at their word – or rather, which word to take them at. Now they seem to be making an attempt to assure the P5+1 nations that they are on the level in not wishing to go nuclear. It is more than 10 years since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei promulgated a fatwa declaring nuclear weapons immoral. Such an edict is exalted in Iran as coming from the highest religious authority. And now, as the negotiators meet in Vienna to put flesh on the bones of the Lausanne framework, there is a reaffirmation from a general of the Revolutionary Guards, which counts a great deal in Iran’s power system.

According to The Jerusalem Post, Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami insisted on the sacred nature of the fatwa. 'The edict is a principled, moral position before it is a technical one,' he was quoted as saying at a defense conference at a Tehran university last week, adding that instead of a nuclear weapon, Iran would aim to develop its arsenal of precision guided missiles that minimize civilian casualties.

Nerves are frayed in Washington, too.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was quoted in The New York Times a few days ago on the eve of his return to the final sessions in Vienna suggesting that it was no longer a priority for the P5+1 powers to insist Iran come clean about the nuclear military work it has been doing all these years while mimicking ignorance. Learning just what mischief Iran has been up to is regarded as crucial by the International Atomic Energy Agency – indeed an essential point of tracing the veracity of the pledges Iran is now expected to make on keeping its commitment.

Well, it still is if Iran is to have any hope of being relieved of sanctions, a huge boost that will still further enhance its power. Now the State Department has clarified that the U.S. and its partners still want to know – and how right they are.

But it is hard to reconcile this principled position with Iran’s 'death to Israel,' 'death to America' rhetoric; with the plan the supreme leader detailed to drive every Jew out of Israel? and indeed with Iran’s decades of nuclear deception. If the ayatollah has imposed this exalted position on the country, why are his ministers giving such a hard time to the U.S., Russian, Chinese, French, British and German negotiators who have spent so much time and energy trying to pin them down? What does it do for mutual trust when immediately after Lausanne, the ayatollah rants about Americans as snakes in the grass – duplicitous, deceiving and untrustworthy – and then the framework agreement is vigorously misremembered by Tehran? Kerry is not a mythmaker.

Iran’s prevarications should remind us that while we would welcome the enterprise and creativity of the Iranian people in the community of nations, the regime is certainly repressive. It’s the nature of the regime and its history that makes it imperative for the P5+1 to hold fast on a number of key issues as way stations en route to the prize that Iran seeks: relief from sanctions.

1. Transparency. Iran must ease access to sites immediately as required by the Additional Protocol agreed in Lausanne and implement Code 3.1 of the 1974 Safeguard Agreements, which imposes a requirement of advance notice to the IAEA in Vienna of any intention to build any new nuclear facility. And the history of Iran’s covert military activity can no longer be, well, covert.

2. Enriched Uranium. Iran had agreed to export enriched uranium to Russia so that for 15 years at least it would never have more than 300 kilograms. The deal broke down. The IAEA recently reported Iran’s stockpile had risen by 20 percent. This is unacceptable. The agency found no evidence of cheating in a rush to develop a bomb? indeed Iran had halted work on other facilities.

But one Iranian negotiator, Abbas Araqchi, now says there’s no question of shipping the fuel abroad. So what’s going on? Is there a bug in the system?

3. Arak. Secure a timetable for shutting down the heavy water reactor at Arak, having its redesign approved by the IAEA and the U.S. and its spent fuel sent to another country.

4. Fordow. The scary Fordow plant, which was deliberately built underground to protect it from bombing, is to be converted to a scientific laboratory. The Israelis want it shut entirely so it can’t be reused as a safe haven for nuclear development. One way or the other, we must ensure that bomb-related research and development is not possible there.

5. Sanctions. Iran demands that sanctions cease as soon as there’s a final agreement. No way. The elaborately tough sanctions squeeze was a big international cooperative effort and its dismantling is a big prize. It should happen only when the IAEA is satisfied with the big initial steps on transparency and access, with the plans for conversion of Fordow and Arak and with an assured ceiling for Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. In short, the sanctions shouldn’t be lifted until road blocks to a bomb are in place.

If we do go down this road of giving Iran a chance to behave in a civilized manner, let’s keep in mind the adage that experience is a wonderful thing it enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again."

Ends…

 

THE UN'S THREE CRIMES: In its editorial on Wednesday, Haaretz says that, despite Israel's reservations about the United Nations, the Human Rights Council and its Gaza war report, the government cannot simply ignore the findings that were published on Monday.

"The UN Human Rights Council’s report on last summer’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza cuts Israel no breaks. The harsh data it presents – including 1,462 Palestinian civilians killed, about a third of them children; thousands of people wounded and left homeless; and the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure – have for the most part already been reported in the Israeli and global media, and don’t offer much that is new.

Thus the dispute isn’t over the facts, but over their interpretation. Did Israel commit war crimes, and should it therefore be put on trial in the International Criminal Court, as the inquiry committee’s chairwoman, Mary McGowan Davis, advised the international community to do? Or did it merely defend itself in a legitimate fashion?

Israel, which decided not to cooperate with the international inquiry committee, bases its response to the report on three claims. First, 'The HRC condemns Israel more than it condemns Iran, Syria and North Korea put together.' Second, 'The HRC originally appointed someone seen as an anti-Israel inciter and agitator to head the inquiry committee.' Third, 'Israel doesn’t commit war crimes, but is defending itself against terrorism that seeks to annihilate it.' On the basis of these defense arguments, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared a few days ago that even reading the committee’s report would be 'a waste of time.'

Israel is indeed at the height of a delegitimization campaign against it, as an occupying state for the past 48 years. But its response to the report shows that it doesn’t know its place or understand its status. In Israel’s eyes, the UN is guilty for having decided to investigate; its officials are haters of Israel; and the organization’s greatest sin is that it condemns Israel, which defines itself as a democracy belonging to the community of enlightened nations, more than it condemns the most benighted of countries.

The problem is that Operation Protective Edge has been thrust into the heart of the conflict between Israel and the UN, as if deliberately to inflame it. And even after the completion of both the UN report and Israel’s own investigative report, horrifying stories about the conduct of Israeli soldiers during this operation have yet to cease trickling out.

The prime minister isn’t entitled to shrug his soldiers at this harsh report and dismiss it as if it were an unimportant nuisance, because the battle isn’t just over Israel’s innocence in the eyes of the international community, and especially in the eyes of the International Criminal Court. This report holds a mirror up to Israel that, even if it is warped, ought to greatly worry every citizen who still thinks that the Israel Defense Forces is a moral army, that a country isn’t a terrorist organization and must comply with the laws of war, especially against civilians, and that his standing as an Israeli citizen depends on his country’s standing in the world’s eyes. It isn’t explanations and whining justifications that the country needs now, but a far-reaching correction of its view of military morality."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION SCENARIOS/SYRIA POLICY: Mehmet Tezkan notes the problems facing a new opposition-based coalition in centrist Milliyet: "The CHP [Republican People's Party] leader has done everything possible to establish a government without the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party]. But he has failed to convince the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]. The MHP has neither accepted a CHP-MHP-HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] coalition, nor approved the idea of the HDP giving the go-ahead to a CHP-MHP coalition from the outside. The CHP’s leader made his last move and offered MHP leader Devlet Bahceli to be prime minister. But the MHP's reaction was very critical."

Sahin Alpay lauds the new Kurdish moderation in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The CHP and the MHP are Turkey's Kemalist parties. The former represents the authoritarian secularism of Kemalism, while the latter represents the authoritarian [Turkish] identity of Kemalism. Although there have been attempts to reform both parties, they failed to shed their Kemalist nature and evolve into forces that embrace wider political groups. With its new policies that not only defend the rights and freedoms of the Kurds but those of all groups that suffer from separatism, the HDP has created a good chance that the Kurdish political movement will distance itself from violence, and that Turkey’s territorial integrity will be secured."

Abdulkadir Selvi assails MHP leader Bahceli in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "What does it mean to want an AKP without President Erdogan? How dare Devlet Bahceli say this? Bahceli is playing a very dangerous game. He is trying to put his hands inside the AKP and carry out a surgical operation. If an AKP-MHP coalition is not formed, there is only one person responsible for this, and that is Devlet Bahceli."

Gulay Gokturk laments a ‘brotherly’ fall out in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Had the HDP and the AKP not turned into such 'hostile brothers' before the election, we would have been facing the most natural and convenient formula now: that of an AKP-HDP coalition. These two parties have worked together to resolve the country's most vital problem and have the potential to agree on a new constitution. If such a coalition could be formed, the Kurdish region in northern Syria would pose no threat to Turkey. On the contrary, one more step would have been made towards the establishment of a 'Kurdish basin' - the one we have been long dreaming of and that would maintain close relations with Turkey."

Murat Yetkin anticipates a change in Turkey’s Syria policy in centre-left Radikal: "Expectations of an AKP-CHP coalition have been on the rise since yesterday. CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, for example, has promised that over two million Syrians will be sent back after internal peace is secured in Syria with Turkey's help. He has also said that with him in power, Turkey would not support radical Islamist groups in Syria's civil war. Ankara’s Syria policy will be one of the first things to change in a potential AKP-CHP coalition."

Dogu Ergil strikes a positive note in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "With no other power in the region offering any serious resistance to ISIS, the Kurds have forced it retreat on several fronts. Syrian Kurdish forces and their Arab allies have rescued about 50 villages and towns from ISIS. Because of this, the U.S. and its allies in the East and the West now see them as a local power that should be supported and protected. It is difficult for Turkey - which opposes this development - to resolve the 'Kurdish problem' internally and establish friendship and cooperate with Syrian Kurds externally. But with strong Kurdish representation in the Turkish parliament, it may now be possible to address these issues. A coalition government in which the HDP will take part or contribute to might offer a golden opportunity on this issue."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Moderate Iran is uncertain: "Many believe that developments are creating a positive atmosphere in the negotiations in the run-up to the July 1 deadline. It is not clear whether the recent U.S. and IAEA position on inspecting Iran's military sites is a retreat. The new position could mean that all parties involved in Iran's nuclear dossier are seeking a result from the months-long negotiations." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is glum: "The American reaction to the Majlis bill to safeguard Iran's nuclear achievements is evidence that the measure came at the proper time. The State Department said that Washington will not sign an agreement that does not provide access to Iranian sites. This is an official announcement and document. It means that - unless its demands are met, the U.S. does not want a nuclear agreement to be reached." 

Reformist Arman argues that constructive engagement precedes economic ties: "If a deal is reached, we should not expect wide economic ties the day after. We should first consolidate our ties with the world and reach a common understanding with the West. In order to cooperate with the world in our current circumstances, we should look to the future rather than the past. We should be able to fulfil our domestic and foreign goals based on national interests by constructive cooperation."

 

YEMEN/SAUDI ARABIA: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami exaggerates: "Increased pressure from Yemeni fighters along the Saudi borders has forced the Saudi royal family to beg for peace with the Houthis. The developments unfolding today indicate the certain defeat of the Saudis in Yemen. This was clear from the first day of the attack. Unlike his predecessors, the new Saudi king started a war without thinking about consequences. Exiting it is very difficult. It is likely that this will lead to the fall of Al Saud dynasty and the end of its rule. The resistance of the Yemeni people against these crimes, and the advancement of the Yemeni people's forces on the land front, have made the Saudis realize that their calculations were completely wrong; now there is no option other than to admit defeat." 

 

WIKILEAKS/SAUDI ARABIA: Hard-line Javan expects more revelations: "The recent revelations by WikiLeaks about Saudi Arabia are valuable only if they really result in a change in Saudi behaviour. The only thing that can make Saudi Arabia change its behaviour is international reaction, which unfortunately has not been very strong. Saudi Arabia has not only bought many Western and Arab media and forced them to remain silent through payments and bribes, but it has also used such methods with countries and international organizations. It is not unreasonable to expect future documents to disclose dirty Saudi acts to promote corruption in international institutions, and among political figures - provided that WikiLeaks itself is not deceived by Saudi petrodollars." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Resalat paints a grim picture: "The situation in Saudi society is volatile due to the mass unemployment of Saudi youths and their discontent with the political structure and the mental and physical backwardness of the country. This is the fault of the regime's dictatorial acts that have led to frequent whispers about a political and social explosion. One important Saudi mistake is misunderstanding domestic developments. Saudis do not want to believe that their country is like a powder keg that could explode at any moment. Activists have expressed their opposition to the current political approach of Riyadh and are preparing for protests. Differences among the members of the ruling family have also made Saudi Arabia more vulnerable." 

 

ISRAEL/PALESTINE: Conservative Khorasan comments: "The Palestinian National Authority's conflict with Hamas over the future Palestinian government delights Prime Minister Netanyahu, who will be the first person to benefit from it. ISIS and Al-Nusra make the Muslim World forget the Palestinian issue. It is not a secret that Israel has an active partnership with other countries in the region to strengthen terrorism. This alliance serves Israeli security and removes the issue of Palestine, a historical wound, from public opinion." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The meeting path

2-Window of opportunity, future uncertaint 

3-Dress rehearsal

 

1-The meeting path

 

Whatever happens after June 30th, Washington’s only option will be to return to negotiations with Tehran either under today’s terms, or in conditions that are even worse for it and its regional allies, says Nasser Qandil in today’s Lebanese al-Bina'

 

As we enter the final week before the deadline for an agreement on Iran's nuclear program, it should be clear that whatever scenario may be imagined, negotiations are ultimately the only path before the U.S. and its allies, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Syrian regime Lebanese daily. Failure to reach an agreement now would only mean negotiations in conditions that are far worse for the U.S. and its allies.

 

ONE WEEK FROM TODAY: "Exactly one week from today, it will be June 30th, the date set for reaching a final agreement over the Iranian nuclear file," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

This date will either bring an understanding or failure and an end to negotiations. If the deadline were to be extended, it would be a merely technical matter of no more than a few days. It would in effect mean that an understanding has been reached. A detailed framework of principles was formulated and signed three months ago, leaving no room for talk of an extension of negotiations over questions of principle. That framework only permits an extension if an agreement is reached but further time is required to agree on the final formulation of some of its terms. That is different from what happened in the Vienna talks that ended on November 24th 2014 without an agreement, and that were crowned with a seven-months' extension that ends on June 30th. The first part of that extension ended at the end of March with the signing of the framework agreement. Our assessment at that time was that the chance of reaching a final agreement was about 50:50.

- If an understanding is not reached and signed, the international and regional situation will become more complicated, resembling entry into a dark tunnel, as if a world war could break out the day after. Washington and the Western states will return to their strict sanctions on Iran, and Iran will declare that it has resumed uranium enrichment to high levels and is storing what it enriches. In about one month’s time, it would have sufficient enriched uranium to make the bomb it is still declaring it does not wish to own, invoking religious and moral considerations for doing so.

Moreover, tension and threats will rise, and perhaps some military harassment or skirmishes may occur, pushing Iran closer and closer to claiming its right to produce a bomb so as to prevent any aggression against it. In that case, the prospects of hearing about Iran's first test of a missile armed with a nuclear warhead will grow. This would be a missile of which Iran already has thousands anyway. Its range extends further than the capitals of Western states, and it requires a smaller amount of enriched uranium than the bomb.

In that case, the international horizons would darken, and negotiations would be resumed. But then, the aim of the negotiations would be to recognize Iran as a military nuclear state. In fact, Iran may accept nothing less than permanent membership in the UN Security Council, in which case the more rational Americans would ask those who have brought the negotiations to failure: ‘What have you done to us you idiots?’

- The other possibility in case of failure would be the spread of regional tensions surrounding Iran and its allies, with Washington resuming its mobilization, support, and incitement of its allies who are already upset about the prospects of an agreement. The harshest confrontations would break out, from Iraq to Yemen to Syria to Lebanon. Other fronts, for example in Kuwait and the UAE, could also head towards clashes that mar the regional map. Similar skirmishes may also occur in the Red Sea, possibly reaching Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, and elsewhere.

But all this will occur after the U.S.'s relations with each of Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – Washington’s most prominent allies in the region – have been damaged and after all these parties have hemorrhaged their capabilities and powers. Turkey is mired in domestic problems that leave it less able to go to war. Saudi Arabia is failing in the Yemen war, which has already damaged its prestige, capabilities, and status. It also suffers from lethal domestic conflicts, and is being gnawed from within by ISIS and al-Qa'ida. As for Israel, it has failed to adjust the balance of deterrence with Hizbollah. And the Syrian opposition is a thing of the past, leaving only ISIS and the Nusra Front on the ground, neither of which is at the height of its powers.

Even if Washington were to resort to the option of confrontation by waging a direct war, the more rational American mind will speak to those who had brought the negotiations to failure thus: ‘If you want the option of confrontation, do you not realize that the conditions for such confrontation were better two years ago, when the American fleets came to strike Syria under cover of charges having to do with its use of chemical weapons? At the time, all the allies were ready and in a moral and material state conducive to waging war. And al-Qa'ida's branches were not the sole heir to any victory that Washington could dream of achieving at the time.’

This rational American mind would also ask those who pushed for the failure of the negotiations: ‘Did you not calculate properly when you clashed with Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and hemorrhaged their powers, did you not know all of this, but opted for war when it was too late? And who will ensure that you will emerge victorious when the people have already heard you say that this war would be a hundred times more difficult and worse than the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and they have seen you retreating in defeat there? So why are you repeating the same mistakes – unless this is your sole way to gather the courage to sign an agreement as a way to avoid war after being driven into one, and after your allies beg you to find any solution at whatever price because they are inflexible and only understand the consequences once they get involved and lose?’

- This leaves the possibility that the negotiations will end successfully by the end of this month with the understanding announced in a week from today, or a few days later. Once that happens, the region will enter a totally new phase. Iran would be liberated from an international discourse that has pursued it as an outlaw state. It would regain frozen assets to the value of 150-billion dollars, as well as its status in the international oil and gas market, producing four-times as much as it is producing and selling today. The world's markets would open up to it, and investments will flow into it.

Politically, the war on terrorism would be the title for a permissible and needed partnership between Washington and Tehran in the region. Meanwhile, Washington's Turkish, Saudi, and Israeli allies would have to confront their bad luck and expect the worse. For they would have suffered much and lost their wars with Iran's allies when Iran was being punished and pursued. What will the situation be like then, when Iran is at the height of its powers?

The estrangement between the U.S. and its allies would increase, and Washington's conviction would be further consolidated that maintaining these states as allies requires changing their rulers. It would also conclude that cooperation with Iran and its allies in localized places, and where possible, is not impermissible, if refraining from such cooperation is merely intended to appease allies that do not warrant such appeasement.

In that case, the region would enter a phase of dismantling and reconstituting the pro-Washington governments. On the other side, Tehran's allies would celebrate their victories, and the boundaries between confrontation with Washington's allies and the war against terrorism – that is, against Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel's 'betting horses,' namely, ISIS, the Nusra Front, and al-Qa'ida, as in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – would be blurred. And the allies of Washington's allies everywhere, including in Lebanon, would start checking their necks [for fear of the guillotine]. So, will they do this sooner rather than later?

Whichever path one may consider, there is an end that meets up with the other paths. And the meeting point is a return to negotiations, but in conditions that are worse for Washington and even disastrous for its allies. So which is the foolish side that is squandering the chance of signing an agreement at the scheduled time when the conditions are better for them?

"And even if we find them beginning to feel their necks early on, that would make no difference. Because there is a great difference between feeling your neck in anticipation of a slap on the face, and feeling it in anticipation of having your head chopped off," concludes Qandil.

Ends…

 

 

2-Window of opportunity, future uncertainty

 

Egypt wants a greater role for Hamas in confronting the common terrorist threat, and Hamas wants to restrict that role to the Strip's borders. And that in itself creates a greater margin for rapprochement and speeds up the process of turning the leaf on estrangement and hostility. We are not unlikely to witness a gradual development in the bilateral relations between the two sides, but not by bounds and leaps. Nor is it unlikely that this will have its effects on Egypt's relations with the Brotherhood after a while, even though this is not inevitable. After all, the 'honeymoon' years of Hamas's relations with the Syrian regime were also black years for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. But what is happening is that a window of opportunity has opened that can be used in the debate in Cairo over Egypt's options for emerging from the dark tunnel of difficult reconciliation and democratic transformation--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Egypt’s decision [to return its ambassador to Tel Aviv] cannot be viewed in isolation of the changes in the map of strategic alliances and balances of power in the region, and that are tantamount to a genuine earthquake. This is driving the major powers to collect all the cards they can so as to use them in confronting a future shrouded in uncertainty… is [the Egyptian ambassador's return] a prelude to an Arab/Israeli normalization that is being imposed regionally by the convergence between the interests of major states in the region and a redefinition of the 'enemy' that has become Iran and not the Hebrew state, as far as certain Arab states are concerned [?] Such normalization is also required at the Palestinian level via a likely 'peace deal' on the grounds that this is 'an advance deposit' that Israel insists on because it is aware that the Palestinian cause may have lost its 'Arab embrace' in light of the collapses and civil and sectarian wars that are taking the region by storm--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

 

There are growing signs of a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt, after both sides have given precedence to pragmatic considerations over their ideological commitments, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. The Egyptian ambassador’s recent return to Israel may be one of the side-effects of this rapprochement. The ambassador's return raises many serious questions whose answers will determine the course of some of the major crises in the region, maintains the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. But this only highlights the fact that Israel is reaping the benefits of the Arab world’s fragmentation and civil wars.

 

DIFFERENT FILES: "Has Egypt decided to separate the Hamas file from that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood?" asks 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Have foreign policy calculations and those pertaining to Egypt's regional role overtaken those of security and Egyptian domestic policy?

Such questions and others like them leap to mind in light of signs that the moment for turning the leaf in the crisis-ridden bilateral relations between Hamas and Egypt is drawing nearer.

The Egyptian court's [February 2015] decision denouncing Hamas as a terrorist organization was not a purely judicial ruling; but neither was the ruling to absolve it from this charge [two weeks ago] a purely judicial one either. In both cases, political calculations and security considerations had a strong influence on the court's discussions and final verdicts. But the most recent court ruling suggests that there is a chance for reopening bilateral channels of communication and 'normalizing' relations, if only at a minimum level.

We have always criticized the policy of severing relations and mutual estrangement between the two sides. And we have often held both sides responsible for the difficult situation that their bilateral relations have ended in – Hamas with its crude and open support for one Egyptian camp against another, and Cairo by confusing Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood's heavily-laden files. That was akin to shooting oneself in the foot and damaging the ability to move diplomatically along two main axes – that of tahdi'a [Gaza lull or calming down] with Israel, and that of inter-Palestinian [Fateh/Hamas] reconciliation.

Egypt came to understand this in time, and Hamas realized that the cost of involvement in the domestic conflicts and lineups of a state such as Egypt is extremely high. The two sides took a step backwards from the brink of the abyss. As a result, it became possible to hold meetings and contacts. In fact, for the first time in two years, it became possible to reopen the Rafah crossing for longer periods; and bringing in building materials into Gaza via the Rafah crossing also became possible.

As we noted recently, the Gaza Strip is on the receiving end of a torrent of initiatives these days aimed at achieving a truce and tahdi'a. Development in return for security. And Egypt is unable to stand on the other side of the fence and watch the scene. It is concerned with every detail of these agreements. In fact, it may find itself a party to some of them, as long as it is the Strip and Hamas's sole (non-Israeli) gateway to the world. And, unless Egypt finds a way to address the de facto [Hamas] authority on the ground in Gaza, whom would it speak to?

Moreover, Egypt knows that the PA in Ramallah wields no influence with Gaza, and that the head of the Palestinian national accord government needs prior permission from Hamas to 'visit' his office in the Strip. Moreover, Egypt realizes that those in Ramallah will not be happy about dismantling the siege and lifting the blockade on Hamas in particular, unless these measures pass through 'the eye of their needle' – and even if the Strip pays the price. With a little pragmatism, Cairo has come to realize that contacts with Hamas are unavoidable.

On the other hand, Hamas may have reached 'the age of despair' at the prospect of [former Egyptian president] Mursi and the Brotherhood returning to power in Cairo. It is undoubtedly watching the increasingly clear air of Egypt's international relations. It can see the regime consolidating its authority and power with each passing day. And the conviction that it is necessary to climb down from the Brotherhood's tree is also growing with each passing day. So, with a little pragmatism as well, Hamas sent enough reassuring messages to Cairo expressing its readiness for greater cooperation and coordination and, more importantly, for withdrawing totally from the game of domestic Egyptian conflicts.

[Hamas Deputy Politburo Head] Dr Musa Abu-Marzouq, who is in charge of dossier of relations with Egypt and contacts regarding a 'long-term tahdi'a,' is traveling back and forth on the Cairo/Doha/Gaza route. Such a development would not have been possible had it not been for an Egyptian green light, in fact had it not been for coordination and consultation with Cairo and its acquiescence.

The last thing that both Cairo and Hamas want, is a new Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. This is a shared interest that lays the grounds for the resumption of relations. It is no coincidence at all that the Egyptian ambassador’s return to Tel Aviv [this week] was simultaneous with the resumption of talk of indirect Israeli/Hamas contacts led by Abu-Marzouq and [Israeli ‘Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’] Yoav Mordechai, with the mediation of the Qatari Ambassador Mohammad al-'Emadi and the UN secretary-general's personal envoy, Nikolay Mladenov. Nor should we ignore the indirect role played by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

Moreover, like Israel, Egypt is closely observing the growing tension in Hamas's relations with the jihadi (ISIS-affiliated) groups in the Strip. It sees a shared interest with Hamas in repressing and excising these groups and severing the arteries that connect them and allow them to cooperate with their counterparts in Sinai. Egypt wants a greater role for Hamas in confronting the common terrorist threat, and Hamas wants to restrict that role to the Strip's borders. And that in itself creates a greater margin for rapprochement and speeds up the process of turning the leaf on estrangement and hostility.

We are not unlikely to witness a gradual development in the bilateral relations between the two sides, but not by bounds and leaps. Nor is it unlikely that this will have its effects on Egypt's relations with the Brotherhood after a while, even though this is not inevitable. After all, the 'honeymoon' years of Hamas's relations with the Syrian regime were also black years for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. But what is happening is that a window of opportunity has opened that can be used in the debate in Cairo over Egypt's options for emerging from the dark tunnel of difficult reconciliation and democratic transformation.

Finally, reports of Hamas/Egyptian rapprochement are not seen as good news in Ramallah. The wager there has been to employ Hamas's predicament and its strict isolation within the Strip's suffocating walls in order to formulate reconciliation terms that are suitable for the PA, Fateh, and the PLO.

Here, eyes turn towards Egypt again. Will Cairo confine itself to dealing with each side to the split separately as a de facto necessity? Or will it make use of its weight and status to resume its efforts to achieve inter-Palestinian reconciliation and restart the dialogue and help the Palestinians regain their lost national unity?

"We will not have to wait much longer before the white smoke rises from more than one chimney in the region," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS: "Two days ago, the Egyptian government decided to nominate a new ambassador to Tel Aviv for the first time since the former ambassador was withdrawn three years ago in protest against the [2012] Israeli aggression on Gaza at the time," writes the editorial in Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This decision was warmly welcomed in Israel of course particularly in light of the spectre of growing international isolation that is haunting Tel Aviv as a result of its racist policies that show little concern for the so-called 'international community.'

Even if this decision was expected or natural in light of the intelligence cooperation in Sinai in particular that has helped the Egyptian army regain the initiative there, it remains a striking development; indeed, a harsh one from a patriotic or nationalist perspective.

It seems that the Egyptian government paved the psychological or media path for this decision by reopening the Rafah crossing for a whole week before the beginning of month of Ramadan [last week]. It announced that it was reopening it again this week, which lends credence to speculation that there has been some 'ease' in its tense relations with Hamas.

But the fact is that what is needed from Egypt is much more than merely reopening a crossing, or providing some aid to the Strip's people who are confronting a humanitarian catastrophe in the true sense of the word. And this is to ignore the fact that reopening this crossing is both a legal and a humanitarian duty before being a national one.

Some observers have sought to link this decision to the French initiative to revive the peace process, one that Cairo has supported. According to this viewpoint, the presence of an Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv would help with the contacts necessary to exert pressure on Israel in this regard. But the truth is that the war criminal Netanyahu has rejected the French initiative in fact. Moreover, the French government has itself said that it will not try to impose its initiative on anyone.

Some Egyptian commentators have sought to explain this decision by reference to the alleged political contacts between Israel and Hamas aimed at agreeing on a long-term truce. They have also referred to the 'free-of-charge normalization' of relations between Israel and a number of Arab states that have never fought it, have lost no martyrs, and whose territories have not been occupied. Therefore, their response to the criticisms of the ambassador's return is to say that 'they deny us what they permit for themselves.' But regardless of whether these allegations are true or not, the prerequisites of Egypt’s national interest remain sufficient to confront Israel's savagery and its scorn for all international resolutions, authorities, and agreements to achieve peace. This has angered even some of Israel's closest allies, in fact.

The sad fact is that the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel without receiving anything real and tangible in terms of Palestinian national rights in return cannot but appear as a 'reward' for Israeli intransigence. In fact, it encourages it, which calls for urgent Egyptian action in this regard.

Egypt’s decision cannot be viewed in isolation of the changes in the map of strategic alliances and balances of power in the region, and that are tantamount to a genuine earthquake. This is driving the major powers to collect all the cards they can so as to use them in confronting a future shrouded in uncertainty.

In light of all this, it may be necessary to pause and consider a number of objective and legitimate questions including the following:

- First, is the Egyptian ambassador's return to Tel Aviv a prelude to an Arab/Israeli normalization that is being imposed regionally by the convergence between the interests of major states in the region and a redefinition of the 'enemy' that has become Iran and not the Hebrew state, as far as certain Arab states are concerned. Such normalization is also required at the Palestinian level via a likely 'peace deal' on the grounds that this is 'an advance deposit' that Israel insists on because it is aware that the Palestinian cause may have lost its 'Arab embrace' in light of the collapses and civil and sectarian wars that are taking the region by storm.

- Second, by returning its ambassador to Tel Aviv to Israel, is Cairo seeking to use Israel and the U.S. Congress against the Obama administration in light of the persistent tension in its relations with that administration, for many reasons including Washington’s criticisms of the legal conditions of the Brotherhood detainees – even though it has recently decided to resume its military aid to Cairo?

- Third, is the ambassador's return an attempt to 'appease Israel' in return for consolidating the new military situation in Sinai imposed by the confrontation with the terrorist attacks there? Egypt’s armed forces now have a greater presence there and a larger attack force deploying various weapons, as well as a united command for the Second and Third Armies, effectively rendering the military part of the [1979] peace treaty with Israel something of the past.

"The answers to these questions are sufficient to redraw the political map of the region and determine the course of some of its most important crises. But they will not alter the fact that Israel is reaping endless gains and victories without war in an [Arab] environment that is collapsing and breaking apart," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Dress rehearsal

 

The burning of a historic Christian Church in the Galilee by Israeli religious fanatics is a dress rehearsal of what may happen in the rest of Palestine as Israel asserts its ‘Jewish identity’ says Amin Qammouriyyeh in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The burning of the Church of the Multiplication of the Loaves and Fishes in Tabgha near Tiberias by Jewish extremists was just a 'rehearsal' for other attacks on non-Jewish sites in Palestine aimed at eliminating any vestige of non-Jewish history in the land, maintains a Lebanese commentator. This is a necessary prelude to declaring Israel as an exclusively Jewish state.

 

GOALS ACHIEVED: "The 'dress rehearsal' of burning down the Church at Tabgha at the hands of Jewish ISIS-like fanatics has achieved it goals," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The place is no mere house of worship. It is an age-old religious and historic site where Christ performed the miracle of the multiplication of loaves and fishes. But despite this, the reactions have fallen far short of the magnitude of the sin. This is because the region's people have grown accustomed to repeated reports of the destruction of temples, churches, mosques, religious seminaries and retreats, the demolition of ruins and sites, and the burning down of history from Sumer to Babel to Timbuktu, via Nimrod, al-Hadar, Ninawa, the Baghdad Museum, and Syria's fortresses and castles. No new catastrophe is enough to upset anyone’s mood or draw their attention, in the wake of the torrent of humanitarian and cultural massacres that are being perpetrated today.

Tadmur's [Palmyra's] ruins that stood their ground throughout history are now waiting for a destruction that will be followed by disappearance amidst the silence of graves. The 'ISIS-ist' Jews who burnt down the Tabgha Church are not in Zenobia's city [Tadmur]. Nor are we blaming 'the international Zionist conspiracy' for all the consequences of our backwardness and savagery. For our 'ISIS-ists' are many, and hail from all of shades of the spectrum. Even if some may have acquired official or party-political or ideological titles, they have shown no humanitarian sense or any cultural concern on the battlefield more elevated than that of those who bear the title of 'terrorists.'

But the 'ISIS-ist' Israelis are making no secret of their satisfaction at what our own 'ISIS-ists' are doing. The annihilation and burial of human history, and the erasing of the memory of enemies and those of a different creed is an ancient Zionist hobby. The aim is to ensure that only one perspective remains for reading the past and future; namely, the Biblical perspective. Israeli archaeologists and historians have been very creative in distorting facts and misrepresenting creeds, while our own 'ISIS-ists' have proven their skill in annihilating anything civilized or of value among us.

Amidst the Arabs’ current drowning in the quagmire of political, cultural, and moral disintegration, the Israeli rehearsal that has succeeded in Tiberias may be repeated in Jerusalem, al-Khalil [Hebron], an-Nasrah [Nazareth], and Beit Lahem [Bethlehem]. For who will deter Israel's 'ISIS-ists' from dancing over the ruins of the Aqsa Mosque and the Church of Nativity if the [Sunni] head of the Arab household is beating the drums for them?

And who among the Arabs has enough shame to raise their voice if a few hundreds-of-thousands of Palestinians were to be deported from the Galilee, the Naqab [Negev] and the West Bank by force or enticement, now that half of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya's people are refugees outside their homes or their homelands?

Israel’s 'Jewishness' of is no mere empty talk or illusion. It manifests itself in actions that are taken every day, one step at a time, and that are implementing a detestable racist Judaization in Palestine, striking at Palestinian unity, and breaking neighboring countries apart in pursuit of their ultimate aim.

"And while we wait for Israel's official declaration [of its Jewish character] after securing our necessary recognition of it, it is no wonder that the fires will continue to rage in the region, paving the way for different maps based on new foundations; or more accurately, new stakes driven into the heart of the region that befit the nature of its new-born entities," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Another Report

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with the United Nations Human Rights Council's report into last summer's war in the Gaza Strip. Israel Hayom's lead headline – 'The Terrorists' Rights Report' – accurately reflects not only that paper's editorial response to the report, but that of the Israeli government as a whole. Yedioth Ahronoth, too, goes hyperbolic in its lead headline, referring to the findings of the commission as 'The UN's Hypocrisy Report.'

More measured headlines appear in Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post, both of which focus on the reports' conclusion that there is evidence that both Hamas and Israel committed war crimes during Operation Protective Edge. The commission announced that it had gathered 'substantial information' and 'credible allegations' that both sides had committed war crimes in the conflict that killed more than 2,140 Palestinians and 73 Israelis.

'The extent of the devastation and human suffering in Gaza was unprecedented and will impact generations to come,' said the chair of the commission, New York judge Mary McGowan Davis in a statement. The report decried the 'huge firepower' used in Gaza, with Israel launching more than 6,000 airstrikes and firing 50,000 artillery shells during the 51-day operation. Palestinian armed groups fired 4,881 rockets and 1,752 mortars toward Israel.

According to the report, at least 142 Palestinian families lost three or more members in strikes on residential buildings in Gaza during the conflict. 'The fact that Israel did not revise its practice of air-strikes, even after their dire effects on civilians became apparent raises questions of whether this was part of a broader policy that was at least tacitly approved at the highest level of government,' the commission said. The report also protested what it called the 'indiscriminate' firing of thousands of rockets and mortars at Israel, which it said appeared to have been intended to 'spread terror' among Israeli civilians.

The report had been scheduled to be published during the Human Rights Council's annual session in March, but investigators obtained a delay after the head of the team, William Schabas, quit under Israeli objections over prior anti-Israel bias. Israel did not cooperate with the commission's inquiry, saying its findings were a foregone conclusion against the Jewish state. Israel earlier this month released its own government-sanctioned inquiry into Operation Protective Edge, which underscored Hamas crimes during the conflict.

According to Ynet, Israel has now launched a new diplomatic drive to counter the automatic Arab majority in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in light of an impending council vote regarding whether or not to adopt as official the findings of Monday's report. Foreign Ministry officials are expecting a vote in favor of the report in the coming days, due to the voting bloc within the council that traditionally aligns with the wishes of Arab countries who vote against Israel.

Behind-the-scene talks with key players in the UNHRC have already begun, but, if adopted by the council, the report will be passed onto the UN General Assembly, as occurred with the Goldstone Report in wake of a previous Gaza conflict in 2009, or Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will be asked directly to monitor its implementation. The diplomatic efforts to sway opinion in the UNHRC in Israel's favor will include a public propaganda campaign in the coming days, meant to spread Israel's view that IDF conduct during the war was 'according to the highest international standards.' This effort is expected to be led on social media.

Israeli leaders, needless to say, condemned the UN report as 'biased' and 'flawed.' Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said the commission that wrote the report was appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, which he said 'does everything but look after human rights.' 'Israel doesn't commit war crimes, but defends itself from a terrorist organization that calls for its destruction. We will not sit idly by. We'll continue to act with strength and decisiveness against all those who try to harm us and our citizens and we'll do so in accordance with international law,' Netanyahu said.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett said the report 'has blood on its hands for allowing the murder of Jews.' Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said that the report is 'distorted and has one aim: To tarnish Israel's image and add fuel to the fire of de-legitimization.'

Israel's ambassador to the United Nations issued a scathing condemnation, branding council members as 'the soldiers of Hamas.' Ron Prosor noted that the findings of the committee supplemented moves by the Palestinian Authority to attack Israel diplomatically. 'The Palestinians have moved the battlefield to the United Nations,' he said. 'The UN is the true frontline, the Human Rights Council serves as the soldiers of the Palestinians and Hamas, and this biased report is their weapon.'

Hamas welcomed the 'condemnation' of Israel in the report: 'We welcome the report's condemnation of the Zionist occupier for its war crimes during the last war against Gaza,' said Fawzi Barhoum, a spokesman for the Islamist movement that rules the Gaza Strip. At the same time, however, Hamas denied that its rockets had targeted Israeli civilian population centers, insisting that it was aiming at military installations.

In other news, all the papers report that Druze protesters on the Golan Heights attacked an IDF ambulance carrying Syrian rebels wounded in the civil war, pulling the injured Syrians out of the vehicle and beating them. One of the Syrians died of his injuries. Two Israelis soldiers who were in the ambulance were lightly hurt in the assault.

The incident marked the second time in 24 hours that Druze protesters targeted an ambulance carrying wounded Syrians. It comes against the backdrop of tensions over Syrian rebels targeting members of the Druze community across the border. The head of the Israeli Druze community, Sheikh Mowafak Tarif, strongly condemned the attack, saying 'this is not our way, and we're in pain over what happened. This is a criminal act, carried out by lawless people and the authorities must act.'

IDF spokesman Moti Almoz called the events on the northern border very grave. He stressed that the IDF condemns all forms of violence against its soldiers and wounded Syrians. He stressed that since the outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria; the IDF has not aided the Jabhat al-Nusra group, but provides assistance to wounded Syrians who come to the border. Netanyahu also condemned the lynching and called on Druze leaders to take action to immediately calm the situation. He called it a very grave matter. 'We cannot let anyone take the law into their own hands, and we will not let anyone disrupt Israeli soldiers from carrying out their duties,' the prime minister said.

Finally, all the papers report that a secret meeting was held Monday between high-ranking Israeli and Turkish officials, in an attempt to repair relations between the two nations – five years after the IDF raid on the Gaza-bound Mavi Marmara flotilla, and while a new flotilla is set to depart for the Palestinian enclave. The Foreign Ministry's recently-appointed director-general, Dore Gold, embarked on a secret trip to Rome, for a meeting that was scheduled ahead of time with Turkish counterpart Feridun Hadi Sinirlioglu. The meeting ended a long period of disconnect between Israel and Turkey.

Gold flew to Italy without the knowledge of Yossi Cohen, the National Security Advisor, who was responsible for talks between Jerusalem and Ankara until now. Gold also did not notify Joseph Ciechanover, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's previous envoy for Turkish issues. Gold is said to have been asked to gauge whether the crisis between the two nations could be brought to an end. The Foreign Ministry confirmed Gold's trip to Rome, but refused to comment on the reasons for the visit.

 

SOMEWHERE BAD IN THE MIDDLE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that accusations of war crimes against Israel are totally unfounded – but that the government bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that the IDF was forced to fight yet another war in Gaza.

"I hope that my esteemed friends from the human rights fraternity will forgive me for saying this, but any talk of Israel having committed war crimes during Operation Protective Edge is, at best, hollow and, at worst, maliciously false. 'War crimes' is a relative concept; compared to whom and to what did Israel commit war crimes? Compared to what Russia is doing in Ukraine? Compared to what the United States did in Iraq or Afghanistan? Compared to what China is doing to Tibet?

I will not be telling my readers anything new if I say that the investigative procedures of the international community are somewhat selective. Superpowers are automatically exempt from investigation and from any kind of punishment. Dictatorial regimes that commit genocide in Africa and the Middle East are occasionally censured, but that's like water off a duck's back for them. Israel is stuck in a bad place in the middle. 

Yes, there were some cases when troops used too many shells, when strikes on residential buildings were superfluous and when more innocent civilians were killed than was necessary. In two cases, soldiers used massive firepower to try and prevent one of their comrades from being abducted. But every decision-maker in the world knows that there is no practical way to carry out a military operation in a sterile environment and to prevent any mishap. Like other Western countries, concern over domestic public opinion turning against the government if too many soldiers are killed – and the army's concern over losing the support of the people – increases the number of civilian casualties on the other side.

Yesterday, after publication of the report, government officials complained bitterly that it draws parallels between Israel and Hamas. I am not sure that I understand them. When previous UN reports pointed the finger of blame exclusively at Israel, arguing that since Israel is a sovereign state it is bound by international law – unlike its enemies in Gaza – the same people complained that Israel was being discriminated against. Now that a UN-appointed commission has made an effort to balance out its criticism, they still complain.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon and army chiefs wanted to kill as many members of Hamas and other terrorist groups as possible. They were not aiming to kill civilians in Gaza. In fact, the opposite is true: out of concern for possible legal or diplomatic woes, they insisted on warning people before their buildings were attacked. Much expensive ammunition was wasted in issuing these warnings; fuel was wasted as fighter jets hovered in the air, making sure that they were attacking the right target. Ironically, Hamas was induced to accept a ceasefire not because of the number of members it lost in the fighting, but because of the massive damage to civilian neighborhoods.

The problem in Operation Protective Edge was not one of war crimes, but how we allowed ourselves to slide toward war. The Israeli government refused to allow money into Gaza that would have paid the salaries of Hamas employees; it prevented goods and produce from entering or exiting the Gaza Strip; and it tightened the blockade of the beleaguered coastal enclave as much as it could. If the government in 2014 had given Gaza the same breathing space that it is currently giving it – there would have been no Operation Protective Edge. This is how our leaders erred. They also made mistakes in how the operation was conducted, in allowing the diplomatic situation to reach a point of dangerous stagnation, in reacting and acting too slowly to events, in being afraid to take risks and in the negligent way that they protected the soldiers and civilians closest to the Gaza border."

Ends…

 

ENCOURAGING TERROR: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that the UNHRC report on Operation Protective Edge proves that Israel is no longer allowed to defend itself against indiscriminate terrorist rocket attacks.

"The United Nations Human Rights Council was incapable of disappointing. First of all – itself. It has a tradition of besmirching Israel at every opportunity and that's a tradition it had to protect. In fact, it's a tradition that, given the opportunity, it would nurture. And that's exactly what it did in this report.

This, exactly, is the context in which we should read the Schabas Report. Israel, according to the commission, committed war crimes during Operation Protective Edge. Is anyone really surprised by that finding? The Geneva-based UNHRC has turned bashing Israel into an art form. It has passed more resolutions criticizing Israel than it has against Syria, Iran, Sudan and Cuba combined. Objectivity has never been the UNHRC's strong suit. When it comes to Israel, it is suffering from a morbid obsession.

The biggest problem with the report is not how its findings were received on the Israeli or Palestinian side; the responses of both sides were rather predictable. The problem is with the party that is supposed to be neutral. Take, for example, a citizen of Finland or Canada, who reads the report and discovers that, during the course of last summer, 4,881 missiles and 1,752 mortar shells were fired at Israel. At the same time, he reads that Israel carried out 6,000 airstrikes against the Gaza Strip and fired 50,000 tank shells. What is the average man in the street supposed to think? He would no doubt reach the conclusion that Israel acted disproportionately. As far as the authors of the report are concerned, the only way to tackle terrorism is with a fine toothcomb.

The number of fatalities also played a role, no doubt: the report found that 2,100 civilians in Gaza were killed – a third of them children. And in Israel? Sixty-seven soldiers and six civilians. The report stopped short of saying 'only 67 soldiers and six civilians.' How can we explain to the world that we will never get used to the sight of a father burying his soldier son? How can we explain to members of the commission that Israeli missiles protect civilians, while in Gaza, civilians protect missiles? How can we make them understand that if it were not for the strict instructions we gave our pilots and soldiers, and based on the number of sorties and the way that Hamas uses civilians as human shields, the number of Palestinian fatalities would have been several times greater?

According to the report, however, whenever the life of an Israeli soldier is in danger, the IDF ignores all the rules. As far as Mary McGowan Davis and Doudou Diène are concerned, this explains everything.

The most problematic element of the report is that, if the international community no longer allows Israel to score decisive victories in its wars, as the last rounds of fighting in Gaza proved, then Israel is being denied the right to protect itself.

There is, however, a half-full glass: first of all, the report also found the Palestinians responsible for last summer's events. They fired missiles indiscriminately, they assassinated suspected collaborators and they dug tunnels which traumatized Israel's civilian population. In other words, they're not all angles in Gaza.

Israel did the right thing by publishing its own report before the UN's. The international media did not ignore it. Anyone who has read both reports, as I have, could be forgiven for thinking that they covered two entirely different wars.

What, in the end, will be remembered from this UNHRC report? That Israel committed war crimes and killed 500 children. And, once again, we will discover not only that we are not allowed to win wars, but that we aren't even allowed to defend ourselves. This is the bottom line that we take away from the report by the UN Council for Encouraging Terrorism."

Ends…

 

AIM FOR BAN: Writing in Makor Rishon, Amnon Lord says that, rather than attacking the systematically biased UNHRC, Israel should take aim at Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, whom he accuses of heading an organization that regularly collaborates with Palestinian terrorism.

"Upon publication of the Schabas Report, which was compiled by a commission of inquiry appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council, members of the committee said that, 'we were deeply moved by the immense suffering and resilience of the victims; we just hope our report contributes in some small way to ending the cycle of violence.'

What will happen, however, is exactly the opposite: the report will merely contribute to the cycle of violence. There is one very simple reason for this: the head of the committee, Mary McGowan Davis, and her predecessor, William Schabas, are continuing the Palestinian tactic of waging a war of terror against Israel by other means. The report was a continuation of Operation Protective Edge itself. The establishment of a commission of inquiry and all of the activity that accompanied it are exactly what Hamas was hoping for from the outset.

Hamas' goal was to provoke the IDF into attacking it in densely populated areas, with the goal of sacrificing as many civilian lives as possible. The fact that the UNHRC report does not accuse Hamas of sole responsibility for the civilian death toll means that it is collaborating with Hamas. And thus, the Palestinian terror attacks, the rockets and the tunnels become part of the campaign of delegitimization against Israel. The UN amplifies and intensifies this terrorism.

Yesterday, before the report was published, I participated in a panel discussion at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, marking publication of a new book by Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, 'The War of a Million Cuts.' During the discussion, Gerstenfeld highlighted a scandalous comment by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who compared the children of Gaza to those in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, Gerstenfeld said, the fact that Ban could emerge unscathed after making such a comment and is treated as an honored guest wherever he goes is a scandal in itself.

The UNHRC report is further proof that the UN itself is an organization that collaborates with Palestinian terrorism, an organization that is a factory for anti-Semitic and anti-Israel hatred. Clearly, the best way for Israel to deal with this kind of report is to go on the offensive and not to try and defend itself. The government acted properly in producing its own report, which told the truth about the events of last summer. But, in the end, this is going on the defensive. Israel's goal should be to delegitimize the head of the UN – unless he distances himself from this report, which creates a moral equivalency between Israel and Hamas and differentiates between the aggressor and the side which launched a war of self-defense.

Last time, after publication of the Goldstone Report, the retired South African judge became the target. This time, there's no point in going after the committee's head. Just after the commission was appointed, Israel enjoyed something of a victory when it managed to reveal the true colors of the man appointed to head it, Professor William Schabas. He was exposed as a supporter of the PLO. Because of the cyclical nature of UN reports, which work like Swiss clockwork after every Palestinian terrorist atrocity, we need to turn our attention to Ban himself.

In the past few weeks, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, has started to adopt the tactics of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who took a huge personal risk when he agreed to address a joint session of both houses of the U.S. Congress. Now Oren has launched an all-out assault against U.S. President Barack Obama and it seems that his campaign is going pretty well. In a series of articles and interviews, ahead of publication of his memoirs, Oren is exposing Obama and pouring cold water on his claim that he is a friend of Israel. Bibi needs to look back on his own time as ambassador to the UN, when he tore then Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to shreds.

This is an issue that Netanyahu must lead; highly placed officials from the Jewish world must follow in his footsteps. The fact is that there is a board consensus in Israel that the IDF and its soldiers must not be abandoned. The general public identifies with the army that protects it – and that is a solid basis on which to build our campaign against the Schabas Report."

Ends…

 

ON FOOLS AND FLOTILLAS: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan says that the government must explain to the world why the Gaza Strip is under siege and why the blockade cannot be lifted as long as Hamas remains in power.

"When MK Basel Ghattas, a member of the Joint Arab List, accuses his parliamentary colleagues of hypocrisy, he knows what he's talking about. Why? Because he and members of his party are also hypocrites. Some say that the new Gaza-bound flotilla is a terrorist enterprise, while others describe it as a 'peace flotilla.' Both of these definitions are self-righteous. The flotilla will not be carrying any weapons that could be used to commit acts of terror. Anyone who claims that they will – as Avigdor Lieberman did yesterday – is misleading people (to put it mildly).

So what does Ghattas says about the flotilla. 'It is a peace flotilla,' he says, 'the goal of which is to focus international public attention of the plight of 1.8 million Palestinians who are living in prison-like conditions and whose lives have been made a misery by the land and sea blockade that Israel has imposed – a blockade which is a blatant violation of international humanitarian law.'

Contrary to Ghattas' assertion about 'prison-like conditions,' what we see and hear from Gaza paints a very different picture. Hamas officials do whatever they like and what they like right now – and what they have been doing for years – is bolstering their capability to carry out terrorist attacks. For them, this is a far more important goal than rebuilding the Gaza Strip. This is not exactly what I would call 'prison-like conditions.'

Ghattas is right about one thing: there is a blockade of Gaza. What he fails to point out, however, is the reason for the blockade. And, needless to say, his European partners aboard the 'peace flotilla' will never ask him. I am not sure whether they don't know why Israel imposed a blockade or whether they simply don't care. In any case, they ignore the reasons. Just as they ignore terrorist hubs elsewhere in the world (and especially in the Arab world). Just as they ignore the fact that more Arabs are killed by Arabs than by non-Arabs.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu talks a lot about this hypocrisy; he lambastes it and he slams it and he criticizes it night and day. In fact, Netanyahu does everything apart from the one thing he should do: explain why there is a blockade and why Israel cannot lift it until such time as Hamas stops trying to destroy the State of Israel. As long as Hamas threatens to fire rockets at every corner of our country, as long as the people of Gaza live on the dream of eradicating the Jewish state, the blockade cannot be lifted. Why does Netanyahu not talk about that? The international community doesn't understand why Gaza is under blockade; it seems to them like an act of pure evil and a senseless attempt to make life in Gaza unbearable.

A few days ago, the Foreign Ministry published a short video clip, mocking the biased coverage of Israel by foreign correspondents. These reporters were angry at the video, but it accurately reflects the reality of their false and biased reporting. The effect of this video, if delivered properly, is far more effective than any number of speeches (no matter how eloquent) by Netanyahu slamming the unfair reporting.

Why do we not do the same thing with the flotilla? Why has the government not produced, for example, videos showing the true goals of those behind the flotilla? It can't be too difficult. How many times do we have to tell out government to stop talking so much and start doing things?"

Ends…

 

TOWARD THE HAGUE: Writing in Haaretz, Barak Ravid says that the UN report into the 2014 Gaza war hints that, after all other measures have failed, the ICC is the only thing that can actually deter the two sides from yet another round of fighting.

"Even if its wording and its conclusions were slightly more balanced in comparison to the Goldstone report, no one was surprised by the fact that the report from the investigative committee appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission indicated that both Israel and Hamas committed war crimes during the war in Gaza last summer. The most important point in the report was about the possible ramifications - the committee members aimed high and far. High, at Israel’s highest ranking politicians and military officers, and far, at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Through detailed display of information and analysis of events, the committee described the horrible cycle that has engulfed Gaza over the last decade. Military conflict between Israel and Hamas, cease-fire agreements, international investigative committees, conclusions and recommendations that go unimplemented, ad nauseam.

Aside from tactical, operative recommendations and conclusions, the committee members also tried to draw more strategic conclusions. They claim that the policy governing use of force formulated by senior politicians and military leaders should be looked into more than the actions of soldiers following orders.

Meaning, the problem is not just the artillery fire aimed at Shujaiyeh that hit civilians, the pilots that blew up multi-story dwellings in Gaza or the tank soldiers that shot everything that moved during the 'Black Friday' in Rafah. The problem is also the decisions made by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, as well as GOC Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Sammy Turgeman, Israel Air Force Commander Amir Eshel and others.

These conclusions aren’t drawn from reports originating with pro-Palestinian organizations, or left-wing Israel-hating groups, but rather the government report compiled by a committee led by former Supreme Court Justice Jacob Turkel, that examined Israel’s policies on investigating possible war crimes. Turkel and his colleagues suggested attributing direct criminal responsibility to military commanders and government officials for crimes committed by their subordinates.

Even if they don’t say so clearly and directly, the investigative committee members aimed their report at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which is currently conducting a preliminary check to see if there is a necessity for a criminal investigation into war crimes during the fighting in Gaza. The report hints that after all other measures have failed; the ICC is the only thing that can actually deter the two sides from yet another round of fighting.

The committee offers a way out – holding an independent and transparent Israeli investigation that would reexamine the military’s policies on the use of force. After all, one of the ICC’s principles is 'complementarity' – it does not investigate a country if that country can prove it seriously investigated itself. Although the Military Advocate General did launch an investigation contrary to the position of the chief of staff, the investigation was not as strict as could be. In the end, Israel preferred to just another thick hasbara report and hope for the best.

In contrast to Netanyahu’s attacks on Monday, the UN report is not the handiwork of anti-Israeli jurist William Schabas, who stepped down from his position leading the committee a few months ago. His replacement, American judge Mary McGowan-Davis, is not an Israel-hater, and she produced a relatively balanced report, considering the Israeli reaction to it.

The report published on Monday has given rise yet again to a familiar question. Was the government’s decision to boycott the committee wise? Just reading a summary of the report is enough to understand that the answer is a clear and concise no. In every instance that the committee received information or testimony from the Israeli side, like that of former Eshkol Regional Council head Haim Yellin, who traveled at his own initiative to Geneva to testify, that information was given comprehensive coverage in the report.

The impression is that if Israel had allowed the committee members access to the sites, and allowed them to meet with Israelis that live near Gaza, and get briefings from IDF officers, or even Netanyahu himself, the final result would have been much better."

Ends…

 

TRAGEDY OR FARCE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that from Israel's point of view, the UN report was bad, but not the end of the world; Palestinian critics, he argues, will say the scene was good, but not enough to bring the house down.

"The release Monday of the UN Human Rights Council’s investigation into last year’s Gaza conflict is an early scene in what will be a multi-act drama. While the Palestinians want this play to be viewed as a tragedy, Israel wants it to be seen as a farce. Monday’s relatively weak scene did not yet give the audience an unequivocal indication as to how things will ultimately play out.

From the vantage point of an Israeli critic, Monday’s scene was bad, but not the end of the world. Palestinian critics will say the scene was good, but not enough to bring the house down. And this scene was preceded by at least three others. Scene 1 of Act 1 was the actual 50-day Gaza conflict. Scene 2 was the appointment, and later resignation, of a clearly biased chairman – William Schabas – who once provided legal counsel to the PLO. And Scene 3 was Israel’s efforts to gets its side of the story out before this report was issued, in order to preempt its findings.

Scenes 2 and 3 weakened the effect of Scene 4, which took place Monday in Geneva. The report released on Monday was not the Goldstone report from 2009, which investigated Operation Cast Lead. It did not contain the drama of that report, chaired by South African jurist Richard Goldstone, nor the categorical conclusions, nor the determination that Israel deliberately killed civilians.

The language in Monday’s report was much more careful, the conclusions more mild and balanced. And that also explains Israel’s much more measured response to this report, than its response in 2009 to Goldstone. Though Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called the report unfair and biased, it was a far cry from his comments following Goldstone, which he said was a gift to terrorists everywhere and a kangaroo court.

Likewise, the Foreign Ministry’s statement saying it needed to 'study' the recent report was much different than saying, as it did with the release of the Goldstone report, that it was 'appalled,' and even 'nauseated' and infuriated by it.

But Monday’s report, again, is just one scene in one act. The drama will remain in Geneva for the time being, where the 47-member UN Human Rights Council which set up this investigation will vote on whether to adopt its findings and decide what to do with them.

Israel is already actively lobbying its allies on the council to reject the report and to vote against it. Not out of any hope that it could actually get the necessary numbers of the council to vote against accepting the conclusions of the report, but rather to get a bloc of Western countries – a 'moral minority' – to take issue with the report, thereby depriving it of any real stature. From an Israeli diplomatic perspective, the best-case scenario is that the report is buried in Geneva after being adopted on the strength of votes from countries like Cuba, Congo, Pakistan, and Venezuela.

A worst case scenario would be that some Western countries on the UNHRC accept the report, it gains traction, and – like the Goldstone report – goes to a vote in the UN General Assembly. Israel wants to nip in the bud any attempts to push this report forward, so as to prevent the creation of various follow-up committees or committees charged with implementing the report’s recommendations.

Ironically, the Palestinians – who pushed hard for widespread acceptance of the Goldstone committee findings – are less likely to be as energetic in pushing the report forward, because while the bulk of the onus is on Israel, the report is not without its criticism of the Palestinians, saying they may have committed war crimes, as well. If the Palestinians had hoped that this report would pave the way for an International Criminal Court indictment of Israel for war crimes or crimes against humanity as a result of Operation Protective Edge, they were likely disappointed. The scene enacted in Geneva on Monday did not seem powerful enough to trigger that kind of sequel."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION DEBATE/EARLY ELECTIONS: Murat Yetkin warns of the negative repercussions of early elections in centre-left Radikal: "The early election scenario could revive the era of violence in dealing with the Kurdish problem, with clashes and deaths reappearing on our agenda and young people returning home in coffins in both the west and east of the country. It would also be no prophecy to predict that holding two elections within six months will overburden politics and the economy."

Mehmet Tezkan suggests that the ruling party could benefit from a coalition in centrist Milliyet: "Forming a coalition is much more advantageous for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) than coming to power alone. This is because if a coalition is formed, the president's tutelage will be ended. The prime minister will act as a prime minister. The president will also start acting like one."

Ekrem Dumanli detects a note of presidential desperation in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "President Erdogan is not yelling out insults these days. He is speaking against 'egotism', sending messages of unity, and even trying to create an atmosphere of neutrality. He has destroyed so many bridges! He has said that he might invite the various party leaders to his palace, but none has accepted this offer. If one tries to make everybody think that one may stay in power forever, one is finally likely to end up alone."

Salih Tuna urges the ruling party to make itself heard in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) feels very proud, but the 41 per cent who voted for the AKP, are keeping silent! If everyone makes demands at the very start, how can a compromise be found? No party should insist on any such conditions. The CHP, the party that received 25 per cent of the vote, presents its pre-conditions, but the 41 per cent do not open their mouth - this is not right."

 

SYRIAN KURDS: Oral Calislar senses a contradiction in centre-left Radikal: "The AKP and the Turkish government should decide what they want. Saying 'move on with the Kurdish peace process' reflects a preference for a warmer and cooperative relationship with the Kurds in the region. The PYD (pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria) represents the huge majority of Kurds in Syria. Turkey cannot create a successful political future by depicting the Kurds in Syria as an enemy, while recognizing the rights of its own Kurds and making peace plans with them."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Moderate Iran responds to critics: "Some critics of the negotiations insist that the additional protocol is a colonial document that has been designed to collect military information. They believe that most of the countries that have accepted this protocol are small, less important and do not have security concerns. Finally they claim that the additional protocol has been imposed on these countries under U.S. pressure. The truth is, however, that the additional protocol is the outcome of the collective wisdom of the international community and the need to consolidate the non-proliferation regime. Most countries - after assessing, consulting and measuring the advantages and disadvantages of this document – have ultimately decided to sign it. In deciding on this matter, Iran should also consider these points." 

Conservative Hemayat defends a bill to limit access to military sites: "The Majlis, with a majority of votes, has endorsed a proposal to protect nuclear rights, achievements and other subsidiary rights including research and development. It is actually ‘the support plan’ for our negotiating team. Approval of the strategy aims at backing the negotiating team and firming its hand in the talks so that they can present their legal demands from a position of strength. The Majlis is committed to showing that the representatives of the Iranian nation always have the wisdom to deal with excess and pressure." 

Hard-line Keyhan contends that moderates are forcing a bad deal: "Where is the secrecy around the negotiations coming from? With ten days to the agreement; which side is maintaining secrecy? Who is confident and who is not? Do the American, British and French delegations not automatically send detailed reports to Tel Aviv? Therefore, from whom are we hiding the contents of the negotiations? Some in the moderate camp, by slander, doublespeak and feigning desperation before the Iranian nation, are practically forcing a bad deal at any cost. By claiming the U.S. is a 'village chief', 'the treasury is empty', 'drinking water and environmental problems will be solved with the lifting of sanctions', etc., President Rowhani made a big mistake and hurt his and his government's manoeuvrability." 

Reformist Arman points to a cost of failure: "Those who oppose a deal fear that such a deal will boost Iran-U.S. ties and expand Iran's influence and status in the region. This is not only restricted to Arab countries, but also to Turkey. If a deal is reached, not only Iran but also the Obama administration and the international community will benefit. Five members of the UN Security Council are participating in these talks as the international community's representatives; the failure of these talks would be a failure of the Security Council. As a result, China and Russia will separate their stands from those of the U.S. and the EU in the future, which will signify a deep division within the Security Council. Under circumstances where the UNSC is accused of impotence and inefficiency, this will further weaken the UN."

 

TURKEY: Conservative Khorasan provides rare support for Erdogan’s party: "The Justice and Development Party's failure to gain absolute majority in parliament pleased the Zionist regime, Europe and the U.S. The Zionist regime expressed joy, because Turkey will no longer be a powerful Islamic country - like Iran - in the region. Turkey, through its support for ISIS and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria and through weakening the state in both countries, has done a great service to the West and the Zionists. The West does not want the return of Ottoman sultans to the region. The paradox of divergence and convergence of the West's and the Zionist regime's ties with Turkey's Islamist government is quite understandable. The return of the current government in Turkey is good for the country's Muslim people and is in line with the interests of the region's Muslim countries, provided that Turkey distances itself from tribal and extremist policies." 

 

SYRIA: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami writes of a big as yet unsuccessful conspiracy: "U.S. authorities say there are 16,000 fighters from more than 90 countries in Syria. This is another proof of a big conspiracy against Syria. No doubt, without the complicity of some governments the presence of this vast army of terrorists would not be possible. Nevertheless, what is certain and is surprising for the world and frustrating for the supporters of the terrorists is that, despite this vast conspiracy, the Syrian regime still perseveres. The U.S. government is one of the main parties hurt by the Syrian crisis. Washington's policy is totally confused." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/RUSSIA: Hard-line Javan believes that Russia would want something significant in return: "Riyadh wants Moscow to change its stance towards Yemen, stop its support for the Houthis and align itself with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is not happy about Tehran and Moscow's close relations and wants Russia to change its position in this regard too. Of course, the Russians are skilful dealers and would not be willing to change their policies unless they achieve something big in return. Working to increase global oil prices is one Russian demand. Another is Moscow's demand for honouring the contract on purchasing weapons from Russia that Saudi Arabia previously suspended." 

 

FRENCH MOVES: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is dismissive of a French role: "French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited Egypt, Ramallah and Israel. His visit's focus is the peace negotiations and increasing French influence in Egypt. Because of French attitudes, Paris cannot be a proper mediator for Palestine as it has not supported Palestine in international forums."

Conservative Resalat questions France’s peace credentials: "In recent years, Lauran Fabius and President Francois Hollande have turned their country's foreign policy into a place for selling weapons of mass destruction and exporting terrorism. France's repeated support for the Saudi ruling family’s airstrikes in Yemen and their consent to a possible Saudi ground attack designate the extent of Paris's involvement in the security crisis in the region."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-War is not an end in itself

2-Futile French diplomacy

3-Jordan’s regional schemes

4-Times are changing

 

1-War is not an end in itself

 

War is not an aim in itself; it is a means of saving Yemen from an even blacker fate if left to the Houthis and former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's militias. It aims, via negotiations, to rebuild the Yemeni nation state after a period when tribes, areas, and militias have proven themselves stronger than the state. All parties, and especially Saudi Arabia, should put as much effort into the negotiations battle as in the battle fought by weapons. They should all show greater concern for the negotiating track and for coordination with other Egyptian and Arab parties to contribute to their success. It is not in the Arab Gulf's interest, and especially not that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue Operation Decisive Storm forever. They must move to [the humanitarian relief] Operation Restore Hope via politics and negotiations--'Amr ash-Shoubaki in al-Masri al-Yawm

 

The Yemeni crisis seems to have been postponed to other times and dates dictated by regional considerations after the conflicting parties have failed to decide the battle on the ground, and now that it has become clear that Operation Decisive Storm cannot bring about any fundamental and qualitative change in the balance of power. That, in turn, has given some regional capitals (and perhaps, Washington) more time during which all parties will be haemorrhaged further. Meanwhile, we wait for the June 30th date – or a few days before– to find out if the final signing of the agreement between the '5 + 1' group and Iran regarding its nuclear program will see the light of day--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The failure of last week’s Geneva conference on Yemen should spur greater efforts to ensure a political resolution of the conflict, urges an Egyptian commentator. The war is a trap that Saudi Arabia was unable to avoid; but it should do all it can to extract itself and the region from its catastrophic results. The only word to describe what happened in Geneva is 'failure' despite the pretence that the conference has prepared the grounds for future talks, argues a Jordanian commentator. And what this suggests is that the Yemeni crisis, like many others in the region, awaits the outcome of the nuclear talks with Iran before it reaches a settlement.

 

DIFFERING VIEWS: "There are those who have dealt with the Yemen crisis lightly, while others have imagined it possible to determine the battle via successive air raids on the Houthis and former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's positions; yet others have seen this as an opportunity to demonstrate Saudi Arabia's rising role in the region and its ability to confront Iranian influence," writes Egyptian commentator 'Amr ash-Shoubaki in Monday's Cairo daily al-Masri al-Yawm.

Some of these views may be correct and others incorrect, but other views, if left to run their course, can only have catastrophic results for everyone.

The real question is this: Why are the Arabs and the Gulf states showing little enthusiasm for the faltering negotiations between the various Yemeni parties in Geneva? And what is behind this excessive zeal for armed conflict and for displaying the Gulf’s, especially the Saudi pilots' combat skills, both in the media and via a patriotic mobilizing discourse that all the Arab states seem to require for reasons having to do with their domestic situations, and not necessarily in response to external threats?

It is clear that there is some Saudi awareness of this as expressed by [veteran Saudi commentator] 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in an interview in al-Masri al-Yawm last month when he commented on [the Saudi-led Yemen] Operation Decisive Storm, saying that it was an unavoidable trap. In other words, Riyadh had to go to war after the Houthis had violated the whole of Yemen, overthrown its legitimate authorities, and threatened the security of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.

But the question today after the failure of the first round of Geneva negotiations is this: Will the war continue indefinitely?

Air raids alone cannot decide any war. Therefore, it is necessary to reach difficult but not impossible accords between the various Yemeni parties, allowing legitimacy, as represented by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to return and rule the country, while also allowing the Houthis to pursue peaceful political action in their capacity as one of the important constituents of the Yemeni people. After all, the Houthis are Zaidi Shiites, and the Zaidis in Yemen amount to about one-third of the total population. There is a need to involve them in the political process, but without their weapons and without the immunity they enjoy while protected by their militia.

In other words, the war must be temporary, but it has lasted too long. It should aim to place Yemen on track towards a political solution, rather than keeping it trapped in an indefinite war of attrition whose true purpose is to hemorrhage Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.

All Arab and regional parties should refrain from military posturing that cannot determine the outcome of the conflict in Yemen. What will determine it is a negotiations table whose track is influenced by the [Saudi] military abilities whose presence and deterrent power have been demonstrated to the Houthis and others.

The object in Yemen is not to pursue war for war's sake. Nor is it to allow us to say that we have strong armies. After all, everyone knows this – according to the Global Fire website's assessments in 2014, the Saudi army comes second after the Egyptian army, and ranks 27th in the world. The object of the war is to reach a settlement and sit at the negotiation table, transforming the failure in Geneva into a future success.

War is not an end in itself; it is a means of saving Yemen from an even blacker fate if left to the Houthis and former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's militias. It aims, via negotiations, to rebuild the Yemeni nation state after a period when tribes, areas, and militias have proven themselves stronger than the state.

All parties, and especially Saudi Arabia, should put as much effort into the negotiations battle as in the battle fought by weapons. They should all show greater concern for the negotiating track and for coordination with other Egyptian and Arab parties to contribute to their success.

It is not in the Arab Gulf's interest, and especially not that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue Operation Decisive Storm forever. They must move to [the humanitarian relief] Operation Restore Hope via politics and negotiations.

"They should do this regardless of the sacrifices, because this is in the interest of Yemen, the Gulf, and the rest of the Arab peoples," concludes Shoubaki.

End…

 

NO BETTER WORD THAN FAILURE: "There is no better word to describe the outcome of the Yemeni Geneva conference than 'failure'," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

This is despite the diplomatic and conciliatory terms that some UN or (the Houthi) Ansarullah spokesmen tried to use so as to deny failure and alleviate the Yemeni people’s shock. That public was hoping that the conference would result in a humanitarian truce that it now badly needs. Yemen has been destroyed, and widespread devastation has been wreaked on its homes, public and private institutions, army barracks, civilian and military airports, infrastructure, and public and health services. There is little food, medicine or potable water, with the result that over four-fifths of the Yemenis are now threatened with 'severe' famine according to international, and especially UN, humanitarian organizations.

Even though the UN Special Yemen envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed said that the conference 'did not fail,' and even though an Ansarullah source said that the conference was the beginning of a 'negotiating track' and that it provided the 'appropriate' ground to build on, all is well only if it ends well, as the saying goes.

The conference ended – and it was not a conference in the conventional sense of the word--because the Sana'a delegation (the Houthis and Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's supporters), and the delegation from Riyadh with the government headed by Vice-President Khaled Bahah, which claims legitimacy for itself, did not meet at a single table. In fact, the Sana'a delegation did not leave its headquarters in its hotel. Ould Cheikh shuttled back and forth between the two delegations, without reaching any specific results.

The Houthis and Saleh's delegation refused to accept the delegation from Riyadh as its 'equivalent' interlocutor. It demanded that negotiations be held with Saudi Arabia directly, which – in its opinion, of course – means that it does not recognize the delegation representing Hadi and the Bahah government.

As a result, the word 'conference' does not adequately describe what happened – unless, of course, insisted upon by the Group of 16 countries that backed the talks and invited the Yemeni parties to meet in order to bridge the gaps between them, and prepare the climate for a 'declaration of principles' that each side could use to claim that it had won or imposed its point of view, or to claim that it has not conceded its fixed principles, at least.

So what will happen from now on?

Perhaps the question 'what happened before now?' would be more relevant in light of the failure to declare a humanitarian truce during the [current] month of Ramadan.  The war continues as fiercely as ever during this month and on all fronts, inside Yemen and near its borders. And this suggests what resembles 'collusion' in refusing to acknowledge the conference's failure and that one party or another is 'responsible' for that failure to some degree. And all this is unfolding in the shadow of media exchanges and what appear to be calibrated leaks, focusing especially on the Yemeni journalist's 'shoe' that was hurled at the Ansarullah's representative. The incident has turned into a tedious and repugnant joke after some tried to draw some analogy between it and the [2008] incident in which an Iraqi journalist hurled a shoe at [former U.S. president] Bush in [former Iraqi PM] Nuri al-Maliki's presence.

Those whose positions are still dictated by their optimism may hope that there will be a ‘Geneva-2’. This is why they do not wish contacts to be severed, even after UN Envoy Ould Cheikh's proposals that seemed to be biased in favor of the [Hadi government] delegation donning the mantle of legitimacy. These proposals called upon the Houthis to withdraw from the cities and hand over their weapons, as well as making other demands that were described as 'principles,' adding up to seven in total. According to reports, the Sana'a delegation refused to discuss these proposals, seeing them as an unfriendly signal on the part of Ould Cheikh.

Ould Cheikh has barely embarked on his difficult mission, one that exhausted his predecessor Jamal Benomar who was also subjected to a test of 'integrity' by certain Yemeni parties that now are allied to the Riyadh delegation. Riyadh blocked Benomar from pursuing his mission and demanded that he be changed. (And this occurred even before [President] Hadi had left Sana'a, and later left the country via Aden).

So where do we go from here?

The Yemeni crisis seems to have been postponed to other times and dates dictated by regional considerations after the conflicting parties have failed to decide the battle on the ground, and now that it has become clear that Operation Decisive Storm cannot bring about any fundamental and qualitative change in the balance of power. That, in turn, has given some regional capitals (and perhaps, Washington) more time during which all parties will be haemorrhaged further.

Meanwhile, we wait for the June 30th date – or a few days before– to find out if the final signing of the agreement between the '5 + 1' group and Iran regarding its nuclear program will see the light of day. Once that happens, the region will enter a new phase and a new formula for alliances and line-ups and especially the balance of power that is different from that of today, will emerge. Alternatively, the nuclear negotiations may fail (or perhaps be postponed), which would launch harsh wars intended to settle numerous pending issues and crises, whether in Yemen, Syria, or Iraq, and perhaps also in Libya and Palestine.

"Be that as it may, we do not have long to wait," concludes Kharroub.

Ends…

 

 

2-Futile French diplomacy

 

France’s attempt to re-launch the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is ill-timed, ill-conceived and ill-fated, says Fahd al-Khitan in today’s Jordanian al-Ghad

 

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius's initiative to re-launch the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations is doomed to failure since Israel has become more intransigent than ever about ending its settlement activities and withdrawing from the West Bank, argues a Jordanian commentator. Anyway, Fabius is the least qualified diplomat to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians given his unqualified bias in Israel's favor.

 

UNWARRANTED BELIEF: "What leads French diplomacy to believe that there is a good opportunity for making progress in the stalemated peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis?" asks Fahd al-Khitan in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

No one in the Middle East or the U.S. shares French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius's hopes to make peace at this specific point in time.

Binyamin Netanyahu's government is even more right wing than his previous one. It does not include a single minister willing to discuss an end to the settlement activities that Fabius opposes, or to think of withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Furthermore, Israel is in a very comfortable geo-political position. The Arab world is drowning in its problems and sectarian wars, and the Palestinian cause is no longer a matter of priority for most Arab states.

As for the U.S., it has washed its hands of the peace process after Secretary of State John Kerry's failed attempts to re-launch the negotiations. The best that can be expected from Washington is not to deploy its veto right at the Security Council should a resolution recognizing the Palestinian state be put to the vote in the future – that is to say, if Fabius's attempt to convince the two sides to sit to the negotiations table fails once more.

In a few months' time, the U.S. will enter the climate of presidential elections. The administration's role on the international arena will retreat and the American political elite will be focused on the electoral campaigns. Therefore, the Obama administration is not expected to exert any pressure on Israel when it proved unable to budge Israel one inch from its intransigent position during the last seven years.

The PA is desperate and disappointed at the international community. It no longer has the energy to enter negotiations that do not include credible Israeli commitments to end settlement activities and withdraw from the West Bank. Moreover, there is the internal split between Fateh in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, which is paralyzing the Palestinians' ability to adopt a single position towards the negotiations.

Furthermore, the man carrying the French initiative, Laurent Fabius, is the last diplomat qualified to play the role of a fair mediator in any dispute with Israel. The French minister is known for his bias in Israel's favor, incomparably more than Kerry. Fabius is a phenomenon in French political life because of his excessive support for the Israeli government. In fact, during the '5 + 1' nuclear negotiations with Iran, Fabius was Israel's voice in the negotiations room.

Fabius's initiative has been received with little enthusiasm and interest in the region's states. There is a general impression shared by Arab diplomats that after Washington's failure to restart the negotiations, there is no hope for emerging from the dark tunnel; and that the French move is no more than a diplomatic flurry intended to fill the vacuum until a new U.S. president is elected.

The French and the Americans may reach an accord in 'extra time' over a draft Security Council resolution after the end of the proposed period for negotiations, in which the State of Palestine is recognized. But despite its importance, a resolution of this sort means nothing on the ground as long as Israel remains unwilling to end its settlement activities and withdraw from the West Bank.

"In other words, what we will have is a Palestinian state 'on paper' and Israeli occupation in reality," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

 

3-Jordan’s regional schemes

  

Amman’s regional schemes in the service of Washington will only lead Jordan towards disaster, says Basimah Hamad in today’s Syrian al-Watan 

 

Despite Amman’s repeated denials, Syria is convinced Jordanian King Abdullah’s recent call to arm and train the Sunni clans in eastern Syria and western Iraq is a part of the design to partition Syria and annex parts of it to Jordan, notes a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. But a number of factors suggest that the Jordanian attempt is doomed to failure.

 

PARTITION PLANS: "The Jordanian monarch's call to arm the 'Sunni' clans in Syria and Iraq is part of the plans for partition led by Washington in the Middle East, 100 years after the [1916] Sykes/Picot agreement whose date of expiry has passed," writes Basimah Hamad in Monday's semi-official Syrian daily al-Watan.

This call is inconsistent with the claim to be fighting ISIS and bolstering Iraq's security, stability, and unity and a peaceful settlement in Syria. On the contrary, it simply confirms Damascus's charge that Amman is backing and exporting terrorism to its neighboring countries. For the truth is that ever since the events in Syria began, Jordan has acted as the spearhead of the project to bring the country down. Jordanian officials have sought to cover this up via mere media declarations stressing the country's 'strong and deeply-rooted' commitment to reaching a 'political solution for the crisis.'

The fact of the matter is that 'Abdullah II's statements during his visit to the northern Jordanian desert a few days ago express less the desire for popular mobilization against the terrorist ISIS, as they do provide additional evidence that he is seeking (in compliance with American diktats) to enlarge the Kingdom geographically at the expense of its Arab brothers, making room for the establishment of a 'security buffer zone' inside Syrian, Iraqi, and Saudi territories. (Steps were taken to pave the way for this a few months ago when the Syrian border crossings with Jordan fell into the hands of the [anti-Syrian regime] terrorist organizations).

As far as the Americans are concerned, implementing this scheme at this particular point in time would secure a number of simultaneous aims: For one thing, it consolidates the existing sectarian and confessional divisions in Iraq as a prelude to partitioning the country; for another, it reduces Syria's area by forcing the Syrian Arab Army to retreat to the borders of the 'Damascus State'; and for a third, it resettles the Palestinians in an alternative homeland and eliminate the Palestinian cause, the core of the Arab/Zionist conflict.

But the chances of realizing these American schemes seem to be nil in light of the following factors:

- First, Jordan is facing domestic problems that threaten a catastrophe in security and economic terms, drawing the country into the heart of the war that is currently raging [in Syria and Iraq]. Then there is the debate inside the country over the official attitude towards Syria, since the backing given to the armed groups in southern Syria over the past five years has led to the 'evaporation' of the 'moderate opposition', and allowed the hard-line and extremist organizations – such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida – to take deep roots in the country.  Thousands of fighters from these organizations have reached the Jordanian borders amidst a spreading environment that welcomes them both – with [the Jordanian town of] Ma'an as an instance of this. In light of all this, it would be difficult for the Hashemite Kingdom to contain the 'jihadis' and repulse their threat.

- Second, the Jordanian monarch cannot attract the clans and secure their loyalty. It is difficult for him to manage them, because of their widespread presence across many Arab countries and the disagreements and conflicts within them. Some have pledged allegiance to ISIS and some to the Nusra Front. (The terrible massacres committed by both organizations against the clans in Deir az-Zour, in the Aleppo countryside and elsewhere, have proven that such pledges do not really offer the clans any protection).

- Third, a large part of the Syrian Arab clans have declared that they support the [Syrian] state. They have expressed their total opposition to 'any call or project that strips them of their national essence and Arab character.' And they have renewed their insistence on the state, on national unity and on their support for the army as 'the sole strong guarantor of the country's unity.' These clans do not need any training or arms from Jordan in order to defend their cities and villages against the terrorist gangs.

- Fourth, Saudi interest in the Syrian file has receded after Operation Decisive Storm [in Yemen]. Syria is no longer a priority for Riyadh because of its preoccupation with the Yemeni predicament.

But more important than all the above is the fact that since it raises the banner of 'liberating Palestine', the [Iran/Syria/Hizbollah] axis of resistance is well aware of the grave nature of the role that Washington's tools are playing in order to partition and fragment Syria.

"It will not stand back with folded arms in response to these schemes," concludes Hamad.

Ends…

 

 

4-Times are changing

 

WikiLeaks’ accesses to half-a-million Saudi state documents suggests that the era of the Kingdom’s media manipulation may have come to an end, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The release of some 60-thousand out of half-a-million documents from the Saudi state's archives by WikiLeaks has had the effect of an earthquake on the Saudi authorities, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. But this is only the tip of the iceberg, and proves that the huge media empires Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have built over the past few decades are rapidly becoming obsolete in the age of the social media.

 

AWKWARD TIMING: "The WikiLeaks website’s release of some 60-thousand documents – the first installment of the half-a-million documents it holds that it obtained via a breach of the [Saudi] foreign and interior ministries' archives, as well as that of Saudi intelligence – comes at an awkward time for the kingdom," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Monday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

It is being targeted by many arrows and besieged by many problems on numerous fronts. It is fighting what appears to be an endless war in Yemen; a second politically and financially costly war in Syria; a third conflict on all fronts with Iran; and a fourth war against the hard-line jihadi Islamist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida.

Saudi officials are especially sensitive towards both Arab and foreign media. They react hysterically to any minor news item published here or there regarding some aspects of their policies that they do not want publicized. So we can imagine their reaction to the publication of half-a-million documents that include some very important secrets regarding their financing of newspapers and journalists, as well as Arab and foreign political figures, telegrams from embassies, comments from ambassadors, and directives from the foreign minister or the head of Saudi intelligence.

Like others, I have had the chance to look at the largest possible number of the first installment of documents. I do not claim any heroics or special expertise. The documents are all available on the web and have been discussed by international media, as well as a very small number of Arab newspapers. And that exposes the extent and reach of Saudi hegemony over the media. What they reveal, in fact, amounts to a veritable earthquake.

The Saudi authorities have warned their citizens not to access these documents, which they have described as 'forged.' They have instructed their spokespersons to stress this claim of forgery and to raise questions as to why WikiLeaks has not published any Israeli documents. This represents a clear 'conspiracy theory' approach to the issue.

That one or two or ten or a hundred documents may be forged is quite possible. But to say that this is true in the case of over half-a-million documents is something that no reason can believe. The same website has published hundreds-of-thousands of American documents without the U.S. State Department claiming that they were forged. Instead, legal measures were taken against the leakers and the owner of the WikiLeaks website who took refuge in the Ecuador Embassy in London.

But is there a 'conspiracy' against the Kingdom? The answer is 'Yes.' Just as the Kingdom conspires against others, wages media, political, and military battles against them, and intervenes in their domestic affairs, it is only natural for others to conspire against it in return, if they can. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is no ordinary or marginal state; it is one of the most important states in its Arab and Islamic environment and the Middle East in general. It is the largest exporter of oil, and the holiest of Islamic sites are located on its soil. Moreover, it controls OPEC, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

But what should concern Saudi Arabia more than the publication of these documents and the secrets they include is the means by which they were obtained and what led Saudi officials to refrain from taking preemptive security measures to prevent its computers from being infiltrated – especially after hackers succeeded in reaching the U.S. State Department's archives and leaking its documents to the WikiLeaks website, benefiting from advanced technologies in this field.

About a month ago, the Saudi Foreign Ministry admitted that the ‘Yemeni Electronic Army’ had breached its archives. This breach may be the source of these documents, and may also possibly be behind the resignation (or forced resignation) of former Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, who occupied that post for over forty years.

We have never heard that Yemen, and specifically the 'Saleh/Houthi' coalition that is being attacked by Saudi warplanes has such an advanced electronic army at its service. Technologically very advanced parties must be behind this, which is not to deny the existence of highly expert Yemenis who have studied at the best Western universities. In this regard, we may note ISIS’s very advanced electronic army whose ferocious digital arms have conducted electronic attacks on American websites.

This breach is a healthy development for the Kingdom and other Gulf and Arab countries. It may motivate them to introduce radical changes to their old policies of using money to impose media blackouts and buy the 'conscience' of journalists. The world has become a small village after all, and modern media technologies and the social media – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp – have changed the way in which the public is contacted and replaced it with citizen journalism, with hundreds-of-thousands of websites and blogs established.

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has built a huge media empire with numerous branches, with the aim of controlling Arab public opinion. It has deployed its vast financial resources and achieved successes that cannot be denied. But the power, influence, and effect of these empires have begun to recede at a rapid pace because others have also developed their media tools and because of the changing political and media maps as a result of the so-called 'Arab Spring revolutions.'

To elaborate, in addition to the social media, the phenomenon of local television stations has begun to take deep roots in many Arab states. The public in countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan no longer relies on [Qatari-owned] al-Jazeera and [Saudi-owned] al-Arabiya [satellite TV] to receive their news and watch political programs and 'talk-shows.' This is because of the large number of special local channels that have filled the vacuum created by the dictatorial regimes that had imposed their miserable media and refused to authorize private newspapers.

What the Saudi WikiLeaks documents have revealed so far is not very serious, and only confirms what was already known – namely, the Saudi authorities' attempt to control Lebanese TV stations by financing them. After all, these Lebanese stations have always stood in the Saudi trench. But the Saudi authorities’ main fear has to do with the other 'package' of documents and the secrets it may contain. For what has been leaked so far, may be mere 'appetizers' that precede the very rich main course.

One of Saudi policy's main problems is that it has increased its enemies and reduced the number of its friends. It has gone to many wars simultaneously, and has abandoned its old approach that used to rely on dialogue and respect for others' interests, and national and personal dignity. It has replaced this with a predilection for confrontation but without passing through a preliminary transitional phase of deep objective scrutiny and examination before taking the decision to go to war.

The huge media empires that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have established have begun to enter a phase of gradual 'decay.' They can no longer deliver the same results in a world in which there is no room for secrecy, censorship, and news blackouts.

The positive hidden aspect of the leak of these documents may be that they will reveal to ordinary citizens, before researchers, the labyrinths of Arab diplomacy, their modes of operation, tools, and mechanisms. This used to be a taboo issue, a sort of 'black box' whose contents no one must see.

But today's world is one in which there is no room for secrets. Anyone who believes otherwise does not belong to this world; they must live in the age of cavemen. Nor should another proven fact be ignored, namely, that opponents are no longer as stupid as they used to be; they now understand the language of the modern era. In fact, they are experts at using it. The variety of the Arab media confirms this and other facts.

"Times are changing. Will Saudi Arabia and its sister Gulf states also change?" asks 'Atwan in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The French are coming

 

Israel Hayom and Haaretz lead their Monday editions with the stabbing attack in Jerusalem on Sunday, in which a Border Police officer was seriously wounded before shooting to death his Palestinian assailant. Both papers point out that this is the second 'lone wolf' attack in a matter of days, following Friday's shooting in the West Bank, in which one Israeli settler was killed and another seriously wounded.

Haaretz adds that, in response to these attacks, the Israeli security forces are revoking some of the concessions that were granted to the Palestinian population of the West Bank for the holy month of Ramadan.

Speaking at the start of the weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem on Sunday, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that Israel's security forces are taking vigorous action to apprehend the murderer of Danny Gonen, the Israeli killed in Friday's shooting attack near the settlement of Dolev. Netanyahu reiterated that the relative quiet in the West Bank must not mislead anyone. 'There are attempted terrorist attacks all the time,' Netanyahu said, 'and, unfortunately, some of them succeed.'

Netanyahu stressed that the only way to reach peace with the Palestinians is through bilateral negotiations. He said Israel strongly rejects attempts to impose international proposals in regard to both security and peace. He met later in the day with visiting French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. According to the i24 television station, Fabius said, following the meeting, that both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas have said they are prepared to return to the negotiating table to resume peace talks. 'France's ideas are based purely on logic: the most important thing is to bring both sides back to the negotiating table,' Fabius told reporters at a press conference. 'I found that both sides are willing to listen and renew talks. Abbas and Netanyahu both said so.'

The French FM also said negotiations could be accompanied by an international committee formed from Arab and European states that are not members of the Middle East Quartet. 'The committee would accompany the negotiations, but not replace the [Israelis or the Palestinians],' he said, adding that his discussion with Netanyahu had been 'profound and helpful.'

In Ramallah, Abbas told Fabius that any new Palestinian unity government would not include Hamas, AFP reports. The remarks came on the eve of a key meeting of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to discuss forming a new cabinet. The unity government between Hamas and Fatah collapsed last week as Abbas decided to dissolve it amid a deepening rift between the sides. '(Abbas) told me this government of national unity could only include women and men who recognize Israel, renounce violence and who are in agreement with the principles of the (Mideast) Quartet,' Fabius said at a press conference in Jerusalem after holding talks with Abbas in Ramallah. Noting that those conditions ruled out Hamas, Fabius added, 'And that suits us perfectly.'

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with preparations for another flotilla of boats that will set sail for the Gaza Strip later this summer, in an effort to break the Israeli blockade. Its headline focuses on MK Basel Ghattas (Joint Arab List), who said Sunday that he planned on joining the flotilla. In a letter to Netanyahu, Ghattas said he would travel to Athens to join Freedom Flotilla III.

Mazen Kahil, head of the European Campaign to Break the Siege on Gaza, told the Hamas journal Palestine on Saturday that the flotilla ships are currently in the Mediterranean Sea. The ships are waiting to join the Swedish ship Marianne, which recently anchored in Italy, on the open sea, and from there continue as a unified group towards Gaza, where they may confront the Israeli Navy as was seen in the Mavi Marmara incident. Kahil detailed that senior public figures, including former Tunisian President Muncef Marzouki, members of the European Parliament, journalists, athletes, artists, as well as left-wing Israelis, will be on board.

In his letter to Netanyahu, Gattas wrote that the flotilla was 'a civilian attempt to break the blockade of Gaza. This is a flotilla of peace which seeks to draw attention to the difficult situation of 1.8 million Palestinians, who live in an open-air prison under horrendous conditions, the result of the land, sea, and air blockade enforced by Israel. This is nothing but a collective punishment, and a gross violation of human rights.'

Elsewhere, security sources in Lebanon say the Israeli Air Force on Sunday struck a remote area in the western Bekaa region to destroy a downed Israeli drone. One of the Lebanese sources told French news agency AFP that the unmanned aircraft believed to have crashed in a mountainous region near the village of Saghbein. Lebanese media broadcast images purporting to show the remains of the aircraft that was targeted, including what looked to be a wing and twisted pieces of metal. The IDF declined to comment on the report.

Finally, three years after it withdrew its ambassador from Israel, Egypt is about to send a new ambassador to Tel Aviv. Hazem Khairat, 57, who was a senior assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister until recently, was tapped as the new ambassador to Israel. He will replace the current ambassador, Atef Salem, who was urgently recalled to Cairo in November of 2012, just two months after his appointment, and has since been technically working as ambassador from Cairo. Salem was recalled by then-president Mohammed Mursi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, to protest Israel's Gaza operation. The formal changing of the guard is to take place in September.

 

 

THE HISTORY MAN: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea comments on the scandal surrounding former Israeli ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, and says that his accusations against U.S. President Barack Obama are utterly baseless.

"Michael Oren is a serious historian. The two books he has written – one of them dealing with the Six-Day War and the other on American involvement in the Middle East since 1776 – were rightly praised by his peers. This week, another book by the former Israeli ambassador to the United States will be published in English; this one is his memoir from his term as Israeli envoy to Washington. The title of the book is 'Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide'.

Two op-eds that Oren published in recent days have caused quite a storm. The first was published by the Wall Street Journal. In it Oren accused U.S. President Barack Obama of deliberately and maliciously abandoning Israel. The second, published in Foreign Policy magazine, portrays Obama as held as an emotional hostage by Islam. 'I could imagine how a child raised by a Christian mother might see himself as a natural bridge between her two Muslim husbands,' Oren writes. 'I could also speculate how that child’s abandonment by those men could lead him, many years later, to seek acceptance by their co-religionists.'

Oren is now a member of the Israeli Knesset, representing the Kulanu party. What he wrote about President Obama was so extreme, so crude, that the leader of his own party, Moshe Kahlon, saw fit to apologize for it in a letter to the U.S. ambassador to Israel.

For some reason, the Americans also expected Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to apologize. Netanyahu refused: if he were to start apologizing for the superfluous comments of every lawmaker who is a member of his coalition, he wouldn't have time for any unnecessary comments of his own.

Some of Oren's colleagues in Jerusalem and Washington said that he must have taken leave of his senses; others opined that he was merely engaged in an aggressive book-selling campaign. This scandal will no doubt ensure that he gets invited to the right-wing television and radio stations in the United States for some friendly interviews. In synagogues across North America, however, his comments will be less warmly received. The same goes, I believe, for the book-reading public.

Following publication of Oren's first op-ed, I called the former ambassador. I asked him what on earth had happened to him. The views expressed in his article would appear to contradict – in spirit and in essence – the comments he made during his tenure as ambassador and prior to that. He tried to explain.

Oren's basic argument is that the speech that Obama delivered in Cairo in 2009 – a speech that was designed to win over the Arab and Muslim street, over the heads of their rulers, by adopting the Palestinian narrative – marked a change in American foreign policy. Oren's second argument is that the speech was a strategic error. Both of these arguments hold water.

What Oren wrote and said after that, however, does not hold water. His dime-store psychological theories about Obama's view of Islam could, in theory, explain exactly the opposite behavior by the U.S. president. The claim that all of Netanyahu's errors were made in good faith and that all of Obama's were malevolent simply does not fit the facts. And Oren should know.

Oren served as Israel's ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2013. Netanyahu, who appointed him, preferred to handle Israeli-U.S. relations via his protégé, Ron Dermer. Oren was not in the loop. He was not involved in the conspiracy cooked up by Netanyahu, Dermer and republican billionaires – a conspiracy that contributed massively to the current crisis. He was not involved in the scandalous reception that Mitt Romney received in Jerusalem, ahead of his presidential showdown with Obama in 2012. On the contrary: While Netanyahu was cutting deals with the Republicans, Oren was under strict instructions to develop relationships with Democrats.

Oren's op-eds are baseless not only in terms of the facts that they present. They are also historically inaccurate. He portrays the United States and Israel as two nations on an equal footing – identical twins, almost – which act in tandem and which reveal all of their secrets to each other. Any change in this intimate relationship, he argues, is abandonment and treason. The truth, of course, is rather different. It is something of a miracle that the alliance between United States – a superpower – and Israel – a satellite country that is utterly dependent on Washington – has survived so long, despite the crises and despite the occasional efforts by both sides to undermine each other.

Obama believed that by distancing himself somewhat from Israeli policy, while bolstering military aid and continuing to support Israel politically, he would be able to help usher in the era of peace that Israel so desperately wants. He was wrong, of course: Netanyahu had different plans; Abu Mazin had different plans. Responsibility for the failures must be shared between all three of them. We, as Israelis, must first and foremost demand that our prime minister take responsibility.

All the rest, including Obama's dreams of his Muslim father, is fiction. It belongs in a novel or some evangelical church, not in the writings of a noted historian."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S BOOMERANG TACTICS: Writing in Maariv, Chelo Rosenberg says that the best way to counter all the threats Israel is facing – terrorism, biased reporting and so on – is to promote dialogue and negotiations with the Palestinians and the moderate Arab states.

"While Israel is preoccupied with an imaginary cultural war, there are developments on truly important matters that are being shunted to the sidelines.

A short but highly significant article that appeared last week on the pages of Foreign Policy magazine dealt with the storm created by a YouTube video produced by the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. In the video – which has since been removed from the Internet – the Western media was accused of pro-Palestinian (and even pro-Hamas) bias in its coverage of last summer's operation in the Gaza Strip.

The weapon that Israel uses is anti-Semitism. In the West – and especially in Europe – accusations of this kind touch on a raw nerve. More and more organizations and media outlets reject the motives that Israel ascribes to its critics. In the last line of that Foreign Policy article, penned by Elias Groll, the author states that this is how 'this particular piece of propaganda functions: by substituting facts for ridicule.'

Israel's attacks on the Western media could have the opposite effect from what we hope to achieve. The more that these media outlets come under attack from Israel, the more likely it is that their response will present to their audiences – who are not necessarily infected with anti-Semitism – more reasons to hate, boycott and condemn Israel. Whoever was behind the idea to turn Western media outlets into Israel's enemies – into anti-Semites, no less! – is a total idiot. Instead of bringing these media outlets closer, explaining the situation to them and refraining from cheap propaganda, Israel decided to clash with them. This is, at best, stupidity; at worst, it's the kind of obtuseness that proves that our leaders are totally disconnected from reality.

The greater the anti-Israel sentiment among Europeans gets, the less likely Western leaders are to stand up for us. As these lines are being written, the European parliament is composing a report that will determine whether Israel committed war crimes during Operation Protective Edge last year. A report published by the United Nations Human Rights Council – a patently anti-Israel organization – could determine that we were guilty of war crimes.

Israelis do not need reminding that such reports are delusionary. The question is to what extent these reports influence public opinion in the West. Most people formulate their opinions based on what they see and read in the media. Reporters who are denigrated and mocked by Israel will not portray us in a positive light. Therefore, the trick is to work in close cooperation with the Western media.

I believe in the veracity of the Israeli report that was compiled and published before the UNHRC report. I am prepared to believe the prime minister when he says that our report 'proves that our military actions were carried out in full compliance with international law and that Israel was merely exercising its legitimate right to self-defense. Hamas' goal was to target civilians and it deliberately hid behind its civilians. That is a double war crime and I believe that it highlights the absurdity of the UN report.'

I agree with every word. The problem is that the people who are supposed to report on Netanyahu's words to the rest of the world are the same journalists that he attacks. It would be a mistake to think, because of the criticism that Israel has leveled against them, these journalists will think twice before casting false aspersions.

The best hasbara is diplomatic activity. Without a diplomatic initiative, without some progress toward the convening of a regional peace conference, at which there would be representatives of moderate Arab states, representatives of the State of Israel and the Palestinians, without an end to the provocative behavior of certain Israeli leaders, who lash out at the entire world – there will be no way to tackle and to put an end to the threats that Israel is facing."

Ends…

 

TERROR WON'T WIN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Haim Shine says that the only response to the recent spike in terrorist attacks is to strengthen Israel's hold on every inch of the Land of Israel.

"The former head of the IDF's Central Command, Gadi Shamni, said in an interview with Army Radio that it is not safe to hike in Judea and Samaria. This statement ignores the fact that danger also lurks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and northern Israel. Palestinian terror knows no boundaries; it does not differentiate between 1967 and 1948. Palestinian terrorism and the Palestinian political leadership share one clear goal: the eradication of the Zionist entity. They are all students of the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and arch terrorist Yasser Arafat.

Only the most naïve among us still believe that the Palestinians would ever accept the existence of a national homeland for the Jewish people. It seems that we are destined to live forever by the sword – at least until those who seek to harm us recognize that all of us – right and left alike – are determined to defend our homeland, that they will never succeed in intimidating us and that the Jewish people have returned home forever. We are not interlopers in our historic homeland.

Citizens of Israel expect the IDF and the defense establishment to do whatever it takes to curtail what appears to be a new wave of terrorism as quickly as possible. Each 'successful' terror attack merely encourages the next terrorists. The Jewish people use fast days as a time of reflection; our neighbors, it seems, use their fasts for murder. It seems to have become something of a ritual: the holy month of Ramadan is used as an excuse to spill Jewish blood, thanks to the culture of incitement which exists throughout Palestinian society. It is ridiculous to say that these attacks are carried out by 'lone wolves.' Doing so absolves the Palestinians' religious and political leadership, which encourages and promotes attacks on Jews, of responsibility. Any claim that the roots of Palestinian terrorism are in their perceived oppression is a downright lie. There are still some Israelis who remember the terrorism of the Fedayeen – long before Israel 'occupied' Judea and Samaria.

These low-life terrorists have three goals: to kill Jews, to make Israelis doubt themselves and to win respect and honor in their own violent society. The best response to terrorism is to strengthen our hold on our homeland. Only by settling in every corner of the land will we make it patently clear that violence will achieve nothing. Anyone who wants peace will find our hand extended; anyone who wants war will be defeated and conquered."

Ends…

 

STOP THE SHIPS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that Israel must take every measure at its disposal – military, political and diplomatic – to prevent the latest Gaza-bound flotilla from reaching shore.

"Five years after the Mavi Marmara attempted to break the blockade of Gaza – which ended with Israeli Special Forces taking control of the vessel and, in the process, killing a handful of the terror-supporting passengers on board – European patsies are once again taking to the high seas in their service of Hamas. Once again, they are lying to the world and saying that their only goal is to get medical equipment to Gaza's hospitals. Once again, they want to defeat Israel – either by overcoming the blockade and reaching Gaza or by provoking us into another bloody international incident.

Israel faces a complicated dilemma. The Foreign Ministry must be in the vanguard of Israel's efforts; it must convince European governments to thwart this provocation. Behind the scenes, the Mossad and other highly trained units must wait patiently to take covert action and must try to prevent this latest flotilla using stealth.

As part of the effort to drum up international support, there is no reason that Israel should not show some flexibility when negotiating the fate of the flotilla. For example, if, last time, Israel demanded that the cargo aboard the vessels be unloaded and inspected at Ashdod's seaport, and only then allowed into Gaza, this time we could propose that such inspections take place on the high seas by Israeli forces and that representatives of the European Union and Egypt also be allowed to participate.

However, Israel must also prepare for the worst-case scenario of small vessels managing to approach Israel's coastline in a clear effort to spark violent confrontation. MK Basel Ghattas announced with great fanfare that he would be aboard one of the ships. He did so in order to ensure that the incident does not end peacefully and that medical equipment is allowed into Gaza. Ghattas is one of the more extreme members of the Joint Arab List – he was previously a member of Balad, just like Hanin Zoabi, who participated in the previous flotilla. This is not a coincidence.

It is still too early to predict how Ghattas will behave. It remains unclear whether his proposed action is criminal, especially since he has merely declared his intention to break the law. But even now, Israel must make is patently clear to him and the other would-be members of the flotilla that their parliamentary immunity will not protect them from legal action, if and when the government decides to take action. Perhaps more importantly, the powers that be must inform him in no uncertain terms that, if he goes ahead with his plans, he will be handled with the full force of the law. Similarly, if – god forbid – there is a violent clash, Ghattas would be well advised not to follow in the footsteps of Zoabi.

But Ghattas is just one small cog in the machine of evil. Israel's message to these people must be that terrorists will not be allowed to dock in Gaza. On this there can be no compromise."

Ends…

 

U.S. POLICY ON IRAN: In its editorial on Monday, The Jerusalem Post says that U.S. foreign policy is a mess and that the only way to restore sanity is for both parties to take a tougher line on Iran.

"Like a cacophonous orchestra or a badly coordinated sports team, U.S. foreign policy-makers seem to be working at cross purposes regarding Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.

On the one hand, the Obama administration appears to be bent on cutting a deal with the Iranians even if it is bad. This explains Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest concession to the mullahs. This one has to do with the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Up until last week, the consensus among the P5+1 nations (at least the Americans and Europeans) and the International Atomic Energy Agency was that it was absolutely essential that Iran fess up to past transgressions. Failing to do so would make it difficult if not impossible to know where to look for current and future violations.

But now Kerry is telling us that knowing about Iran’s past is no longer important. 'The possible military dimensions, frankly, get distorted a little bit in some of the discussion, in that we’re not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in,' Kerry said last week.

President Barack Obama has tried to make the case on a number of occasions that no other feasible option exists for stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program besides a negotiated agreement. He has also claimed such a deal would have a moderating effect on the Islamic Republic. Obama has insisted that the Iranians are rational actors who will inevitably adhere to the basic contours of such an agreement.

While Kerry and Obama strive to reach a deal with the Islamic Republic, the U.S. State Department, in its annual report on terrorism issued on Friday, has a very different message to relay. Iran, it turns out, is one of the world’s biggest state supporters of terrorism. Throughout 2014 and into 2015 – the period during which negotiations were going on between the P5+1 and Iran – the Islamic Republic continued its terrorist-related activities unabated. The State Department assessment suggests that neither the election of the supposedly 'moderate' President Hassan Rowhani nor the prospect of a nuclear accord with the P5+1 has had a moderating effect on Iran’s activities in the Middle East and the world as a whole.

'We continue to be very, very concerned about IRGC (Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps) activity as well as proxies that act on behalf of Iran,' said Tina S. Kaidanow, the State Department’s senior counterterrorism official, referring to Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Palestinian terrorist organizations in Gaza. 'We watch that extremely carefully.'

The report also found that Iran expanded its foreign operations in Africa, Asia and South America. Just last week, yet another dummy bomb was found near the Israeli Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay. In February, Tehran’s ambassador to Uruguay was summoned to the country’s Foreign Ministry to explain why an Iranian diplomat was spotted close to a dummy bomb planted in November of last year.

How are we to understand these conflicting messages? On one hand, President Obama is bringing to bear all of his influence to convince Americans, Saudis, Israelis and others in the region and elsewhere of the importance of reaching an agreement with the Iranians. And the Obama administration has shown a willingness to facilitate reaching a deal by abandoning its red lines – such as the demand that Iran reveal the history of its nuclear weapons program.

On the other hand, the U.S. State Department acknowledges that Tehran continues to support terrorism around the world. Could it be there is a connection between Iran’s continued aggression and the U.S.’s conciliatory approach to Iran? After all, the Iranians have no reason to believe that the Obama administration’s assurance that 'all options are on the table' is anything but an empty mantra.

Tehran has not been forced to face military or even diplomatic retribution from the U.S. for remaining a leading state sponsor of terrorism. If anything, the Iranians have learned from the very different fates of Libya and North Korea the importance of obtaining nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. While Washington helped overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi after he gave up his nuclear program, the White House has avoided a military confrontation over North Korea’s nuclear program.

Harmony and consistency must be brought to U.S. foreign policy. This will only happen when Congress, on a bipartisan basis, insists that Iran stops supporting international terrorism and the administration reassesses the merits of the nuclear arms agreement currently being negotiated with Tehran."

Ends…

 

ASSAD'S ALLIES: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that Iran and Russia are continuing to provide the Syrian regime with advice, intelligence and weapons – but not boots on the ground.

"Iran and Russia, the two countries that are helping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, will continue to prop up his beleaguered regime. That’s the most recent assessment by Israeli defense officials, despite the series of major military failures Assad has incurred in recent months. In Israel, it’s believed that the two countries will continue to provide the Syrian leader with advice, intelligence and weapons, in order to stabilize him and stop Sunni rebel groups from advancing toward the regions still under the regime’s control.

Over the past few months, Assad’s troops have suffered serious defeats in Idlib Province in northern Syria, the ancient desert city of Palmyra in the southeast, as well as north of the town of Daraa, southern Syria. The Syrian army has had to withdraw troops from some areas, such as Jabal al-Druze near the border with Jordan, and move them toward Damascus and the Alawite enclave in northwestern Syria.

However, it seems that Iran and Russia – each working separately – are both determined to ensure the regime’s survival. In this context, Assad’s army is redeploying, among other ways by establishing a new fortification line east of Damascus in order to stop the rebel advance. The regime is also working to shorten its defense lines and focus on protecting the areas it considers essential, preparing to defend the capital and the Alawite region from continued assaults by the rebels.

At the beginning of the month, reinforcements were sent streaming to the Alawite enclave, out of fear that the Southern Front, which unites the Sunni rebel groups, will manage to score some military victories on the edges of that area. Iran still needs Assad as part of its struggle for regional hegemony, which it is waging against the relatively moderate Sunni countries – chief among them Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For Russia, the port of Tartus, in the heart of the Alawite enclave, is of prime importance; it uses the port to maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean.

Since the civil war began in 2011, the Assad regime has received huge quantities of weapons and ammunition from Iran and Russia. It may be assumed that this trend will continue in coming months. Still, Iran is not prepared to send units from its Revolutionary Guards into the fray, and is making do with advising and guiding behind the scenes, despite Assad’s requests to increase its involvement. It seems that Tehran fears the direct, outright involvement of Iranian soldiers, which could sabotage ties with the world powers over the emerging nuclear agreement. As a senior Israeli defense official recently put it, the Iranians 'are ready to fight to the last drop of Hizbollah volunteers’ blood in Syria,' but not to sacrifice their own men in the war.

The Syrian president is worried by the operational capabilities of the Sunni opposition, which relies particularly on increased weapons shipments from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, among which are TOW anti-tank missiles that allow the rebels to make relatively precise and deadly strikes on Syrian army tanks and positions in the various cities. In recent months, a sharp decline can be seen in the operational abilities and morale of the Syrian army, whose soldiers are exhausted from the continued fighting. The regime is expected to try to reorganize its units, which are depleted by the deaths, injuries or captivity of many fighters in harsh battles throughout the country.

The past few days have seen no change in the situation in the Druze village of Khader, which was surrounded by Sunni rebel fighters last week. In conversations between senior political and military officials and leaders of the Israeli-Druze community, the Druze were promised that the Israel Defense Forces is prepared to assist the inhabitants of the village if there is a flight of refugees over to the Israeli side of the border. At the same time, severe warnings were sent to the rebels not to enter the village."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKEY/SYRIA BORDER TENSIONS:  Semih Idiz claims that Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are now both under U.S. protection in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Today, Ankara faces something that I have feared for a long time. The situation suggests that an autonomous Kurdish region will be established in northern Syria, similar to what previously happened in northern Iraq. Besides, this entity will lie right next to the Kurdish region in Iraq. In light of this, the most important development is that this region, too, should be under the control of the U.S. and the West. The U.S. is not only the protector of Iraq’s Kurds but of Syria’s Kurds as well."

Mustafa Edip Yilmaz argues that Ankara perceives a new threat in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "It is not ISIS’s banners that are fluttering at the border, but those of the PYD and the FSA (Free Syrian Army). According to President Erdogan and PM Ahmet Davutoglu, this is very bad news. Both politicians have been pointing to a conspiracy in their statements on this issue. According to them, foreign powers are creating a space in Syria for the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and the PYD. And Turkey is being deceived to a great extent. In brief, the PYD, which has declared autonomy and silenced its opponents without any opposition, seems to have turned into a threat."

Beril Dedeoglu detects an Iraqi-type situation in centre-right, pro-government Star: "There are two and a half options regarding who will be in control of Syrian territories across the border from Turkey. One is ISIS, or some similar radical group. The other is an entity whose rules are determined by the YPG [People's Protection Units-- the PYD's armed wing]. The remaining half-option is the umbrella that is called the FSA (Free Syrian Army). No matter which one is preferred, the calculations will have to be made by looking at the balance between Damascus and the local governments, because Syria is currently a multilateral entity. This is similar to the Erbil-Baghdad balance."

Ufuk Ulutas says that Washington has gained a new proxy in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "The U.S. which seems to have found a partner in the PYD [pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party] to fight against ISIS in Kobani and cooperate in order to shape the new Syria, is not only happy because ISIS is in retreat, but also because the PYD is filling the vacuum areas. With both parties pleased, the PYD has gained an international protector and the U.S. has gained a proxy that will run its errands on the Syria-Iraq front."

Amberin Zaman calls for an urgent policy review in leftist Taraf: "According to Syrian-based Turkish journalist Hediye Levent, the Syrian army might launch an attack in the coming days to secure the Damascus-Aleppo highway which is vital for the defence of Damascus. It has already begun its military build-up in Idlib. Iran and Hizbollah will take part in this operation as well. This might have a very critical outcome for Turkey. Turkey should urgently reconsider its Syria policy."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Misinterpreting Abdullah

2-No half-solutions, no half-wars

3-Israel’s true face

4-A new Turkey on the horizon

 

1-Misinterpreting Abdullah

 

Jordan’s King is not seeking extend the ‘Hashemite’ state but to arm Syrian and Iraqi Sunni clans against ISIS and Shiite extremists, says Jamil an-Nimri in today’s Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Jordanian King Abdullah’s recent statements regarding arming the Sunni clans in eastern Syria and western Iraq have been misinterpreted as referring to plans to expand the country’s borders and establish a new Hashemite kingdom, but this is far from the truth, maintains a Jordanian commentator. Jordan wants to arm these clans so as to fight ISIS and the extremist Shiite militias, paving the way for reforms inside these states that will benefit all their constituents.

 

REAL AND IMAGINED SCENARIOS: "His Majesty [King Abdullah’s] statement about backing the Sunni clans in eastern Syria and western Iraq has stirred a wave of speculation that – as usual – went very far in searching for what lies behind his words and that ventured into the world of real and possible scenarios intended to restructure the region, its states and their borders," writes Jamil an-Nimri in Friday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

No one can change the borders of states; but the maps of influence, hegemony, and roles shift and change ceaselessly. Jordanian policy is very realistic in this regard. The sense behind the king's statement does not go beyond its immediate meaning, which addresses a very urgent need, in fact. The king merely spoke a truth that is exploding in our faces every day, telling us that the catastrophe unfolding in eastern Syria and western Iraq has to do with the [Sunni] clans and peoples of these areas who are trapped between the hammer of ISIS and the anvil of the unjust and sectarian [Shiite] forces.

Ever since the Iraqi army’s suspect withdrawal from Mosul, it has been clear that the success of the confrontation with ISIS and the defeat of the scheme of partition that this dangerous organization is pursuing in Syria and Iraq, rests on the creation of a military force that embodies the spirit of patriotism and moderation in Sunni circles. It has also become clear that the international coalition's air strikes will produce no results without a military intervention on the ground; one that neither the U.S. nor any member of the coalition wants to carry out.

Whatever one may believe regarding the U.S.'s true intentions – with claims that it wants to weaken ISIS but not to eliminate it at this stage, or that it is efficiently drawing red lines for ISIS in the north (in the Kurds' areas) while leaving it free to act in the south (in the Sunni areas) – it is clear that there is no alternative to a capable force drawn from the Sunni areas' population that represents the moderate patriotic line.

After defeating ISIS, this force will devote its attention to securing a political settlement between the various domestic forces based on equality and participation in domestic reform, rebuilding the state and finding a fair and balanced formula for government.

[Former Iraqi PM] Nuri al-Maliki and the Iraqi forces that are Iran's lackeys have exploited ISIS's invasion and the intense fear that resulted from it in order to legitimize the creation of a [largely Shiite] militia that goes by the name 'Popular Mobilization Units' (PMU). These Shiite militias became an officially recognized force that legitimately extends its authority over entire areas and neighborhoods.

But who other than Maliki and his companions wanted ISIS in eastern Iraq? This was reconfirmed by the Iraqi army's withdrawal from al-Ramadi and the Syrian army's withdrawal from Tadmur [Palmyra]. In fact, the Iraqi army's withdrawal was something that current Iraqi PM Haidar al-'Abadi could not control. And despite repeated calls, there was continuous procrastination and postponement in arming the Iraqi Sunni clans. The result has been that these clans now view themselves as a victim of both sides, trapped between ISIS's hell and the fire of the sectarian militias.

So what is ‘coded’ in the king's statement, when the truth is screaming in our faces, telling us that everything depends on backing the Sunni clans in Iraq and Syria in order to establish a moderate patriotic force that defeats sectarianism and criminal behavior on both the Sunni and the Shiite fronts, and that aims to create a united Arab homeland for all its citizens?

This is Jordan's line. Any talk of regional ambitions or of suspect scenarios, is the work of sick imaginations. But Jordan has an immediate and urgent security interest, of course, in confronting this situation and preventing the threats emanating from ISIS's control of these areas from reaching our borders. Jordan now is a central state in the region, and it is ridiculous to believe that it can protect itself or contribute positively simply by refraining from action and withdrawing from the scene.

This, of course, is not Jordan's mission all by itself. We still say that a joint Arab force should play a role. Or that advanced joint Arab bases for logistical support should be established alongside the U.S. bases, at least.

"These bases should then back up the fighting forces made up of the inhabitants of the Sunni areas in south- eastern Syria and south-western Iraq," concludes Nimri.

Ends…

 

 

2-No half-solutions, no half-wars

 

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf need to make a strategic decision either to pursue an all-out confrontation with Tehran in Yemen, or to find some means of accommodation with it, says Raghida Dergham in today’s pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

 

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states should realize that the nuclear deal with Iran will be signed sooner or later, and that this will end Iran’s international isolation, maintains a Lebanese commentator. They should therefore make up their mind, either to go all the way in their war against Iranian influence in Yemen and elsewhere, or to reach understandings with Iran over regional issues. Half-solutions and half-wars are no longer effective in the emerging new international situation.

 

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED: “The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany (the ‘5 + 1’) may not end by the end of the current month,” writes Raghida Dergham in Friday’s Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

This is because the two main issues that are the subject of disagreement remain unresolved. These are: The means and extent to which Tehran’s past commitment not to produce nuclear weapons is to be investigated and corroborated; and the ‘snap-back’ (re-imposition) of sanctions should it fail to honor that commitment in the future.

But the delay in reaching an agreement does not mean that the negotiations have collapsed. In fact, they are very unlikely to collapse even if the delay were to last for months, not just weeks. And the reason for this is that U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamene’i are both determined that they should not fail. Obama because of his concern for his legacy and reputation as it will be recorded by history; and Khamene’i is determined because of his desire to protect a regime that has been in power for 35 years, and that now, more than ever before, needs the necessary funds to consolidate its hold domestically and implement its regional plans.

The other states involved in the negotiations – Russia, China, Germany, Britain, and France – may disagree over one detail or another; but they are all agreed on the following: There is no alternative to ensuring the negotiations’ success at whatever cost and in whatever manner. For this reason, these states, that are responsible for upholding international peace and security and ensuring respect for the UN Security Council’s resolutions, are burying their heads in the sand as they watch Tehran violate the resolution that bans it from producing and exporting weapons, or from deploying military advisors or fighters outside its borders.

This reality should awaken the Arab states to the new situation in their international relations, including their relations with Tehran, and the manner in which it views the Gulf states in practice. For a new and important matter is taking shape within the framework of political and geographical changes, and it is necessary for it to be discussed frankly, attentively, and without being annoyed by criticism.

Tehran’s autocratic regime is not the only threat to the Arab region, although its expansionist ambitions are part of those threats. Turkey has its own ambitions and its means of intervening in the Arab region in a manner that serves its interests or its president’s aims. Israel has its intransigent policies that insist on rejecting the two-state solution and on persisting with its occupation and its construction of illegal settlements that undermine any prospect of establishing a Palestinian state. ISIS and its ilk are killing people and destroying the Arabs’ past as it destroys the cities that bear witnesses to these civilizations.

Then there is the track record of certain Arab leaders, some of whom have gone down in history as employing their obsession with power for torching their own lands and dispersing their peoples. And the mistakes committed by other Arab leaders are astonishing. Their cost has been paid by past and present generations, and will be paid by future generations as well, unless quickly put right. And last but not least, we have the great powers that have often toyed with the Arab region, always finding in it leaderships fertile ground for joining them in manipulating the Arabs’ resources and peoples.

The crisis of confidence, therefore, is local/domestic, regional, and international. The primary characteristics of the Arab region today are fragmentation, division, and willing or unwilling involvement in quagmires, bloodbaths, and destruction. There are exceptions, of course. But even some of these have begun to slide towards involvement in these quagmires and should take care before it is too late.

The U.S. has already made up its mind. It informed Gulf states’ officials whom President Barack Obama met in Camp David a month ago, that the nuclear agreement – with the consequent bilateral relations between the U.S. and Iran – is a done deal, and that the Arab leaders have no say in the matter. It also informed them that they should adapt to the imminent status quo if they want the ‘guarantees’ they have been seeking from the U.S.; in order to protect these states against a direct military aggression, but nothing else.

In other words, if the Gulf states believe Iran to be assaulting Saudi national security via the Yemeni gateway and striking at the Kingdom’s flanks, that would not count as an aggression subject to its security guarantees in Washington’s view. On the contrary, Washington differs radically in its assessment of Iran’s role in Yemen and does not agree that this is tantamount to an Iranian assault on Saudi national security. In other words, regardless of the Obama administration’s clear determination to protect the nuclear agreement as a supreme strategic priority, Washington is not sympathetic to the logic of the [Saudi-led] ‘Arab coalition’ in Yemen that views the Houthis as an ally and tool of Tehran with which it is targeting Saudi Arabia.

This is why the ‘Arab coalition’ will not receive American military aid in Yemen, regardless of previous hints issuing from the U.S. administration in this regard. Therefore, any military strategy that the ‘Arab coalition’ adopts should be based on self-reliance, and not on hints that the U.S. may be ready to provide some military support.

Based on the above, the ‘Arab coalition’ has to choose: It can either make a qualitative effort to consolidate its military position via a naval landing [in Yemen] to secure the main cities such as Aden, Taiz, and al-Hodeida, relying totally on itself and not on the U.S. or Pakistan; or it can come to the conclusion that a well-considered exit strategy bolstered by a Yemeni ‘Marshal Plan’ is capable of foiling the Iranian project that is based on miring the ‘Arab coalition’ states in the Yemeni quagmire.

There is an important difference between Arab and Iranian military thinking in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran adopts a strategy whereby it controls the land via an ally on the ground, whom it provides with all its needs; while Saudi Arabia relies on an air-based strategy and on tribes in the traditional manner. There is a clear need now for reconsidering this strategy, and for thinking of an all-out involvement with added impetus and vigor that abandons half-solutions and self-control. And let Yemen be the first station for this qualitative change in strategic thinking.

What we mean here, is that there is nothing wrong about either of the above two options – a qualitative military escalation via a naval landing that secures the cities, or reaching an understanding with Iran. If the Saudi national interest calls for an understanding with Tehran over Yemen or as part of broader regional understandings, there is nothing wrong with that at all. Understanding, quite naturally, entails concessions from both sides.

And there is nothing wrong if the result promotes the Saudi and Arab national interest. Describing the notion of understandings as amounting to defeatism is shortsighted because the supreme interest must always be the prime guide. Courageous leaders are those that carry nations forward, not those that lead them to further destruction. And this is true of Tehran more than anyone else.

It is claimed that Tehran wants a trade-off with Riyadh on the following basis: ‘Let us do as we wish in Syria, and we shall leave you in peace in Yemen’. It is also said that Riyadh rejects this trade-off because it is not ready to abandon Arab Syria to Tehran, allowing it the chance to build its ‘Persian Crescent’ that is swallowing up entire Arab states – or parts of them –imposing its hegemony on them and reducing the Arabs’ weight in the regional balance of power.

There is some truth to this point of view. The other point of view says: Let Iran become further implicated in Syria so that it can turn more and more into its Vietnam. For in Syria, Iran is facing many ISIS-like groups and it cannot impose its hegemony because it is impossible for it to control the country. In other words, the contrary point of view says: Resort to the principle of ‘take and ask for more’ as part of any ‘trade-off’ of Yemen for Syria.

The fact is that Yemen is very important as a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side, and securing it is necessary. But Syria is now fragmented and Saudi Arabia will be unable to save it, not even from partition, now that it has become too late. Syria as a country and as a nation has paid the price, and no one is innocent of what has happened to it. But if Iran desperately wants it, despite the continuing infighting, let it reap what it has sown in Syria, and let this be its ‘Vietnam.’

Iraq’s fate will be better if regional understandings are reached over it, including between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is because Iraq is neither ready nor prepared to choose between these two players. Iraq needs Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states to play a coherent and well-considered role in helping overcome ISIS which was launched from it soil, and to avoid allowing Iran to monopolize ISIS’s defeat on the ground and on the battlefield. Theoretically speaking, if an Iranian/Gulf understanding is reached in Iraq based on logical and practical grounds, it may be possible to save Iraq from the plans to partition it that Iran is accused of sponsoring so as to fulfill its ‘Persian Crescent’ design.

None of the above means that Tehran is ready for such understandings, especially now that it is on the threshold of joining as an international partner in the U.S.’s new move toward the East. It is also about to be embraced by the European states, China, Russia, India, and Brazil.

 Therefore, any talk of isolating Iran is now a thing of the past. We must either adapt to the new reality one way or another via understandings or via a total boycott; or we should take matters in hand on the ground and adopt a strategy of confrontation that informs all those concerned that the war in Yemen is one we cannot afford to lose, and that we are in the midst of a fateful battle with Iran that stretches from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon.

“Half-solutions are no longer effective; but neither are half-wars,” concludes Dergham.

Ends…

 

 

3-Israel’s true face

 

Israel’s unwillingness to act in defense of its Druze citizens’ beleaguered brethren in Syria highlights the fact that it is a state of the Jews alone, says Randa Haidar in today's Lebanese daily an-Nahar

 

The manner in which Israel has been dealing with its Druze population’s reaction to the Syrian opposition factions’ attacks on Syria's Druze has once again highlighted the fact that it is a state for the Jews and that all its other citizens are second-class citizens, argues a Lebanese commentator on Israeli affairs. It has also exposed Israel's links with the Syrian opposition.

 

UNWILLING TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS: "Israel's Druze have discovered the true face of the state in which they live, whose identity cards they carry, and in whose army they serve," writes Randa Haidar in Friday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

For Israel, which is willing to risk everything to defend any Jew in danger, is not ready in any form or manner to do anything to protect its citizens' Druze brothers who are now under serious threat in Syria from the hard-line Islamist groups.

Syria's Druze do not need Israel's protection. They are able to defend their presence in this area where they have deep roots; no one will succeed in uprooting them from it. But while the moves by the Druze in Israel represent a natural and automatic reaction that expresses the strong sense of solidarity between members of the Druze sect wherever they are, Israel’s official reaction has once again exposed the fact that it is not a state for all of its citizens, but that of the Jews before anyone else. The special status Israel accords to the Druze primarily aims to divide and separate the minorities from each other in order to rule them more tightly while inciting them against each other.

How difficult it must be for members of the Druze community in Israel to watch their brothers on the Syrian side under threat and shelling, without being able to come to their aid. The long years of Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights have not succeeded in destroying the powerful links that connect the members of the same sect who are in continuous contact with each other. It must be painful for them today to see their brothers and relatives suffer without being able to come to their aid.

Israel's means of dealing with its Druze's activity was scandalous, beginning with the Israeli army’s decision to declare the Golan Heights a military zone in order to prevent Druze groups from approaching the border fence [with Syria]– one that the army quickly rescinded when it realized its mistake; moving on to the announcement by military officials that Israel would not receive any Syrian Druze refugees on its territories, even though it has received hundreds of wounded [opposition] Syrians and established special field hospitals for treating them throughout the past years; and ending with talk of behind-the-scenes Israeli efforts to pressure the Syrian opposition groups and demand that they should not attack the Druze—which suggests that Israel has an established network of relations with these groups.

A massacre of Syria's Druze would inflict a terrible wound on the psyche of Israel's Druze, who believe that the predicament of any Druze anywhere in the world is their own personal predicament and who cling to their sect and insist on their Arab identity.

"This is certain to have long-term effects on their attitude towards the Israeli state," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

 

4-A new Turkey on the horizon

 

Ankara [is faced with] a choice between two options: Either to abide by Washington’s strategy in Syria and provide support to the armed groups only in accordance with [U.S.] strategy; or lose its ability to deliver aid to the groups that have a closer connection to Turkey than the U.S. Therefore, ISIS’s expulsion from Tal Abyad sends an additional message after that of the [June 7th Turkish parliamentary] elections aimed at domesticating the AKP and bringing it back to the American fold. This may explain Erdogan's [strong negative] reaction to the YPG's capture of Tal Abyad--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The blow that Erdogan has received in the elections has left him in a state hysteria, especially since no opposition leader is willing to visit the new palace he has built and where he resides…If we add the foreign factor to all this, especially Washington's attitude towards the next government, then everything becomes possible, but with the clear truth that the old Turkey has come to an end, and that a new Turkey is emerging on the horizon, even though its general features remain unclear--Mohammad Noureddin in Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

In addition to demonstrating that ISIS can be easily defeated when there is a Washington-backed decision to do so, the Kurds’ capture of Tal Abyad may have been intended as a U.S. message to Turkey and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), highlighting the consequences if it refuses to abide by America’s strategy in Syria, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Syrian Beirut daily. It is evident that a new Turkey is emerging in which the AKP will no longer have exclusive monopoly over power, argues a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. But President Erdogan will continue to do everything possible to ensure that he can wield power, even if he has to call for early elections.

 

LIBERATING TAL ABYAD: "Acting in coordination with well-directed U.S. aerial strikes, the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) have succeeded in liberating the town of Tal Abyad that ISIS had taken control of before capturing the [Syrian] city of al-Raqqa," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The fight lasted for only a few hours. In fact, the battle to liberate Tal Abyad resembled that of liberating Tikrit. For as soon as the decision was taken to storm each city, ISIS simply collapsed and was unable to conduct a battle that lives up to the hullabaloo that has surrounded its capture of many areas in Syria and Iraq.

ISIS's rapid collapse before the [largely Shiite Iraqi] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Tikrit and the YPG in Syria implies one of two things: First, that ISIS fighters are not as able and motivated as many have portrayed them to be; they are mere mercenaries, in fact, who flee from the confrontation as soon as they face a serious force, evacuating their families to safe areas. Second, that ISIS – or important elements of it at least – yield to the diktats of Western governments when the latter decide that one area or another represents a red line that ISIS should not cross.

Regardless of which of these two factors explains ISIS's rapid collapse and retreat first from Tikrit and then from Tal Abyad, this important development cannot be seen in isolation of the West’s broad scheme that constitutes the backbone of U.S. strategy in the region. The U.S. is well-known to be seeking two major goals in Syria in the short-term if its strategy for this arena is to succeed:

- The first is to create a zone inside Syria controlled by the groups that cooperate and coordinate with the U.S. exclusively, and on whom it is possible to rely when sending weapons or other aid. Moreover, these groups should have no links with the extremist Islamist organizations that include members classified as terrorists by the U.S. The YPG satisfies these requirements more than any other Syrian opposition group, given the internal disagreements within the [‘moderate’] Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and its lack of any presence on the ground, and in light of the Nusra Front's liquidation of the ‘Syria's Rebels Movement’ and the ‘Hazm Movement’ on which the U.S. had previously relied.

Today, the U.S. aspires to control a strip of land parallel to the Turkish borders, stretching from al-Qamishli to 'Ain al-Arab, and perhaps later to 'Afrin, by enabling the YPG to take control of this area as an effective and trustworthy ally capable of securing results on the ground – contrary to the other extremist Islamist organizations.

- The U.S.’s second aim is to create a buffer zone that limits the AKP's ability to act in accordance with a purely Turkish strategy of which the U.S. does not approve. This would confront Ankara with a choice between two options: Either to abide by Washington’s strategy in Syria and provide support to the armed groups only in accordance with this strategy; or lose its ability to deliver aid to the groups that have a closer connection to Turkey than the U.S.

Therefore, ISIS’s expulsion from Tal Abyad sends an additional message after that of the [June 7th Turkish parliamentary] elections aimed at domesticating the AKP and bringing it back to the American fold.

"This may explain Erdogan's [strong negative] reaction to the YPG's capture of Tal Abyad," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

TURNED LEAF: "The Turkish elections have turned the leaf on the AKP's monopoly over power," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

The AKP's loss of its absolute majority and the fact that it now has 70 less MPs in parliament have radically reshuffled the political cards and brought the country to a new phase of balances, probabilities, and dangers.

All eyes now are focused on the next government. Will it be led by the AKP along with one of the opposition parties? Or will the opposition-collectively- have the say in forming a government from which the AKP will be excluded and remain outside power?

After the Supreme Electoral Committee has officially declared the results of the elections, the person who will be asked to form the new government is [PM and current AKP head] Ahmet Davutoglu, since he heads the largest party in parliament. The constitution allows him forty-five days to form a new government; and if he fails, custom requires the president to ask the head of the next largest party – the People's Republican Party (CHP) led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu – to form the government. Otherwise, the president has the power to call for early elections.

The elections’ political consequences have begun to be felt:

First, signs of rifts inside the AKP have begun to emerge. Erdogan has suffered a major reversal to the AKP's monopoly over power and his dreams of establishing a presidential/sultanate regime. He has begun to make his calculations on the assumption that he wishes to be a leader who is not retrained by his limited presidential powers that prevent him from being a major political player.

Viewed from this perspective, Erdogan still hopes to reestablish the AKP's authority, and hence to revive the idea of a presidential regime. He believes that this can be achieved by ensuring that no coalition government is formed, with or without the AKP. Instead, and after the 45-days period expires, he is seeking to head to early parliamentary elections before asking the next party in line to form the government. He believes that such elections will restore some of the votes he has lost and bring the AKP back to parliament with an absolute majority, at least. But circles close to the president believe otherwise, fearing that the party will be faced with a further retreat in early elections, ending up with 35% of the vote [rather than the 40% it now enjoys].

For their part, PM Davutoglu's circles believe that early elections will pose a threat to him. For before such elections, he will have to hold a general AKP conference where his head will be on the line and he will be held responsible for the party's defeat. This is why Davutoglu prefers to form an AKP coalition government with one of the opposition parties, most probably the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

And as for the opposition, it appears that no final decision has been taken not to join the AKP in a single government. The only party that has announced that it would not in join any coalition with the AKP is the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP).

But the opposition finds itself in a very awkward situation. No government can bring the Kurds (HDP) together with the MHP. Therefore, the margin for maneuver is very wide. One opposition view says that it should not waste the opportunity provided by the elections results to form a government that excludes the AKP. This can be used to purge the state of all the damage done to it by Erdogan's regime over 13 years in power, especially that done to the judiciary, and to open up the corruption and foreign policy files. According to this line, any party that joins the AKP would be betraying what it had promised the electorate before the elections, and would therefore be punished by the voters in the first elections to be held.

In light of this, Erdogan's role in any new government remains central – unless the entire opposition agrees to form a government. After all, he will not allow Davutoglu to form a government that intends to open the corruption files or limit his constitutional powers. In other words, Erdogan will continue to fight to ensure that he remains constitutionally in charge or as the de facto authority, even if this entails risks that he has grown accustomed to taking and that place the entire country on the brink of an abyss.

For the blow that Erdogan has received in the elections has left him in a state hysteria, especially since no opposition leader is willing to visit the new palace he has built and where he resides. Even his meeting with the most senior MP, Deniz Baykal, who is a leading CHP figure, took place in the Foreign Ministry guesthouse.

"If we add the foreign factor to all this, especially Washington's attitude towards the next government, then everything becomes possible, but with the clear truth that the old Turkey has come to an end, and that a new Turkey is emerging on the horizon, even though its general features remain unclear," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Truce or dare

 

Haaretz leads its weekend edition with an exclusive report about a new government plan to provide 110,000 of Israel's poorest families with a daily food basket. The plan is needed, Haaretz says, because the number of Israelis living below the poverty line has increased significantly in recent year. The problem, however, is that the number of needy families is actually three times greater than the number the government plans to provide for. In addition, only a fraction of the 500 million shekels needed to bankroll the plan has been found.

Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead with the suspected arson attack on the Church of the Multiplication and the wall-to-wall condemnation that followed. The church, where Jesus is said to have performed the miracle of the bread and fish, was gutted in the blaze. Graffiti in Hebrew calling for 'idol worshipers' to be driven out of Israel was found on the outside walls of the church.

Police are still looking for the alleged arsonists who attacked the church, which is located on the banks of the Sea of Galilee and is one of the most popular stops for Christian pilgrims visiting the Holy Land. According to reports in all the papers, 16 youths from nearby Jewish settlements were questioned about the attack and subsequently released.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with Shin Bet head Yoram Cohen to discuss the attack. The prime minister ordered Cohen to launch a top-priority investigation and called the attack 'an attack on all of us. We will bring to justice those responsible for this criminal act. Hatred and intolerance have no place in Israeli society,' he added in a statement.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with still more comments from controversial Culture Minister Miri Regev. Regev continued on Thursday to stoke the fires of conflict which has raged in recent days between herself and Israel’s artistic community, calling the country’s artists 'tight-assed, hypocritical and ungrateful' people who 'think they know everything.' Artists from various fields have accused the new minister of seeking to limit freedom of expression through anti-democratic measures, and have expressed outrage at her stated intention to defund institutions and subversive works that in her opinion 'delegitimize' Israel.

Away from the top headlines, all the papers continue to report on the fallout from comments by former Israeli ambassador to Washington, MK Michael Oren, who accused U.S. President Barack Obama of deliberately sabotaging Israeli-U.S. relations. Having been roundly criticized by the leader of his own party Kulanu; the opposition, the White House and the State Department, Oren got something of a backhanded vote of support yesterday from Netanyahu, who rejected an American request that he disavows Oren's comments. Since Netanyahu is not Oren's boss any more – and since he probably agreed with everything the former ambassador said – he refused the American request.

In other news, France's Foreign Minister arrived in Cairo on Friday with an initiative aimed at bringing Israel and the Palestinians back to peace talks under an international framework. Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius is to explore the prospects for talks when he meets tomorrow in Cairo with Arab League ministers, and then with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on Sunday.

The Reuters news agency quotes a senior French diplomat as saying, 'We can no longer isolate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the regional context.' If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, said the senior French diplomat, radical groups such as Islamic State will make the Palestinian cause their own.

France is hoping to convince Arab states, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council members to pressure both Israeli and Palestinian leaders to make compromises that neither side wants to make alone. 'The method to reach a definitive solution has been for both sides to meet face to face with the Americans as an honest broker, but this method has failed. It needs international support.' said the French diplomat:  France has so far focused on Arab states for a possible UN Security Council resolution that would set negotiating parameters and establish a time period, possibly 18 months, to complete talks.

In other diplomatic news, Ynet reports that the Palestinians will next week submit their first file to the International Criminal Court in their bid to open criminal proceedings against Israel, according to comments from an official on Thursday. The move is part of an increased focus on diplomatic maneuvering and appeals to international bodies by the Palestinians, who have been frustrated by the lack of progress in peace negotiations.

Finally, in an interview with the Times of Israel, former Shin Bet director Yuval Diskin says that he is 'seriously considering entering politics.' 'My cooling off period from politics ended with the last election cycle, I had many offers that I turned down consistently.'

 

TRUCE OR DARE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Smadar Perry comments on recent report of a possible long-term truce between Israel and Hamas – and reminds readers that Egypt calls the shots.

"In order to prevent the kind of surprises that nobody likes and to forestall the next conflict for as long as possible, several key players are currently working behind the scenes: Qatari diplomat Muhammad al-Ahmadi, who heads the Committee for Rebuilding Gaza, is working on behalf of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Khalifa Al-Thani; former Bulgarian foreign minister Nikolay Mladenov, who was appointed in 2015 to serve as United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's special coordinator for the Middle East peace process; Moussa Abu Marzouk, the long-serving deputy leader of Hamas' political wing; and Gen. Yoav Mordechai, Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories.

When I visited Doha last month, a senior Foreign Ministry official there told me about a series of secret meetings between Mordechai and al-Ahmadi. 'They met two or three times in Israel,' he told me, 'and once more when Mordechai visited an Arab country. At these meetings, they reached understandings on the urgent need to rebuild the Gaza Strip, to deal with the humanitarian crisis there and to prevent another outbreak of violence. It was important for us to make it clear to the Israeli general that we are willing to contribute to the cost of the rebuilding effort and not to fund terror. No one wants missiles fired at Israel. Hamas is weak and tired.'

It now seems that the messages about how Hamas' leadership (the political leadership, that is, not the military leadership) wants a long-term truce with Israel started to arrive within two months of the end of Operation Protective Edge. At first, the message came from Gazan businessmen who are allowed out of the Strip and into Israel and who were chosen to relay vague messages. They were completely ignored by the Israeli side.

A month later, these messengers were given the outline of the 10-point plan for an end to missile attacks. Hamas also drew up a document for a year-long 'rolling tahdiyah,' which could be extended to a five-year truce if Israel agreed to Hamas' demands. 'Hamas did thorough homework,' one Israeli official told me. 'They prepared a plan for the rebuilding of the destroyed neighborhoods, they spoke about the distress and despair of the homeless, they pointed out that there is potential for conflict and they provided a long list of possible donors. They also made a forceful demand for the establishment of a seaport, an airport and for the unlimited opening of the border crossings into Israel and Egypt.'

Hamas' second attempt to promote a ceasefire was also rejected by the Prime Minister's Office and the Defense Ministry. But Hamas did not give up. 'They started to inundate every Western diplomat or foreign envoy who visited the Strip. They approached the European Union and the United Nations' special envoy. They rewrote their 10-point plan and they asked mediators to tell Israel, in the name of the Hamas leadership, that unless Jerusalem accepts the truce proposal, the next round of fighting would be inevitable.

Now, too, after Israel has started to gradually lift the blockade (in recent weeks around 1,000 people were allowed to leave Gaza every day), after Qatar was given permission to send food and equipment to Gaza, after 92,000 Gazans were provided with building materials – and their full names were recorded to ensure that there materials were not used to build tunnels for Hamas – Israel still insists that there are no indirect talks and no negotiations. Nobody in Israel is sitting around waiting for a truce to be agreed.

Things do appear to be calmer on the ground. 'Hamas is thwarting other groups' efforts to provoke Israel,' the senior official told me. 'Israel is rewarding Hamas by hooking Gaza up to Israel's natural gas supply and to its desalination projects. Another water pipe and another electricity cable have been installed.'

Last weekend, Musa Abu Marzouk left Gaza for Qatar, to update his boss, Khaled Mish'al, and to present the document drawn up by Mladenov. There are no Israeli fingerprints on that document, which details how the sides can reach a truce agreement. Even the title of the document is noncommittal. It does not specify whether the truce is supposed to last five years or double that. Rather, it contains an easily understood equation: In exchange for total quiet from Gaza, Israel and Egypt will gradually lift the blockade and will provide Gaza with economic incentives, primarily allowing the export of fruit and vegetables to Israel during the year that Jewish law obligates Israeli farmers to let their land lie fallow. The longer the agreement holds water, Israeli officials say, the easier it will be to extend it and to reward the Gazans for their 'good behavior.'

One of the cornerstones of any truce agreement is the establishment of a seaport in Gaza. In this context, it is important to differentiate between Hamas' political leadership, which is looking for ways to get inside the royal palace in Saudi Arabia and the presidential palace in Cairo, and the organization's military wing, which remains loyal to Iran. The military wing insists that there will be no understandings until such time as Israel lifts its objection to a seaport and as long as it refuses to release Hamas prisoners. Without a seaport, they say, there's nothing to discuss. The IDF, for its part, is equally adamant that the time is not ripe for a seaport in the Gaza Strip.

But even if the sides reach an agreement in principle over a seaport, there will remain questions about supervising it and making sure that it does not become the main route for Hamas to smuggle arms and ammunition into Gaza. Hamas has proposed that NATO supervise the seaport by deploying Turkish forces. Israel will never agree to let Turkey play any kind of role and will insist that Israeli inspectors supervise the seaport using 'electronic eyes.' This, they say, is what happens at the border crossings between Gaza and Israel.

'It's true that both sides – Israel and Hamas – want to prevent the next round of fighting,' according to one foreign observer, who has been keeping a close watch on the messages relayed between Gaza, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Doha, Ankara and UN headquarters in New York. 'But despite the reports and the rumors, it's far from clear that the efforts will end in success.'

According to the same observer, even if the sides manage to reach understandings, the process will not end in an agreement. 'There will be no ceremonies and no celebrations,' he warned. 'Israel will continue to see Hamas as a terrorist organization and Hamas has no intention of announcing that it recognizes Israel's right to exist.'

On the Israeli side, there is slightly more optimism. 'Hamas is now making huge efforts to prevent rogue organizations firing missiles at Israel, and Israel is allowing more construction material into Gaza and is granting more permits to enter Israel and the West Bank. All of this is done in the name of 'humanitarian gestures' and as part of the effort to rebuild Gaza,' one official in Jerusalem says.

According to the same official, Hamas is panicked over the possibility that ISIS will gain strength and support in Gaza. 'Relations between Hamas and Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi are at an all-time low,' he added, 'and Cairo only decided a few days ago to alleviate some of the pressure by removing Hamas' political wing from its list of terror organizations. They are also opening the Rafah border crossing for Ramadan. Egypt is letting Hamas' leaders know that Cairo calls the shots: if it sees that the smuggling tunnels to and from the Sinai start to operate again, it will close everything down again'."

Ends…

 

RAMALLAH'S CONCERN: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem explains why unofficial and indirect contact between Israel and Hamas over a long-term truce agreement has got the Palestinian Authority worried.

"The Palestinian Authority has not been involved in the indirect contacts between Israel and Hamas over a long-term ceasefire. Although it wasn't informed in advance, it has now been briefed on the contacts by both Israel and Egypt.

The PA finds itself being tossed on the horns of a dilemma: it cannot come out against a long-term truce or openly support the renewal of violence. It cannot oppose the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip or oppose the role being played by Arab mediators, such as Muhammad al-Ahmadi, who is the Qatari ambassador to the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority also cannot oppose Israel's easing of the blockade and the good-will gestures that Jerusalem announced ahead of the start of the holy month of Ramadan.

Hamas is working on two parallel fronts: It is working with the PA to reach an agreement over implementation of a reconciliation agreement. At the same time, it is working with Israel – via mediators – in an attempt to broker a long-term truce.

The PA's concern is that, if a ceasefire agreement is reached between Israel and Hamas, it will lose what little influence it still has in Gaza. The bottom line is that Ramallah has no way of exerting pressure on either side – so Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas fired his unity government in an effort to indicate to both Hamas and Israel that the PA is still an important part of the equation and will not allow itself to be sidelined.

The question that everyone in the West Bank is asking is what will happen first: Will there be a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas before a new unity government is formed in Ramallah, or will the formation of a new unity government accelerate a truce agreement that is coordinated with the PA?

Abu Mazin is worried that a truce agreement between Israel and Hamas will exacerbate the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will bolster Hamas' grip on power in Gaza and will make it more popular in the West Bank. He is worried that Hamas will be in a position to form an independent emirate in the Gaza Strip – a mini-state that would be known as Hamastan.

Earlier this week, Abu Mazin convened the Central Committee of his Fateh movement to discuss the situation. Delegates at the gathering agreed that Fateh should oppose any long-term ceasefire agreement with Israel. At the end of the committee meeting, a statement was issued in which Fateh said that it remained committed to the ceasefire agreement that was brokered last summer in Cairo, but warned that 'making partial agreements and justifying them by talking about the lifting of the blockade merely serves Israel's interest of driving a wedge between Gaza and the West Bank.'

Fateh, which is the ruling party in the West Bank, is afraid that, if Israel and Hamas reach a deal, Jerusalem will try to force the Palestinian Authority into accepting a similar long-term but interim agreement, given the difficulty of reaching a final-status solution. This, Fateh officials argue, would be akin to agreeing to an independent Palestinian state within temporary borders – something that they have consistently rejected."

Ends…

 

NO COALITION EXPANSION FOR NOW: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Sima Kadmon says that Binyamin Netanyahu's 61-member government will not be expanded any time soon – which means that it will be vulnerable to defeat in votes on lawmakers' private legislation.

"The speech that opposition leader Isaac Herzog delivered this week in the Knesset would appear, for the time being at least, to have removed one burning issue from the agenda: despite reports to the contrary, the Labor Party is not on the verge of joining Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's government. Herzog's speech was not the kind that is delivered by someone who knows that he's about to join the coalition; it contains some statements and assertions that the prime minister would find very hard to live with, touching, for example, on Netanyahu's relationship with a certain casino tycoon. It now seems that, if Labor is going to join the government, it will only happen after that party holds a fresh round of leadership elections.

Early this week, there were also indication that former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was about to make his way back into the coalition. In fact, he said straight out that, if the government approves the construction of 1,000 housing units in Ma'aleh Adumim, he would bring Yisrael Beiteinu back into the coalition fold. One could be forgiven for thinking that Netanyahu would jump at this opportunity and that Lieberman would resume his role as foreign minister. But that would be a mistake. Lieberman knew fine well that 1,000 housing units over the Green Line is something that Netanyahu could never agree to at this time. So Lieberman may as well have said that he would join the coalition the moment that pigs are cleared for take-off from Ben-Gurion International Airport.

Lieberman knew as well as anyone that his condition was impossible. Quite apart from the political considerations, it seems impossible to find the space to build 1,000 units in Ma'aleh Adumim. Netanyahu has enough problems with the White House as it is; he doesn't need the added headache of more settlement construction. Lieberman knew that, so he decided to take Netanyahu for a ride. After all, isn't this the right-wing government that the prime minister is so proud of? Yet it isn't even capable of building homes in Ma'aleh Adumim. Just to be on the safe side, Lieberman added to his list of demands the passing of the controversial Jewish homeland law. This was clearly not an attempt to warm his way back into government.

Within the Likud, meanwhile, all the talk is that Netanyahu will propose that Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon return to the bosom of the Likud. This, too, doesn't look likely to happen. Especially after this week, with Netanyahu convinced that Kahlon loyalists worked against him in a key Central Committee vote. Netanyahu is 100 percent certain that the Kulanu leader used his friends within the Likud to undermine him. After all, the prime minister reasons, if Kahlon is planning to return to the Likud one day, it would be in his interests for power to reside with the Central Committee, where he remains a popular figure.

So that appears to be that. Netanyahu's 61-member government has begun its life and it doesn't look like it's going to be expanded any time soon. Every Wednesday, when MKs' are allowed to submit their own proposed bills to the Knesset, there will be a threat to its existence. This week, instead of flooding the Knesset docket with such proposals, the opposition put all of its eggs into two baskets – which the government was easily able to vote down. If this is the pattern for the coming four years, Netanyahu will be able to sleep soundly at night."

Ends…

 

CHARLATAN: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan accuses Michael Oren of sacrificing Israeli-U.S. relations for the sake of his own popularity.

"The last thing we needed right now is Michael Oren. Earlier this week, he accused U.S. President Barack Obama of deliberately sabotaging U.S. relations with Israel. That's not a new accusation in these parts, but Oren was our ambassador in Washington and his words should carry more credibility. After all, he was there and he saw what was going on. He should know, shouldn't he? Well – no. First of all, all the reports say that he was kept far away from the private meetings in the White House. There were journalists who had greater access to the president than he did. And even if he did get wind of what was going on behind closed doors, it's far from certain that he understood the situation correctly.

The White House has clearly accused Oren of lying. When he was in Washington, they say, he spoke very differently. Indeed, when he was still serving as Israel's ambassador, he said on more than one occasion that 'both sides have made mistakes.' Now that he's a Knesset member, representing a party that is considered close to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, he says that 'while neither leader [Obama or Netanyahu] monopolized mistakes, only one leader made them deliberately.' The 'one' that he was referring to, of course, was Obama. Oren's argument is not based on facts; it's based on interpretation of facts, which he attempts to portray as facts.

So what does Oren base his accusations of malicious sabotage on? Since becoming president, Oren argued, Obama has 'abandoned the two core principles of Israel’s alliance with America.' These two principles, he said, are 'no surprises' and 'no daylight.' I have been covering the relationship between Israel and the United States for many years and I am finding it hard to remember a time when there weren't surprises and when dirty laundry wasn't aired in public. Both sides have violated these principles. So how can a former ambassador talk such nonsense? After all, Israel and the United States even spy on each other. Or maybe Oren wasn't aware of this open secret.

One can only assume that Oren's goal was to win popularity points from the Israeli right – of which he is now a card-carrying member. Maybe he also wanted to give the Republicans a boost and the Wall Street Journal – which is identified with the GOP – is the perfect place to do that. To this end, Oren sacrificed Israeli-U.S. relations and worsened ties between Obama and Netanyahu. That is the behavior of a charlatan. It is abusing his previous position to make himself more popular. After all, Oren entered the political arena with no support base to speak of. He is one of those MKs who is swept into parliament on somebody else's coattails. Nobody voted for him; he was appointed. Now he appears to want to create a support base for himself – but he chose to do so at the expense of Israel's vital national interests.

Someone needs to stop Oren before he does any more damage. But who should that be? I am reminded of the joke about the schoolboy who falls asleep in class. The teacher asks the kid sitting next to him to wake him up. 'But, Sir,' the child replies. 'You're the one who put him to sleep. You should wake him up!'"

Ends…

 

A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION FOR SYRIAN DRUZE: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that some Druze see al-Nusra Front as an enemy that must be fought, while Druze in the north are dependent on the rebel Sunni group.

"The money raised by Israeli Druze to help Syrian Druze in the Suwaida region has already reached them. A Druze leader from the area, Wahid Balous, thanked the donors and promised that the money would be used to buy arms to defend the Druze heartland, Jabal al-Druze. However, Balous was also careful to mention that 'Israel is the Arabs’ enemy, and anyone who is the Arabs’ enemy is also our enemy.'

Balous is thought to head the Druze militia that’s being recruited to fight the attack on Suwaida launched by Syria’s Sunni rebels, spearheaded by the Al-Qa’ida-linked Nusra Front. But he isn’t the only Druze leader in the area, nor is he necessarily the most accepted. The community is still divided between those who favor continuing to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and those, like Balous, who accuse Assad of betraying the Druze by refusing to give them heavy weaponry and reneging on his promise to defend them.

Assad previously wooed minorities like Druze and Christians to bolster the rule of his Alawite sect against the majority Sunnis. Despite that, he always viewed the Druze suspiciously, among other reasons because of their violent clashes with Bedouin tribes in 2000, which the Syrian Army forcibly suppressed. He apparently shared the view of Adib Shishakli, Syria’s president from 1953-54, who declared, 'My enemies are like a snake. Its head is in Jabal al-Druze, its belly in Homs and its tail in Aleppo. If I cut off its head, the snake will die.' And Shishakli practiced what he preached: He bombed Druze towns mercilessly.

When the Syrian revolt erupted in 2011, the Druze disappointed Assad by refusing to declare their unreserved support for him. They were furious over the Syrian Army’s inability to defend the Druze around Suwaida from a campaign of abductions by Sunni rebels. In recent weeks, this rift reopened when Druze leaders refused to let community members join the Syrian Army to fight the rebels. The Druze said this was because Assad had broken his promise of a few months earlier that Druze recruits would fight only in the Druze region and not be sent to other fronts.

Nevertheless, large portions of the Druze community still declare their loyalty to the regime – especially since the current threat comes from radical Sunni militias that, if they indeed take over Syria, would likely avenge themselves on Assad’s loyalists.

But the controversy over whether or not to abandon Assad isn’t the only one splitting Syria’s Druze community, which numbers an estimated 400,000. When Nusra Front took over Idlib Province earlier this year, the Druze there 'agreed' to adopt Sunni Islam in exchange for protection. That’s why Nusra Front issued a rare apology after its fighters killed 23 Druze in the area about 10 days ago, saying its fighters had violated orders. So, while the Druze in Jabal al-Druze see Nusra Front as an enemy that must be fought, they’re also aware this could endanger the Druze in Idlib, who are dependent on the rebel group for protection.

This also explains the Syrian Druze attitude to the possibility of Israel intervening on their behalf: Any such intervention could not only endanger the Druze in Idlib, but would also be held against the Druze if the civil war ends with radical Sunnis in control of the country. This isn’t a groundless fear, especially in light of recent reports that Kurdish militias are expelling Arabs from some of the areas they control in the north. If that’s how the Kurds are treating Arabs, why wouldn’t Sunni militias treat Druze the same way?

Nor is it just the Druze whose loyalties are torn: Syrian Christians face a similar dilemma. For decades, the Assad regime protected them. In exchange, for the past four years Syrian church leaders have either openly declared their loyalty or at least declined to oppose the regime. This earned them the ire of Sunni rebels, who labeled them collaborators. But in contrast to the Druze, the Christians have no militias and their popular self-defense committees are no match for the rebel forces.

The safest choice for them is to flee – to Lebanon, Turkey or Europe. Unlike the Druze, who view Jabal al-Druze as a 'homeland' that is worth defending, the Christians have no special territorial attachment to Syria. Other than Lebanon, there is no other Christian community in the Middle East that could give them shelter. But even in Lebanon, they wouldn’t have an easy time – mainly because the cost of living there is much higher than in Syria. As a result, many Christian refugees who originally fled to Lebanon have gone back to Syria and relocated to the city of Tartus, where the regime is still firmly in control.

Christians, like Jews, are considered 'people of the book,' meaning they are theoretically entitled to protection from Muslims if they accept severe restrictions on their worship, pay a special tax and obey the Muslim rulers. Indeed, Christians in the Raqqa area signed such an agreement last year with Islamic State. The Druze, in contrast, are considered heretics who must be eradicated. But this hasn’t stopped either ISIS or Nusra Front from killing Syrian and Iraqi Christians. And it apparently won’t stop them from cooperating with Druze militias if this serves their interests."

Ends…

 

BLACK LABEL: Writing on the website of the i24 television station, Karni Eldad says that a proposal by the left-wing Meretz party to label settlement products would be the death knell for co-existence between Jews and Arabs.

"Israel’s left-wing Meretz Party is promoting a bill that would label products made in the settlements. Although the bill is not expected to pass, it annoys a lot of people, among them the Samaria Settlers' Council and those threatening to dismiss the Palestinian workers who make the products that Meretz would like to label. And so the hawks from the far left and right fight, while the main victims are the Palestinians.

In 2012 two important laws came into effect in the Palestinian Authority: a boycott law on settlement products and a law banning Palestinians from working in Israeli-run West Bank factories. While the first law was fully enforced - goods from the West Bank were destroyed and stickers boasting that 'this house is clean of settlement products' were pasted on houses and businesses, implementation of the second law proved harder.

Factory owners in the 14 Israeli industrial zones in the West Bank grew increasingly concerned as the date approached for the law to go into effect. They feared that their 15,000 Palestinian workers would stay away. But on the appointed day the exact opposite happened. Everyone showed up for work as if there was no law forbidding them to do so.

How come thousands of workers dared go to work despite the ban? I dare assume that the law was not meant to be implemented, only declared. Why? Well, the factory workers in the settlements, the ones whom the BDS organizations wish to boycott, earn their salaries in accordance with Israeli law. Their salary is 2.5 times higher than the average salaries in the Palestinian Authority, and has added social benefits. An Israeli employer who does not provide workers with these benefits is prosecuted.

Given that Arab society is based on clans and families, each employee supports a considerable number of people. It is conceivable that employment provided by West Bank settlements feeds about 100,000 Palestinians. In addition, these industrial zones generate jobs in transportation, equipment supplies and other services, providing livelihoods for wider circles of the Palestinian population.

It is believed that some 10 percent of Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority earn their living directly from businesses in the settlements, and this does not include all the construction workers building the settlements themselves. In other words, on the day that the Palestinians stop working in the settlements, the PA will collapse. That is what will happen if plants close as a result of pressure from boycott organizations, or if the plants are moved out of the settlements and into Israel’s 1967 border lines.

Think about it, you there in Paris or Stockholm: When you boycott the products of the settlements, you contribute to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and the rise of Hamas. When you boycott the settlements you create hunger and poverty among Palestinians. But what's worse - when you're boycotting the settlements produce you undermine peace and coexistence in the region.

Most of the leftists in Israel have never met a Palestinian (no, a bohemian Israeli Arab writer living in Jaffa doesn’t count. I mean the menial laborer who struggles daily and really lives in the territories. The one whom they all claim to want to protect and do what’s best for him). They enjoy speaking in his name, knowing what is good for him somewhere in his refugee camp, while they drink espresso and soda in a trendy Tel Aviv cafe.

Even in the settlements themselves there is no real encounter with the Arabs. There is more contact than in Tel Aviv, because they are the workers building the houses there, but one can distance oneself from them emotionally and physically.

The only real connections between Israelis and Palestinians occur at work. There encounters occur every day of the year in the factories that BDS wants to shut down. There a real bond is created; there is where coexistence is real. There Israelis and Palestinians share pita bread, olives and olive oil. There they talk about their wives and babies, with Israelis handing over clothes and medicine for the Palestinian children. There they look each other in the eye. Those who boycott products from the settlements don’t know what they are doing. Because what they are really doing is boycotting the only chance for coexistence and hurting the Palestinians economically. We Jews, we'll manage. We can move our plant a few kilometers to the west into pre-67 Israel and continue to work. But what about the Arabs?

Boycott organizations don’t tell you all this because they want you to believe that you are working for peace and the Palestinians. They do not want you to know their true intention: the destruction of Israel. Do not lend them a hand."

Ends...

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

FORMER PRESIDENT DEMIREL’S DEATH: Cengiz Candar has mixed feelings over the passing of former Turkish president Demirel in centre-left Radikal: "As he is not of this world any more, he will inevitably be compared to the presidents and prime ministers who have succeeded him. In such comparisons, Mr Demirel will look good. We are aware of this in today's Turkey. When I heard the news of his death, it was as if the half-a-century-long, giant part of my life had passed. I felt sorry for the death of Demirel, who was 91. It was a weird feeling. Because I felt that I was sorry for the decision he took in 1972 to pass a death sentence on three left-wing student leaders."

Mehmet Tezkan pinpoints the late leader’s greatest mistake in centrist Milliyet: "Demirel in the 1980s was not like the Demirel of the 1970s. He was not the Demirel who voted for the execution of student leaders Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Aslan and Huseyin Inan. This was a wise, democratic and tolerant leader before us. If one were to ask what his biggest mistake was, it was his decision to leave the solution to the Kurdish problem to the military, after saying 'we recognize the Kurdish reality'."

Nasuhi Gungor offers an unflattering assessment in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Yes, Demirel represents 40 years for the country; but not that of a treasured memory but of erased principles. He represents values violated without even thinking for a moment. He represents no principles. He represents vagueness. He represents a man of his time. He represents no accountability. He represents the insensitivity of coming on to the scene as a son of the nation but removing its children. He represents dirty war. He represents extrajudicial execution. He represents falsehood."

Ali Bayramoglu takes a more balanced view in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Frankly speaking, Demirel was a leader who acted based on the dynamics of the era he belonged to. He reproduced them and became successful but only within this context. As for the question of basic rights and freedoms, especially in the 1970s when the demands of the left increased, he, the ninth president, fared less well. His good deeds and contributions will be remembered, and his mistakes will take their place in history books."

 

SYRIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM: Tunca Belgin is concerned about a growing Syrian refugee problem in Milliyet: "Ankara has focused on a possible new refugee influx from Syria, as well as on the coalition dealings backstage. It must be so, because when the refugee influx began four years ago, we said that 'our red line was 100,000'. Today the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is around 2 million. For that reason we say that no matter what government may be formed, this problem cannot wait. This is because these ordinary people may include men of the Syrian intelligence service, and ISIS as well. Thus, in the coming era, there could be social clashes, incitement to hatred and xenophobia etc."

Pinar Ogunc suggests that some refugees may be on their way home in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Some of the Syrians who have fled the war and bombs to Turkey have begun to return to Tal Abyad on the Syrian side. The YPG [pro-Kurdish People's Protection Units] fighting ISIS in northern Syria is reported to be ready to call on all the people of Tal Abyad to return home in a couple of days. Thus will represent the Syrian Kurds’ response to the charges of ethnic cleansing and demographic manipulation that have been directed against them."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Sharq deals with basics: "The sole purpose of the critics of the talks is to weaken public trust and confidence in our negotiating team. This will intensify with a possible agreement. Apart from politics, morality does not permit pressure on a team in the toughest of talks. If a deal is reached, a great crisis will end with diplomacy, and not war and bloodshed." 

Reformist Arman is anxious: "Those with wisdom know well that the country is in a perilous economic situation and if a deal is reached, many problems will be solved. Many countries, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are worried about any improvement in Iran/U.S. ties and will be happy to see the talks fail, but this deal will be beneficial for the region in the long term. The nuclear deal will also benefit the international community and credit five members of the Security Council."

Hard-line Keyhan invokes history: "With just two weeks to go to the deadline, the text of an agreement is still not ready; to finish it in this short time seems unlikely. One of the issues is the American effort to find a mechanism to re-impose sanctions in case of a possible breach by Iran. But, what are the guarantees that the Americans will remain committed and not break their promises? The U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile agreement. Later, the U.S. abandoned the treaty and exited. Another instance of such behaviour is the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II). That treaty was never implemented and after several years of wrangling, the U.S. announced its formal end. We are at the negotiation table with such a country; a country that easily tramples treaties it has signed. It is crucial that we get firmer guarantees of U.S. commitment to its obligations and define the proper response to their usual breaches." 

 

ANNIVERSARY OF ROWHANI ELECTION: Conservative Khorasan reminds the president of the Supreme Leader’s views: "Hassan Rowhani's administration came to power with a plan for nuclear talks and the lifting of sanctions. Indeed, he has tried hard in this regard. However, the country’s problems starting with drinking water and commonplace issues to major decision-making should not be dependent only on the issue of sanctions. As the Supreme Leader stressed, the Iranian people's honour does not rely on the talks and our development needs the promotion of domestic talents."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami extols: "In the domestic arena, the Rowhani administration prioritized reform on the basis of moderation and rationality. Despite reservations about the effectiveness of its economic policies over the promised time; nearly a year after coming to power, the government brought inflation down from 40% to less than 17%. In the foreign arena after a decade of dispute with the world and deadlock in nuclear talks, the government of hope and prudence improved international understanding with authority towards removing the high wall of sanctions. In case of success, this will remove one of the main concerns of people and resolve the country's problems."  

Reformist Mardom Salari counsels: "President Rowhani very soon realized that the remedy for the pain of economic problems is cooperation with the world and the lifting of the sanctions imposed during former president Ahmadinejad's term. His priorities are the economy and diplomacy. The lack of support by MPs for the government is behind many unresolved problems. Less than eight months are left until Majlis elections, if Rowhani and his team want the legislative branch to be allied with them in the two remaining years of the administration's term, they should cooperate with them more actively. Loss of valuable time will cause more problems for the people and government". 

 

ELECTIONS: Moderate Iran is upbeat:" The proliferation of parties and political groups suggests a hot and extensive competition in the 2016 elections. There are various factors involved in the heating up of the electoral campaigns, but the determining factor will be the behaviour of the government as the main executor of the elections. The political parties have a positive feeling that the government will not consider them as rivals and useless members of the community. The time when political parties were blamed for originating differences and creating obstacles against progress has gone."

 

MIDDLE EAST: Conservative Khorasan is despondent: "As long as regional states expect Western political and military force to deal with ISIS, or intervene in the Gulf of Aden; as long as peace talks on Yemen are held in Europe instead of Islamic capitals; determining the fate of Islamic lands by Muslims will remain a sweet dream. The Muslim world, it seems, lacks enough will to manage its affairs." 

 

YEMEN: Conservative Quds blames the Saudis: "Despite obstacles by the Saudi regime, Yemeni political currents, including the Houthis have attended the Geneva conference. For the past few days, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have used all their tools to prevent Houthi participation in the conference. These efforts have failed. The objective of the Saudi regime was to divert the meeting and portray itself as seeking to resolve the Yemeni crisis. It comes at a time when Saudi Arabia is the main party behind the war and has played an obvious role in intensifying it." 

 

TALEBAN/ISIS: Hard-line Javan expects conflict: "The Taleban, in a letter, asked ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi not to interfere in Afghanistan's affairs. Will Baghdadi listen to the Taleban request? The answer is clearly negative, because Baghdadi's personality and the nature of ISIS are such that they do not accept any group except themselves. When they are able to find a place in Afghanistan, they will not step back. Despite this letter, Baghdadi and ISIS will increase their activity in Afghanistan even at the cost of bloody conflicts with Taleban." 

 

U.S./Al-Qa’ida: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz explains: "The killing of Al-Qa’ida leaders in Libya and Yemen is presented as an American achievement. Why has the U.S. made such moves in the current situation and what are its goals? Congress is endorsing the defence budget while Pentagon is trying to acquire more funds. By magnifying the killing of Al-Qa’ida leaders, the U.S. is seeking to legitimize its expansion throughout the world."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-‘An exchange of ideas’

2-Faint hopes in Geneva

3-A question of credibility

4-Turkish complicity

 

1-‘An exchange of ideas’

 

The main problem with this potential deal [between Hamas and Israel] stems from the fact that it represents a unilateral decision and action on Hamas's part. This justifies the suspicion of facilitating Israel’s schemes that seek to isolate and separate the Gaza Strip from the rest of occupied Palestinian territories which would break the back of the Palestinian national project and weaken the solidarity campaign with the Palestinian cause that is spreading with each passing day. Hamas continues to reject the notion of establishing a state in Gaza. It speaks of its continued commitment to the national framework in any likely deal with Israel. But no one is bothering to explain how such a deal can be reconciled with a national framework in light of Hamas’s stumbling reconciliation and deteriorating relations with Fateh and the PA--Talal 'Awkal in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

What Israel will gain is, first, an undertaking to limit the development of Hamas’s military capabilities in Gaza. Second, Hamas would have backed away from its old program that accepts a long-term truce in return for a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and adopted a new position whereby it accepts a long-term truce in return of lifting the siege on the Gaza Strip. (And there may be unpublicized clauses regarding extending the truce to the West Bank; or this be taken for granted by adopting the policy of striking at Gaza if the resistance emerges in the West Bank.) And, third, Israel would have offered something to the Europeans who are secretly and intensively mediating this ‘exchange of ideas’--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Both Hamas in Gaza and the PA in Ramallah are threatening to take unilateral steps that will jeopardize the prospects of Palestinian national reconciliation and accord, maintains a Palestinian commentator. Hamas seems to be heading towards a long-term truce with Israel without consultation with Ramallah, and the PA president has suggested that the Palestinian national accord cabinet will resign without consulting with Hamas. While both Israel and Hamas may have something to gain from a long-term Gaza truce, the Palestinians as a whole would suffer because this will effectively sever the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, warns a Palestinian commentator in a Jordanian daily.

 

MORE AND MORE CONFUSED: "The Palestinian political scene is becoming more and more confused as a result of further dramatic steps by both sides to the split, with each responding to the other with equally significant moves," writes Talal 'Awkal in Thursday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

For some time now, the foreign, Hebrew and Arab media have been reporting that a number of mediators are at work in sponsoring indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel. The talks concern a long-term truce that would ensure Israel's security, in return for reopening the crossing points, building a floating seaport, and permission to allow construction material to enter the Strip.

Preparations for this deal at the media and psychological levels were underway even before [Hamas advisor] Dr. Ahmad Yusuf spoke of 'chats' [with Israel]. And this means that the Palestinian and non-Palestinian public alike will not be confronted with any shocking news.

These psychological and media preparations are still underway. Some senior Hamas figures such as Osama Hamdan admit that Hamas has received written ideas from the Israeli side and is preparing a response. Others senior figures deny these reports.

The main problem with this potential deal stems from the fact that it represents a unilateral decision and action on Hamas's part. This justifies the suspicion of facilitating Israel’s schemes that seek to isolate and separate the Gaza Strip from the rest of occupied Palestinian territories which would break the back of the Palestinian national project and weaken the solidarity campaign with the Palestinian cause that is spreading with each passing day.

Hamas continues to reject the notion of establishing a state in Gaza. It speaks of its continued commitment to the national framework in any likely deal with Israel. But no one is bothering to explain how such a deal can be reconciled with a national framework in light of Hamas’s stumbling reconciliation and deteriorating relations with Fateh and the PA.

Hamas has succeeded in reducing Egypt's hostility to it, and in replacing the negative climate in Cairo with a more promising one. Egypt gave expression to this by opening the Rafah crossing throughout this week and by allowing cement to enter the Gaza Strip, and by toning down the [anti-Hamas] rhetoric on the media front as well.

This success was not the result of any positive statements. And it has nothing to do with moral considerations. What has happened is that Hamas appears to have convinced our sister Egypt, in deeds not just in theory, that it is concerned about Egyptian national security, and that it is ready to cooperate in protecting it and has no interest in intervening in Egypt’s domestic affairs.

In light of this promising climate, Hamas is once again talking of the importance of Egypt’s role in the reconciliation process with the PA/Fateh and in the negotiations with Israel. And this suggests that Egypt’s role in these dossiers may now be energized.

On the other side, President Mahmoud 'Abbas detonated a heavy weight bomb when he spoke of the resignation (or forced resignation) of PM Dr. Rami al-Hamdallah's cabinet without taking the national accord agreement with Hamas into consideration. That was a step that Hamas deemed to be unilateral and unacceptable.

The detonation of this bomb came after rumors of a potential large-scale shuffle in the accord government, which also requires a return to dialogue and national accord. But such an accord seems absent in both cases, whether the cabinet will be merely reshuffled or replaced altogether.

Objectively, the accord government's life has gone beyond its agreed tenure – from six months to a year. The government's shelf life has already been exceeded, and it has effectively failed to fulfill the missions delegated to by the national accord, so much so that it now appears to be a party to the split even though it is innocent of this charge. After all, its failure has to do with the political leadership of both Hamas and Fateh.

Via its spokesman Nabil Abu-Rudeineh, the Palestinian presidency has approved the idea of a truce. It failed to express any clear objection to those aspects having to do with negotiations between Hamas and Israel. But it did register a warning against sliding towards ‘a state with provisional borders’ by which it was referring to a 'Gaza state' that Israel is trying to impose.

Objectively also, the Palestinians really need to change the means of dealing with the reconciliation dossier and the confrontation with the Israeli occupation. And this means that we are in genuine need of a political government, one in which all factions take part. Such a government would be better placed to deal with both these two files more positively and vigorously.

There is a clear difference between the situation when the national unity government headed by [Hamas leader] Ismail Haniyeh was formed [in 2006], and the situation today when the international and regional communities are more willing to deal with a government in which Hamas takes part. This is especially true, now that the international community has come to the conviction that it is Israel that is responsible for the negotiations' failure, and that Hamas represents a major player that cannot be realistically ignored or dealt with by force.

"We do need a political government and we do need a truce. But these needs are derived from the greater need for a new national dialogue and a new national accord that puts the twisted course of Palestinian politics right and that ends the rapid deterioration in the situation," concludes 'Awkal.

End…

 

NO DENIAL: "Hamas does not deny that there are some 'ideas' about a new tahdi'a [lull or calming down] –a long-term truce, in fact, – in the Gaza Strip," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Thursday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

What it does deny is that a final agreement has already been reached regarding such a truce. And it promises that if such an agreement were to be reached, it would fall within the framework of what Hamas leading figure Salah al-Bardawil has referred to as 'the active forces of the Palestinian people.' But that is a flexible expression that could mean many things.

These reports come almost a year after the end of the last Gaza war. Had an agreement similar to what is being discussed today been reached during that war, the fears and opposition to it would have been much less than what we are witnessing now; it would have been viewed as part of a solution and a means of managing the conflict.

During the 2014 war, it would have appeared as if both sides – Israel and Hamas – were extracting themselves from the predicament of confrontation. Now, however, the questions are (justifiably) growing as to why the Israelis would agree to a truce or a tahdi'a in which they pay a political price, when they are actually currently enjoying a tahdi'a and truce free-of-charge.

The truth is that these questions impart some credibility to the analysis proffered by Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] Politburo member Kayed al-Ghoul, who said that the proposed ideas are 'part of a truce deal in which Israel is trying to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank. It may be accompanied by closing all crossings in tandem with building a floating seaport in an attempt to separate Gaza totally from the West Bank both politically and geographically, transforming the Strip into an independent Palestinian entity, and thereby gaining a free hand to isolate and expand settlements in the West Bank, creating facts that would lead the international community to accept the notion of seeking alternatives to a Palestinian state on all the territories occupied in 1967 in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.'

One of the most important questions in my view but that has not been posed so far is this: Can Israel accept a truce that includes undertakings by Hamas concerning the Gaza Strip alone?

The situation today is one where there is an effective truce with the Gaza Strip; one that the Israelis are trying to build on in favor of a mechanism that would ensure that the resistance there would be structurally weakened and that its military development would be blocked; meanwhile Hamas and others are trying to develop that situation in order to move towards an end to the siege.

Separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip in political, economic, and daily livelihood terms may be part of Israeli thinking. But the connection between the military and the security levels is also clear. In other words, Israel is dealing with Gaza as if it were a hostage or a prisoner: Whenever there is escalation in the West Bank, Gaza and the Palestinians there are attacked, so is Hamas. This is what happened last year for example, when a Hamas cell kidnapped three settlers in the southern West Bank. This was followed by what is believed to be part of the Israeli response, and that took the form of a criminal and bloody war against the people of the Gaza Strip.

In light of this equation – a Gaza truce that is conditional on a West Bank truce, whether Hamas admits this or not, and whether it formally agrees to it or not – the situation will apparently be comfortable for the Israelis. In return, they may be ready to reduce the siege on Gaza.

What Israel will gain, first, is an undertaking to limit the development of Hamas’s military capabilities in Gaza. Second, Hamas would have backed away from its old program that accepts a long-term truce in return for a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and adopted a new position whereby it accepts a long-term truce in return of lifting the siege on the Gaza Strip. (And there may be unpublicized clauses regarding extending the truce to the West Bank; or this be taken for granted by adopting the policy of striking at Gaza if the resistance emerges in the West Bank.) And, third, Israel would have offered something to the Europeans who are secretly and intensively mediating this ‘exchange of ideas.’ It would have even offered the Turks something, thereby consolidating the policy of managing the conflict rather than resolving it. And the Americans would also be relieved, because there would be some change in the scene.

There is a fourth Israeli gain whose burden will be assumed by the Palestinians– namely, the persistence of the inter-Palestinian political split. As to why the Palestinians would assume this burden, this is because the PLO's leadership does not seem to be serious about developing the expanded leadership framework in the PLO, and because Hamas has not allowed the accord government to work in the Strip.

"Hamas would thus be able to say that in the absence of an expanded leadership framework in the PLO, and after the disbandment of the Palestinian accord government, the 'active forces' (mentioned by Bardawil) would refer to Gaza alone, since it has no option for ending the Strip’s suffering other than accepting a truce," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

2-Faint hopes in Geneva

 

The best that can be expected from the Geneva Yemeni conference is a two-week humanitarian truce on the occasion of Ramadan, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Geneva Yemen meeting is unlikely to make any serious progress given both sides' impossible preconditions and demands, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. The best that can be achieved would be a two-week truce to deliver basic needs to the Yemeni people particularly during the arduous month of Ramadan.

 

SOLE ACHIEVEMENT: "The most prominent, perhaps sole, achievement of the Geneva international meeting between the conflicting Yemeni parties up till the point this article was written, is the fact that it remains in session and that none of the participating delegations have withdrawn, despite the tense climate that dominates it, the huge obstacles standing in its way, and the wide gap that separates between the parties," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The deliberate delay for more than 24 hours of the UN plane in Djibouti carrying the Houthi and Saleh delegations only confirmed that there was an attempt to obstruct their participation in the Geneva meetings.

We do not know what interest Egypt and Sudan may have had in closing their airspace to a plane raising the UN flag. But what is certain is that some party must have pressured them to take this step that reeks of naivety and bad judgment. It portrays the two countries as not being in charge of their own independent decisions. In fact, we believe that it is not unlikely that this incomprehensible and unjustifiable position came at the behest of the Saudi authorities. But what adds to the awkwardness of these two countries' position is the fact that their governments were forced to back down and permit the plane to cross their airspace. This came after the U.S. and the Sultanate of Oman intervened.

In the corridors of the Geneva meeting, two conflicting positions have emerged that are difficult to reconcile, especially during the three-day timeframe set aside for the meeting:

- The first is the position of the Yemen 'Riyadh delegation,' which presents itself as representing legitimacy. This was expressed by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's government's Foreign Minister Riad Yassin. It can be summarized by including only one item on the meeting's agenda, namely, a discussion of how to implement UNSCR 2216 that calls for the Houthi/Saleh forces’ withdrawal from all Yemeni provinces and handing over of the weapons captured from the army's arsenals.

- The second is the position of the 'Houthi/Saleh' coalition, as expressed by Mr. Mohammad az-Zubairi, member of the Houthi delegation. He rejected 'any dialogue with President Hadi's government,' and demanded 'a discussion with Saudi Arabia to end the aggression on Yemen.'

President Hadi's delegation’s demand that the Houthi/Saleh forces should withdraw and hand over their weapons appears difficult to satisfy because those making it are in exile have no presence on the ground. Moreover, there is no party able to fill the security and political vacuum that would occur if such a withdrawal were to take place. And the same can be said about the demand to hand over weapons. To whom are they supposed to be handed over? And in accordance with what terms and conditions? Withdrawal and handing over weapons can only occur as a result of a political agreement and in accordance with clear mechanisms; it cannot be a pre-condition to any agreement.

In fact, the same can be said about the Houthi/Saleh coalition's demand for a direct dialogue with Saudi Arabia to end its air raids on the grounds that it is Saudi Arabia that is conducting this war on Yemen and has the first and last word regarding its fate, and because – as the Houthis believe – the Yemeni 'Riyadh delegation' can make no independent decision apart from the Saudi position.

But the Saudi leadership does not want to be a party to the negotiations. It is trying to give the impression by every means possible that this is an inter-Yemeni problem and that its resolution is in the hands of the Yemenis alone. In addition, Saudi Arabia recognizes neither the Houthis nor president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh. It did not invite them to attend the 'Riyadh dialogue.' The only 'dialogue' the Saudi authorities believe in and are pursuing is aerial bombardment until the other side surrenders, raises the white flag and heads to Riyadh for the sole purpose of signing the document acknowledging its defeat.

In light of this intransigence, as reflected in the impossible preconditions that both sides are insisting on, and their refusal to sit together in the same room under the UN's umbrella, the best that can be hoped for is that the participants will reach an agreement on a two week truce to deliver basic aid to the 25 million Yemenis living in catastrophic conditions, according to the International Red Cross Committee.

The crisis is rapidly ceasing to be a Yemeni crisis, and is becoming a regional one that is likely to escalate and expand. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Amir 'Abdollahian’s withdrawal from Tuesday’s opening session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference held in Jeddah as Yemeni President Hadi was delivering his speech, is but one indication in this regard. The implication is clear. And Mr. 'Abdollahian’s position is identical to that of the Houthi/Saleh coalition in this regard as well. Mr. 'Abdollahian wanted to deliver a clear message to his Saudi hosts and the entire world, that his government does not recognize the legitimacy of President Hadi and that it will continue to back the Houthi/Saleh coalition as the alternative or true legitimacy, or both.

The entire Yemeni nation lacks the most basic needs – water, electricity, food, and medicine – in light of the siege imposed on it and the ongoing threat of aerial bombardment by Operation Decisive Storm's warplanes. This suffering will be redoubled now that the holy month of Ramadan has arrived. And this requires all parties to accept a truce and cease their fire so as to permit the convoys of humanitarian aid to reach the hungry mouths as soon as possible.

"Unless, that is, the delegations taking part in the Geneva meeting prefer to do the Ramadan fast in Switzerland. But that is another matter," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

3-A question of credibility

 

We can ask the ICC why it has not acted in Myanmar for example, or in South America, or in the Arab states where war crimes and crimes against humanity continue to be perpetrated. And why has Israel not been prosecuted, for example? The ICC will suffer what the UN has suffered, namely a gradual loss of credibility because of the great powers' domination of the Security Council. The fact that the rulers of any one country are not prosecuted is mostly the result of some great power's opposition for purely political reasons. And the prosecution of other rulers is also often for political reasons as well--Bassam Tayyarah on Lebanese www.akhbarboom.com

 

The UN has experienced the embarrassment of having passed some of its worst resolutions– the [2011] strike against Libya is one example – while it has remained on the margins if those inhabiting the first tier [the U.S.] have wanted it to do so – the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is an example. In the latter case, it refused to authorize the invasion but was also unable to stop it or to raise the catastrophic issues surrounding it, all of which condemn the U.S. It is from this organization or club that missions to find a solution for Syria have been emerging. The most prominent were [former UN envoys] Kofi Anan’s, then Lakhdar Brahimi's mission. And in the recent past, we have been living in the shadow of [current UN Syria envoy] de Mistura's mission that is not spreading sufficient light for us to see any hope for it--Ass'ad 'Abboud in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Sudanese President 'Omar al-Bashir has managed to leave South Africa despite the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant against him because African states and public opinion view the ICC as focused on prosecuting African leaders alone, maintains the editor-in-chief of a Lebanese website. And this is the result of the great powers' exploitation of international bodies to suit their own purposes. The U.S.'s abuse of the UN after the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the main reasons why the latter is unable to come up with a successful solution for the Syrian crisis, maintains a commentator in a Syrian state-run daily. The new initiative by UN Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura is no exception.

 

EVADING JUSTICE: "Sudanese President 'Omar al-Bashir has succeeded in evading 'international justice' after leaving South Africa a free man despite a South African judicial order banning him from travel," writes Editor-in-Chief Bassam Tayyarah on the Lebanese website www.akhbarboom.com.

Was this due to al-Bashir's cunning or daring? Or was it due to lassitude and the reluctance to carry out the orders of the judge who banned him from travel?

The fact is that it is neither. The main reason that led the Pretoria authorities to disregard the ICC's request stems from the fact that as far as African governments are concerned, the court in The Hague only seems to prosecute African leaders. And this strips it of any semblance of neutrality, tarnishing it in the eyes of African public opinion.

Many European newspapers have asked: Is the ICC racist? The answer is no, of course. But what has happened is that some thirteen years since it was activated working by the Rome Treaty, its actions have been restricted to prosecuting and trying Africans.

The ICC has initiated investigations into four issues: 1) North Uganda; 2) the Democratic Republic of Congo; 3) the Central African Republic; and 4) Darfur. It has also issued nine arrest warrants and is detaining two suspects who are awaiting trial.

It is true that the charges against these rulers have a legal basis that must be proven under the rubric of justice in The Hague. But restricting its prosecutions to Africa has stripped the court of any respect, which is the basis of success for international bodies and institutions' work.

We can ask the ICC why it has not acted in Myanmar for example, or in South America, or in the Arab states where war crimes and crimes against humanity continue to be perpetrated. And why has Israel not been prosecuted, for example?

The ICC will suffer what the UN has suffered, namely a gradual loss of credibility because of the great powers' domination of the Security Council. The fact that the rulers of any one country are not prosecuted is mostly the result of some great power's opposition for purely political reasons. And the prosecution of other rulers is also often for political reasons as well.

This is why the African states have begun to establish their own special courts to evade the ICC's clutch: An extraordinary African court was established by Senegal and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This court will try former Chadian president Hissene Habre in Dakar on charges of committing 'crimes against humanity' and 'war crimes.' The Central African Republic has also enacted a law that permits its own criminal court to try war criminals after the civil war. And a number of African states are preparing to try their murderers themselves.

In this way, the great powers who have 'tamed and domesticated' the ICC in accordance with their interests have effectively nipped the very idea of international justice in the bud, just as they have done with the UN and with most international institutions.

"In light of this, it is no wonder that the U.S. and Israel have so far refrained from joining the treaty for the establishment of the ICC," concludes Tayyarah.

End…

 

A DOSE OF REALISM: "Let us be realistic," writes As'ad 'Abboud in the official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

Neither we, nor the world at large, are accustomed to expecting the UN to act as an international body that is able to resolve the world's problems. It may also play no significant role in resolving these problems at all. But, throughout its history, it has been a pole that attracts initiatives that can offer possible solutions.

In saying so, we are being totally objective. For the UN is just a large club on whose arenas and playgrounds the interests of states and nations interact based on a ladder of priorities that gives pride of place to the strongest. And, in fact, the UN has always been clear about who is the strongest.

Within this club, states sit in two tiers – permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. The two tiers were subsequently turned into three tiers when an entire new tier was formed for the U.S. alone after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc.

In this three-tiered era, the UN has experienced the embarrassment of having passed some of its worst resolutions– the [2011] strike against Libya is one example – while it has remained on the margins if those inhabiting the first tier [the U.S.] have wanted it to do so – the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is an example. In the latter case, it refused to authorize the invasion but was also unable to stop it or to raise the catastrophic issues surrounding it, all of which condemn the U.S.

It is from this organization or club that missions to find a solution for Syria have been emerging. The most prominent were [former UN envoys] Kofi Anan’s, then Lakhdar Brahimi's mission. And in the recent past, we have been living in the shadow of [current UN Syria envoy] de Mistura's mission that is not spreading sufficient light for us to see any hope for it.

The ambiguity surrounding de Mistura's mission not only stems from his desire to steer clear of the mistake of the media appearances committed by his predecessors. Despite the thick fog surrounding the UN envoy's mission and the low visibility that prevents the onlooker from seeing clearly, it seems that he is the most serious and the one envoy that is taking the most initiatives.

However, I believe that the weakness in his mission – assuming there is any –is just a symptom of the malaise from which the UN and its performance have suffered due to the dispersal of its members between the three tiers – despite the Russian/Chinese attempt to correct this, backed by public calls from South American and some Asian and BRICS countries.

All that anyone wishing to study the state of the UN needs to do is to observe its Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's performance in his attempt to launch a Yemeni dialogue in Geneva. Ban is a truly wretched fellow. He took off his international garb provided by the UN and donned an American suit!! We all remember him at another previous Geneva conference where an attempt was made to begin a Syrian dialogue? He was busy counting the words and minutes allocated to Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem, instead of asking him to speak longer so as to be better informed about what was happening in Syria. That day, Minister Mu'allem responded that it was he who was bearing the true picture of what was taking place on the ground, instead of being absent in New York!

On Tuesday, de Mistura had to reveal the truth – if only partially –about what his mission is facing. He had to do this before the Syrian government, which has always backed him and has emphasized its support for his mission and for a political solution for the Syrian crisis.

But someone, one of those coming to us with initiatives and who are in charge of marketing them, must acknowledge these facts before much time has passed:

"Mr. de Mistura, what did the opposition tell you? And who are the opposition? And who do they represent?" asks 'Abboud in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

4-Turkish complicity

 

Turkish President Erdogan’s reaction to the fall of the Tel Abyad border post to the Kurds only exposes the extent of his complicity with ISIS, says Ahmad Mustafa Ali in Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Turkish President Erdogan reaction to the Kurds’ capture of the border town of Tal Abyad in Syria exposes his alliance with ISIS, argues a commentator in an Arab Gulf daily. His concern also stems from the towns importance as a main supply line for the flow of men and weapons from Turkey to ISIS, and of stolen oil and goods from Syria into Turkey.

 

CAUSE FOR REVULSION: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statements in which he expressed his concern because the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in cooperation with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have managed to wrest control of the city of Tal Abyad and its border post from the terrorist ISIS, are cause for revulsion," writes Ahmad Mustafa Ali in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

They are also cause for ridicule and questions about the extent of Ankara's relations with this extremist organization.

For the past two years during which ISIS was in control of Tal Abyad and its crossing point with Turkey –classified as among the most important gateways between Syria and Turkey – we saw no signs of worry or concern, or even displeasure for that matter, on Erdogan's face or those of the main pillars of his regime. No one seemed to be concerned that ISIS's black flag was fluttering on their borders. In fact, Tal Abyad represented the main gateway for the infiltration of more than 90% of the extremists from across the world on their way to the lands of the alleged Caliphate, and from whence they have engaged in their terrorism against the Syrian people.

The Tal Abyad crossing with Turkey was the terrorist organization’s main economic and human artery. Via that border post, and with facilities offered from the Turkish side, stolen Syrian crude oil was sold at low prices in Turkish markets thirsty for this product. This is in addition to the agricultural products for which the areas occupied by ISIS are famous.

This illegal trade was used to finance ISIS's terrorist activities – the killing, slaughter, and repression of the Syrians living under its rule, and its violence. And that allows us to view the Turkish regime as complicit in the shedding of innocent blood in Syria. In fact, it is hardly strange that U.S. President Barack Obama has urged the Turkish authorities to exert a greater effort to control their southern borders on more than one occasion.

Activists have published documents, pictures, and videotapes on the social media proving the extent to which the Ankara authorities, led by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), have been implicated in smuggling terrorists into Syria and in supplying them with weapons. This was evident from the images published by international news agencies that show ISIS terrorists armed to the teeth and explosive belts standing less than ten meters away alongside Turkish soldiers on both sides of the border, exchanging smiles, while the inhabitants of the area who were fleeing the hell of the clashes were being prevented from entering Turkish territories. The next day, there were pictures of smiling ISIS fighters handing themselves over to Turkish soldiers after being expelled from Tal Abyad.

This is in addition to this extremist organization’s use of Turkish territories as a bypass through to circumvent and pounce on the YPG – as evident in the terrorist car bombings at the 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) crossing during the YPG's battles with ISIS.

ISIS's loss of Tal Abyad and its gateway to Turkey means that its human and economic artery has been severed. It also means that Turkey will be deprived of its stolen Syrian oil, agricultural produce, and industrial equipment. It was thus only natural for Erdogan to emerge every now and then with a speech expressing his concern about the defeat of his ally ISIS at the border area. He was also clear when he expressed his hope that a few kilometres of borders of the areas under ISIS's control will be preserved in the Aleppo Province at least.

For this reason, if the international [anti-ISIS] coalition is serious about destroying this extremist organization, it must act to deprive it of its northern border strip in Syria in cooperation with the YPG, which has proven its ability to fulfil this mission on the ground.

"It must also steer clear of Turkey that is happy to see ISIS's black flags fluttering along its borders," concludes Ali.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

North & South

 

Israel Hayom leads its Thursday edition with a report by a group known as 'My Truth' into the events of last summer's Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. 'My Truth' was established about six weeks ago by five reservists, in response to 'Breaking the Silence,' which has published soldiers' testimonies about unlawful acts carried out during the 50-day conflict. Needless to say, 'My Truth' claims that the IDF did everything possible to ensure that there would be a minimal number of civilian casualties during the operation, including not carrying out surprise attacks that would increase the chances of civilian fatalities.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with a report into how the Israeli embassy in Stockholm, working with pro-Israel groups in Sweden, managed to overturn a decision by three supermarkets to boycott Israeli products. According to the report, this is 'an important victory' for Israel, since Jerusalem was concerned that the three supermarkets would start a domino effect and that all 655 branches would follow suit.

Haaretz leads with events on the Golan Heights, reporting that Wednesday saw fierce battles around the Druze village of al-Khader, which is the last remaining pro-Assad enclave on the Golan. According to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel is closely following developments around its borders, and will instruct the relevant authorities to do what is necessary. The prime minister, who was speaking in the Knesset, did not elaborate.

Earlier, in what is believed to have been a false alarm, sirens were sounded in Israeli communities in the northern Golan. No landing sites were located, and it is believed the alert was triggered by fighting on the Syrian side of the border. Haaretz also reports that a high-ranking Israeli army officer who serves on the Golan Heights said on Wednesday that rumors that Druze in Syria near the Israeli border are being massacred were baseless. 'The rumor mill saying that the Druze are fired upon and massacred is baseless,' the officer told reporters. He confirmed that fighting between rebels and regime forces took place not far from the village on Tuesday, and stressed that the sirens sounded on the Israeli side of the Golan were due to exchanges of fire inside Syria, and were not directed at Israel. 'This is one of the calmest periods in the Golan Heights. There are no specific alerts in the sector,' the officer said.

In other news, the storm over comments by former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, continues to rumble on. Oren published an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal asserting that while both U.S. President Barack Obama and Netanyahu made mistakes in their relations over the past few years, Obama's mistakes were 'deliberate.'

Oren – now a Knesset member from the Kulanu faction – accused the administration of flouting two longstanding traditions in bilateral ties, maintaining an outward appearance of 'business as usual,' even during disagreement, and not 'springing on the Israelis' policies without first quietly ironing differences out. The accusations came days ahead of the formal release of 'Ally,' a memoir by Oren recounting his time as Israel's envoy in Washington, and containing criticisms of the Obama administration in its relations with Israel.

The op-ed drew censure from the United States ambassador in Israel, Dan Shapiro, who, in an interview with Army Radio, described Oren as a politician trying to promote sales of his new book.

Finance Minister and Kulanu leader Moshe Kahlon apologized to the White House over Oren's criticism, saying it does not reflect the party's position. In a letter to Ambassador Shapiro, Kahlon distanced himself from Oren's statements. 'I was always very candid and vocal, expressing my deep and sincere appreciation for President Obama's efforts to stand by Israel and defend its interests,' the finance minister wrote.

A spokesman for the State Department in Washington on Wednesday also denounced what he called the 'false' assertions by Oren. State Department spokesman John Kirby insisted that as Oren had only been the ambassador, he 'had limited visibility into many of the private discussions and deliberations that he describes.' Secretary of State John Kerry believed that Oren's account, 'particularly the account of President Obama's leadership in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, is absolutely inaccurate and false, and doesn't reflect what actually happened in the past,' Kirby was quoted as having told reporters.

On the Palestinian front, meanwhile, Hamas has denied that it has been holding secret talks with Israel and that it is about to reach a long-term ceasefire agreement with the Jewish state, the Ma’an news agency reported on Wednesday, quoting a senior member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) group. According to the official, Saleh Zeidan, Hamas’s denial came in a meeting of Palestinian factions that included Hamas, the DFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Islamic Jihad. Zeidan added, however, that Hamas must also issue an official statement affirming its denial. He warned that any unilateral long-term agreements between Hamas and Israel would have 'dangerous consequences' and would be to the benefit of an Israeli plan to 'separate the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian national project', according to Ma’an.

Also on the Palestinian front, there were conflicting reports as to whether the national unity government headed by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah has, as reported, submitted its resignation to Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas. While some reports suggested that Hamdallah had submitted his resignation to Abbas and that the Palestinian leader was already working on forming a new government without Hamas, the Gaza-based organization rejected the unilateral dissolving of the unity government. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that, 'Hamas rejects any one-sided change in the government without the agreement of all parties. No one told us anything about any decision to change and no one consulted with us about any change in the unity government. Fateh acted on its own in all regards.'

Finally, police are investigating a suspected arson attack on the Church of the Multiplication on the banks of the Sea of Galilee. In addition to the fire, police found Hebrew graffiti scrawled on the walls of the church. Taken from a passage in the Hebrew prayer book, the graffiti read: Idol-worshippers should be destroyed.

 

 

OUR FRENEMIES IN GAZA: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ephraim Halevy says that Hamas and Israel are frenemies – and that, as such, they must continue to pursue channels of communication that might be able to avert the next round of fighting.

"In recent months, more and more of the players on the international stage – countries and non-countries alike – have needed a phrase to describe a situation in which another player is both a friend and an enemy. So they have started to use the word 'frenemies,' which is a portmanteau of the words friend and enemy.

Players who are frenemies have a complex relationship with their environment. Hamas, for example, is engaged in a state of conflict with Israel, but its battle against other organizations in the Gaza Strip, which do not respect its authority, serves Israel's security interests. Moreover, Hamas is enjoying greater freedom of operation than international public opinion would grant to Israel. It is quicker to act, more efficient and less restrained toward the common enemy than Israel would have been.

In the north, the situation is even more complex. There is a greater number of non-state players – Hizbollah, the al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida, ISIS, the Free Syrian Army, to name just a few. Each of them is inflicting losses on another of Israel's enemies. The fact that these players are fighting each other weakens all of them in the struggle against Israel. It is possible that Israel will also find a frenemy among one of these players on the northern front.

A new situation means that Israel needs to find a new strategy and new tactics. First of all, we must recognize the differences between the various non-state players and treat each of them differently. We can no longer relate to them all as terrorists who are cut from the same cloth.

Secondly, we must drop our sacred principle of not engaging in any kind of diplomatic contact with terrorists. This approach has prevented Israel from using the tools at its disposal to gain a greater understanding of these groups and to influence their thinking.

Thirdly, Israel must rank these players according to their cost-versus-benefit; those who contribute to Israel's national security interests should be rewarded.

Fourthly, we must develop serious dialogue with at least some of these new players, based on our national interests. There are certainly things that we can demand of certain groups and there are things that they can offer us in return. Instead of a policy of quiet in exchange for quiet, we should develop a more dynamic policy, which seeks to change the situation to the benefit of both parties.

Fifthly, instead of judging other parties in the region, we should invest more effort in finding ways to live with them. For example, the more goods and produce allowed into the Gaza Strip, the more contact there is between Israelis and Gazans at the border crossings and in the media, which will break through physical barriers and borders. We should be encouraging such contacts, not limiting them.

If recent contacts between Israel and Hamas lead to a long-term truce between the sides, it is vital that we use such an agreement as the first stage toward a new path. Our tactics must lead to a strategy of ongoing dialogue. The strength of any such agreement will depend on the relationship between Israelis on one side of the border and the Arabs on the other side. One government official was quoted as saying that we are enjoying the quiet without having to give Hamas a seaport and/or an airport. Without getting into the merit or otherwise of these demands, recent talks prove that the quiet-for-quiet equation belongs to the past. All that promises is another round of fighting in the future.

The tough talking rhetoric of both sides will continue, but that should not prevent either side from pursuing fresh and less belligerent channels of communication. Israel and Hamas will continue to prepare for the next war as if it is inevitable. And that may well be true. But if another round of violence erupts simply because both sides saw it as inevitable, we will not be able to tell the international community that we were dragged into a war against our will. More importantly, the government of Israel will not be able to look its citizens in the eye and tell them that."

Ends…

 

QUIET, FOR NOW: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yoav Limor comments on the situation on the Golan Heights, saying that – for the time being at least – there is no reason to panic.

"Senior IDF officers were on high alert yesterday, after reports of dramatic developments on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. The border itself is quiet, top officers reported, and there is currently no danger to the Druze. Therefore, they concluded, there is no need to panic.

But perhaps they should have ended their informal briefing with the word 'for the time being.' Officers who are experienced enough and long enough in the tooth should know that what is happening today on the Syrian border is one thing, but that tomorrow could be very different. Events inside Syria have a dynamic of their own and they could develop in directions and at a pace that are different from what Israel is expecting or wants.

The main headache facing the IDF is the fate of the Druze village of al-Khader, on the northern Golan Heights, which is now almost the only enclave on the Golan which remains loyal to the Syrian regime and which is still controlled by Bashar al-Assad's forces. Contrary to reports – which, it seems, were tendentiously but understandably disseminated by members of the Druze community in Israel, who are extremely worried about the fate of their brethren – this week's battles took place close to the village but not inside it. There was certainly no massacre of the local Druze population.

The rebel groups that are fighting Assad's forces have captured two positions close to the village, but, for the time being, they have refrained from entering it. Perhaps that has something to do with the fact that, thus far, the al-Nusra Front (and ISIS) have refrained from attacking the Druze anywhere in Syria; perhaps it's because they are afraid of fighting against the villagers, many of whom are heavily armed and well trained. Then again, it may be for a very different reason – one connected to Israel, which has relayed very clear messages to the rebel forces, warning them not to attack the Druze in al-Khader or on Jabal al-Druze, which is further away from the Israeli and Jordanian borders. Just two days ago, IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, addressing the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, issued a further warning.

The IDF knows that the situation could change almost overnight. This obligates Israel's security forces to be well prepared for any eventuality. Although Israel has an alliance with the Druze, it has no intention of allowing thousands of refugees with Syrian citizenship from entering the country. At the same time, Israel's public commitment that it would not stand idly by while the Druze are attacked could create a dilemma for the IDF. This dilemma will become even more acute with increased calls for help from members of the Druze community outside Israel.

Faced with these bad options, if al-Khader falls to the rebels, sparking a mass exodus toward Israel, Jerusalem would seek to establish a buffer zone adjacent to the border; a kind of enclave that would provide the Druze refugees safe haven on Syrian soil but with Israel guaranteeing their safety. Israel would only allow special humanitarian cases – people injured in the fighting, for example, to enter Israel. It is doubtful whether this would be enough, so Israel must prepare its response to a situation in which things spiral totally out of control, including the possibility of protests by the Druze inside Israel. Even if that were to happen, however, Israel's topmost goal would be to ensure, as much as possible, that we are not dragged into the Syrian Civil War."

Ends…

 

FIVE REASONABLE YEARS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that a five-year truce between Israel and Hamas would be reasonable reward for the last two IDF operations in Gaza and would save us from having to fight another two.

"It is possible that reports about an international effort to broker a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas are nothing more than a trial balloon. It is also possible that there are contacts, but that they will lead nowhere. Then again, there's a good chance that, even if the sides do manage to reach some kind of understanding that would signal the start of a prolonged truce, there would be a major outcry on both sides of the border fence. However, if there is any truth in the reports about such negotiations – direct or otherwise – they should be pursued. Five years of ceasefire (or even just a truce) may not represent the 'end of the conflict' that Israel wants most of all, but they would save us from having to launch another two operations like Operation Protective Edge and Operation Cast Lead. At least two.

Binyamin Netanyahu and Moshe Ya'alon are experienced and wise enough to know that such military operations, at best, give us two or three years of quiet but no more. Therefore, a five-year ceasefire would save hundreds of lives, would avert devastating damage and fear and at least two more United Nations reports. The price? Allowing Hamas to cement its position as the ruling faction in Gaza, allowing it to increase its military capabilities for the next round of fighting and, almost certainly, allowing it to dig more tunnels.

Projects such as the construction of a seaport under international supervision and extensive building projects across Gaza are, in the eyes of most Israelis, a heavy price to pay for a period of quiet. For others, they are the foundation on which a longer-term truce can be built. But both groups recognize that the interim time could be used to increase the IDF's military advantage over Hamas and to reinforce the defensive measures in place in Israeli towns and villages adjacent to the Gaza border.

There is also the possibility that the new and more flexible approach of Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi toward Hamas is a sign that, if talks develop into actions, the presence of al-Qa’ida in the Sinai could be eradicated. Egypt would regain full sovereignty over the Sinai and Israel would be free of a threat that could grow exponentially.

Winston Churchill once famously said that, 'The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity, while the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.' While contacts are going on somewhere in secret – and the road to an agreement is a long and difficult one – each of us will find the version that suits him or her. It's safe to assume that if the negotiations do not hold out any false hopes and if they are conducted in a sober manner, they will lead to a reasonable agreement. Even if a long-term ceasefire is agreed upon, the defense establishment will have to remain as alert as it ever was and residents of southern Israel will have to refrain from euphoria. A five-year ceasefire would be the best way to mark the anniversary of the start of Operation Protective Edge.

If, as a byproduct, a five-year truce with Hamas shows Palestinian leaders in Ramallah what they have missed out on, then no one in Israel will be too upset."

Ends…

 

THE ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that the national security advisers of Israel and the United States – Yossi Cohen and Susan Rice – continue to enjoy fruitful and friendly working relations, despite the bad blood between their bosses.

"With less than two weeks left before the deadline for the six world powers and Iran to finalize their nuclear deal, Israel is not giving up its fight against what Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has described as 'a bad deal.' A delegation of senior Israeli officials, headed by National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen, left this week for Washington, for what could be described as a rearguard action against the nuclear deal.

In a series of conversations that members of the delegation held with top U.S. officials who are involved in the talks with Iran, Israel will make one final effort to influence several clauses in the agreement and to change the language. Israel would also be delighted if it managed to postpone the final approval of the agreement. 'The deadline is not written in stone,' one senior Western diplomat in New York told me this week, 'but the chances that Israel will manage to make significant changes to phrasing that has been agreed upon in exhaustive talks over the past few weeks are close to zero. You know what? Not 'close to zero.' You can write 'zero'.'

By stubbornly trying to influence the content of the agreement between Iran and the G5+1, Israel is conveniently forgetting about the crisis in the relationship between U.S. President Barack Obama and Netanyahu. The message is clear: in sharp contrast to the Iranian issue, Israel has given up on any effort to restore relations with the U.S. president and to rebuild the mutual trust that has been battered almost to death over the past six years. As things currently stand, there is no indication that Israel is making any serious effort to end the total disconnect between the White House and the Prime Minister's Office. It seems that Netanyahu has decided that it would be a waste of time to put his energies into rebuilding his relationship with the president, since; in any case, Obama will be leaving the White House in a year and half.

If this is indeed how Netanyahu is thinking, then he is making a serious mistake. After all, his antipathy toward the president will be remembered by future presidents and will be held against him – even if the next incumbent is a Republican.

At a time when the relationship between Obama and Netanyahu has been sidelined, Israel's concerns over what it sees as a 'bad deal' with Iran have increased the frequency and intensity of contacts between senior White House staff and their counterparts in the National Security Council in Jerusalem. The concerns have especially strengthened the working relationship between the respective National Security Advisers of the United States and Israel: Susan Rice and Yossi Cohen. That channel of communication is active and fully functioning – in total contrast to the mutual suspicion and resentment that exists between Obama and Netanyahu.

The working relationship between Rice and Cohen has become a byword among journalists and commentators in Washington. Cohen does not force himself on the White House staff. On the contrary – he is a welcome guest. During his current trip to Washington, Cohen was invited by Rice for a one-on-one dinner at a top local restaurant, in an extraordinary gesture of friendship that did not go unnoticed.

This week, Rice will have another opportunity to express the White House's support for Israel, when she explains to a local Jewish community the details of the Iranian nuclear deal. Rice will represent the president at a special ceremony in Manhattan to honor Abraham Foxman, the outgoing national director of the Anti-Defamation League."

Ends…

 

ABBAS SHOWS HE'S THE BOSS: Writing on the website of the i24 television station, Danny Rubinstein comments on developments with the Palestinian unity government, which he says have been sparked by Israel-Hamas contacts, internal Palestinian power struggles and shifts in the policies of Qatar and Egypt.

"The Palestinian unity government formed a little over a year ago by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, led by the Fateh organization, and the Gaza-based Hamas, has come to an end.

The government of technocrats, as it was described, was tasked primarily with preparing elections. But it did nothing in this regard. The PA and Hamas are as yet unwilling to give up their positions of power, such as control of the Gaza border crossings and of the various security forces in the Strip.

From the start, each side sought to take advantage of the unity government for its own purposes. The PA wanted to use the unity government to gain control of Gaza, whereas Hamas thought the unity would strengthen its standing not just in Gaza but in the West Bank, too. Both were wrong.

Operation Protective Edge, the code name for Israel's summer 2014 war with Gaza, upset everyone's plans, imposing an important new role on the government: the reconstruction of Gaza. But the government acted slowly and ineffectually.

The backdrop of the current crisis was likely the rumors circulating in recent days regarding indirect contacts between Israel and Hamas over a five-year truce. These rumors gained a certain amount of credibility with a formal confirmation by Hamas spokesmen, chief among them Osama Hamdan, who arrived in Gaza from Lebanon.

It is entirely unclear whether such an agreement is feasible, but the rumor mill generated great anger on the part of the leadership in Ramallah, especially of Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin). As far as the chairman is concerned, this is a provocative step designed to humiliate him, the Palestinian Authority and the PLO as the sole representatives authorized to deal with Israel. And here comes Hamas, bypasses them and presumes to be a diplomatic entity conducting negotiations with Israel as if there were no Authority in Ramallah and no PLO.

Abu Mazin's anger and that of his people was fueled further by what appeared to be an easing of Egypt's hostility toward Hamas. The Egyptians, while still regarding Hamas as an enemy organization and even designating it as a terror organization a few months ago, appear to have moderated their anger in recent days. Hamas activists, led by Moussa Abu Marzouk, who traveled to Gaza from his home in Cairo, have strenuously avoided angering Egypt in recent weeks. And they were successful, at least on one front. After a lengthy, virtually complete, closure of the Rafah border crossing, the Egyptians agreed to open it this week for a few days. Thousands of people who had been waiting on both sides were able to cross. Although the passage was opened at Abu Mazin's request, Hamas continues to control the crossing and the opening was also a goodwill gesture toward Hamas.

Abu Mazin and his people suspect that Mohammed Dahlan, who has good ties with the Egyptian government and President Sissi, is behind these moves. Abbas views Dahlan as his most dangerous enemy, believing he is constantly conspiring to overthrow him. Abu Mazin's associates say that any time a problem arises in the West Bank and Gaza, Abu Mazin is convinced that Dahlan is to blame: when gangs run amok in Nablus – Dahlan is the culprit. When rockets are fired from Gaza toward Israel, it's a Dahlan plot, and so on.

These suspicions are not unfounded. Abu Mazin is 80 years old and has no visible successor. There is also no clear procedure for the process of selecting his successors in the three jobs he holds: chairman of the PLO, chairman of Fateh and head of the Palestinian Authority. Mohammed Dahlan is the only one openly seeking to replace Abu Mazin and he is enlisting support and raising funds, primarily in the Gulf States.

An additional reason for the deepening rift between the PA in Ramallah and Hamas is the relationship with Qatar. The emirate's rulers are an important funding source for the Hamas movement in Gaza, and to a large measure its only source. Hamas leader Khaled Mashal lives in Qatar, along with members of the movement's leadership. In fact, all of Qatar's support for Hamas is at the expense of the PA and Abu Mazin. In other words, the funds keeping Hamas afloat in Gaza enable the organization to prevent the Palestinian government from taking control of Gaza.

The new government will not be much different than the previous one. It will still be a government of experts, technocrats, but this time the ministers will be more closely affiliated with Fateh and more inclined to fight Hamas. In other words, more than anything else, the new government is a strong signal to Hamas and all other elements in the region, Israel included, that Abu Mazin and the Palestinian Authority are the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people, those responsible for the fate of the West Bank and Gaza and for the future of the Palestinian people."

Ends…

 

FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Alan Elsner says that recent comments by former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, and the extracts of his soon-to-be-published memoirs, highlight the fundamental flaws in Israeli policy.

"Former Israeli ambassador Michael Oren is getting some attention for his claim in a memoir to be published next week that President Obama 'abandoned Israel.' Oren’s book will likely be a hot topic of conversation in our community this summer – and already it’s coming under fire for its looseness with the facts.

The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, in a highly unusual move and using blunt, but appropriate language, has questioned Oren’s facts. 'Michael Oren published an imaginary account of what happened,' Shapiro said in an interview with Army Radio. 'I disagree with what he wrote. He was an ambassador in the past, but he is now a politician and an author who wants to sell books. Sometimes an ambassador has a limited point of view into ongoing efforts. What he wrote does not reflect the truth.'

Oren’s book also apparently contains an outrageous and incendiary attack on Jewish-American reporters who cover the conflict. According to Chemi Shalev of Haaretz, Oren argues that Jewish journalists are largely responsible for American media’s anti-Israel coverage and the ‘double standard’ it applies in its coverage of the Jewish state. Oren also writes that the antagonism towards Netanyahu shown by Jewish journalists such as Thomas Friedman and Leon Wieseltier resembles 'historic hatred of Jews.'

Attacking the messenger seems to be the new tactic of the Israeli government. This week, it issued a preposterous cartoon portraying 'clueless, gullible western journalists' covering Gaza. It truly shows the pathetic depths that Israel’s 'hasbara' has sunk to.

Israel seems blind to the fact that its problem is not poor PR or biased reporters or 'self-hating Jews' or a 'hostile' President of the United States. The problem lies with the policies of a government that wants to continue to build settlements, maintain and deepen the occupation and has no serious plan or intention to make peace with the Palestinians.

Oren’s book is another example of the way Israeli officials simply miss the point. His basic contention that the strength of the U.S.-Israel relationship depends on there being 'no daylight' and 'no surprises' between the two nations does not stand up to scrutiny. In the past, as Peter Beinart demonstrates in an article in Haaretz, there has frequently been daylight between the President of the United States and Israel on key issues. And there have been plenty of surprises going in both directions.

The real, underlying strength of the U.S.-Israel relationship does not come from the papering over of disagreements or a determination to keep them private but on the common values that the two nations share which derive from their founding documents and core principles. To the extent that one or the other partner strays from these principles, the relationship is going to experience difficulties.

The current tension between the United States and Israel can be attributed to a fraying of those very values by a succession of right-wing Israeli governments. Specifically, the steady, inexorable expansion of settlements and the persistence of what has become an almost 50-year occupation of another people is slowly eroding and degrading the sense of shared values that binds Americans to Israelis.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has abandoned the two-state solution as a serious policy goal – if it ever was one for him – and most of his cabinet is on record as being vehemently against it. Israel is no longer seen as being serious about reaching peace with the Palestinians and seems content to rule them against their will indefinitely.

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a fundamental American interest as well as the only means of guaranteeing Israel’s long-term security while preserving its Jewish and democratic character. An Israeli government that sincerely committed itself to that goal and worked to bring it about would see a sudden improvement in its relationship with the United States and as well as the rest of the international community. It’s either that or producing more silly, childish cartoons blaming reporters for all of Israel’s woes."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

KURDS/SYRIA POLICY: Cengiz Candar sees Ankara’s Syria policy in tatters in centre-left Radikal: "The Erdogan-Davutoglu duo’s Syria policy, which kept the Akcakale-Tal Abyad border gate open during the policy of 'neighbourhood with ISIS', but began to perceive a border threat after the Kurds have taken control of Tal Abyad, is suffering repeated defeats. Erdogan and Davutoglu's anti-Kurdish and de facto pro-ISIS Syria policy has collapsed with the 'fall' of Tal Abyad. After the June 7th general elections and the capture of Tal Abyad from ISIS, life has become much more difficult for the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] and its blind supporters."

Writing in the same paper, Gonul Tol claims that the Kurds can no longer be ignored: "According to the president, ISIS, which controlled Tal Abyad just beyond our borders for 18 months is not an 'entity that will threaten our borders'. He said the real danger comes from the Kurds who took Tal Abyad from ISIS. The troubles this point of view creates for this country, which sees not ISIS but the Kurds as the bigger threat, are obvious. But it is not sustainable because the status the Kurds have acquired today makes it impossible to ignore them."

Secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet argues that Turkey needs a new government "While Turkey was trying to intervene in Syria's domestic policy, Syria has become a domestic issue for Turkey. The only thing that the government distributes to the 81 provinces of Turkey equally, is Syrian refugees. Amid a debate about how the problem of the refugees--who have spread to all our cities and are living in very bad conditions-- will be resolved, a new refugee influx has arisen alongside a very complex power balance at our border. Aside from all the other sins committed by the AKP government, the failure of its Syria policy alone is sufficient proof of Turkey’s need to proceed with a new government."

Beril Dedeoglu explains the problem with joining the fight against ISIS in centre-right, pro-government Star: "If Turkey joins the coalition and launches military action against ISIS, in a way it will be supporting Assad to consolidate his power. But on the other hand, it would be taking a clear stance against Russia. If Turkey delays the Assad issue and focuses on the fight against ISIS first, the West would be persuaded that Turkey too has joined the anti-Russia campaign. But Turkey faces a number of drawbacks. One of these issues involves the Kurds." 

Murat Kelkitoglu detects another U.S. game in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Just across Turkey's southern border, a very serious game is being played. As with what happened in Iraq, the U.S. is once again one of its leading actors. Although the real goal is to establish a 'Kurdistan state' in the north of Syria, some papers have reported developments in Tal Abyad with very interesting headlines. Ankara is very uncomfortable with the U.S.'s attitude towards the region as well. The support it offers the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party], which is on the U.S. terrorist list, is very worrisome."

Hasan Cemal calls for genuine peace with the Kurds in independent online T24: "More than 2 million Syrian refugees living in poverty represent the un-concealable sign of the bankruptcy of the Erdogan Davutoglu duo’s Syria policy. Now, a second sign has been added: The liberation of Tal Abyad in Syrian Kurdistan, that is to say Rojava (Western Kurdistan), from ISIS and its recapture by the Kurds. A Turkey that makes real peace with its own Kurds and opens the door to real democracy and a law-governed state will rapidly advance to become a state that contributes to regional peace and expands its sphere of control via its credibility in the region."

 

MURSI DEATH SENTENCE UPHELD: After the death sentence passed on former Egyptian president Mursi was upheld Rahim Er issues a call to defend the Turkish president in centre-right, pro-government Turkiye: "One reason why the Egyptian verdicts are so violent is to intimidate Tayyip Erdogan. The Islamic world does not want to be ruled by its own local sons! The last hope of the alienated pro-Western groups is a coalition [in Turkey] or to divide the AKP at its September congress. If there is no coalition or if they cannot divide the party, Erdogan must be surrounded like a steel wall. This nation should not endure the shame of 'not being able to defend another leader that it loves' again."

Ibrahim Karagul claims that democracy and freedom have lost out in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The global hegemony front has won in Egypt. The 'hit men' of the U.S. and Europe have won because every coup maker in this area is a hit man of the West. Democracy, freedom and human pride have lost. The Egyptian people’s quest for freedom, pride and justice has lost. For now. These are not judicial sentences, but murder, revenge and political genocide."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman is clear: "Extending the talks reduces the chances of their success. U.S. improper demands have delayed reaching an agreement. Bringing up the issue of inspection of military facilities deviate and undermine the talks. The possibility of a delay in lifting the sanctions is to discourage the Iranian side. If the Additional Protocol is for a tighter supervisory regime for Iran as compared to other countries and is a prelude for inspections like those in Iraq under Saddam, then Iran will not accept the Protocol."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz questions whether Obama is the right address: "The negotiations are going through a sensitive period. Obama always claimed that he alone can produce a positive outcome and that an agreement can only happen during his tenure. Obama's retreat on the role of Congress and his dependence on the Zionist regime and a number of Arab countries suggest that he is not an independent person. In contrast with his repeated claims, Obama cannot be the right party for the negotiations; the honesty of his attitudes is questionable." 

Reformist Sharq blames the West and its allies: "The negotiations are getting close to the deadline of June 30. There is some pessimism in Iran due to the raising of new issues and the excessive demands of the other side. Why is the West creating these obstacles? Did Iranian extremists escalate mistrust or was it American extremists, Zionist propaganda and Saudi Arabia that caused this pessimism?" 

Conservative Resalat targets Mogherini: “EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini's role and competence will be under scrutiny in this round of talks. In most cases, she has not played her expected role. She has not taken any steps to curb U.S. and French behaviour and excessive demands. The main duty of Mogherini in this round is to integrate the positions of the P5+1 states and arrange their demands to avoid wasting time during the talks. She has not had a good performance in this regard! Her unfavourable performance has been intensified after the Lausanne statement." 

Moderate Iran exposes the sticklers: "Hardliners believe that the victory of Rowhani's government in the nuclear talks will result in their isolation. The minority that opposes the negotiations will not give up the path of confrontation and creating obstacles. With the new round of talks, the hardliners have anxiously adopted the worst method to sabotage the negotiations. They use defamatory discourse and ridicule our diplomatic elites in their newspapers and websites."

 

ISIS: Reformist Mardom Salari refuses to hold Turkey solely responsible: "All countries in the region made mistakes that led to the creation of ISIS. This applies to countries that instigated insecurity in the region and to Iraqi currents that were not able to unite. For that reason, regional and even international cooperation is required to resolve the problem of ISIS. Accusations will not help. Saying that ISIS operates from the Turkish borders and with Turkey's support is not a very appropriate language; terrorist groups use all spaces and go as far as finding a way into the Pentagon and the Twin Towers. It cannot be categorically asserted that the Turks are behind the ISIS story."

 

KURDS: Conservative Khorasan writes of Kurdish successes: "There have been two important developments in the situation of Kurds in Turkey and Syria over the past ten days. The pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party was able to enter the Turkish parliament with 13 per cent of the votes. This victory will impact Turkey's foreign policy and intervention in Syria. On the other hand, Syrian Kurds were able to take the important and strategic town of Tel Abiad back from ISIS. The recent victories of Kurds may strengthen the move toward independence for the Kurdish regions in Syria and Iraq. Will the Kurds repeat their former mistake of ignoring the region's realities or will they smartly not become a tool for others?" 

 

TURKISH ELECTIONS: Hard-line Javan considers possibilities: "The parliamentary elections in Turkey were a political earthquake that changed the political trends of the last few years. There are various scenarios about the future government. One scenario suggests the formation of a minority government, another, the formation of a coalition under the Justice and Development Party. The final option will be holding early elections. If the outcome of the previous election is repeated, the Justice and Development Party will face a very complicated and unprecedented situation."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-A misplaced desire for revenge

2-Erdogan: End of the ‘era of miracles’

3-The national interest above all

 

1-A misplaced desire for revenge

 

The [Egyptian regime’s] enthusiasm for death sentences on the grounds that they are a means of intimidating and restraining the Brotherhood and imposing the state's political authority, is misplaced. Egypt's interest today requires that this dossier be closed and that the horizon be opened to a political reconciliation that looks to the future. There is no doubt that yesterday’s death sentences have revived concerns about the return of the international isolation that was imposed on Cairo after president Mohammad Mursi was deposed. Moreover, these sentences will destroy the Egyptian judiciary’s reputation and bolster international denunciations of it. Dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood as if it were a mere 'terrorist' movement that is incidental to political life in Egypt and that can be ended by executing its leaders is nothing but an illusion. It needs to be replaced by a more realistic and wiser political vision--Dawood ash-Shiryan in pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

 

Death sentences these days are issued by Egyptian courts with the same frequency as weather forecasts or statements about the estimated times of arrival of airplanes posted at Cairo Airport. In fact, it is difficult to count these sentences because of their frequency – this is to say nothing of the life sentences that seem to clone themselves and reproduce at record speed. There is no use repeating what we have said on previous occasions, namely, that these sentences are 'fabricated,' 'dishonest,' and represent a mark of shame on the Egyptian judiciary. For the Egyptian authorities are no longer perturbed by any such statements; in fact, they are music to their ears even if issued collectively by the most important international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. And this is because, quite simply, these authorities are thirsty for revenge and bloodshed--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The latest death sentences passed yesterday (Tuesday) against deposed Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and a number of other Muslim Brotherhood leaders will only revive the international campaign against Egypt and its judiciary, argues a leading Saudi commentator. They will not put an end to the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in the country, and should be replaced by a wiser approach to the movement. The sentences passed against Mursi and his comrades are politicized and reek of the desire for revenge, maintains the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily. Moreover, no one should believe that these sentences would not be carried out at the end of the day.

 

AGGRAVATING THE TENSION: "Yesterday (Tuesday), the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced deposed president Mohammad Mursi and a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders to death," writes Dawood ash-Shiryan in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

These sentences will aggravate the tension in Egypt. They will revive the international campaign against the country that began after the accused’s dossiers were sent before the Egyptian [Al-Azhar] mufti to pass a final sentence. Washington, Berlin, the UN, as well as other Western capitals, have headed this campaign. Over the past weeks, the Egyptian government has sought to contain the criticisms levelled against it, and President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi hinted that the death sentences will not be carried out during his visit to Germany last week. But the fact that they were upheld yesterday will bolster the position of some Western governments and organizations that claim that the death sentence 'has become the Egyptian authorities' favorite tool for purging the political opposition.'

The Western campaign has pursued the Egyptian judiciary, deeming the trial of Brotherhood leaders as political in nature. This was stated clearly by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who said that his country wishes that 'the Egyptian judiciary would act in accordance to the law and what is right, and not in accordance to political criteria.'

The death sentences will have a very serious effect on the climate of investment and tourism in Egypt. They will also prevent the mere consideration of any potential political reconciliation between the regime and the Brotherhood. In fact, they will also lead to the escalation of the violence from which the country is suffering.

The Court of Appeals is likely to reject the death sentences and call for a new trial. And this means that the Brotherhood leaders’ trial will take a long time. But prolonging the judicial process is not in the interest of stability in Egypt. The fact that the trials will continue after the death sentences have been passed will not contribute to absorbing the anger; it will only fuel it.

Furthermore, an amnesty by the president after long trials will deprive it of its expected political impact. The best solution would be for President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi to end the local and international dispute and abrogate these sentences, thereby sparing Egypt the likely and serious political consequences and protecting the country's stability.

The enthusiasm for death sentences on the grounds that they are a means of intimidating and restraining the Brotherhood and imposing the state's political authority, is misplaced. Egypt's interest today requires that this dossier be closed and that the horizon be opened to a political reconciliation that looks to the future.

There is no doubt that yesterday’s death sentences have revived concerns about the return of the international isolation that was imposed on Cairo after president Mohammad Mursi was deposed. Moreover, these sentences will destroy the Egyptian judiciary’s reputation and bolster international denunciations of it.

Dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood as if it were a mere 'terrorist' movement that is incidental to political life in Egypt and that can be ended by executing its leaders is nothing but an illusion.

"It needs to be replaced by a more realistic and wiser political vision," concludes Shiryan.

End…

 

HUMAN RIGHTS’ VIOLATIONS: "All we hear from Egypt these days are reports of violations of human rights and liberties, and of politicized judicial verdicts that reek of the desire for revenge," writes Wednesday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

We were therefore not surprised by the fact that the Cairo Criminal Court yesterday upheld the death sentence passed against former president Mohammad Mursi, as well as five others including the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide Mohammad Badi'e, former speaker of parliament Sa'd al-Katatni, and Dr. 'Issam al-'Aryan – all in the case publicly known as 'the storming of the prisons.'

Death sentences these days are issued by Egyptian courts with the same frequency as weather forecasts or statements about the estimated times of arrival of airplanes posted at Cairo Airport. In fact, it is difficult to count these sentences because of their frequency – this is to say nothing of the life sentences that seem to clone themselves and reproduce at record speed.

There is no use repeating what we have said on previous occasions, namely, that these sentences are 'fabricated,' 'dishonest,' and represent a mark of shame on the Egyptian judiciary. For the Egyptian authorities are no longer perturbed by any such statements; in fact, they are music to their ears even if issued collectively by the most important international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. And this is because, quite simply, these authorities are thirsty for revenge and bloodshed.

All those who have met with president Mohammad Mursi – and the writer of this commentary has met him twice, once in Ankara, and the second time in Ittihadiyya Palace in Cairo – would know well and at the first encounter that he is not the sort of man who would storm prisons or contact a foreign state. His sole concern is for Egypt's security and stability, and for ensuring its ability to overcome all its economic and social problems in the shortest period and by the quickest means possible.

It is shameful of the Egyptian authorities to accuse president Mursi of contacting ‘foreign parties’. When asked about who these parties are, the Prosecutor General tells you it is Hamas and its military wing, the 'Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades. For even if these charges are true, the man who stands accused of them does not deserve to be executed; on the contrary, he deserves medals of honor, patriotism, and pride.

Such a political and judicial mentality can only lead Egypt to more bloody violence and terrorism, further economic collapse, and more instability. And this can only redouble the Egyptians' suffering and the crises of their daily livelihood that are only getting more complicated and intense.

We disagree with the view that these death sentences will not be implemented at the end of the day. This is because the speed with which they are being issued, the fact that they have been upheld by the Criminal Court, and the fact that the dossiers have been referred to the mufti to endorse them – all suggest that we may wake up one morning to see president Mursi and his comrades swinging from the gallows.

President Mursi and his comrades are a terrifying obsession for the Egyptian authorities even when he is behind bars. He came across as calm, firm, and confident of the justice of his cause. He raised his fist as he heard the court's decision to uphold his death sentence.

"This alone is sufficient to recognize the mettle that real men possess, and the valor that marks them out at difficult historical moments," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

2-Erdogan: End of the ‘era of miracles’

 

The Turkish leader’s schemes have been decisively foiled at home and abroad by the Kurds; after a decade of success, his ‘era of miracles’ appears to be drawing to an end, says ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in today’s Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Turkish President Erdogan has suffered two major setbacks recently, both of which were inflicted upon him by the Kurds, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. The first was inflicted by Turkey’s own Kurds when they managed to secure a significant number of seats in parliament; and the second was at Tal Abyad where Syria’s Kurds have put paid to Erdogan’s dreams of dominating Syria and have paved the way for an independent Kurdish state by defeating ISIS and creating a contiguous Kurdish area along the Syrian/Turkish borders. The upshot is that Erdogan’s golden era may now be over.

 

NO GOOD NEWS: “No good news is reaching the [Turkish Presidential] White Palace these days,” writes ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Wednesday’s Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Having suffered a ‘setback’ according to most of the region’s newspapers and international media, the Turkish leader is closely watching the collapse of his project in northern Syria. Meanwhile, reports of the economic ‘miracle’ linked exclusively to him and his ruling party for thirteen years suggest that the ‘age of inspiration’ and ‘the era of miracles’ has come to an end. So what will he do?

Ever since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, and especially after it entered the phase of militarization and armament, the Turkish leader set two main goals for his country’s policy in Syria: First, to topple the regime in Damascus; and, second, to extend full Turkish influence over the whole of northern Syria – if not in pursuit of implicit historical schemes, then at least to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity in this area similar to northern Iraq.

To attain these two aims, Mr. Erdogan proceeded based on the principle that ‘the end justifies the means.’ There was no political or diplomatic means he did not resort to. And he fought the broadest and longest war of enticement and mobilization against both the Syrian regime and the Kurds alike. There was not a single bad epithet that he did not use to describe his two sworn enemies, so much so that Turkey went so far as to provide direct backing to all those who took up arms against the regime in Syria and Syria’s Kurds. And that included ISIS.

Despite repeated and angry Turkish denials of all of the accusations that Ankara was facilitating the flow of rebels, arming them, and trading with them on the oil and stolen goods markets, not a single international or regional capital accepts the Turkish claim or even understands it. Thus, the latest statements by the U.S. president spoke of the need for Turkey to make additional efforts to control its borders. And the latest ‘surprises’ in the Turkish press were the documents and conclusive proof published in the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet exposing Turkish intelligence’s direct role in transporting fighters and weapons to ISIS. This was the ‘scoop’ that the paper paid a price for when all its copies were confiscated that very same morning.

The Turkish president has resisted all regional and international – as well as domestic – pressures to dispel the ambiguity in his relations with ISIS. He has rejected all attempts to tighten the noose around the organization. He opposed the international coalition and did not permit NATO warplanes to use the vital Incirlik Airbase to strike ISIS. In fact, he has roared as loud as he could that it was impermissible to strike at ISIS while refraining from striking at ‘Assad’s forces.’ And he has attacked the West ‘which kills the Arabs and the Turcoman’ but does not strike the terrorist Kurds’ positions. And he has done everything possible to destroy the Kurdish ‘pocket’ before it expanded. In fact, a quick look at the manner in which ‘the leader’ dealt with the Kobanei battle exposes the extent to which he has insisted on confronting this new entity and preventing its expansion and spread.

Erdogan’s Syria policy was the subject of internal Turkish divisions. It is certain that this represents one among many reasons for his failed wagers and foiled dreams at the ballot box. But the main surprise (or, rather, blow) came from the Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP’s) success in securing a comfortable number of seats, exceeding the required minimum [10% threshold] by over fifteen seats. The party also succeeded in regaining seats that would have undeservedly gone free-of-charge to the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party).

The second ‘setback’ consisted of the Kurdish Popular Protection Units’ (YPG’s) successes in inflicting a series of major defeats on the hard line fundamentalist group-ISIS – from Kobani to Tal Abyad. These successes provide geographical contiguity for the new Kurdish entity’s areas and do away with the need for Turkey to provide backing for the YPG (as happened in Kobani). In fact, they transform the Kurds into a ‘neighboring state’ along a broad stretch of the Turkish/Syrian borders.

I suppose that what riles the Turkish leader most is the fact that the West with its missiles and air power, is siding with the Kurds and backing their project, providing them with all forms of support, protection and sponsorship. This shackles the ‘Sultan’s’ hands and renders his statements and threats no more than verbal flourishes that make no difference whatsoever.

Mr. Erdogan has lost his battle with the Kurds twice. The first time was against his own country’s Kurds after the latter’s party’s sudden and significant win in the recent elections. The second time was against Syria’s Kurds who are rewriting the region’s history and drawing closer to achieving their ‘right to self-determination’ with each passing day. And they are doing so despite all the effort, time and money that the Turkish leader has invested in the opposite direction and despite the tarnishing of Turkey’s image and that of its [‘moderate Islamist’] model after the notion of [Turkish] ‘soft power’ failed and was replaced by the image of a state that sponsors ISIS and facilitates its actions and terrorism against Turkey’s two neighboring countries, Syria and Iraq.

It seems that Erdogan’s ten ‘fat’ years will be followed by ten ‘lean’ years. This lean decade already began in fact with the outbreak of the Arab Spring’s revolutions and the revival of ‘Sultanate’ dreams.

“And I do not know whether there will new episodes in this ‘series of catastrophes,’ especially if this obstinate man insists on astonishing the world with the surprise of early elections –ones that we do not know whether they will be blessing or a catastrophe for the ‘Sultan’,” concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

 

3-The national interest above all

 

As the national accord government seems to be falling apart, there is need for more than mere Fatah/Hamas reconciliation; a whole new Palestinian national program has become a must, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

With the inter-Palestinian Fateh/Hamas split completing its eighth year, it is necessary to reconsider the very foundations of the national agenda that has been pursued over the past years, urges a leading Palestinian commentator. A new agenda should be adopted that includes all parties and that eschews any wager on an illusory peace process or on Arab or regional forces.

 

AFP reports the Palestinian government will resign within 24 hours, PA President Mahmoud Abbas announced late Tuesday as a dispute over the governance of Gaza came to a head. Government officials did not confirm the planned resignation, but did acknowledge that such a move has been under discussion for several months over the cabinet's inability to operate in the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. Such a move would deal a heavy blow to a Palestinian unity agreement signed in April 2014, which sought to end seven years of bad blood between Abbas's Fateh movement and its rival, the Islamist Hamas movement. "Within 24 hours the Palestinian government will resign," Abbas told members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, according to several senior officials who attended the evening meeting in the West Bank city of Ramallah. An official in the president's office said Abbas would meet Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah at midday (0900 GMT) today, Wednesday. Ahead of yesterday’s meeting, the Revolutionary Council's secretary general told AFP that the cabinet would stand down over its inability to rule in Gaza. Officials did not say whether the consultations to form a new government would include Hamas.

 

EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY: "The eighth anniversary of the [2007] inter-Palestinian split has passed without eliciting much concern," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This is because the reconciliation has been frozen despite the fact that it has been over a year since the national accord government was formed-- without helping to end the split. On the contrary; the situation has worsened after the government’s formation and the state of the reconciliation now resembles that of the 'peace process,' which died a long time ago and has turned into a process without peace.

The split has deepened both horizontally and vertically, and the influence of the groups with an interest in prolonging it has taken deep root at every level. The effort to end the split now requires greater impetus and a long period before success can be achieved.

On this unfortunate anniversary, I register some remarks, conclusions, and lessons:

- First, the split has deep Palestinian roots having to do with disagreements, interests, and ideologies, and giving priority to the struggle for power over anything else. There are also foreign Israeli, Arab, regional, and international factors, which implies that the decision to end the split is not a purely Palestinian one; it is one that is influenced by Israel and by Arab, regional, and international parties.

It is true that the influence of external factors varies, especially in light of the Arab changes, preoccupations, and domestic wars. But the Israeli factor remains a major one. For it is in Israel’s interest to ensure that the split continues until it turns into a separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the International Quartet's unfair preconditions [imposed on Hamas] remain a major obstacle that cannot be easily dismissed. For whenever the formation of a national unity government with the participation of all factions is considered, these preconditions emerge as a major obstacle and prevent the creation of the only government capable of confronting the challenges and threats.

- Second, ending the split will not be achieved by the entreaties, wishes, and demands of the two parties and those benefiting from it to end it. It can only end by finding a third party that expresses the will of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians, including the members and supporters of Fateh and Hamas, and which works on building up popular political pressure that grows and grows until it reaches a point where the pressure to end the split outweighs the pressure to maintain it.

To reach that point, the efforts to end the split must be part of a more comprehensive endeavor. This should occur within the context of a process meant to rebuild the Palestinian national-patriotic movement and redefine the national program and the PLO's institutions in a manner that takes the new facts, the emerging expertise, the deep changes, and the lessons and morals from previous experience into consideration. After all, what may have been permissible or workable a hundred, fifty, or even twenty years ago is no longer permissible or workable today in the age of post-modernity, globalization and the rise and fall of patriotic, nationalist, international, and Islamist movements, and in light of the emergence of the terrorism phenomenon and trans-border and transcontinental takfiri organizations.

- Third, ending the split cannot be achieved in a selective manner; nor can it be achieved by focusing on certain selected aspects and disregarding other equally fundamental aspects. It can only be secured within the framework of a major process that is intended to lift the Palestinian people up to attain their aims and rights. Only then can the Palestinians act because there would be a major cause worth sacrificing for. By contrast, reconciliation on the basis of distributing power and preservation of the status quo will not attract the people's interest.

We need to end the split and regain unity; we do not need reconciliation alone. And this requires reaching a comprehensive agreement that is a single package, which includes the bases of political partnership and common denominators. It must also include management of conflict over the remaining outstanding issues in a democratic manner, and giving priority to rebuilding the PLO so as to include the various shades of the political spectrum. Moreover, the issues facing the Palestinian Authority (that has no authority) should not be put ahead of a PLO that has been disregarded and marginalized, allowing the Oslo course of action – which has harmed the unity of the cause, land, and people, and under whose ceiling almost all are now working – to persist.

This is the same course of action that has marginalized and split the Palestinian cause, restricting it to the establishment of a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. This, in turn, has led to a situation where we humiliatingly crawl after the establishment of a 'mini-state' whose limbs are torn apart, on part of the land occupied in 1967 (a state with 'provisional' borders), or to the establishment of a 'Gaza state' in return for a long-term truce.

- Fourth, working towards a comprehensive agreement and a complete package does not mean that we should refrain from any achievable step, especially in those domains that affect people's daily lives and provide protection for the Palestinian people against the current terrible threats they face the various places where they are located. For as the principle says, 'if something cannot be achieved in total, it should not be abandoned in total.' But it is important to link any step that we take to a coherent process that aims to end the split and regain national unity on patriotic, democratic, accord, and genuine political partnership bases. The final aim cannot be merely that of managing the split or cohabiting with it, or to advance theories about why it is impossible to end.

Ending the split is difficult, very difficult, in fact, but it is not impossible. This is because unity is necessary for the victory of national liberation movements, and because the racist, settlement, colonial, occupation project that aims to expel all the Palestinians targets every Palestinian. It does not distinguish between a moderate and an extremist Palestinian, or between Fateh and Hamas. Moreover, given its aims, schemes, radicalism, and extremism, this project accepts no compromise; it wants to achieve everything. This is why it has foiled all efforts and initiatives intended to reach a solution even though the Palestinian and Arab sides have made major concessions in return for which they have only 'reaped the wind.'

- Fifth, the current season is not one of harvest. It is not the phase for establishing a Palestinian state, even if this comes at the expense of the right of return and the Palestinian people's other rights. It is the phase of standing our ground, keeping the cause alive, reducing the harm done to us and the losses we suffer, foiling all solutions and options preferred by Israel, preserving our rights, aims, and what remains of our gains, refraining from offering any new concessions, and withdrawing those already made but in accordance with precise and responsible calculations that aim to rebuild the all-inclusive national institution, the national program, and a single leadership. And all this must be done in a manner that continuously safeguards and enriches pluralism as the source of the Palestinian cause's power, immunity, and continuity.

Quite simply, the solution lies in launching an all-inclusive national dialogue that is crowned with a national conference in which representatives of all of Palestinian communities take part. These must include women, the youth, and the Diaspora, in a manner that is proportionate to their size and role. And this dialogue should not be confined to the outside layers of the political system or to merely formal and procedural aspects; it must not focus on distributing power or on serving individual, factional, or partisan interests. It should instead rely on 'the pillars of the supreme national interest' and aim to produce the right answer to crucial questions, the most important of which are: Where does the Palestinian cause stand now? Where does it wish to reach? And how can it achieve what it wants?

Ending the split requires Fateh, Hamas, and the president before anyone and anything else to believe in partnership and embody it in various fields and at various levels within the PA and the PLO. They must be convinced that the Palestinian ship that sails in a sea tossed by storms and powerful waves cannot be steered to the shore of safety by any single leader or faction. This is especially unlikely now that everyone, without exception, finds themselves amidst a deep national predicament because the strategies pursued after the changes and domestic Arab wars have reached a dead end. The Palestinian cause needs all the people's energies and forces, and no party can claim to be able to achieve national salvation and liberation all by itself.

Ending the split also requires an end to the individual control and hegemony that have deepened after it. It requires an end to the wager on illusory changes, or on Arab, regional, and international parties – with the president and Fateh wagering on the U.S. administration and the so-called 'peace process,' and Hamas relying on the Muslim Brotherhood and certain Arab and regional parties.

"There is no alternative but to forgo these losing wagers and adopt a new approach in which everyone gives first priority to the national interest over all outside interests and agendas," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

More than baby steps

 

In one of the more bizarre lead stories of recent times, Yedioth Ahronoth's top headline on Wednesday is a report that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has ordered manufacturers to stop using trans-fat within three years.

Haaretz leads its Wednesday edition with news that, under pressure from Culture Minister Miri Regev, organizers of the Jerusalem Film Festival on Tuesday decided not to screen a controversial documentary on Rabin assassin, Yigal Amir. At a meeting with festival administrators, Regev – who has been using her ministry's funding to force her ideological viewpoint on Israeli theaters and artists, threatened to halt state funding for the festival unless the film was screened outside the festival. Festival director Noa Regev agreed to screen the film, 'Beyond the Fear,' a few days prior to the festival. However, the festival administration decided not to withdraw the film from the festival competition for Best Israeli Documentary.

Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead with the spike in tensions on the Golan Heights, where there have been intensive battles between forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and rebels on the Syrian part of the border in recent days. On Tuesday, the IDF and Israel Police declared a section of the northeast Golan Heights a closed military zone – then lifted the decree hours later and returned the area to normal.

Early Tuesday morning, al-Qa’ida’s Nusra Front killed one Syrian Druze officer and wounded 10 others in the border town of al-Khader, while on Wednesday morning, rocket sirens sounded across the Golan. It is still not clear what sparked the sirens or whether any missiles fell in Israeli-controlled territory. Israel Radio cited Syrian rebel sources that some opposition forces had taken over several hills near Mount Hermon on the Golan Heights after fierce fighting with the Syrian regime and Hizbollah forces.

On the Palestinian front, Haaretz reports that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced Tuesday that the unity government led by Prime Minister Rami Al-Hamdallah was expected to tender its resignation, with the goal of assembling a new cabinet in its wake. Abbas made his announcement during a meeting of Fateh's Revolutionary Council.

The president's initiative stems from the fact that the current government is struggling to function, particularly in the Gaza Strip. Earlier Tuesday, the secretary general of Fateh's Revolutionary Council, Amin Maqboul, was quoted saying that the government would 'resign in the next 24 hours because this one is weak and there is no chance that Hamas will allow it to work in Gaza.' According to Palestinian sources, Abbas is expected to appoint Hamdallah again to form the new government, which will include a number of changes.

Indeed, the Palestinian unity government did resign later on Wednesday. ‘Hamdallah handed his resignation to Abbas and Abbas asked him to form a new government,’ Nimr Hammad, an adviser to Abbas, told AFP. Hamas said on Wednesday it rejected any unilateral dissolution of the Palestinian unity government, according to Ynet. 'Hamas rejects any one-sided change in the government without the agreement of all parties,' spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri told AFP.

According to Arutz 7, Abbas revealed that there are no contacts with Israel about peace talks at the current juncture and warned of the 'destructive' ramifications of the current status quo being allowed to continue. He also said that the PA would only back a French-penned UN resolution if it met all Palestinian demands: an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a clear date set for the end of negotiations and implementation of PA sovereignty. Abbas emphasized that the PA emphatically opposes recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, reiterating his vehement rejection of the recognition that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu demanded in talks. If recognition of the Jewish state is included in the French proposal the PA will not back it, warned the PA chairman.

Abbas also revealed that in the international contacts aiming to reach a ceasefire agreement for Gaza several ideas were raised, including the establishment of a connection from Gaza to a sea port in Turkish Cyprus, as well as establishing an airport in Gaza. He blamed Hamas for the delay in international aid to Gaza, evidently pointing out the belligerent nature of his rival.

In related news, Israel announced on Tuesday evening that it is relaxing restrictions on the movement of Palestinians to and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, ahead of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

A spokeswoman for the Defense Ministry unit which manages civilian affairs on the West Bank said that for the first time, Palestinians will be able to travel by bus directly from West Bank cities to the Al-Aqsa compound in Jerusalem. Men over 40 and women of all ages from the West Bank will be able to pray at Al-Aqsa, the Temple Mount, and 800 people from the Gaza Strip will be allowed to attend Friday Muslim prayers there.

In addition, 200 Gazan residents will be allowed to visit relatives in the West Bank during Ramadan, which is to begin today or Thursday. Five hundred people from the West Bank will be authorized to enter Gaza. Israel is to allow three hundred Palestinians living abroad to visit relatives in Gaza, and five hundred West Bank Palestinians would be permitted to travel from Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport.

The Israeli spokeswoman said that the measures are possible because of relative security calm and the ongoing security cooperation between Israel and the West bank-based Palestinian Authority. But Israel is warning that any Palestinian breach would have consequences.

 

BABY STEPS TOWARD A TRUCE: Writing on the NRG website, Assaf Gavor explains why Israel and Hamas are reportedly close to agreeing on a five-year truce and why both sides are keen for this to happen.

"Over the past few days, there have been constant reports that Israel and Hamas are on the verge of agreeing on a long-term truce. Senior Hamas member Moussa Abu Marzouk, who reportedly took the truce agreement to Qatar for discussion with other senior members of the group, was quick to deny comments by another Hamas official, Osama Hamdan, who said that a decision to accept the offer could be reached this week.

Abu Marzouk denied that there is a concrete proposal for a long-term cessation of hostilities, but we should take his denials with a pinch of salt – in part because he made similar denials when he was negotiating an end to Operation Protective Edge. The fact that many foreign diplomats have visited the Gaza Strip over the past month – with Israel's blessing – would seem to indicate that both Israel and Hamas are keen to ink an agreement.

Economic issues are the major factor, which is pushing both sides toward dialogue. Israel believes that a situation in which the people of Gaza are suffering from acute poverty, record unemployment and lack of hope is leading to a spike in terrorist activity; therefore it has allowed more trucks to enter the Strip, carrying construction material and food.

Hamas, which used to take advantage of the distress of the people of Gaza to recruit more terrorists, is now playing the role of the responsible and moderate regime and is a full partner in efforts to improve the situation in Gaza. The organization's leaders recognize that signing a long-term truce with Israel – which could be warmly welcomed by the European Union, the United Nations, Qatar and Turkey – could open the door for billions of dollars of reconstruction aid and could accelerate the rehabilitation of Gaza.

Hamas has other goals, too: it is desperate to establish a more solid regime in Gaza. One of the promises that Hamas leaders made to the people of Gaza after Operation Protective Edge was that the blockade of the Strip would be lifted; a truce agreement that ensures the reopening of the border crossings and provides Gaza with a seaport could certainly allow Hamas to live up to that promise.

Many people may raise an eyebrow, but Israel is also keen for Hamas to cement its grip of power in Gaza, since it needs for there to be a clear address for any complaints or questions. This has been the between-the-lines message at briefings by senior military officials and politicians, all of whom reiterate that Israel sees Hamas as the address for anything that happens inside Gaza.

The Salafi organizations that have sprung up recently in Gaza are using the poverty, the unemployment and the desperation to recruit terrorists. One such organization – the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade – which has sworn allegiance to ISIS has fired rockets at Israel on three recent occasions. That group's goal of portraying itself as the true resistance movement, compared to the 'fake resistance' of Hamas, has upset the delicate balance that existed between Israel and Hamas (and the smaller groups that obey its orders).

Whenever there is quiet, aid to Gaza increases. Israel even turns a blind eye to Hamas efforts to rebuild its offensive capabilities. Whenever a rocket is fired, Israel bombs Hamas buildings and both sides issue belligerent statements without any real intent. Upsetting the balance coupled with mutual concern on both sides that ISIS could get a foothold in Gaza, are increasing the likelihood of a long-term agreement, which would stabilize the situation.

Hamas is looking for alternatives to Iran. It's not true to say that Tehran has turned its back on the Palestinians, but the ayatollah regime is preoccupied with fighting in places like Syria, Iraq and Yemen. This means that the Palestinians have dropped down the Iranian pecking order. With ties between Hamas and Iran cooling off, the Palestinian organization is tempted to develop a relationship with other countries. If a five-year truce deal can help Hamas to improve its relations with Egypt and can bolster ties with Qatar, then it will certainly see such an agreement as worthwhile.

One of the ramifications of ISIS's sudden appearance on the scene in Gaza is that Hamas is now cooperating again with Egypt. Their common battle against ISIS terrorist activity in Gaza and the Sinai was a pleasant surprise for Hamas, which was looking for a way to resume dialogue with Cairo after a prolonged period of disconnect. Israel is not getting too hot under the collar about this rapprochement. Nimrod Sheffer, the head of the IDF's Planning Directorate, told NRG that, as far as he is concerned, cooperation by Egypt and Hamas against Salafi terrorists is a positive development. Sheffer, a former fighter pilot, thus hinted that the situation on the ground has allowed Israel and Hamas to start talking and to take baby steps toward a long-term truce."

Ends…

 

EGYPT IS THE KEY: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that the key to help the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip is in Egypt's hands.

"Yasser Arafat, in one of his more provocative and dismissive statements, once said that Jerusalem would be the capital of Palestine despite Israel's objections. Anyone who doesn’t like it, he continued, could go and drink the sea in Gaza. A lot of water has flowed in the Mediterranean Sea since then and, a year after the most recent war, Gaza finds itself under a blockade by Israel and Egypt. Plans to build a floating seaport off the coast of Gaza remain nothing more than a pipe dream.

At the moment, it is the Palestinians who are most focused on the issue of a ceasefire: in the Palestinian media, in talks with Hamas members and in internal discussions within the Palestinian Authority. The proposal being discussed, which is not new, is for a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, lasting between five and 10 years. In exchange, Israel will lift its blockade of the Gaza Strip by allowing for the establishment of a seaport, where goods entering and exiting the Strip will be unloaded.

Even though there has been no major breakthrough on the matter, there is some behind-the-scenes activity. This stems in large part from the fact that Egypt appears to have adopted a more flexible and softer position regarding Hamas. Thus far, Cairo has been dead set against any kind of concessions to the organization that currently rules Gaza.

Until recently, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and senior members of his regime defined Hamas as a branch of the organization they hate the most, the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt has accused Hamas of aiding and abetting ISIS terrorists in the Sinai Peninsula. The disinterest that Egypt has shown toward the suffering of the people of Gaza has thwarted any attempt to forge ahead with talks aimed at reaching a long-term ceasefire.

Moussa Abu Marzouk, the deputy political leader of Hamas' political bureau, recently visited Egypt and met with the head of the Egyptian intelligence services. With their agreement, he then travelled to Gaza and conducted talks with the political leadership of Hamas there and with the commanders of the organization's armed branch. Then he returned to Egypt, where he continued his talks in Cairo.

It is possible that the change in the Egyptian approach comes against the backdrop of Hamas' willingness to cooperate with Egyptian intelligence officials in their battle against Sinai terrorists, as well as concerns within Hamas that Salafi organizations in Gaza, which have the backing of ISIS, are getting stronger.

Israel is not involved in these contacts – at least not directly or openly – but it's safe to assume that it is being briefed on them via various channels. As things currently stand, all that remains for Israel to do is to try and help the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip and to lift some of the pressure on residents of the beleaguered coastal strip. And that's just what Yoav Mordechai; the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories announced this week, days before the start of Ramadan."

Ends…

 

REASONS TO HATE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber says that Israel may be paranoid, but that doesn't mean the world isn’t out to get us. The secret, he says, is not to give the world any more reasons to hate us.

"The wittiest aphorism that springs to mind at the moment also happens to be the most clichéd and hackneyed. But that doesn't mean it's no relevant for us here and now. That saying, ascribed to Henry Kissinger, is 'Even a paranoid can have enemies.'

The question now is not whether the persecution of the State of Israel is justified. The fact is that we are under attack. The United Nations report into Operation Protective Edge is just one of the symptoms of this persecution; it's not even the most acute symptom. We survived Pharaoh and we will survive this report, too. The archives of the Defense Ministry may be full to the seams, but there's still room in some dusty drawer for another UN report. But, it would be a mistake to say 'Good riddance' and to ignore the report entirely – especially given the global atmosphere of animosity towards us. The international community has changed. So have we, but we still don’t fully understand what is happening here.

This report, like many previous reports, was written by people who have never been on the field of battle. It was written, no doubt, in a comfortable and air-conditioned room, with ergonomic lighting and comfortable chairs – nothing like the kind of conditions that apply when the bullets are flying. The report fails to encapsulate the feeling of fear and shock, the fact of a bitter enemy trying to kill you, the innocent civilians who set off bombs from the safety of their homes. How can we know this even though the report has yet to be published? Because all reports are like that. The advantage of hindsight directs the criticism. The spirit of 'what if…' and 'if only…' permeate every page of every such report.

And still, despite our rejection of this kind of criticism, it seems that the international community is now dreaming of sterile wars. Jurists and other experts in international law want wars to look like a visit to an amusement park: no smoke, no fear and an abundance of caution; as sterile as an operating theater.

These international experts would appear to have complaints about the behavior of IDF officers and soldiers: civilians were killed and, even worse, many children lost their lives. Our heart aches for every noncombatant killed – even if the very word 'noncombatant' is a misnomer that should never be used – in every operation and war we have been involved in. But we must bear in mind that the Gaza Strip is not like the empty sand dunes of the Sinai. Gazans have the highest birthrate in the world and the streets are full of children. Some of them have become the stuff of folk legends, like the children used to fire rocket-propelled grenades during the first Lebanon War.

This does not mean that there is any kind of justification for the killing of innocent civilians and children. The IDF must do absolutely everything in its power to avoid firing at innocents. And still, I would love to be standing next to the authors of such reports when they come under rocket fire. What would they do to save their own lives and the lives of their children? They would fire like crazy. Yes, even at the risk of harming civilians and children. The Americans, for example, took the lives of 5,000 Panamanians (some say 15,000) in order to lay their hands on that country's drug-dealing president, General Manuel Noriega. All of those killed during Operation Just Cause – the invasion of Panama by the United States in December 1989 – were innocent civilians and many of them were children.

What does this mean? It means that wars will always be a matter of life or death. In future wars, too, innocent lives will be taken. Military leaders must take every possible measure to minimize the number of civilian casualties, but faced with an 'us or them' situation, any sane country will put its own civilians' safety first. It's not easy. It sends shivers down the spine. But it's the truth.

But for Israel's military and political leaders, a different conclusion is needed. They must do everything in their power to avert war altogether. If there is no choice and war is the only option, then they must plan their offensives in such a way that they lead to minimum civilian causalities. How can that be done? It's up to the defense establishment – which is given every resource it could possibly need – to come up with an answer.

In the meantime, we will continue being paranoid and will continue to believe that the whole world hates Israel. That's true, after all. We have to make sure we don't give it any more reasons to hate us."

Ends…

 

THE DRUZE DILEMMA: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit describes the dilemmas that Israel is facing because of the increased tensions on both sides of the Golan Heights and the plight of Druze villages inside Syrian territory.

"The IDF knew in advance that declaring the northeastern part of the Golan Heights a closed military zone was not an operational necessity for Israeli troops deployed across from the Druze village of al-Khader, inside Lebanon. Rather, it was a precautionary measure, taking in the unlikely event that some unplanned spark would set off a violent chain of events in the area.

Given the current sensitivity of this stage of the fighting that is taking place under the very noses of the IDF and Israeli Druze, there was some logic behind the decision – and every reason to welcome the quick decision to lift the military closure. Not only to safeguard the tourist industry on the Golan Heights, but also to prevent the establishment of a barrier – psychological and physical – between the Druze and the rest of Israel.

Concerned members of the Druze community moved toward the border fence, in order to watch their beleaguered brethren, who are engaged in direct confrontation with the al-Nusra Front. They are also concerned that the situation will deteriorate. There are several thousand Druze living in al-Khader. Most of them live in poverty; they make their living from agriculture, which is not particularly easy on the Golan, and they are fiercely loyal to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This is because they traditionally assumed that the Alawite regime would be more moderate than the Islamist terrorist organizations.

On the ground, the panic was much worse than the reality. 'Much ado about nothing' was how one official described it to me. Some mortar shells were fired and there was a report that the Free Syrian Army had demanded that the al-Nusra Front take care not to attack the Druze communities. It's safe to assume that a similar message was relayed from Israel. But there's a problem: Atta Farhat, the head of the Druze Zionist Council for Israel, believes that Israel should allow Israeli Druze to go to the assistance of their brethren in the besieged village – which is a Druze enclave in a hostile region – and to equip them with arms and ammunition. According to Farhat, they are isolated and, unfortunately, at this stage the government is not willing to afford them any practical assistance. In fact, Israel would not really want to even provide them with clandestine help.

Israel is weighing up its military and political response to the regional situation. If Druze refugees do indeed try to enter Israel, the government has to decide whether to allow them to enter an enclave that would be set up on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights. But there is no guarantee that Israel would be willing for this to happen. One consideration that must be taken into account is how barring these refugees from entering would impact on relations between the State of Israel and its Druze citizens.

It has been said many times by Israeli politicians and military leaders that we see ourselves as being on the outside of the battles that are taking place as part of the Syrian Civil War. We do not want to be dragged in. We must not allow ourselves to be dragged in. But we must have an answer ready for several possible scenarios. Because of Israel's special situation, we find ourselves facing several simultaneous dilemmas – all of which provide a stiff challenge to Israeli policy regarding the Syrian Civil War and the Druze community inside Israel's borders."

Ends…

 

GAZA FIRST (AGAIN)?: Writing on the website of the Institute for National Security Studies, Benedetta Berti and Anat Kurz comment on recent developments in the Gaza Strip, which, they say, is reminiscent of the post-Oslo atmosphere.

"Recent weeks have given rise to new concerns over the possibility of yet another military escalation in the Gaza Strip. The fear is that internal tensions between Hamas and local Salafi jihadist groups in the Strip may drag both Israel and Hamas into a round of conflict that both parties would much rather avoid. Yet along with attention to the security situation in Gaza, the broader political and geostrategic context, one where Gaza continues to occupy an especially central and crucial role, must be considered.

Since the war in the summer of 2014 between Israel and Hamas and its dire humanitarian and economic impact on the Strip, there has been much momentum to support reconstruction of the area's civilian and economic infrastructures. Moreover, reconstruction, particularly against the backdrop of Hamas’ relative weakness, is increasingly thought by Western actors relevant to the political process as possible leverage for a long term truce between Hamas and Israel and hence a means to secure calm in the Israeli-Palestinian arena as a whole.

Interestingly, this focus on Gaza resembles the line of thought that dominated the discourse on the political process in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Oslo accords, with the 'Gaza [and Jericho] first' idea (the Cairo Agreement) – agreed upon in May 1994 by Israel and the newly-established Palestinian Authority. There are of course considerable differences between then and now, including in terms of both sides' trust in the ability to reach a comprehensive peace agreement and the cohesiveness of the Palestinian political sphere. Yet Gaza once again is increasingly considered to be a place where an Israeli-Palestinian political-territorial dialogue could and perhaps should start.

No doubt, using the 'Gaza first' option as a springboard for advancing the political process forward would be a highly complex project, particularly since in the past two decades the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has split into separate conflicts involving Israel, the PA, and Hamas. But one key lesson of these turbulent years is that past attempts to ignore the Gaza Strip and Hamas in the context of efforts to generate a breakthrough in the political process have not brought Israel or the Palestinians any closer to a peace agreement.

After Hamas’ victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, the primary Israeli approach toward Palestinian politics – backed by a number of key international players, chiefly the United States – consisted of encouraging the existing divide between Hamas and Fateh as means to weaken Hamas. After the internal feud in the Palestinian arena turned violent, culminating in Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007, the policy focused on attempting to weaken Hamas by isolating its government and the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, renewal of the dialogue between the Palestinian Authority/PLO and Israel came to be seen as both a tool to advance an Israeli-Palestinian understanding as well as a chance to further isolate and weaken Hamas. However, the combination of economic restrictions and political isolation did not lead to Hamas’ capitulation in Gaza, nor did ignoring the Strip facilitate the achievement of a political agreement between Israel and the Fateh-led PA. Put simply, ignoring a problem does not make it go away, but it may make it worse. Today, both Hamas and the Gaza Strip, just like in the past, remain essential ingredients in the Palestinian arena and in any political process related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have grown apart significantly in terms of economic indicators since the early 1990s, and the gap has widened exponentially since 2007. However, reintegrating the two economies by investing in the economic development of the Strip as well as by encouraging economic links between Gaza and the West Bank is crucial to the viability and functioning of a future Palestinian state. Until conditions are ripe to realize the ultimate goal, the international approach should focus on more money, more access, and more integration.

More money: efforts to rebuild Gaza continue to be severely underfunded, with virtually all international organizations working well below the necessary budget and with only roughly a quarter of the more than $3 billion pledged having reached the Strip.

More access: reconstruction depends on more construction material reaching Gaza, with border and economic restrictions eased, both from the Egyptian and from the Israeli side. For this to happen while addressing Israel’s security concern, there should be a re-deployment of PA security forces at the borders and the recreation of the defunct EUBAM mission. Moreover, more access also means work to reverse Gaza’s current state of isolation and promote market reintegration between Gaza and the West Bank.

More integration: political reintegration between Fateh and Hamas needs to be encouraged as part of this process. For the PA this is not only crucial to somehow reestablish its presence in Gaza, but also to promote the goal of Palestinian independence. Ignoring Gaza’s de facto ruler, Hamas, disregards the fact that enforcing a political agreement that Hamas does not at least tacitly tolerate will make it politically complex for Fateh to enforce it in the West Bank, and to a much greater extent in Gaza. Hamas will also be more likely to rely on violence to spoil a process in which it has no stakes or incentives.

The time is also ripe for an extended ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Since the end of the last round of confrontation, both sides have demonstrated their determination time and again to refrain from playing into the hands of the jihadist factions that seek to instigate yet another round of hostilities in the Gaza sphere. However, any explicit or implicit understandings between Israel and Hamas should not occur at the expense of the PA. To the contrary, reintegrating Gaza and the West Bank at the political level should remain a priority as means to get the political process back on track. In addition, institutional coordination between the PA and Hamas is essential, since cooperation of the PA in the reconstruction enterprise is presented by the main donor governments, and with good reason, as a prerequisite for transferring the critical aid already pledged and executing the project in full force. Thus, commitment to the PA as the Palestinian partner in a political process — through ongoing and substantial economic backup—should continue, along with a strong expectation of substantive coordination between the PA and Hamas, which could even evolve into yet another reconciliation effort between the two rival parties and the articulation of new inter-party rules of the game and institutional balance of power. A detailed political initiative, even if only a performance-based, incremental, and long term plan, could facilitate recognition by the PA that the 'Gaza first (again)' program is not intended to bypass it as the recognized representative of the Palestinian people for any political process and therefore soften its approach regarding coordination with Hamas

As for Hamas, a political initiative would demonstrate to the organization that the reconstruction project is by no means intended to facilitate its further military entrenchment in the Strip. True, disarmament of Hamas is an unrealistic objective. Under the present circumstances, even a total halt on its armament buildup would be hard to accomplish. Yet embarking on a comprehensive reconstruction of the Strip should demonstrate to Hamas that it must give up a great deal in return, to both the PA and Israel, if it wishes to avoid further risks to its civilian hold on the Strip

In any case, reversing the policy of isolation of Gaza and Hamas and focusing attention on putting Gaza first should be seen not just as a step toward impeding a violent implosion in the not-so-distant future, but also as groundwork toward resumption of constructive Israeli-Palestinian dialogue."

Ends…

 

THE LABEL LIBEL: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Mose Apelblat asks whether a proposed measure to label Israeli products from the occupied territories is a minor problem or strategic threat.

"The push in EU for some kind of sanctions against Israel for not taking any steps to restart the dormant peace process is gaining momentum. A measure in the pipeline is the proposed labeling of a list of Israeli products from the occupied territories.

In a letter (April 13) to the EU high representative of foreign affairs and security policy, Federica Mogherini, 16 foreign ministers out of 28 EU member states asked her to take the lead on labeling settlement products. What they are asking for, as they did already in 2013 of her predecessor Catherine Ashton, is that the EU issues guidelines on the labeling. In their view it is an 'important step in the full implementation of EU’s longstanding policy, in relation to the preservation of the two-state solution.' To this is added a consumer protection aspect. European consumers must have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing in supermarkets and shops.

But the consumer aspect shouldn’t be overrated. The main reason for the EU to issue guidelines for labeling produce from the settlements is political. In the EU’s view the settlements are illegal and an obstacle to peace. It has no interest in supporting the economy of the settlements by misleading labeling.

As long as there was some hope in the peace process, the EU suspended its guidelines on labeling. Now with the new Israeli government, made up of right-wing and Orthodox parties, when whatever peace hope there was has faded away and announcements are made on new construction in the settlements, the EU has obviously lost patience with Israel.

That said, it should be recalled that Israel already has agreed with the EU that products from the occupied territories will have to be distinguished for customs purposes and not benefit from preferential duty-free treatment according to the EU-Israel Association agreement. Such a technical agreement was adopted in 2004 without prejudice to the political positions of the two parties to the agreement.

Israel could easily agree to this because of the insignificant role of settlement produce in Israel’s trade with EU. According to a recent estimate it only amounts to less than 300 million euros or one percent of the total EU-Israeli trade in 2013. Another reason was that there was no labeling on the products. The information on the origin of the products – including postcodes – was stated in the customs documents.

This might change now. The U.K. was the first EU member to advise retailers to label agricultural products from the settlements. In December 2009 the U.K. department of environment, food and rural affairs issued technical advice to retailers to label food grown in the settlements, for among other reasons to distinguish it from Palestinian products.

The British advice said that traders and retailers 'may wish' to indicate whether the product originated from an Israeli settlement or from Palestinian producers. This could take the form, for example, of 'Produce of the West Bank (settlement produce)' or 'Produce of the West Bank (Palestinian produce),' as appropriate. To what extent it affected consumer demand in U.K. is not known.

The Dutch government, which announced in 2014 – and later backtracked – that it would issue similar advice proposed that products should be labeled 'Israel settlements in the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank or in the Palestinian territories.' Belgium issued a notice in August 2014 that made labeling of food and agricultural products compulsory, with for example the following label: 'Product of the West Bank (Israeli settlement).'

The choice of label obviously lies in the hands of the EU and retailers in the member states. Labels like those above are stating a fact about the origin of the products. Israel does not want 'to call the child by its name.' However, from an Israeli point of view EU-wide guidelines on labeling, which Israel could influence, are preferable than having EU member states choosing their own labels.

The Israeli export of agricultural produce from the settlements is marginal and any reduction of its size because of a decrease in consumer demand would not damage the Israeli economy. However, the effect on the rest of exports cannot be ignored. From labeling settlement products, the path to boycotting not only them but Israeli exports in general might be short. When you start to distinguish between products from within and outside the Green Line, you might raise doubts about the origin of all Israeli products. The labeling plays also into the hands of the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions movement.

The EU will keep telling Israel that this was never the intention and that labeling settlement products is not part of any boycott campaign against Israel. It will be up to the consumers to decide if they want to buy products from settlements or not. This is not the whole truth since the EU also plans to limit the jurisdiction of Israeli authorities to certify that certain food products comply with health safety requirements. Without certification, no export of those settlements products will be possible.

The Israeli government is obviously upset. The new minister of public security, strategic affairs and information, Gilad Erdan, has reportedly established a task force to tackle the problem. At least he has acknowledged that a minor issue from a purely economic viewpoint might become a potential strategic threat against Israel.

Israel should try to influence the wording of the labeling. If no agreement can be reached, Israel has two alternatives: either announce some confidence building measures and restart the peace process, hoping that this will persuade EU to suspend again the labeling, or completely halt the export of settlement products that require labeling. Most settlement products do not require labeling.

The first choice is very unlikely considering the composition of the current government that blames – partly correctly – the Palestinian Authority for the deadlock in the peace process. There remains the other alternative. It should not be any problem for Israel to consume the products from the settlements domestically or export them to non-EU countries. Why risk Israeli exports? If no settlement products are exported, there won’t be any embarrassing labeling."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

KURDISH ADVANCE/SYRIAN REFUGEES: Nihat Ali Ozcan believes a Palestinian-type refugee problem is emerging along the borders with Syria in centrist Milliyet: "The U.S. must be interpreting the moves made by the PKK- (Kurdistan Workers' Party) affiliated PYD (Democratic Union Party) from three perspectives: To box in ISIS from the north, entrust control of the 'foreign terrorist fighter' routes across the Turkish border to the PKK/PYD as a new ally, and finally, to create an obstacle to the operations of its 'ally' Turkey, whose Syria policies the U.S. dislikes and does not conceal that. The current [Kurdish-led] ethnic cleansing, however, heralds a new Palestinian-Israeli-type problem in the region."

Writing in the same paper, Ergun Babahan predicts hard times ahead: "The fall of Tal Abyad means the collapse of Turkey’s game plan. The Kurdish entity that has appeared there frees women and defends civilization, contrary to ISIS. At the moment, it is being protected by the American air force and it will gain independence within the process in Syria, while the ruling AKP's (Justice and Development) Sunni-based project has collapsed. If a Turkish coalition is formed on an anti-Kurdish peace process basis, achieving peace and comfort will frankly be just a dream. Turkey’s policy in Tal Abyad shows that the necessary lesson has not yet been learned. There is a strong probability that the coming era may be even more painful and tense than before."

Gungor Mengi urges immediate action in centrist Vatan: "It is obvious that Turkey is in urgent need of a government. The Kurds in Tal Abyad will remain there or will move to Turkey as they wish, but the Turkomen will be deported from this region. They will be unable to enter Turkey; even if they do get in they will be unable to return to their villages again. The current government does not have the luxury of overlooking these incidents by focusing on the 'coalition' issue."

Secular, Kemalist tabloid Sozcu calls for accountability: "The AKP government has caused us unbelievable trouble. We are currently already feeding 2.5 million people in the refugee camps who have fled from Syria to Turkey. No one knows the exact number. No official statement has been made on this issue. All the resources of the state are being transferred to Syrian refugees. A new government will soon be formed. One of its first priorities should be to bring the officials who caused us all this Syria trouble before the Supreme Court. Thanks to them, we have lost millions of dollars and disgraced ourselves before the world."

Fadime Ozkan outlines the Kurdish threat from the south in centre-right, pro-government Star: "If Tal Abyad is taken by the YPG, this would entail filling the gap between the Kobani and Cezire cantons, and the establishment of geographical contiguity for the Syrian Kurds. The next step will be the declaration of a Syrian Kurdistan. Turkey has been left to deal with the situation of either 'ISIS or the PKK'. Turkey's southern border is surrounded by Kurdish states and its eastern and southeastern regions are under the control of the HDP, which is the 'civilian face' of the PKK-PYD military wing."

Kahayan Uygur blames the U.S and others for the current mess in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "With a campaign orchestrated by the U.S. leadership, the AKP’s votes have shrunk and the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] has been enabled to clear the 10% electoral threshold. The beginning of ethnic cleansing in Syria with the U.S. acting from the air and the PKK/YPG on the ground is the first result of the instability that Turkey has been dragged into. The situation of tens of thousands of Arabs and Turkomen stuck at the border gates represents the cruel face of the West and its collaborators, as well as demonstrating the failure of some groups in Turkey to understand what is going on."

Ibrahim Karagul detects a wide-raging anti-Turkish design in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The project to weaken Turkey is being implemented through the PYD, the PKK's Syria wing this time. Even before the last elections were held and when some groups understood that Turkey would join a coalition, an operation was intensified to deactivate Turkey in northern Syria, sever all its ties with the south and open a northern Iraq-Mediterranean corridor. Huge demographic operations began and deportation and ethnic cleansing were launched against the Turkomen and Arabs. At the same time, this may be the latest aspect of the strategy to contain Turkey, reduce it to naught in all the regions and countries that it has opened itself up to for ten years, and imprison it in Anatolia again."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan strikes a pessimistic note: "With full confidence, we can say that it is impossible to clinch a good deal with the P5+1, especially with the U.S. This is because of excuses, excessive demands and obstruction by America over the past 12 years. They sabotage the talks and put the blame on Iran. President Rowhani should direct all his objections and protests to the other side and not to his friends who are unanimously with him and the esteemed nuclear team for a good deal, and, united in opposition to a bad deal." 

Moderate Iran brings in Israel: "With just a few days before the deadline, an opinion poll of U.S. Jews shows that approximately 60 per cent support a nuclear deal with Iran. But in Israel, Netanyahu believes that an agreement is the worst mistake of the West, because it will not prevent Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Israel is seriously trying to take advantage of the current situation to tie up its interests and security to this agreement." 

Conservative Resalat believes that the U.S. is involved: "The Zionist regime's espionage at the venue of the nuclear talks is worrying. There are many signs that point to an American role in this affair. U.S. reaction to the Zionist espionage points to Washington's involvement in this inauspicious matter." 

Reformist Arman opines on the government’s duty towards its supporters: "The government should either allow no discussion on nuclear issues at all or the opportunity to speak for everybody. In this regard, the government can get people’s support. If the government helps to make the issues transparent, it would have fulfilled its duty toward its supporters. The government should know that it is not alone and has many defenders, but the path for them is not smooth."

 

CRITICIZING ROWHANI: Conservative Khorasan suggests that Rowhani is weakening the Iranian hand in the talks: "President Rowhani spoke about the effects of sanctions. Do these remarks not send the message that sanctions have exhausted Iran and it is ready for a deal at any price? Showing the country weak and debilitated provides advantage to the other side. The U.S. has clearly not shown any flexibility unlike our respectable president. It has accounted our moderation and tolerance to weakness and has increased its blackmailing demands. Speaking of the military option, threatening further sanctions, coordinating with Persian Gulf countries to attack Yemen and military pressure exerted on our allies are all tools used to make Iran accept the least possible advantageous deal." 

 

ANNIVERSARY OF ROWHANI ELECTION: Reformist Mardom Salari is concerned: "On the eve of the second anniversary of Rowhani's election, the government's priority is still the nuclear talks followed by the economy. The nuclear talks are in their final phase; two years ago nobody imagined that it was possible to negotiate with world powers, isolate the Zionist regime and insist on Iran's rights. On 14 June 2013, people voted for moderation and to be rescued from extremism. Two years later, they expect to feel the change in atmosphere. Cancelling concerts and legal political meetings, neglecting women and youths' demands may lead Rowhani to lose his supporters. Perhaps the government intends not to address these issues until the end of the nuclear talks to prevent its opponents from distracting it. If this is the government's roadmap, it will gradually lose its supporters. The more the government retreats, the more its opponents will move forward."

Reformist E'temad is balanced: "People are partially satisfied with the two-year performance of Rowhani's administration. Although the government has not acted upon all its promises, it has tried hard. Next year, it should take action to fulfil its promises; it should try to fill the gaps and put the country in a balanced position. Balance should be provided in economic, cultural and more importantly, in the foreign policy spheres."

 

YEMEN: Conservative Quds contends that the Saudis are losing: "Through unity and not embarking on a serious armed conflict, the Houthis have weakened the Saudis. Unity between Shiites and Sunnis has acted as deterrence. Because of its attack on Yemen, the Saudi government has faced considerable domestic pressure.  The Saudi goal of attacking Yemen was to overthrow the Houthis and impose its dominance on its southern neighbour. However, they not only failed to reach their goal, but the Houthis became more integrated and gained more support." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz condemns: "Thousands have been killed and millions have been displaced in Yemen. The UN has announced that 20 million Yemenis are in need of humanitarian assistance. The American/Saudi coalition continues to bomb Yemen with no observance of any human and Islamic principles and laws. It has set the eradication of Yemen and its people as a priority. Ahead of the holy month of Ramadan, Saudi Arabia continues to kill the Yemeni people. The Islamic world is getting ready for welcoming Ramadan whilst the Yemeni people are in their worst state. Saudi attitudes show that it is not committed to Islamic laws and human rights' regulations." 

 

SYRIA: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami writes of hard days for Erdogan: "Reports from Syria and Iraq point to the advancement of people's militia against Takfiri groups. A number of events altered the course and shattered the dream of overthrowing the Syrian regime, including major achievements of the Syrian army along with Hizbollah fighters in the important region of Qalamoun; decisive political developments in Turkey and the heavy defeat of terrorists in northern Syria. President Erdogan, whose worst nightmare in his 13-year rule is to see the collapse of his empire, knows that the continuation of these losses in Iraq and Syria can lead to the total collapse of the Takfiris, which will ruin his investments in the region." 

Hard-line Javan welcomes the return of the UN envoy to Damascus: "De Mistura seems to be serious about holding the Geneva meeting with the participation of the Syrian government and its opponents. Reports about changes in his stance are not true. There is no doubt that any progress in his mission is related to applying pressure on the opponents of the Geneva meeting such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia who seek to overthrow the Syrian regime with the support of Qatar."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Yemeni Geneva, Syrian Geneva

2-The significance of Tal Abyad

3-Jordan gets drawn in

 

1-Yemeni Geneva, Syrian Geneva

 

Resolving the domestic Yemeni problem is as difficult as resolving the Syrian domestic problem, now that the country's doors have been flung open to the surrounding winds. In the grip of profound disagreements, with each side clinging to its intransigence, and without the ladders that would permit the various parties to climb down from the trees they have ascended, the Yemeni 'Geneva' becomes merely the first station at which the crisis-train will be supplied with sufficient fuel to continue down a difficult track filled with pitfalls and sharp bends--Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar.

 

The context in which the Yemeni Geneva is being held confirms that it will not achieve any results and will not end the war. It will not even limit its escalation. This track is most likely to be similar to that of the Syrian Geneva. Therefore, the dynamics of the war and the balances they may produce will determine Yemen and the region's future. Neither Geneva nor any other rounds held in other locations inside or outside the region will be able to decide this. Only one thing can reduce the distance that must be covered. It lies in the political consequences of this war inside Saudi Arabia that may force it to change its approach, not only to the situation in Yemen, but at the regional level. But so far, this is unlikely even though it can be expected-- Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese daily al-Bina'

 

This week’s Geneva Yemen conference is less about the domestic Yemeni problem, as it is about the broader regional conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, says a Lebanese commentator. It is therefore unlikely to produce any solution for the Yemeni crisis before that broader conflict is resolved. The Houthis Ansarullah and their allies cannot accept the Saudi terms for ending the war in Yemen, and Saudi Arabia cannot end the war before achieving any of its political aims, maintains another Lebanese commentator. The Geneva conference is therefore most likely to fail. The only things that may change it are changes within Saudi Arabia, but there are no signs of such changes yet.

 

LIKE ITS SYRIAN PREDECESSOR: "The Yemeni 'Geneva' Conference is like its Syrian predecessor," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The main object is to find a solution for the domestic crisis; but its real content is about testing regional and international intentions and exploring the extent to which the major players are willing to reach settlements that have nothing to do with the Yemeni situation or the Yemenis' interests.

The Yemeni war began with a demonstration of Saudi 'decisiveness' that was meant to cut the 'putschist' Houthi and [deposed Yemeni president] Ali Saleh (who dared encroach upon the [2011] Gulf Initiative), down to size. It aimed to rehabilitate [current fugitive Yemeni president] 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour and his government's 'legitimacy' and bring the country back under the Gulf's suzerainty, severing its relations with the Gulf's mortal enemy, Tehran. But the only thing we hear of Operation Decisive Storm today is the drones and warplanes, the sound of explosions and the wailing of victims. The war, meanwhile, has turned into numerous wars, and the country has been broken down into many arenas, fronts, and battles.

The parties fighting it out today in Aden are different from those fighting in Sana'a or ad-Dali'; and there are other and different parties fighting in Lahej, Hadramaut, and Saba'. Each battle has its own peculiar character, reasons, forces, background, and circumstances. In one location, the fighting is between [pro-Houthi] rebel military units and loyalist [pro-Hadi] defense committees. In another location, the fighting is between Popular Committees and Revolutionary Committees. In certain locations, al-Qa'ida is fighting against Zaidi rebels, while Shafi'i tribes are fighting against extremist salafis or mujahidin. And regular army units are sometimes fighting against other opposing army units. But what we have mostly are tribes fighting it out with other tribes, sometimes in the name of Arab nationalism, sometimes in the name of Yemeni patriotism, and many times in the name of religion and sectarianism. In fact, each of Yemen's fighting arenas now needs its own special 'Geneva.'

The Saudi sponsor of Decisive Storm wants Geneva to turn Yemen back to what it was like before the [September 2014 Houthi] coup in Sana'a. Abdelmalik Al-Houthi, together with Ali Saleh and others, reject the past and insist on a conference that would establish new grounds for a political solution based on the de facto situation resulting from their expansion and the fact that have held their ground in the face of Decisive Storm. Each party at the Geneva table has its own priorities that do not agree with those of the other parties; and none of them has anything to do with the Yemenis' interests.

Resolving the domestic Yemeni problem is as difficult as resolving the Syrian domestic problem, now that the country's doors have been flung open to the surrounding winds. In the grip of profound disagreements, with each side clinging to its intransigence, and without the ladders that would permit the various parties to climb down from the trees they have ascended, the Yemeni 'Geneva' becomes merely the first station at which the crisis-train will be supplied with sufficient fuel to continue down a difficult track filled with pitfalls and sharp bends.

Those who are very optimistic await a ray of Yemeni hope after the Iranian nuclear agreement. The latter is being crafted, not only in Vienna but at the Syrian 'Geneva’, the Yemeni ‘Geneva’, and Baghdad. Those who are relatively optimistic believe that it is unlikely for any solution to emerge before an Iranian/Saudi dialogue that produces a settlement for all the region's pending crises. Those less optimistic see no ray of hope before a broader U.S./Russian understanding is reached, beginning with the Ukraine and ending with the price of oil.

"As for the pessimists – not to say the realists – they see Yemen's war as yet another facet of the wars of sects and tribes that has struck the region, and that will not end before its leading figures and their homelands are totally exhausted," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

End…

 

ONE OF TWO OUTCOMES: "Many people are wagering on the possibility that the Geneva conference will result in one of two outcomes," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The first is an agreement between the conflicting parties that put an end to the war now raging in Yemen. But if such a comprehensive agreement proves impossible, the second outcome would be a ceasefire that accompanies new rounds of negotiations and dialogue, whether in Geneva or in other capitals. It is clear, however, that developments on the ground and the between the conflicting parties’ visions render both these aims unachievable:

- First, a political agreement that leads to an end to the war seems impossible, in light of the insistence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni faction supporting it that the Ansarullah, the Yemeni General People's Congress, and the parties supporting them should accept the preconditions set by the pro-Saudi faction. These include 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's return as Yemen's president, acceptance of the Riyadh conference's resolutions, and the Ansarullah and Yemeni army’s withdrawal from all cities.

It goes without saying that these terms are impossible as far as Ansarullah and its allies are concerned. If the movement accepts them after all the destruction that Yemen has suffered in a war that is now drawing close to completing its third month, this would be tantamount to inflicting a defeating upon itself before its supporters and backers. Moreover, it would entail abandoning the interests and motives that drove them to act in the manner they did to begin with.

Given this, bridging the gap between the two sides and finding common political grounds based on mutual concessions calls for many rounds that could last for many long months, perhaps even years. But will the war continue throughout this period? Will the Yemeni Geneva become like the Syrian Geneva, which is now almost four years old?

- Second, ending the war and making room for negotiations and dialogues (no matter how long they may take) faces significant obstacles. Ending the war in the shadow of the current balance on the ground would amount to a defeat for Saudi Arabia and its allies because the Yemeni army and Ansarullah now control about 90% of the country. Saudi Arabia is well aware that ending the war now would make matters easier for Ansarullah and their allies. It will not induce them to offer any concessions in the dialogue and negotiations. In light of such calculations, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to agree to end the war at this point because this would have serious and uncontrollable consequences inside both Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The context in which the Yemeni Geneva is being held confirms that it will not achieve any results and will not end the war. It will not even limit its escalation. This track is most likely to be similar to that of the Syrian Geneva. Therefore, the dynamics of the war and the balances they may produce will determine Yemen and the region's future. Neither Geneva nor any other rounds held in other locations inside or outside the region will be able to decide this.

Only one thing can reduce the distance that must be covered. It lies in the political consequences of this war inside Saudi Arabia that may force it to change its approach, not only to the situation in Yemen, but at the region's level.

"But so far, this is unlikely even though it can be expected," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

2-The significance of Tal Abyad

 

The significance of the Tal Abyad battle stems from Syria’s Kurds’ open aims after receiving unlimited support for their legitimate and courageous battle against ISIS in 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani). It seems that the secret understandings, Mas'ud Barzani's recent visit to Washington during which the man spoke clearly of Iraq's Kurds' right to independence within one year, as well as drafting of a new constitution for Iraq’s Kurdistan Province and setting an imminent date for electing a new president for the Province (after the refusal to extend Barzani's term), all indicate that the previously reticent talk of drawing new maps in the region but not for the region as a whole, has begun to take public and louder form. The remarkable thing is that the magic has turned against the magician, Erdogan. --Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

It is Erdogan's right to be concerned about every defeat or setback suffered by ISIS, the Nusra Front, or the other terrorist groups – even those described as 'moderate' to disguise their terrorism. For this cannot but be a defeat or setback for his destructive project. There is no doubt that ISIS's defeat in Tal Abyad, whether at the hands of the Kurds or others, will be a defeat for Erdogan as well. This is because he will feel that he has lost hid wagers. And his wagers will be foiled even further when his defeat in the recent elections will begin to be translated into political terms on the ground—Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

The Syrian Kurds’ advances in the battle to control ISIS's last border crossing between Turkey and al-Raqqa Province in Syria have raised the alarm bells in Ankara, which only exposes the fact that Turkey was relying on ISIS to block the Kurdish dreams of independence, argues a Jordanian commentator. But the Kurds appear to be closer to achieving this dream than ever before. President Erdogan's concern at the Kurdish forces advances’ in Tal Abyad are understandable because this represents a major setback for ISIS, with whom he has been allied, asserts the editorial in an Emirati daily. Erdogan's destructive schemes and his dreams of dominating the region seem all but thwarted.

 

RAGING BATTLE: "The battle is now raging between ISIS forces, and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) affiliated to the self-administration regime declared by the coalition of Kurdish forces led by the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its head Saleh Muslim," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

ISIS holds the important and strategic Syrian border town of Tal Abyad, the sole crossing point between Turkey and Syria’s al-Raqqa Province that is controlled by ISIS. In fact, this battle is no less important and serious in its circumstances, developments, and results than the famous battle that took place at 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani). Among other things, that battle exposed the extent and nature of Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian crisis. It also exposed, in particular, the strong alliance between Turkish intelligence and the terrorist organization.

ISIS has been used by Ankara to achieve its strategic aims of dominating Syria. It has been especially used to destroy the Kurds’ 'dream' of establishing a geographically contiguous state that brings together the four parts of historical Kurdistan, which was partitioned and annexed by four states – Turkey (where the majority of Kurds live), followed by Iraq, Iran, and finally Syria.

When ISIS invaded 'Ain al-Arab, Erdogan wrote the obituary of this town with its Kurdish majority very early on. He declared that its capture by ISIS was 'inevitable.' He then refused to allow Turkey's Kurds to come to the rescue of their brothers in 'Ain al-Arab. He also used his alliance with Mas'ud al-Barzani, the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan Province who competes with [imprisoned PKK-Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader] Abdullah Ocalan over leadership of the Kurdish nation's presence in the four states, and who has been pressuring Turkey's Kurds in particular to 'moderate' their demand and agree to remain within the Turkish state's framework. At the same time, Barzani aspires to expand his ambitions for 'independence' and establish a Kurdish state in the other three states – Syria, Iran, and Iraq.

For this reason, it was not strange to hear Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan producing a statement that reeks of a sense of threat from aboard his plane that brought him back from Azerbaijan. He said that what is happening in Tal Abyad ‘was not a good sign, because it may lead to the establishment of an entity that threatens our borders.’ Moreover, he added, ‘everyone must take our sensitivity towards this issue into consideration.’

Here the picture becomes clear. One can understand the nature and purpose of the successive events and aims behind this focused and ferocious Kurdish momentum whereby the YPG is pursuing ISIS's fighters and tightening the noose around their necks in Tal Abyad after defeating them in the town of Suluk.

Tal Abyad is a strategic town in the Kurds' scheme, of course. Controlling it facilitates their mission of linking the areas under their control, beginning with al-Hasaka, via 'Ain al-Arab/Kobani. They can thereby create a border cordon that would allow for a Kurdish demographic majority, after reports of ethnic cleansing operations that have forced the Arabs and Turcoman out of the areas and villages controlled by the Kurdish units. This, in turn, has exposed the 'Kurdi-fication' project that is proceeding unabated with the object of establishing an independent Kurdish state in northern Syria, or Rojava, Western Kurdistan.

If we were to add the zeal and effectiveness manifested by the U.S.-led international coalition support for the (Syrian) Kurdish forces' attack, namely, the focused and continuous bombardment of ISIS forces something that did not occur when ISIS was occupying Tadmur [Palmyra] and al-Ramadi –the object would no longer remain hidden and developments would no longer appear to be mere coincidence.

The [anti-Damascus, Gulf/Turkish/U.S-supported] Antioch operations room and other similar rooms have given the terrorist groups a free hand in the Syrian north and south with the aim of drawing new lines, or a new map or maps for Syria. At the very least, their aim is to improve the terms of any negotiations whether at [UN Syria Envoy] de Mistura's table, or in whatever format negotiations may take place: at Moscow-3 or the Cairo meetings or the Riyadh conference (which has still not been held), or even if based on a Russian/U.S. understanding that has yet to take shape.

The significance of the Tal Abyad battle stems from Syria’s Kurds’ open aims after receiving unlimited support for their legitimate and courageous battle against ISIS in 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani). It seems that the secret understandings, Mas'ud Barzani's recent visit to Washington during which the man spoke clearly of Iraq's Kurds' right to independence within one year, as well as drafting of a new constitution for Iraq’s Kurdistan Province and setting an imminent date for electing a new president for the Province (after the refusal to extend Barzani's term), all indicate that the previously reticent talk of drawing new maps in the region but not for the region as a whole, has begun to take public and louder form.

The remarkable thing is that the magic has turned against the magician, Erdogan. For after using ISIS to preempt any Kurdish rebellion in his country, we now see Syria's Kurds reaching Turkey's borders in force.

"And all this is happening after Turkey's Kurds foiled Erdogan's presidential dreams in the June 7th elections, and after their rise on the Turkish political and party-political scene," concludes Kharroub.

End…

 

ERDOGAN’S CONCERN: "When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expresses his concern at the advance of Kurdish fighters towards the ISIS-occupied Syrian town of Tal Abyad across the Turkish borders, we cannot but remember that when ISIS was attacking the town of 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) last year, Erdogan expressed the belief that the town would fall into ISIS's hands," writes the editorial in Tuesday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

At the time, Erdogan openly procrastinated in an attempt to prevent Kurdish fighters from reaching the defenders of 'Ain al-Arab and give ISIS a chance to occupy the town. Moreover, the Turkish authorities allowed the terrorist organization to wage attacks on the town from the north, that is to say, from Turkish territories, in order to facilitate its occupation. But the winds blew in directions different to those desired by Erdogan's ships. ISIS was defeated and began to retreat from wide areas in the region. And now we have reached Tal Abyad, which is one of the terrorist organization's strongholds along the Turkish borders.

What does Erdogan's worry suggest? The matter does not call for an extensive analysis of reasons and motives. Quite simply, it points to his fear of ISIS's defeat. It also confirms that this terrorist organization receives special support from Erdogan, and that he is determined to use it to continue to destroy and hemorrhage Syria so as to avenge the failure of his Ottoman project of controlling the region.

Erdogan's denial that he is allied to the terrorist groups – not only those targeting Syria, but also those spreading destruction in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere – changes nothing about the fact that the alliance exists and that it this has been demonstrated by a great deal of evidence and proof. Such proof has been discussed by many Western research centers, security and intelligence agencies, and is being exposed by sound and image by the Turkish media.

Erdogan can deny all these charges about his alliance with terrorism. That is only natural since admitting them would implicate him directly. But what about the trucks filled with weapons that were caught heading towards Syria protected by the Turkish intelligence, and whose contents were videotaped and their drivers interviewed, as revealed by the Turkish Daily Cumhuriyet?

Moreover, how do the terrorists export oil from Syria and Iraq's oil fields? What route do they take to achieve this? And who drives the tankers that publicly transport this oil across Turkish territories and sells it to businessmen at prices lower than half the international prices?

But this is not all. Turkish territories are still considered to be a safe haven for terrorist groups, and the headquarters and passageway for all mercenaries who have been recruited from across the world to fight in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s denial of this and the attempt to shift the blame to others do nothing to contradict this truth, which refutes all the statements that have been issued by Erdogan or other Turkish officials in this regard.

It is Erdogan's right to be concerned about every defeat or setback suffered by ISIS, the Nusra Front, or the other terrorist groups – even those described as 'moderate' to disguise their terrorism. For this cannot but be a defeat or setback for his destructive project.

There is no doubt that ISIS's defeat in Tal Abyad, whether at the hands of the Kurds or others, will be a defeat for Erdogan as well. This is because he will feel that he has lost his wagers.

"And his wagers will be foiled even further when his defeat in the recent elections will begin to be translated into political terms on the ground," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Jordan gets drawn in

 

Recent moves by the Jordan’s King Abdullah suggest that the country is about to be drawn further into the raging wars in Syria and Iraq, says ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Jordanian monarch’s recent steps calling for arming Iraq and Syria's Sunni clans, and the ceremonial raising of the old Hashemite flag, indicate that Amman feels under growing threat from ISIS, but is only receiving minimal support from its traditional Gulf allies, argues the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. Jordan will now have to make up its mind and decide how to confront this threat, but the signs are that it is about to embark on a risky military and confessional path.

 

SURPRISED CITIZENS AND NEIGHBORS: “Jordan’s King ‘Abdullah II surprised both his citizens and neighboring countries when he officially announced his support for the Sunni clans in eastern Iraq and southern Syria,” writes Editor-in-Chief ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on Tuesday’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Most political observers who believe that the King’s statements made during his meeting with sheikhs and dignitaries in the Jordanian Badiya area bordering Syria were intended to pave the way for arming the clans, also recall what he had said some years ago regarding the threat posed by the ‘Shiite Crescent’, inaugurating a move towards a more dangerous phase in the war on ISIS.

The Jordanian monarch’s visits and speeches are always meant to achieve domestic or foreign political aims and pave the way for subsequent moves. This is especially true when they are directed at the Bedouin groups that still constitute the backbone of the Jordanian regime and a political institution that has a strong say in the regime's structure and in ensuring its security, stability, and survival.

It is worth noting that such clear talk of backing the Sunni clans in Iraq and Syria, that have strong branches in Jordan, coincides with another step of deep political significance. This is the Jordanian monarch’s handover of the Hashemite banner to the head of the army General Mish'al az-Zaban during a large celebration attended by the ruling family and many senior officials, ministers, and statesmen.

This red flag is inscribed with the phrase 'There is no God but Allah, and Mohammad is His Messenger'. As well as invoking Allah's name, expressing gratitude to Him and bearing a seven-sided star – it is the same flag borne by Sharif Hussein bin Ali during the Great Arab Revolution [in 1916]. It is a symbol of Hashemite authority, the authority of the descendants of the Prophet.

Both the statements about backing Sunni clans and the Hashemite flag ceremony represent extremely significant messages that the Jordanian monarch has chosen to address to more than one party: The regimes in Syria and Iraq, as well as ISIS, which controls half the territories of the two countries and threatens to expand into Jordan. It also sends a strong message to Saudi Arabia, whose relations with Jordan are now passing through a phase that can best be described as worse than 'lukewarm' and better than 'tension' – in fact, as a mixture of both.

So what exactly did the Jordanian monarch wish to say? And why did he choose this timing? And how did the Jordanian people and the region's leaders receive these messages?

It should first be noted that the regime, before its people, is concerned about the worsening economic situation, the growing budget deficit (two-billion dollars) the rise in the state's public debt (30-billion dollars) and the major rise in prices across the country after the government's ended its subsidies for basic goods such as fuel and soon bread. In addition, high taxes have been imposed on other goods in a desperate attempt to cover the deficit and stop the growth in the public debt.

What exacerbates this concern is that the Gulf states that are Jordan's main allies have not responded to the Jordanian monarch’s calls for help, or have only done so half-heartedly. By way of contrast, the Gulf has poured billions of dollars into Egypt during the March Sharm el-Sheikh economic summit. The irony is that this disregard for Jordan has led to extensive cooperation between Amman and Cairo against the tripartite Saudi/Turkish/Qatari coalition.

The developments in Jordan's neighboring countries are a source of a different and perhaps more dangerous of sort of concern. ISIS forces, which control half of Iraq, are now a stone's throw away from Jordanian territories. A few months ago, they bombed the Turaibil border crossing with Iraq in a suicide attack. That was a warning that the Jordanian government understood well.

Meanwhile, on the southern Syrian front, the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Nusra Front has taken control of all of the Syrian/Jordanian border crossings. It is now the main force on the ground in the Der'a Province, which is just across the borders from Jordan. It is worth noting that the Nusra Front is the main constituent of Jayshul Fateh, which in turn is backed by the Qatari/Saudi/Turkish coalition that does not harbor much good will towards Jordan.

Against the background of the dearth of Gulf financing and the exacerbating threats along its eastern and northern fronts, Jordan has found itself in an extremely difficult position that has forced it to take urgent action. The main title was the call to arm the Sunni clans to confront hard-line political Islam, thus creating a shield that protects Jordan's borders, or that constitutes the country's first line of defense. At the same time, an attempt is being made to reinforce the Jordanian army's fighting spirit by strongly reviving the Hashemite heritage and brandishing the Hashemite flag.

Jordan is on the verge of a more forceful, more effective, and more dangerous role in the war on ISIS, particularly after the latter took everyone by surprise by capturing the cities of al-Ramadi in Iraq and Tadmur [Palmyra] in Syria, despite 3000 U.S. air raids against its positions. This is because Jordan is one of the spearheads of the U.S.-led 60-state anti-ISIS coalition. It is being asked for greater involvement in the war, indeed, to move on to a ground war after the Iraqi army has collapsed and U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has declared that it lacks the desire or the will to confront ISIS.

Jordan's armament of the Sunni clans coincides with the deployment of some 450 U.S. military experts to Anbar with the aim of forming a 'Sunni militia' to fight ISIS and oust it from al-Ramadi and, afterwards, from Mosul. In other words, we are on the threshold of another 'Awakening' scenario whose authorship can be traced back to the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 General David Petraeus who established these forces to confront al-Qa'ida’s expansion at the time.

We are also entering a phase in which new Islamic authorities and ideologies are being activated to provide religious cover for the ongoing war across the region. Jordan is reviving the Hashemite banner, while Egypt is working hard to impart momentum to al-Azhar's Sunni authority. Meanwhile, Erdogan's Turkey is reviving the Ottomans’ authority by building a new Ottoman palace (with 1150 rooms). As for ISIS, it adopts the Wahhabi ideology in its original form as created by Imam Mohammad bin 'Abdelwahhab in the early 18th century, and that was later gradually abandoned by the Saudi leadership. As for the Shiites in Iraq, Iran, and the rest of the Islamic world, they have forcefully revived the slogan: 'At your service Imam Hussein.' They have also rallied around the legitimacy of the Prophet's descendants.

Jordan is on the threshold of a serious and risky sectarian and military venture. It is rapidly sliding towards involvement in a ground war, and its leaders want to stress to its people that this is their war before being the war of others; one that is meant to protect their state and preserve its security and stability. And it seems that there is no real opposition to this tendency.

Nothing happens by coincidence in Jordan (or in any other Arab state for that matter) in light of the escalating sectarian polarization, U.S. military intervention, and the project to fragment the various Arab states by way of completing what begun by the Sykes/Picot agreements about a hundred years ago. These agreements are now being 'updated' under the banner of finishing off what remains of the Arab states and the Arab nation.

The new Jordanian venture is undoubtedly rife with dangers, like any other military venture. It places Jordan on the front line whereas it has sought to hold the stick in the middle and to play all sides against each other throughout the past five years. And it has achieved some success in this for which it is envied. But it seems that the new equation is different.

There is no room for middle-ground positions these days. The space for maneuver is rapidly narrowing. Holding the stick from one end alone has become inevitable and unavoidable. This perhaps is the most important summary of all of the Jordanian monarch's moves and the content of his messages, whether to arm the clans or raise the Hashemite flag.

"Jordan's coming days will be different and difficult. Its sole consolation is that others in the region will face no less difficult days," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Is BDS anti-Semitic?

 

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with a report that U.S. President Barack Obama has invited Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for talks in Washington next month after a deadline for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran. The report quotes unnamed State Department sources as saying Obama had invited Netanyahu for talks in mid-July, after a June 30 deadline for a major powers deal with Iran on its nuclear program.

However, Officials in the White House and the Prime Minister's Office were quick to deny the report. A senior official in the U.S. administration told Haaretz that as yet no invitation was extended from Obama to Netanyahu to come to Washington. However, the official added that 'absolutely we’d expect that there will certainly be occasion for the two of them to meet in Washington at some point going forward.' A source within the Prime Minister's Office said that as yet no invitation was received regarding a Netanyahu visit to the U.S.

Responding to the Yedioth Ahronoth report, Yesh Atid party chairman Yair Lapid said that 'it is alarming because it means that the prime minister will be invited after the nuclear deal signed with Iran. 'It means that we have lost the ear of the White House at a critical moment. The collapse of relations between the Prime Minister and President [Barack] Obama makes us pay dearly,' he added. 'When it comes to the Iranian nuclear issue, there is no difference between the Opposition and the coalition.'

Haaretz adds that National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen, who is in Washington, met with his U.S. counterpart Susan Rice for dinner on Monday night. Deputy Spokesperson for the White House's National Security Council, Alistair Baskey, said that the two discussed the ties between Israel and the U.S. as well as regional security issues. A senior Israeli official said that a key part in the discussion focused on the unfolding nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers.

Haaretz leads with a report that the government is considering altering the Sheshinsky Law – which regulates the operation and taxation of the country's natural reserves. According to the report, the proposed change would benefit the companies that currently control the vast majority of these gas reserves.

Israel Hayom leads with the news that IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot has decided to establish a new Cyber Branch in the IDF in light of the global increase in cyber-attacks. According to the report, Eisenkot established a team to investigate the defensive and offensive realms of cyber activity immediately upon entering the chief of staff's office, and decided to establish a cyber branch rather than a cyber-command. It is not yet clear whether the branch will be headed by a major-general, or simply fall under the purview of one of the General Staff's other high-ranking officers.

In other news, all the papers report that, according to Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds, leading members of Hamas convened in Qatar over the past several days to discuss a proposal for a long-term ceasefire with Israel. According to Palestinian officials quoted by the paper, Hamas representative Moussa Abu Marzouk went to the Qatari capital of Doha on Saturday in the hope of finalizing a three-to-five year truce with the Jewish state. The truce proposal, which is backed by both Qatar and Turkey, is based on an outline formulated by UN special envoy to the Middle East Nikolay Mladenov, according to NRG.

The report added that Abu Marzouk held a series of meetings in Qatar with Hamas leader Khaled Mish'al as well as other senior officials in the organization. Hamas is expected to accept the plan which includes the creation of a floating Gaza seaport. Meetings will decide whether the floating port would be controlled by Israel or an international authority. Discussions over building an airport in the Gaza Strip have been delayed for the time being.

In related news, Haaretz reports that the IDF has given permission to reopen around 70 Palestinian shops in Hebron, in the area near the Cave of the Patriarchs, after 20 years. It will be the first time that the stores will be open since the Hebron massacre in 1994. Immediately after the news was announced, three shop owners reportedly rushed to unlock their shops but were not yet allowed to open the stores.

Meanwhile, some 4,000 Druze demonstrated in Isfiya on Monday evening to show solidarity with their brethren in Syria. Hundreds of Christians who live in the village also joined the demonstration. The demonstrators called out 'We're ready to die as martyrs for our brothers the Druze' and declared 'If need be – we will cross the border to Syria to defend our brothers.' Members of the Druze community in Israel have been raising funds to help purchase arms for the Druze in Syria, and have so far raised over NIS 10 million.

Finally, the Cypriot foreign minister – who is currently visiting Israel – confirmed Tuesday that his country thwarted a Hizbollah plot to attack Israelis or Jews. Ioannis Kasoulides' comments come after a 26-year-old Lebanese-Canadian was arrested last month on charges related to the discovery of a massive amount of ammonium nitrate in the basement of a home in Larnaca. Earlier this month, Israel said Cyprus had told the Jewish state that the fertilizer was to be used for bombs by Hizbollah, and that Israelis or Jews in Cyprus may have been intended targets.

Asked about that account, the Cypriot foreign minister said, 'Your information is correct.' Asked whether a Hizbollah bomb plot had indeed been foiled, he said, 'Most probably.'

 

 

IT'S NOT THE OCCUPATION, STUPID: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dror Eydar says that Israel's 'occupation' of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967 is not the reason for the boycott movement, which, he says, is a continuation of the struggle against the Jews' right to a homeland in the Land of Israel.

"Part of the sane Israeli left have woken up and joined the struggle against the boycott. But they find it a hard struggle. Since their genius plans were shot down in a barrage of fire and blood, a strategy from the fringes of the left – a strategy that expects the international community to do their dirty work for them and to force Israel to withdraw from the very heart of the Land of Israel – has crept into the discourse. The boycott movements serve this trend. The bottom line is that the argument between left and right centers on one key question: Is the root of the problem in 1967 or 1948? In other words, when certain people speak about the 'occupation,' are they talking about Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, or are they talking about the whole of Israel (in other words, Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation)?

Not everyone who demonstrates against Israeli 'apartheid' is an anti-Semite, but anyone who blindly accepts the fallacious claim that Israel has a policy of apartheid against its Arab citizens – without checking the facts – is anti-Semitic, since believing blood libels against the Jews is one of the oldest and darkest traditions in the world. The BDS movement is the cornerstone for a variety of boycott movements and it does not recognize Israel's right to exist inside any borders. Its stated goals include not only the 'occupation,' but the 'right of return' and 'equal rights for Israel's Arab citizens.' In other words, changing the Jewish character of the State of Israel and making it a state for all its citizens. As historian Norman Finkelstein, one of the most prominent supporters of the boycott movement, put it, the goal is the eradication of Israel.

While it is true that campuses in the United States are a hotbed of anti-Israeli activity, this is nothing new. The United States is losing out because its campuses have become incubators for radical and anti-nationalist ideologies, inspired by Europe. But support for Israel remains strong across the United States, because many of these students, once they enter the real world, see the truth. There are tens of millions of Christians whose support of Israel is steadfast. In addition, the vast majority of the Jewish population of the United States still supports Israel.

There have been claims that Palestinian organizations and terrorists are not behind the boycott movement. This is a ridiculous claim, since the main players in the BDS movement are pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli groups, which advocate for the Palestinian narrative, rather than 'human rights' as a whole. Nobody is claiming that Breaking the Silence, for example, is a terrorist organization, but there's no question that it indirectly assists those who would justify terrorism against us.

The answer to the boycott movement is not just hasbara. The answer is to go on the offensive: To expose the sources of these groups' funding, to work tirelessly to halt the flow of money to them and to expose the true anti-Semitic faces of the leaders of the boycott movement. We also need to wage war on the legal battlefield. The study published last week by Professor Eugene Kontorovich showed that there is no international law against doing business with companies located in 'occupied territories.'

The problem is not the occupation. The moment that the 'occupation' of Judea and Samaria ends, a new occupation will become the target: the 'occupation' of pre-1967 Israel. The boycott movement will start to focus on the Bedouin in the Negev, the Arabs in the Galilee, the way that Israel 'forces' Judaism on its poor Arab citizens and so on. It is convenient for the left to ignore the anti-Semitism of the BDS movement and focus on the 'occupation' of 1967. They claim that, if a Palestinian state is established, our enemies will leave us alone. Decades of experience have taught us that this is a false assumption. But let's assume for one moment that the 'occupation' really is the reason for the boycott movement. Are there no other occupations in the world, which are far more violent and bloody than ours? In Africa and Asia, in Europe and in the Middle East. Russia has captured parts of Ukraine, the Western Sahara is occupied by Morocco, northern Cyprus has been invaded by Turkey and so on.

In the past week alone, tens of thousands of people have been murdered across the world, including right here on our doorstep in Syria. And still, the attention of the international community seems to be focused exclusively on Israel. Only when it comes to Israel are there accusations of 'apartheid,' 'ethnic cleansing,' 'repressions' and other words and phrases taken directly from some Orwellian lexicon. Don't Africans deserve human rights? And Syrians? What about the Yazidis, the Christians in the Middle East and the people of Sri Lanka? The Arabs of the Middle East always 'enjoy' special attention from the international community, since their struggle is against Israel – in other words, against the Jews who returned to their ancestral homeland. This is the very definition of discrimination.

By taking their struggle against us to the realm of a boycott, our enemies are merely continuing a long struggle against our right to a homeland in Zion. We need to understand this very basic truth and not allow ourselves to be distracted by the smokescreen of 'occupation'."

Ends…

 

EVIL WIND: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini says that the BDS is anti-Semitic, since it assumes that any supporter of Israel is a traitor to their own country.

"Many people seem to think that the BDS movement is one organization. It isn't. It is an atmosphere. It is an evil wind. It does not seek to criticize the occupation or the settlements. Anti-Semitism was once defined as hatred of Jews that goes beyond what is necessary. The BDS movement's hatred for Israel goes far beyond what is justified. Its hatred has crossed the border into racism. This evil wind has permeated some of the most important places of learning and knowledge.

A few days ago, there were reports in the American media that Bernie Sanders, the Jewish candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, denied that he has dual American and Israeli citizenship. The reports appeared after, Diane Rehm, a presenter on National Public Radio claimed just that. Sanders issued an immediate denial. Rehm is known for her strong views against Israel. She later apologized for asserting that Sanders has dual nationality, saying that she had taken the information from an unreliable source on the Internet.

Claims of this kind are a low blow for anyone running for president: they insinuate that, in addition to holding two passports, the person in question actually has dual loyalty. This is an argument that is regularly made against supporters of Israel, who are described as being 'Israel Firsters' – in other words, that they put the interests of Israel ahead of the interests of the United States. Here and there, there are even mutterings about possible treason.

Accusing someone of holding dual nationality and forcing them to deny it is an exercise in media manipulation. It starts with a false claim someone posts on the Internet. Then that claim is repeated on a mainstream radio program. Thereafter, the New York Times – the most important liberal newspaper in the United States – gives credence to the claim by publishing the subject's denial. It's like publishing a report that Sanders denies beating his wife. Just by publishing the denial, the accusation becomes news. Something is very wrong if Sanders needed to issue a denial.

Bernie Sanders is an independent senator; on most issues, he identifies mainly with the far left wing of the Democratic Party. He was a vocal opponent of the war in Iraq and he was the first senator to announce that he would not attend Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's speech to Congress. The American left should be very proud of him. The problem, therefore, is not Sanders' views. The problem, it seems, is the fact that he Jewish. That is enough to accuse him of dual loyalty.

The lie starts out as something small, perhaps invented by some radical and anti-Semitic group on the left or the right. These groups are part and parcel of the evil wind that the BDS movement has created. It is the same evil wind that led a university in California to investigate whether one member of the student Senate was promoting an Israel First agenda. Suspicion focuses on whether the student in question had dual loyalties. She was Jewish, so she was suspect.

Those who deny the BDS movement claim that it is a marginal problem and that there is no reason for us to get overly worked up. They say that the groups involved in the boycott movement are small and lack any real influence. But the anti-Semitic incident at the California university is repeating itself in the mainstream media. Even a presidential candidate is not exempt. Even Bernie Sanders is having mud thrown at him, for no other reason than the fact that he is Jewish.

Opinion polls show that support for Israel among the American public is at an all-time high. But this is an illusion. In the main centers of learning and knowledge, there is a creeping process of change. The evil wind of the BDS movement already control many organizations representing students and lecturers. Among young Americans – Jews and non-Jews alike – support for Israel is in decline.

As usual, some people will claim that the occupation is the central problem. Israel's policies can be criticized and some of that criticism is justified. But saying that the BDS movement came into existence because of the 'occupation' is like arguing that racism against black people exists because some blacks are violent. The evil wind of the BDS movement is racist and it has started to permeate into the mainstream media. Not just on the fringes. And this is a growing phenomenon."

Ends…

 

THE DAY AFTER: Writing on the NRG website, Yehuda Blanga says that it is not in either sides' interest for Israel to openly support the Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon and the Golan Heights – for the same reason that the Druze never openly joined forces with Israel: fear of 'the day after'.

"There are around half a million Druze living on Jabal al-Druze. This is the largest concentration of members of the sect in the Middle East or in the world. For centuries, Jabal al-Druze has been the only place where members of the Druze community could find safe shelter from persecution and where they could enjoy some degree of autonomy. As members of a minority within Syria, the Druze have cooperated over the years with other minorities – Christians, Isma'ilis and Alawites – as part of a shared fate that was forced upon them because of the complex tapestry of nations that make up Syria. The Druze have shown outstanding loyalty to the Alawite regime of the Assad family – the father Hafez and the son Bashar.

In Syria, minorities make up around 35 percent of the population; each sect has played a role in the Syrian Civil War. In fact, it is thanks to the support of these minorities that Bashar Assad is still in power. Petrified by what would happen if Assad's regime were overthrown, the Druze decided to rally round the Alawite regime. However, the weakening of the Syrian president in recent months has changed the situation. Defeats suffered by forces loyal to the regime, the seemingly never-ending civil war and the withdrawal of government forces to key areas in the Syrian heartland have left the Druze fighting for their lives.

It is important to understand that the danger facing the Druze community is not just from the front adjacent to Israel. The attacks by Islamist forces, including the al-Nusra Front, against Druze population centers, are also taking place in northern Syria, in the Idlib Province. Out of a sense of solidarity, members of the Druze communities in Israel and Lebanon have made their voices heard in recent weeks – especially after the massacre in the village of Qalb Lawzeh in the Jabal al-Summaq region. Their goal is to help members of their extended family who are trapped in Syria. And this is where the question about Israeli involvement in the war-torn country comes into play.

Should Israel openly intervene to help the Druze? The answer is no. That is: Israel should not use military force to intervene in the battle against the Syrian rebels. Why? Because, thus far, Israel has stood on the sidelines and has managed not to let the fighting approach its borders. We must not forget that, on the Golan Heights, the al-Nusra Front has established a permanent presence. If Israel were to intervene militarily, it would provide that organization with an excuse to carry out revenge attacks if its members are killed or injured by IDF fire. In addition, Hizbollah and Iran would not look kindly on Israeli intervention and would use it as an excuse to carry out attacks against us. If that were to happen, the path of all-out war would be a short one.

In addition, the Druze in Syria and some of those who reside on the Golan Heights, remain loyal to the Assad regime. They see Israel as the enemy and the fact that we provide humanitarian aid to anyone fleeing the fighting in Syria – including Islamist fighters – does not win us any points in their eyes.

It is hard to ignore Israel's colossal failure to forge an alliance with groups that have similar interests – such as the Druze. Instead of forging an alliance with them, Israel gave the Druze – especially those who live among us – a sense that, in the end, they would be returned to Syria.

Since the Druze are traditionally loyal to whichever regime they live under, there is no reason for them to be loyal to Israel. If, tomorrow morning, they find themselves living in Syria again, any new regime would seek to punish them for cooperating with the 'Zionist enemy' – even if the Golan Heights are returned to Syria as part of a peace agreement.

So what should Israel do? It should work behind the scenes, as it knows perfectly well how to do, in order to bolster trust between itself and the Druze leadership. It should send whatever humanitarian aid is needed. It should encourage the West, especially the United States, to come to the Druze community's aid and to help them in their life-or-death battle."

Ends…

 

ISRAELIS, NOT BDS, MUST END THE OCCUPATION: Writing in Haaretz, Iris Leal says that, if anything can be learned from the case of South Africa, it’s that one cannot expect boycotts alone to change the situation.

"It’s easy to give in to the sense that the increasing deterioration in Israel’s international standing is some kind of cosmic punishment imposed on the right-wing government for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s electoral victory. Easy, but foolish. There clearly is a concerted boycott campaign against Israel, but if anything can be learned from the case of South Africa it’s that one cannot expect boycotts alone to change the situation.

Even the personal animosity between Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama and the strained relations between their governments will not result in a reassessment of long-standing policy, which is influenced by a complex set of factors. The constraints on punitive measures that the constellation of American political power would permit and Israel’s association agreement with the European Union are evidence that we are far from a general break with the rules that have prevailed up to now.

Sanctions that would limit or halt trade and put a stop to private investment and business development are effective. The 1985 announcement by Chase Manhattan Bank that it would not renew short-term loans to South Africa’s ruling National Party until it ended apartheid was an important milestone in the fight against that policy, in large measure because other banks joined in, causing a liquidity crisis for the Pretoria government. But despite the difficulties created by these measures, it is doubtful they would have played a decisive role in the eventual regime change, were it not for the assistance of internal forces.

The opposition in South Africa never stopped creating its own disruptions. It went to great effort to maintain international awareness about apartheid. It cooperated with foreign organizations and encouraged the boycott, without fearing that the NP would label it unpatriotic. The rivalry and bitterness between the opposition and opponents of the South African regime on one hand and those in power on the other were sufficiently deep to create two peoples, rendering anti-apartheid, pro-sanctions forces around the world the enemy of one and the savior of the other.

In what way does this resemble the Israeli opposition? Could anyone imagine the head of the opposition, Zionist Union chairman Isaac Herzog, or perhaps his No. 2, Tzipi Livni, or Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, or his party colleague Ofer Shelah, calling for a boycott of products from West Bank Jewish settlements and for economic and other sanctions, to help put an end to the occupation?

For now, they are all competing with Netanyahu, his cabinet and the Yedioth Ahronoth daily to be the staunchest opponents of the boycott. An automatic patriotic response kicks in, resulting in a false united front in the face of international condemnation.

The refusal, on both sides of the aisle, to accept full responsibility for the occupation and its consequences is reflected in a denial of guilt by the public as a whole, as if the situation of the Palestinians is none of its business and not its responsibility to remedy. The world, people here say, always judges Israel harshly.

The economic price of apartheid and the burden that it imposed on South Africans were important factors in ending white-minority rule. But the occupation, which also constitutes a heavy economic burden on Israelis, does not affect voting patterns in Israel’s geographic and socioeconomic periphery, in towns with high unemployment, despite the fact that they are denied the resources that are directed into the settlements.

And when everyone is to blame except for us, it’s comforting to console ourselves with a feeling of victimhood that is stripped of historic and moral responsibility. The bad news is that the current state persists because nobody else will do our job for us."

Ends…

 

PILLARS: Writing on the i24 website, Yakub Halabi says that Israel can no longer rely on the pillars of its foreign policy and that it must start abiding by international norms of behavior.

"Israel’s foreign policy has for years been underpinned by three main pillars: Israel’s military power that in Clausewitzian terms constitutes a continuation of foreign policy by other means, U.S. diplomatic support, especially within the UN, and German solidarity with Israel and protection of its interests within the EU institutions. Recently, however, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and organizations such as the BDS are dragging Israel into a new arena with governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs), where the old pillars are proving ineffective. This new system is a diffused one, with thousands of powerful and autonomous organizations and multinational corporations that are independent of states.

Unfortunately, Israel’s foreign policy institutions have been unprepared to deal with this new challenge and they find it difficult protecting Israel’s interests within these organizations due to three factors: first, the UN General Assembly's recognition of Palestine as an independent state paved the way for the PA to join the ranks of many IGOs as an equal member. Second, in many of these IGOs, such as the FIFA Congress, all member states are equal and each has one vote; in other words, Israel becomes highly vulnerable within IGOs in which the U.S. has no veto power. And third, these organizations operate based on universal norms, to which, in their view, Israel does not adhere given its occupation of the West Bank, siege on the Gaza Strip and settlement building.

The two recent incidents with FIFA and the telecom giant Orange have exposed Israel’s diplomatic vulnerability. In both cases, Israel had to employ intensive pressure - on the President of FIFA and the CEO of Orange - to avoid a suspension or boycott, but more importantly - to preempt a wave of penalization by IGOs or corporations. This pressure culminated in a meeting between these figures and the PM of Israel, as if the former were heads of states. Israel came out of these two battles with minor injuries. At the same time, the PA and Palestinian organizations discovered the potential power of IGOs and corporations and Israel’s vulnerability to them - and will likely continue to pursue this path. With FIFA, the Palestinians were promised that a committee will be established to examine the freedom of movement of Palestinian soccer players. FIFA, in other words, succeeded in twisting Israel’s hand, where many states failed.

However, the problem of the Israeli government and many Israeli writers, such as Emmanuel Navon, is that for them the West Bank is merely a 'disputed territory' and that corporations should 'think twice before buying into the phony claims of political NGOs and of uninformed ambassadors.' Palestine, however, is much more than 'a disputed territory'. Palestine is a de facto state, and to a certain extent a de jure one given that many states, IGOs, INGOs and corporations have recognized it as such.

De facto, Palestine has an effective government, a parliament (the Palestinian Legislative Council), elected municipalities, security forces, a judiciary system including a supreme court, embassies and representatives in many states and IGOs, sport leagues, private and public media networks. It has vibrant civil society organizations and, above all, a society that is highly politicized and conscious of its distinct national identity. Israel deliberately continues nonetheless to perceive the PA as an entity that is subordinated to it under the Geneva Convention that applies to occupied territories. Israel, in short refuses, to take the PA seriously or face the reality that Palestine is a state and a nation in its own right.

In conclusion, under this internationally diffused system in which non-state actors play a major role in world politics, Israel has no choice but to start abiding by universal norms. The three pillars that underpinned Israel’s foreign policy were relevant to the state-centered system of the Cold War international climate, but these pillars are effective no more."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

NEW SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: Mehves Evin charges the government with indirectly aiding ISIS in centrist Milliyet: "Only those with hearts of stone would remain unmoved in resorting to arms and water cannon so as to drive back civilians escaping from ISIS and pouring into Akcakale [Turkish border town with Syria]. Only those in denial would say that there is no humanitarian crisis here. By sending back the civilians escaping from Tal Abyad, and keeping Akcakale open for the passage of jihadists, Turkey is willingly or unwillingly supporting ISIS."

Celal Baslangic accuses Ankara of manipulating the refugee issue in independent online T24: "The reason why Turkey accepted two million Syrian refugees was that it was seeking to win a card to influence the whole world and persuade the West to topple Syrian President Assad by rescuing people fleeing from oppression, rather than merely a difficult humanitarian situation. But the number of refugees to be used against Assad has now exceeded Turkey's absorptive capacity. Otherwise, the country that has accepted millions of people, would not have made several thousand Syrians wait at the border for over two days - it would have shown those escaping from ISIS the same 'humanity' it has shown to those escaping from Assad."

Ufuk Ulutas asks the government’s critics to take a clear stance in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "A campaign is being conducted against the government that has paid a political price for consistently opening the borders to civilians for four years - and it is being conducted by those who are asking: Why are you opening the borders? A decision should be made on whether the borders should be opened and whether civilians, regardless of whether they are Turcoman, Arab or Kurdish, should be allowed in. For those sharing pictures of ISIS terrorists in Syria and criticizing Turkish troops for doing nothing about this – do you want Turkish soldiers to enter Syria or not? My answer is clear: open the border to civilians, do not let Turkish soldiers enter Syria and prevent villages from being emptied. What about yours?"

Sevil Nuriyeva detects a great power game in centre-right, pro-government Star: "If Turkey can persuade Russia on the Syria issue, there will be serious progress. But Russia, too, uses the Syria crisis to apply pressure on the West, and especially the U.S. that is trying to manipulate Moscow. Thus, Russia in fact wants to use the Syria card and as a means of pressure against the West.”

 

COALITION SCENARIOS:  Baskin Oran sees only one viable coalition scenario in centre-left Radikal: "The meeting between President Erdogan and former CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] leader Deniz Baykal made my stomach turn. A CHP-MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] coalition should be formed immediately. The HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] should support this coalition from outside. This brings the total number of MPs to 292. This coalition will have only one function: to form a reform cabinet and repair the damage done by Erdogan over the past couple of years."

Orhan Bursali wonders what the CHP may have in mind in secular, Kemalist, Cumhuriyet: "There is no doubt that there will be coalition talks between the CHP and the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party]. But the main tendency will be to try the CHP-MHP-HDP option and see how it goes. The MHP represents the main problem here. As always at critical times, it is highly likely that it will back the AKP and form a coalition against the HDP. When this option is exhausted, the CHP will talk about a coalition with the AKP. The main question here is this: why would the CHP want to be in government with the AKP? What is its goal?"

Ali Unal recalls the ruling party’s failures in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "In the third era of AKP rule, the regime in Turkey unfortunately resembled a dictatorship. The AKP linked everything to the elections and winning them under the excuse of the 'will of the nation'. It tried to oppress people across Turkey via illegal acts. And with arbitrary subcontracts, it established a media that worked as its own. Over a short period of time, a regime that had already been only partly viable totally collapsed in Turkey."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan harangues President Rowhani: "In a recent press conference, Mr Rowhani said he was not concerned but hopeful about the negotiations. He accused critics of benefiting from sanctions. Are the 130 new sanctions imposed over the last two years part of the same green dream garden that Mr Rowhani has been talking about? In pursuit of this dream he constantly attacks expert critics, claiming that they are opposed to people's wellbeing and the lifting of sanctions. If sanctions are weapons of hatred and hostility combined with a policy of deception and dishonesty, how can we believe that the same evil enemy will set aside its tools?" 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz writes of shifting sands: "The U.S. and its allies have signed the Additional Protocol under special conditions. They have many plans for the future of the Protocol. Fundamental and extensive changes are expected to be introduced. If a country signs it, it does not mean that the current laws of the Protocol will apply in the future. Apart from the Additional Protocol, the issue of possible military dimensions is also being pursued by Americans and is linked to visiting military sites. This should be settled in the nuclear negotiations. If the Additional Protocol is to be agreed to, special conditions of Iran should be considered. Otherwise, the Protocol will not be good for Iran and its cost will be worse than those of the sanctions." 

Reformist Mardom Salari expects a deal to bring conservatives nearer to reformists: "A nuclear deal, because of its impact on economic development, can have a significant role in reducing the gap between our traditionalist and modernist political elites. The economic experience of such a deal will gradually push traditionalist discourse aimed at gaining greater legitimacy towards the modernist discourse in favour of using the economic capacities of developed Western countries. It will reduce the gap between the two paradigms on cooperation with the West. In fact, the positive economic effects of a comprehensive deal will lead traditionalist elites to review their strategies toward the West and adopt an approach of cooperation to increase people's support."

 

ISIS: Conservative Khorasan reports: "Al-Raqqah province in northern Syria and bordering Turkey is the capital of ISIS. This region has been witnessing the advance of Kurdish forces over the past few days. Their strategy is to dominate the border regions and cut off ISIS. If it were not for Turkey's continuous financial, military and logistic support, the terrorists would never have been able to establish a war footing in Syria from the small area of territory they occupy. The advancement of Syrian Kurdish forces is a big defeat for ISIS and an even bigger disgrace for Turkey's government."

 

ANNIVERSARY OF ROWHANI'S ELECTION: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami highlights achievements and suggests changes: "Two years have passed since Dr Rowhani was elected as president. Over these two years, his administration tried to avoid hasty decisions, sudden changes and provocations. They have largely been successful in their commitment to such conduct. In foreign policy, the government's general approach has been to reduce tension and avoid isolating Iran and incurring unnecessary costs and hostility. The government's strategy to create economic stability is also clear. The government should act with seriousness and firmness with destructive and illegal schemes against the government, especially in cases where the interests of the nation and the regime are compromised. Replacing the middle-level government managers could promote this agenda. According to estimates, more than 75 per cent of current officials are from the previous two administrations. Naturally, they will not be supportive of the policies of this government." 

 

YEMEN: Conservative Hemayat accuses the U.S. of resorting to dirty tricks: "America, its allies in the EU and reactionary Arab countries have tried to ignore the clear realities in Yemen and depict an illusory image of it to the world. It has been suggested that the U.S. has asked the Houthis to go to Geneva and attend negotiations supervised by the UN. UN intervention in Yemen's domestic affairs and the passing of resolutions are not acceptable. The country's political groups are seeking to solve their problems by themselves. No one accepts UN intervention in the domestic political disputes of a country and to defend an illegal president who is not supported by the public."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Doomed to failure

2-Damascus adopts a new strategy

3-Erdogan’s ‘soft putsch’ option

 

1-Doomed to failure

 

Yemen's legitimate [Hadi] government has always proven its seriousness about saving the country. The [Houthi-led] putschists on the other hand have consistently demonstrated the opposite in all their actions. If they are once again waiting for Tehran's directives to find which direction to take, they are once again mistaken. The compass has veered away from Tehran after [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm and after the UN resolution banning their armament. In other words, there is no longer any prospect that Iran may save them from what it has implicated them in. Their only escape is to look to their local and Arab environment and cooperate with it so as to end the crisis and return to cohabit with the other constituents of Yemen--Saudi al-Watan

 

There is nothing so far that will force the Ansarullah and the supporters of Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to squander the cards they hold and that allow them to impose their terms, instead of conceding their gains, as the advocates of 'legitimacy' are trying to get them to do. Even if it is held, the Yemeni Geneva meeting is doomed to failure and collapse. Not holding it at all may be a better option, because the road to Geneva is currently paved with bad intentions. And this means that the time has come for both parties to the conflict (including their regional backers) to climb down from the high tree, and leave the entire matter to the Yemenis themselves, free from any threats and the beating of the war drums, or from seeking the help of competing regional capitals--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The Yemen conference scheduled to be held in Geneva today (Monday) will be a waste of time unless it is based on the fixed principles of the 2011 Gulf Yemen Initiative, the Riyadh Conference resolutions, and UNSCR 2216, insists the editorial in a Saudi daily. The Geneva meeting is doomed to failure because the attending parties seem unwilling to recognize the facts on the ground and continue to seek the help of regional powers to alter the balance, maintains a Jordanian commentator. The best solution would be to leave the Yemenis to resolve their own problems free from any outside intervention.

 

PUTCHISTS’ DISAGREEMENTS: "While the representatives of the legitimate [Hadi] Yemeni government head to take part in the consultative meeting that is meant to begin today, the procrastination, postponement and leaks about disagreements between the [Houthi-led] putschists have continued," writes the editorial in Monday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

This means that the meeting is likely to be postponed again if the putschists pursue the same path and in the same manner. In such a case, failure will be the inevitable outcome of the proposed meeting.

Yemen's legitimate government has always proven its seriousness about saving the country. The putschists on the other hand have consistently demonstrated the opposite in all their actions. If they are once again waiting for Tehran's directives to find which direction to take, they are once again mistaken. The compass has veered away from Tehran after [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm and after the UN resolution banning their armament. In other words, there is no longer any prospect that Iran may save them from what it has implicated them in. Their only escape is to look to their local and Arab environment and cooperate with it so as to end the crisis and return to cohabit with the other constituents of Yemen.

The Houthi putschists and the supporters of the deposed president Saleh need to understand that the equation has changed, and that what they used to believe were achievements have become a burden on them. The popular resistance to them has awakened and is confronting them, siding with legitimacy and with Yemen and its people. These forces seek Yemen’s interest and not that of Tehran and that its expansionist policy that has begun to turn against it after all of its cards have been exposed. In fact, Iran will soon wake up to the shock that it has squandered a lot of money, time, and human life in the pursuit of irrational ambitions and failed schemes, one of which was to control Yemen’s decision via the Houthis.

If the Geneva meeting is postponed or not held at all, this will only foil the chances of a Yemeni solution. What is being said of disagreements between the Houthi putschists and the deposed Saleh over their share of representation in their delegation to Geneva is merely a continuation of the anarchy that they have inflicted on Yemen. For the putschists did not disagree when they decided to stage their coup. They did not disagree when they occupied the capital Sana'a and other cities before confronting the forces of the Arab coalition, and then that of the popular resistance. But when the time came for them to supposedly agree on saving Yemen, reports appeared of disagreements over minor issues when viewed from the perspective of the Geneva meeting’s aims.

Let the putschists squabble among each other as much as they like. But let them know that there are fixed principles they cannot evade if Yemen is to be saved. The most important of them is that the Geneva meeting needs to be based on the Gulf Initiative, the Conclusions of the National Dialogue, the Riyadh Conference, and UNSCR 2216.

"Anything else would be futile and a waste of time," concludes the daily.

End…

 

LEGITIMACY: "Unless the unexpected happens at the last moment, the Geneva Yemeni meeting – note the expression 'meeting' – between the disagreeing camps in Yemen will be held today," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

The two camps are the following: On the one hand, there are those who cling to the nonsense about 'legitimacy' when, in fact, they control nothing on the ground, despite their claims that the militias loyal to Ali Salem al-Beidh that they describe as 'a popular resistance,' follow their orders. On the other hand, there is the coalition between the Ansarullah (Houthis) and the supporters of former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, especially in the Yemeni army, the majority of whose members are still loyal to him in one form or another.

So the 'meeting' is supposed to be held today in the beautiful Swiss city that has become the capital of negotiations, dialogues, and meetings. It will be mediated by the UN, whose Envoy Ismail Ould al-Cheikh will be moving between the two delegations as a 'postman.' This is because they refuse to sit face-to-face, now that the gap between them has widened and is difficult to bridge. Or, to be more accurate, now that the various sponsors, financiers and allies of the two camps, have made sure to prevent this.

All parties have reached a dead end after using all available military means, and after the land, naval, and aerial sieges have failed to achieve their purpose. Nothing remains in Yemen but destruction, starvation, and the lack of basic services, primarily water and medical care. Thousands of people have fallen and thousands of others have been wounded in a futile war, even though those who initiated it could have opted for different means and approaches to those whose futility and failure to secure any political aims have been proven.

In fact, such aims are even more difficult to achieve by military means in light of the complex Yemeni map with its heavy burdens of a horizontal and vertical matrix of tribal and clan legacies. Moreover, this matrix continues to change and metamorphose as a result of complex factors, of which the ceaseless pressures and temptations of neighboring countries are a significant element. Nor should we ignore the sectarian and confessional factors that are fed by numerous parties that have an interest in keeping Yemen hostage to its poverty and tearing apart its social fabric, ensuring that its political, party-political, and military – and especially clan and tribal – 'elite' remains subject to outside powers' grants, monies, and (especially) promises.

So, today, the Yemeni parties are supposed to meet – and they are in fact just two camps – based on an agenda announced (in fact imposed) by one of them, namely, that of the government camp that claims legitimacy. On its way to Geneva that camp has said that there can be no talks or dialogues with the 'putschists' and that the 'meeting' merely aims to implement UNSCR 2216 which calls for the Houthis' withdrawal from the 'occupied' cities and an end to the firing at civilians and deployment of international observers to monitor the ceasefire.

But regardless of whether these preconditions are realistic or not, what is noteworthy is the fact that 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's government clings to them even though it and those backing it must realize that nothing will compel the 'putschists' (as they describe them) to implement them. After all, the latter are in a relatively comfortable situation on the ground and have not suffered any real defeat or major setback. On the contrary, they are achieving daily gains, at a time when there are growing disagreements and hostilities within the camp of 'legitimacy'.

In fact, the formation of the government delegation headed by Riad Yassin was merely the product of the escalating disagreement between Hadi and his deputy, PM Khaled al-Bahah. In addition, all hope has been lost of liberating any Yemeni province or administrative district either in the north, or especially in the south, where 'legitimacy' would establish its headquarters, allowing those who support it to continue their backing it now that it may have turned into a burden on them.

So where do we go from here? Unless both sides back away from their prior conditions, the prospects that the Yemeni Geneva meeting, whatever its form or agenda, may succeed seem to be nil. (It is ironic to note in this regard that each camp claims that it has agreed to head to Geneva without any pre-conditions). These preconditions appear to be totally contradictory. The 'putschists' insist that the basis of any dialogue be the Peace and Partnership Agreement reached last September [2014] among all Yemeni parties, including Hadi and his backers. Meanwhile, the 'legitimacy advocates' are entrenched behind UNSCR 2216 and the Riyadh Conference resolutions, a conference that was not attended by the Houthis and Saleh's supporters.

The latter camp [the advocates of 'legitimacy'] is totally disregarding the current balance of power, which is not in their favor. Or rather, let us say that there is nothing so far that will force the Ansarullah and the supporters of Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to squander the cards they hold and that allow them to impose their terms, instead of conceding their gains, as the advocates of 'legitimacy' are trying to get them to do.

Even if it is held, the Yemeni Geneva meeting is doomed to failure and collapse. Not holding it at all may be a better option, because the road to Geneva is currently paved with bad intentions. And this means that the time has come for both parties to the conflict (including their regional backers) to climb down from the high tree, and leave the entire matter to the Yemenis themselves, free from any threats and the beating of the war drums, or from seeking the help of competing regional capitals.

Foreign intervention, whatever its discourse and justification, can only exacerbate and aggravate the crisis, preventing the Yemenis from reaching an accord. There are many such examples and they are clear for all to see.

"All that we have to do is to look at what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and Libya," concludes Kharroub.

Ends…

 

 

2-Damascus adopts a new strategy

 

It appears as if this is the hour of decision, amidst a media war that recalls the first months of armed clashes between the Syrian army and armed groups. Meanwhile, developments on the ground in Iraq, political developments in Turkey, and what is happening in the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the West, all appear as decisive factors in the Syrian dossier, giving rise to widespread expectations of harsher and more difficult months ahead…Amidst this madness, Syria’s leadership and its allies in the region and the world are acting with the aim of preventing any further territorial losses, while strengthening their defensive capabilities in order to repulse any attacks in the south, north, or center. And this calls for greater coordination between them. It has become clear in fact that better organized operations rooms have been established that include Syrian, Iranian, and Hizbollah leaders, in tandem with the increase in Russian military support for the Syrian army--Ibrahim al-Amin in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

[A senior pro-Syrian regime says] that with the rise of hard line and moderate organizations, factions, and brigades in the Syrian opposition (around 175 different factions, some independent and others allied to one another) and in light of the West's determination and the insistence of certain Arab states implicated in the Syrian situation on backing and providing expertise, equipment and financial, intelligence and training support to the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad's regime, and in light of the West’s readiness to turn a blind eye to ISIS as well as the Nusra Front’s expansion – amidst all these factors, the Syrian regime and its allies in their common fateful battle have decided that pursuing a strategy of seeking to bring all areas back under state's control would be delusional and tantamount to a suicide mission--Elia Mighnayer in Kuwaiti al-Ra'i al-'Am

 

Syria seems to be on the verge of a phase of even more intense fighting and bloodshed over the coming weeks and months, as the armed opposition and its supporters try to push more forcefully to topple the regime, and as the regime's allies bolster its defenses, argues the editor-in-chief of a Lebanese daily. Developments on the Syrian battleground have forced the army and regime to change tactics, reports a Lebanese commentator in a Kuwaiti daily. These new tactics call for withdrawal from the countryside, while maintaining the regime’s hold over the major cities and population centers.

 

INTENSIFYING BATTLE: "The battle over Syria is intensifying," writes Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Monday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

The local parties are at the peak of mobilization, and the regional and international powers are more deeply implicated in the conflict than ever before.

It appears as if this is the hour of decision, amidst a media war that recalls the first months of armed clashes between the Syrian army and armed groups. Meanwhile, developments on the ground in Iraq, political developments in Turkey, and what is happening in the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the West, all appear as decisive factors in the Syrian dossier, giving rise to widespread expectations of harsher and more difficult months ahead.

It is becoming manifestly obvious that the Turkish/Qatari/Saudi/French understandings have failed to bear fruit in the Syrian north by bringing the political and military situation there under control. Every time the armed opposition advances on the ground, the disagreements between its various constituents intensify. And all this is being accompanied by the further marginalization of the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the opposition representative preferred by the aforementioned sponsor states.

On the other hand, the areas under the terrorist groups’ control have witnessed wild battles that leave thousands of people killed or wounded, and terrible destruction. But even more dangerous is that these battles have flung open the door to the forced displacement of tens of thousands more civilians, either towards the areas controlled by the state or to neighboring countries.

Since the exact scale of the U.S. program for backing the armed opposition in Syria has been revealed, as has been the extent of American training and scheming in the southern part of Syria, it is becoming evident that the states sponsoring the armed opposition are currently seriously considering concentrating their efforts on the southern front. This is based on calculations that have led them to conclude that they will be in a better position to control the political and military situation in these areas, and that it would be possible to eliminate ISIS in the entire area that stretches from Damascus's southern countryside up to and including Der'a and Suweida. Contacts are underway to establish a new alliance that includes 15 Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions together with the major Islamist factions, especially the Nusra Front and Jayshul Islam.

Against this background, this new alliance is preparing for a series of strong military offensives in Der'a and al-Qunaitra provinces, and to intimidate the people of Suweida' with the aim of driving a wedge between them and the state, either by war or by political means and pressures. And it is, of course, a mere 'coincidence' that among those taking part are those forces led by [anti-Syrian regime Lebanese Druze leader] Walid Jumblatt in Lebanon as well as certain Druze elements working with the Zionist institutions in Palestine. Meanwhile, the states that are supporting these schemes are bearing in mind the need to establish some form of coordination between the various forces that would safeguard Jordan and Israel's interests on the one hand, and strengthen Saudi Arabia and the U.S.'s influence, on the other.

Amidst this madness, Syria’s leadership and its allies in the region and the world are acting with the aim of preventing any further territorial losses, while strengthening their defensive capabilities in order to repulse any attacks in the south, north, or center. And this calls for greater coordination between them. It has become clear in fact that better organized operations rooms have been established that include Syrian, Iranian, and Hizbollah leaders, in tandem with the increase in Russian military support for the Syrian army.

Based on the available indications, the camp that backs the Syrian state seeks to achieve the following:

- First, to consolidate a military deployment that prevents the armed opposition from any further military gains

- Second, to regain control of certain strategic points such as Ariha, Jisr ash-Shughour, and southern Idlib [in the north], while expanding the zone of military safety south of Damascus.

-Third, to complete the process regaining control of all border areas with Lebanon in the Qalamoun and the Anti-Lebanon mountain range, as well as al-Qa' and al-Zabadani.

-Fourth, to introduce adjustments in the techniques and nature of forces in the field as part of a broad effort to raise battle readiness with the help of thousands of fighters from the countries that are members of this axis.

- Fifth, to create mechanism and frameworks on the ground that would permit greater participation from the local population in the operations, with the aim of bolstering the points of contact with the enemy and consolidating a military deployment that prevents any new breaches by the [opposition] armed elements.

In addition, there is certain unpublicized concern to confront U.S./Israeli efforts in the Syrian south. It seems that a fierce covert battle is raging with the Israelis who are seeking to raise the level of their intervention in Syria, and who face the threat of a confrontation, either with the Syrian army or with Hizbollah across the entire region. According to knowledgeable sources, the Americans are trying to create facts on the ground that would block any direct Israeli intervention, for fear of expanding the zone of confrontation, and out of concern that the influence of the extremist groups may increase. This is because there are those in Jordan who are worried that these groups may take control of the borders, and they will find those [armed Islamist elements] on the Jordanian side who will meet up and connect with them.

Syria seems about to enter a phase of extreme tension. But what is being said in the media of the powers and states that are backing the armed opposition most clearly recalls what this very same media has done over various phases throughout the past four years.

"Their efforts were confined to stoking political illusions, while the results of their incitement have always been greater bloodshed," concludes Amin.

End…

 

A DIFFERENT CONVICTION: "A senior source from the Joint Operations Room in Damascus has informed this newspaper that 'after the death of over 50-thousand soldiers in the Syrian army alone, Damascus has come to a military/political conviction that is different to that that has determined its actions over the five years of war in Syria'," reports Elia Mighnayer in the Kuwaiti daily al-Ra'i al-'Am.

The source said that with the rise of hard line and moderate organizations, factions, and brigades in the Syrian opposition (around 175 different factions, some independent and others allied to one another) and in light of the West's determination and the insistence of certain Arab states implicated in the Syrian situation on backing and providing expertise, equipment and financial, intelligence and training support to the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad's regime, and in light of the West’s readiness to turn a blind eye to ISIS as well as the Nusra Front’s expansion – amidst all these factors, the Syrian regime and its allies in their common fateful battle have decided that pursuing a strategy of seeking to bring all areas back under state's control would be delusional and tantamount to a suicide mission.

As a result, the leadership decided to adopt certain constraints:

- First, it has decided to maintain control over the main cities, such as Latakia, Tartous, Homs, Hama, and Damascus. For these cities constitute the regime’s backbone, and it can survive through them indefinitely, using them as vantage points from which to appear at international forums in the Syrian government's name and its decision-making capital, Damascus.

- Second, the leadership has decided to redeploy Syrian soldiers and officers so as to ensure that every individual would serve in their own hometown, amidst their own families and relatives. The idea is that every individual would then fight ferociously in defense of his or her land and family.

 Therefore, it was decided that the Syrian army would not defend any city whose inhabitants do not offer to fulfill their army service. This, for example, is what happened in Der'a and its countryside, and Suweida' Province, where 27 thousand Syrian soldiers and officers failed to join their military units and preferred to remain in their own areas. One reason for the 52nd Brigade’s retreat from the region stems from the absence of a large number of soldiers and officers from the battlefield. And that, in turn, led the Brigade’s withdrawal due to its inability to repulse any expected assault.

According to our same aforementioned source, the withdrawal from any city will be followed up by the establishment of two strong defensive lines to protect other cities, such as what happened in Damascus. Therefore, if the people of Suweida' fail to join the army, the latter is likely to withdraw from the town leaving it a battlefield between ISIS and the Nusra Front.

- Third, the regime and its allies have reached the conclusion that they will not enter any battle that offers no horizon for liberating a Syrian city or countryside. This should determine a new map in which Syria will be divided up. ISIS now controls an important part of the country, while the Nusra Front and the factions backing it hold another. The Syrian army shares this control with them; it controls that part of Syria that is open to the sea – in Latakia and Tartous – as well as a number of military and civilian airports. But the main problem remains that of the sources of oil, gas, and valuable minerals, such as phosphate and other resources, over which the regime is at loggerheads with ISIS. For the regime wants the sources of energy in the cities under its control.

- Fourth, the regime and its allies will resort to protecting the cities they control and ensuring that no other force can approach them. And the regime and its allies will carry out major attacks to divert the opposing forces, especially in Aleppo, Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, Deir az-Zour, al-Qunaitra, and the Aleppo and Damascus countryside. The aim is to ensure that these areas remain as an arena for continuous military operations, thereby engaging the anti-regime forces without resorting to open maneuvers that would leave the regime's forces vulnerable to counter strikes. This is especially important because the so-called 'moderate forces' have acquired considerable firepower, including advanced equipment and laser-guided missiles.

- Fifth, the regime and its allies have decided to ensure that the Eastern Ghouta and Idlib should act as a magnet, where the regime can make some advances.

- Sixth, the Syrian regime will henceforth no longer take it upon itself to ensure public order, thereby satisfying civil society's needs in the areas that are out of its control. Therefore, Damascus will not pay public salaries in those areas that are under the opposition's control. For this effort, which represents two-thirds of the entire war effort, is now beyond the means of the regime and its intentions. So the burden of medical care, civil administration, electricity, gas, roads, and education –will now all fall on the opposition that seeks to take control of any particular village or city from the regime.

- Seventh, the Syrian army’s withdrawal does not have a negative effect on the strategy of winning and losing. In other words, the fall of Der'a, Idlib, or al-Raqqa does not mean that the regime itself has fallen or that its influence in Syria or in various international forums has waned. For, for every player in Syria now has a political role; and the same goes for the two main forces, ISIS and the Nusra Front, which have been and remain major players. But according to the same source, Idlib will not remain in the Nusra's hand for long; a campaign is being prepared with the aim of bringing it back under the central government’s authority.

- Eighth, note that ISIS, the Nusra Front, and their allies in the Syrian opposition, all recognize the Syrian Lira. The one-thousand lira banknote carries a picture of late president Hafez al-Assad, while the two-thousand lira banknote bears the image of President Bashar a-Assad, which is used by people in all areas.

"Therefore, even when regime withdraws from al-Raqqa, Der'a, and Idlib, its symbols continue to circulate in the opposition factions' hands," concludes Mighnayer.

Ends…

 

 

3-Erdogan’s ‘soft putsch’ option

 

The Turkish president may try to subvert the last election’ results by calling for new ones but this is unlikely to improve his or his party’s position, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The establishment of a Turkish coalition government in which President Erdogan's party does not have the final say on a number of sensitive issues will open up files that both the ruling AKP (Justice and Development) and Erdogan wish to keep firmly closed, says a leading Jordanian commentator. All indications suggest that the president and his party are thus merely going through the motions before calling for early elections, but there are no guarantees that these elections will produce any different results.

 

DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE: "It is difficult to believe that Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has accepted his electoral defeat," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The controversial leader may have overcome the 'shock' and read summaries of the thousands of articles and analyses that explained the features and implications of his personal setback at length. But we are dealing with a resilient leader who is obstinate and obsessed by his messianic leadership. Such figures do not acknowledge defeat easily, and it is certain that the man is preparing to wage one of his most ferocious counterattacks for which he is famous.

It is true that he accepted the elections results after an unprecedented silence that lasted for four days. It is also true that he urged the various parties to come together in a coalition government, and not give priority to their narrow interests over Turkey's national interest (consider just who it is who is criticizing such personalization of interests!). But it is also true that many observers are waiting with growing interest for what Erdogan may be cooking up in his legendary new presidential palace, away from the eyes of the curious and the 'cockroaches' [that Erdogan claims forced him out the former presidential palace into a luxurious new one].

Mr. Erdogan will initiate consultations with the parties to form the next coalition government. There are signs that he will ask his 'shadow,' [current PM] Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu to form the new government, despite the terrible defeat the party has suffered under his uncharismatic leadership. But the question here is this: What directives will Davutoglu bring with him from the 'Master of the Palace,' and with what intentions will he manage the coalition negotiations?

Will we be facing a farcical show whose sole purpose is to offer sham respect for the customary constitutional measures with the aim of convincing the Turks that their 'leading' party respects the rules of the democratic game in both word and deed? Or is the man really serious in his efforts and sincere about his words and deeds regarding the need to uphold 'Turkey's supreme interests'?

Most assessments suggest that the former is the more likely. If the Turkish opposition refuses to submit to the ruling AKP's terms for forming a government or if Davutoglu fails to form one, it is unlikely that the president will ask the next party in line – the People's Republican Party (CHP) – to form a new government. The level of mistrust, and the AKP and Erdogan's fear that the many files that they have kept tightly shut will drive the president to resist the pressure to accept a peaceful transfer of power. This is especially likely since he is fully aware of the fact that a government in which his party does not constitute the backbone and whose actions he does not personally control, will not refrain from opening all such files. And some may be extremely embarrassing for the president, the [former] government, and the ruling party.

The corruption file, whose stench has spread everywhere, is one of the most important such dossiers that Mr. Erdogan does not wish to hand over to a government made up of parties other than his own before the statute of limitation has passed and the evidence, data, and witnesses have all disappeared.

There is also the file of the [Erdogan/AKP government’s] 'forbidden love' with ISIS and Turkey's direct support for it with arms and men, and in the oil and stolen relics and black market trade. This is yet another file that the president does not want to leave in the hands of those who will show him no mercy.

Then there are the Islamization and 'empowerment' projects that simply bypassed the constitution and the law in many cases and that are among the files that the 'Sultan' [Erdogan] wishes to keep under strict cover.

If the opposition forms the next government, Mr. Erdogan's entire political future will be in jeopardy (there are those who claim that the last elections have taken his leadership to its last station). In such a case, Mr. Erdogan would fail to fulfill his dream of leading Turkey and heading the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic [in 2023]. But even more seriously, the man could face the same fate that he inflicted on his opponents – the leading figures of the army and the country’s former secular leadership.

Early elections may be Erdogan's last 'putschist' option. But for such a coup to succeed, it must be 'soft' and consistent with the text of the law, even if it conflicts with the spirit of the constitution. To this end, we are likely to witness marathon consultations and negotiations whose first and last aim is to pave the way for early elections without stirring the suspicion that such a 'coup' is underway.

But there are no guarantees that the results of early elections will be any better than those of the last [June 7th] ones. There is nothing to reassure the AKP that it will return to rule Turkey all by itself. More specifically, there are no guarantees that Mr. Erdogan will be able to realize his dream of remaining in the presidency with extensive – that is, absolute – powers.

"In fact, the magic may turn against the magician and the winds may once again blow in directions that the leader's ships do not desire," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Druze Blues

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Monday editions with  comments by a leading Israeli actor, which they present as being part of the local intelligentsia's campaign against new Culture Minister Miri Regev and vice versa. Speaking on Thursday at an emergency cultural meeting in Jaffa focused on the recent 'anti-democratic measures' taken by Regev and Education Minister Naftali Bennett, Oded Kotler likened right-wing voters to 'a herd of straw and cud-munching cattle.'

Regev responded to Kotler’s remarks, saying that likening Likud voters to 'cattle' reveals the 'ugly and patronizing face of the speaker, Oded Kotler and some of the participants who clapped for him.' Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog, head of the opposition, also slammed Kotler for his speech, saying that the actor’s comment 'has absolutely nothing in common with culture, love of mankind or pluralism.'

Haaretz leads with the cabinet's decision to approve a proposed law that would enable authorities to force-feed Palestinian prisoners who are on hunger strike. Israel has long been concerned that hunger strikes by Palestinians in its jails could end in death and trigger waves of protests in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel's Medical Association, which considers force-feeding a form of torture and medically risky, has urged Israeli doctors not to abide by the law if it is passed.

Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan, who sponsored the bill, said the cabinet's support for the legislation would allow him to re-submit it to parliament for two final votes in the near future. It already passed a preliminary vote in the Knesset before the parliamentary election in March. 'Hunger strikes by imprisoned terrorists have become a weapon with which they are trying to threaten the State of Israel,' Erdan wrote on Facebook. 'The cabinet's decision today sends a clear message: we will not blink in the face of any threat.'

Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian Prisoners Club, which advocates on behalf of Palestinians in Israeli jails, called the legislation racist and a violation of international law. Under current Israeli law, patients cannot be treated against their will, although an ethics committee can be asked to intervene.

Hamas called for the immediate release of hunger-striking prisoners held by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Ismail Haniyeh appealed for the release of Khader Adnan, who was imprisoned by Israel and has been refusing food for about 40 days. He also called for the release of Islam Hamad, who has been held by Hamas's rival Fateh and has been reportedly on hunger strike for 63 days. Haniyeh said that Israel 'arrests and kills our sons and our brothers, while our brothers use the same means.'

The Jerusalem Post is the only paper that leads with Israel's preemptive report on Operation Protective Edge – unveiled days before a United Nations probe into the 50-day war is due to be released. Prime Minister Netanyahu was presented on Sunday with the report. In remarks at the start of the weekly cabinet meeting, Netanyahu said that the report is especially important as part of efforts to counter anti-Israeli initiatives and de-legitimization efforts. He said the report presents the true picture of Operation Protective Edge, which proves unequivocally that actions carried out by the IDF were in accordance with international law, in contrast to the actions of Hamas, which deliberately fired at civilians while intentionally hiding behind their civilians. The Prime Minister stressed that the state of Israel and the IDF are committed to the rules of international law not because of this or that report or UN committee, but because Israel is a democracy and a moral country with values.

In its first comments on the Israeli report, Hamas said Sunday night that Israel, and not it, would pay the price for the 'lies' the report includes. Hamas leader Izzat al-Rishq called the report 'a lie that is being spread to cover up (Israel's) war crimes. It is a blatant attempt to squeeze out of responsibility and to spread lies that will support the evil narrative' of Israel. Al-Rishq said, Israel is attempting to divert attention from the 'real' report that is due out in several days by the United Nations Human Rights Council. That report is expected to be far more sympathetic to Hamas than the IDF's report.

Speaking earlier, former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that there was no need to wait for that report 'in order to know that it will not be worth the paper it is printed on.' Speaking of the Human Rights Council, Lieberman said that 'there is no group in the world whose essence is the opposite of its name, with 'enlightened' countries like Cuba and Libya as its important members.'

In other news, all the papers run stories about the fate of Syria's Druze community, following a series of rallies and marches in northern Israel on Sunday. Members of Israel's Druze community called for the protection of the sect’s members threatened by jihadist movements Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

Israel intends to create a humanitarian buffer zone inside Syria, along its border, to help that country's Druze, according to Walla! News. Israel is in contact with the Red Cross and various countries regarding the buffer zone. A diplomatic source told Walla! that 'there is no intention to ignore the possibility of a massacre against the Druze.' Several weeks ago a senior Israeli military official, briefing reporters, also said 'Israel would not stand idle if it sees a massacre.'

A Red Cross spokeswoman declined to confirm or deny the report, but added that the organization is 'conducting secret contacts with various elements regarding the situation in Syria.' Israel has been providing medical treatment to Syrians injured as a result of the fighting at a military field hospital on the Golan Heights and at Israeli hospitals.

Israel has also asked the United States to increase its aid to the embattled Druze community in Syria, Haaretz reported Sunday. The request was made last week to the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, on his visit to Israel. According to Haaretz, while Israel is unlikely to intervene on the Druze’s behalf in the Jabal Druze region of southern Syria, it is prepared to offer humanitarian aid to residents of the Druze village of Khadr, which lies close to the Israeli border.

 

 

ISRAEL OUTSIDE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that, for the time being, Israel is not involved in the Syrian Civil War or in helping the Syrian Druze – because it has learned the lessons of the past.

"The attacks by various terrorist organizations against the Druze population of Syria present Israel with an unprecedented and tough problem. It is a military problem and a diplomatic problem – but first and foremost it is a moral problem. The leader of the Druze community in Israel, Sheikh Mowafak Tarif, was given a full appraisal by the relevant Israeli officials of Jerusalem's position in light of the murderous (and distant) threat posed by ISIS and the more moderate (and more proximate) threat posed by the al-Nusra Front. The relative moderateness of the official Druze leadership toward the Israeli defense establishment's handling of the situation makes one think that silence, in this case, is the best policy. If life in the Middle East has taught us anything, it's that when you have to shoot, you shoot. And if you don't have to shoot, don't talk either.

If Israel takes any action to help the Druze, it must do so quietly and with total ambiguity – in part because the 700,000 Druze residents of Syria are split between different geographical locations. More than half of them are located on Jabal al-Druze, which was the driving force behind the Syrian Revolution of 1925; the rest are located in areas under the control of President Bashar al-Assad. Some Druze have also thrown in their lot with the Assad family and are fighting for its survival.

So what, then, do the Druze really want? When push comes to shove – and it seems inevitable that it will – Israel will expect an official announcement from a unified Druze leadership in Syria. The IDF will not repeat the mistakes of Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan, who dragged Menachem Begin into the first Lebanon War on the mistaken assumption that it was a humanitarian effort to save the Christians there and who, in the end, turned their backs on the IDF.

In public, Israel will not be able to give the Syrian Druze anything more than moral support. Their leaders say that Israel intervenes on behalf of Jews who are under threat anywhere in the world. If, they say, it is still true that all Jews look out for the wellbeing of their landsmen; then this should also apply to the Syrian Druze. But the truth is that even Israel's commitment to Jews across the globe is not absolute. Only if the defense establishment feels that it can no longer live with events on the border will it undertake even a minimal humanitarian effort. Israel is not involved in the Syrian Civil War; and the Druze refuse to see themselves as refugees. Yesterday, the leader of the pro-Zionist Druze leaders in Israel said that they would prefer to die defending their land than to abandon it.

If, despite it all, some of the Druze population needs to be relocated to save it from ISIS' murderous advances, it is obvious that they will move from Jabal al-Druze into Jordan. This is because the Hashemite Kingdom has the resources to deal with incoming refugees and also because it is geographically closest. Israel is an interested party, watching the battles unfold with concern. But, for the time being, it is outside of the lines of battle."

Ends…

 

KEEP OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini says that, notwithstanding our desire to help the Druze, Israel cannot afford to be dragged into the bloody quagmire of the pan-Islamist war that is raging across the Middle East.

"The Middle East is a hornets' nest. That's not something new. Lebanon went through a bloody civil war, in which 150,000 people were killed. What is happening now in Syria and Iraq is just a continuation of decades-long tribal warfare, which does not look like it's going to end in the foreseeable future. Somalia has already collapsed; Libya, too. Yemen is on the same path of self-destruction, while Syria and Iraq are blowing themselves to smithereens. They are all engaged in battles to the death.

This festival of bloodshed has produced one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent years. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and millions have been turned into refugees. It is a chilling human tragedy. There are no demonstrations against this new jihadist imperialism, which brings death and destruction to every place it passes. Pan-Arabism has run its historic course. It has been replaced by pan-Islamism, which is much more dangerous and murderous.

Israel tried to intervene once. But it failed to save the Christians in Lebanon and failed to eradicate Palestinian terrorism. All it did was damage to itself. Our hearts go out to the victims of this bloodbath, in which people are massacred irrespective of religion, race or ethnic belonging. Western governments are not getting involved because they are afraid. The West intervened in Libya. Its intentions were good. The outcome was dire.

Intervention is justified when it helps. This is not the situation today. Things are more complex. Who is killing whom? Why? Who are the good guys and who are the bad guys? Who is the aggressor and who is the victim? There are no separation lines. There are no good guys and no bad guys. The Druze sided with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who committed countless atrocities. Now they could find themselves the victims of pan-Islamism, which is no less brutal. And only one thing is clear: Israel cannot do and must not do what the United States and Sweden refuse to do.

This does not mean we should be indifferent to the fate of the Druze. We can and should help anyone who comes knocking on our door. Medical assistance. Humanitarian aid. But, under no circumstances, should Israel allow itself to be dragged into that bloody quagmire. No good will come of it. All that will happen is that we will sink into the quagmire, too. We have been in that situation once before. We cannot afford for it to happen again."

Ends…

 

COMMON INTERESTS: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that Israel and Hizbollah have a shared interest in protecting the Druze population of Syria and Lebanon – and that the United States is helping to arm them.

"The situation in Syria is getting increasingly dire with each passing day. The horrific chaos there has already claimed 200,000 lives, left hundreds of thousands injured and created quarter of a million refugees. But there is another disaster lurking around the corner – the existential threat to the Druze community in Syria. That could drag Israel into the firing line against its will.

At the moment, Israel is merely keeping close tabs on events just the other side of the border. For reasons of national and regional security, we cannot say exactly how it is doing this. Sources in the Israeli defense establishment say that they have no intention of intervening in the Syrian Civil War, but will the Druze community in Israel – which numbers around 130,000 people – allow the government and the IDF to stand idly by while the million or so Druze in Syria face annihilation?

The fate of the Druze was discussed last week during the visit to Israel of General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Reuven Rivlin called on the United States to defend the Druze in Syria and it seems likely that his comments were coordinated with Israel's most senior military officials. It is also likely that these officials made similar comments when they subsequently met with Dempsey.

Ayyub Kara, the Druze Knesset member who serves as Deputy Minister of Regional Cooperation, attended a regional summit last week in Jordan to discuss the rehabilitation of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. He took advantage of his visit to Amman to meet with the spiritual leader of the Druze community in Syria, Sheikh Youssef Jourba’a, and with members of the Jordanian government and military. Later this month, he will also visit Turkey, where he will try to persuade the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an to open up the border as an emergency measure and to allow Druze refugees to find safe shelter in his country.

Behind the scenes, however, the messages and the contacts are a lot more complex and fascinating; they are creating alliances that the public will never be aware of and which, under other circumstances, would have been unimaginable. The Druze conundrum involves Israel, Jordan, the United States, the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qa’ida offshoot), Hizbollah and – further afield – Iran.

As an ethnic and religious minority, the Druze enjoyed the protection of Bashar al-Assad and his army until recently. But the regime told them that it would no longer be able to protect them, especially the largest concentration on Jabal al-Druze, where more than 700,000 of them are threatened by the rapid advance of ISIS. Jabal al-Druze is located some 60 kilometers from the border with Jordan and just 50 kilometers from the border with the Golan Heights.

In the Idlib province in northern Syria, which is controlled by the al-Nusra Front, some 20 Druze residents have been killed of late. Leaders of the al-Nusra Front were quick to issue a rare apology, saying that the killings were a localized incident and that those responsible would be punished. Since one can hardly imagine any organization linked to al-Qa’ida apologizing for killing people it sees as infidels, it seems likely that a strongly worded message was relayed to the al-Nusra Front, warning them not to attack the Druze.

A similar message was relayed a few months ago to the Salafi organization which controls the area of the border between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, where – in the foothills of the Hermon, there is a concentration of Druze villages. According to reports in the foreign press, there have been contacts between Israel and the al-Nusra Front for some time, with the goal of ensuring quiet on the Golan border. But the Druze in Syria, Israel and Jordan are not relying merely on apologies and understandings; they are starting to get organized.

Hundreds of Lebanese Druze have heeded the call of their leader, Walid Jumblatt, who has, in coordination with Hizbollah, ensured them safe passage. So – in a bizarre and almost unbelievable turn of events – Israel and Hizbollah have a common interest: to protect and strengthen the Druze.

There is a broader effort underway to establish a Druze militia. This ambitious effort hopes to recruit 100,000 fighters. The effort is spearheaded by a Druze former general in the Syrian army. The heavy weapons and training that any such force would need would no doubt be provided by the United States, via Jordan. One can only assume that Israel is aware of these moves and that the U.S. has coordinated with Jerusalem. At the same time, the Israeli defense establishment is preparing itself for the emergency scenario whereby it has to allow thousands of Druze refugees to cross over the border of the Golan Heights into Israel."

Ends…

 

DRUZE BLUES: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Eyal Zisser says that Israel is morally obligated to help the Syrian Druze, who are under immediate threat from ISIS and the al-Nusra Front.

"The successes of ISIS in Syria has raised concerns in Israel that, one day in the not too distant future, the organization's fighters will be preparing to attack us from the Syrian side of the border fence on the Golan Heights. In the meantime, however, ISIS continues to focus its attention on the battles within Syria; in recent weeks, there have been signs that ISIS has been making a concerted effort to take Jabal al-Druze, in the south-east of Syria, which is home to some one million Druze. But ISIS is not currently threatening just the Druze population of Syria. In addition, the al-Nusra Front – an offshoot of al-Qa’ida which is also operating in Syria and which is considered more moderate and pragmatic that ISIS – is increasing its pressure on Jabal al-Druze from the west, as well as on several Druze villages in the foothills of the Hermon – directly opposite the Druze communities inside Israel.

The al-Nusra Front has captured the Idlib province in northern Syria, which is home to several thousand Druze. Many of them were forced to flee their homes and those who were left behind were forced to abandon their faith, to destroy their own places of worship and to adopt the customs of the al-Nusra Front. Last week, there were even reports of mass murder of members of the Druze population by the al-Nusra Front.

Over the years, the Druze have stood by Syria and have been loyal to its rulers. They remained loyal to the regime even after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War – especially when, as a result of this revolution, they found themselves slowly being surrounded by radical Islamist forces. However, Bashar al-Assad did not repay their loyalty in kind and has now abandoned them to their fate. Assad is like the captain of a sinking ship who is trying to offload excess ballast. He does not have the ability or the desire – and, most significantly, he does not have the military force – to send aid to the Druze and to protect them from ISIS and the al-Nusra Front. Instead, he is using all his resources and putting all his effort into saving whatever he can of his regime; at the top of his list of priorities is his capital city, Damascus, and, even more importantly, the Alawite-controlled coastal strip, where members of his tribe – who form the backbone of his regime – are concentrated.

The Druze, therefore, have been left to face ISIS and the al-Nusra Front alone. The Druze are a famously unified group and they are famous for their willingness to fight against anyone who seeks to harm them. Still, faced with hordes of ISIS and al-Nusra Front fighters closing in on them from every side, the Druze need help and assistance.

The Druze are still considering their next step and will not necessarily ask Israel for help. After all, they have thrown in their lot with Syria – even though that country does not really exist anymore. It is entirely possible that, if the rebel forces increase the pressure on the Druze villages near the Hermon, residents there will ask for Israel's help. They might even ask for safe refuge on Israeli soil. Jabal al-Druze, in contrast, is far from the Israeli border and is not territorially contiguous with the Golan Heights.

As far as Israel is concerned, reaching out to help the Druze would be a strategically logical move, since it is clear that ISIS will continue to march toward the Golan Heights once it has finished its work on Jabal al-Druze. But, in addition, it would be the moral and humanistic thing to do. Not only is Israel morally obliged to help any minority that is under threat, it also owes a debt to the Druze residents of Israel, who can only look on helplessly as their brethren on the other side of the border face a very real and immediate threat."

Ends…

 

A STRATEGY OF REFUSAL: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem says that there are some Palestinian leaders who recognize that regional developments have created an opening for the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – notwithstanding President Mahmoud 'Abbas rejectionist policies.

"The most talked-about issue in the territories last week was the Palestinian poll that found that half of Gaza residents want to emigrate. Palestinian experts explain the reason as the difficulties for the younger generation, for economic reasons, to marry, find a job and a place to live.

The fact that the younger generation in the territories has begun to lose hope is due to the Palestinian rejectionist strategy that Mahmoud Abbas leads, and Hamas’ plan to establish an Islamic state.

Abbas has made a strategic decision not to return to negotiations with Israel without receiving international guarantees for an Israeli withdrawal to the ’67 lines, a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and a solution to the refugee problem. Abbas has been encouraging boycott moves against Israel in recent days, to force Israel to accept Palestinian demands.

Therefore, it is crucial for Israel to wage an intensive response to the international boycott campaign in order to show the world that this is damaging the chances for a political solution and strengthening the Palestinians’ stance of refusal. The Palestinians are not interested in real negotiations but rather in an international decision that comes at the expense of Israel’s security interests.

But the Minister of History has other plans. The two major threats to the Middle East today are the rise of Iran and the spread of Islamic State, knocking aside the Palestinian problem. Within the Palestinian leadership are those who understand that Abbas’ rejectionist strategy is mistaken and will only increase local distress because Israel is a strong state and in the end Abbas will not be able to force his will on Israel in the international political arena. These Palestinian officials believe that the major changes in the Middle East create new opportunities to restart negotiations with Israel. They say the Arab states today are more prepared than ever before to accept an agreement between Israel and the PA. These states, particularly the Gulf States, see Israel as an ally in the war against Iran and ISIS."

Ends…

 

BRING IT ON: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yonah Jeremy Bob says that the Foreign Ministry’s preemptive report on the 2014 Gaza war was meant to strike hard and deep at the United Nations Human Rights Council report – but asks whether Israel is actually ready to do battle against the United Nations.

"The stage is set, the main actors have taken their positions and in a day or a matter of days, the main event will begin.

The Foreign Ministry’s robust report on the 2014 Gaza war was meant to strike hard and deep at the United Nations Human Rights Council report expected to be published with highly negative conclusions about the IDF’s conduct during the war and alleged war crimes.

The legal shots across the bow were the culmination of a campaign that included hosting a large conference of countries’ heads of legal divisions in February, tours of top law schools in the U.S. and Europe by Israeli officials, and multiple rounds of pro-Israel reports on the IDF’s conduct by countries’ heads of legal divisions and top military law academics.

There are also the four IDF published reports, the latest from last Thursday, on the status of 190 reviews of incidents from the 2014 war, along with 22 full criminal investigations, three indictments and vivid detail on controversial cases that have been closed.

The new report not only explains the context of the war from the Israeli perspective but goes into painstaking detail in disputing Palestinian statistics on civilian casualties. It describes in detail IDF munitions and tactics meant to reduce casualties; translates portions of a Hamas manual that calls for endangering its own civilians; and explains all the changes to the IDF’s investigations processes post the 2008-2009 Gaza war as a result of the 2013 quasi-governmental Turkel Commission review of those processes. The most positive change is the speed with which the IDF opened its initial criminal investigations, some within weeks of the end of last year’s war.

The legal message from Israel to the UNHRC could not be clearer: Bring it on. But is Israel truly ready? The report says that Israel has implemented many of Turkel’s 18 recommendations for improving investigations. An exhaustive review of the recommendations by The Jerusalem Post revealed that only six of 18 recommendations have been fully implemented, though there has been progress on another five recommendations and some of those rejected are considered minor.

Most critically, as first reported in the Post, cabinet secretary Avichai Mandelblit has said that the government rejected recommendation No. 10, which was to set a time limit by when prosecutors need to decide whether to issue an indictment or close an alleged war crimes case. This will raise red flags at the UNHRC and elsewhere.

The Foreign Ministry’s report and IDF reports describe in vivid detail why the IDF has closed the files on certain tragic incidents. But almost 10 months after the war, there is still not a single war crimes indictment. (There are three indictments for theft.) The investigations of many of the most severe incidents – the Hannibal Protocol incident, Shujai’ya incidents, an attack on a coffee shop and several attacks on UN facilities – are still up in the air, though the Post was told that the state had heavily weighed publicizing decisions on the Hannibal Protocol incident before the UNHRC report is released. The IDF’s decision – justified or unjustified – to close the file on the Gaza Beach incident, in which four Palestinian minors were killed, without indictment did not win Israel any fans.

The truth is that Israel has done a phenomenal job building alliances with like-minded influential militaries and academics and has improved its own investigations, but has still left itself vulnerable in that area. Whether the UNHRC and – even more important and just around the corner – the International Criminal Court think Israel has reasonably investigated itself will likely determine the course of this crucial battle over the IDF’s legitimacy."

Ends…

 

INEFFECTIVE PR: Writing in Haaretz, Barak Ravid says that an Israeli diplomatic initiative to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community would have worked better than any report.

"Hundreds of hours of work by attorneys, diplomats and officers were invested in the 270-page Israeli report on Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. The result was a comprehensive, detailed and well-formulated document. And yet, the report’s efficacy is dubious. It would be no exaggeration to say that its impact on Israel’s international standing, its legal position and its public image will barely be felt.

The Israeli report was published on Sunday, so as to come out ahead of the UN Human Rights Council report on the war in Gaza, which may be released on Monday. One of the main aims of the Israeli report was to try to influence the way the UNHRC report will be covered in the international media over the next few days. It is unlikely this goal will be achieved.

Few Israeli or international correspondents attended Sunday’s press conference at the Foreign Ministry, where the main points of the report were presented. Despite the serious work invested in it, the report provided no new information. Moreover, the three jurists selected to be the report’s 'presenters' had trouble piquing anyone’s interest or summing up the report in sound bites that would lead media coverage.

Although the report is serious, it is not much more than a particularly long PR document by the government of Israel. That is the way it will be perceived by the few people who read it from beginning to end, or by the few who read its summary. In the world of 2015, especially in the West, this is no longer enough.

If the government of Israel wants to persuade people of the rightness of the decisions it made and the actions it took last summer, it must establish an independent commission of inquiry in which international figures take part. That is exactly what was done by the Turkel Commission that examined the events of the 2010 Turkish flotilla to Gaza. The report that commission issued had decisive importance, in view of the investigation commissioned by the UN secretary general, which determined that Israel did not contravene international law when it took over the Mavi Marmara.

One of the main reasons the Israeli report on the Gaza war is no more than an academic exercise is that Israel decided to boycott the UN Human Rights Council probe. A major part of the decision not to cooperate with the council was emotional, but another part of it was rooted in logic. After all, the UN Human Rights Council has a clear bias against Israel and the probe into the Gaza war was headed by the anti-Israeli legal expert William Schabas.

Nevertheless, the decision to boycott the Human Rights Council investigation became less logical and reasonable after Schabas resigned because of a clear conflict of interest, and was replaced by the American jurist Mary McGowan Davis. The latter, who holds balanced views toward Israel, wrote a report a few years ago stating that the Israel Defense Forces investigations following Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009) had taken too long, but were carried out properly and with major effort on Israel’s part.

If Israel had changed its mind and cooperated with McGowan-Davis on the Operation Protective Edge probe, and presented her with the findings of its own report, it is highly likely the outcome of the UNHRC report would have been improved. The fact that this did not happen raises the suspicion that the government in Jerusalem boycotted the commission only to be able to claim at the end of the day that the panel is a bunch of anti-Semites, and that the whole world is against us.

But the most serious problem about the Israeli report released Sunday is that it suffers from the same problem that Israeli government policy has suffered ever since Binyamin Netanyahu entered the prime minister’s office in 2009. Over the past six years, it seems Netanyahu and his people are trying to solve every diplomatic problem Israel faces by finding a clever, winning argument that will persuade the world that Israel is right. But the way to gain the world’s support is by acting, not talking. An Israeli diplomatic initiative to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community would have worked better than any report."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

COALITION OPTIONS/EARLY ELECTIONS: Oral Calislar rules out one particular coalition option in centre-left Radikal: "Actually, the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party]-HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] coalition is the most reasonable among coalition options regarding a series of basic issues, such as the Kurdish peace process, democratization and a new constitution. However, there was great tension between the two parties during the election campaign. Their bridges were burnt and as a result, since election night, the HDP’s leaders have been saying 'we are not going to form a coalition with the AKP'. Thus, in the short run at least, the doors seem to be closed to an AKP-HDP coalition."

Mehmet Tezkan suggests that President Erdogan has made up his mind about early elections in centrist Milliyet: "The head of state, i.e. the president, is seriously considering new elections in November.  He has told former CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] head Deniz Baykal that his priority is early elections. Those close to [Erdogan’s new presidential palace] Bestepe are saying that the president has armed himself with the notion of early elections after observing the tendencies of the last few days. If we head to the polls again in November, the fear of ending up with no coalition and of continuous uncertainty might lead those who stopped voting for the AKP to support the party again."

Nuray Mert calls on the AKP to act responsibly in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "We have an opportunity to mend our democracy. Now our duty is to make the proper use of this opportunity. The AKP bears a great burden in this. It has to act responsibly, instead of playing for chaos!"

Sevgi Akarcesme remains sceptical about early elections in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "A coalition with the AKP will not go beyond serving Erdogan's interests. The argument that if the AKP cannot form a coalition, Erdogan will take the country to early elections, ignores how strong the opposition’s hand is if it plays its cards well. Besides, it will not be easy to persuade newly elected MPs, who have not yet received their pension rights, to run again."

Ahmet Tasgetiren sees the potential for a broad coalition in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Will the Kurdish peace process represent the biggest obstacle to a possible AKP-MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] coalition? I do not believe that a rapprochement between the AKP and the MHP is impossible. I believe that this will make the peace process much healthier. Such a rapprochement does not necessarily need to be realized by targeting the HDP, for example. On the contrary, healthy communications can be built with this party, and in the end, all of Turkey will win; its east and west, Turks and Kurds."

Hayrettin Karaman believes the main opposition party will act in its self-interest in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The CHP seems to be willing to form a government, even with the AKP. This is how it seeks to weaken the reaction of the grassroots, rescue some heads and secure its share of opportunities from being in power."

Hasan Cemal does not believe that the president has changed his colors in independent online T24: "I have been watching Erdogan's first speech on June 7th quite carefully. Has he changed? He is in a certain mood. He is trying to send positive messages on the coalition issue, and about not leaving Turkey without a government. Is he persuasive? I do not think so. I have the impression that he is playing his own game once again. I think that he has not dropped his original 'game plan', especially after hearing his statement that he is the first president to have been elected directly by the public. His enmity towards the West in his speech greatly strengthens this impression. I repeat that Erdogan is a heavy burden on both Turkish politics and the AKP."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Saving Yemen

2-End of an era

3-Illusory enemies

 

1-Saving Yemen

 

The success of the 'international' dialogue in Geneva will not only save Yemen; it will also save the GCC states. After all, the continued instability in Yemen and the expansion of the war there pose the greatest threat to the GCC states. The advanced F-16s and F-15s in the Gulf coalition states’ possession have failed to determine the result of the war or force the Houthis and their allies to raise the white flag of surrender, despite over 3000 air raids over a period of 75 days; nor have they succeeded in preventing Katyusha rockets from being fired [from Yemen into Saudi Arabia] or the introduction of Scud missiles into the game. Let the Yemenis talk to each other. The Geneva conference is set to begin without preconditions. And it is always useful to remember that the Yemenis have proven their great ability to talk to each other in a civilized manner, reaching agreements that lead to national reconciliation and gradual stability--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

What no one is saying so far is that the Geneva meeting is taking place primarily because of U.S. pressure. For it seems that Washington is in dire need of ending the fighting in this region for numerous reasons, including the fear that it could develop into a large-scale border war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis—backed by Iran. Second, Washington is seeking calm in this region so that it can proceed with its nuclear agreement with Iran till the end. It is clear that American pressure will be translated into cards for the Houthis and Saleh's followers to be used at the negotiating table and that this cannot provide a solution that is acceptable in Yemeni and regional terms--Bashir al-Bakr on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

If the [Houthi] putschists were to think rationally, they would realize that the proper option for them is to work for Yemen, not for Iran. It is the Yemenis in all their constituent parts with whom they will have to cohabit. And no matter how hard it may try, Iran will remain alien to Yemen and its people; a people who will never easily surrender to Tehran's politicians’ dreams of reviving the glories of the Persian Empire. Negotiations for Yemen's salvation are around the corner. But the putschists' behavior does not suggest that they are serious about negotiating peace. They must prove otherwise, for this is not a game and what is at stake is the fate of a nation and its future. If they are unwilling to serve Yemen's interest, their only options are either to surrender and accept the return of legitimacy, or to prepare to confront what they are unable to resist--Saudi al-Watan

 

The Yemeni dialogue that is planned to begin in Geneva in a few days' time will not only save Yemen if it succeeds; it will also save the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, from the predicament they find themselves in, maintains the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. But the signs are that the Gulf states have yet to learn the lesson of their failure in Yemen. It is evident that the Geneva conference is taking place as a result of U.S. pressures that are providing the Houthis and their allies with cards they can use at the negotiations table, argues a commentator on a Qatari-owned pan-Arab website. But this means that the prospects for an agreement in Geneva are dim. Amid reports of border incursions into Saudi Arabia by their militias, the Houthis should realize that they are not powerful enough to confront Saudi wrath, warns the editorial in a Saudi daily. They are clearly being egged on by Iran, which suggests that the Houthis are not serious about the Geneva dialogue.

 

MAIN ITEM ON THE AGENDA: "The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC’s) foreign ministers have concluded a ministerial meeting in the Saudi capital, Riyadh," writes Friday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The main item on the agenda was the situation in Yemen, as well as developments in the Syrian crisis. But the conferees did not forget the Palestinian cause and the peace process; so they mentioned it in passing merely out of 'politeness'.

Stressing peaceful political solutions was the most evident common denominator in the political statement issued at the end of the meeting. But military solutions are still being sought, even if such a solution is still facing a stalemate and is yielding negative results in Yemen. In Syria, by contrast, there has been progress towards a military solution. Syrian opposition forces, backed by the Turkish/Saudi/Qatari triad and as represented by [the Islamist] Jayshul Fateh, Nusra Front, and Ahrar ash-Sham have succeeded in capturing the headquarters of the regular Syrian Army's 52nd Brigade which is considered to be one of the largest military bases in southern Syria.

At a press conference at the end of the meeting, Qatari Foreign Minister Mr. Khalid Al-Attiyah, who headed the meeting, said that the [Saudi-led] Operation Restore Hope coalition would not stop until the relevant UN Security Council resolutions were implemented, including UNSCR 2216. He added that 'the GCC can and will continue to protect its interests.'

It was noticeable that Mr. Al-Attiyah did not use the [military] title Operation Decisive Storm, replacing it with [humanitarian] Operation Restore Hope instead. But he did not tell us how the coalition will maintain course and on what grounds now that the rules of the game in the Yemeni crisis have changed, turning it into a purely Saudi/Yemeni affair as evident from the escalating bloody war raging along the two countries' mutual borders.

The GCC statement (some of whose wordings appeared at the aforementioned press conference) and its strong escalatory tone, comes only three days before the first session of the Yemeni dialogue in which the majority of parties to the conflict are participating under the UN's umbrella.

It is the GCC's right to defend its strategic interests, of course. But it must define these interests precisely, especially with regard to the Yemeni and Syrian files. For the statement’s threatening tone may have a negative impact on the Geneva dialogue, even before it begins. It casts doubt on its results, because it sides with one camp against another.

Mr. Al-Attiyah has stressed that the coalition that aims to restore 'legitimacy' to Yemen has not been dissolved, and that it will remain in action until the UN resolutions are implemented, especially UNSCR 2216 based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But the facts on the ground point in a different direction. Most of the Gulf and Arab warplanes that took part in Operation Decisive Storm have returned silently to their bases; and this includes the two Moroccan and Sudanese planes. This is because the crisis has developed into a purely Yemeni Saudi war – or, rather, one between the Houthi/Saleh coalition and the Saudi armed forces. The role of non-Saudi warplanes has become very limited, if not pointless.

The hope was that the GCC would offer its strong support to the international Yemeni dialogue conference that will begin in Geneva on Monday and provide it with all the factors necessary to guarantee its success. This could have been done by adopting a more flexible, moderate and rational position and by steering away from issuing threats.

However, it seems that these ministers cannot see what is happening on the ground, almost three months after Decisive Storm was launched. Or, if they do, they have not studied the situation well enough to derive the appropriate lessons and morals, which would produce a serious review of their current policies. After all, their ineffectiveness has been demonstrated in the field, so far at least.

The escalatory tone, the threat to use force to impose political solutions, and the insistence on the policies of exclusion and marginalization of major political and military parties to the crisis, such as the Houthi Current and the General People's Congress headed by former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh have all driven the U.S. to bypass and thwart the Gulf states, and to initiate a dialogue with the Houthis in Muscat. This is exactly what it did when it negotiated with the Iranians over their nuclear program behind Saudi Arabia's back.

The success of the 'international' dialogue in Geneva will not only save Yemen; it will also save the GCC states. After all, the continued instability in Yemen and the expansion of the war there pose the greatest threat to the GCC states. The advanced F-16s and F-15s in the Gulf coalition states’ possession have failed to determine the result of the war or force the Houthis and their allies to raise the white flag of surrender, despite over 3000 air raids over a period of 75 days; nor have they succeeded in preventing Katyusha rockets from being fired [from Yemen into Saudi Arabia] or the introduction of Scud missiles into the game.

Let the Yemenis talk to each other. The Geneva conference is set to begin without preconditions. And it is always useful to remember that the Yemenis have proven their great ability to talk to each other in a civilized manner, reaching agreements that lead to national reconciliation and gradual stability.

"But the policy of 'impetuousness,' 'breaking heads,' and personal vendettas is based on an entirely different point of view" concludes the editorial.

End…

 

UNDER THE UN UMBRELLA: "The Yemenis will meet in Geneva in a couple of days’ time under the UN umbrella after months of fighting and destruction, and amidst doubts about the meeting's precise agenda and an intense conflict between the positions of the parties that will sit at the negotiating table," writes Bashir al-Bakr on Friday on the Qatari-owned pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

In principle, there are two main parties: Yemeni legitimacy, as represented by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and the party that turned against it, consisting of the Houthis and the followers of deposed president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh. But other Yemeni, Arab, and foreign parties will also attend, and the Yemeni parties will include senior figures and major elements that have their weight in the crisis; but they will be divided between the two main sides to the conflict.

The main features of the Geneva process have not been clearly drawn and the UN is primarily responsible for this because it has not adopted a specific agenda for which it has secured prior agreement between the two parties that are separated by a deep abyss. As a result, the UN's position has appeared somewhat confused ever since it took the initiative to call for the conference and set May 28th as its initial date.

In fact, this confusion was already evident the text of the invitation that called for 'talks,' suggesting that the meeting's agenda would be open, and that each side would be free to determine the starting point it finds most appropriate. It also suggested that the UN's main concern was to ensure that the meeting takes place, because it is wagering on the possibility of convincing the two sides to find common denominators that would allow them to turn the dialogue into a solution.

But the first signs indicate that the two sides to the crisis are unlikely to agree on an agenda. The Houthis and Saleh's representatives have decided to head for Geneva, saying that they have agreed to take part without any pre- conditions. On the other hand, the side representing legitimacy has said that the Geneva meeting is not for negotiations, but for reaching an UN-sponsored agreement on the mechanisms for implementing UNSCR 2216, which essentially calls for recovering the state from the Houthis.

When the Houthis say that they oppose any prior conditions for the dialogue in Geneva, what they primarily mean is that the dialogue must begin from the point when Sana'a was stormed [by the Houthi coalition] last September 21st [2014], which resulted in the Peace and Partnership Agreement sponsored by former UN envoy Jamal Benomar. In all their positions, they deem this agreement to be final and nonnegotiable.

The issue that concerns the Houthis more than anything else is the war and the damage it is causing. The leaks from their talks in Muscat with the Americans suggest that they are demanding vast financial compensation reaching some 200 billion dollars in order to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw from specific areas in the south, while preserving their right to intervene again if necessary.

When the Houthis and Saleh entrench themselves behind such demands, they are basing themselves on the fact that they possess two important cards: First, the situation on the ground and their military control of positions in the major cities, especially Sana'a, Aden and Taiz. Second, the understanding with the U.S. that was reached via Iranian participation in Muscat, and one of whose major points is to combat al-Qa'ida.

But what no one is saying so far is that the Geneva meeting is taking place primarily because of U.S. pressure. For it seems that Washington is in dire need of ending the fighting in this region for numerous reasons, including the fear that it could develop into a large-scale border war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis—backed by Iran. Second, Washington is seeking calm in this region so that it can proceed with its nuclear agreement with Iran till the end.

"It is clear that American pressure will be translated into cards for the Houthis and Saleh's followers to be used at the negotiating table and that this cannot provide a solution that is acceptable in Yemeni and regional terms," concludes Bakr.

End…

 

DIRE CONSEQUENCES: "Whatever their aims and schemes, the fact that the [Houthi/Saleh] putschists in Yemen have moved towards the borders with the Kingdom will have dire consequences for them," writes the editorial in Friday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

It seems that they have not or do not wish to understand the message affirmed by the leadership of the Arab coalition, namely, that 'Saudi borders are no-go zones,' and that Saudi forces are 'ready to deter any threat from across the borders in Yemen.'

The Houthi putschists and the supporters of the deposed Saleh have tried to draw near the Kingdom's borders before; and they received the punishment they deserve. If they were to repeat the same thing despite the warnings, Saudi forces will be waiting for them. This is what happened a couple of days ago when our forces destroyed a Houthi armored vehicle when it tried to approach Dhahran al-Janoub. This is also what happened yesterday when the militias tried to approach the border area in Jizan. The Saudi forces besieged them.

They are either deluded that they can pursue the confrontation and wage major battles in the belief that outside aid will come to their rescue and enable them to hold their ground; or there are those who  – in the hope of achieving part of their agenda – are drawing up plans for them and sending them into the fray with little concern for their loss of life and equipment; or they are suffering from such confusion that they are rushing to take actions that are akin to suicide without calculating the consequences and are merely implementing the scenario that has been written for them.

Tehran's fingerprints on the putschists are clearly visible in all the above cases. They [the Houthis] have said they wish to take part in the Geneva conference, but if they are planning to head there bearing an Iranian agenda, they will only succeed in making proposals that will be totally rejected. For Iran’s games have now been exposed, and the putschists' submission to Tehran is now clear to all and sundry.

If the putschists were to think rationally, they would realize that the proper option for them is to work for Yemen, not for Iran. It is the Yemenis in all their constituent parts with whom they will have to cohabit. And no matter how hard it may try, Iran will remain alien to Yemen and its people; a people who will never easily surrender to Tehran's politicians’ dreams of reviving the glories of the Persian Empire.

Negotiations for Yemen's salvation are around the corner. But the putschists' behavior does not suggest that they are serious about negotiating peace. They must prove otherwise, for this is not a game and what is at stake is the fate of a nation and its future.

"If they are unwilling to serve Yemen's interest, their only options are either to surrender and accept the return of legitimacy, or to prepare to confront what they are unable to resist," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-End of an era

 

While it may seem to be an exaggeration, the weekend vote in Turkey marks the inevitable end of President Erdogan and the ruling AKP’s era, says Mohammad Noureddin in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Although it may appear to be an exaggeration, the results of the Turkish elections indicate the effective end of the era of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, argues a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. The signs have been there over the past three years, and all that remains is to complete the dismantlement of the AKP edifice within the Turkish state.

 

OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS: "Last Sunday’s Turkish elections ended the AKP era," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

Some may see this as an exaggeration; but an objective analysis leads us to this conclusion.

Ever since the Gezi Park Uprising broke out in June 2013, we have been saying that the countdown to the end of the AKP, and more specifically, to that of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has begun. After the [December 2014] corruption scandal exploded, the noose tightened around his neck. It is true that he subsequently won both the municipal and presidential elections; but momentous changes are not measured by incidental developments and do not occur with a simple press of a button.

The fact that civil society rose up in Gezi against Erdogan for the first time two years ago, and that Erdogan responded by repressing the uprising and accusing those involved of implementing a foreign conspiracy, was one turning point. The fact that the corruption scandal exploded and that Erdogan rushed to end his partnership with Fethullah Gulen, his strongest ally outside the AKP, was another turning point. The fact that Erdogan banished his partner and companion [former president] Abdullah Gul from the AKP, represented yet another a turning point. The fact that Erdogan dismissed all the AKP's senior leadership on the pretext that they were not allowed to run three successive times for parliament was another such turning point. The only thing left of the AKP was Erdogan who wanted last Sunday's elections in order to reduce the party, the state and Turkey itself to his own person.

Then came the June 7th parliamentary elections and the protest against Erdogan's policies peaked. The various turning points have come together and produced an earthquake. 60% of Turks voted against Erdogan and his party and against them remaining in power. But the electoral turning point was no mere station on the path to ending the AKP and Erdogan era; it represented its actual end. Erdogan may remain as president of the republic and complete the remaining part of his term, which is four more years. And the AKP may remain as partner in a coalition government. But both are on a certain path towards their inevitable end.

The party now is no longer what it was 13 years ago; it is not even what it was four years ago. 20% of its electoral bloc has decided to abandon it. This is no passing moment or coincidence; it is a structural adjustment to the AKP's body. To lose such a large proportion of their base after 13 years of successive victories means that they are on their way to inevitable breakdown. In this regard, the AKP's path is very similar to that of the [Islamist] Motherland Party that monopolized power throughout the 1980s! In the latter case, Turgot Ozal's desire to become president in 1989 lead to his party's defeat in 1991, forced him out of power, and led to his party's total disintegration ten years later.

Erdogan left the AKP last year to become president. His lust for power led him to try and change the entire political system in order to satisfy his own person alone. But he received the knockdown blow and a slap to his and his party's face instead. And just as the Motherland Party disintegrated, nothing can stop the disintegration of the AKP even if the process were to take a decade. So the end is already here, but it may need some time before it is complete.

The opportunity now exists to change the power structure radically and totally cleanse it of the 'deep state' set up by the AKP, which has confiscated the judiciary's independence, repressed liberties, and elicited major security and economic threats as a result of Erdogan's policies that have sought to impose his sole hegemony over the Middle East. One of the most important manifestations of these policies was his unjustified agitation against Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood's rule was toppled there. But the only reason for this was the fact that his [regional] design had received a very heavy blow as a result of the change in Egypt.

There is no good reason why the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood should collapse in Egypt, and later in Tunisia, while it remains in place at the Sublime Porte in Turkey. And just as the path to the AKP's extinction is inevitable, it was inevitable that the blows to the bases of the Muslim Brotherhood’s movement would not stop at the borders of Egypt, Tunisia, and the Gulf states. Dismantling this edifice can only be completed by reaching Istanbul. It was inevitable that the Sublime Porte would be defeated and for its protective awning to collapse on everyone’s head.

Turkey voted against one-man rule, against the abolition of democracy, against corruption, against trading in religion, against the policies of denying the identities of others, and against the Ottoman project in the region.

"The Turkish nation lived up to the good things expected of it. What is now needed is to finish the job of bringing down this edifice that threatened the balance in Turkey and stability in the entire region," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

3-Illusory enemies

 

The 'Arabs' have replaced their enemy, Israel, who occupies the territories of three of their states, with an illusory enemy fabricated by their imagination: For one side, this is Iran, and for the other, it is Turkey, says, Mohammad Yaghi in today's Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

It is ironic for the Arabs to be divided between two camps; one that sides with Turkey and the other with Iran, when these two states have maintained excellent economic relations with each other and continue to cooperate where their interests require this, notes a Palestinian commentator. Meanwhile, Israel is the supreme victor, and the Arabs are fighting other powers' battles on their behalf on Arab soil.

 

DEEP SPLIT: "What attracted my attention most during the past week was the deep split in the Arab world between Turkey's supporters and Iran's supporters," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Iran's allies shout at the top of their voice on the social media: Here is the Turkish nation saying 'No' to Erdogan and voting in favor of his Kurdish opponents instead. This is met by competing screams from Turkey's supporters: At least Erdogan does not forge elections as the ayatollahs in Iran do; he accepts his people's will.

This miserable dispute between infighting 'Arabs' goes on, as if one side lived under Turkey's rule, and the other under Iran's.

When the Arab peoples rose from their deep slumber at the end of 2010, many of us believed that the revolutions had broken out because the terrible conditions in the Arab world had reached a peak. But the events that occurred after these revolutions showed us that there is no bottom to this pit: Every time one thinks that we have reached rock bottom, we seem to wake up to a deeper abyss.

The 'Arabs' continue to fight among each other over things over which they have no influence. They fight over issues that do not affect their interests: They seem unconcerned about how Turkey has turned from a country in debt, to one that offers loans; from a country run by the military, into a state where the people chooses its leaders; from a state allied with their enemy, Israel, into one at loggerheads with it. But the only thing that concerns these 'Arabs' is the fact that Erdogan and his party support the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nor are the 'Arabs' interested in understanding how Iran has stood its ground in the face of an economic siege that has been imposed on it since 1978 up till now. They are not concerned about how it has become a regional power that the West is trying to contain and appease. They are not interested in its support for Hamas and Hizbollah or its hostility towards Israel. All they see in Iran is the help it extends to the Arab 'Shiites.'

In 1977, Israel was at the height of its power: Egypt had turned from an enemy into a friend; Iran was supplying it with oil; Israeli warplanes were carrying out training exercises over Turkish territories. In 1978, Iran turned into Israel's greatest enemy. Turkey gradually followed suit, and more clearly after the Mavi Marmara [Gaza] incident in 2010. And in 2011, Israel's 'strategic asset' [Mubarak] in Egypt fell.

Logic dictates that in such a situation, Israel should be at its worst, after losing its three most important allies in the region. But the truth is the exact opposite. The occupation state today is living its most glorious moments.

Iran and Turkey did not change; it is the 'Arabs' who have changed!

In less than a year, the 'Arabs' replaced their enemy, who occupies the territories of three of their states, with an illusory enemy fabricated by their imagination: For one side, this was Iran, and for the other it was Turkey. But what the 'Arabs' do not know is that while they are 'committing suicide' for the sake of Iran and Turkey, both states are rapidly developing their mutual economic relations, setting aside their disagreement over Syria.

In April 2014, the two countries signed an agreement raising the size of their annual trade from 15-billion dollars to 30-billion dollars. And they agreed on plans to establish tens of free economic zones between them. In 2015, the two countries agreed to reduce the customs tax between them in order to encourage mutual trade.

Economic relations between Turkey and Iran are old and precede the AKP coming to power in 2002. Perhaps the most important example was the 1996 20-billion dollars gas deal, which also included building a 1600 miles long pipeline to carry gas from Tabriz to Ankara, which has been completed and been operational since 2001.

Erdogan's party continued to develop economic relations between the two countries. [Current Turkish PM] Davutoglu, who was Turkey's foreign minister in 2011-2012, was lecturing Assad and offering him his 'advice,' threatening the regime with dire consequences if it failed to listen to him. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry was signing an agreement with Iran regarding the development of its oil fields and the Turkish Parliament was ratifying a cooperation agreement between the two countries in field of health.

What the 'Arabs' who are fighting each other in the name of Turkey and Iran do not realize is the true extent of trade exchange between the two countries and that it continues to grow each year. 6.5% of Turkey's exports in 2013 were to Iranian markets, while 12% of Iran's exports went to Turkey the same year.

Turkey is not even in agreement with the Arab 'opposition' to Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey has not issued a single statement regarding this program. For example, Turkey has rejected Western pressures to sever its economic ties with Iran because of its nuclear program, and has only implemented the sanctions against Iran that were ratified by the UN Security Council.

And, Turkey did not say – as did some 'Arabs' – that ‘a rational enemy like Israel is closer to us than an ignorant enemy like Iran’. This is because Turkey and Iran are patriotic states. They distinguish between their competition to uphold their interests in the Arab world, and their economic relations that serve them both.

Turkey does not mind allying itself with the Gulf states on the Syrian issue as long as that also strengthens its trade exchanges with them, and as long as this may produce a regime in Syria that is closer to it than the current regime that relies on Iran. But Iran does not feel that this is sufficient reason to be hostile to Turkey. At the end of the day, the war is not raging on Turkish or Iranian territories, but on Arab lands.

When will the Arabs realize that Iran and Turkey's influence in the region stems from the fact there are no states in the Arab world that defend their nations' interests and deal with their citizens equally, regardless of their ethnic or confessional origins?

"When will the Arabs stop fighting others' battles on their own lands?" asks Yaghi in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Looking back

 

Israel Hayom and Yedioth Ahronoth have the same lead story in their Friday edition: a report that the attorney general has ordered a criminal investigation into a former state attorney, as part of an ongoing and seemingly endless investigation into allegations of corruption among senior lawyers.

Haaretz leads with an investigative report into the kidnapping and murder exactly a year ago of three yeshiva students in the West Bank, which – according to some interpretations – was one of the reasons that Israel launched Operation Protective Edge against Hamas in Gaza, just a couple of weeks later. The article highlights the mistakes that were made by police officers investigating the boys' disappearance, but also looks at the role of the IDF and Shin Bet.

The report claims that the Shin Bet failed to detect the kidnapping plot in advance and missed the involvement of a third man in the scheme, even though all three perpetrators were well-known Hamas operatives. As for the IDF, Haaretz says, it only began searching for the boys four hours after one of their fathers informed it that his son was missing.

The Jerusalem Post also leads with a story that is related to the events of last summer – an IDF investigation which has decided that no criminal charges will be filed against soldiers involved in one of the most documented incidents of the 2014 Gaza war with Hamas – the killing of four boys on an open Gaza beach area. A preliminary IDF probe confirmed the children were killed by an Israeli strike on a compound next to the Gaza harbor and that according to information gathered by the IDF, the compound was being used by Hamas naval fighters as a base of operations.

According to the investigation's findings, the compound had been under IDF surveillance for several days prior to the strike, due to intelligence relating to a meeting of Hamas militants that was to take place in it. On the day of the IDF strike, an Israeli military aircraft identified several running figures entering the compound – whom IDF forces took to be Hamas militants. 'At no stage of the event were the figures identified as children,' the prosecution's statement read. 'The decision to carry out a strike against the figures identified in the compound was made after all necessary pre-strike authorizations were received, and a survey was carried out to make sure no citizens were in the area.'

In other news, all the papers report on the rocket attack on southern Israel on Thursday night – the second such incident this week. The same Salafist group which claimed last Saturday night's rocket attack – the Omar Hadid Brigades – also claimed last night's attack. The group said the rocket was in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, and their own members incarcerated in Hamas-controlled jails in Gaza. 'The Jews will never enjoy security and safety as long as we are alive,' the group said in a statement.

Finally, Walla! News reports that a senior Israeli official held several meetings in Western countries between 2012 and 2014 with members of the secular Syrian opposition, despite Israel's official stance of neutrality regarding the internecine civil war. The meetings, which are the most senior-ranking ones to have taken place between the sides, did not reach any concrete agreement on cooperation between Israel and the rebel forces, but both sides reportedly attributed importance to the very fact of their being held.

As for the identity of the Israeli source, the news site reports he or she is a high-ranking diplomatic source in a significant public position, who continues to serve in that post – but it did not reveal the name of the source. The meetings took place with the aid of a non-governmental source that is in contact with several secular opposition groups in Syria. As opposed to being a string of continuous meetings, they were rather a set of talks at different points in time, with the conversation focusing on the shared enemies between the opposition groups and Israel.

A source familiar with the meetings told Walla! that 'the important thing in these meetings was the dialogue, and the fact that the dialogue received approval in the form of the participation of a senior Israeli official. In the Syrian opposition there are people who want to see us take a side, but for most of them it's clear that from our perspective that's not on the docket,' added the source. 'Israel can help in the humanitarian field, no more than that.'

He noted that despite the official neutral stance, Israel clearly shares common enemies with the secular opposition forces, who confront the hostile Assad who remains in a state of war with Israel on the one hand, as well as the Iran-backed Hizbollah propping him up, and on the other vie with radical Islamic rebel forces such as al-Qa’ida affiliates and now Islamic State (ISIS). A diplomatic source in Israel told the news site 'the problem with the secular forces that oppose Assad is that they are full of good intentions, but they have no true power on the ground.'

 

 

48 YEARS OF MISTAKES: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Igal Sarna says that the occupation is a cancer eating away at Israel's flesh – and that we are now paying the price for 48 years of mistakes.

"Israel really messed things up 48 years ago. Now everyone's unhappy: the right and the settlers have achieved a third of their goal and they are scattered across the territories like disgruntled invaders; their children are uncontrollable; they carry out revenge attacks against innocent Palestinians and they live without personal security. The left sees how its bleak predictions about the occupation are coming true and is being marginalized in an increasingly fascistic country. Meanwhile, the Palestinians are living somewhere between occupied autonomy and a defenseless and landless existence. The situation is bad for everyone. In 1967, Moshe Sneh and Raja Shehadeh made a proposal for two states, living side by side, or for Israel to annex some 6,000 square kilometers of the West Bank and to grant full civil rights to the 1,000,000 or so Palestinians living there. What a pity we didn’t grab one of those proposals with both hands.

If we had acted differently in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, Israel would now be a flourishing binational state, with full relations with every country on earth and with a reasonable level of coexistence. There would be several Arab parties in the Knesset and Arabs would take a full role in running the country. The worst-case scenario is what we are now: a 48-year-old apartheid country on the verge of a massive change – like South Africa was just before F. W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison. By not making any decision, we got the worst possible outcome: a malignant conflict that permeated deep into both sides and corrupted them both, alongside an effective international boycott telling us: Change or perish. Either way, with the settlers intertwined so tightly within the Palestinian population, the only option available to Israel is a binational state – either one that we establish voluntarily or one that we are forced to accept. The two-state solution has been murdered by the right.

A boycott, therefore, could serve as a painful but necessary course of chemotherapy. It is exhausting, it has terrible side effects – but modern medicine has yet to find a more effective way to deal with a body that it attacking itself and its surroundings. We are still waiting for the medical breakthrough that will allow the body to defend itself from cancer using its own immune system. For 48 years, we successfully fended off any mediation attempts by the international community – from American secretaries of state, European prime ministers and secretaries-general of the United Nations – to save this land from the cancer of controlling another people and plundering their land – two disasters that are wrapped up in each other in the cancer of occupation.

The establishment of this extreme and extremely narrow right-wing government could be a blessing. It represents faithfully and without shame the occupation and the violence. It is being opposed by an economic boycott, which seeks to tell a country with no borders that there are some boundaries it cannot cross. Israel acts like a wild adolescent with no parents to impose some kind of discipline and with no boundaries; it did to others – and to itself – whatever it felt like doing.

A secret Finance Ministry report which warned of the dangers that a boycott could pose – and why are reports that tell the truth to Israelis always classified as top secret? – was spot on. The report quotes academic research which proves that a country's image has a profound effect on its economy. The BDS movement strengthens Israel's negative image as a country engaged in a long-term conflict and a country that ignores human rights – much like South Africa was during the apartheid years. This comparison – which is much more of an accurate reflection of reality than any government hasbara – is undermining the foundations of prosperity that only exist in truly democratic countries. Therefore, a boycott that terrifies a hardline government like the one we currently have could lead to the kind of reevaluation that will, in the end, save us from ourselves."

Ends…

 

HAMAS DETERRED: Writing on the NRG website, Omer Dostry says that fewer rockets have been fired at Israel in the 10 months since Operation Protective Edge than after any of the previous operations in the Gaza Strip – and that none of these have been launched by Hamas – which is a sure sign that deterrence is working.

"The recent trickle of rocket and mortar attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip – including last night's attack – raise questions about Israel's claim that last summer's operation in the Strip succeeded in deterring Hamas from launching missiles. As soon as Operation Protective Edge came to an end, almost exactly a year ago, there were those who argued that Israel had lost or, at best, had achieved nothing from 50 days of fighting. The next round, they argued, was only a matter of time.

These arguments, in addition to recent developments on Israel's southern front, deserve answers that are based on empirical data and a meaningful analysis of the strategic situation, rather than on gut feelings or instinct.

In the past two weeks, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade – one of several ISIS-sympathetic Salafist groups in Gaza – has fired rockets at Israel as part of an internal dispute between its members and Hamas. The organization claimed responsibility for last week's rocket attack, saying that it was revenge for the death of one of its members in a shootout with Hamas. In addition, on May 26, Islamic Jihad also fired a rocket at Israel in the aftermath of an internal dispute that erupted when a new commander was appointed to head the organization in the northern Gaza Strip.

In both cases, Hamas was quick to carry out arrest operations and to track down these renegade terror organizations – some of which were coordinated with Islamic Jihad. It did so openly and made sure that Israel was aware of it. Obviously, Hamas is not motivated by any great desire to protect Israeli citizens from rocket fire, but because it hates these Salafist groups and because it is afraid of an Israeli response.

Hamas' political situation inside Gaza is currently highly complex: it is trying to maneuver between Israeli deterrence and the erosion of its authority as the ruling party in Gaza – as well as an ever-present concern that ISIS is growing stronger all the time. On the one hand, Hamas is accused by its rival organizations of collaborating with Israel. On the other hand, it is still reeling from the blows it was given during Operation Protective Edge and certainly does not want any further escalation – especially when it is still licking its wounds from the last round of fighting.

Israel's deterrence capability is proven by the figures. According to Shin Bet statistics, in the 10 months that followed the end of Operation Cast Lead, a total of 207 rockets and mortar shells were fired a Israel; in the 10 months since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, 59 rockets and mortar shells were fired. In contrast, since the end of Operation Protective Edge, fewer than 10 projectiles have been fired – and none of them were fired by Hamas itself.

In addition to the Israeli deterrence factor, Hamas' dire economic situation and its tense relations with Egypt also play a key role. Since the rise to power of Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, Hamas has been unable to use the underground tunnels to bolster its arsenal and finds itself severely limited. This is preventing it from rearming at the rate it would like and from obtaining the kind of weapons it wants; as a result, the organization's confidence in its own abilities has been undermined.

Having said that – and given the growing strength of Salafist organizations in Gaza and the Sinai – relations between Hamas and Egypt have improved somewhat. Israel has no strong objections to this, primarily because it provides Jerusalem with a clearer picture of the renegade organizations operating in Gaza and allows the IDF to deal with them more effectively. Even though Israeli leaders constantly declare that they see Hamas as responsible for everything that happens inside the Gaza Strip, they prefer as little friction as possible with the organization, since they know that any clash between Israel and Hamas could lead to wider escalation.

It seems almost unavoidable that there will be another round of fighting between Israel and Hamas at some stage in the future, but, for the time being and for the foreseeable future, Hamas has no interest in challenging Israel – both because of Israel's deterrence capabilities and because of its own economic and political situation."

Ends…

 

BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY: Writing on NRG, Amir Rapaport says that, while Jerusalem has denied any connection to the Duku virus, it is almost certain that Israel will take whatever measures it deems fit to remain as informed as possible about the nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers.

"The reports claiming that Israel has planted a virus in the computers of the hotels, in which talks on the nuclear deal with Iran were conducted, sound more than logical. Of course, Israel does not respond to the reports in any way, but it is highly likely that it will take any measure necessary to find out what is happening in the talks behind closed doors.

The reason for such an effort could be linked, first and foremost, to the fact that the outcome of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, regarding a permanent agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, will be of historic significance to the region. Israel is currently not receiving regular, full updates on what is happening in the negotiations. It must settle for partial updates by the U.S. and some of the other participants in the discussions.

In any case, the results of the negotiations with Iran have far-reaching implications for all countries in the region, not only Israel. The Persian Gulf states are already in advanced talks with the United States to buy a huge amount of weapons as a counterbalance to the Iranian threat. The Iranians themselves will start an arms race as soon as the sanctions are removed, and Israel will need to significantly increase the amount of weapons it possesses in view of the regional arms race that is emerging.

Israel currently does not have the ability to influence the talks, even though Minister Yuval Steinitz (who remained in charge of the issue also in the new government), states Israel's position regarding the requirements that should be presented to the Iranians, in his talks with representatives of the different countries.

The mystery remains: what is really going on in the 'behind-closed-doors' discussions?

According to the report in The Wall Street Journal, researchers at Kaspersky Lab found that hotels that hosted the nuclear talks were targeted by a sophisticated, state-level factor – the same one that was behind former cyber-attacks on Iran designated 'Stuxnet' and 'Flame'. The virus 'Stuxnet' was planted in Iranian centrifuges site and caused great delay to its uranium enrichment project. The computer worm 'Flame' was a spying tool of the highest order. Their production is attributed to Israel and the United States jointly, and considered a huge success.

According to all reports, the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate operates advanced collection capabilities using cyber-attack tools – therefore the reports of espionage in the hotels in which talks were held sound reliable. The difference is that the target was not Iran this time, but the partner of previous cyber-attacks – the U.S. In addition, the discovery was made by a Russian expert – this reality can occur only in the era of cyber wars.

It can be assumed that the world powers will accept this act with certain understanding, if it was indeed done by Israel, and that all sides will continue to monitor each other, using advanced cyber tools."

Ends…

 

WHEN WILL IT END?: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yaakov Amidror says that, without massive assistance from Iran, the Alawites and their allies in Syria are doomed to be defeated, ousted from power and massacred.

"When the events that were mistakenly called 'The Arab Spring' began in Syria; many of those who follow events in our northern neighbor closely realized that there is no real alternative to the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad. There was no movement stronger and more deeply rooted – as the Muslim Brotherhood is in Egypt – and there was no secular grouping with Western characteristics, as there was in Tunisia. Syria was artificially created by French and British officials, who divided up the region after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. As a result, Syria does not have a tradition of being a country.

Moreover, around one quarter of Syria's population (the 12 percent who are Alawites and a similar number of Christians and Druze) controls the vast Sunni majority. But minority rule (which many people doubt can even be called Muslim) and the cruelty with which it has ruled, have engendered a huge amount of hatred among the Sunni population. They have sworn to extract revenge against the Alawite minority.

The Sunni uprising that erupted in the spring of 2011 was not planned; like most of the major events of the so-called Arab Spring, it was created by chance, following a localized incident. There have been thousands of such incidents during the long years of the Assad regime, yet almost all of them passed without leaving their mark on history. The Sunnis did not prepare themselves for this new situation and certainly did not organize properly. It is little wonder, therefore, that there is no Sunni leadership that has the backing of the majority. It followed that the Sunnis have been unable to unite in a joint military campaign and that their power is split between dozens of small and uncoordinated rebel organizations. In some cases, they are even fighting each other.

Even today, after more than four years of rebellion against the Assad regime, there are all kinds of active organizations, from those who are interested in relations with the West to those who seek closer ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. There are also, of course, those that are affiliated to al-Qaeda and ISIS. This split in the opposition ranks meant that there would be no early victory, since it was impossible to concentrate enough forces in any one place to obtain a decisive advantage over the Syrian army – notwithstanding the dissent within the ranks of Assad's forces and the many reported cases of desertion. Thus far, the United States has been extremely cautious and has not given the rebels much tangible support – in part because Washington recognized that there was no one organization in Syria that it could count on.

There has been talk of late that the situation is about to change again. The United States, with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States – and in coordination with Turkey – has managed to unify some of the less extremist opposition groups in the Idlib region. There are already signs that change is afoot. On the field of battle, the rebels have recorded successes against Assad's forces, in part because of the coordination between them. Contact with Turkey, if it can be maintained, will be extremely important, since Ankara has played a rather strange game in Syria thus far: it has turned a blind eye to the many ISIS recruits who have crossed into Syria via its territory and it has blocked aid to the Kurds who have been fighting, in northern Syria on the border with Turkey, against ISIS.

The successes of opposition forces led Hizbollah – the Shiite organization in Lebanon that has the backing of Iran and Syria – to increase the number of its fighters deployed in Syria. For Hizbollah, Syria is an important logistical ally and it physically links Lebanon with Iran – but, at the same time, the organization is acting on Iran's behalf. For Tehran, propping up the Assad regime is part of a broader effort to contract a Shiite axis stretching from Tehran, via Baghdad and Damascus, into Lebanon. In order to achieve this, the Iranians are willing to sacrifice as many Hizbollah fighters as necessary – and not just in Syria. Iran is now using Hizbollah to fight ISIS in Iraq and in Yemen, as backup to the Houthis.

It is totally clear that Syria is where Hizbollah is currently focusing its attention, where more than 500 of its men have been killed and where thousands more continue to bear the burden of the fight to save Assad. The Alawite regime is now more dependent than ever on Hizbollah – more even than it is on Iran and Russia, despite the strategic importance of their support for Assad.

So what will happen in the end? No one has a clear answer to that question, but there are some lessons that we can learn from the current situation. We are still not near an end to this crisis. It will take a long time before a stable regime takes control of Syria. However the crisis ends, there will be more bloodshed. Both sides will continue to fight an extremely cruel war – and the world will stand by watching. If the Sunnis win, most of the Alawites will be massacred; the Druze and Christians will also suffer. The Sunni side, if it manages to overthrow Assad, will start to fight amongst itself until a victor emerges to take control of what remains of Syria. The radical elements within these organizations, which are currently fighting Assad, will turn against each other with the same level of cruelty that they fought against the Syrian regime.

It appears that, without massive Iranian involvement, the rebels will be victorious – if only for reasons of demography. The Alawites and their allies in Syria have very limited human resources compared to the Sunnis. For every potential supporter of the Assad regime, there are three who would die to defeat it. To use a phrase borrowed from basketball, the Sunnis have a deeper bench. And in wars of this kind, that can be the difference between defeat and victory."

Ends…

 

INDULGING ISRAEL HASN'T WORKED – MAYBE THE BOYCOTT WILL: Writing in Haaretz, Yossi Sarid asks how long Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will act like Putin, Erdogan and Berlusconi, but asks to be rewarded like Nelson Mandela?

"And it came to pass, when Binyamin Netanyahu held up his hand, that Israel prevailed, and when he let his hand down, the boycott prevailed. But Netanyahu’s hands were heavy. So Isaac Herzog and Yair Lapid stayed up his hands – the one on the one side, and the other on the other side.

I wouldn’t attribute any importance to the position of the two doppelgangers. In a place where Netanyahu stands, the moral left won’t stand; you will always walk alone in your path, Bibi. At any moment when a different voice is necessary, that’s precisely when they say 'amen' to him – 'There’s no left or right and we must stand together.' But they don’t represent us; you won’t find us in the ranks of the choir. With leaders of the opposition like this, who needs toadies?

Because this is what we expected them to say: You, Bibi, you’re the one who’s bringing disaster down upon us. You were 'strong against Hamas' and you destroyed Iran with your words, and in your eyes we were all collaborators, who are forbidden to enter the congregation or the coalition. There’s absolutely nobody better than you; you’re a cannon whose targeting system is off, and instead of shelling our boycotters, you’re firing on our own forces. And the bombshell you fired – 'No Palestinian state will be established during my tenure' – can’t be put back into its maw. Did Orange CEO Stephane Richard succeed in retracting, in your view?

So go with your own power, and the power of Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban and Dr. Miriam Adelson, but without us. Let’s see you do it on your own. After all, Jewish tycoons from Las Vegas were always known for their enormous influence over college students in California.

'The world' isn’t anti-Jewish or anti-Israel, and there’s no 'de-legitimization campaign against our very existence.' BDS is a negligible organization that doesn’t smell nice and sometimes stinks. True, anti-Semites haven’t disappeared, and like vultures they flock to carrion. But who’s the one who’s feeding them? Who’s the one leaving easy prey in the fields for them?

The opposite is true, Bibi, the exact opposite: No state has ever benefited from such a generous allotment of consideration as Israel has, and the Green Line border has long since won total international recognition. For 48 years they’ve been explaining to us politely that control over another people can’t continue forever, and that the settlements would be an obstacle to us; but it’s as if we didn’t understand what they were telling us. We didn’t give a damn, and they finally broke.

Any other country would have been punished long ago, even a great power like Russia that invades Crimea and Donbass. Only Israel wasn’t; they discriminate in our favor because of the Holocaust. But new generations are arising which knew not Hitler, and therefore we’ve fallen into overdraft in our account with history.

The impression made by 'the only democracy in the Middle East' is also fading, because this is how our democracy, which won hearts only yesterday, looks today: It doesn’t tolerate minorities that go to the polls in droves; it can’t digest a 'subversive opposition'; it harasses human rights organizations and 'left-wing NGOs'; it limits freedom of expression by law; it shuts artists’ mouths; it imprisons refugees without trial and deports them for no fault of their own; it plots to segregate passengers on buses; it hands its army over to the ayatollahs of the hesder yeshivas; and it abandons its commitment to freedom of worship in Jerusalem. Jewish zealots attack Christian pilgrims at the Tomb of David, who himself never knew where he was buried, and demand that they stop the Last Supper in the middle.

Israel – it’s not what you imagined. And the international community is sick to death of its arrogance and presumption, its lies and manipulations. How long will Netanyahu act like Putin, Erdogan and Berlusconi, but ask to be rewarded like Nelson Mandela?

It’s not just that the settlements have sprouted like mushrooms after every acid rain, but now, they’re even asking us to fertilize them – to buy their honey, their wines and their cheeses. What common sense didn’t do, perhaps the boycott will do; boycott, let’s have it.

Adelson and Saban told us in their joint interview about the feast fit for kings that they consumed before embarking on their holy war, and curiosity is consuming us: Which of the items on their table was a product of the greater Land of Israel? Did they order take away from the dairies of Sussia and the vineyards of Yitzhar? What goes down their throats over there as smoothly as oil is stuck in our throats over here like a stolen olive – or as some would say, 'like a piece of shrapnel in the ass'."

Ends…

 

EYE SPY: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman postulates on whom Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will select as the next director of the Mossad – and examines the challenges that person will face.

"The hush-hush whispers in the hallways of the Mossad headquarters in Glilot, a few kilometers north of Tel Aviv, over the last few weeks have danced around the question: Who will replace its director, Tamir Pardo? Curiosity surrounding his would-be replacement intensified when Pardo replaced his incumbent deputy – whom the censor has asked only be identified as N. – by a new appointment, now known as A.

These deputies came from the two most prominent Mossad operational units. N., like Pardo, originated in and later commanded the unit known as Keshet, which directs surveillance and break-ins into 'still objects' – offices and equipment belonging to adversaries, where bugs and cameras are installed and computers infiltrated.

A. comes from perhaps an arguably more critical unit, Caesarea, which is in charge of sending agents on operations in enemy lands. Since a decade ago when the Mossad was restructured, the deputy head has also overseen the Operations Directorate, which houses all of the organization’s operational units.

Pardo is no stranger to hasty in-house shuffling. In his four-and-a-half years in office, he has had four deputies. In this sense, he has continued the atmosphere of restlessness that permeated the tenure of his predecessor, Meir Dagan, who whimsically replaced his deputies like a new pair of socks. Yet during Dagan’s eight-year tenure, he had the same number of deputies, but in twice the time.

Nevertheless, the answer to the question of who will replace Pardo depends on another issue: Will Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu extend Pardo’s term, which is due to expire at the end of 2015? Unlike the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), where the head is legally limited to a five-year term with the option for the cabinet to extend it for another year, there is no Mossad law on the books. The Mossad, Prime Minister’s Office and Justice Ministry have been struggling for the last seven years to draft such a law.

Witness the results: The mythological Isser Harel held the office for 11 years until 1963; his successor, Meir Amit, lasted just five years. Yitzhak Hofi served in the post in the ’70s for eight; as did Dagan, who served from 2002 to 2010.

The media adviser in the Prime Minister’s Office declined to answer The Jerusalem Post’s questions on this matter. But insiders and officials familiar with the Mossad estimate that it is very unlikely Netanyahu will extend Pardo’s term beyond five years in December. This is not to say that Pardo was a bad manager or failed in leading the Mossad in its new challenges and frontiers. While Pardo might lack some of Dagan’s charm and charisma, he has continued in the footsteps of his predecessor.

According to foreign media reports, the Mossad under Pardo was less involved in assassinations; only one Iranian nuclear scientist was killed in 2011, in comparison to five when Dagan was in office. But this does not indicate that Pardo is more hesitant and less daring than Dagan; most likely, those who were in charge of the assassination campaign – which was only one measure in a broader campaign to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons – reached the conclusion that the method was outdated and had exhausted itself as a useful tool. Yet Pardo continued to see Iran as the Mossad’s No. 1 target for gathering information, with Hizbollah as the second.

Although the Mossad basically remained a human organization – recruiting and running agents as sources for information were its bread and butter under Pardo – it expanded its sigint (intelligence derived from electronic and communication messages used by the targets) and cyber capabilities; and it improved relations with its worldwide counterparts, especially the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Indeed, last week CIA director John Brennan visited Israel and met with Pardo and other senior intelligence chiefs, exchanging estimates about Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the P5+1 negotiations – which is reaching a crucial point, as talks are set to conclude at the end of the month.

Another important development in the Mossad in the last five years is the enlargement and upgrade of its research and analysis department, to the degree that it is now almost equal to its big brother – the research department of IDF Military Intelligence, which is still charged with providing the cabinet with a national intelligence estimate.

Yet Pardo will probably be replaced in six months, mainly because he didn’t get well along with Netanyahu. A well-noted incident occurred two years ago when Pardo, in a closed-door meeting with business executives, asserted that the Palestinian issue trumps Tehran as Israel’s biggest national security problem. Saying that directly contradicted his boss, who time and again has beaten the Iranian drum, calling it an existential threat for the Jewish state.

In the corridors of the Mossad and the Prime Minister’s Office as well as in the media, four names are mentioned as potential successors to Pardo. One is an outsider, Maj.-Gen. Amir Eshel, commander of the Israel Air Force, and the other three are from within the Mossad. It’s more probable that the next head of Mossad will come from within the organization’s ranks – and the remaining three candidates served in the Mossad’s operational units.

One such candidate is the above-mentioned N., who until recently was Pardo’s deputy. Another is Ram Ben-Barak, also a product of the Keshet department. As a young operative, he was arrested together with three team members by police officers near a building in a European city under suspicious circumstances. The incident didn’t stain his career, and he reached the top echelon to serve as a deputy to Dagan; he then went on sabbatical and worked for the Brookings Institution in Washington, and most recently was director-general of the Strategic Affairs Ministry.

But the leading candidate is Yossi Cohen, who specialized as a case officer in recruiting and running agents from Arab countries, was head of the department charged with these tasks and served as Pardo’s deputy until two years ago. He was then picked up by Netanyahu to be his national security adviser and lead the National Security Council. Cohen, who managed to develop friendly – even warm – relations with Netanyahu’s family, is the favorite for the Mossad top job."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 11.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS RESULTS: Cengiz Candar insists that the president should acknowledge his defeat in centre-left Radikal: "After the June 7th election results that said 'no' to one-man and one-party rule, President Erdogan cannot be allowed to remain in the [extravagant] new presidential palace at Bestepe. The criteria of respect for the elections’ results and his respect for 'democracy' and the 'national will' will be to vacate Bestepe and return to the old presidential palace at Cankaya. The Turkish people have blocked Erdogan’s path on June 7th, punished the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) and rewarded the three other parties insofar as they have remained distant from the AKP."

Mehmet Tezkan calls on the politicians to bide their time in centrist Milliyet: "Let there be an AKP-CHP [opposition Republican People's Party] or an AKP-MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] or a CHP-MHP coalition, or one that includes the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance]. Let such a coalition be established, but not just for the sake of doing so. What I am trying to say is that we should not be in a hurry. The politicians should not feel pressured. They should not be intimidated by the threat of early elections. All these years have taught us that the price of slapdash coalitions can be quite heavy."

Gungor Mengi sees a host of new problems ahead in centrist Vatan: "Turkey's problems are waiting to be solved, but it seems that the coalition chaos will continue. Aside from everything else, an additional three thousand Syrians fleeing from ISIS and the pro-Kurdish People's Protection Units have entered the Turkish border and have been taken inside. There are already over 2 million refugees, most of whom will not return to Syria, and even this problem awaits urgent intervention."

Mustafa Balbay believes the AKP is paying for its past confrontational policies in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The AKP is facing the consequences of the policies of tension it has been pursuing for years. In one sense, the AKP government represented the 'cold war' era in Turkish politics. This was not only one that it waged against the opposition parties, primarily the CHP, but it is also a war that the AKP waged against the state’s institutions. These elections’ results suggest that common sense points to a coalition without the AKP."

Mumtazer Turkone commends the HDP for being on the right path in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The basic paradigm of the Kurdish problem has been turned upside down. With his confession of 'deposit votes', HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas has demonstrated that he is aware of this profound change. However, by voicing the objection that ‘there is no deposit’ [PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party leader in Kandil, northern Iraq], Mustafa Karasu has demonstrated that he insists on the old paradigm. This exemplifies the essential tension in Kurdish politics that appeared even on the very first day after the election. Kandil thinks about reaping the store’s profit, but the HDP is concerned about opening all its doors to the market. In terms of Kurdish politics, of course the second path is the right one."

Ahmet Kekec does not rule out an AKP coalition with the main opposition party in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Erdogan might look positively on a possible AKP-CHP coalition. Since he believes that economic stability can continue with a strong coalition, he would not categorically dismiss this possibility, but will not send this message via Deniz Baykal (former head of the CHP and current MP). He would not make this improvident move at least. CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu should definitely take part in a coalition government in order to rescue his leadership and allow his 'failure' to be forgotten."

Ali Bayramoglu argues that the state will no longer be part of the Kurdish peace process in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Every formula that does not take the Kurdish problem into consideration will cause new and serious crises at this juncture. Apart from an AKP-CHP coalition, all formulae in which the HDP is excluded and the MHP joins in will entail certain conditions for addressing the Kurdish problem and the peace process. There is no doubt that these will drive the peace process, and that the state mechanism for resolving the Kurdish problem will end."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami clarifies: "The differences between the two sides are coming out in the open. The Iranian delegation seeks to conclude the talks by July 1. But, as Foreign Minister Zarif has stressed, Iran wants a good agreement and for this, it is not ready to be under the pressure of time or blackmail in contravention of international norms." 

Conservative Resalat does not betray any flexibility: "Demands by the West to inspect Iranian military sites have become a major problem for reaching the final agreement. Iran will never accept illegal inspections of its military and nuclear facilities and has repeatedly stressed this during the negotiations. If the other side does not review its approach to unhindered inspections, illegal access to military sites, immediate lifting of sanctions, the Fordow power plant and so for; there will be no agreement. Iran's red lines are unmovable." 

Moderate Iran exudes confidence: "Ahead of the final round of talks in the next two weeks, it seems that the two sides are nearing an agreement. Yet, opponents of a deal are raising their voices. Perhaps they are worried about the post-agreement period and want to divert peoples' minds from the basic issues of the parliamentary elections. People's support and the elites' trust in the government indicate that the effort to swerve public opinion will not work even when they distort Rowhani's speeches." 

Reformist E'temad considers Obama’s timeline: "On the threshold of the last days of his presidency, wrapping up the nuclear negotiations with Iran has become a vital issue for Obama. If the two sides fail to reach an agreement by June 30, there is the possibility that issues on the margins of talks would disturb the negotiations. Perhaps the June date may not be the last deadline, but for Barack Obama, who is looking to his legacy, a later date would be too distant."

 

IRAN/EUROPE: Reformist Arman is hopeful on many fronts: "Europe has realized that Iran is a trustworthy partner in the global fight against extremism and terrorism. Iran should establish a common discourse with Europe to be able to protect Syria and Iraq from regional and global harms and paralyze those who commit murder under the banner of Islam. The EU is looking forward to the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Of course, this does not mean that Europe will deviate from its principles because of this, but it wishes to have close ties with an Iran that does not possess nuclear weapons and considers a nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions as the first step to achieve this goal." 

 

CRITICISM OF ROWHANI’S ADMINISTRATION: Conservative Khorasan reproaches: "The Islamic revolution’s wise Leader’s emphasis on maintaining national dignity and refraining from showing weakness and passivity to the enemy and his constant reminder of the enemy's breach of promise, its greed and animosity should be important factors in the diplomatic confrontation with the American front. However, his recommendations are less expressed in the words and deeds of some high-ranking government officials, especially the respectable president Hassan Rowhani. The messages received by the enemy from this faction confirm the success of the enemy's hostile actions. Unfortunately, some officials have linked resolving the country's bottlenecks to the lifting of sanctions. They do not know that the greedy enemy does not recognize any limits and the advantages we may receive from such talk will not be a key to open big locks with." 

Hard-line Keyhan focuses on lack of scientific progress: "When the current government came to power, Iran ranked 15th in the world of science. Since then, the unmatched pace of Iran's scientific development not only stopped, but collapsed. There are specific reasons for such impedance. Running the Ministry of Science through a caretaker is one. Clearly, the continuation of such a politicized situation led to a further decline in scientific progress, which will increase pessimism of the academic community over the government of hope and prudence." 

 

ISRAEL/UN: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is outraged, but not surprised: "The UN measure to remove Israel from the list of violators of children's rights is another confirmation of the incapacity of the UN to implement its commitments, including fighting invaders and criminals." 

 

SYRIA: Conservative Quds looks at the media campaign: "In a coordinated move, Arab media have magnified the advances of ISIS and Al-Nusra Front in Idlib, Qalamun and Deir al-Zur and considered it as the beginning of the collapse of the Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made an all-out effort to strengthen terrorist groups in Syria because of the failure of their regional policies." 

 

ECONOMY: Conservative Hemayat comments: "The issue of sanctions, which goes back to the years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, has always created challenges for our vulnerable economy. Our enemy, without firing a single bullet, is trying to cripple the revolution's dreams through concentrating its attack on the economy. It is very difficult to use our potential, but there is hope that our officials would rethink their economic policies and block the enemy's greedy path forever."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 11.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-‘Democracy storm’

2-No room for arrogance

3-How not to wage war

 

1-‘Democracy storm’

 

The tripartite Qatari/Saudi/Turkish alliance, which has failed to topple the Syrian regime, failed in its support for the moderate Islamists in Libya, and failed to contain the expansion of Iranian influence in the region, will be among the leading victims of Turkey’s 'democracy storm'... The 'Erdogan model,' which performed the miracle of affecting a marriage between Islam and democracy against the background of unprecedented economic growth (7% per annum), is drawing close to its end. There is one basic reason for this, namely, that the main engine behind this project – the 'zero problems' policy with Turkey's neighbors – was dropped, totally undermined, in fact, leaving Turkey surrounded by few friends and many enemies--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Any reduction in [Turkish] support offered to the terrorist groups or in opening the borders to these groups should have a positive effect on the balance of power on the ground in favor of the Syrian state and army. This is especially true at the current delicate juncture when preparations have been underway to escalate the terrorist organizations' assault on various fronts in Syria. The AKP's priority today, is to focus on the domestic situation even if it fails to review its policy and draw the proper lessons and morals from its electoral defeat. And all this assumes that it will maintain its unity while there are those who expect it to suffer from internal splits. The party's ability to deliver aid to the terrorist groups by forcing the state’s institutions to do so has also been weakened. And this will have a major impact on what is happening in Syria and Iraq--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

One of the most important facts confirmed by the recent Turkish elections is that 'democracy' is the most effective cure for all outstanding problems and that resolving these problems via 'ink-stained fingers' [after casting votes] is a thousand times better than resolving them with our teeth. And another important fact confirmed by these elections is that there is no room left today for describing Turkey's Kurds as 'mountain Turks.' Moreover, this Kurdish nation should assume the place it deserves in this region, just like the Arab nation, the Turkish nation, and the Iranian or Persian nation. For there is no difference between any of these nations--Saleh al-Qallab in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The main reason Turkish President Erdogan has failed to implement his overall project of a marriage between Islam and democracy against a background sustained economic growth is because he veered away from his initial policy of 'zero problems' with the country’s neighbors, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. The electoral setback suffered by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is sure to affect the country’s foreign policies, especially the aid and facilities it has been providing to terrorist groups in Syria, anticipates a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. One of the most important facts confirmed by the recent Turkish elections is that the Kurds can no longer be ignored and that it is time for their national identity to be recognized when drawing the region's new maps, asserts a former Jordanian information minister.

 

ERDOGAN’S DISAPPEARING IMAGES: "The images of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have disappeared from the front pages of newspapers and Turkish news bulletins, at least for the past three days," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Turkey seems both divided and in a state of shock. The split is clear between Erdogan's supporters, who have held undisputed power for 13 years, and his opponents who came together and succeeded in blocking his momentum and clipping some of his political and popular wings. As for the shock, it stems from concern across the country as to what may happen in the future, and the fear of instability and anarchy.

President Erdogan, who had become addicted to victory over a period of two decades whether as head of Istanbul's Municipal Council or as leader of the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) was not defeated in last weekend’s parliamentary elections. But the fact that his party won around 40% of parliamentary seats was no victory compared to previous elections, all of which he won with a large majority. The fact that he did not secure a parliamentary majority in the face of an opposition that comes from almost the same shade of the spectrum and all of which is united against him and has put toppling him at the top of its list of priorities, amounts to a major defeat.

The majority of opposition parties – or, more accurately, the three main parties: the People's Republican Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Peoples' Democratic Party [HDP] – have all stressed that they will not join a coalition government with Erdogan and his party. These three parties now control 60% of parliament seats between them, which enables them to form a coalition that can win a vote of confidence. Therefore, Erdogan has only two options: Either to become an honorary president with no power, and to deal with a prime minister from the opposition; or to call for new parliamentary elections.

Everyone you meet in Istanbul tells you that democracy has been the main winner in these elections. People compete in recounting what they view as Erdogan’s mistakes over the past three years. On the other hand, his supporters speak bitterly of a 'conspiracy' against Islam and Turkey led by the same powers accused of a conspiracy by their leader's enemy, Bashar al-Assad. For when you ask them who these conspirators are, they very confidently respond: Israel, the U.S., and France.

It is true that democracy has won in Turkey. When the turnout stands at a high and unprecedented 86% that reflects the extent of democratic political awareness. It also reflects a desire for change, whether we agree with it or not. But the second main winner is the Kurdish HDP, which has brought all shades of the political spectrum together in opposition to the AKP's hegemony – women, leftist intellectuals, environmental activists, and liberals. For this party, which has turned Turkish political life upside down, has raised the slogan of 'cohabitation,' which has been absent, or been forcefully absented, in recent years.

President Erdogan committed a series of mistakes. They began with his attempt to change a prime ministerial system of parliamentary government that has lasted for one hundred years, into an American-style presidential system that places most powers in the president's hands. He also chose a weak prime minister (Ahmet Davutoglu) based on his personal loyalty even before his party political loyalty. And he accused his opponents of atheism, homosexuality, terrorism, and treason; brandishing the Qur'an at the peak of the elections, and using religion to pursue political aims, most importantly, to remain in power while accusing others of apostasy.

By the normal measure of countries other than Turkey, one could say that President Erdogan is still strong. He has planted his supporters and loyalists in the critical stations of the state over a period of 13 years; and will remain president till 2019. But his power remains merely formal. The man has grown accustomed to be sole ruler. Through his party, he controls the four main powers – parliamentary, presidential, executive and judicial. But he q2r`DSWfailed to impose full control over the fifth power, the media, which has played a major role in undermining the basis of his rule by exposing corruption and his weapons’ smuggling to jihadi groups in Syria, as well as the [summer 2013] suppression of protests by environmental activists in Taksim Square.

Turkey today faces an uncertain future. The countdown to the end of the Erdogan phenomenon has begun. It also faces three main challenges: First, that of the Islamic State (ISIS), which now lies at its borders. Second, the two million Syrian refugees, whose numbers continue to rise, and third, an economy characterized by depression and slow growth.

At the AKP conference in 2012, which was the last held with Erdogan as the party’s head according to its bylaws, the most prominent foreign invitees were then Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and Hamas Politburo Head Khalid Mish'al. Mish'al in particular received a standing ovation when he delivered his speech before over five thousand people crowding the basketball pitch where the conference was held.

Mursi now is behind bars after he was toppled by a military coup, and is facing the death sentence. As for Mr. Mish'al, he currently resides in the Qatari capital, Doha, close to withdrawal from public life after most Arab doors have been slammed shut in his face.

At that same conference, to which I was invited, Erdogan delivered a momentous speech in which he enumerated the names of all Ottoman caliphs, one after the other, amidst wide applause. Perhaps he was optimistic that he would be one of them; but the results of the latest elections appear to have put paid to that dream, at least for the foreseeable future.

Erdogan's Islamist project has faced a major setback, and at an inopportune moment. This project was initially based on legitimate Arab popular revolutions that would bring moderate political Islam (the Muslim Brotherhood) to power via the ballot box. Many people believe that one of Erdogan's biggest mistakes was his failure to assess the size and power of the opposing camp correctly, as well as his failure to create the grounds for cohabitation with the other shades of the political spectrum, specifically the non-Islamist ones. He relied on confessional sectarianism as a means of attracting supporters, and as the foundation for this project instead.

The shakeup suffered by President Erdogan's center of power will cause headaches for his Islamist allies, especially in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. It may cause them a great shock that never crossed their leaders’ minds. There is no doubt that Hamas will be among those harmed most, at least temporarily, because President Erdogan was one of its most prominent backers, if not its only one. He fought to break the siege imposed on it and the Gaza Strip, the movement's sole base of government.

The tripartite Qatari/Saudi/Turkish alliance, which has failed to topple the Syrian regime, failed in its support for the moderate Islamists in Libya, and failed to contain the expansion of Iranian influence in the region, will be among the leading victims of Turkey’s 'democracy storm.' The satisfaction reflected in Damascus and President Sissi's media and in the statements of Iraqi officials, perhaps best summarizes the extent of the predicament that this alliance may face in the coming days and months.

The 'Erdogan model,' which performed the miracle of affecting a marriage between Islam and democracy against the background of unprecedented economic growth (7% per annum), is drawing close to its end.

"There is one basic reason for this, namely, that the main engine behind this project – the 'zero problems' policy with Turkey's neighbors – was dropped, totally undermined in fact, leaving Turkey surrounded by few friends and many enemies," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

EVERYONE KNOWS: "Everyone knows that the AKP's Turkey has been playing a major role in the war on Syria, whether by opening its borders to foreign terrorists, or by supplying them with arms, or by hosting a joint international/regional operations room that directs and leads the terrorist war on Syria," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Thursday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

Moreover, Turkey has played a major role in foiling any political solution for the Syrian crisis, obstructing all attempts to seek a political resolution that would spare the Syrians' blood and end their country’s destruction.

The results of the Turkish elections will undoubtedly have a major influence on the course of events on the ground. This is especially true at this point in time, when the international and regional [anti-regime] wager is on Turkey's role in the current escalation in Idlib Province, and the preparations for a similar escalation in the Aleppo Province.

The elections’ results have delivered a strong blow to such schemes, regardless of how the situation will develop in Turkey. For the AKP is now under strict surveillance by all three opposition parties, all of which oppose Erdogan's policy in Syria, specifically his support for the terrorist organizations, whether those internationally classified as terrorist or moderate.

Moreover, the Turkish state's security and military agencies have always had their reservations about the AKP governments' policies in Syria, exerting a great effort to obstruct them. In fact, they were hounded as a punishment for their stance. But it is now no longer possible to proceed with these same policies towards the police or with the arrest of a large number of the policemen under various excuses. For there is no legitimate government or authority to provide cover for these sorts of actions by the AKP government, even if covert and covered by a thick cloud of statements from AKP leaders and government members claiming a foreign conspiracy. The charge that the AKP government was sending weapons to Syria was dismissed as part of this conspiracy.

By remaining in power for over 13 years, the AKP may have succeeded in infiltrating Turkey’s military and security agencies to a large degree. And the party may still be able exploit its supporters in these agencies to continue to provide the aid it offers to terrorist groups in Syria. But this will not be as open, bold and extensive as it has been in the past when the AKP was in power alone.

Any reduction in the support offered to the terrorist groups or in opening the borders to these groups should have a positive effect on the balance of power on the ground in favor of the Syrian state and army. This is especially true at the current delicate juncture when preparations have been underway to escalate the terrorist organizations' assault on various fronts in Syria.

The AKP's priority today, is to focus on the domestic situation even if it fails to review its policy and draw the proper lessons and morals from its electoral defeat. And all this assumes that it will maintain its unity while there are those who expect it to suffer from internal splits.

The party's ability to deliver aid to the terrorist groups by forcing the state’s institutions to do so has also been weakened. And this will have a major impact on what is happening in Syria and Iraq.

"And it is especially true of those policies that are the subject of disagreement between the various political parties that are now represented in parliament," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

UNRECOGNIZED NATION: "The most important truth confirmed by the recent Turkish elections is that there is a Kurdish nation in this Middle Eastern region that was 'overlooked' by the notorious [1916] Sykes/Picot agreements," writes Saleh al-Qallab in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

This is a nation that has remained unrecognized. Its members are scattered between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and also Syria. Since World War I, and for an entire century, and on more than one occasion, they were subjected to repression, alienation, violence, and massacres, and were hung from electricity poles, as happened in Iranian Kermanshah.

Perhaps what needs to be said after this extraordinary victory by Turkey's Kurds, is that 'democracy' offers the best solution to the Kurdish problem. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan may have drawn the world attention to the existence of the problem, but that particular experiment [‘armed struggle’] ultimately proved to be a failure. The reason was that it became a tool in the various regional conflicts used by different regimes, including the Assad Sr. and Assad Jr. regime, for dealing with issues that have nothing to do with the Kurds or their cause.

What may also need to be said after this victory is that the manner in which the successive Turkish regimes that came to power after the Ottoman state's collapse up till the beginning of the democratic era dealt with the Kurds was not only strange; it was also counterproductive and unjust. It produced violent reactions, with the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan representing one of them. For it is both unreasonable and unacceptable for an entire nation of over 15 million people (according to some assessments) to be defined as 'mountain Turks' and to be denied the use of their national language or national dress.

Today, there are numerous indications that the Sykes/Picot borders are no longer held sacred, and that new maps may be in the process of being drawn for the region. In fact, this is an issue that needs to be considered very seriously, whether in Turkey or Iraq or Syria – and before that in Iran which, on the pretext of being an Islamic state that opposes nationalist tendencies, rejects any move towards independence and continues to persecute this [Kurdish nation] and hang its members from the electricity poles.

It is an injustice of historical proportions for the Kurds to continue to live in the painful conditions imposed on them since the days of Sykes/Picot; an unjust and unfair era in their history. We Arabs should certainly be more enthusiastic in support of this nation's independence. It has participated alongside us in defending this Arab region against all colonialists. The heroism of Saladin [a Kurd] is still taught in all our schools and universities. Moreover, we should all now recognize that our Kurdish brothers– whether in Syria or Iraq or Palestine or Jordan – have been part of our patriotic and even nationalist movements, and that the greatest Arab poet of the twentieth century – Ahmad Shawqi – was a member of this Kurdish nation that is truly a sister nation to the Arabs.

One of the most important facts confirmed by the recent Turkish elections is that 'democracy' is the most effective cure for all outstanding problems and that resolving these problems via 'ink-stained fingers' [after voting] is a thousand times better than resolving them with our teeth. And another important fact confirmed by these elections is that there is no room left today for describing Turkey's Kurds as 'mountain Turks.' Moreover, this Kurdish nation should assume the place it deserves in this region, just like the Arab nation, the Turkish nation, and the Iranian or Persian nation.

"For there is no difference between any of these nations," concludes Qallab.

Ends…

 

 

2-No room for arrogance

 

Both the Syrian regime and the opposition in all its shades have no choice but to forgo their arrogance and seek common ground towards a political transition, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

One of the main problems with the recent Syrian opposition conference held in Cairo was the fact that it excluded the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in compliance with Egyptian demands, says a leading Jordanian commentator. But a serious possible breakthrough has appeared via the decision not to insist on President Assad's departure as a precondition for any dialogue with his regime. The question is whether Cairo, Moscow and Riyadh can find common ground in pursuit of a Syrian solution.

 

GAME OF OPPOSING AXES: "The Syrian patriotic opposition conference that recently ended in Cairo failed to avoid the game of opposing regional axes and camps," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

It seems clear that the exclusion of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was in response to Egypt’s desire to cut the Turkish and Qatari 'arms' that have infiltrated the Istanbul coalition (i.e. the Syrian National Coalition-SNC), down to size.

The conference included 'the cream' of Syrian opposition figures and groupings that we know of. The majority of those who took part can easily be classified as independent Syrians who have patriotic agendas. Possibly because of the host country's influence, the conference also tried hard to include opposition figures that are close to Saudi Arabia. For Cairo is trying to steer the Syrian opposition away from Doha and Ankara, but is not doing the same when it comes to its ally, Saudi Arabia, the most important donor for the ailing Egyptian economy and the main source of support for the current Egyptian regime.

The conference concluded with mostly positive results. It spoke of political solution as the sole way out of the Syrian predicament. It drew a roadmap that begins with a transitional ruling council with full powers, an interim government and an interim military council for rebuilding and rehabilitating security and military institutions. It also proposed dialogue and negotiations with the regime, which is a daring idea that the various Syrian oppositions have been trying to avoid mentioning in public for fear of being driven into the 'bazaar' of bids and counter-bids for which they have become famous.

Assad's fate was a contentious point at the conference. The pro-Saudi opposition current in particular spoke loudly in favor of Assad's departure as a gateway and precondition for launching the process of political transition in Syria. Most participants shared its views and demands, but without making them a precondition for dialogue; rather, as an item to be discussed and as goal that would crown the negotiations and dialogue with the regime within the framework of a roadmap and a reasonable timeframe. In both structure and content, the conference was thus closest to Egypt’s view of the Syrian crisis. Without offending any of them, one can describe most participants as representatives of the 'Egyptian line' in the Syrian opposition.

The conference and conferees' point of weakness was that the meeting dealt with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria as absolute evil. In fact, it accepted negotiations with the regime, but not with the Brotherhood. This is a major landmine that could explode at any moment, and that may undermine the effort to build a broad national accord, whether between the various opposition forces, or between these forces and the regime. The Cairo conferees should not have submitted to Egypt’s calculations. For Cairo under Sissi is obsessed with a Brotherhood complex, even in its foreign policy. This does not befit Egypt, and ultimately does not serve its interests.

The insistence on excluding the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is akin to talk of 'Palestinian national reconciliation' without Hamas. It is true that the Brotherhood does not play the same role as Hamas in Palestine; but anyone who wishes to confront ISIS, the Nusra Front and terrorism, and who hopes to build a pluralistic Syria by opening the door to a political transition, should not exclude certain forces or submit to such calculations.

A second opposition conference in Cairo with the participation of a larger number of forces and figures under intensive Egyptian sponsorship and with the participation of pro-Riyadh opposition figures and groups, will raise many questions, such as: What remains for the Riyadh conference that is planned under Saudi sponsorship? Will it build on what was begun at the Cairo conference? Or will it, if held, aim to denude the Cairo conference’s results of their content, placing the conferees along the same track as the political and military escalation that is consistent with the aggressive tendency that has recently come to characterize Saudi foreign policy?

And what of the Moscow-3 conference? Is there any coordination between Cairo and its ally Moscow regarding this matter? Or is each side working alone, perhaps against the other? And does the Cairo conference pave the path to expanding the Moscow conference and extending its participation, especially since the conferees in the Egyptian capital have publicly declared that they wish to negotiate with the regime? If so, what objection might there be against them taking part in Moscow-3?

Cairo and its Syrian conferees say that their conference does not lay the grounds for a movement or entity that is meant to replace or act as a parallel entity to the SNC on the grounds that a number of leading SNC figures participated in their personal capacity. But does it make sense for all these efforts and accords to end merely because the meetings are over, and the participants have returned to the capitals from whence they came? And how will the SNC members who took part in Cairo deal with the issues over which there is a difference between the SNC's hard-line demands and the conference's more modest proposals?

And finally, what attitude will the [Syrian] regime take towards the Cairo conference? Will it view it as a potential gateway towards a broad Syrian national dialogue, even if it has its reservations or rejects some of its conclusions? Or will it choose to denounce what has happened, viewing it as uncoordinated with Damascus and beneath further discussion or comment, and not worth the ink with which it was written?

If I could advise the regime in Damascus, I would have asked Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem to take the initiative and contact his Egyptian and Russian counterparts asking them to help coordinate an open debate without prior conditions with all those who attended the Cairo conference. Once it convenes, all issues can open for discussion, including Assad's fate, the terms for a political transition, the nature of the transitional period, and so on. And Mu'allem could also ask Russia and Cairo to coordinate a joint regional effort in which Iran and Saudi Arabia would also take part, as well as the five permanent UN Security Council members, to sponsor this dialogue, guarantee its results, and provide a security net for the conferees.

"There is no room for arrogance, diktats, and conceit on the part of any of the Syrian parties. Time, in their case, is measured in terms of further blood and destruction. And there can be no victor in this futile and destructive war. Any victor will be defeated, defeated, defeated," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-How not to wage war

 

The Saudi experience in Yemen suggests a lack of knowledge of the most basic principles of warfare, says Luqman 'Abdullah in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The course of the war on Yemen has so far demonstrated that those who planned the war know nothing of the basic rules of warfare, maintains an Arab commentator in a left-leaning Beirut daily. In particular, they have failed to formulate an exit strategy should the war go wrong, as is now happening for Saudi Arabia, whose well-equipped army's weakness has been exposed by a few committed Yemeni tribe members willing to sacrifice themselves.

 

WAR IS NOT AN END: "The decision to go to war is usually taken by states after all other political and diplomatic means of negotiation and dialogue over a contentious issue have been exhausted," writes Luqman 'Abdullah in Thursday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

For war is not an end in itself. It is the final resort for achieving political aims or improving the terms for negotiations. But in both the Israeli and Saudi cases, war only seems to be the means for imposing surrender, hegemony, and occupation.

Former UN envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar’s testimony before the Security Council has confirmed the claim that the Saudi regime is 'waging war for war's sake.' He said that the Yemenis were close to reaching a final formula agreed through dialogue for ruling their country, and that the party that foiled that agreement at the last moment was Saudi Arabia.

One of the most obvious first steps by a country’s supreme command whenever the decision is taken to go to war is to formulate a comprehensive strategy based on an assessment of all possible scenarios and the required reactions to each possibility. But in the case of the Saudi aggression on Yemen, no rational person would believe that the 'boys' [in reference to the young age of Saudi Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman] who took the decision to wage war knew anything about the most basic military axioms that call for plans and alternative plans for dealing with potential scenarios.

The best evidence of this comes from the fact that they ran out of targets after the first week of the war. They had to seek the help of the U.S. which announced via State Department and Defense Department sources that it was a partner in the aggression by supplying the Saudi authorities with targets and intelligence and logistical aid, taking it upon itself to refill Saudi Arabia's arms and ammunition depots, as well as providing it with political cover.

Western diplomatic and press leaks, especially former U.S. foreign secretary Colin Powell’s statements, have confirmed that when Saudi Arabia informed Washington of its decision to wage its aggression on Yemen, it gave itself a period of ten days to complete the mission and destroy the [Houthi] Ansarullah. Anyone reviewing the manner in which the aggression's aims were formulated would see that the decision was taken at a moment of rash political stupidity; one when Al Saud felt frustrated by the Yemeni people's ability to rid themselves of the Saudi hegemony that they have been suffering from for decades.

A war such as that that Al Saud are waging on Yemen required a prior study based on an extensive store of information at every level regarding Yemen's historical, religious, geographical, social, and economic conditions, and the Saudi army's own capabilities, especially its ground forces. For air superiority on its own cannot determine the outcome of battle, as evident from many precedents in this regard. Such a war should also have been preceded by an examination of regional relations and the extent to which the various regional states can influence the struggle.

The TV images of the Saudi army, heavily armed with the most advanced weapons, fleeing from its border posts before a few fighters from the Yemeni tribes armed with light or medium weapons, highlights the extent of the humiliation that the Saudi leadership has inflicted upon itself. It also exposes this army's weak sense of patriotic loyalty as well as its lack of commitment to sacrifice in order to protect its homeland.

The [Saudi] Border Guard, ground forces, and National Guard forces have all taken turn in being deployed along the borders with Yemen. What is peculiar in this regard is the Saudis need to seek the help of ground forces from allied states, even if brought in from Bahrain. Yesterday, units from the Bahraini ground forces arrived at the border posts and were deployed in support of Saudi ground forces.

The border operations have exposed Al Saud's army's slack condition and its inability to hold its ground in confrontation against a ferocious Yemeni army that relies on a cohesive popular support coupled with a boundless readiness to remain steadfast and offer sacrifices. And this demonstrates that those who planned this war know nothing about strategy because they failed to develop strategies for exiting from the quagmire if they were to be mired in it, which is exactly what is happening today.

"This is something that the American side now realizes, but without a clear U.S. response, bearing in mind that past experience demonstrates that Washington has a long history of buying and selling at its friends' expense," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 11.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Duqu

 

Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead their Thursday editions with the Wall Street Journal's report that the three luxury Swiss hotels that hosted the nuclear talks between Tehran and six world powers had been targeted by a version of the sophisticated Duqu spyware, a virus considered a hallmark of Israeli intelligence operations. According to the report, the software allows its handlers to monitor activities, steal computer files and eavesdrop on rooms in which the affected computers are operating.

In the report, the Moscow-based cyber-security firm Kaspersky did not identify Israel by name as being responsible for the breach, but said it did conclude the threat came from the same source as the original Duqu virus, and that the breach was likely carried out by a government. The Wall Street Journal previously reported that Israel allegedly spied on the Iran nuclear talks in 2014.

Jerusalem was quick to dismiss the report as 'baseless.' Although government officials originally declined to comment, Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely on Thursday denied that Israel was involved. 'The international reports of Israeli involvement in the matter are baseless,' she told Army Radio. 'What is much more important is that we prevent a bad agreement where at the end of the day we find ourselves with an Iranian nuclear umbrella,' she said.

Any speculation that Israel spied on Iran or Western powers using a virus is just that, according to Yitzhak Ben-Israel, the head of Israel's National Cyber Authority. 'These viruses are found on millions of computers around the world. It's similar to a mass virus that is spread between people – trying to track down the origin of a virus is speculative. There is often no way to pinpoint the culprit.' Nevertheless, said Ben-Israel, hacking to discover secrets 'is part of the game, especially for issues like the Iranian nuclear program.' While it might be logical to assume that Israel perpetrated the hack, 'there is no proof of this,' he added.

The U.S. State Department refused to comment on the reports. State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke said at the daily press briefing that 'these are claims by a private company about another government, so we're not going to weigh in on that report,' he said. Rathke noted that Washington 'takes steps' to ensure 'that confidential, classified negotiating details stay behind closed doors in these negotiations. We are always mindful of the need…to take steps to keep our discussions confidential,' he added.

Haaretz leads with a report that a delegation from the prosecutor's office of the International Criminal Court at The Hague is due to arrive in Israel at the end of the month as part of the prosecution's preliminary examination into whether war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Palestinian sources said Palestinian political leaders had been informed of the delegation's planned arrival by the court recently. The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine if there is a reasonable basis to the claim that crimes have been committed that are within the court's authority to investigate. If the prosecution does decide to launch an investigation, it is possible they will not just investigate allegations of Israeli war crimes, but also actions committed by the Palestinians.

A senior Israeli official who is dealing with the matter told Haaretz that such a visit is a routine part of conducting such preliminary examinations. 'Nothing about it testifies to the progress of the examination or its pace,' the official said. Israel has yet to respond to the prosecution request and will hold discussions about it over the next few days.

In other news on the Palestinian front, Yesh Atid chairman Yair Lapid presented his diplomatic initiative for a regional peace conference under American auspices in a meeting at the White House with senior Obama advisor for the Middle East, Robert Malley. According to Lapid, the bilateral track has failed, and it is time to give a chance to a regional process. Lapid also expressed concern over the emerging agreement between Iran and world powers over Tehran's nuclear program.

 

ZIGZAG: Writing in Makor Rishon, Ariel Kahana says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has harmed himself and the State of Israel by taking back his previous rejection of the two-state solution – especially since U.S. President Barack Obama himself has said that a Palestinian state at the current time is impossible.

"It was rather embarrassing to listen to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu once again repeat the two-state slogan in his speech at the Herzliya Conference this week. Netanyahu's U-turn – in an interview just before the election, he told NRG that 'no Palestinian state would be established' if he was reelected, yet he backtracked a couple of days after leading his party to victory. This was part of his effort to reassure the international community. But today, months after being reelected, such comments are extremely unsettling.

Netanyahu tried to explain the apparent contradiction by saying that, while he supports the two-state solution in principle, it is not practical at this time. This would have been a reasonable explanation if it were not for the fact that, in recent weeks, Netanyahu appears to have dropped that, too. Since forming his fourth government, Netanyahu has met with several foreign ministers and, during the course of these meetings; he hasn't dared to repeat his assertion that the two-state solution is dead.

The zigzag in Netanyahu's position forces us to ask: Which Netanyahu should we believe? Western countries have also not forgiven or forgotten the prime minister's pre-election comments and, as a result, he does not have their trust. The United States and its European allies were always suspicious that Netanyahu's Bar Ilan speech – in which, for the first time, he expressed his support for the two-state solution – was a bluff; they also believe that his comments on the eve of the election are, as U.S. President Barack Obama stated quite clearly, a truer reflection of the prime minister's views. If this is the case, one cannot help but wonder why he is pretending, and, in so doing, is risking the last drop of faith that Washington and Brussels have in him. The leaders of the United States and the European Union are not total idiots.

Apart from that, I am not convinced that Netanyahu needs to say anything at all about the negotiations with the Palestinians. As things currently stand, there seems to be a general agreement that it is not realistic to work toward the establishment of a Palestinian state – especially given the new and justified security demands that Netanyahu has made in light of the situation in the Middle East and given the fact that Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas seems hell bent on ruining any initiative for the resumption of talks.

It is so unlikely that an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal is possible at the moment that even President Obama has said as much. If Obama, whose eagerness to end the conflict comes close to defining his presidency, says that it's impossible, why is the Israeli prime minister claiming that it is possible? Instead of making fools of international leaders, Netanyahu should have simply quoted Obama, who told Ilana Dayan in an interview last week that, 'realistically, reaching an agreement does not seem possible in the next 12 months. It's a very tough challenge.' A true statesman does not mince his words; he comes out and tells people the truth as he sees it.

In addition, Netanyahu is wrong to say that the alternative to the two-state solution is a binational state. The international community recognizes a whole range of options between those two extremes, such as autonomy, a confederation, a protectorate or the kind of creative solutions that were implemented in such places as Gibraltar, Porto Rico and Guam.

Netanyahu is not the only leader to act in this way, of course. In Israel and abroad, most of those who deal with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process relate to the two-state solution in an oversimplified and dogmatic matter. This is especially dangerous when one considers that the establishment of a Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to the State of Israel. A Palestinian state – and it doesn't matter what kind of security arrangements are in place – would seek to undermine the security of Israel, just as Yasser Arafat did after singing the Oslo Accords and just as Abu Mazin is now doing across the globe.

More and more people in the world are realizing that the Fateh leadership's raison d'être is not to worry about the future of the Arab residents of Gaza, Judea and Samaria, but to destroy Israel. If this is the situation before a Palestinian state is even established, it's not hard to guess what will happen once there is a Palestinian state. This is why Netanyahu should not have backtracked on his rejection of the two-state solution. He should have continued his slow but steady process of rescinding his Bar Ilan commitment.

Netanyahu sees himself as the protector of Israel from attacks by the gentiles and he has the full support of the Israeli public to do just that. But that is exactly the reason why his zigzagging is an embarrassment to himself and to us. People prefer to hear the truth, even when it's hard to swallow. They just don't want to be hoodwinked."

Ends…

 

GOODBYE, JAMES BOND: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth comments on the Wall Street Journal's claim that Israel planted a virus to spy on the Iranian nuclear talks.

"I do not know whether Israel was responsible for planting the Duqu virus in three hotels where, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal yesterday, the Iranian delegation to nuclear talks was staying. But if Israel was responsible for the virus, then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was wrong when he said that Israeli officials' comments on the talks were pointless, since they did not know all the details. If Israel was, indeed, spying on the talks, then it knew at least as much as the people who were doing the actual negotiating. But enough with speculation.

There's no question that the timing of the WSJ report will increase tensions and suspicion between the countries involved in the nuclear talks. Israel, along with the Gulf States, is keeping a close eye on every scrap of information emerging from the talks. The question is: How are they getting this information? There are plenty of ways of obtaining information and it would be naïve in the extreme to think that all sides involved in the talks – which began in 2003 and resumed in 2009 – did not make every effort to get their hands on whatever information was available.

Even among the world powers that are supposed to cooperate between them, there is a strong desire to know what the Chinese, the Russians, the French and (especially) the Americans will do next. Of course, everybody wants to know what the Iranians are up to – and Israel has already taught the international community several lessons in intelligence gathering.

In parallel with the nuclear talks, a real psychological war is being waged among the countries involved in Iran's nuclear program. Some three months ago, the Wall Street Journal published a report claiming that Israel was spying on the United States. Warning lights flashed and Israel was quick to deny the report. There was also a report that Washington was planning to keep Israel out of the loop, since it was concerned that any classified information which reached Israel would soon be leaked to the outside world. This report, too, disappeared without a trace. Of course, if Israel really did plant the Duqu virus, then it wouldn't have been reliant on the Americans for information anyway.

The modern world and the advances in technology have provided those involved in espionage and intelligence gathering with new tools. Gone are the days of undercover agents and spies with miniature cameras. James Bond has been put out to pasture and he's been replaced by a computer virus capable of listening to any type of communication – until the cyber security experts at Kaspersky Lab discover it, of course.

I don’t know what is true and what's invented in this latest WSJ revelation, but everything sounds like it makes sense."

Ends…

 

KASPERSKY'S LITTLE JOKE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ronen Bergman says that the discovery of a virus in the computers of hotels that hosted the Iranian nuclear talks raises more questions than it answers.

"In the early days of the State of Israel, The Information Division B was one of the most mysterious and secretive braches of the country's embryonic defense establishment. It was disbanded in 1952, but not before giving birth to several hugely important organizations, such as the equally mysterious Institute for Biological Research in Nes Tziona.

It is possible that one of the cyber security experts at the Kaspersky Lab, which discovered a virus in three of the hotels that hosted the Iranian nuclear talks in Switzerland, was having a sly joke at our expense when he called the virus – which everyone seems to believe was planted by Israel – Duqu B. I have interviewed Eugene Kaspersky many times over the past few years; he refuses steadfastly to say which country he believes is behind the virus. He refused to do so this time, too. But even the name of the virus indicates that the finger of blame is pointing directly in Israel's direction.

In May 2012, the International Telecommunications Union – which is run by the United Nations – contacted Kaspersky on an urgent matter. Iranian oil and gas companies had asked the UN for emergency help after files on their computers started to mysteriously and spontaneously delete themselves.

Kaspersky's team was up to the challenge. After a few days of intensive efforts, they managed to identify the virus. They announced that it was perhaps the most sophisticated virus in existence. It could, for example, activate a computer's microphone and camera, delete files at will and so on. Kaspersky decided to name the virus after one of the lines of a code it contained: Flame. 'It was a particularly virulent piece of malware,' Kaspersky told me at the time. 'Only professionals could have written it and it would have taken a lot of resources.'

Shortly after that, there was a report in the United States that the Flame virus was part of an American-Israeli project – codenamed 'The Olympic Games' – the goal of which was to delay the Iranian nuclear program. As far back as 2010, a computer lab in Belarus identified a different virus in the same software – Stuxnet. A few weeks after Flame was identified, another virus – Duqu – was found. Yesterday Kaspersky announced that this latest virus was, it seems, an advanced version of Duqu.

If these reports are accurate and Israel's intelligence bodies are behind the virus, it seems to prove that Israel has once against managed to develop the most advanced spyware on the market.

There are still plenty of open questions: Were viruses only discovered at those three hotels? If not and the virus has spread to dozens or perhaps thousands of connected computers, is it not possible that underground elements are using it for their own nefarious purposes? And here's another important question: What information stored on the hotels' computers could possibly help whoever installed the virus? Do these hotels have surveillance equipment in their evaluators or meeting rooms? And if not, isn't the information that the virus gathered worthless? It's possible, therefore, that more old-fashioned spy tactics might have yielded more useful information than a computer virus."

Ends…

 

JERUSALEM SYNDROME: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit says that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on Jerusalem this week had little to do with Jerusalem – and everything to do with who determines American foreign policy.

"Martin Van Buren was a fascinating character. The eighth president of the United States, whose political cunning earned him the nickname 'The Little Magician,' was in office for four years, until his defeat by William Henry Harrison in 1841.

Van Buren was just one of the many presidents who were mentioned in the long ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down on Jerusalem this week. His handling of the status of the dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over ownership of the Falkland Islands, which erupted when Van Buren served as Secretary of State, was just one of the crises mentioned in the court's ruling. These crises were referred to because they touched on the same issue that is at the heart of the Jerusalem question. It's not, however, a question about Jerusalem, Israel or even U.S. President Barack Obama. It has nothing to do with the peace process or relations between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the White House. In short, it was totally unrelated to any of the burning issues that we tend to obsess over.

You can read for yourself, if you can wade through the 100 or so pages of the ruling. There is only one question on the table: Who has the right to determine American foreign policy? More specifically: Does the president have the right to recognize a foreign country and does Congress have the right to instruct the president to do the opposite of what he planned?

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the president. Not President Obama; every president; those who came before Obama and those who will follow him. The ruling certainly came down on the side of Obama's immediate predecessor, George W. Bush. After all, the bill that would have recognized Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel was passed when Bush was president and it was Bush who challenged Congress' authority to pass such laws.

The Supreme Court Justices' ruling was not about the status Jerusalem. Rather, it was about who is supposed to decide about the status of Jerusalem – and it ruled that the president, not Congress, has the authority. If some future president decides to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, then this week's ruling will not have been a blow to Israel. But, most significantly, it's none of Israel's business. Just like the Americans do not have the power to tell Israel how to divide up responsibility between the Foreign Ministry and the Strategic Affairs Ministry, so Israel cannot decide how the United States divides up foreign policy powers between the president and Congress.

Despite the fact that the ruling was not about Jerusalem; let's talk about Jerusalem – which is, without question, a problem. It is a problem for Israel, but, at this stage, it is also a problem for the United States. It is a problem because the administration – any administration – has its hands tied by its predecessors. Its hands are tied since the precedent is that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital would ruin the United States' relations with the Arab world. Only something very dramatic will free the administration from these shackles; only something very dramatic will allow it to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

The proof is obvious. Presidential candidates like Bush himself, always promise to move the United States' embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. None of them have done so. Not because they didn't want to, but because they recognized that the price would be too high and the benefit, from an American perspective, too small. There's no special reason to upset the status quo and there are several good reasons to protect it. This is not a question of what is right; it's a question of interests. Israel, of course, must continue to insist that Jerusalem is its capital city and it must continue to hope that there will be a window of opportunity that will allow some future president to decide that the benefits outweigh the costs.

Israel must try to understand what happened this week: the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling did not undermine Jerusalem. Rather, it weakened Congress and strengthened the president's control of foreign policy. The ruling is relevant to issues such as Iran, the battle in the United Nations and other struggles wherein Israel hopes that a friendly Congress will save it from a confrontational president. If this week's ruling sent any kind of message to Israel, it is that only the United States has the right to decide which of its branches of government will rescue Israel. Israel, of course, has the right to save itself from itself."

Ends…

 

THE OVAL OFFICE PHARAOH: Writing in Haaretz, Ari Shavit says that Israelis and their leaders must bury the hatchet with U.S. President Barack Obama – or risk a head-on collision that will have catastrophic results.

"The man working in the Oval Office devotes a great deal of thought and feeling to Israel. The first reason for this is his identification with the enlightened, lost Israel of the Labor movement. The second is his frustration that at present Israel seems to him like a country that has lost its way. The third is the sense of affinity he feels to liberal American Jewry, among whom he rose politically and continues to live today. The fourth is the deep pain Barack Obama feels because many Jews in Israel and the United States think of him as the Jews’ enemy. The fifth is the Iran deal being hammered out in Lausanne, which he aspires to turn into his historic foreign policy legacy. The sixth is the political and moral need he feels to do something about the Palestinian issue. The seventh is Binyamin Netanyahu.

But President Obama is not dogmatic. Pleasant, attentive and businesslike, he is extremely pragmatic. The main thing he has learned over the past six years is the limits of power. The main thing he is still learning is the complexity of reality. Ideological victories are not what he’s after. He seeks practical solutions. Someone to run with, someone to work with. Someone with whom change can be brought about.

For seven different reasons, Obama wants to reconcile with the Israelis and make peace with the Jews. This is why he gave fascinating interviews to Jeffrey Goldberg and Ilana Dayan. This is why he donned a kippa and spoke like a Reform rabbi at the Adas Israel synagogue in Washington. This is why he is ready to go to extraordinary lengths to find an Israel that he can love, work with, and with whom he can put things right. Can things be put right? They must be.

The relationship between the U.S. president and Israel has been studded with mistakes, misunderstandings and missed opportunities. While Netanyahu’s Jerusalem felt that Obama’s Washington doesn’t understand the Middle East, Obama’s Washington felt that Netanyahu’s Jerusalem doesn’t understand the 21st century zeitgeist. While the frontier democracy felt that the democratic superpower was being overly conciliatory, the democratic superpower felt that the frontier nation was becoming more extremist and nationalist.

But all that’s happened in the last few years is nothing compared to what could happen if the Iranian nuclear deal is finalized and signed in the coming summer. If that happens, we will soon witness a head-on collision. On one side will stand a Democratic president determined to leave a mark on the world, and on the other will stand an Israeli/Republican alliance determined to prevent what it perceives as the end of the world. On one side will stand a liberal White House that enjoys overwhelming support of the new, multicultural and open-minded America, and on the other side will stand a conservative Congress that represents the old, white America and is perceived as Israel’s close ally.

If the deal goes through, the shameful shouting and heckling that was showered upon Jack Lew will double and triple among American Jewry. If the deal doesn’t go through, the Jews will be perceived as the ones who thwarted the first African-American president and who forced the United States into a dangerous confrontation with Iran and Islam. Whatever the political outcome of this confrontation, the consequences may be horrendous. Obama, Israel and the American Jewish community will emerge from it battered and bruised.

In the little time that still remains until the moment of truth, the air must be cleared. The incitement against Obama must stop. We must reach out to him. It is not Pharaoh that is working in the Oval Office. It is not Haman that is residing in the White House. It is a true friend. It is absolutely legitimate to argue with the thinking person serving as president of the United States, but that person must be respected and cherished. It’s not too late to restart the ailing relationship. It is a moral and political imperative to do so at once."

Ends…

 

ERDOGAN’S LOSS: In its editorial on Thursday, The Jerusalem Post says that it is always a welcome development when an autocrat-wannabe like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is brought down a peg.

"President Recep Tayyip Erdogan harbored unconcealed ambitions to resurrect a present-day version of the Ottoman sultanate of old, with himself cast in the starring role. For that he needed enough parliamentary clout to change the constitution and put unprecedented executive powers in the president’s hands, in contrast to his current status as titular head-of-state only. This is what Sunday’s election in Turkey was all about.

Erdogan failed to amass the mandate he sought and, for the first time since his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power 13 years ago, he lost his parliamentary majority. In itself that certainly appears to justify joy in Israel, which Erdogan – a Muslim Brotherhood torchbearer – bashes relentlessly and vituperatively.

Erdogan had set in motion a counterrevolution against the secular post-World War I republic that modern Turkey’s ideological father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, established. Ataturk abolished the sultanate and sought Turkey’s transformation via political, cultural, social, economic and legal reforms. Despite occasional resort to military coups to protect its threatened secular quasi-democracy, Turkey became a NATO stalwart and for decades held radical Islam at bay. Erdogan changed the direction in a fundamental way.

For Israel, this constituted a particular blow. An outcast in its neighborhood, Israel yearned for Muslim friends, for a comradeship of self-preservation with the region’s other non-Arabs – Turks and Iranians. This made singular sense in the heyday of nationalist pan-Arabism. It, however, eroded as religious fervor supplanted nationalist zeal and Arabs could theoretically welcome Iran and Turkey into their club rather than shun their co-religionists as rank outsiders. First Iran was lost to the ayatollahs, and then the 'strategic alliance' with Turkey collapsed, despite the fact that pre-Erdogan, Ankara’s eyes seemed set westward as it coveted EU membership.

None of the above trends, it needs be stressed, have changed with Erdogan’s letdown at the polls. His visceral hostility to Israel is unlikely to be mitigated by his failure to effectively undo the overhauls that Ataturk put in place almost a hundred years ago. Erdogan’s hold on foreign policy has not diminished. The setback he suffered may only make him all the more aggressive and vindictive. His capacity for blaming everything and anything on Jews is well-known. Spewing Judeophobic rhetoric just one day before Turks were to cast their ballots, Erdogan found no issue more conducive to garnering support than blaming The New York Times for a supposed century of anti-Turkish bias fueled by 'the Jewish capital that is behind it.'

Such knee-jerk pillory-the-Jew vitriol has become bon ton in much of Turkish public discourse and there is little likelihood that the damage wrought could be instantly reversed. This is all the more so in view of Turkey’s economic travails and the probability that it is in for prolonged instability. Erdogan is only 19 parliamentary seats short of a majority and he possesses various alternatives for achieving it. He can illicitly tempt opposition parliamentarians to his camp. He can try to form a coalition. He can opt for a minority government and then, whenever things don’t go his way, he can agitate and provoke until he is 'forced' to declare a game-changing state of emergency. Erdogan can, in essence, seize power. He has shown in the recent past that he is not shy of cynically employing any assortment of dirty tricks. He has jailed the military hierarchy, opposition politicians and noncompliant journalists. He violently repressed protests. He instituted a personality cult – exemplified by his omnipresent portraits – and built himself a sumptuous 1,150-room palace, all in the name of egalitarianism.

Erdogan is far from a defeated foe. Under no circumstances should he be written off. His capacity for malice must not be dismissed, even if his dreams of heading an ostensibly elected sultanate were knocked down – for now. We can only hope that the election results are a harbinger of changes to come in the country that once seemed like it could be Israel’s strongest ally in the region."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS: Gonul Tol argues that that the EU and Washington read last weekend’s election results differently in centre-left Radikal: "The European Union is pleased that there has been no election fraud, and that a weakened AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] has come out of the ballot box after a very tense and antidemocratic electoral campaign. Another pleasing development as far as the EU is concerned is that the HDP has passed the 10% electoral threshold and that it represents the Kurdish political movement in parliament. While the EU is evaluating the results within the context of Turkish democracy, Washington is approaching the issue from the point of view of regional policy, especially the Syrian perspective. That is why the picture that has emerged after the elections is not that bright for the U.S. when compared to Europe."

Sami Kohen predicts a foreign policy shift in centrist Milliyet: "The political picture that has emerged after the election shows that even if it forms the next government, the AKP, which has lost its majority, will be unable to conduct its foreign policy with the same degree of comfort as before. If a coalition is formed, the ideas and red lines of the party that will become partner in government will need to be taken into account. There are many sensitive foreign policy problems on Turkey's agenda. While the new government deals with them, it should take account of the attitude of the coalition partners and fine-tune its foreign policy accordingly."

Ceyda Karan believes that the change in the national mood was reflected elsewhere in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "On the morning of June 8th the people of Turkey were not the only ones to breathe a sigh of relief. We were fed up with the domestic discourse that polarized and divided the country with the object of driving people to clash with each other. It is possible that those who attach significance - by safeguarding their own interests of course - to economic and political cooperation with a country such as Turkey that links Europe to the Middle East, do not have a different view. They have also been suffering from the rhetoric which has turned foreign policy traditions upside down and linked every issue to baseless conspiracies."

Orhan Miroglu claims that Turkey came under outside pressures in centre-right, pro-government Star: "If Turkey is talking about a coalition today and if the birth of a one-party system [based on the HDP - pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] is emerging in one region of Turkey, this is because of the bill that the international powers have forced Turkey to pay since it has implemented the [Kurdish] peace process as a national project. This is a form of a punishment. What was done with weapons in Syria has been done through the ballot box in Turkey."

Emin Pazarci suggests that a coalition is on the cards at any moment in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "The ballot box produced uncertainty on June 7th. Turkey is now talking about coalition models. And what is being generally said is that 'this party will not come together with that; and that that party will not sit with this'. However, there is nothing in politics such as 'this cannot happen'! This is politics; everything can change at any moment."

Hasan Cemal calls for constraining the president in independent online T24: "Unless the answer to the question of who is boss in the AKP becomes clear, the door to normalization cannot be opened in Turkey. Stability in this country is a dream unless [President] Erdogan is restrained within the constitutional framework, and is made to accept the validity of a parliamentary system, not a presidential one; that is to say, what are the constitution’s red lines. Dissent within the AKP cannot be prevented unless the Erdogan problem is resolved. The number of those who became aware of the fact that June 7th represented a sharp lesson is growing within the AKP."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

SANCTIONS: Conservative Hemayat asserts: "Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of accusations of terrorism, human rights abuses and the nuclear programme. Thus, it is not only the nuclear issue. It is not clear what pretext the U.S. will use to keep sanctions in place after a nuclear agreement is reached. Neither the government, nor the Iranian nation will accept an agreement that does not involve the complete lifting of sanctions. If the talks fail, Iran will show the world which side was not keen to reach a deal and was after excessive demands and bullying from the very start." 

 

NUCLEAR BILL: Reformist Arman brings in Israel: "Based on the bill requiring a nuclear deal to be approved by parliament and in case it is ratified, inspections of Iranian military sites by the IAEA will be banned. A country with Iran's power would not allow such inspections. If inspections are to take place, then the Zionist regime should also accept inspections of its own military sites. The Majlis bill is a reasonable one and MPs have the right to pass such a bill."

 

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS: Hard-line Keyhan comments: "The remarks of President Rowhani that securing the lifting of sanctions should be a top priority were widely condemned by hard-line critics. They contended that his statement sends 'a message of weakness' to the other side in the heat of complex nuclear talks. How could this be the case when our rivals have already recognized the undeniable fact that Iran is at the top of its power and experienced the role it plays in the region and the world?" 

 

TURKISH ELECTIONS: Reformist E'temad expects some changes: "The Justice and Development Party will not be able to establish its own government and has to form a coalition with other parties. This will have an important impact on relations with Iran, especially on issues related to Iraq, Syria and economic ties. It is expected that economic relations will not suffer, but Turkey's regional policies and their cost will be scrutinized. The elections results will degrade the axis of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which will weaken their role in Syria."

 

SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Resalat paints a gloomy picture: "Saudi princes are leaving Saudi Arabia to Morocco and the West, particularly to France and the UK fearing possible bloody conflicts among the ruling family. Some members of the royal family are not satisfied with the changes introduced by King Salman. Over the past few months, the country is speedily moving towards decline and failure. In addition, efforts to resolve internal political problems have weakened the royal family."

 

IRAQ/ISIS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz affirms that unity is the only way to victory: "On June 10, 2014, ISIS terrorists took control of Mosul. The Iraqi military should have resisted few hundred terrorists, but this did not happen. ISIS managed to take control of Mosul in a short time and started its advance to capture the rest of Iraq. One year has passed since this event and Iraq is still in intensive care, which is fateful for the entire region. The only solution for Iraq is reliance on unity amongst its religious sects and the espousal of Islamic views."  

 

DOMESTIC ISSUES: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami reports: "The Ministry of Roads and Urban Development recently unveiled a comprehensive housing plan. Over the past 35 years, Iranian governments made numerous promises for solving this deep rooted issue. But housing still remains a big problem."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Arrogance and gloating

2-The new Gaza threat

3-Unknown perpetrators

4-Boycott Israel, not just the occupation

 

1-Arrogance and gloating

 

[Turkish President] Erdogan disregarded the most basic principles of international relations and respect for other countries’ sovereignty. And this is to say nothing of his support for a group [the Muslim Brotherhood] that uses terrorism and intimidation as its means of coming to power, or his support for extremist groups in neighboring Syria. Arrogance consumed Erdogan's mind, and he believed he could deceive all the people all of the time. He pursued his fanciful dreams and sought to revive the past glories of the Ottoman Empire, crowning himself as the Middle East's sultan, and becoming the key to the region and in control of all its affairs. He believed that he could become the region's sole spokesman, and that the West would have no alternative but turn to him whenever it wishes to do anything in the area--Egyptian al-Ahram

 

There are those who may argue that Turkey needed a leader of Erdogan's status, with significant authority bestowed upon him by the people in order to achieve serious political and economic goals. But the correct response is that there is no achievement bigger than healing the wounds of identity, history, and geography. The latest Turkish parliamentary elections have opened the door to such an achievement. But what is most risible among the crowd of gloaters at Erdogan's misfortunes are those Arab tyrants and their supporters who are in the midst of a totally different historical moment that conflicts with what has happened in Turkey. Those Arab tyrants boast that they remain on their thrones at a time when their countries are collapsing and fragmenting and when their peoples are rushing collectively or individually to flee for their lives by land, sea, or air, so as to escape the terrible holocaust their rulers have imposed on them--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

Turkey’s voters have finally come to realize the price of President Erdogan's domestic and foreign policies and have punished him accordingly, by inflicting a terrible defeat on him and his party in last Sunday’s parliamentary elections, says the editorial in an authoritative Cairo daily. The Arab tyrants who have been gloating over Erdogan's setback are the most risible of his opponents, argues the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. Given Turkey’s current situation, Erdogan has, in fact, proven that he is the Ataturk of the current moment despite his electoral defeat, managing to deal with the problems that these very same Arab tyrants have failed to address.

 

SLAP IN THE FACE: “Turkey’s voters have delivered a powerful slap in the face to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan," writes the editorial in Wednesday's authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

At the same time, Erdogan has been severely punished for his bad policy choices and imprudent behavior, especially in foreign affairs, due to his insistence on intervening in the domestic affairs of some of the region's countries.

The Turks have come to realize that Erdogan's presence at the summit of power poses a threat to the country’s future and its regional and international relations. This is why they decided to deny the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) its parliamentary majority in what appears to be the prelude to early general elections and removing the AKP from power after it has held onto the country's reins for the last 13 years.

Erdogan disregarded the most basic principles of international relations and respect for other countries’ sovereignty. And this is to say nothing of his support for a group that uses terrorism and intimidation as its means of coming to power, or his support for extremist groups in neighboring Syria.

Arrogance consumed Erdogan's mind, and he believed he could deceive all the people all of the time. He pursued his fanciful dreams and sought to revive the past glories of the Ottoman Empire, crowning himself as the Middle East's sultan, and becoming the key to the region and in control of all its affairs. He believed that he could become the region's sole spokesman, and that the West would have no alternative but to turn to him whenever it wishes to do anything in the area.

Did Erdogan not contemplate the moral that was plain for him to see, namely, that as the Brotherhood was gloating over Egypt's misfortunes in the 1967 defeat (even though Egypt is their country whose importance and status they have failed to appreciate), he utterly failed in the parliamentary elections at that very same moment?

By way of contrast, opinion polls point to a rise in [Egyptian] President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's popularity inside and outside the country thanks to his efforts, his achievements during the short period he has been in power, and his policy of steering clear of the petty actions and macho statements that Erdogan had grown accustomed to on every occasion.

Nor did Erdogan notice that the ballot box has clearly said that he is no longer appropriate for him to remain in power. For if he has no interest in power for its own sake, as he claims, why did he not tender his resignation after his party's resounding defeat, so as to offer a practical demonstration that he respects the voters' will?

Erdogan chose to back a terrorist group that harbors nothing but ill will towards its own country, and that boasts that it intends to topple Egypt from every available podium. But this will not happen, God willing, because Egypt's people are defending it together with its great patriotic army.

"This army bears a sword with which it protects the country's national soil in one hand, and pickaxe for construction rather than destruction, in the other," concludes the daily.

End…

 

MANY GLOATERS: "No sooner did the results of the Turkish parliamentary elections appear, then there was a wave of gloating at Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's misfortunes," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

There are many such gloaters, and at their forefront stand Erdogan’s ideological and personal enemies who believed that the rise of his star, his economic and political successes and his indisputable popularity since he moved from the Istanbul Municipality to the premiership in 2003 until he became head of state in 2014, has been nothing short of disastrous.

These gloaters include Erdogan's ideological and political enemies in Turkey and the Arab world, headed by some Arab tyrants. In Turkey, there are the hard line Turkish secularists represented by the People's Republican Party (CHP). Their problem is that Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning AKP have secured the leadership of the state even though they [the secularists] had been enjoying this privilege ever since the establishment of the republic in 1923.

Broadly speaking, Ataturk and the Turks’ greatest achievement was to preserve the unity of the Turkish state. Secularism was the ideology adopted by Ataturk and the Turkish elite, assuming that this would be the creed that would prevent the country from breaking apart. But Ataturk's successors used that ideology as a pretext for blocking the peaceful transfer of power. The price was paid in terms of Turkey's Islamic identity and those who believe in it. The Kurds also paid the price, but their nationalist calls have safeguarded their aspirations for independence. In this sense, the Islamists were the partners of Kurds for many long decades.

The AKP's sweeping victories in all Turkish elections since 2003 represent a major achievement that has followed upon a long history of struggle. The party also tested the Turkish Republic's ability to develop and rise up the ladder of civilization and respect for democracy, human rights, self-expression and dignified life. Similarly, the fact that the Kurds have finally entered parliament marks an achievement for their peaceful struggle and a new test for the Turkish system's ability to develop and become more civilized.

In this sense and from a historical perspective, the victory of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) – the party that managed to bring the Kurds' aspirations to parliament – cannot be viewed as a defeat for the AKP, as those gloating over Erdogan's setback would like to believe. Rather, it represents the historical expression of a moment when the sense of injustice against Islam and Kurdish identity have come together in defending their right to exist, expressing themselves, and mending the path taken by the Turkish Republic – an instance of what Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi refers to as 'the cunning of history.'

For at this momentous turning point in Turkey's history, the Turks – who conquered Constantinople – have managed to conquer a new Constantinople that takes them to the open space of tolerance and a common desire to build of their country.

There are those who may argue that Turkey needed a leader of Erdogan's status, with significant authority bestowed upon him by the people in order to achieve serious political and economic goals. But the correct response is that there is no achievement bigger than healing the wounds of identity, history, and geography. The latest Turkish parliamentary elections have opened the door to such an achievement.

But what is most risible among the crowd of gloaters at Erdogan's misfortunes are those Arab tyrants and their supporters who are in the midst of a totally different historical moment that conflicts with what has happened in Turkey.

Those Arab tyrants boast that they remain on their thrones at a time when their countries are collapsing and fragmenting and when their peoples are rushing collectively or individually to flee for their lives by land, sea, or air, so as to escape the terrible holocaust their rulers have imposed on them.

Erdogan did not acquire the same sort of power as Ataturk, quite simply because Turkey no longer needs an Ataturk. As for the Arab tyrants, they are still trying to bury their people together with their rule, which has been long dead.

In this sense, Erdogan is the Ataturk of his specific historical moment. Under his rule, Turkey became the 17th largest economy in the world. And because of him, there is now a chance to solve two the major problems that the Arab world remains unable to address: that of identity, and the problem of minorities.

"As for the gloating Arab tyrants, all they are doing is to turn their era of living-dead states into a permanent one," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-The new Gaza threat

 

The emerging jihadist threat in Gaza calls for a comprehensive political and social solution for the Strip, and not just new security arrangements with Egypt, says Ahmad Jamil ‘Azm in today’s Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Recent developments in the Gaza Strip with the emergence of salafi jihadi groups and reports of an understanding between Hamas and Egypt concerning the situation in Sinai highlight the need for a lasting and comprehensive solution for the situation in the Strip, argues a Palestinian commentator in a Jordanian daily.

 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: “A number of recent developments in the Gaza Strip have been linked to what has come to be known as ‘jihadi salafism’ or the takfiri groups,” writes Ahmad Jamil ‘Azm in Wednesday’s Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

These developments may arise from different directions, but they all seem to highlight the need to close this file. Yet the question remains as to whether this is possible, since all the current proposals are of a security nature whose effectiveness without a parallel comprehensive political and social solution is in doubt.

The first such development was revealed by reports, backed by statements from senior Hamas figures, concerning an understanding with the Egyptian authorities (or early signs of one) that would normalize relations with Hamas in the Gaza Strip based on the latter’s cooperation with arrangements in Sinai that involve creating buffer zone between the Strip and the violent salafi jihadi (takfiri) groups. This appears to be an implicit admission of a connection between what is happening in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai.

The truth is that such a link seems clear and is not simply an accusation; moreover, the Egyptian authorities are as responsible for this state of affairs as Hamas. For it is impossible to ignore the fact that the phenomenon of armed elements and violent groups in Sinai would not have emerged had it not been for the tunnels ‘industry’ and the unofficial economy that accompanied it. That ‘industry’ and its economy are linked, in turn, to various tribal and social structures that seek an ideological slogan to justify their activities. At the very least, these structures provide a fertile ground for infiltration by al-Qa’ida and its ilk. Had there been a solution other than of the tunnels, their economy and the social structures linked to them, what happened would not have taken place.

The second development this week was the rocket fire aimed at Israel by salafi groups in the Strip. Responsibility was claimed by a group calling itself The Martyr ‘Omar Hadid Brigade – Beit al-Maqdis. This in turn is linked to a third development. The Palestinian news agency Ma’an quoted Hamas sources as saying that ‘these (salafi) elements number no more than 1-3% and are not united in any way; they are no more than scattered individuals who do not follow any particular figure, but each group calls itself a different name. But they are under [Hamas] control and their movements are being monitored. In fact, 10 of them are already in prison.’

In other words, these are small and scattered groups. This may be true; but it does not make them any less dangerous. However, the Hamas source, whose knowledge and position in the movement are not known, may have been unintentionally exaggerating the strength of jihadi salafism. For 1-3% is an enormous figure, especially if this represents a proportion of the overall [1.8 million] population. If, however, he is referring to the extent of popular support for these movements, this may be more accurate, or even less than the true figure, in fact. But however it may be read, it remains a huge figure, amounting to some 60-thousand people bearing in mind the Gaza Strip total population. 5% of them would be enough to upset all the existing balances, since firing rockets at Israel to ‘spite’ Hamas could undermine the entire situation and a few such attacks could drag the Strip into a deadly abyss.

Cooperation between Hamas and Egypt, assuming it takes place, would be a step in the right direction, provided certain conditions were satisfied, most importantly:

- First, that there should be a conviction that a security solution alone is insufficient, with no illusions that a limited trade-off between Egypt and Hamas would be enough for what is required. For without a tangible change in the existing political, economic, and social circumstances, the environment would remain suitable for extremism. Hamas knows that some of its own elements may be attracted by this sort of thinking and pattern of action, bearing in mind that no organization is immune to having their members veer towards extremism. For example, Mumtaz Daghmash, one of the first to lead such groups, was an officer in the PA’s Preventive Security when Fateh was still in control of the Strip. In other words, there is need for a comprehensive plan for easing the living conditions in the Strip.

- Second, Hamas should not once again conclude that any opening to Egypt – no matter how big or small –will allow it to rule the Strip by itself, or that this can replace the need to reach an understanding with the Palestinian presidency, or to accept the [2014] national accord government in order to reach a permanent solution for the Strip.

Any ease in tensions between Hamas and Egypt provides an opportunity that may be used by the Palestinian presidency to try and formulate a comprehensive concept that would end the current occluded horizon of national reconciliation. Instead of a limited security solution in Sinai in return for reducing the pressure on Hamas, it may be possible to work on formulating a complete package for the Strip.

"This is especially necessary in light of the blockage in the peace process and the current freeze in the process of internationalizing the Palestinian cause," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

3-Unknown perpetrators

 

There is nothing strange about the fact that the perpetrators in the cases of Mosul, Tikrit and al-Ramadi have remained unknown, for in today’s Iraq no one is held accountable for forgery, corruption or betrayal, says 'Adnan Hussein on today’s Iraqi www.sotaliraq.com

 

One full year after the fall of Mosul in ISIS’s hands, the identities of those that facilitated its capture remain unknown, notes an Iraqi commentator. But there is nothing strange about that, given what else has been happening in the country since 2003, and since party politics and the entire political system have been built on corruption and the protection of those guilty of illicit gain.

 

OPEN FILE: "Even after a full year, the perpetrators remain unknown," writes 'Adnan Hussein on Wednesday on the Iraqi website www.sotaliraq.com.

And a year from now, we shall still find that the file continues to be opened once, and closed many times, and that the perpetrators are still unknown. And the same will happen in two, three, and ten years’ time.

There is no intention to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime in which Mosul fell; one that paved the way for countless major crimes such as the occupation of one-third of the country's area, the death of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, the enslavement and rape of thousands of others, and so on.

But there is nothing strange about this. All the killings by car bombs, mortar shells, shootings and guns with and without silencers, that we have witnessed since 2003 have remained unsolved and their perpetrators have remained unknown. Tens of prominent politicians, distinguished academics, professionals and famous media figures, and thousands of ordinary people have been killed –assassinated deliberately and with prior planning and determination, in fact.

Markets have been burnt down, and schools, hospitals, homes, mosques, and churches demolished in the process. Yet our state institutions have proven unable to identify the perpetrators of these actions. The victims' families have tired of repeated inquiries and their material and psychological cost. They have therefore surrendered to the status quo. And the status quo is that no one wants the perpetrators' identity to be known. This is because removing the cover that hides their identity would be akin to a horrendous earthquake, with the earth vomiting out what lies deep inside, and all that is high tumbling down. On that day, no legally or illegally amassed monies will be of any use. But everyone is careful to safeguard their monies and families.

There is nothing strange about the case of Mosul. All the forgeries witnessed in various general and local elections have been classified as perpetrated by unknown people. And the same goes for the forgeries of academic degrees and official documents that have allowed thousands who have failed in their studies to assume leading state posts with the full knowledge and protection of religious and non-religious parties, as well as parties whose ranks have been infiltrated by former murderers and Saddam’s minions.

There is nothing strange about the case of Mosul. All of the major financial and administrative corruption, whose heroes were MPs, ministers, senior ministry figures, heads of institutions, general directors, bankers, businessmen, contractors, army, police and security officers … all these dossiers have remained closed. The open files were confined to petty thieves and those with no fixed dwelling –a euphemism for those who have fled the country with the help and facilitation of their partners inside the state’s apparatuses.

There is nothing strange about the fact that the perpetrators in the cases of Mosul, Tikrit, and al-Ramadi have remained unknown. And there will be nothing strange if they were to remain unknown for two, three, or ten years to come, perhaps forever.

"For we live in the land of wonders, in a state of wonders, with a government and a judiciary of wonders," concludes Hussein.

Ends…

 

 

4-Boycott Israel, not just the occupation

 

The Palestinians should escalate their most effective means of pressure so far extending it to a boycott of Israel and its racist laws, not only the occupation, says Hani al-Masri in today’s Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The recent successes chalked up by the campaign to boycott Israel have greatly worried the Israeli government, notes a leading Palestinian commentator. But such a campaign cannot be guaranteed success unless the Palestinian leadership throws its weight behind it, and unless the movement ultimately questions Israel's very legitimacy and does not confine itself to boycotting Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

 

DEEPLY CONCERNED: "Israel has been deeply concerned because of the growth of the boycott movement– so much so, that the French mobile phone firm Orange suspended its contract with Israel’s Partner Company," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This gave rise to a major Israeli campaign in which the government headed by Binyamin Netanyahu took part. Pressure was exerted on the French government, which owns 25% of Orange's shares, and which ultimately forced the company to backtrack on its decision to suspend its activities in Israel. But the issue is still not over, and the battle will continue until Orange retracts its last decision.

Last week, the presidents of Israeli universities met with the Israeli president and told him that the academic boycott of Israeli universities has reached a dangerous point, but that Israel can abort this if it acts immediately. They warned the government that it if fails to act and wage a counter-campaign before it is too late, Israeli universities and academics would be unable to work or cooperate with universities or academics around the world.

The Israeli government also held a special meeting to discuss the boycott and how to confront it. It decided to set aside more funds to combat it, as well as organize a campaign to collect contributions from Israel's friends, matching the Israeli budget allocated for this mission, at least. And the Knesset is preparing to discuss the matter again.

The Israeli government views the boycott as of equal importance and danger as 'terrorism'. It is focusing on the claim that boycotting Israel is a form of anti-Semitism that targets 'the Jewish state,' which is an extension of the anti-Semitic campaign that targeted the Jews and peaked with the massacre committed by Hitler's Germany against millions of Jews. This is a false and feeble claim, because the leaders and members of the boycott campaign include Semites and Jews. Second, the Israeli counter-campaign focuses on the claim that the boycott aims to de-legitimize and destroy Israel, and wipe off the map.

The boycott's importance stems from the fact that it focuses on Israel's point of weakness, the same point that Israel portrays as its source of strength. This is the claim that it represents an oasis of civilization and democracy, with high moral values, a state that respects human rights and liberties and abides by international law and respects international legitimacy. This is despite all the crimes, massacres, sieges, and killings of children, destruction of homes, institutions, churches, mosques, and international institutions it has been engaging in, and despite the racial discrimination and attacks on human beings and their homes, and the violations of law and moral values – all of which run contrary to its claim that it is being done in self-defence.

The strong point of the Palestinian struggle is that it is in defense of a just and morally superior cause, and relies on international law and international legitimacy, even though it only calls for the realization of the minimum of Palestinian rights. Therefore, boycotting Israel is one of the means of resistance that strongly exploits Israel’s vulnerability. It can achieve qualitative successes that can change the entire situation, but only if it is perceived as one of the Palestinians’ new and long-term strategic tools, not merely as a tactical means for exerting pressure to improve the Palestinians' living conditions under occupation, or to improve the terms of the negotiations that have failed (and will continue to fail) to end the occupation unless based on points of strength that the Palestinian negotiators bring to bear at the negotiating table.

Matters have reached a point in fact where Israel has passed an endless series of racist laws. And this transforms it more and more into a regime hostile to humanity, worse than the defunct racial discrimination regime in South Africa. What worries Israel's leaders is that they fear the growth of the boycott campaign, since it is likely to secure greater successes in light of the great change in international public opinion, especially in Europe and the U.S. Israel believes that it has lost Europe and America’s universities. And it fears that this change in public opinion will lead to a similar change among governments sooner or later. Once that happens, it will not be long before Israel faces isolation, sanctions and trials.

One example of the boycott campaign's recent successes comes from the National Union of Students (NUS) in Britain which represents 7-million students, and that has demanded that Israel be boycotted. The giant French company Veolia was forced to sell off most of its business in the occupation state after losing billion-dollars as a result of the boycott campaign against it across the world.

Yet despite the boycott campaign’s successes, one should not rest assured regarding its future. Israel has deployed all its power against it and is trying to mobilize its friends and allies to foil the campaign. It has achieved important successes in this regard by convincing the U.S. Congress, the Canadian Parliament and other world parliaments, to pass laws banning the boycott of Israel as a form of anti-Semitism. These laws also include measures to punish the advocates and participants in campaigns to boycott Israel.

The Palestinians and their friends need to exert greater efforts and deploy more resources and energies to ensure the success of the boycott campaign. Among the measures that need to be taken, the Palestinians’ PA and PLO leaders must throw all their weight behind this battle, and not confine themselves to dealing with it reticently, or failing to intervene when they should do so. One example of this was Orange's backtracking on its decision after the Israeli government exerted pressure on the French government; that should have been met with similar counter-pressures from the Palestinian government.

Moreover, the Palestinian government should work on convincing Arab leaders and governments to join the boycott, because these are some of the most important tools for entering a guaranteed path towards affecting the required change in the balance of power.  That will halt Israel’s racist settlement activities and its schemes against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and inside the territories occupied in 1948.  It will open a window of opportunity for imposing a settlement that achieves the basic minimum of Palestinian national rights. For these rights will never be achieved in light of the continued illusions and wagers on the international community alone, or on the path of negotiations and U.S. pressure on Israel. For that is the course that has led us to the catastrophe that we find ourselves facing today. Persisting with these illusions and wagers will only produce a bigger catastrophe.

This leaves one final point: Should the boycott be confined to the occupation and settlements and steer clear of questioning Israel's alleged legitimacy? Or should it be comprehensive and focus on the fact that Israel is a state established on the ruins of another nation that it continues to try and annihilate, refusing to implement the dictates of international law and UN resolutions whose implementation could pave the way to a satisfactory solution for the Palestinian problem?

So far, Israel has also aborted all solutions and initiatives that aim to reach a settlement that upholds the basic minimum of Palestinian rights, despite the fact that the Palestinian leadership has recognized Israel's right to exist and has halted resistance to it, abiding by all its security and economic obligations that ensure Israel's security and stability. This calls for a review of the Oslo track and for liberation from its commitments, if only gradually, beginning with ending security coordination and ending with rescinding recognition of Israel.

Those who wish to confine themselves to boycotting the settlements should do so. But the boycott will not bear fruit unless it questions the entire Israeli project. Only then will Israel feel that it is being pursued, and that it may suffer isolation, sanctions and accountability for its previous and ongoing crimes.

"After all, an entity that engages in occupation, settlement activities and racism, and which is an embodiment of a Zionist colonial project that continues to unfold, cannot be legitimate," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Right wing shenanigans

 

Deputy Knesset Speaker Oren Hazan – the freshman Knesset member who has been accused of pimping for guests at the Bulgarian casino he ran and of supplying and consuming hard drugs – is the unwilling star of the front pages of all Israeli newspapers on Wednesday.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with an analysis by Sima Kadmon, which asks the questions that most Israelis are posing today: How on earth did such a shady character make it into the Knesset? Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead with a further allegation against Hazan, which emerged after he was told that he cannot – in light of the original allegations against him – head a meeting of the Knesset's anti-drug authority. In response, Hazan is accused of threatening Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein, saying that he would dig up dirt to discredit him.

Haaretz, which also carries the Hazan story on its front page, leads instead with what it calls a concerted effort by ministers to limit actors' and performers' ability to protest against government policies. Haaretz says that two recent moves by Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Culture Minister Miri Regev are the first harbingers of this campaign. Bennett ordered the immediate removal of 'A Parallel Time,' a play performed by the Al-Midan Theater in Haifa, from the list of performances made available to schoolchildren, arguing that it justified the murder of soldiers. Regev, for her part, said that she is considering cutting government funding to the Elmina Theater in Jaffa after its leader Norman Issa refused to perform in the Haifa Theater’s play 'Boomerang' in a Jordan Valley settlement.

In other news, comments by various officials at the annual Herzliya Conference are given varying degrees of prominence in the newspapers. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who addressed the conference yesterday evening, said that Arab leaders agree with him that an emerging nuclear deal with Iran won't stop Tehran from getting atomic weapons.

Netanyahu told the prestigious conference that he is not the only voice in the Middle East against the deal. 'I am often portrayed as the nuclear party pooper,' Netanyahu said. 'But I speak with quite a few of our neighbors, more than you think, and I want to tell you that nobody in this region believes this deal will block Iran's path to the bomb.' Netanyahu warned the deal would spark a nuclear arms race that will see the region 'crisscrossed with nuclear trip wires as other states nuclearize' in fear of Iran. He said lifting the sanctions rewards Iran with 'prosperity at home' while allowing it to continue 'aggression abroad.'

Speaking earlier in the day, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said that he does not believe a stable peace agreement could be reached with the Palestinians in his lifetime – one of the bleakest assessments from a top-level cabinet member since talks collapsed last year. Ya'alon, one of Netanyahu's closest allies, accused the Palestinians of having 'slammed the door' on efforts to keep discussions going, and said they had rejected peace-for-land deals for at least 15 years. His comments were dismissed by a Palestine Liberation Organization official who told Reuters that Netanyahu's administration bore the blame for the impasse.

Elsewhere, Israel Radio reports that the most senior U.S. military officer has reassured Israel that it will maintain a military edge over potential adversaries, including Gulf Arab states, regardless of whether Washington completes a nuclear deal with Iran. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the statement after meeting in Tel Aviv with his Israeli counterpart and with Ya'alon. Dempsey told reporters that Israeli officials expressed their concern at the scope of U.S. military assistance to Gulf States as a bulwark against Iran.

Washington has long pledged to ensure that Israel has what is called a 'qualitative military edge' over its potential adversaries in the region. But Dempsey said the Israelis are concerned that the growing size of Gulf Arab militaries could erode Israel's edge.

Finally, Haaretz reports that top Egyptian intelligence officers met recently with senior Hamas officials from outside the Gaza Strip to discuss the poor relations between Egypt and the Strip’s Hamas regime, senior officials of the Islamist organization confirmed on Tuesday. According to Palestinian media reports, Hamas’ main demand was that Egypt reopens its Rafah border crossing with Gaza. Egypt, for its part, demanded several confidence-building measures from Gaza’s rulers, though Hamas officials declined to specify what these entailed.

Hamas said it has agreed to some of these measures, but others require further discussion. Senior Hamas official Salah Bardawil told Palestinian media outlets in Gaza that Egypt’s intelligence agencies understand that Hamas isn’t involved in any activity to undermine Egypt’s national security, contrary to the picture painted in Egypt’s official media. But while the sides are discussing easing the Egyptian blockade of Gaza, Bardawil added, it’s impossible to speak of a true reconciliation or a restoration of Hamas’ former close ties with Egypt.

 

A NEW DIPLOMATIC TSUNAMI: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir explains why the next few months – once the nuclear deal with Iran is finalized – are likely to see a redoubling of international onslaught against Israel.

"Israel hopes to nix the signing of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers not simply because it is a dangerous deal. The more immediate concern is that, on the day after the deal is inked, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will once again become the main item on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union and the international community will turn its attention to the party it sees responsible for the impasse in the peace process – Israel.

This is the prevalent opinion that I have heard in off-the-record chats with diplomats in Washington and New York. 'Israel is likely to be subjected to a diplomatic onslaught that will surprise even the most pessimistic people in Jerusalem,' one senior Western diplomat told me this week. 'In the Security Council, in Western capitals and at the headquarters of the European Union they are just waiting for the Iranian nuclear deal to be finalized and approved by the U.S. Congress.'

The assumption is that this enforced waiting period will end in September. So, the annual United Nations General Assembly will mark the start of a massive and global diplomatic campaign against Israel.

According to my conversations with reliable sources in New York, who are well aware of the atmosphere in European capital cities regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that Brussels has already drawn up documents and working papers that detail the sanctions that will be imposed on trade with Israel and on Israeli agriculture, science and culture. Unless, of course, Israel puts forward some kind of diplomatic initiative, which would lead to a major breakthrough and significant progress toward a resolution of the conflict.

'Senior officials in Jerusalem are aware of these European sanctions documents, some of which have even reached Israeli hands,' I have been told. When U.S. President Barack Obama talks repeatedly about how it will be hard for his country to defend Israel in various international forums, he is referring most specifically to the planned European sanctions against Israel.

The Americans are facing a complex dilemma. The White House and senior State Department officials are opposed to the involvement of the Security Council and other international bodies in its own diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – since this is an area that they feel they should be dealing with exclusively. The White House has not yet decided how it will respond to the French proposal that is currently being touted at the Security Council – a resolution that Israel, of course, vehemently objects to – and it is still considering how best to respond to the package of planned European measures.

The problem, according to Western diplomats in New York, is that the new government that has been established in Israel is not expected to launch any new and daring diplomatic initiative. 'Given that there is no one in the new Netanyahu government who will object to the lack of a diplomatic initiative on the Israeli side,' one Western diplomat told me this week, 'Israel can expect a stormy time over the next few months. This time, Israel will pay a heavy price for the prolonged stalemate. This time, it's far from clear that Uncle Sam will manage to save Israel; he might not even want to,' he warned."

Ends…

 

QUESTIONS FOR ABU MAZIN: Writing in Maariv, Yitzhak Bar-Ner calls on Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas to agree to resume negotiations with Israel.

"Good morning, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas. I would like to ask you a few critical questions, if I may:

Do you not want to disprove the argument that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his ministers keep on making, that Israel has no one to talk to on the Palestinian side, since you refuse to engage in dialogue and you have some unacceptable preconditions to the resumption of negotiations? Could you not make some kind of effort to ensure that you are not remembered as the last Palestinian leader who refused to recognize the existential need for negotiations and for reaching the two-state solution and because of whom Israel became a binational state of all its citizens?

You are a clear-thinking and realistic leader, who sees how Israel has gone on the defensive. It is under threat because of your approach to the International Criminal Court and it is at a loss how best to deal with this threat. It is starting to feel the effects of the boycott movement and finds itself – much like your own people – at international checkpoints. Israel's relationship with the Obama Administration is on the edge; it is headed by a clone of Erdogan and Putin and someone who is intoxicated by winning 10 seats thanks to the gullibility of the Israeli voter.

The threat from the Gaza Strip is starting to grow again, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is bloodied and trying to intimidate people and Syria is in turmoil. Who knows what tomorrow will bring? So don’t you think that this is the perfect time to convene one final round of negotiations, perhaps involving moderate Arab countries? During the course of these negotiations, we could determine the borders of our countries, the status of Jerusalem, the payment of compensation to refugee (on both sides), the political relationship and cooperation between us, as well as joint measures that can be taken against anyone who tries to derail the peace talks, who incites violence or who resorts to violence. As soon as both sides have agreed to think outside their respective boxes, the negotiations can continue until an agreement is reached? Is that acceptable to you?

You have always chosen the diplomatic path over the path of terror, Mr. President, but you're not getting any younger. The standing of the Palestinian Authority is getting weaker by the day. If an election were to be held today in the territories, experts say that Hamas (which is hated, battered and humbled in Gaza) would win easily. The young generation in the West Bank and Israel has grown up on hatred of the other side, as well as fear of it. There are good reasons for this hatred, but we cannot allow it to dictate our future. You know that the situation is liable to get worse and that's why your security forces are still helping Israel to thwart terrorist activity in the territories.

So what are you waiting for? Are you waiting for Netanyahu and his government – which has started to show a more forgiving attitude toward Hamas in what can only be described as an insult to you – to reach a long-term truce in Gaza and to convince the Egyptians to open the tunnels between Rafah and Gaza? Just so they won't have to go to war again and – perhaps more importantly – to prevent you from setting foot in the Gaza Strip?

So why don't you assume the role of initiator? Everyone knows that you are furious and insulted. No one is asking you to love the people you hate, but mutual enmity is a recipe for stagnation, for inactivity and for dangerous parasites to take control. Why don't you announce to the world that, in order to allow for the resumption of negotiations, you are suspending your efforts to drag Israel into the dock in The Hague – if Israel promised to implement a settlement construction freeze, to punish the 'price tag' offenders, to remove the checkpoints in Areas A, B and C and to crack down on illegal infiltrators entering its territory?

Before the election, Netanyahu swore that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch. Why don't you prove him to be a liar and, at the same opportunity, you might live long enough to see the Palestinian state come into existence."

Ends…

 

LIP SERVICE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Aviad Kleinberg says that the United States' refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel – while de facto accepting the government's policy of creeping annexation - is hypocritical and anachronistic.

"There is something strange about United States refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, a policy that was given additional backing this week by a ruling from the Supreme Court. The court's ruling – which does not address the crux of the matter, but merely asks who has the authority to make policy decisions on such matters (the president) – has put this ridiculous anomaly back in the headlines: the United States' traditional refusal to swallow this particular frog – the status of Jerusalem as Israel's capital city – while gladly swallowing other, less palatable frogs.

According to U.S. policy, Israelis born in Jerusalem – both the western part of the city and the eastern section – are not part of the State of Israel; rather, they hover in air. They are residents of a city that, for the time being, does not belong to any country. All of this is a throwback to the partition plan which determined that Jerusalem would be under international control and would be governed by a special commissioner appointed by the United Nations. Not much remains of this partition plan. One by one, many countries have recognized the 1949 Armistice Lines, even though they are radically different from the proposed borders in the partition plan and were reached as a result of war, rather than negotiations. Jerusalem remains a kind of footnote to a plan that long ago stopped being relevant. In practice, despite the fact that the U.S. Embassy is located in Tel Aviv and despite this ridiculous passport ruling, the United States recognizes the status of Jerusalem in every significant aspect. Official representatives of the United States, including the president, do not refuse to visit the city. On the contrary – they visit Jerusalem often, as guests of the Knesset and the government. Refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel is a secondary victim of the American obsession with imaginary political correctness and their desire to placate the Palestinians over an issue that is neither here nor there.

As a rule, the United States does not view international relations as acceptance of everything that the other party does. In Saudi Arabia, for example, there is a de facto system of non-indentured slavery and there are countless examples of human rights abuses which the liberal United States must surely be opposed to. This does not mean that the Americans will refuse to have full diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia before the human rights issues have been dealt with. Diplomacy deals with the world as it, not the world as we would like it to be. That does not mean that we should not strive to improve the world. The situation is always dynamic. It just means that diplomacy exists in a world that needs improving.

Israel benefits greatly from this approach. The United States refrains, for example, from imposing any kind of sanctions against Israel over its settlement policy, even though Washington believes that this policy is a violation of international law. In fact, American administrations have placed no impediments in the path of Israel's policy of annexation. Even when Israel blatantly violates its commitments to the United States – by refusing to evacuate illegal outposts, for example – the United States turns a blind eye and merely hints that Israel may have to pay one day.

What is particularly vexing, therefore, when it comes to U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem, is the fact that it is paying lip service and nothing more. If Washington really wanted to promote an agreement between us and the Palestinians, it could find 1,001 ways of doing so. But it doesn't want to, for several reasons: it is not convinced that a deal is possible and it does not see an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement as its most important interest. From a political standpoint, an energetic American peace drive would not be acceptable to Israel's annexation government and would lead to harsh criticism of the administration. Obama and his top officials have no political interest in exposing themselves to such criticism, just as they have no interest in sparring with Netanyahu – notwithstanding the way that the Israeli prime minister spits in their faces. That's just the way things work.

In a better world, the United States would recognize Jerusalem – or at least the western part of the city – as the capital of the State of Israel; at the same time, it would aggressively pursue a peace deal. In this world, however, the United States in reality supports Israeli annexation, but won't allow Jerusalem-born children to write Israel as their country of birth in their U.S. passports."

Ends…

 

THE DISUNITED CITY: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein says that some of the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem have become no-man's-land, where the Israeli government and the Jerusalem municipality no longer provide basic services and where armed gangs roam the streets.

"Last weekend, the most widely-read Palestinian newspaper, al-Quds, published a lengthy interview with Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat. This was something of a milestone for a newspaper which has consistently pursued an aggressively nationalistic line and which spares no criticism of Israeli government policies. In this rare interview, Barkat spoke at length about approved plans for massive construction of housing for the city's Arab population in the Jabel Mukaber neighborhood. According to Barkat, the start of construction is imminent. He explained the difficulties he had encountered in gaining approval for the plans and how each apartment would cost the city 70,000 shekels in municipal fees. The mayor also said that he intends to narrow the gaps in the infrastructure and municipal services enjoyed in the two parts of the city.

The very fact that al-Quds was willing to interview Barkat shows that the Palestinian residents of the city are undergoing a process of Israelization. The vast majority of them work in the western half of the city and some even commute to central and northern Israel in order to work. Arab construction and haulage companies from East Jerusalem also play an important role in Israeli commerce. The Hebrew-language schools in Jerusalem are full of young Palestinians. More and more students from East Jerusalem study at the Hebrew University and various colleges scattered throughout the city. There is also a gradual trend of more and more Palestinians seeking full Israeli citizenship (more than 20,000 have already become full citizens of the Jewish state).

However, one figure that Barkat mentioned is especially significant: 20,000 dwellings in East Jerusalem that have been erected without the requisite planning permission. This is a stunning phenomenon, which was not addressed in the interview. In some East Jerusalem neighborhoods that are under Israeli sovereignty – beyond the security barrier – municipal rules and services are in meltdown. There is terrible poverty and criminal gangs run wild. Places like the Shuafat refugee camp and the adjacent neighborhoods, with a total population of 120,000. This is almost one third of the total number of Arab residents of Jerusalem.

In practice, what is happening is that the Israeli and municipal systems are unable to take control of these areas. The Palestinian Authority is not allowed to set foot there and, as a result, these areas are becoming a no-man's-land: high-rise housing is being erected without safety supervision; the alleyways are narrow, full of potholes and garbage. There are no sidewalks, no postal service, the water supply is intermittent and residents do not have basic services like sewage and sanitation. In light of this, house prices there are ridiculously low: a four-bedroom apartment costs no more than 100,000 shekels, while something similar in an average Israeli town would cost 20 times as much.

There is no policing, no ambulances and no firefighters. Bullets fired by warring gangs often stray into neighboring Jewish areas like Pisgat Ze'ev. It's only a matter of time before one of them hits someone. These abandoned neighborhoods are a disaster waiting to happen and many people will die: An earthquake, a fire an IDF raid following a stray bullet. Everyone will be looking for someone to blame. For Barkat, this is good reason to be very worried."

Ends…

 

HAMAS COMES TO ISRAEL'S RESCUE: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that, by reaching an agreement with Hamas, Israel hopes that it can avoid entering into meaningful peace talks with the Palestinian Authority.

"It’s hard to explain how the gossip columnists have missed the love story of the year: Israel and Hamas are back together. True, we know Hamas is attracted to Israel for the money, and Israel is mostly enamored by the military insights that Hamas demonstrates, but the dream is already being worked out: a tahadiya, a long-term cease-fire of five or maybe even 10 years, the opening of the Gaza border crossings for incoming construction materials, the construction of a port and perhaps permission to operate an airport.

What could be better than such a marriage of convenience, particularly now that Egypt has given Hamas, although not its military wing, its stamp of approval? 'We need to talk to Hamas,' a lot of people are saying. Such remarks are being carefully directed, calling for talks with Hamas and not the Palestinians in general; not Mahmoud Abbas and not the Palestinian Authority that he heads. After all, they are not partners to anything.

But those calling for talks with Hamas, bypassing the peace process, are forgetting what happened when Israel carried out its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Here’s a reminder: It’s not Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza that spurred Hamas to shoot rockets at Israel. Hamas was doing so, and committing attacks against Israeli settlers, even before the disengagement from Gaza. Such acts caused the Israel Defense Forces to pour troops onto the streets of Gaza until it almost didn’t have the freedom to carry out any other operations.

The Israeli public at the time was sick of a situation in which the task of protecting 7,000 Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip was consuming the attention of entire brigades. Ultimately Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to withdraw from the Strip, not in an effort to establish a preliminary model for an independent Palestinian state, but so that he could hold onto the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

It was a unilateral move, taken without negotiations with Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. And after that, Israel boycotted the joint Palestinian government formed following the 2006 Palestinian election that included Hamas, just as it later boycotted Abbas when he set up a consensus government after reconciliation with Hamas. As long as Abbas doesn’t manage to control Hamas, Israel ruled, there could be no talk about peace. It was a convincing bluff. As if Israel would have been prepared to map out its final boundaries, uproot the settlements or divide Jerusalem if Abbas did manage to 'control' Hamas, but Hamas was a nice excuse.

Now Hamas may again get the role of coming to Israel’s rescue. Thanks to Hamas, Israel can avoid entering into peace talks and at a cheap price, because when it comes to Hamas, there is no need to talk about evacuating settlements or withdrawing from territory. Hamas won’t turn to the International Criminal Court, the expanding boycott of Israel doesn’t affect it one way or another, and more generally, Hamas isn’t at all excited about any kind of peace agreement with Israel. Hamas and Gaza will get quiet and in return, Israel can declare that there is finally quiet in Gaza — and no urgency in advancing the peace process.

That’s the core of the lie over talking with Hamas, but in such an idyllic situation, it’s important to remember that the organization is playing the role here of the battered wife. She is imprisoned in a ghetto surrounded by electrified fencing. The residents of Gaza are not allowed to freely travel to the West Bank. Exports from Gaza are small, and mostly wither in the fields. The international aid that was promised Gaza in October 2014 is mostly still firmly in place in the pockets of the donor countries. Trucks with merchandise from Israel don’t even supply a quarter of the consumption of the residents of Gaza, more than half of whom are unemployed. University students can’t finish their studies and tens of thousands of Gazans are still homeless thanks to Israel’s Protective Edge military operation last summer, which accomplished only the first step in urban renewal — tearing down without rebuilding.

Israel is ignoring all of this. It only gauges the extent to which it is quiet in Gaza based on the number of rockets fired from there. That is a measurement based on mutual deterrence, with Israel convinced that the mutual threat is stronger than the mutual despair. But quiet in Gaza doesn’t have a life of its own. It requires a foundation that will ensure its existence, and is not a substitute for an overall peace process."

Ends…

 

HIZBOLLAH’S FIGHT BACK: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Alex Yung says that Hizbollah is seeking to offset recent setbacks with a retaliatory offensive.

"Hizbollah has claimed victory in a battle with its rival Jabhat Al-Nusra, over the significant Qalamoun area on the Lebanese-Syrian border. If true, the fighting would represent a change to the otherwise consistent losing streak that allies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have sustained in recent months.

'A strong defeat was dealt to the armed militants and they left the areas of the battlefield,' Hizbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, said in a televised address to supporters in Beirut. But the attack on Al-Nusra, the Al-Qa’ida affiliate in Syria, is also an attempt to win the media battle.

Following months of sporadic skirmishes triggered by Al-Nusra in Lebanon’s border regions, Hizbollah launched its own counter-offensive. The aim was to clear the mountainous area that separates Lebanon and Syria of rebel groups fighting against the Assad regime in the country’s long running civil war. As well as a military operation, the move is representative of a broader attempt by Hizbollah to reassure the Lebanese population that the Shiite group still has the initiative.

Paramount for Hizbollah is the reversal of the image that has been portrayed recently in the media that the group and its allies are losing the war in Syria. A number of strategic setbacks to the Syrian regime have sparked speculation that rebels may soon defeat what is left of Assad’s forces. This would represent a huge blow to Hizbollah’s image and to its logistical supply lines from Iran.

In mid-March, Hizbollah launched the Qalamoun operation to secure the Lebanese border from encroaching Sunni rebel fighters. The group has always maintained that its intervention in Syria was in order to protect Lebanon, its Shiite communities and sites within Syria. Lebanon has at times experienced spillover violence from the neighboring civil war, including a series of explosions in civilian areas in 2013 and 2014 and sectarian clashes in Tripoli throughout 2014. Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance was jeopardized by the Shiite Hizbollah’s battles against predominantly Sunni organizations in neighboring Syria.

Nasrallah has claimed that groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Nusra Front represent an existential threat to Shiites living in Syria, and by extension to those living in Lebanon.

Just weeks after the start of the operation, Nasrallah announced in a televised address that the first phase of the assault was complete and that Al-Nusra had been pushed away from the border. The second phase of the operation, against ISIS fighters in the region, could now begin, he said. It remains unclear how much of Nasrallah’s comments are merely propaganda and how much represent actual facts on the ground.

'Hizbollah wants to show they can still project [force], especially against Al-Nusra, as recent headlines have all been negative,' Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland who specializes in Shiite militias, told The Media Line. Smyth, referring to the string of recent regime defeats in Syria that included the loss of the historic city of Palmyra in May, highlighted the effectiveness of groups like ISIS at utilizing propaganda, including making clever use of conventional and social media to advertise their exploits, he said. This media attention has given them the appearance of maintaining near unstoppable momentum and can be extremely intimidating to fighters arrayed against them. However, Smyth also pointed out that this is not the first time that the media has speculated over the imminent demise of Assad’s regime in Damascus. 'Sometimes the media sphere overblows this threat,' explained Smyth, so he is cautious about the most recent wave of conjecture.

ISIS’s skill stands in stark contrast to the less social media-savvy Hizbollah, which is now seeking to use similar methods in an attempt to dispel the rebels’ image. A quick, decisive and concrete gain, made in front of the media’s lenses, is one way to do this.

In a rare departure for the often-secretive group, Hizbollah organized a number of media tours for major regional and international news agencies. The group took a number of journalists to see the gains claimed by Hizbollah, allowing reporters to meet and interview combatants in an apparent attempt to counter the effective media narrative that ISIS is infamous for.

A second key public relations objective for the Qalamoun offensive is to rebrand Hizbollah as the defenders of Lebanon, rather than simply as a Shiite fighting force. Many people in Lebanon’s religiously divided state have felt that Nasrallah’s army has been sounding increasingly sectarian, and the group wishes to reverse this perception.

Nasrallah’s recent condemnation of the Saudi Arabia-led air campaign over Yemen was a key example of this sectarianism, Imad Salameh, associate professor of political science at Beirut’s LAU University, told The Media Line. 'Nasrallah’s message is self-defeating for his own party as they say they are ‘defending the legitimately-elected government in Syria’ and then do not use the same logic in Yemen,' Salameh said.

'Hizbollah is very much working in the interests of Shi’itism and fragmentation, so pretty much the whole of Nasrallah’s program of undermining and creating conflicts in Arab states - under the banner of fighting Israel - is becoming very exposed now… this is of concern for the group,' Salameh explained.

Since the beginning of Hizbollah’s intervention in Syria, it has pushed the narrative that it is protecting Shiite communities and locations in Syria. This message had a lot of traction with Lebanon’s large Shiite population, but has not played strongly with other major sects among Lebanon’s religiously diverse population.

Smyth points out that Nasrallah needs a better message, in particular for Lebanon’s Christian and Druze populations. The group asserts that it is the ‘true defender of Lebanon and the only one capable of keeping the country safe.’ But for this message to be effective, Hizbollah needs to keep wining in Syria and to do so in a way that can be related to by the Lebanese people. For this, operations like Qalamoun are key.

The recent offensive, although smaller in scale than many of Hizbollah’s other Syrian campaigns, had far reaching implications for the group - both domestically and internationally. It arguably was seen protecting Lebanon, completing a job that the Lebanese army had been unable to achieve due to a lack of manpower, arms and restrictive rules of engagement. This may have garnered some support domestically for Hizbollah but is unlikely to change the long-term belief by many in Lebanon who see the intervention in Syria as an extension of Iran’s foreign policy."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS:  Ezgi Basaran uncovers what lies behind the ruling party’s electoral defeat in centre-left Radikal: "Let no one be offended, but the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] has totally trounced the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] in the Kurdish region. The people of this region, the majority of whom describe themselves as religious, did not opt for the AKP. What allowed the HDP to pass the 10% electoral threshold was not the votes coming from CHP [main opposition Republican People’s Party] supporters, but those of the Kurds who have voted for the AKP in the past."

Melih Asik sees a positive path ahead in centrist Milliyet: "No matter who says what, the final result represents a win for democracy. Religious-based policy maneuvers, and the attempt to curtail freedoms and fool the nation, have received a blow. The country has escaped from one man's obsession. One should take a deep breath. If the AKP is the loser in these elections, the HDP is the winner. In the coming era, this party bears a huge responsibility. If it behaves responsibly and Tayyip Erdogan is contained within the limits set by the constitution, we will enter the path to normalization."

Ali Sirmen believes that the electorate has chastised the president in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Turkey does need an ordinary coalition but a broad national one. However, Erdogan, who turned these elections into a plebiscite on his desire for uncontrolled power, and who sees himself as the de facto leader of the AKP despite what the constitution says, and who has tried to enforce his policies via his post, represents the biggest obstacle to both this coalition and a democratic settlement. But the voters have clearly demonstrated that they are against Erdogan’s despotic tendencies and have punished the AKP."

Sahin Alpay has new hopes for a solution of the Kurdish problem in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "By heading to the ballot box with a high 87 % turnout, the people have denied the AKP the chance to come to power alone. They have taught the government, which was mired in bribery and spreading hatred, an unforgettable lesson. One of the elections’ most significant results is that the HDP led by Selahattin Demirtas has shattered the 10% threshold. I believe that, led by Demirtas, the HDP's success has opened the door to a peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish problem and a guarantee of Turkey's integrity."

Hasan Cemal calls for constitutional constraints on the president in independent online T24: "Erdogan is a not only burden on Turkey’s politics but the AKP as well. Just as he became a burden on politics in Turkey by nullifying democracy, peace and the rule of law, he has become a burden on the AKP for the same reasons. Now it is time for normalization. And the way to do that is first of all to bring Erdogan back within the 'constitutional boundaries'."

Resul Tosun accuses the opposition of deceit in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The election results have demonstrated that there is no dictatorship in this country. If that had been the case, many parties would have been unable to run in the elections. Even if they had, and the dictator was unhappy with the results, he would not just have accepted the outcome. The opposition has told lies consciously and has deceived public opinion at home and abroad."

Gulay Gokturk takes a calm view of defeat in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "If we had woken up on June 8th to a Turkey in which the HDP had remained below the threshold, we would have been facing a situation today in which masked groups were paralyzing life in all the cities, vandalizing property and clashing with the police. The social media would be full of lies that the elections were rigged and the opposition parties would have declared the elections as unfair and the government illegitimate. The HDP has passed the threshold and the AKP has lost the power with 40 per cent of the votes. But what has happened? No one from the AKP has said anything about fraud. As the AKP would not want to be an irresponsible party that casts Turkey into the fire just because it did not come to power alone, and it will evaluate all coalition possibilities first of all."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Resalat does not believe the U.S. is ready for a deal: "Differences between the parties still remain. Currently, the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 are not seriously determined to sign a final agreement. The Islamic Republic of Iran will not accept a bad agreement in this diplomatic battle. In order to have fruitful talks, America and the P5+1 should give up their irrational demands especially regarding the lifting of sanctions and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency." 

 

TURKISH ELECTIONS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami thinks it is the beginning of the end for Erdogan: "The heavy defeat of Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party in the parliamentary election will have positive consequences for the Turkish people and regional countries, especially Syria and Iraq. Erdogan's defeat is the beginning of the decline of his party and his gradual removal from power. His complicity with the Zionist regime in supporting terrorists to create instability in the region is no longer hidden from anyone. The Turkish people sensed the impact of these negative measures. By not voting for this party they opposed the anti-Islamic, immoral and inhumane policies." 

Hard-line Keyhan expects dramatic changes: "Why did the Justice and Development Party face such a defeat? What will be the consequences? Undoubtedly, Erdogan's domestic and especially foreign policies played an important role in this outcome. There will be consequences that will change Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Erdogan's bitter defeat will lead him to give up the delusion of reviving the Ottoman Empire and will shrink his regional ambitions. It can stop Turkey's adventures in Syria. Perhaps, the Syrian people are the happiest after the election results." 

Conservative Khorasan clarifies: "Over the past few years, Turkey played an active role in guiding and controlling terrorism in the region. Turks thought that Assad’s decline would mean the removal of a rival and their political dominance. Excitedly, they forged an early alliance with Mursi's fragile government in Egypt and tried to attract some Palestinian groups. The final goal of these fragmented and non-strategic policies was the revival of the Ottoman Empire. Not only they failed, but also Turkey’s diplomacy was exposed to risks in the region and the world, especially in the EU. The recent elections are an overwhelming blow for authoritarianism in Turkey."

Hard-line Javan explains: "Although Erdogan will continue his previous policies with his strong personality, it is obvious that he is no longer Turkey's leading man and should prepare himself for a lengthy battle with parliament. The Justice and Development Party's defeat is due to his interventionist policies in the region, his suppression of protests and his new Ottoman-oriented political ambitions." 

Conservative Hemayat lists some of the reasons: "One reason behind Erdogan's failure is that Turkish borders have become insecure due to his wrong strategies. People are tired of the Justice and Development Party's policies. The high level of unemployment, violation of human rights, corruption, curbs on freedom of speech, political control over the legal system, media control and the adoption of dangerous foreign policies played an important role in the defeat of Erdogan’s Party." 

Reformist Sharq writes about rebuilding charisma: "Recep Tayyip Erdogan's charismatic leadership has been undermined. Recession, unemployment, financial corruption, violation of human rights, arresting journalists and neglecting the south-eastern regions affected the outcome of the elections. Erdogan will have to rebuild his undermined charismatic figure in Turkey's political system." 

Reformist E'temad considers the options: "The results of the parliamentary polls showed that ethnic and religious minorities can be strongly effective in Turkey. A parliament of four parties is formed; none of them could obtain a majority. One option is the formation of a coalition. The other option a minority government and early election."

Moderate Iran deliberates one possible consequence: "Turkey's next government will have to change the Justice and Development Party’s domestic and regional policies. Takfiri extremists and jihadi groups based in Iraq and particularly in Syria will no longer be able to count on Turkish logistic and procurement support."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The curtain has yet to fall

2-The rational and the irrational

3-Hasty assumptions

 

1-The curtain has yet to fall

 

The world's concern has centered on Erdogan's person, not on Turkey or its ruling party or government. Cutting the man down to size (who as we have said has turned from an asset for Turkey into a burden) is the source of the satisfaction that has sometimes reached the point of gloating, at the Turkish elections’ results. Yet the [ruling] AKP has retreated and was not defeated. It still came out first with a wide gap separating it from the party next in line. And the curtain has yet to fall on Erdogan's political march. The man does not lack new means of resuming his course, regaining his role, and pursuing his dreams. Nonetheless, it is still a major setback for the party and an even stronger slap to the man's face --'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

A snowball will form and with it will roll the head of the Brotherhood's project; one that lost a redoubt in these elections through which it had hoped to regain what it has lost in Egypt and Tunisia by taking Syria by force... A fateful and crucial round has turned the leaf on the Brotherhood and Ottomans in the region's life. And it has turned the most dangerous leaf of the war on Syria. But most important is not what is happening today; most important is the track that has been inaugurated and that will have countless repercussions. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that it is Syria, its army and its president that have made the Turkish opposition's victory against Erdogan and his party possible. They are full partners in that victory and, inevitably, in the gains that will be gleaned from it--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Turkey's interests do not change when the ruling party changes. The tools and methods may change, such that we may find Turkey showing greater concern for the Kurds' interests in Syria, and recognizing the role of the liberal and secular currents on the Syrian arena. But it will stick to its position in rejecting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and it will continue to side with that regime's enemies because of its own regional interests. There is no doubt that the elections' results will not lead to a change in Turkey's foreign policy, but to some new balance. Ankara will not refuse to back the Brotherhood; but it will not side with them at the expense of others on the Syrian arena either--Dawood ash-Shiryan in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Most of the world and the region seem to be relieved at the results of the weekend Turkish parliamentary elections, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. Yet while the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) remains the strongest single party, three scenarios await Turkey today, two of which are bad for it and one is good. More important than the different scenarios for post-elections Turkey is the fact that President Erdogan's prestige has been badly damaged, which means that he will now face greater domestic opposition, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. Moreover, Syria and its allies have played a major part in making the AKP's defeat possible, and will therefore share in the fruits of the Turkish opposition's victory. Those who expect a change in Ankara's policy towards Syria as a result of the elections are engaging in wishful thinking, maintains a leading Saudi commentator. Turkey's Syria policy may change its tools and methods, and be less supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood; but it will continue to oppose the Assad regime and seek to topple it.

 

SMILING FACES: "Many people had smiles on their faces the night before last as they followed reports of the drop in the Turkish ruling AKP's support in the recent elections, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Assad and as-Sissi may have had more than a smile on their face. The same goes for Tehran, Baghdad, and Beirut's Dahyieh [Hizbollah’s stronghold]. The first irony is that a faint smile may also have spread across the faces of numerous Gulf capitals, with the exception of Doha. The second irony is that Israel, Iran, and Hizbollah share-- each from their position-- the desire to see the end of the new Ottoman leader's myth, and that desire was satisfied.

Western capitals, in turn, felt no sorrow at the slap in the face that Turkish voters delivered to the 'Sultan's' [Erdogan’s] ambitions. For in the latter years of his rule, Turkey was beginning to veer towards a hybrid form of government: a mixture between a democracy on the retreat and an autocracy raising its ugly head, wrapped in the thick blanket of 'Sunni theocracy.'

The manner in which Erdogan has been dealing with the region's crises, his discourse that was beginning to overflow with confessional overtones, and his frivolous reactions to certain diplomatic crises, were all cause for broad concern, especially since they coincided with a tendency to limit freedom of the press, stifle opinion and free expression, attack the judiciary's independence, and mount a systematic assault on civil society as in the [2014] peaceful demonstrations in Gezi Park and Taksim.

Russia also has good reason to feel satisfied at the fact that the man’s wings have been clipped, as he is responsible for weakening its ally in Damascus. He is also the greatest facilitator of ISIS and the Nusra Front's movements along the borders with Syria, and from there into Iraq. Moreover, the man has expressed positions that were not to Moscow's liking regarding the Crimean crisis. And he does not refrain from tampering with the Kremlin's backyard in the former Soviet republics.

Only Qatar and the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood felt disappointed and let down. Both spent an unhappy night waiting for the elections' results. And both are sure to be engaging in very delicate calculations, for many of their wagers and hopes in the region have been pinned on Turkey; more specifically, on the special role that the AKP’s leader and the country's president was supposed to play. But his dreams of reviving the glories of the Sultanate, the Caliphate, and the [Ottoman] Empire have all been dashed.

The truth is that we are facing the first test of [Turkey’s] 'zero problems with neighbors' theory, which was transformed into a 'zero friends' reality during the Arab Spring years. The first official and unofficial responses have indicated as clearly as possible that the world's concern has centered on Erdogan's person, not on Turkey or its ruling party or government. Cutting the man down to size (who as we have said has turned from an asset for Turkey into a burden) is the source of the satisfaction that has sometimes reached the point of gloating, at the Turkish elections’ results.

Yet the AKP has retreated and was not defeated. It still came out first with a wide gap separating it from the party next in line. And the curtain has yet to fall on Erdogan's political march. The man does not lack new means of resuming his course, regaining his role, and pursuing his dreams. Nonetheless, it is still a major setback for the party and an even stronger slap to the man's face. And this leads us to the third irony, namely, that the outcome of the elections will ultimately be in favor of Turkey, its future, its role, and its alliances – assuming that Erdogan does not decide to rebel against the elections' results in some way or another.

Three scenarios await Turkey after the elections. Two are very bad and extremely dangerous for its future and stability. The first and worst consists of the president’s decision, backed by one-third of the elected parliament, to call for early elections in 45 days’ time. That would amount to a soft coup under cover of the legitimacy of the law, the constitution, and ballot box – just as Egypt’s anti-Mursi] soft coup enjoyed the cover of the legitimacy of the June [2013] Revolution and the millions of people who took to the streets after it proved impossible for them to head to the ballot box because of Mursi and the Brotherhood’s intransigence.

The second scenario, which is no less bad, would be if the nationalist and secular opposition were to try and exclude the AKP from power based on close to two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. This will force the party that won the elections into opposition, which will create a crisis in the transfer of power, or one that arises from dealing with the new authorities. In such a scenario, Turkey will not enjoy stability.

The third and most logical scenario would be to form an expanded coalition government that breaks the [AKP’s] monopoly over power and consolidates the peaceful transfer of power, restraining the Islamists' and the [AKP] leaders' impetus and curbing their regional adventures. It will also open the door to [their] accountability over issues of corruption, the repression of liberties, and the attacks on the judiciary, press, and civil society.

This last scenario will save Turkey from the threat of sliding towards deadly 'dualisms' and prepare the grounds for a new phase without a decisive role for a single man. For it has been tangibly proven that most of that man's recent decisions have stemmed from a deep faith in himself and his leadership, and from a discourse booby-trapped with the man’s personal, individual, and cultural complexes.

"And these have reflected a large dose of taqiyya [dissimulation] that required ten years to reveal what lay hidden deep inside," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

MAJOR EARTHQUAKE: "Ever since the neo-Ottoman project emerged clearly from the AKP and its leader Erdogan's discourse, and ever since this coincided with the American and Israeli moment of weakness and their inability to fight wars capable of breaking Syria as the central link in the chain of the pro-resistance axis stretching from Iran to Lebanon and Palestine, the region has been at the center of a major earthquake," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

With its one hundred million people, its large economy and the most powerful army in the region and its membership in NATO, Turkey's appetite for swallowing up Syria or taking control of it was whetted. It hoped to use it as a passageway and as the headquarters for its project, which cannot survive in Egypt or Tunisia unless Syria fell into its lap based on the deal Turkey struck with the U.S. and Israel.

The importance of Qatari and Saudi money, media, intelligence and fatwas may be one side of the balance, while Turkey’s role is on the other. For without Turkey, no one would dare to offer their borders for an undeclared war; or have the ability to absorb a quarter-of-a-million fighters from around the world, organizing them, arranging their affairs, arming them, and supplying them with the necessary financing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the arms supplied by France or bought in Libya. All such preparations and capabilities are important to the extent to which Turkey is ready to employ them and join in leading this war.

Turkey’s verbal incitement and its subsequent practical incitement on the ground were sufficient to initiate a series of Syrian/Turkish border wars. Many Syrians and lovers of Syria believed that the alternative to the deadly hemorrhage imposed on the country by Turkey would be less harmful than pushing matters to a state of open war. Turkey may have been deterred if it felt that the prospect of such a war were serious. And if it was not deterred, the repercussions of such a war as missiles fell on Turkish cities, would have been sufficient to alter the equation.

But Syria behaved on the assumption that Erdogan's provocations aimed to drag Syria into a war that renders his intervention acceptable to the Turkish people, motivated by their patriotism and right to self-defense. Syria decided that patience would be good for Syria as it bled, because the Turkish people's patience with Erdogan would run out sooner or later, and the hour would come when the Turks would say to the petty sultan 'Enough!' Once that happens, all equations would change.

The dynamics of Syrian steadfastness succeeded in stirring Egypt’s army and elite to stand up to the Brotherhood's attempts to impose themselves on society, and speeded up Mohammad Mursi's fall. Similarly, Syria's steadfastness was one cause for foiling Qatar's role and its [former] emir's promises to the Americans [to topple the Syrian regime] until his hour came and he was sacrificed on the Saudi altar. Saudi Arabia then joined the fray and took it upon itself to pursue the war and throw its weight behind al-Qa'ida in the war. But throughout, Syria was sure that its steadfastness would mean that Erdogan's end would be nigh and that this will come at Syria's hands.

Erdogan and his party’s resounding defeat does not stem from their ability or lack thereof to form a government. It stems from the damage done to Erdogan's standing and the fall of his leadership. Both these factors mean that various forces, currents, and institutions in the judiciary and the army and elsewhere will now more openly dare to express their desire to withdraw from his failed project, leaving him to bear the consequences and pay the price on his own. What we have thus witnessed in the elections is but the first signs of change, much more of which will emerge later. A snowball will form and with it will roll the head of the Brotherhood's project; one that lost a redoubt in these elections through which it had hoped to regain what it has lost in Egypt and Tunisia by taking Syria by force. After all, the Brotherhood has lost what it has lost because of Syria; and it wagered that it would gain much if it can take Syria again.

A fateful and crucial round has turned the leaf on the Brotherhood and Ottomans in the region's life. And it has turned the most dangerous leaf of the war on Syria. But most important is not what is happening today; most important is the track that has been inaugurated and that will have countless repercussions. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that it is Syria, its army and its president that have made the Turkish opposition's victory against Erdogan and his party possible. They are full partners in that victory and, inevitably, in the gains that will be gleaned from it.

Israel is lame and cannot wage war. It is shackled by the lethal balance of deterrence with the resistance [Hizbollah]. Saudi Arabia is emerging from Yemen with a humiliating defeat, accepting a political solution that bears no resemblance to its initial discourse regarding the war. Egypt is marginalized and deeply wounded. As a result, Turkey was the spearhead of the Turkish/Israeli project. The fact that it has now moved into the intensive care unit means that the hour of agreement over Iran’s nuclear program is near, and that the region must prepare for a new reality. And Syria lies at the heart of these new equations. With it, the features of a victory are being drawn, with its glorious pages being written by the Syrian army and the resistance's men in the Qalamoun.

"Congratulations to Syria and the resistance. Their pure blood that was shed in the Qalamoun has flowered and born fruit on Istanbul's streets," concludes Qandil.

End…

 

GLADDENED AND SADDENED: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's failure to win an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections, and his failure to transform the Turkish political system into a presidential regime, have gladdened the enemies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the supporters of Iran’s policy in the region," writes Dawood ash-Shiryan in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

They have also saddened the Muslim Brotherhood's supporters and the Syrian regime's enemies. The commentaries in the newspapers representing both sides spoke of the AKP leader's defeat because he did not secure a majority of seats in parliament, as if Turkey had returned to the 1980 coup.

The press that supports Iran and Bashar al-Assad's regime ignored the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and its leader Selahattin Demirtas's success. The party had decided to fight the elections for the first time with a single party list, representing the Kurds and the minorities in Turkey. Its success was ignored even though the fact that a Kurdish party has entered parliament will strengthen Turkey’s position regarding Syria, even if in a different manner and may give Syria's Kurds a greater say.

Most of the coverage gloating over Erdogan's failure saw his defeat as an indicator of a radical change in Turkey's foreign policy towards numerous Middle East issues, the first of which is the Syrian crisis. Some have gone so far as to claim that Erdogan's defeat will cut Turkey's regional role down to size, and will contain its efforts to impose the Muslim Brotherhood's project on the Turks and the region. But the opponents of Assad's regime and the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were less rash in their analysis of the results. They spoke of consequences, but did not portray the AKP's defeat as a coup.

Anyone observing the coverage of the Turkish parliamentary elections in the Arab press would notice that it is grounded in a refusal to accept that Turkey has experienced genuine elections. They view what has happened as nothing more than party-political conspiracies. This is not strange. For these papers are published in states that practice a false 'democracy' where the ballot box always has 'holes' in it. This is why the redistribution of seats in the Turkish parliament was portrayed as if this parliamentary experiment were a fake game supervised by former Egyptian [Mubarak era] interior minister Zaki Bader.

Talk of a radical change in Turkish regional policy after the elections is wishful thinking. Turkey's interests do not change when the ruling party changes. The tools and methods may change, such that we may find Turkey showing greater concern for the Kurds' interests in Syria, and recognizing the role of the liberal and secular currents on the Syrian arena. But it will stick to its position in rejecting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and it will continue to side with that regime's enemies because of its own regional interests.

There is no doubt that the elections' results will not lead to a change in Turkey's foreign policy, but to some new balance. Ankara will not refuse to back the Brotherhood; but it will not side with them at the expense of others on the Syrian arena either.

"The results of the Turkish elections have proven that the democratic process there has reached the stage of maturity. In fact, these results indicate that the Turkish people have decided to transform the 1980 coup into nothing more than a story from the past," concludes Shiryan.

Ends…

 

 

2-The rational and the irrational

 

There is nothing ‘rational’ about seeking an alliance with Israel against Iran, and Saudi Arabia should be wary of the potential fallout, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The meeting between a former senior Saudi intelligence officer and an advisor to the Israeli PM, as well as other meetings between Saudi and Israeli officials, are motivated by the view that Iran represents a greater threat to Saudi Arabia than Israel, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. But this is a mistaken assessment that will only fuel the homegrown and foreign threats facing Saudi Arabia.

 

FROM SEMI SECRET TO PUBLIC: "Throughout the past five years, we have grown accustomed to reading or hearing of semi-secret meetings, that have developed into public ones between former head of Saudi intelligence head Prince Turki al-Faisal and former Israeli officials," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Tuesday’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The most recent was held about a year ago with the former head of Israel’s Mossad Amos Yadlin. Throughout, Prince Turki has stressed that he occupies no official position in the state, and that he holds these 'normalizing' meetings based on his own personal convictions and views that do not commit his government. In fact, he went so far as to write an article and publish it in a Hebrew daily in which he spoke of peace and expressed his wish to visit the Holocaust Museum in occupied Palestine.

It was no coincidence that the same sort of initiative was taken by retired Saudi General Anwar Eshki who was an advisor to Prince Turki when he was his country's ambassador in Washington, and who now heads a center for strategic studies in Jeddah and actively participates in political conferences and forums, one of which took place in Tehran a few months ago.

The picture of Dr. Eshki shaking hands with Dore Gold, one of Binyamin Netanyahu's most prominent advisors, at a conference organized by the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington a few days ago was on the front page of most Israeli newspapers; but not a single Saudi or Gulf newspaper published it. The Israeli papers described this meeting as an important development in relations between the two countries who are confronting the same enemy, Iran.

Dr. Eshki described the meeting as a coincidence. He said that he met with Gold in the latter's capacity as the head of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, not as an Israeli official. Dr. Eshki seems to have forgotten that such a meeting should not have taken place at a time when the academic boycott of Israel, its professors and universities is on the rise across the whole of the U.S. and Europe.

But Dr. Eshki’s meeting with the extreme right-winger Dore Gold is not new. Gold has confirmed that this meeting was at least the fifth between them, which raises many questions regarding Eshki's claim, especially since he presents himself as a specialized academic who believes in objectivity and professionalism in dealing with issues.

When a fellow journalist asked Dr. 'Eshki about the interview he gave to an Israeli newspaper during his participation in the Conference on Democracy and Free Trade held in Qatar last month, he answered that he gave it to a Dutch journalist who took the initiative of publishing it in the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth without his knowledge or permission.

But the truth is the exact opposite. Israeli journalist Smadar Perry, who participated in that same conference, was asked whether Eshki had been hesitant about an interview in an Israeli newspaper when she presented herself as an Israeli journalist. She answered that he was not, and according to her story, that he welcomed that because he wished to convey a message through her and her newspaper to Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu to the effect that 'the time has come for Israel to recognize the [2002/2007] Saudi Peace Initiative.' In that same interview, he revealed that 'King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz supports this peace initiative,' and added: 'Give us all the occupied territories and you will get full peace and normalization with 22 Arab states.'

The danger of such Saudi/Israeli meetings even if they are 'academic' in nature, stems from the fact that they occur with a green light and perhaps encouragement from the Saudi authorities. For those who know the kingdom and the decision-making process fully understand that it is impossible for a person of Prince Turki al-Faisal or General Anwar Eshki’s status to shake hands or hold a secret or public meeting with Israeli or any other officials without prior consultation or coordination with the man in charge in his country.

But such meetings with Israelis and the fact of their growing frequency at a time when the kingdom is engaged in numerous wars on a number fronts, in Yemen, Syria and Iraq as well as on a domestic front where it is facing terrorist attacks and bombings by sleeper ISIS cells, reveals a mistaken and short-sighted reading of the Kingdom and the entire region's priorities. This is especially so since these meetings provide lethal live ammunition to those who wish to undermine Saudi Arabia's stability and threaten its security.

The Israelis have celebrated a sentence repeated by strategic expert General Anwar Eshki: 'Israel is a rational enemy, and Iran is an ignorant enemy.' That is an implicit praise for Israel, and a clear denunciation of Iran and it amounts to an implicit acknowledgment that his country prefers to cooperate with the former against the latter on the grounds that Iran is a common enemy.

I do not know what General 'Eshki’s conception of reason and ignorance really is. Does he, for example, believe that those who occupy the Aqsa Mosque, undermine its foundations, work on Judaizing occupied Jerusalem and erasing its historical Arab and Islamic character, settle 800 thousand settlers in the West Bank, divide Abraham's Tomb, kill thousands and destroy 80-thousand homes in the Gaza Strips, wage wars on south Lebanon, and occupy Arab, Lebanese, and Syrian lands – does he believe that all of this is done by a rational enemy? If so, then who counts as irrational? Those who do the opposite?

Saudi Arabia is passing through an awkward phase. We do not believe that a rapprochement with Israel at any level can lead it to the shore of safety. On the contrary, it will only aggravate the threats surrounding it; the domestic ones before the foreign ones.

We do not believe that Iran and its allies in the region, who raise the banner of hostility to Israel and back the resistance to its occupation in word and deed, represent an ignorant enemy. On the contrary, they are very clever and rational, and point their compass in the right direction.

It may be worth reminding our brothers in the Saudi camp that is pushing for contacts with the Israelis and is trying to campaign for seeking their aid as an ally in the war against Iran, that Israel has lost all its recent wars and that its air power has not decided any of them. In this, it is exactly the same as the U.S. Air Force, which has failed to destroy ISIS even though it has already conducted four thousand air strikes on it, and its Saudi counterpart, which has failed to impose surrender on the Houthi/Saleh alliance so far after three thousand raids and 73 days of continuous bombardment.

Saudi Arabia can, if it wishes, win the hearts of the Arabs and Muslims – and its own citizens before anyone else – if it points its compass towards Palestine and the Aqsa Mosque as its late King Faisal bin 'Abdulaziz did. That is the shortest route to preserving its security, stability, and territorial and demographic integrity.

"For it is the land of the Two Holy Shrines come what may, and God has bestowed this beneficence upon it; therefore, its officials should rise to the level of this responsibility and all its religious and historical consequences," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

3-Hasty assumptions

 

Syria’s Kurds would be making a grave mistake if they were to wager on winning their independence as a result of standing neutral between ISIS and Damascus, says Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra’i

 

The Syrian Kurds' neutrality in the ongoing battle for al-Hasaka exposes their hidden agenda of using the confrontation between ISIS and the Syrian army in order to carve out an independent Kurdish state, claims a Jordanian commentator. But they may be too hasty in their assumption that such a state would be acceptable to the major regional powers that have the ability to prevent its establishment.

 

CAUSE FOR SUSPICION: "The position adopted by the 'Kurdish Self-Administration' in northern Syria, which is referred to as Rojava (that is, Western Kurdistan) in Kurdish, is both noteworthy and cause for suspicion," writes Mohammad Kharroub in the Amman daily al-Ra’i.

It decided to adopt a neutral stance in response to ISIS’s intensive and fierce attacks on the Syrian city of al-Hasaka that has a demographic mix of numerous ethnicities and that cannot be classified as purely Kurdish or Arab given the presence of other races and groups.

This raises many serious questions as the aims behind such a suspect stance when everyone knows that ISIS's next target after the Syrian troops and the Popular Forces fighting on their side will be these very same Self-Administration forces. These forces control entire neighborhoods of the city, which have so far remained far from the frontlines and safe from ISIS's shells, car bombs, and rockets.

If we were to refer to the recent reports by Lucinda Smith in the UK daily Times regarding the Kurds 'ethnic cleansing' operations against tens of thousands of Arabs in northeast Syria – which confirm what human rights organizations active in the area have said, namely, that the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) have been burning Arabs villages down after taking control of certain areas – we would seem to be confronting a series of carefully studied steps taken in accordance with a timetable that relies on foreign support.

In fact, it would be no great risk to say that certain international and regional capitals believe that the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria is only a matter of time. Moreover, there would be no harm in deploying ISIS's power to achieve this aim, as long as this serves two other aims: Exhausting the Syrian army and driving it out of these areas; and luring ISIS into a trap where it can be bombarded by the international coalition from the air and resisted by YPG forces on the ground. This is what happened in 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) where the battle was decided in the Kurds' favor.

In addition, this further deepens the Kurds' alliance with Washington, which reports suggest is now in favor of the establishment of a Kurdish state (or states) in historical Kurdistan. These lands are scattered over four states, but Syria and Iraq seem 'qualified' for the implementation of such an idea.

The ongoing attack on al-Hasaka, the success of the Syrian army and its allied forces in repulsing them and the YPG’s insistence on remaining neutral or making impossible demands on the Syrian army in return for backing it (and not taking part in the town’s defense against ISIS) – all clearly reveal the extent of the many-sided conspiracies against Syria. These conspiracies, moreover, all intersect at the project of partitioning Syria or toppling its state and transforming the country into sectarian and confessional mini-states.

That, in turn, would put an end to Syria's geopolitical role and provide a launching pad for the new colonial project that hides behind the claim that the Sykes/Picot agreement has ran its course and that it is time to draw new maps for the region. And these maps will strip the region's countries of their Arab identity and transform it into a geographical area inhabited by a number of ‘nations’ that have multiple connections and fragmented identities. Furthermore, the Arab language alone (or even the [Islamic] religious link) will not succeed in uniting these 'nations' or in providing them with the same goals. This is the plan in which numerous Arab and Islamic regimes, organizations, and groups have been implicated.

The battles now raging on the various battlefronts across the whole expanse of Syrian territories that have recently taken a path that has exposed their aims more clearly, have apparently acquired a momentum that was not there a few months ago. This has resulted in [the opposition’s] 'achievements and victories' on the ground in northern and southern Syria, leading some rash commentators or those deceived by illusions and media drivel to write the Syrian regime's obituary, deeming its fall to be certain.

But this seems just a return to a deluded form of wishful thinking that recalls the foolish predictions made by the same people at the start of the events in Syria, only to subsequently discover that they were wagering on mirages and on the promises of 'friends' that could not take material form on the ground.

Syria's Kurds or the Kurds of the YPG, and especially the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) would be gravely mistaken if they were to believe that the Americans were truthful in their promises and that they will be 'best man' at the wedding that leads to the birth of the long-awaited Kurdish state. They must learn the lessons and morals of the Kurdish past from the [1946] Mahabad Republic that lasted for only one year, and up till now. Throughout, the Americans have let the Kurds down and left them at the slightest turn at which Washington could uphold their interests.

Nor would Israel be of any use this time round, even if Syria's Kurds believe that Tel Aviv represents the shortest path to Washington. For there are Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan who are 'ideologically' opposed to Syria's Kurds and are allied with their enemies (Turkey). Moreover, Syria's Kurds failure to realize that the decision today is not in the hands of the U.S. alone, because certain important regional capitals that also have influence and power will not 'digest' the idea of an independent state in northern Syria.

The Kurds’ neutrality regarding what is happening in al-Hasaka bears some illusions stemming from arrogance and hasty – not to say mistaken – calculations. They seem to assume that their victory against ISIS is 'guaranteed' at a time when this organization is expanding and when its project to establish its state clearly enjoys the implicit support of certain Arab capitals.

"For these capitals view ISIS as a weapon that they can use to smuggle through the conspiracy to partition Syria and tear the Arab region apart," concludes Kharroub.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Damaged goods

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with the latest installment in a long-running corruption soap opera: news that a retired senior police officer was questioned Monday at the police's internal investigations department as part of an ever-widening corruption investigation centering on celebrity lawyer Ronel Fisher.

Also on the front pages of all the newspapers is a claim – immediately denied – that Deputy Knesset Speaker Oren Hazan used hard drugs and ordered escorts for customers of his business in Bulgaria. Oren – a freshman Likud MK – said that he plans to sue Channel 2 for first reporting the allegations. 'I've already instructed my lawyer to send a warning letter prior to filing a lawsuit against Channel 2 and reporter Amit Segel,' Hazan wrote on his Facebook page.

The other big story of the day came courtesy of the Supreme Court in the United States, which struck down a disputed law that would have allowed Americans born in Jerusalem to list their birthplace as Israel on their U.S. passports. It is seen as an important ruling that underscores the president's authority in foreign affairs. The court ruled 6-3 that Congress overstepped its bounds when it approved the law in 2002. It would have forced the State Department to alter its long-standing policy of not listing Israel as the birthplace for Jerusalem-born Americans. The policy is part of the U.S. government's refusal to recognize any nation's sovereignty over Jerusalem, until Israelis and Palestinians resolve its status through negotiations.

While there has been no official response from Israel or Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Likud MK Ze'ev Elkin reacted by noting that Jerusalem is the capital of the Jewish state and 'will remain that for eternity.' Elkin, whose portfolio includes Jerusalem, called on the U.S. administration to accept 'the simple fact that is a fundament of the Jewish heritage, and incidentally of Christian heritage as well - Jerusalem is the heart of the Land of Israel, and the eternal capital of the State of Israel.'

Also responding to the decision was Deputy Defense Minister Rabbi Eli Ben-Dahan (Habayit Hayehudi), who lives in the southeastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Har Homa. 'United Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish people and the center of the world,' asserted Ben-Dahan. 'This is how it was and how it will be.' 'The Obama administration should express a clear position that Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Israel, especially in a period in which movements that negate the existence of the state are raising their heads,' he added.

The Palestinian Authority welcomed the decision. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, a spokesman for Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, said that the Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the decisions of international institutions, the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. He further stated that 'the decision sends an obvious message that Israel is an occupying power of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.'

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, a new study says that Israelis and Palestinians would gain billions of dollars from peace. The RAND Corp. study published Monday indicates over the next decade Israelis would gain $120 billion from a peace deal. The Palestinians would gain $50 billion, marking a 36-percent rise in their average per-capita income. In contrast, a return to violence would see the Israeli economy lose some $250 billion in foregone economic opportunities, while the Palestinians could see their per-capita gross domestic product fall by as much as 46 percent.

In related news, senior cabinet minister Silvan Shalom has called on the Palestinians to return to the negotiating table without pre-conditions. Shalom has been designated by the prime minister as Israel's chief negotiator with the Palestinians. Speaking at the Herzliya Conference, minister Shalom said that if the Palestinians were serious, they would find a real partner in Israel. He called for the convening of a security-diplomatic-economic conference with the participation of the Palestinians and moderate Arab states, along with Israel. Shalom said that such a conference would advance peace negotiations and the overall situation in the region.

Finally, Netanyahu ensured that the 'BDS threat' remained in the headlines, saying that he is encouraged by the unity between right and left in Israeli politics in the effort against the anti-Israel boycotts. Speaking at the weekly Likud faction meeting in the Knesset, the prime minister said that he was also encouraged by the legislative process underway in the U.S. against the phenomenon of boycotts, and that such an effort will help Israel's international campaign. In a reference to the Meretz faction, Netanyahu said that he was surprised to hear that one of the Knesset factions was introducing a bill to distinguish the labeling of Israeli products manufactured in the West Bank. The prime minister said he would be asking to remove the bill from the Knesset agenda.

 

NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST THE BOYCOTT: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ronen Bergman says that the only effective way to deal with the BDS movement is to engage in meaningful and serious negotiations with the Palestinians.

"The recent spikes in the noise surrounding the organized boycott of Israel – most of which have been purely symbolic thus far – are a warning light. However, there has been an outpouring of nationalistic claptrap over late, which is misleading the Israeli public and preventing serious discussion from taking place. Here are some examples:

1-BDS is a direct continuation of the Arab boycott of Israel: No it isn't. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, Arab countries imposed an economic boycott on the State of Israel, using their oil to force international companies and organizations not to have any contact with Israel. This time, no Arab state or association is spearheading the boycott. Rather, it is a confluence of unconnected people and groups across the world, who are united in their harsh criticism of Israel – some of which is justified, some of which is totally fallacious – and their shared goal of taking whatever measures are needed to force Israel to end the occupation.

2-Israel is the only country subjected to boycotts and since we are Jews, the BDS is anti-Semitic: Not true. A comparison of the BDS movement today and the global campaign against apartheid will show that the participants share many of the same characteristics, come from the same places, use the same rhetoric and focus their efforts on similar areas. Were the students in the United States and Europe who demonstrated in huge numbers against segregation in the U.S. South and against the regime in Pretoria also anti-Semitic?

3-The boycott movement is being organized by terrorists, Palestinians and radical anti-Semites: No, it isn't. Among the hundreds of organizations and Facebook groups which are involved in the BDS movement, there are doubtless some who match that description, but if it were up to them, Israel would have been boycotted long ago. Not that they didn't try. The power of a boycott lies in the momentum it manages to create among groups that have nothing to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From the moment that suicide bombers stopped blowing up buses and cafes in our towns and cities, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looks like a complex territorial dispute that destabilizes the entire region and, from afar, looks like apartheid.

4-Israel can beat the boycott if its hasbara effort were only more effective and had more funding: No, it couldn't. The key problem in the war against the boycott is not the marketing – it's the product. In 2015, you can't sell the occupation. More effective Israeli propaganda will only buy us limited time – another apology from the CEO of Orange, another resolution rejected by FIFA. It cannot save us forever. Covert missions and intelligence gathering is only effective when dealing with a handful of adversaries; it's useless against hundreds of organizations and hundreds of thousands of people.

5-'The goal of the BDS campaign is not just to influence Israeli policy on this issue or that; it is to eradicate Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.' So said Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked. That might be true for some of those who protest against Israel, but it is not the case for the vast majority. I have met with people who are actively involved in the campaign to boycott Israel, and it is my impression that they are genuinely concerned that, because of the occupation, Israel is becoming an apartheid state and that they have a duty to change this. Some say that I am being fooled by clever anti-Semites who conceal their true intentions. But claims that there is a conspiracy to destroy Israel by criticizing the occupation demand proof – and the burden is on the people making that accusation.

The apartheid regime in South Africa did not collapse because of the ANC's terrorism, but because regime leaders saw how white South Africans were leaving in their droves, since they did not want to live in a pariah country and recognized that the end was near. The comparison that supporters of the BDS movement make between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa is far from accurate, but the comparison between the international community's relationships with the two is more accurate. We must look this truth in the eyes and understand that there is only one way to deal with the boycott: genuine negotiations with the Palestinians."

Ends…

 

THERE'S NO SUCH LAW: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dror Eydar argues that advocates of the boycott movement against Israel cannot argue that their actions are dictated by international law – since there is no such law prohibiting economic dealing with companies operating in 'occupied' territories.

"Supporters of the boycott – including some Israelis, who half-heartedly advocate a boycott of settlement products, base their arguments on international law. Well, Judea and Samaria are not 'Palestinian territories.' At most, they are disputed. Israel, too, claims ownership of those lands, by virtue of national identity, history, justice and the bible. These are arguments put forward by world-renowned jurists ever since the end of the Six-Day War.

In any case, opponents of Israel's settlements in Judea and Samaria claim that international law prohibits anyone from economically helping an occupying force in territories that are the subject of a battle. Here's a surprise for you: there's no such law. Writing on the website of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Dr. Eugene Kontorovich – an expert in constitutional law, international law, and law and economics – wrote an article titled 'Economic Dealings with Occupied Territories.'

Kontorovich examined legal rulings and the economic behavior of European countries and showed that, as far as the Europeans are concerned, international law does not prohibit economic activity in occupied territories. European companies operate in Western Sahara – a region that was captured in 1979 by Morocco and which has not been recognized by any state; the same goes for northern Cyprus, which was captured by Turkey in 1974.

At the same time as the European Union was taking action to bar economic ties over the Green Line, it was signing economic treaties with Morocco which help that country's presence in Western Sahara. Among these companies were those from France. They signed these deal not because, when it comes to Morocco, they are willing to turn a blind eye to the law, but because there simply is no such law.

What makes the story of Orange and the comments by its global CEO even more amazing is that a French court has ruled that companies are not violating international law or the Geneva Convention by operating over the Green Line or even by dealing with the Israeli government. The British High Court reached a similar conclusion. There are no examples of contradictory rulings. James Crawford, another jurist who specializes in international law, was hired by some British trades unions to write a legal opinion backing up the BDS movement; he reached the conclusion that there is no law against economic ties with companies in 'occupied' territories. Supporters of the BDS movement argue that they cannot do business with Israel not because they are anti-Israel or anti-Semitic – but because international law prohibits them from doing so. But the behavior of the Europeans elsewhere in the world proves that this simply isn't the case. In fact, the law that they are trying to apply to Israel is so problematic that they do not try to apply it to other countries.

Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth this week, Sever Plocker wrote that, 'Israeli right-wing representatives use a language and terms that the Western academic left doesn’t understand and doesn’t accept. So they had better keep quiet.' Plocker was referring to Tourism Minister Yariv Levin and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked. It's nothing new to find journalists turning their boorishness into ideology. Let's not forget that historical and religious arguments are also part of the arsenal used by those who are arguing Israel's case.

Economic bodies that take steps against Israel will find themselves getting into trouble with European law. And even if we fail to persuade the Europeans, it's important to know that they are not acting in accordance with any international law – because there is no such law."

Ends…

 

IRON DOME ISN'T ENOUGH: Writing on the NRG website, Avishai Shorshon says that the Iron Dome missile defense system is allowing Israel's government and defense establishment to remain on the back foot, while Hamas is consistently upgrading its offensive capabilities.

"This week, the IDF Spokesperson's Office announced – to the joy and applause of local residents – that an Iron Dome missile defense battery would be deployed in the Rehovot region. Presumably, those celebrating the announcement were looking forward to taking a selfie in front of the latest local attraction.

But allow me to cool their enthusiasm somewhat. The Iron Dome does not turn the IDF into a more professional army and does not make it better prepared for the next conflict. At most, it provides our political leadership with some breathing space. That has become a strategic goal. It is a strategy that is based on the absence of any serious response to a very real threat. Instead our leaders brag to the world about how the Iron Dome keeps Israeli citizens safe from Hamas rockets.

The Iron Dome is an excellent defensive system and it is fantastic that Israel developed it, along with many other defensive systems. But the problem is how we view it. Defensive measures have become part and parcel of the military strategy of the IDF and the State of Israel. In fact, they have become the main strategy of the IDF and the defense establishment. The Iron Dome is important, but it's not the most important thing. The defense establishment should focus more on eradicating the threat and not just protecting us from it. Another battery, another bomb shelter and another concrete box won't weaken Hamas; rather, they will be seen as a challenge and the organization will redouble its efforts to overcome our defenses.

Throughout the course of 2,000 years of exile we protected ourselves, defended ourselves and thought of ways to make the next blow less painful. We thought long and hard about the best way to present our other cheek. Now that we are masters of our own domain, it's time to leave behind this kind of thinking and to ensure that no one will dare to attack us again in the future.

Imagine what would have happened if Israel did not have the Iron Dome during Operation Protective Edge. What would have happened when a barrage of missiles fell on Tel Aviv, causing unprecedented damage and loss of life? What would have happened to us and how would the IDF have responded?

If the IDF and the government treated each intercepted missile as if it had hit its target and caused the maximum amount of damage, the situation would be very different. Because, in the end, if we sit by and wait for Hamas to improve its rocket capabilities; it will end very badly. The government has to decide whether it will adhere to the spirit of exile or whether it will finally act like a sovereign government."

Ends…

 

THE DEKEL PLAN: In an open letter to Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon published in Maariv, Udi Dekel details the kind of regional diplomatic initiative that he believes will end tensions with the United States, provide Israel with diplomatic and military stability and resolve once and for all the Palestinian issue.

"Nobody knows better than you, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, that the current crisis in the relationship between Jerusalem and Washington is not merely personal; rather, it is a reflection of the different ways that the two governments see the key challenges facing the Middle East and how these challenges should best be met.

Because Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is also Israel's foreign minister, there is an opportunity for you, Mr. Ya'alon, to restore your standing in the eyes of the Obama Administration and to become the address for anyone interested in rebuilding trust and cooperation between the two countries. That is why you must – as soon as is humanly possible – initiate an open and frank dialogue with your American counterpart, to discuss urgent security and diplomatic matters.

The main issues that you should discuss with him are as follows: the ramifications of the Iranian nuclear agreement, with emphasis on creating a system of inspection, verification and effective intelligence. This dialogue should also pave the way for Israel to receive 'compensation' from the United States, in the form of advanced weapons systems, closer strategic coordination and a clear and unequivocal American commitment that, in the event that the Islamic Republic violates the terms of the agreement, sanctions will automatically be imposed anew. It must also touch on continued American military support for Israel after 2017. The Obama Administration must understand that it is impossible to carry out President Obama's order to destroy ISIS without also smashing the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis, which is encouraging Sunni organizations to join forces with ISIS. Finally, the talks must end with the Americans agreeing to discuss the security arrangements that Israel feels are necessary in the event of a deal with the Palestinian Authority – including arrangements that are not specified in a final-status agreement.

As defense minister, you are obviously concerned about the ramifications of a nuclear deal between the West and Iran in a broader context. After all, such a deal would provide Iran with an incentive and the means to expand its negative influence across the region. You must, therefore, reach an understanding with the United States to establish a regional system of military cooperation, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – with the emphasis on preparing a broad response in the event that Iran violates the nuclear agreement or misuses the agreement to expand its regional influence and its support of destabilizing elements across the Middle East. The purpose of this cooperative venture would be to block Iran's efforts to expand its sphere of influence. At the same time, it must formulate a plan to prevent Iranian-backed terrorist infrastructures from taking root – the al-Quds Force, Hizbollah and various Shiite militias – on the Golan Heights, in southern Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip. Israel must ready itself for the possibility that ISIS will set up shop on its border on the Golan.

I share the opinion that a final-status agreement with the Palestinians, which will bring to an end a century of conflict and will represent the culmination of mutual demands, is not attainable in the foreseeable future. However, the stagnant diplomatic process is a serious problem for Israel, since it damages our international standing and undermines the legitimacy of all of our diplomatic and military endeavors. Therefore, you must initiate a diplomatic-military plan based on three ideas.

Beyond the moral issue, it is in Israel's interests to help rebuild the Gaza Strip, in order to prevent radical factions that could accelerate escalation and drag Israel into another round of fighting with Gaza. Similarly, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza could fall on Israel's shoulders, both because the international community sees Israel as responsible for the situation there and also because of the concern that there could be a mass exodus of Gazans attempting to enter Israel.  At the same time, Hamas – which is feeling the distress of the people it rules over in Gaza – is intimating that it is willing to reach a long-term truce with Israel in exchange for the accelerated rehabilitation of the Strip.

Any such agreement would have to overcome several obstacles. First, that it would give Hamas even greater power over Gaza and would further entrench its regime. Second, the refusal of the Palestinian Authority to take a leading role in the rebuilding effort and the funds needed for it, despite the demands of the West and Arab states, which have undertaken to fund the project. Third, Egypt, which is a key player in the rebuilding project, has declared all-out war on the Muslim Brotherhood and is refusing to get behind a project that will further cement Hamas' position.

The first priority, therefore, must be to persuade the Palestinian Authority to play a more active role in rebuilding Gaza. For this, Israel needs to come up with a diplomatic plan that gives Ramallah political, security and economic incentives: this could include control over the border crossings into Gaza and expanded authority over parts of Judea and Samaria. Israel could also free up parts of Area C for economic and industrial projects, alleviate some of the restrictions on Palestinian travel in the territories and give more work permits for Palestinians to enter Israel. All of this would be in exchange for the PA's willingness to be an active participant in the effort to rebuild the Gaza Strip and to prevent Hamas growing stronger at its expense.

Finally, a multinational task force – including the moderate Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan), the international community, the Palestinian Authority and Israel – must be established to ensure that the rebuilding process has full political and financial support. This will make it easier for Egypt and the PA to participate.

The bottom line is simple: a comprehensive diplomatic initiative to resolve the Palestinian issue and to rebuild the Gaza Strip – as part of a broad regional initiative involving the United States, the international community and as many moderate Arab states as possible – would provide Israel with the political and military stability that it so desperately needs."

Ends…

 

MUTUAL SUSPICION TRUMPS ECONOMIC BENEFITS: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that, despite a report forecasting that Israel could reap a $123 billion peace dividend; facts on the ground are likely to stymie any progress.

"The report released on Monday by the RAND Corporation that a diplomatic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would provide economic dividends to both sides is fine in theory but oblivious to certain facts on the ground which could well condemn it to obscurity.

The report estimates Israel’s 'peace dividend' at $123 billion after 10 years, with the Palestinians benefiting to the tune of $50 billion plus a 36 percent increase in average GDP per capita. The corollary, if peace is not achieved, could be renewed long-term armed conflict between the two sides with severe economic repercussions for both. Israel alone could lose out on a projected $250 billion in economic opportunities over the decade.

The conclusions of RAND, a prestigious international organization, reflect what should already be understood: A permanent diplomatic solution between Israel and the Palestinians would bring economic benefit to both sides. It could potentially ease the security burden on Israel (even if, in that regard, the report isn’t very optimistic,) remove obstacles to international commerce – with the boycott movement showing signs of picking up steam – and would free up the Palestinian economy after many decades of hardly functioning in the shadow of occupation.

But the optimistic forecast touted by RAND should be read with a few caveats, which could undermine its entire theoretical success. First, as became clear after the most recent election, fear for personal security trumps possible future economic benefits for Israelis. The terrible memories of the Second Intifada, which ended only 10 years ago, are ingrained in the memory of every Israeli, as well as every Palestinian. Many Israelis would likely ask themselves: what if the agreement fails, and the territory we evacuate becomes a hotbed of terror once again? What price will we pay, both economically and in terms of loss of life?

Second, and perhaps just as much an obstacle as the first point, is that the Palestinians, according to RAND and other economists over the years, would be expected to be the big economic winners from a two-state agreement. Among them, as well, the potential for economic benefit would have to compete with the weighty issue of ideology – the willingness to accept Israel’s existence, as well as the other Israeli demands on which Palestinian negotiators, from Yasser Arafat to his successor Mahmoud Abbas, have been unable to soften their positions: Jerusalem, the future of refugees, borders and the settlements.

If the long years of frustrating failures have revealed anything, it’s that both leaderships (certainly Israel under Netanyahu, and the Palestinians under Abbas, though his approach is more rational than Arafat’s,) are incredibly suspicious of the other side. It seems that there is only a partial will to reach a permanent agreement. To that we need to add the other obstacles standing in Israel’s way, including the need to relocate at least a hundred thousand settlers from isolated settlements (of about 390,000 settlers in the West Bank, and a similar number over the Green Line in Jerusalem) – a difficult issue for the public, and an even more difficult order to give to the IDF, many of whose senior commanders are religious and support the settlements.

RAND’s report was published during a week in which Israel, with great public disinterest, marked 48 years since the Six Day War and the occupation of the West Bank. Despite their thorough analysis, research and good intentions, it’s likely that this promising vision will also crash against the shores of reality. Unfortunately, it’s likely that this report will do nothing more than accumulate dust in a desk drawer somewhere in the Finance Ministry or the Foreign Ministry. It’s definitely possible that in 10 years or so, someone will pull it out of the drawer and ask: What if?"

Ends…

 

KURDS IN THEIR WAY: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Ely Karmon comments on the strategic significance of Turkey’s election results for the Kurds.

"The results of Turkey’s June 7 legislative elections represent a significant setback for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political aspirations to change the constitutional framework and become an autocratic leader with unmatchable powers.

Not only has his AK Party lost the majority in the Turkish Parliament, but for the first time a Kurdish party, The People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which succeeded in attracting the Turkish left, religiously conservative Kurds who had voted for the AKP in previous elections, and disaffected liberals, passed the difficult threshold of 10 percent of the vote and entered the Parliament in force. Most Turkish analysts and columnists have portrayed HDP’s leader Selahattin Demirtas as the star of Sunday’s parliamentary elections. Paradoxically, Erdogan himself is responsible for his own demise and for the Kurdish victory.

One of Erdogan’s most important legacies is an ongoing peace process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK). The Kurdish Opening of the AKP government has put a temporary halt to a thirty year insurgency that has cost over 40,000 lives. After years of clandestine negotiations with PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkey’s intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, one month before the August 10, 2014 presidential elections, the Turkish Parliament approved legislation creating the legal framework for Turkish politicians to engage in the peace talks. The peace process caused fierce opposition by Turkey’s nationalist camp and toward the end of the presidential campaign, Erdogan‘s ethnic and sectarian appeals to the Turkish nationalist camp helped him gain the Presidential race.

Thus, President Erdogan faced a choice between expanding his Kurdish Opening, 'which will move Turkey closer to becoming a bi-national state [or] continuing to assuage right-wing Turkish nationalism.' His AK Party will be hard put to manage rising expectations among Turkey’s Kurds while retaining Turkish nationalist support for the 2015 elections. It was clear during this negotiation process that Prime Minister Erdogan’s liberal policy regarding the Kurds was meant mainly to bring him their votes in his campaign for the presidency and stabilize the country during a period of regional turmoil.

With the approach of the June legislative elections, Erdogan faced a serious dilemma, as he acutely needed the Kurdish vote for his Presidential project but feared the backlash of the Turkish nationalists and the military.

Erdogan showed no signs that he plans to meet any of the Kurds main demands, including constitutional changes to give Kurds ethnic-based rights and some self-rule. He focused on avoiding concessions while extracting promises that the PKK will disarm and disband. On February 15 he said he was 'expecting' Ocalan to make a statement that the PKK was going to disarm, hoping this would give his party a boost before the national elections.

However, Ocalan stopped short of calling for the full disarmament of the PKK, a move that Turkey’s government had expected. In an address delivered 21 March on behalf of Ocalan by HDP leaders in the majority Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, where thousands gathered for the celebration of Nowruz, the PKK leader emphasized that a 'democratic solution' was the only way to settle Turkey’s Kurdish problem.

HDP’s leader Demirtas for his part realized that he needed to contain the damage from the joint statement by Kurds and the Turkish government and on March 17, he said his party would never help Erdogan realize his ambitions for presidential rule, even as he restated Kurdish commitment to making peace with Turkey.

The direct result of Erdogan’s disappointment has been the government’s decision to isolate Ocalan in the ?mrali prison beginning April 5, when HDP’s delegation last visited him.

Turkish journalist Cengiz Candar predicted two days before the elections that in any scenario of the elections results 'for many citizens of Turkey, notwithstanding the uncertainties the elections may lead to, the most important outcome would be to see whether the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era will commence.'

Some Turkish newspapers like Sozcu headlined the 'downfall' of President Erdogan, and Today’s Zaman dubbed it a rejection of 'authoritarianism, the palace, and corruption.' London’s Al-Quds al Arabi expects the ramifications of the vote to 'define the future of the whole region for years to come.'

President Erdogan for his part could be in a state of shock. At the writing of these lines, Monday evening, he didn’t appear in public and Erdogan’s office issued a brief statement declaring that the nation’s will is above everything else. He acknowledged that no party had won an overall majority and said this was a 'real and healthy' reflection of the election race. He stressed the great importance of 'responsible behavior and necessary sensitivity' of all political forces 'to preserve the atmosphere of stability and confidence in [the] country and [the] democratic achievements.' Erdogan’s conciliatory tone contrasted sharply with the highly polarizing language he used during the campaign.

Turkey enters now a period of political uncertainty and the issue of the difficult process to build an unnatural coalition or to return to new elections will preoccupy the Turkish political class and the public. The HDP’s huge electoral success gives it now a leverage to press the government for the liberation or at least easier detention conditions for PKK leader Ocalan. At the same time it will clearly put the Kurds in a position of force in the negotiations for their future in the Turkish state. On the internal and regional strategic level, the Kurds’ new political status will change the rules of the game in Turkey, but probably also in Syria, Iraq and even Iran."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS:  Murat Belge sees a personal defeat for President Erdogan in leftist Taraf: "We will continue to calculate who has won what, but there is someone who has lost: Erdogan. There is no doubt that he will first turn on PM Minister Davutoglu etc. But I do not believe that many people who will accept this, even among his own grassroots. I also do not think that he will understand the electorate’s response that has cracked over his head like a whip. I cannot guess what kind of manoeuvres he will resort to, and I do not even want to think about that. We will see. But in June 2015, we have passed a very significant barrier, brothers!"

Murat Yetkin detects a significant political shift centre-left Radikal: "The HDP’s [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance’s] success is the product of the most serious act of solidarity presented by voters in Turkey in recent times. Some 2-3 per cent of the leftist urban vote, who could have easily voted for the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] under other conditions, gave their votes to the HDP instead, for two reasons: The first is HDP leader Demirtas' promise not to allow Erdogan to introduce a presidential regime. Second, they believe in the need for Kurdish politics to become part of Turkish politics and support that goal. The HDP’s entry to parliament, not narrowly but with a comfortable margin of some 80 MPs, will not only alter Turkey’s political life but Kurdish politics as well. This is the end of Erdogan's rise in Turkish politics." 

Mehmet Tezkan believes that the results may signal new elections in centrist Milliyet: "A coalition means that the president will stay outside. For that reason, the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will not agree to such a coalition. In short, establishing a coalition that can rule Turkey for the next four years is beyond difficult; it is simply impossible. What will happen then? We will have early elections, either in the autumn, or in a year’s time. All the calculations point in this direction. Can the AKP form a minority government? It can, but only under certain conditions, such as that of new elections. The president is the biggest loser from the elections." 

Hikmet Cetinkaya calls on the HDP’s leaders to remember the aspirations of those who voted for them in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The situation is clear; the HDP has destroyed the barrier of an anti-democratic, pro-coup era; the law on parties and election has been bankrupted. The HDP and its co-chair Selahattin Demirtas are the winners of the elections. The HDP’s senior ranks and Demirtas must not forget the votes that have supported his party! The people of Turkey want peace, fraternity and unity, not separatism; they want social compromise, not alienation. Our democracy, our people, have won!"

Ali Bulac argues the HDP has benefited from the AKP’s mistakes in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The HDP has played its key role successfully. The majority of the votes it received have come from Kurdish-rooted citizens, no doubt. In no other elections have Kurdish voters supported a Kurdish nationalist party to such an extent. In this election, the religious Kurdish voters gave up on AKP. But votes went to the HDP, not only from Kurdish electors, but from the AKP, CHP and the SP [Felicity Party that gave birth to the AKP] as well. It would be no exaggeration to say that votes went to it even from the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]. Even if they did not want to do so, the people have voted for the HDP for a compelling reason. This has to do with the serious mistakes that the AKP has been committing for a long time, of course."

Hasan Cemal has high hopes for the future in independent Internet T24: "There is no reason to beat around the bush. There is only one loser in the election: Tayyip Erdogan. And the winner is Selahattin Demirtas and the HDP. This is the victory of peace and democracy. It represents Erdogan’s collapse. On June 7th, he put himself up to the vote, and lost. The June 7th elections, and the fact HDP has destroyed the 10% threshold (which is quite shameful for a democracy), represent a turning point for democracy. It is a turning point for the state of law. It is a turning point for peace. The ‘New Turkey’ that the AKP often refers to will now actually be built. I believe in that." 

Nasuhi Gungor predicts stalemate and new elections in centre-right, pro-AKP Star: "Altogether we will see whether the party that promotes ethnic identity and political understanding [the HDP] will be able to open a new page that overcomes its past or not. Another important result is that no strong model of government will emerge from the elections. It is clear that a government formed by the three other parties (CHP/MHP/HDP) will not last long. We are entering a new era with surprising results and many questions. I am one of those who believe that new elections lie ahead."

Ibrahim Karagul anticipates a period of political uncertainty in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-AKP Yeni Safak: "The HDP is the surprise of these elections, of course. I always thought that it would pass the electoral threshold but I did not think that it would receive so many votes. The growth of the HDP and the MHP has fed each other and these two changes have overturned the elections’ results. It seems that a serious number of votes have shifted from the AKP to the MHP, and that the Kurdish conservative electors have shifted to the HDP. The growth of the HDP has seriously come at the expense of the CHP. It seems that the CHP's centrist and pro-status quo role has ended with these elections. An AKP-MHP coalition may be a strong government. But still, it is very premature to raise such a difficult prospect. There may be those who think about a CHP-MHP coalition and a government that can be supported by the HDP from outside. This too will be a disaster for the country and will not have a long life."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Mardom Salari is self-righteous: “Iranian decisions are based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2013, on international law and the nation’s basic rights. They are based on transparency, honesty and support for the negotiating team. On the other side, the decision-making crisis in the United States is more obvious than ever. The Western strategy of isolating Iran has come at the expense of democracy based on participation and civil rights. Western support for authoritarian regimes in the region, alliance with terrorist groups and opposition to Assad’s regime are due to their hostility to Iran. The failed fight against Takfiri groups in Iraq and ISIS shows that the Middle East is the main challenge for the Obama administration.”

Moderate Iran berates the hardliners: “When the hard-liners’ plan to launch street protests against the nuclear talks was banned, they launched a campaign in the social media. They replaced street protests with the collection of signatures for a petition and asked those whose professions have nothing to do with foreign policy to declare their position on the most professional and technical part of the nuclear negotiations - namely access to Iran’s nuclear and security sites.”

 

SANCTIONS: Conservative Khorasan questions the president’s wisdom: “It is surprising that President Rowhani speaks about sanctions from a position of weakness. It is surprising that he disregards the progress achieved during his own administration despite the problems imposed by sanctions and considers the resolution of the country’s problems dependent on the lifting of sanctions. The two sides’ weapons in the talks are clear to see. The West has the weapon of sanctions and pressure on Iran and on our side we have the resistance weapon and some nuclear technical achievements. Amidst this scene and approaching the final act, the president’s stance in pumping up the other side’s weapon - even if this is not an exaggeration - is contrary to the principles of prudence and hope. We should hope he will compensate for this error.”

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz counsels: “Since the revolution’s victory, Iran has been under harsh U.S. and Western sanctions. Our Honourable President has linked the solution of all economic and environmental problems such as youth unemployment and diminishing water resources to sanctions. Undoubtedly, the sanctions have affected the economy, but experts have asserted that sanctions have less impact on Iran’s economic problems than perceived. The government should not concentrate all options on the results of the negotiations.”

 

KHOMEINI: Hard-line Keyhan remembers the Imam: “The ‘establishment of the pure Islam of Muhammad against American Islam’, ‘faith in the promises of God and no trust in the arrogant powers’, ‘faith in the will and strength of the people and against a focus on government’, ‘concrete support to the poor against the rich’, ‘firm opposition to international bullies and oppressors’, ‘national independence and rejection of submission’ and ‘national unity and fight against divisive plots’ are the main principles of Imam Khomeini. These pillars of the Imam’s thought are a thorn in the enemy’s eye.”

 

YEMEN: Conservative Hemayat is outraged by Saudi behaviour: “The Saudi justification for bombing Yemen is irrational, illegal and inhuman. They claim that the legitimate Yemeni government has asked them for support and that in order to bring the legal government back to power, they have launched the war. This justification is not in line with their actions. Killing defenceless people, destroying public sites, the national infrastructure and food stocks and blockading Yemen from ground, air and sea are not in line with this logic. Who has allowed the Saudi government to attack a country to defend its government?” 

 

TURKISH ELECTIONS: Conservative Resalat reports: “The People’s Republican Party, which is the main critic of Erdogan’s policies towards Syria, has managed to win the votes of the Alevis of Turkey. Turkish Alevis, who have very close ties with Syrian Alawites, seek to prevent the ruling Justice and Development Party from taking full control of parliament.” 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-End of the ‘Sultan’s’ dreams

2-Correcting an error is not enough

3-Real differences

 

1-End of the ‘Sultan’s’ dreams

 

'Sultan' Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had to take off the mantle of 'Mehmet the Conqueror' after failing to secure a majority in parliament. Yesterday's [Turkish] elections have put paid to the dreams of 'the builder of a New Empire': No presidential regime; no constitutional amendments; and no monopoly over power. That is a result that may rein in Erdogan’s horse regarding numerous regional files, most importantly Syria, where his opponents have accused him of backing the terrorists and taking Turkey to the brink of the abyss. And the other major turning point has to do with the Kurds' broad entry into parliament as the main reason for the ruling [AKP-Justice and Development] party's setback--Elie Hanna in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Ataturk now breathes freely because his republic has been saved, and secularism escaped being slaughtered with Erdogan's [Muslim] Brotherhood knife. The new butcher rebelled and the image of his shadow on the wall led him to believe that he was a giant. This was before the Turkish people restrained him and restored him to his natural size. Now it is his duty to apologize to the 'cockroaches' that he falsely accused of forcing him to build his new palace and abandon his old one. He must frankly admit that he did this as a prelude to declaring the death of Ataturk's republic and the birth of the new Ottoman Sultanate, garbed in the mantle of a republican regime that replaces Ataturk's ideas with those of [Wahhabi founder] Mohammad bin 'Abdelwahhab and [Muslim Brotherhood founder] Hassan al-Banna, leading to crowning him as a sultan donning a suit and a necktie--Mundhir 'Eid in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

The results of yesterday's (Sunday's) Turkish parliamentary elections have put an end to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's dreams of altering Turkey’s political system into a presidential regime, says a Lebanese commentator. But it will also undermine his party's interventionist policies in the region, since the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will have to form a coalition with other parties, all of which are opposed to such intervention. Erdogan's defeat will end his dreams of overturning Ataturk's secular republic and declaring himself a new sultan wearing a suit and a necktie, maintains a commentator in a Syrian state-run daily. But he may call for early elections until then he will escalate his terrorist tactics against his enemies inside Turkey, and including Syria as well.

 

A DECISIVE DAY: "It was a decisive day in Turkish political life," writes Elie Hanna in Monday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

'Sultan' Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had to take off the mantle of 'Mehmet the Conqueror' after failing to secure a majority in parliament. Yesterday's elections have put paid to the dreams of 'the builder of a New Empire': No presidential regime; no constitutional amendments; and no monopoly over power.

That is a result that may rein in Erdogan’s horse regarding numerous regional files, most importantly Syria, where his opponents have accused him of backing the terrorists and taking Turkey to the brink of the abyss. And the other major turning point has to do with the Kurds' broad entry into parliament, as the main reason for the ruling party's setback.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent a different sort of night than those he has been accustomed to. He undoubtedly woke up to find a wide-open arena in which a 'sole leader' used to move about, now full of other players romping and frolicking about. The AKP fell far short of the two-thirds of the vote it had hoped for; it even failed to secure 50%-plus-one of the votes (276 seats).

At Cankaya Presidential Palace, the 'Sultan' will sit together with his aides to study the dossiers of those with whom he will be forced to share power after shelving his dreams to amend the constitution directly via parliament, or a popular referendum. He faces a number of options, the sweetest of which is still very bitter; and what they have in common is that they will all restrain his regional aspirations.

The scenarios now facing the ruling party, such as a coalition with the People's Republican Party (CHP) or the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) or the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), are all difficult to contemplate. They all require a retreat inward after the Turkish 'octopus' has sought to stretch as far as Tunisia, starting from Syria.

- A coalition with the MHP requires a freeze if not a retreat from the path of 'internal peace' with the Kurds that the ruling party launched some years ago. The Turkish right wing is also opposed to a wide-ranging rapprochement with the Arab countries, preferring a return to the West instead. A week ago, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said that 'Recep Tayyip Erdogan's regime and his government' were partners in the war on Syria 'via coordination and cooperation with the terrorist organizations.' At one electoral rally, he called for 'trying and holding all Turkish officials accountable for their role in this conspiracy.' And at another rally a few days ago and in reference to Erdogan, he said that 'those who brandish the Holy Qur'an at electoral rallies but do not refrain from spreading lies and fabrications will be held accountable for the corruption whose details emerged in 2014'.

- The second scenario, namely, that of a coalition with the AKP's main opponent, the CHP (which contributed to exposing the Turkish intelligence service's cooperation in allowing trucks filled with weapons to cross into Syria and reach the extremists there) is seen as the most hateful option for Erdogan. Two days ago, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu stressed that he looked forward to peace in Syria and the return of two million Syrian refugees in Turkey to their country.

Kilicdaroglu is well known to be among the most fervent supporters of secularism in Turkey. At the same time, he has supported friendly relations with President Bashar al-Assad's regime and [former Iraqi PM] Nuri al-Maliki's Iraq having visited Baghdad in 2013 – and strong relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

- This leaves 'the most difficult' option, that of a Turkish/Kurdish coalition in parliament. After his victory yesterday, HDP leader Salah Demirtas said: 'We promised our people not to form a government with the AKP, and we shall not back away from it.' For his part, Erdogan has described Demirtas as 'a pretty boy who is only a front for the [terrorist PKK] Kurdistan's Workers' Party.' Despite this, a coalition with the HDP remains a possibility, even if a costly one. The price will have to be paid in regional and domestic preconditions whose realization will constitute the prelude to establishing a Kurdish state in the region.

The reason for this entire predicament stems from the fact that the HDP has crossed the 10% electoral threshold, which is enough to undermine all of Erdogan and his companions' dreams. At the same time, this has put an end to twelve-years of continuous rule based a single party. And this is a setback for Erdogan and his PM Ahmet Davutoglu who portrayed the elections as a choice between 'the new Turkey' and return to a history characterized by short-term coalition governments and economic instability.

In effect, and according to the unofficial results of yesterday's elections, over three million voters lost their confidence in the AKP, and their vote was distributed between the other parties. It is also noteworthy that the votes that Erdogan lost did not go to his traditional opponent and largest opposition party, the CHP, but to the 'extremists' – i.e., the Kurds and the MHP (which received additional million-and-a-half votes).

Yet many are still wagering on Erdogan. Some suggest that he will use his position to ensure that power is not handed over to any opposition party, since the constitution grants him such authority. They add that he will ask Ahmet Davutoglu to form a government since he is the leader of the largest political party. The constitution grants the PM-designate 45 days to form a government and pass a vote of confidence in parliament. If Davutoglu fails, Erdogan may not ask the next biggest party to form a government, but may order the cabinet that did not pass the vote of confidence to remain in power.

"He will then decide to disband parliament and announce a date for early elections within 90 days," concludes Hanna.

End…

 

TOO NARROW ROOMS: "The 1150 rooms of his new presidential palace were too narrow for the dreaming Ottoman revivalist, shrinking to the same size as the ballot boxes that are the reason for what he now has to face,” writes Mundhir 'Eid in Monday's official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

Did Recep Tayyip Erdogan's project fall, or did the Turks punish him for his wanton behavior both inside and outside Turkey? The result is one and the same. Ataturk now breathes freely because his republic has been saved, and secularism escaped being slaughtered with Erdogan's [Muslim] Brotherhood knife.

The new butcher rebelled and the image of his shadow on the wall led him to believe that he was a giant. This was before the Turkish people restrained him and restored him to his natural size. Now it is his duty to apologize to the 'cockroaches' that he falsely accused of forcing him to build his new palace and abandon his old one. He must frankly admit that he did this as a prelude to declaring the death of Ataturk's republic and the birth of the new Ottoman Sultanate, garbed in the mantle of a republican regime that replaces Ataturk's ideas with those of [Wahhabi founder] Mohammad bin 'Abdelwahhab and [Muslim Brotherhood founder] Hassan al-Banna, leading to crowning him as a sultan donning a suit and a necktie.

Suffering from megalomania, and assuming the role of his spiritual forefather [proverbially cruel pre-WWI Ottoman general]  ‘Jamal Pasha the butcher’ in the region, Erdogan is well aware that by failing to secure a majority and cross the two-thirds threshold in parliament, he will be hostage in his presidential palace, dreaming of days that are gone forever, and heading towards days when the justice system will play with the cockroaches that will appear in his rooms and offices. For he cannot now build a third palace, even if he were to be eaten alive by cockroaches in his new one.

Erdogan's realization of his future and the prediction of the AKP's loss have driven him to take a preemptive step, especially after his hysterical fit after the results became known. This may take the form of early elections and a series of terrorist attacks against his enemies inside Turkey, and foreign attacks by providing unlimited support for his mercenaries in Syria.

Erdogan's pain is really that of two pains wrapped in one: A loss inside Turkey and a defeat that will be inflicted on his terrorist mercenaries in Syria. This defeat will stretch from al-Qalamoun to al-Hasaka in the north to Der'a and al-Qunaitra in the south.

This same pain has touched his ally in conspiracies, 'His Majesty' who claims to be a descendent of the Hashemite line [Jordanian King Abdullah] but whose views and crimes are Western through and through. This pain has pushed 'His Majesty' to summon his 'boy' Zahran 'Alloush [commander of the opposition Jayshul Islam] on the pretext of fighting ISIS and the Nusra Front, ignoring the fact that one dog will not bite another.

"The mercenary terrorist 'Alloush spent a week moving between Al-Hayat and Crown Plaza Hotels [in Amman] coordinating and receiving orders from the American, Jordanian, and Saudi intelligences, regarding their plans of terrorist action in Syria," concludes 'Eid.

End…

 

 

2-Correcting an error is not enough

 

It is not enough for a Cairo court to correct the egregious error of brandishing Hamas as a terrorist organization, Egypt’s siege on Gaza must also end, says Fahmi Houeidi in today’s Egyptian Ashurouq

 

Egypt’s Court of Appeal’s decision to rescind a verdict by another Egyptian court classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization is good news; but it is sad to note the situation has descended to such a point as to leave the leading Arab resistance movement a victim of domestic Egyptian polarization, says a leading moderate Egyptian Islamist.

 

BOTH HEARTENING AND SAD: "It is both heartening and sad news at the same time," writes Fahmi Houeidi in Monday's Egyptian daily Ashurouq.

We are certainly heartened by the Cairo Court of Appeal's decision to cancel the sentence issued in February that brands Hamas a terrorist organization. But this satisfaction cannot disguise a profound sadness that stems from how far we seem to have gone in judging the most important resistance movement in the Arab world, so much so that we now are ready to question whether it is a terrorist organization or not.

I am sure that it was just a coincidence that the Egyptian court's decision was issued on the anniversary of June 6th that evokes the painful and shameful memory of the Arab dream that received a lethal blow in the 1967 defeat and the subsequent earthquake that resounded around the entire Arab world.

I do not know how far this verdict of 'innocence' may affect Cairo's relations with Hamas, but I am sure that the court's decision has turned the leaf on a chapter that did Egypt great damage and unjustifiably distorted its image. It harmed Egypt politically and greatly undermined the judiciary's standing because some court had found momentary justification to describe Hamas a terrorist organization, when another refrained from doing the same to Israel on the grounds that this matter does not fall within its jurisdiction.

Celebrating correcting the court’s mistake does not mean that a breakthrough has occurred in Cairo's relations with Hamas. In addition to eliminating a black mark that damaged Egypt's reputation, the court's decision only altered one element of a thorny record that is haunted by numerous sensitivities and complexes. For no one can deny that many developments have marred the course of relations between Cairo and Hamas. These relations not only reached the point of total estrangement; some have gone so far as to accept the idea that Egypt may engage in some military action against Hamas in Gaza. And this is not an inference on my part; my information indicates that the ambassador of a great power in Cairo raised a question as to such a possibility, and that he received a response to the effect that this was no longer out of the question.

It is now known that toppling the Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt marked the beginning of the deterioration of relations with Hamas, and that certain terrorist attacks in Sinai and some Egyptian cities were so effective as to convince the security agencies that a foreign hand had played a role. In this regard, mention was made of tunnels and the expertise of Hamas's military wing, the Qassam Brigades.

The tensions that occurred at the beginning were a valuable gift to the Egyptian security forces that were accused of killing and sniping at the [anti-Mubarak] January 2011 Revolution's youths, as well as being responsible for the prevailing anarchy at the time (opening the prison gates, for example). The security forces rushed to accuse Hamas, not only because the political climate was appropriate, but also in an attempt to wash their hands clean of the revolutionary youths' blood.

These accusations were made even though the official investigation into what happened during that phase revealed no role for Hamas, and despite the fact that the military commanders in charge in Sinai had not witnessed any unusual activity on Hamas's part via the tunnels at that time. This was backed by Israeli intelligence, which monitors everything that takes place along the borders.

And it is no longer any secret that other parallel efforts were exerted to distance Cairo from Hamas. The Ramallah PA's intelligence services contributed to such efforts because the PA had not overcome its hostility to Hamas and could not overlook the fact that the movement has been monopolizing power and decision-making in the Gaza Strip since 2007.

There are many elements of this dossier that Egypt’s security agencies insist upon and that Hamas denies. In the current tense climate, it has become difficult to uncover the truth about what really happened. But those who have paid the highest price and have been the victims of this polarization are the Gaza Strip's people. Close to two million inhabitants are suffering from an extremely harsh siege because of the closure of the Rafah crossing, the Palestinians' sole exit that does not pass via Israel. And if Israel was happy at the destruction of the tunnels that served the Strip's inhabitants' needs because its goods represent the sole alternative that have come to monopolize Gaza’s markets, the movement of the Strip's inhabitants, whether students or ill people receiving treatment or workers, has been paralyzed.

Gaza’s suffocation in this manner has obstructed reconstruction, destroyed people's lives, and spread despair among the infirm and businessmen alike. That, in turn, has bred a state of frustration and rebellion, which has flung open the doors to the growth of extremism as embodied by the salafi jihadi elements and ISIS's supporters. This is the problem that Hamas is now facing, especially after it has clashed with members of these groups on more than one occasion this year. In fact, it is ironic that Israel, which is hostile to Hamas, has noted the growth of the phenomenon, whereby the youth join jihadi salafi groups and is now fearful that this may lead to an explosion in the Strip that would be in these groups' interest – a possibility that I do not believe Egypt’s security agencies are unaware of.

The closure of Rafah crossing has faced us with a sad irony whereby we have been adopting political positions that run counter to our own fixed principles. For political considerations have led to the humiliation and the destruction of the lives of two-million citizens in Palestine, even though defending Palestine and the Palestinians are among Egypt's most cherished principles.

The judiciary has corrected the error of deeming Hamas a terrorist group. What remains, is for politics to correct the error of closing down Rafah crossing and imposing a siege on the Palestinians.

"For that is not only an insult to the Palestinians; it is also an insult to Egypt’s fixed beliefs,' concludes Houeidi.

End…

 

 

3-Real differences

 

Despite the diplomatic sweet talk, there are real and troublesome differences between Cairo and Riyadh, says Khalid ad-Dakhil in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Despite all talk of a common Egyptian/Saudi vision of the region's crises (primarily Syria and Yemen) and Iran's role in them, Egypt is clearly concerned about Saudi Arabia’s recent choice of alliances, argues a leading Saudi commentator. But Egypt's adamant opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood offers no workable alternative.

 

NOTEWORTHY HAPPENINGS: "Something noteworthy happened in Saudi/Egyptian relations last Sunday," writes Khalid ad-Dakhil in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

On that day, Saudi and Egyptian newspapers published similar reports stressing the same thing, namely, that there was no disagreement between Riyadh and Cairo over Yemen and Syria. On the contrary, the two countries' views and positions regarding the region's issues are in total agreement. This is what appeared in al-Hayat, [Egyptian] al-Masri al-Youm, and [Saudi-owned pan-Arab] Asharq al-Awsat. Egypt’s al-Ahram waited till the next day (Monday) to publish a similar report.

Despite the differences between one paper and another regarding how the report was formulated, the source appeared to be one and the same – the joint press conference held in Cairo by Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir and his Egyptian counterpart and host Samih Shukri. So far, there was nothing extraordinary about this. But on the same day, the Egyptian Ashurouq deviated from the norm and published a report that was totally different from what had been published in the abovementioned papers. Its headline read: 'Growing hidden tension between Riyadh and Cairo because of the Yemeni and Syrian Brotherhood.' In a subtitle, the report wrote: 'Saudi Arabia has opened the door wide for the Brotherhood to come to power in Yemen … and Egypt views this as a violation of a red line.'

Ashurouq’s report quoted official Egyptian sources as saying that Cairo had communicated to Riyadh its fear of what it views as the 'excessive' openness to the Muslim Brotherhood various branches. The report added that Egypt views 'the attempt to rely on the Brotherhood to end the crisis' in Yemen or contain the situation in Syria as certain to have dire consequences for regional stability because, 'if the Brotherhood reaches power in some Arab countries with Saudi backing, they will not be satisfied with this and will try to take control of all Arab capitals.'

So, who was closer to the truth, the papers that reported what the Saudi and Egyptian foreign ministers had said in their joint conference, or what Ashurouq quoted official Egyptian sources as saying?

A scrutiny of what was said at the press conference reveals an inescapable gap between what al-Jubeir said and what Shukri said regarding the same issue.  On Saudi Arabia and Egypt's similar points of view regarding the Syrian situation, for example, al-Hayat quotes the Saudi foreign minister's reference to 'the two countries' efforts to exclude Bashar al-Assad after he has lost his legitimacy.' According to the paper, he added that 'the Saudi/Russian contacts are consistent with Egyptian/Russian contacts insofar as both are seeking to convince Moscow to abandon Assad.' These are clear and direct references. Their importance stems from the fact that they were made immediately after the two ministers' talks and at a joint press conference.

By contrast, the Egyptian minister did not mention the Syrian president's situation or future. When talking of contacts with Russia, he said not more than that Egypt wants Moscow to convince the Syrian regime to join a political process with the opposition. At the same time, the Egyptian minister did not comment on what his Saudi counterpart had said on this issue.

Riyadh and Cairo's assessments may be in agreement in that the situation on the ground has put an end to the Syrian president's future, and that this is no longer possible to avoid. But they differ over the manner in which they are driving developments, and the political alternatives for the post-Assad period. Riyadh is clear and direct in its position, namely, that Assad's fall is the first step towards ending the Syrian tragedy. Cairo, on the other hand, seems hesitant and has not yet made up its mind. This is why its diplomatic language tends to be general, unclear, and indirect.

And the question here is this: Does this lack of clarity disguise a view that is different to the Saudi vision? And is this ambiguity simply an attempt to accommodate Saudi Arabia because Egypt needs it?

But the fact is that, much as Egypt needs Saudi Arabia, the latter needs Egypt as well. If so, why then is the language used direct in the one case, while it is less so in the other? Does this express a deeply hidden Egyptian fear that Saudi Arabia may secure its interest? Or is this an expression of a chronic malaise, namely, that Arab states cannot agree with each other or form alliances in which they secure their common interests?

We are also dealing with the same Egyptian ambiguity regarding another issue that the two ministers addressed at their joint conference – that of foreign intervention in the Arab world. Al-Jubeir mentioned Iran by name as the sole country engaged in such intervention. For his part, Minister Shukri stressed 'Egypt's rejection of any foreign intervention from outside the region in Arab affairs or Arab security, and any attempt to infiltrate the Arab nation or impose influence and suzerainty over it should be firmly confronted within the framework of defense of pan-Arab national security.' But he avoided any mention of Iran and what it is doing in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, particularly, its use of [Shiite] militias as a proxy war tool in the Arab world.

By adopting this position, Egypt may be trying to distinguish itself from Saudi Arabia, allowing itself some margin of maneuver for reaching some form of understanding with Iran. This is both a common and an acceptable aim. But it is also clear that in light of the scale of its intervention, Iran has made it impossible to reach such a desirable understanding. It is trying to turn its intervention into a fait accompli that everyone should accept and cohabit with, with the aim of transforming its achievements so far into permanent gains, and a part of new and different regional arrangements that bear no relation to the fact that some country or another is an Arab land.

As far as Iran is concerned, its supreme leader [Ayatollah Khamene’i] is also the Muslims' supreme leader; and the Arab states effectively represent an Islamic arena that is open to it and its interests. Moreover, Iran has not made all these vast financial, military, and political investments in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon only to reach an understanding whereby it would relinquish them in favor of some Arab state's interests.  The odd thing is that, under 'Abdul Nasser, Egypt viewed the Shah's Iran as an enemy, next to only Israel in terms of its threat, even though Iran's intervention and hostility towards the Arabs did not reach their current level until after it turned into an 'Islamic Republic' and severed its relations with Israel.

So what has changed?

This question takes us back to the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, which according to Ashurouq’s report is the main sticking point between Riyadh and Cairo. The most remarkable element in what the official Egyptian sources told that newspaper is the claim that 'excessive' openness to the Muslim Brotherhood will lead them to control all Arab capitals. And this manner of addressing the issue suggests that the way in which Egypt has dealt with the domestic Brotherhood problem has not led to its resolution; on the contrary, it has transformed it into a worrisome Egyptian predicament that shackles the country’s regional strategic options, at least at this difficult Arab juncture.

The strategic option is a Saudi/Egyptian coalition that fights extremism, restores life and credibility to the notion of the state in confronting the proliferation of all sorts of militias across the Arab world, which is threatening each and every pillar of the state. And, since it is Iran that is feeding this phenomenon, there is no alternative but to adopt a common Arab position against this destructive role.

Does this require preventing the Brotherhood from political participation or reaching power in one Arab state or another? If such participation is based on an agreed- vision – namely, upholding the notion of the state – and if it takes place within a constitutional political process that has room for all, and puts an end to destructive crises such as in Syria or Yemen, what would be wrong with that? In such a case, participation becomes a local or domestic issue, and not a Saudi or Egyptian one, as is in Morocco and Tunisia, for example.

On the other hand, how can be it right to exclude the Brotherhood in Yemen when there is a consensus that the solution there should not exclude anyone? And if Saudi Arabia has no objection to the Houthis as an unarmed political party, why should it object to the Islah Party [the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood]? And the same logic applies even more clearly in the Syrian case. For it is impossible to fight the many extremist militias operating there (Sunni and Shiite alike) without a strong alliance that embodies moderation and commits to the state vision without the Brotherhood. The sole alternative is the establishment of a regional coalition similar to that waged Operation Decisive Storm. Would that be acceptable to Cairo?

It seems that what Ashurouq published was closer to the truth than what the other newspapers reported. There is some Egyptian concern about Saudi Arabia's choices, but this lacks vision and provides no alternatives. It is the sort of concern that is itself a cause for worry. In the past, Saudi Arabia was worried about Egypt's choices. Now, the two countries are exchanging positions, which reflects the fact that they do not have a common vision.

"And this is a gap that Iran, the militias, and terrorism can use to infiltrate the region," concludes Dakhil.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The odd couple

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Monday editions with the result of the Turkish parliamentary election, which ended with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's losing its majority in the Grand National Assembly. Both papers describe the result as a blow to Erdogan and, by extension, good news for Israel.

Haaretz leads with a report that Israel recently carried out a series of tests in the desert, in conjunction with a four-year project at the Dimona nuclear reactor, to measure the damage and other implications of the detonation of a so-called 'dirty' radiological bomb by hostile forces. Such a bomb uses conventional explosives in addition to radioactive material. The research concluded that high-level radiation was measured at the center of the explosions, with a low level of dispersal of radiation by particles carried by the wind. Sources at the reactor said this doesn’t pose a substantial danger beyond the psychological effect.

Elsewhere, two subjects continue to dominate the Israeli press: the campaign against the BDS movement and sporadic rocket fire from the Gaza Strip.

According to Israel Radio, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has instructed staff at the Israeli embassy in Paris to refuse a meeting with the CEO of Orange, Stephane Richard, at the Israeli embassy in France. Netanyahu stressed that if Richard is interested in explaining his recent remarks regarding cutting ties with the Israeli communications company Partner, he is invited to do so in Israel. Netanyahu earlier rejected Richard's apologies and clarifications that Orange is in Israel to stay. In remarks conveyed to an anti-BDS summit in Las Vegas, Netanyahu said that Richard's subsequent words don't square with his unequivocally hostile remarks in Cairo, where he declared his intention to end the company's business dealings with Israel.

'De-legitimization of Israel must be fought,' Netanyahu said. 'It is not about this or that Israeli policy. It is about the right to exist here as a free people.' Netanyahu said the Israeli government is committed to launching assertive and innovative programs to combat the lies and slander that are levelled against Israel.

On the rocket fire from Gaza, Netanyahu used his opening remarks at the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday to reiterate that Israel holds Hamas responsible for any firing from the Gaza Strip. He slammed what he called 'international hypocrisy,' claiming that he hasn't heard any condemnation from the international community, including the United Nations, of the rocket fire. 'It is interested whether this silence will continue when Israel acts to defend itself,' Netanyahu asked rhetorically. The prime minister said that the growing tide of hypocrisy in the world would not tie the hands of the Israeli government when the time comes to defend its citizens.

Contrary to his claim, the UN did condemn the rocket attacks – and was quickly followed by the United States. 'Clearly the U.S. stands with the people of Israel as they defend their people and their nation against these kind of attacks,' White House press secretary Josh Earnest, accompanying President Barack Obama at a G7 summit in Germany, was quoted as telling reporters.

The latest rocket attack occurred on Saturday night, when a lone projectile was fired at the Ashkelon region. A radical Islamist Salafist group calling itself the Omar Hadid Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack, although, like Netanyahu, the IDF repeated its stance that Hamas is responsible for everything that happens in the Strip. In its response to the attack, the Israel Air Force struck a number of militant infrastructure sites in the northern Gaza Strip. Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon also gave an order to close the Erez and Kerem Shalom border crossings between Israel and Gaza for all but humanitarian purposes. The army said that the border crossings will be re-opened based on how the security situation develops.

In related news, settler-run news service Arutz 7 – quoting a report Egyptian newspaper Al-Youm Al-Sabe’ – says that Hamas sources claim that senior members of the group have agreed to cooperate with the security forces in Egypt in the fight against terrorism in the Sinai. The sources told the newspaper that recently there have been several meetings between Hamas officials and high-ranking security officials in Egypt to discuss ways to fight the terrorists.

Finally, in a highly charged exchange at the annual Jerusalem Post Conference in New York, columnist Caroline Glick accused former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi of refusing to carry out the prime minister's order of preparing for a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Dagan and Ashkenazi both denied the accusation, with the former saying that, if such an order had ever been given, it would have been illegal.

 

RALLYING ROUND: Writing in Israel Hayom, Omer Dostry says that leaders of the Israeli left should not criticize the government's decisions and policies, but should rally round to defend the country from external threats.

"Speaking last week in the heat of the public debate about the growing threat of a global boycott against Israel, opposition leader Isaac Herzog leveled a harsh allegation against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his government: 'The grave and severe actions of the Israeli government and its leader are fuelling, nourishing and strengthening the boycott trend and hatred toward us on the international stage.' Meretz leader Zahava Gal-On made similar comments: 'The boycott serves Netanyahu and Netanyahu serves the boycott,' she said, adding that only in the fantasies of the right is it possible to claim that the BDS movement is motivated by anti-Semitism.

These are dangerous allegations and speak volumes about the moral sickness that has taken hold of the Israeli left in recent decades and especially in the past few years. It appears that opposition to this government and irrational and inexplicable hatred toward the prime minister have become mixed up with opposition to the state itself and that the left has lost the ability to differentiate between them.

At a time when the State of Israel is fighting against a number of boycotts on the international stage – and, incidentally, that number is tiny, insignificant and almost irrelevant; it has been blown up out of all proportion – there are senior Israeli officials who are acting against the state and against its almighty efforts to nip these boycotts in the bud. They do so by challenging the legitimacy of Israel's arguments about the real roots of the boycott movement.

We must stand up and say, in a clear and loud voice that boycotts against Israel – whether against the settlements in Judea and Samaria or against the State of Israel itself – are anti-Semitism, pure and simple. Since time immemorial, those who hate Jews have used boycotts and discrimination against us. In fact, boycotts have always been a key part of the tactics used by Arab inhabitants of the Land of Israel against the Jews. The first such boycott was implemented way back in 1921. In 1945 the Arab League launched a total boycott against Jews in the Land of Israel.

Therefore, this new anti-Semitism – unlike classic anti-Semitism – focuses on the State of Israel and its citizens. Hatred of Jews with hooked noses has been replaced by hatred of the State of Israel, which is accused of occupying another nation's land and of terrible cruelty. The humiliations, the repression and the massacres that the Jewish people suffered for generations have been replaced (or, more accurately, added to, since Jews in the Diaspora are still suffering violence and humiliation at the hands of anti-Semites) by a new tactic: attempts to boycott the State of Israel and to use diplomatic and economic means to try and eradicate it. All of this is done using the façade of 'enlightenment' and 'academic freedom.'

When leaders of the left-wing camp place even part of the blame on Israel, at a time when, elsewhere in the world, regimes are committing crimes against humanity, genocide and endless repression, the international community listens and uses those arguments to back their hypocritical and demagogic calls for a boycott of the Jewish state. Under these circumstances – whereby Israelis, some of them in very senior positions, toe the line set by our greatest enemies and play a role in the fallacious and ridiculous allegations, demonization and delegitimization of Israel – who even needs the BDS movement?

Unfortunately, the actions of the left leave no doubt as to the mortality of its members. I believe that they are encouraging external pressure on Israel in order to undermine the current government and, in so doing; they are damaging the whole of Israel. They fail to realize that being a 'fighting opposition' – which is what Isaac Herzog said that the Zionist Union would be – does not mean automatically objecting to the policies and decisions of the government – especially not its official policies in relation to the international community. Sometimes, politicians from all sides of the spectrum must come together to rebuff external threats to the future of the country. Without saying 'Yes, but...'"

Ends…

 

A YELLOW CARD FOR ERDOGAN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Eyal Zisser says that the results of yesterday's election in Turkey show that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not omnipotent as he would like to believe.

"The people of Turkey made their voice heard loud and clear yesterday. Most voters said 'No' to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan three times: the first time they denied his party its majority in parliament; the second time, they gave a Kurdish party representation in parliament for the first time, where it will be a constant thorn in the president's side; and thirdly, they declined to give Erdogan the majority he needed to make the constitutional changes needed to turn Turkey into a presidential republic, in which power – both practical and formal – are in the hands of the president.

Because of the convoluted electoral system in Turkey, the split in the secular vote and especially because of the extremely high electoral threshold (10 percent), a large number of the votes cast for Erdogan's opponents were wasted. Erdogan and his party will still be able to form the next government, therefore, and will continue to run the country. But their wings have most definitely been clipped.

The election result can only be seen as a personal defeat for Erdogan, who used the full force of his influence to promote his party. In so doing, he violated his supposedly neutral position as president, which is – in theory, at least, like Israel's figurehead leader. Erdogan incited, threatened and even imprisoned some of his opponents and journalists who dared to criticize him.

None of this helped him on Election Day. The outcome of yesterday's election is bad news for Erdogan, but excellent news for Turkey. It seems that, even after a decade of power, Erdogan has not managed to eradicate all opposition to his regime.

It's still too early to determine whether this is the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era in Turkey, but it is clear that the magic is starting to wear off and that the would-be sultan is not as omnipotent as he and his supporters would like to have believed. And it is also clear that the virulent incitement against Israel, coupled with a wanton foreign policy that has turned Turkey into an international outcast, are no guarantee of electoral success. The Turkish people are tired of Erdogan and they used yesterday's election to show him a yellow card."

Ends…

 

ON HOPE AND FEAR: Writing in Maariv, Meir Uziel comments on U.S. President Barack Obama's interview with Channel 2 last week, saying that, on at least three issues, there are things he fails to understand.

"The interview that U.S. President Barack Obama granted to Channel 2's 'Uvda' program was such a success that he will no doubt be invited to make a sequel with journalists from Channel 1 and Channel 10 in the near future. In fact, the U.S. president may find himself having to address the people of Israel in a weekly television broadcast, because, in order to avoid allegations of discrimination and in accordance with the advice of legal advisers and the demands of the monopolies commissioner, he would have to give interviews to all three of the major television channels in Israel.

Obama is a fine orator. He answers questions well, he's got a winning personality and his enthusiasm is contagious. There's no doubt that he wants to talk to Israelis. As he himself complained: 'There are a lot of filters between me and the Israelis,' he said, adding that Israelis were 'not receiving' the president’s messages directly from him. I cannot imagine that Obama would say something similar in an interview with a French or Australian television channel, but that is obvious. Obama wants to talk to Israelis and how many Israelis will he find in Germany. Okay, quite a lot, but not as many as in Israel.

When Obama talks directly to us, his words hit home – yet it is natural that we have questions for him. Given that there is no program on Israeli television where viewers have the opportunity to put their questions directly to the president, I will use this column to touch upon three of the comments he made in his Channel 2 interview.

Hope versus fear: I hope the president will forgive me for saying this, but we Israelis are bigger experts than him on both hope and fear. For 2,000 years, we nurtured the hope of returning to our homeland and many of us hope with total faith that the messiah will come soon. What better example of hope is there? Unfortunately, we are also world leaders in fear. Ilana Dayan, who did not limit herself to asking the right questions, told Obama that we cannot accept even a tiny percent chance that we will be wiped off the map. So this is the question that I pose to every foreigner I talk to: How many times in history has the Jewish people faced extermination? Obama understands Israel's security needs, but what would he – as an American – think and do if it were clear to him that his country's enemies wanted to destroy him?

The Palestinians who want peace with Israel: According to Obama, there are Palestinians 'with good intentions.' This is what he told Channel 2: 'Let's say I'm a Palestinian student or I'm a Palestinian and I don't buy the rhetoric of Hamas, and I know there are good people inside of Israel.' True, there are many Palestinian like that; more than we can ever know. I am looking forward eagerly to the day when their voices are the loudest in Arab society. Whenever I meet with Palestinians, this is what I tell them: 'Peace is not enough for me; I want you to love us.' This is the hope: that day will arrive.

The world is a better place: Obama also said that the world is a better place. If he was referring primarily to the Western world, then he is correct. But he fails to understand that it is true because, 70 years ago, world leaders refused to engage in negotiations with evil, refused to see the arguments of both sides, did not fill peoples' heads with talk about how children on the other side of the divide were suffering; they fought against evil. There could only be one outcome: the unconditional surrender of evil."

Ends…

 

QUESTIONS FOR OBAMA: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Oz Almog asks U.S. President Barack Obama the questions that he says Ilana Dayan should have asked him in her interview last week.

"These are the questions that Ilana Dayan – who interviewed U.S. President Barack Obama last week – should have asked, in response to his comments. She didn't, so I will:

Obama: 'Israel is losing its fundamental values as a Jewish and democratic state.'

My question: There has been an increase in furious demonstrations in the United States against the racism of the police. Mr. President, is the United States losing its fundamental values as a Christian and democratic state?

Obama: 'It is possible to reach a framework agreement with a peace-seeking regime in the Palestinian Authority.'

My question: The Palestinian Authority has declared the establishment of a new unity government, which includes representatives of Hamas. Do you think that this is a peace-seeking regime?

Obama: 'Let’s say, I’m a Palestinian student or I’m a Palestinian businessman in the West Bank, and I believe in peace, and I don’t buy the rhetoric of Hamas, and I know there are good people inside of Israel and I recognize Israel’s right to exist, but every day I’m traveling through checkpoints that may take me hours, and if I have a business trip or a student exchange trip, I may not be able to go because I don’t have a state, and I’m restricted.'

My question: Do you really believe that the security barrier and the checkpoints were built solely in order to make life miserable for the residents of the West Bank? And what exactly is the opinion of the Palestinian majority – including students and businessmen – who elected Abu Mazin and who, according to recent polls, support Hamas' agenda, about Israel's right to exist? Every single day, thousands of passengers are delayed at American airports for strict security checks, which include taking off their shoes for inspection. What about those restrictions?

Obama (in response to a proposal to segregate Jewish and Arab passengers on certain bus lines in the West Bank): 'We have, I hope, a special empathy and a special regard for those who are being mistreated because of the color of their skin or the nature of their faith.'

My questions: Do you really believe that the proposal – which was admittedly stupid and has therefore been dropped – was motivated by a racist ideology and was designed to humiliate Palestinians? Is that further proof for you that Israel is an apartheid state?

Obama: 'I think it’s fair to say that if I showed up at the Knesset without checking with the Prime Minister first, that there would be a sense that some protocols had been breached.'

My question: If Netanyahu and his advisers are genuinely afraid that a nuclear deal with Iran will endanger the State of Israel – and you have gone on record as saying that you believe their concerns are authentic – then why do you think that it's wrong for him to do everything in his power to thwart the deal? Would you not breach protocol to stave off an existential threat to your country?

At the end of the interview, Dayan allowed herself a lighter question (even though some would argue that the whole interview was conducted in a semi-jocular mood) and asked about basketball. 'You tweeted that Lebron James is the heart of the Cleveland Cavaliers, but do you know who his coach is?' Obama, with his typical politeness, replies: 'He’s an outstanding former Israeli coach, David Blatt.'

And this raised another question: Have American sports commentators not been guilty of condescending to Blatt? Does their superficial coverage of him not stem from exactly the same arrogance and American ethnocentricity? Maybe this is the key flaw to Obama's foreign policy and defense strategy, which could cost us all very dearly."

Ends…

 

A DECADE SINCE THE DISENGAGEMENT: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yifat Erlich says that the disengagement from the Gaza Strip is proving to be the nightmare that many warned it would be.

"Was Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip a failure? How can anyone even ask that question? For the past 10 years, ever since Israel withdrew every single one of its soldiers and settlers from the coastal territory, we all witnessed the realization of the dream on a daily basis. Israel is not the same country it was before the disengagement. The bloody conflicts of the past have been replaced by peace and prosperity. Our children, on the northern border and in the south, leave their homes every day safe in the knowledge that no harm will come to them. Every day, the people of Gaza send over missiles of love and brotherhood, which fall one our heads like gentle drops from heaven. Israel's education budget has been doubled thanks to our government being able to slash defense spending and Israeli students have climbed to the very top of the OECD's education rankings.

In addition to a marked improvement in our economy and our society as a whole, Israel is once again the darling of the international community. There are no boycotts against us, because we proved that we have the courage and the willingness to make sacrifices for peace. Mobile phone companies from across the world are waiting in line to be part of this new regional superpower. Even the most ardent anti-Semite has been forced to rethink his views in light of the situation in the Middle East, which has changed beyond recognition.

The Arab world, too, has fundamentally changed. Following in Hamas' footsteps, other countries in the region recognized that violence no longer pays off. Within a decade, Israel managed to forge alliances with Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As soon as the Gaza Strip became a modern-day Garden of Eden, residents of Judea and Samaria also rejected the path of terror and returned to the negotiating table. An historic peace accord allowed them to establish an independent Palestinian state, which now provides a peaceful home to millions of Arabs and hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers.

Even the settlers from the Gaza Strip, having been handled with efficiency and love by the Israeli government, overcame their emotional trauma and now thank God for saving them from the threat of terrorism. The flowers of peace and love are blossoming in cities like Ashkelon and Be'er Sheva and the dark days of rocket attacks are long forgotten.

Wake up, you dreamers. It's been 10 years since the disengagement and we are witnessing the nightmare come true."

Ends…

 

THE ODD COUPLE: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that, Israel officially regards Hamas as an enemy, holds it entirely responsible for every attack from Gaza and responds harshly to every instance of fire – but practically speaking, its policy is the opposite.

"The firing of rockets at the Negev from the Gaza Strip, which happened twice in three days last week, is still a localized problem. The rockets were launched by an extremist Salafi faction in the context of a local conflict with the Hamas government in the Strip, after Hamas arrested some of its activists and killed one of them. Hamas is working to stop the firing on Israel and Israel is giving it time to deal with it.

In the meantime, there is still hope in Israel that the regime in Gaza can overcome the internal threat and ensure that it does not escalate to the point of renewed conflict with the Israel Defense Forces, as the Salafis are threatening to do.

In the coverage of the escalation in the Israeli media, the organization that fired the rockets was prominently branded as Islamic State. That is a somewhat dubious claim. ISIS’ successes in Syria and Iraq in recent months have prompted various jihadist groups throughout the Arab world to position themselves as branches of the worldwide brand. In some places, like Sinai, a connection has been created between a local faction (Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which has now changed its name to Sinai Province) and ISIS, and apparently money was also sent. In other places, such as Gaza, the connection seems to be symbolic.

But the description of the Gaza group as ISIS by the Israeli security establishment serves two goals. It strengthens Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s line, which depicts extremist Islamist terror at the fences on all of Israel’s borders, and it provides an excuse for Israeli conduct. If the choice is between Hamas and ISIS (contrary to Netanyahu’s claim at the end of last summer’s war that 'Hamas is ISIS') then there is a reason that Israel is in no hurry to topple the Hamas government.

Meanwhile, neither Hamas nor Israel is dealing robustly with the Salafi groups. Hamas is having a hard time challenging the Salafis, although they are far fewer in number than Islamic Jihad, on which the regime in Gaza has forced its will with relative ease. It seems that the Salafis play by their own rules and are more insistent on having their way. Israel, for its part, has so far avoided direct attacks on leaders of the Salafi groups.

The worry over the recent nighttime sirens in Negev communities is completely understandable, given the events of last summer. What is not being discussed is the large gap between public declarations by Israel’s government and its actions. Officially, Israel regards Hamas as an enemy, holds it entirely responsible for every attack from Gaza, responds harshly against Hamas installations in response to every instance of fire and threatens to escalate its actions. But practically speaking, its policy is the opposite. It takes great care that its punitive attacks on Hamas do not harm anyone, seeks to strengthen Hamas control in the Strip (as long as it maintains the cease-fire) and operates new channels of mediation, much to Egypt’s displeasure.

Egypt today is Israel’s closest regional partner. The two countries are joining forces in dealing with the local ISIS faction in Sinai and other Salafi organizations operating in the area, and they coordinate their positions on many activities. But on the question of Gaza, they do not agree. Egypt has a complete lack of faith regarding Hamas’ intentions and continues to enforce a tight siege on the Gaza Strip by keeping the Rafah border shut. It is also trying to push for greater involvement of the Palestinian Authority in the crossings.

Israel suspects that the PA does not really want to accept any responsibility for Gaza. What is more, ties between Jerusalem and Ramallah are tense in any case in light of the dependence of the new Netanyahu government on a narrow right-wing coalition.

For these reasons, it might be more convenient for Israel to reach indirect, general understandings with Hamas, which will not bind Netanyahu to political concessions (as long as he does not publicly concede that he has, de facto, recognized Hamas as a partner.) This is the background for the increased activity in the area by Qatari representatives, who are not dealing only with the economic rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip.

The Egyptians also suspect that Turkey, an opponent of the generals’ regime in Cairo and partner of the Muslim Brotherhood axis in the Middle East, is increasing its involvement in the Gaza Strip. Only last summer, at the height of the war, Israel adamantly refused to involve Qatar and the Turks in mediation with Hamas and faced off against the United States because of the latter’s willingness to consider a compromise proposal by those two countries. Now, it seems that Israel’s approach has changed.

There are many players in the Gaza arena and many more that are active behind the scenes. At the moment, it seems that the Salafi rebellion against Hamas is putting at risk the relative stability attained between Gaza and Israel, though at some later stage the risk could come from the Hamas military wing, which is conducting an independent policy separate from that of the organization’s political leadership. Above all, there is the economic distress in the Strip, with unemployment at 50 percent, scarce potable water and inhabitants living with a sense of continual siege. It is hard to expect long-term stability, even if Israel has so far done more than Egypt to make possible the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip after last summer’s war."

Ends…

 

A KINDER AL-QA’IDA: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Yoram Schweitzer comments on al-Qa’ida’s efforts to distance itself from ISIS and how this impacts on regional alliances and rivalries.

"In recent months there have been salient and extensive organizational efforts by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates to distinguish themselves from Islamic State. Against the backdrop of the blatant brutality inflicted by Islamic State on all its adversaries — Muslims, minorities and foreigners — al-Qa’ida and its partners are seeking to portray a moderate and pragmatic image. For instance, while Islamic State proudly took responsibility for a cluster of extremely lethal terror attacks executed in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, where most of the casualties were Muslims, spokesmen for al-Qa’ida and its affiliates expressed reservations regarding them.

This trend of separation and differentiation between the two camps was also apparent in the recent, rare television interview given to Al Jazeera by Abu Mohammad Al-Julani, the leader of the Nusra Front, which is part of the al-Qa’ida alliance. One can learn from this interview about the prime strategic aims of the Nusra Front and about its principal rivalries, but mainly it tells us of Julani’s interest in quelling the fear, harbored by many, that the Nusra Front aims to turn Syria into an al-Qa’ida base of operation in the region.

As is the case with other al-Qa’ida spokesmen, Julani presented the operation of his organization as mainly defensive against the brutal aggression of Assad’s Alawite regime, which attacked, killed and exiled millions of Sunni Muslims. Julani clarified that his organization does not attack anyone who is not attacking him. He further added that his organization will not set the score with its attackers, if they repent and adhere to the Muslim faith.

Julani also declared that his organization will not forcefully impose religion on its rivals or the minorities living in Syria. He promised not to attack his enemies, should they follow the ‘right path’, despite being supporters of Assad’s regime, which has been responsible for forty years of Sunni suffering, creating many refugees and the atrocities taking place in Syria in recent years.

Julani explicitly pointed at Hizbollah, which supports the Assad regime, as a primary enemy of his organization because the Shiite organization shared responsibility in the regime’s crimes and vowed to collect the debt from Hizbollah and determined that when Assad’s regime falls, so will Hizbollah. Simultaneously, when Nasrallah tried to convince the Lebanese populace that Nusra was a threat to their country, he took pains to reassure civilians, saying that his organization makes a clear distinction between Hizbollah and the innocent citizens of Lebanon, whom Nasrallah presumes to represent.

Julani also sent reassuring messages towards the Western world distinguishing them from the United States. He warned that if U.S. aggression against his organization does not stop there will be retaliation but did not specify in what way. He clarified that his primary goal at this point is to topple Assad’s regime, not wage international terrorism. However, Julani did not state that al-Qa’ida shares this policy, but emphasized that his organization’s policy is subject to the orders of Al-Zawahiri, his supreme leader. He also denied U.S. claims that an al-Qa’ida faction called 'Khorasan group' operates within his organization, recruiting activists in Syria to carry out future international terror attacks.

Analyzing Julani’s rhetoric in the interview clarifies that he is interested in continuing the same line his organization has took in all its years in Syria: to present a pragmatic and moderate image based on alliances and cooperation with local elements in order to implement the shared goal of toppling Assad’s regime. For this purpose he obscures his true intentions and plans to establish an Islamic State, which will operate under strict Sharia Law, which will surely be implemented by force.

Also notable is his attempt to disguise the line his organization will take towards minorities that will strive to maintain their unique character and how he will impose Sharia Law. By comparison, his policy towards Arab and western countries is relatively clear, despite the fact that his organization currently doesn’t mirror the brutal acts of the Islamic State.

Though Julani didn’t specifically address Israel in this interview, Julani’s plans for the Jewish state are clear. A recent declaration by Al-Zawahiri, Julani’s supreme leader and head of al-Qa’ida, stated that once Assad, the traitor from Damascus, is removed, the liberation of Jerusalem will follow."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

SUNDAY GENERAL ELECTIONS: Oral Calislar believes that common sense will prevail in centre-left Radikal: "I believe that on elections day (June 7th) society’s common-sense will contribute to a normalizing process. The HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] is at the point of passing the 10% electoral threshold comfortably. The parties that we can describe as 'pro-status quo' have not witnessed any significant increase in support. One of the biggest reasons why the interest in the HDP has increased in the west of Turkey, is the climate of peace; that is to say, the peace process, which gradually seems to have become permanent."

Mehmet Tezkan argues that the elections will address more than the parliament’s future in centrist Milliyet: "The fact that the HDP will pass the 10% threshold and the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will decrease to 40% makes a coalition inevitable. In a way, the election will answer the regime problem as well. With its votes, the electorate will declare what kind of a regime it wants to be ruled by. On Sunday night we will see whether the people will opt for a presidential or a parliamentary system."

Ali Sirmen hopes for a national coalition in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "What will allow Turkey to become much more manageable is a national democratic coalition. This formula is possible with the inclusion of all parties. That entails a national coalition in which the AKP, the CHP [Republican People's Party], MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] and the HDP (that we predict will pass the threshold) agree on a constitution that is not tailored to fit any one person but the country, resolve the problem of judiciary, open the door to democratic negotiations over the Kurdish problem. In this coalition, all parties will be on one side, and Mr. Erdogan will be on the other."

Mumtazer Turkone expects the AKP to lose in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "If the HDP passes the threshold, its success will be due to Erdogan. Taking an anti-Erdogan stand has been the main dynamic behind its rise in Turkey’s Western regions. Erdogan is indirectly fuelling the HDP’s campaign. This is a situation where sheer craftiness will be defeated by common sense. And its cause is political blindness; the kind of blindness caused by being in power." 

Yasar Taskin Koc sees a repeated pattern in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "We consider every election as something new and are always deceived in this manner. The same things happen all the time; everyone’s place and alliances are clear. After the election, we forget all this. But as the next election approaches, we will once again know who stands with whom." 

Nazli Ilicak decries the status quo in centrist, Bugun: "Let us assume that the HDP does not pass the threshold and the AKP wins a majority. Even if a change in the constitution does not happen, a de-facto presidential system is already being practiced in Turkey. Moreover, the government has adopted such a blunt attitude that those it dislikes are soon sent to prison and there is heavy pressure on the media"

Hakan Aksay addresses the ruling party directly on independent Internet T24: "In this contest, the first round will be enough for us. We do not want you [AKP] on the ground in the second round. We will show that with our votes as well on June 7th: We are fed up with you. Thirteen years are enough. We have become tired. Go now!"

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Two-way ticket to Geneva

2-The Friday test

3-On knife’s edge

 

1-Two-way ticket to Geneva

 

The Yemeni government's participation in a dialogue conference alongside the Houthis who have usurped power in Sana'a, has raised the fears of many Yemenis that this may provide the means of saving the Houthis and Ali Saleh at the expense of Yemen itself. But a realistic reading of the Yemeni government and Houthis' decision to take part in the Geneva dialogue conference on June 14th indicates that it is the Houthis who have taken a step backward. The repercussions of this retreat will primarily affect Ali Saleh, the temporary ally of his Houthi enemies. After all, he has fought bloody wars against them and has now burnt all his bridges with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Moreover, he has no ideological umbrella from Iran to protect him--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The Geneva conference [has become] a demand and a means of exit for the [Saudi-led] coalition more than the Yemenis, despite the enormous human and material damage done by Decisive Storm’s missiles and bombs. Contrary to the substance of UN Resolution 2216, Geneva will be held without preconditions; it will not be held in Riyadh, and the UN and not Saudi Arabia will sponsor it. And most importantly, it will be held without achieving any victory worth mentioning, for the Houthis have neither abandoned their weapons nor withdrawn from the cities to their faraway caves. What is certain is that the delegation representing Yemeni 'legitimacy' [President Hadi] will reserve two-way tickets for itself, from Riyadh to Geneva and back--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The Saudi refusal to acknowledge the failure of its aggression has meant that Riyadh has been unable to see that the world, even including its own friends, has come to the conclusion that this aggression must end, and that its persistence will lead to nothing but more killing and destruction of the Yemeni people. There is talk now of another date for the Geneva conference, sometime after June 10th. If Saudi Arabia agrees to attend this conference, or if it allows its camp to attend, as seems to be the case, this means that Riyadh has accepted that it has failed to achieve any of the declared aims of its aggression, particularly since it had previously insisted that the [2012] Gulf Initiative and the UN resolutions and nothing else constituted the terms of reference for the dialogue and were the precondition for any such conference--Luqman 'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The exiled Yemeni government and Houthis’ consent to attend the Geneva conference on June 14th was only possible because the latter were forced to retreat after realizing that their project to rule Yemen had failed, maintains the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. But the main threat to stability in Yemen remains deposed president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh. None of Riyadh's preconditions for a conference on Yemen have been satisfied, and yet it has given the go-ahead for its Yemeni allies to head to Geneva, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. If anything, this indicates that Riyadh and its allies are desperately seeking a way out from the Yemeni predicament despite the fact that it is the Yemeni people who are suffering the greatest losses. Saudi Arabia has clearly been forced to back away from its preconditions for any inter-Yemeni dialogue after realizing the failure of its operation and its isolation on the international stage, maintains a commentator in a left-leaning Lebanese daily. But this dialogue is likely to be long and complicated because it is unclear to whom the Houthis are to hand over the cities currently under their control.

 

A NEW POLITICAL PHASE: "The Yemeni government's agreement to take part in the Geneva conference and the subsequent consent of the Houthi Ansarullah movement, have both paved the way before the possibility of moving Yemen on to a new political phase," writes the editorial in Friday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

The Houthis announced their acceptance of dialogue 'without preconditions' after negotiations with the Americans in the Omani capital Muscat, and under the watchful eyes of the two major regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Meanwhile, the Saudi-led Arab coalition is continuing its air raids against Houthi positions and former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's forces. On the other hand, the Houthis have escalated the conflict by deploying missiles to attack sites in Saudi border cities, while an official spokesman for the 'Yemeni army' that they control has claimed that 'the war now is equal.' In other words, the military equation now is this: Missile strikes inside Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and air raids on Yemen on the other.

The Yemeni government's participation in a dialogue conference alongside the Houthis, who have usurped power in Sana'a, has raised the fears of many Yemenis that this may provide the means of saving the Houthis and Ali Saleh at the expense of Yemen itself. But a realistic reading of the Yemeni government and Houthis' decision to take part in the Geneva dialogue conference on June 14th indicates that it is the Houthis who have taken a step backward.

The repercussions of this retreat will primarily affect Ali Saleh, the temporary ally of his Houthi enemies. After all, he has fought bloody wars against them and has now burnt all his bridges with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Moreover, he has no ideological umbrella from Iran to protect him. In an interview with the satellite TV station al-Mayadeen, Ali Saleh exposed his cards with an unusual ferocity. This suggests that his opportunistic alliance with the Houthis has become a subject for Arab and international negotiations and that his head is now on the line.

The Houthis have been forced to 'sip the poison' of negotiations – to use Imam Khomeini's expression – before they have had time to enjoy the privileges of controlling Yemen if only for a short while, and even though they believed they had taken full hold of it. And a number of political and military developments are behind this:

- The first, of course, is Operation Decisive Storm that has ended a long phase of Saudi policies that resorted to soft power, money, and influence from afar. Regardless of the results of a military survey of the Houthi’s most important command-and-control positions, the basic consequence of that operation is that none of that movement's leaders is now safe.

- The second development is that Houthi and Ali Saleh and his men are now operating outside the framework of international legitimacy after UNSCR 2216. This means that their control of Yemen is just a temporary hiatus in the country's history, which must end if the country is to emerge from the current vicious circle.

- The third development is that Ali Saleh has lost his special relations with some Gulf states. The fact that he continues to try to pull the strings of these relations is evidence of his despair rather than his cunning.

- The fourth and perhaps the most serious development is that because of various international and geographic factors, the Iranians have come to realize that they can no longer influence the game in Yemen and that their attempt to use the Houthi card has failed. They are most likely to have conveyed this to the Houthis.

This analysis indicates that Ali Saleh will constitute the main obstacle to the coming settlement. The leaks coming from Yemen and the Gulf indicate that negotiations are underway to ensure his departure from Yemen.

"Will he leave, or will Yemen witness a new bloody confrontation between the deposed president and his enemies/allies the Houthis?" asks the daily in conclusion.

End…

 

PRECONDITIONS DROPPED: “Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's government has dropped its 'preconditions' and decided to back away from its refusal to take part in the Geneva conference before the Ansarullah submit to the UN demand that they hand over their weapons, withdraw from the city centers, and allow 'legitimacy' [Hadi] to return to the country," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Friday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The Yemeni delegations will now head to Geneva in the middle of this month to join an exhausting process in search for the bases of a political resolution of the Yemeni crisis. And they will do this without prior conditions and under the UN's sponsorship. So what happened in a single week and that has forced the exiled [Hadi] government to be willing to ‘sip the poison’? What are the true reasons behind this U-turn?

If we want to know what paved the way to Geneva, we must know what happened in Muscat. The password came from there, where the Omani capital hosted multi-party dialogues in which the Americans and the Iranians spoke with the Houthis and sought a political way out of the Yemeni predicament. And the Saudis, as well as the major players in the region and the world, were not far from these dialogues,

After seventy days of futile war, all parties are drawing close to a shared conclusion: The [Saudi-led] coalition has no hope of winning this war or emerging victorious from this risky venture. Instead of searching for solutions that help the Yemeni party allied to Operation Decisive Storm [Hadi], the search has begun to focus on finding a way out for Saudi Arabia and the coalition it is leading from the Yemeni 'quagmire', without paying much heed to saving the Kingdom’s face.

The fact is that neither Hadi nor his government could have decided to reject the Geneva conference and then accept to take part in isolation of Saudi directives in this regard. It is clear that the coalition has accepted to escape while it can, opting for the view that cutting its losses is better than seeking gains. And is there any damage worse than being involved in a futile war that is costly in both political and moral terms?

This is why the Geneva conference became a demand and a means of exit for the coalition more than the Yemenis, despite the enormous human and material damage done by Decisive Storm’s missiles and bombs.
Contrary to the substance of UN Resolution 2216, Geneva will be held without preconditions; it will not be held in Riyadh, and the UN and not Saudi Arabia will sponsor it. And most importantly, it will be held without achieving any victory worth mentioning, for the Houthis have neither abandoned their weapons nor withdrawn from the cities to their faraway caves.

"What is certain is that the delegation representing Yemeni 'legitimacy' will reserve two-way tickets for itself, from Riyadh to Geneva and back," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

SAUDI ASSUMPTION: "Saudi Arabia deals with the UN and its organizations on the assumption that they are all subject to its will, and that their policies should provide cover for its aggression," writes Luqman 'Abdullah in Friday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

It exerted pressure to remove former UN Yemen envoy Jamal Benomar from his post against the background of the Gulf regimes’ accusations that he was siding with the Ansarullah. But the truth is that Benomar was merely pursuing his mission as far as possible within the balance of power in the Yemeni and regional political map.

When the current UN Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad was appointed, the Saudi and Gulf media sang his praises on the assumption that he was close to them and has private interests in Saudi Arabia, in addition to being a friend of Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir. But the reality on the ground and the man's performance so far have proven that he is following in his predecessor's footsteps, because, simply put, Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve its aims and most of Yemen's provinces are now managed by the Supreme Revolutionary Committee which is close to Ansarullah, even in the shadow of the aggression on the country.

It is true that Gulf diplomacy succeeded in getting the UN Security Council to issue UNSCR 2216 but its diplomacy has failed to squeeze out any political 'juice' from this resolution, as well as failing to make use of it in changing the military situation on the ground.

Moreover, the disastrous scenes resulting from the aggression have placed the international humanitarian organizations and bodies in a difficult position because of Saudi Arabia's excessive violence, and its systematic destruction of the country with no commitment to the usual rules of engagement that restrain military action. As a result, these organizations have reserved a role for themselves and their activities have offered a diplomatic alternative in the absence of any effective and significant political initiatives.

This was context for the UN’s decision to specify May 28th as the first date for a dialogue between the various Yemeni constituents in Geneva. That was rejected by Saudi Arabia, as conveyed to the UN by means of a letter sent by fugitive President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi to the UN secretary-general, on the grounds that the Ansarullah were continuing to provoke Yemen's neighboring countries.

Parallel to these developments, talks were held in the Sultanate of Oman, and the government in exile in Riyadh appeared to be dissatisfied with the manner in which they were proceeding. Anyway, that government was not invited to these talks to begin with. As for their content, it emerged that they took place between the real players and in the absence of their proxies. The spokesman for Hadi's government expressed this view when he said that the Muscat negotiations are between the Ansarullah and the Americans and that their outcome was not binding on Hadi.

But what is important about all this is that the Saudi refusal to acknowledge the failure of its aggression has meant that Riyadh has been unable to see that the world, even including its own friends, has come to the conclusion that this aggression must end, and that its persistence will lead to nothing but more killing and destruction of the Yemeni people. There is talk now of another date for the Geneva conference, sometime after June 10th.

If Saudi Arabia agrees to attend this conference, or if it allows its camp to attend, as seems to be the case, this means that Riyadh has accepted that it has failed to achieve any of the declared aims of its aggression, particularly since it had previously insisted that the [2012] Gulf Initiative and the UN resolutions and nothing else constituted the terms of reference for the dialogue and were the precondition for any such conference. In fact, it did not confine itself to this, but demanded that it should decide which Yemeni parties and figures were to be invited to this dialogue as a precondition.

But the information available so far indicates that it is the Yemeni people's various constituents that were previously holding a dialogue in Yemen who will be invited to the Geneva conference without any change. And more important than all the above is that the dialogue will be held without preconditions and in good faith, according to a press statement issued by the UN Security Council after a session devoted to discussing the Yemeni situation.

As for Ansarullah, they are heading to dialogue with a broad space for manoeuvre. Most Yemeni provinces are in their hands even if they agree to hand over the cities they hold. But the problem has to do with the party that will replace them against the background of al-Qa'ida’s growing strength and the absence of any force that is acceptable to both sides, given that the most of the army’s units are now seen as being pro-Ansarullah.

"And this calls for long and complex negotiations," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

 

2-The Friday test

 

As Saudi Arabia faces the possibility of another Friday attack on Shiite shrines, everyone should hope that today passes peacefully, says 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Saudi Arabia’s security forces face their most serious test today (Friday) after two successive Friday bombings of Shiite mosques in the Kingdom, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. If they fail, it would mean that ISIS has established dangerous cells in the country that outshines al-Qa'ida in its power and financing.

 

NOT MUCH TO SAY: "It has been some time since Lt.-Gen. Ahmad al-'Asiri – Operation Decisive Storm's spokesman appeared at his daily press conferences to discuss the latest developments in the Saudi-led Arab coalition bombardment of Yemen," notes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But there is not much he can say to journalists and media representatives now that it is already two months since the Storm began and is approaching the middle of its third month, and now that the Kingdom is sliding towards other sorts of wars that require other sorts of spokesmen.

Developments on the Saudi domestic front and the bombings that have occurred there have certainly overshadowed the reports from Operation Decisive Storm. They have also overshadowed the raging war that is getting more intense and dangerous along the Yemeni/Saudi borders. On that front, the Yemeni Houthi Ansarullah have begun to publicize their military operations and missile bombardments of Saudi positions for the first time, whereas they previously used to claim that Yemeni tribes were carrying them out.

Throughout the past week, the Saudis – including their security agency leaders– have had their hands on their hearts for fear and worry. It is also certain that they are praying to God that this Friday will pass without any bombings similar to those that targeted two Shiite mosques within eight days. The first was al-Qudaih Mosque in al-Qatif during prayers the Friday before last, killing twenty worshippers in the process. The second was al-'Anoud Mosque in ad-Dammam, resulting in the death of four people, including the suicide bomber who was trying to infiltrate the worshippers and blow himself up in their midst.

This Friday will be the most important test of the Saudi security men. If it passes peacefully, that would be cause for the Saudi security leadership's satisfaction. Equally satisfied will be Crown-Prince and Interior Minister Mohammad bin Nayif who built his reputation inside and outside the country as the Kingdom’s strongman because of his 'successful' plans to destroy al-Qa'ida and its cells after a spate of assassinations and bombings that targeted Western and foreign citizens some ten years ago.

It is the Saudi Crown prince and his security aide's misfortune that al-Qa'ida's cells are modest compared to Islamic State's (ISIS) cells, which have announced their responsibility of the bombings in al-Qatif and ad-Dammam. This is because these are local cells that draw their support from the poorer sectors of society. Moreover, they are members of a 'state' that has a presence close to the Saudi borders; has created an entity within two powers that used to be major regional states – namely Iraq and Syria; conquers new cities almost every other month; captures hundreds if not thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition, tanks and armored vehicles; adds to its financial resources other sources such as oil and gas wells, phosphate mines, and invaluable priceless historical relics (in Tadmur [Palmyra]); and acquires new citizens who have to pay taxes to fill its coffers.

Undermining the Kingdom's stability tops this dangerous and bloody organization's list of priorities. And the first step in its scheme to sow the seeds of [Sunni/Shiite] sedition is to strike at Shiite mosques and Husseiniyyas in the hope of 'radicalizing' the hard-line Shiites, pushing them into taking up arms on the pretext of self-defense. That, in turn, would lead to sectarian confrontations, which may ultimately drag some foreign party (Iran) to provide them with financial and military aid as it is now doing in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. There is no need for a lengthy explanation of what may happen as a result.

Anyone following the social media pages of Saudi Shiite activists, especially those living outside the Kingdom, would detect a tangible tendency towards forming popular committees to defend the mosques and the Husseiniyyas, and a reluctance to rely on the Saudi security forces' abilities. If this development elicits a response – and there is some belief that it will –it will have dire consequences.

Certain regional and international parties want to implicate Saudi Arabia in a series of domestic and foreign wars in order to hemorrhage it in financial, human, and political terms, especially in Yemen and Syria, and soon in Iraq. One possible sign of this is the fact that Yemen has been transformed into a domestic Saudi affair that entails an extremely costly security and financial burden that may last for decades. And this is happening at a time when oil returns have fallen to half their previous levels, the deficit in the annual Saudi budget is growing, and the commitment to intervention in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and other Islamist countries is growing. We have to bear in mind here that Yemen's population is larger than Saudi Arabia’s, but with one major difference; namely, the absence of infrastructure and record levels of poverty in Yemen.

[Fugitive] Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's agreement to attend the Geneva [Yemen] conference planned for June 14th without any preconditions may be the beginning of Saudi Arabia's realization of the extent of its predicament in Yemen and an attempt to escape the crisis there as soon as possible in order to cut its losses. The previous terms for any negotiations such as the Houthis' withdrawal from the cities they have captured, handing over their weapons, and the exclusion of former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh and his General People's Congress party from any negotiations, are all impossible preconditions that have only proven to further complicate the problem rather than creating the climate required for solving it. Their mistaken nature and the shortsightedness of those behind them have by now been exposed. The most important evidence of this is the U.S.'s intervention in this dossier, and the fact that it has launched a dialogue with the Houthis without consulting with President Hadi or anyone else.

Saudi Arabia has implicated itself, or rather has been implicated by others, in a bottomless Yemeni pit, without being provided with a ladder to climb up. Its more reasonable leaders must act in order to find such a ladder before it is too late. And there are many reasonable people in the Kingdom who only need to find someone to listen for the chance to express their views and offer their recommendations.

The domestic threats are much greater than the foreign ones. In fact, the situation may develop in such a manner that the two threats merge into one. This would be a catastrophe. And when U.S. State Department Spokesman John Kirby says that ISIS is very dangerous and destroying it may take three to five years, then – even though this assessment seems modest in our view – it is a nightmare for Saudi Arabia. After all, ISIS believes that its 'caliphate' can only be complete after capturing Mecca and Medina.

Like millions of others, we hope that the Friday prayers will pass without any bombings or shedding of innocent blood. At the same time, we also hope that all the previous policies that have provided the appropriate climate for these bombings will be subject to a review.

"And we confine ourselves here to this simple wish," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

3-On knife’s edge

 

In the most critical Turkish elections in over a decade, the result hangs on a couple of percentage points in one direction or another, says Mohammad Noureddin in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

As Turkey heads for one of its most momentous general elections in over a decade this Sunday (June 7th), it is clear that the elections will be decided by a tiny percentage of the vote, notes a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. In particular, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may lose both its majority and its leader's plans to amend the country's constitution if a relatively small Kurdish party manages to secure 10% of the vote.

 

THE MOST IMPORTANT ELECTIONS: "In three days' time, Turkey faces one of the most important elections since 2002 when the AKP first came to power and has remained there till today," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

The importance of these elections does not stem from who will attain first, second, or third position; that is already known. Their importance stems from the fact that depending on certain minor factors, the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) may either lose its monopoly over power or even power itself; or it may consolidate and strengthen its grip on government; or the current status quo may continue.

Nonetheless, this is the first time that the possibility of the AKP losing power has been seriously raised. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP has achieved one victory after another since 2000 and with large majorities that gradually increased from 34% in 2002 and reached 49% in 2011 – almost half the total vote. To this the party added its victories in all municipal elections as well as the presidential elections of 2007 (when Abdullah Gul became president) and 2014 when Erdogan took the presidency chosen directly by the people.

After these last presidential elections, the AKP's frontman changed. Erdogan was no longer president of the party or head of the government. Ahmet Davutoglu was chosen as head of both party and government with full backing from Erdogan who anointed him as his successor in these posts.

This is one of the main characteristics of the current elections: The AKP will fight elections without Erdogan at the helm for the first time. The second factor is that, in the current elections, the party lacks all its known MPs and leading figures who have helped to secure its glories over the past twelve years. This is because the AKP's internal rules, as drafted by Erdogan, do not allow any MP to remain in their post for more than three successive parliamentary sessions.

Another factor is that the party is fighting these elections with no significant role for one of its most important founders– Abdullah Gul – after he left the presidency in 2014 and made room for Erdogan. Furthermore, the party is fighting the elections at a time when it is up to its ears in corruption scandals.  Although they have had no effect on the municipal elections, their influence will be felt in the current elections.

The AKP is also fighting the upcoming elections against the background of an economic recession and a drop in the standards of freedom and democracy, especially when it comes to freedom of the press. The latest scandal in this regard was the revelation of the content of trucks carrying weapons to Syria that Erdogan has always insisted on denying, claiming that the trucks were only bearing humanitarian aid to Syria's Turcoman. No one knows what effect this will have on the Turkish voter, especially in light of the damage done to the credibility of Erdogan and Davutoglu's discourse.

As for the opposition, it is distributed over four main parties:

- The first is the secular Republican People's Party (CHP) that has come second in all elections with around 27% of the vote. The party does not aspire to dramatically increase its share of the vote this time around; but it is trying to present itself as more open to the religious sector and is promising the voters vast economic projects, such as building a new city in Anatolia or the Black Sea, which would be an international center.

- Next in line are the hard-line right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with around 17% of the vote. Although the MHP's ideological tenets are close to those of the AKP, it is more secular and strongly opposes Turkey's involvement in the Syrian crisis and in Iraq by protecting Iraq's Turcoman.

- Then comes the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in fourth position in the country as a whole. In the past, the HDP did not run in elections; instead, its candidates used to run as independents. The party, which supports Abdullah Ocalan’s Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is fighting the current elections as a party in the hope of passing the 10% electoral threshold that allows it to enter parliament. If it does not pass the threshold, it will remain outside parliament.

- The fifth party in the country is an alliance between the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) the heir to Necmettin Erbakan, and the Great Union Party (BBP). These are two small Islamist parties which together may get around 3% to 4% of the vote.

These are crucial elections for Recep Tayyip Erdogan who wants the AKP to achieve a sweeping victory that secures two-thirds of the seats (367 seats out of a total of 550) so he can amend the constitution and change the regime from a pluralist parliamentary to a presidential one that concentrates all power in the president's hands and may even cancel the post of prime minister and ministers.

If the AKP does not secure 367 seats, then the least that Erdogan wants is 330 seats. This is the necessary figure for passing constitutional amendment in order to bring the presidency to a popular referendum. Erdogan can wager on such a referendum to change the political system in such a case.

All eyes are focused on the Kurdish HPD. If the party succeeds in crossing the 10% threshold, it will win 55 to 60 seats, but if it fails, the majority of these 60 seats will go to the AKP, which would increase its power and allow it to get close to and perhaps exceed the 330 MPs or more if it wants.

The HDP's success will constitute a blow to the AKP, and its failure will be of great benefit. And all this turns on a sole factor: that of the HDP securing 10% of the vote. Current polls indicate that the HDP is standing on knife's edge somewhere between 8% and 11%. In other words, a percentage point or two, or even half-a-point, could be decisive for the presidential system's success or failure.

But there are other possibilities, if the HDP wins 10% of the vote and the AKP's share falls to below 42%, for example, it is likely that the AKP would not secure absolute majority – half the votes plus one (276 MPs.) In that case, it is very likely to be unable to monopolize power alone.

"In other words, a point or two up for the HDP or a point or two down for the AKP, will determine the results and decide Turkey's future. So in which direction will the Turkish voter veer?" asks Noureddin in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

BDS

 

With the exception of Haaretz, all Israeli newspapers lead their weekend editions with the fallout from the comments in Cairo by the CEO of Orange, who said that he would cut ties with Israel if it were not for the threat of costly legal action. The comments were seen by the Israeli government as an endorsement of the BDS movement, despite the fact that Stéphane Richard made it quite clear that any such decision would be 'business, not politics.'

In an exclusive interview with Yedioth Ahronoth, Richard rejected accusations of anti-Semitism and support of the world-wide BDS saying, 'We love Israel. This has absolutely nothing to do with the kind of political debate in which I don't want to be.' Richard rejected the notion that he had caved into pressure by BDS activists. 'I was not aware that there is an international campaign regarding this; I'm very sorry about this. It is a purely commercial point regarding the use of our brand by a company under a license agreement,' he added. 'We don't want to do that. Now we have a contract with Partner with an option for us to stop the use of the brand in the future, but not tomorrow of course. I have never said that Orange wanted to withdraw from Israel.'

Nonetheless, as Israel Hayom reports in its lead story, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has urged the French government to distance itself from Richard's comments. 'I call on the French government to publicly repudiate the miserable statement and miserable action by a company that is under its partial ownership,' Netanyahu said at a memorial ceremony in Tel Aviv for the victims of the 1948 Altalena sinking.

Netanyahu called on Israel’s allies 'to unconditionally declare – in a loud and clear voice – that they oppose any kind of boycott of the Jewish state. 'The absurd drama in which the democracy that observes human rights – the State of Israel – and which defends itself from barrages of missiles and terrorist tunnels, and then absorbs automatic condemnations and attempted boycotts; this absurd drama will not be forgiven,' Netanyahu added.

Cabinet minister Miri Regev – apparently aware that the president of the French Republic does not have the power to fire the CEO of a private company – called on Francois Hollande to fire immediately Richard 'if he does not apologize for his anti-Semitic comments.' In a similar message, the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Center urged Hollande to act to reverse Orange Telecom's Israel boycott move. In a statement the center urged Hollande to intervene in what they termed a 'shocking betrayal of the world's only democracy in the Middle East.' The center also sent a letter to the UN's 193 member-state International Telecommunication Union secretary general, noting that 'as the French government owns 25 percent of Orange, it is for France to keep its non-discriminatory and universalist responsibilities to the ITU vision.'

Speaking on Friday, meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said that his country is firmly opposed to a boycott of Israel, but insisted that Orange has the right to decide on its business strategy. The French FM added that France, along with the European Union, holds a consistent and well known stance against Israel's settlements in the West Bank.

In other news, Maariv reports that, minutes after Wednesday night's rocket attack that was claimed by a Salafist group in Gaza affiliated with ISIS, Hamas told Israel that it was not behind the attack and that the ISIS affiliate was trying to cause conflict between Hamas and Israel. As Hamas rushed to clear out of sites fearing the IDF retaliation that was quickly forthcoming in the wake of the rocket strike, a senior Hamas source sent a message to Israel via Egypt. In the message, the Hamas source said an ISIS affiliate in Gaza, which is in a state of conflict with his group, intentionally fired the rocket to cause Israel to strike back at Hamas and escalate the situation.

The Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigades, which claimed the rocket attack, said in a statement on Thursday that the strike was in revenge for 'the death of an Islamic State member in Gaza by Hamas members.' The statement apparently refers to a Salafist leader affiliated with ISIS who on Tuesday was shot dead by Hamas forces in Gaza City as they tried to arrest him and he allegedly opened fire on them.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon responded to the message on Thursday, saying, 'even if those firing on Israeli territory are gangs of rebels from global jihad organizations interested in challenging Hamas by firing at us, we view Hamas as responsible for the goings-on in the Gaza Strip, and we won't tolerate attempts to harm our citizens. Tonight the IDF responded with strikes to the (rocket) fire. And if needed - we will strike even harder, and last summer proved that.'

In related news, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, is to visit Israel next week to meet Ya'alon, and likewise hold his first working meeting with the recently appointed IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. The defense leaders will discuss the threats from Syria and Gaza.

Finally, in its lead story, Haaretz reports that Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon is upping the pressure on Netanyahu. In a closed meeting of Kulanu’s MKs on Monday in the Knesset, Kahlon stated, 'It will be difficult to impossible to continue functioning in this coalition for the long term with 61 MKs.' That comment, which was not reported in the media, was reported to the Prime Minister’s Bureau, where it lit up one or two – or maybe 10 – red lights.

 

OH, BOYCOTT: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that the beautiful Israel that many in the West long for never existed and that they want to punish the ugly Israel that they see today.

"Speaking at the start of his weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu made the following heartfelt speech: 'We are in the midst of a great struggle being waged against the State of Israel, an international campaign to blacken its name. It is not connected to our actions; it is connected to our very existence. It does not matter what we do; but what we symbolize and what we are matters. This is a phenomenon that we have known in the history of our people – what hasn’t been said about the Jewish People? They said that we are the focus of all evil in the world. They said that we poison wells. They said that we drink the blood of little children. All of these things are being said about us today as well.'

Speaking in the Knesset, new Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked argued that the BDS movement was, at its root, anti-Semitic. 'In the previous century, it was the Jews who were dehumanized,' she said. 'Now, it is the State of Israel that is being dehumanized.'

There is a grain of truth in this assertion. Efforts to isolate and boycott Israel on the international stage are not clean of anti-Semitism, hypocrisy and double-standards. Better men than I can spell out exactly where the world has sinned on this issue and everything they say would be confirmed and documented.

The comments at a press conference by the CEO of global mobile provider Orange, Stéphane Richard, are an example. Orange (which was previously known as France Telecom) provides mobile phone services for some 230 million people across the globe. In Israel, Orange provides the company that shares its name with nothing more than a name. Pro-boycott organizations in France have consistently been demanding that Orange sever its ties with Israel and that demand is weighing heavily on the company's directors. Richard said that he would be delighted to cut ties with Israeli company Partner, but that he was concerned that the company would be slapped with massive fines in the Israeli courts. If the CEO of an American company had said something along those lines, he would be fired within a day. Richard, it seems, will merely have to apologize.

But back to Netanyahu. 'It does not matter what we do,' he said. 'The struggle against Israel has nothing to do with our actions; it is all about our very existence.' The kind of Zionism with which I grew up disagrees with the prime minister. It matters a lot what we do – for good and for bad. It's convenient to think that all the global criticism of Israel stems from anti-Semitic motives. It's convenient because that frees us of the need to deal with our actions and our shortcomings. Before it was split apart, the Ministry for Intelligence and Strategic Affairs prepared a 150 million shekel budget for fighting the BDS movement. Wealthy Jews from overseas would be asked to contribute an equal sum, if not more. Not one single shekel of this will be spent on examining how our actions in the West Bank impact on the BDS movement.

Molad, the Center for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy, recently published a survey about the boycott movement. According to the organization, 90 percent of the demands of the Western effort calls for a boycott related to Israeli activity in the territories. The remaining 10 percent seeks to undermine the existence of the State of Israel, under the flag of the BDS movement. According to Molad officials, 'on every issue that we examined, the existing obstacles and obstacles that are likely to emerge in the future are directly linked to Israel's control of the territories and to its treatment of the Palestinian population.' They go on to detail these obstacles: first and foremost, the settlement enterprise, which is seen as a serious violation of international law and then Israel's military actions and legal system in the territories. There is no Western country which questions Israel's right to exist, but there is no Western country that is willing to recognize additional settlement construction.

The reality on the ground is more complex. Anti-Israel propaganda on campuses across the United States and in Western Europe does not stop at the Green Line. The occupation is the accusation, but the enemy is Israel. The students who are exposed to these arguments will one day sit in parliament, on the boards of major companies and in the courts. They will be the backbone of the Jewish community. Political parties and human rights organizations are gradually adopting similar generalizations. When Israel financially compensates businesses and colleges in the territories that are harmed by the partial boycott, it is helping the cause of the BDS movement. Their propaganda is toxic and false, but our government is making life easy for them.

With the exception of some Evangelical churches, no one in the West can be persuaded that Israel's West Bank settlements are justified. It doesn't matter how many lecturers we send or how much money we invest in our campaign. It's impossible. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely can tell them that God promised us this land until she's blue in the face, but her god is not their god.

Anti-Semitism was prevalent a decade ago and three decades ago. And still, boycotting Israel was seen in the West as something that must not be done. Any Western boycott was part of the crude oil economy and had nothing to do with human rights. When Israel became more economically powerful, that boycott disappeared. Without improving our performance in terms of human rights, the current boycott with not go away.

U.S. President Barack Obama gave a special interview to Channel 2's Ilana Dayan. In the interview, which was aired this week, he positioned hope against fear: Netanyahu is offering Israelis fear (fear of Iran, fear of concessions to the Palestinians and fear of change), while he was offering us hope.

I used to believe that the Fear vs. Hope equation was true. The outcome of the recent election has made me question this. I am not sure that fear is the right word. It is possible that Israelis, or at least some of them, are like supporters of a soccer team. Say, Beitar Jerusalem, for example. It is not fear that causes Beitar supporters to run riot whenever their team plays Bnei Sakhnin. It's hatred. Netanyahu has used his considerable talents to unify a large proportion of the Israeli public against a common enemy. Not nation versus nation, but people versus people, tribe versus tribe. The Arabs are a perfect enemy. In fact, all non-Jews. They're all anti-Semites, each and every one of them.

Faced with this depressing picture, Obama invited us to look at pre-1967 Israel. He imagines us as a kind of utopia: committed to peace, humanistic values and human rights. That is a myth, of course. In many respects, Israel today is a much better place than it was in its early years. The main thing we have lost is the confidence that things will be more just, more correct and more humane. We are flapping about in the puddle that we created.

It's little wonder that foreigners compare Israel today to that myth: the former kibbutz volunteer who is now his country's foreign minister; someone who heard how Jews were in the vanguard of the civil rights movement; someone who is religious and reads the bible; someone else who remembers the horrors of the Holocaust. They all compared the reality to the myth and they cannot accept it. They want a beautiful Israel that doesn't exist. And they want to punish the ugly Israel."

Ends…

 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini answers some of the questions that the BDS movement has forced many people – including staunch supporters of Israel – to ask.

"The 'Fighting the Boycott' campaign launched by this newspaper has sparked numerous reactions and questions – some challenging and significant. They attest to the challenges posed by the BDS movement. The questioners are not anti-Semites. A portion of the BDS supporters are falling under the spell of the movement because it purports to be tackling a real problem. Yes, the Muslims and Arabs are killing Arabs and Muslims as a matter of routine, far more – and it's only intensifying. But the focus on Israel, some critics of the country argue, stems from the fact that Israel is a democracy. There are other questions and issues too – concerning the occupation, human rights, the settlements, the blockade, and more. Look, says the man on the fence to himself, the occupation has been around for decades, and there's no peace and no hope. So perhaps the non-violent approach offered by the boycott campaign is in fact the right way?

Let's try to answer some of these questions – because they represent the questions of many a good man and woman who are being sucked into the rhetoric of the BDS campaign not out of hatred for Israel or anti-Semitism, but because they truly believe in human rights, non-violence and fixing the world. They deserve answers.

Perhaps the problem is the occupation and not the BDS campaign?

This appears to be the most widespread argument among those who understand, explain and justify the boycott. Omar Barghouti, a leader of the BDS campaign, was once asked: Will an end to the occupation also bring an end to the campaign? 'No,' he replied bluntly. More importantly, the BDS campaign wasn't suspended even for a moment when Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni spoke for Israel. They actually wanted to end the occupation. It didn't work out for them.

Would an agreement with the Palestinians silence the BDS movement?

On the contrary. The initiators and leaders of the campaign are opposed to a peace settlement based on two states for two peoples. Their guiding principle is the so-called right of return, which would mean an end to Israel; and one of their main slogans reads: 'From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.' We need to find a compromise, and we need to fight for a settlement and peace – and that's exactly why we also need to oppose the boycott campaign.

Perhaps the BDS campaign is intensifying because Israel has rejected the peace proposals?

In early 2001, Yasser Arafat went to the White House and turned down Clinton's peace proposal. In 2008, Mahmoud Abbas rejected a similar proposal from Ehud Olmert. In March 2014, Abbas again said no – this time, to a proposal drafted by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Thus, even if the lie about Israeli rejectionism is repeated a thousand times, it still remains a lie.

Perhaps the fact that Israel continues to build settlements is proof that it doesn't want peace?

The settlement enterprise is the focus of intense public debate within Israel. Not every piece of criticism aimed at Israel is demonization; and criticism of the settlement enterprise is certainly not demonization. In any event, the construction in the West Bank, for the most part, is taking place inside the existing settlement blocs, which even under Clinton's proposal will remain in Israeli hands. Justified criticism is one thing, but support for BDS is a different story altogether.

Perhaps it's worth trying the non-violent BDS approach in light of the failed diplomatic efforts and armed struggles?

A campaign led by people who deny Israel's right to exist cannot hide under a blanket of 'a non-violent campaign.' Negating Israel's right to exist is 'politicide,' political annihilation, a blatant violation of international law. We're not dealing with a fight for rights, but a fight rather to single out and deny one particular nation's right to self-determination.

Perhaps international pressure is a legitimate means to achieve political goals?

International pressure is a legitimate tool. Therefore, and as unpleasant as it may be, the European Union has every right to pressure Israel regarding the settlements, to mark products and the like. But don't get things mixed up. There's a big difference between international pressure designed to promote a peace settlement and the BDS campaign, the stated aim of which is to oppose any peace arrangement based on two states for two peoples.

Just because Iran and North Korea violate human rights, does that mean Israel can do so too?

Violating human rights is unjust, regardless of the national or religious identity of the state. The problem is that while dozens of countries are involved in conflicts and human rights violations, an international campaign is waged almost exclusively against just one country – Israel. Hypocrisy isn't morality. Double standards aren't standards. The criticism aimed against Israel isn't criticism; it's racism.

And what about the blockade on Gaza?

Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip. It didn't want a blockade. The blockade is not against the residents of the Strip; it's against the supreme effort on the part of Hamas to acquire weapons. A flourishing and prosperous Gaza Strip is in Israel's interests. The BDS movement and Hamas have other interests at heart.

There are many more questions; and some of the claims against Israel are indeed justified. Feel free to ask anything you like. The dialogue has just begun. To be continued."

Ends…

 

 

THE DOOR'S STILL OPEN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that it is not too late for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to rescue his relationship with U.S. President Barack Obama.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu instructed his ministers not to respond to the polite but damning comments that U.S. President Barack Obama made during his interview with Ilana Dayan. According to one of Dayan's colleagues at Channel 2, the reason he told them to remain silent is that Obama's comments had very little impact. That's one interpretation. But I believe that Netanyahu recognized that, for the first time, the massive gulf between him and the U.S. president manifested itself in the latter saying outright that he doesn't believe the former. This is unprecedented, and Netanyahu does not want to get into another argument over issues of trust.

The lack of faith between Obama and Netanyahu could mean that the American leader gives the green light to a French resolution which would embarrass Israel in the United Nations Security Council and which could end up at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. But if Netanyahu had the courage and if he was not afraid of his coalition partners, he could – at the expense of a few uncomfortable days in the media – rectify the situation.

The Americans know that Netanyahu's concerns about the Iranian nuclear deal are reasonable. They want to compensate Israel in order to bury the hatchet. It may be unpleasant for him, but – even if it means alienating and upsetting his coalition partners and his rivals in the Likud – Netanyahu must accept this peace offering. Literally: he must travel to Washington, meet with Obama and graciously accept the compensation that the Americans are willing to pay in exchange for him lowering the tone of his anti-Iran deal campaign. In any case, the outcome of the negotiations between the six world powers and Iran is not up to Netanyahu. He must reach some understanding with the White House, which includes an American message to Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas that there can be no alternatives to direct negotiations: not the Security Council, not The Hague and not FIFA.

Obama said some harsh things about Netanyahu and to Netanyahu. But he has not slammed the door to the White House in his face."

Ends…

 

WHERE ARE THE HEROES?: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan urges Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to go on the offensive and show the world the truth about the Palestinians – rather than react too late to the BDS campaign.

"Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely said this week that, 'Israel will not stand idly by while an organization that is dedicated to blackening the name of IDF soldiers operates on the international stage and does grave damage to the honor of the country.'

What exactly does Hotovely plan to do to 'Breaking the Silence,' the organization at which her terrifying threat was directed? The answer: she will use the full force of the Foreign Ministry to act against the group. Wow. All of the Foreign Ministry? Did her predecessor, Avigdor Lieberman, even leave behind anyone who can do something?

When will the people of Israel recognize that, when a right-wing government says that it will act, it will do and it will struggle, it almost always means that it will respond after the fact to some offense? Remember how, just a year ago, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his colleagues threatened to wipe Hamas off the map in Gaza? If speeches were weapons, Hamas would have been eradicated long ago. We know that didn't happen and isn't happening today. These right-wing heroes didn't even initiate last summer's war – they merely responded to Hamas' rocket attacks.

Our right-wing heroes need to stop being so defensive in the face of those who seek to delegitimize Israel and who portray us as a cruel occupier. Instead, they must start showing the world the root cause of the conflict, the rejection by the Palestinians and the Arabs of the United Nations partition plan and the peace proposals that Israel has made over the years. They must use solid facts to show that the Palestinians are rejecting peace and that their goal is nothing short of ending Israel's existence. Any time that Palestinians and their supporters hold a rally and shout 'Free Palestine,' there should be a group of Israelis and their supporters answering with shouts of 'Free Israel' – from terror, from boycotts, from besmirching and from lies. They must show the world clearly that these 'peace-loving' Palestinians inculcate in their children a hatred of Israel and a desire to destroy the Jewish state. They need to show to the international community that all of this – the hatred of Israel and the refusal to live in peace – did not start with the 'occupation,' but long before Israel was even established. When the Arabs rioted in Hebron in 1928, there was no occupation and no Israel. Why don't we tell that to the world, instead of whining about how right we are?

Have we played some role in creating this situation? Obviously. But the impression that people overseas are getting is that the Palestinians want peace, they are an oppressed people and we don't want to give them a state. That isn't true. It's certainly not the whole truth. Doesn't Netanyahu know that the best form of defense is attack, not a threat of attack? Didn't they teach you that in your elite IDF unit? So why are you being so defensive all the time? Instead of shutting down art exhibitions, why not try to organize some long-term and broad campaign to show the world the truth about the Palestinians and their incitement?

Sometimes I feel like I am wasting my breath. Who am I talking to? At this critical time for Israel's foreign relations, our prime minister appointed someone like Hotovely to run the most important diplomatic campaign in Israeli history? Hotovely? Seriously?"

Ends…

 

OBAMA'S KID-GLOVE ULTIMATUM: Writing in Haaretz, Yoel Marcus says that U.S. President Barack Obama is not pushing Israel to do what the United States wants – but what Israel must do for its own good.

"Can I tell you something? Watching the interview with President Obama on TV Channel 2’s 'Uvda' ('Fact') magazine filled me with envy. Why don’t we have leaders like that, without tricks and gimmicks, ones who present their core beliefs without waving around silly diagrams and illustrations? How soothing it was to listen to a leader who doesn’t trigger an anxiety attack after every sentence he utters, by imparting a feeling that our end is nigh.

He didn’t even look like French President Charles De Gaulle, who called us 'our friend and ally,' yet imposed an arms embargo on the eve of the 1967 war. With one stroke he broke off the wonderful friendship we were so sure was there for eternity, sending us straight into the bosom of the 'Orient.' How could we not understand that the 'Orient' for French diplomacy was always biased toward the Arab world?

When asked by his interviewer Ilana Dayan whether he holds a grudge against Bibi, especially after his shameful conduct in deciding to appear before the United States Congress, he hesitated for a few seconds. It was clear that if he is angry, he would not express it during that interview. 'Imagine if I came before the Knesset without an invitation and negotiated with the Labor Party and its leader.' Then he paused, smiled and moved on. 'I understand you’re not a hugger,' Dayan suggested helpfully.

The president was unwilling to retract positive words he had said about Netanyahu in the early stages of the latter’s term. He was willing to add a few statements that every Israeli should take to heart and internalize: The issue is not what America wants but what Israel must do for its own good; the issue is who is acting in a way that will make Israel secure; I was there when Israel’s security was on the line; I have to tell the truth as I see it; there is a politics of trust and one of intimidation. He added another important point: I’m appealing to the Israeli public. In other words, not to Netanyahu.

Obama is not a back-slapping, chummy kind of team player. Between the lines it was evident that he doesn’t really appreciate being bad-mouthed by Netanyahu in the U.S. He won’t behave as De Gaulle did, telling an enthusiastic million Frenchmen who gathered to welcome him in Algeria that he understood them, only to go ahead and do the opposite of what they wanted, repatriating settlers – excuse me, Frenchmen – to France.

On a personal level, the relations between Bibi and Obama are at an unprecedented nadir. What has transpired in Europe, with its various types of boycott, is gradually creeping into the U.S., starting with isolated pockets of opposition on campuses and continuing with a sharp turn in the attitude of U.S. media toward Israel. This includes professional journals that refuse to publish work by Israeli academics.

We are digging our own pit. The harsher the criticism becomes, the harder it will be to stop it. That’s what it was like in South Africa during the apartheid years. This writer remembers the words of a senior official in the apartheid regime, who said that if South Africa had five million South Africans in the U.S. (the number of Jews there at the time), no one would boycott it. He was wrong, as is anyone else who thinks so. The creeping sanctions against Bibi’s Israel may reach a point at which it is too large even for influential billionaires Haim Saban and Sheldon Adelson.

One can’t rule only on the basis of intimidation – you are a country that was established on a basis of human rights, the president complimented us. He views the neutralization of a nuclear Iran as his greatest task. Let me get this deal done, he said, since it’s a good one. When I finish I’ll return to the peace process here.

That’s what the president is telling us: I’ll get you security in all areas but, my friends; you are losing the world and the values that underpin your independence. It wasn’t difficult to understand – this was a kid-glove ultimatum."

Ends…

 

A MATTER OF TRUST: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that U.S. President Barack Obama told Israelis this week that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cares greatly about their security, but that he does as well.

"A video clip from December 4, 1991, is currently making the rounds, showing a younger, darker-haired Binyamin Netanyahu, then the country’s deputy foreign minister, at a press conference in Washington alongside then-ambassador to the U.S. Zalman Shoval. It was just after the Madrid Conference, and in the midst of the intense procedural jockeying taking place before the start of bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians.

This was nearly 24 years ago, before YouTube was born, when there were only 1 million Internet users, when Silence of the Lambs was a new hit movie, the airbag was just invented and Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia. Yet the relevance of what Netanyahu said back then is astounding in the context of the diplomatic jockeying taking place today.

Fast-forward to Wednesday, and a meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu held with New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Murray McCully in Jerusalem. 'The main thing we have learned is that peace is achieved, as we did with Jordan and with Egypt, through direct negotiations between parties, and not by fiat – it just doesn’t work that way. I hope it works, but it has to work through direct negotiations.' Twenty-four years later, and Netanyahu is using the same argument – even the same words – to try and deflect the same thing: efforts to impose an agreement on Israel.

Netanyahu made his comments to McCully not because New Zealand is a diplomatic heavyweight, but rather because it is punching above its weight these days as a member of the UN Security Council (it will assume the rotating presidency of the council next month). It is also, according to reports, working together with France on a proposal that will be brought to the UN Security Council before September, to enshrine in a UN resolution the parameters of a two-state solution, and set a deadline for the establishment of a Palestinian state and an Israeli withdrawal from the territories.

Israel is adamantly opposed to the move, concerned the resolution will give the Palestinians what they want – a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps and a capital in east Jerusalem – without spelling out any of the concessions the Palestinians will need to make regarding Israel’s security issues or their demand for a right of return for refugees. In other words, Israel is concerned this is just the newest incarnation of an oft-tried attempt to impose a solution from the outside.

Netanyahu’s most recent comments against the idea came at the top of a meeting with McCully, but they could have just as easily been said in response to U.S. President Barack Obama’s sit-down Tuesday night on Channel 2. Netanyahu was careful this week not to respond directly or get into a tit-for-tat with Obama over the interview – an interview at times very critical of him and his policies.

Tuesday’s interview was part of a concerted effort by the president over the last few weeks to assuage Jewish and Israeli fears over the impending Iran deal and U.S. Mideast policy. Prior to that, he gave an interview to The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg that dealt heavily with Israel and Jews, and delivered a speech a few days later to the Adas Israel Synagogue in Washington.

In the Channel 2 conversation, Obama was tellingly noncommittal regarding how the U.S. would react to moves at the UN. He stressed that when it comes to the 'most important thing' the U.S. provides Israel – security, military and intelligence assistance – those elements were sacrosanct and not 'conditioned on any particular policy.' Yet regarding the UN, he said that 'up until this point, we have pushed away against European efforts, for example, or other efforts, because we’ve said that the only way this gets resolved is if the two parties work together.'

But now, he stated, it is becoming more challenging to do so, because Israel does not seem committed to a two-state solution. 'If, in fact, there’s no prospect of an actual peace process, if nobody believes there’s a peace process, then it becomes more difficult to argue with those who are concerned about settlement construction, those who are concerned about the current situation. It’s more difficult for me to say to them, be patient and wait because we have a process here; because all they need to do is to point to the statements that have been made saying there is no process.'

This interview, taken together with The Atlantic piece and Obama’s synagogue speech, help create an impression that Obama is placing the preponderance of the onus for the failure on Israel and Netanyahu – who he indicated was playing 'the politics of fear.' Even perhaps without intending to do so, the impression one could reasonably take away is that Israel is limiting opportunities for Palestinians because of the color of their skin or the nature of their faith, and not because of anything the Palestinians have done – either through maximalist demands or violence.

That impression will lead many Israelis to conclude that Obama is not being fair with them or their reality, an impression borne out in poll after poll. But why is that important? Why should the U.S. president really care whether Israelis think he is being fair? Because in the same breath, in the same interview, he is asking them to trust him – to trust him regarding the Palestinians, and trust him regarding Iran.

Regarding the Palestinians, Obama maintained he has never suggested that 'Israel should ever trade away its security for the prospect of peace.' In fact, he emphasized that in the heat of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s negotiations in 2013-2014, he sent over top U.S. military advisers and asked Jerusalem what it needed to protect itself against 'the worst-case scenario.'

'And the truth is,' he said, 'we have ways we could deal with issues like the Jordan Valley. ‘The problem, however, is that Netanyahu and his military advisers don’t think that in the current, uncertain Middle East, those ways are sufficient. As he said last week in a briefing with Israeli journalists, Israel will need to retain a security presence under any agreement throughout the entire West Bank. Not only along the Jordan River, to prevent arms smuggling from Jordan, but throughout Judea and Samaria – to keep tunnels from being built into Israel, or rocket manufacturing facilities from sprouting up in Nablus and Jenin, like they have in Gaza.

As far as Tehran is concerned, Obama said Netanyahu 'cares very much about the security of the Israeli people, and I think that in his mind, he is doing what’s right.' He then added, 'I care very much about the people of Israel as well, and in my mind, it is very much in Israel’s interest to make sure that Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon. And I can, I think, demonstrate – not based on any hope, but on facts and evidence and analysis – that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon is a verifiable, tough agreement.'

Both Netanyahu and Obama want to prevent Iran from getting a bomb. The difference and the problem is that while Obama feels his path will do just that, Netanyahu believes it will have the opposite effect.

The American president has, over the last few weeks, articulated abundant empathy and sympathy and respect and appreciation for Israel, Jews and his interpretation of core Jewish values. But by being perceived as placing most of the onus for the status quo on Netanyahu, and creating a construct that if only the prime minister would do more, then there would be peace, Obama is – as he did in 2009 – misreading an Israeli public that just recently went to the polls and made it clear it doesn’t see Netanyahu as primarily responsible for the moribund diplomatic situation.

This connects to the Iranian issue in that Obama – by saying that he, like Netanyahu, cares greatly about the people of Israel and has concluded that the current, negotiated path is better for Israel’s security – is essentially asking Israelis to choose who they trust more."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 04.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE 7th GENERAL ELECTIONS: Cengiz Candar argues President Erdogan is destroying his party’s electoral hopes in centre-left Radikal: "If there were the presidential elections rather than general elections on June 7th, Erdogan would never have been chosen as the president based on his performance over the last couple of days. The idea that Erdogan is more popular than the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] has always been dominant in public opinion. However, this time around, Erdogan is the person primarily responsible for his party’s great loss of votes, where even the votes that can bring the AKP to power alone have become in doubt. With him in charge, he is bringing down the AKP as well."

Mehmet Tezkan believes that the ruling party and its leaders are in trouble in centrist Milliyet: "I am listening to the president. I am listening to the prime minister. They are very nervous. They are very angry. The president is not talking like a president. He is talking like a party leader who has joined an election campaign. He is uttering slogans in support of the ruling party. He is attacking opposition leaders using the harshest words. The government is in distress. It is in a difficult situation. It is shaking."

Can Dundar believes that the president is paying the price for his support of his former Gulen allies in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "I guess Erdogan has asked the question that best describes what we are facing: 'what did they ask for that we did not give?' In fact, the president gave his former accomplice [Gulen Movement leader Fethullah Gulen] every authority, post and opportunity. He turned a blind eye to the oppression of the movement’s rivals without paying attention to the law and rules, to the Gulen’s deep organization inside every element of the state. And in the end, the structure that he created came and hit him. This is the photograph that you see on the front page of Cumhuriyet [showing the Turkish police fighting with the Turkish intelligence agents who were allegedly taking arms to Syria in January 2014]."

Ali Bulac has high hopes for the Kurdish movement in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The June 7th elections represent a critical threshold. The Kurdish political movement’s biggest handicap is the 10% election barrier. This is really a high and unfair bar. It was primarily put in place to prevent the Kurdish political movement from becoming legal. If the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] passes the barrier, this will put great pressure on the AKP."

Nasuhi Gungor uncovers the opposition’s plans in centre-right, pro-government: Star: "If the HDP passes the electoral threshold, the AKP’s power will decrease even if it comes to power, and those groups who did not wonder where and how the Kurds live, will then move against the AKP thanks to the Kurds. If it cannot pass the electoral barrier, claiming that the Kurds have been left outside the system, it will forge an alliance with Kandil [PKK- Kurdistan Workers' Party northern Iraq leadership] and put into force the street plan rehearsed in October 2014 [pro-PKK protests that the state was not supporting the Kurds in Kobani, Syria against ISIS]."

Abdulkadir Selvi outlines the potential consequences of an HDP win or loss in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "If it can continue and advance as a party of Turkey and not just the Kurds, as it has developed since the presidential elections in August 2014, the HDP has the opportunity to become Turkey’s main opposition party. If it cannot pass the barrier and move toward the mountains and violence, the HDP’s last days will begin. Whether the HDP passes the barrier or not will affect the balance of power between Kandil and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as well. It will be a significant test for Ocalan's leadership as well."

Emin Pazarci launches an attack on the U.S. media in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "The U.S. media has openly begun to support the HDP. International agencies have been activated. The HDP has been given a makeover and a Turkish flag has been put into its hand. And yet, the peace process has not been foiled! Moreover, the hands of those seeking to divide the country have now become stronger. The target is clear: to evict the AKP from power, get the HDP into parliament and cause a legislative deadlock, thus creating a chaotic atmosphere in Turkey in order to achieve autonomy at least." 

 

 

Iranian press quotes will not be published on 3-4 June due to public holidays in Iran on the occasion of Ayatollah Khomeini's death anniversary

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 04.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Boiling point

2-The same old story

3-Qatar will not be deflected

 

1-Boiling point

 

Tehran [has] conveyed Russia and Iran's diagnosis of the situation to its allies as follows: Syria remains the main object of the enemies' camp, despite the continuing war of attrition on the Yemeni and Iraqi fronts. Therefore, a counter-offensive in Yemen and Iraq will accelerate the enemy's requests for negotiations and reaching understandings over a settlement for the Yemeni crisis, and over partnership in Iraq's war on ISIS. By contrast, in Syria, there is no room for anything other than overturning the balance without having to wait for compromises. The result was that Turkey and Saudi Arabia were informed that Iran and Russia have decided to go along with the globalization of the war, and will respond to Ankara and Riyadh's volunteers [in Syria] with volunteers, monies with monies, and weapons with weapons. And if armies come to the fore, the response would be by means of armies. After all, Syria is part of Russia and Iran's national security. June will be the month for logistical and battlefield preparations for changing the rules of the game. And we shall soon see the results--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The thrill of 'victory' that has possessed the terrorist Nusra Front and its supportive coalition headed by Turkey, may have contributed to raising their morale and the extent of their conceit, leading them to disregard the other side’s potential reactions. For they have ignored ISIS’s 'strategic' advances, whether in Tadmur [Palmyra] which is now threatened with destruction and demolition, or near the Turkish borders where ISIS now controls the border strip that links Syria and Turkey at the Mari' and A'zaz areas.  Is this mere coincidence? Or is ISIS preparing to join as a full partner or even lead Jayshul Fateh in order to storm and capture Aleppo, linking it to Idlib as a prelude to partitioning Syria under Turkey's sponsorship and guarantees? At any rate, we will not need to wait long. Matters have reached a boiling point and an explosion seems certain-- Mohammad Kharroub Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The [Syrian] regime would collapse [if Assad is removed from power], just as in the case of Saddam Hussein and al-Qadhafi’s regimes. And since there are no civilian and patriotic forces in Syria that can fill the vacuum, the scenario of anarchy and open civil war leading to the country's partition and its submission to extremist terrorist organizations is more likely than any other alternative. Only a political process that makes its way by means of an international (Russian/U.S.) and regional accord can preserve, and even reform, the regime without having to live with 'Assad forever.'... Only such a scenario can provide an opportunity whereby the regime and its institutions can survive without its head and president. Everything else is no more than delusion and suspect scenarios-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

After failing to secure their aims by relying on local Syrian forces and foreign fighters, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and their allies have decided to globalize the war on the Syrian regime and mobilize thousands of 'volunteers' who have invaded Syria from various sides, claims the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. But Syria's allies are now ready to accept the challenge and globalize their own response to this onslaught in return. The situation in Syria, especially in the north, threatens to slide into an open confrontation between Turkey and Iran, maintains a Jordanian commentator. This is the result of Ankara’s open involvement in the battles in that area, threatening to capture the city of Aleppo and reach the Syrian coastline, which would seriously tip the balance of power in the country. The Syrian regime’s opponents have been seeking a way to decapitate it by removing President Assad from power while preserving the regime and its institutions in place, notes another leading Jordanian commentator. But such a scenario is impossible to achieve unless pursued via a political solution that seeks the gradual replacement of Assad as part of a regional and international accord.

 

A DIFFICULT TASK: "When the war on Syria was an international war waged by means of domestic tools, Syria was able to bear the burden all on its own, despite the difficulty of the task," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in the pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

It stood its ground for two years before scenarios in which forces on the ground, media campaigns, psychological war, religious fatwas and intelligence activities were all managed by foreign powers.

When [former UN envoy] Kofi Anan's mission to save Syria failed and Lakhdar Brahimi was summoned to manage al-Qa’ida’s war in his capacity as a UN envoy whose main goal was to pursue the psychological war and offer the Syrian leadership a deal in which it would trade its own safety and step down as a means of ending the war waged by al-Qa’ida, the Syrian state once again stood its ground and endured the hemorrhage and the savagery of the battle. It managed to achieve a miracle with its steadfastness and began to lay the grounds for its victory and counteroffensive. And after loyal parties headed by Hizbollah took its side, this was enough for it to secure major achievements during the following two years.

As the war entered its fifth year, the alliance waging war on Syria went on to a new phase; that of an all-out globalized war. In this globalized war, Syria's northern, southern, and eastern borders were flung open before every mercenary from all around the world willing to fight. Camps were set up in Turkey and Jordan and cover was provided by claiming that they were meant for training a ‘moderate opposition’, even though the U.S. president had already described that opposition as a mere fantasy.

The revived talk of a moderate opposition was not merely meant for media consumption; nor did it indicate any change of mind that such an opposition was mere fantasy. It was intended as a cover for these training camps and for bringing in thousands of fighters who have nothing to do with any Syrian [domestic] opposition – in effect, Turkish 'janissaries' and the Saudis 'camel corps' – via Syria's borders with Jordan and Turkey, and the areas under ISIS's control along the borders with Iraq.

All this occurred as UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura began his preparations for the Geneva Conference to which he expected to receive orders to issue an invitation to the Nusra Front under its new name of Jayshul Fateh. This also coincided with the Saudi war on Yemen that was launched with only three months left of the period for reaching a final deal in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear file. Meanwhile, a clear American decision emerged to invest in ISIS's attacks that aim to hemorrhage both Syria and Iraq, and to provide cover for the Saudi/Turkish/Israeli/Qatari/French effort to rehabilitate the Nusra Front.

The Americans’ wager was that it would be possible to reach the end of the period for negotiations with Iran with the pro-resistance axis in its worst days. Iran and its allies' weakness could then be exploited in order to secure concessions in the nuclear negotiations, and the pressure would continue on Iran to ensure its retreat on all regional fronts. The U.S. would subsequently be able to return to the postponed Ukrainian negotiations in order to impose its terms of submission on Russia.

Consultations were held between the resistance forces– from Hizbollah to Syria to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) to the Revolutionary Committees in Yemen – and the decision reached was that Syria would not fall, Iraq would not fall, and Yemen would not be humiliated; moreover, al-Ramadi, Tadmur [Palmyra], Jisr ash-Shughour and Idlib would be recaptured; Aden and Sana'a would be preserved; and Dhahran inside Saudi Arabia would be threatened.

This conclusion was conveyed to the Iranian leadership which informed its allies that it was ready to continue its negotiations over the nuclear file but without being hostage to their failure, and that it has begun to prepare for the measures that must be taken on July 1st if the negotiations succeed, and more importantly, those that must be taken if the negotiations were to fail. The Iranian leadership also informed its allies of its decision to back them and share the burdens with them, and that it would cover their financial and armament costs.

After consulting with Moscow, Tehran conveyed Russia and Iran's diagnosis of the situation to its allies as follows: Syria remains the main object of the enemies' camp despite the continuing war of attrition on the Yemeni and Iraqi fronts. Therefore, a counter-offensive in Yemen and Iraq will accelerate the enemy's requests for negotiations and reaching understandings – over a settlement for the Yemeni crisis, and over partnership in Iraq's war on ISIS. By contrast, in Syria, there is no room for anything other than overturning the balance without having to wait for compromises.

The result was that Turkey and Saudi Arabia were informed that Iran and Russia have decided to go along with the globalization of the war and will respond to Ankara and Riyadh's volunteers with volunteers, monies with monies, and weapons with weapons. And if armies come to the fore, the response would be by means of armies. After all, Syria is part of Russia and Iran's national security.

"June will be the month for logistical and battlefield preparations for changing the rules of the game. And we shall soon see the results," concludes Qandil.

End…

 

SOLEIMANI’S PRESENCE: "The presence of General Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of the Qods Brigade in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in northern Syrian and his remarkable statement – that 'the world will be surprised by what we and the Syrian military commanders are preparing for the coming days' – suggest that the situation in this sensitive border region has still not stabilized in favor of the armed [opposition] groups," writes Mohammad Kharroub in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

These groups have succeeded in taking control of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, and have advanced further towards Ariha and the Mastouma military base, securing significant influence for Jayshul Fateh (which was established by Turkish and certain Arab intelligence agencies) in Idlib Province. This, in turn, has raised fears that the battle may move towards Latakia Province, with all that this implies in terms of its demographic and sectarian Syrian makeup, especially since the armed groups would have reached the Syrian coast which is the major strategic aim of ISIS and its sworn enemy/sister organization the Nusra Front, both of which are on the international list of terrorist organizations.

Those in charge of the Antioch [opposition] operations’ room have been trying to embellish the Nusra's image in order to rehabilitate and legitimize it. For that purpose, they introduced the new formation that they refer to as Jayshul Fatah, even though the Nusra is its main constituent, while its remaining takfiri wings are no more than military décor. And all this alters nothing about the fact that this alleged new faction, which has been artificially cobbled together, is no more than a cover for ‘Sultan’ [Turkish President] Erdogan's desire to dominate Syria and benefit from its geopolitical position, from whence he can expand in the Arab region under false and ridiculous pretexts and claims.

Regardless of General Soleimani's 'controversial' statement, which raises fears, poses questions and gives rise to much speculation, the mere fact that the man has headed to the Syrian north, and Latakia Province in particular, sends a clear message to the players in the region that 'new' rules for the game are beginning to emerge, and that the opposition’s potential expansion towards Homs or Latakia – with talks of moves in the Syrian south to control Der'a Province and block the road to Damascus as a prelude to besieging and storming the capital – would entail an imminent and fundamental change in the existing equations and lineups. And that is something that Tehran will not allow, even if this calls for direct Iranian intervention on the battlefield. This is in addition to reports in the media that is close to the [Iran/Syria/Hizbollah] 'resistance axis' claiming that volunteers from Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan (residing in Iran) have reached northern Syria and are assuming a role similar to that being played by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq.

These developments suggest that the situation is about to take a turn towards further escalation that is open to various possibilities and scenarios, with a regional war as one of them. But this is not all; for in light of the talk of a scenario for Aleppo similar to what happened in Idlib (that is most likely to be implemented in first days of Ramadan which is just a few weeks away), Tehran senses that the situation in the Syrian north has reached a point of no-return, and that the red line that it has determined after which it would intervene on the Syrian battleground directly has already been crossed, despite the fact that the main [regional] players had been careful not to cross it for over four years.

Turkey, which is preparing for the June 7th parliamentary elections, is also cautious about sliding towards war with Iran after the battle of Idlib and what happened afterwards, has revealed the depth of its involvement in this 'achievement.' This has exerted unprecedented pressure on Damascus leading to much talk and wishful thinking, with many of those who hate the Syrian regime and support the terrorist and takfiri organizations coming out with expectations and predictions bordering on prophecies about its inevitable consequences. These are similar to their 'prophecies' in the first months of the crisis in 2011 to the effect that the regime's days were numbered and that their entry into Damascus was only a matter of time.

In fact, the emergence of Nusra Front head Abu-Mohammad al-Fateh al-Jawlani on an Arab satellite television station [Qatar’s al-Jazeera] to boast that his next move will be towards Damascus and not [the Alawite heartland] Qirdaha or Latakia, was just one part of this coordinated and rabid media campaign. This campaign is designed to promote fake or exaggerated victories, deliberately ignoring the balance of power and the reactions of Syria's allies and backers, turning a blind eye to the catastrophic results that await Syria, its people, state, and social fabric [should the takfiri groups win the war on the regime].

So where do we go from here?

The thrill of 'victory' that has possessed the terrorist Nusra Front and its supportive coalition headed by Turkey, may have contributed to raising their morale and the extent of their conceit, leading them to disregard the other side’s potential reactions. For they have ignored ISIS’s 'strategic' advances, whether in Tadmur [Palmyra] which is now threatened with destruction and demolition, or near the Turkish borders where ISIS now controls the border strip that links Syria and Turkey at the Mari' and A'zaz areas.

Is this mere coincidence? Or is ISIS preparing to join as a full partner or even lead Jayshul Fateh in order to storm and capture Aleppo, linking it to Idlib as a prelude to partitioning Syria under Turkey's sponsorship and guarantees?

"At any rate, we will not need to wait long. Matters have reached a boiling point and an explosion seems certain, especially if we take into consideration Iranian President Hassan Rowhani's statements on Tuesday that ‘some states are miscalculating and imagining that the terrorist elements can be a tool that they can always use to achieve their aims; but Iran will stand on the Syrian government and people's side till the very end’," concludes Kharroub.

End…

 

AN OLD THEORY: "Syria's enemies' political and military actions are based on the view that it is necessary to preserve the Syrian regime and its institutions, including its military and security institutions, but without Assad," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the leading Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

It is an old theory, as old as the Syrian crisis itself. It receded over the past two years, especially after the [U.S./Russian 2013] 'chemical weapons deal', but it has now been revived, as the Syrian crisis enters its fifth year to the pace the recent leadership changes in Saudi Arabia and the outbreak of Operation Decisive Storm and Operation Restore Hope [in Yemen].

We say it is an old theory that has accompanied the Syrian crisis ever since its outbreak, but especially when the [peaceful] revolution faded and the country entered the phase of militarization and armament. Every state in the Friends of Syria (FOS) grouping has tried hard to topple Assad, no door was left without being knocked, and no labyrinth was left without exploring its hidden pathways, all in search for a way to rid the regime of its head. But all these efforts met with utter failure, which forced the West – or at least some parts of it – to begin to review its positions and policies, reaching a climax with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s famous statement in which he denied any possibility that Assad had no role in Syria's future.

Today, and to the tempo of the past three months’ dramatic developments on the ground, these efforts have been revived. The promotion of this slogan/theory has begun to assume an intense aggressive character. Washington has resumed its talk of the need to ensure that Assad is out of the picture. The Saudi foreign minister has been advertising an Egyptian/Saudi agreement to preserve the regime after decapitating it.

But so far, no one knows how this slogan can be translated into action. Even those who advocate it most fervently cannot tell us how they will do this. Will they arrange a coup on some moonless night? Did they not try this before to no avail? Do they expect a revolt against Assad from inside the narrow circle surrounding him? Are they waiting for someone to carry out what may be described as the most important assassination in the region's modern history, but also, perhaps, as the most costly such operation? No one is providing any answers.

Washington knows what it does not want in Syria. It does not want the terrorist and extremist organizations to control the country and turn it into a second Libya, from whence they can base themselves to threaten its security and that of its allies in the region and the world. Saudi Arabia also knows what it does not want in Syria; in short, it does not want Assad to remain in power for even one more day. Turkey also does not want Assad, even though it also wants Syria as a 'vital space' for its trade and industry, and a backyard for its new sultans. But, once again, no one knows how to affect this outcome.

A regime such as the Syrian regime built half-a-century ago on individual leadership and the rule of the single, inspiring and inspired leader, is closer in structure to the 'Sinmar theory' of architecture. Sinmar [mythical Arab architect] built a unique castle for a tyrant who was astonished by its excellence. The architect was so proud of his achievement that he went on to display his abilities before the ruler, revealing the secret of a stone, which if removed, would cause the entire castle to collapse. The ruler then asked the architect whether he had revealed this secret to anyone else. When the architect answered that he had not, he ordered him to be thrown from the top of the castle, paying the price for his exceptional abilities.

In short, Assad is the 'Sinmar stone' of the existing Syrian regime. In this, it resembles all absolute regimes ruled by a single individual. If removed from his place without prior arrangement or preparation, the entire edifice will collapse, leaving the whole of Syria as a vacuum that will most probably be filled by extremist and terrorist Islamist forces, such those we know and have become notorious.

There is not the slightest guarantee for any scenario other than this. To avoid this outcome and steer clear from squandering all their gains in Syria, Moscow and Tehran are trying to avoid this 'Sinmar scenario.' Moscow has brought us the glad tidings of greater agreement with Washington, although we do not know which of the two capitals has moved closer to the other. As for Tehran, ever since Operation Decisive Storm, it has been threatening that the Syrian crisis would take a new direction, while General Qasem Soleimani has promised us surprises of the heavyweight variety.

Washington, meanwhile, is lost between the pressures of its traditional allies who want Assad toppled, and its own interests and calculations that indicate that the priority should be given to fighting ISIS. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are all heading towards the 'Sinmar scenario,' even if the outcome would be the regime's fall, the collapse of its institutions, and Syria’s transformation into another Somalia, not even another Libya.

As for Egypt, the other major Arab player, it is without an effective independent 'foreign policy.' It oscillates between its traditional point of view that expresses its interests and its understanding of the Syrian scene on the one hand, and the pressures of the largest Gulf donor [Saudi Arabia] on the economy of the region's 'sick man', on the other.

I believe that such a scenario is extremely unlikely, not to say impossible, in the Syrian case. Most likely, the regime would collapse [if Assad is removed from power], just as in the case of Saddam Hussein and al-Qadhafi’s regimes. And since there are no civilian and patriotic forces in Syria that can fill the vacuum, the scenario of anarchy and open civil war leading to the country's partition and its submission to extremist terrorist organizations is more likely than any other alternative.

Only a political process that makes its way by means of an international (Russian/U.S.) and regional accord can preserve, and even reform, the regime without having to live with 'Assad forever.' That would be a gradual process that begins by transferring powers to a transitional government and that ends in presidential elections in which Assad does not take part, and that can be held either early or at the end of his current term.

"Only such a scenario can provide an opportunity whereby the regime and its institutions can survive without its head and president. Everything else is no more than delusions and suspect scenarios," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-The same old story

 

PA PM Hamdallah’s interview with the Washington Post suggests that the Palestinian leadership is about to embark on the same failed negotiations policy as before, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The Palestinian PM’s recent statements indicate that the Palestinian leadership is ready to resume negotiations with Israel while postponing its plans to head to international legal bodies to take action against Israeli violations of international law, notes a Palestinian commentator. But there is nothing to suggest that the outcome of this policy will be any different to that of its predecessors.

 

UNEXPECTED REVELATION: "In an interview with The Washington Post, Palestinian PM Rami al-Hamdallah has unexpectedly revealed what may explain the relative stalemate and silence that have enveloped the Palestinian cause," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

He said: 'we have had certain assurances from the United States that, they will resume the negotiations between us and the Israelis after the Iranian deal. We count on the [United] States and are sure it will deliver.' So, the Palestinian leadership is waiting for the American promise to be fulfilled.

Rami al-Hamdallah did not openly say that there is an agreement with the Americans to postpone the Palestinians' plans to head to international courts, the UN and other international bodies. But the logic of his statements as well as events on the ground – the sluggish pace of moves on the international arena – suggest that a diplomatic tahdi'a [lull or calming down] is underway, in tandem with the tahdi'a on the battlefield.

As a result, the following question becomes justified: Was the Israelis' release of Palestinian monies after the last Knesset elections part of these same arrangements? And have these silent and implicit arrangements been made without any formal agreement, or are they part of clear and officially formulated agreements and contacts?

What al-Hamdallah has revealed is that part of what is happening, at least, is based on waiting for the American promise to be fulfilled. And while taking into consideration the manner in which the different powers are distributed in the Palestinian system such that the PM does not have much say in the negotiation and political process but may nevertheless be informed of the decision-making process– Hamdallah is saying that negotiations can be resumed if a resolution is adopted by the UN or if an international promise is made that a plan will be adopted that specifies a clear date for ending the occupation and establishing the Palestinian state.

This leaves us with the question: Is the Israelis' acceptance of this resolution or plan a precondition for starting the negotiations? There is no clear answer to this question in the interview. The text suggests more that the Palestinian side is ready to accept international guarantees as sufficient for launching the negotiations, without making Israel's acceptance a precondition of this.

Hamdallah says that a French initiative is being prepared in coordination with the U.S. and with 'talk of a time limit.' He adds that a 'U.N. resolution can be issued, which would set a timeframe to end the occupation and establish a state along the ’67 borders. If issued, I’m sure we can go back to negotiations.' And he goes on to say: 'Whether it is through the French initiative or any other, we [want to] a guarantee for a timetable for the Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of the state and a freeze of Israeli settlement activities.'

Two issues are at stake here. The first, which is the more difficult, is to freeze settlement activities. The second requires some international party to come up with a resolution or initiatives that specifies a timetable. But what is absent from Hamdallah's statements is any mention that the international resolution should be accepted by Israel before negotiations begin. It naturally goes without saying that a settlement freeze requires direct Israeli consent.

The main problem in Dr. Hamdallah's statements is that this scenario has often been repeated in the past – that is to say, that the Palestinians are being called upon to wait until the preoccupation with some other regional file ends. This occurred during the Iraq/Kuwait war, which was followed by the (1991) Madrid Conference. It also occurred after the Second Gulf War (2003) when the Roadmap initiative was launched that referred to a Palestinian state, the formation of an International Quartet, and a specific date for the establishment of the state, namely, 2005, ten years ago. So how does what Hamdallah present as the Palestinian leadership's position differ from the Roadmap? And why should the outcome be any different? Is this not the same old pattern as before?

Hamdallah relies on American and international pressure on Israel. The newspaper asked him: 'you think the outside pressure on Israel will be enough?" And he answered: ' Yes, I think the intervention of the U.N. and the great powers is important to convince Israel to reach a peaceful settlement.' But given that he did not offer any indication that the U.S. intends to exert real economic or military pressure on Israel or to reduce its military backing for it for that matter, and given that all European policies call for a reduction and ending cooperation with Israel when it comes to settlements alone, but not regarding other matters, the Palestinian PM's optimism seems questionable. Is there really anything there to justify it?

What prevents the Palestinians from persisting with their plans to seek international organizations' help, mending the domestic Palestinian household, and especially the PLO, and escalating popular resistance, while at the same time waiting for international initiatives? After all, Israeli polices, especially settlement policies wait for nothing. And the Palestinians’ suffering continues unabated.

"And when the U.S. reaches an agreement with Iran, it will have fewer reasons to worry about what is happening in the Middle East or to intensify its pressure on Binyamin Netanyahu," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

3-Qatar will not be deflected

 

Qatar is determined to pursue its efforts to host the 2022 World Cup despite all the hostile racist media campaigns, says today’s Qatari Asharq

 

The attempts to deny Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup are motivated by racism and anti-Islamic sentiment, insists the editorial in a Qatari daily. But Doha will proceed with its preparations for the World Cup without paying attention to these detestable campaigns.

 

RACIST CAMPAIGN: "The racist campaign by international forces that have found it hard to accept that an Arab and Muslim country has won the honor of organizing the 2022 World Cup coincides with what Qatar is suffering regionally and internationally for its defense of the causes of freedom and human rights, and for its support for the persecuted and wretched around the world," writes the editorial in Thursday's Qatari daily Asharq.

It is 'impossible' to deny Qatar its right to organize the 2022 World Cup – this was the expression used by Qatari Foreign Minister Dr. Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah to summarize Qatar’s response to the rabid campaign against the state and its positions that aim to build a tolerant and just world, free from detestable racism and fanaticism.

Qatar deservedly won the honor of organizing the most important sports competition in the world. It presented the best offers – football grounds and sports institutions – that will secure the competition’s success. At the same time, it stressed that the state will ensure that no mistakes will occur when the time comes, and that work on the construction sites for 2022 World Cup are proceeding according to plan. Five million working hours on these projects have been completed so far without any deaths, which undermines the claims made in certain media, that the state has stressed are far from the truth.

It is wrong to misrepresent the statistical data. Certain elements of the international media have done so deliberately by obfuscating certain reports and drawing misleading conclusions based on unfounded suspicions. They have misrepresented a report by the World Health Organization that predicted possible deaths resulting from heart and arterial diseases that could afflict human beings anywhere in the world, not just in Qatar alone. And they have emerged with a deceptive conclusion based on predictions regarding the years it would take to construct the World Cup's installations. They thereby placed the carriage before the horse and extrapolated into the future before any problem has occurred, in what is a reversal of logic, understanding, and the rules of inference.

Qatar will proceed with its preparations and installations for the 2022 World Cup without paying any heed to the obstructions raised by the obstructers or the defeatists’ attempts to weaken its will, or to the conspiracies by powers hostile to the Arabs and Muslims around the world.

"In doing so, it is motivated by its deep-rooted faith in the need for spreading the values of justice, tolerance, and humanity around the entire globe," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 04.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Kerry factor

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Thursday editions with comments by the CEO of mobile telephone giant Orange, who told a news conference in Cairo that his company would sever ties with Israel 'tomorrow morning,' if it would not be subjected to massive penalties by the government. Stephane Richard said Orange intends to withdraw its brand from Israel as soon as possible, but that the move would take time. 'I am ready to abandon this tomorrow morning but the point is that I want to secure the legal risk for the company. I want to terminate this, once again, but I don't want to expose Orange to a level of risk and of penalties that could be really sizable for the company.'

Orange holds a stake in Israeli mobile company Partner, which sells the global company's products and service in Israel. French human rights groups have been pushing their government, which has a 25 percent stake in Orange, and the company itself, to end the relationship over Partner’s activities in Israeli settlements.

Israel Hayom goes for a pun in its lead headline; saying that 'Orange is no longer a Partner,' while Yedioth Ahronoth reports that 'Orange CEO supports the boycott against Israel.' Based on these two headlines – which are not necessarily backed up by the facts of the story itself – Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett urged Israelis not to turn their backs on Partner, which, he said, was the victim in this case. 'Partner is a purely Israeli company with 3,500 employees here. All of the infrastructure, including towers, customer service, etc., belongs to it. The only relationship Partner has with world Orange is the licensing of its name.'

Even before the Orange CEO's comments, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked told MKs earlier Wednesday that, 'There is currently a large-scale campaign to delegitimize Israel, aimed against its existence as a Jewish nation. The aim of the campaign is not only to influence Israeli policy one way or another, but to demonize Israel, hurt its vital interests and its ability to defend itself, and eventually eliminate its existence as a Jewish and democratic state.'

Partner owner Haim Saban, for his part, hit back at Richard, saying that he is, 'proud to hold the controlling stake in Partner, which is an Israeli owned company that leases the Orange brand. Threats won't deter me and I will continue to work on behalf of Israel and lead the global struggle in support of Israel.'

Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely sent a letter to Richard, urging him to take back his remarks regarding a boycott of Israel. 'I call on you to refrain from taking part in the industry of lies directed against Israel,' wrote Hotovely, adding, 'I am sure that these reports do not reflect the intentions of your company, and call on you to clarify the issue as soon as possible.'

Economy Minister Aryeh Deri also condemned Richard’s remarks, adding, 'One cannot force anything on Israel by way of boycotts and the only way is through dialogue and negotiations. I intend to contact the CEO of Partner Communications and the heads of the company and offer them any assistance to cope with the boycott intentions of Orange,' said Deri.

Haaretz leads with a report that IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot is planning a major reform to the role of the Military Rabbinate. Coincidentally or not, the report comes in the same week as a soldier was sentenced to 10 days in jail for sharing non-kosher sandwiches with his colleagues on an army base. According to Haaretz, Eisenkot plans to limit the Military Rabbinate's controls and its presence in the education of IDF units. Eisenkot says that he will instruct the military's manpower unit to reevaluate the division of responsibilities between the Military Rabbinate and the Education Corps.

None of the newspapers lead with the rocket attack on southern Israel on Wednesday night – the second such incident in the space of 10 days. Like the previous incident, this one appears to have been the work of organizations that are currently engaged in clashes with the ruling Hamas faction. This did not prevent the IDF from striking Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip in retaliation and it did not stop Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon from holding Hamas responsible.

'Even if the shooters last night were jihadist groups rebelling against Hamas by firing at us, we view Hamas as being responsible for everything that occurs in the territory of Gaza,' Ya'alon said in a statement on Thursday. Israel's patience towards this type of terrorism should not be tested, the defense minister cautioned, adding, 'We will not tolerate any attempts to harm our civilians or allow the return of a reality where rockets are trickling into the state.'

After Israeli warplanes struck three militant training camps in response to the rocket fire – aimed at Ashkelon and Netivot – Ya'alon said Israel 'will hit even stronger,' if necessary. 'Last summer proved that,' he said in reference to the 50-day July-August war that ended with an Egyptian-brokered truce in August. 'We will act decisively and firmly to ensure the security of the residents of the South and the citizens of Israel.'

The IDF said 'hits were confirmed' in the predawn attack that left infrastructure damaged but no casualties.

 

FOR THE WANT OF A NAIL: Writing in Israel Hayom, Zalman Shoval says that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's bicycle accident could have far-reaching implications for the Iranian nuclear deal.

"Will U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's broken femur change reality when it comes to the Iranian nuclear threat? The top U.S. diplomat took a tumble from his bicycle last week, when he decided to enjoy a break from the intensive talks he was holding with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. He was airlifted back to the United States and underwent surgery in a Boston hospital. During their last meeting, on Saturday, the two leaders failed to hammer out the final details of the nuclear agreement and decided to reconvene the next day. But Kerry's accident meant that they never did.

Even before the U.S. secretary of state's accident, it seemed unlikely that a deal would be reached by the end-of-June deadline. Now, however, it seems almost certain that the deadline will be missed, since the negotiations have stalled over the fundamental issues that will determine whether a deal is even possible: Iran's willingness or otherwise to allow international inspectors to visit its military installations and what kind of system will be put in place to ensure that sanctions are re-imposed if Iran violates the agreement. As usual, the Iranians have managed to lead the West on a merry dance, by promising all kinds of concession – most of them imaginary – on issues that are not central to the nuclear issue. They have taken full advantage of the support they are getting from Russia and from China – and the burning desire of the Obama Administration to reach an agreement.

The Iranians were so certain that they would manage to get their way and that they would succeed in duping the six world powers that, in a speech last week, President Hassan Rowhani told his people how well off they were going to be as soon as sanctions are lifted. At the same time, a senior member of the Iranian delegation to the talks told reporters that his country would never allow foreign inspectors to visit its military sites.

Kerry played a central role in international efforts to broker a deal with Iran. But he also spent much of his time trying to convince the United States' European allies – especially France – to take a less arduous position and to be more flexible in its demands of Tehran. Kerry was planning a series of meetings with European leaders to discuss the matter. Following his bicycle accident, however, these meetings have been cancelled. This does not mean, of course, that there is zero chance of reaching a final agreement by the end of June. But, the absence of one of the key Western figures in the negotiations – at such a critical juncture in the process – will surely have an impact on progress.

Last week, two important editorials were published in the United States, which addressed the Iranian issue. The first was written by Ray Takeyh, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who explained that the deal being offered to Iran will strengthen the ayatollahs' grip on power and will make it more extreme. The second article, written by several former U.S. officials, claimed that, since the Iranian leadership views the United States as its sworn enemy, it cannot be a partner in the battle against ISIS, as Washington hopes. According to the proverb, for the want of a nail the kingdom was lost. Is it possible that, for the want of a little caution on John Kerry's part, the Iranian nuclear deal will also be lost?"

Ends…

 

A POINTLESS CABINET: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman says that Binyamin Netanyahu's security cabinet is a pointless body, since its members are clueless about security matters and, in any case, the prime minister and the defense minister make all the decisions.

"It is not entirely clear to me why otherwise intelligent people – like ministers in the government, for example – clamber over each other to get a seat in Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's security cabinet. True, being a member of the inner circle comes with a certain cache, grants access to the state's most closely guarded secrets and provides a rare insight into the abilities of our Special Forces. In practice, however, the security cabinet is no more than a political debate club with no teeth.

The security cabinet, which is supposed to approve and monitor the performance of the defense establishment on such vital issues as training, intelligence and extraordinary operations, has never done any of this properly and does not have the tools to do so today. This is true of security cabinets in which there were several ministers with military backgrounds – such as the 2006 cabinet, which was roundly criticized by the Winograd Committee for its failures during the Second Lebanon War – and it is certainly true of the security cabinet formed last month by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which looks more like the anemic list of members of a housing committee.

I very much doubt that anyone in Israel has more knowledge about the country's transportation infrastructure than Yisrael Katz, but the moment that he accepted the position of intelligence minister, he shot himself in the foot. In order to make his voice heard in the security cabinet without making a fool of himself, Katz will have to spend at least four hours every day reading briefings from the Shin Bet, the Mossad, Military Intelligence and other intelligence-gathering organizations. Dan Meridor, who is far more suited to serve as intelligence minister – spent entire days meeting with representatives of these bodies in order to study the issues. Where will Katz find the time and energy to read endless intelligence material? I doubt that he has the tools to discern when he is getting full cooperation from these bodies and when they are merely stringing him along. Moreover, he will never see the truly top secret information – which is for the prime minister's eyes only.

Another member of the security cabinet is the minister for strategic affairs – which is another of the empty positions in the fourth Netanyahu government. Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, who used to serve as strategic affairs minister, discovered how pointless that job is when his views were ignored during the Mavi Marmara affair. Gilad Erdan, who fought tooth and nail to get that job, hopes to contribute to Israel's campaign against the Iranian nuclear program, alongside the much-overlooked job of reforming the police force. But there's a minor problem here: the three bodies which deal with Iran – the Mossad, the Atomic Energy Agency and the Foreign Ministry – all answer to Netanyahu. It seems highly unlikely that Erdan, with all due respect, will be the leading voice in the security cabinet on all matters related to the Islamic Republic.

Katz and Erdan are just two examples of the professional weakness of the current security cabinet, which is bloated with honorific ministers. Even the body which is supposed to compensate for the lack of professional knowledge on the part of ministers – the National Security Council – is under the prime minister's auspices, so it's Netanyahu who decides what the ministers are told, when the security cabinet is convened and how often. The fact that Netanyahu decided to give Yoav Gallant – the only general in the government apart from Ya'alon – observer status in the security cabinet would seem to prove that the prime minister does not view it as a professional body that should be listened to in times of crisis. So who needs a security cabinet? In any case, prime ministers always surround themselves with a smaller, more intimate team, which prepares decisions for the security cabinet and the government to approve.

Of the dozen members (and observers) in the security cabinet, one can count the ministers who have actual experience in security matters on less than the fingers of one hand. And so, even in 2015, Israel's security matters will be managed and overseen by the prime minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff – just as they were during the Second Lebanon War. The Winograd Committee recommended that, at least in times of national crisis, the prime minister be obligated to convene his security cabinet. But who ever listens to the recommendations of committees?"

Ends…

 

THE HONEYMOON'S OVER: Writing on the Walla! website, Avi Issacharoff says that the best-laid plans of Hamas and Israel – to maintain the relative quiet of the past 12 months – may be disrupted by various Salafi groups in the Gaza Strip.

"In the early hours of Thursday morning, the Israeli government published a statement in which it reiterated that it holds Hamas responsible for the rocket fire against southern Israel a few hours earlier. This announcement may, at first glance, appear to be dramatic, but the truth is that it is totally devoid of content. Not only is Hamas not responsible for the attacks, the Israeli government is keen for Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli response to the rockets – the traditional response of bombing empty Hamas facilities – unsurprisingly ended without injuries. Hamas is also aware of the ritual: rockets are fired at Israel, Hamas evacuates its facilities, Israel bombs them – and everyone returns to their routine until the next time.

Unnamed Israeli defense officials – who suddenly fancied themselves as Palestinian affairs experts – explained to local reporters that the background to the rocket attack was tensions between Hamas and various Salafi groups in Gaza. Residents of the Gaza envelope insist that they will not be held hostage by the battles between Hamas and the Salafi organizations – but this is the reality of the situation. That is what happened last week, too, when a spat between two senior commanders from Islamic Jihad led to a rocket being fired at Be'er Tuvia. And this appears to be the case with the most recent attack.

Following the killing of one of the leaders of a Salafi group by Hamas' security forces, they threatened to retaliate within 48 hours. At first, it appeared that the response would come in the shape of an attack on one of Hamas' positions, but it now appears that the Salafis opted to respond by firing rockets at Israel. Even the heads of jihadi groupings understand that one of Hamas' key goals at the current time is to maintain the relative quiet with Israel.

Ironically, Israel in recent months has been the main lifeline for the Hamas regime in the Strip. Moreover, the Jewish state is virtually the only regional and global player keen on keeping Hamas in power. The volume of goods entering Gaza from Israel is constantly on the rise. IDF Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Major General Yoav Mordechai also recently approved the transfer of dual-use materials into the Strip, even though some of these materials can be used to produce weapons. Mordechai was operating under the assumption that terrorist activities will decrease as the humanitarian situation in Gaza improves.

At a special press conference organized by the Qatari envoy to Gaza, Mohammed al-Emadi, the diplomat praised the Israeli official for allowing the entry of the materials into the Strip. Perhaps the Qatari diplomat’s enthusiasm can be seen in the context of a Palestinian request to establish a gas pipeline between Israel and Gaza, which will include the construction of a special station on the Israeli side aimed at increasing power supply to plants in the Strip. Less than a year after the latest war between the two sides, the Israel-Hamas relationship is blossoming. Too bad the Salafi organizations are trying to put a damper on the occasion.

In this light, it is also hard to not take into account recent claims made by Palestinian Authority officials. These officials state repeatedly that Israel is engaged in talks with Hamas over a long-term ceasefire, while neglecting negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. The PA has cited specific Israeli officials, serving and retired, whose names have not been cleared for publication, allegedly managing direct talks with Hamas. These negotiations are focused on the return of the remains of missing Israeli soldiers, but also on reaching a long-term truce agreement.

The truth is that, in practice, such an agreement is already in place. For the time being, Hamas is trying unsuccessfully to maintain the calm, while Israel remains faithful to the principle of 'quiet will be met with quiet,' and has provided quite a few economic benefits to help Hamas consolidate its rule over the Strip.

In the meantime, residents of southern Israel cannot expect real quiet. A fight between two clans or rival factions will often end in rocket fire at the Israelis. The Israeli responses, mostly due to public opinion, will probably become more severe with time, as will the attacks from the Strip. And so, with baby steps, Hamas and Israel approach the next round of violence."

Ends…

 

FULL-TIME JOB: Writing in Maariv, Lilac Sigan has five pieces of advice for Gilad Erdan, who is the government's point man in the campaign against the BDS movement.

"Gilad Erdan is a talented politician, but, in addition to the slew of jobs he has accepted in Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's new government, he has also agreed to moonlight in a very important job: he's government's point man when it comes to thwarting boycotts against Israel. If he wants to succeed, there are some measures that he has to implement.

1-Reining in the ministers. Much has already been said and written about Yisrael Katz's lack of diplomatic acumen. So with all due respect to the ministers' freedom to write what they want on their Facebook pages, if Israel wants to defeat the BDS movement, Erdan will have to impose some kind of discipline on his cabinet colleagues. He will need the help of the prime minister to do so. One populist status update on Facebook could do untold damage to Israel's hasbara efforts.

2-Recognize that the campaign is being waged inside Israel, too. Many Israeli leftists are unaware of the ramifications of the position they are taking, since one of the uglier phenomena of recent years is the cynical use that the anti-Zionist camp makes of left-wing views. Erdan needs to spend time talking to leaders of the sane left, to convince them not to allow their perfectly legitimate views to be hijacked by the radical left. It is easy to show moderate people that one-sided pressure against Israel does not bring peace closer, but distances it. The only outcome of one-sided pressure is that hatred for Israel has surpassed even hatred for ISIS – and anti-Semitism is on the rise.

3-Speak with one clear and focused voice. Miri Regev is spearheading a campaign against the cultural boycott, Tzipi Hotovely believes that she can convince the international community that Israel is right by using passages from the bible and there are so many plans and programs in the pipeline that no one knows what is really going on. Israel is already in a position of inferiority compared to the well-organized anti-Zionist campaign that has been formed over the past decade. And the international media is not exactly on our side. Not only do comments like those uttered by Hotovely harm Israel's image, as long as we are not all on the same page, we are simply wasting huge amounts of time, energy and money.

4-Create an informative website for Israelis. Many Israelis want to play some role in protecting their country's image, in light of the disinformation being spread by anti-Zionists, but they don't have a clue where to even start. An Internet site and an increased presence on social media will be a hit with Israelis, if it provides answers to the lies, makes the facts readily available and tells surfers where they can go to put their new-found knowledge to the good of the country.

5-Don't emulate the bad guys. It would be a terrible mistake to believe that the only way to counter the lies of the anti-Zionists is to emulate them and to play as dirty as they do. The correct way to deal with those who have dedicated themselves to 'proving' that Israel is an apartheid state and so on, is to make sure that we remain the good guys. The campaign of delegitimization, which seeks to argue that Israel is a cruel occupying force, is bolstered by any signs of aggression from members of the Israeli government. The anti-BDS campaign, as well as Israel's diplomatic activity, must be conducted in a reasonable manner. It needs to present evidence of the Palestinian leadership's incitement and violence and to prove that the anti-Zionist campaign is full of lies and half-truths – and that it serves the interests of Hamas' terror and Fateh's rejectionism. Indeed, I would say that it is time for Israel to stop responding. The best campaign Israel can mount is not reactive, but proactive. It must reflect exactly the opposite of what we are being accused of.

I truly wish Erdan the best of luck. As long as Israel is not initiating anything on the diplomatic front, however, he will have his work cut out for him. Erdan has many job titles in this government, and he cannot afford to take any of them for granted. Countering the BDS movement is a job for a professional – and it's a full-time position."

Ends…

 

NO EXCUSES: Writing in Haaretz, Israel Harel says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has got what he wanted – a right-wing government with no internal opposition – so he no longer has any excuses for his failures.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu no longer has adversarial ministers in his cabinet like Yair Lapid and Tzipi Livni. If this time he goes out of his way to be energetic, focused and treat others well, his government could last a long time. No longer can he blame his failures on others, as he usually does. The space for excuses has grown smaller.

Netanyahu’s personality is the source of most of his failings. He is jealous of the success of his partners (although as prime minister he could praise them, because any credit to them is a credit to him); he burns bridges instead of building them; he stirs conflicts instead of preventing them; he pits sectors against each other instead of bringing them together and keeping things calm. If not for these traits of his, the previous government would have lived out its term. What’s more, Netanyahu would have achieved many of his aspirations and won what he longs for so much: broad recognition, not just sectoral, as a national leader of historic proportions.

Despite these shortcomings, if this time he manages to overcome his weaknesses and do what he is supposed to do – efficiently and closely manage the work of the ministers – Israel might enjoy a government that implements its platform, especially in the realms of society, welfare and the economy, with which the coalition parties went to the voters. Other than the issue of the coalition’s size, 61 MKs, it’s hard to recall a government that had a better starting point than this one. Despite the disproportionate mournfulness over 'how bad' this is, the real situation, in most areas, is not bad at all, certainly not relative to what is happening now in the world, including the developed one.

Zionist Union leader MK Isaac Herzog did not fail because of a 'weak' election campaign and Netanyahu did not win because of his strong points this time either. The retreat from national Zionist values among those who called themselves the 'Zionist camp' is what led to the stinging result, this time as well, like the previous times. In a film about Herzog’s conduct during the campaign he was shown to be worthy as a national leader. If Netanyahu were blessed with even some of the character traits that Herzog has (and which Herzog’s own camp held against him), he would be the ideal leader.

Because of these characteristics of Herzog’s, and despite the policies Zionist Union presented, the party garnered 24 seats. To the best of my knowledge, quite a few traditional voters of the national camp, who had become fed up with Netanyahu’s hedonistic personality, voted for Zionist Union. The collective Israeli character, despite the significant changes it has undergone, still appreciates honesty, modesty, humility, personal example and making do with little. If Likud had a leader with Herzog’s traits and a classically Likud political ideology, Zionist Union would have ended up, as in previous elections, with 13 to 15 seats.

Right-wingers who voted for Herzog assumed that if he won, he would not make territorial concessions. Not because he doesn’t want to, but because there is no one to concede territory to. The Palestinians do not want peace; they want the Jewish state to disappear. Better that the moderate left – which knows this deep down – reach this conclusion and have the courage (in the past, when the Palestinians deceived the left’s leaders, it did not have the courage), and say so out loud. This could also soften the international position toward Israel.

The leftist camp is paying the price, and will continue to, of its inability to admit the serious diplomatic and security errors it made over the decades. Until it admits the error of its ways – and it will not – the rule of national camp is in no danger. When this camp has worthy leadership that will determinedly and consistently execute a clear national policy, it can strengthen its rule – and with a much larger majority than it has now – for many years to come."

Ends…

 

OBAMA AND NETANYAHU CAN STILL COOPERATE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Amos Yadlin says that since the Israeli prime minister and the U.S. president share the same ultimate strategic goal – denying nuclear weapons to the ayatollahs in Tehran – they should be able to find enough common ground to work together.

"Israel’s prime minister and U.S. President Barack Obama share the same ultimate strategic goal – denying nuclear weapons to the ayatollahs in Tehran. The president has repeatedly made this point clear, as has Binyamin Netanyahu.

They drastically differ, however, in their assessments of the deal taking shape with Iran. They hold very different assumptions regarding Iran’s reaction to the deal and behavior in the years to come. These divergences are rooted in fundamental differences in how the two men perceive the world, and as the president himself put it, different political traditions and different orientations: A 'politics of hope vs. politics of fear,' Optimism vs. experienced, risk-averse pessimism. This divergence corresponds with major differences in how vulnerable each country is to a potential Iranian threat, and between their respective lessons from history.

Netanyahu’s prediction is that once an agreement is signed Iran will hide, cheat and lie. It will wait patiently for the best opportunity to break out to a bomb, and do so through the many holes in the agreement. Obama’s belief is that once a diplomatic breakthrough is made, a positive cascade reminiscent of Nixon’s 'Opening to China' will occur.

The two men should both agree, however, that personal disagreements should not stand in the way of where both countries agree and share a vital interest. The responsibility is ultimately theirs to find a way to bridge their differences and build together a strategy that will prepare the partnership for scenarios where neither of their predictions comes true.

President Obama as the leader of the larger, stronger state in the alliance, and as the force behind the Iran outreach effort, should initiate an unequivocal, public appeal for Netanyahu’s participation in a well-prepared summit before the June deadline arrives. He should present a strategy for how a bomb will be denied to Iran should his hopeful predictions not come to pass. He should explain how exactly America will counter any of the possible negative scenarios Netanyahu describes. In order to gain the trust of Israelis, that explanation will have to be water-tight and convincing, covering the ability to 'snap back' biting sanctions; the credible ability to act militarily to prevent an Iranian breakout; and the commitment to continue to counter Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony via a 'dual track' strategy, even after the agreement.

The prime minister would be wise to tone down the rhetoric and focus on the agreement’s actual weak spots. It wasn’t the agreement that brought Iran to the nuclear threshold – it has been treading that threshold for years, and the agreement doesn’t allow Iran to build a bomb, not now and not 20 years from now. However, the prime minister is right in pointing out how problematic is the signing of an agreement that legitimizes Iranian enrichment of uranium, undermining former United Nations Security Council decisions. President Obama conceded in his NPR interview that the agreement does little by way of preventing Iran from reaching 'zero breakout' time a decade on.

Netanyahu should call off the offensive against the White House and reach the summit with clear, constructive propositions on how to improve the deal based on the principles presented by Vice President Joe Biden in his April 30 speech at the Washington Institute (cutoff of fissile material; phased sanctions relief; one-year breakout; and verifiable assurances of a peaceful program).

An outcome of the summit should be a bilateral 'side agreement' that includes written understandings and a security compensation package to mitigate the risks stemming from the agreement. There should also be mention of what both countries do if the prime minister’s pessimistic assumptions indeed prove well-founded.

That level of intimacy and coordination will bear dividends with regard to other shared interests in the Middle East. The trudging campaign against Islamic State, the collapse of Syria, Libya and Yemen, a possible UNSC vote against Israel, the prospect of further rounds of fighting with Hizbollah and with Hamas in Gaza, or the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign against Israel – all issues that correspond with the most difficult, challenging question of Iran’s role in the Middle East.

America and Israel do not have the privilege of sparring and squabbling when faced with a common adversary that is engaged in a systematic effort to go nuclear. Iran’s striving for hegemony and involvement in nefarious activities are causing instability throughout the Middle East, affecting the lives of millions. Iran’s actions must be countered by an effective, long-term strategy. History will not be forgiving to leaders who, due to lack of personal chemistry and the will to engage with one another, fail to produce one for their peoples."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE 7th GENERAL ELECTIONS: Ugur Gurses dismisses fears of the elections’ impact on the economy in centre-left Radikal: "Two main fears have been spread during the election campaign: that the election results will turn the Turkish government into a coalition, and that Deputy PM Ali Babacan will not be in charge of the economy any more. Both these fears are presented as the worst scenario for the economy. Both are unfounded. If there is a coalition, it will not have such negative consequences. On the contrary, the politicians who are spreading fear should learn their lessons well."

Mehmet Tezkan argues that the ruling party is in a state of panic in centrist Milliyet: "We will be heading to the polls in four days’ time. The ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) has ratcheted up its rhetoric. It has taken it to the point of words that should not be said even in a fight. One can say that this is normal in the final days before the election; the parties play their last cards. But this is not the case. The ruling party is in a state of panic. If one were to ask where I have got this from I would say: first, from what religious figures are saying as they have begun to criticize the government which they have never criticized up till now; and second, from the fact that the government is conducting a religion-based campaign. In addition, there are the warnings from newspaper columnists who are connected to the government’s grassroots. President Erdogan is trying to save the ruling party sinking vessel."

Mustafa Balbay insists that Erdogan’s era is over in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Erdogan is the AKP’s problem from now on. He has stopped being Turkey’s problem. For someone who has lost all neutrality in the June 7th election process, used the state’s resources for his party alone, put pressure on all state institutions to work for the AKP, even resorted to Hitler-like methods in silencing the press and manipulating public opinion, it is now impossible to be president of all of Turkey. In this sense, the term of the 12th President of Turkey, Erdogan, has ended. What remains is the president of the AKP."

Nazli Ilicak believes that the incoming government will not bring stability in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "Turkey should be prepared for early elections. It is possible that the new government may not be formed in the required 45 days or that a short-lived coalition may be formed. This coalition will take some democratic steps and some economic measures. And in a year’s time, new election will be held. These elections will not bring stability. Even if the AKP comes to power alone, it will not bring stability."

Kurtulus Tayiz detects a campaign against Erdogan’s person in centre-right, pro-government Aksam:  "Since the [summer 2014] Gezi square uprising and the December 2014 coup attempt were meant to end with Erdogan be handcuffed and toppled like Muhammad Mursi and sent to the gallows like Adnan Menderes [former Turkish PM hanged after 1960 military coup]. What do they want from Erdogan? We can give a clear answer to this question: President Erdogan can only rescue himself from such pressure only by submitting to the national will."

Unsal Ban paints a dire scenario in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "A coalition will be the main cause for instability and will lead to growing economic fragility, as well as leave our country defenseless against inside and outside shocks. All the achievements of the last 12-13 years will suddenly disappear. The impact of this situation on the public will be felt almost immediately. Prices will go up rapidly, wages will stay fixed and life will become more expensive."

 

 

Please note that Iranian press quotes will not be published on 3-4 June due to public holidays in Iran on the occasion of Ayatollah Khomeini's death anniversary

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-‘The wars of others’

2-Syria, the day after

3-FIFA fiasco

 

1-‘The wars of others’

 

The Paris conference’s call (that was adopted by Qatar) to launch an urgent political process in Syria is both important and imperative. There is need to reach a political solution, end the war, and protect civilians. It has become necessary for the international community to consider the nature of the transitional phase in Syria very seriously and to enable the Syrian people to determine their own future. It should offer them every means of support to enable them to protect themselves, with the resolutions of first [2012] Geneva Conference providing the terms of reference for a political process leading to a free Syria without Assad--Qatari Asharq

 

The [Syrian] regime has all but turned into an administrative and military faction led by Tehran with Moscow behind it. As for the opposition, it is the voice or echo of voices that have abandoned military action and made way for extremist organizations that have nothing to do with the Syrian people and their political, social, economic, and cultural demands. The regime in Syria is impossible, and the opposition is equally impossible. The fact is that Syria is suffering from wars fought by others on its soil and at the expense of its lost and displaced people. 'The wars of others' is an expression that the Lebanese used to shirk their responsibility for their own homeland's destruction, and the Syrians may follow in their footsteps--Mohammad Ali in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The international anti-ISIS coalition's meeting in Paris to review its strategy should pave the way for more serious policies in Syria and Iraq, insists the editorial in a Qatari daily. In Syria, these policies should lead to a political process that gets rid of the Assad regime, while in Iraq national reconciliation should be pursued without excluding any Iraqi constituent. The Paris conference seems to have ignored Iran's decision to 'unite' the Syrian and Iraqi fronts by allowing the movement of pro-regime forces between the two countries, claims a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi-owned daily. Meanwhile, the Syrian people are paying the price for the proxy war being fought by regional powers on their soil.

 

THE GREATEST CHALLENGES: "The Syrian and Iraqi crises represent the two greatest challenges to the international community that affect international peace and security," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Qatari daily Asharq.

They have produced a humanitarian crisis that requires urgent action to protect civilians and provide humanitarian aid. The violence has left victims and refugees behind, and it has become necessary for the UN to act.

The Paris conference’s call (that was adopted by Qatar) to launch an urgent political process in Syria is both important and imperative. There is need to reach a political solution, end the war, and protect civilians. It has become necessary for the international community to consider the nature of the transitional phase in Syria very seriously and to enable the Syrian people to determine their own future. It should offer them every means of support to enable them to protect themselves, with the resolutions of first [2012] Geneva Conference providing the terms of reference for a political process leading to a free Syria without Assad.

For its part Iraq, needs to consolidate the process of national reconciliation, pursue its reforms, avoid the exclusion of any Iraqi constituent, strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, and ensure that everyone is treated equally without discrimination.

Iraq has a chance to return to the Arab lap and its Gulf neighborhood. Qatari Foreign Minister Khaled bin Mohammad al-'Atiyyah’s visit to Baghdad is a step in this direction. Reopening the Qatari Embassy in Baghdad is another step in the right direction, deepening relations between the two countries and safeguarding Iraq's security, unity and sovereignty, while working together in order to achieve genuine national reconciliation.

Terrorism in all its forms should be denounced. And Qatar is a member of many international forums dedicated to fighting terrorism. Its advice is to deal with the causes of terrorism in order to pull it out by the roots. It is necessary to pursue a realistic policy that produces effective remedies for conflicts and fulfils the aspirations of nations for security, peace, and stability in a manner that safeguards their unity and sovereignty.

"A mission awaits the UN that is not easy, either in its political or its humanitarian dimensions. There is no alternative to the international community’s determination to resolve these crises, even if this calls for measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and appropriate resolutions," concludes the daily.

End…

 

REVIEWING THE BATTLE: "The anti-ISIS international coalition met in Paris to review the battle with this extremist organization and to regain control of al-Ramadi at the very least," notes Mohammad Ali Farhat in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Although the coalition is striking at ISIS in a number of Syrian areas while it waits for a few thousand moderate Syrian opposition fighters to be trained, it is also focusing on Iraq since the government there enjoys universal recognition. By contrast, the Syrian regime has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the leading regional and international capitals and it is impossible to cooperate with it against ISIS or any other terrorist organization.

The Iraqi government has not publicly announced before the international coalition that it has revoked its reservations towards unifying the Iraqi and Syrian fronts against ISIS and the other armed opposition groups. But the truth is that Baghdad has complied with Tehran's wishes to unite both fronts, it allowed thousands of [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) volunteers to head to Syria to fight alongside with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Lebanese Hizbollah over the past few days, with unprecedented coordination with the Syrian army. In fact, supporters of the [Iran/Syria/Hizbollah] 'resistance axis' expect a counter-attack on the Jayshul Fateh (which includes the Nusra Front) to regain Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, and Ariha and reverse the shift in the military balance between the regime and armed opposition.

The anticipation of a counteroffensive has silenced the 'resistance axis's supporters’ complaints against Iranian and Russian policies towards the Syrian crisis. They had previously described these policies as negative and had cast doubt on Tehran and Moscow's stance on the Syrian regime's future, specifically, the fate of its president, Bashar al-Assad.

Baghdad's consent to unite the battlefronts against the armed extremist opposition in Iraq and Syria can be seen as the first test of the post-nuclear-agreement era between the West and Iran. For it is highly unlikely that the ruling Da'wa Party in Iraq will rebel against the U.S. which has installed it in power and has used it to forge a delicate balance with Tehran that paves the way to either future coordination or collision with it should the nuclear agreement falters in its last stages.

The Syrian regime's opponents, as well as Iran and its supporters, are unanimous in portraying Syria and Iraq’s armed and extremist opposition as a dangerous tool in the hands of regional and international powers. Smoke bombs are being set off to obstruct the real vista. Thus we hear every camp attributing ISIS to its enemies. The organization is portrayed either as a tool of Tehran or Ankara or Washington or Damascus, depending on who is making the accusation. But what is strange is that this organization, which has occupied large areas of Iraq and Syria, is still being dismissed as a mere tool of other powers.

As we wait for the promised counteroffensive by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Iraqi PMU, Lebanese Hizbollah and the Syrian army to regain Idlib Province, Syria's image today is taking shape as the land of conflict between two forces that cannot meet: the regime and the opposition. The regime has all but turned into an administrative and military faction led by Tehran with Moscow behind it. As for the opposition, it is the voice or echo of voices that have abandoned military action and made way for extremist organizations that have nothing to do with the Syrian people and their political, social, economic, and cultural demands.

The regime in Syria is impossible, and the opposition is equally impossible. The fact is that Syria is suffering from wars fought by others on its soil and at the expense of its lost and displaced people. 'The wars of others' is an expression that the Lebanese used to shirk their responsibility for their own homeland's destruction, and the Syrians may follow in their footsteps.

"This will happen when they are brought to a regional or international conference in Ta'if or some another city to sign an agreement to end the war, achieve reconciliation, renew the regime, and issue a general amnesty for all local criminals, together with the 'guests' who have infiltrated Syria to kill its people and destroy its civilization in the regime's or the opposition's slogans, or in the name of the promise of a holy state that has never existed and never will," concludes Farhat.

Ends…

 

 

2-Syria, the day after

 

There are many indications that the rapid collapse of the [Syrian] regime's forces in Idlib and elsewhere were the result of its inability to replace the causalities it has been suffering. And as Iran decides to fill the vacuum with Shiite fighters, Washington is implicitly colluding with it by clinging to its strategy of avoiding any strikes against the regime in its controversial training program for the [‘moderate’] opposition --Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Three years ago, at the height of speculation and wagers on NATO aerial strikes against regime targets in Syria, we said that the first American air raid would target fundamentalist forces in the opposition's camp, not the regime; and this is what actually happened. Today, at the peak of speculation regarding who will rule Syria after Assad, we say that the 'moderate opposition' will fall before the Assad regime and that the legacy left by it and the regime will be shared by the two 'brotherly' organizations [ISIS and the Nusra], before one of them succeeds in liquidating the other--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The Syrian regime seems unable to replace its human losses that are leading to its rapid collapse on a number of fronts, but Iran has rushed to fill the vacuum with Shiite fighters drawn from around the region, claims a Lebanese commentator. Meanwhile, the U.S. is implicitly colluding with Iran by refraining from any strikes against the regime and its allies. Even though the regime’s collapse is not imminent despite losing a number of battles, ISIS and the Nusra Front would inevitably fill the vacuum created by its fall before one of them liquidates the other, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. All other assessments suggesting that 'moderate' forces could fill that vacuum are no more than wishful thinking.

 

LAME AMERICAN STRATEGY: "America’s lame strategy against ISIS is facing a new setback," writes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Beirut daily an-Nahar.

The training program for moderate Syrian fighters that began in Turkey is threatened with collapse. A leading opposition figure has threatened to withdraw from the program together with a thousand of his men in protest against the U.S. administration's insistence on avoiding any strikes against the Syrian regime and its allies from Hizbollah and the other militias, restricting the confrontation to ISIS.

This program has been controversial from the very start. The repeated postponements of its launch have fuelled doubts about its seriousness. The latest reports that it is faltering come at a time when the need for an effective third force seems more urgent than at any time before. Having fortified its position in Homs, ISIS is now advancing towards Aleppo and expanding its battlefronts against both the regime and opposition forces simultaneously. It now controls over half of Syria's total area. Meanwhile, having invaded Idlib after achieving gains on the southern front, the [Qa’ida affiliated] Nusra Front is expanding northwards.

While the world hesitates to draft an effective strategy that would prevent Syria from falling into extremist hands and revive some hope for its future, Iran is throwing a lifeline to Assad in an attempt to help him regain the initiative and compensate for its severe losses suffered this spring when a large section of the Iraqi Shiite fighters trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard withdrew from Syria to confront ISIS's growing threats in Iraq. But numerous reports indicates that these militias have recently returned and are assuming additional tasks on numerous Syrian fronts over and above their previous ones, despite the fact that Iraq’s battlefronts with ISIS have heated up again.

Philip Smith, a researcher on Shiite jihadi affairs, has written that the Dhulfiqar Brigade, which is part of the Abulfadl al-Abbas Brigade, was deployed to the Latakia area sometime between February and early March 2015. Since this Brigade has taken part in the battles in the Damascus area and its environs since 2013, the new front points to the haemorrhage of fighters in the regime's ranks, and highlights the fact that Iran is rushing to pump new blood into its veins so as to repel any potential attacks by the Islamist fighters.

In the areas in which Hizbollah is deployed in large numbers – specifically along the Lebanese/Syrian borders – Smith says that some Dhulfiqar forces were deployed there in mid-April. The two had fought side-by-side in the first attack in the Qalamoun last year. This is in addition to claims by fighters from that same Brigade that they moved to Idlib on May 24th to help 'liberate' the regime's forces that were besieged in the Jisr ash-Shughour Hospital.

"There are many indications that the rapid collapse of the regime's forces in Idlib and elsewhere were the result of its inability to replace the causalities it has been suffering. And as Iran decides to fill the vacuum with Shiite fighters, Washington is implicitly colluding with it by clinging to its strategy of avoiding any strikes against the regime in its controversial training program for the opposition," concludes Freiha.

End…

 

OVER OPTIMISTIC WAVE: "There has been a notable increase in competing reports and analyses that draw the main scenario for the day after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad's regime," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

But the problem with this over-optimistic wave of propagandistic clamor consists of the fact that much of it is drawn from assessments based on wishful thinking that lack seriousness, depth, and caution and is part of the psychological war that is being waged on the regime and its allies with the active participation of the Turkish/Saudi/Qatari axis’ media. Most such analyses also ignore the most likely scenario if predictions regarding the regime's fall prove to be correct, specifically that in which ISIS and the Nusra Front take control of the country.

The regime is on the retreat militarily and on the ground. This is an indisputable truth, especially over the past three or four months. But the loss of one or many battles does not mean it will lose the war. In fact, there are credible reports that the regime has decided to move to Plan-B and focus on the center/coastline axis that stretches from Latakia to Damascus via Homs, Hama, and the Qalamoun, where over half of Syria's population lives. This means that the regime's loss of one or more provinces will take the war raging in Syria to a new level, but without putting an end to it.

Another scenario is sometimes mentioned in serious Western circles, namely that of the regime's 'sudden collapse.' But there are many obstacles that prevent this from happening, most importantly, the fact that the majority of those who have been fighting on the regime's side believe they are waging a life-or-death battle and that their options have become very limited.

But let us take those analyses that deal with the 'day after' Assad's fall seriously. Here, it should be stressed that the sole organized forces that are likely to fill the vacuum left by the regime are the jihadi/Qa'ida/ISIS forces. No force in the opposition camp classified as ‘moderate’ has the ability to fill that vacuum. We would thus be facing a dangerous race between the various shades of the jihadi spectrum to reach the heart of the capital and rule Syria from there. All other scenarios and alternatives are mere figments of the imagination or an expression of ignorance and 'denial,' or perhaps an attempt to market the slogan of toppling the regime, regardless of what may happen afterwards.

This prospect is causing the West, especially the U.S., serious concern and it does not concern Russia, Iran, and Hizbollah alone. Meanwhile, the Arab/regional axis that is opposed to Assad and his allies seems to be indifferent to what happens or who will rule Syria after him. The important thing is that Assad should leave, that Iran should be de-fanged and that [the Saudi-led Yemeni] Operation Decisive Storm should continue, this time on Syrian soil and airspace.

These fears are what brought U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to the resort in Sochi [Russia] and that have led the two superpowers to initiate a dialogue at the level of experts and second-tier figures regarding Syria. It may also be what has led the Russian foreign minister to say that Moscow and Washington share a common view regarding what is happening Syria but without revealing its nature and limits.

I believe that the coming days will witness a feverish race between military escalation and diplomatic initiatives especially if an international agreement is reached with Iran over its nuclear file.

This is not a matter of looking into a crystal ball and predicting the unknown. For what is happening in northern Syria represents a rehearsal for what the situation may be like the day after the regime's fall. The violent battles between ISIS and the Shamiyya Front are just a trial run for the subsequent battles that will break out in Syria's northwest between ISIS and the Nusra Front, which heads Jayshul Fateh.

A bloody and feverish race is underway to fill the vacuum left by the regime in northern Syria, which also includes the areas under Kurdish control. Reports indicate that ISIS is advancing on two fronts, with the [Kurdish] Popular Protection Units (YPG) in the one case, and the Islamist groups fighting under the Shamiyya Front's banner in the other. On the first front, it is benefiting from the Kurds' ethnic cleansing of Syrian Arabs and their expulsion from their areas; and on the second front, ISIS is exploiting the various opposition groups' endless fears, divisions, and rivalry to decide the situation in its favor.

Three years ago, at the height of speculation and wagers on NATO aerial strikes against regime targets in Syria, we said that the first American air raid would target fundamentalist forces in the opposition's camp, not the regime; and this is what actually happened. Today, at the peak of speculation regarding who will rule Syria after Assad, we say that the 'moderate opposition' will fall before the Assad regime and that the legacy left by it and the regime will be shared by the two 'brotherly' organizations [ISIS and the Nusra], before one of them succeeds in liquidating the other.

"In light of such a situation, we still believe (or hope) that the 'international community' has not yet totally divorced its reason and interests, and that it will intervene with an initiative for a political solution for the Syrian crisis before it is too late now that the Syrians have lost their ability to take such initiatives, hold dialogues, produce solutions, and safeguard their independent decision," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-FIFA fiasco

 

The Palestinian motion to expel Israel from FIFA has ended in a fiasco for which those responsible must be brought to account, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The Palestinian motion to freeze Israel's membership in the international soccer federation (FIFA) and its subsequent withdrawal, were nothing short of a fiasco, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. But that is the result of much deeper and more serious ailments afflicting the entire Palestinian political regime and its decision-making process, which will eventually lead to a total catastrophe.

 

NO RIGHT TO DECIDE: "To being with, neither [Palestinian Football Association head] Jibril Rajoub nor anyone else no matter how high his rank – even if president – has the right to decide to enter a major battle such as filing a motion to expel or suspend Israel's membership in FIFA and then withdraw or postpone it," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Such important issues, which will have major consequences in case of either victory or defeat, should be studied within the proper national and institutional frameworks before the appropriate decision is taken. This is essential if the national collective and its institutions are to assume responsibility for these consequences, whether positive or negative. After all, one person’s decision can be influenced or totally determined by their personal assessments and interests. As for decisions taken by national institutions, they reflect collective assessments and express the national interest.

But the main catastrophe is that, for a long time now, the Palestinians no longer have one collective national institution or a single national program, or even a single decision or leadership. The [Fateh/Hamas] split has persisted and has deepened vertically and horizontally, affecting everything. We now have various leaderships and authorities, and the result is that every Palestinian group now seeks its own salvation by itself.

There are a million questions regarding how Palestinian decisions are taken and how the authority to take these decisions has been transformed more and more into the president's prerogative alone in the absence of any effective role for PLO institutions – the Executive Committee, the Central Council, and the National Council that were formed a long time ago without elections and without renewal by accord.

At the same time, the various executive, judicial, and legislative powers have been concentrated and monopolized in the hands of a single person [the president] driving the Palestinian political regime further and further towards a one-man-rule regime without any participation, checks, or accountability.

This pattern is reproducing itself at every level and in all positions. A single person is in charge of what happens in the sports domain; another in the security domain; a third in the economic sphere, a fourth in education, and so on. This is because Palestinian politics do not deal with institutions but with issues each with one person in charge, while the final authority belongs to the president alone with the help of some figures who do not constitute an institution or even a 'kitchen-cabinet'.

This is the context in which to place and best understand Rajoub’s unilateral decision to request to freeze Israel's membership in FIFA raising expectations so high as to speak of the possibility of securing 160 votes out of the total of 209, which is more than the number needed for the motion’s success. It is in this context as well that we can best explain the subsequent 180 degrees U-turn and the claim/excuse that insisting on the motion would not have secured the required number of votes, or that a prior vote would have blocked the Palestinian motion since it politicizes sports, which is inconsistent with FIFA's role.

In both cases, a major mistake was committed and the person responsible must bear responsibility for it. The person responsible for this mistaken assessment – that the Palestinian motion could proceed and reach the voting phase, or that it would not proceed and would be blocked, or would be defeated if a vote were cast – must be held accountable for this mistake. He must be held accountable instead of transforming defeat into victory, as the Arabs are famously wont. For calling for the motion was presented as securing the formation of a FIFA committee as proposed by Israeli PM Netanyahu to [then FIFA head] Blatter during his latest visit, and whose job would be to monitor any Israeli racist violations and any restrictions on the movement of players; as for the issue of the Israeli settler teams, that is not part of FIFA's areas of expertise.

Yes, the battle with the racist, Zionist, settlement occupation is an open battle in FIFA and everywhere else. And losing this round does not mean the end of the war. It requires more work on expelling Israel from FIFA and from all international institutions, on prosecuting it legally and on imposing isolation, boycott, and sanctions on it for the crimes it has committed in the past, and its ongoing crimes such as settlement activities.

But this requires reviving the Palestinian leadership's credibility which has been badly eroded because of the failure to persevere with the policy of gathering the means of influence and power with the aim of adjusting the balance of power and reaching a moment when the occupation and the entire Israeli colonial project become more costly for Israel and those who back it than whatever benefits they may accumulate from them.

Henceforth, it will be more difficult to convince states to back any new Palestinian effort because many of them will view such efforts as no more than a ploy whose aim is to exert pressure with the aim of returning to the bilateral negotiations under American – or merely formal international – sponsorship. After all, the [2009 Gaza] Goldstone Report was postponed and when that postponement was retracted, the report's findings were not implemented. We have also obtained The Hague's Court's legal fatwa [condemning the Israeli West Bank Separation Wall], which is a legal and political treasure that granted the Palestinians more than they had asked for-- but they did nothing with this achievement. Instead, the court’s judgment was shelved, and construction of the Separation Wall continues. In fact, I fear that the time may come when we may lose the majority in the various international institutions because of the lack of faith in the Palestinian performance.

Another issue has accompanied the withdrawal of the Palestinian request and aggravated the situation further. This is the Palestinian’s ambiguous attitude towards the competition between Blatter and [Jordan’s] Prince Ali bin Hussein over FIFA's presidency. It seemed that the Palestinian position leaned in favor of Blatter and that the decision to vote in the prince's favor was taken at the very last moment. In fact, Rajoub admitted that he was late in taking that decision.

And the question here is this: Why hesitate in choosing between an Arab and another candidate? If Blatter is better for the Palestinians, then this should be made clear. And if there are personal calculations or mistaken assessments at work, then those who brought them to the table should be held accountable.

Of course, this gives no one in Jordan or anywhere else the right to speak badly of the Palestinians or harm the relationship between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples. That relationship has been at its best for some time and this must be built upon rather than undermined.

"And why have we not seen campaigns against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and the other Arab countries that voted in Blatter's favor? This further indicates that conditions are continuing to deteriorate to such an extent that unless an Arab project emerges that responds to Arab rights and interests and lifts up the Arab peoples, we will all be facing a catastrophe in the full sense of the word," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 03.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Zigging & Zagging

 

As the first anniversary of Operation Protective Edge draws closer, Yedioth Ahronoth leads its Wednesday edition with the story of an IDF soldier who lost both legs in the campaign and went on to be elected head of the Eshkol Regional Council. Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom all lead with the interview that U.S. President Barack Obama gave to Channel 2, which was aired in full on Tuesday night. Israel Hayom leads with the Iranian angle. Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post highlight Obama's comments about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Haaretz focuses on Obama's assertion that the stalled peace process, along with the conditions Netanyahu has set for establishing a Palestinian state, have made it harder for the United States to continue defending Israel at the United Nations. Obama hinted that the U.S. may withhold its veto on a French initiative to transfer a decision on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the UN Security Council.

The Jerusalem Post headlines Obama's claim that the international community does not believe that Israel is serious about a two-state solution and his warning that it is unrealistic to think that a Palestinian state could come into existence in the near future. Obama added that it is 'difficult to simply accept at face value' Netanyahu’s comments about accepting a Palestinian state, and that these statements appear to look as if they are 'simply an effort to return to the previous status quo – that we talk about peace in the abstract, but it is always tomorrow.'

Turning to Iran, Obama said that he believes Netanyahu cares deeply about the security of the Israeli people. 'I care very much about the people of Israel as well, and in my mind it is very much in Israel’s interest to make sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, and I think that I can demonstrate, not based on any hope, but on facts, evidence and analysis, that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon is a verifiable tough agreement. A military resolution will not fix it, even if the United States participates, it would temporarily slow down an Iranian nuclear program, but not eliminate it.'

Israel Hayom leads with Netanyahu's response to Obama's interview. Speaking before the interview was aired in its entirety, Netanyahu said that Israel can rely only on itself and that a nuclear deal with Iran will not only pave Tehran's path to obtaining as many nuclear bombs as it wants; it will also enrich the Islamic Republic's coffer with billions of dollars.

In his response to the interview, opposition leader Isaac Herzog said Wednesday morning that Netanyahu has 'humiliated' Obama. Herzog said that the tone Obama used in the interview proves that there is a serious crisis in relations between Israel and America. 'This is an important interview of a friend of Israel who is worried about the security of Israel,' Herzog told Army Radio.

In other news, Haaretz reports that Israeli intelligence officials say that the Palestinian Authority leadership does not believe negotiations with Israel will produce any results, and therefore plans to step up its anti-Israel activity in international forums. This assessment, which is shared by most of the intelligence agencies, is based on statements made by both sides since Netanyahu’s new government was formed. The agencies predict that the PA will adopt a confrontational stance and try to undermine Israel’s standing in international agencies – not only the United Nations, but also dozens of other organizations, along the lines of last week’s failed bid to get Israel suspended from FIFA, the international soccer federation. At this stage, they say, the struggle will remain largely nonviolent.

Meanwhile, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said the Palestinian Authority will dissolve itself if a peace agreement with Israel resulting in two states is not reached by the end of this year. Erekat said that a committee established by the PLO Central Council in its last meeting in March decided to place an ultimatum before Israel as a last resort. 'Israel will have to make a choice before the end of this year: either we have a contract or partnership that will lead to a two-state solution or Israel will be solely responsible from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean,' he said. 'This cannot be sustained.'

In other news, the Foreign Ministry has dismissed the motion passed by Britain's National Union of Students to join the BDS movement against Israeli companies, saying it is a 'decision without any real implications made by a body that has already expressed anti-Israel opinions in the past. Instead of expressing hatred towards Israel, British students should invest some time in history lessons and realize that the distance between verbal hatred and prejudice to heinous crimes is not that big,' the ministry said in a statement.

Finally, following on from Arab media reports on Tuesday of IAF airstrikes on two targets on the Lebanese-Syrian border, a Lebanese source associated with Hizbollah has offered an explanation for the reports, which it said were mistaken. According to the source, IAF fighter jets were indeed flying over Lebanon during the afternoon hours on Tuesday, but did not launch any strikes. While the IAF jets were in the air, one of the Syrian rebel organizations struck a Hizbollah post, creating the impression that the jets had struck the post, according to the source, as reported by Israel Radio. The claim dovetails with reports in the Lebanese Daily Star, according to which fierce fighting was taking place on the outskirts of the same Arsal region where one of the strikes was reported.

 

 

OBAMA'S INTERVIEW: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that U.S. President Barack Obama's interview with Channel 2 raised more questions than it answered.

"In a fascinating and intelligent interview with Dr. Ilana Dayan, U.S. President Barack Obama made it clear that Binyamin Netanyahu is not the only first-class campaigner on the scene. He's one too. Netanyahu knows how to pluck on the heartstrings of the average Americans. Obama, it seems, knows how to strike a chord with Israelis.

Obama is eloquent and precise. He sought to persuade us that he is concerned for Israel, that our strategic relationship with the United States is solid and that he would never do anything to undermine the security of the State of Israel. The discussion became almost philosophical when Obama touched on relations between nations and peoples: the understandable element of fear when it comes to formulating policy versus the need to leave some room for hope. He understands Israel's concern for its security – the fear about Iran's nuclear program as well as the growing strength of the Arab-Palestinian diplomatic campaign – but can't understand why Israel focuses solely on its security concerns.

From the outset, it was clear that Obama would be all sweetness and light in his conversation with Dayan, but that did not prevent him from bringing up a long list of scores he had to settle. According to the U.S. president, the deal with Iran answers all of Israel's justified concerns. If the deal is violated, he said, sanctions would automatically be imposed again. He answered the question that Netanyahu posed at the United Nations about the deal, but did not address a more important question: What will happen if there's no deal. As Dayan terrifyingly put it: The first bomb will fall on Tel Aviv.

I have a problem, however, with Obama's comments on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. According to the president, Israel is losing the fundamental moral values that defined it. It is moving away from the legacy of defense-minded leaders like David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan. His main complaint, however, was that he simply does not believe Netanyahu's stated intention to implement the two-state solution. This, I believe, is the first time in history that an American president has said that the Israeli prime minister is not only wrong, but that he doesn't believe him.

It was at this point of the interview that Dayan missed an opportunity to ask the obvious question: Why does Obama put more stock by Netanyahu's pre-election comment that there will be no Palestinian state on his watch than on his subsequent return to the path of the two-state solution once the polling stations had closed? After all, isn't it possible that he only said that the two-state solution was dead in order to win the votes of right-wingers, while his post-election comment could be a more accurate reflection of what he really believes? Of course, the opposite might be true. But why believe one version over the other?

Israelis who care will wake up this morning to the ever-increasing dilemma of whether to accept Obama's arguments or not. To put it simply: Do we believe him? It will be fascinating to read public opinion polls that will ask that question. Many people will keep their observations to themselves. For me, the interview raised more questions than it answered."

Ends…

 

EJECT RAJOUB: Writing on the NRG website, Ze'ev Kam says that, far from being a figure for peace and coexistence, Jibril Rajoub is a warmonger, an anti-Semite and a racist.

"Writing on his Facebook page this week, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz suggested that Israel should imprison Jibril Rajoub in the make-shift prison that Israel once used to incarcerate Yasser Arafat – the Muqata’a in Ramallah. Katz also suggested that, while he's in prison, Rajoub could spend his time playing soccer with the other inmates. As chairman of the Palestinian Football Association, Katz explained, Rajoub knows a thing or two about the sport.

But let's be realistic for a moment: When Rajoub decided to take aim at Israeli soccer by trying to get it kicked out of FIFA, he knowingly and willingly sacrificed the Arab teams which play in Israeli leagues – including in the Premier League. Incidentally, there are also Arab players on Israel's national team, which is a shining example of how sport can encourage coexistence. Rajoub wasn't trying to promote or advance sport in the Palestinian Authority. His sole goal was to destroy.

Like a struggling soccer team that plays an ugly game in order to survive, Rajoub's only strategy is to spoil the other team's game. There's no creativity and no attempt to score. All he (and they) want is to ruin the other side's game in any way possible. If Rajoub's campaign began and ended with unsporting behavior, we could simply shrug our shoulders and get on with our lives. The real problem with Rajoub, however, is that he is an anti-Semite and a racist. For the past few years, he has been involved exclusively in terrorist activity and glorifying terrorists.

For example: Rajoub personally sponsored a sports tournament that was dedicated to the memory of Abu Jihad – an arch-terrorist who was responsible for the murder of no fewer than 125 Israelis. On another occasion, Rajoub said that a soccer match between Israel and Palestine would be a crime against humanity. No less and no more.

This 'humanist' also said that a minute's silence in memory of the 11 Israeli athletes killed by Palestinian terrorists at the Munich Olympics was racist. Never mind: everyone already knows that the perpetrators of that despicable attack were Palestinians. If honoring the memory of victims is racist, according to the head of Palestinian soccer, then it's pretty easy to guess what he thinks about the terrorists themselves.

And while we're on the subject of the Olympic Games, let's not forget that Rajoub has also set his sights on barring Israel from that, too. That is the next goal he has set for himself. Here in Israel, for some reason, people are afraid of calling Rajoub what he is: a racist and an anti-Semite. When Katz proposed incarcerating him in the Muqata’a, some Israelis were up in arms at the suggestion and defended the honor of the terrorist-loving soccer chief. As if Rajoub were some well-intentioned diplomat. As if he is the person who will bring the peace that we all long for. It's high time that we call a spade a spade: Rajoub promotes war and hatred, and he hates the Jews. Instead of allowing him to kick off soccer matches, Israel should kick him in the backside and eject him from our lives."

Ends…

 

FIGHT THEM ON THE BEACHES: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan says that Israel needs to work harder to counter the Palestinian campaign to win over global public opinion – since, he says, public opinion shapes the policies of leaders.

"Now that the children who were elected to serve in the Knesset on March 17 have been given their toys to play with, perhaps we can move on to deal with the vital national interests of the State of Israel? Many commentators have pointed out that, during the demonstrations last week outside the headquarters of FIFA in Zurich, there was a significant Palestinian presence, while Israel was notable only by its absence. You have to admit that it's a little strange that we acted as if the whole vote had nothing to do with us. How did this happen? What are the root causes?

Obviously, activity of this kind does not happen by itself. Someone needs to initiate it, to organize it, to fund and execute it. Who? I believe that's the government's job. The prime minister, perhaps? Or maybe even Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely? If she's been foisted upon the Foreign Ministry, then why not give her something to do? Why not put her in charge of Israel's response to such demonstrations? Rather than spending all of her time telling diplomats that God gave us this land, she could actually do something useful. We don't need divine intervention; we need earthly action.

The Palestinians are fighting. To paraphrase Churchill, they are fighting us on the beaches; they are fighting us on the landing grounds, in the fields and in the streets. When it comes to fighting the public relations and propaganda war against Israel, the Palestinians will never surrender. Our weapons, in contrast, are speeches, rhetoric, Knesset panels and ministerial postings.

The issue of boycotts against Israel should be top of the prime minister's agenda. Not before, of course, he has managed to satisfy all of the kiddies in the kindergarten; I mean, 'cabinet.' Now that he's got his cabinet in place, it's time for Netanyahu to practice what he preaches and get to work. Forget about everything else for the time being and start working to halt the tidal wave of diplomatic attacks that is being launched against us. Stop telling us how right we are. That’s irrelevant. History is full of people who were right and were defeated.

Israel must be present everywhere that the Palestinians are. We must show the world their terrorism, their rejectionism, the danger that they pose to Israelis. In order to do this, Israel must mount counter-demonstrations wherever the Palestinians demonstrate. Not only to defend Israel, but also to go on the offensive and to convince the world of our case. That can't be done from the comfort of an office in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. It also can't be done by sitting down with U.S. President Barack Obama and his advisers. While Israel is wasting its time with presidents and tycoons, they – the Palestinians – are dealing with global public opinion. And, at the end of the day, it's public opinion that will shape the policies of world leaders. And that might not be to our advantage.

There are some talented and capable people who could spearhead Israel's effort to win over public opinion. Both within the Foreign Ministry and elsewhere. They need to be recruited to lead this campaign. We deserve the kind of Jewish inventiveness that was once commonplace. And we need to stop with our messianic rhetoric."

Ends…

 

ZIGGING AND ZAGGING: Writing on News 1 website, Elyakim Haetzni accuses Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of lying to Israelis and Palestinians alike – and bemoans the fact that no one on the Israeli right is up in arms.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has done it again. He zigged in one direction and then zagged in the other. During the election campaign, he declared that there would be no Palestinian state. When he met with European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini he said that he favors the two-state solution.

In any other country, such capricious and fickle behavior by the prime minister would spark a coalition crisis or, at the very least, a public outcry. Here, no one raised an eyebrow and we all allowed Netanyahu to justify the public perception of him as a political magician. Yitzhak Shamir once famously said that it is permissible to lie for the sake of the Land of Israel, but he only lied in one direction. He was never caught out telling lies to the people of Israel. The secret of Netanyahu's success, since he lies consistently and systematically to everybody, is that his lies cancel each other out: the Arabs don't believe him when he says that he is in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state and the Israeli right doesn’t believe him when he rejects the two-state solution. That might go some way to explaining why no one is surprised by his zigging or his zagging.

But there's a problem. Can you imagine the faces of the people he has deceived when they wake up one morning and find that the prime minister has made his decision – one way or the other? He will turn to them and ask innocently: Didn't I warn you? Yes, he did. The problem is that he also warned the other side of exactly the opposite decision.

If and when that happens, the settlers – who were preordained perhaps to be the victims of this dirty trick – will only have themselves to blame. After all, they and their supporters gave Netanyahu a 'miraculous' 30-seat haul in the election, which allowed him to feel as if he was being swept back into power on a wave of public love – despite his lack of integrity and his fundamental untrustworthiness, which he barely bothers to conceal.  And just as they turned a blind eye to Ariel Sharon's unlawful modus operandi when he advanced projects dear to their hearts, they are now telling themselves that Netanyahu is only lying to the Arabs, not to them. The right encased Sharon in a cloak that protected him from allegations of impropriety (just like the left did during the disengagement) and it will do the same for Netanyahu.

In his last meeting with Mogherini, Netanyahu proposed something that the Palestinians have been demanding all along and that he has always rejected: that the negotiations begin with talks on the borders. Suddenly, without any kind of discussion or decision by any government body, Netanyahu proposed discussing 'the borders of the settlement blocs.' The phrasing of this proposal is deliberately vague and is an insult to our intelligence. After all, this is exactly what the Arabs and the Americans proposed: a return to the 1967 borders. As a down payment to the settlers, Netanyahu added that 'this will make it clear on which parts of the West Bank Israel will be able to continue building.' He also suggested an interim agreement, in exchange for which Israel would be given the 'right' to build in the settlement blocs and the Palestinians would be allowed to build everywhere else. In practice, Netanyahu has agreed to hand over the vast majority of Area C of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority.

Even after these comments were made public, there was no public outcry. This is a major upheaval in Israel's position and is almost the same as adopting the whole of Meretz's platform. As the right celebrates its 'great victory' in the election, it remains silent when the prime minister effectively agrees to uproot 100,000 Israeli from their homes in Judea and Samaria. The Yesha Council, which is supposed to represent these people, was silent. Habayit Hayehudi, too. Even the rightist core of the Likud, which controls the ruling party, didn't say a word. The silence of Netanyahu's 61-member coalition is truly deafening."

Ends…

 

IT'S THE OCCUPATION, STUPID: Writing in Haaretz, Ravit Hecht says that, contrary to the campaign launched by Yedioth Ahronoth, the main threat facing Israel is not the BDS movement – it's the occupation itself.

"The daily Yedioth Ahronoth has launched a campaign called 'Fighting the boycott' — the sub headline declares that the paper too 'is mobilizing to join the battle.' Yedioth was never a journal with a particular ideology, so it’s probably trying to position itself as a patriotic, right-wing paper in its war against the leading daily, the free Israel Hayom owned by U.S. casino magnate Sheldon Adelson.

The campaign's opening salvo was an article by right-wing journalist Ben-Dror Yemini, who accused rock star Roger Waters, gender theorist Judith Butler (a Jew) and physicist Stephen Hawking of harboring dark motives and anti-Semitism in their opposition to the occupation. Yemini lays out the usual right-wing argument against anti-Israel initiatives: The boycott, divestment and sanctions movement, despite the way it presents itself, not only opposes the occupation but denies Israel’s very right to exist.

According to this thinking, Nazi-like propaganda methods ensnare naïve young Jews who espouse values of tikkun olam, repairing the world. In addition, the global struggle against the occupation is hypocritical and biased because only Israel is targeted, not those awful countries like Iran, Sudan or North Korea.

This last argument is particularly interesting because it’s popular on the right and implies an unconscious admission of guilt. If Israel is as pure as the driven snow, why should it be mentioned in the same breath as emblems of human rights violations? If Israel is completely blameless, why does it need special treatment or a better spot in the group of problem countries?

The answer is that most Israelis — even if they fear territorial concessions for security reasons and don’t believe that a peace deal with the Arabs is sustainable — know that Israel is committing an injustice against civilians and denying them their freedom. They know that in the frequent rounds of violence, Israel kills thousands of innocent people as well as terrorists. They know that in a certain place under Israeli rule there is one legal regime for one nation (Israeli law for settlers) and a different one for another nation (military law for Palestinians).

How does one deal with such guilt, to which Yemini is also an accomplice? 'Israel, of course, is far from perfect', the writer states before returning to the real enemy, the BDS movement.

Yemini sets BDS in his sights, but Israel faced a suspension from FIFA last week not because of that vilified organization but because of claims by the Palestinian Football Association that others supported. The affair that made the whole country hold its breath proves the opposite of what Yemini is arguing. Israel is a member of FIFA because the world recognizes its sovereignty within the 1967 borders. It risked expulsion because of its policies in territories it captured in 1967.

Stretching the conflict back to 1948, which Yemini attributes to the boycott movement, serves his goal. It removes with a magic wand Israel’s responsibility for the situation that began in 1967.

The hope that the Palestinians will quietly resign themselves to the settlements, happily content with the conditions imposed by the occupation, is unrealistic. What can we do if they impudently insist on resisting and striving for freedom, their natural right? Under those circumstances, what kind of struggle do Yemini and his right-wing readers, or any other reasonable person, prefer? Diplomatic and economic measures or exploding buses? UN votes or suicide bombers?

One can object to boycotts, including cultural or economic boycotts of the settlements. But sanctimonious wailing and the automatic posing as victims coated with the memory of the Holocaust is as mistaken an approach as the one Yemini accuses BDS of. Israel’s problem isn’t BDS or Jibril Rajoub — it’s the occupation."

Ends…

 

IT’S TIME FOR SUNNIS TO SHINE ON ISRAEL: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Eric Mandel says that if the Arab world could come to terms with the existence of a Jewish state with a Muslim minority in its midst, then it might offer enough cover for the Palestinian Arabs to move forward.

"I recently had the privilege of being the keynote speaker for the Defense Industry Offset Association, an organization of American defense contractors doing business in the Middle East. The members were well informed and receptive to a presentation of a multifaceted Middle East that does not fit into a 140-character tweet.

I discussed 'Understanding the Complexities of the Middle East: America’s Challenge for the 21st Century.' I shared my view that American foreign policy experts still seem to be out of step with the reality of a Middle East where American compromise and outreach are perceived as weakness, and are unilateral. One needs look no further for evidence of our diplomatic naiveté than Iran’s masterful manipulation of the American negotiators.

My talk was a journey into the ever-changing Middle East, where today’s accurate analysis may become obsolete before the sun sets.

I spoke about:

1. The war between the Sunnis and Shiites, led respectively by the Saudis and Iran.

2. The security implications for America and her allies if a final deal with Iran leaves it as a nuclear threshold state.

3. The root causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4. The war for Sunni supremacy between Turkey and Qatar on one side, and the more American-oriented Saudis, Egyptians and Gulf States on the other.

I tried to disabuse them of the simplistic analysis of many 'mainstream experts' who think Israel is the primary obstacle, and that Israeli acquiescence is all that is needed for regional stability.

Middle East pundit Fareed Zakaria of CNN is a case in point: 'First, there is the disappearance of the Arab threat [to Israel]... it’s gone....Of course, there is Iran’s nuclear program, though it has significantly slowed for now... [Israel] has built a wall that reduced terrorist attacks against Israel to virtually zero... [And] with so many stars aligned in Israel’s favor... it is a golden opportunity...staring Netanyahu in the face.'

Where shall I begin? It is certainly true that some Sunni Arab nations are more preoccupied with killing Shiites rather than Jews for the time being. But the 'golden opportunity' is a two-way street; the Sunni nations must come to terms with the existence of a Jewish state living securely within the greater Arab and Muslim world.

Israel has been willing to meet with the greater Arab world to negotiate a regional agreement, although not the 'take it or leave it' Arab Peace Initiative that would leave Israel with indefensible borders, and would leave unresolved the Palestinian right of return. After years of anti-Jewish incitement, the conservative Gulf States are afraid that a public initiative for normalization of relations with Israel could threaten the stability of their regimes.

Last week, Israel Radio reported that Israeli and Gulf State diplomats met in Jordan to discuss common security interests. This is a golden opportunity for U.S. President Barack Obama to facilitate reconciliation between Israel and the Sunni Arabs, and to encourage them to emerge from the shadows and publicly meet with Israeli officials.

Zakaria ignores the fact that up until now the only thing that has united the Shiites and Sunnis is their hatred of Israel. Sunni governments need to distance themselves from Sunni non-state radical actors, and reconcile with Israel for their own long-term economic prosperity.

In Iran, while the ayatollah pragmatically has decided to pause some of the nuclear activity, this cannot blind Zakaria to the fact that Iran has hoodwinked the Obama administration into accepting its right for nuclear enrichment, accepting the buried nuclear enrichment facility of Fordow, and convincing the American negotiators to ignore the continued transgressions of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action.

When the president signs a final agreement with Iran this summer, Israel and the Gulf States will have to deal with a 'nuclear threshold' Iran that may or may not be rational. Its supreme leader wants to 'raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground' and 'annihilate' Israel. He also wants Mecca and Medina in Shiite hands. (Even President Obama last week told The Atlantic’s Jeffery Goldberg that the supreme leader is an anti-Semite.)

Zakaria also incorrectly believes that Israel’s security fence, which he inaccurately describes as a wall, is the primary reason why Israel has sustained so few terrorist attacks from the West Bank. In fact, it is Israel’s physical presence within the West Bank and the human intelligence it gathers because it controls the disputed territory that, according to many Israeli military officials with whom I have spoken, explains the decline in terrorist activity.

Zakaria seems oblivious to the fact that Israel has tried multiple times to return the vast majority of the territory to the Palestinian Arabs at great risk to its own security. But Zakaria is as silent as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was to an Israeli offer in 2008, or to an American initiative in 2013 to restart talks.

Ironically, the last two people who want Israel to withdraw from the territories are President Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan. Both know that without Israel in the West Bank, Hamas will take over the West Bank, and Jordan will likely fall to a terrorist entity. That does not mean Israel cannot withdraw from some territory, but it does mean that any immediate withdrawal will depend on a strong Israeli presence – not only for the Israel’s sake, but also for the survival of the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.

There truly is a window of opportunity, but it is not up to Israel alone. Somehow, Zakaria and his ideological fellow travelers must abandon their belief that the tiny state of Israel is all-powerful against 400 million Muslim Arabs, whose landmass and population dwarf the minuscule Jewish state. If, however, the Sunni Arabs conclude that acceptance of a Jewish state in their midst will not crumble the edifice of the 1,400-year history of the Islamic religion, they will receive overwhelming reciprocity from Israel, while immediately advancing their economic vitality by integrating with the advanced Israeli economy.

If the Arab world could come to terms with the existence of a Jewish state with a Muslim minority in its midst, then it might offer enough cover for the Palestinian Arabs to move forward, ending incitement, and actually responding to realistic conflict resolutions. How’s this for the headline of Zakaria’s next article: Will the Arab World Miss its Golden Opportunity to Make Peace with Israel?"

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE 7th GENERAL ELECTIONS: Oral Calislar describes Turkey’s elections’ eve climate in centre-left Radikal: "With every passing day, the leaders are gradually stepping up their rhetoric in order to boost their support and persuade the voters. Because the opposing sides’ media have become involved, the climate is becoming confused. Observing matters from a distance, the scene appears gloomy. One can say that CHP [Republican People's Party] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] voters have hope for change with regard to their parties. A sense of calm is much more apparent especially in the MHP. Those left behind are the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] and HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] voters." 

Nihat Ali Ozcan questions the Kurds’ commitment to peace in centrist Milliyet: "Even if the HDP acts as if it were independent, the true power is imprisoned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Ocalan and his party. The HDP cannot decide by which means to pursue politics at the strategic level, and including extra-democratic methods. The HDP has been assigned two roles in Ocalan’s and consequently, in the PKK's political-military strategy: One is the visible part of the iceberg and it is the legal fight at the ballot box. And the other is the use of force, which is the sine qua non of the PKK’s political-military strategy. It is important to determine which role the HDP will undertake in the coming era, rather than the number of its MPs in parliament."

Sukran Somer downplays the significance of the ballot box in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "In our world, and especially as we look around us, there are many authoritarian dictatorships in the Middle East and Muslim world that came out of the ballot box. If one ignores the [Arab] kingdoms that are a legacy form the past and that have survived thanks to their strong relations with the U.S., the Western world and its imperialist interests and all the shari’a-style dictatorships that are based on different sects, use ballot boxes."

Sahin Alpay has a simple remedy in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "If one does not want Turkey to head in the direction that President Erdogan wants, if one does not want to see the gradual suppression of freedom of the press, the opposition and democracy, if one opposes Erdogan, then there is no remedy other than saying yes to [HDP leader Selahattin] Demirtas. It seems that Erdogan and his supporters’ biggest fear is that the HDP will pass the 10% electoral threshold."

Erhan Basyurt fears the country’s ruin in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "Cumhuriyet newspaper has been subject to a political lynching after it published pictures of the illegal transfer of weapons to terrorist organizations in Syria in January 2014. HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtas has summed it all up: if the AKP emerges from the elections strong, it will launch an operation against all its opponents. Turkey is moving away from freedom and democracy and turning into a poor, authoritarian country in which everyone is suspect. Those who do not accept illegal acts are punished and those who obey them are praised. The country is being dragged towards the abyss. The retreat from democracy is ruining Turkey." 

Hasan Cemal argues that Erdogan faces growing opposition even from within his closest circles in independent Internet daily T24: "Yes, it is true; Turkey's problem is Erdogan, full stop! Please note this as well; those who have become aware of this fact are growing not just among the AKP’s senior ranks, but within his own inner circle as well. The price of Erdogan is gradually growing bigger. It is no secret that behind closed doors inside the AKP, meticulous calculations are being made as to 'how to get rid of Erdogan'. Their calculations are linked to June 7th. If the HDP passes the 10% threshold on June 7th, the Erdogan problem will be solved."

Murat Kelkitoglu accuses the HDP of seeking to scuttle the peace process in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "The HDP problem’s is not that of the peace process at all. Its only goal is to hamper President Erdogan, who is the architect and guarantor of the peace process. They make no effort to hide that. If the HDP passes the electoral threshold, the Republic of Turkey’s most valuable project, namely, the peace process, will come to an end."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

CRITICS OF NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist E'temad is confident: "Those protesting against the negotiations ignore the vote and decision of the people to elect Hassan Rowhani in June 2013. This minority cannot have a serious impact on the talks. These critics make clear to the West that there are some in Iran who want to obstruct the negotiations, which would probably work in Iran’s favour in the talks. An agreement that the people and regime want will be reached soon." 

Reformist Arman does not believe the critics are being helpful: "For some time now, critics of Rowhani's government have sought to influence public opinion instead of providing support based on logic. There is no sign of constructive criticism. Moreover, some have tried to hold illegal gatherings and provoke public feelings. This will have the opposite effect. Perhaps the opponents want to copy the other side, hoping that the protests will pressurize them. However this behaviour is such that it does not have a psychological impact on the opposite side, but further pressurizes our own officials." 

 

YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan finds an opportunity for the Houthis: "The war in Yemen is not helping the Saudi ruling family and can be the biggest opportunity for the Houthis. Unwittingly, Saudi Arabia is forcing them and the rest of the Yemeni people to think about their own defence requirements. Dialogue has lost much of its relevance; the proposed Geneva talks will not secure an achievement for the Houthis and there is no point in holding them. The Houthis should not sit and wait for the Geneva conference to define the fate of Yemen. They should form their own cabinet and formally announce it. The persistence of the Saudi aggression will lend it legitimacy."

Hard-line Javan compares Yemen to Gaza: "Although the Arab League and the Islamic Cooperation Organization were established to support Palestine, they are silent regarding current developments there, including the human tragedy in the Gaza Strip. This has laid the way for the continuation of the Zionist regime's expansionist and repressive measures. The silence and passivity of these two Islamic and Arab institutions in Gaza and Yemen is led by Saudi Arabia. Conditions in Gaza and Yemen are similar in many respects; both countries are the victims of the Saudi/Israeli coalition."

For conservative Resalat the war in Yemen is nothing less than a war against Islam:" The war in Yemen will lead to Saudi Arabia's defeat and will pave the way for the disintegration of the country as well as the weakening of Islam by the hegemonic powers. Leaders of Islamic countries should not forget that the expansion of proxy wars, like Saudi Arabia's war on Yemen, is a new conspiracy to create discord among Muslims, and destroy Islam and Muslim countries at the hands of the Muslims themselves and in the name of Islam. The war will lead to nothing but Muslims serving America, Israel and other arrogant countries." 

 

FIGHTING ISIS: Conservative Quds writes about the expansion of ISIS: "ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq have not been weakened - rather they enjoy more power and military capability. The media and propaganda concentration on events in Iraq aims at distracting attention and strengthening ISIS in Syria to pave the way for their expansion into new regions, including Yemen, Libya, some parts in Lebanon as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan is more serious. In recent weeks, the name of ISIS has been frequently heard in circles of active terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Concern over the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has reached Tehran, and a Taleban delegation visited Tehran for consultations about this new crisis." 

Moderate Iran counsels Syria: "Following the latest round of terrorist attacks of Takfiris in Syria and the fall of the city of Palmyra and the Idlib Province, concerns regarding ISIS operations have increased in public consciousness. Because of the military support of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Syrian army should think about strengthening its lines of defence, so that it can prevent the widespread advancement of Al-Nusra and ISIS and gradually rescue Syria from terrorists by recruiting forces from within the Syrian people."   

Conservative Khorasan argues for one front, one fight: "Since the emergence of the terrorist group ISIS and the spread of other Takfiri groups in the region, the only force that has seriously fought them has been the popular resistance movement in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. However, it is entirely naive to think that the defeat of ISIS in Iraq will resolve Iraq’s problems. Ignoring the terrorists' backup resources in Syria will slow down their elimination and will ensure that the shadow of terror will remain over Iraq. Although the resistance front is ideologically strong, the battlefield gap between their forces in Iraq and Syria has made the fight against the Takfiris more difficult. The drying up of the evil tree of ISIS will not be realized unless an integrated resistance front is formed with the entry of Iraqi popular forces into Syria and the broader presence of Lebanese Hizbollah from Baqubah in Iraq to Latakia in Syria and from Dara'a in Syria to the Beqaa in Lebanon." 

 

U.S./PAKISTAN: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz contends that Pakistan is repeating the same mistake: "A Pakistani delegation is in the U.S. to participate in a new round of strategic negotiations between the two countries. The Americans claim that they seek to increase military assistance to Pakistan in order to strengthen its defensive capability, especially in the fight against terrorism. Pakistani authorities insist that by improving strategic and military relations with the U.S., they will develop their capability in the fight against terrorism and gain superiority over their rival India and even Afghanistan."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Talking in Muscat

2-The Somalization of Syria

3-‘Sherman’s war’ in Iraq

4-In Iran’s service

 

1-Talking in Muscat

 

The American negotiators are most likely to face obstinate [Houthi] interlocutors who are ready to cling to their positions including the refusal to withdraw from the cities they have occupied. They also have new demands, including that their names be removed from the terrorism lists and that Saudi Arabia pays a large compensation for the destruction caused by the bombardment of Yemen by Saudi and allied warplanes over the past two months. The fact that the Americans have joined the fray and decided to sit with Houthi negotiators [in Muscat] is effectively a major diplomatic victory for this Yemeni side. It represents an important recognition of the Houthis by the world's major superpower. This is a major achievement that their enemies – especially Saudi Arabia – should recognize--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The scenarios that observers feared in their worst nightmares have begun to raise their ugly heads in Saudi Arabia. Saudi border cities and areas are now battle zones, while terrorism has struck inside the Kingdom twice in a single week against the background of the spreading confessional tension and discourse of hatred, incitement, and sedition. There is no military solution for Yemen no matter how much those who advocate such a solution may deny this. The solution is political par excellence. And it is in the interest of all parties –aggressors and aggressed-- to head towards such a political solution; today before tomorrow. For there will be no winners in this war after all the destruction and the deep rifts that have been carved into the body of relations between the two neighboring countries and brotherly peoples--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The Muscat talks between the U.S. and a delegation from the Houthi Ansarullah current represents a major diplomatic achievement for this Yemeni group further underlining the failure of the attempt at a military solution in Yemen, maintains the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. The net result of the Saudi-led attack on Yemen so far has been to strengthen the Houthis and transform them from an isolated local group into a major constituent of the country, sought by the U.S., Russia, the UN and others, argues a leading Jordanian commentator. It is time for this proxy war to end and for Saudi Arabia and Iran to settle their accounts directly.

 

OPEN CHANNELS: "The U.S. has been forced to open up a channel of communication in Muscat with the Houthi Ansarullah current to discuss two main issues," writes Tuesday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

- The first issue is the prospect of a political agreement that restores security and stability to Yemen after the attempt at a military solution has failed to force the Houthi current and its ally former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh to surrender.

- The second issue is the release of a number of American subjects held by the Houthi forces in Sana'a, three of whom work in the private sector and the fourth is an American national of Yemeni origin.

When we say that the U.S. was forced to open this channel of communication, we mean that this came after Washington exerted enormous political and punitive pressures on the Houthi current and its ally president Saleh in the hope of halting their military expansion in Yemen, and in solidarity with the U.S.'s Saudi ally. But it did not succeed in achieving its goals.

These punitive measures included placing the leader of the Houthi current and some of his aides as well as president Saleh and his son Ahmad on the terrorist list, freezing their financial assets in American banks and banning them from travel outside Yemen. But it is clear that the U.S. realized the futility of these sanctions because the Houthi current has no foreign assets and its leader 'Abdelmalik al-Houthi has only rarely left his main headquarters even to the capital Sana'a, let alone travelled outside the country.

[Fugitive Yemeni] President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's government's spokesman, Rajeh Badi, who officially exposed the fact that these talks were taking place from his base in the Saudi capital Riyadh, stressed that they were in response to an American request and that the Houthi delegation led by the Ansarullah's Politburo head Saleh as-Samad arrived in Muscat on a plane provided by the Americans.

It is still too early to pass any definitive verdict on these negotiations or on their prospects of success or failure. But the fact that the U.S. was forced to initiate a dialogue with the Houthis represents a clear attempt to break the stalemate in the Yemeni crisis as result of the fact that the 'Houthi/Saleh' coalition did not surrender to Saudi Arabia's preconditions, the most important of which was President Hadi's return to Yemen, the Houthis' withdrawal from Sana'a and Aden, and handing over the weapons they have captured from the Yemeni army's arsenals.

The Houthis now are in a very strong bargaining position because they are the strongest force on the ground and because their losses have been limited as result of the Saudi aerial bombardment carried out under the banner of Operation Decisive Storm. Most of these losses have been suffered by the Yemeni people and by certain forces loyal to president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh and their weapons’ stocks. But the worst destruction has been inflicted on the already very poor Yemeni infrastructure.

The Houthi's primary source of power seems to stem from soldiers and leading figures’ staying power and their readiness to live in extremely difficult conditions. According to reports, they carry their missiles, rockets, and weapons on the backs of donkeys and mules to areas along the Saudi borders, thereby avoiding being attacked by warplanes, and have succeeded in suspending ordinary life in Jizan and Najran the two most important southern Saudi cities by shelling them with Katyusha rockets and mortars.

The American negotiators are most likely to face obstinate interlocutors who are ready to cling to their positions including the refusal to withdraw from the cities they have occupied. They also have new demands, including that their names be removed from the terrorism lists and that Saudi Arabia pays a large compensation for the destruction caused by the bombardment of Yemen by Saudi and allied warplanes over the past two months.

The fact that the Americans have joined the fray and decided to sit with Houthi negotiators is effectively a major diplomatic victory for this Yemeni side. It represents an important recognition of the Houthis by the world's major superpower.

"This is a major achievement that their enemies – especially Saudi Arabia – should recognize, regardless of the success or failure of the Muscat talks," concludes the daily.

End…

 

DIALOGUE IN OMAN: "The Houthis are in Muscat to hold a dialogue with the U.S. mediated by Oman," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Ansarullah have denied this, not because the dialogue and the mediation have not occurred, but in order to preserve their 'credibility.' For it makes no sense to demonstrate in Sa'da under the banner of 'Death to America' then talk to it in a neighboring capital.

In short, however, Washington has not adopted its ‘moderate’ allies' reading of the Yemeni crisis. It has decided to take a bypass road and communicate with the Houthis. And there is no doubt that this represents a new political blow to Washington’s allies, as has been its wont.

In this context the statements issued by 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's 'legitimate' government do not seem worth the ink that they are written with. They seem closer to letting off steam or a temper tantrum. Moreover, they are most likely to express the views of this government’s sponsors and backers who cannot aim their critical darts at their strategic ally directly, and thus urge their allies to do so.

The Houthis have headed to Moscow at almost the same time, but this time invited by the Russian Foreign Ministry. The aim is to hold a dialogue with the Russian leadership so as to close the file of the Yemeni crisis, based on the two sides' shared fear of ISIS and al-Qa'ida's proliferation and the revival of terrorism against the background of the regional confessional split. And that is an unprecedented development in Moscow's relations with this Yemeni force.

The Houthis are at the UN. They are a major constituent of the Geneva Conference and official participants in it by the UN's invitation. UN Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad tours Sana'a, moving between [deposed president Saleh’s] General People's Congress party and Ansarullah whom Saleh has said are in charge of political decisions in Yemen today

Anyone who wants a solution for Yemen must also head to Sana'a. But the picture would not be complete without collating its main elements together: Before Operation Decisive Storm, there was no record of any substantial contact between Washington and the Houthis. The latter's relations with Russia, were also confined within strict limits and at low levels. After Decisive Storm and all that has been said of its 'success,' the Houthis have turned from a local/tribal/confessional player isolated on the mountain tops and caves into a major player sought by 'international legitimacy' and the international decision-making capitals. In my view, the Houthis should pray to God that Decisive Storm’s 'successes' should continue and intensify.

Two months (and one week) after it began, it seems that Operation Decisive Storm has entered a phase where the picture has been reversed. The efforts to 'demonize' and exclude the Houthis have not only failed; they have achieved the opposite results. And I also suppose that these developments will leave an indelible imprint on the nature of the political solution sought by the regional and international parties in Yemen, beginning with a ceasefire agreement or a 'long-term truce' that the UN envoy is working on for the near future.

The fact of the matter is that the military operations ran out of targets after very few days, as testified by various political and military observers. The same targets have been shelled and destroyed again and again. Meanwhile, the human cost of the war continues to rise, setting off a wave of international anger, and the burning embers and fall out from the war's wild fires have begun to fall on those who launched as well.

The scenarios that observers feared in their worst nightmares have begun to raise their ugly heads in Saudi Arabia. Saudi border cities and areas are now battle zones, while terrorism has struck inside the Kingdom twice in a single week against the background of the spreading confessional tension and discourse of hatred, incitement, and sedition.

There is no military solution for Yemen no matter how much those who advocate such a solution may deny this. The solution is political par excellence. And it is in the interest of all parties –aggressors and aggressed-- to head towards such a political solution, today before tomorrow. For there will be no winners in this war after all the destruction and the deep rifts that have been carved into the body of relations between the two neighboring countries and brotherly peoples.

Washington is behaving on this assumption. Former U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell revealed some aspects of the covert contacts between Riyadh and Washington. He has also revealed certain interpretations and assessments of what has been happening that lend support to those who said from the very first day of this war that Yemen is the burial ground for invaders throughout history, and that it is a quagmire that should be avoided by all possible means. This is evident from the lessons of history both ancient and modern.

After two months and one week of the war, Decisive Storm has not done away with the Houthis and their allies. The Yemenis have not regained their hope of security at present and prosperity in the future. The time has come to close this file and to leave it to Yemen’s people to manage their affairs by themselves.

As for those keen to settle account with others, they should aim their guns and artillery at each other directly instead of forcing so many regional countries and nations to pay the heavy price of their proxy wars.

"This is equally true of both Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-The Somalization of Syria

 

There is no neat solution for the Syrian conflict; the most likely scenario is that of the country’s descent into Somalization, says Amin Qammouriyyeh in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

A review of the current lines of conflict in Syria demonstrates that the fate awaiting this country is even worse than partition into independent states or self-rule entities along sectarian and ethnic lines, argues a Lebanese commentator. It is more likely to be akin to that of Somalia.

 

HATED REGIME: "There are many who hate the Syrian regime and they all have their reasons for doing so," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

Quite a few have suppressed their anger at the regime and reluctantly convinced themselves of the need to discuss a solution with it for fear of the unknown alternative. But the majority still wish for its collapse, regardless of the outcome and the fate that awaits the country.

Developments on the ground in Idlib, Tadmur [Palmyra] and Bosra ash-Sham have given the impression that the end is near and that the leaf is about to be turned on the Assad family's rule once and for all. They are clearly wagering on new developments, especially in Homs and its countryside, which should sever contacts between the regime's two strongholds in Damascus and the Syrian coast. Alternatively, they wager on advances in Sahl al-Ghab that would place Latakia within range of fire of the regime's enemies, or a tight siege of the capital that should undermine the government's legitimacy.

There are many wagers on the Assad regime's collapse in the camp of those who hate it, and they are met by the enumeration of numerous counter-options from the opposing camp, such as holding their ground in the western part of the country which is the most densely populated area and that stretches from Der'a to the sea via Damascus, coupled with strengthening their hold over the Homs area and its heart in the Qalamoun. The hope is to consolidate control over these areas from which a renewed counter attack would begin to regain the less densely populated eastern areas. At worst, these options include abandoning Syria as it stands today, accepting a smaller Syria in its place, should partition be imposed as a fait accompli.

The current map of forces and the regional and international powers behind them suggest that Syria will not return to what it was prior to March 2011 [when the anti-regime protests began]. Nor do they suggest that either side can deliver a knockout blow to the other. Iran will not permit the remnants of its ally's regime to collapse, and may not refrain from direct involvement in order to preserve its main bridgehead to the Mediterranean since its fall means the end of its eastern dreams. And Russia, which clings to the Syrian army and what remains of state institutions rather than the person of Assad, will fight to prevent Syria from being transformed into another Libya.

On the other side, the Arab coalition that is in a rush to topple the regime is unsure about the necessary tools to achieve this goal. On the one hand, it is hesitant about encouraging the march of the Islamic State (ISIS) for fear that it may reach the Gulf and Jordan's borders. On the other hand, it is unable to free its 'moderate friends' in Jayshul Fateh and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) from the pincer formed by ISIS in the east and the regime's forces in the west.

Similarly, Turkey is turning a blind eye to the extremists, but is swallowing poison with every advance by the Kurds in al-Hasaka and al-Qamishli, consolidating their new entity along its borders, one that is protected by an American red line. As for Washington, the 'million dollar prize' goes to whoever can answer the following question: What does it want in the Middle East?

The lines of separation in Syria do not resemble those drawn in former Yugoslavia, turning it into independent republics. Nor do they resemble the current lines being drawn in Iraq, which may be consolidated into self-rule provinces on ethnic or sectarian lines.

"More than anything else, they resemble those that emerged in Somalia, turning it into a fictive name for an entity that is fought over by pirates and warlords," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

Ends…

 

 

3-‘Sherman’s war’ in Iraq

 

Iraq’s Sunni provincial leaders have chosen to follow the Gulf’s racist culture and sectarian wars rather than communal peace and prosperity; just like the American Southern secessionists a 150 years ago, now it is too late, says 'Amer Mohsen in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The local leaders of Iraq's Sunni provinces are very similar to the leaders of the South during the American Civil War 150 years ago, argues a Lebanese commentator. They chose the Arab Gulf's rulers' hate-filled sectarian discourse and have thereby forfeited their right to be part of the emerging new Iraq. The only solution is their enforced defeat.

 

A HARSH AND TERRIBLE WAR: "The course of the war, like that of any war, will be harsh and terrible," writes 'Amer Mohsen in Tuesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

It is a war against an enemy fighting to the finish without no horizon for a settlement or any intention to cohabit and live peacefully within Iraqi society.

Coming events are certain to provide the Gulf media with the propaganda material that they have been broadcasting in ISIS's favor for some time. In fact, many of their correspondents are ISIS sympathizers in reality. Suffice to look at their personal accounts on the social media to realize their hateful sectarian extremism. (In fact, in some cases their bosses have forced them to deny public access to their accounts in order to maintain appearances at least.) These are the people supplying us with reports and analyses from Iraq. But apart from the propaganda spread by Iraq's enemies, Iraqis cannot be happy about the transformation of their cities into war zones and ruined neighborhoods. There is no doubt that every Iraqi cares for his or her country and fate more than the Gulf emirs and their propaganda tools.

There is a clear comparison between the current course of events and a controversial historical incident going back to the American Civil War, when the North’s General Sherman's army moved deep into the South and burnt down its economic capital, Atlanta. (An incident immortalized in the classic film Gone with the Wind.)

On the 150th anniversary of Sherman's army's march to the sea, setting fire to the farms of white land-owners all the way to Atlanta en route, a southerner wrote to The New York Times complaining about the general's harsh treatment and the collective punishment he inflicted on the city. A military correspondent using the pseudonym 'Gary Preacher' responded to the article, explaining that Sherman's actions – the destruction of the main port and the Confederate Army’s lines of communication-- were not only militarily justifiable, they were also necessary to shock the South’s white supremacist slave-owner society, forcing its elite to understand that their view of the world was no longer possible or capable of survival.

Sherman, says Preacher, was not bloody by nature; on the contrary, he abhorred war, expressing this repeatedly in his writings and speeches. He was a professor at a military college in Louisiana deep in the South before the Civil War, and tried to warn his southern colleagues against collision with the North, stressing that the Northerners would not permit them to destroy their common homeland without a fight. He also stressed that they were bound to fail: 'only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else, you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to begin with.'

Sherman's colleague in the North’s army command, General Grant, described the Confederate cause as 'one of the worst for which a people ever fought.' It is as if he were talking about the cause of the [Sunni] 'revolution' in Iraq today, ever since that began with the hatred-filled protests in public squares in Fallujah and al-Ramadi – protests with which the Gulf's media of course identified – and stretching all the way up the dark rule of ISIS and the Sunni 'clan rebels.'

Like the American Southern elite a century-and-a-half ago, this elite – which stretches from the Euphrates to the Gulf's sheikhdoms, and which has built its world on sectarian hatred has failed to recognize the base character of its discourse and its unacceptability in today's world. It has failed to acknowledge the clear realities of the balance of power and the potential consequences of its actions. For this elite's entire society bases its behavior on false narratives and on the refusal to accept reality as it is.

What the American South's leaders failed to comprehend was that Sherman aimed to end the war/slaughter launched by the separatists, using the only possible means for doing so. He did not aim to punish or seek revenge against them. (This is similar to a case of people suffering from paranoia or schizophrenia, who cannot be convinced that no one is persecuting them, as Preacher notes). The war would not have ended had the Northern army not penetrated deep into the strongholds of this ruling elite to prove to it by military force, that its culture, ideology, and way of life did not belong to this world.

The confrontation with the human monsters controlling Mosul, Fallujah, and al-Ramadi, and their extensions in culture and the media, is similar to Sherman's war. A quick look at the detestable world in which these monsters live would be sufficient to convince any Iraqi and anyone living in the Arab Levant of this war's necessity. It must put a final end once and for all, to the Wahhabi invasion that wants to settle in our land with its leaders, media, and sponsoring states, and its sheikhs and their culture.

Ordinary people are paying the price, and the majority of the people of Western Iraq are now forcefully displaced refugees after their cities and villages have been destroyed in battle. As for Iraq’s politicians and elites who have implicated themselves and their country in this war, they will have no place in this country and they are fully aware of this.

The local leaders in al-Anbar, Mosul, and Salahuddin could have opted for a totally different path. They could have benefited from Iraq's riches and their provinces' position to promote development, construction and prosperity, living honorably on their country and land's resources. Instead, they chose to follow the Gulf and its racist culture and sectarian wars. Now it is too late.

A century-and-a-half ago, General Sherman spoke of people similar to these local Iraqi leaders, the masters of the American South, highlighting the dire consequences awaiting them: 'Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience, they could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war; very well. Last year they could have saved their lives, but now it is too late … Next year their lands will be taken … and in another year they may beg for their lives in vain’," concludes Mohsen.

Ends…

 

 

4-In Iran’s service

 

By attacking Shiite targets in Saudi Arabia, ISIS is performing an invaluable service to Tehran, says Mashari adh-Dhaidi in today's Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

ISIS’s recent attacks on Shiite targets in eastern Saudi Arabia will not be the last of their kind, warns a Saudi commentator. ISIS aims to ignite a sectarian sedition in Saudi Arabia, and it is the country's fate to face up to this challenge. The irony is that Iran is the main beneficiary of ISIS's claims to be defending the Sunnis.

 

ABHORRENT AIM: "Will ISIS end its attacks in Saudi Arabia that aim to sow sedition and confine them to one or two incidents?" asks Mashari adh-Dhaidi in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Will the terrorist attacks on the Dalwa Husseiniyya and the mosques in al-Qudaih and al-Ahsa', al-Qatif and ad-Dammam in eastern Saudi Arabia be the last of their kind?

The answer does not augur well. I hope I am mistaken, but ISIS's planners and murderers' determination to proceed with trying to ignite sectarian sedition between the Shiites and the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia is very clear. We must not delude ourselves into believing anything else; for ISIS's propaganda and its murderers are declaring that they will not refrain from pursuing their abhorrent aim.

The picture thus becomes clear and the confrontation is now an open one. War plans must be developed and resources must be mobilized to fight this disease. The Saudis must accustom themselves to an extensive and open confrontation with this dark group that has made barbarism as well as deception and dissimulation its profession.

There is no need to repeat what has often been said before. The main beneficiary if ISIS's plans were to succeed (God forbid), will be Iran. It will weaken the Saudi home front and disperse the power of Saudi military and security forces. For the Saudi state is fighting an open war with Iran in Yemen; so by its attacks, ISIS is providing Iran with untold services even as it claims to be defending the Sunnis. How can all this be reconciled together?

Be that as it may, Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have faced confrontations with al-Qa'ida in the past. They fought an open war with its local cells for years. At the same time, development programs proceeded unabated without allowing one battle to overshadow another. At the time, the late King 'Abdullah said that we would fight al-Qa'ida for thirty years if need be.

A few days ago, when receiving ambassadors to Saudi Arabia in the presence of Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Crown-Prince, Interior Minister and the 'Tsar' of the war on terrorism Prince Mohammad bin Nayif said: 'The Kingdom is taking a strong stance against terrorism, and such incidents will not shake us. We have experienced worse and thank God, the situation is under control. If anything happens, we shall deal with it as appropriate.' The prince also revealed that many terrorist attacks were forestalled, noting that if anything happens it would be dealt with severely but in a balanced manner so as to ensure that it does not affect the lives of the rest of society.

For this reason, panic and despondency should not take hold of our spirits; nor should impatience and haste lead some people to take what is happening lightly. Those who are patient, determined, and have vision and the stronger will, will prevail.

Many major countries in the world have witnessed extensive wars against terrorist groups or mafia gangs or even wars with other states, for around half-a-century without allowing these confrontations to dominate the public sphere or to affect people's morale.

The war on ISIS's scheme to ignite sectarian sedition has begun. And we can expect ISIS to diversify its crimes to achieve its aim of stirring sedition.

"But this is our fate. And we shall face up to it," concludes Dhaidi.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Obama speaks again

 

Yedioth Ahronoth leads its Tuesday edition with a double murder in Lod, where a man stabbed his ex-wife and her new partner to death. Israel Hayom leads with Israeli reactions to an interview that U.S. President Barack Obama has given to Channel 2, which will be aired in full this evening. A preview of the interview was released yesterday allowing all of the newspapers to report on it and many politicians to respond.

Speaking to journalist Ilana Dayan, Obama said that the forthcoming agreement between the world powers and Iran is the best way to ensure that Tehran does not obtain nuclear weapons. According to Obama, an American military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would not dismantle Tehran's nuclear program. The interview comes less than a month before the deadline for signing the agreement on Iran's nuclear program and was filmed on Friday at the White House.

'I can I think demonstrate, not based on any hope but on facts and evidence and analysis that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon is a verifiable tough agreement. A military solution will not fix it, even if the United States will participate, it would temporarily slow down an Iranian nuclear program, but it will not eliminate it,' said Obama.

In the interview, Obama touches on Israeli-American relations, the apparent tension between himself and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, as well as many other subjects. Obama was asked if he is concerned that because of the deal, Israel might strike Iran's nuclear facilities without notifying the U.S. ahead of time. 'I won't speculate on that,' said Obama, adding, 'what I can say is to the Israeli people, I understand your concerns and I understand your fears.'

In response to Obama's comments, unnamed government officials told Israel Hayom that, 'the U.S. president is determined to reach a bad deal with Iran. It appears that the agreement with Iran will be signed, because the American president is interested in the agreement,' the sources said.

Elsewhere, Israeli officials – past and present – have been speaking about the situation on the northern border. Haaretz's lead headline quotes deputy IDF chief Yair Golan as saying that the defense establishment has started keeping an even closer eye on Syria’s civil war, because of growing assessments that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is having trouble repelling the rebel onslaught and is rapidly losing its grip on some of the areas still under its control. 'De facto, the Syrian army has ceased to exist,' Golan said Monday.

According to Golan, the Israeli defense establishment believes Hizbollah suffered at least 80 fatalities in the past month’s battles in the Qalamoun Mountains, on the Syria-Lebanon border. 'This isn’t a good moment – not for Hizbollah, not for Assad and not for Iran in Syria,' one defense official said on Monday. He added that the Assad camp faces a dilemma over whether to continue fighting with the same intensity in the Qalamoun region, or to focus on defending the Alawite enclave and its major cities, Latakia and Tartus.

He added that Israel is currently trying to verify assessments that Hizbollah has lost about 1,000 fighters in Syria since the civil war began four years ago – significantly more than the 700 fatalities that had been the prevailing assessment until recently. He added that Hizbollah is using a wide variety of weaponry in Syria, including rockets and explosive-laden drones.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said on Monday that the chemical threat from Syria has plunged over the past year, according to Defense News reports. Speaking on day two of a five-day nationwide drill, Ya'alon said the chemical threat had dropped significantly as a result of international pressure to demilitarize Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles. As evidence of the dwindled threat, and the relative success of a September 2013 agreement that led to the removal and destruction of declared Syrian stockpiles, Ya'alon cited recent use of chlorine bombs by forces loyal to Assad. 'The Syrian regime today uses against its citizens substances that are not exactly chemical weapons…which points to the fact that he [Assad] lost his ability to wage chemical attacks in the manner that he had in the past,' he said. Ya'alon added that the IDF would continue to train in the event it needed to face chemical weapons on the battlefield.

On a similar theme, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak said that the threat to Israel from Hizbollah should not be underestimated. Barak, who gave a speech at Tel Aviv University marking the 30th anniversary of the IDF deployment in southern Lebanon, said that Israel has 'never had to cope with 100,000 rockets and we have not even begun to deal with their accuracy.' Accurate rockets, he said, 'are not 'more of the same' – they are something completely different.'

Finally, on the Palestinian front, the United States has not yet made a decision on what actions it will take regarding a UN resolution being worked on by France that would set a timetable for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said on Monday. Harf was asked in her daily briefing about comments made by Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah in an interview with The Washington Post. In that interview, Hamdallah said the French resolution was drafted in coordination with the United States, hinting Washington would not veto such a resolution. 'We’ve made no decisions with respect to action at the UN, and certainly not on a hypothetical resolution,' she replied.

 

OBAMA'S COURT JEWS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Haim Shine says that the Israeli left, the Israeli media and U.S. President Barack Obama's Jewish advisers are continuing with their efforts to overthrow the elected prime minister of the State of Israel.

"Channel 2's interview with U.S. President Barack Obama – which was previewed on our television screens last night and which will be aired in full this evening – proves that the good people at Israel's leading commercial channel are still very much part of the campaign to topple our right-wing government. Judging by the behavior of the editors and journalists employed by Channel 2, it seems clear that they do not believe that the election is over and they are still fully committed to damaging the prime minister; they want to portray him as someone who is fighting against the American president at the expense of the security and future of the State of Israel. This is a baseless and unfounded accusation, which uses falsehoods and manipulation.

Israeli citizens understand full well that Obama – from the moment that he assumed office – preferred to extend the hand of friendship to the Muslim world at Israel's expense. As he enters the final stretch of his presidency, he is doing the same thing by spearheading a dangerous agreement with Iran – once again at the expense of Israel's survival. Obama is neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Israel; his main problem is that his court Jews are telling him that the right-wing government in Israel is dangerous, since it cannot be bowed, and that it would be better if Israel had a leftist government which would follow the orders of Haim Saban and Shimon Peres.

Throughout the Jewish people's 2,000 years of exile, there have been some who have earned the title 'court Jews.' Kings, counts and tyrants recognized the talents of the Jews and recruited them to their service, to act as their advisers. These court Jews dealt with monetary matters for their masters and sometimes were even sent on sensitive diplomatic missions. They were loyal servants to their masters; they were professional sycophants. Because of the concern of dual loyalty – to their non-Jewish master on the one hand and their Jewish brethren on the other hand – the court Jews were forced to identify completely with the former. After all, they were doing his bidding.

The phrase 'court Jews' has been replaced in the modern era with the phrase 'close adviser.' Barack Obama has surrounded himself with countless Jewish advisers: in the White House, the State Department, the media, secretive NGOs and overseas diplomatic missions. What all of these Jewish advisers have in common is a liberal and left-wing worldview. Their fundamental loyalty is to the interests of the United States. They cannot be blamed for this. After all, their salaries, their status and their position all come from the American taxpayer.

In their stupidity, these advisers are convinced that the citizens of the State of Israel are a bunch of politically primitive ignoramuses whose judgment is flawed and who don't know what's best for them. Like many others in history, they think that they can save the Israeli people from themselves. What they are willfully ignoring, however, is the fact that the Israeli people, in their wisdom, got together and decided in a democratic election that they have no interest in the second-hand views that Obama's advisers and the Israeli left are trying to sell them. The Jews returned home from exile so that we would not have to live in a situation whereby a foreign ruler tells us what to do.

Obama's advisers' main concern is the legacy of their president. Toward the end of his presidency, Obama is proving to be one of the weakest presidents of modern times. Under his leadership, the United States has become more of a paper tiger than ever before. The most powerful nation in human history is helpless in the face of terrorists riding in pickup trucks and armed with nothing more than machine guns. The Middle East is in chaos, Europe is unable to halt the spread of radical Islam, Ukraine is in flames – and yet Obama and his advisers are preoccupied with the downtrodden Palestinians.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is preventing Obama and his advisers from shaping the president's legacy. He is David to their Goliath. He refuses to shut up about the danger posed by Iran – a terrorist state which could obtain nuclear capability at any moment. Anyone willing to listen can hear how the Iranians are refusing to allow international inspection of their nuclear facilities – yet Obama and his advisers are determined to carry out their second great folly of the 21st century. The first, of course, was the United States' support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Obama and his Jewish advisers have blocked their ears, because the noise of reality was disturbing them. Instead of dealing with the charges against them, these condescending advisers describe Israelis as irrational. Thanks to the kind of rationality that they are proposing, the Jewish people have paid a terrible price throughout history. Instead of policy, the United States has vengefulness; instead of showing independence of leadership, Obama is collaborating with Channel 2 to undermine the elected prime minister of the State of Israel. Only the Americans seem to think that they have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

The voice of the Israeli electorate was heard loud and clear on March 17. Threats do not work on the Jewish people. As it says in the Book of Exodus, the more the Children of Israel were oppressed, the more they multiplied and grew."

Ends…

 

PLAYING DIRTY: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yoaz Hendel says that the real goal of the BDS movement is not to protest Israel's policies, but to protest Israel's existence – and that, in this struggle, Israel's enemies have no moral compunction about inventing false accusations.

"In June 2, 1964, at one of the most beautiful spots in Jerusalem – the Seven Arches hotel on the Mount of Olives – the Palestine Liberation Organization was founded by Ahmad Shukeiri. This is a date that we should remember well when discussing the global boycott, divestment and sanctions movement (BDS). Three years before the occupation of Judea and Samaria. Three years before Israel became – as some people claim it is – the root cause of all instability in the Middle East. Three years before the Palestinians, according to the anti-Israel narrative, became an oppressed people. The goal of the organization was to wage an armed struggle against the State of Israel. Not to establish an independent Palestinian state, but to annul the independent Jewish state that, against all the odds, survived its war of independence in 1948.

This story is the basis of the current struggle against the anti-Israel BDS movement. Anyone who thinks that the BDS movement was formed to protest Israeli policy is missing the point; the BDS movement is fighting against Israel's very right to exist.

The greatest problem with the BDS movement is that it is not waging an armed struggle against Israel; it is battling for hearts and minds. This is an asymmetrical war for public opinion, for legitimacy and for support. The weapon that the BDS movement uses is accusations of human rights abuses. Most of these allegations are groundless; some are simply imaginary. The frontline of this battle is in the West, in the family of liberal and democratic states to which Israel belongs.

The concept of an asymmetric war is used to describe a situation in which a large and powerful army is fighting against a guerilla army or terrorist groups. Israelis are all too aware that power has its limitations. We know that Hamas uses children and civilians as human shields. We know that the IDF will do everything in its power not to harm innocent bystanders. Terrorist organizations, in contrast, have no such rules and no moral limits. This is as true in warfare as it is for the BDS movement. It is a war in which there are no rules, in which morality plays no role and in which truth and falsehood are interchangeable.

Almost exactly 13 years ago, an Israeli drone spotted a staged funeral taking place in a refugee camp in Jenin. A perfectly healthy young Palestinian man, wrapped in a flag, was being 'laid to rest' while all around him people were wailing and mourning. The object was to create another indictment against Israel in the aftermath of Operation Defensive Shield. It was another ploy to try and convince the world that Israel committed a massacre. The façade was revealed when the 'mourners' dropped the 'dead man,' who quickly got to his feet and walked away. Dead man walking, indeed.

Following that incident, Mohammed Bakri released a wholly tendentious film called 'Jenin, Jenin,' in which he told the story of the alleged massacre. That movie was a hit among the BDS crowd. Similarly, in 2013, there were stories that Israel was committing genocide against the Bedouin in the Negev, whereas, in fact, the government merely passed a law which would have granted these communities official recognition by the state. In a similar vein, Yasser Arafat accused Israel of poisoning the Palestinian water supply and, after his death; his widow accused Israel of killing him. There are hundreds of other examples of lies that, for BDS supporters, have become the truth.

A democratic sovereign country cannot lie, cannot invent facts and cannot make assertions that it can't prove. Sometimes officials make mistakes and many times they don't tell us everything – but a country like Israel knows that there are limits and that, in the battle for public opinion, it cannot play dirty.

Paradoxically, the frontline of this war is manned by educated, liberal people who, in theory, have the capacity for self-criticism. Every year, on more than 160 university campuses across the world, students mark Israel Apartheid Week, where all the 'horrors' of Israel are put on display. Sometimes Israel is compared to Nazi Germany and sometimes it is merely accused of genocide.

The distance between invented accusation and taking action is a short one. In spring 2010, Berkeley became the first university where the student body tried to declare an official boycott of companies that trade with Israel. A year earlier, a Norwegian holding fund was the first to divest from an Israeli company. A pension fund followed suit and divested from Africa. Israel and a handful of performers who were afraid of Roger Waters' reaction cancelled their planned shows in Israel.

The success of the BDS movement is marginal in economic terms, but hugely significant in that it has created a virtual world in which good is evil and vice versa. Some of the people partnering these Palestinian organizations are Jews – Israelis even – who want to change Israel. They cannot see that the goal of the BDS movement is not to change Israel, but to destroy it. Israel isn't perfect. There are plenty of areas that need improvement. But the lies that are being told about Israel in order to delegitimize it are unacceptable. How can we counter these lies? First of all, by being aware of what is happening. And, just as importantly, by knowing our history."

Ends…

 

UNWORTHY CITIZENS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ariela Ringel Hoffman arguers that Israelis who eschew the standard means of protesting government policy and instead advocate a boycott should have their citizenship revoked.

"I would support a proposal to revoke the citizenship of those Israelis who are spearheading the campaign to boycott the State of Israel. How can I justify this position? By using exactly the same argument that those who justify such activity employ. This justification can be summed up in one single sentence, which has become something of a cliché in Hebrew: If you can't get something done using force – use more force. Or, to put it another way: these boycotters, who live in glasshouses, have adopted stone-throwing as their principle strategy.

In democratic countries, there are many ways that citizens can promote their agenda. Politics is one of them – and it's one of the better ways, despite what we all think about the political process. But it's not the only way. There are other ways of influencing public opinion: mass protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies. Israel is no stranger to such public displays of dissent. Just a couple of years ago, a mass movement calling for social change came into existence and managed to change many things.

Boycotts are not part of the toolbox available to those who object to the policies and behavior of the government. Boycotts belong to a very different arsenal. They are not the product of criticism from someone who loves Israel and is trying to improve it through 'tough love.' Anyone who uses boycotts is not only guilty of changing the rules of the game, but of changing the whole game. He or she is removing himself from the democratic consensus of what constitutes a legitimate struggle.

It is true that revoking someone's citizenship is an extreme response by any state. And it is true that it is a measure that should be reserved for very rare cases and should be used with extreme caution. It is the kind of measure used when a state has no other way of expressing its disdain for a citizen who it wishes to expunge from its midst. But in the case of Israelis who advocate a boycott of their own country, the truth is that they have in any case switched sides. Anyone who is unwilling to take part in the genuine, long, exhausting struggle to change the character of their country by legitimate means is not worthy of holding the citizenship of that country."

Ends…

 

STRANGLING GAZA: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein says that unemployment – the result of blockades by Israel and Egypt – is intensifying the suffering of 1.8 million Gazans, who are still traumatized by last summer's war.

"According to a report published last week by the World Bank, which focused on the economy of the Gaza Strip since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the unemployment rate there is among the highest in the world.

According to the report, unemployment reached a peak in the fourth quarter of last year, when 43 percent of Gazans were jobless. Another report, published by the London-based Portland Trust, says there was a slight dip in unemployment in the first quarter of this year, when the rate dropped to around 41.6 percent.

These reports paint a depressing picture of the standard of living in Gaza, where the population has risen by 230 percent since 1994, while per capita income has fallen by 31 percent. In addition, the manufacturing sector in Gaza has shrunk by 60 percent over the course of the past two decades, mainly due to a ban on exports.

According to the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in 2014, an average of just three trucks a week left the Gaza Strip carrying agricultural produce and locally manufactured goods. During the first half of 2007, an average of 240 trucks a week were allowed to leave Gaza. In the first few months of 2015, that figure rose to 18 trucks a week – half of them destined for the West Bank and the rest for overseas markets.

The World Bank points out that, while the number of Gazans employed in the manufacturing sector has plummeted, the number employed in the security forces has doubled. This statistic apparently includes the 20,000 Gazans who are employed by Hamas' security apparatus.

The only positive statistic in the World Bank report is related to progress in rebuilding homes. Some 80 percent of Gazans rely on humanitarian aid from various international organizations, primarily the United Nations. Much of their suffering is due to the poor public services provided by the Hamas government: electricity is only available for a few hours every day, the water supply is contaminated, the sewage system barely functions and there are not enough buildings for schools.

An acquaintance of mine – a Gaza-based lawyer – told me in a telephone conversation this week that, in the aftermath of last summer's war, almost all of Gaza's 1.8 million residents are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and do not believe that there is any hope for the future. Apart from exceptional humanitarian cases, the border crossings between Israel and Gaza are closed and relations between Hamas and Egypt are at a low ebb, following Cairo's decision to close the Rafah border crossing.

Both Israel and Egypt see Gaza as the epicenter of terrorist activity in the region and Hamas, which continues to rule there, as nothing more than a terrorist entity. There is a consensus among the international community, meanwhile, that unless the Gaza borders are reopened as part of some wider diplomatic agreement, the future holds nothing but more suffering for the civilian population there."

Ends…

 

SHARED STRATEGY: Writing in Haaretz, Michèle Flournoy and Ilan Goldenberg say that the United States and Israel must renew engagement, and President Obama's speech at a Washington synagogue showed he's willing to reach out.

"U.S. President Barack Obama’s address last week to the Jewish community at a Washington synagogue is a signal that despite disagreements on Iran’s nuclear program, the president is reaching out to the Israeli government to find a way forward. With Israel’s election and government formation process complete, it is now time for a renewed engagement between the United States and Israel on a shared strategic agenda.

We do not believe it is possible to overcome all of the difficult policy and personal differences that exist between Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. But if the relationship remains as it is, it will hurt both Israel and the United States.

Both sides share common strategic interests in maintaining regional stability, countering terrorism and preventing proliferation. Both share a common history, based on 50 years of close collaboration, of being stronger and safer when they work together on issues of common concern, particularly in the defense and intelligence arenas. And perhaps most importantly, both states share common democratic values and cultures, which bind their people together.

To renew a shared strategic agenda, both leaders should privately pledge to each other to do no harm to the relationship. Netanyahu does not need to agree with Obama’s Iran policy. However, he should restrain himself in the American media and on Capitol Hill, particularly during the presidential campaign season. Politicizing the issue of support for Israel would undermine long-standing bipartisan support and would ultimately be disastrous for Israel.

For his part, Obama does not need to acquiesce to Netanyahu’s position on settlements or the two-state solution, but he should put an end to high-level leaks from the White House anonymously criticizing the Israeli prime minister.

The United States and Israel should reengage in a high-level, in-depth strategic dialogue on Iran. This discussion has never fully stopped, but it cannot be successful as long as the political relationship remains fraught.  Such an agenda should include developing a shared strategy and cooperative intelligence and defense activities to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region, especially the threat posed by Hizbollah in southern Lebanon. It should also explore the details of how a nuclear deal with Iran would be implemented, how violations would be handled, and what could be done outside the framework to provide incentives for Iranian compliance.

During our time in government, we have both seen, in person, how helpful such a dialogue can be to Israeli and American officials. Israelis appreciate the greater clarity they gain about American plans and policies through this exchange, which helps them refine their own approach. Meanwhile, Israeli officials often play the valuable function of 'red-teaming' American policies and providing insights that improve American strategy.

The United States should also reengage Israel in deep consultations about future bilateral security cooperation and should offer a robust reassurance package to demonstrate its long-term commitment to Israel’s security. This commitment should include additional security assistance to turn the Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system into a nationwide system that goes beyond addressing discrete threats. It should also include thickening Israel’s layered ballistic missile defenses in the face of increasingly sophisticated missile threats from Hizbollah.

The United States could also fast-track negotiations and an agreement on a new 10-year memorandum of understanding regarding American military aid to Israel. The agreement is due to be renewed in 2017, but bringing the date closer could send a clearer signal now.

The two states should also reengage in a deep consultative process on Israel’s qualitative military edge. This is particularly important in the wake of the Gulf Cooperation Council summit at Camp David, and the potential arms sales the United States may execute with its Gulf partners in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear agreement.

Finally, Obama and Netanyahu should each empower a senior official to lead efforts to strengthen U.S.-Israel channels and rebuild the relationship. These designated officials will have to be close to the leaders to bring credibility to the process, but both should be somewhat removed from the tensions that have plagued the relationship in recent months.

In the end, these steps will not fix all of the problems. Tensions will persist as long as Obama and Netanyahu continue to disagree on the right approach to Iran. And with a new right-wing coalition taking the reins of government in Israel, there is likely to be further tension between the United States and Israel when it comes to addressing the Palestinian issue.

But despite these challenges, both sides can, at a minimum, outline a common agenda that gets them working together again more closely on shared security challenges. Such an approach would be in the interests of both America and Israel."

Ends…

 

HIZBOLLAH IN CONTROL: Writing on the website of the i24 television station, Yoav Stern asks whether the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will also be the death knell for Hizbollah.

"Hundreds of Hizbollah fighters have been killed in battles in Syria since the start of the civil war there in 2011. Thousands of the organization’s fighters, previously trained in guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces, are currently waging defensive battles to prevent wide swathes of Syria from falling into the hands of regime opponents, which are many and sundry.

Hizbollah fighters are deployed in Syria because the survival of Bashar al-Assad is good for the organization and constitutes a strategic asset for the Shiite axis of which it is a part. But contrary to last week’s declarations by Hizbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbollah does not really need Assad for its continued existence, and it is not under existential threat.

Hizbollah is not abandoning its front against Israel. One can learn a lot about Hizbollah’s state of readiness in southern Lebanon from the blitz of Arabic-language broadcasts on last week's 15th anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal.

Since the round of direct fighting with Israel in 2006, Hizbollah has deployed forces in the villages of southern Lebanon, leading many Christians to abandon their homes. In other villages, the Shiite residents welcomed the organization. In yet other villages, the organization forced itself onto the local population.

The organization has built up an array of fortifications to enable it to surprise Israeli ground forces and attack them. According to some reports, the militants drilled a series of tunnels into the rock surface. The sounds of drilling were clearly heard above ground in Israel.

Hizbollah will take great pains to carry out the instructions of its leader, one of the greatest Arab orators around, that it conduct battles inside Israel's Galilee region. An Iranian and Syrian-supplied arsenal of some 100,000 rockets and missiles, with ranges covering Israel's entire territory, will be of great help in that regard.

The Shiite organization, with its headquarters in Beirut's southern neighborhoods, has turned the entire country into a broad base of operations. Over the past 20 years, with slow but determined steps, it has assumed control over all of the country's power centers. There was no one to stand in its way: not members of the other sects – the Christians who are divided among themselves, the Druze, the Sunni – and not other Shiite groups, either. None of these elements could stop Hizbollah from creating a state within a state, not even the allies of the other groups outside Lebanon.

The organization currently controls Lebanon's international airport in Beirut, as well as extensive areas that have de facto been expropriated from the state, which, in turn, has become a mere skeleton. Lebanon's army is nothing but a semblance of a regular military force, the security agencies have had their wings clipped, and state institutions are only providing limited services. The paralysis is so great, that Hizbollah and its allies have even been successfully torpedoing the appointment of the country's president, whose role is purely symbolic.

Hizbollah’s entrenchment is so deep that it can doubtless keep operating even without Syrian support. After all, what kind of support is Syria providing? This support consisted, first and foremost, of weapons transfers, but also financial aid, logistical and transportation support and help in internal Lebanese matters. Today, Syria is no longer able to help with most of these things, yet Hizbollah is thriving and its importance is growing. Even with Syria falling apart, Iran can still send weapons to Lebanon by air and sea without running into interference. Financially, there's of course no need for Syrian intermediaries to channel funds from Iran to Lebanon. True, Syria's arms industry was a considerable source of supply for Hizbollah, and much Syrian ammunition found its way to the mountains and hills of southern Lebanon, as well as to eastern Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. But in any case, during direct clashes between Hizbollah and Israel, Syria conducted itself with great care.

So why does Hizbollah agree, nonetheless, to sacrifice its fighters on the Qalamoun range, in the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo and on the Syrian side of the Golan? That's because Hizbollah is the most significant strike force of the Shiite axis outside Iran. Assad's Syria provides a central link in this axis. Its fall into Sunni hands, whether those of the Islamic State or of various opposition forces (such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army and dozens of Sunni, Kurdish and Druze sects) would deal Iran and its allies a painful blow.

This does not mean that Hizbollah is not concerned. In addition to the deaths of its fighters in the Syrian arena, its militants are also deployed on the front lines of the fighting in Yemen, and in Iraq, where they are engaged in the eastern front battles against fighters of the Islamic State organization. Occasionally one hears, too, that another Hizbollah operative has been captured in some seemingly secondary arena in Asia, Europe and America, where the organization is trying to locate targets (mostly Jewish or Israelis).

This widespread deployment is straining the organization's capacity to its limits, but if it does not exhaust itself in Syria, the experience its soldiers are gaining there will only strengthen it."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.06.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS: Mehmet Tezkan argues that the ruling party is fighting to stay in power in centrist Milliyet: "The government has made its success dependent on the pro-Kurdish HDP alliance's failure. If the HDP remains below the 10% electoral threshold, the 45 to 50 seats that it could have won will be a lifesaver for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). They will keep the ruling party in power. That is why they are using all possible means to ensure that this happens."

Selcuk Gultasli dismisses the president’s claims to victimhood in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "There has been a huge increase in the number of those ready to insult President Erdogan ever since he was elected president. The 'dregs' of the West, as Erdogan refers to some Western newspapers, have noted that he has been suing someone almost every day ever since he was elected. Those who are sued are not insulting him at all. But Erdogan interprets any criticism as an insult and does not miss any opportunity to claim 'perpetual victimhood'. That is the problem!"

Ozcan Tikit regrets the ruling party’s reluctance to accept the HDP’s patriotic claims in centre-right HaberTurk: "At the HDP's rally in Istanbul, there were some eye-catching pictures. The Turkish flag was one of the leading themes of this rally. Actually, this was not the first time something like that has happened. We are used to seeing the Turkish flag at many HDP election rallies. At the Istanbul rally, this turned into a phenomenon. It is impossible not to feel sad about the fact that certain pro-AKP groups approach rallies with Turkish flags with 'but' comments. Interpreting the Turkish flags at this rally as being anti-AKP can only be explained as an act of exclusion."

Orhan Miroglu has no faith in the HDP’s peaceful intentions in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Today, the HDP is a movement that has been taken over by weapons. It cannot rescue itself from this captivity but wants the voters to play along with it. There is not the slightest chance that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) will lay down its arms. There was an even better chance of this happening in the 1990s."

Yasin Aktay charges the HDP with fascism and racism in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The HDP is clearly conducting an armed election campaign. In this context, it can enter a village, pursue its election campaign and if it sees any opposition or resistance, it can take up arms and commit a massacre. The HDP is involved in fascist politics based on Kurdish racism, especially in the east and southeast."

Kurtulus Tayiz claims the HDP is wedded to force in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "I do not believe that the HDP can make any contribution to our democracy - no matter whether it clears the 10% threshold or not. Unless the HDP severs its ties with violence, terror and murder, it can make no contribution to democracy. The violence in the mountains has been replaced today by the organized tyranny of the street. In both cases, it is the PKK and the HDP that practice, enforce and use violence as a political tool."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan is incredulous: "The negotiations with the U.S. and the Geneva and Lausanne agreements have not made Iranians happy. Linking the wheels of the economy to the centrifuges stopped the centrifuges from spinning, but did not make the wheels of the economy spin. It made the U.S. both frown and smile. Associating the economy with factors beyond our borders and to talks with America was a great error. Worst of all, this unseemly propaganda takes place in the midst of a diplomatic battle with the enemy. Our people have the right to know, after two years of suspending most nuclear activities, why even the smallest problem has not been solved and the lifting of even a small part of the sanctions is still uncertain despite finalizing Iran's commitments in the final agreement." 

Hard-line Javan opines on good and bad agreements: "The Americans are seeking a good agreement for themselves and a bad one for Iran. The West is under the impression that economic pressures have forced us to negotiate and they think that the Iranian nation has no choice but to accept their demands and will do so. Every Iranian knows which agreement is good and which is bad. Iranians expect only a good agreement from our negotiating team. A good deal is one that will guarantee national interests, as well as our dignity, security and independence by respecting the red lines set by the wise leader of the Revolution." 

Reformist Sharq accommodates: "The Additional Protocol requires elaboration because it has been inferred that our negotiating team has promised the other side that the door for inspecting military sites will remain open. Meanwhile, no talks have been held on the inspection of military sites and therefore such a promise has not been made. What has been discussed is the issue of accepting the Additional Protocol and its mechanisms. We have two options: we can declare that we do not accept the protocol and leave the negotiations, or we can accept the protocol, knowing that we will always have the opportunity to reject access to military sites if it harms national security. The second option might be worth considering. The possibility that they may demand access to important military sites is not high because, just like us, the IAEA and the West do not want to upset the agreement." 

Reformist Arman is balanced in criticism: "Instead of showing sensitivity towards the Additional Protocol, which could prove the peacefulness of our nuclear activities, we are discussing banning inspections at military sites. Greedy illusions of countries like France are also wrong; they think that, in this delicate situation, they should force commitments on us before the Additional Protocol, which is not acceptable. Insisting on such demands threaten the wellbeing of the negotiations." 

Conservative Resalat is defiant: "Washington and its Western allies insist on investigating Iran's most upright children when they themselves are behind nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism used against the region's oppressed women and children to kill millions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and North Africa. The Islamic Republic will never allow its nuclear scientists to be investigated by the world's famous nuclear terrorists and their institutions." 

 

CRITICISM: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reminds the president: "Criticising, expressing opinion and analysing are the duties of journalists and experts. An atmosphere of criticism and expressing one's views improves matters. Whenever critics react to the nuclear issue; officials, including the President, adopt a serious stance. On Saturday, he said: 'The country's secrets should be protected.’ He forgot that critics have pointed out several times that military issues and interviews with our scientists should never have been subjects for negotiations." 

 

REGIONAL POLITICS: Reformist Mardom Salari examines regional attitudes: "Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Turkey, is trying to strengthen ISIS so they can overthrow the ruling regimes in Iraq and Syria and uproot the Houthis in Yemen. If they succeed, they will proceed to Lebanon and other countries. These countries also fear that following a nuclear deal, Iran may turn into a major power in the region and will impose its will on them; therefore, they want the West to push Iran into deadlock on various fronts to deprive it of becoming a major power. It is likely that Saudi extremists have formed a team that wants conflict and battle with Iran." 

 

FIGHTING TERRORISM: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami doubts Western intentions: "In an interview with Al Jazeera, the leader of the Nusra terrorist group was hostile to Hizbollah of Lebanon, but assured the West that the group has no enmity to the U.S. and Europe and will not use Syria as a base to attack them. The remarks of this criminal reconfirm the convergence of Western interests with those of the terrorists in Syria and Iraq. Their common objective is to strike at the anti-Zionist resistance front. Hence, it would be naive to expect Western powers to stand against terrorism in the region. The so-called anti-terror coalition forces led by America have achieved nothing against the terrorists; this phony operation, in many cases, has strengthened the terrorists. Recent developments and the revelation of new aspects of the conspiracy in the region have emphasized the need for regional countries to form a common front to deal with terrorism." 

Moderate Iran is misinformed: "Shiite forces have taken the responsibility of fighting extremists on the two fronts of Syria and Iraq. Contrary to the poisoning propaganda spread by Western media, world public opinion does not consider Shiite forces to be destructive; rather they see them as a force that is trying to create stability in the region. Regional and world powers accept this reality. The only way to overcome extremists is to allow these groups to be involved in the fight against them." 

 

TURKISH ELECTIONS: Conservative Khorasan marks the challenges facing Erdogan: "Less than a week remains before parliamentary elections in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party [AKP] considers the upcoming elections an opportunity for a transition to neo-Ottomanism. The desire to go back to the era of Ottoman hegemony is impossible without absolute power. The Party's first step towards fulfilling this high dream is to amend the country's constitution. Kurdish parties, nationalists and Kemalists, will be the main obstacles for the Justice and Development's absolute dominance. Last year's financial embezzlement and Erdogan's occasional adventurisms over the past few years - as well as the dark situation for freedom of speech and human rights have dimmed the AKP's luck."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.06.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

  

1-A difficult task

2-Blair’s unlamented departure

3-Fateful elections

 

1-A difficult task

 

The ongoing confrontation requires deploying all available diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and military means. It seems that it is Cairo and Riyadh's fate to assume this difficult task at this delicate point in time. This is the context in which to view new Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir's visit to Cairo and his consultations with senior Egyptian officials regarding developments in Yemen, Syria, and Libya and the means of confronting terrorism. The major Arab countries have come to the realization that 'Arab solidarity' is the sole means of improving the conditions in the Arab world and confronting the attempts to spread anarchy there. Moreover, the explosive crises in Yemen, Syria, and Libya cannot withstand wasting any more time. Unless Cairo and Riyadh lead the way and assume their responsibilities, it is hard to imagine an alternative that is capable of replacing them in fulfilling this task--Egyptian al-Ahram

 

Egypt’s leadership is especially sensitive about the Turkish/Qatari alliance, and this extends to any party that draws close to this alliance, since this is tantamount to backing the Muslim Brotherhood. It is unlikely that relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia can be very warm after the latter has joined this alliance because President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's Egypt places the war on political Islam at the top of its list of priorities, viewing the Muslim Brotherhood as a 'terrorist' movement. Operation Decisive Storm has faltered and has failed to achieve most of its aims…After over two months of aerial bombardment, Saudi Arabia may be forced to reconsider its policies and alliances, especially after the Houthis have carried the war into Saudi territories and the recent bombings of Shiite mosques in ad-Dammam and al-Qutaif by ISIS sleeper cells. These two bombings in less than a week have generated a sense of fear and panic among both Saudi officials and the Saudi people. Saudi Arabia’s return to Egypt after a period of alienation and lukewarm relations is one indication of such a review, or at least paves the way for it-- pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The new Saudi foreign minister's visit to Cairo, which is his first since he assumed his post, addressed the situation in Yemen, Syria, and Libya and the need for common Arab action for dealing with the wars raging in the three countries, says the editorial in the leading Egyptian daily. The minister's visit reflects the major differences between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, especially over the Syrian file, according to the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. But Riyadh’s faltering war in Yemen may also be forcing it to reconsider both its alliances and policies on this issue.

 

NO DOUBT: "There is no doubt that the entire Arab world looks to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to save the region from drowning in the quagmire of terrorism, poverty, extremism and foreign schemes," claims the editorial in Monday's authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

U.S. President Barack Obama recently declared in no uncertain terms that the U.S. does not wish to fulfill the Middle Eastern governments duties for them; ‘they and not the U.S. have to protect their own national security,' he said.

At a first glance, it may seem logical for the U.S. to want to back away from any commitments. But that has not prevented Washington from being involved in seeking to affect the Middle East balance, siding with one side at the others' expense, invading Iraq, adopting a policy that promotes ‘creative chaos’ with research centers closely linked to the U.S. administration rushing to speak of redrawing the Middle East’s map. In other words, the facts on the ground seem to be different from the declared policies, and the least that can be said about these American practices is that they complicate the situation in the region further and do not contribute to resolving any of its problems. Moreover, they are not in line with the Arabs’ view of how best to deal with the region's issues.

But regardless of U.S. policy, the region cannot brook any more disregard or hesitation. The ongoing confrontation requires deploying all available diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and military means. It seems that it is Cairo and Riyadh's fate to assume this difficult task at this delicate point in time. This is the context in which to view new Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir's visit to Cairo and his consultations with senior Egyptian officials regarding developments in Yemen, Syria, and Libya and the means of confronting terrorism.

The major Arab countries have come to the realization that 'Arab solidarity' is the sole means of improving the conditions in the Arab world and confronting the attempts to spread anarchy there. Moreover, the explosive crises in Yemen, Syria, and Libya cannot withstand wasting any more time. Unless Cairo and Riyadh lead the way and assume their responsibilities, it is hard to imagine an alternative that is capable of replacing them in fulfilling this task.

"For this reason, the major international powers are scrutinizing the Arab roadmap for dealing with the crises closely," concludes the daily.

End…

 

EXTENDED CLOSED MEETINGS: "On his first official visit to Cairo since he became Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Mr. 'Adel al-Jubeir insisted at the press conference he held with his Egyptian counterpart Samih Shukri after their extended closed meetings, that there were no disagreements between Riyadh and Cairo over the Syrian and Yemeni issues, and that both countries' points of view were identical in this regard. But Mr. Shukri expressed a different point of view towards the Syrian file," notes Monday's editorial on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The Saudi foreign minister's visit to Cairo comes after a period when relations between the two countries had cooled and that witnessed Egyptian media campaigns attacking Saudi Arabia and the war it is waging in Yemen (Operation Decisive Storm) directly. This is the war that Egyptian journalists who are considered to be pro-regime have described as 'an aggression'-- something that has provoked many Saudi journalists into a harsh response.

The disagreement began and worsened after Saudi Arabia joined the Turkish/Qatari alliance hostile to Egypt and that backs the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Islamist factions, especially the [Syrian Islamist opposition] Jayshul Fateh. Most members of this faction belong to two al-Qa'ida-affiliated organizations, the Nusra Front and Ahrar ash-Sham. Saudi Arabia’s 'indirect' financial and military support for this faction has shifted the military balance of power on the ground, and has led to Jayshul Fateh’s control of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, as well as the Qarmid military base in northwestern Syria. Preparations are now underway for a major offensive that aims to take control of Aleppo.

There are major differences between the Saudi and Egyptian views of the Syrian file. These have been reflected in the two countries' backing for competing opposition factions: Riyadh is hosting a conference in mid-June in which the 'non-jihadi' Islamist factions will take part with the aim of establishing a new opposition coalition. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood will be strongly represented in this coalition. For its part, Cairo, will shortly host a conference in which the liberal and leftist 'patriotic' opposition factions will take part, but without the participation of Islamist factions-- moderate or extreme.

At the aforementioned press conference, Mr. Shukri stressed the importance of backing the ‘patriotic’ Syrian opposition forces ‘to enable them to engage in political action that extracts Syria from its crisis and resists the phenomena of terrorism and terrorist elements on the Syrian arena.’ He said nothing about the need to topple the Syrian regime.

It was also worth noting that while Mr. Shukri showed no disagreement with his Saudi counterpart regarding the Yemeni file, he also said nothing about Iranian intervention in that crisis. He deployed general and ambiguous terms saying: 'In today's talks, we discussed everything that concerns Arab national security and the need for security and stability in the Arab countries and the Arab peoples; Egypt's national security is closely linked to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf's security in general.' He added: 'Egypt refuses any outside intervention in Arab affairs' – which was the sole and 'indirect' reference to Iran.

The two ministers held a closed ‘four-eyes’ meeting. Mr. al-Jubeir was almost certainly bearing a message from the Saudi monarch to the Egyptian authorities regarding many issues, primarily the Syrian crisis. It is impossible to know the message's content but Saudi sources have confirmed to raialyoum.com that 'the Saudi/Turkish alliance is not as strong as reported in the press,' adding that it was 'temporary' and that Saudi Arabia still values Egypt’s role in the region's crises and understands that it cannot be disregarded.

Egypt’s leadership is especially sensitive about the Turkish/Qatari alliance, and this extends to any party that draws close to this alliance, since this is tantamount to backing the Muslim Brotherhood. It is unlikely that relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia can be very warm after the latter has joined this alliance because President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's Egypt places the war on political Islam at the top of its list of priorities, viewing the Muslim Brotherhood as a 'terrorist' movement.

Operation Decisive Storm has faltered and has failed to achieve most of its aims, the most important of which was to force the Houthi/Saleh alliance to withdraw from Sana'a, to hand over the weapons they have captured from the Yemeni army and to allow Yemen's 'legitimate' [exiled] President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi to return.  After over two months of aerial bombardment, Saudi Arabia may be forced to reconsider its policies and alliances, especially after the Houthis have carried the war into Saudi territories and the recent bombings of Shiite mosques in ad-Dammam and al-Qutaif by ISIS sleeper cells. These two bombings in less than a week have generated a sense of fear and panic among both Saudi officials and the Saudi people.

"Saudi Arabia’s return to Egypt after a period of alienation and lukewarm relations is one indication of such a review, or at least paves the way for it. All we can do now is to wait and see what happens next," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-Blair’s unlamented departure

 

The former British PM did nothing over eight years as International Quartet Envoy, and his resignation marks the end of both his post and the mechanism it was meant to represent, says Ali al-Jarbawi in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

International Quartet special envoy Tony Blair’s resignation effectively marks the end of both his post and the Quartet itself, maintains a Palestinian academic and former PA minister. Although there were objective reasons for Blair’s failure, his own personal ambitions and political views also played a major role in foiling his prospects of success.

 

AFTER MUCH FOOT-DRAGGING: “Finally and after much foot-dragging, Tony Blair announced his resignation from his post as the International Quartet's Middle East peace envoy,” writes Ali al-Jarbawi in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Blair departs a scene that stretched for over eight years without achieving anything worthwhile, apart from some petty details such as reopening some crossing point or removing a military checkpoint set up by the occupation during the second intifada.

The Quartet spent tens of millions of dollars on its envoy that were meant as aid for the Palestinian people. In addition to his expenses, this included the cost of his luxurious office, his team’s enormous salaries, the high costs of his residency and his continuous travels. But the result of all of this can be eloquently summarized in one word: Nothing!

Blair achieved nothing. Yet he remained in this post that bears an honorific title for eight years. This represents an excellent example that should be studied and taught regarding posts that have resounding titles but that lack any real content. The important thing for those who hold such posts is their title and not their content.

It may be useful to examine the reasons for Blair's failure after many years at his post with the resounding title. One can think of five reasons for his failure, which are all interconnected. Collectively, they provide an explanation but not a justification, for Blair's failure in his mission.

- The first reason stems from the ineffectiveness of the body that appointed him as an envoy. The International Quartet – which consists of the U.S., Russia, the EU, and the UN – was meant to be a follow up mechanism for a political settlement between the Palestinians and Israel. But this framework was not given a chance and was unable to take charge of the peace process from the moment it was established. That dossier remained the monopoly of the U.S., while the International Quartet remained hostage to the power that dominated it. It held meetings only when necessary, and issued statements only when necessary.

A framework’s ineffectiveness is certain to affect its results. The Quartet’s envoy will thus necessarily be ineffective. Faced with direct American control over the entire dossier, he has neither enough power nor sufficient influence. The initiative and the ability to influence what happens are not his.

- The second reason has to do with the fact that the Quartet’s envoy’s mandate was limited to enhancing the Palestinian economic and administrative performance in preparation for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This meant that the political domain was not part of Blair’s remit. But the separation between the economic and the political dimensions represents the source of the problem and the cause of failure, since the roots of the problem of occupation are political and not economic.

The source of economic problem is political. Therefore, improving the Palestinians’ economy and their institutional performance requires a change in the occupation’s policies. As an occupying force, Israel is in full control of Palestinian life in all its aspects and details. If the Quartet’s envoy’s mandate does not include dealing with the political roots of the problem but focuses on its economic dimensions alone, he will be unable to achieve the required breakthrough.

- If the basis for the two first causes of failure has to do with the International Quartet’s objective conditions and its diminished if not neutralized role, then Blair’s personality and goals from assuming his post represent another major reason for failure. After the British Labor party removed him from its leadership and as head of the UK government, Blair sought another post. In the aftermath of the mass criticism of his role in the [2003] war on Iraq, he hoped to regain some stature on the international arena. He tried to head the EU Commission, but failed. He then turned to the International Quartet. The Bush administration helped him to secure this post in recognition and gratitude for his role in the war on Iraq.

Blair was neither serious nor sincere in fulfilling his mission. He turned his post into a PR exercise, trying to use it to mend his battered reputation and cleanse it of the accusations directed against it. Blair was also focused on acquiring money via his many consultancies that distracted him from pursuing his job as Quartet envoy. He visited Palestine intermittently and at separate periods. He held some meetings, distributed smiles before the TV cameras, made a few statements, then left for months on end, after which he would return and repeat what he had done the time before. It is true that the objective conditions for his work were not really suitable for achieving anything; but he exerted no effort to change this and have a positive impact.

- The fourth reason stems from Blair’s clear unwillingness to confront or anger Israel. For in addition to being a traditional sympathizer, his reaction to its occupation policies that impinge on every aspect of Palestinian life lacked any integrity. He would choose his words very carefully when speaking of Israel, ensuring that they would ultimately be totally meaningless or useless. It was as if he was begging for ‘gifts’ from the occupation authorities and never seriously tried to pressure them in any way. He acted merely as a ‘mediator’ who conveyed Palestinian demands and came back with Israel’s rejections of these demands. And if the Israelis granted him some ‘small gift’ every now and then, that was exaggerated and presented as a huge achievement.

- Finally, it should be acknowledged that the Palestinian/Israeli situation was not conducive to any breakthrough or progress in the political process for much of Blair’s term as International Quartet’s envoy: Right-wing Israeli governments with clear pro-settlement policies; successive wars on the Gaza Strip; a domestic Palestinian split; and regional and international scene that was preoccupied with other problems.

None of this helped to prepare the appropriate climate for proceeding with the peace process-- one that was and still is faltering. Blair did not succeed, and he knew that he would not succeed. Yet he did not draw the necessary conclusions. He did not address the reasons for his failure or resign his post early. Instead, he squeezed the very last drop from his post till leaving it dead and lifeless, with no chance of it ever reviving.

“It would thus be better to write the obituary of the envoy’s post and that of International Quartet as well,” concludes Jarbawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Fateful elections

 

Turkey’s upcoming general elections will constitute a turning point in the country’s domestic and foreign policy, says Mohammad Noureddin in Lebanese as-Safir

 

As Turkey prepares to head to the ballot box next Sunday (June 7th), it is clear that these will be the country’s most momentous general elections for almost a decade, maintains a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs. Their results will have major repercussions for the situation in Syria and Egypt, and for Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia.

 

TURNING POINT: “June 7th is not only the date for general elections in Turkey; it will also mark a turning point in Turkey’s policy towards Syria and the Middle East,” writes Mohammad Noureddin in the left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

Everything depends on their outcome. Their impact on foreign policy will be clear: Either even greater impetus to the policy of foreign entanglement, especially in Syria; or the beginning of the countdown to ending Turkey’s predicament, departing the Syrian quagmire (or as some have begun to refer to it, Ankara’s potential Vietnam) to a large extent and withdrawal from the region’s many crises. If this occurs, it will also have a great impact on Turkish/Egyptian relations.

President Erdogan is impatiently waiting for the evening of Sunday June 7th to declare the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP’s) victory in the first parliamentary elections that will be held without him officially at the party’s helm. This is despite the fact that he still seems to be the party’s effective leader, heading to over three venues a day to address the masses, or attend some celebration, or inaugurate some project.

Erdogan’s intervention in the elections is in violation of the president’s role that should remain neutral and above the domestic electoral competition.  The elections’ outcome will affect both the domestic balance and Erdogan’s aspiration to be appointed ‘sultan’ with absolute powers, as well as the country’s foreign policy direction. He does not want to end his political life as a resounding failure.

The decisive factor here has to do with whether the AKP can win two-thirds of parliamentary seats (367 of the total of 550) allowing it to amend the constitution, or win the 330 seats at least that are necessary for transforming any proposal to amend the constitution into a referendum. Otherwise, the situation will remain as it is today.

But if the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) manages to pass the electoral threshold with 10% or more of the vote, and if the AKP fails to win between 43% to 44% of the vote, then this would mean that it had failed to secure half-plus-one of the seats. That would be a great catastrophe for the party, since it would be unable to dominate the government exclusively. In that case, it will call for early elections or form a coalition government with another party. But whichever party that may be, Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies will not be the same as they are today if it agrees to form a coalition with the AKP.

The People’s Republican Party’s (CHP’s) views on Syria are not in line with the AKP’s; and the same goes for its policies towards Egypt. As for the Kurdish HDP, it will only enter a coalition with the AKP on very strict terms that the ruling party cannot accept. The party whose ideological views are closest to the AKP is the National Movement Party. But this party also strongly opposes Erdogan’s Middle Eastern policies and calls for an end to Turkish intervention in Middle Eastern and especially Syria’s affairs, which only serve Washington’s greater Middle East project, in the party’s view.

In light of this, Turkey seems to be at a crossroads: it will either head towards a full non-parliamentary ‘Sultanate’ regime if the HDP fails and the AKP wins over 44% of the vote; or it will head in the opposite direction should the AKP fail to monopolize power. But even if the latter wins a small majority of no more than 300 seats, this would mean that support for the party’s domestic and foreign policies will change. Persisting with the same policies would be a risky venture that would not enjoy support even from within the AKP.

In fact, we should not exclude the possibility that this could be a gateway towards shakeups and rifts inside the AKP, especially in light of [former president] Abdullah Gul’s protests. Gul refused to take part in Erdogan's celebrations of the 'Conquest of Istanbul' even though he was invited to them. Similarly, Bulent Arinc has been criticizing the party for its role in economic development, but not providing justice.

In addition, many leading party figures have eschewed direct political activity because the party's bylaws prevent any member from running for office for a fourth time – which does not apply to Erdogan who is now president, and who has worked on eliminating all potential competitors inside the party. As a result, we seem to be facing a new version of the ‘Motherland Party’ whose disintegration began after its head Turgot Ozal moved from the premiership to the presidency in 1989. (Here, we should open a pair of parentheses to say that the Turkish/Saudi/Qatari coalition in Syria is in a race with time before the elections in anticipation of surprises. This is why it has intensified its pressure in Syria, leading to the developments in Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, and Tadmur).

The AKP's failure in the elections or if it only secures a modest result are likely to exert pressure on the government to alter its Syrian policies. But if the party achieves a major victory and if the HDP fails, Turkish intervention in Syria will intensify wagering on a new popular mandate and benefiting from Saudi backing.

In this instance, Erdogan will fall victim to megalomania, believing that remaining in power will enable him to expand his intervention, especially in light of the reports of an 'in-principle' Turkish/American agreement to provide air support for the opposition in Syria. And this unambiguously means that drones or piloted Turkish warplanes will take off from Turkey and fly over Syrian territories to test the possibility of establishing a security zone.

This would entail sinking deeper, directly and publicly into the Syrian quagmire this time around, eliciting certain, not just a possible, Syrian, Iranian, and Russian reaction to this development, and changing the manner in which this axis has been dealing with Ankara. By taking such a step, Ankara would only be inviting the military battle and violence into Turkey’s interior, which will not be spared the inevitable destruction that any Turkish involvement in a new Vietnam will bring with it this time around-- according to the Turkish daily Radikal

This leads us to Egypt. Erdogan has resumed his sharp discourse against President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi, describing him once again as a putschist, and as someone who used to pray behind [deposed Muslim Brotherhood president] Mohammad Mursi before he betrayed him and toppled him from power. He also repeated that he would never recognize Sissi as Egypt's president. Erdogan's renewed critical tone, which he has repeated in his electoral campaigns over recent days, suggests that the Qatari and Saudi effort to mediate with Ankara so as to cease its intervention in Egyptian and Gulf affairs in general has failed.

It also reflects the fact that Erdogan is still wagering on his and his party's special project from which no country is to be excluded. Heading the list of targets is Saudi Arabia, whom Erdogan holds responsible for the failure of his project in Egypt because it toppled the Muslim Brotherhood's regime. Here Erdogan is playing a deceptive double game with Riyadh. On the one hand, he welcomes its support in Syria; but on the other hand, he has refrained from supporting Saudi Arabia in its war on Yemen and confined himself to offers of intelligence and logistical support that make no difference to the direct ground, aerial, and naval support that Riyadh wants from its backers.

In light of his policy that knows no friends or companions either old or new, Erdogan's absence will deprive Saudi Arabia from a means of pressure on Damascus. But the situation in Syria aside, Riyadh will not be too unhappy if Erdogan were to be weakened, or even if the AKP loses the elections. This is not because the alternative to Erdogan is likely to offer Saudi Arabia more; there is no such alternative. Rather, it is because Riyadh will be rid of its strongest competitor for leadership of the Sunni Muslim world, one which has caused it many problems by embracing the Muslim Brotherhood and by continuing its contacts with Tehran, even this remains below a set ceiling.

If Erdogan, however, secures a major victory in the elections, this should be reason for panic in Saudi Arabia. It would mean that the entire Turkish state would be centralized in his hands thereby injecting the Ottoman horse with a new dose of madness at the foreign level. It would also lead its rider to try to regain Egypt and undermine Saudi influence there and monopolize intervention in Syria and deciding on policies based on what he believes is appropriate for Turkey with no consideration for Saudi calculations. In fact, the best alternative for Saudi Arabia would be for the AKP to remain in power, but with no change to its current size if not a reduction thereof.

If Turkey’s parliamentary map remains largely as it is, however, this would mean that its stance and positions would remain as they are, grasping whatever opportunities may emerge here or there, while Erdogan's eyes remain focused on some inalterable aims: toppling the regime in Syria, and trying to change the situation in Egypt as much as possible.

"All this is linked to one or half-a-points up in one place, or two points down in another, which makes the Turkish elections truly interesting this time round with major consequences," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.06.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Offside

 

Haaretz leads its Monday edition with news that the IDF is considering rethinking its policy toward soldiers who smoke soft drugs during their free time. All other newspapers lead with the fallout from Friday's drama (or lack thereof) in Zurich.

Yedioth Ahronoth's lead headline – 'Fighting the boycott' – refers not only to the Palestinians’ aborted attempt to get Israel kicked out of FIFA, but to a wider global trend of boycotts against the Jewish state. In a long article highlighting organized attempts to turn Israel into a pariah state, Ben-Dror Yemini is given a free hand to summarize the history of the BDS movement and to comment on the current state of affairs. His conclusion – which echoes Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's comments at Sunday's cabinet meeting – is that there is a very real threat to Israel's right to exist.

Israel Hayom, for its part, eschews any attempt to examine the phenomenon in depth and merely quotes Netanyahu, who told his cabinet that Israel is facing an 'international campaign to tarnish its image.' According to Netanyahu, that campaign is not connected to Israel's policies in Gaza or the West Bank, but is rather an anti-Semitic attack to deny Israel the right to exist. 'The last thing that we should do is bow our heads and ask where we erred, where we went wrong,' Netanyahu said. 'We did not err, we did not do wrong. We are put up to standards that no other democracy is forced to face. We do not need to justify ourselves. We just need to say the truth. It doesn't matter what we do, but rather what we represent. What hasn't been said about Jews throughout history - that we are the source of evil in the world; that we drink the blood of small children - all this has been said of us. It wasn't true then, and it isn't true now. As long as we reject this and refrain from self-flagellation, we will be stronger and more solid,' Netanyahu added.  'They say if only we were nicer, or more generous,' the prime minister continued. 'We've made many concessions and it hasn't changed a thing, because this campaign of delegitimization is much deeper, it wishes to strip us of our right to live here.'

Speaking later in the day at a joint news conference with German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier, Netanyahu reiterated that he is committed to the peace process and said that direct talks are the only way forward with the Palestinians. Netanyahu also commented on the arrest of a Lebanese man in Cyprus accused of planning attacks on Israeli targets, describing it as an example of Iranian terrorism.

Steinmeier is due to visit the Gaza Strip on Monday, to assess the socio-economic situation in the wake of last summer's war. In meetings with Israeli and Palestinian officials on Sunday, he expressed concern about Gaza, which is struggling to recover from devastation of Operation Protective Edge. He said that 'concrete measures' were needed to reconstruct the coastal enclave in order to prevent a renewal of the conflict.

Steinmeier told President Reuven Rivlin that Gaza's rehabilitation would build confidence between both sides, and added that resumed peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians should focus on Gaza as well as on the West Bank. Rivlin said that 'the need to rebuild Gaza and the renewal of direct negotiations' is very clear to Israel.

Hamas welcomed Steinmeier's visit to the coastal territory, even though the German diplomat has no meetings scheduled with officials from the Islamist movement. A Hamas statement said the visit is an important step, and Hamas expects Germany to play a role in lifting the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. A Hamas source denied rumors that the foreign minister's visit is tied to contacts on a swap between Israel and Hamas.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, a senior Palestinian official said that in light of the ongoing diplomatic stalemate, the Palestinians are considering lodging a complaint against Israel with the International Criminal Court in about two weeks’ time. Speaking to Israel Radio, Nablus Governor Akram Rajoub said that in light of the impasse, going to court is a legitimate right of the Palestinians, even though it is anticipated that Israel will respond by imposing collective punishment. He speculated that if the impasse continues, there will be implications on the ground – but he said he does not expect a third intifada to break out.

In other news, settler-run news service Arutz 7 reports that Hamas is planning to kidnap more Israeli soldiers, a spokesperson for the group said Sunday. According to Abu Obaidah, kidnapping IDF soldiers is one of the best ways to ensure the release of prisoners from Israeli prisons. Writing on his Twitter account, Abu Obaidah said that Hamas members not in prison 'are obligated to do everything to ensure the freedom of prisoners.' He said that he was thus sending a message of support to the prisoners, urging them not to lose hope, and that the day of their release would come soon.

In the United States, finally, where a solidarity march with Israel was held in New York on Sunday, CIA director John Brennan said that, despite the disagreements between the United States and Israel with regards to Iran, the intelligence cooperation between the two countries has not been harmed. Speaking on CBS News, Brennan stressed that there is a 'very, very strong relationship between the United States and Israel on the intelligence, security and military fronts.' 'It's one of the great things, I think, about our system; there can be policy differences between our governments but the intelligence and security professionals know that we have an obligation to keep our countries safe and secure,' he added.

 

OFFSIDE STORY: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians – including but not limited to Palestinian athletes – is the root cause of a growing sense among our Western allies that they can no longer defend us on the international stage.

"Faisal Husseini, the late leader of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, began a hunger strike one day, to protest Israeli construction over the Green Line. He climbed a hill opposite a new Jewish neighborhood and set up a protest tent there. To the best of my memory, there was only room for two people in his tent – and only if they were prostrate.

And then Yisrael Hasson, the deputy director of the Shin Bet, turned up on the scene. He lay down next to Husseini. A group of journalists was gathered outside, waiting for some news to emerge from the tent. After almost an hour, Hasson emerged and, without saying a word, left the scene. Husseini, too, remained silent, but the halo of heroism surrounding his hunger strike had disappeared. A while later, he took down his tent and went home.

I have no idea who convinced Jibril Rajoub to show some flexibility during the FIFA congress in Zurich: it could have been the organization's invincible president, Sepp Blatter, who was fighting for his seat, or it could have been the representatives of Qatar, who, having bought the right to host the 2022 World Cup, were afraid that their massive investment could go down the drain. Perhaps it was the dazzling diplomatic moves of Deputy Foreign minister Tzipi Hotovely or the winning smile of Israel Football Association chairman Ofer Eini. If I were a betting man, however, my money would be on a different answer: I would bet that someone simply reminded Rajoub where he came from and where he's going. Maybe he remembered without any help.

Rajoub's glory days were back when he served as head of the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. If Yasser Arafat was the king of the territories, Rajoub was the crown prince. His praises were sung by Shin Bet officers, who remember with appreciation the way that he took on Hamas in the aftermath of the wave of suicide bombings in 1996. Acting on Rajoub's orders (some say that he even took part in the operations personally) Hamas activists were driven from the hilltops of Betunia – south-west of Ramallah – where Rajoub would later establish the headquarters of his security force. I once asked Rajoub why he needed such fancy headquarters. In his croaky Hebrew, he replied: 'Hamas respects us when they see our strength.'

During Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, Rajoub refused to hand over to Israel the Hamas members who had taken shelter in his headquarters. He was acting on the direct orders of Yasser Arafat. After a four-day siege, the IDF destroyed the building using attack helicopters and tanks. The villa in which Rajoub lives to the north of Ramallah came under fire from an IDF unit stationed in Beit El. The commander of that unit was a certain Benny Gantz.

I met with Rajoub in Ramallah at that time. He sounded like someone whose whole world was collapsing around him. 'You tell me,' he said. 'Why are they doing this to me?'

His assistant, Abu Osama, took me on a tour of the compound. Anything that had not been destroyed by IDF fire had been smashed, including a massive portrait of Rajoub hanging in his luxurious office. 'You can destroy a building,' Rajoub told me, 'but you cannot destroy our dream of freedom.' The terror attacks of the previous month were insufferable, I told him. No government on earth would sit quietly by and allow that to happen. 'I understand,' he replied, 'but it will get worse before it gets better.'

Rajoub went on to rebuild his political career, taking over as the head of several Palestinian sports bodies. He saw the economic, political, diplomatic and perhaps even sporting potential. Israel does not discriminate against Palestinian athletes; it treats them the same as it treats all of the Palestinians under occupation. And that is exactly the problem.

All sides in this story are playing a game of make-believe. FIFA is pretending that Palestine is a country. It deserves professional soccer leagues and tournaments, with the best players and lots of fans, who are allowed to access the stadia unimpeded. The people of Palestine deserve a national team they can cheer on. The occupation, however, plays by different rules and FIFA is not equipped to deal with that.

The settlers' lobby is also playing make-believe. They believe that what is true for Be'er Sheva is true for Alon Moreh, that the rules that apply to a factory in Tefen are the same rules that apply to a factory in Barkan and that Beitar Tel Aviv is subject to the same laws as Beitar Ariel. For years this is the rulebook that the Israeli government has been playing by – but the international community refuses to play ball.

That is why the celebrations of Israeli politicians are, at best, premature. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was right when he argued that the occupation is not the only reason that the Palestinians wanted Israel booted out of FIFA and that they were, in fact, challenging Israel's very right to exist. But our problem is not just with the Palestinians; it's with many of our allies in the West. From junction to junction, from vote to vote, it is getting harder for these friends of ours to defend Israel's policies in the West Bank – morally and politically. We can always find a way to get Rajoub to back down. But as long as we remain an occupying power, we will have a problem with the rest of the world."

Ends…

 

RAJOUB'S FINEST MOMENT?: Writing on the Walla! website, Avi Issacharoff says that Jibril Rajoub's decision to put the good of the Palestinian people ahead of his own political interests is typical of the man – but warns that there are others who are pushing for a resumption of violent confrontation with Israel.

"Jibril Rajoub has made plenty of mistakes during his decades of involvement in Palestinian politics and security. His decision over the weekend to drop his demand that Israel be expelled from FIFA over its treatment of Palestinian soccer players is not, it seems, one of those mistakes. Ironically, it was his decision to push for Israel's suspension without knowing how it would end that can be counted among his worst errors – and one that he is likely to pay a heavy political price for on the Palestinian street.

For years, Rajoub was known by Jacob Perry and other senior Shin Bet officials as Gabriel Regev, thanks to the close cooperation that he, as head of the Palestinian Preventative Security Forces, gave Israel. Now Rajoub is in the vanguard of an active opposition to Israel. Not in military terms, but with what he refers to as 'the nonviolent struggle.' His goal was to embarrass Israel on the international stage while, at the same time, distancing the Palestinians from a return to the path of violence.

Rajoub's main mistake was complacency. Just like the Palestinian Authority was with its United Nations Security Council push – when it was sure that it has a majority backing its resolution recognizing the Palestinian state and that the United States would have to impose a veto – he was wrong. This time, too, at the moment of truth, Rajoub discovered that he did not have the required votes to boot Israel out of FIFA. He was convinced that almost 200 of 209 members of FIFA would support his effort to expel Israel, but Israeli Foreign Ministry officials and FIFA itself were busy working to thwart him. FIFA recognized that ejecting Israel would be a major blow for its own future.

At that stage, Rajoub had two options available to him. The first was the suicide option: forging ahead with a vote on expelling Israel, even though he knew that he would lose it. If he had done so, he would not have achieved any practical change on the ground, but he would have earned plaudits on the domestic Palestinian political scene, since he would have proved that he is willing to go the whole nine yards in his struggle against Israel – which is what the Palestinian people want of their leaders.

The second option was to scale back his offensive. He could try to lift some of the travel restrictions on Palestinian soccer athletes, thanks to increased supervision of the issue by FIFA and by a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee that would be established. This option would do him severe damage on the domestic political front, however.

It came as little surprise when he went for the second options. Had he successfully spearheaded the expulsion of Israel from FIFA, Rajoub would have been seen as the leading candidate to succeed Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, yet he opted for the least populist course of action imaginable and dropped (temporarily, at least) his demand that FIFA expel Israel. He even shook Eini's hand in full view of the television cameras.

On Palestinian social media and among Palestinian politicians, reactions to Rajoub's decision were predictably scathing. Hamas, as always, was extremely critical of his conciliatory move – despite the fact that Hamas itself is ensuring quiet on the Gaza border and has rounded up those militants responsible for last week's rocket attack. As one Fateh official said recently, Hamas would stop birds flying from Gaza to Israel if it could.

Hamas' criticism was echoed by Rajoub's so-called colleagues from Fateh, who used the opportunity to try and bring him down a peg or two. Can you imagine an Israeli politician deliberately doing something that harms his or her own standing in order to improve the lot of Israeli sports? And what has Rajoub himself got to say about all this? 'Let the dogs bark,' he told me. 'I have been through a lot worse during my career. I am looking out for the interests of the Palestinian people; I don't count how many people are cheering me.'

Some people would say that I am laboring under delusions of naiveté and that Rajoub is a cynical politician from his head down to his toes. That might be the case, but experiences would suggest otherwise. Looking at the history of Rajoub and of Abu Mazin, one gets a picture of two leaders who have, on more than one occasion, swam against the flow. When the Palestinian public expected them to do something extreme and contrary, they both proved on several occasions that the good of the Palestinian public is more important to them than popularity.

During the second intifada, for example, Abu Mazin was almost the only Palestinian leader who expressed reservations. He clashed with Yasser Arafat on the issue, demanded an end to violence and, as a result, was excluded from the inner circles of the Palestinian president. He was also the first Palestinian leader who called for an end to violence in the struggle against Israel – even though doing so was hugely unpopular. When he ran for president in 2005, he stunned observers by unequivocally calling for an end to rocket attacks against Israel.

The only other Palestinian leader who opposed the intifada – and the only member of the Palestinian security forces to do so – was, of course, Rajoub. As head of the Preventative Security Forces, he ordered his forces to refrain from any kind of clashes with Israel and warned that anyone who did not abide by his order would be dismissed. The same cannot be said of Rajoub's counterpart in the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Dahlan, or the head of the Palestinian intelligence services in the West Bank, Tawfiq Tirawi.

Rajoub paid a price for this behavior. When Israel captured the headquarters of the Palestinian Preventative Security forces in April 2002, Dahlan was the first to attack Rajoub for surrendering Hamas members to the Israeli enemy. Despite the accusations, Rajoub was actually responsible for Israel inadvertently releasing some Hamas members, whose identity had been concealed.  Rajoub was called a traitor by Dahlan and his ilk.

So where is all of this leading Israel? As always, politicians from the Likud and the other right-wing parties will have a field day. One cannot expect them to welcome Rajoub's attempt to have Israel booted out of FIFA, but one can expect them to wake up and recognize the status quo will only lead to more anti-Israeli measures in various international bodies and, at the same time, to a rise in the number of Palestinians who want their leaders to engage in full-on battle with Israel – not just on the diplomatic front, but on the ground, too. At the same time, we could also see a growth in the number of people on both sides who, having despaired on the two-state solution and of intifadas, are now willing to see a single state established between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea."

Ends…

 

DON’T COUNT ON ERDAN: Writing on the NRG website, Ilil Shahar says that, by dismantling the Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has harmed Israel's efforts to stave off the threat of boycotts.

"Over the weekend, we witnessed a diplomatic campaign against Israel's expulsion from FIFA. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu spoke to FIFA president Sepp Blatter; the Foreign Ministry sent a delegation headed by Israel Football Associated chairman Ofer Eini to Zurich and representatives of the Israeli diplomatic service across the globe exerted pressure on other countries' federations. There was one minister, however, who was not reported to have taken an active role in the effort: Minister of Public Security, Strategic Affairs and Minister of Information Gilad Erdan, who is supposed to have overall responsibility for the issue of boycotts in the fourth Netanyahu government.

It's not entirely fair to blame Erdan. He only took up his new position a few days ago and has not yet learned the ropes – especially who is on whose side. But this whole story highlights how problematic and inefficient Netanyahu's dismantling of the Foreign Ministry really is. Even after Erdan has fully studied the issue of boycotts against Israel, how are he and his small team supposed to deal with the large number of calls for boycotts and the activities of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli organizations across the world? After all, most of the manpower for such things is in the Foreign Ministry, which is the only government ministry to have representatives in all four corners of the globe? Instead of pooling its resources, the State of Israel is spreading them out and, in so doing, reducing their efficiency.

In the United Kingdom alone, there are more than 160 trades unions. If the United Road Transport Union – the organization that represents the interests of workers in road haulage, distribution and logistics – were to impose a boycott against Israel, there would be no one to transport Israeli-made goods from the ports to the shops. There are also some 50,000 churches in Britain. If one of them were to declare a boycott against Israel, that could lead to a domino effect. Therefore, Israel must identify the potentially problematic organizations and nip any boycott proposal in the bud.

Can one Jerusalem-based minister – no matter how talented he might be – identify such threats and deal with them in time? The only people truly capable of doing do are diplomats at the Israeli embassy in London – but the moment that the prime minister transferred responsibility for dealing with boycotts to a different ministry, he effectively relieved them of all responsibility for the matter. The often-understaffed embassy will now be dealing less with the boycott threat and more with those matters that are still under their responsibility: regular meetings with British officials and helping out Israeli nationals who get into trouble. As a result, one of the key strategic threats facing the State of Israel is likely to fall between the cracks.

The State of Israel needs a full-time foreign minister. Our prime minister seems to think that he is best equipped to take on that job. With his fluent English and his proven public diplomacy skills, there's no question that he's the best man for the job – but he has a country to run. His attempt to please all of his ministers by dismantling the Foreign Ministry will harm us all."

Ends…

 

WHERE DOES BIBI STAND? Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Jeff Barak slams Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for chiseling away at the responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry and parceling them off to politicians whose sense of self-importance is greater than their talents.

"Let’s assume Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely was talking tongue-in-cheek when she said in a weekend newspaper interview she had no problems shaking the hand of a male diplomat (Hotovely is religiously observant and avoids physical contact with the opposite sex) because, as she put it, there was no danger of there being any affection in the contact.

Given Israel’s standing in the world, it’s fair to say that any foreign diplomat on the receiving end of Hotovely’s handshake would probably make the same claim. Which, in the eyes of many, makes it scandalous that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has chosen not to appoint a full-time foreign minister to make Israel’s case on the world stage, preferring to keep the portfolio to himself for now and leaving the relatively junior politician Hotovely as a deputy minister to run the ministry.

Moreover, in a desperate move to keep his more senior Likud colleagues onside, Netanyahu has also chiseled away at the responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry, slicing and dicing its various activities and parceling them off to politicians whose sense of self-importance is greater than their talents.

Silvan Shalom, whose day job is interior minister (as well as holding the meaningless title of vice prime minister), is also the minister responsible for Israel’s strategic dialogue with the United States and negotiations with the Palestinians. At least this latter title is unlikely to take up much, if indeed any of Shalom’s time in the foreseeable future.

Yuval Steinitz, meanwhile, the minister of national infrastructure, energy and water (yes, the longer the title, the less important the position), is also theoretically responsible for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat, an appointment which has not been met with any signs of discernible concern in Tehran.

And finally, Gilad Erdan has been rewarded for his long sulk by having the ministries of public information (or hasbara to use the Hebrew term) and strategic affairs (but obviously not the strategic dialogue with the U.S.) added to his duties as minister of internal security. All that’s needed now is for Netanyahu to create a new ministry for rescuing Israelis caught in earthquakes abroad, and there really will be no reason for the foreign ministry to exist.

But the truth of the matter is that the foreign ministry has always been at the mercy of the whims of the prime minister of the day. Having a full-time foreign minister, as the dismal record of Avigdor Lieberman in this position shows, is also no guarantee of diplomatic success. In fact, this year we’ll be spared the embarrassment at the United Nations annual general assembly of having the country’s foreign minister publicly contradict positions laid out only a few days earlier by the prime minister, as Lieberman used to do to Netanyahu.

The example of Shimon Peres as foreign minister best highlights how success in this role depends on the backing of the prime minister. While foreign minister under Yitzhak Shamir, Peres signed the 1987 London Agreement with Jordan’s King Hussein, which aimed to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict via what was known as the 'Jordanian Option'; the resolution of the Palestinian issue through Jordanian sovereignty over the entirety or most of the West Bank.

While Peres had Shamir’s approval to negotiate with Hussein, Shamir refused to support the agreement reached. As a result, it was never brought to the cabinet for discussion and Hussein, frustrated by Peres’ failure to deliver, soon after relinquished any claim to sovereignty over the West Bank, paving the way for Yasser Arafat to win international recognition as the legitimate Palestinian representative.

But Peres, as we know, never gives up. As foreign minister under Yitzhak Rabin, he gave his backing to secret talks between two Israeli academics and three senior PLO officials, the beginning of the Oslo process that eventually led to Israel’s recognition of the PLO and direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Despite the long and bitter history of disputes between Rabin and Peres and their diametrically opposing characters, Rabin shared Peres’ view of the need to change the status quo regarding the Palestinians and the two men jointly created a new reality. Peres, his deputy Yossi Beilin and the foreign ministry director- general of the time, Uri Savir, were rightly seen as the front-runners of the Oslo process, but they could not have progressed without the support of Rabin as prime minister.

The issue facing the foreign ministry today is not whether it needs a full-time minister in place, or whether Israeli diplomats arguing Israel’s case should rely on the Bible and Rashi for proof of their argument, as Hotovely has suggested (this time not tongue-in-cheek), but rather a clear sense of direction as to where the prime minister stands on the defining issues of Israel’s foreign policy.

Is Netanyahu in favor of a two-state solution or against? Is the Bar-Ilan speech relevant or not? Without knowing the answer to this, no foreign ministry, no matter how well-staffed or in control of all diplomatic- related activities, stands a chance of success."

Ends…

 

GAME (NOT) OVER: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that territorial withdrawals persuade Israel’s enemies that Israel is weak – and the state has abandoned its duty to assure the safety of the civilian population.

"Fifteen years ago Ehud Barak, as prime minister and defense minister, took one hell of a gamble. He ordered the Israel Defense Forces’ unilateral withdrawal from the south Lebanon security zone, abandoning in haste Israel’s allies of many years, the South Lebanon Army. It was one more move in the seemingly never-ending deadly game of Israel versus Hizbollah. The game isn’t over by a long shot, but it’s not too early to venture an assessment of this bold move.

Four years earlier in 1996, while Shimon Peres was prime minister and defense minister, the IDF conducted a 16-day campaign against Hizbollah, Operation Grapes of Wrath. It ended in a UN-brokered cease-fire providing that Hizbollah not use Lebanese villages for attacks against Israeli targets and Israel refrain from attacking Lebanese villages.

But Hizbollah kept on using villages as bases for attacks against Israel, while Israel stuck to the agreement and was now fighting Hizbollah with one hand tied behind its back. Fighting between Hizbollah and the IDF continued over the next four years, during which the IDF lost about 24 soldiers a year. It was Barak’s intention to put an end to these losses. His calculation was simple. After an IDF withdrawal to the international border, Hizbollah would have no reason to attack Israel and would limit its activities to Lebanese politics.

To preempt the possibility of such attacks, he warned that Israel would retaliate with devastating blows that would 'set fire' to Lebanon. After having UN officials confirm that the IDF had withdrawn to the international border, he believed he had the legitimacy for that kind of response, and Hizbollah would be deterred from taking any hostile action against Israel.

It didn’t quite work out that way. Hizbollah struck again and Barak didn’t make good on his warning. A number of Hizbollah provocations finally led to the 2006 Second Lebanon War in which thousands of rockets were launched at Israel and 165 Israeli soldiers and civilians lost their lives. It was a reminder that deterrence against a terrorist organization and legitimacy are elusive concepts. Whether on balance the 2000 withdrawal saved Israeli lives is not at all certain.

The withdrawal did create a perception in the eyes of Israel’s enemies of Israeli weakness. Hizbollah emerged victorious, becoming the dominant power in Lebanon, and began amassing a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles aimed at Israel. Hassan Nasrallah did not miss the opportunity to celebrate 'victory.' Two days after the May 26, 2000, withdrawal from Bint Jbeil, abandoned by the IDF, he announced: 'We offer this victory to our oppressed people in occupied Palestine; our people in Palestine your destiny is in your hands …. Your path to freedom is through serious resistance and a real uprising, intifada …. Israel is weaker than a spider web.' Four months later, in September 2000, the second intifada broke out, claiming thousands of Israeli victims.

A sinister part of Barak’s unilateral withdrawal was the abandonment of Israel’s allies the South Lebanon Army. They had for years fought side by side with the soldiers of the IDF and had sustained losses greater than those of the IDF. Israel betrayed them. But the long-term effects of the withdrawal are the most serious of all. Israel abandoned its traditional defense doctrine that it is the state’s duty to assure the safety of the civilian population.

That’s why David Ben-Gurion insisted that France’s air force guard the skies and ensure the safety of Israel’s civilian population before he agreed to Israel’s participation in the 1956 Suez Campaign. That’s why Menachem Begin launched Operation Peace for the Galilee in 1983 to protect the civilian population in the north from rocket attacks from southern Lebanon. That’s why Israel maintained a presence in the south Lebanon security zone for years.

Since then, almost unnoticed, Israeli withdrawals and the increasing rocket ranges have brought Israel’s entire civilian population under the threat of rocket and missile attacks. The game is not over."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS: Baskin Oran depicts a climate of fear in centre-left Radikal: "In every place of the world and in every era, every oppressive administration’s basic method is to create an enemy and thereby survive. The chronological order here has gone from 'reactionaries', 'bandits', 'bigots', 'communists', to 'leftists', 'separatists' and 'terrorists'. Now it is the turn of the [alleged Gulen] 'parallel' state structure. No one can say anything for fear of being identified as members of this alleged structure."

Engin Altundis sees a ray of hope in Radikal: "The HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] is a brand-new party, which is just two years-old. Like a rainbow, it includes all the colors of Turkey’s democracy: Socialists, feminists, social democrats, democratic Muslims, representatives of the Alevis, Kurds and unionists. But women, most of all. While Turkish society has been tense in recent years, there is great benefit in giving a chance to the HDP and thus to Turkey’s future democratization by not lending an ear to the manipulation and slander of the neo-nationalist-AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] alliance. Turkey deserves that."

Mehmet Tezkan offers a prediction in centrist Milliyet: "The belief that a single party government will not emerge from the ballot box is getting stronger. The assessments are like this. If the HDP passes the 10% electoral threshold, it will be hard for the AKP to reach power alone. If the HDP does not overcome the barrier, a presidential regime and one man rule are at the door."

Nuray Mert warns against a one-party system in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The president and the ruling party have lost all restraint. They are depicting this election as a struggle between 'enemies of the nation' and the government that claims to be the ‘one and only representative of the nation’. In this case, not only has democracy in this country been crippled, it has become impossible to conduct a democratic struggle. Depicting those who oppose a party as enemies, identifying a party with the state, the nation and the survival of the nation, is something that happens only in party-states."

Mustafa Unal suggests that the ruling party is facing failure in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The AKP is very aware. It has cut back on its goals. The excitement and enthusiasm have been replaced by fear and anxiety. This has been reflected in the newspaper columns as well. The fear has almost turned into panic. There are many things that the AKP and its supporters will lose. What will be lost will not just be the election. Financial benefits will be cut for example. Law and democracy will be restored for example [applied against the AKP]."

Hikmet Genc challenges the opposition in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "There are certain TV channels, newspapers and columnists who have made attacking President Erdogan and the government a daily duty. There are those who threaten him and say 'your end will be like Menderes [former Turkish PM hanged in 1961]. Then they say that 'there is no freedom of expression, no freedom of press in Turkey'. These unconscionable people are not taking people seriously. Is there anything that could be said before 2002 but cannot be said today? They need to think well whether they are free or not."

Kurtulus Tayiz uncovers the opposition’s plans in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "The June 7th elections are being conducted as the first phase of a plan to weaken Erdogan politically. The chief role here has been taken by the PKK and HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas. All components of the old state, all legal and illegal forces have been mobilized to support Demirtas. A broad coalition has been established. Even the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] has been included in this coup coalition. After the elections a move will be made to drive a wedge between Erdogan and his party, and to drag him toward the Menderes’ fate step by step."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The spreading fire

2-Image and mirror image

3-Egypt’s Syrian priorities

4-Good riddance

5-Mending Saudi-Jordanian relations

 

1-The spreading fire

 

ISIS poses a real threat to the region. Why? Because the fact that it has control of areas in Iraq has astonished many people. And because the Assad regime is losing in Syria, this is cause for satisfaction; but there is also cause for more concern because this organization and others like it may be the only alternative in certain Syrian areas, as is now happening. In light of this, consolidating the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria is a necessity imposed by the reality of the situation in these areas of conflict. For if the coalition does not succeed in stopping ISIS in its tracks, the fire will spread to the remaining Arab areas--Saudi al-Watan

 

So far, ISIS and the Nusra Front have killed anyone who disagrees with them, anyone who does not believe in their ideas, every Shiite, Christian, or Zaidi who has fallen into their hands, and every Sunni Muslim who does not accept their way of ruling the areas under their control. Women were taken into captivity and distributed as war booty, as if we were still living in the age of slavery. It is therefore foolish to belittle the threat posed by ISIS and the Nusra Front should they win in the war raging in Syria. There will certainly be a massacre of the Shiites, Christians, and Druze in Lebanon. The heads of the leaders of the Sunni current will roll, which is exactly what is happening now in Syria, unless they are lucky enough to flee Lebanon. After all, are beheadings not the first thing that ISIS does whenever it is victorious in any confrontation in Syria or Iraq? Mohammad Yaghi in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

By their actions, ISIS and other similar factions are leading Syria towards partition and fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines, notes the editorial in a Saudi daily. Unless the anti-ISIS coalition is strengthened soon, the Syrian fire will spread to other Arab countries.  If the Syrian regime falls, it seems inevitable that Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will be next in line for violence and bloody civil war, maintains a Palestinian commentator. Given the absence of guarantees that the U.S. or any other power can prevent this, it is sheer madness for some of these circles to wish for the fall of the Syrian regime and Iran’s defeat at any cost.

 

FABIUS WARNS: "French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said nothing new when he warned just a few days ago that Iraq and Syria face the threat of partition unless the anti-ISIS international coalition is strengthened," notes the editorial in Friday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

France will host a summit of 24 countries in Paris on June 22nd to discuss the U.S.-led coalition's strategy against this terrorist organization.

 The spectre of partition did not exist at the start of the Syrian revolution; but after the terrorist organizations entered Syrian territories, this threat has now become real. These terrorist organizations’ entry has served Assad's regime at many levels:

- First, it gave the mistaken impression that the takfiri militias represent the alternative to the regime.

- Second, the fighting in Syria has spread to many fronts whereas there was previously a legitimate opposition that represented the people under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA); but we now have ISIS, the Nusra Front, and other jihadi factions instead. And we all know that the disagreements and infighting that broke out between the various armed terrorist factions and groups, and between them and the FSA has fragmented the resistance to the Syrian regime, which has been the main beneficiary of what has happened.

- Third, this led the regime to seek the help of pro-Iran factions and militias including elements of the Basij, Hizbollah, and other brigades to confront any opposition to the regime.

This bloody panorama has confounded the Syrian scene. To this should be added the fact that the terrorist groups, primarily ISIS, are not only fighting against the regime; like the regime, they are also fighting all shades of the Syrian spectrum and all constituents of the Syrian people. This has led the Kurds, for example, to resort to their areas and to try to put their own affairs in order to confront ISIS.

The same has happened in many other battles. In other words, Syria turned into an arena for fighting between various kinds of enemies, and this is what will ensure the success of any of its ethnic or sectarian constituents.

ISIS poses a real threat to the region. Why? Because the fact that it has control of areas in Iraq has astonished many people. And because the Assad regime is losing in Syria, this is cause for satisfaction; but there is also cause for more concern because this organization and others like it may be the only alternative in certain Syrian areas, as is now happening.

In light of this, consolidating the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria is a necessity imposed by the reality of the situation in these areas of conflict.

"For if the coalition does not succeed in stopping ISIS in its tracks, the fire will spread to the remaining Arab areas," concludes the daily.

End…

 

CAUTIOUS IN DEALING WITH SYRIA: "I have learnt to be cautious when considering the situation in Syria," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

On the one hand, the unrest in Syria began in March 2011 in a manner similar to which it started in most Arab countries: A section of the people took to the street demanding an end to the injustice it has been suffering for decades. But this action was not left to take its course, radicalize, and stretch from Der'a to the other Syrian provinces. Soon other forces joined in and resorted to confessional incitement, armament and financing, and introduced takfiri groups into Syrian territories.

There are those who always wish to remind us that the regime's resort to 'thugs' to put down its opponents was the reason why Syria has reached its present condition. But this is only a small part of the truth. On January 28th 2011 – the so-called 'Friday of Anger' – Mubarak's regime killed 600 Egyptians; but this did not lead the Egyptians to take up arms. And on August 14th 2013, when the [Muslim Brotherhood] sit-in in Cairo’s Rabi'a Square was ended, over a thousand Egyptians were killed within hours, but this also did not lead to civil war. And on January 8th 2011, bin Ali's regime killed 28 Tunisian activists in al-Qasrain, Tala, and ar-Riqab; but this did not lead the protestors to take up arms.

The distinctive mark of Syria lies in the foreign intervention motivated by the conflict with Iran and the need to defeat it by toppling one of its allies in the region – the Assad regime. This is why the opposition forces were armed, monies were spent to split the Syrian army, and a sectarian media war was waged by the regime's regional enemies. So U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden said nothing new when he said at Harvard University a few months ago that some U.S. allies have financed terrorists in Syria in an attempt to topple Assad at any price.

Today, the question of how the slaughter in Syria began is no longer important. The most important question now is this: What if the Syrian regime is actually toppled? Will Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia be safe?

When Hizbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah said a few days ago that his party and the Syrian regime's victory in Syria guarantees that the war will not reach Lebanon, and that if they are defeated, the primary losers will be [Hariri's pro-Saudi] Future Current and the remaining Lebanese forces, many people laughed at his claim. But did the man not speak the truth?

So far, ISIS and the Nusra Front have killed anyone who disagrees with them, anyone who does not believe in their ideas, every Shiite, Christian, or Zaidi who has fallen into their hands, and every Sunni Muslim who does not accept their way of ruling the areas under their control. Women were taken into captivity and distributed as war booty, as if we were still living in the age of slavery.

It is therefore foolish to belittle the threat posed by ISIS and the Nusra Front should they win in the war raging in Syria. There will certainly be a massacre of the Shiites, Christians, and Druze in Lebanon. The heads of the leaders of the Sunni current will roll, which is exactly what is happening now in Syria, unless they are lucky enough to flee Lebanon. After all, are beheadings not the first thing that ISIS does whenever it is victorious in any confrontation in Syria or Iraq? Is this not what it did in the city of Tadmur [Palmyra] last week – a mass massacre of more than 400 people in a single day, as the Syrian opposition not the regime's media documented?

What is really strange is that Saudi Arabia and Jordan understand this very well, but it appears that their policies do not really reflect the true nature of the threats surrounding them. The assumption may be that the U.S. will put all its capabilities at work to defend them if they are under threat. Perhaps because Jordan is forced to go along with the Gulf states that back it economically. Perhaps Saudi Arabia believes it is far from danger.

But these are all just illusions: First, because the U.S. is unwilling to get involved in the Middle East again as it did in 2003. Second, even if we assume that it placed all its capabilities to work as it did when it fought al-Qa'ida in Iraq between 2004 and 2006, there can be no guarantee of victory before both countries are all but destroyed. And third, and most importantly, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are at the heart of the crisis, and they are actually being targeted and not immune to the threat.

Jordan is the second Arab country after Tunisia in the number of 'jihadis' it provides who join ISIS and the Nusra. I recently read a book that said that ISIS only appears in failed states such as Syria and Iraq, because of the anarchy there. This is true in general; but was Syria a failed state before the war? Syria became a failed state because of the war.

But the threat to Saudi Arabia is even greater because it has become involved in a war on Yemen. One of the most important immediate consequences of this war is the strengthening of al-Qa'ida along its southern borders. ISIS has been active along Saudi Arabia's eastern borders with Iraq. And in ISIS and al-Qa'ida's discourse, Saudi Arabia heads the list of targets because of its religious status, and it is undoubtedly being targeted as evidenced by the recent suicide attack on a mosque in the town of al-Qudaih in eastern Saudi Arabia.

In short, the fall of the Syrian regime has huge security repercussions for Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It is thus difficult to understand this madness that makes victory against Iran an absolute priority.

"If the Syrian regime falls, the war will inevitably spread to the neighboring countries, after which these countries will drown in bloody wars that they today believe are far from them and against whose threat they think they are safe," concludes Yaghi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Image and mirror image

 

The situation created by ISIS's entry into al-Ramadi in particular, have provided an opportunity for the birth of popular mobilization forces that are not confined to the Shiite shade of the spectrum, but extend to include the Sunni constituent. For numerous sectors of that constituent have reached a level of awareness and understanding that what is happening is an attempt to tamper their fate as well. Such a force – whatever its name – which may come from different sectors but which shares the same aim and fate can act as a means of protecting the political process, even in the post-ISIS phase--Salem Mashkour in Iraqi as-Sabah

 

We have no objection to the Shiites' beliefs. In fact, we have no objections to the beliefs of any group of people as long as they remain a matter of faith, spiritual values, rituals, rites, and worship. But when these beliefs fan the flames of civil division and strife, and when they turn into a mighty engine for polarization, division, and divergence, then they amount to incitement and a culture of hatred and fanaticism that threatens national unity. This is what the PMU is doing – following in the footsteps of the Nusra Front and ISIS. For as great is the need for its role in the battles of al-Anbar and elsewhere, it stirs fears, worries, and caution regarding the coming days to the same extent. It is in this regard in particular that the PMU and ISIS play similar roles. Whichever looks at itself in the mirror will see the image of the other-- Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

One of the positive responses to ISIS's emergence and its advances in Iraq is the formation of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) which fulfill the role of a necessary force whose main task is to defend the new regime, maintains an Iraqi commentator in a pro-government daily. ISIS's advances in al-Ramadi have drawn Sunni elements to the PMU, making it more representative of Iraq's various constituents. The PMU is a confessional militia which will alienate most of Iraq's Sunnis and render them wary of joining the fight against ISIS, warns a leading Jordanian commentator. It is the reverse image of ISIS and, like it, it can only lead to the breakdown of Iraq and its people.

 

SOMETHING GOOD FROM BAD: "If anything bad can have good consequences, then among the more 'positive' aspects of ISIS's entry into Iraq and its threat to Baghdad is the PMU's emergence after the jihad fatwa from the [leading Iraqi Shiite] authority as-Sistani," writes Salem Mashkour in the pro-government Iraqi daily as-Sabah.

All radical revolutions require a force that protects the new regime against the threat posed by the old regime's forces that try hard to topple, or at least to obstruct the work of the incoming regime in order to claim that it has brought nothing good to the country.

But what happened in Iraq was even worse. Elements from the old regime have waged an armed revolt against the new regime ever since it was established after April 2003, while other elements have engaged in political sabotage from within the new regime by infiltrating it.

The old regime did not fall as a result of a revolution or a military coup; it came to power via a U.S. military invasion, which was the only way to rid the majority of Iraqis of dictatorship. But the result was the same: Toppling the old dictatorial, repressive, sectarian, chauvinistic and savage regime, and the establishment of a totally different one under the banner of democracy, federalism, liberties, and the peaceful transfer of power.

But no one thought of establishing a guard to protect the new regime. As a result, the political arena produced armed elements acting outside the state's framework and that took it upon themselves to respond to those who were trying to topple or confound the new regime. And this had its own negative consequences that further complicated the scene. In Iran, for example, where the royalist regime was brought down by a popular revolution in 1979 and as soon as the revolution succeeded, the new regime’s leadership took the initiative of forming two protective forces– the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Islamic Revolution's Committees.

When Saddam waged his [1980-88] war on Iran, the Iranians viewed it as a proxy war for other outside forces that was aimed at toppling the new regime. As a result, the abovementioned two forces became the vanguard for the battle on all fronts, together with the Basij (‘Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed’). It was thanks to the performance of these three forces on the various fronts and inside Iran that the attacks it suffered were repulsed and the regime was protected.

Iraq, however, lacked such an ideologically committed force that believes in the new regime and protects it by force. One reason may have been that regime change was the result of action by foreign forces and there was no united and harmonious local force that could have taken such a step. But more important than all this was the sharp political split between two camps, and the system of distributing shares and partnership that brought people who do not believe in the new regime and who were trying to weaken it into crucial posts. The formation of such a protective force had to proceed within the framework of power-sharing and coerced partnership. As a result, it could not be either harmonious or united in its aims, which meant that it could not fulfill its expected the role.

The situation created by ISIS’s entry into al-Ramadi in particular, has provided an opportunity for the birth of popular mobilization forces that are not confined to the Shiite shade of the spectrum, but extend to include the Sunni constituent. For numerous sectors of that constituent have reached a level of awareness and understanding that what is happening is an attempt to tamper their fate as well.

"Such a force – whatever its name – which may come from different sectors but which shares the same aim and fate can act as a means of protecting the political process, even in the post-ISIS phase," concludes Mashkour.

End…

 

SUCCESSIVE TERMS: "Mr. Nuri al-Maliki ruled Iraq for two successive terms (2006-2014) and fought hard to obtain a third term but to no avail, after the Iraqis united, or almost united, against him," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Before him, Dr. Iyad 'Allawi and Mr. Ibrahim al-Ja'fari each ruled for about a year, if we disregard their first term in office when the Iraqi Governing Council was still running the country. Anyway, this first term lasted only one month in accordance with the monthly rotation system adopted by the Council.

After eight years of almost individual role with semi-absolute powers, especially in his second term, Mr. Maliki has just come out with a statement speaking of the PMU as 'the sole remaining alternative' and as Iraq's guarantor that must be supported until the mission of building a national Iraqi army is completed. But how were all these years, billions of dollars and all the efforts on training and sponsorship, spent? Al-Maliki blames those who came after him, who have only been in power for a few months.

But the tragicomic side of Maliki's statements is that they coincided with the beginning of the counterattack on al-Ramadi, to which the PMU chose to give the codename: 'At your service, Imam Hussein.' This is guaranteed to provoke, not only the community that embraces ISIS and its sister organizations, but the thousands of volunteers from the Sunni clans who would have definitely preferred a different codename, such as 'At your service, Iraq,' or 'At your service, al-Anbar,' or any other name that highlights the patriotic aspect rather than the confessional character of the military campaign to recapture al-Ramadi, liberate al-Anbar, and preserve the country and people's unity and protect them against partition and fragmentation.

We have no objection to the Shiites' beliefs. In fact, we have no objections to the beliefs of any group of people as long as they remain a matter of faith, spiritual values, rituals, rites, and worship. But when these beliefs fan the flames of civil division and strife, and when they turn into a mighty engine for polarization, division, and divergence, then they amount to incitement and a culture of hatred and fanaticism that threatens national unity.

This is what the PMU is doing – following in the footsteps of the Nusra Front and ISIS. For as great is the need for its role in the battles of al-Anbar and elsewhere, it stirs fears, worries, and caution regarding the coming days to the same extent. It is in this regard in particular that the PMU and ISIS play similar roles. Whichever looks at itself in the mirror will see the image of the other.

This bitter precedent was set in Tikrit and the miserable militia-like practices that accompanied and occurred after 'liberation,' and which the PMU is trying hard to deny. But the insistence on using the abovementioned codename for the operation to liberate al-Ramadi indicates that it fails to take the other parties’ sensitivities into consideration and is proceeding with its confessional discourse and practices till the end of the road.

It is these – its discourse and the practices – that have played an undeniable role in 'fertilizing' the environment that embraces ISIS and provides it with all the elements it requires to 'remain and expand.'

It seems that no one wants to learn from the lessons of the previous experiences. Most important by far is the fact that 'religious identity' – whether sectarian or confessional – is the opposite of 'national/patriotic identity.' For the formation of an Islamist party necessarily calls for the establishment of a Christian party. And the establishment of a Shiite militia makes it necessary to give birth to a Sunni militia.

Chauvinistic Arab nationalist parties pushed ethnic minorities to seek secession – from North Africa to the mountains of Kurdistan, via Southern Sudan where ethnic exclusion was mixed with religious exclusion. As for fragmentation, it will not stop at any limit. In the absence of a collective and uniting identity, sub-national identities will continue to branch out and give birth to less inclusive and smaller identities, with no 'bottom' to the pit of breakdown and division.

Like others and perhaps more than others, the Iraqis have paid a huge cost for the policies of exclusion, elimination, and marginalization for more than half-a-century and up till the present time.

Under the banner of 'At your service, Iraq' the clan members who joined the Iraqi Awakening Forces – with names like Mohammad, Yazid, Mu'awiya, and 'Omar – can fight bravely in defense of their city and sacrifice all they hold dear in order to recapture it. But under the banner of 'At your service, Hussein,' I believe they will sleep with half-closed eyes for fear that they may pay with their lives the price for the eruption of instinctive sectarian sentiments that recall 'Hussein's revenge' and [historic Shiite] demands punishment for his murderers – the old ones, but especially also the new ones.

In short, Iraq's liberation from ISIS – assuming this is achieved in the foreseeable future – will be no more than a new chapter in the open Iraqi crisis that will remain susceptible to various possibilities and scenarios, just as the fall of president Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 closed one chapter but opened up an even bloodier one that is more dangerous for the future of the country and its people.

"Within a short period, we may be faced with the challenge of 'containing' the PMU militia, whose role and influence are growing, turning it into a burden not a guarantor of Iraq, and into a cause of its subsequent problems, not a tool for confronting and dealing with them," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Egypt’s Syrian priorities

 

Cairo seems to have adopted an ambiguous stance towards the Syrian regime, says to Mohammad Barhouma in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

As Egypt prepares to hold a conference for the Syrian opposition factions, other than the Muslim Brotherhood, it is becoming clear that Cairo insists that the achievement of the Syrian people's legitimate aspirations can only be achieved by preserving Syria's unity and state institutions, primarily its army, argues a Jordanian commentator. President Assad's departure or remaining in power is a relatively minor point compared to this aim.

 

OPPOSITION STATEMENTS REJECTED: "In a TV interview, Egyptian Foreign Secretary Samih Shukri rejected the statement made by the head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC) Khaled Khoja regarding Egypt's neutrality in the conflict between the Syrian opposition and regime," writes Mohammad Barhouma in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The Egyptian minister responded to Khoja by noting that already Cairo had already hosted a Syrian opposition conference in January, and is preparing to host the Cairo-2 Conference on June 8th and 9th.

Be that as it may, there is some ambiguity surrounding Egypt's attitude towards Assad remaining in power. There are those who say that Cairo is in accord with Moscow on this issue, and we have not come across a frank and direct official Egyptian statement denying this.

The Egyptian position leans towards distinguishing between the Syrian state and the regime – despite the difficulty of such a distinction. As Minister Shukri says: 'the person of President Bashar al-Assad is one thing, and Syrian state institutions is another. We must consider the difference between them. For whether a particular person stays in power concerns the Syrian people and does not concern us. What does concern us is the survival of the state institutions.'

The fact of the matter is that this approach is consistent with the position of Jordan, the UAE, Tunisia, and perhaps Algeria on the Arab scene. They may also explain U.S. President Barack Obama's statements that there may be no resolution of the Syrian crisis during his term in office. Moreover, it may provide an explanation of why a few days ago the U.S. bombed a site controlled by the Nusra Front in Idlib. The implicit message was: 'The Nusra and hence the [Saudi-backed Islamist] Jayshul Fateh should not expand towards Damascus and the Syrian coast, even if the regime and its allies seem unable to prevent this.'

It thus appears that an American red line has been drawn which is not canceled out by what is being said about the U.S.'s readiness to back the creation of no-fly zones along the Syrian/Turkish borders. Furthermore, Washington will sense no contradictions in its attitudes towards Syria, as long as what it is doing is consistent with Obama's idea of a 'strategic balance' in the region and preventing the jihadis from approaching Damascus and the coastline.

Egypt will try to convince the Syrian opposition factions attending the Cairo-2 Conference – and the Muslim Brotherhood is not among them – that the realization of the Syrian people's legitimate aspirations can only be achieved by preserving the unity of Syrian territories and its state institutions, with the army at the vanguard, while linking Assad's departure to the threat of the country sliding towards anarchy.

"These are Egypt's priorities in Syria, and this is what it will try to propose in Cairo-2, which it hopes will produce a national covenant, a roadmap, and a political committee to follow up on its conclusions," concludes Barhouma.

Ends…

 

 

4-Good riddance

 

Very few Palestinians will be shedding any tears over Tony Blair’s resignation as Quartet representative, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Former British PM Tony Blair's resignation from his post as advisor to the International Quartet will be welcome across the Arab world and beyond, says the editorial in a pan-Arab online daily. This is not only because of his duplicitous role and his support for Israel, but also because of his role in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the death of over one million Iraqis.

 

WAR CRIMES: "We do not think that anyone in or outside the occupied Palestinian territories will feel sad or sorry that former British PM Tony Blair has resigned his post as International Quartet envoy," writes the editorial on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This is not because the man failed to achieve any peace or prevent any settlement activities or end any Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, throughout the seven years he spent in this post. Rather, it is because his name in the minds of honorable Arabs and Muslims, is linked to the war crimes he committed in Iraq as one of the main architects of the war that led to the death of over one million Iraqis, the country’s destruction, and was the launch of a colonial scheme to destroy the main centers of Arab civilization and most, if not all Arab countries.

Tony Blair should be standing in the dock, accused of being a war criminal. He should not have been rewarded with the post of peace envoy, which totally conflicts with his racist positions that are hostile to the Arabs and Muslims. But nothing is unlikely in these appalling Arab conditions.

This man engaged in all sorts of deception and lies throughout the past years. He fiercely supported the expansionist Israeli plans, and was in effect an advisor to Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu and to all the Arab tyrants who wallowed in the blood of their nations, even if he was not formally appointed in such a post.

Blair was chosen for the mission of achieving false peace in the hope that he may atone for his sins, or some of them. Instead, he did the exact opposite. He deceived everyone, primarily the PA's men, when he came out with his concept of 'economic peace' and building the Palestinian state's infrastructure. His peace took the form of a war on Gaza and settling over half-a-million Israelis in occupied Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Blair resigned after fulfilling his mission in the service of Israel and its settlement schemes. He justified its wars of aggression in Gaza; he tried to defend its image even though it is seen as a racist state across the world; and he has helped it confront the honorable people in the world who continue to demand that it, its universities, and its goods be boycotted because of its occupation, racism, and crimes in the occupied territories.

It is sad that many Arab states lay out the red carpet for this war criminal and sign contracts with his company that offers its advice in return for millions of dollars. These include Kuwait and the UAE. Therefore, we ask these states to end their cooperation with him out of respect for the souls of our martyrs who were killed because of his grave crimes in Iraq.

"We shall not shed a tear because he resigned," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

5-Mending Saudi-Jordanian relations

 

Jordan has sent a special envoy to try and mend its strained relations with Riyadh, notes Fahd al-Khitan in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Jordan have not been at their best since the new Saudi monarch Salman came to power and the change he has brought about in Riyadh's regional alliances, notes a Jordanian commentator. But the visit to Riyadh by a former head of the Jordanian Royal Court may change that.

 

UNEXPECTED STEP: "The step was unexpected, and it has three main implications,' writes Fahd al-Khitan in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

First, it amounts to an official recognition that Saudi/Jordanian relations are undergoing a crisis. Second, it indicates that Jordanian diplomacy is unable to overcome or ease this crisis via its current form and structure. This is why the Jordanian 'system' sought help from someone outside the decision-making circle. And the third implication, which is an important one, concerns the identity of the envoy, Dr. Bassem 'Awadallah who was said to have lost touch with the political 'center' ever since he left his official position as head of the Jordanian Royal Court eight years ago. Today, that claim has been shown to be inaccurate.

'Awadallah's relationship with Saudi Arabia is not new. When he headed the Royal Court he formed strong ties with influential figures in the Saudi administration under the late King 'Abdullah bin 'Abdulaziz. The local political elite got the impression that 'Awadallah's political influence stemmed from his good relations with Saudi Arabia, as well as with various important international and regional parties.

This impression was not without foundation. For after he left his post, he joined a Saudi commercial establishment managed by Sheikh Saleh Kamel, before he finally ended up in Dubai as the director of the Emirati Tomoh Advisory.

Even though the transfer of power to a new king in Saudi Arabia was smooth in form, it amounted to a coup in political terms. It quickly affected Saudi Arabia's regional position and alliances. And the special relationship between Jordan and Saudi Arabia appeared to have been one of its victims.

 'Awadallah was in close touch with the changes in Saudi Arabia and followed developments there. His recent visit and his nomination as King 'Abdullah's personal envoy were clear indication of his direct ties to the new leadership, which may be used to redefine relations between the two sides.

What is also interesting about this step, is that it was announced by the Saudi rather than the Jordanian side, which has kept silent about it so far. The Saudi media reported the warm welcome extended to 'Awadallah and his pictures with the Saudi monarch and Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif, Saudi Arabia's strongman.

The visit was preceded by Awadallah’s notable appearance at the Dead Sea World Economic Forum at the main session held under the banner of 'Jordan Relaunched.' 'Awadallah spoke of the Gulf states and their 'hoped for' role in backing Jordan to overcome its economic crisis.

Was this participation and the messages it sent a preliminary step that paved the way for Riyadh's visit only, or does it pave the way for something else beyond? It is hard to predict future developments. But what is certain is that 'Awadallah’s return to the limelight via the Saudi gateway will give rise to a wide debate in Jordan’s political and media circles and excite the rumor machine, which has remained idle for years.

In the short run, it is important to monitor the course of Jordanian/Saudi relations and to measure the likely effects of 'Awadallah's visit to Riyadh and the unwritten messages he has carried with him and those he has brought back to Amman.

"Will relations return to their normal course? If so, the question concerning 'Awadallah's domestic role will be a legitimate one," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Football Wars

 

Most Israeli newspapers lead their weekend editions with today's scheduled vote by FIFA on a Palestinian proposal to eject Israel from world soccer over its alleged discrimination against players and coaches. Yedioth Ahronoth describes it as 'Judgment Day' for Israeli soccer. Israel Hayom quotes Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warning that ousting Israel from FIFA would lead to the 'collapse' of the governing body of world football.

'The attempt to hurt Israel will destroy FIFA,' Netanyahu told journalists at his Tel Aviv office. 'If you start with one country, then you move to another, and that would spell the end of this organization (FIFA),' said Netanyahu. He noted his meeting in Jerusalem last week with FIFA President Sepp Blatter, who opposes the move to expel Israel. 'I told Blatter that if he will allow suspending Israel, it will pave the way for the collapsing of FIFA,' Netanyahu added.

Haaretz, which does not lead with the FIFA story, reports that, Israeli officials met with FIFA officials until late Thursday night in an effort to draft a compromise proposal that would prevent the association’s Friday vote on the Palestinian proposal to ban Israel. The proposal consists of concessions Israel is offering the Palestinians in soccer-related issues.

According to the source, Israel offered a four-point proposal that addressed most Palestinian grievances.

1-Palestinian players and coaches will receive special documents to facilitate their travel from Gaza to the West Bank and abroad.

2-Israel will ease restrictions and promote soccer-related projects in the West Bank, including the construction of a stadium and other facilities.

3-Israel would cover the costs of tax and customs for sports equipment imported by the Palestinians to the West Bank via Israel – predominantly via the Ashdod seaport.

4-A joint committee comprised of representatives from Israel, the Palestinian Authority and FIFA would be formed and would convene monthly to address day-to-day issues and any problems that arise.

The source said Blatter welcomed Israel’s proposal but stressed it would need the approval of Palestinian soccer chief Jibril Rajoub before removing the vote on banning Israel from FIFA’s slate. The source said Rajoub acceded, but added another demand – that FIFA ask UN Secretary Ban Ki-moon to issue a decision within three months on whether the five Israeli teams based in West Bank settlements were within Israeli territory. Meanwhile, two female protesters interrupted Blatter's opening address to the conference, waving red cards at FIFA representatives and chanting 'Israel out!' before being escorted out of the hall by security guards.

Haaretz, leads with a report by Zvi Bar'el on ‘Hizbollah’s war of survival,' in which he reports on the Lebanese organization's change in tactics, which includes recruiting Palestinian fighters to its ranks and establishing Christian units.

In other news, all the newspapers report that France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius says he will travel to Israel and the Palestinian territories in June to try to revive the peace process and persuade all sides to accept a French UN Security Council resolution that would set parameters for talks. 'We are for a two-state solution. We need to ensure Israel's security that's obvious. There is no peace and security without justice for the Palestinians, but let's be frank justice hasn't been given to the Palestinians,' Fabius told France Inter radio.

France recently handed a working document to Arab League countries in preparation of a Security Council resolution that would set a timeframe and the exact parameters of new peace talks between Israelis and the Palestinians. 'I will go ... to Egypt, the Palestinian territories and Israel to speak to their leaders,' Fabius said. We want the negotiations to restart between the two sides and that these negotiations be put within an international framework.' Aides to Fabius said the visit would take place ahead of a final round of nuclear talks between major powers and Iran at the end of June.

Elsewhere, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak said Thursday that Israel should initiate steps to end the conflict with the Palestinians. Speaking to Army Radio, Barak suggested that if the PA refuses to reach a settlement to the conflict, Israel should take unilateral steps to establish a Palestinian state. Israel and the 'moderate Arab world', as he put it, have a mutual interest in reaching a compromise. 'The center of this common interest is radical Muslim terrorism and Iran's hegemonic and nuclear intentions,' Barak said, but added that 'there is no chance' that this cooperation can take place without Israel showing its willingness 'to seriously discuss the Palestinian issue.'

'I know Abbas and I know his heirs; I suggest we should try to solve it with them, and if not – to seriously consider the unilateral steps that are required to create a situation of no return of a disengagement from the Palestinians,' he continued. He suggested that Israel 'marks a border inside the land of Israel that includes the settlement blocs and all of Jerusalem’s neighborhoods, the military presence along the Jordan River that meets Israel’s security needs. On the other side an independent Palestinian state will be established.'

Finally, Reuters – citing sources on both sides – reports that United States defense aid to Israel is likely to increase after 2017. A current package worth $3 billion a year expires in 2017. A U.S. official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said negotiators were close to a new deal that would bring annual payouts to $3.6/$3.7 billion on average. An Israeli official, who also declined to be named, put the expected aid at between $3.5 billion and $4 billion. 'The United States is trying to douse the fires after our flare-up about the Iran deal,' the Israeli official added, referring to negotiations on Tehran's disputed nuclear program.

 

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini says that the Israeli left has been conditioned to reject anything that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu proposes – and, in so doing, it is missing as many opportunities as Palestinians.

"In a meeting a few days ago with EU Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu proposed holding a series of talks about the 'settlement borders.' Gilad Erdan, whose new titles make him one of Israel’s six foreign ministers, added in response that 'the negotiations with the Palestinians will involve territorial concessions.'

Like with any proposal linked to Netanyahu, the regular choir broke out into its well-known chorus: He's fooling everyone; he doesn't mean it; it's simply another move to buy time; he's deceiving us again. Interestingly, when Netanyahu says something in the opposite vein, the likes of the statement: 'There won't be a Palestinian state during my term in office,' he becomes the most trustworthy individual who truly means every word he says – even if the statement came in the heat of the election campaign and was designed to attract voters right of the Likud. 

Why the hell is Netanyahu viewed as a con artist only when he says something that rings of moderation? And how come those very same leftists tell that every rejectionist statement from Mahmoud Abbas is made 'for domestic purposes,' only, whereas every moderate statement is 'proof that the Palestinian leader wants peace' and should be taken seriously?

The settlement enterprise is the biggest bone of contention between Israel and Western leaders. They believe that Israel is expanding and stifling any possibility of a Palestinian state. This isn't true. The expansion is taking place primarily within the large settlement blocs. Netanyahu's proposal comes to resolve the ongoing disputes with Europe and the United States. After all, the Clinton peace plan, the Geneva Initiative and Olmert's proposal all include settlement blocs. So why does construction in Ramat Shlomo, which will never be ceded under any peace arrangement, spark responses that sound like we are dealing with settlement building in the heart of Jenin?

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry ran back and forth between Ramallah and Jerusalem. He prepared a draft proposal, which wasn't very different to the Clinton plan. Netanyahu appeared inclined to respond positively to most of its clauses. He didn't agree to the division of Jerusalem.

At a crunch meeting at the White House on March 17, 2014, Abbas and his team rejected the offer – in the exact same way that the same Abbas rejected Ehud Olmert's offer in 2008; and in the exact same way that Yasser Arafat rejected Clinton's proposal in late 2000. Tzipi Livni, in all fairness, made it clear that the talks mediated by Kerry didn't fail because of Netanyahu, but primarily due to Abbas. The moderate, so very moderate, Palestinian leader has already said no, and will continue to say no, to any and every proposal that does not include the right of return en masse.

Against this backdrop, the Zionist left should have seized on Netanyahu's initiative to determine the 'borders of the settlements.' In light of Abbas' positions, and also due to the current geopolitical situation and the make-up of the new Israeli government, there is no chance of securing a peace deal. But there is a chance to adopt measures that would ward off the disaster of one big state. And the most important step in this direction is to put a stop to the expansion of the settlement enterprise.

It can be done – because in the framework of the talks with Kerry, Netanyahu agreed to a Palestinian state covering more than 90 percent of the West Bank. Netanyahu's consent came under pressure; it was forced out of him; but he gave it. Thus, a dialogue is possible. There is room for an important step. And when the danger of a takeover of Judea and Samaria by one of the Jihadi offshoots, like Hamas, subsides, we can move on to additional steps. But if nothing is done, if the stagnation persists, then the horrific vision of a single state will begin to take shape.

It turns out that the Palestinians aren't the only ones to miss every opportunity; the new Zionist left, as opposed to the Zionist left of yesteryear, would rather stick with political cattiness than afford a chance, albeit a small one, to taking a step in the right direction."

Ends…

 

ECONOMY FIRST: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that, for most Palestinians, economic prosperity comes before the struggle for nationhood.

"The Palestinians are sending us mixed messages. In Zurich, Jibril Rajoub, known to his friends in the Shin Bet as Gabriel Regev, is trying to get Israel booted out of FIFA. In Jordan, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas is complaining bitterly about the behavior of the Israeli government, but, at the same time, he talks about the need for increased economic cooperation, since the situation in the West Bank is dire and people are desperate.

One military source I spoke to this week tried to help me get things straight. The defense minister, the chief of staff and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories support a more liberal policy, he told me. They have been encouraging the establishment of Palestinian industrial zones in Jalami, Qalqiliyah and Tarkumiyeh, all three of which are adjacent to the seam line; in Jalami, construction work has already begun; irrespective of what bus lines they use, more and more Palestinian laborers are allowed to enter Israel to work; and the Palestinian leadership understands that Israel wants to help strengthen the PA.

PA-sponsored terrorism is on the decline. The Palestinian security forces are nipping all terror cells in the bud. Over the course of the past year, they have helped to rescue no fewer than 538 Jews who accidentally found themselves in Area A. That's an impressive number and its contribution to maintaining the quiet is obvious.

There are almost no shooting attacks and there are zero suicide bombings; there are, however, vehicular attacks and stabbings. People with tough personal back backgrounds hear a sermon in their mosque, see a film, read a tweet or a status on social media – and decide to carry out an attack. The IDF tried to profile these spontaneous terrorists: is there a pattern, do they use the same language? Thus far, they have been unable to piece together a useful profile.

The main concern among Israeli defense officials is what happens in the fall, after the negotiations with Iran are over, during Ramadan and the Jewish High Holy Days. On the ground, the Palestinian Authority is getting weaker – and that is a major worry for the IDF. I asked my source to explain why. The main problem is the refugee camps, he said. The PA is totally absent from them. The second problem is the intermediate generation in Fateh, which does not believe that it will ever assume leadership roles in the organization. The older generation has refused to convene meetings of the organization's leadership for good reason. The third problem is the opposition. Mohammed Dahlan invests the money that he gets from Dubai in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in helping orphans and in funding weddings. Abu Mazin sees him as the enemy. The fourth problem is the youth. They are on a knife's edge. The only ideology that they can identify with is the struggle against Israel.

But, in the meantime, the need to exist is overcoming everything else. The economy comes first and then the struggle for nationhood.

The head of the IDF's Judea and Samaria Division, Tamir Yadai, was recently on a tour of Hebron. He was greeted by a delegation of 50 traders, who didn't say a word about the occupation, the peace process or the settlers on the town's controversial Shuhada Street. Their main concern was the commercial potential of the town. They followed him from factory to factory. At a mattress factory, he asked which Israeli company they were manufacturing for. They showed him a part of the plant where there were labels for several different Israeli companies. Take your pick, they told him."

Ends…

 

GOOD AS GOLD: Writing in Makor Rishon, Amnon Lord says that the appointment of Dore Gold as director general of the Foreign Ministry is a turning point in Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's tenure, since it will allow him to hit the reset button on Israel's foreign policy.

"There are several appointments which could turn out, in retrospect, to be turning points in Binyamin Netanyahu's tenure as prime minister. One of the most obvious of these was the appointment this week of Dore Gold as director general of the Foreign Ministry – even though he has the personality, skills and knowledge to be foreign minister, rather than in a senior position in the civil service.

This is the kind of appointment that everyone must agree is good for the State of Israel and good for the Foreign Ministry. The scorn and disdain with which some elements in the media greeted the appointment are nothing short of infantile. Even some of the country's top commentators, it seems, don't always do their homework. They proved that they know nothing about one of the most important contributors to the debate over Israeli strategy and foreign relations.

Gold is one of those people who do not see Israeli foreign policy and strategic issues through the very narrow prism of Ramallah. Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority are now a marginal issue in Israel's diplomatic universe. The Palestinian issue has become a festering cesspit of stagnant water. There's no progress there. The Palestinians have missed their historic moment. And it's not because Dore Gold is a rightist and not because he opposed the Oslo Accords from the outset.

Gold is an expert in international relations who thinks big. His vision is global. He knew what he was saying when he told reporters that he sees 'protecting the interests of the State of Israel' as the main task he faces in his new position. This is the kind of statement one expects from someone who understands the power of the state, its place in the family of nations and what contribution Israel can make to other countries – including our closest neighbors and potential allies who are further away geographically. Gold is an expert on Saudi Arabia and has written several books about the country and its ruling royal family. Presumably, his expertise is not limited to academic issues and he will have a significant contribution to make to the blossoming relationship between Israel and its potential allies across the Middle East. Like Saudi Arabia; the most powerful member of the Sunni axis.

Anyone who has been keeping a close eye on Gold's career also knows that his opinion and analysis of certain events is often sought out by Arab commentators and officials. His books, for good reason, are translated into Chinese. It is vitally important for Israel's interests that the director general of the Foreign Ministry is seen by the international community as someone who has the trust and ear of the prime minister. This has not always been the case in the Foreign Ministry since Netanyahu's return to power in 2009. In fact, this is the first time that Netanyahu can start to implement a change in Israel's foreign policy and can start to use it – for a change – to advance the Jewish state's strategic and global interests.

Israel's consul-general in New York was recently asked whether it was appropriate for an organization like J Street to participate in a pro-Israel rally in the city. He replied that he unreservedly supports the left-wing group's participation. This is the sort of thing that proves that the Foreign Ministry is still the same body that is was 25 years ago, when its policies were influenced by the Labor Party, by Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin, Uri Savir and, more recently, by Alon Liel."

Ends…

 

FOREIGN BODIES: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has done untold damage to Israel's Foreign Ministry and says that he is lucky that cooperation and coordination with the United States continues despite his handling of the relationship.

"Over the years, Israeli prime ministers have – to put it mildly – never been their foreign ministers greatest admirers. They have jumped at every opportunity to prove that they determine the country's foreign policy. They especially liked to show the world that they were in charge of Israel's relationship with the White House and that they are the address for any and all dialogue with the U.S. president.

Some prime ministers managed to conceal the distance between them and their foreign minister; others maintained a façade of propriety and politeness in their relationship with the foreign minister, allowing him and his officials to spearhead Israel's initiatives and proposals on the global stage.

Ironically, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – who decided to keep the foreign ministry for himself and could have rebuilt its reputation, positioned himself as the main driving force behind the country's foreign policy and revitalized its authority – has broken all records. He downgraded its standing, insulted its officials and – most ironically – has denigrated the once-exulted position that he now holds.

By appointing Tzipi Hotovely as deputy foreign minister, by creating a new position of minister responsible for relations with the United States, by appointing Dore Gold as director general of the Foreign Ministry and by dividing up the powers of the ministry between several ministers, Netanyahu has doomed it to extinction and thwarted any hope that it will be able to initiate, influence and spearhead Israeli foreign policy. He has emasculated the very body that is supposed to represent Israel on the international stage.

Israel is facing many serious challenges at the United Nations. It is likely to face increased confrontations with the European Union. Bearing this in mind, it is impossible to overstate the scope and extent of the damage that the prime minister has done to the standing and power of the Foreign Ministry.

It appears that Netanyahu is unaware – or has elected to remain unaware – of the extent of the crisis in relations between him and the U.S. president. He does not, it seems, plan to make any special effort to rebuild that shattered relationship.

Judging by the appointments he has made since being reelected, it is clear that Netanyahu's sole purpose was to surround himself with people who already share his worldview and who will not bother him with dire predictions regarding future clashes with the European Union and will not upset him by telling him about all of the anti-Israeli resolutions being brought to the Security Council. Most importantly of all – they won't trouble him with working papers about the Palestinians or – God forbid – the peace process.

Silvan Shalom is a talented individual. As foreign minister, he spearheaded moves that improved Israel's presence at the United Nations and its working habits. But in his new position as responsible for relations with the United States, Shalom has very little chance of successfully rebuilding relations between Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama.

One of the main obstacles in Shalom's path is Israel's ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer. Obama's closest advisers refuse to have anything to do with Dermer, who, since arriving in Washington, has become a diplomatic embarrassment and a major cause of damage. Unfortunately, as long as he remains ambassador, the newly appointed 'American Relations Minister' will not be able to do his job.

If Shalom were to ask for a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the answer would be yes. But when he is asked about an Israeli initiative for the resumption of talks with the Palestinians, all Shalom would be able to do is report to Kerry on his own talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas and Saeb Erekat. After all, any new Israeli initiative for peace with the Palestinians is under the authority of the prime minister.

When it comes to security and cooperation with the Obama Administration at the UN, Shalom will also be similarly ill-equipped to do anything. That, after all, is the realm of National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen and his American counterpart, Susan Rice. Despite the tension between Netanyahu and Obama, the Cohen-Rice channel is still working in a positive atmosphere and has made practical progress. One example was the American move to thwart Egypt's attempt to force Israel to sign up to a treaty calling for a nuclear-free Middle East. That is entirely down to the close cooperation between Rice and Cohen.

Senior Western diplomats believe that the United States will veto the French Security Council resolution aimed at advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and will continue to protect Israel. This is despite Israel's right-wing foreign policy, despite Netanyahu's recent appointments and despite the bizarre way that he's split up all of the traditional roles of the Foreign Ministry. The Americans are continuing with their current policy, whereby they are the sole mediators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and whereby the Security Council has only a marginal role to play. How long this will continue is anybody's guess."

Ends…

 

ALONE AT THE TOP – BY DESIGN: Writing in Haaretz, Yoel Marcus says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu feels more secure in his position than ever before, since there are no talented people threatening him and he is certain he will prevail over Obama.

"What happened this week between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat over the Jerusalem portfolio in the cabinet proves once again that the prime minister is a man without inhibitions. Barkat claims that Bibi broke a promise to leave the post unfilled so Jerusalem’s affairs could be coordinated directly between the prime minister and Barkat as mayor. 'So what if he promised?' one might ask, in a contemporary variation on the late Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who was quoted as saying that he promised but didn’t promise to keep his promises. 'He’s not allowed to promise?'

We have a country that is going downhill and a prime minister whose brakes have failed. Nothing interests him other than serving out his full four-year term as prime minister. He’s a man with no shame who is capable of scaring the public with his dramatic pre-election warning that Arabs were going to the polls in droves. And then once he got himself reelected, he also had no problem saying that he 'didn’t intend to be racist.' In any event, one time he is in favor of a two-state solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and the next time against.

And in his ongoing cultivation of himself as leader of the nation, here and there you deceive a little and frighten people a little. Mayor Barkat believed Bibi and got burned as a result. Benny Begin, too, swallowed Bibi’s words of flattery, and Bibi needs Begin. There is no substitute for Begin as a standard bearer in the cabinet for the legacy of his father, but suddenly Netanyahu made Benny Begin redundant around the cabinet table. It’s crowded at the top.

So 'no problem,' as they say on the street, they either throw Benny Begin out or make minister without portfolio Ofir Akunis the ambassador to the United Nations. Let’s hope Begin stands up for himself because he’s the only one who can teach Bibi a lesson. What could Bibi do to him? Order the staff to remove him from the cabinet room?

What’s happening here is much more significant when it comes to the nature of the 'profession' of being an Israeli leader. Even though the term 'seat' has been sacred in our political life since the establishment of the state, there has been a real change recently in everything having to do with terms and rotations in office. On kibbutzim and in the army, there is no such thing as a job for life. Both the head of the Intelligence Corps and the head of the kibbutz cowshed are replaced every three or four years. That’s good for the country. Why? Because at a certain stage people begin to be overly enamored with themselves, with their whims, those loyal to them and with their own mistakes. And that’s dangerous.

What happened to Bibi? Thanks to two factors, he has managed to consolidate his standing as long-time ruler: 1) Thanks to a law requiring a cooling-off period before army brass could enter politics, he plugged the pipeline leading from the Israel Defense Forces into government. Figures such as Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz, Yitzhak Mordechai, Haim Bar-Lev and Motta Gur would no longer find their way home via a privileged government job. 2) He has taken control of law enforcement in the country. At one time the Police Ministry, as it was called, was simply reserved for a so-called Sephardi politician. Now the Israel Police fulfill an important political role. The police pay close attention to every important political appointment from the president on down, from Avigdor Lieberman to Gabi Ashkenazi. The last public security minister, Yitzhak Aharonovich, objected to extending the police commissioner’s term to a fourth year, but Bibi cajoled and acted and the commissioner stayed. No one is parachuted in from above anymore by surprise.

Bibi feels more secure in his position than ever before. There are no talented people threatening him, and he is certain the methods he has selected will enable him to prevail over U.S. President Barack Obama and even Yedioth Ahronoth owner Noni Mozes. On the other hand, his is a leadership approach without leadership, statesmanship, graciousness on the part of the victor or majesty. It’s negative leadership, a bull in a china shop. Instead of bringing people together, he sows division, he reigns by fear. His is a Foreign Ministry without a foreign minister and with drab Tzipi Hotovely as deputy minister and Dore Gold as director general. The empty minister’s chair is what will be making the decisions and Bibi can now fly on an official state aircraft custom-built for him with two bedrooms.

His gatekeeper was supposed to be Kulanu party leader Moshe Kahlon, the finance minister, but Kahlon has stumbled on his first step. He laughed all the way to the helm of the Finance Ministry, but in politics, he who laughs is he who laughs last. They say it will be Bibi, because at the last moment, he will tempt Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog to join a government of national unity. But Herzog, who starred in a documentary about his campaign, has now finished off his future prospects career with coarse street language.

Bibi may be arrogant, but sooner or later, the prime minister will be – mark my words – Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid."

Ends…

 

THE RACISM SMOKESCREEN: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Evelyn Gordon says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's much-maligned Election Day comments have been misreported: the prime minister wasn’t targeting Israeli Arabs, she argues, but foreign-funded NGOs.

"Two months later, that Election Day warning refuses to go away. Just last week, U.S. President Barack Obama condemned it yet again; even actress Natalie Portman has joined the party. Yet Binyamin Netanyahu’s infamous remark has been widely and deliberately misconstrued by the simple expedient of omitting its second half.

Granted, the first half – 'Arab voters are coming to the polls in droves' – was indefensible. Especially now, when Israeli Arabs are more interested in integrating than ever before, politicians should be encouraging this trend, not alienating them by painting them as enemies. But politicians nearing the end of an exhausting campaign often slip up and say stupid things they don’t really mean. Netanyahu retracted this part of the statement immediately. And in practice, his last two governments have invested heavily in Arab integration.

In contrast, he never retracted the statement’s second half; instead, he doubled down on it. Because that part wasn’t a slip of the tongue, but something he really meant – and which resonated deeply with his voters.

So what did he actually say? Here’s the initial statement: 'Arab voters are coming to the polls in droves. Left-wing NGOs are bringing them in buses.' And here’s his subsequent clarification: 'There’s nothing illegitimate about citizens voting, Jewish or Arab, as they see fit. What’s not legitimate is the funding, the fact that money comes from abroad from NGOs and foreign governments, brings them en masse to the polls in an organized fashion, in favor of the left, gives undue power to the extremist Joint Arab List, and weakens the rightist bloc such that we’ll be unable to form a government.'

In other words, he was concerned about bolstering JAL, and legitimately so: Many of its MKs are indeed extremist (think Hanin Zoabi). But primarily, he was outraged that foreign governments and NGOs, via the Israeli NGOs they fund, were blatantly trying to influence the outcome of Israel’s election. And his voters shared that outrage, for three reasons.

First, it’s an affront to any citizen of a democracy to have foreigners trying to sway his country’s election, because it eviscerates democracy’s most fundamental right: the right to choose the government that rules you, rather than having it imposed from outside. Nor is this sentiment unique to Netanyahu voters: Israeli Druze were similarly outraged when Lebanese Druze leader Walid Junblatt urged them to vote for JAL. The community’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Moafaq Tarif, demanded that Junblatt 'respect the right of Druze in Israel to vote as they please,' because they’re 'an inseparable part of Israeli society' who 'enjoy freedom of expression and freedom to do as they please.' Similar comments came from Druze supporters of both Labor and Likud. But this sentiment resonates doubly with Netanyahu’s base, because it contravenes not only basic democratic rights, but also Israel’s raison d'être. The Jewish state was created precisely so that Jews could finally control their own fate instead of having it controlled by others.

Second, foreign intervention stirs age-old Jewish fears, because the non-Jewish world’s track record on protecting Jews is lousy: See the Holocaust, Inquisition, Crusades, pogroms and expulsions from country after country. Even many Jewish holidays commemorate failed attempts to annihilate the Jews (including Passover, Hanukkah and Purim. Consequently, this fear is ingrained in the psyches of all but the most secular Jews, and certainly in Netanyahu’s voters, who tend to be more traditional. So when he talked about 'money from abroad' and 'foreign governments,' his voters instinctively heard this as 'people who don’t have our best interests at heart.'

Third and most important, however, was the track record of these foreign-funded NGOs themselves. Many Israelis would instinctively oppose anything these NGOs support, because they demonstrably don’t have Israel’s best interests at heart.

Take, for instance, B’Tselem, the Israeli NGO most frequently cited by the infamous Goldstone Report on the 2009 Gaza war. The Goldstone Commission was unabashedly created to be a lynch mob. First, it was set up by the viciously anti-Israel UN Human Rights Council, whose only country-specific permanent agenda item is condemning Israel. The HRC has condemned Israel 61 times since being established in 2006, compared to five for Iran, one each for ISIS and Boko Haram, and zero for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Hamas. Second, the commission’s explicit mandate was to investigate Israel alone, not Hamas. Finally, the very resolution that established the commission had already declared Israel guilty of war crimes, including deliberately targeting civilians. The commission’s job was merely to provide 'evidence' for that predetermined conclusion, and it duly produced a report so biased that its own lead author later repudiated it.

Thus no NGO with Israel’s best interests at heart should have cooperated with Goldstone. But B’Tselem didn’t just cooperate; it eagerly plied the commission with anti-Israel libels liked inflated civilian casualty figures (compare its figures to this). Indeed, as B’Tselem unblushingly admitted in January, whenever it’s uncertain whether casualties were civilian or combatant, it labels them civilian – then accuses Israel of excessive civilian casualties.

Or take Adallah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Its stated goals include eliminating Israel’s Jewish majority by relocating millions of descendants of Palestinian refugees to it. That’s an explicit provision of Adallah’s proposed 'Democratic Constitution,' which even terms this a necessary condition for an 'equal and democratic' society. In other words, Adallah deems Israel an undemocratic, apartheid state unless it agrees to voluntarily self-destruct.

Nor are B’Tselem and Adallah unique; they are merely two of dozens of similar organizations – all virulently anti-Israel and all funded mainly by foreign governments, either directly or via foreign NGOs. As NGO Monitor reported in 2011, European governments spend more money 'promoting civil society' in the Mideast’s only democracy than they do in all other Middle Eastern countries combined – $75 million to $100 million a year.

This is what truly concerns Netanyahu’s base. It’s why his last two coalitions tried to pass legislation limiting foreign funding for NGOs, and why his current coalition is expected to try again. And all the talk about Netanyahu’s 'racism' has merely served as a smokescreen to obscure this very real problem."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

CONTROVERSY OVER RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE: Writing in the centrist Milliyet, Mehmet Tezkan accuses President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of anomalously introducing the concept of religious leadership into what is essentially a secular state: "The president has described the head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, Mehmet Gormez, as a 'religious leader' in order to legitimize his use of a million Turkish liras for buying a Mercedes, expenditure which opposition parties criticized. The president has thereby brought back the concept of religious leadership to Turkey. But let me say this: Democratic, secular, law-governed states have no religious leaders. We do not have such an institution. There is no post of chief imam in our state. There is no Ayatollah institution. But the president has also enlarged the ground covered by this leader. He said that Gormez is not the religious leader of Turkey alone. He upgraded him to the leader of the Muslim world!"

In secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Balbay sees the controversy over the Religious Affairs Directorate as an instance of a pattern in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) reshapes state institutions to fit its own image: "The Directorate of Religious Affairs has never been subject of much political controversy. Those who occupied this chair have always been people respected by the general public, regardless of the government in which they served. However, this institution too has been affected by the AKP government's habit of making all institutions look like the AKP; turning them into institutions that belong not to the state but to the AKP."

Ahmet Tasgetiren thinks that the controversy is not over the Directorate's official car, but over the Directorate's head's way of dealing with religious affairs, in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Discussions of religious affairs rarely concern only 'religious affairs.' In fact one dimension of the debate over the nature of the 'system' in Turkey has always concerned the status or mission of religious affairs. For the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP,) this institution 'is no different from the institution of the land registry cadastre.' So what is the real issue being debated in the controversy over the Religious Affairs Directorate's official car: Merely the official car, or Directorate's head Mehmet Gormez' way of dealing with religious affairs?"

 

GENERAL ELECTION: Writing in centre-left Radikal, Murat Yetkin sees no chance of any change in the Turkish government's anti-West rhetoric as long as the AKP and Erdogan remain in power: "The majority of Turkish voters like their politicians to throw down an external challenge, especially against the West. Although they see their interest as lying in relations with the U.S. and the EU, they feel released by this discourse against them. And in this atmosphere, President Erdogan moves on to become the sole determinant in foreign policy as well. The result: As long as Erdogan remains president and the AKP remains in power, we should not expect a Turkish foreign policy line that is different from today's."

Ali Yurttagul is impressed by the effect of votes cast by Turks living abroad on the outcome of the elections at home, in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The votes of Turkish citizens living abroad are an important factor for the parliamentary arithmetic. Since they are divided up among the cities, they also affect the distribution of the MPs. In many cities, the 'last' chair can pass from one party to another because of these votes. An unusual number of 'external' votes for a party can affect the composition of parliament. For the first time in these elections, we will be able to measure such an effect."

Although the majority of Kurdish votes will go to the pro-Kurdish leftist alliance (HDP) because of anger at the AKP's Kurdish policies, there is no evidence that the more religious Kurds are moving away from the AKP, says Abdulkadir Selvi in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "No tangible switch is being observed from the AKP to the HDP among the 'religious Kurdish' votes. The HDP is a party that is the first choice of 63 per cent of the Kurds. If a group of religious Kurds are moving away from the AKP, this is not simply about the election process. The process of questioning began with Kobani [anger at the government about the lack of support for the Syrian Kurds' fight against Islamic State in Syria] and Uludere [where more than 30 Kurds were killed at the border by Turkish jets] and with the government's statement that 'there is no Kurdish problem'."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Javan suggests an unbiased nuclear monitoring formula: "One of the most effective means of preventing the Western countries’ from abusing the Lausanne statement is to establish a board comprised of representatives from Iran and the P5+1 in order to supervise the performance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a board can prevent the IAEA from providing biased reports and acting against Iran’s interests."

Conservative Resalat has no faith in Washington’s word: "The results of our nuclear scientists’ efforts over 23 years are reflected in the deal today. Experience teaches us that arrogant cowboys and uncultured Americans have never been true to their word, and are known for their perfidy and deceit. Everyone who trusted America has been humiliated. The fate of Yasser Arafat, Saddam, Qadhafi, Mubarak, Mursi and others are examples of this. It is clear that the heroic people of Iran will never allow the country's nuclear capabilities to be put up for auction under the guise of suspending the sanctions."

Moderate Iran praises the government’s performance: "Rowhani's government of moderation and hope has taken major and effective steps to resolve the nuclear dossier. The government’s practical, strategic and technical approach has been successful in reducing the hostilities and bringing a relative peace to the Iranian nuclear issue. The results obtained in the talks so far show that the government’s methods based on moderation and hope in resolving the nuclear problem have revived the country's interests in the negotiations."

 

ISIS/IRAN:  Reformist Arman claims that Iran is ready to confront ISIS: "There is no threat to Iran's borders from ISIS at the moment.  They can pose a threat to these borders from two locations: the Baluchistan border areas and Kurdistan. Iran's military preparedness should be accompanied by enhancing the awareness of ISIS and its motivations. Addressing such issues will reinforce the country's ability to resist. If the ISIS terrorist group moves towards the Iranian borders, it is certain to elicit a strong Iranian reaction. At present, Iran is at risk of war with ISIS. Iran's political stance against ISIS demonstrates that we are ready to eliminate them. On the other hand, it is no secret that, Iran is offering its support in suppressing ISIS based on the Iraqi people and their government’s request".

Reformist Mardom Salari warns Riyadh of the consequences of its policies: "ISIS can carry out certain actions as a result of its cooperation with some regional countries, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan as well as the Zionist regime. ISIS forces have always faced difficulty confronting the popular resistance in Syria and Iraq. Iran, Iraq and Lebanon’s unified stance is very important in order to resolve the crisis. Saudi Arabia has always tried to set ISIS against countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Iraq that refuse to respond to Saudi demands, but it should be noted that this issue will have negative consequences for the Saudis".

Hard-line Keyhan is concerned about U.S. policy in Iraq: "Iraq’s 'Popular Mobilization Units' (PMU) that are at the centre of the country’s military confrontation with the takfiris have been under consistent attack from American senior and low-level officials. But why should the dissolution of the PMU, which has scored numerous victories, be the most important precondition for the Americans to supply weapons to the Iraqi government? Dividing the Iraqi military along Shiite-Sunni lines will lead to nothing but deepening ethnic and religious differences and weakening the armed forces."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami lambastes Saudi actions in Yemen: "During the two months of an unequal war, the Yemeni revolutionaries and the country's army have retaliated severely against the aggressors. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a 'scorched earth' policy in Yemen, and apart from killing people, it is destroying the country's economic structures and infrastructure. Meanwhile, the international organizations have closed their eyes to the atrocities committed by Al Saud and no reaction has been observed from them."

 

ISRAEL/PALESTINE: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz argues that Israel is taking advantage of regional developments: "Over recent weeks, the Zionist regime has taken its most severe stance against Palestine so far. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s insistence on the ownership of the whole Jerusalem and his plan to determine the West Bank’s settlement borders raise a question as to what is behind this policy and what goals are being pursued. Political observers believe that the Zionist regime's attitudes stem from regional developments. As the region focuses on the terrorist crises in Iraq and Syria, as well as Saudi crimes in Yemen, this regime is taking advantages of all this to maintain its occupation of Palestine."

 

TALIBAN/IRAN: Conservative Qods takes a positive view of a visiting Taliban delegation: "The Taliban delegation’s visit to Tehran, headed by Tayyeb Aqa the head of the Taliban bureau in Qatar, has not been officially confirmed, but there are various reasons for this event. It is important because it can be viewed as reflecting a new phase in regional developments and as a positive step towards dealing with the current realities in the region."

 

FUEL PRICE HIKE: Conservative Khorasan prefers expert criticism of government policies: "The government's recent subsidy move has been criticized due to the lack of information offered to the people in this regard. Price increases, without any explanations to the public are in direct contradiction with supreme leader Khamenei's call for understanding and unity between the government and nation. The government's subsidy move is an inevitable and defensible one in general, and the best means of correcting the mistake is fair and wise, rather than destructive, criticism. Therefore, to correct the government's minor mistakes, one should resort to expert critics and not analyses based on illusions"

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- The ‘demons of partition’

2-Cairo-Riyadh rivalry

 

1- The ‘demons of partition’

 

Was it not natural for French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius to express his concern that the situations in Iraq and Syria were drawing close to partition, since ISIS on the one hand and the Syrian and Iraqi regimes on the other, are stirring confessional sentiments and historical vendettas which, if their demons continue to be invoked, will show no mercy for anyone? Fabius is sounding the alarm bells: The international coalition must reconsider its strategy because of ISIS's expansion and the 'Abadi government's failure to honor its commitments. The alternative is partition and 'further massacres.' Baghdad’s commitments are in essence to rebuild a national Iraqi army and a government policy that does not discriminate between Sunnis and Shiites. So, is [Iraqi PM] 'Abadi unaware that the leaders of the factions of the supposedly Shiite militias have announced their campaign to liberate al-Ramadi under the banner of ‘At your service, Imam Hussein’ with the army fighting behind them?-- Zuhair Qussaibati in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Disbanding the present [Iraqi] army means flinging the doors of Baghdad, (and subsequently other cities in the center and south of the country) open to ISIS. At the very least, it will lead to Iraq’s ‘Somalization’, leaving the country at the mercy of militias whose numbers will rise and that will fight over everything. As a result, the country will break down into mini-states controlled by sub-sects of sects. Good, sound, and rational action was what all former governments should have taken, as well as the entire political class, both before and after ISIS invaded us. Such action consists of restructuring of the army and the entire security establishment on the proper sound bases. But success in this task requires the political regime and everything about the political process to be restructured as well--'Adnan Hussein on Iraqi www.sotaliraq.com

 

Just imagine: The U.S., which destroyed the Iraqi army and decided to disband it in a clear and blatant decision that could have only been taken by a Zionist such as Paul Bremer (who was put in charge of Iraq in an act of unprecedented defiance of every Arab) is now reproaching that same army for the weakness it may have revealed in combating the terrorism whose true nature and global capabilities no one knows better than the U.S.! In Iraq, the Americans are shedding hypocritical tears; and in Syria, they are expressing glee over our misfortunes, totally ignoring the military, political, and economic siege they have been imposing on this country and its army. But they have nothing but contempt for all Arab armies – including the Saudi army that has been driven by them into the Yemeni quagmire. It is not enough for the U.S. that the Arab armies have sworn that they will fight no one but Iran and anyone linked to it, going so far as to ally themselves with Israel against Iran and its allies--Ass'ad 'Abboud in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Just as Washington expressed its confidence in the ability to liberate [Ramadi], but failed to explain why it did not prevent it from falling, the PMU militia did the same, though in a different manner. Thousands of its fighters marched to the city's outskirts in preparation for the battle for liberation, without knowing why they did not defend the city before it fell. What is certain is that each side will try to make use of what has happened to promote its own interests. For its part, Iran will find in al-Ramadi's fall an opportunity to consolidate its presence in Iraq, rendering it acceptable, perhaps even necessary by Washington, which will view the Iranian-backed militias as the sole force capable of confronting ISIS in light of the Iraqi army's collapse. In turn, the PMU militia will emerge as a winner because it would have been recognized as an indispensable national force--'Assem 'Abdelkhaliq in Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

When the Iraqi army is being led into battle by the Shiite Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMU) militias, and when the strongest man in Iraq is Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, it is no wonder that that army's morale is weakened, insists a Lebanese commentator. This is especially true in light of the militias’ confessional anti-Sunni practices. The proposal to disband the Iraqi army after its repeated failures against ISIS would have even worse consequences than the U.S. decision to disband Saddam's army after the 2003 invasion, maintains an Iraqi commentator. The fault does not lie with the soldiers and junior officers, but with the senior Iraqi commanders and, more importantly, the dominant political elite that has misruled the country over the past eight years. It is truly ironic for U.S. officials to criticize the Iraqi army for 'lacking the will to fight' ISIS after they first destroyed it and then failed to rebuild it on sound patriotic bases, says a Syrian commentator. But this only shows that the U.S. does not want to see any strong Arab armies, and only wants them to fight Iran and its allies. Three parties have failed to stop ISIS's advances in al-Ramadi – the U.S., the Iraqi government forces, and the Iranian-backed militias, notes an Arab commentator. But all three are accused of having facilitated these advances in order to achieve other aims.

 

SOLEIMANI RE-EMERGES: "After an absence that lasted weeks, the Commander of the Qods Brigade, General Qasem Soleimani – who for a while, and as ISIS expanded in Iraq seemed to be the 'legendary' figure who commands the Iraqi army’s brigades and militias and directs them on the battlefield – has re-emerged," writes Zuhair Qussaibati in today’s Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

When Soleimani disappeared after the Tikrit battle, the result was ISIS's major push in al-Ramadi. He may have left the mission to U.S. air raids. But here he is today, blaming President Barack Obama, and daring to publicly accuse him of 'taking part in the conspiracy.' And – who knows? – Soleimani may once again suddenly emerge with the PMU, whose slogan ‘In your service, Imam Hussein’ in the campaign to recapture the heart of [Sunni] Anbar Province from Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, has been criticized by the U.S. Congress. 

The Iraqi forces simply 'evaporated' when ISIS attacked al-Ramadi. Last year’s Mosul catastrophe was repeated, even though these forces were 'much more numerous than their enemy, but still chose to withdraw.' This was the Pentagon’s assessment of what happened and which insisted on its position, thereby erasing U.S. President Joe Biden’s attempt to assuage Haidar al-‘Abadi's government's anger.

Between ‘Abadi and his anger, and Soleimani's denunciation of the Americans' role in the 'conspiracy,' the PMU adopted a slogan for the liberation of al-Ramadi which once again does not take into consideration the inevitable need to avoid everything confessional or anything that could provoke Anbar's Sunnis' irritation, fear, or anger. After all, the manner in which [former PM] Nuri al-Maliki rewarded the 'Awakening Forces' is still live in their memories.

On the other hand, was it not natural for French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius to express his concern that the situations in Iraq and Syria were drawing close to partition, since ISIS on the one hand and the Syrian and Iraqi regimes on the other, are stirring confessional sentiments and historical vendettas which, if their demons continue to be invoked, will show no mercy for anyone?

Fabius is sounding the alarm bells: The international coalition must reconsider its strategy because of ISIS's expansion and the 'Abadi government's failure to honor its commitments. The alternative is partition and 'further massacres.'

Baghdad’s commitments are in essence to rebuild a national Iraqi army and a government policy that does not discriminate between Sunnis and Shiites. So, is 'Abadi unaware that the leaders of the factions of the supposedly Shiite militias have announced their campaign to liberate al-Ramadi under the banner of ‘At your service, Imam Hussein’ with the army fighting behind them?

This seems like yet another scheme to weaken the army's morale. And, in light of this, it is only natural to expect Soleimani to lead the PMU since he is the 'legendary cross-border figure.' In this manner, the Iraqi military establishment finds itself in the background, while the Qods Brigade and its 'experts' will be in the vanguard. In such a situation, is there any need for the U.S. warplanes that are deployed in Assad Base [in Iraq]?

ISIS is weak before Syria's Kurds, but gets stronger in Iraq. Al-Ramadi fell. Only a few people seem to remember that Mosul has been in [ISIS ‘Caliph’] al-Baghdadi's clutch for almost a year now. It is now a forgotten city.

As an instance of the 'outer space aliens' in the Iraqi army – a reference to the thousands of imaginary names on its rosters – the commander of al-Anbar's police admits that the number in his force alone now stands at 21-thousand officers wearing the cape of the 'invisible man.'

Despite this, al-'Abadi is optimistic that the liberation of the Anbar Province is imminent. The province's clans are taking part in the fight to defeat ISIS. Everyone hopes that the PM's optimism is justified and that what happened to the Sunni Iraqis' possessions in Tikrit would not be repeated. But no one can accuse al-Ramadi's refugees of being responsible for the tragedy of forcing them to return to areas where fighting was still raging. That message is clear and certainly has confessional fingerprints all over it despite al-'Abadi's undertakings.

Between Iraq’s 'invisible men' and the 'legendary' Iranian commander, the mystery of why American missiles and warplanes have been unable to prevent ISIS surprises and strikes is certainly legitimate. It is also certainly legitimate to ask 'Abadi why he has reneged on his commitments and why he repeatedly defends the PMU despite the latter’s violations, abuse, and liquidations, which only helps to create a confessional Iraq, or at best take the country down the highway towards partition and fragmentation.

Does it make sense, for example, that militias are leading an army on whose training and armament billions of dollars were spent? It is clear that Fabius was not exaggerating when he warned against the possibility of massacres. For even taking the Americans' mistakes and confused strategy into consideration, how can it be right for Soleimani to blame U.S. impotence when Tehran does nothing but encourage everything that weakens the Iraqi army and strengthens the militias' hold and violence?

Al-Ramadi's refugees fled ISIS's terror and violence but were sent back by agencies and militias managed by Soleimani and his experts via an Iranian 'remote control' device. 

"Despite this, voices are being raised in Tehran in the belief that there are those in the region who believe – or should do so– that it is actually concerned about its neighbours’ 'security, stability, and prosperity'," concludes Qussaibati.

End…

 

THE RIGHT TO THINK: "The right to think for oneself is unshakable and absolute, and no authority that has any right over a thinking mind other than the conscience of its owner," writes 'Adnan Hussein on the Iraqi website www.sotaliraq.com.

But because not all ideas are good and fine, what is bad should be publicly rejected, opposed, and refuted by confronting arguments with counter arguments and evidence with counter-evidence, and not by force or coercion, naturally.

The idea of disbanding the existing Iraqi army is not only worse than the decision to disband the former Iraqi army in its entirety after the fall of Saddam Hussein and his regime. It is also a very foolish notion, especially in the current dangerous conditions.

In 2003, there was no ISIS occupying a third of the country's area and threatening even more. Moreover, there were over 50-thousand elite American, British, and other troops deployed in Iraq. Yet, despite this, it subsequently became apparent that the decision to disband the entire former army was neither good, nor sound, nor wise. It was a bad decision, in fact, and its cost was enormous – hundreds of thousands of people killed or wounded, and tens-of-billions of dollars in material losses.

The new army is not up to the task it has been assigned; nor is it able to bear the national responsibility it has been delegated with. This has been proven again and again. But the fault cannot be pinned on the army's soldiers and lower ranking officers, but on its commanders; more specifically, its senior commanders who have transformed it into an institution for spreading corruption not for fighting in times of trouble and calamity.

The army was not built on the required solid foundations of capability, professionalism, and patriotism. The two former governments and the two former supreme commands (which are one and the same) are responsible for this. Throughout the past eight years, the appointments and the assignment of missions and responsibilities were made on the basis of whims, wishes, and narrow personal and party-political interests. This explains why the constitution was repeatedly violated throughout those years, even though it called for military and security appointments to be brought before parliament for endorsement.

But disbanding the present army means flinging the doors of Baghdad, (and subsequently other cities in the center and south of the country) open to ISIS. At the very least, it will lead to Iraq’s ‘Somalization’, leaving the country at the mercy of militias whose numbers will rise and that will fight over everything. As a result, the country will break down into mini-states controlled by sub-sects of sects.

Good, sound, and rational action was what all former governments should have taken, as well as the entire political class, both before and after ISIS invaded us. Such action consists of restructuring the army and the entire security establishment on the proper sound bases. But success in this task requires the political regime and everything about the political process to be restructured as well. For after all, the failure of the military and security establishments is the product of the failure of the existing political order; and the corruption of commanders in the army and the security establishment is a consequence of the political class's corruption.

The idea of disbanding the army casts doubt on the patriotism of all Iraqis, when doubt or at least suspicion should be cast on the patriotism of the dominant political class.

"For every day that passes provides new evidence that this class is not fit to manage even the smallest corner of the country," concludes Hussein.

End…

 

CARTER’S OPINION: "In U.S. Defense Minister Ashton Carter's opinion, the Iraqi army lacked the will to fight in defense of the city of al-Ramadi that ISIS has recently occupied," writes As'ad 'Abboud in the official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

After he made this statement, many American officials sought to restore some honor to the Iraqi army, especially after Iraq’s reactions to what the U.S. defense secretary had said. In fact, some U.S. officials went so far as to encourage the Iraqi army and build up its confidence.

If we consider what the various senior American figures up to and including U.S. President Barack Obama himself and his Vice-President Biden had said alleging that they were disturbed by ISIS's advances and the Iraqi army's retreat, and which led to promises of backing the army and employing the 'coalition's aerial war machine’ to regain al-Ramadi from ISIS – Mr. Carter's opinion seems to be more than a passing remark. It seems to rise to the level of blame and perhaps even accusation!

But the more correct thing would be to classify all this as an example of political farce. Just imagine: The U.S., which destroyed the Iraqi army and decided to disband it in a clear and blatant decision that could have only been taken by a Zionist such as Paul Bremer (who was put in charge of Iraq in an act of unprecedented defiance of every Arab) is now reproaching that same army for the weakness it may have revealed in combating the terrorism whose true nature and global capabilities no one knows better than the U.S.!

In Iraq, the Americans are shedding hypocritical tears; and in Syria, they are expressing glee over our misfortunes, totally ignoring the military, political, and economic siege they have been imposing on this country and its army. But they have nothing but contempt for all Arab armies – including the Saudi army that has been driven by them into the Yemeni quagmire.

It is not enough for the U.S. that the Arab armies have sworn that they will fight no one but Iran and anyone linked to it going so far as to ally themselves with Israel against Iran and its allies. For Israel, and the U.S. and the West behind it, can never trust the Arabs no matter how far the latter may go with their treason. Just note what the Arab leaders have suffered as a result of the U.S.'s approval in the so-called 'Arab Spring' and ask yourselves: Were these leaders so opposed to the Americans and Israelis’ will?

Israel, and therefore the colonial West and the U.S., cannot accept any strong Arab army – from Algeria via all the Arab Maghreb, to the Nile Valley, the Gulf, and the Levant. And no attempt is made to hide this; for Israel objects to any arms’ deal with any Arab state, even if it is with dear but dwarf-sized Qatar, and even if it involves buying a 22-carat artillery piece whose price is equivalent to an entire oil well, unless it can ensure that it will be operated far from it, and that is incapable of being deployed in any fighting in any direction in fact. And the war on terrorism is evidence of this.

Does the U.S. really want Arab armies to be able to fight terrorism?

In light of all that is happening and all that one can see, I leave it to the reader to answer this question. I leave it to the commanders of Arab armies to find a way in which to build a truly patriotic army that can fight and confront.

"But this will only be achieved by relying on ourselves and our own abilities," concludes 'Abboud.

End…

 

TRIPLE FAILURE: "What the fall of the Iraqi city of Ramadi in the hands of ISIS highlights is the failure of the U.S.’s air raids, the fact that the Iraqi forces fled, and the failure of Iran’s aid to the Iraqi government in the form of weapons and military advisors," writes 'Assem 'Abdelkhaliq in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

This triple failure necessarily leads us to question its causes. Were these three parties really unable to halt ISIS's march? Or did one or more of them have undeclared political calculations that led them to be lax about defending the city, leaving it as easy prey to the terrorist ISIS?

The latter supposition does not arise from a vacuum. It is made all the more credible by a wave of accusations against all three parties, holding them responsible for the city’s fall.

- The first party to stand accused is the U.S. No one understands how it allowed ISIS forces to advance towards the city over a period of days and perhaps weeks, or why it did not confront these forces, attack them, and eliminate them.

It is not clear what the U.S. warplanes did, or why they failed to destroy the attacking forces, or to obstruct their advance and prevent them from infiltrating into the city at least. For what use are air raids if ISIS is still able to expand and gain new ground?

Those who pose questions and cast doubt on America’s intentions speak of Washington’s undeclared calculations that aim to prolong the war. They recall Obama's assessment that it would be necessary to allow his forces at least three years to contain ISIS.

But the logical question here is this: Does a superpower require all this time to destroy a terrorist organization? If so, how come it succeeded in defeating Saddam and occupying the whole of Iraq in three weeks, not three years?

Another cause for puzzlement is U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s statement after the city's fall, in which he expressed his confidence in the Iraqi government’s ability to liberate it in a few weeks or even days’ time backed by U.S. warplanes. But if he was so confident of liberating the city, how does he explain why it fell so easily? Would it not have been better to use the capabilities that will now be used to liberate it in order to defend it and prevent it from falling to begin with?

- As for Iran, it stands accused of making political calculations to benefit, perhaps even be the primary beneficiary, from the fall of al-Ramadi. There is good reason to support this conclusion. For this city in particular represents the [Sunni] clans’ popular base and where training the clans or Awakening forces took place. It includes, Baghdadi Base where American military experts and advisors are stationed. Purging the city from these Americans and clan forces will serve Iran's interests directly.

For it knew that the Americans would withdraw from this base as soon as the city falls, which is what they did, and that the remnants of the clan forces would be slaughtered by ISIS, and this happened as well. The fall of the city also ensures that [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) would be deployed in order to liberate it, which is also what happened.

All of which amounts to a knockout blow to PM Haidar al-'Abadi, aborting his American-backed project to form non-sectarian national force. Such forces – of which al-Ramadi's clans formed the nucleus – are not welcomed by Iran; and now they will not exist.

- The third accused party is the Iraqi side. Here, we do not have the 'Abadi government in mind. The Iraqi equation encompasses many militias, and former Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki wields great influence over them. And it is clear that 'Abadi's political defeat will serve Maliki and his domestic allies’ interest.

To this should be added the fact that al-Ramadi's fall represents another blow to ‘Abadi’s non-sectarian reconciliation project, one that totally contradicts the sectarian policy that was pursued by Maliki throughout the time he was in power.

Just as Washington expressed its confidence in the ability to liberate the city, but failed to explain why it did not prevent it from falling, the PMU militia did the same, though in a different manner. Thousands of its fighters marched to the city's outskirts in preparation for the battle for liberation, without knowing why they did not defend the city before it fell.

What is certain is that each side will try to make use of what has happened to promote its own interests. For its part, Iran will find in al-Ramadi's fall an opportunity to consolidate its presence in Iraq, rendering it acceptable, perhaps even necessary by Washington, which will view the Iranian-backed militias as the sole force capable of confronting ISIS in light of the Iraqi army's collapse.

In turn, the PMU militia will emerge as a winner because it would have been recognized as an indispensable national force. This is evident from the fact that the first to ask for its help was PM ‘Abadi himself, who could find no other force after the government forces’ defeat, even though he was initially opposed to seeking the PMU's help.

Finally, we should not fail to mention the fact that the city’s fall coincided with the U.S. announcement that it has killed an ISIS leader, Abu Sayyaf, in Syria. This has important implications even it turns out to be unintended. For only hours after the announcement of this assassination that Washington deemed to be a major achievement in its war on ISIS, the latter responded by capturing al-Ramadi.

The difference is great and significant: The Americans celebrate a limited tactical gain, while ISIS responds with a major strategic victory.

"This is not reassuring," concludes 'Abdelkhaliq.

Ends…

 

 

2-Cairo-Riyadh rivalry

 

Relations between Cairo and Riyadh seem to have taken a sharp turn towards rivalry and competition, especially over Syria, notes today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

With Saudi Arabia effectively joining the Turkish/Qatari alliance which embraces the Muslim Brotherhood, relations between Riyadh and Cairo have taken a turn for the worse, notes the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. These two capitals are now rivals, and this manifests itself most clearly in their respective attitude towards the various Syrian opposition groups.

 

DIFFERING POSITIONS: "Before last January, Saudi/Egyptian accord was at its peak as far as the various burning Arab files, particularly the Syrian file, were concerned," writes Thursday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But since Saudi monarch Salman bin 'Abdulaziz came to power, the two countries' respective visions have differed and their positions have conflicted with each other. Saudi Arabia joined the Turkish/Qatari trench that is hostile to Egypt, and talk of Saudi financial backing for Egypt has begun to subside, and with it, the billion-dollars figures of Saudi aid have begun to drop, and relations between the two states have shrunk at record speed.

Saudi/Egyptian relations have entered a phase of 'unfriendly rivalry,' at least over the Syrian file. This has emerged most clearly from the two capitals' competition over hosting Syrian opposition conferences that are consistent with their respective political leanings and views of a resolution of the Syrian crisis and the region's crises in general.

This June we will witness two Syrian opposition conferences: The first will be held in Cairo early in the month and will bring the 'patriotic' Syrian forces together under the sponsorship of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, with the aim of 'ending the Syrian crisis via a political solution, terminating the loss of Syrian blood, honoring the Syrian people's aspiration for change, and preserving the unity of Syrian territories and state institutions,' as the Egyptian Foreign Ministry's statement put it.

As for the second conference, it will be held around the middle of June in Riyadh, which appears to have replaced Istanbul in that capacity. According to statements by Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-'Atiyyah, the opposition's political and military factions will attend the conference with the aim of preparing for the post-Assad period.

The most important difference between the two conferences has to do the identity of the attending factions and forces, and the differences between their ultimate political and military aims. The first conference, sponsored by Cairo, will totally exclude the Muslim Brotherhood, which is sponsored by Turkey and Qatar; Saudi Arabia joined the latter two in this sponsorship early this year. As for the second conference, and according to one of the most prominent liberal opposition figures’ statements to raialyoum.com, the aim is to rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood and the other salafi forces, ensuring that the Islamists would have the upper hand in any new opposition coalition.

The Saudi authorities want to contain the Syrian opposition just as they have 'contained' the Yemeni state. They want to make Riyadh the headquarters of that opposition, while taking charge of financing and armament operations directly, and not via mediators. It is unlikely that either Turkey or Qatar would dare compete with it in this field. For when Saudi Arabia sits at the driving wheel, the rest must sit in the backseat, as one former Arab foreign minister told this daily.

The equation is very clear and it can be gleaned from reading between the lines of the two conferences and the preparations underway to hold them. Egypt, which is one of the parties to this equation, is working with the axis that includes Moscow, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, with the aim of reforming the Syrian regime by including some opposition leaders in the state institutions and decision-making circles, but under President Bashar al-Assad's umbrella, even if only temporarily.

 By contrast, the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari triangle – the other side to the equation – aims to pull the Syrian regime and its institutions out by the roots, and to reconstruct the Syrian state based on its declared visions. It also aims to ensure that the moderate Islamist currents, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, will constitute the dominant forces, which however will cohabit with the liberal factions and parties in an attempt to avoid a repetition of what happened in Egypt.

It is difficult to say which of the two sides to this equation will win. But it seems like the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari alliance has begun to gain some traction on the ground, imposing a new reality. That may take the shape of a no-fly zone or the establishment of a new mini-state in northwestern Syria, with Aleppo as its capital and enjoying direct Turkish protection. This may then constitute the launching-pad for creating other such Syrian pockets.

What lead us to go this far in our expectations are Tuesday’s statements by the Turkish foreign minister, in which he said that his country had reached an agreement with the U.S. on the need to provide aerial cover for the armed Syrian opposition in order to protect it against the regime's warplanes. For, as he put it, it would be futile to train and armed opposition forces without providing them with protection against air raids and explosive barrels dropped by the regime's forces.

The question of course concerns the nature of the Iranian/Russian/Syrian response to any step of this kind of seriousness and effectiveness, which could change the balance of forces on the ground, and in the air as well.

The Syrian opposition's summer will certainly be scorching hot in political and military terms. Saudi Arabia's departure from the Egyptian/Emirati alliance, and its decision to join the Turkish/Qatari axis, aims to achieve decisive victory for the opposition in Syria, speed up the toppling of the regime, and rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood. That would represent a lethal blow to the axis headed by Egypt, and especially those aspects having to do with the embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood and the (non-jihadi) salafis.

For this reason, it is not unlikely that the Egyptian/Saudi 'rivalry' will rise to the surface and may extend to other issues in addition to the Syrian file.

"The coming days will answer many of the questions raised in this regard," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Hamas conundrum

 

Israel Hayom and Yedioth Ahronoth lead their Thursday editions with the mass arrest of FIFA officials in Switzerland yesterday on corruption charges. While Israel Hayom focuses on the officials who now face extradition to the United States, Yedioth Ahronoth finds an Israeli angle, reporting in its lead headline on Friday’s planned vote at FIFA's Congress on a Palestinian proposal to boot Israel out of the international soccer body.

According to this report, the Foreign Ministry is engaged in a frantic effort to ensure that enough representatives oppose the proposal; but that Israeli officials are concerned that Qatar – which was controversially awarded the right to host the 2022 World Cup – is effectively paying other federations to vote against Israel. One Israeli official compared the Qataris' behavior to how it allegedly won the right to host the World Cup. According to Army Radio, however, the turmoil in FIFA may lead to the postponement of tomorrow's vote.

The Jerusalem Post leads with the extreme heat that hit the region yesterday, while Haaretz reports that the companies that control Israel's gas reserves are digging in their heels over the government's plan for major reforms, and are refusing to lower prices in accordance with a government directive.

The fallout from Tuesday's Grad rocket attack in southern Israel continues to grab headlines. The most interesting comment of the day came from President Reuven Rivlin, who said the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip is in Israel's interest. Speaking during a tour of the north, Rivlin called for an international initiative to rebuild the coastal territory, with the understanding that the rebuilding requires the ending of all hostility toward Israel.  Commenting on the rocket fire from Gaza on southern Israel earlier this week, Rivlin said that Israel would continue to respond promptly and firmly to any attempt to disturb the calm in the south.  Asked about talking with Hamas, the de facto leadership in Gaza, Rivlin said he has no aversion to holding negotiations with anyone who is prepared to negotiate. The question, he said, is what they want to negotiate about.

Meanwhile, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said on Wednesday evening that Israel’s airstrike on terrorist infrastructures in Gaza in retaliation for a rocket attack on southern Israel makes clear that it has no intention of ignoring rocket fire onto its territory. 'We see Hamas, which controls Gaza, as being responsible for what goes on there,' Ya'alon said during a meeting with visiting American senator Lindsey Graham. 'We are not going to tolerate any threat to the State of Israel and its citizens,' he added.

Several other MKs also spoke out about Hamas yesterday. Infrastructure, Energy and Water Minister Yuval Steinitz said that unless Hamas reined in the terrorists in Gaza and prevented them from attacking Israel, Israel would do it for them – and sweep away Gaza’s Hamas rulers in the process. Speaking on Israel Radio, Steinitz said that Israel did not destroy Hamas during last year's Operation Protective Edge, choosing to deliver a heavy blow instead that would hopefully put Hamas 'on notice' of what could happen if Israel really put its mind to dealing with the terror group. 'It's possible they need a reminder,' he said.

Meanwhile, Meretz leader Zahava Gal-On said that all that Protective Edge proved was that negotiations were the only way to bring peace. 'At the end of the operation, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that he had brought Hamas to its knees, but we see that it continues to operate. Might is not what will bring quiet in the Strip. Israel must help rebuild Gaza and commit to a peace plan based on the Saudi plan,' which would essentially have Israel withdraw from all of Judea and Samaria and most of Jerusalem.

MK Omer Bar-Lev (Zionist Union) called on the government to act against Hamas, placing the responsibility for rocket fire against Israel on the group. 'The lack of will shown by the government in failing to respond appropriately to Tuesday’s attack, along with the lack of negotiations, ensures that Israel will fight Hamas again. If such a fight takes place,' Bar-Lev said, 'Israel must show Hamas what its 'price tag' is.'

In other news, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has expressed his appreciation for the efforts of outgoing Middle East Quartet envoy Tony Blair, who announced his resignation from the position yesterday. Netanyahu said in a statement that, Blair had made great efforts over the past years to advance stability and peace in the region. Netanyahu said Blair's deep understanding of the Middle East had helped him to develop a reliable network of contacts with heads of state in the region.

Netanyahu also noted that Blair worked to advance important economic projects between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and that many times his understanding helped him to bridge gaps between the positions of the sides in the region, including in times of crisis.  It was not immediately clear who was going to be appointed in Blair's place.

On the Iranian front, the United States says that at this point it is not considering an extension of the negotiations between six world powers and Iran on a nuclear deal beyond the existing June 30th deadline. A State Department spokesman said that the United States believes world powers can reach a final deal with Iran on curbing its nuclear program by the existing deadline.  Senior Western diplomats have recently expressed their doubt about keeping to the current timetable for formulating and implementing the accord.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to hold talks in Geneva this weekend with his Iranian counterpart Mohammed Javad Zarif, in the framework of the nuclear talks.  Iran's state television earlier quoted the country's senior nuclear negotiator as saying that the deadline might be extended and the talks might continue after June 30th.

Finally, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) on Wednesday promised to respond with a 'violent pushback' if the United Nations attempts to force a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinian Authority on Israel. Graham, who is expected to officially announce that he will be running for president on June 1st, was speaking at a press conference in Jerusalem after meeting with Netanyahu.

Asked how he planned to act against the UN if any of the initiatives to set a deadline for a peace agreement were passed, Graham said he would withdraw funding to the body: 'I am in charge of the foreign assistance account, I’m in charge of the money we provide for the United Nations,' he said, according to Haaretz, in reference to his chairmanship of an appropriations subcommittee. 'I’m not going to ask the American taxpayer to fund an organization that’s going to be used in a way to marginalize' Israel, Graham added, calling Israel 'our best friend.'

 

 

GAZA, AGAIN: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman comments on a new dynamic between Israel and Hamas, whereby both sides realize that no one will help them reach a workable understanding and whereby they are willing to engage in direct but clandestine dialogue.

"Israel and Hamas have quietly ended the potential escalation caused by this week's Grad attack. They did so not by means of a mediator from Switzerland, Egypt or Qatar and not with the help of a United Nations envoy. This represents a significant change in Israel's dealings with Hamas – and it is taking place far from the public eye.

In public, it was reported that Israel and Hamas exchanged messages via a Palestinian official. It is safe to assume that this 'Palestinian official' comes from the Gaza Strip, just as we can safely assume that Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon did not carry out extensive background checks to ensure that the official is not a card-carrying member of Hamas.

This is not the first time that there has been direct dialogue between the IDF and Hamas. In the past, such dialogue was centered on tactical incidents along the border fence. This time, however, is fundamentally different. For the past six months, Hamas has been intimating quite clearly that it is willing to engage in genuine direct dialogue with Israel on a long-term cessation of hostilities. For political reasons, Israel is not ready for open and direct contact with Hamas. However, Israel's military and defense establishment – especially the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and the chief of staff – see this as being in Israel's vital national interests. To Ya'alon's credit, we should point out that he has not prevented the IDF from doing so. The fruits of this secret discussion are already being enjoyed on both sides. The fruits are few, but they do exist.

But make no mistake about it: Hamas has not turned overnight into a pro-peace organization. It continues to arm itself and it is possible that, under certain conditions, it could still decide to renew its battle against Israel. But Hamas' political situation is dire these days; worse than ever before, in fact. It sees how its traditional relationship with Qatar is now being influenced by Israel, how Egypt continues to show it the cold shoulder and how its relationship with the Palestinian Authority continues to deteriorate. Unlike Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, Israel is helping with the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip – and Hamas is repaying the favor by ensuring quiet on the southern front.

Moreover, Jerusalem has taken several small but significant steps – such as allowing students from Gaza to travel to universities in Jordan via Israel, rather than Egypt. So while it is true that there is still no export of produce from Gaza and laborers are not allowed to work in Israel, these steps are slowly coming to fruition.

The Grad rocket that hit Israel on Tuesday night was fired by members of Islamic Jihad. The background to the incident was an internal dispute and was not meant to be a challenge to Hamas' authority. Disputes over funding, prestige and appointments can sometimes be translated into attacks against Israel. In the aftermath of Tuesday's attack, Hamas made every effort to show Israel that it was dealing with the incident; the search for the perpetrators was very public and was done with much fanfare. Hamas' main rivals in the Gaza Strip are the radical Salafi organizations, which are dedicated to stirring up trouble between Israel and Hamas. So Hamas has arrested many members of these organizations and is preventing them from operating freely.

Islamic Jihad represents the 'official' opposition to Hamas, but it still listens to orders from the de facto government of Gaza. The struggle between these two organizations is over Iranian support, but it now appears that this battle has been settled: it seems likely that Iran stopped transferring money to Hamas' armed wing some two months ago, in response to comments by Hamas leaders about the invasion of Yemen. This means that Hamas has lost tens of millions of dollars that it used to get from Tehran following Operation Protective Edge.

There has been another change in the nature of the dialogue between Hamas and Israel since the end of Operation Protective Edge. Neither side is talking in terms of 'rounds of fighting' any more. Any rocket attack from Gaza against Israel is met with a proportional aerial response – and that's the end of the story. Hamas has stopped responding to Israel's response, and so on.

Still, Gaza was and remains Israel's most volatile front. Despite all of the criticism of how Operation Protective Edge was conducted from a military point of view, the key political achievement of the operation was that Hamas and Israel have both discovered that no one else will help them and that they have to find some kind of workable agreement themselves. This has created an almost unique opportunity. But if we don't play our cards right, we will find ourselves sliding back in time and another round of fighting will be inevitable."

Ends…

 

HAMAS' FINGERPRINTS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Shaul Bartal says that Hamas has become expert at concealing its involvement in terrorist activity, so that it can claim that other organizations are responsible for violating understandings it has agreed to.

"The rocket that hit Israel on Tuesday evening, followed by the IDF response in the Gaza Strip, has raised concerns that a fresh outbreak of violence is imminent. Various commentators have suggested that Hamas may not have been responsible for the rocket fired and it was the work of some rogue organization such as Islamic Jihad or one of the Salafi groups currently operating in Gaza. Therefore, they argue, Israel should not see the incident as a violation of the post-Operation Protective Edge ceasefire agreement by Hamas. In any case, they say, Israel should respond carefully, if at all.

This is not the first time that Hamas has chosen to violate a ceasefire agreement and to try and place the blame on another organization. Sometimes, the organization cited is unfamiliar to the Israeli security establishment. In May 2011, for example, the interrogation of a Gaza terrorist by the name of Azzam Ahmad Abu Karim revealed that there is an organization in Gaza called the Protectors of al-Aqsa, which operated as a branch of Hamas and existed purely to hide Hamas' role in the rocket-manufacturing process.

Hamas argues that this organization does not heed its authority and, as such, Israel cannot accuse it of violating the ceasefire agreement. This approach was adopted and perfected by Fathi Hamad, the former interior minister in the Hamas-run government of Gaza. Together with Mohammed Deif, they currently spearhead a tough, militant line against Israel. This is the method that Hamas uses to carry out terror attacks against Israel. The organizations are given their orders directly by senior Hamas commanders, but are far enough removed so that Hamas' fingerprints cannot be found on them.

Terror attacks in Jerusalem also bear all the hallmarks of Hamas' efforts to carry out suicide missions via other organizations. When, in March 2008, Ala'a Abu Dahim carried out an attack on a yeshiva in the capital, Hamas refrained from taking responsibility. Instead, it was claimed by a previously unknown organization called Ahrar Al Jalil – which also took responsibility for a vehicular terror attack two months later. It was only later that year that Abu Oubeida, a Hamas spokesman, admitted that his organization was, in fact, behind both attacks. He praised the work of Ahrar Al Jalil, which killed a total of eight Israelis and wounded many more. Once again, Hamas used the same system: a fictitious terrorist organization takes responsibility for rocket attacks, stabbings and bombings, thereby concealing Hamas' fingerprints. In the case of the Gaza Strip, however, there is no question that Hamas is responsible for rocket attacks against Israel, since Hamas rules with an iron fist.

The culture of resistance against Israel is deeply rooted in Palestinian society – especially in the Gaza Strip. All of the organizations there have armed wings: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other various and sundry organizations. In their posters and literature, all these organizations define themselves as part of a united front to protect and define Palestine; they often have joint operations commands. During Operation Protective Edge, Islamic Jihad websites claimed that the operational areas of the Gaza Strip had been split between it and Hamas and that cooperation between the organizations was so close that they had even set up a joint 'war room' for all the terrorist groups operating in the Strip – headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The Israeli response, which, according to the IDF, included bombing empty Hamas and Islamic Jihad headquarters, will not prevent further attacks. 'The enemy’s threats do not scare the Gaza Strip and do not scare the children of Gaza,' Hamas' political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, stated yesterday. He went on to say that the whole of Israel has been panicked by 'one stray missile.'

Hamas did not invest so heavily in the production and testing of Grad missiles for no reason. It is preparing for the next round of fighting and, in the meantime, it is reminding us every so often that it still exists and that it can still attack us."

Ends…

 

MONEY TALKS: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben Menachem says that, unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad is totally dependent on Iranian support – which has been slashed recently due to disagreements between Tehran and leaders of the organization in the Gaza Strip.

"Islamic Jihad, which is headed by Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, is the Palestinian organization closest to Iran, which supports it financially and provides almost its entire budget. Iran’s support for Islamic Jihad has been exclusive, and any reduction in that aid affects the organization’s activity. In recent years, most of that activity has been carried out in the Gaza Strip, from where Islamic Jihad fires rockets at Israel and sometimes tries to mount terror attacks in southern Israel.

Iran financially backs Islamic Jihad and Hamas despite the fact that they are Sunni 'resistance organizations' – unlike Hizbollah, which is Shiite. Iran wants to use the two Sunni groups’ terror activities against Israel. In recent years it has equipped and armed them for attacking Israel from Gaza. Among other things, Iran wants to activate them in case Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Recently, Iran has significantly scaled back its budget for Hamas because of disputes with the head of its political bureau, Khaled Mish'al, over the civil war in Syria and over Hamas’s stance toward the crisis in Yemen. As a result, the budget for Hamas was cut and the group was forced to reduce its military activity.

On May 25, 2015, Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported that Islamic Jihad’s financial crisis had worsened to the point of bankruptcy, and that its operatives had not received their salaries for the three previous months and apparently not for the fourth month either. The report said a dispute had broken out between the organization and Iran, with Iran demanding that it openly takes an official stance against the military activity of the Saudi-led Arab coalition in the Yemeni crisis, just as Hizbollah has done, but Islamic Jihad refused.

Iran is pursuing a policy of 'money talks,' and having failed to dictate its position on Syria and Yemen to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it has been sanctioning them by withholding funds essential to their activity.

On May 19, the East Jerusalem newspaper Al-Quds reported that the leader of Islamic Jihad had recently visited Tehran several times in an attempt to resolve the crisis, and that Hizbollah had tried to mediate – but to no avail because Islamic Jihad wants to maintain a neutral stance toward the Yemeni crisis.

The halting of Iran’s financial assistance, if it continues over time, could severely hamstring Islamic Jihad.  Whereas Hamas has other sources of income, such as the taxes it levies in Gaza, Islamic Jihad is completely dependent on Iranian money for its existence. Iran is possibly punishing the organization to teach it a lesson. In the long term, Iran needs Islamic Jihad; it cannot allow itself to lose a military force that directly threatens Israel and is subservient to Iran’s will."

Ends…

 

IRANIAN DISINTEGRATION: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Guy Bechor says that, like other countries in the region, there is every chance that Iran will disintegrate into ethnic, tribal and religious chaos – allowing terrorist groups with no compunctions to take control of its nuclear facilities.

"Last Independence Day, I received a message via Facebook from an Iraqi man who wanted to congratulate Israel and to thank the Jewish state for destroying Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor in 1981. If it were not for Israel, he wrote, Iraq would have had countless nuclear facilities. Imagine what would happen today if Iraq possessed nuclear weapons, he added. Israel saved the Iraqi people, he told me. Indeed, had Israel not destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor, it would now be in the hands of ISIS, which has captured large parts of the country. What would the international community have done then?

This message raises questions not only about what might have happened and what was prevented from happening, but also about what will happen in the future. Iran is a country that is deeply divided along ethnic, religious and tribal lines – no less so than Iraq and Syria. Perhaps even more so. There is no majority ethnic group in the country; the Persians, who are suffering from a negative birthrate, are now a minority, although, with 45 percent of the population, they still make up the largest ethnic group in the country.

Some of the minority groups in Iran want independence from Tehran and want to be included as part of other countries. The Azeri population, for example, wants to join Azerbaijan, while the people of the Baloch region have aspirations of joining Pakistan. The Iranian Kurds want to be part of Greater Kurdistan, which they hope will encompass parts of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. The Arabs, for their part, want to establish an independent country called Ahvaz (in Arabic) or Khuzestan (in Persian).

In other words, it is just a matter of time before Iran collapses under the weight of ethnic clashes, Sunni-Shiite rivalry and inter-ethnic violence. Already tensions are extremely high and there are clashes between the regime and many of the groups seeking independence. The only thing that is keeping the massive country from falling apart is the fear of the vacuum that will be created if the despised regime in Tehran falls. They are afraid of becoming another Syria, but once ethnic and religious tensions boil over, they are impossible to contain. That is why it is important for the Iranian regime to focus all of its attention on Israel – to cover up the domestic rivalries that threaten to tear the country apart.

Imagine if Iran – which has nuclear facilities across its territory – were to disintegrate like Syria, Iraq, Libya or Yemen and if civil war were to break out between rival armed militias. The danger of mass destruction would be imminent – and not necessarily by means of a ready-made nuclear bomb. After all, if one of those militias were to get its hands on radioactive material, it could easily manufacture a dirty bomb or some other weapon – and we know only too well that the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites knows no boundaries. We can just be thankful that neither side has yet got its hands on a nuclear bomb.

The United States is operating on the rather naïve assumption that the Iranian regime will continue to rule over the whole of the country. However, the regimes of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya were just as strong, as were the regimes in Egypt and Yemen. In addition, Iran is a melting pot country, where almost every ethnic or tribal group in the region is represented – from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from the Persian Gulf to Turkey. If Iran disintegrates, terrorist groups will emerge and will overrun the entire country. The Persians are a relatively weak force in this ethnic mix. If Iran collapses, there will be an almighty battle for control and use of its nuclear facilities. And we already know that organizations like ISIS have no boundaries when it comes to exercising ruthless violence.

So the question we have to ask ourselves, as outsiders with a vested interests in what happens to Iran: What good will U.S. President Barack Obama's nuclear deal do anyone? The answer is simple: None whatsoever. And when Iran falls into ethnic, religious and tribal disarray, no one will be able to claim that they were not warned."

Ends…

 

LET THE PEOPLE OF GAZA GO: In its editorial on Thursday, Haaretz says that the IDF and the Shin Bet both favor issuing more work permits for Gazans to enter Israel and urges the government not to allow hostility toward Hamas to exacerbate conditions in the Gaza Strip.

"Some 15,000 people who have asked to leave the Gaza Strip are still trapped there since last summer’s war. These people are imprisoned in the Strip without being able to return to their work or family abroad. Thousands of them need medical treatment and more than 1,000 others are students who couldn’t leave for their studies overseas and stand to lose their visas and scholarships and miss a year’s studies.

In the last two days the Rafah checkpoint opened, but only in one direction – from Egyptian Rafah to the Gaza Strip. In the past two years the checkpoint has been closed most of the time. It only opens for a limited time and for a small number of people who are permitted to leave the Strip. The last time the checkpoint opened for entering and leaving the Strip was in the middle of March, for a total of 2,443 entries and exits.

Egypt’s refusal to enable Gaza residents to fly from Cairo completes the almost-complete blockade on the Strip’s people, apart from the Erez checkpoint, which is controlled by Israel. But despite the easing of some restrictions Israel announced after the war, the situation has remained almost the same.

'We feel like cattle in a pen. But even cattle are allowed sometimes to go out into an open space. In Gaza we’re forbidden to do so and we don’t even know why,' Mayasem Abu-Mer, a 25-year-old Gazan resident, said Tuesday. Abu-Mer was denied passage through the Erez checkpoint to the West Bank and from there to the Allenby checkpoint.

Delays in handling exit requests from the Gaza Strip are chronic. The Palestinian Civilian Committee submitted to Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories a first list including the names of some 350 students from Gaza, to arrange for their departure via the Allenby checkpoint to Jordan. The request was submitted last year. Meanwhile the semester began, scholarships and visas expired and only at the end of December did Israel approve the exit of 150 people on the list. Ultimately only 37 students left that way.

At the beginning of March, after 57 students were permitted to leave the Strip, those who came to the Allenby checkpoint were not allowed to enter Jordan because their visas had expired while they were waiting for their passage permits from Israel.

Control over checkpoints, airspace and sea renders the Gaza Strip heavily dependent on its neighbors. Israel, whether it wants to or not, is to a large extent responsible for this population. Both the IDF and Shin Bet are in favor of giving more work permits to laborers. There’s certainly no reason for students who have families abroad and residents with urgent medical problems not to receive humane, efficient treatment. We cannot allow the explosive security situation and the hostility toward Hamas to exacerbate the conditions in the Gaza Strip and increase the local pressure. This is not only a Palestinian interest but an Israeli one."

Ends…

 

THE SECRET OF ISIS' SUCCESS: Writing on the website of the i24 television station, Danny Rubinstein comments on the difficulties that Western and Arab powers face in their struggle against ISIS.

"In a recent interview with The Atlantic magazine, U.S. Senator John McCain revealed that 75 percent of the fighter jets that set out to attack Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria return to base without having dropped their bombs because there is nobody on the ground to hit. This revelation by the respected senator encapsulates the main problem of all the bloody struggles in the Middle East: organized armies don’t know how to deal with armed gangs or terror militias made up of volunteers inspired by faith and willing to sacrifice themselves.

The Israeli army, which had to cope with the militias of Hamas in Gaza and Hizbollah in Lebanon, knows this well. Neighboring Arab countries also have to come to terms now with this problem. The Egyptian army, for example, is having trouble defeating Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a relatively small terrorist group operating in the Sinai Peninsula, which swore allegiance to the Islamic State this year.

Many Israelis find this difficult to understand. Israel controlled the Sinai for 15 years (1967-1982) and its soldiers and citizens wandered freely in the desert and flocked to Sinai’s pristine beaches. The Bedouin population of that region is sparse and tourist-friendly and there are only a handful of urban communities. Why can’t the well-trained and well-equipped Egyptian army capture these murderous terrorist gangs that run wild there? They repeatedly blow up pipelines carrying natural gas to Israel and Jordan, attack military facilities and police stations in Egypt, ambush Egyptian patrols and kill dozens of soldiers and officers.

The Egyptians suspect that the group receives assistance from Hamas in Gaza and has therefore shut off the overland passage and smuggling tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip. But this does not solve the problem. Egypt's military intelligence has a hard time finding the terrorists’ hiding places, whether in desert crevices or among Bedouin tribes. All the tanks, helicopters and sophisticated equipment of the Egyptian army are not worth much when they can’t find the terrorists who, of course, don’t wear uniforms, talk only on cell phones, and don’t have offices with Internet, email, and social networks. They emerge suddenly in unexpected places and hit hard at the Egyptian army.

Despite the differences between the militants in the Sinai Peninsula and those fighting on Iraq’s borders with Syria and Lebanon, the principle is similar. The flight of the Iraqi army, which has almost ceased to exist, from the city of Ramadi and other cities, primarily Mosul, is a case in point. Iraqi soldiers are fleeing from the extremist volunteers of the Islamic State, joined by tens of thousands of refugees terrified by the murderous cruelty of these fanatics. How can the bombs of the Americans and their allies help? Sending troops to fight a ground incursion, as proposed by Senator McCain, is a doubtful remedy. Western intelligence is not designed to discover the movements of the various rebel groups, and pilots are afraid to harm civilians on the ground.

In Syria, the situation is similar. In recent days Syrian soldiers fled from the desert town of Palmyra, leaving behind weapons and military equipment. 'Luckily we were quick and managed to save the large antiquities collections from Palmyra and brought them to Damascus in time,' admitted a spokesman who told of the Syrian escape from Palmyra.

A remarkable story in terms of its military structure is Hizbollah in Lebanon. On the one hand, Hizbollah is an army in every respect. It has regular trained units, a hierarchy, and command and control. On Monday, Arab television showed an organized military funeral of nine soldiers and a Hizbollah senior commander killed in fighting against Syrian rebels on the Lebanese border. On the other hand this militia hardly has any heavy equipment (tanks, planes) but an incredible arsenal of thousands of rockets hidden mainly in southern Lebanon. Hizbollah is built for a struggle against Israel, but being engaged as it is in helping the regular Syrian army, Hizbollah has abandoned its front against Israel, for now. Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah earlier this week urged his men to fight against the Islamic State, which he called 'an unprecedented threat to history'. This is unlikely to help the organization given that IS forces have managed to complete their takeover of half the area of Syria.

One can find other examples in the Arab world, for example in Libya or in Yemen, where Arab coalition forces are hard pressed to repel the Houthi rebels.

Regular armies have the capacity to deal with other regular armies. But they are helpless against fanatical terrorist groups. Dealing with those requires an array of other measures, political and economic in nature. The power of a large regular army is simply no use."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE 7TH ELECTIONS: Cengiz Candar hopes for the ruling party’s defeat in the upcoming June 7th general elections in centre-left Radikal: "The latest election polls strongly suggest that the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] is likely to fail. This is what lies behind President Erdogan's panic and the reports of a 'split' in the 'AKP community'. Erdogan and the AKP cannot achieve what they want in this election and the truth is that their failure is good for democracy. It is best for Turkey's future. It is for Turkey's good."

Mehmet Tezkan believes the election results are still hard to predict in centrist Milliyet: "Pro-government commentators have gradually begun to talk about the possibility of a coalition. The estimation is that the ruling party will either narrowly preserve its place, or slide below the 276 seats needed for a parliamentary majority, and be politically constrained. It is difficult to guess what percentage of the vote the ruling party may get."

Aydin Engin sees the opposition at a disadvantage in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] has finally remembered that it is a social democrat party and it has generated huge excitement inside and outside the party via the numerous projects it has announced. But such excitement alone, unfortunately, will not bring it to power. This is because it is paying the ransom of its sins in the previous years and it is starting the race with 26-27 per cent of the vote."

Fadime Ozkan suggests that a coalition may be inevitable in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The June 7th elections are of historic significance. They have the potential to change Turkey's destiny. If the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] passes the 10% electoral threshold and the AKP fails to receive the votes it desires and secure 275 seats in parliament, a coalition is inevitable."

Hasan Cemal looks to a defeat for the president in independent Internet T24: "The June elections may allow the country to stop taking sides and end the polarization. Turkey will be comfortable if one man [President Erdogan] receives a fatal blow at the ballot box. The doors of political compromise would then be opened."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman raises two points: "Our nuclear negotiators are bound and obliged to act under the supervision of the Supreme Leader and will not go beyond his outline and redlines. The Americans want to go beyond the Lausanne agreement regarding interviews with our nuclear scientists. In addition, if the Additional Protocol is to be implemented, it should be in a manner similar to other countries that have accepted the protocol; no exception should be made for Iran."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz objects: "The nuclear negotiations are going through a sensitive phase. The Americans are trying to turn this agreement into a tool not to remove sanctions. They have insisted several times that if a final agreement is reached, sanctions will remain in place to secure the interests of the U.S. and the Zionists."

Conservative Khorasan calls for respect of fair critics: "Any team, group or person trying to achieve a deal at any price, i.e. at the price of undermining our dignity and independence and violating the nation's rights, is an unforgivable betrayal. The negotiating team and the government should respect critics, especially fair and caring ones, and should consider their criticism an asset for consolidating the government's strength and power. The West has political power and the global media at its disposal; they have extraordinary poisoning propaganda and power against our country."

Reformist Mardom Salari is concerned: "Developments in the Middle East have created problems for the nuclear talks. American extremists and radicals took advantage of this situation and pressed the administration to bully Iran. The Saudi/Israel axis, Iran's main opponents in the region, made the situation harder. For the U.S., resolving Iran’s nuclear case is very important; therefore, it is unlikely that such issues will stop the talks. They may, however, delay them. We should be careful not to move towards stopping them. Stopping the talks will be to both sides' detriment and in Saudi Arabia and Israel's favour. Therefore, we should reduce the intensity of domestic objections."

 

RED LINES: Hard-line Javan claims that red lines cannot be tempered with: "Comments by senior Iranian negotiator Abbas Araqchi need to be reviewed. His remarks that ‘some redlines might be tweaked from time to time, and once they are, the negotiating team will make the necessary adjustments’ is not correct. As is clear from the term 'red lines', they specify the basic contours and framework of negotiations. Without these lines the talks could have nasty and unexpected results. Downgrading our current stances, when the West is not ready to make more concessions, paves the way for the enemy's excessive demands." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Resalat warns: "Saudi rulers should not forget that their unconditional support for ISIS and other terrorist groups will pave the way for their expansion to Saudi Arabia. These crimes can lead to the deepening and institutionalization of hostility caused by the brutal killing of the Yemeni nation and the destruction of their infrastructure. It will result in the continuation of regional conflicts as well as Saudi Arabia's political isolation."

 

YEMENI PEACE CONFERENCE: Hard-line Keyhan explains: "President Abd-Rabbo Mansur Hadi and Saudi Arabia's request for the UN to indefinitely postpone the Geneva peace conference shows that the talks are not in the interest of Saudi Arabia and Saudi-linked Yemeni groups. The reason is clear: though the Saudi regime and affiliated Yemeni groups have extensive support from outside, they have no power anywhere inside Yemen. Until the Saudi regime and its Yemeni agents are able to achieve significant successes inside Yemen, they will be reluctant to participate in any talks. The postponement of the Geneva talks will be combined with an escalation of war and conflict." 

 

DOMESTIC POLITICS: Moderate Iran believes Rowhani is doing alright: "The language and political discourse of opponents of Rowhani's government have intensified and their activities and efforts to disrupt the work of the government have become more organized. The opposition was hopeful to create gaps between the government and other institutions in light of the economic recession inherited from the previous administration. However, the government in addition to maintaining consistency, managed to prevent political disputes."

Reformist Sharq explicates: "The closer we get to parliamentary elections, the more conservatives intensify their pressure. Through limitless criticisms and ignoring the real roots of problems inherited from the past, some are trying to hinder the development of the nation. The Rowhani administration took office after eight years of anxiety where the intellectual and legal underpinnings of the country were unsettled. Naturally, the government's priority in the past two years has been to return to the era before the turbulence."

 

ECONOMY: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami suggests a more equitable way: "By raising prices of energy carriers and gas, the government has started the third phase of the targeted subsidies law. This price hike puts pressure on society, and the low-income strata will suffer most. The government must stop this and refrain from further price hikes. Instead, it should openly and promptly remove from the list the names of those who do not need cash subsidies. This is certainly closer to equity and justice and puts less pressure on the lower echelons of society."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The war against ISIS

2-Turkey’s new game

3-The Gaza trap

 

1-The war against ISIS

 

The fact that the offensive launched yesterday (Tuesday) by the sectarian [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) with the army's backing has been given the name Labbayka Ya Hussein [‘In Your Service, Imam Hussein’] is enough to raise questions and stir confessional feuds in this delicate situation.  While the operation's name aims to mobilize the people after U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's criticism of what he described as the Iraqi army's 'lack of will’ to fight ISIS, the national government should not have accepted this title in light of its need for the support of the Sunni clans who inhabit the land and have the right to claim al-Anbar for themselves. The war against ISIS is a necessary duty. At present, a number of states that are not classified as Shiite are involved in this war. So what is pushing the Baghdad government to mobilize its people, or to silently accept its people's mobilization on a sectarian basis?—Emirates’ al-Bayan

 

Why has Mosul’s liberation from ISIS’s terrorist clutch been obstructed so far? And why has this goal been forgotten by allowing terrorism to capture al-Ramadi and Tadmur [Palmyra] almost simultaneously? And what is this force that is destroying and occupying a large area of Syria and Iraq using hundreds of modern pickup trucks and Hummer Jeeps without the 'posturing' coalition's warplanes and Iraq and Syria's tanks being able to stop them? The military science of wars waged by armies against guerillas leaves us all unable to accept what we are seeing and hearing. Terrorist ISIS's wars and raids are all part of a larger scheme that is meant to destroy the region's nations economic capabilities, and to keep the West’s arms factories running…The West provides weapons and equipment and information to both sides of the conflict, while ensuring that neither will win, and that the human, financial, and economic hemorrhage will continue for many years to come--Khalid az-Zubaidi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The official name given to the operation to liberate al-Anbar Province in Iraq smacks of pro-Shiite sectarianism and should have never been accepted by the Iraqi government, insists the editorial in an Emirati daily. It risks losing the support of the province's Sunni clans. The rapid emergence and strength of ISIS and its sister terrorist organizations is a mystery, since there is no explanation for the ease with which they are allowed to move around in large convoys in the open desert, argues a Jordanian commentator. This suggests a Western scheme behind ISIS whose aim is to prolong the conflict in the region with the object of siphoning off its resources.

 

THE SITUATION REMAINS THE SAME: "Maliki's government goes and [PM] al-'Abadi's turn in Iraq comes, but the situation remains the same," writes the editorial in Wednesday's UAE daily al-Bayan.

No progress has been made in mending the rift in the social fabric or improving the security and political situation in a manner that reassures the various parties that the homeland belongs to everyone and that the Iraqi state is for all clans and sects, and everyone is under the law and the constitution and stands at the same distance from them all.

The fact that the offensive launched yesterday (Tuesday) by the sectarian [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) with the army's backing has been given the name Labbayka Ya Hussein [‘In Your Service, Imam Hussein’] is enough to raise questions and stir confessional feuds in this delicate situation.

While the operation's name aims to mobilize the people after U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's criticism of what he described as the Iraqi army's 'lack of will to fight' ISIS, the national government should not have accepted this title in light of its need for the support of the Sunni clans who inhabit the land and have the right to claim al-Anbar for themselves.

The war against ISIS is a necessary duty. At present, a number of states that are not classified as Shiite are involved in this war. So what is pushing the Baghdad government to mobilize its people, or to silently accept its people's mobilization on a sectarian basis?

Why does the Iraqi government lose its friends and those who wish to help it every time? Why does it fail to rule in accordance with principles that govern the foundations of a modern state, only to satisfy passing and exclusivist sentiments?

"This is the question that PM Dr. Haidar al-'Abadi ought to answer responsibly and as soon as possible if al-Anbar's clans and the Arab coalition forces are to fight together with high morale and a united creed," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT: "It is the people’s right, (before that of the elite and the experts) to know who finances the terrorist ISIS, who provides it with logistical support and information to evade the attacks on it in Iraq and Syria," writes Khalid az-Zubaidi in the leading Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Does it make sense that all the satellites and means of surveillance and reconnaissance that can pursue a small car in narrow mountain roads in many countries from Yemen to Afghanistan to Pakistan cannot monitor 400 vehicles full of arms and criminals who destroy and kill hundreds of people in various areas of Syria and Iraq? Does it make sense that hundreds of vehicles can be sent to such terrorist organizations from countries bordering Syria on its north without being monitored?

Which banks have opened accounts worth tens-of-millions of dollars for importing these vehicles? And which state or states are financing this aggressive effort that is burning the land and destroying human beings in the name of freedom and change?

It is certain that the human and material aid that is reaching the new international terrorism that goes by the name 'ISIS' is being passed over in silence by the major powers, with the U.S. at their vanguard, even if it pretends otherwise. The efforts on the ground confirm the international coalition forces’ effective neutrality in the fight against ISIS and the theatrical nature of their aerial sorties. This is if we assume good will on their part; but it is most likely that a Western scheme of aggression is underway with the aim of squandering the resources of the states that have a financial surplus by inducing them to spend it on arms’ deals worth hundreds-of-billions of dollars each year. This scheme also aims to undermine developmental efforts in the region, especially in the two strongest and most important countries in material, human, and military terms, namely, Iraq and Syria.

It seems that the aim is to drown the region in ‘creative chaos’ that has turned into an uncreative and immoral chaos that may yet reach the other Arab states, one after the other. And the pretexts are ready, including the latest statements made by one American official that the Iraqi army lacks the will to fight.

But why has Mosul’s liberation from ISIS’s terrorist clutch been obstructed so far? And why has this goal been forgotten by allowing terrorism to capture al-Ramadi and Tadmur [Palmyra] almost simultaneously?

And what is this force that is destroying and occupying a large area of Syria and Iraq using hundreds of modern pickup trucks and Hummer Jeeps without the 'posturing' coalition's warplanes and Iraq and Syria's tanks being able to stop them? The military science of wars waged by armies against guerillas leaves us all unable to accept what we are seeing and hearing.

Terrorist ISIS's wars and raids are all part of a larger scheme that is meant to destroy the region's nations economic capabilities, and to keep the West’s arms factories running. They aim to implement the well-known policy of 'dual containment,' that is one of the West's traditional policies. The West provides weapons and equipment and information to both sides of the conflict, while ensuring that neither will win, and that the human, financial, and economic hemorrhage will continue for many years to come.

And while the pictures and names of the new terrorism's organizations may change, the results remain the same – namely, more killing and destruction. Meanwhile, the Zionist entity remains safe from the Arabs, despite their soft criticisms of it.

The wars of terrorism that are sweeping over the region are alien to us, and are not part of who we are. What is happening is a very carefully stage-managed systematic aggression that is meant to ensure a sort of 'domino effect.'

"And this is the most dangerous thing we are facing these days," concludes Zubaidi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Turkey’s new game

 

Turkey’s agreement with Washington to provide air cover to the Syrian opposition represents a new phase of Ankara’s regional of aggression, says Mohammad Kharroub in today's Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The Turkish foreign minister’s announcement that the U.S. and Turkey have reached an 'in principle' agreement to provide air cover for the Syrian opposition raises many questions regarding its aims, motivations, and the opposition parties that will receive such cover, says a Jordanian commentator.

 

A RESOUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT: "Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s 'resounding' announcement regarding an 'in principle' agreement between Ankara and Washington to provide aerial cover for the Syrian opposition has stolen the limelight and was at the forefront of news bulletins," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

For many, the announcement seemed to inaugurate a turning point in the American position and to be a very significant indication that the situation in Syria is now ready for a dramatic NATO step. This comes after most of those who made this assessment fell into the trap of the exaggerated illusions and dreams that the end of Syrian regime is nigh.

The media clamor, the disinformation, and the exaggerations that have accompanied the fall of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour into the hands of the Nusra Front's terrorists – which is the Syrian branch of al-Qa'ida – and the fall of Tadmur [Palmyra] into ISIS's hands were partially responsible for this. Also responsible were the celebrations with which the Arab [Gulf] satellite TV stations greeted the three cities’ fall, which they claimed were captured by the 'Syrian opposition,' making sure to mention neither ISIS nor the Nusra Front.

After all, both these organizations represent the two terrorist faces of a single salafi takfiri group. Both are receiving open support from certain world capitals, but especially from certain regional capitals that claim to be fighting ISIS and that have established international coalitions for that purpose and for drying up its sources.

In fact, there are reasons for suspicions regarding the international coalition's air raids, which have been going on for almost a year but with the result that ISIS has only got stronger instead of being weakened. These air raids have not even contributed to foiling ISIS's schemes that have begun to assume more dangerous proportions. Instead, ISIS now is implementing its theory 'abolition of borders', which is an integral part of its strategy, while 'volunteers' and 'monies' continue to flow into its budget – sometimes in the form of the new oil fields it captures, and often by the growing number of land routes and border outposts with neighboring countries it has been taking control of.

Anyway, Turkey's readiness to raise the issue of air cover again, possibly suggesting the establishment of a security zone, could not have arisen from vacuum. It comes after Washington's relations with Baghdad became tense when the latter was angered by the American officials’ insulting statements issued against the Iraqi army's performance in al-Ramadi, claiming that six-thousand Iraqi soldiers either fled or acted in a cowardly manner or surrendered to no more than 150 ISIS fighters who stormed the city.

In addition, we should note the unprecedentedly sharp tone and language used by Turkish President Erdogan against American media. At their forefront is The New York Times – given the paper's status in the U.S. and in the world at large. Erdogan described an article in this distinguished newspaper as 'impolite,' and issued the following warning: 'As a newspaper, you should know your limits!' And he did not refrain from accusing the paper of 'intervening in Turkey's affairs' by adding that 'by publishing such articles, you have gone beyond the limits permissible by freedom.'

But what does all this suggest?

Those who defend Erdogan and his policies of aggression towards Syria, Egypt, and most Arab countries that view his ally, the Muslim Brotherhood, as an undemocratic organization that engages in various forms of military, political, and intellectual terrorism, should closely examine what this man says and does regarding the Syrian state and the Egyptian people's choices. They should scrutinize how he engages in the ugliest forms of intervention in the affairs of this Arab country, and how he makes no secret of his schemes to annex Syrian territories.

In fact, what The New York Times published is insignificant compared to what Erdogan and [Turkish PM] Davutoglu have done to Syria, or the inappropriate and personally insulting statements and judgments they have issued that brim with sectarian, confessional, and racist sentiment. These should be added to everyone that is said about Erdogan's regime's corruption and dictatorial nature, and about its repression of minorities, those opposing him, as well as his former allies and wide and weighty sectors of Turkish society, such as the Kurds and the Alevis. And this is to say nothing of his false allegations regarding what he refers to as 'the parallel structure' – a reference to the Hizmet Movement led by Fethullah Gulen, whose hand Erdogan once kissed, and without whose support and backing he would not have achieved power after splitting away from [former Islamist leader] Necmettin Erbakan.

Does not such an 'in principle' agreement between Ankara and Washington, and at this specific point in time, highlight the two countries' attempts to sabotage all the current efforts which have picked up speed after ISIS's expansion and its capture of wider areas of Iraq and Syria to find a political solution for the Syrian crisis?

We mention here Kerry's meeting with Russian President Putin and FM Lavrov in particular, as well as UK PM David Cameron's support for these same efforts, as well as the French President Hollande’s support for a political solution in Syria (even though he has persisted with his opportunism by insisting that there is no role for Assad in tomorrow's Syria.) And this is to say nothing of Cairo’s effort to bring the various Syrian opposition groups in the Diaspora together and push them to hold a serious dialogue with the Syrian regime in order to find solutions that are acceptable to all parties.

Finally, the statements being issued by Ankara are nothing more than an attempt to cover up its involvement in backing the terrorists and murderers. They represent an attempt to reserve for themselves a share of the Syrian 'cake,' which it thought was ready to be partitioned. But Erdogan may be greatly disappointed. He may pay the price inside Turkey when he discovers that his demagoguery, tension, fanaticism, and aggressiveness have come to pose a threat to Turkish society itself. This is in addition to the fact that Syria will stand its ground and that neither its state nor its regime will fall.

But of what opposition is Mevlut Cavusoglu speaking? And for whom will he provide air cover? For ISIS or the Nusra Front? Or does he believe that he can play his game based on the risible formula that terrorism's backers are trying to propose according to which the Assad regime will be removed from power in order to ensure that ISIS does not take over?

"But to whom are they preaching?" asks Kharroub in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-The Gaza trap

 

Israel may be ready to offer some facilities to Hamas in Gaza but only in return for consolidating the inter-Palestinian split, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Against the background of the persistent inter-Palestinian split and both parties’ refusal to offer concessions that would lead to a genuine partnership with a common strategy, both sides are effectively in competition with each other in order to win Israel's favor, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. The recent reports of indirect talks between Hamas and Israel and the facilities that Israel is offering the Gaza Strip represent an instance of its exploitation of the Palestinian split in order to promote its interests and liquidate the Palestinian cause.

 

WEST BANK MODEL: "During the latest Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, the Netanyahu government, with the approval of the U.S. and some European and international circles, hinted that it may be willing to allow a seaport and an airport to be built, lift the siege, and allow for reconstruction, if Hamas were to agree to a long-term truce and disarm and end its resistance – in other words, apply the West Bank model to Gaza," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Israeli circles inside and outside the former government preferred allowing Abu Mazin's PA to extend its full authority over Gaza, because that would help ensure Israel's security, the resumption of negotiations, and an agreement that permits the establishment of a Palestinian state based on Israeli preconditions – namely, at the expense of the refugee’s cause, and without Jerusalem, without sovereignty, on disconnected areas and on only a part of the West Bank. In other words, stripping it of all the requirements of genuine statehood other than the name.

Hamas vacillated between two options: a readiness to consider Israel’s proposal but without accepting to disarm the resistance while accepting a long-term truce; and remaining under the PA's umbrella, especially after the formation of the national accord government [in April 2014] while maintaining the sources of power that allow it to control the PA but without being in government. It forgot that Israel will negotiate with it in exactly the same manner as it negotiates with the PA. That is to say, it wants everything upfront while offering little in return, and which it will later try to take back.

Hamas realizes that its deteriorating relations with Egypt, the fact that its relations with Iran have not returned to their former status, and in light of its financial crisis that has prevented it from paying its government employees' salaries regularly, leave it with few options.

It cannot lift the siege, open the crossing points, and reconstruct the Strip if it – and not the PA that is recognized internationally and by the Arabs – is the umbrella under which all these things are to be achieved. This is why it agreed to the formation of a joint Palestinian delegation headed by [Fateh official] 'Azzam al-Ahmad to negotiate the truce’s terms, while trying to ensure that it has the final word regarding any such agreement. But the negotiations ended and all it got was a ceasefire [without conditions] with the result that the situation got worse than it was before the aggression.

According to numerous Hamas, Israeli, Arab, and international sources, Hamas and Israel have held indirect talks via Qatari, Turkish, European, and international mediators conducted against the background of a ceasefire agreement, but without an agreement on opening the seaport and airport, or on lifting the siege and starting reconstruction.

Negotiations over these matters were to be continued, but nothing has happened so far, and it does not seem about to happen any time soon. At the same time, the national accord government has not fulfilled its responsibilities regarding the Gaza Strip because the PA – as it says – does not want to be used to offer cover for the Hamas government while it remains in effective charge. The PA wants the accord government to actually rule. Hamas, on the other hand, rejects this without a comprehensive agreement over all issues. Meanwhile, the Gazan citizen remains the victim, ground between the two jaws of the inter-Palestinian split, and trapped between the Israeli siege and aggression and the [Egyptian] closure of the Rafah crossing.

During its indirect negotiations with Israel, Hamas has been motivated by the loss of any hope of achieving reconciliation soon; by the Strip’s worsening crisis, and by its fear that the current conditions will lead to total collapse or an explosion if things remain as is.

It believes that Gaza's steadfastness and the brave resistance it embodied during the last aggression, as well as Israel's fear of a new confrontation or the collapse of the Hamas authority – which could lead to total chaos and a vacuum that is most likely to be filled by extremist Islamist elements that are under no one's control, since the national accord government and Fateh cannot fill that vacuum – could convince Israel to reopen the seaport at least, even if international supervision, but without disarming the resistance, all in return for a long-term 5 to 15 years truce

When matters got serious, Israel asked Hamas via mediators to end the smuggling and development of weapons, and end the tunneling, especially that of offensive tunnels dug along the borders targeting Israel first and foremost. This is because the Netanyahu government's wager is that the dire straits in which the Strip and Hamas find themselves could drive them to accept Israeli preconditions.

In fact, the Israeli government's main concern is to ensure that any step must contribute to prolonging and deepening the inter-Palestinian split, transforming it into total separation. This is because this could totally block any solution that ends the occupation and establishes a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, and paves the road towards completing a fait accompli on the ground, leaving the Israeli solution as the only practical option.

So far, Hamas is adamantly denying what President Abu Mazin has been repeating, namely that it has held direct negotiations with Israel, despite the fact that a number of its leading figures have confirmed that there have been 'contacts' and 'conversations,' while others have gone so far as to express their readiness to hold direct negotiations, while clinging to the Palestinians fixed national principles and resistance, and without repeating the concessions offered by Fateh and the PLO on such issues. They say they are willing to negotiate, especially if the aim is to deal with livelihood and humanitarian issues, such as prisoner-exchanges, lifting the siege, reopening the crossing points, and reconstruction.

The fact is that direct negotiations may have already begun, or may happen soon, if the door of national unity is not reopened. So far, no agreement has been reached, and it would be difficult to reach one if each side continues to cling to its preconditions regarding disarmament or the resistance's weapons. Moreover, the success of the extremist right in the recent Israeli elections and the formation of the most extreme government since Israel's establishment may improve the chances of reaching an agreement between Israel and Hamas, or at least improve the existing situation but without reaching an agreement.

If [Labor Party led] ‘Zionist Camp’ had won the recent elections or had taken part in the government, the balance would have tilted in favor of extending Abu Mazin's PA's power to the Gaza Strip, with stricter policies towards Hamas. This is because Zionist Camp is open to negotiations and fears the consequences of the current stalemate on the 'peace process,' leading to the emergence of options and alternatives that are not in Israel's favor, including the one-state option that threatens Israel's survival as a 'Jewish' state.

This is because Netanyahu's fourth cabinet is even more strongly opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state than his previous cabinets, even if this is based on Israeli preconditions. For the most that this fourth cabinet can agree to is a 'self-rule authority' in return for ending the conflict and a final agreement. It is, after all, the government of settlers and the advocates of 'the entire land of Israel.'

And this is not changed by the fact that Netanyahu has returned to trickery and maneuvering by speaking of the Palestinian state. For what is more important than what he says is the fact that the government's program does not include any reference to the Palestinian state. Moreover, all that this government is doing and planning to do renders the establishment of that state more impossible than at any previous time.

This is especially true of this government's expansion of settlements, its plans to transform the illegal settlement outposts into parts of the existing settlements or into 'legal' settlements, as happened in the past, with tens of such outposts, and all against the background of the completion of the process of 'Judaization' and 'Israelization' of Jerusalem, the transformation of the West Bank's separation from the Gaza Strip into something permanent, and the deepening of the fact that the PA in the West Bank is an Authority without any authority.

To achieve all these aims and in order to avoid being dragged into a new confrontation at a time that is inappropriate for it, Israel prefers a situation in which the Hamas authority continues to control the Gaza Strip. This is not out of love for Hamas, but because that ensures that the inter-Palestinian split will continue and will be used to blackmail President Abu Mazin and squeeze new concessions from him, such as an agreement to resume negotiations without preconditions or in accordance with soft preconditions, or his willingness to consider solutions that would damage Palestinian rights. Moreover, this can ensure that Hamas continues to be held responsible for what is happening in the Strip, provided it remains weak vis-à-vis Israel. This is why, every time Hamas becomes stronger, a new aggression is waged against it, forcing it and the Strip to pay a huge price for clinging to the option of resistance, to the smuggling and development of arms, and to digging tunnels.

In order to implement this policy and prevent the situation in the Gaza Strip from collapsing or exploding, Israel has agreed to offer numerous concessions, allowing money to enter the Strip to pay the salaries of the Hamas government employees, as well as the entry of goods and some reconstruction material. Israel has also granted permits to tens-of-thousands of Gazan workers to work in Israel, and increased or extended the permits for VIPs and the businessmen to enter Israel and move between the West Bank and Gaza.

The continuing inter-Palestinian split and the fact that both parties are unwilling to offer concessions and adopt positions that would end it and restore national unity on the basis of common denominators, full and real partnership in the PA and the PLO, and referral to the people based on the rules of an accord democracy, means that they will continue to compete to win Israel's favor.

Israel would then choose the party that offers it most; but the most that it can offer the PA in the West Bank is 'self-rule' but under the occupation state's sovereignty, and the most it can offer in Gaza is a 'mini-state' in return for a long-term truce.

"By contrast, the road to unity and resistance based on an agreed-upon strategy could open up broad horizons that may save the cause, the land, and the people," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The fear level

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Wednesday editions with the rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip late Tuesday evening. Air raid sirens sounded in towns across southern Israel at 9:02 P.M. yesterday and the IDF later confirmed that at least one Grad rocket fired from Gaza struck near the community of Gan Yavne, near Ashdod. Some southern residents reported seeing Iron Dome missile defense batteries deploying to intercept at least one incoming rocket. Sirens were heard in Ashdod, Ashkelon and in numerous towns and villages in the Lachish and Hof Ashkelon regions close to Gaza. No injuries have been reported.

In response, Israel Air Force aircraft this morning struck four ‘terrorist infrastructures’ in southern Gaza on Wednesday, the IDF Spokesperson said. Direct hits at the targets were identified, said the statement. 'The IDF views the incident gravely. The Hamas terrorist organization is responsible' for any attacks on southern Israel, the statement added.

According to reports in Gaza, the Israeli military struck Islamic Jihad and Hamas training facilities in Rafah and Khan Yunis in the Strip's south, and Beit Lahiya in the north. No casualties were reported as the facilities were empty after a warning was issued overnight. The Palestinian Ma'an news agency reports that efforts were made with Egyptian involvement to ask Israel to restrain its retaliation to the rocket fire and avoid escalation.

Speaking Wednesday, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon warned that, 'Israel has no intention of allowing daily attacks on its citizens, as was done by members of Islamic Jihad. Tonight the IDF hit Islamic Jihad and Hamas targets in response to the attack on the south. We are holding Hamas responsible for what occurs in the Strip, and we will not suffer any threat to our southern citizens,' he said. 'If there won't be quiet in Israel, the Gaza Strip will pay the heavy cost, in order to make anyone who intends to challenge us to reconsider his actions,' Ya'alon continued. 'It would be best for Hamas to prevent all attempts at attacking Israel or provoking us. Otherwise we will act with much greater force. I would not advise anyone to test us.'

According to Haaretz, Israeli security officials said they believe that the rockets were fired by the military wing of Islamic Jihad, apparently following an internal dispute within its ranks over the appointment of a new military commander in north Gaza.

Ynet adds that a Hamas source told its reporter that the organization has arrested the militants behind the rockets launched Tuesday night. 'What happened yesterday goes against the interests of the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and against our national interests,' the Hamas source said. 'We consider the rocket fire to be a dangerous thing. Right after the rocket fire, our security forces were deployed to different places across the Strip and hunted for the shooters until they were found and arrested,' the source continued.

He noted there were mediation efforts underway between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to de-escalate the situation as soon as possible. While refusing to elaborate on who the mediators were, he said Egypt was not involved.

Former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, in his new role as a member of the opposition, criticized the government for its response to the rocket attack. 'A weak response by a weak right-wing government,' Lieberman told Army Radio. 'While negotiating for a coalition position, I demanded that the government make a priority of eliminating Hamas. They did not agree to this and that is why we are seeing terror gaining strength. We don't need to conquer the Strip but rather to destroy Hamas's infrastructure. That will be much cheaper and much faster than starting a new military operation every other year.'

In other news, Army Radio reports that Egyptian security forces have destroyed more than 500 tunnels infiltrating Egypt from Gaza, according to state media. Egyptian military spokesman Mohammed Samir told the state-owned Al-Ahram that the army had uncovered 521 tunnel entrances from Gaza into the Sinai Peninsula over the past six months. Egypt has sought to shut down the complex and extensive network of smuggling tunnels from Gaza, used to transfer commercial goods as well as weapons and fighters in and out of the Hamas-run enclave.

 

 

BACK TO ROUTINE: Writing on the NRG website, Amir Rapaport says that last night's rocket attack from the Gaza Strip drew an almost automatic Israeli response – but he does not expect any further escalation.

"The rules of the game obligated Israel to respond to the rocket fire on Tuesday night from the Gaza Strip – despite the fact that the rocket was, in all probability, fired against the orders and instructions of Hamas, which Israel holds responsible for everything that happens inside Gaza.

In the past, Israel would turn a blind eye to any isolated incident of rocket-fire from Gaza. It only launched a large-scale operation when there had been a build-up of launches. This is what happened in Operation Cast Lead in 2008 and Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012.

However, during the tenure of Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, a new policy was adopted regarding Israel's northern and southern borders: any incident of rocket attack from Gaza or from Syria will be met with an Israeli response. Usually, this means airstrikes against military targets. Israel holds Hamas responsible for any rocket fire from Gaza, no matter who actually pressed the launch button.

This policy has forced Hamas to take energetic action to prevent other organizations from firing rockets at Israel. Since Operation Protective Edge almost a year ago, just a handful of rockets have been fired, making the past 12 months among the quietest on Israel's southern border since the first Qassam was fired some 15 years ago. In one highly unusual incident, a rocket was also fired at the western Negev last month. The Israel Air Force responded by hitting targets in the northern Gaza Strip.

Last night, a Grad rocket – with a range of 40 kilometers – was fired at Israel. This was not just a Qassam, the home-make rocket with a relatively small range. Last night's Grad apparently landed in the Gan Yavne region and did not cause any damage or injury. Nonetheless, the IDF was committed to Ya'alon's policy and, as a result, airstrikes were launched in the early hours of this morning. Israel, it seems, was unmoved by reports coming out of Gaza that the incident was the result of internal squabbling within Islamic Jihad. Hamas, which has acted with determination to prevent rocket fire against Israel, will now investigate the incident.

Despite last night's rocket attack and this morning's response, the fundamental picture remains unchanged: the IDF and Hamas are not ready for another round of fighting and are not interested in resuming hostilities. Therefore, the chances are that Israel's limited response will mark an end to the incident and routine will quickly return to the south. Until the next time, of course."

Ends…

 

CARROT, STICK AND IRAN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Avraham Ben Zvi says that U.S. President Barack Obama's current policy toward Israel – which combines both carrot and stick – will do nothing to smooth over the cracks in the relationship between the two partners.

"U.S. President Barack Obama's handling of the Middle East situation in recent months – and especially in the past few weeks – creates the impression that the greatest threat to the values, culture and democratic traditions of the United States is being posed by its Israeli ally. As the Middle East continues to find itself in a state of turmoil, the White House makes every effort to remain within the framework of the special relationship between Washington and Jerusalem, but its policies contain an internal contradiction. On the one hand, it warns, on an almost daily basis, that the normative, ideological and conceptual common denominators that form the basis of the American-Israeli partnership are being eroded. At the same time, while the president is leveling harsh criticism at Israel for, in his words, deviating from the 'American way' of pluralism and tolerance, he still approves a massive package of political and strategic incentives for Israel.

Obama's decision to block an Egyptian attempt to convene an international conference on creating a nuclear-free Middle East – which Israel, of course, vehemently opposes – and his willingness to provide Israel with advanced weapons systems (including hellfire missiles and bunker-busters) are two parts of this policy of backing and supporting Israel. Against the backdrop of this paradox, whereby Obama makes full and simultaneous use of the carrot and the stick in his dealings with Israel, the question arises as to the real direction of American diplomacy in the twilight of Obama's presidency and how we should interpret the conflicting signals that reach Jerusalem from Washington.

On the military front, the picture is clear. The decision to sell Israel advanced weapons, which will help us deal with potential regional challenges (with Iran at the center, of course) and to maintain a balance of deterrence with our enemies, is a confidence-building measure that is designed, first and foremost, to give Jerusalem advance compensation for the nuclear deal with Iran that is due to be signed by the end of next month. Washington hopes that this will persuade Netanyahu to tone down his objections to the deal and to stop fighting against it.

However, if this is the case and if Obama is seeking to reassure Israel that it has the full and unwavering support of the United States, then why did the president choose to also make several highly critical comments about the nature of the only true democracy in the Middle East? The answer to this question, which provides a link between the carrot and the stick, is concerned with Iran; it has nothing to do with any kind of moral or ideological criticism that the president may have. This is especially true given that the state of race relations in the United States is hardly something that Obama can urge Israel to emulate.

Indeed, it seems that Obama – ever the politician – has identified an opportunity to increase his room for maneuver in his dealings with Netanyahu as the deadline for a nuclear deal with Iran draws closer. Working on the assumption that the promised carrot will not achieve its goal and will not lessen Netanyahu's opposition to the Iran nuclear deal, Obama decided to add an element of strong-arm tactics to his dealings with Israel – including a prolonged campaign to try to 'educate' us. With public support for Israel among liberal Americans on a constant downward trend for the past several years, Obama is therefore trying to accelerate the process in the hope of undermining still further Israel's base of public support – especially among the new generation of Democratic supporters. He hopes that this will allow him to complete negotiations with Iran (and perhaps even to get the ball moving on the Palestinian front, too) without coming under fire from the pro-Israel camp in the American public and in Congress, where there is continued opposition to the deal.

In the coming months, we will find out whether Obama's approach bears fruit and whether the split within the ranks of the pro-Israel camp in the United States widens. What is already clear is that the repeated use of the stick (condemnations and criticism) will sour relations between the two partners even more than it already is. In this case, the carrot that Obama is offering will not soften Netanyahu's opposition to the Iranian nuclear deal."

Ends…

 

WE'RE ALL WRONG: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber says that everyone involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is wrong about something – and explains why.

1-"Left-wingers are wrong if they believe that one signature on one diplomatic agreement will bring peace to this troubled land. They are also wrong about the extent of Arab enmity – not to mention Palestinian enmity – toward the State of Israel, Israelis and Jews. There is no love affair – nor can there be – between peoples who have been fighting each other and killing each other for decades.

2-The right is wrong to believe that we can continue to rule over millions who belong to a different people and a different religion; that we will be able to keep dozens of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria; that we can keep on fooling ourselves that everyone else in the world is an idiot and that only we are geniuses. The right is also wrong if it thinks that there will never be a Palestinian state.

3-The national-religious are wrong to put all of their faith in God Almighty to protect us from all ills. They are wrong if they think that we can claim sole ownership of this land and that the territory has been promised to the Jewish people alone. The Zionist enterprise did not come into existence in a land that was uninhabited.

4-Secular Israelis are wrong if they think that Zionism has run its course and that the words of the national anthem no longer mean anything, that the flag is worthless and that other symbols of Jewish sovereignty have lost their significance. They are also wrong for the scorn and disdain with which they view anyone who does not agree with them. Their antipathy toward the Jewish religion, toward other opinions and other camps is driving them to distraction.

5-The Americans are wrong if they believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is nothing more than a minor headache compared to the other duties of the nation that has accepted the role of the world's policeman. As a country that views itself as the only empire in the world, the Americans believe that a small operation involving a handful of Marines will allow them to evict tens of thousands of settlers from their homes in Judea and Samaria and perhaps the Golan Heights too.

6-The Europeans are wrong if they believe that the horrors of the Holocaust have been forgotten and that they no longer owe the Jewish people anything. The State of Israel will continue to remind them for many more years about the role that they played in the attempted annihilation of the Jewish people and will make them pay a price for something that cannot be expressed in numerical terms. At this stage in history, Europe will do almost everything that the Americans ask it to do. The United States will do almost anything that Israel asks it to do (although this may change in the near future). If Europe decides to clamber aboard the boycott bandwagon, Israel will survive perfectly well.

7-The settlers in Judea and Samaria are very wrong if they believe that the Americans – followed by the rest of the international community – will allow them to continue pulling the wool over everybody's eyes. For the past 48 years, the Americans have refused to recognize the occupied territories (and it really doesn't matter whether you rebrand them as 'liberated territories') or to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's unified capital city. The Americans really are Israel's friends and allies; they have done more than we can say to ensure our military and economic survival. But they are running out of patience. This should be a real cause for concern in Israel – and especially in Judea and Samaria.

8-The Palestinians are wrong if they think that the State of Israel will collapse or simply crumble into the Arab ocean that surrounds it. Many countries have occupied the Land of Israel over the years, but they have all moved on since then. Unlike them, the Jewish people have nowhere else to go.

9-The Jews – and especially Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – are wrong if they think that they can keep on playing for time and still survive. We have been postponing the inevitable for 67 years, but 67 is merely a footnote in historical terms."

Ends…

 

THE FEAR LEVEL: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yossi Shain says that Israelis – like other nations – live in a constant state of fear, but that the fear level changes according to circumstances.

"A learned American acquaintance of mine visited Israel recently. During his visit, he asked me how Israelis are not more afraid, given the fires that are burning all around us. Indeed, this is a good question. What level of fear is appropriate for Israelis, in light of the brutality and mass murder in our region?

Research has shown that democracies move rapidly from a state of normality to a state of emergency. The level of fear among citizens of democracies can sometimes change overnight, going from one of war-footing to one of routine. Israelis are especially adept at this: in 2002, when suicide bombings were at a height, the fear level also reached new highs: 92 percent of Israelis were concerned for their own personal security and for that of their families. Since then, the fear level has been relatively low, but there have been spikes during times of military conflict.

Politicians are directed, to some extent, by the fears of the people. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been accused many times of fanning the fears of Israelis: he has been charged with over-exaggerating the Iranian nuclear threat – including the disgraceful use of Holocaust-themed rhetoric – and of overstating other regional threats, in order to steer the public discourse away from economic and social issues and to ensure that he is not called upon to find a long-lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. During the course of the 2015 election campaign, Netanyahu was roundly castigated for crossing red lines of democratic behavior by calling on Israeli Jews to vote Likud in order to counter the wave of Arab citizens he said were 'voting in droves.' Among those who have criticized him for these comments was U.S. President Barack Obama, who continues to do so two months after the election.

So what is the right fear level? Is Netanyahu exercising a strategy of fear instead of hope? Or is it possible that Israelis are actually not fearful enough? Nations which have undergone terrible acts of violence often suffer from trauma for many years. This is true of the Jewish people in the post-Holocaust era. Since 1948, more than 23,000 Israelis have died in the country's wars, but, fortunately for us, we have not experienced the kind of protracted war and trauma that other nations in this region have gone through.

There's no doubt that we were not fearful enough before the Yom Kippur War, because of the sin of arrogance. During the period of the Oslo Accords, too, we failed to be circumspect enough and, even though most of the Israeli public has since shaken itself out of this state of comfortable numbness, there are still many here who are not afraid enough. There are those who are not afraid enough of a deal with the Palestinians that would obligate Israel to withdraw completely from the West Bank. They must be made to realize that any such withdrawal will lead, inevitably, to the mass arrival of jihadi forces to the West Bank, which would make life intolerable for all Israelis. At the same time, there are also those who are not afraid enough of the erosion of the borders between us and the Palestinians. Messianic forces, who are demanding a state of permanent occupation (annexation, they call it), will lead to the disappearance of the Jewish state, as well as increased isolation on the international stage, being labeled an apartheid state and the end of normal life here for good. Even those who demand that the government annex the West Bank and give full citizenship to the Palestinians there – people like Moshe Arens, for example – must be made to understand that such a situation will inevitably lead to violent tensions between the two peoples, which could easily escalate into all-out conflict.

In answer to the question, therefore, about the proper level of fear for Israelis, I would suggest that the answer can be found somewhere between the famous saying by Franklin D. Roosevelt ('We have nothing to fear but fear itself') and the ancient Hebrew proverb ('Happy is he who is always afraid')."

Ends…

 

 

THE TWO-BUS LINE SOLUTION: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that brutal discrimination is the lot not just of thousands of Palestinian laborers in route to work, but of five million Palestinians living under occupation for 48 years.

"A minor earthquake shook Israel last week. No one was killed, no houses were destroyed. A few feelings were hurt, but not mortally. What happened exactly? A clinical decision had been made to prevent physical contact between Palestinians and settlers on the bus lines that operate in the West Bank. Bodies shall not touch, smells shall not mingle. What did the defense minister call it? A 'pilot' plan.

All of a sudden this experiment, which essentially just reflects reality, causes a great uproar. Before you know it, Rosa Parks’ famous bus ride during the civil rights struggle in the United States is being cited, as is the segregated transportation instituted by the Nazis in Germany. The demise of 'Jewish values' is being bemoaned, comparisons to South Africa’s apartheid regime have become inevitable, and most of all – the prime minister is taken aback by a poke in the eye from the black president of the United States.

But this was an artificial earthquake that was over even before the seismographs could record its intensity: The pilot was shelved, and the naked mannequin that offended the sensibilities of passersby was removed from the Israeli display window. The world’s only Jewish democracy continued to sprawl on the seashore – and, unlike their black brethren, the Palestinian masses didn’t go out to demonstrate and demand equal rights. American Jews breathed a sigh of relief, and their president praised the Jewish values he was taught.

So what was all the fuss about? After all, brutal discrimination is the daily lot not just of the thousands of Palestinian laborers, but of the nearly five million Palestinians who have been living under occupation for 48 years already. Roadblocks regularly separate settlers from Palestinians, the occupation laws are enforced differently with regard to the two population groups; for decades, policies related to building permits, land appropriation and house demolitions have been sketching crude lines of segregation.

Where has the response of American Jewry, liberal and otherwise, been to this built-in discrimination? Where has the president been while the Palestinians have been seeking to establish an independent state that will ensure their rights? Why was it the proposed bus segregation of all things that kicked up such a storm?

It’s not a matter of hypocrisy. It’s worse than that. The local and international response shows that Israel is already perceived as a binational state that is obliged to conduct itself in line with universal criteria. A binational state cannot tolerate segregated buses. The law must be equal for all. Employment opportunities must be equally open to all citizens, and no one must be discriminated against on the basis of race, gender or smell.

And thus, public buses are not just a means of transportation. They symbolize a sense of equality. The sense, though not necessarily the reality. As for example, ultra-Orthodox men can trample on their wives’ rights, but they can’t force them to the back of the bus or make them get off.

An Israeli Arab’s request to live where he pleases may be rejected, or he may be turned down for a job because of his ethnicity, but you can’t make him get off the bus. You can occupy Arabs and exploit their status as an occupied people to abuse their rights, and even find support for doing so in international law, but you can’t do anything to stain the democratic aura of the occupying state and prevent them from riding the bus of equality.

But occupation is not apartheid. It has recognized rules of its own, and equal rights are not one of them. In fact, those who are loudly decrying the plight of the Palestinian bus riders are contributing to the blurring of this important distinction. Whoever raises the flag of apartheid is basically saying that if the occupation were nicer and fairer – if Palestinians could ride buses with settlers – it would disappear, or at least not be felt.

Nobody should feel virtuous because the pilot scheme was tossed in the trash. It’s the real thing, and should be used permanently."

Ends…

 

UNHEALTHY RESOLUTION: In its editorial on Wednesday, The Jerusalem Post says that a World Health Organization resolution condemning Israel and similar one-sided resolutions in other United Nations bodies are a travesty.

"Little attention was paid in Israel to the latest UN anti-Israel extravaganza. Presumably we’ve grown inured to the hatred spouted at the Jewish state.

While the Arab Spring’s carnage boggles the civilized mind, the World Health Organization, the UN’s public health agency, has identified the true transgressor – Israel. WHO’s annual assembly last week condemned Israel for 'violating the health rights of Syrians in the Golan.'

This is a travesty in every conceivable aspect. While the bloodbath in the region continues unabated, the international forum has found nothing else worth focusing upon but Israel. Only Israel was singled out by the WHO assembly. This comes despite the fact that Israeli medics and hospitals provide indisputably altruistic treatment to spiraling numbers of civilians and enemy combatants from Syria, fleeing that country’s killing fields. The most cutting- edge medical care is given to critically wounded victims who reach the Golan border.

But most disheartening of all is the fact that this disgraceful resolution was adopted in Geneva by a whopping majority of 104 to 4, with 6 abstentions and 65 no-shows. Israel, unjustly accused and unjustly convicted in another UN kangaroo court, was condemned even by European delegations, which purport to occupy the high moral ground – although they ought to know all about blood libel.

Gallingly, the Syrian government – which has been mass-murdering its own citizens – submitted a document that urged WHO to 'intervene immediately and take effective measures to end inhuman Israeli practices that target the health of Syrian citizens.' The Israeli 'occupation authorities' were accused of 'continuing to experiment on Syrian and Arab prisoners with medicines and drugs and to inject them with pathogenic viruses.' This charge aroused no revulsion apparently among the participants. Not one representative of any country of the European Union was outraged, protested, or walked out of the deliberations.

This could be perceived as farcical, were it not in fact tragic.

The Palestinian Authority, Israel’s purported peace partner, blasted Israel for supposed sins against Gazans and West Bank Arabs, cynically omitting mention of the fact that Israeli hospitals are where the seriously ill Palestinians choose to head to when in need, including PA higher-ups. Gaza’s Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh sent his granddaughter here and Mahmoud Abbas’ wife was recently operated on in an Israeli hospital.

We Israelis serially impress ourselves and pat ourselves on the back for our good deeds – and these are prodigious indeed, even under challenging circumstances. Our knee-jerk reaction is to dispatch our rescue and medical crews to any disaster site anywhere in the world. We helped during Turkey’s last major earthquake, although all we received in return was invective and hostility. We sent our medics to Haiti after its earthquake, only to be berated in medieval libel-style for organ-theft. We aided the Nepalese victims of the latest Himalayan earthquake, only again to be maligned for a variety of supposed nefarious ulterior motives. There seemingly is nothing the Jewish state can do to convince its defamers of its true nature, no more than individual Jews could before Israel’s independence.

This is hardly the first bizarre anti-Israel resolution to be produced by UN forums for whom Israel remains an unparalleled atrocious ogre. But this resolution stands out for its utterly outlandish misrepresentation and boundless wickedness. It must be judged the most abhorrent since the UN equated Zionism with racism in 1975 (an equivalence the UN itself later rued and retracted).

Time and again the most brutal dictators dispatch to the UN their mouthpieces, who in deadpan fashion declaim the obligatory human rights catchphrases, while promoting Israel’s denunciation for any and every imaginable trumped-up crime against humankind. All the while, representatives of self-righteous democracies smugly vote for the vilification of a fellow democracy, as if thereby vindicating their own virtue. Foreign ministries – which demand existential risks of Israel – don’t raise a semi-quizzical eyebrow, but go with the Israel- bashing flow and countenance the new Judeophobic zeitgeist.

Their stock pretext is that this isn’t anti-Semitism, but a legitimate critique of Israeli policies. Yet only Israel is thus pilloried. Moreover, Israel is wrongfully and falsely damned in a grotesque spectacle of hate."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE GENERAL ELECTIONS: Serkan Demirtas uncovers the ruling party’s ploy in centre-left Radikal: "We can say that there is climate of panic in the AKP (ruling Justice and Development Party). Or we can look at the picture from another angle, and see a propaganda tactic whereby the AKP is trying to create a fear that the 'good times are coming to an end' so as to raise its level of support up to 45 per cent and the number of its MPs to over 300. ‘Ok’, they are saying ‘we have learnt our lesson; do not break the established order; go and put your stamp on the lamp [the AKP’s symbol]’."

Mehmet Tez highlights the unpredictable youth vote in centrist Milliyet: "Over the last year since the August 2014 presidential elections, a million youngsters have become voters. Since the last general elections, 2.5 million new voters will be going to vote on June 7th. We are heading towards an election where there is an unbelievable struggle over every single vote. But no one knows if and how the 2.5 million youngsters will vote. If this number were to be added to a party’s already existing votes, it would allow it to come to power alone."

Mumtazer Turkone believes the AKP knows that it is on a losing streak in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Things are going bad for the ruling party. The growing objections and criticisms coming from the core of the party should be interpreted as an 'I told you so' mood, rather than an effort to improve something."

Mehmet Metiner suggests that the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] has problems with its own constituency in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The HDP only damages the religious Kurds but the Kurds in general. The HDP, of course, has nothing to do with religious Kurds. As in the case of the CHP, the HDP has a secularist outlook that has its problems with religion and religious affairs. Looking at the HDP’s list, one sees various enemies of religion."

Akif Emre maintains that government is on hold in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "During these days just before the elections, many of Turkey’s outstanding problems have been postponed until after June 7th.  No fundamental political decisions or those relating to the functioning of the state are possible until this is over."

Hasan Cemal senses the beginning of the end for the president and his ruling party on independent online newspaper T24: "Erdogan's attacks on the Dogan Media Group, its owner Aydin Dogan, and on Hurriyet newspaper and its writers are shameful. It is shameful in the name of democracy. It is shameful in the name of freedom of expression. It is shameful in the name of political ethics. So, June 7th will be the beginning of the end for Erdogan. Not only Erdogan's dream of a full presidential system, but the probability of the AKP coming to power alone is disappearing as well."

Gulay Gokturk examines the prospects for a coalition in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "As the biggest party, the AKP can create a coalition with any of the three opposition parties. It is not known what kind of changes will happen within the HDP after the elections, but it is very difficult for it to become a coalition partner based on its current policy. Although CHP [Republican People's Party] leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu says 'there can be no coalition with AKP', it is possible for a party that is thirsty for power to alter its discourse after the elections and accept a coalition partnership. On the other hand, most people believe that the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] is the strongest candidate for a coalition partnership.”

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman asserts that the success of the talks should remain the focus: "The issue of the inspection of Iran's military facilities proposed by the West has been added by Arab countries and the Zionist regime. Iranian officials have stated repeatedly that they will not allow inspection of military sites. The talks may be delayed for such reasons, but it is unlikely for the sides to declare their failure as a result. If the talks fail, it will have consequences for both sides. A nuclear deal is necessary for the West, for the region and for Iran. The sides should negotiate the disputed issues and not allow the talks to be side-lined. If the West intends to resolve the matter, it should amend its positions." 

Conservative Hemayat does not expect a cure for all problems: "Some suggest that the removal of sanctions will resolve all economic problems! Economic issues such as foreign currency, liquidity, the cost of money, production, trade, inflation, recession, and money transfers are polyhedral. The role of international involvement in economic growth and the gross national product cannot be ignored. However, too much concentration on the outcome of the negotiations and linking the outcome of the talks to the resolution of economic problems is a major strategic mistake." 

Moderate Iran distinguishes between two types of critics: "Most Iranian critics of the talks support our peaceful nuclear policies and our nuclear negotiators. Their concern is that negotiations should protect our interests and that our red lines will be preserved. There are some critics, however, who shout that we have moved away from the goals of an agreement. If we pay attention to their reasons and remarks, we will come to the conclusion that, for them, reaching an agreement means surrender. They are not criticising the negotiations; rather, they are against any agreement." 

 

IRAN/U.S.: Conservative Resalat is graphic: "America's hand in the region and the world is under the axe of the Iranian nation. If we do not cut this hand, they will continually encroach on our independence, sovereignty and security just as they did over the past three decades. Iran will be liberated only if this hand is cut off." 

 

REGIONAL TIES: Reformist Sharq calls for revising ties: "The Muslim Brotherhood is in the geopolitical camp against Iran; there are also serious ideological differences with them. The recent stances of the leaders of Turkey and the Brotherhood show that they are cooperating with Saudi Arabia to maintain hegemony in the region. Iran should seriously revise its choice of regional allies, both state and non-state actors, by relying on realism rather than ideology." 

 

U.S./IRAQ: Conservative Khorasan is aghast: "The fact is that the Iraqi army lost Ramadi. Prime Minister Haidar al-‘Abadi has announced vast operations for taking back the city. How has ISIS been able to preserve its presence in the region since 2010? How is it possible for the Iraqi army not to be able to deal with this terrorist group through its oil revenues and weapons bought from various countries, including America and Russia? The alleged goal of the international coalition against ISIS was to end support for this terrorist group. U.S. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter should pay attention to the destination of weapons that are sent to some Arab countries and then provided to ISIS." 

Hard-line Javan is appalled: "The fall of Ramadi reveals the destructive role of Americans in fighting ISIS. The insulting remarks of Ashton Carter and Martin Dempsey have highlighted this role. Instead of meeting their commitments after being in Iraq for the past 12 years, the Americans allow themselves to insult the Iraqi nation and army in order to escape their own responsibilities." 

 

ISIS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami insists that ISIS is a Zionist creation: "With the expansion of the activities of Takfiri terrorist groups, especially ISIS in Syria and Iraq, it became clear that their supporters have long-term and dangerous plans for the entire region. The notion that the Zionists are behind these groups, especially ISIS, has become a certainty because their actions are fully in line with the objectives and interests of global arrogance and its regional ally, the Zionist regime. Muslim nations should note that though ISIS and other terrorist groups are a threat to the entire world, Islamic countries are their main backers. It is a trap the Zionists have laid for regional mercenary governments who have joined the terrorists. If these governments think that terrorist groups would remain loyal to them and secure their political ambitions, they are quite naive." 

Reformist E'temad examines: "ISIS has targeted the Arab world before posing a threat to Iran. The reason is obvious: ISIS and similar groups are too insignificant to stand against our country. The Islamic Republic has clear and declared objectives in the region and supports the stability of legitimate and legal governments and movements. ISIS is a regional and international project that has powerful supporters in the Arab world. Its main objective is to disrupt the borders of the Arab world and weaken its governments in order to boost the security of Israel and create an opportunity for the intervention of the big powers in the region." 

 

SYRIA/TURKEY: Reformist Mardom Salari blames Turkey: "12,000 terrorists in Syria from Turkey changed the battle-field situation in favour of the terrorists. The Syrians will never hold talks with terrorist groups who are not willing to give the slightest advantage to Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Therefore, the situation in Syria is moving towards gradual collapse. Most of the current problems arise from the Syria-Turkey borders. In fact, Turkey's government provides all the logistic and intelligence support to the terrorist groups. Until the Syrian government gains control over the borders, the situation will not improve. The events in Yemen, Iraq and Syria are part of an interconnected chain aimed at carrying out U.S. plans to fragment the Middle East."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Lost opportunities and deepening hostilities

2-The forces that fight ISIS

3-Demonizing the Shiites

 

1-Lost opportunities and deepening hostilities

 

The Geneva [Yemen] meeting, which has been postponed till further notice, could have provided the most appropriate grounds for discussing all… political and logistical issues and agreeing over them. It seems, however, that [Yemeni] President Hadi was subject to pressures from the country that is hosting him and his government – Saudi Arabia – with a view to raising obstacles in the face of this meeting three days before it was supposed to convene. The reasons for this remain hidden, and we in this paper are among those at a loss to understand them. Were President Hadi's impossible and hard-line demands an expression of Saudi/Gulf anger at reports that a senior Houthi delegation has arrived in the Oman capital Muscat to meet with American and British officials regarding the Yemeni situation, without consulting with Saudi Arabia, and in a repeat of what happened when the Omani capital hosted secret American/Iranian negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program for more than six months?--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Saudi Arabia and the coalition it is leading have failed to secure any advances or achieve any of their declared aims, either via Operation Decisive Storm or [the humanitarian] Operation Restore Hope. Thus, the Houthis' power has not been weakened, and the bombardment of the army has not prevented it from continuing to fight alongside the Popular Committees. In fact, it has become clear that every day that the war continues brings further gains for the Yemenis, both inside Yemeni territory and on Saudi soil. In light of this, the following urgent question arises: How much longer can Saudi Arabia and its allies in this war continue to wage air raids whose only achievement is to kill civilians, destroy infrastructure and obliterate vital institutions, which will not lead to victory, but will only deepen the state of hostility between the Yemenis and the Saudi regime?-- Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

As the war on Yemen enters its third month, a major opportunity to reach a political solution for this conflict via the UN-sponsored Geneva conference has been lost after it was postponed due to the impossible preconditions demanded by the Saudi-led coalition, argues the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. The result is that the war may now drag on for months, perhaps years, to come. It is clear that the Saudi-led war's only achievement as of yet has been to kill civilians and destroy Yemen's infrastructure, notes a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus daily. The (Zaidi Shiite) Houthi Ansarullah Movement and its allies, both inside Yemen and inside Saudi territories, have achieved all the gains so far.

 

ENTERING THE THIRD MONTH: "The Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm completed its second month on Monday and it enters its third month today, Tuesday," writes the editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

In fact, if the current political stalemate in Yemen were to continue, it is not unlikely that we may one day note in this column that the Storm has completed its first, or even second or third year.

The prospects for a political solution and hence a ceasefire in Yemen suffered a major setback yesterday, Monday, after UN Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed announced the indefinite postponement of the Yemeni dialogue conference that was scheduled to begin in Geneva on Thursday with the participation of the various parties involved in the conflict.

The military confrontation, especially in the Yemeni south, has continued between the Houthi/Saleh coalition and the ‘popular resistance’ forces loyal to President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. President Hadi has chosen Riyadh as his headquarters ever since he left Aden after the Saudi Operation Decisive Storm began its air raids. Tens of people are being killed or wounded in these clashes every day; a considerable number of them civilians.

Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi had insisted on impossible preconditions if he and his allies were to take part in the Geneva conference. Most prominent was his demand that his Houthi opponents and the forces of former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh that back them, should fully withdraw from all the areas they have taken over and hand over all the weapons they took from the Yemeni army's arsenals when they stormed the capital Sana'a and other cities, in implementation of UNSCR 2216, and as a precondition for joining any negotiations.

When we say that these preconditions are impossible, this is because their acceptance prior to any dialogue would have been tantamount to raising the white flag of surrender and acknowledging defeat. But this is impossible in light of the current map of the conflict and the balance of power on the ground, and also because of the Yemeni people’s famed sense of pride and dignity, regardless of which trench they may stand in.

This point can be made more clearly by asking how President Hadi’s demands are to be implemented without a dialogue. To which party will the weapons be handed over, for example? Who will supervise this process? And, if the Houthis were to withdraw from the cities and return to their headquarters in Sa'da, what force would fill the ensuing vacuum and how?

The Geneva meeting which has been postponed till further notice could have provided the most appropriate grounds for discussing all these political and logistical issues and agreeing over them. It seems, however, that President Hadi was subject to pressures from the country that is hosting him and his government – Saudi Arabia – with a view to raising obstacles in the face of this meeting three days before it was supposed to convene. The reasons for this remain hidden, and we in this paper are among those at a loss to understand them.

Were President Hadi's impossible and hard-line demands an expression of Saudi/Gulf anger at reports that a senior Houthi delegation has arrived in the Oman capital Muscat to meet with American and British officials regarding the Yemeni situation, without consulting with Saudi Arabia, and in a repeat of what happened when the Omani capital hosted secret American/Iranian negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program for more than six months?

It is difficult to know the answer. The Omani side prefers to put a tight lid on its actions; and it is thus unlikely that any information will be released regarding these meetings, their nature, and the parties taking part.

In a telephone interview, raialyoum asked a senior Yemeni official from [former] president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) if he had any information about the Muscat meeting; he answered that he does not. And we concluded from that the GPC was not invited to these talks and was not consulted either. But this source also stressed that the GPC's Houthi allies would be certain to inform the GPC of the results of the meeting after the delegation returns.

It is neither strange nor bad for the Americans to be talking to the Houthis. After all, they are about to sign a historic agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear ambitions. Moreover, the Iranian leadership has backed down from its escalatory discourse insisting that the relief ship it has sent to Hodeida Port with 2500 tons of humanitarian aid would not be searched, and has accepted to unload the shipment in Djibouti. So, are the American/Houthi negotiations part of an American/Iranian deal?

The Yemeni issue is likely to witness numerous surprises in the air, on the ground, and on the diplomatic front. The war seems to be still in its first lap, and the Saudi side still aspires to a military victory after completing its preparations for a ground intervention. This could occur in Hadramaut Province where it has most support, after making arrangements via a third party with al-Qa'ida, which is the strongest force in that area. And that may lead to a red carpet being laid out for President Hadi or his deputy Khaled al-Bahah to conduct the war against the Houthis and president Saleh and his forces from there.

"Time will tell," concludes the daily.

End…

 

NO GOALS ACHIEVED: "As the war on Yemen draws near to completing its second month, its course does not point to any tactical or strategic goals that have been achieved," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in the pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

In the last week of the second month of the war, the following battlefield developments occurred:

- First, resistance from the supporters of President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi – whose term in office has ended – and elements of the Southern Action Movement (SAM) has been extinguished after the army and the Popular Committees have captured the neighborhoods of al-Tawahi, Crater, and other major areas of Aden despite the persistent aerial and naval bombardment of the Yemeni army and Popular Committees in Yemen's economic capital.

- Second, the army and Popular Committees have taken control of al-Howtah, the capital of Lahej Province. The media that backs the aggression on Yemen, especially [the Qatari-owned] al-Jazeera, admitted this major development on the ground, justifying the city's fall and the withdrawal of the armed groups on the grounds that it was meant to spare the civilians and the city further destruction. It is clear that this a mere excuse for defeat since similar withdrawals should have also occurred in other areas where the confrontation is still raging.

- Third, the army and the Popular Committees have succeeded in making new advances in Ma'rib, main stronghold in Yemen of al-Qa'ida, which now enjoys the open support of Saudi Arabia and its allies.

- Fourth, the army, Popular Committees, and the tribes' forces have succeeded in taking control of many sites inside Saudi territory, and in capturing over 100 Saudi soldiers in Jizan and 'Asir provinces.

- Fifth, the UN Security Council has rejected a draft resolution presented by Jordan with Saudi Arabia's support that aims to bestow legitimacy upon the Riyadh conference and adopt its resolutions calling for excluding the Houthis and Saleh’s GPC from taking part in any inter-Yemeni dialogue. The Security Council has insisted on holding the dialogue in Geneva, in a neutral country, which is the Ansarullah's demand.

In contrast to these gains, Saudi Arabia and the coalition it is leading have failed to secure any advances or achieve any of their declared aims, either via Operation Decisive Storm or [the humanitarian] Operation Restore Hope. Thus, the Houthis' power has not been weakened, and the bombardment of the army has not prevented it from continuing to fight alongside the Popular Committees. In fact, it has become clear that every day that the war continues brings further gains for the Yemenis, both inside Yemeni territory and on Saudi soil.

"In light of this, the following urgent question arises: How much longer can Saudi Arabia and its allies in this war continue to wage air raids whose only achievement is to kill civilians, destroy infrastructure and obliterate vital institutions, which will not lead to victory, but will only deepen the state of hostility between the Yemenis and the Saudi regime?" asks 'Abdullah in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

2-The forces that fight ISIS

 

The forces that fight ISIS and jihadi salafism fiercely and bravely are mostly of the same general character. The Shiite militias in Iraq that go by the name of Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have become the Iraqi state and the international coalition's spearhead in the war on ISIS… But the PMU and ISIS's motives are of the same nature: Both are extremist confessional religious forces, armed to the teeth with ideologies, religious creeds, and faith in the hereafter. In Syria as well, had it not been for Hizbollah and some Shiite militias, the regime would have been unable to retain control over one-third – some say one-quarter – of what remains of Syrian territories. The regime has won battles of a strategic nature with the direct support of religious troops armed with their creed, even though the Syrian army is, by definition, a secular ideological force. But there is a world of difference between what its ideology once was, and what it has ended as. There is also a world of difference between a creed that has contempt for life and seeks death, and one that looks forward to 'God's paradise on Earth’--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

It is clear that the [Syrian] armed forces' decision to retreat was studied and prepared, and did not occur in the chaotic manner that the oil-countries' satellite TV stations portrayed it as a 'surrender' and an 'escape from the confrontation.' The ground was laid for this decision after ISIS's first attack on the city was repulsed. Precautionary measures were taken, including the evacuation of Tadmur prison, the relocation of planes from the city's air force base, and the removal of a large number of ancient relics to safe and secure locations... Based on the available information, there was no doubt that protecting the lives of Syrian soldiers takes precedence over any other priority. Nor can the Syrian Arab Army ignore in its calculations the importance of its options as it fights a fateful battle in the Qalamoun, already aware of the presence of terrorist organizations in the barren hills of the area and the roads connecting them to the Syrian desert. Be that as it may, protecting this city, which is on the world heritage list as it faces the threat of sabotage, looting, and destruction, is the world's responsibility and not that of Syria alone--Basimah Hamad in Syrian al-Watan

 

The battle against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has demonstrated that regular armies are an ineffective tool when it comes to fighting ideologically committed forces such as ISIS, and that the most effective forces are those that belong to equally committed militias driven by similarly religious motivations, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. But this only indicates that the coming wars in the region will be more ferocious, bloodier, and longer. The regular Syrian army's withdrawal from the ancient city of Tadmur (Palmyra) was not a retreat in disarray as it is being portrayed by the Arab Gulf media, but an orderly and well-considered withdrawal in light of the need to fight more urgent battles elsewhere, maintains a Syrian commentator in a pro-regime daily. Anyway, saving Tadmur from ISIS is the world's responsibility, and not only Syria's.

 

A QUESTION OF WILL: "U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has accused the Iraq army of 'lacking the will to fight ISIS', which angered the Iraqi PM and a number of Iraqi officials," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Iranian General Qassem Soleimani made the same accusation, but directed this time around against the U.S., when he said that 'it did not want to fight ISIS in al-Ramadi.'

But if so, who wants to fight ISIS? And how can the war on terrorism be won? And will the various parties confine themselves to delivering aerial blows from afar to this most ferocious and bloody organization?

So far, the region's regular armies have not displayed any 'exceptional talent' in confronting this organization. The Syrian army, the most coherent of state armies, has yet to fight a decisive battle against ISIS. It suffered severe losses in the fighting over the ash-Sha'ir oil field, and it staged an orderly withdrawal from Tadmur without fighting to the finish.

The Iraqi army has suffered two defeats, not one. The first was in Mosul [in June 2014] and the second in al-Ramadi. The Arabs needed six years to wake up from the shock of the 'June [1967] setback'; how many years will the Iraqi army need to wake up from its two setbacks?

The forces that fight ISIS and jihadi salafism fiercely and bravely are mostly of the same general character. The Shiite militias in Iraq that go by the name of Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have become the Iraqi state and the international coalition's spearhead in the war on ISIS, so much so that they now wait for a 'plea for mercy' and 'urgent calls for help' to advance to the battlefronts in al-Husaiba and al-Ramadi, after Washington has suspended its veto against their participation in the wars and battles in the (Sunni) Western provinces.

But the PMU and ISIS's motives are of the same nature: Both are extremist confessional religious forces, armed to the teeth with ideologies, religious creeds, and faith in the hereafter.

In Syria as well, had it not been for Hizbollah and some Shiite militias, the regime would have been unable to retain control over one-third – some say one-quarter – of what remains of Syrian territories. The regime has won battles of a strategic nature with the direct support of religious troops armed with their creed, even though the Syrian army is, by definition, a secular ideological force. But there is a world of difference between what its ideology once was, and what it has ended as. There is also a world of difference between a creed that has contempt for life and seeks death, and one that looks forward to 'God's paradise on Earth.'

It may be an irony worth considering that ISIS’s greatest defeat was in 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) at the hands of the Syrian Kurdish fighters backed by some peshmerga and volunteer units. Kobani was a bitter lesson for ISIS, the likes of which it has not tasted from any of its other enemies so far.

On the other side of the border, Iraq's Kurds are playing an important role in confronting ISIS and are making advances on the ground, backed by the international coalition. The peshmerga's first battles with ISIS were close to scandalous. After years of stability in ruling Iraq’s Kurdish province, the peshmerga had turned into something akin to a regime army, similar to the other Arab armies. But the Kurds' sense that the gains achieved by their historic struggle for self-determination may be wasted overnight awakened a sweeping national sense among them and revived the peshmerga’s old fighting spirit. Its commanders were forced to recall old fighters to stand at the vanguard on the battlefront so as to give itself time to catch its breath and rally ranks again. Today, the peshmerga is fighting more effectively than the new regular Iraqi army.

In Yemen, there have been no serious cracks in the regular army’s ranks, which is an important sign, even though this army is described in the pro-Operation Decisive Storm media as that of ‘the deposed Ali 'Abdullah Saleh.’ We have not heard of another Yemeni army fighting in defense of 'Hadi's legitimacy' or in order to restore him to his felicitous rule in Arabia non-felix. When the issue was mentioned at the Riyadh conference for Yemeni dialogue, there was a call to form a new national army; in other words, the old army is still loyal to 'deposed president' [Saleh]– or so it is claimed.

But regardless of these details that are not directly linked to our subject today, the reason why Yemen and the Yemeni army have proven able to stand their ground is thanks to the Houthis and their Ansarullah militia. Had it not been for them, Yemen's army would have been unable to maintain its control over most of Yemen's territories despite the Saudi-led coalition’s thousands of aerial sorties and despite the militias and committees and al-Qa'ida that are fighting in the opposite trench.

In modern wars, the latest generations of advanced weapons and technologies play an important role in determining their fate and outcome. Yet the soldiers, officers and fighters’ morale and fighting creed remain the determining factor on the battlefield.

Yesterday, the Iraqi PM was telling the BBC that an ISIS suicide bomber was behind the steering wheel of a truck booby-trapped with thousands of kilograms of highly explosive material, which is equivalent to a small nuclear bomb. But whoever sits atop a nuclear bomb cannot be a mere fighter or soldier; and this is why a purely quantitative comparison between the number of soldiers and fighters loses its relevance.

This is the difference between a fighter armed to the teeth with a creed, even if it is of a corrupt and evil character as in the case of ISIS fighters, and a regular soldier who impatiently awaits his usually modest salary at the end of the month. What we have are old armies that were corrupted by the regimes of corruption and tyranny that denuded their combat doctrine of any content, and new armies that are more akin to gangs of mercenaries and security companies. As for real fighting, it is now the monopoly of religious and ethnic militias, armed to the teeth with doctrines that bubble over with enthusiasm and high morale.

"And this means that the coming battles will be bloodier and more ferocious, and the coming wars more costly, destructive, and protracted," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

UNEXPECTED SETBACK: "There is no doubt that the unexpected setback in Tadmur came as a shock to the public because it coincided with ISIS's capture of the Iraqi city of al-Ramadi and the Tanaf (al-Walid) border crossing with Iraq," notes Basimah Hamad in the pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

After the terrorist organization stormed the city, numerous questions were raised on the Syrian street that did not receive a satisfying and clear answer, such as: Why did the army withdraw from this vital area? And where were Syria's allies? And how did ISIS's columns reach the city, covering hundreds of kilometers in open desert, without being bombed? And what about the airport, the fate of the civilians, the historic buildings, the plans to defend the city? And is a counteroffensive being prepared to recapture it? And is the city's recapture a priority? And so on.

Amidst a dearth of information on this issue, rumors have found their echo on the Syrian street, especially because the hostile media has focused on addressing the 'Tadmur raid' via reports that cast doubt on the Syrian Arab Army's capabilities, stressing that the alleged Caliphate state 'survives and is expanding.'

In this regard, two main issues were highlighted over the past few days with the aim of lowering morale and undermining confidence:

- The claim that the Syrian regime allowed ISIS to enter Tadmur and loot its relics and antiquities.

- The claim that, by occupying a city that is 215 kilometers away from the capital Damascus and that is a connecting hub between Syrian provinces, ISIS is 'now in control of half of Syria' and can 'secure its strategic depth' in al-Raqqa, Deir az-Zour, and al-Anbar.

But setting these ways of presenting what happened aside, since those behind them are the Turkish/Saudi/Qatari media machines, and steering clear of claims that 'in war, there are advances and retreats, and the battle swings both ways,' it is necessary to shed light on the issue from a broader perspective:

It is clear that the [Syrian] armed forces' decision to retreat was studied and prepared, and did not occur in the chaotic manner that the oil-countries' satellite TV stations portrayed it as a 'surrender' and an 'escape from the confrontation.' The ground was laid for this decision after ISIS's first attack on the city was repulsed. Precautionary measures were taken, including the evacuation of Tadmur prison, the relocation of planes from the city's air base, and the removal of a large number of ancient relics to safe and secure locations.

These precautionary measures confirm that it was not possible to do better for the city, despite the status of the ancient city's Queen Zenobia in our national and world consciousness. For the current conditions are ones whereby the various fronts across all Syrian territories are witnessing heated battles. Based on the available information, there was no doubt that protecting the lives of Syrian soldiers takes precedence over any other priority. Nor can the Syrian Arab Army ignore in its calculations the importance of its options as it fights a fateful battle in the Qalamoun, already aware of the presence of terrorist organizations in the barren hills of the area and the roads connecting them to the Syrian desert.

Be that as it may, protecting this city, which is on the world heritage list, as it faces the threat of sabotage, looting, and destruction, is the world's responsibility and not that of Syria alone. Destroying it would be 'a terrible loss for humanity,' as UNESCO Director Irina Bokova put it. Did Obama not say that the city's occupation was 'a setback for the international coalition'? Did Hollande not deem it the 'heritage of all humanity' and urge the world to act in its defense? Did the Arab League's secretary-general not demand taking 'the necessary steps' to save it?

In other words, the 'international community' and the 'we-are-the-world' bandwagon should stop shedding crocodile tears and assume their responsibility, not only regarding what the High Representative for the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Federica Mogherini) said is 'a symbol of Syria's rich cultural heritage and a crossroads of civilization,' but also regarding the failure to contain the terrorist organization.

"This failure continues, even though nine months have already passed since the formation of the [U.S.-led] 'international coalition,' which was established on the pretext of fighting that organization and destroying it", concludes Hamad.

Ends…

 

 

3-Demonizing the Shiites

 

The attack on a Shiite mosque in Saudi Arabia has been an occasion for further Sunni extremist self-delusion and demonization of the Shiites and Iran, says Mohammad as-Sadiq pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk

 

Last Friday's suicide attack on a Shiite mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia for which ISIS claimed responsibility, has highlighted the fact that no country is immune to the chaos that is spreading across the region, notes a Saudi commentator on a Qatari-owned website. But the reaction of some Sunni extremists inside Saudi Arabia, blaming Iran and, implicitly, the Kingdom's Shiites for the attack, also demonstrates that Saudi Arabia’s extremist currents are living in denial and demonizing the Shiites.

 

NOT THE FIRST TIME: "This is not the first time that ISIS targets Shiites' mosques and Husseiniyyas in Saudi Arabia," notes Mohammad as-Sadiq on Tuesday's Qatari-owned pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.

And it seems that this will not be the last time this will happen, at least, based on the threats issued in that organization’s statement regarding the crime, and in light of the fact that ISIS continues to spread in the Arab world, and as long as the main problem remains unaddressed, waiting for it to disappear on itself.

A suicide attack targeted the Imam Mosque in the village of al-Qudaih in the east of the Kingdom, almost six months after a similar ISIS attack in the village of ad-Dalwa in al-Ahsa' Province. In the period between the two attacks, a close observer of the Saudi scene would have noticed that the first attack failed to produce any notable change in the Kingdom’s policy with regard to restraining the threats and intimidation emanating from extremist organizations inside Saudi territories. The only thing that has happened is that some ISIS members have been arrested, which represents a security action to which the state’s most senior echelons anyway pay special attention alone because it touches upon a fundamental element of state legitimacy.

It is worth noting that in both attacks, the government behaved as an agency responsible for all citizens. But the behavior of the media after the crime remained as before, the religious preachers and sheikhs’ discourse remained the same, as if the attack had never occurred. A newspaper published in the Eastern Province, where the majority of citizens are Shiites, poured its wrath upon the Houthis and the Iranian regime, as well as the Kingdom's Shiites in articles brimming with sectarianism and on the pretext that the Kingdom's Shiites are all Iran's allies and are suspected of maintaining contact with it, despite the fact that none of the Shiite currents or their leaders inside the Kingdom have any historic or current ties with the Houthis. Similarly, certain activists and preachers did everything possible to demonize the Kingdom's Shiites, in what seemed like a settling of old accounts.

It is certain that the Yemen war has provided the extremist and non-extremist Islamist currents with an opportunity to settle scores with Iran in general and the Shiites in particular, bearing in mind that most members of these currents are engaged in sectarian mobilization such that the differences between the jihadis and so-called 'enlightened Islamists' have all but disappeared.

In short, these groups have exploited the climate of war and mobilization inside the Kingdom in order to misrepresent the causes of war and to link the Saudi Shiites to the Houthis and Iran, whom in these groups’ discourse emerges as the Shiites' legitimate global representative. As a result, the Kingdom's Shiites have to pay the price of Iran and its allies’ wars in the region with the blood of their sons and daughters.

Those fanatics are trying to pin this hideous crime in al-Qutaif province on Iran this time around. Occasionally they go so far as to claim that Iran is behind ISIS in the region. This is not only an attempt to absolve themselves from their direct responsibility for fanning the flames of sectarianism against Shiite citizens, as they have been doing in their daily tweets, sermons and speeches that are overflowing with fanaticism and hatred. It is also an attempt to present what happened as if it were an inter-Shiite problem, blaming the Saudi Shiites for what has befallen them, and portraying them as one and the same Shiite body controlled by Iran. They portray the attack on them as a mere warming up exercise in which these rabid forces are preparing for a duel till death.

All these diabolical interpretations and theories regarding Iran's responsibility for the al-Qudaih attack stem from their desire to claim that ISIS terrorism is counterbalanced by Shiite terrorism. This is because these people’s faulty reason views ISIS as a 'Sunni sin' for which a counterpart must be found in the Shiite case. As a result, Sunnis and Shiites would then be seen at the very least as equal in the production of evil, or the balance is tipped in favor of Shiite evil, in which case they can project themselves as worthy of universal sympathy.

But the fact is that no one has linked ISIS to Sunnism as such, let alone accusing the Sunnis in general of being responsible for its crimes – as these groups themselves prefer to link some specific organization or political faction to all members of a sect. But what is one to say to a group that is ignorant of political affairs and social science, a group that only sees Sunnis and Shiites on this planet and imagines that an individual, no matter how far he or she may stray east or west, must be committed to his or her confessional group, even if the crime’s perpetrator lives on Mars?

This group's insistence on blaming Iran highlights the extent to which it is implicated in the conflict between the various sects. This is because it veers towards deeming evil to be the distinctive mark of the other sect. All evil comes from that sect, whereas 'our people' are innocent of any crime. In fact, every aspect of this reaction is a case of sectarian malice; for had their calculations been non-sectarian, they would not have hesitated to denounce any Sunni or Shiite criminal since they would be basing themselves on a value system that gives no weight to sectarian calculations.

Saudi Arabia now stands in ISIS's line of fire. There is no longer any country that is immune to the current chaos. Every one’s security is targeted. Given this, everyone is responsible for fulfilling their duty so as to prevent the ball of fire from continuing to roll. But the carnival of denunciation that these people indulge in after every crime, linking it to Iran, does not absolve them from the charge of being implicated in the Arab civil wars via their demagogical discourse and their incitement to further infighting.

"When will they realize the true nature of their role?" asks Sadiq in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 26.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The final piece

 

Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead their Tuesday editions with the eight-month jail term handed down yesterday to former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for unlawfully accepting money from a U.S. supporter. The sentencing on Monday comes in addition to a six-year prison sentence he received last year in a separate bribery conviction. Olmert's legal team said that it was extremely disappointed by the sentence and was given 45 days to appeal against it.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with what may be the final piece in Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition jigsaw – the appointment of Gilad Erdan as a minister in the government. In addition to taking on the role of public security minister, Erdan will also serve as minister for strategic affairs and public diplomacy (hasbara) minister. He will also – presumably in his ample spare time – head the government's response to the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

During coalition negotiations, Erdan – a senior and popular member of Netanyahu's Likud party – originally demanded the Foreign Ministry and then insisted on being interior minister, in addition to public security minister. He had also said that he would accept a large budget increase for internal security in place of being named public security minister. As a result of the appointment Benny Begin stepped down as minister without portfolio, in order to leave the Likud with 12 ministers.

Netanyahu also announced Monday that he was replacing Nissim Ben Sheetrit as director general of the Foreign Minister with Dore Gold, a long-time confidant and known opponent of territorial compromise with the Palestinians. More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that Gold – who has penned a weekly column for Israel Hayom for several years – is a staunch opponent of the Iranian nuclear deal.

Gold served as Netanyahu's foreign policy advisor in 1996-1997, after which the prime minister appointed him ambassador to the UN, a role he held until 1999. 'I am aware of the various significant challenges facing Israel at this time, and my duty is to protect the country's interest,' said Gold.

Netanyahu's handling of the Foreign Ministry and its various components has come under fire according to a report on Channel 10. Foreign Ministry officials have argued the fragmentation of the ministry's powers will do nothing to enable Israel to present the world with a clear and coherent strategy regarding security and foreign affairs, nor fight global de-legitimization of the Jewish state. Mostly, the officials argue, because the international community and Israeli consulates worldwide will have no idea who in Israel to turn to in order to discuss such issues. The result of expropriating various authorities of the Foreign Ministry, officials say, will, while 'avoiding hurting the egos' of ministers, still cause a serious blow to Israel's capabilities.

Haaretz leads with an exclusive report, according to which Netanyahu told European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini that he wants to resume talks with the Palestinians, with the goal of reaching understandings on the borders of settlement blocs that Israel would annex under a peace agreement. An Israeli source briefed on Netanyahu’s meeting with Mogherini last week said the prime minister explained that in this way, it would be clear what parts of the West Bank Israel could continue building in.

'It’s clear there are areas that will remain under Israeli control under any agreement, just as it’s clear there are areas that will remain under Palestinian control under any agreement,' the source quoted Netanyahu as saying. 'Therefore, we can advance toward understandings on which areas we can continue building in, since in any case, they’ll remain under Israeli control.'

This is the first time since he took office in 2009 that Netanyahu has voiced willingness to discuss the size of the settlement blocs and their borders with the Palestinians, Haaretz points out. This is also the first time he has voiced willingness, albeit indirectly, to freeze construction outside the blocs.

Agriculture Minister Uri Ariel (Habayit Hayehudi) responded harshly to the Haaretz report. 'If indeed there is truth in this, it is a dangerous precedent,' Ariel said Tuesday morning. 'The proposal clearly contradicts the first article of the government's guidelines – the Jewish people's unquestionable right to the Land of Israel and a sovereign state and its national historic homeland.' Ariel added that he 'expects all members of the coalition headed by the prime minister to keep those guidelines.'

Erdan, for his part, defended his prime minister, saying that no one should be surprised at the announcement and that a return to peace talks, if anything, was expected. 'Anyone who is in Likud knows that we will have to partner with the Palestinians to discuss not only our right to land and security needs, but also on a compromise that would include territorial concessions,' Erdan told Army Radio in an interview on Tuesday morning. He added, however, that the likelihood of actually reaching an agreement is low. 'Are we there? Of course not,' he said, noting that no one has 'yet succeeded in bringing Mahmoud Abbas to the negotiating table and stopping his unilateral steps.' However, he insisted that 'peace will only be achieved around the negotiating table.'

Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat called Netanyahu's proposal to discuss the borders of settlement blocs an attempt to legitimize the settlements, an issue he said that the Palestinians were not prepared to accept. Erekat told Haaretz that the Palestinian stance was very clear: West Bank settlements are not legitimate and there is therefore no place for discussion about their borders, according to international law. If Netanyahu is interested in renewing the political process, Erekat said, he must halt all construction in the settlements, implement the fourth stage of prisoner release of Palestinians jailed and tried before the Oslo Accords, hold negotiations based on the 1967 lines, and within a determined period of time end the occupation. Any other position, Erekat said, will render the negotiations irrelevant and meaningless.

Finally, Iranian Deputy Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said that Moscow and Tehran have concluded negotiations on the delivery of Russia's long-range S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran, which should take place 'within a short period.' The deputy minister was speaking on a visit in Moscow on Monday. He said the system will be delivered at 'the earliest possible opportunity.'

The Russian Foreign Ministry has not confirmed the statement, merely reiterating 'the importance of maintaining a regular Russian-Iranian dialogue'. A Russian source claimed that no date has been set for the delivery. So far, Tehran has suggested the end of 2015 as a possible date for receipt of Russia's S-300 missiles, whose sale, banned in 2010 by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, was again authorized in April by Vladimir Putin.

 

AMERICA FRONT AND CENTER: Writing in Israel Hayom, Zalman Shoval says that, given the worrying messages coming from Europe, Israel's diplomatic focus must remain on its stalwart support – the United States.

"The frequency of visits to Israel by European Union officials has increased since the swearing-in of the new government. These officials bring a warning to Israel: If we do not put forward some diplomatic initiative that will help to resume negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, we can expect increased pressure from Europe – which could manifest itself in concrete measures. According to these officials, the Europeans plan to 'play a leading role in the re-launch of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, based on the two-state solution.' At the heart of the European plan is the French proposal that calls for the immediate resumption of talks and the imposition of an 18-month timetable for their completion. If the negotiations do not produce an agreement by the end of these 18 months, France will recognize the Palestinian state.

As the phrasing of the French proposal makes patently clear, Israel is the only side that faces pressure to reach an agreement; it is a proposal that lacks any balance. Expressions of concern for the Israeli position or for Israeli interests are nothing more than lip services. When the French proposal, for example, mentions 'security arrangements that Israel needs,' it makes no attempt to explain how these security arrangements are to be guaranteed; this includes the issue of a demilitarized Palestinian state and secure borders for Israel. In addition, a Palestinian state is viewed as the final outcome of any negotiations, without Israel having any kind of say in the limitations that will be placed on this state regarding the security of the Jewish state.

It is hard, therefore, to escape the conclusion that the European Union would support the establishment of a Palestinian state even without genuine negotiations between the sides and that it would ignore most of Israel's positions in doing so.

Some of the European countries are allies and supporters of Israel and have been so for many years. When it comes to the Palestinian issue, however, it appears that other countries are setting the tone – perhaps, in part, because of the demographic situation that they are facing. This may be especially true for countries like France. It is possible therefore that the divisions within the European Union – such as the very real possibility that the United Kingdom will leave the Union – will work in Israel's favor.

In a more just and moral world, one could have expected of Europe – of all places, given its history with the Jewish people – to form a united front against anti-Semitism, both in its ancient form and its more modern form – anti-Zionism. We could also have expected the Europeans to take a more active role against threats of economic and academic boycotts against the Jewish state. The main issue here is not necessarily the argument over the two-state solution – and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has eloquently explained why Israel has problems with the two-state solution at the moment – but the one-sidedness of the European Union, which wants to impose solutions that do not take into account Israel's fundamental security needs and which sides with the most extreme demands of the Palestinian side.

It is no surprise therefore that the Palestinians take encouragement from recent statements by European officials and that they have dug in their heels as a result. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas – whom Pope Francis urged to be an 'angel of peace' – says that Palestinian refugees in Syria must not give up on the demand to return to Israel; Saeb Erekat said, at the end of his meeting with European foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini that the Palestinians are willing to resume negotiations with Israel only on condition that they are guaranteed to get all their demands.

This is not the first and certainly not the last time that Europe tries to play a role in the Palestinian issue. In so doing, it bypasses the United States. We can only hope that, once again, the Americans take the wind out of the European sails. In fact, there are already encouraging signs that Washington – despite its differences of opinion with Jerusalem on the Iranian nuclear issue – will adhere to its traditional policy when it comes to issues that Israel sees as vital to its security. Over the weekend, the U.S. thwarted an Egyptian-backed proposal to impose a deadline on a proposal for a nuclear-free Middle East. We can only hope that the Americans will take a similarly pro-active approach to the French resolution on Palestine when it is brought before the United Nations Security Council in the coming weeks. The practical conclusion from all of this is that the United States must remain front and center of all Israeli government's diplomatic efforts."

Ends…

 

THE ILLUSION OF INERTIA: Writing in Maairv, Chelo Rosenberg warns that, by embracing the illusion of political inactivity, Prime Minister Netanyahu's new government is taking a grave risk with Israel's future.

"U.S. President Barack Obama recently told al-Arabiya that, over the course of the coming year, there is zero chance of progress in peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This comment passed more or less under the radar of the Israeli media and public and there was no real response from Jerusalem to it. Given that until just recently, Israel was preoccupied with the formation of its new government, this is understandable. That does not make it any less lamentable, however, given that the diplomatic front is the most pressing and potentially dangerous for the Jewish state.

'I don't think [a comprehensive agreement] is probably possible in the next year, given the makeup of the Netanyahu government, given the challenges I think that exist for President Abbas,' Obama said. One could be forgiven for reading this as an aside, but it does contain an important message. Obama has examined the new Israeli government and has concluded that it does not want to resume negotiations with the Palestinians. True, Abu Mazin is also mentioned as someone who faces many difficulties, but the president, for whatever reason, opted not to point the finger at the Palestinian leader and to say that he is not interested in negotiations. Rather, according to Obama, Abu Mazin is facing 'challenges,' in the shape of Hamas and other militant organizations.

The main significance of Obama's comments is that, until the end of his tenure in January 2017, the new Israeli government can relax and enjoy the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – which is exactly what nearly every member of Netanyahu's government wants. But there's a down side, too: it is a terrible mistake to believe that there is any such thing as inertia in this world – and especially in the Middle East. Before we delve into the long list of dangers that Israel would face if it embraced the inertia paradigm, it's worth taking a look at one trifling issue that has been on the agenda of late: the Palestinian efforts to have Israel kicked out of FIFA (the governing body of world soccer). This has already necessitated a major political drive by Israeli leaders and a visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority by FIFA president Sepp Blatter. This is merely an example of what Israel could be facing on the international front.

The attacks on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his new government from members of the Obama Administration – and from the president himself – are a sign of the disdain with which it is viewed. Netanyahu talks a lot about security, but he ignores one of the key elements in safeguarding Israel's national security – our relationship with the United States. Those who fully understand the state of the relationship between Jerusalem and Washington cannot be anything but deeply concerned. Israel's dismissive attitude toward Obama himself is no secret, but decision-makers in Jerusalem should bear in mind that the Americans have one very strong character trait: they don't quickly forget insults and they make people pay for them.

Anyone who is familiar with the atmosphere today in the United States – on university campuses, in the corridors of power and within international organizations – knows full well that Israel is facing grave dangers, from the threat of boycotts to harshly anti-Israeli resolutions in the United Nations. It would be very easy to downplay these threats, but we must not overlook the possibility that this climate will be translated into concrete measures.  Those counting on inertia to save us are making a grave mistake. Unless Israel takes the initiative, it will find itself led in a direction it does not want. This is not an attempt to scare or intimidate. This danger is real. Israel cannot step outside historical processes. There is no such thing as diplomatic inertia, only the illusion of inertia. Below the surface, something is always going on.

Perhaps the best example of this is the Yom Kippur War. Golda Meir and her government ignored all the warnings and embraced what they thought was diplomatic inertia. And then came the shock of Yom Kippur. Sometimes history deceives us, by repeating itself in a slightly different version of the past."

Ends…

 

THE LESSONS OF LEBANON: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Giora Eiland says that the main lesson that Israel should learn from its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon 15 years ago is that, if a Third Lebanon War breaks out, it must see Lebanon as its adversary, as well as Hizbollah.

"This week marks the 15th anniversary of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The decision was, at the time, the right one and then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak displayed enormous courage in carrying it out. The error was the policy that Israel adopted in the aftermath of the withdrawal and the future ramifications posed a danger to Israel's security. Withdrawing from Lebanon was the right thing to do since Israel gained nothing from remaining in Lebanon – at the cost of 25 lives every year. At the time of the withdrawal, many mistakes were made, but that does not alter the strategic fact that it was the right decision.

Barak's policy was based on Israel gaining international legitimacy as a result of the withdrawal. That is exactly what happened when the IDF pulled back to the border determined by the United Nations. But this is also where Israel began to miss the point. Even before the IDF's withdrawal, it had full international legitimacy to fight against Hizbollah – a terrorist organization backed by Syria and Iran. Israel did not have to withdraw from Lebanon in order to continue its fight against Hizbollah – if that organization continued attacking us. By withdrawing from every inch of Lebanese soil, Israel gained international legitimacy to act against Lebanon if its territory were used for terrorist attacks against us. We made a mistake when we did not make this abundantly clear before the withdrawal and we made a mistake in the way that we handled the Second Lebanon War. We tried to defeat Hizbollah, yet we allowed Lebanon – which gave full protection to Hizbollah – to avoid any responsibility.

What will happen if a third Lebanon War breaks out? If Israel conducts that war in the same way that it conducted the previous one, we will be in serious trouble. While it is true that the IDF has improved since the end of the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah – in relative, tactical terms – has improved more. The outcome of another Lebanon war – whether it lasts 33 days or 50 days – will be much harsher from an Israeli perspective than the previous one. We have to accept the fact that the IDF cannot defeat Hizbollah without the Israeli home front paying a very heavy price.

The conclusion is clear. If there is an outbreak of hostilities on Lebanese soil, and if Israel decides to go to war, it must declare war on Lebanon itself and it must focus its firepower not only against Hizbollah, but also – some would say mainly – against the Lebanese army, against Lebanese infrastructure and against Lebanon's national institutions. Since no player on the regional stage – not Syria and Iran on the one hand; nor Saudi Arabia and the West on the other hand; and certainly not Hizbollah itself – would be willing to accept the destruction of Lebanon, any Israeli attack against Lebanese infrastructure would lead to an urgent call for a ceasefire. By achieving a ceasefire after three days of fighting, rather than 33 days, Israel would be able to declare victory and would create an effective deterrent to ensure that there is no more fighting.

There are those who argue that the international community would not allow us to act in this way. This is not true. After all, the international community would not tell us to stop shooting and would not tell Hizbollah that it is entitled to continue attacking Israeli civilians. The international community would call on both sides to cease fighting at the same time and the sooner this happens, the more Israel stands to gain.

Moreover, the most efficient way to prevent a third Lebanon War is to make it quite clear how Israel would act in any such war and who it would see as its adversaries. The moment that the fighting starts, the time for explanations is over. This is the main lesson that the 15 years since our unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon should have taught us. Israel must always seek war (or some kind of agreement) with a sovereign state and not with a terrorist organization. This is as true for Lebanon as it is for Hamas in the Gaza Strip."

Ends…

 

AFTER THE DEAL, THE COMPENSATION: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman comments on the compensation package that Israel will demand from the United States, if and when the nuclear deal with Iran is signed.

"Against the backdrop of the imminent nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers, the Israeli defense establishment has started to examine the compensation package that Israel will demand from the United States. Well-informed sources believe that Israel will seek a significant increase in the military aid that it gets from Washington – from $1.3 billion a year to $4 billion. This sum does not include special grants that the United States relays to Jerusalem for the development and procurement of anti-missile systems like the Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow 3.

American officials have explained that Israel has already come to terms with the fact that a nuclear deal with Iran will be signed within the next couple of months and that it is already starting to prepare for the day after the deal. Indeed, the IDF Planning Directorate is busy drawing up a long list of the compensation items that it believes will bolster the Jewish state's defenses. One issue that is currently being discussed within the Israeli defense establishment is the decision by the United States to sell advanced weapons systems to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia – the likes of which it has never sold them before.

The current military aid deal between Israel and the United States, which is spread out over a decade, is due to expire in 2017. In the past, Israel planned to ask the next U.S. administration – the one that will replace the Obama Administration – to extend the current deal by another 10 years. However, given the massive deals that the Americans have signed with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, Israel now plans to ask for a larger defense package within the next few months.

The assumption in Israel is that, within weeks of the P5+1 signing its deal with Iran, the United Nations Security Council will lift sanctions against the Islamic Republic and, immediately thereafter, the European Union will follow suit. In fact, some European nations are already behaving as if a deal has already been signed and there have been intensive meetings between EU officials and Iranian representatives, aimed at normalizing relations. The Obama Administration, in contrast, will find it hard to lift sanctions immediately, since they were imposed by the Republican-controlled Congress.

Within the Israeli defense establishment, there is a widespread belief that the Obama Administration will be generous with Israel – in part because Jerusalem has had no choice but to come to terms with the Iranian nuclear deal, even if it does not admit so in public. One of the first signs of this new American generosity toward Israel was the decision over the weekend to thwart Egypt's effort to push through a document calling for a nuclear-free Middle East. In addition, as part of its package of goodwill gestures to Israel, the Obama Administration announced last week that it had approved a $1.87 billion arms deal with Israel, including munitions and precision guidance kits."

Ends…

 

THIS IS WHAT A DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yehudit Katsover and Nadia Matar take U.S. President Barack Obama to task for criticizing Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's new government.

 “In an unusual and disturbing departure from the normal and accepted relationship between states, U.S. President Barack Obama has criticized the composition of the new Israeli government. He declared that it disturbs him that many government ministers object to the idea of establishing a Palestinian state in the heart of Israel. We would expect the leader of the Democratic Party in the United States to honor the democratic results of democratic elections in the only democratic state in the Middle East. Somebody should explain to the president that the Israeli voter has granted a majority to the right-wing camp as a result of clear-headed judgment and in light of several failed attempts to begin implementing the idea of dividing the land.

The Israeli voter has seen the results of the delusional New Middle East to which the present president and his predecessors in the White House have tried to lead him. The Israeli voter has seen the death and the terror that the Oslo Accords and the withdrawal from Gaza have brought upon him. The Israeli voter has seen how much blood the vision of the Left has cost and especially – the Israeli voter has chosen to recover his national pride and return to his culture, to the cradle of the Jewish nation, and to the living connection between himself and his land.

That is why the Israeli voter has chosen to place in leadership positions people who present a different vision – the vision of the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Ministers Yisrael Katz, Naftali Bennett, Uri Ariel, Ze’ev Elkin, Yariv Levin, Danny Danon, Miri Regev, Tzipi Hotovely and Ofir Akunis, as well as Knesset speaker Yuli Edelstein, deputy ministers Ayoub Kara and Rabbi Eliyahu Ben-Dahan are all quoted in the Sovereignty Journal, published by Women in Green, supporting its campaign for the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.

The vision of the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria is first and foremost a national one, shared by the people of Israel, who understand that this is our land and the inheritance of our forefathers. This foundational principle precedes all of the other explanations and justifications and is the bedrock upon which they are based. As the late Uri Elitzur, former Netanyahu chief-of-staff, put it: 'Judea and Samaria are the backbone of the Land of Israel, the very heart of the Jewish People’s land throughout the generations and we are obliged to make every effort to realize the ownership of the Jewish People and its sovereignty over its land.' 

Communications Minister Ofir Akunis agrees, and is quoted in the March 2015 issue of Sovereignty as saying: 'My objection to a Palestinian state stems primarily from the fact that our right to the land is eternal and irrevocable. The Land of Israel is the property of the Jewish People and there is no people in the world that would surrender its motherland.'

The application of Israeli sovereignty over the Land of Israel is consistent with international law. In 1921, at the Conference of San Remo, the League of Nations recognized the rights of the Jewish People to its land. With this act, the nations turned the Balfour Declaration and the vision of establishing a national home for the Jewish People in the Land of Israel into a principle of international law that is accepted by all nations. And this recognition was further reinforced with the establishment of the United Nations (Article 80 of the UN Charter).

Israeli sovereignty over all of its land is also clearly necessary for security reasons. There is no knowledgeable person in Israel that would like to see the coastal lowland and heavily populated residential centers of Gush Dan, or Ben Gurion Airport, within range of Arab Palestinian gunfire, which would paralyze Israel’s gate of entry and chase away investors, leading to economic collapse and placing a heavy burden on Israel’s defensive capability.

As Education Minister Naftali Bennett said in the March 2015 issue of Sovereignty: 'A Palestinian state would cause the Israeli economy to collapse. Ben Gurion airport would be paralyzed, there would be no tourism, no commerce, we would return to the economic collapse of the second intifada and people would flee. The subject of annexation in Judea and Samaria is not a distant vision, but something concrete that is possible to achieve.'

In a controlled and gradual process, after declaring loyalty to the state, the Arabs of Judea and Samaria would be granted the opportunity to make a request for citizenship. Thus, the principle of democracy will be preserved. A stable, consistent and secure government of Israel would enable these Arabs to enjoy the advanced state of medicine, infrastructure, technology, employment, education and stable economy that exist in the State of Israel – which is more than any Arab state can offer.

The opinions stated above are representative of the position of many members of the government of Israel, and the People of Israel has elected them because they had the inner strength to say these things confidently and proudly. Yes, Mr. President; the two-state solution is, finally, dead. Now the people of Israel want to promote the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. As a democrat, we expect the president of the United States to honor this and to accept it, even if the results of the elections in Israel do not suit his personal positions."

Ends…

 

GOOD DECISION, BAD RATIONALE: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that Israel's revocation of a plan for segregated buses for Palestinians in the West Bank was the right decision, but that it was motivated by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's fear of what the world would say, not morality.

"The revocation of the decision to not allow Palestinian workers from Judea and Samaria returning from work to travel on buses used by Israelis was the right decision. But it looks like it was taken for the wrong reason.

The reaction to be expected in the world to the demand that Palestinian workers should travel on separate buses should not have been the primary, and certainly not the sole, reason for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s decision. It is the moral standards to which we must adhere that should have been the reason. Separating passengers on public transportation according to their ethnic background violates our moral standards. What we think of ourselves is more important than what the world thinks of us.

There is no denying that there is a security problem, and that Israeli civilians on occasion feel themselves endangered. This is the result of frequent acts of terror committed by Palestinians against Jews. Too many buses have been blown up by Palestinian terrorists causing death and injury to hundreds of Israelis. Palestinian taxi drivers have kidnapped and killed Jewish passengers. Not so long ago a Palestinian driver picked up three Jewish boys and murdered them. In Jerusalem Palestinian terrorists almost daily try to knife Jews and Palestinian drivers try to run down Jews in the street.

Does that mean that the way to protect Jewish passengers is to keep all Palestinians from using the public transportation available to Jews? Or that such passengers needing a taxi should be accommodated by being provided with one driven only by Jews? Is the solution to the security problems caused by Palestinian terrorists the separation of Jews from Arabs? Separation is not the answer. It is morally wrong, and also destructive to Israeli society. Jews and Arabs have learned to live together in Israel to a point where separation between Jews and Arabs is both impossible and undesirable.

Palestinian workers from Judea and Samaria are coming to Israel daily because the Israeli economy needs them and the Palestinian economy benefits from it. The integration of Israel’s Arab citizens in Israeli society must be the aim of government policy, and improving the standard of living in Judea and Samaria is good for Israel and good for the Palestinians. Separation of Jews from Arabs even if limited to Judea and Samaria runs directly counter to this trend.

In Israel itself the integration of Arab citizens in society and in the economy is advancing year by year. There are Arab physicians in Israel’s hospitals, Arab professors at Israeli universities, Arab lawyers and accountants in the big law and accounting firms, Arab pharmacists in pharmacies in the major cities, and Arab taxi drivers throughout Israel. Nobody in his right mind would think of separating Jews from Arabs here.

The situation in Jerusalem is more complex. Many residents of local Arab neighborhoods work in Jewish-owned establishments throughout the city. Many of Jerusalem’s drivers of buses and taxis serving Jewish neighborhoods are Arab.

The recent spate of terrorist acts committed by Arab residents in Jerusalem has caused apprehension among some of its Jewish residents. But separation is not the answer. It is morally reprehensible, and undesirable in the eyes of those who want Jerusalem to remain a united city. Better security has to be achieved by increasing the manpower of the security services, the police and security personnel stationed at strategic locations in Jerusalem – not by separating Jews from Arabs.

Whereas in Israel Jews constitute the majority and Arabs the minority, the situation in Judea and Samaria is reversed: Arabs are the majority there. Some Israelis on the left want to uproot the 500,000 Jews living there. That would be the ultimate 'separation.' 'We are here and they are there' is their slogan.

But in this case, too, separation is not the answer. Neither separation achieved by transferring Jewish residents, nor separation on public transportation services. Our defense establishment should seek to provide security for all living there within the bounds of the moral standards in which we believe."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KURDISH ISSUE/GENERAL ELECTIONS: Baskin Oran uncovers a presidential ruse in centre-left Radikal: "President Erdogan first won time by talking about the 'peace process'. Now he is openly denigrating the Kurdish movement in order to win the votes of pro-Turkish Kurds and force them to say 'there is no Kurdish problem'. And if this provokes the Kurds, he will soon attack them again by saying 'we said peace, but the terrorists said no.' But the Kurds are not listening to him. And this is driving him mad."

Ali Sirmen pins his hopes on the opposition’s common sense in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The organized attacks against HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] voters and the fact that both the president and the PM have deployed the discourse of hatred during the election campaign carry the risk of things getting out of control and consequent clashes in Turkey. The bomb attacks against the HDP in Adana and Mersin earlier this week almost caused such an outcome. Will common sense, which does not exist in the government but of which there is a lot in the opposition, be able to prevent a social explosion? We will see."

Okay Gonensin predicts a new coalition in centrist Vatan: "Even if there is an opportunity to establish a coalition, the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] has zero chance of doing so. The AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will either choose the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] or the HDP as its coalition partners. If the HDP continues to follow the advice given to them, an AKP/MHP coalition will be the only option. In fact, no matter what is being said during the election campaign, the parties that are closest to each other on the issue of a new constitution, the peace process, and even on a presidential system, are the AKP and the HDP."

Kurtulus Tayiz has no faith in the opposition in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "When the peace process was just beginning, it was hoped that the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and the HDP would change. But the PKK continues to be a focal point of violence; it has turned into a subcontractor for those internal and external powers that want to drag Turkey into a civil war. And the HDP has turned into a party that those seeking to undermine political stability hope to exploit. The difference between the parallel structure, [‘deep state’] the Gulen movement, and the HDP has almost disappeared."

Mumtazer Turkone sees nothing but government failure in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The critical moment has been passed on the Kurdish issue and the benefits provided by the AKP have been replaced by rapidly increasing losses. The Syrian civil war and the unpreventable rise of nuclear Iran, and the damaged relations with the U.S. and the EU have all quashed the advantages that the government once represented. Today, we need a new government even in order to establish relations with Egypt."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Facing the consequences

2-No dialogue with the Houthis, no room for Iran

3-Erdogan’s impudence

 

1-Facing the consequences

 

The very idea that ISIS will soon begin destroying those magnificent columns, arches, buildings and inscriptions [in Palmyra], horrifies every civilized person. And it is now clear that ISIS destroys only what it cannot carry off; the rest is not subject to the rulings of takfir [apostasy] but to the dictates of money. For ISIS sells everything that it can cart away… Can anybody tell us what in the world is going on? We, who do not easily accept facile and simplistic conspiratorial explanations based on nothing but readymade imaginings and suppositions, stand in amazement, unable to explain what is happening. Our minds are disturbed by a question concerning ISIS's strength and its renewed ability to advance and succeed, whereas we previously believed that the international coalition’s intensive aerial intervention had stopped this organization in its tracks as a prelude to turning it back--Jamil an-Nimri in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

[The] changes in U.S. priorities, the confusion in choosing allies and the absence of a political and military focus have all served ISIS, which has exploited them to good effect. As a result, it took everyone by surprise with its expansion and battleground victories in the Syrian east and Iraqi center. We would not find it strange, nor do we deem it unlikely that the Syrian forces' withdrawal and the fact that they did not fight ferociously to defend Tadmur [Palmyra] were intended as a message to Washington, saying frankly that the fall of this historic city in ISIS hands was the direct result of the change in Washington’s list of priorities and its decision to push the confrontation with ISIS to the bottom of that list. Therefore, the message says, Washington must bear full responsibility and confront ISIS alone, with all the ensuing consequences-- 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

By capturing Ramadi in Iraq and Tadmur (Palmyra) in Syria, ISIS is now in effective control of the Syrian and Iraqi deserts, and is threateningly deployed along Jordan's borders, notes a commentator in a Jordanian daily. But the mystery is why the U.S.-led coalition air force failed to prevent this by intensifying its air attacks on ISIS forces. The fall of al-Ramadi and Tadmur is forcing the U.S. to review its strategy and its list of priorities in the region once again, notes the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. But it is not easy to see what new policy Washington can pursue in order to stop ISIS’s advances.

 

OPEN GATES: "The occupation of al-Ramadi and Tadmur opens the gates of the Syrian and Iraqi deserts to ISIS," writes Jamil an-Nimri in Friday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

It is as if ISIS were compensating for the limited areas it has lost or retreated from in northern Syria and central Iraq by capturing even larger and more important areas elsewhere. And it is as if the international coalition set red lines for ISIS in the north and the east, to which the organization responded by heading south.

We saw what happened in the Kurdish town of Kobani, half of which was occupied by ISIS, which fought desperately to capture it totally. But the Kurds fought bravely in its defense, and they received effective air support that allowed them to repulse ISIS and put an end to all its hopes of making further advances in that location and in the remaining Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish areas.

This is unlike what happened in al-Ramadi. ISIS first occupied a limited area, then completed its invasion despite its inhabitants’ requests and the resounding official declarations of Iraq’s military preparations to save the city. Nor did we see any effective air support or Iraqi ground forces coming to the rescue. This continued until the forces defending al-Ramadi fled in haste without looking back.

Something similar happened in Tadmur.  ISIS was two kilometers away from the town when the entreaties and calls to protect this historical site began. The Syrian regime said it was sending reinforcements to defend it; but we then saw ISIS storming the city and the regime's forces beating a hasty retreat.

Tadmur – or Palmyra – is one of the most beautiful and greatest historic cities on the UNESCO world heritage list. It was the capital of the Arab Queen Zenobia who rebelled against the Romans. The very idea that ISIS will soon begin destroying those magnificent columns and arches and buildings and inscriptions, horrifies every civilized person. And it is now clear that ISIS destroys only what it cannot carry off; the rest is not subject to the rulings of takfir [apostasy] but to the dictates of money. For ISIS sells everything that it can cart away. The forces withdrawing from Tadmur seem to have taken that into consideration; they carried all the historic relics they could take and stored them in a safe place, according to official statements.

Can anybody tell us what in the world is going on? We, who do not easily accept facile and simplistic conspiratorial explanations based on nothing but readymade imaginings and suppositions, stand in amazement, unable to explain what is happening. Our minds are disturbed by a question concerning ISIS's strength and its renewed ability to advance and succeed, whereas we previously believed that the international coalition’s intensive aerial intervention had stopped this organization in its tracks as a prelude to turning it back.

Despite the slow pace of the counteroffensive and U.S. President Barack Obama's talk of a confrontation that may last for three years, the advances made by the Iraqi forces and the recapture of Tikrit had sent a positive signal. There was talk of preparations for the battle of Mosul. Instead, however, we saw the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) militias committing violations in the liberated areas, sending a miserable message as to the nature of the supposed liberation project. And we saw the Iraqi army acting in a weak and impotent manner, while the Baghdad government was begging for more arms despite the billions of dollars spent on such weapons by previous Iraqi governments.

Could the Iraqi forces not have reacted more quickly and prevented the fall of al-Ramadi? Or do they wish to prove that only the PMU, with its bad sectarian reputation and not the army, is capable of fighting and defeating ISIS? Was it not possible for the air force to intervene effectively and bomb ISIS forces so as to prevent them from entering Tadmur?

ISIS is now expanding and has taken control of half of Syria and Iraq. After a year of aerial bombardment, the organization has doubled the areas under its control in the Syrian and the Iraqi deserts that border us [in Jordan].

'We in Jordan have every reason to fear what lies in store," concludes Nimri.

End…

 

U.S. STRATEGY REVIEW: "The U.S. administration has announced that it is in the process of reviewing its months-long strategy for destroying the Islamic State (IS/ISIS), after the latter has taken control of the Iraqi city of al-Ramadi," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But was there really an American strategy to begin with for it to be reconsidered? And, anyway, even if such a strategy exists, it is one that is shaky, confused, and proven to have failed.

Washington formed a military coalition consisting of sixty countries including a number of Arab states. Its warplanes have waged over 3700 air raids since last summer, and its spokespersons have been boasting about its success in restraining ISIS and preventing it from expanding. They also began to prepare for celebrating this great achievement.

But ISIS forces have now blown this entire theory sky high. They have proven that the American spokespersons' statements are nothing more than wishful thinking. For over the past couple of days, we woke up to two resounding slaps to the Americans and their coalition’s face with the capture of the city of Tadmur deep in the Syrian desert, and al-Ramadi at the gateway to the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

U.S. strategy is based on intensifying air raids and relying on them as the main means of blocking ISIS's expansion, leaving the ground war to the Iraqi army which it has armed and trained, hemorrhaging over 25-billion dollars of the Iraqi coffers to cover these expenses in the process. This plan led to the recapture of Tikrit with the aid of the PMU forces that consist mostly of Shiite militias such as the 'Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Forces, and the Abul Abbas Brigades.

ISIS's capture of al-Ramadi and Tadmur – which effectively means that it is now in control of almost half of Syria and one-third of Iraq – has dispersed all the rising American and Iraqi optimism. It has forced Washington to call for a meeting of coalition foreign ministers in Paris next week to find out where the fault lies and amend the current strategy, or adopt an alternative one.

But what more can Washington do than it has already done throughout the past ten months of its air raids? More training? More armament? More air raids? Send ground forces into Syria and Iraq?

To begin with and before answering these questions, let us first speak of the U.S.’s mistaken strategy and the holes with which it is riddled. These can be summarized as follows:

- First: The first main feature of the confusion that surrounds U.S. strategy concerns the sudden, unstudied, and unrehearsed changes in its list of priorities, especially in Syria. It initially placed toppling the Syrian regime at the top of this list. Then it abruptly changed course, and convinced itself and its allies that absolute priority should be given to fighting terrorism and ISIS as its main manifestation. Now, however, Washington has returned to the first alternative; namely, to toppling the regime in compliance with Saudi/Turkish pressure. And all these acrobatic changes have occurred within the space of no more than two years.

- Second: U.S. strategy in Iraq is based on backing Mr. Haidar al-'Abadi's government, but at the same time, it does not want to anger the Sunnis; or, rather, it does not want to serve as a military tool in the hands of the Shiite and (Sunni) Kurdish majority. This is why it asked Mr. 'Abadi to arm the Sunni clans in order to confront ISIS as happened in the case of the ‘Awakening Forces’ formed by General David Petraeus, the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq to fight al-Qa'ida. But just like his predecessor PM Nuri al-Maliki, Mr. 'Abadi continues to reject this American demand. He insists on seeking help from the PMU instead, because he does not trust the Sunni clans and believes that they will turn against him after they have been armed, and that they – or a large part of their fighters – will join ISIS.

- Third: The imminent nuclear agreement with Iran has shocked the (Sunni) Arab states that are members in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. As a result, these states are 'lukewarm' and distrustful of the U.S. strategy for fighting ISIS and their official and unofficial media have begun to accuse Washington of stabbing the Gulf states in the back, and relying on Iran as a strong regional ally at their expense.

These changes in U.S. priorities, the confusion in choosing allies and the absence of a political and military focus have all served ISIS, which has exploited them to good effect. As a result, it took everyone by surprise with its expansion and battleground victories in the Syrian east and Iraqi center.

We would not find it strange nor do we deem it unlikely that the Syrian forces' withdrawal and the fact that they did not fight ferociously to defend Tadmur were intended as a message to Washington, saying frankly that the fall of this historic city in ISIS hands was the direct result of the change in Washington’s list of priorities and its decision to push the confrontation with ISIS to the bottom of that list. Therefore, the message says, Washington must bear full responsibility and confront ISIS alone, with all the ensuing consequences.

It follows that we do not agree with the claim that the Syrian army is now exhausted because of the length of the war and Saudi/Turkish/Qatari armament and financing of the armed opposition, which has led to the fall of major cities, such as Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, and Mastouma military base, the Syrian regime's last stronghold in Idlib.

We do not know how Washington will deal with the major and shocking defeats inflicted on it and its Iraqi allies by ISIS forces. Increasing the number of air sorties will not do much to change the situation. Retraining and arming the Iraqi army is unlikely to yield positive results; for how many times can this army be armed, trained, and rehabilitated? Did they not say the same and make the same plans after the fall of Mosul [last year]?

What Washington does not seem to realize is that ISIS forces are not only made up of bearded fellows and hard-line Islamists. They are more a mixture of those who drive trucks carrying tons of explosives in suicide attacks in pursuit of martyrdom (as they see it), and senior former officers of the Iraqi Republican Guard and Iraqi army. These officers who have studied in major military colleges and academies in West and East, were driven by Paul Bremer Iraq's military governor in the first days of the occupation, into the lap of hard-line Islamism after disbanding their army and guard, and towards desperation, frustration, and marginalization as a result of the de-Baathification process based on the advice of those [Iraqis] who backed their country's occupation.

But what theory could the military trainers of the Iraqi forces resort to regarding the means of confronting these explosive trucks? Can they show them how to blow them up? But they are prepared for that precise purpose to begin with.

It may be that the American and Iraqi military forces mobilized for regaining al-Ramadi will succeed in ousting ISIS from the city, but this does not mean that it will not fall into its hands again.

ISIS’s capture of al-Ramadi has delayed the battle to regain Mosul. The organization has added to its arsenal very advanced American weaponry and equipment, left by the Iraqi army when it fled the city to escape death. This is exactly what happened in Mosul, al-Raqqa, and Deir az-Zour. And to this should be added the psychological and moral effects of this defeat, which will be difficult to address.

Iraq is in the midst of a crisis that is no less intense than that of its Syrian neighbor. The main cause of all that has and is still happening there are the Americans, their occupation, and the readiness to trust them. For after all, the Americans are pulling the sectarian and ethnic strings; and they ultimately want to tear the region apart, break it down and drown it in civil wars.

"Anyone who claims otherwise is living on a different planet," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

2-No dialogue with the Houthis, no room for Iran

 

Yemen’s legitimate government must not attend the UN-sponsored Geneva Conference or accept any role for Iran in Yemen, says Mohammad Saleh al-Musfir in today's Qatari Asharq

 

Now that the Riyadh conference on Yemen has been held, it is clear that the legitimate Yemeni government’s attendance at next week's UN-sponsored Geneva conference would constitute an admission of the former conference’s failure, maintains a Qatari commentator. In all circumstances, the Yemeni government and its allies must adamantly refuse any Iranian role in any humanitarian effort or any attempt to resolve the Yemen crisis.

 

MANY RESOLUTIONS: "The Riyadh Yemeni conference has ended by issuing many resolutions, recommendations and statements, such as the call to form a federal state, and a united federation, one that President Hadi said will 'raise the republic's flag over the Marwan Mountains in Sa'da Province' – a reference to the effort to defeat al-Houthi’s militias," writes Qatari commentator Mohammad Saleh al-Musfir in Friday's Qatari daily Asharq.

Meanwhile, al-Houthi responded to President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi saying: 'The republic's flag is already raised over Sa'da, but al-Qa'ida flags are the ones raised in Aden.' Others claim that the flags of secession are being raised in the southern Yemeni cities.

Promises were made at the Riyadh conference to compensate, equally, all those harmed by the war in Yemen. And there was talk of accelerating the civil administration’s return inside the country in order to pursue its national duties there.

This is wonderful news to tell the truth, and these are carefully framed speeches. But the fundamental question to which we have yet to see an answer is this: How will compensation be offered as the war continues to rage on most of Yemeni lands? And how will this compensation be computed when destruction consumes all of Yemen's achievements, whether as citizens or as a state? And what is to be done when, according to reports from Yemen, all of the country’s cash has been stolen from the Central Bank and its branches.

I wish that the Riyadh conference had focused on three issues: The first is the return of all Yemeni military commanders and tribal sheikhs to secure positions inside the country from where they can conduct the battle. Second, the rejection of any Iranian help that reaches Yemen by any means, with the Arab states and the states that are taking part or supportive of Operation Decisive Storm taking it upon themselves to provide aid to the Yemeni people. And, third, taking a decision to mine all the regional waters so as to prevent any supplies from being smuggled to al-Houthi and [former president] 'Abdullah Saleh.

Regarding foreign aid, the Sultanate of Oman set a precedent in the region's history when it refused to accept any aid when it suffered natural disasters; namely, the strong storms that inflicted enormous losses and caused torrents and floods. With this in mind, I emphasize the Yemeni authorities' right to reject any help from Iran under any guise or pretext. Such a stance would be to the credit and honor of Yemen and its brave leaders.

If the legitimate Yemeni leadership were to agree to participate in the Geneva conference called for by the UN secretary-general on May 28th, this would effectively constitute an admission that the Riyadh conference has failed. It would be contrary to the Yemeni position that the Riyadh conference was a success.

Moreover, Iran's participation in any official or unofficial Yemeni dialogue should be opposed by the Yemenis first, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab and other friendly states on the Red Sea littoral. Iran has no geographical borders with Yemen. It has no interest of any sort connecting it to the Yemeni people. Its relations with a sect [Zaidi Shiite Houthis] that is a minority in Yemen does not justify its intervention in Yemeni affairs or the Red Sea, which is effectively a purely Arab sea closed to those outside it.

The Red Sea and its eastern coastlines from the Aqaba Gulf to Bab al-Mandab in the south are all Arab lands, and from Suez in the north and to Bab al-Mandab in the south also are Arab lands. In light of this, Iran has a right to pass through these international waters similar to that enjoyed by all other states, and nothing more.

Yemen’s legitimate leadership, headed by 'Abed-Rabbo Hadi, has no right to meet and hold a dialogue with those who took up arms against the nation and state. That tyrannical force looted all the Yemeni army's camps; occupied the capital by force of arms, arrested the country's supreme leadership (the president, the PM, and the members of his government), expanded across the entire state, and is now destroying the cities of southern and central Yemen with great hatred.

On what basis can a dialogue be held with these usurpers? There is no room for any dialogue with these usurpers before they lay down their arms and withdraw from all the cities and countryside that they have occupied, and before they recognize the legitimate government led by President Hadi.

The public and secret American pretexts for imposing a dialogue between Yemen’s legitimate leadership on one side, and al-Houthi and 'Abdullah Saleh's cronies on the other, for fear that al-Qa'ida and ISIS will expand in the region, are all risible excuses that should not be taken seriously.

Based on the above, it is our right to remind the U.S. administration and our leaders in the Arab world, especially the GCC states, of what Henry Kissinger said about Iran earlier this month: 'Iran poses a greater and more serious threat than that posed by ISIS and al-Qa'ida.' While we are fighting al-Qa'ida in Yemen as well as the vanguard of ISIS, we must also reject the Iranian presence in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

It is the duty of the Yemeni president as well as of PM Khaled Bahah to pay official visits to the states that backed Decisive Storm, accompanied by a chosen elite of military and political officials to express the Yemeni people and their leadership's gratitude for these state’s support in their battle to regain Yemeni sovereignty which has been hijacked by the Houthis and their supporters.

They must address the world's capitals to explain the Yemeni situation and ask these states to act in solidarity with the Yemeni people and their legitimate government. We may understand the reasons that limit President 'Abed-Rabbo Hadi's ability to move outside; but we do not understand why he does not delegate this mission to the PM.

Finally, there is no room for Iran on the Arabian Peninsula's soil, especially in Yemen, or for any Iranian effort even if it is of a humanitarian character. Iran's actions are never innocent.

"And there can be no negotiation or dialogue with those who have taken up arms against the Yemeni people and their legitimate government on which there is accord by all Yemeni parties," concludes Musfir.

Ends…

 

 

3-Erdogan’s impudence

 

Someone who confiscates the freedom of the justice system and who changes police commanders and judges in order to cover up government corruption, has no right to criticize other states or complain about their laws, says Mohammad Noureddin in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

Turkish President Erdogan and his PM Davutoglu's criticisms of the death sentence passed against former Egyptian president Mursi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders, smack of double standards, maintains a Lebanese commentator on Turkish affairs writing in a Gulf daily. But these also betray a deeper hostility towards Egypt whose roots go back to the Ottoman period.

 

PAINFUL HEADACHE: "Egypt presents one of the most painful headaches for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular, but also for his PM and head of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ahmet Davutoglu," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

Erdogan has continuously dealt with Egypt as if it were an Ottoman province, even though it was the first such province to rebel against the Ottoman sultans' rule and to secure semi-independence under Mohammad Ali Pasha’s leadership. In fact, had it not been for British intervention, Mohammad Ali's project would not have ended where it did; yet despite that intervention, he laid the foundations for Egypt's independence and its modern renaissance.

The Turks never forgave the Egyptians for confronting the sultanate and what came after it. Despite its secular government and NATO membership, the same Ottoman spirit continued to prevail in Turkey after the Second World War in confronting Egypt under 'Abdul Nasser, and in opposing all Arab liberation causes, with Algeria as the prime example.

With Erdogan and his party's ascent to power in 2002, and the consequent revival of the Ottoman project, Turkish hostility towards Egypt, and even its Gulf allies, was forcefully revived. It peaked when the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government was toppled and its president Mohammad Mursi was deposed after the June 30th 2013 revolution. Since then, Erdogan and Davutoglu have never wasted an opportunity to attack the new Egyptian President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi. Erdogan's impudence went so far as to attack Sissi from the UN podium last September, thereby demonstrating a total disregard for all international courtesies.

Despite some Gulf efforts to improve relations with the Gulf states as well as with Egypt specifically, Turkey’s negative discourse towards Egypt and the Gulf states in general – with the exception of Qatar – did not change. But Turkey’s discourse is not confined to what is said officially; there is also the discourse of the media loyal to the AKP. For example, the Turkish daily Yeni Safak, which is the most loyal to Erdogan, used foul language in reference to Gulf states after the sentences were passed on Mursi and the other Muslim Brotherhood leaders.

But the truth is that Erdogan and Davutoglu's reactions to these sentences betray their double standards. Erdogan says that 'the death sentence against Mursi is a death sentence against the ballot box.' Erdogan still understands democracy as nothing but the ballot box. He forgets that elections are the less significant part of the democratic process. The simplest requirement of democracy is for the winner to respect the choices of the minority, of the groups that did not vote for the ruling party. But in Turkey itself, and because of an unfair and unjust electoral law, Erdogan has gone far in denying the rights of opposition groups, deeming it his right to confiscate the opposition's freedoms and choices, even though it represents nothing less than 50% – that is, half the nation.

Moreover, Mursi as well as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government were loyal to the path chosen by their political mentor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Within a very short time and in a hasty manner, they worked hard to take over the judiciary, the administration, and the military establishment. That, in turn, led to the people and that very same military establishment’s uprising in 2013.

Erdogan says: 'The world, especially Europe, has stood by watching the death sentences in silence, even though capital punishment has been banned in Europe.' But Erdogan must surely realize that the ban on the death sentence in one country does not provide justification to criticize sentences passed in another based on that country's laws. In the U.S., the death penalty is still in use; so should we criticize this, or is this a matter for the U.S. to choose and decide?

Moreover, does Islam not condone the death penalty, as well as stoning and cutting off of hands? Does this not mean that when Erdogan criticizes the EU because it failed to criticize the death sentences in Egypt, he is thereby criticizing Islamic shari'a law, which permits this penalty?

We are making this comparison not to defend or criticize the death penalty in Egypt or elsewhere, but to highlight Erdogan's double standards. After all, he once said that, had he been in power in 2001 when the death sentence was passed against [imprisoned Kurdish leader] Abdullah Ocalan and before it was later canceled under pressure from the EU, he would have carried it out immediately.

"Someone who confiscates the freedom of the justice system and the freedom to protest, and who changes police commanders and judges in order to cover up a government corruption scandal, has no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, or to speak about freedom and democracy," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Reset

 

Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post lead their weekend editions with the interview that U.S. President Barack Obama gave this week to The Atlantic, which was published on Thursday evening. Or, more accurately, Israel Hayom leads with the response of Likud hardliner Yariv Levin to the interview.

In the interview, conducted by Jeffrey Goldberg – which focused on ISIS, Iran and Israel-U.S. relations – Obama again criticized Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s comments on a Palestinian state and Arab-Israelis before the last elections. Obama said that the security relationship between the United States and Israel will remain strong, but reiterated that there will be 'consequences' from Netanyahu’s remarks.

In response, Levin said that, 'We have much appreciation and respect for the president of the United States, but there's no place for statements which constitute interfering in the internal affairs of Israel.' This sentiment was echoed by Habayit Hayehudi lawmaker Motti Yogev, who accused Obama of 'conspiring … against Israel's prime minister – and Israel, in general.'

Zionist Union MK Shelly Yachimovich said that, while Obama's criticism of Netanyahu is unusual and perhaps borders on the unacceptable; Netanyahu has brought it on himself. Yachimovich said that she believed Netanyahu when he said on the eve of the March election that a Palestinian state would not be established during his time in office. Actions are the best indication of a politician's intentions, she added, and Netanyahu has maintained a diplomatic freeze all his years as prime minister. As a result, she said, the prime minister has caused Israel's isolation in the world and an unusual condemnation from Washington.

Elsewhere, Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the latest news in the mob bust that has been occupying the Israeli media for the past week, while Haaretz reports in its main headline that right-wing activist Aryeh King has purchased an abandoned church compound near the Aroub refugee camp between Hebron and Jerusalem, and is refurbishing it ahead of establishing a new settlement outpost at the site. King, who specializes in buying Arab-owned real estate, purchased the property three years ago from its church owners.

In other news, Israel Radio reports that former President Shimon Peres departed Friday morning for an international economic conference in Jordan. He will be meeting with Jordan's King Abdullah, Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, as well as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Peres is expected to discuss with them the possibility of renewing the diplomatic process in a regional framework, as well as discussing efforts to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip.

Meanwhile, a new World Bank report warns that the economy in the Gaza Strip is on the 'verge of collapse.' The report says that the Gazan unemployment rate is now the highest in the world. The World Bank is calling on both Israel and international donors to remedy the situation. The report charges that 'blockades, war, and poor governance have strangled' the Gazan economy. It says that about 43 percent of Gaza's 1.8 million residents are unemployed and that youth unemployment reached about 60 percent by the end of last year.

All the papers, meanwhile, report on the speech by Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely to employees at the Foreign Ministry. Quoting medieval Talmudic scholar Rashi, Hotovely said that Israeli diplomats must stop apologizing for their country, since 'this country is ours – all of it.'

Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman apologized Thursday after calling supporters of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict 'autistic.' Lieberman, who heads the Yisrael Beiteinu party, made his remarks earlier Thursday in an interview with Israel Radio. 'Anyone who thinks going back to the 1967 lines will solve the conflict is autistic,' Lieberman said.

Finally, all the papers report that, according to the Defense Ministry, exports of weapons systems and Israeli-developed technologies were down $1 billion in 2014 compared to the previous year. However, arms exports to African states were up 40 percent in the same period. According to figures released by the ministry, export deals worth $5.66 billion were signed with Israeli defense industry companies in 2014. The 2013 total had been $6.5 billion, itself a $1 billion drop from 2012 figures. The 12.9 percent drop stemmed from a reduction in defense budgets and acquisition programs in the United States and Europe. In some of these countries, there is a demand by local politicians for the use of local firms, which affects the level of trade with Israeli companies.

 

A PRESIDENTIAL DISCONNECT: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth comments on the interview that U.S. President Barack Obama gave The Atlantic yesterday, saying that it proves just how disconnected he is from reality.

"Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said this week that his country would 'not let foreigners inspect any military sites' and that he objects to 'unreasonable demands' by a 'brazen and insolent enemy.' In case it isn't obvious, he was referring to the United States.

So what if Khamenei said what he said? The path to a nuclear agreement with Iran has already been mapped out and no one involved is going to let words derail it. And yet, judging by the extensive interview he gave Jeffery Goldberg in The Atlantic, what bothers U.S. President Barack Obama most is not these latest pearls from Khamenei, but Election Day comments by Binyamin Netanyahu about Arab voters – comments for which he has already apologized. Comments of this kind, Obama said, are 'contrary to the very language of the Israeli Declaration of Independence' and may have 'foreign-policy consequences.'

In other words, Iran is allowed to be an anti-Semitic state-supporter of terrorism, which undermines stability in Sunni countries and which openly mocks American values, but Obama still trusts it to be a rational country and feels that he can sign a nuclear deal with it. Nonetheless, he treats Netanyahu like some kind of a marked man, who will not be invited to the White House any time soon.

Well done, Mr. President! You've found the real source of all the problems of the Middle East: Not Iran, with which you are about to sign a nuclear deal; and not ISIS, which you claim is being defeated. The main problem facing the Middle East today is the democratically elected leader of the State of Israel. But, hey – long live democracy.

There were three key elements to Obama's interview: the war against ISIS, the nuclear agreement with Iran and Obama's relationship with Israel and the Jewish people.

ISIS first: This was the part of the interview which proves just how disconnected the U.S. president is from reality and how he still thinks he's living in the romantic age of the Arab Spring or the promising days of Mursi. 'No, I don’t think we’re losing,' he told Goldberg. Just yesterday, the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra fell to ISIS and earlier this week, Ramadi in Iraq was overrun. Obama explained that the Iraqi forces that were deployed in Ramadi were not those that had been trained by the Americans. Half of Syria is in ISIS hands and Damascus remains in Assad's hands (terrorists versus a terrorist regime) – and Obama still insists that 'we are no losing.' But Netanyahu's comments about Arab voters will have implications for the United States' foreign police. Obama doesn't see any problem with the way that the battle against ISIS is being conducted, and that means that Netanyahu is the problem.

The second part of the interview was dedicated to Iran. Obama is a young president, so he tried to explain something to Goldberg: 'Look, 20 years from now, I’m still going to be around, God willing,' he said. 'If Iran has a nuclear weapon, it’s my name on this.' Obama seems to have forgotten, however, that just two months ago he himself said that, with the deal with Iran, 'essentially, we're purchasing 13, 14, 15 years of assurances that the breakout is at least a year.' In other words, Obama will have to answer to history not in 20 years, but in 15 years. He said so himself.

The third part of the interview dealt with the president's relationship with Israel. 'I want Israel … to embody … the human or universal values that … led to the end of Jim Crow and slavery. The same values that led to Nelson Mandela being freed.' Even if he did not say so explicitly, Obama sees Netanyahu as the antithesis of Mandela. Obama is confused, however, between a policy that is based on the need to safeguard a country's security and one that is based on racism and apartheid.

The president seems incapable of forgiving Netanyahu for his comment about Arabs streaming to the voting stations. God forgives, but Obama can't. Has Obama forgotten that, during his 2012 election campaign, he called for Hispanics to vote en masse in order to punish his Republican rivals? Who was he referring to: Ted Cruz? Marco Rubio? And what about Vice President Joe Biden, who told an audience of black Americans that, if Republican candidate Mitt Romney were to win the election, they would end up in chains again? Does Obama think it was totally fine for the Conservatives in the British election to call on their supporters to vote in order to mitigate the influence of the Scottish National Party in parliament? Of course it's fine – as long as it's not Netanyahu.

Obama misses the Israel of yesteryear, the Israel of the kibbutz and the Israel of Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir. This was the Israel that he first came to know. So here's a little reminder, Mr. President: It was Golda Meir who insisted that 'there's never been a Palestinian people. If Netanyahu had said something like that, it would be the end of the world for Obama."

Ends…

 

PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS: Writing on the Maariv website, Lilac Sigan says that the Israeli right is giving the Palestinian anti-Israel campaign all the ammunition it needs, by insisting on policies that play straight into the hands of all those who accuse Israel of apartheid.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was absolutely right to put a quick stop to the latest ill-conceived proposal regarding Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank. But before we examine the wretched decision by Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon to introduce a pilot whereby Jews and Arabs would travel on separate buses in the West Bank, let's first recognize one thing: any use of the word 'apartheid' it totally out of place. It is a word that has come into use with the sole purpose of making Israel look like a monster; any comparison between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa is a misrepresentation of the facts.

In Israel, there are no race laws against Arabs. Rather, there are policies regarding our relationship with the Palestinians. It is unfortunate and undeniable that Palestinian leaders define Israel as the enemy and are trying to harm the Jewish state in any way they can. But use of the inappropriate word 'apartheid' cannot be an excuse. It is time for rightists to finally understand that the decade-long Palestinian campaign has been a success. Israel is currently in a situation where it has to 'prove it doesn't have a sister' – and it is irrelevant whether that is justified or not.

The right cannot continue pretending that it is engaged in hasbara, while continuing to do what it does. Even the Palestinian leadership is now saying – off the record, of course – that the new Israeli government is doing its work for it. The radical left, at least, knows and admits that it is providing the global anti-Israel campaign with ammunition. What is the right's excuse? Even if it does not alter its policies or its ideology one iota, the right must start to behave in a more intelligent manner.

The Palestinians' tactics are to make people forget all about terrorism and the truth of the conflict, by portraying Israel as an abusive regime that is cruel for no good reason. The more the right is up in arms, the more credence they give to these claims. Even if they are up in arms for good reason, this is the outcome. Being right doesn't help.

Ya'alon has to understand that it doesn't matter what specific problem he hopes to solve, segregated buses cannot be the answer. He cannot provide Abu Mazin and his cohorts such potent material for their anti-Israel campaign and their accusations of apartheid – especially not while the president of FIFA is visiting the West Bank and Israel to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian demand that 'racist' Israel be banned from international soccer competitions.

Construction Minister Uri Ariel would also be well advised to change his rhetoric. He took advantage of U.S. President Barack Obama joining Twitter this week to send a tweet of his own: 'Welcome!  Happy Jerusalem Day! In case you didn’t hear PM Netanyahu: Jerusalem won't be divided again, we build all over the city.' What exactly was he hoping to achieve with that tweet? Let's hope that Abu Mazin and Ismail Haniyeh sent him a thank-you note for helping their campaign. Failing to do so would just be rude.

The right must forget its policy of infantile contrariness. The rules of the game have changed and it is harming Israel on the most important front of all – the PR front. All of those who insist on acting in an aggressive manner are merely bolstering the world's problematic impression of Israel – even if they genuinely believe that they are acting in self-defense.

Paradoxically, the Israeli right has turned itself into as much of an asset for the anti-Israel campaign as the extreme left. Perhaps the time has come to stop being so right and so self-righteous and to start being smarter. We will all end up paying dearly for the right's lack of foresight."

Ends…

 

CROSSING THE RUBICON WITH LIEBERMAN: In Yedioth Ahronoth, Shimon Shiffer and Nahum Barnea sat down with former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who spoke to them about Israel's relations with moderate Arab states and about Israeli-Arab lawmakers whom he sees as a threat to Israel's existence.

"There are many negative things that one could say about MK Avigdor Lieberman, but there's one thing that must be said to his credit: he is the only lawmaker who joined the ranks of the opposition out of choice. The Knesset has yet to come to terms with the change. Until he has found a permanent office from which to handle his affairs as a backbencher, Lieberman will continue to use the foreign minister's office – just one door down from the prime minister.

My colleague Shimon Shiffer and I met with Lieberman this week.

'One of Netanyahu's ministers called me this week,' the former foreign minister told us. 'He asked me to explain how I can be in favor of the death penalty for terrorists while still talking about an agreement with the Palestinians.

'People don't understand me – and that's part of the problem. You see the portrait on my wall? Jabotinsky. We need to be cruel and generous, Jabotinsky used to say. I am willing to be generous only if I am also cruel. This isn't Luxembourg. We must be cruel. A jury in Boston – Boston, not Alabama – can sentence a terrorist to death but we can't? We do exactly the opposite. We're not willing to give and we refuse to kill.'

We understand what you mean when you talk about being cruel, but what about the generosity part? In response, Lieberman started talking about the Kurds' war in Iraq and Syria.

'This is a classic example. We don’t know how to be generous. We used to control the entire Middle East. Today, it's as if we don't exist. Everyone is too scared of commissions of inquiry. Everything is based on rigid templates. I tried to explain to other foreign ministers that the best thing they can do to bring peace and stability to the Middle East is to forget all about Israel. All of their proposals and ideas and parameters have brought nothing but chaos. Butt out. We can work with Iran along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf States; we can work together to develop the region. Together, we can change the world.'

You held a series of secret meetings with officials from the Gulf States. What did you learn?

'When you sit down with them in a closed room, they talk just like us. When they met with Obama last week, they spoke about Iran in the same terms we do – they used even harsher words. At the moment, there are zero gaps between us and them.'

But that's not what they say.

'They haven't crossed the Rubicon yet. That's all that is left for them to do – to move from secret talks to open dialogue. There's still a long way to go before they cross the Rubicon – but I am not downplaying what has already been achieved. It will take more time. In the end, they will cross it. Not because of us, but because of their own interests. They see what is happening in Libya, Syria and Yemen. There is a knife at their throats. They also see how they are treated by the United States. Washington betrays its allies and we do the same. If moderate Arab countries want to survive, they have to fight. Airstrikes are not enough. They need to be fighting on the ground, too.'

Lieberman is convinced that the Obama Administration will not rush to resume its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

'For the past 12 months, the Americans have been passive. Even Kerry! He's got enough worries elsewhere. Just compare the frequency of his visits here at the start of his tenure to how many times he has visited in recent months.'

You used to be close to Mohammed Dahlan. He is now seen as Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas' greatest rival and a serious contender to run the Palestinian Authority. Are you still in contact with him?

'I can't remember who I am in contact with.'

Lieberman's views on Israeli Arabs and their leaders have not become any more moderate since he joined the opposition ranks; perhaps the opposite.

'I don’t have a problem with Arabs. I have a problem with Israel's relationship with them. I believe that [Joint Arab List chairman] Ayman Odeh endangers our existence. He and Mohammed Barakeh talk very differently when they speak in Hebrew, but there's no difference between them. They are like Rowhani and Ahmadinejad.

'If the head of Odeh's public relations team compares Zionism to ISIS and he is not willing to reject the comparison; that says everything that needs to be said. He also isn't willing to condemn Hanin Zoabi. And he refused to even sign a surplus vote deal with Meretz because it is a Zionist party. In Arabic, he incited against any Arab citizen of Israel who is willing to do national service. We ignore him when he's speaking Arabic.

There are many Israeli Arabs who feel differently. They are afraid to speak out because they understand that they cannot rely on the Jews: in the end, we will turn our backs on them. That's the way things work in the Middle East. The only time that I was ashamed to be a Jew was when I sat down for a long conversation with Antoine Lahad, the commander of the South Lebanon Army. He told me how Israel had fooled him.'

Lieberman apparently decided that his criticism of Binyamin Netanyahu could wait for another time. He obviously felt that, over the past few weeks, he had said quite enough about his former ally and boss."

Ends…

 

ERDO-BIBI: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea reflects on the similarities and differences between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

"In two weeks from now, on June 7, there will be an election in Turkey. This election is considered critical: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former prime minister who was elected president, hopes that his party will win up to 60 percent of the seats in parliament. That would allow him to change Turkey's constituent, giving the president far-reaching powers. His rivals are not sparing him their harsh criticism. According to reports in the Turkish press, he has been accused of 'constitutional dictatorship,' being power-drunk, megalomania and insanity. Erdogan doesn't give two hoots: his aggressive election campaign has broken all the rules.

In one of his Knesset speeches, Isaac Herzog compared Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to Erdogan. This is an interesting comparison: it contradicts many of the things that have been said and written about Netanyahu, including on these pages. For years, I described Netanyahu as a talented but weak leader, intelligent but susceptible to being pressured. His image is that of a strong leader, but in practice he is anything but; he has rhetorical skills that are the envy of other world leaders, but his decision-making skills are pitiful. I am not the only one who sees Netanyahu in this light: Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon also described him in such terms, as do most of the people who worked with him.

It is possible that Netanyahu was always stronger and more determined than we gave him credit for; it is also possible that he has changed. Let's just assume, for the sake of argument that Netanyahu turned over a new leaf earlier this year; that his depression was replaced by mania. Suddenly, he woke up one morning and decided to be more like Erdogan. He used all of his contacts in the United States and managed to get himself invited to address Congress. Judging by the outcome, that trip was a failure: it prevented Israel from having a say in the terms of the nuclear deal with Iran, it alienated the Democrats and it increased Iranian influence over the region – much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia, which is our ally in the struggle against a nuclear Iran.

But Netanyahu is convinced that he is Erdogan. He thinks that no one can get the better of him, not even the president of the United States. He fires ministers, calls an early election, dismisses the judges for the Israel Prize, interferes in the free press, conducts a racist election campaign that was based on cynicism and lies – and he sells out the core values of the State of Israel and Zionism in shameless coalition deals.

Bibi-watchers were quick to say that the prime minister is sweating again, that he's easily extorted and that he's panicking. Maybe. But I think Netanyahu is in a state of euphoria. He shows disdain for everyone: for Obama, whom he doesn't believe is worthy of being president; for the centrist politicians who were his fig leaf in the previous government; for the civil servants who carry out his orders, often against their better judgment; for journalists – both those who suck up to him and those who criticize him; for the Arabs, who didn't descend on the polling stations in buses funded by left-wing NGOs; for voters in the periphery, who swore that they would never vote Likud again, but did just that on Election Day; and for the politicians and parties who joined his coalition. As far as he is concerned, what he gave them in exchange for joining his government was meaningless, since he doesn't care about such matters. Everything that he cares about – the United States, Iran and the media – remains in his hands. Let these children have fun with other issues. In fact, let them fight amongst themselves over who gets to sit next to him in the official coalition portrait.

Like Erdogan, Netanyahu relies on broad support from the voters. Like Erdogan, he is waging war against the state institutions which limit his power. Erdogan got the better of the Turkish military, which had previously been the de facto regime in Turkey. But the courts, the business community and the free press are still putting up a fight. That is why he wants to change the constitution. His excuse, of course, is governability. But that's just a euphemism. When leaders talk about governability, they mean unlimited power.

Netanyahu's behavior reminds me of Curling – the winter sport when competitors have to send a granite disc down the ice, while four teammates sweep the ice clean before it. The attorney general and the IDF's chief legal adviser are Netanyahu's sweepers; Isaac Molho cleans up after him.

The problem is that Netanyahu allows things to get out of control. The scandal over segregated West Bank buses is a prime example. It started with the grumbling of a group of extremist settlers. They merely wanted to let off steam – not actually change anything. Ya'alon, however, panicked. The army opposed his pilot, but when the defense minister gives an order, the army obeys. The first media outlet to report on the plan was 'Ba'sheva' – which is published by the settler movement. It was only after Israel was hit by a torrent of accusations of apartheid that Netanyahu intervened and forced Ya'alon to put his plan on ice.

Netanyahu may be strong like Erdogan, but Israel is not Turkey. We can't always afford to do the things that other countries do."

Ends…

 

MY BIG, FAT ISRAELI ARSENAL: Writing in Haaretz, Uri Misgav comments on the United States' decision to provide Israel with a massive injection of arms and ammunition, asking exactly what the purpose is.

"It warms the heart to hear of the Pentagon’s 'compensation deal' with Israel in exchange for the agreement with Iran.

The deal consists of 8,000 smart bombs, 14,500 smart bomb guidance systems, 50 bunker busters, 4,100 'small' bombs (only 110 kilograms of explosives) and 3,000 Hellfire missiles for the Apache helicopters. The overall cost is $1.8 billion. This does not include separate deals for another 3,000 bomb guidance kits and enlarging the F-35 stealth bomber fleet.

What is all this armament intended for and where? To ensure an Israeli attack on Iran, immediately after the powers sign an international agreement with it? Perhaps just to replenish stockpiles after the last war rampage in Gaza, which broke all the Israel Defense Forces' records in ammunition use?

The Pentagon announced that these deals reflect the 'American commitment to Israel’s security.' Funny thing, the pace of armament keeps increasing, yet I don’t feel any safer over the years. History has proved that reckless armament doesn’t lead to security. It leads mainly to wars. Since 2006, when Israel began to base its warfare almost exclusively on fire power and pounding from the air, we’ve had one war in Lebanon and three in Gaza. Four wars in less than a decade.

That’s why it appears to me that these deals reflect mainly the American commitment to the American arms industries. One suspects that Israel is indeed 'the American aircraft carrier in the Middle East.' But not as a metaphor or a simile — a real aircraft carrier. An enormous arsenal. An impenetrable bunker whose scope is impossible to discuss, not to mention its very existence.

According to this bitter logic, the Americans won’t help us end the conflict; at most they’ll help us manage the flames. The conflict produces just too many jobs for them and their politicians. The Germans won’t save us either. Guilt-ridden, they compensate us with nuclear submarines and missile boats to safeguard Yitzhak Tshuva and Noble Energy’s oil rigs. This is good for their tormented conscience and also produces income and jobs at the shipyards in Kiel.

But passing the guilt on is not enough. In this case the cows may want to nurse, but the calf craves to suckle ravenously. Following the seminal traumas of the Holocaust and the War of Independence, Israel is a captive of its own armament obsession. This is reflected not only in wars. Somehow, after every peace agreement or strategic arrangement we hasten to 'compensate' ourselves with planes and tanks and missile systems and bombs and military bases. This is how you raise a child with eating disorders – you give the kid some 'compensation' that only exacerbates his condition. Just so he stops yelling.

Nothing can stop this bulimia. Not even the nuclear potential, which was supposed to serve as a calming deterrent. Mordechai Vanunu revealed at the time that Israel had more than 200 nuclear warheads. Thirty years have passed. I wonder how many it has today and whom exactly they’re intended for.

The complex permeates all the way down, from the Pentagon and Dimona reactor to the streets of our cities. Mayors of big towns have set up 'local police forces' in the past year, armed of course. Is it any wonder that peace has become a four-letter word? This is what remains of the Jewish genius: smart bombs, student trips to the Warsaw Ghetto and swearing-in ceremonies for military recruits in Masada.

History has proved that reckless armament doesn’t lead to security. It leads mainly to wars."

Ends…

 

HITTING THE RESET BUTTON: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Rebecca Shimoni Stoil says that U.S. President Barack Obama's interview with The Atlantic was an attempt to redefine the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem.

"A day before a major address to America’s Jewish community, President Barack Obama’s interview with the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg set the tone for the coming outreach effort meant to soften the impact of any Iranian nuclear deal among skeptics. After months of acrimonious back-and-forth between top officials in Washington and Jerusalem, Obama set out his parameters for U.S.-Israel relations – retaining his right to criticize Israeli policies, but asserting that even publicly aired discord did not preclude support for Israel and the Jewish people.

The interview with Obama was published one day before the president is set to give a major speech directed at American Jews. The address will be delivered at Washington’s Adas Israel Congregation, a Conservative synagogue that counts among its members numerous Washington heavy-hitters, including Goldberg himself.

Although Obama’s speech is officially timed to mark Jewish American Heritage Month and is slated as a tribute to former senator and Holocaust survivor Tom Lantos, Obama is expected to use the opportunity to try to calm the waters over the impending nuclear deal with Iran and his administration’s frosty relationship with the Netanyahu government.

Obama’s interview was at times defensive, arguing that criticism of Israel’s policies did not constitute a lack of support for Israel and the Jewish people as a whole — and, for that matter, that he was not 'bifurcating' the American Jewish community. Obama’s opponents have pointed to his pursuit of an Iranian nuclear deal as linked to his very public run-ins with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu over topics that include both Iran, the two-state solution, and the status of Israeli Arabs.

If, as Vice President Joe Biden said last month, the U.S. and Israel fight like a family, Obama sees it as a family whose fight extends past the closed doors of the house, and into the street, no matter what the neighbors think

Obama complained that 'there has been a very concerted effort on the part of some political forces to equate being pro-Israel, and hence supportive of the Jewish people, with a rubber stamp on a particular set of policies coming out of the Israeli government.' 'If you are questioning settlement policy, that indicates you’re anti-Israeli, or that indicates you’re anti-Jewish. If you express compassion or empathy towards Palestinian youth, who are dealing with checkpoints or restrictions on their ability to travel, then you are suspect in terms of your support of Israel. If you are willing to get into public disagreements with the Israeli government, then the notion is that you are being anti-Israel, and by extension, anti-Jewish,' he continued. 'I completely reject that.'

Obama’s argument echoed those made by leftist groups like J Street. If this was a trial balloon for Friday’s speech, the argument is unlikely to win over many beyond the already-converted – who have been making this argument themselves for almost a decade.

Obama’s red lines for the U.S.-Israel relationship do not preclude criticism. Obama also rejected arguments made by many American Jewish leaders that suggested that even if criticism is necessary, the acrimony should not be public.

If, as Vice President Joe Biden said last month, the U.S. and Israel fight like a family, Obama sees it as a family whose fight extends past the closed doors of the house, and into the street, no matter what the neighbors think.

'You should be able to say to Israel, we disagree with you on this particular policy. We disagree with you on settlements. We think that checkpoints are a genuine problem. We disagree with you on a Jewish-nationalist law that would potentially undermine the rights of Arab citizens. And to me, that is entirely consistent with being supportive of the State of Israel and the Jewish people,' he argued. 'Now for someone in Israel, including the prime minister, to disagree with those policy positions—that’s OK too. And we can have a debate, and we can have an argument. But you can’t equate people of good will who are concerned about those issues with somebody who is hostile towards Israel.'

While most of Obama’s interview seemed to offer a traditional set of guarantees – ensuring Israel’s security, fighting international actions that unfairly single Israel out, maintaining security and intelligence ties – he also occasionally seemed to mix messages about the red lines.

Obama asserted that under certain conditions, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism were clearly linked. 'Do you think that Israel has a right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, and are you aware of the particular circumstances of Jewish history that might prompt that need and desire?' he asked. 'And if your answer is no, if your notion is somehow that that history doesn’t matter, then that’s a problem, in my mind.'

But at a different point in the interview, referring to his critiques of Israeli policy, he said he maintained the right to 'speak honestly and truthfully about what I think will be most likely to lead to long-term security, and will best position us to continue to combat anti-Semitism' – a statement that seemed to tie willingness to criticize Israel’s policies with the ability to combat anti-Semitism. 'I make no apologies for that precisely because I am secure and confident about how deeply I care about Israel and the Jewish people,' he stated.

If Obama’s interview is any indication of his case to American Jews as a whole, it does little to break ground in appealing to the center-right who are likely to remain unconvinced by the argument that his criticism is a sign of tough love. The 'we’re such good friends that we should be able to criticize each other' argument has been tried before, with little resonance outside those who already leaned toward supporting the president.

The red lines in the interview – reserving the right to publicly criticize, ambiguity on the relationship between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, and American support for Israel’s security that transcends immediate political acrimony – offer little in new reassurances for those who fear the erosion of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

If past interviews with Goldberg are any indication, Thursday’s interview is a dress rehearsal for Friday’s speech – one that can still be sharpened or dulled before the president makes what will probably be his most significant speech to Jewish America in some time."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE 7th GENERAL ELECTIONS: Dogan Heper finds the upcoming June elections hard to predict in centrist Milliyet: "I have witnessed many elections, but this is somewhat more complex compared to the previous ones. In the past, the result would be almost clear well in advance, but it is difficult to predict today. As the leaders keep talking, they are confusing people’s minds. In my opinion, even if the leaders do not believe in what they say, that is okay because they are trying to check whether something might work. Turkey’s fundamental problems do not stem from the leaders' speeches."

Writing in the same paper, Ergun Babahan pinpoints President Erdogan’s true objective: "Erdogan’s real goal is to ensure the ruling AKP's (Justice and Development Party’s) exclusive power, not the presidency. The cabinet and the parliamentary group under his control already mean that we have a de facto presidency. Not a single subcontract or law can be passed without his approval. It is not possible for Erdogan to say yes to a scenario such as minority government based on an AKP-HDP (pro-Kurdish leftist alliance) coalition. Such a government would mean the end of his absolute control." 

Gungor Mengi gives the coming elections exceptional status in centrist Vatan: "The fake votes will increase rather than decrease, because the disgrace that we have witnessed so far offers no hope for an honest election. The June election may open the door to a period that will totally change Turkey's administrative system and constitution. That is why it has greater significance than all the other elections that were said to be 'rigged'."

Mustafa Balbay suggests that the ruling party is in a quandary in secular, Kemalist, Cumhuriyet: "By trying all methods, from fuelling tension to changing the subject, the AKP is trying to avoid making the June 7th elections the top item on the agenda. Losing votes in a party such as the AKP, whose only reason for existence is to be in power, is a much more serious problem than losing strength socially. This is the trauma facing the AKP. The moves to mitigate the loss of votes might cause it to suffer much more serious losses."

Ahmet Tasgetiren suggests that a triple opposition alliance is possible in centre-right, pro-government Star: "If we were to ask the leaders of three opposition parties 'which coalition formula is best for you?’ they would have no answer. For these parties, only a CHP [Republican Peoples' Party]-MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] and HDP coalition seems thinkable. Here, the CHP might form such a triple coalition because the CHP grassroots converge with the MHP and the HDP."

Rasim Ozdenoren believes the opposition is losing ground in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Those who expect to benefit from incitement are getting disappointed. Ever since the June 2013 Gezi Park protests, the confederacy of evil has had a problem toppling Erdogan. However, he is a hard nut to crack! As the HDP is opposed to the AKP, it tries to give the impression that the AKP was behind the latest bomb attacks on HDP centers. But this does not work anymore. These provocations are not working. The nation wants a proper opposition, not a provocation."

Hakan Aksay portrays a growing struggle on independent Internet newspaper T24: "The HDP is a very young party. After some time it became clear that it does not feel dependent on the government or imprisoned by it just because it is conducting a peace process with it. There is a gradually emerging struggle between the two parties."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan makes a distinction: "Although nothing has yet been finalized in the talks, all signs show that the West wants to impose an unprecedented inspection regime. Accepting an agreement that would allow inspections of Iranian sites would expose us to Western intelligence agencies and will not resolve our economic and political problems; rather, it will bring serious security threats. We should not forget that for Americans a bad deal is just a bad deal; for us, a bad deal is dangerous as well." 

Reformist Mardom Salari is cryptic: "Even the smallest mistake may suspend the Lausanne understanding. It is time to trust our nuclear experts, not frighten them with political generalizations and encourage them with our support to leave the negotiations room with confidence, a clear voice and pride. Let us admit that in these talks one hand is empty and one is full."

Conservative Resalat writes of capitulation: "Interviews of our nuclear scientists by the IAEA or any other body is tantamount to nuclear capitulation and accepting the blatant interrogation of our hardworking scientists. The West and the Agency know our nuclear activities, so why do they still insist on questioning our nuclear scientists? The government and the nuclear team should adopt a clear stance against the excessive demands of the P5+1 and take action for their breach of promises." 

Reformist Sharq is both suspicious and detached: "The Western request to inspect non-nuclear and military facilities is serious and a condition for an agreement. The U.S. seeks to change our behaviour, but is not honest in stating its goals. By insisting on having access to our military projects, the West wants to find out possible military dimensions of our nuclear facilities. However, the clout of our missile industry and our superiority over our neighbours tempts the West to make us more vulnerable through gaining such information, which makes us more sensitive about the move." 

 

PROXY WAR: Conservative Quds threatens and reassures: "A number of tiny and weak countries in the Persian Gulf that are unable to fight Iran directly seek to incite regional and international powers to act against us by exaggerating the risk of our nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar, who are largely dependent on the Zionist regime and the U.S., are trying to persuade America to act against Iran. As the Supreme Leader stated, countries in the Persian Gulf are using terrorist groups to impose a proxy war in the region. Iran has never had any intention to attack any nation but it will respond seriously to threats from any country. The world knows well that the Iranian national security doctrine is based on defence, not offence." 

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Reformist E'temad explains: "The Saudis have abandoned the calm and conservative policy they had been following for a long time and are now anxious about developments in the region. Their concerns are mainly caused by the conditions that would prevail after a nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers. Following the upgrading of Iran's role in the region; they think that the West no longer pays special attention to their demands as the presence of Iran in the important issues of the region increases."

 

YEMEN: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami reports: "Saudi forces continue to kill the people of Yemen with no reaction from international and human rights organizations. These organizations have abandoned the defenceless people of Yemen. There is no sign of surrender by the Yemeni revolutionaries, which disgraces and angers Saudi rulers. In fact, 50 days of non-stop and inhuman attacks by the Saudi military have had no results." 

 

EUROPE/PALESTINE: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is dismissive: "EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini visited the occupied territories. Although European leaders have had a relatively positive stance towards Palestine; some have even made anti-Zionist remarks, Western rectitude towards Palestine is still doubtful. Mogherini's trip to Palestine is a propaganda move that will improve the position of the West in the region but will not achieve anything for the Palestinian nation." 

 

AFGHANISTAN: Hard-line Javan is cautiously optimistic: "Due to various reasons, Taleban and the Afghan unity government have become closer than ever. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's efforts have been effective in this regard. There are tough days ahead for peace and compromise with the Taleban and we should wait for future developments. The negotiations between Taleban and the Afghan government as well as with regional players particularly Iran, might be effective."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Tadmur has fallen

2-Tehran’s ruse

3-The new Middle East dish

4-Libya faces European intervention

 

1- Tadmur has fallen

 

How can Western public opinion – which, according to the media bandwagon these days, is the main body that is concerned about preserving the world's heritage – believe that its technologically advanced forces were 'surprised' by this ISIS march? And what is said of Tadmur [Palmyra] can also be said about ISIS's march on al-Ramadi [in Iraq] and of all of ISIS and the Nusra Front's moves before that, whose victims were not only stone relics of interest to Western tourists, but innocent civilians some of whom were slaughtered, some forcefully evicted, and those that remained forced down on their knees on the pretext of implementing the shari'a. There are those who will respond by saying: 'It is Bashar's [Assad’s] fault.' But after ISIS's march in the desert, I am beginning to detect an alliance between Bashar and the West that is meant to break Syria, Iraq, and the entire region apart-Bassam Tayyarah on Lebanese www.akhbarboom.com.

 

Will the situation stay as it is? What will happen in the areas outside the [Syrian] regime's control? Will ISIS and the Nusra Front sweep over northern Syria? Will each of the two organizations accept its opponent's control of wide areas of the country? Or will we witness rounds of fighting between them, as well as wars that consume everything in their path? And what about the remaining opposition factions? What stance will they take? And what about the neighboring countries? Will they live with these organizations as a de facto reality, ruling over mini-states and emirates along their borders? Where are the red lines whose violation would be deemed as lethal by the regime? Are we facing decisive bone-breaking battles, or is it a case of ‘negotiations by fire’ and the sort of last-minute battles that precede and race with settlements?-'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

With the fall of the strategic and historic Syrian city of Tadmur (Palmyra) into ISIS's hands, it is unbecoming to resist the temptation to accept the theory that speaks of a conspiracy between ISIS and the West, maintains a Lebanese commentator. For it is hard to believe that American satellites were unable to spot hundreds of ISIS vehicles crossing the Syrian desert. The situation in Syria seems to be taking a turn for the worse as far as the Assad regime is concerned, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. It seems to have moved to 'plan-B,' where it focuses on defending the capital and the lines of communication linking it to the Syrian coastline, leaving most of its borders to the control of terrorist groups that threaten the country's neighbors. But it is not clear that this plan is working and the potential threat to Jordan is growing. Syria may not take precedence over Iraq as the arena of greatest international concern.

 

RUSHING TO THE RESCUE: "So Tadmur has fallen into ISIS hands!" writes Editor-in-Chief Bassam Tayyarah on Thursday on the Lebanese www.akhbarboom.com.

And the international community has rushed to the city’s rescue. It will meet two weeks from now in Paris on June 2nd to confront ISIS. More than 20 ministers will get together after giving ISIS sufficient time to destroy what it can destroy and to uproot relics from the city to sell on the international antiquities market.

The international community meets, but let us say it more clearly: the major Western powers together with some of the region's states that follow in these states' footsteps will meet – to discuss what happened to the historical city of Tadmur after the catastrophe that has struck it.

We do not believe in conspiracy theories; but how are we to describe what has been happening since May 13th? Long columns of ISIS forces have crossed hundreds of kilometres of open desert, moving from their positions in the east towards the city of Tadmur, without a single American satellite detecting them. Is that believable? Pilotless drones can find a person wanted by the CIA in a car in the midst of a large number of cars after being detected by satellite; and these drones can then take off and kill him. But America’s satellites were unable to detect the long columns of trucks, four-wheel drives, and tanks heading towards Tadmur a week ago!!

How can one believe this? How can Western public opinion – which, according to the media bandwagon these days, is the main body that is concerned about preserving the world's heritage – believe that its technologically advanced forces were 'surprised' by this ISIS march?

And what is said of Tadmur can also be said about ISIS's march on al-Ramadi [in Iraq] and of all of ISIS and the Nusra Front's moves before that, whose victims were not only stone relics of interest to Western tourists, but innocent civilians some of whom were slaughtered, some forcefully evicted, and those that remained forced down on their knees on the pretext of implementing the shari'a.

There are those who will respond by saying: 'It is Bashar's [Assad’s] fault.' But after ISIS's march in the desert, I am beginning to detect an alliance between Bashar and the West that is meant to break Syria, Iraq, and the entire region apart, killing the largest possible number of their people, then selling their relics in Western markets.

"It is an example of a conspiracy theory in its ugliest manifestation," concludes Tayyarah.

End…

 

TALK OF PARTITION: "With the [Qa’ida-affiliated] Nusra Front (acting under the name of Jayshul Fatah) taking over northwestern Syria, the theories and analyses that speak of Syria's partition have been resuscitated," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Northeastern Syria will be subject to ISIS control, its northwest has pledged allegiance to the Nusra Front, and what remains is only Aleppo, which is divided between the regime and the opposition, and some Kurdish pockets in the northeast that are fighting bravely in defense of their areas and their 'cause.'

Will Aleppo be the Nusra Front's next goal after Idlib? Will we witness a battle between ISIS and the Nusra over Aleppo? Is this what Turkish President Erdogan meant when he spoke of a new Sykes/Picot agreement threatening a new division of the region's states whose borders were drawn 'with a ruler'? Will we end up in cantons that are in conflict with each other and fixed ceasefire lines, as some Lebanese media sources have reported Arab and Western diplomats as saying?

Will the regime's retreats before the Nusra Front's 'breaches' in the northwest and the south, and ISIS's 'breaches' in the Syrian desert and Tadmur continue? Has the regime decided to move to 'plan-B' against its will, forced to defend Syria's center and coastline, leaving the 'peripheries' to the control of hard-line and jihadi groups, and casting the burden of confronting them onto the shoulders of the neighboring countries and its regional and international allies?

With the exception of its borders with Lebanon, all of Syria's borders with its Arab and regional neighbors appear to have fallen under the control of ISIS and the Nusra Front. The Syrian/Jordanian borders were the most recent to fall into Nusra and its allies' clutch a few weeks ago. And had it not been for Hizbollah, which views the battle in Syria as its own, large areas of the Syrian borders with Lebanon would also be under the control of jihadi organizations. For as is well-known, the regime has already lost its borders and crossing points with Iraq and Turkey.

We are thus facing a new picture and 'realistic' maps that are being drawn with steel and fire. I do not suppose that the regime in Damascus really wanted to hand over its borders and crossing points to the jihadi organizations in order to throw the ball of fire into its neighbors' court, even if some of these neighbors are hatching conspiracies against Syria, according to certain accusatory narratives. Had the regime sufficient power and abilities, it would have worked on regaining every inch of Syrian territory. But it and its allies' capabilities are limited at the end of the day. They have suffered severe exhaustion in the recent period. Moreover, its ability to recruit and mobilize is now weaker than at any time before. As for the low morale that is seeping into the Syrian interior, it has descended to levels unprecedented over the past four years.

So what is to be done in such a situation?

The regime seems to have answered this question by reorganizing its priorities, or perhaps, by resorting to what has been described as 'plan-B.' In this plan, efforts will be focused on securing Damascus and the line linking the mountain and the coast, via Homs and Hama. Major efforts and enormous resources are being used to secure these areas. The recent Qalamoun battles fall within this context.

But the regime is facing dangerous breaches that are still threatening this plan. Among them is the eastern Ghouta where Jayshul Islam is located, led by Zahran 'Alloush; and it shells the heart of Damascus and its security zone from these areas. Meanwhile, ISIS is advancing along the Tadmur axis in Homs Province, where the Wa'r neighborhood, as well as ar-Rastan and Talbisa remain major strongholds for the various opposition groups. And this is to say nothing of the Qalamoun’s barren areas where battle has yet to be settled (around the [Lebanese] town of 'Irsal) even if the regime and Hizbollah have scored a major success in the area's mountain peaks and hills.

The regime has accepted ISIS's control of the northeast until further notice, and is trying to prevent or contain the organization's advance on other fronts, as is happening in the fierce battles of Tadmur. And Tadmur is strategically important, not only because of its proximity to Homs, but because it opens up to the eastern Syrian desert all the way to the Euphrates. In this sense, it poses a threat to Jordanian security, which is linked to the security of the Syrian desert that stretches deep inside Jordan.

The regime is apparently fighting its last battles in Idlib Province. The attack on Jisr ash-Shughour has spoiled its momentum. The fall of al-Mastoumah has given its enemies the upper hand, and the battles of Ariha may be the last to be fought in this province.

There is no change in the rules of engagement in the southern provinces. The regime has apparently replaced its military confrontation with the Nusra and its allies with a political battle with Jordan. And there are no advances or breaches on this front; things have remained stagnant and the front lines remain fixed.

Will the situation stay as it is? What will happen in the areas outside the regime's control? Will ISIS and the Nusra Front sweep over northern Syria? Will each of the two organizations accept its opponent's control of wide areas of the country? Or will we witness rounds of fighting between them, as well as wars that consume everything in their path? And what about the remaining opposition factions? What stance will they take?

And what about the neighboring countries? Will they live with these organizations as a de facto reality, ruling over mini-states and emirates along their borders? Where are the red lines whose violation would be deemed as lethal by the regime? Are we facing decisive bone-breaking battles, or is it a case of ‘negotiations by fire’ and the sort of last-minute battles that precede and race with settlements?

Will Moscow and Tehran stand aside silently before the erosion of their Damascene ally's power after the series of painful blows it has suffered that may lead to rapid collapses that would, in turn, require saving what can be salvaged before it is too late? Will the international community accept Syria's partition in this manner, as a result of which it will turn into a series emirates ruled by groups, most of which are classified as terrorist?

The eyes of the world are focused on Iraq, especially after the past year’s collapses, from Mosul to al-Ramadi. But much water has flowed under the Syrian bridge, and Damascus may unexpectedly turn into the first priority on the international agenda if the situation remains as it is at present.

"And this poses many threats and challenges to Jordan, that are greater and more severe than those blowing upon it from Iraq," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Tehran’s ruse

 

Washington’s seems to have fallen for yet another of Tehran’s ruses which is intended to bring the Iranian army into Baghdad, says Hassan Haidar in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The suspect developments that lead up to ISIS's capture of the Iraqi city of al-Ramadi and that have eventually convinced the U.S. to accede to the Iraqi government's request for seeking help from Shiite militias, all suggest an Iranian ruse that is ultimately meant to bring the Iranian army into Iraq, claims a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi-owned daily.

 

FALLING INTO THE SAME TRAP: "Tehran never tires of repeating the same manoeuvre and Washington keeps falling into the same trap again and again," writes Hassan Haidar in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

And whenever the Americans refuse some Iranian policy, they are later 'forced' to accept it because it is 'better' than what may happen otherwise. Then they come up with pretexts to justify what is happening and to convince their 'allies' that it was not possible to do any better.

A few weeks ago, the Arab Gulf states exerted great efforts to persuade the Obama administration not to provide aerial backing for the Iraqi army if Baghdad insisted on involving Shiite militias in the battle to 'free al-Anbar' from ISIS's hold, after the violations these militias had committed against the Sunni inhabitants when they entered Tikrit at the end of March.

But the 'Abadi government's compliance with the American demand to exclude the militias did not last long. For that government is now seeking the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Unit’s [PMU’s] help to oust the extremist ISIS from al-Ramadi, which 'suddenly' fell into the organization's hand. However, while avoiding 'conspiracy theories,' let us review some of the facts that have surrounded the fall of al-Anbar's capital and that reveal some of the manner in which the situation in Iraq will develop:

- ISIS's attack on al-Ramadi came only two days after the end of the Camp David Gulf/U.S. summit that emphasized the need to confront Iranian intervention in the Arab region in general, and in the Gulf in particular.
- The U.S.-led international coalition has been waging an average of 15 air raids a day on ISIS forces and positions for about ten months. So far, these air raids that are costing tens of millions of dollars daily, have not had a significant impact on ISIS's offensive capabilities, despite repeated American claims that it is now 'on the defensive.'
- In monitoring the ISIS’s moves, the U.S. army is relying on a wide network of intelligence agents and satellite surveillance that can follow in detail and pursue any vehicle that leaves an ISIS position, just as its remotely-controlled pilotless drones are doing in Pakistan and Yemen with the aim of striking Taliban and al-Qa'ida extremists.
- Via the same satellites, and numerous ground stations, the U.S. and its Western allies monitor the mobile phone and wireless communications of ISIS leaders and members, bearing in mind that ISIS does not have any network of ground communications.

- A few days ago, the U.S. Special Forces carried out an operation in eastern Syria against a second-rank ISIS leader. This shows that it uses the intelligence information it collects adeptly whenever it wishes to do so.
- Iraqi army unites deployed in al-Ramadi decided to withdraw before ISIS forces because of what they described as 'the ferocity of the fighting and the size of the attacking forces,' in a repeat scenario of Mosul's fall [last June].

It is possible that there was serious 'shortcomings' on the part of the Americans and the Israelis in exposing ISIS's military moves that preceded the attack on al-Ramadi, bearing in mind that ISIS had mobilized large forces to carry out its attack and capture the city.

As for the result of all of this, we should note the Iraqi government's rush to seek help from the 'readymade alternative' to the army on whose reorganization and armament it has spent billions of dollars. It called upon the Iranian PMU, which is led by Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers, to gather its arms and head towards al-Ramadi to recapture it. At the same time, American analysts have rushed to stress that Baghdad does not have that many alternatives even if the PMU’s participation will intensify the sectarian tension in the country because of their intense hostility towards the people of al-Anbar.

The Iraqi government's pretext is that the fall of al-Ramadi threatens Baghdad and Karbala in particular, the two cornerstones of Iranian influence in Iraq. But what if the PMU militias were to fail to recapture al-Ramadi? 'Abadi's 'only alternative' then is most likely to be to ask the Iranian army to enter al-Rashid's capital [Baghdad] on the pretext of protecting it, after it has proved impossible for Tehran to capture it for centuries.

"Is this not the 'cooperation' that the Iranian defense minister discussed in Baghdad a few days ago?" asks Haidar in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-The new Middle East dish

 

In the process of building an alliance against Iran, Israel and the Arab Gulf states may be cooking up a deal on the Palestinian front, says Hani Habib in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

There are unmistakable signs of a new regional alliance between the Arab Gulf states and Israel, maintains a commentator in a Palestinian daily. In light of the U.S.'s diminishing role in the region and in response to the 'Iranian bogeyman,' the two sides share common interests that could justify such an alliance. And the revived talk of the (2002/2007) Arab Peace Initiative provides cover for discussions that may pave the way for such an alliance.

 

PARIS RETURNS TO SILENCE"… And Paris soon returned to silence, after a period when it raised its voice declaring its unwavering determination to present a draft resolution to the UN Security Council regarding the Palestinian/Israeli conflict," writes Hani Habib in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

After Abu Mazin [PA President Abbas] welcomed this French initiative, we stopped hearing about it, other than that Washington has pressured Paris to cancel or postpone it. The declared justification for Washington's request is that the U.S. has opened the file of its relations with Tehran within the framework of the latter’s nuclear program, which, in turn, has had a negative effect on its relations with Israel. The U.S. cannot confront Israel on two simultaneous issues– the Iranian dossier and the Palestinian dossier. Therefore, Paris must, at the very least, postpone any discussion of the latter file.

But developments of the past week have indicated that the American request to France is not directly connected to Washington's preoccupation with Iran and its negative repercussion for relations with Israel. Rather, the matter is about quiet efforts, some of which have now become public, to 'cook up' a deal on the Palestinian/Israeli front. Various reports may intersect and overlap; but they all fall within the framework of this thorny prospect.

A few days ago, and after winning the latest Knesset elections, Israeli PM Netanyahu noted that 'Israel is not alone in being threatened by the Iranian nuclear program, but others who live in our neighborhood are also threatened; therefore, this may give rise to common interests and opportunities to develop alliances, and may also push the peace process forward.'

Israeli analysts and opinion-makers commented on Netanyahu's statements, saying that it was very likely that the Israeli PM will propose a discussion of the Arab Peace Initiative (API) and the idea of regional peace. This is meant as a way of wasting time, escaping pressure, and evading the political blockade that some significant international parties have threatened to impose after it has become clear that Netanyahu's latest cabinet is the most extreme so far, which provides justification for these states to intensify their pressures on the Hebrew state. By being prepared to open up the file of the API and the idea of regional peace, Netanyahu would appear to be more interested in the peace process than at any time before, even though the facts indicate the exact opposite.

To recall how the API began, the Saudi monarch proposed the idea in 2002 via an American journalist, before it took the form of a formal initiative. Now, there is a new context, arising primarily from the attempt to exploit the current regional and international conditions. For one thing, there is a right-wing government in Israel, with a fragile majority but one that is strong enough to adopt daring positions. Some in Israel and among the Arabs say that it was a strong [right-wing] Israeli government that withdrew from Sinai [in 1979] and the Gaza settlements [in 2005], and not the Labor Party and 'moderate' governments.

For another thing, there is the 'Iranian bogeyman' that the Gulf states believe poses a threat, not because of its nuclear program, because of the fear that it will support the opposition movements that are rebelling against these states' regimes. There is also the fear, which is now tangible, that these forces will expand to reach these states' southern borders with Yemen. And there is the historical and permanent fear of revolution in [Saudi Arabia’s] Eastern Province with its Shiite majority and where the major oil fields are located. This is where the Iranian threat lies in Saudi Arabia’s view, and not the Iranian nuclear program.

At a recent meeting in Amman between representatives of Arab states that do not have relations with Israel and Israeli officials that was revealed by the Israeli media, it is worth noting that those who met, Arabs and Israelis alike, agreed that 'the region's states must prepare for a new security situation in which American influence in the region is on the retreat.'

I believe that this summarizes much that is going on that is serious. Everyone knows that the U.S. was the power that provided protection for the kingdoms, emirates and other regimes, especially in the Arabian Gulf, in the service of its own interests. These regimes relied on their American ally; but it began to weaken and its capabilities and power began to shrink. Therefore, an alternative must be sought. But in light of the deteriorating Arab situation in general, Israel could constitute the alternative on which it is possible to wager. And there are common denominators and shared interests that Netanyahu spoke of as mentioned above, and that would bring these parties together with Israel.

Therefore, Paris must remain calm and return to its nest. Something new is afoot and there is no need to head to the UN Security Council. Something is being cooked up, and it is almost ready, while the Palestinian domestic file is not far from all that is happening.

"The de facto Gaza [Hamas] state and the repeated talk of rebuilding its infrastructure with a seaport, perhaps an airport, and an economic structure, may all contribute towards providing the ingredients of this dish," concludes Habib.

Ends…

 

 

4-Libya faces European intervention

 

Europe is on the verge of another military intervention in Libya but this time with a more expansive purpose, says Faisal Jalloul in Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

With the spread of terrorism in Libya, which has now become the main route for illegal immigration into Europe, and that is divided into two centers of power neither of which seems able to impose itself on the other, the country seems to be on the verge of an intervention that will gradually impose European suzerainty over it, warns a Lebanese commentator.

 

DANGEROUS POSITION: "Libya occupies an extremely dangerous position on the list of burning states in the Middle East," writes Faisal Jalloul in the UAE daily al-Khaleej.

It is on the verge of a regional or European campaign to impose suzerainty on part, perhaps the larger part, of its soil, resulting from the security anarchy, terrorism, and civil war that exists there.

To begin with, we should point to the difficulties that preceded and followed the fall of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi’s regime, and that are now preventing political compromise over a new ruling regime that would allow the country to be managed in a normal manner:

- The first difficulty coincided with the establishment of this country around three tribal/factional centers that are geographically far apart– Tripoli, Baraqa, and Fezzan – and that were weakly merged together because of the vast distances that separate them. There is also the country's sparse demography (6 million inhabitants) coupled with an enormous area (1.8-million square kilometers).

Under royalist rule, the upper hand in the country’s management was given to the east and to Benghazi in particular. Under Qadhafi, it belonged to the west, then to a ruling elite, but without decisively overcoming the other centers of power. Then the recent revolution came to restore the upper hand to the east, but also without being able to subjugate the other centers of power. This is especially true of Misrata and the Muslim Brotherhood, which has succeeded in hijacking the so-called 'Arab Spring' movements everywhere.

- The second difficulty consists of the interaction between foreign intervention and domestic division. Turkey and Qatar support the Brotherhood current, while other Arab states back the army of General Khalifa Haftar. These foreign interventions have contributed to creating two governments and two parliaments, and out of the folds of this split the terrorist has ISIS emerged, taking the city of Derna as its capital.

The emergence of this terrorist organization has further complicated the prospects of compromise between the conflicting parties. Destroying ISIS has become the precondition for political compromise and establishing a stable regime. While the Tripoli government is working on liquidating this organization, the Tobruk government is taking its time before waging a military campaign against it, deeming ISIS to be a problem for Tripoli before anything else.

But what is most dangerous about the ISIS phenomenon is its intervention in Egypt via the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group that pledged allegiance to [ISIS ‘Caliph’] Baghdadi some months ago, and that is waging wide ranging terrorist attacks in various Egyptian areas, especially Sinai. This is in addition to provoking the Egyptians by slaughtering tens of Copts on the Libyan shore because they refused either to convert to Islam or pay the jizya.

- The third difficulty consists of the security breakdown, which is the consequence of the preceding factors. Libya has turned into a wide-open space for anarchy and the absence of law. It is laced with separate 'security islands' with no coordination among them, each taking care of its neighborhood and having its own local priorities.

This, in turn, has contributed to the flow of those seeking to reach Europe from all over the world, but especially from Africa, and the emergence of smuggler gangs of every sort, as well as mafias that exploit the immigrants' weakness and send them to Europe in conditions that lack the most basic humanitarian elements.

- A fourth difficulty emerged from the above, and consists of the occluded horizon for national reconciliation, which is seen as a decisive precondition for the formation of a national unity government and restoring control over the Libyan territories as a whole.

Thus with reconciliation and the formation of a national unity government proving too difficult, Libya faces three extremely difficult scenarios:

-The first is one whose main features can be seen in the intensive European action on the pretext of confronting illegal immigration and putting an end to the flow into Libyan territories, and preventing terrorists from leaking into the Old Continent via this country. In addition, this action aims to ensure the conditions required for the secure flow of Libyan oil into European markets.

While the EU insists on the need to provide international legitimate cover for its supposed security operations on Libyan shores, these operations may expand and be transformed into a form of suzerainty over the Libyan coastline first, then on this country’s remaining territories, if local groups were to wager on this development against other groups.

-The features of the second difficulty emerge from the coordination efforts between the Arab states in North Africa, in an attempt to pursue a common effort aimed at resisting the terrorism flowing in and from Libya.

-The third difficulty has to do with national reconciliation via the dialogues organized by the UN and that took place in Algeria and Morocco.

"This is because the success of these dialogue calls for a genuine miracle – namely, ideal objectivity, a strong patriotic spirit, and a profound appreciation of the dangers that threaten Libya's very existence," concludes Jalloul.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The damage has been done

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Thursday editions with the decision to launch a pilot program, whereby Palestinians working in Israel would be forced to use different bus routes from Israeli settlers. The tidal wave of condemnation that followed the Haaretz report about Moshe Ya'alon's intention to implement the plan – which was originally reported back in October of last year – forced Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to intervene and order his defense minister to shelve it.

However, as Haaretz stipulates in its lead headline, Ya'alon has only agreed to put the plan on ice temporarily and he fully intends to reintroduce it after making 'changes and improvements.' According to reports in all the papers, while the prime minister was aware of Ya'alon's plan in general terms, he was not consulted about the timing and was unaware that his defense minister planned to launch it this week.

In defending his plan, Ya'alon claimed that there had never been any intention to segregate Jews and Arabs on West Bank buses and that the goal was merely to increase supervision of Palestinian laborers entering and leaving Israel each day. Every state is entitled to monitor those entering and leaving, certainly in the sensitive security situation in which we live, Ya'alon said.

Most of the papers run analyses and comments about the pilot and the way it was implemented: the lack of coordination between various government ministries, the apparent blindness to the damage it would cause Israel's image and Ya'alon's insistence that the plan is not dead; merely on hold. In fact, only one paper, Israel Hayom, has an article supporting the move – and that is written by one of the more radical members of the settler movement.

The segregated buses story was not the only dramatic story to unfold yesterday. Among other stories was Netanyahu's latest U-turn on the issue of Palestinian statehood. In remarks at the start of a meeting with the visiting European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, Netanyahu said that he remains committed to peace and that he supports the vision of two states for two peoples – despite his election campaign statement that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch. Netanyahu stressed, however, that in order for this to happen; the Palestinians must first recognize the Jewish state.

On Iran, Netanyahu said that Tehran is the greatest enemy of peace, and it is still not too late for world powers to secure a better deal with it on the nuclear issue. Mogherini, for her part, said that world powers are working very hard to reach a final agreement with Iran and pledged that the Islamic Republic would not be able to acquire nuclear weapons. She welcomed the prime minister's comments on a Palestinian state and said the European Union is interested in peace and security in the region. She expressed hope that negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel would move forward. Earlier in the day, Mogherini held talks in Ramallah with Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, Haaretz reports that Norwegian Foreign Minister Boerge Brende warned Prime Minister Netanyahu on Wednesday that international pressure on Israel will resume once Iran and the six powers sign their expected nuclear deal at the end of June. Netanyahu and Brende held an unusually long meeting at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, lasting for about 90 minutes. Brende is considered friendly to Israel, and his warning was offered in the spirit of friendly advice rather than as a threat. Brende told Netanyahu that given the expected resumption of international pressure over the Palestinian issue once an Iran deal is signed, the new Israeli government must come up with its own diplomatic initiative, the Norwegian diplomat reported. 'I hear you loud and clear,' the diplomat quoted Netanyahu as responding.

Meanwhile, French newspaper Le Figaro published a draft of the proposed French United Nations Security Council resolution on the Israel-Palestinian conflict on Wednesday. The resolution, which is being promoted by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, calls for the immediate resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and their conclusion within 18 months. If no agreement is reached in the allotted time, France will recognize the Palestinian state, according to Le Figaro. The draft calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state 'based on the June 4, 1967 lines, with mutually agreed and equal land swaps.' It also calls for the positioning of Israel's security requirements 'at the center of the peace talks.' It provides for the establishment of a system that 'guarantees the security of both Israel and the Palestinians, with effective oversight over borders, and prevents the reappearance of terror and the smuggling of munitions.'

In other news, a day after Haaretz reported that Israel and the United States have been engaged in negotiations over a package of 'sweeteners' to soften the blow of the Iranian nuclear deal, Washington has announced that it will sell Israel a bundle of military hardware at an estimated cost of $1.879 billion in aid funds. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees the Foreign Military Sales program, said in its required notification to Congress that the proposed sale has already been reviewed and approved by the State Department.

'The United States is committed to the security of Israel, and it is vital to U.S. national interests to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self-defense capability,' the agency said. 'This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives. The proposed sale of this equipment will provide Israel with the ability to support its self-defense needs. These munitions will enable Israel to maintain operational capability of its existing systems and will enhance Israel's interoperability with the United States.'

The deal will provide Israel with some 3,000 hellfire missiles, 250 medium-range air-to-air missiles, 4,100 glide bombs, and 50 super-penetrator bombs designed to reach underground sites. U.S. officials said the planned sale would 'replenish' existing stocks in Israel's arsenal and would not provide the country with new types of weapons. Defense sources in Israel insisted that the weapons package had no connection with the nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran to curtail its nuclear program, nor with other U.S. arms sales to Gulf Arab states.

Finally, all the papers report on a decision by a Swiss court to order the state-owned Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company to transfer $1.1 billion to Iran in a ruling over oil supply agreements dating back to before Tehran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Israel announced immediately that it has no intention of complying with the ruling. 'Under the laws of trade we cannot transfer funds to an enemy country,' a statement issued by the Finance Ministry said Wednesday.

 

THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that Israel cannot undo the damage caused by Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon's pilot plan to segregate West Bank buses – a plan that nearly everyone, it seems, opposes in retrospect.

"The defense establishment's plan to institute separate buses for Israelis and Palestinians on West Bank roads sparked a storm on Wednesday: It took Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu by surprise, was roundly criticized in Israel and abroad, and was immediately frozen.

The whole situation once again personified the Israeli balagan – chaos – in all its might, with the deputy defense minister dispatched to present the plan from the Knesset rostrum, only to be informed by a member of the opposition seated before him in the plenum that the plan had been shelved, without anyone letting him know.

The man behind the plan, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, insists that his intentions were completely security related, and that there was no hidden racist motive involved. Ya’alon considers his plan an attempt to increase control over the passage of Palestinian laborers into Israel by requiring them to register, coming and going, when traversing the Green Line in West Bank crossings.

The trouble is that this demand would mean separate buses (because the settlers absolutely reject being themselves delayed at the crossings), and separate buses are perceived as an outright manifestation of the apartheid rule Israel is accused of imposing in the West Bank. Moreover, claims voiced by settlers of dangers posed to Jewish women by the Palestinian laborers (claims which themselves emit a strong scent of racism), came up during preliminary discussions held ahead of the plan's implementation – and were reiterated over the past two days - in a way that pulls the rug out from under the security argument that Ya’alon was trying to promote.

The discussions over Ya’alon's plan began back in January 2014. To his mind, the plan was also motivated by a state comptroller’s report from the beginning of the decade that criticized the crossings' breeches. And yet, the Israel Defense Forces was not enthusiastic. The previous GOC Central Command major, Nitzan Alon, said he doubted stricter tabs on crossing registration of laborers would necessarily reduce security risks. The launching of the pilot program was put off by several months until the defense minister enforced it on the military this week. Meanwhile, already in October of last year - when there were intentions to launch a pilot at a single crossing - the Justice Ministry warned it would be problematic legally. Despite that, the pilot was launched this week, with the intent of commencing its implementation at four crossings.

The report on Tuesday night in Haaretz immediately engendered angry responses in Israel and particularly harsh responses abroad. The first to denounce the plan was actually a right-winger, former Interior Minister Gideon Sa’ar, who offered a fleshed-out attack on it via a tweet. The plan, he wrote, was mistaken and damaging both to the settlement project as a whole and to Israel’s status in the world. He called for it to be cancelled as soon as possible.

President Reuven Rivlin, too, was angered. It should be noted that he waited with his response until he had spoken by phone with Ya’alon, who told him the plan had been shelved. But even when welcoming the freeze, the president did not hold back his criticism of the original decision. Separation between passengers, he said, was 'inconceivable.' In addition, the president scolded members of the right wing who supported the move, deeming their opinion on the matter contrary to the founding principles of the state.

The prime minister knew, in principle, about Ya’alon’s intentions to enforce the plan – but he was not informed that it would start this week. Netanyahu had made no attempt to intervene in order to freeze the plan. On Wednesday morning he was forced to recognize the fact that circumstances required his intervention. Netanyahu had a meeting on Wednesday with the European Union’s Foreign Minister Federika Mogherini; that was followed by a joint statement to the press - and the last thing he needed was to be publicly taken to task by the EU, along with a grilling by foreign reporters. Then came the abrupt U-turn. Netanyahu and Ya’alon spoke on the phone and Ya’alon’s media adviser issued a short statement to the press to the effect that the two 'have agreed to suspend the pilot at the Judea and Samaria crossings.'

But Ya’alon, it emerged later, has not backtracked from his support of the plan. The defense minister considers it a necessary step for the prevention of terror attacks. The problem, he believes, is largely a PR one: namely, that the way the plan was presented to the media made it look racist, and caused a furor that necessitated its freezing. Now the Central Command and the Office of the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories will go back to the drawing board and take further steps to prepare infrastructure and a new pilot that will involve all 13 crossings. In a few more months, when things calm down, perhaps the plan will be deemed re-introducible, aided by the appropriate public relations.

That’s Ya’alon’s approach. The chance that it will happen seemed very unlikely on Wednesday. Netanyahu was quick to distance himself from his defense minister’s recommendations and his staff energetically briefed the press that this was not his doing.

In recent years Ya’alon has been a responsible voice of moderation on sensitive defense issues – in particular during last year’s war in Gaza and in regards to the cautious management of Israeli policy on the northern border. And yet, the plan he instigated for bussing Palestinian laborers separately displays obstinacy, shortsightedness and an utter disregard of the 'bigger' diplomatic picture. What he realized on Wednesday morning, together with Netanyahu, he should have known last week as well."

Ends…

 

SELF-HARM: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini slams the obtuseness of a government that willfully makes decisions that it must surely know will only serve to alienate Israel still further on the international stage – without contributing one iota to national security.

"In a moment of clarity, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu yesterday decided to cancel the decision by the Defense Ministry to force Palestinian laborers in the West Bank to use separate buses from Israelis. But the original decision, which spread like wildfire across the globe, has raised many troubling questions. Have our leaders really lost the plot as much as this decision seems to indicate? Sometimes, all one can do is rub one's eyes and wonder at the idiocy of our decision-makers. This is not a new phenomenon. After all, they surely know that Israel is facing horrific propaganda. They know that there is a growing campaign to label Israel an apartheid state. So why?

Segregated buses are highly symbolic. It is another weapon for those who accuse Israel of apartheid. Let's assume that there are fantastic excuses and wonderful justifications; but the damage is so great, so massive, that the leaders of the BDS campaign against Israel could hardly believe that the Netanyahu government had given them such a generous gift.

Israel has the right to take any measures it sees fit in order to protect itself and its citizens from a new wave of terror or from lone-wolf attackers. Here and there – and we must be honest enough to admit this – this entails taking measures that infringe on the human rights of the Palestinians. This is a sine qua non of the current situation. But segregated buses? The very concept of forcing different groups to use different buses takes us straight back to the dark times of South Africa or the southern United States. Anti-Israel activists are just waiting for an excuse to yell 'Apartheid!' One decision by the defense minister gave them exactly what they were looking for.

In this case, for a change, the self-righteousness is also misplaced. How many of the Palestinian passengers on these buses have attacked or even insulted Jewish settlers during the past year? Or five years, for that matter? That was the question I posed to the Defense Ministry's spokesman. He told me to direct my question to Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon's office, which, in turn, told me that the IDF Spokesman's Office was the right address for my query. Of course, the IDF Spokesman's Office referred me back to the Defense Ministry. I got no answer. Instead, I got confusion. The fact that no one could tell me how many such cases there have been of late did not prevent defense officials from launching a pilot that is, for the most part, symbolic. A symbol of discrimination. A symbol of apartheid. A symbol of our decision-makers' obtuseness.

Let's not delude ourselves. Israel is far from perfect. There are many problematic decisions that are not overturned because of a massive backlash of global censure. Take Al-Shuhada Street in Hebron, for example, where Jewish and Palestinian pedestrians are segregated. That causes far more harm to the Jewish state than it safeguards our security. It's not apartheid, however. It's stupidity, which allows others to accuse us of apartheid-like policies. And what is even more depressing is the fact that such behavior proves that the penny still hasn't dropped. It is unforgivable for a soldier deployed at a checkpoint to humiliate a Palestinian. But it is far more unforgivable when our leaders make such god-awful decisions.

Do they really not understand what they are doing? Do they not understand that such decisions will push countless more students – many of whom are Jewish – into the anti-Israel camp? Do they not understand that the convenience and comfort of the settlers is not worth a fraction of the strategic damage that these decisions cause to Israel? In fact, the decision is even more worrying because no one in the Defense Ministry thought to consult with the Foreign Ministry, which opposes the plan, or with the Justice Ministry, which opposes the plan, or with any of the many right-wingers and settlers who also oppose it.

The only crumb of comfort we can take from this whole sorry affair is that the prime minister intervened to prevent even greater damage. But this is scant comfort. There are many things that Israel could do to improve the lives of the Palestinians, without harming its own security. We can and should implement them. Perhaps someone will wake up and realize that it's time to implement them. Not because it is in the interests of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people. But because it is in the interests of Israel, the Israeli people and the Zionist enterprise."

Ends…

 

JUST DROP IT: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit wonders if there is no one in Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon's close circle who could have warned him that his plan for separate buses for Jews and Arabs in the West Bank would make Israel look like an apartheid state.

"Here's my assessment: You would be hard pressed to find anyone in the IDF who supports the plan to segregate Israelis and Palestinians on buses in the West Bank – a pilot that was born yesterday morning and which breathed its last breath just a few hours later, but not before doing Israel's already battered image on the international stage even more damage; perhaps even irreversible damage. I would also suggest that the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Maj.-Gen. Yoav Mordechai, who has a sensible head on his shoulders and a keen sense of justice, would not have cooperated with any such plan. Neither would IDF chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon's plan came into existence last year. Toward the end of his term as IDF chief, Benny Gantz wanted nothing more than to end his military career as quietly as possible; he wanted to get home safely and he didn't care which bus he had to take and which checkpoints he had to pass through. Gantz tried to avoid potholes on the road to his retirement; he didn't express any opposition to Ya'alon's plan, even though the then head of the IDF's Central Command told him quite specifically that Israelis and Palestinians riding on the same bus together did not pose any security risk. The pilot of Ya'alon's program was approved in October 2014 but was only launched yesterday.

Why? Perhaps because someone thought that it would be a good idea to unveil this idiotic idea on the same day that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was due to meet with European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini? Perhaps because it coincided with the visit to Israel of FIFA president Sepp Blatter, who came to examine Palestinian accusations that Israel was implementing a policy of apartheid against soccer players. We may be right, but we're sure as hell not smart.

Israel is engaged in a rearguard action against becoming a pariah state. The BDS movement is gaining momentum and influence. The Europeans are sharpening their knives, commercial boycotts are more prevalent, the prosecution at the International Criminal Court in The Hague is increasingly threatening, the Vatican has recognized the Palestinian state and France and New Zealand are working on a United Nations Security Council resolution to set a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the territories. This is just a very partial list of the storm clouds gathering over Israel's head. And what do we do? We establish a nationalist, right-wing government, stuffed to the rafters with settlers and the ultra-Orthodox – all in accordance with the will of the voters.

Under these circumstances, Israel must steer well clear of any and all potential minefields. We must only get into spats where there is absolutely no choice. And that is something that Ya'alon doesn't know how to do. He is a good and worthy man, but he can't spot a pothole in the road without doing serious damage to his chassis. It's true that the Jews who use public transport to get to their homes in Judea and Samaria occasionally feel threatened. Obviously, that's not pleasant. But, on the other hand, even expressing such sentiments is racism. That's what it sounds like, so that's what it is.

Even rightists like Gideon Sa'ar, Dani Dayan and President Reuven Rivlin came out yesterday against the damaging pilot. After all, there have been no terror attacks on these bus lines for many years. All the talk about female Israeli passengers being sexually harassed on these lines is disproved by the fact that there have been almost no complaints filed to the police. Surely the damage that Ya'alon caused yesterday with his ill-conceived plan is far greater than any benefit that could accrue.

Is there no responsible adult in Ya'alon immediate circle who can keep an eye on him, who can put a friendly hand on his shoulder and tell him: 'Moshe, listen – I know that you want to improve your image among the settlers. I know that you've got one eye on future primaries in the Likud. But this isn't a game. Segregated buses don't look good to the international community. Forget about your pilot, Moshe. It's just not worth it.'

Israel yesterday enjoyed the worst of both worlds. Yet, at the end of a difficult and painful day, Ya'alon insisted on touting his plan again: it's not apartheid, he insisted. We just wanted to conduct security checks on the Palestinian laborers as they return to their homes. That's the right of every country. He insisted that he would revise his pilot and present it to the government again for approval.

The question we need to ask, of course, is why Ya'alon didn't present a more acceptable plan in the first place? Why is he so keen for Israel to be tarred and feathered again? Ya'alon has already earned brownie points from the settlers for at least trying to implement his plan. Now he should just drop it."

Ends…

 

A LOW FLAME: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman comments on the spate of lone-wolf attacks and warns that, if they reach a critical mass, they could become an all-out intifada.

"The rise on the number of lone-wolf attacks – Palestinians who wake up one morning and decide that the time is right to fulfill their national destiny and to stab or run over a Jew – is a clear manifestation of the law that applies to the world of terrorism: the more the Shin Bet and the IDF manage to take out terrorist organizations' established infrastructure in the West Bank, the more attacks that are carried out by individuals with no links to terrorist organizations.

The anti-Israel energies that are constantly simmering in the West Bank are always looking for some way to erupt. When Israel destroys a Hamas infrastructure, local cells of two or three people are established in the same villages or a lone Palestinian decides to act. Ironically, when the incident book of the intelligence officer in the IDF's central command is empty, the Border Police, the Shin Bet and the IDF are on high alert – because they know that lone-wolf attackers don't appear on anybody's blacklist.

All the efforts of the Shin Bet and the IDF to construct a psychological profile of a would-be suicide terrorist are doomed to failure, since their motives are made up of an endless amalgamation of frustrations, the security situation, discrimination, personal problems, the desire to avenge the death of a family member at the hands of Israeli forces – and sometimes even economic hardship. Given the fact that more than 700,000 Palestinians have been arrested and detained since 1967, there is almost no Palestinian family that does not have a score to settle with Israel.

Following the rioting by East Jerusalem Arabs in October and November last year, the Shin Bet took upon itself the responsibility for maintaining 'public order' and for tackling 'popular terrorism' in the villages surrounding the capital – a role that was previously filled by the police's so-called minorities department. Since then, by deploying professional intelligence-gathering means, the Shin Bet has managed to lower the flames somewhat and to clear the ground of activists, money and weapons. But the man who yesterday used his vehicle to run over two police officers, and the person who wakes up tomorrow and decides to do something similar, cannot be located ahead of time – since no one knows what is actually going on in a person's mind. The Shin Bet and the IDF publish daily reports about the number of rioters, stone-throwers and other lawless elements they arrest, but it is extremely rare for them to announce that they have arrested someone for planning, say, to stab a soldier.

All that can be done is to employ defensive measures, to use deterrence and to be alert. Defensive measures can be taken at bus stops, train stations and hitchhiking stations. Deterrence can be achieved by ensuring that there is a large presence of security forces on the main roads and potential trouble-makers are arrested. Just as Israeli civilians have gotten used to being on the lookout for unattended suspicious objects, they will also have to get used to looking out for unnatural behavior on the part of drivers or anyone else.

As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned, the lone-wolf attacker is the perfect way to ensure that there is always a constant level of unrest on the ground. Ramallah is currently focusing on its diplomatic struggle against Israel, but it relies on a constant state of disquiet and small fires on the ground. These can take the shape of small riots near the West Bank separation barrier or the actions of a lone terrorist, both of which are an authentic expression of rage that enjoy the sympathies and understanding of the international community. The Palestinian Authority does not want a violent intifada, yet a lone-wolf could be the spark that sets one off – against the wishes of the Palestinians and against the interests of Israel.

The recent war-game exercise conducted by the IDF's Judea and Samaria Division was designed to examine how the military would respond to situations that could spark all-out violence on the ground – what is commonly referred to in Israel as a third intifada. One of the most realistic scenarios that was examined during the exercise was an outbreak of violence caused by a critical mass of lone-wolf attacks, in which there would be a major spike in death and injury. If the death toll were to reach unacceptable levels, Israeli authorities would be forced to respond harshly, there would be unavoidable friction between security forces and the Palestinian population and there would be a major outbreak of violence. There is, therefore, a major threat posed by the increasing frequency of these spontaneous terror attacks.

The stage will come when Israel will have no choice but to employ far more draconian measures to deter such attacks than those that it currently uses. Assuming, of course, that the High Court gives the green light to such measures."

Ends…

 

RITES OF PASSAGE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Douglas Bloomfield says that, for presidential hopefuls in the United States, the road to the White House always goes through Jerusalem.

"Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker just returned from one of the rites of passage for presidential hopefuls: a pilgrimage to Israel. He followed a well-worn path that will be trod several times by his rivals who believe the road to the White House goes through Jerusalem.

Ostensibly Walker, a Republican, and the others are honing their foreign policy credentials, and several will make other stops abroad, but that’s not the real reason. They will boast of meeting foreign leaders and engaging in (superficial) conversations they will later claim gave them great insight into world affairs. But the real goal is to win the pro-Israel primary by impressing deep-pocketed Jewish donors like casino mogul Sheldon Adelson.

That’s why Walker quickly tweeted his picture shaking hands with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and another taken at the Western Wall. The unstated inscription on the pictures was, 'Dear Sheldon, Hey, look at me here with your boy Bibi.' Walker echoed Netanyahu’s views about Palestinian statehood – maybe someday but not in the foreseeable future – and how radical Islamist terror is the greatest threat facing the nation.

Walker’s trip was paid for by his own PAC and by the Adelson-funded Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC), which has been running such trips for years. The group took Texas Governor George W. Bush in 1998, when he got a helicopter tour from Ariel Sharon; Walker also got a chopper tour, with a nephew of Moshe Dayan. Sen. Barack Obama went in 2008 after securing his party’s nomination.

The presidential contender pilgrimages have been going on for months and will continue into next year. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Florida) is expected in Israel this summer. No candidate in either party has been to Israel as often as Mike Huckabee. Other recent visitors include Senators Rand Paul, Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham as well as Ben Carson, Bobby Jindal, Rick Perry, Chris Christie and Rick Santorum.

On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton has made numerous trips as first lady, senator and secretary of state. Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, the only Jewish candidate, spent several months on a kibbutz following college graduation. Martin O’Malley, who plans to announce his candidacy May 30, has been to Israel several times, most notably as governor of Maryland leading trade delegations.

These trips are often made with wealthy supporters or groups like RJC. Souvenirs include photos for campaign literature, anecdotes for speeches, some names to drop and a patina of experience. But it’s mostly about the money – especially on the GOP side, where conservative pro-Israel mega-givers are increasingly important to candidates.

Adelson is by far the biggest and best known of wealthy Jewish donors, but there are a number of others in both parties. Adelson boasted of spending in the neighborhood of $100 million in the previous election cycle, mostly to defeat Obama, and indicated he’ll do more this time. The RJC, one of his top causes, claims to have raised $13m in the 2012 cycle, with at least $4.5m going for anti-Obama attacks and said it plans to spend more in 2016. The annual RJC meeting at his Las Vegas casino has been dubbed the Adelson Primary, as a continuous procession of GOP hopefuls audition for the billionaire and a chance to kiss his ring or some other part of his anatomy as visions of his checkbook dance in their heads. When New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie had the temerity to refer to the West Bank as 'occupied territory' in Adelson’s presence, a near mortal sin to the far Right, he was quickly informed of his transgression and rushed to beg for mercy.

Rubio tried to amend a Senate bill on Iran nuclear negotiations barring any deal unless Tehran recognized Israel. It was opposed by GOP leadership and the White House but it had been proposed by Netanyahu, another recipient of Adelson’s generosity. For Rubio it had far less to do with Iran than with his own fundraising. He knew his amendment was a poison pill and would fail, one GOP insider told the National Journal, but it didn’t matter because 'he’s working harder to get Sheldon than to solve problems.' It would also appeal to Rubio’s own Jewish billionaire benefactor, Florida car dealer Norman Braman.

AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups assign 'rabbis' to help guide candidates navigate Jewish politics and hook up with political action committees (PACs) and other donors. The PACs dominated political giving until recent Supreme Court decisions lifted virtually all restrictions on campaign contributions and ushered in the age of the billion-dollar campaigns, Super PACs, billionaires and bundlers. Wealthy individuals can give unlimited amounts directly to campaigns or through other groups, openly or secretly.

Adelson may be the most prominent but other top Jewish Republicans include hedge fund executives Paul Singer and Seth Klarman, home builder Larry Mizel, real estate developers Mel Sembler and David Flaum and software execs Larry Ellison and Safra Catz. On the Democratic side of the ledger are George Soros, Wall Streeters Marc Lasry and Steve Rattner, L.A. Reid and Haim Saban from the entertainment industry and Dallas lawyer Marc Stanley among others.

Many are bundlers – people who organize and collect checks from other donors to maximize their impact. Bundlers generally don’t have to be identified. In the wake of the Citizens United and other Supreme Court decisions a veil of secrecy has replaced the disclosure that was supposed to follow the Watergate scandals. 'The biggest donors, in both parties, no longer need to endure public scrutiny if they prefer not to. Knowing how much a donor gives, and where, can lead to unwanted publicity and will certainly lead to more fundraising calls. Major donors can largely control what the public knows and what remains secret,' said Aaron Keyak, a Democratic political consultant. It’s enough that the candidate knows who gave and remembers to show gratitude once in office.

Israel plays a larger role in Republican fundraising because it is seen as their only real appeal to Jewish voters, who remain staunchly progressive in domestic politics. Adelson is only the latest and perhaps most visible, pressing his hardline views which are then seemingly adopted by GOP candidates.

The great risk is the increasing polarization of support for Israel, particularly under Netanyahu’s influence and his proclivity for meddling in American partisan politics. His 2012 endorsement of Mitt Romney and this year’s Congressional speech attacking Obama’s Iran negotiations left a bitter taste among many, especially Democrats.

The new, virtually unregulated environment for campaign giving will add to the importance of pro-Israel big givers, especially on the GOP side – and inevitably widen the partisan gap on the Israel issue."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS/BOMB ATTACKS: Mehves Evin detects an issue of trust in centrist Milliyet: "As the June 7th election date approaches, it is no surprise that ugliness and tension are on the rise. The threats and attacks against the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] in particular are so numerous that they cannot be ignored and cannot be considered as mere 'isolated' incidents. People’s lives are now being threatened. Will the votes be counted in a fair manner without any trickery? Everyone is talking about this now, because there is an issue of trust."

Mustafa Balbay suggests that the government will stop at nothing to protect its power in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "There is no legal protection in this country anymore. There is no more rule of law. Because the same law can be interpreted in different ways according to the time and place, and someone at the top can dominate everything from defining what is a crime, to designating the punishment, while proclaiming ‘I am above everything’. In this election, an observer from each party will act as the representative of the people while controlling the opening of the ballot boxes and counting the votes. Nothing in the world smells as bad as what impertinent governments are ready to do to protect their power."

Murat Aksoy charges the government with anti-Kurdish incitement in centrist Milliyet: "All these actions are part of a systematic campaign of provocation. What the actual perpetrators do not see is that the current incitement against HDP has backfired and has only deepened the social polarization. Let us acknowledge that the wishes of Yalcin Akdogan (who is the coordinator of the Kurdish peace process in the Davutoglu government) that the HDP should not pass the 10% election threshold and his accusations and indictments against this party, have gone beyond the borders of normal political rivalry. This discourse expresses a subconscious approach toward the HDP."

But Abdulkadir Selvi takes the HDP to task in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The HDP leaders have identified those responsible for this week’s bomb attacks! They have declared President Erdogan and the AKP as the perpetrators of the attack. This HDP attitude is as wrong as the attack itself."

 

MURSI VERDICT: Gonul Tol examines Washington’s reactions to the death sentence passed on former Egyptian president Mursi in centre-left Radikal: "Obama is silent about what is happening in Egypt for the same reasons that lead him to remain silent about democracy and human rights violations, intervention in the judiciary, and the arrests of journalists in Turkey. Democracy and the construction of liberal values are not a priority on Obama's foreign policy agenda. His priority is security. He sees the region and the alliances that he formed in the region from this perspective. Ankara wants Washington to call a coup a coup and condemn Mursi's death verdict. However if Obama cast pragmatism aside and built his foreign policy on democratic values, he would have a couple of things to say about the AKP as well."

Ozlem Albayrak compares Egypt to Turkey in Yeni Safak: "Look at what has been happening in Egypt over the past two years in this country that tried to transition to democracy for the first time in its history. The most obvious thing that one can see is the hypocrisy of the West. This has been proven once again with the West’s 'huge condemnation but zero action' against the death penalty passed on Mursi. During the June 2013 Gezi Park protests, Turkey's economy was at its best and Erdogan was not a dictator. Since the reasons behind this attempt were artificial, the leader could not be toppled, no matter how hard the West wanted to do so. But Egypt’s democracy was in its infancy and it could not overcome this trouble."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Khorasan calls for ‘realistic pessimism’: "To achieve a positive, historical and good deal, we need to be realistically pessimistic. If we are not, we may reach a deal, but not achieve our main goal of lifting sanctions. The negotiating team should abandon their unrealistic optimism. Many times, the Americans have managed to change a losing game into a winning one for them. We should not be thrilled, should not act in haste, should not raise expectations and should not be overwhelmed with optimism until the last moment. We should not forget that the enemy remains the enemy and until the very last moment, it will try to change the situation in its favour and to our detriment. The enemy does not forget its hostility; let us not forget it either."

Reformist Arman clarifies: "The request by IAEA chief Yukiya Amano to inspect our military sites has become an important factor in the talks. Foreign minister Zarif and his team should explain Iran's position on this issue clearly. The Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa that forbids the manufacture of atomic bombs; our politicians have declared that we are not after this and the world has also admitted this reality. It is wrong to think that we are holding talks to remove sanctions. The goal of the talks is to resolve the nuclear issue; the removal of sanctions is a consequence. If the talks are successful, the sanctions will be certainly lifted."

Conservative Resalat cautions: "As predicted, the U.S. has failed to act in accordance with the Lausanne statement and violated each of its commitments. If they fail to accept Iran's red lines in the remaining short time, the negotiations will fail. Other members of the P5+1 group, (excluding the UK, which always follows the U.S.), should be asked to change their direction. Sympathetic critics should be taken seriously about the vulnerable points of the Lausanne statement." 

 

TALEBAN VISIT: Conservative Khorasan justifies a visit by a Taleban delegation: "The coalition government of Chief Executive Abdullah and President Ashraf Ghani believes that establishing security in Afghanistan requires talks with the Taleban. Iran, with its long borders with Afghanistan, cannot stay uninterested and alienated regarding these developments. The further activation of ISIS near our eastern borders should not be overlooked. Perhaps, talks with the Taleban in Tehran are a preventive measure against the possible alliance of Taleban and ISIS. Due to Taleban's changeable positions, one cannot be very hopeful about success. The Taleban visit to Tehran will allow the two sides to be informed about each other's stances directly and without intermediaries like Qatar."

 

IRAQ: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami explains: "The fall of Ramadi to ISIS is an important lesson for the Iraqi government. The main reason for the fall was the relegation of people-based militia, leaving only the army to fight ISIS terrorists. A propaganda war against the people's militia started after their significant achievements against ISIS in Salah-al-Din Province and Tikrit. Most of this propaganda was initiated by the U.S. and the British. Their real objective was to prevent the government from using the militia so that ISIS will succeed in its fight against the Iraqi army, which is less motivated to resist." 

 

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: Hard-line Javan suspects: "In the Camp David summit, President Obama talked about joint drills with Arab countries. The U.S. is trying to strengthen its military presence in the region. It is using small military units as advisors and is training forces instead of launching a military campaign. Conducting drills with Arab countries is part of this scenario." 

 

ROWHANI'S ADMINISTRATION: Hard-line Keyhan is critical: "After two years of the Rowhani administration, people do not expect any more that the economic promises made during the elections will be fulfilled. Is the government compelled to continue on the same path? It persists on increasing liquidity, importing more and weakening agriculture and industry. Instead of dealing with these problems, it is waiting for gratifying news from the nuclear talks to resolve economic problems overnight! If one is willing, the path is not hidden. The Supreme Leader has repeatedly stressed the use of domestic capabilities to overcome economic problems."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Iraq’s Sunnis pay the price

2-In Yemen as in Syria

3-A process without results

 

1-Iraq’s Sunnis pay the price

 

President Barack Obama has stressed that he does not approve of the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilisation Unit’s (PMU's) intervention in Sunni areas. This has allowed ISIS to expand into al-Anbar's capital. As a result, al-Ramadi has turned into what resembles a sandbag in an arena of multi-level conflicts whose price is being paid by Iraq’s Sunnis at the hands of those who claim to be fighting and going to war to protect them. Evidence of this not only comes from the material and human losses suffered by the people of Tikrit and al-Ramadi (and who knows where else); but also from the fact that the first to be killed were 500 clan members who rejected ISIS's authority--Elia G. Mighnayer in Kuwaiti al-Ra'i al-'Am

 

The fact that Iraq is falling prey to two exclusivist tendencies is being confirmed today: We have ISIS on the one hand, and the Shiite militias on the other. ISIS's advance justifies these militias’ growing influence as the sole force able to confront it. And Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, as well as the growing feeling among Iraqi Sunnis that they are being marginalized and excluded from decision-making positions, have left them as the primary victims of ISIS's project. As for those [Sunni Iraqis] who stand up to this project, they find no path ahead but to escape into the unknown, or to face slaughter after being pronounced traitors by this terrorist organization--Elias Harfouche in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The Tikrit scenario is likely to be repeated in the Iraqi city of al-Ramadi, with the largely Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) forces preparing to enter the city after the Iraqi army has proven unable to confront ISIS, predicts a Lebanese commentator in a Kuwaiti daily. But the same problems that emerged in Tikrit will emerge in al-Ramadi as well, with the Iraqi Sunnis being forced to pay the heaviest price by the very same forces that claim to be defending them. The main beneficiaries of ISIS's advances in Iraq are the PMU forces and, behind them, Iran, while the main community to be harmed by these advances are Iraq's Sunni Arabs, argues another Lebanese commentator. But this is the result of years of marginalization of the Sunnis since the U.S. occupation, on the pretext of ‘de-Baathification’.

 

HOW THE BATTLE BEGAN: "The battle of al-Ramadi began in December 2013 when Iraqi forces arrested [Sunni] MP Ahmad al-'Alwani and clashed with the [Sunni] Dulaim, al-Jumailat, al-Bou 'Issa, and az-Zoba clans," recalls Elia G. Mighnayer in Wednesday's Kuwait daily al-Ra'i al-'Am.

Tens of thousands of al-Anbar's police then joined the organizations that raised the banner of confronting the Iraqi forces. That ignited a fire, leading to the loss of trust between Anbar Province, its inhabitants and the area's clans on the one hand, and former Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki, on the other. This, in turn, led to the creation of an environment that strongly embraced the Islamic State in Iraq, and that later turned into the Islamic State (ISIS)

In addition to the lack of trust, there is a lack of combat expertise and doctrine necessary to confront ISIS's ideologically motivated mujahidin. This is why the formation of the ideologically committed PMU was announced after the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Mosul. The PMU regained Diyala, Jurf as-Sakhr, Amirli, and Tuz Khormato, then reached and captured Tikrit, the capital of Salahuddin Province.

But the PMU's role set off a Western propaganda war against the group’s main constituent. The flames of that fire were fanned primarily by hostility towards Iran, and by the U.S.'s wish to divide Iraq up into mini-states. As a result, the PMU stopped at Tikrit, waiting for the sectarian fire to be extinguished. The world was satisfied with the American warplanes' raids on ISIS's strongholds in Tikrit rather than the PMU's shelling. As a result, the warplanes' fires destroyed the city and forced hundreds of thousands of its people to flee towards Baghdad and southern Iraq in search of refuge.

The same is now being repeated in al-Ramadi. Military sources confirm that the PMU is preparing to enter al-Ramadi before the beginning of Ramadan, and is ready to regain the city in less than 60 days, whereas ISIS's capture of the city required around 600 days. But the main problems remain the same, and can be summarized as follows:

- First, the PMU pursues a military policy that requires a preliminary bombardment in order to reduce its potential human losses and this inflicts enormous destruction on property and on the areas where ISIS is fortified.

- Second, destruction will befall yet another Sunni city where ISIS believes it will be allowed to remain so as to annex it to its 'state.' This will delay the return of the city's inhabitants whose property and livelihood will suffer.

- Third, the inhabitants' return will not be easy anyway, because the problem in al-Anbar is the same as that in Tikrit. It consists of finding local forces that are loyal to Baghdad and that are capable of preventing the infiltration of pro-ISIS elements into society again.

- Fourth, the central government must be assured that it will be arming the security forces in al-Anbar, and that these forces will not join ISIS with their weapons once more. This is especially necessary because Washington is making no secret of its desire to annex al-Anbar to a Sunni mini-state, in parallel with another Kurdish and a third Shiite state.

- Fifth, President Barack Obama has stressed that he does not approve of the PMU's intervention in Sunni areas. This has allowed ISIS to expand into al-Anbar's capital. As a result, al-Ramadi has turned into what resembles a sandbag in an arena of multi-level conflicts whose price is being paid by Iraq’s Sunnis at the hands of those who claim to be fighting and going to war to protect them.

"Evidence of this not only comes from the material and human losses suffered by the people of Tikrit and al-Ramadi (and who knows where else); but also from the fact that the first to be killed were 500 clan members who rejected ISIS's authority," concludes Mighnayer.

End…

 

MOSUL REPLICATED: "Al-Ramadi’s fall in ISIS's hands is an exact replica of the fate suffered by the city of Mosul about a year ago," writes Elias Harfouche in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The Iraqi army flees the battlefield with whatever armored vehicles it can take. And what it cannot, remains as reinforcements for ISIS's terrorists, which they use to advance to other positions. As for the people of al-Ramadi and Anbar Province, they are fleeing with whatever they can carry, to wherever they can reach. Meanwhile, army and police checkpoints stand in their way at Baghdad's gateways for fear – as they claim – that ISIS elements may infiltrate their ranks into the capital.

At this time, the Iranians rush to rescue the Iraqi government. Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan is the first to arrive in Baghdad, while supreme leader Ali Khamene’i’s advisor, Ali-Akbar Velayati, who is viewed in various capitals as Iran's actual foreign minister, declares from Beirut and Damascus – the latter one of the newly revived Iranian Empire's capitals, in addition to Baghdad and Sana'a – that Tehran is ready to help the Iraqi government if it should request it to do so 'in an official way as a brother.' The practical translation of this is that the Baghdad government should ask in a public and clear manner that Iraq's fate should be left to Iran if it wants to save its provinces from ISIS's advance.

Some may ask: But where are the Americans in all these developments? What is Barack Obama's administration, which withdrew from Iraq after its occupation and handed over its administration to the Iranians, doing?

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry says that Ramadi's fall in ISIS's hands will not last for long, and that its liberation will be achieved within weeks. Other American officials do not oppose Iran's participation in confronting ISIS via the PMU militia, as long as this occurs under the supervision of the Iraqi leadership. Despite the disregard for people's intelligence that this betrays – since it is known that the PMU receives its orders and even its weapons and equipment from Iran – it is tantamount to recognition of Iran’s critical role and the need for it to liberate Iraq's largest province with its Sunni majority.

There is no doubting the fact that Ramadi's fall represents a major setback for the Iraqi national project and for building of a united army that is able to fulfil its mission in all Iraqi areas, regardless of their sectarian identity. In fact, the process of destroying the Iraqi army began with what [first U.S. governor of Iraq] Paul Bremer referred to as the 'de-Baathification' of Iraqi institutions. This continued with the reconstruction of the Iraqi army based on sectarian and confessional share-allocation, and excluding capable officers. This happened especially under Nuri al-Maliki's government, which wasted billions of dollars on building an army that ultimately, turned out to be an illusion. The plan to seek the army's help proved to be a failure again and again, whenever the army was asked to fulfil its duties in defending Sunni areas attacked by ISIS.

But this is not all. Successive Iraqi governments have adopted a policy of excluding the country’s Sunnis. While the Kurdish provinces in the north were providing for their own self-protection and while the central government agencies were providing protection for the Southern [Shiite] provinces under Iran’s mantle, the other provinces remained unprotected.

What happened in Mosul a year ago is being repeated in al-Ramadi, as what happened afterwards in the case of Tikrit. In both cases, the [Sunni] clans were forbidden to obtain the weapons that would protect them on the pretext that such weapons may end up in ISIS's hands. But – lo and behold – the terrorist organization captured the Iraqi army's weapons that were supposed to be there to protect the citizens.

In this way, the fact that Iraq is falling prey to two exclusivist tendencies is being confirmed today: We have ISIS on the one hand, and the Shiite militias on the other. ISIS's advance justifies these militias’ growing influence as the sole force able to confront it. And Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, as well as the growing feeling among Iraqi Sunnis that they are being marginalized and excluded from decision-making positions, have left them the primary victim of ISIS's project.

"As for those [Sunni Iraqis] who stand up to this project, they find no path ahead but to escape into the unknown, or to face slaughter after being pronounced traitors by this terrorist organization," concludes Harfouche.

Ends…

 

 

2-In Yemen as in Syria

 

The Riyadh conference on Yemen seems to be following in the footsteps of the failed Syrian ‘moderate’ opposition, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The statement issued by this week’s Riyadh conference on Yemen is reminiscent of the Syrian opposition's statements after its conferences held in various regional and international capitals, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. But developments in both cases have shown that such conferences and the groups taking part are irrelevant to what is happening on the ground. Both countries seem to be on the same trajectory towards further conflict and political partition.

 

FINAL STATEMENT: "The final statement of Yemeni dialogue conference that was concluded in Riyadh yesterday (Tuesday), resembles those issued by the Syrian opposition every now and then, especially at the conclusion of their repeated marathon meetings in Istanbul," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Wednesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

But there is one difference between the two: The Riyadh statement was issued by 'legitimacy,' 'the authorities,' and 'the head of the regime' [fugitive president Hadi] in Yemen, while the Syrian statements are issued by the opposition or, more appropriately, oppositions. It is as if we were seeing a reverse image, even though the elements in both statements seem very similar.

The obsession with Iran and its allies and, behind that, the deep [Sunni/Shiite] confessional fault line, dominate both discourses – that of the Syrian opposition and that of the official Yemeni authorities. There are explicit and implicit attacks and criticisms of Tehran's agents and tools – Assad in the Syrian case, and al-Houthi in the Yemeni case. These statements are overflowing with talk of bringing down, toppling, imposing surrender, conditions and diktats. And they are accompanied by demands that know no beginning or end: Safe zones, international intervention, militarization, armament, building a national army, new security institutions, calls for federalism, so on and so forth.

The Yemeni statement demands the return of 'legitimacy,' while the Syrian statement calls for toppling it after it has lost its legitimacy. Neither statement fails to express gratitude to the sponsors and backers who, by the way, are the same parties in both cases. For the war is one and the same even if it rages in two far flung arenas. A cursory look at the contents and terms deployed in both statements would lead us back to the same source.

In both statements, there is talk of terms of reference for a political solution-- any political solution-- even though their content does not give the impression of serious intent or any readiness for such a solution. In Syria, there is talk of Geneva-1 [June 2012] as a point of reference, but according to only one interpretation of it that is based on toppling and bringing down the regime, and insisting that 'there is no room for Assad in the future.' And in Yemen, the talk is of the Riyadh Declaration, the [2011] Gulf Initiative and its implementing mechanisms, UNSCR 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC's) statements, and Yemeni President Hadi's letters, as preconditions that must be satisfied by a solution-- any solution-- and as the ceiling below which it is impermissible to fall.

In Syria, the statements are issued by one opposition camp, amidst countless such camps. And in Yemen, the statement is issued by one camp, without the other main party to the conflict. In other words, both statements seem to be the result of monologues and do not evoke the spirit of the very 'dialogue' they are demanding.

In Syria, the statements are issued by parties that have no real presence on the ground, while the 'victories' on the ground are being achieved by ISIS and the Nusra Front, both of which believe that those issuing these statements are apostates, just as they hold the head of the regime in Damascus to be one as well.

And in Yemen, the situation seems to be heading towards a similar fate with reports that ‘al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’ is advancing in Hadramaut and other provinces confiscating the role played by the pro- 'Hadi committees and the Southern Action Movement (SAM), just as al-Qa’ida's sister movements in Syria have confiscated the role played by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the 'moderate opposition.'

Both statements are supposed to pave the way for negotiations under an appropriate international sponsorship, and always in Geneva. And this means that both statements express the point of view of only one camp, be it large or small, against the background of the absence of the other camp’s viewpoint. Yet both statements – that of the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) in Syria's case, and Hadi's 'legitimacy' in Yemen's case – claim to be speaking in the name of the people and legitimacy, and as the people’s ‘sole legitimate representative.’

But no matter how long such allegations persist and how far such affronts may go, each of the two parties will sit across from another party in Geneva. There will be negotiations and dialogues, and the claims of being 'the sole legitimate representative' will lose their effect, glitter, and – most importantly – their ability to being exploited and employed by the sponsors and backers.

The two statements' talk of 'new countries,' of democracy and de-centralisation (unions/federations) is mere talk of temporary settlements that will not stand their ground for long, even if a regime were to be based on an agreed formula for power-sharing (fifty/fifty) as mentioned in the Yemeni statement. Unions and federations in both cases are a necessary preliminary and a transitional arrangement before we move towards permanent division and partition.

In Yemen, the SAM will not cease or desist before securing the independence of the 'Arab South [Yemen] State.' In Syria, all eyes are focused on what is being planned for the northern areas, from the countryside of Latakia to Raqqa, via Idlib and Aleppo. The aim is to establish a mini-state under Turkish/Arab sponsorship – at first as a safe zone, then as a backyard for Erdogan's influence, and later as an 'independent' state with the same affiliation. This is what the realpolitik school of politics suggests.

But the irony about both statements is that those issuing them will not reach the phase of 'reaping the fruits,' even if we assume what is the best from their point of view. For if the Syrian regime were to fall, there would be no place for the SNC's men in the new regime’s structure. On the contrary they may be beheaded by ISIS and strung up by the Nusra before they beat the Fateh Armies [Gulf-backed coalition] to Damascus.

In Yemen, reports speak of plans to ensure that Hadi disappears from the picture sooner than expected or predicted, to be replaced by one of the Riyadh conferees, most likely [current PM] Khaled Bahah. And this is also based on the assumption that these conferees will be at the vanguard of Sana'a and Aden's conquest.

In both cases, the Syrian and the Yemeni peoples are paying the price for the raging fires in the wars between sects, tribes, and confessional groups with their flesh; wars between camps fighting it out over roles and leadership; wars whose fuel is human beings, trees, and rocks, people and stones, and the accumulated cultural heritage of two historic civilizations.

"One of these [Yemen] is the Arabs' first homeland, and the other [Syria] is their 'beating heart'," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-A process without results

 

Renewed talk of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations will only revive a path that is all process and no peace, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

It would appear that some semblance of Palestinian/Israeli negotiations could be resumed soon, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. This is because both the Israeli PM and the PA president need this at the present time, even though neither expects the negotiations to yield any results other than prolonging the current stalemate and preventing the PA's collapse.

 

ABBAS’S PRECONDITIONS: "In his speech on the [May 15th] occasion of the Nakba, President Mahmoud 'Abbas stated his preconditions for resuming negotiations," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

These were as follows: 'A freeze on settlements; the release of the fourth installment of pre-Oslo [1993] prisoners, and beginning uninterrupted negotiations for a year that ends in an agreed timetable for ending the occupation by the end of 2017.'

These are pliable preconditions, even for someone like Netanyahu. The president did not link them to Israel’s consent to anything else, such as preparing to end the occupation or an end to the racist schemes of aggression in Jerusalem that aim to 'Judaize' and 'Israel-ize' the city and expel what remains of its [Arab] inhabitants, or lifting the siege on the Gaza Strip and ending the aggression against it. Nor did he – as has been his custom lately– link resuming the negotiations to issuing a UN Security Council resolution that specifies a timeframe for ending the occupation, or demand that these negotiations should be held within the framework of an international conference and proceed on the basis of international law and UN resolutions.

In fact, Netanyahu may view the president's preconditions as extending him a lifeline. Resuming the negotiations may put an end to the multi-faceted policy of internationalization that the Palestinian leadership has launched. It can block the path before international – especially European – isolation and the sanctions that are likely to be imposed on Israel, and the growing boycott movement that is likely to intensify. In addition it can weaken the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) hoped-for role after the Palestinians' membership takes effect.

Netanyahu can agree to release the pre-Oslo prisoners and stop building in settlements, but only after denuding this move of any substance. This is what his government did in 2010 when it engaged in the theatrical act of a partial and temporary 'freeze' on settlements, one that did not include Jerusalem or the settlement blocs or the already existing building projects or the already approved building grants. In fact, another such 'freeze' may be on the cards since the Likud Party refused to commit in writing not to resort to any sort of settlement freeze during the consultations to form the government, even though it did commit to expanding settlement activities. Of course, Netanyahu’s more extreme partners can oppose any kind of settlement-freeze, which would render his position more difficult both internationally and in terms of his relations with the U.S. and Europe.

But what lies behind this unexpected Palestinian return to the policy of negotiations even after the formation of the new Israeli cabinet?

In an article by Chemi Shalev in the Israeli daily Haaretz under the title 'Will 'Abbas save Netanyahu?, he says that the conditions that 'Abbas has set for resuming negotiations do not seem to be 'pie in the sky,' not even to Netanyahu. For the latter can agree to release the prisoners, and accept some formula for freezing settlements, and a year's worth of uninterrupted negotiations with the aim of ending the occupation by 2017. Shalev adds that resuming the peace process may represent a knockout blow to all those who wish to harm Netanyahu.

Shalev also wagers that Abu Mazin will save Netanyahu because he 'lives and dies by the good will of the Israeli government and authorities.' Furthermore, if 'Abbas were to violate his very low ceiling in a manner that would upset Jerusalem (the Israeli government), the hotter heads in the new Israeli cabinet could very well prevail and demand unilateral steps that would put an end 'Abbas's PA.

Shalev may be right. Abu Mazin's behavior seems to suggest that he fears the internationalization of the Palestinian cause that he has begun. This is evident from his apparent hesitation in presenting a new draft resolution to the UN Security Council, ending security coordination with Israel and holding it responsible for its occupation, activating Palestine's membership the ICC, and resorting to popular resistance.

The president also seems hesitant about ending the inter-Palestinian [Fateh/Hamas] split and restoring national unity. This is because he knows that were he to do so, he would be entering a major confrontation with the most extremist Israeli cabinet that is very willing to act rashly in the shadow of an Arab, regional, and international situation that is not appropriate for him. Therefore, Abu Mazin apparently believes that keeping the door open to resumed negotiations and actually resuming them should Netanyahu comply with his [Abu Mazin's] soft preconditions, is the lesser of all evils. This is despite the fact that this is the same path he has been pursuing ever since he came to the presidency [in 2005] but without achieving his aims. He has reached a situation instead that can at best be described as 'unenviable.'

Despite the dangers and damage resulting from initiating a new path that begins by totally and irrevocably shutting the door to the path of direct negotiations under merely formal American and international sponsorship, a new path could open up future horizons that may save the cause, the land, and the people.

What is also leading Abu Mazin to consider the possibility of returning to negotiations is his fear that Netanyahu may exploit the Arab-Gulf/Israeli concord against Iran and propose an initiative for regional peace that marginalizes the Palestinian side and lures the Arab parties into negotiations. To entice these parties, Netanyahu has been hinting at the possibility of discussing the [2002/2007] Arab Peace Initiative, whereas in reality, he aims to complete the liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

Abu Mazin has also despaired of the possibility of any fundamental change in U.S. policy in light of U.S./Israeli tensions and after the administration declared that it was about to reassess its policy towards the peace process. Obama recently stated that reaching an agreement is now a very distant prospect; and he expressed his pessimism at the chances of resuming negotiations in light of the new Israeli cabinet’s makeup.

Obama also clearly indicated that it is not possible to reach a major and comprehensive agreement within a year from now. He believes that the reason for the fact that no progress was achieved during the six years he spent in the White House is because the two leaders’ political considerations -and note that he holds them both equally responsible here– that did not permit them to take the necessary decisions. He added that 'the politics of fear has been stronger than the politics of hope over recent years,' and that it will take some time to rebuild trust. Therefore, Obama will focus on trying to improve the atmosphere between the two sides by reconstructing Gaza and improving the economic situation. Moreover, he added, ‘if we succeed in gradually rebuilding trust, then I believe the two-state solution will resume its place.’

The above indicates that the U.S. policy reassessment that Obama had promised has gone into labor only to give birth to a mouse: First, his administration urged everyone to wait for the results of the Israeli [March] elections; then it urged that they all should wait for the formation of the new cabinet. Then American officials stated that Obama was waiting to see how the new Israeli government would act and whether Netanyahu would take steps that make it clear that he was still committed to the two-state solution.

Furthermore, American sources indicate that Obama has still not decided whether to deploy a U.S. veto against the proposed French Security Council resolution. But even if the U.S. were to refrain from doing so this would only be on one condition, namely if the French proposal is denuded of its substance and is transformed into a mere gateway to resuming the negotiations, no more and no less.

The depth of the U.S. commitment to Israel remains unchanged, especially since there is nothing at the Palestinian and Arab level that is pressing the White House against the background of Palestinian weakness and dithering, and the lack of courage to proceed to other options, and against the background of the domestic wars and conflicts that are raging across the Arab region.

And all this is happening as the chances of reaching a final agreement over the Iranian nuclear program increase, with Obama needing Congress to endorse this agreement that he deems to be his greatest achievement. For this reason, he is not interested in directing another blow at Israel by changing U.S. policy towards it; in fact, he may be more concerned about appeasing it.

The little interest that remains in what is happening on our front stems from the fear that the situation may totally deteriorate if the current situation remains as is without any negotiations. The situation may slide towards anarchy with the PA collapsing and the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis returning to its true nature as one between an occupation and an occupied people, without the ruse of the so-called 'peace process.'

The effort to stem the deterioration and prevent the collapse explains the persistence of American, European, and international moves, and the continuous flow of European foreign ministers to the region to explore the possibility of resuming negotiations. If that proves impossible, there may be progress in the political process even without negotiations, according to the EU's Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini.

"For what is important is the process and not the results it may yield. This is because an ongoing process blocks the path before other Palestinian options and alternatives," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Frozen Apartheid

 

The Jerusalem Post, Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Wednesday editions with the latest on what police are calling the biggest mob bust in Israeli history. The main development in the case is that the identity of one of the crime families involved has been revealed. Police say that those arrested are suspected of carrying out underground hits, including a bombing in central Tel Aviv in 2003, in which three innocent bystanders were killed.

Only one newspaper does not lead with this crime story. Instead, Haaretz has on its front page two stories that do not appear in any of the other papers. In its lead story, Haaretz reports that Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon has issued a directive launching a pilot program to separate Israeli and Palestinian bus travel in the West Bank. Palestinian workers will now have to return from Israel to the West Bank via the same checkpoint they left and will not be allowed to ride Israeli bus lines. The new regulations, implemented by the Civil Administration, could lengthen some workers' commutes by as much as two hours, according to the human rights organizations that plan to appeal against the new rules to the High Court of Justice.

According to the plan, Palestinians who enter Israel to work via the Rayhan, Hala, Eliyahu and Eyal checkpoints may now only return to their homes via the same checkpoints through which they left the West Bank. They will also no longer be allowed to ride common buses with Israelis to the West Bank. The pilot is expected to last three months, after which it will be reviewed.

In response to the directive, Meretz leader Zahava Gal-On said that the move is 'tantamount to apartheid.' Gal-On said the defense establishment was caving in to pressure by Jewish settlers who have complained about the presence of Palestinians on bus lines, calling the separation 'unacceptable in a democratic state.' 'This is how apartheid looks,' the Meretz leader told Israel Radio. 'There is no better or nicer way to put it. Separate buses for Jews and Palestinians prove that democracy and occupation cannot coexist.'

Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog wrote on his Facebook page that Ya'alon's decision would add flames to the fire of hatred towards Israel.  'The decision to separate Palestinians and Jews on public transportation is an unnecessary humiliation that is a stain on the state and its citizens,' Herzog said.  'This is another one of the prime minister's mistakes who is giving in to and supporting a horrible decision that has no connection to the security of the state,' the opposition leader added. 

However, with criticism mounting from across the political spectrum at home and abroad, Netanyahu's office announced that the prime minister had ordered Ya'alon to suspend implementation of the plan. It remains unclear whether the suspension is temporary or whether the criticism has nixed it permanently. "The proposal is unacceptable to the prime minister," a statement from the Prime Minister's Office said. "He spoke with the defense minister this morning and it was decided that the proposal will be frozen."

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov, has called on Israel to freeze Jewish construction in the West Bank and to take further steps to restart negotiations with the Palestinians. In a discussion at the UN Security Council, Mladenov said that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 'will be engaging the new government to explore realistic options for a return to meaningful negotiations towards a two-state solution within a reasonable time frame. To give hope back to people, we must act to advance the prospect of a two-state solution: Israel and Palestine living side-by-side in peace and security,' Mladenov told the 15-member council.

Meanwhile, European Union Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini will arrive in Israel today for a two-day visit – her first to the country. During her visit, Mogherini will meet with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Elsewhere, Former President Shimon Peres spoke to the British newspaper The Telegraph about the declining relationship between Israel and the U.S., saying that reviving efforts to achieve a two-state solution is the best way to repair things with Washington. However, he expressed doubts about Prime Minister Netanyahu's interest in doing so.

Haaretz second front-page story reports that the United States and Israel have begun preliminary, unofficial contacts regarding special American military aid for Israel due to developments in the Middle East. Although neither side has said so explicitly, the report says, the Obama administration plans to provide Israel substantial defense compensation if an agreement is signed between Tehran and the world powers to limit Iran’s nuclear program. This is in light of the continued defense risk perceived coming from Iran, as well as huge arms deals between Washington and the Gulf states. The United States is likely to provide Israel with, among other things, more F-35 combat aircraft and another battery of a missile interception system.

A key component in any future arms deal with Washington will be an anti-missile system. Israel, the paper says, is now likely to request additional aid to finance an improved Arrow 3 battery and to acquire some more Iran Dome batteries. The sides may also discuss the acquisition of technological systems for intelligence-gathering purposes.

In related news, Ynet carries a report from Reuters, which says that a senior Israeli official took a swipe at Washington on Tuesday over Iran's purchase of second-hand civilian aircraft, saying the acquisition violated U.S. sanctions and went ahead despite a tip-off from Israel. Iranian Transport Minister Abbas Akhundi was quoted on May 11 by the Iranian Students News Agency as saying Tehran bought 15 used commercial planes in the last three months. He did not say who sold them or how they had been acquired.

'Israel learned from intelligence sources about this very significant breach of the sanctions in advance of it occurring,' said the Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity. 'We flagged the issue to the U.S. administration. Unfortunately, the deal still went through and there was no success in preventing it.'

 

 

BYPASSING OBAMA: Writing in Israel Hayom, Omri Dostry says that, by admitting that peace between Israel and the Palestinians is 'nearly impossible' in the foreseeable future, U.S. President Barack Obama has, in effect, sided with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's diplomatic approach of containment.

"The recent declaration by U.S. President Barack Obama, that a comprehensive deal between Israel and the Palestinian Authority is not possible within the next 12 months, is a reflection of what American policy will look like in the foreseeable future regarding the conflict. Obama is, in fact, claiming that he will not invest the time or the energy on the subject, despite his insistence that the United States would continue to push for what his administration believes in.

These comments, which came in an interview with al-Arabiya television network, are good news for Israel and for Prime Minister Netanyahu, whose diplomatic plan has been in place ever since he established his second government in 2009. That plan focused on countering the diplomatic disadvantages that Obama brought when he won the presidency. When he was sworn in, Obama presented a clearly pro-Palestinian policy on diplomatic issues and displayed a haughty disregard for Jerusalem's demands. In an attempt to cover up this antipathy toward the Jewish state and to show Jewish voters in the United States that his approach was actually balanced, Obama bolstered the security relationship between Washington and Jerusalem.

The differences between the Obama Administration and the Israeli governments that have been in power throughout his presidency stemmed first and foremost from the characters of the two leaders: Netanyahu is a conservative on social matters, liberal on economic matters and a realist when it comes to diplomatic and military issues. Obama is liberal on social issues, a socialist on economic issues and a liberal in terms of his outlook on diplomatic and military issues. One could say that they are diametrically opposites. Because of Obama’s anti-imperialistic approach and seeing the world as a zero-sum game in which no country can prosper unless it's at the expense of another country, he tagged the Palestinians as the victims and the weak side, while Israel was seen as the last of the Western colonialist powers and the root of all regional instability.

During his two most recent terms as prime minister, Netanyahu has managed to find a strategy which bypasses Obama. Shortly after the establishment of his second government, Netanyahu delivered the Bar-Ilan speech, in which he expressed his acceptance of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel – on conditions that Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas was not ready to accept. At the same time, he agreed to a 10-month settlement construction freeze. During his third term, he even agreed to free Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails in exchange for a Palestinian commitment to resume negotiations. These tactics managed to portray Abu Mazin as a serial rejectionist. The price that Israel paid for these strategic moves was relatively low compared to the huge benefit of successfully thwarting Obama's efforts to impose a bad agreement.

In addition to stating that it will be 'almost impossible' to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal in the foreseeable future, Obama added that, 'we can … try to rebuild trust [by] relieving the humanitarian suffering of Gaza … creating business opportunities and jobs inside the territories. If we can slowly rebuild that kind of trust, then I continue to believe that the logic of a two-state solution will reassert itself.' Obama was, in effect, adopting the policies of the Israeli prime minister, who has said that, given the instability in the Middle East, the growing strength of jihadi movements and the disintegration of nations, Israel must focus on containing the conflict and achieving stability – rather than trying to resolve it by means of dangerous adventurism."

Ends…

 

WAITING FOR SEPTEMBER: Writing on the Walla! website, Amir Tibon comments on the role that the United States is likely to play in the virtually non-existent Israeli-Palestinian peace process – and says that there is very little chance of negotiations taking place at all in the foreseeable future.

"Martin Indyk, who served as the head of the United States' negotiating team to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, said this week that the Obama Administration would ask France to hold off on its United Nations Security Council resolution regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state until the end of summer. According to Indyk, the reason for requesting the delay is that Washington wants to focus on the nuclear deal with Iran and avoid confrontation with Israel on two fronts simultaneously.

Speaking at a foreign policy conference in New York, Indyk said that 'the White House is currently focused on the Iran deal. The administration does not need to complicate matters with two simultaneous issues that will create friction with Israel.' He added that the French would not submit their resolution if they believe that there is a chance that the United States will use its veto. Paris understands, he said, that if they move forward before September, that is what will happen. Having said that, he added, the French will submit their resolution in September. Asked how the Obama Administration would respond to the French initiative, Indyk said that there is a good chance that the United States would 'go with it' – in other words, would not impose a veto.

According to Indyk, if the French proposal that is eventually submitted is not balanced enough in the eyes of the Obama Administration, then President Obama will consider putting before the Security Council an independent American proposal, which will include elements that neither side will like. According to Indyk, the American counter-proposal would include reference to the 1967 borders with territorial exchanges, but would also declare unequivocally that Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people. He explained that a Security Council resolution is necessary since, at the moment, there is no chance of resuming negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Indyk argued that the two leaders – Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas – lack the public legitimacy to conduct serious negotiations. 'Netanyahu has established a narrow, right-wing government, in which, unlike his previous government, there are no representatives of the political center. Abu Mazin, for his part, lacks public legitimacy and has not held an election since 2005; he does not have a mandate from the Palestinian people to make the kind of concessions that would be needed for an agreement. He is paralyzed. Circumstances on both sides make it extremely complicated to reach an agreement.'

Speaking at the same event as Indyk was former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams, who also served as senior Middle East advisor in the George W. Bush administration. Abrams agreed with Indyk's assessment and added that it would be a 'waste of time' for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to try and renew Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Instead, Abrams suggested that the Obama Administration should focus on improving security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, saying that the deployment of Palestinian police forces in East Jerusalem was a positive development. In addition, Abrams called on Israel to allow the Palestinians to improve their cellular telephone infrastructure in the West Bank, which, he said, was lagging significantly behind the infrastructure available in Israel.

The pessimism that is shared by Indyk and Abrams regarding another round of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations is a rare moment of harmony for an otherwise divided Washington. When two senior former officials – one identified with the Democrats and the other with the Republicans – share the same position, it should be clear that the idea of negotiations is not relevant at the current time. President Obama said similar things in an interview over the weekend with al-Arabiya. During the course of that interview, he said that his administration would not be focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the foreseeable future.

All of this casts a rather problematic light on the announcement by Netanyahu this week that he is appointing Interior Minister Silvan Shalom to be responsible for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in his new government. The chances of any such negotiations ever taking place during Netanyahu’s fourth government are close to zero, but if, by some miracle, they do happen, the person who will actually engage in talks with the Palestinian side is Netanyahu's personal envoy, attorney Isaac Molho. During the last round of talks, Molcho conducted, alongside the official negotiations that Tzipi Livni was in charge of, a secret channel of communication. It is possible that Molho is currently involved in secret talks now, too, but there is very little chance of official and organized talks, which Shalom is supposed to spearhead, taking place.

In addition to the Palestinian portfolio, Shalom is also responsible for 'strategic dialogue between Israel and the United States' – an important position that was, in Netanyahu's previous government, filled by Yuval Steinitz. Despite the fact that Shalom has been given a fancy title and, on paper, responsibility for Israel's most important strategic relations, the truth is that the little strategic coordination that is still going on is being handled by Netanyahu's National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen and not by any member of the cabinet. The fact that Shalom has replaced Steinitz will have almost no impact on this at all."

Ends…

 

THE FIRST CRISIS: Writing in Maariv, Karni Eldad says that the first coalition crisis is already upon us and that Habayit Hayehudi cannot allow itself to be a member of a government that destroys the homes of Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria.

"Who needs a foreign minister when you've got a defense minister?

The deterioration in Israel' relations with the United States and the European Union, the threats of boycott against us and the international pressure have not persuaded Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that he needs to accelerate his decision-making process and name a foreign minister – not even a temporary one, until such time as he is able to expand his narrow coalition. The position of foreign minister, who is supposed to use diplomatic means to forge brave new relationships between us and the international community, is currently being filled in practice by Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon.

In an effort to ingratiate himself with the international community, however, our defense minister is making decisions which violate the basic interests of the very people who voted for him and his party. There is no other way to explain the order that he has given to the Civil Administration to tear down the homes of Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria – despite the fact that there are still legal processes and challenges underway. Last week, IDF bulldozers were sent to raze two homes in Tekoa, in the Gush Etzion bloc of settlements. All that remains of them now are two piles of rubble.

The demolition passed off without incident because of the nature of the people of Tekoa, who are among the most moderate and least militant of the settlers. Things will be very different indeed, however, when the bulldozers move on to the Shiloh bloc of settlements, where the Civil Administration has been ordered to tear down a dozen homes – many of which are also still being argued over in the courts and some of which have been inhabited for 10 years.

That area of the territories – northern Samaria – is completely different from the more moderate Gush Etzion. In Shiloh, residents are already preparing for the struggle; they are already exerting pressure on Netanyahu's new coalition – which, as we all know only too well, is so narrow that it can easily be toppled. There are many among the settler movement who believe that a government order to demolish the homes of Jews is a good enough reason to bring down the government.

On the ground, too, activists are already working to ensure that the demolitions do not pass without a struggle. Meir Brettler, a member of the Likud central committee and one of the most powerful ground-level activists, had some harsh words to say about the decision: 'We have a right-wing government that is carrying out the policies of the radical and anti-Zionist left. The defense minister has set himself the goal of destroying the homes of Jews and he is doing so with great gusto. We demand an end to this policy.'

MK Eli Ben Dahan from the Habayit Hayehudi party was supposed – according to the coalition negotiations – to be handed responsibility for the Civil Administration. Because of Ya'alon's objections, Netanyahu will not, in the end, give him that position. It appears that Ya'alon is not willing to give up on the authority to someone who has openly declared that the age of Jewish house demolitions is over.

Thus far, the mini crises that afflicted the negotiations over the formation of a new coalition have been about ego, honor, jobs and status. Now, however, we are about to experience our first serious coalition crisis – one over a true matter of principle. Can Habayit Hayehudi be a partner in a government that violates its own coalition agreement by razing the homes of Jews?"

Ends…

 

WHERE'S THE MONEY: Writing on the News 1 website, Mordechai Lipman says that, in order to counter the Palestinians' diplomatic war against Israel, the government should ask the international community for an explanation as to why the Palestinian Authority is exempt from using its vast wealth to help its own people – rather than relying on Israel.

"The Palestinian struggle to delegitimize Israel – a struggle that is global and which often descends to the basest level – will intensify in the coming weeks and months. The Palestinians are telling the few remaining allies that Israel still has that the new government in Jerusalem is more extreme and more right wing than its predecessor. They point to the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not even mentioned in the new coalition's guidelines and that, in order to advance their goals, the Palestinians need to intensify their diplomatic battle against the Zionist state with all tools at their disposal.

The Palestinians are using whatever means they can to remove every last ounce of legitimacy from Israel: the International Criminal Court, the United Nations Security Council, FIFA, as well as various boycotts against Israeli products, universities and cultural events. In this battle, the Palestinians have only used up a fraction of their political arsenal. Much more is to come.

There is no peace between Israel and the Palestinians. There isn't even the appearance of peace. There is just the illusion of quiet. For years, the Palestinians have been waging a political war against us. Now they are threatening to intensify it. A new onslaught can be expected and additional international bodies are likely to be drafted into the Palestinian effort to destroy the State of Israel by destroying its legitimacy.

They are holding nothing back in this struggle. Even Israeli Arabs have been recruited. Every so often, Arab citizens of the State of Israel win another small victory. Palestinian and Hamas flags are openly displayed at protests and rallies organized by parties that are represented in the Knesset and by public-sector workers. We have become so used to this that we simply don't react. Our government's response to these kinds of provocations is silence. If this were a 'real' war, I wonder how Prime Minister Netanyahu would respond.

There are many issues on which Israel and its official representatives could have and should have countered the Palestinian propaganda machine. One senior government official told me – off the record – that Israel has been asking Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas to explain why the Palestinian Authority is not using the money that it receives from the Arab world, from the United States and from elsewhere to improve the infrastructure of its citizens. It has failed to build a power station and, because of the lack of investment in suitable infrastructure, the streets of Palestinian cities are filled with sewage. In response, the Palestinians merely chuckled. Why should they build a power station as long as Israel provides the Palestinians with all the electricity they need – free of charge, thanks to international pressure?

Many Israelis have been asking themselves what happens to the money that the Palestinian Authority gets from overseas, primarily the West, the United States and Arab states. A few days ago, Channel 10 even broadcast a special investigation into the issue. According to data it collected, around $35 billion have been transferred to the Palestinian Authority over the past decade. This is a massive amount of money, yet we have seen no signs of economic development in the West Bank. Even if we accept that this sum may be greater than reality, the question still stands: Where is the money? The unavoidable answer is that the money is now in the deep pockets of Palestinian officials.

During Israel's war of Independence, when the IDF controlled the Gaza Strip, some 200,000 arrived there – most of them from the West Bank. Because they and their descendants are defined as refugees and because UNRWA has effectively taken control of the Strip, these people are now exempt from the universal need to look out for their own interests. UNRWA builds schools for them, UNRWA builds hospitals for them. So every dollar that reaches Hamas' hands can be used to build tunnels and manufacture rockets. The two Palestinian governments – Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Abu Mazin in the West Bank – do not feel that they have a duty to do what any sane government would do: work for the good of its people by providing their most basic needs.

The silence of this Israeli government and previous governments is becoming a major crisis. The damage it will cause could be irreversible. When there is talk of peace – especially on the Palestinian side – this is the worst possible behavior. We must demand that our government starts to take more seriously its commitment to contain the conflict – and to ask out loud the difficult questions that many Israelis have been asking for years."

Ends…

 

THE NEXT GAZA WAR THAT NOBODY WANTS: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Jonathan Schanzer and Grant Rumley say that Israel would rather keep its powder dry for more serious threats, like Hizbollah to its north, Islamic State in Syria and possibly even Iran, than Hamas. 

"Israel and Hamas would probably rather not go to war again this summer, but rogue Hamas factions may push the two into conflict again. Hamas’s Gaza-based political leaders, who have failed to attract funding to rebuild homes and other key civilian needs after Israel laid waste to much of their military infrastructure, understand that another war would be devastating. Likewise, Israel would rather keep its powder dry for more serious threats, including Hizbollah to its north, Islamic State in Syria, and possibly even Iran.

Of the two, Hamas’s political leadership is probably more wary. The regime in Egypt, which sees Hamas as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement it toppled in 2013, has destroyed an estimated 2,000 smuggling tunnels – and even flooded some with tear gas – thereby cutting off Hamas’s access to weapons, cash and goods. Hamas leaders know that if they are ever to convince Egypt to open its borders, they will need to charm Cairo’s financial patrons in Saudi Arabia, who are busy leading an air campaign in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis.

Hamas knows that another war with Israel, especially one fought with Iranian weapons, will not necessarily earn the favor of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the other Sunni states. Between the Iranian nuclear threat, the expansion of the Islamic State and other regional threats, the Sunnis don’t want any more conflict in the region – even against Israel – if it can yield Iran more leverage than it currently has.

This might explain why Hamas has defied its own principles by engaging in behind-the-scenes cease-fire negotiations with Israel. Senior Hamas official Ahmed Youssef recently acknowledged the Islamist group was in indirect 'chats' with Israel via international mediation. Though both Israeli and Hamas officials denied the report, the indirect track appears to be making progress. Israeli analysts suspect the internationally-mediated negotiations – which are rumored to include officials from the UN, Europe and Qatar – could yield a three- to five-year cease-fire, and potentially even prompt the Israelis to ease their blockade of Gaza.

But even if some Hamas members want to sue for calm, others may not be inclined to go along. Israeli radio recently shocked listeners when it announced that Mohammad Deif, Hamas’s top military commander, was in fact alive and operational in Gaza. Deif, who oversees Hamas’s military operations in Gaza, was believed to be dead after an Israeli strike last summer killed his wife and child. Deif has already started preparing for another round. He has deep ties with Iran, which is now poised to receive some $120 billion in sanctions relief.

It’s a certainty that Deif has already applied for some of those funds. Along with general funds and training, Deif will undoubtedly look to Iran to restock his rocket supply, and possibly even to acquire Iranian drones. It’s also a safe bet that we will see an encore of the roughly 40 tunnels that prompted last summer’s Israeli ground invasion. Deif was the brains behind those tunnels. And now reports suggest that, with Deif back in business, Hamas is rebuilding them – often at the expense of fighters’ lives.

The Israelis are trying to keep one step ahead of Hamas’ military mastermind. They are currently developing countermeasures to detect and destroy these tunnels. The pioneers of the remarkable Iron Dome technology that successfully downed 735 Hamas rockets last summer have been hard at work on anti-tunnel technology ever since the war concluded last August.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is hopeful that such countermeasures will deter Hamas from launching the next round. Indeed, the Israeli leader stopped short of re-taking all of Gaza last summer for fear of a 'Fallujah-style' battle, and he was hammered by politicians on both his left and his right during the March elections for his decision. Isaac Herzog, the leader of the dovish Zionist Union party, even accused Netanyahu of 'strengthening' Hamas.

The Israeli military knows that another conflict may be looming. This is why recent training exercises have been conducted to prepare for a full conquest of the Gaza Strip. But while the IDF could easily re-take the territory, holding it is the hard part. The price of administration and control would be a tough sell to the Israeli public that was only too eager to withdraw from the territory in 2005. This is exactly why the Israelis, much like many Gazans, may be content letting this summer pass without another conflict.

The wild card will be the internal fissures within Hamas. This is an issue that has garnered quite a bit of attention in recent weeks. Amid the political upheaval of the Arab Spring, which has resulted in ad-hoc sponsorship from states and donors from around the Middle East, the group has multiple patrons with competing regional agendas, and is irredeemably fractured as a result. The group’s Iran-backed military wing, the West Bank leaders, Gaza leaders and political-wing figures in places like Qatar, Turkey and Egypt are far from aligned. Unilateral decisions taken by one or more of these figures can have deadly implications.

Last summer, it was Hamas’s external military leadership in Turkey that ordered the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. That operation sparked an Israeli reprisal that soon led to escalation and then all-out war. Tellingly, in an interview two months after the end of the Gaza war, Qatar-based Hamas leader Khaled Mish'al admitted he had no foreknowledge of this operation.

An uneasy calm exists now between Hamas and Israel, punctuated by the predictable cantankerous rhetoric and an occasional rocket testing. None of that has come close to sparking another conflict, primarily because neither side really wants one. But what Israelis and Palestinians want may not matter now that actors like Mohammed Deif are back in the rocket-making business, digging tunnels for the next round."

Ends…

 

COOPERATION NOT BOYCOTTS: Writing on the website of i24 television station, Arik Segal says that, with politicians pessimistic about the chances of renewing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, it is up to the business community to provide some glimmer of hope.

"In the absence of political negotiations, civil society should take the lead and start by building business communities.

U.S. President Barack Obama's recent statement, in which he expressed pessimism about reaching peace in the Middle East during his term, did not come as a surprise. Indeed, domestic politics and regional instability imply that the deadlock in negotiations will not end anytime soon. The continuous turmoil in the region takes the international attention away from the Israeli-Palestinian issue and reduces instances of external pressure. Moreover, the growing presence of jihadist groups on Israel's borders means that the chances of it withdrawing from any territory are slimmer than ever.

In the national political arena, the newly elected Israeli government is expected to be a bit more hawkish than the previous one was. Israeli voters seem to have lost hope of any progress in the peace process and have focused their electoral zeal on socioeconomic issues instead. Likewise, Palestinians have lost hope for change, opting however to maintain the security cooperation with Israel, thereby maintaining the status quo.

This quagmire provides an incentive for those who do believe that peace is possible to try and find new paths for making it happen. Such was the motivation of Arab and Israeli Harvard Business School students, who organized a conference last month and invited Arab and Israeli businessmen and entrepreneurs who have a common interest in promoting well-being and prosperity as the bases for arriving at peace and security.

The conference, called 'Economic Prosperity for Peace', gathered prominent Israeli and Palestinian business leaders who are active in the bilateral economic sphere. Four keynote speakers as well as four panels presented a vibrant picture of many small and large scale initiatives aimed at promoting the inclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Israeli information and communications technology (ICT) industry, as well as cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian businesses.

Despite the positive atmosphere and a sense of optimism, the most common question asked by skeptics was how economic cooperation could have a wider scalable impact on the public and the government in order to create a visible change. Increased employment and a rise in the standard of living can decrease motivation for violence and confrontation, but it cannot answer basic needs such as recognition or national identity. In this context, the biggest barrier to altering negative perceptions of respective communities remains the inability to expose such initiatives and publicize Israeli-Arab business cooperation due to the fear of being seen as 'collaborating with the enemy.'

The answers to those challenges should be carefully discussed in future conferences and workshops, yet the advantages of using the economy as a means of cooperation and not one of boycott is still more effective in terms of conflict resolution, mainly because it benefits both sides. Promoting economic boycott and sanctions could yield some diplomatic results and force Israel to be more flexible in peace negotiations; however it will hardly have a positive impact on Israelis' need to have the Palestinians accept the existence of the Jewish state and live peacefully side by side. Economic cooperation, however, beginning with the founding of small business communities, will provide both peoples with material benefits and build trust, which is a more effective strategy in bringing a long-term peaceful solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

BOMB ATTACKS/GENERAL ELECTIONS:   Oral Calislar is concerned about the electoral impact of yesterday’s bomb attacks on two HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] centers in centre-left Radikal: "Political debate is a usual phenomenon. The fact that it may get tougher from time to time should also be seen as something natural. However, it is important to refrain from resorting to the ‘language of violence’. In the end, we are passing through an era when attempts are being made to end the [PKK’s  Kurdistan Workers' Party] armed struggle. The latest bomb attacks can poison the election atmosphere even though they do not reflect society’s general trend."

Mehmet Tezkan examines the prospect of a coalition in centrist Milliyet: "Will there be a coalition? If the CHP [main opposition Republican People's Party] and MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] secure the necessary number of seats, there will be a coalition. There cannot be a CHP-MHP and HDP coalition. Can the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] form a coalition with any one of the opposition parties, CHP, MHP or HDP? It can, but this will not suit the presidency’s [Erdogan’s] desires. As long as the president is cursing coalitions, he will not allow the ‘party of his heart’ [the AKP] to join any such coalition." 

Bulent Korucu adopts a relatively calm approach in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The bomb attacks on the HDP’s offices in Adana and Mersin led to concern and speculation that ‘we are returning to the 1990s’. Yesterday's attacks created a feeling that we have nowhere to go in resolving the Kurdish problem. But this pessimistic atmosphere soon dissipated. The majority of the public has declared that it recognizes the provocation and will not be deceived. The president should have condemned the attack and demonstrated his support for the HDP, even symbolically. If the HDP clears the 10% electoral threshold barrier, the presidency will come to naught, but hell will not break loose."

But Ali Bayramoglu is worried about matters spiraling out of control in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "There have been many attacks against the HDP in this election campaign. But the scope of the latest two attacks, their target and location in Adana and Mersin raise many questions. There is a big Kurdish community in these two cities. Unrest is possible in certain neighborhoods, even districts. We are talking about places where dangerous incidents are likely to happen and protests can get out of control."

Hakan Aksay ascribes malign intent to the ruling party in independent internet T24: "Things will not continue in this manner. This has become clear. A brave and honest campaign will not bring the desired outcome. It will not work via a democratic election campaign. If it does, the government will lose. The ruling AKP can secure a majority of votes. They can even win. But this is not enough for them. For them to feel properly secure, the opposition must be crushed."

 

MURSI VERDICT: Sami Kohen decries the death sentence passed on former Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi in Milliyet: "It is clear that Egypt’s judicial system is still inclined to resort to execution and that the court that has passed a death penalty on Mursi and his 106 supporters has done so for political reasons. The fact that judiciary has released former dictator Hosni Mubarak after a public uprising in 2011 but has decided to execute Mursi who came to power for the first time with free elections, shows how contradictory Egypt’s judiciary has become".

Nilgun Cerrahoglu detects a message in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "There is no democratic Muslim country in the Middle East. Terrible reports are coming from there every day. In Saudi Arabia, for example, people are being beheaded and women are stoned to death. Has Ankara ever reacted against such actions in the name of human rights? But when it comes to Mursi, the issue is indisputable. Yusuf Kaplan from Yeni Safak wrote that the Mursi case is being interpreted as a message to Erdogan saying: ‘attention, you may also end up like that’."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is not fond of the Additional Protocol: "The Additional Protocol is voluntary; countries can adopt it by their own choice. However, in fact, this is not the case. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the West and the U.S. take steps to convince the target country to sign a deal and accept the Additional Protocol. This Protocol has not been presented to the Majlis, hence, Iran has no obligation to implement it by law. The West expects Iran to accept the Additional Protocol, which is excessive bullying; that is why it should not be accepted." 

Hard-line Javan does not accept inspection of military facilities: "Recent remarks by IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, that the nuclear agreement will allow Agency inspectors to visit military facilities, once again challenge the nuclear talks. In the past, agency inspectors disclosed Iran's nuclear centres and scientists, which posed serious threats. Military facilities will become obvious targets for possible American and Zionist threats following the inspections; they always talk about the military option and all options being on the table. Moreover, such visits will create an opportunity for hypocrites and Zionists to disrupt the negotiations and the lifting of sanctions by raising fake claims that will hinder the implementation of an agreement." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan urges the Houthis to take the military initiative: "Why do the revolutionary Houthis not give a befitting response to cruel Saudi attacks to deter them? Would not this absence of response increase the confidence of the aggressive Saudis to attack the innocent Yemeni people? Does not this lack of reaction suggest that the Houthis are facing serious military problems? People in the region who witnessed the atrocities of the primitive Saudi regime against humanity raise such questions and expect the Houthis to take the initiative in military attacks." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami dismisses the 'Save Yemen' summit in Riyadh: "Saudi leaders hope that what they could not achieve through war, aggression and crimes, can be achieved through political consultation and media noise. They hope that the half-baked 'Save Yemen' summit in Riyadh will complement their war crimes, fulfil their objectives, affix the 'mask of saviour of Yemen' on their faces and cover up all their inhuman atrocities." 

 

SCOTLAND: Conservative Resalat argues that Scotland is a challenge for Cameron: "Holding another referendum in the UK is the first serious warning of senior Scottish leaders to British Prime Minister David Cameron. The prime minister opposes holding any other referendum in Scotland. But, as the EU has no choice but to make concessions to London if they want the UK to remain in Europe; Cameron has also no choice but to give in to the Scots. This can turn Cameron form a victorious political winner to a totally defeated loser." 

 

AFGHANISTAN: Moderate Iran writes of a stalemate: "The bloody incidents in Kabul indicate that the policies of the national unity government led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Dr Abdullah to extinguish the fire of war and open the door of negotiations with Taleban have not been fruitful so far. The current developments in Afghanistan are not to the benefit of Taleban, the government or the army, because neither the government has the military capability to remove Taleban nor the Taleban are in a position to defeat the Afghan army, the U.S. and NATO forces." 

 

CABINET RESHUFFLE: Reformist E'temad does not believe that the problem lies with particular ministers: "Many believe that reshuffles in President Rowhani's cabinet, or in other words repairing the cabinet, can be helpful in addressing governmental problems. This, however, ignores the main issue of planning and policies. Changing cabinet ministers in the last two remaining years of the government's tenure will not help resolve problems."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-From grey to black

2-The storm resumes

 

1-From grey to black

 

Whatever justifications the [Iraqi] government may advance, Iraq today is torn apart and lacks a state in the absence of a genuine central army. It is being defended by [Shiite] militias accused of sectarianism and being Iran's lackeys, and of committing human rights violations in Tikrit and elsewhere. It is also being defended by thousands of American, Iranian and other advisors, and by the warplanes of an international coalition that some accuse of aiding ISIS instead of fighting it. After the total security collapse in al-Anbar, it is not strange to find Iran’s defense minister rushing to visit Baghdad yesterday to discuss preparations for the new battle. Anyway, this will not be an easy one. And whatever its outcome, it will produce a strategic change in the Iraqi – and perhaps regional – balance of power in light of al-Anbar's importance for both Jordan and ISIS alike--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The forces, states, and parties hostile to the [largely Shiite] PMU’s factions have only the following options: First, they can accept ISIS's control over the areas now under its control, especially in Ninawa and al-Anbar provinces. And they can also accept the likelihood that ISIS will consolidate its control and eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance, specifically in al-Anbar Province and the transformation of Ninawa Province, and specifically the city of Mosul, into a base for waging more attacks on Kirkuk Province and the city of Irbil, where the Kurdish parties are in control. Second, they can rely on the Iraqi army and some [Sunni] clansmen linked to leaders who prefer to cooperate with the U.S. rather than the PMU. These leaders have already publicly stated that they accept Iraq's partition in order to receive direct U.S. military aid without satisfying the central Iraqi government's conditions or securing its prior acceptance. Third, they can abandon the policy of seeking American support and accept the PMU factions' help to regain the areas now under ISIS's control --Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The [Iraqi Sunni] clans' eagerness to rid their cities of their extremists will only mature and become the main issue when a Sunni province is formed in the center of Iraq, governed by Sunnis, with a Sunni national guard that faces the Sunnis' neighbors in one and the same country: The PMU is for the Shiites, and the peshmerga for the Kurds. And in this way, U.S. VP’s Biden's prophecy that Iraq will become a number of federal states closer to independent entities is drawing closer to being realized. Al-Ramadi [grey in Arabic] is painting Iraq with its colors. It is turning its future grey, leaning toward black--Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The fall of al-Ramadi was a bloody lesson that will have a significant impact on the so-called 'political process.' Expelling ISIS's fighters cannot be achieved except by ensuring that military operations are not subject to the whims of politicians, regardless of their affiliations. It can only be achieved by ending the practice of sectarian share-distribution inside the armed forces, which have suffered terribly from the intervention of politicians, corrupting elements, and failed figures. Wars are won by the brave who are willing to make sacrifices, not by a crude intermingling of the political with the military. Yet the fall of al-Ramadi will be a strong reason for ensuring the cohesion of those who love and cling to Iraq's unity. These are the strongest and largest force. In a few weeks' time, we shall see important positive changes occurring on the ground. The strike force [PMU] will impose itself on the battlefield and the political ramblings will be on the retreat-- Wafiq as-Samerra'i in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

ISIS’s capture of al-Ramadi represents a major failure for Iraqi PM Haidar al-'Abadi's government, and it is the direct result of the government's dereliction of its duty in supplying al-Anbar Province’s Sunni clans with the weapons and equipment they need to defend their land, maintains the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. Those opposed to the participation of the largely Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in the battle of al-Anbar have only three options to choose from, argues a Lebanese commentator in  pro-Syrian Beirut daily. They can either accept ISIS's control of the areas it occupied, or try to regain control of these areas with U.S. backing, or accept the PMU's conditions for joining the battle. The battle of al-Ramadi has dealt the final knockout blow to the Iraqi army, which is the only national institution that could still keep Iraq united, argues a Lebanese commentator. The Sunni areas of Iraq will only rid themselves of their extremists when they become independent entities with their own national guard, similar to the PMU for the Shiites and the peshmerga for the Kurds. The fall of al-Ramadi was the result of a conspiracy by a group of clan leaders and Iraqi politicians who made sure that the Iraqi army would not receive any backing from the PMU, maintains a former Iraqi intelligence chief under Saddam who defected to Saudi Arabia. But these politicians now face the anger of their constituency and the forces that seek Iraq's unity will soon have the upper hand.

 

HUMILIATING IMAGES: "The images published yesterday of the Iraqi army’s disorganized withdrawal from the city of al-Ramadi were truly humiliating, as was these forces’ apparent terror as they fled under fire; but such images were not entirely unexpected," writes the editorial in Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

Al-Ramadi has been bound to fall in ISIS's hands for some time now in light of the severe lack of equipment, weapons and human resources from which the [Sunni] clans have been suffering and in light of Iraqi PM Haidar al-'Abadi government's failure or dereliction of its duty in coming to the city’s aid.

It is difficult to overstate the scale of the disaster. Al-Ramadi is the center of Anbar Province (which covers about one-third of Iraq's total area). It is of major symbolic and strategic importance, especially since it links Baghdad to Syria and to Jordan. And its fall will naturally pose a direct threat to Baghdad's suburbs, where ISIS sleeper cells are believed to be deployed waiting for 'zero hour' to be activated.

Despite its limited capabilities, al-Ramadi managed to stand its ground for seventeen months before ISIS's attacks, until the latter grabbed its chance to achieve its first important victory after its losses in Salahuddin Province. Rather than their victory in Tikrit motivating Iraqi forces to advance towards and liberate Mosul, these forces now find themselves facing a difficult battle; one that ISIS believes is 'the final confrontation' before marching on the capital.

A number of difficult questions should be raised here, especially in light of the large number of victims. After all, according to Deputy-Head of Anbar Council Faleh al-'Issawi, 600 Iraqis were killed and 7000 civilians fled their homes in less than two days, against the background of the acts of violence that al-Ramadi witnessed when it fell into ISIS's hands. These questions include the following:

- First, what has 'Abadi's government done throughout the past months to back the government forces in al-Ramadi since it refused repeated calls from the clans there to provide them with the arms and forces necessary to defend the city?

- Second, if the 'Abadi government finally ended up seeking the help of the Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) forces to save al-Ramadi, what was the reason for the delay in reaching this decision? Was it waiting for approval to come from Washington first?

- Third, who is responsible for the repetition of the 'great escape' in which army forces fled from the al-Ramadi battle, a carbon copy of what happened in Mosul last year? And is this behavior an expression of the true level of their training and battle preparedness? Or was there a 'conspiracy' to hand over the city, as some parties inside and outside Iraq are claiming?

- Fourth, what happened to the promises that 'Abadi personally made about a year ago after the fall of Mosul, to rebuild the Iraqi army on genuine patriotic and professional bases that would ensure that its loyalty is to Iraq and not to any particular party or a sect?

Whatever justifications the government may advance, Iraq today is torn apart and lacks a state in the absence of a genuine central army. It is being defended by [Shiite] militias accused of sectarianism and being Iran's lackeys, and of committing human rights violations in Tikrit and elsewhere. It is also being defended by thousands of American, Iranian and other advisors, and by the warplanes of an international coalition that some accuse of aiding ISIS instead of fighting it.

After the total security collapse in al-Anbar, it is not strange to find Iran’s defense minister rushing to visit Baghdad yesterday to discuss preparations for the new battle. Anyway, this will not be an easy one. And whatever its outcome, it will produce a strategic change in the Iraqi – and perhaps regional – balance of power in light of al-Anbar's importance for both Jordan and ISIS alike.

As for the U.S., whereas it previously used to oppose the PMU forces’ entry into al-Anbar for fear that Iranian hegemony would expand (rather than out of concern for the province's people), it has now been has forced to change its tune, 'on condition that these forces are under government control' – which is no more than an attempt to find a pretext for its dubious position that is unable to change the balance of power on the ground.

Anbar's fall may once again raises questions as to the true nature of the international coalition and its ability or desire to halt ISIS's expansion. This is especially likely in light of the fact that some Iraqi leaders accuse the coalition of failing to secure any military successes after hundreds of air raids in Iraq.

"Finally, we are dealing with a new failure for the 'Abadi government, not a setback for al-Anbar which stood its ground as much as possible in the face of impossible political, sectarian and strategic facts," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THE PMU REFUSES: " The PMU’s various factions from the 'Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq to the Badr Organization to the Hizbollah Brigades to the Saraya as-Salam have announced that they will not take part in cleansing  ISIS from the areas it has captured if the [U.S.-led] international coalition were to have any role in these battles,” writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

This applies to air raids, or to military experts supervising, planning, and even directing some battles and choosing the forces taking part, thereby ensuring that U.S. influence will return to certain areas of Iraqi, and as long as it is difficult to extend this influence across the whole of the country.

The PMU factions' rejection of the U.S.-led coalition's participation in the battles arises from two main considerations:

- First, the factions' leaders are convinced that the U.S. is in collusion with ISIS and is trying to exploit it in order to revive its influence in Iraq, which poses a threat to both the PMU and the ongoing military struggle. PMU factions are totally convinced that the U.S. Air Force has intervened against PMU forces on more than one occasion while it has failed to intervene against ISIS groupings. Therefore, the PMU’s participation in battles in the shadow of U.S. military intervention poses a threat to their forces and casts doubt on their prospects of victory.

- The second reason is political. Those political forces that support the PMU factions or to which these factions belong are against offering any concessions to the U.S. that may restore the latter's influence in Iraq as a matter of principle.

In light of the above, the PMU's attitude is final and cannot be changed. Therefore, the forces, states, and parties hostile to the PMU’s factions have only the following options:

- First, they can accept ISIS's control over the areas now under its control, especially in Ninawa and al-Anbar provinces. And they can also accept the likelihood that ISIS will consolidate its control and eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance, specifically in al-Anbar Province and the transformation of Ninawa Province, and specifically the city of Mosul, into a base for waging more attacks on Kirkuk Province and the city of Irbil, where the Kurdish parties are in control.

- Second, they can rely on the Iraqi army and some [Sunni] clansmen linked to leaders who prefer to cooperate with the U.S. rather than the PMU. These leaders have already publicly stated that they accept Iraq's partition in order to receive direct U.S. military aid without satisfying the central Iraqi government's conditions or securing its prior acceptance.

- Third, they can abandon the policy of seeking American support and accept the PMU factions' help to regain the areas now under ISIS's control, just as the city of Tikrit – the capital of Salahuddin Province – was regained in a just few hours (and not a few days or weeks) after the PMU joined the battle.

"These options confirm that the ball now is not in the PMU’s court, but those who are opposed to it. They have to decide which of these three options they will choose," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

BLACK FLAGS FLUTTER: "The U.S. is leading a huge international coalition to fight ISIS and has the largest military base, the 'Ain al-Assad Air Base in al-Anbar, only a few kilometers from al-Ramadi," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

Despite this, and despite the Americans’ absolute control over Iraq’s skies, al-Ramadi fell within a couple of days and the black flags now flutter over its buildings.

One of the ironies is that the very same day, U.S. warplanes spotted [ISIS commander] Abu Sayyaf and his fellow terrorists in a small house in Deir az-Zour and annihilated them in a very professional raid. But despite the density of its air sorties in Iraqi skies, it failed to see thousands of black-clad fighters storming a city as large as al-Ramadi!

Al-Ramadi has fallen and with it what remains of the structure of the derelict Iraqi army in a knockout blow. And with that, the last hope for a national security institution whose fragile strings still link the Iraqis together falls as well.

The shock of al-Ramadi has overturned all PM Haidar al-Abadi’s calculations; he who believed that he came to protect what remains of the Iraqis' unity. The only cards left in the hands of his fragile government coalition are the PMU and the Sunni clans. But al-Ramadi is not Tikrit or Irbil. It is larger in area, has a larger population and is geographically distant from the Shiite strongholds of the PMU parties and its factions.

It is as if those who have turned a blind eye to the fall of al-Anbar's capital wish to portray the PMU as an inflated balloon so as to deflate it in al-Anbar, after it saw itself as an undefeatable force that can rule Iraq, just as Saddam had ruled it with his Baath Party.

What separates the PMU from the clans is more than what unites them. The clans that are already upset at the PMU's practices in the liberated areas, see little difference between the PMU and ISIS. They raise hell when a building belonging to the Sunni [religious] waqf is burnt down in al-A'zamiyya a few days ago merely because the Shiites were accused of burning it; but they keep absolutely silent when car bombs kill pilgrims on their way to the Shiite holy sites. They can see no harm in dragging the PMU into their battles in al-Anbar, but they do not want to see a repetition of what happened in Tikrit and Biji in al-Ramadi and Fallujah. In fact, given a choice between having Shiite armed elements control Sunni cities and allowing ISIS to remain in them, a considerable part of the Sunni clans opt for ISIS, despite its severely bitter taste.

The clans' eagerness to rid their cities of their extremists will only mature and become the main issue when a Sunni province is formed in the center of Iraq, governed by Sunnis, with a Sunni national guard that faces the Sunnis' neighbors in one and the same country: The PMU is for the Shiites, and the peshmerga for the Kurds. And in this way, U.S. VP’s Biden's prophecy that Iraq will become a number of federal states closer to independent entities is drawing closer to being realized.

"Al-Ramadi [grey in Arabic] is painting Iraq with its colors. It is turning its future grey, leaning toward black," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

End…

 

CONSPIRATORIAL AGENDAS: “It is no longer any secret that a class of merchants of politics and war exists among the people of al-Anbar that acts in accordance with its personal and conspiratorial agendas to dismantle Iraq," writes Wafiq as-Samerra'i in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

This class succeeded in enriching itself illegally by looting public monies and exploiting the situation in Iraq after 2003. It no longer needs outside financial support, which continues to flow to it anyway under various pretexts.

Members of this class helped in the preliminary moves that paved the way for ISIS's entry into Iraq, taking control of the city of Fallujah 17 months ago, as well as Ninawa Province and many other areas in Anbar Province. The occupation of the city of al-Ramadi, the largest city in the province, was the latest development in this regard.

The city of Mosul fell as a result of 'a conspiracy and defeatism.' And the fall of al-Ramadi was the result of a series of conspiracies, deceptions, and battlefield surprises. A ‘shock and awe operation’ via a series of suicide attacks using armored vehicles was carried out against the government compound and other sites that were the central defense links in the city. What was very odd to say the least was the fact that the commander of police left the city two days before it fell, and headed to Irbil together with a number of clan sheikhs and senior administrative officials in the province. Was this part of the conspiracy or was it a dereliction of duty, or was it the manifestation of an exceptional ability to predict what would happen, or what?

A class of separatists who are ISIS’s lackeys played a major role in al-Ramadi's fall. The dimensions of this conspiracy were clear to anyone with the least familiarity with the culture of intelligence and who believe that conspiracy theories are sometimes true. This conspiracy aimed to drag the Iraqi army into Mosul, extending its lines of communication and exhausting it in unequal battles, thereby weakening the center's strategic reserves after which Baghdad would be attacked from al-Anbar Province. But the warning campaign against this threat was sufficient to expose the conspiracy.

As a result, the separatists resorted to escalating their demands for arming the clans, using a discourse that was just a cover for a project with different aims. After all, the conflict with ISIS can never be won via a war waged by the clans; it can only be won via a strike force that is immune to hostile infiltration. This is because of the relations of kinship between these clans and the largest proportion of ISIS fighters, who are themselves members of Anbar Province's clans.

Had al-Ramadi fallen ten months ago that would have posed a serious threat to the capital Baghdad and to Karbala Province as well. But this threat is no longer on the cards after the creation of a strike force that includes tens of thousands of volunteers, and after the improvement of security measures around Baghdad and its south, and around Karbala as well. As a result, and from an operational perspective, the fall of al-Ramadi now carries implications for the province alone.

But this does not diminish the scale of the failure in al-Anbar. After all, what was expected was to build on the successes [in Tikrit and elsewhere] and not the opposite. But wars are generally not free of setbacks, retreats, defeats, and failures, except in cases of absolute strategic superiority. But the main elements of such superiority do not exist so far thanks to the failures of the armament projects and other political complications and obstacles.

The politicians of al-Anbar, and even the province's Council, succeeded in ensuring that the PMU forces would not enter the province to fight alongside the army. But the army cannot decide the outcome of a battle without help from a strike force. As a result, army troops were denied one of their most important sources of power. Moreover, given the nature of its job, the local police force cannot assume major combat roles.

The politicians stuck to their position until ISIS totally swept over the city. Once that happened, the Provincial Council and most politicians abandoned their opposition to the PMU joining the battle, but only after ISIS had completed its occupation of the city and imposed its control over it.

The fall of al-Ramadi was a bloody lesson that will have a significant impact on the so-called 'political process.' Expelling ISIS's fighters cannot be achieved except by ensuring that military operations are not subject to the whims of politicians, regardless of their affiliations. It can only be achieved by ending the practice of sectarian share-distribution inside the armed forces, which have suffered terribly from the intervention of politicians, corrupting elements, and failed figures. Wars are won by the brave who are willing to make sacrifices, not by a crude intermingling of the political with the military.

Yet the fall of al-Ramadi will be a strong reason for ensuring the cohesion of those who love and cling to Iraq's unity. These are the strongest and largest force. In a few weeks' time, we shall see important positive changes occurring on the ground. The strike force [PMU] will impose itself on the battlefield and the political ramblings will be on the retreat.

"But this requires the defeat of ISIS's lackeys first, who are now very concerned about the people's anger," concludes Samerra'i.

Ends…

 

 

2-The storm resumes

 

As ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ resumes in Yemen, we may be on the brink of a wider war with a larger number of victims, deeper hatreds and worsening vendettas, predicts 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The war in and on Yemen has resumed after a five-day humanitarian truce has ended, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. Even worse is that Riyadh is holding a conference for the Yemenis that excludes the Houthis and their allies, which is hardly the recipe for peace and reconciliation that the Yemenis require.

 

AIR RAIDS RESUMED: "After a lull of a few days, the official Spokesman for the Arab coalition [Saudi] Brigadier-General Ahmad 'Asiri announced the resumption of air raids (Operation Decisive Storm) on Monday, accusing the Houthi alliance of violating the five-day truce," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Tuesday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The question here is this: What next? What can Saudi warplanes bomb this time round? And how long will the air raids last? A week? A month? A year?

It is clear that the Houthi alliance paid no attention to the truce, perhaps because it was not consulted about it. It believed it applied to the border clashes with Saudi Arabia, but not to the ongoing clashes between the Yemenis. So it halted its border shelling [of Saudi Arabia] but did not abide by the terms of the truce that have to do with the internal clashes on the grounds that this is a domestic Yemeni affair that does not concern Saudi Arabia or the coalition states.

The Houthis benefited from the truce militarily. They brought rockets and artillery to their areas in Sa'da and 'Omran along the Saudi borders in preparation for resuming shelling deep inside Saudi Arabia, since this is their most effective card in this war in response to the air raids, before which they are impotent. They also advanced in Aden and captured Khormaksar and Crater, the two most important neighborhoods in the southern capital.

Ceasefires usually come after negotiations between the two fighting sides via mediators. But this rule did not apply to the five-day truce. The Saudi side’s decision was the result of American and international pressure after a severe deterioration in the humanitarian conditions in Yemen where almost half the population (24 million in total) does not have enough food, potable water, fuel, medicine and electricity, and with over half-a-million people having fled their homes in search for safety far from the areas under assault. And these figures are on the rise.

All sides are agreed that the only way out of this war, led by one of the world's richest states against one of the poorest is via a political solution. But until we find that solution, the proper grounds must be prepared. This has not happened so far, and we do not believe it will happen soon.

After all, the Saudi authorities have aborted an international effort to bring the conflicting sides together at a conference in Geneva without excluding or marginalizing any particular side, by insisting on proceeding with their conference in Riyadh that began on Sunday with only its Yemeni allies in attendance, headed by [fugitive] President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

The other party to the crisis – the Houthi current and its main ally President Ali 'Abdullah Saleh and his forces’ decision to boycott the conference is both logical and understandable because Riyadh is not a neutral capital, and its government has declared war on Yemen and has sent its warplanes to bomb their military bases, imposing a land, sea, and air siege on the country.

Going to Riyadh to participate in this conference would be tantamount to raising the white flag and accepting all the terms imposed by Decisive Storm in advance, beginning with the Houthi alliance’s withdrawal from Sana'a, Aden, Taiz and Hodeida and handing over the weapons taken from the Yemeni army's arsenals, and ending with laying out the red carpet at Sana'a Airport to receive the 'legitimate' President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

But 'surrender' is a word that is absent from the Yemeni nation's lexicon regardless in which trench they may stand. If the Saudi officials, who represent Yemen's most important neighboring country, and whose country has fought or backed numerous wars in Yemen do not know this or fail to understand its significance, this is a real tragedy in the true sense of the term.

Disregarding the Houthi/Saleh alliance and excluding it in the demeaning way that we have witnessed throughout the first fifty days of the war cannot produce the appropriate climate for a healthy dialogue that produces a political solution to the crisis. It will only lead to further escalation and complications, and [the Houthis’] greater reliance on foreign forces, specifically Iran.

Perhaps the most important attempt to exclude the Houthi/Saleh alliance was the shutdown of its TV stations preventing them from broadcasting using the al-Arabi and Nilesat satellites. These stations' influence and reach was weak to begin with; but it is the other side’s right to possess the tools to express its views, even if it happens to be an opponent.

We have protested against the closure of some of the Syrian regime's satellite TV stations and we now protest against the closure of the Yemeni stations because we think it is our duty to do so as journalists who believe in freedom of expression. But we already know that many people will not tolerate this principled ethical stance, even though hostility also has its rules and ethical standards.

The ‘Conference for Saving Yemen and Building a Federal State’ that convened in Riyadh on Sunday will face major difficulties in pursuit of its mission of salvation because it is one in which only one shade of the spectrum is represented, and because it is being held in the least suitable capital. Time will sooner or later show that there is no alternative to Geneva, Muscat or Algiers, under the auspices of a neutral party, such as the UN.

We wish that the five-day truce had been extended and the Houthis had abided by it so as to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the largest possible number of our Yemeni brothers because the alternative is the resumption of the Yemeni/Saudi border war, mutual shelling and more raids, dead, wounded, and destruction in a country in which there are no – or rather, no more– targets that can be destroyed. But it seems that these wishes that which we keep repeating in every article are one thing, and what the fighting parties want is something else altogether.

Operation Decisive Storm has not achieved most of its aims. The Houthis are advancing in Aden and other areas, as is al-Qa'ida. President Hadi's current residency in Riyadh will last for a long time to come. Meanwhile, the Iranian ship [bearing humanitarian aid to Yemen] is approaching the Port of Hodeida protected by warships in an openly defiant step that does not suggest a peaceful outcome so far.

"And this means that we may be on the brink of a wider war with a larger number of victims, deeper hatreds and worsening vendettas. But our reliance is on God, and He is best to rely on," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 19.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Shalom for peace

 

Yedioth Ahronoth, The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom lead their Tuesday editions with what police are calling a major breakthrough in their fight against organized crime. According to the report – which appears on the front pages of all other newspapers – around 50 suspected members of various underworld families have been arrested. Outgoing police chief Yohanan Danino described the operation – codenamed 'Case 512' – as one of the largest and most significant investigations carried out by police in recent years.

Haaretz leads with news that the new government is expected to cancel an initiative introduced by the previous government to find employment for thousands of ultra-Orthodox men who currently rely on state funding.

The Jerusalem Post carries on its front page a report that, according to unnamed sources, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told Likud officials in closed-door meetings that he would like the peace process with the Palestinians to resume soon. The report states that he has named Interior Minister Silvan Shalom as the official responsible for talking with the Palestinians – taking over from Tzipi Livni, who filled that position in the previous government. Unlike all the other newspapers, however, the Jerusalem Post fails to add to its report that Shalom has gone on record many times opposing a Palestinian state and any territorial compromise. Shalom will also be in charge of strategic dialogue with the United States. Both positions are traditionally held by the Foreign Ministry, although not exclusively so.

Shalom will meet with Livni in the coming days to learn what happened behind the scenes in the previous negotiations, which were mediated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. He expressed confidence that he could bring about renewed talks despite a Palestinian decision to focus on persuading the international community to impose a solution on Israel. The Prime Minister’s Office said that attorney Isaac Molcho, who had accompanied Livni to talks with the Palestinian Authority, would remain Netanyahu’s personal envoy to the PA.

Reactions to Shalom's appointment as de facto 'peace minister' were predictably scathing. Meretz leader Zahava Gal-On mocked Netanyahu for appointing a minister to oversee negotiations that she did not believe the prime minister would seek to restart. Speaking to her faction in the Knesset, she warned that if Israel did not seek an accord with the Palestinians, the international community would force a Palestinian state on Israel within two years.

Palestinian leaders also responded Tuesday to Shalom's appointment, saying that it is unimportant who will mediate because Netanyahu isn't interested in peace. According to Israel Radio, the officials said that there is no point in meeting with Shalom until Israel agrees to a number of conditions, including the end of building over the Green Line, the return to 1967 borders and the release of prisoners in Israeli jails.

Livni, meanwhile, said that she would be 'happy to help Silvan, but I don't see negotiations with the Palestinians on the horizon because the situation is very complicated. I will share with him my understanding of the role, but I remain pessimistic.' In an interview on Army Radio, Livni added: 'The question depends, first of all, on a prime minister the world does not believe in. The appointment of a minister like this will not promote the trust of the global community in him.'

In related news, European Union foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, said ahead of a visit this week to Israel and the Palestinian Authority that continuing the status quo is not an option. Mogherini said in a statement that her trip this Wednesday and Thursday will stress that the European Union is 'ready to play a major role in re-launching the peace process,' but with an end result that includes Palestinian statehood. Mogherini is due to meet with Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other officials during her trip.

Elsewhere, Opposition leader Isaac Herzog has told the visiting Norwegian foreign minister that Hamas is continuing to dig tunnels in the Gaza Strip in order to attack Israelis. Herzog warned that if the European Union does not get involved to prevent this from happening, and does not advance the cause of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip through a diplomatic arrangement, another round of violence involving Gaza is just a matter of time. Herzog expressed the concern that the political situation in Israel and the composition of the government will not allow for a serious effort to reach an agreement that would preserve the security of Israeli citizens.

Finally, Sepp Blatter, the president of soccer's world governing body, FIFA – is scheduled to arrive in Israel on Tuesday and will be meeting with Netanyahu to discuss the petition by the Palestinian Football Federation to suspend Israel from the organization. Tomorrow, Blatter is scheduled to meet with Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah.

 

MINISTER OF FOREIGN/DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Itamar Eichner says that Interior Minister Silvan Shalom will be Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's de facto foreign minister, since he has also been appointed chief Israeli negotiator with the Palestinians and its point man in contacts with the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and the Mideast Quartet.

"While everyone was watching intently to see whether Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu would use the vacancy at the Foreign Ministry as a bargaining chip in his efforts to expand his coalition and whether Gilad Erdan would return to the bosom of the government – we actually discovered that what is supposed to be one of the most senior positions in the government is being systematically voided of content and powers.

Interior Minister Silvan Shalom revealed in closed-door conversations over the past few days that he had reached an agreement with Netanyahu, whereby he would act as de facto foreign minister. Sources close to the prime minister confirmed yesterday that Shalom had agreed to serve as the government minister responsible for contacts with the Palestinian Authority (a position that was filled in the last government by Justice Minister Tzipi Livni) and for strategic dialogue between Israel and the U.S.. He would also be the government's point man for Israel's contacts with the international community regarding the reconstruction effort in the Gaza Strip.

Shalom's main job will be to try and renew dialogue with the Palestinians, in order to prevent Israel being dragged to the International Criminal Court in The Hague and to prevent the UN Security Council from advancing any resolution that imposes a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His job will mean that he deals directly with the Obama Administration, the European Union, the United Nations and the Mideast Quartet. Shalom – who served as foreign minister between 2003 and 2006, a period which covered the second Intifada and Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and who is not only the most experienced minister but also deputy prime minister – said that his appointment is designed to intimate to the international community that Netanyahu is keen to renew negotiations with the Palestinians.

This rather surprising revelation will not only exacerbate tensions between Netanyahu and Erdan, it will also create a problem for Netanyahu regarding his newly appointed deputy foreign minister, Tzipi Hotovely. According to Hotovely, she has already agreed with Netanyahu that she will be the de facto foreign minister and that the prime minister will not appoint anyone over her. 'The prime minister appointed me deputy foreign minister without a minister – and with all the powers of the position,' she said yesterday. 'As long as no one tells me to the contrary, I will act with all my energy to fulfill my position loyally in every area that the State of Israel operates.'

In Netanyahu's fourth government, no fewer than five ministers and one deputy minister will be dealing with diplomatic and defense issues – the most important of which, from Netanyahu's perspective, remains Iran: Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz, Minister for Strategic Threats Ze'ev Elkin, Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yuval Steinitz (who is also responsible for Israel's Atomic Energy Agency) and, as mentioned above, Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely. Sources close to Netanyahu said yesterday that attorney Isaac Molcho, who is close to the prime minister, will continue to serve as Netanyahu's special envoy to talks with the Palestinians.

The Palestinians, meanwhile, have denounced Shalom's appointment as Israel's chief negotiator. An unnamed Palestinian spokesman was quoted yesterday by news agencies as saying that, Shalom 'does not believe in a Palestinian state. He's against a two-state solution. It's not an issue of names. It's an issue of policy,' he added."

Ends…

 

IT'S TIME FOR BAR-ILAN 2: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yossi Beilin says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu should reach out to the Arab League and should announce that Israel accepts – in principle – the Arab peace initiative, otherwise he will spend his entire fourth term chasing after MKs who have the power to bring down his government.

"Last Thursday evening, as I was watching the swearing-in of Binyamin Netanyahu's new government, I allowed myself to hope for a moment that the prime minister would surprise us all and would unveil his policies for the next five years. I hoped that, among these policy statements, he would address international expectations regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, since he must know that the United States and the European Union will not give him any grace period before exerting pressure on him and his government to restart negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

Netanyahu sees a UN Security Council resolution calling for a settlement construction freeze as a threat to the State of Israel, equally a resolution setting out the parameters of a final-status agreement between Israel and the PA – a resolution that the United States may not necessarily veto. If he is serious about thwarting such resolutions, and if it is really important to him to prevent the Palestinians from forging ahead with unilateral initiatives on the international front – especially when it comes to the International Criminal Court in The Hague – then he must deliver an updated version of the Bar-Ilan University speech in which he would express support for the two-state solution. Anything less will be too little.

Since he missed the opportunity to do so during the swearing-in of his new government, Netanyahu must now do this within the framework of a Knesset debate – which he himself must initiate – or anywhere else that is convenient for him to do so, without enraging his right-wing coalition partners. The main gist of any such speech must be that Israel is willing – at any time and in any place – to enter into negotiations with the Arab League on the peace initiative that Israel rejected in 2002. He could add the caveat that discussing the Arab peace initiative does not mean that Israel agrees to every clause of that document and that Israel has no intention of bypassing the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which is the recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Such a discussion could lead to the resumption of direct talks between Jerusalem and Ramallah, on the basis of principles agreed upon ahead of time by Israel and the Arab world. Of course, Israel would have to ensure that, if the negotiations are successful, all of the Arab states would set up embassies in Jerusalem, the capital of the Jewish state.

There is often a tendency to underestimate the importance of words, but no one was able to ignore Netanyahu's first Bar-Ilan speech and – if a second Bar-Ilan speech contains the elements mentioned above – it will be just as significant and no one will be able to ignore it either. If the Arab world picks up the gauntlet and if talks with Arab countries destabilize the coalition, I have no doubt that center-left parties will provide Netanyahu with the parliamentary safety net he needs to push through any agreement.

The greatest threat facing the current government is not the fact that it is based on a coalition of just 61 out of 120 lawmakers. After all, there have been narrow governments before and there have even been minority governments. Rather, the main problem is the fact that the coalition contains politicians with very different interests and each of them has the ability to topple the government. Center-left parties will not be tempted to join the coalition by the promise of ministerial positions, but – if the government is serious about making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – they will not be able to sit on the sidelines and watch it collapse. If Netanyahu does not decide to go for some dramatic move that will impact on the diplomatic and the domestic political situation, he will spend however long this government has in a constant and exhausting chase for rogue MKs."

Ends…

 

IRAN THE SAVIOR: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that the United States shares in the blame for the fall of Ramadi to ISIS – and for affording Iran the opportunity to increase its regional influence.

“Just a few days ago, we congratulated American Special Forces on the operation they carried out on Syrian soil, in which a senior ISIS commander was killed. But we did say that it was too little, too late – especially for the thousands of civilians who have been slaughtered so far. We also said that the operation would not change the situation on the ground, where ISIS continues to enjoy the upper hand and continues to conquer territory.

Despite the airstrikes and despite the massive coalition that Washington put together, ISIS yesterday managed to retake Ramadi, the central Iraqi town about 110 kilometers west of Baghdad, which it last held in the spring of 2014. In an editorial published recently, the New York Times asked why Iraq could not win the battle against ISIS without Iran's help. That is something we have been asking too. And that, perhaps, is the biggest problem that Israel is facing in this whole story.

There's no question that retaking Ramadi is ISIS' greatest achievement this year. Things were not supposed to happen like this. The Iraqi army – which is being trained and armed by the United States and which has the added assistance of coalition airstrikes – and the Sunni militias that are operating alongside it should have been enough to allow the Baghdad government to retake the al-Anbar Governorate, of which Ramadi is the capital city.

The New York Times reminded its readers yesterday that the United States has a long and painful history in the al-Anbar province, where more than 1,000 U.S. troops have been killed. Because of the closeness between the current U.S. administration and the Baghdad regime, this current failure in this bloodstained desert region is also the fault of the United States.

There were some who believed that ISIS was on the back foot, after its failure in Tikrit and the losses it sustained along the border with Kurdistan. But ISIS is alive and kicking – and still decapitating its captives.

The failure to hold Ramadi is the fault of the Iraqi and army and the Sunni militias fighting alongside it. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-aAbadi said last month that safeguarding Ramadi and retaking Anbar were his government's top priority. In practice, the Iraqi army has disintegrated and its soldiers fled for their lives, leaving their weapons and ammunition behind for ISIS.

Because the coalition only engages ISIS by means of airstrikes, Baghdad has no option but to get assistance from Shiite militias. Which brings us back to Iran. The problem with the Shiite militias is not only the way that they treat the Sunni population, but the fact that they are sponsored by Iran, which is using the situation to increase its influence in Iraq and Syria (and Yemen, too). It is also taking advantage of the situation to get closer to Washington. One could also say that Iran, in this case, is the United States' savior. 

The war against ISIS is far from over – and it will get a lot worse before it gets better.

Ends…

 

 

BETTER OFF IN PRISON: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein explains why laborers from the Gaza Strip might soon be allowed back into Israel – and why that would be a good thing for all involved.

"The State of Israel stands only to gain if it allows laborers from Gaza to enter its territory to work. The Israeli defense establishment has been examining this possibility for some time, on the assumption that alleviating the unemployment problem in Gaza would bring stability and quiet to the Strip.

If the proposal is accepted, the first stage would see several hundred older laborers return to their places of employment in Israeli communities adjacent to the Gaza border – places where they used to work over a decade ago. The laborers would enter Israel via the Erez border crossing, where the number of Palestinians crossing into Israel every day has increased steadily in recent weeks.

The defense establishment has already allowed Gazan producers to export their goods to the West Bank and, in future, also to Israel. The goal of the move was to tackle the unemployment crisis in Gaza. In order to allow this to happen, Israel needed to increase the number of staff performing security checks, to provide special storage facilities for agricultural produce and to lift some of the restrictions on movement.

Since 2006, not a single worker has entered Israel from the Gaza Strip; prior to that, tens of thousands of Gazans – making up some 60 percent of the workforce in Gaza – worked inside Israel. Residents of the Strip who are allowed into Israel are limited to people seeking medical treatment in Israel, businessmen, special humanitarian cases and around 200 older worshipers who are allowed to travel to Jerusalem every Friday for prayers at the al-Aqsa mosque.

The economic and humanitarian situation in Gaza has barely improved since the end of Operation Protective Edge. The rampant unemployment – which currently stands at over 40 percent – is caused not only by the ban on laborers entering Israel, but also by the Israeli ban on the export of Gazan produce to Israel and the West Bank.

Until seven years ago, some 85 percent of everything produced in Gaza was exported to the West Bank and Israel. The main produce was agricultural – specifically strawberries – but there was also textiles, furniture and other foodstuffs. There were even some high-tech exports, thanks to the companies founded by graduates of Gaza's various universities.

Around half of the people of Gaza – some 900,000 people – are dependent on food aid handed out by the United Nations. Electricity is only provided for eight hours a day on average and the rebuilding of Gaza's infrastructure after Operation Protective Edge has not yet begun. The main reason for the sluggish response to the global effort to rebuild the Strip is that the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza have been unable to implement the reconciliation agreement between them.

Since last summer, 123 young Gazans have attempted to cross the border fence into Israel, risking their lives in the process. They know that, if they are not killed in the attempt, they will live better lives in an Israeli prison, where they are guaranteed a bed and food, than a life of poverty and unemployment in Gaza."

Ends…

 

NONPROLIFERATION: In its editorial on Tuesday, The Jerusalem Post says that it is hardly a surprise that, as The Sunday Times reported this week, Saudi Arabia has reached out to its ally Pakistan to acquire 'off-the-shelf' atomic weapons.

"A centerpiece of U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy agenda has been nonproliferation. But with Saudi Arabia more than just threatening to acquire nuclear capability 'off the shelf' from Pakistan and with other Sunni states sure to follow, his dream of a nuclear-free planet seems more out of reach than ever.

Obama’s pursuit of nonproliferation goes back at least to his short tenure in the Senate. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he traveled to Russia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine to inspect nuclear facilities and developed an idea of international diplomacy. It was at this time that he began talking about initiating conversations with Iran.

In 2009 Obama, in a speech in Prague, made sweeping promises proclaiming that the U.S. has a 'moral responsibility' to lead the world toward a nuclear-free reality. The following year, the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia was signed. But the New START treaty was marred by Russia’s unwillingness to cooperate. It was barely ratified and generated no additional nonproliferation deals.

Elsewhere, the nonproliferation cause seemed to be falling apart as well. Not only did North Korea – despite diplomatic efforts – obtain nuclear capability, it began spreading its know-how elsewhere. Where diplomacy failed, however, the use of force provided remarkable results. A nascent nuclear weapons facility in Syria, developed by the North Koreans, was prevented from being developed further not by diplomacy but by a military strike – reportedly by the IAF. North Korea has, apparently, not tried to repeat the performance since.

Another case in point is Libya, which, in the wake of the coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, decided to give up its weapons of mass destruction. The late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi wanted to avoid the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.

For a time in 2003, Iran also showed a real willingness to negotiate with the U.S.. The Iranians were frightened because U.S. forces, in just three weeks, had routed an army that Iran had failed to defeat during a bloody eight-year war. A two page Iranian proposal for a broad dialogue sent by fax via Switzerland suggested everything was on the table – full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian terrorist organizations. In hindsight, the Bush administration was probably wrong to be skeptical.

These cases seem to show that deployment of military might can scare autocrats into doing the right thing. And cautious use of force also has a ripple effect on the decision-making process of autocratic regimes not directly targeted, because they fear they will be the next in line if they do not comply.

Despite the failure of New START and the North Korea precedent, Obama continues to make the case for diplomacy, most recently regarding Iran. In an address in the Rose Garden shortly after the framework agreement with Iran was announced, Obama laid out two alternatives: more sanctions or bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, both of which he ruled out.

'Do you really think that this verifiable deal, if fully implemented, backed by the world’s major powers, is a worse option than the risk of another war in the Middle East?' he said. 'Is it worse than doing what we’ve done for almost two decades, with Iran moving forward with its nuclear program and without robust inspections? I think the answer will be clear.'

For the U.S.’s Gulf allies and for Israel, the answer is not so clear. First, a limited military operation in Iran led by the U.S. would not necessarily spark a war. Second, by signing an agreement with Iran that allows it to retain much of its enrichment capability and continue to amass research, the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 are essentially granting legitimacy to an Iranian nuclear program that is clearly not for peaceful goals. The Saudis and other Sunni states in the region are asking why they can’t also be granted legitimacy for their own nuclear weapons programs. That is the essence of the mantra 'no deal is better than a bad deal.'

A report by the UK’s Sunday Times that the Saudis have reached out to its ally Pakistan to acquire 'off-the-shelf' atomic weapons is hardly surprising under the circumstances.

Obama’s goal of a nuclear-free planet is a noble, though somewhat naive, aspiration. Achieving it, however, is a very different matter."

Ends…

 

SYRIA IS STILL THE EPICENTER: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that ISIS recapture of a key Iraqi city is not the turning point that some commentators seem to believe and that the real battle is taking place in Syria.

"The Islamic State’s success Sunday in capturing the city of Ramadi, only 110 kilometers (about 70 miles) from the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, has brought in its wake a number of terrifying forecasts concerning the organization’s continued advance. Despite the importance of Ramadi, which is the capital of Anbar Province, it is doubtful whether the raising of the black flag of Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) over what remains of the government buildings in Ramadi necessarily reflects anything other than a singular achievement.

That’s because it seems the most dramatic regional battles are currently taking place in Syria: Over the pressure Sunni rebel groups are putting on President Bashar Assad’s regime in and around Damascus; the fighting in the strategic Qalamoun Mountains, on the border between Syria and Lebanon; and, most important, the advance of opposition forces toward the Alawite enclave in northwest Syria.

ISIS’ success in Ramadi can be attributed to much the same reasons the organization won a series of impressive victories last summer: Exploiting the element of surprise against the disorganized fighting demonstrated by the Iraqi army and Shi’ite militias; its high level of mobility; and its willingness to sacrifice soldiers in dangerous moves, in order to accumulate assets on the ground.

Despite the support it received from the United States through aerial bombing, the Iraqi government did not learn its lesson, and failed to carry out the counterattack it said it would in Anbar Province. Consequently, the last remnants of the Iraqi army retreated from the provincial capital this week. However, as has been seen over the past year, ISIS has run into difficulties more than once holding onto its assets after conquering them. There is a huge difference between a highly motivated attack to capture a target, and the ability and motivation to hold onto it over a long period of time.

When asked occasionally about the success of the U.S. campaign to aid Arab countries in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, senior American military officers have remained cautiously optimistic for some time. They say the efforts against the jihadist group have had some success in containing its offensive operations, and sometimes even in taking back some of the territory it controls, systematically attacking its leadership and closing down some of the channels it uses to make money. Based on the situation as the Americans understand it, the enormous momentum that ISIS enjoyed over the past year has been halted, and the organization’s true level of influence is gradually declining over time.

The campaign against ISIS is just one of the many conflicts occurring in Syria, of course, with the most important being the rebel effort – a very uncoordinated one – to overthrow Assad. This is where Assad’s troubles are growing. So much so that the Israeli defense establishment does not rule out the possibility that the Syrian president may be forced to flee the capital, in light of the frequent attacks by rebels who have been shelling his palace from their strongholds in the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus. Ultimately, he may have to concentrate his defense on the Alawite region in northwest Syria, around Latakia and the coastal city of Tartus.

Except, it is actually right there, near Latakia, where a critical battle for Assad’s survival may take place very soon. Over the past two months, the rebels have earned a great many victories in northern Syria and continue their stubborn advance westward: >From Aleppo to Idlib, and from there to the city of Jisr al-Shughur, and then onto the Nebi Yunis ridge – from which they can shell Latakia effectively – in the heart of the Alawite territory. To do so, it seems the rebels will focus their efforts and speed up their reinforcement of troops in the area, with the goal of taking control of further territory. This double-edged pressure, around the areas of Damascus and the Alawite region, has, for the first time in a long while, threatened the stability of Assad’s rule. Until recently, it seemed he had adapted to the problems of fighting, and succeeded in thwarting the attacks of his enemies.

A great deal of attention from the Arab and foreign media is still focused on the battle in the Qalamoun Mountains. There, the Syrian army and Hizbollah are trying to reestablish control of the corridor through which weapons and troops are funneled between Syria and Lebanon. Hizbollah has loudly trumpeted its successes in that campaign, but in reality it has taken over mostly open areas that the Sunni rebels chose to leave. Hizbollah even held a tour for Western journalists last week in the positions it captured, but failed to convince its media guests it had made any real gains."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS:  Mehmet Tezkan detects a significant shift in the ruling AKP’s (Justice and Development Party’s) election campaign in centrist Milliyet: "The ruling party has changed its rhetoric over the last couple of days. When I say the ruling party, I do not only mean the prime minister [Davutoglu] but the president [Erdogan] as well. The president has been involved in the election campaign from the very beginning. In the first quarter of the campaign, the government was busy responding to the CHP's [main opposition Republican People's Party's] economic promises. It was at pains to contradict them. In the second quarter of the campaign, however, it has changed its tone. It has begun to focus on religion, faith, the Qur’an, the Ka’ba, the kiblah [Muslim direction of prayer] religious high schools and the headscarf. It has made religious sensitivities the main issue of the campaign debate."

Mustafa Balbay sees the ruling party losing ground in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The June 7th election is different from previous elections. The HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] has joined the election under its own signboard rather than as independent candidates, for the first time. In general, there has been a serious shift among the groups that have voted for the AKP since 2002. Especially among those with a centre right background who used to vote for it but are currently tending to vote otherwise."

Ali Unal argues that the government has made things worse both at home and abroad in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The gap between rich and poor, and the unfair distribution of income in the country have gradually become worse. The government is seeking a deal with the terror organization [PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party] and its leader. Innocent people have been sacrificed for that purpose. As in Syria and Egypt, Turkey has played a role in the massacre and suffering of millions of Muslims as a result of its foreign policy fiascos."

Markar Esayan believes his predictions have come true in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The HDP has begun to falter. When it began to attack religion so as to look sympathetic to the obsessed seculars, it lost the conservative Kurds. And in trying to win over the conservative Kurds by being pro-Kurdish, it has hit the wall. At the beginning of the campaign, I assumed that the HDP leaders would make many mistakes. And this is exactly what has happened."

 

MURSI VERDICT:  Murat Yetkin takes issue with the death sentence passed on former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammad Mursi in centre-left Radikal: "Mursi's death sentence is wrong, not only because the death penalty has no place in the contemporary world as an irreversible punishment. It is murder at the hands of the state. In Mursi's case, it will also complicate everything in the Middle East. It is as if the Egyptian government is not only telling the Egyptian nation but the whole Arab nation that they are not mature enough to determine their destiny through the ballot box."

Abdulkadir Selvi launches an assault on the West in Yeni Safak: "The death penalty is a certificate of honor for Mursi and a disgrace for [Egyptian President] Sissi and the West. The West, which has been cooperating with kings and dictators in Egypt for years, could not tolerate democracy for a year. We have seen that the Egyptian people were perfectly capable of managing democratic rule. We have seen that the real problem came from those who did not believe that the Egyptian people deserved democracy. The West, which has championed democracy for years, has sided with the [Sissi] military coup in Egypt."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan is bitter: "The fuss in the media and political circles suggest that the talks will work miracles. However, those attending meetings in Camp David, New York, Geneva, Muscat and Vienna gradually started to come back to their senses. Foreign Minister Zarif says that we do not trust the U.S., but what is taking place in reality is the opposite of this correct principle. Today, no one doubts that America is engaged in sabotage; it has betrayed us and broken its promises many times in various locations." 

Conservative Hemayat seeks clarity: "The latest round of nuclear talks was pursued by America in an unseemly manner as part of the strategy for continuing sanctions and threats alongside the negotiations. We should, therefore, clearly designate our red lines as articulated by the Supreme Leader and not retreat one bit. It will benefit the other side if there are any ambiguous phrases in the agreement, which may be taken advantage of in the future. As the Supreme Leader said, America cannot be trusted. Vague avowals in the Lausanne Statement - like the Western side's assertion that under future agreements Iran will be told how to act at Fordow - must be corrected as soon as possible." 

Conservative Khorasan counsels steadfastness: "The remarks and tone of Iranian officials involved in the talks indicate that in the last phase leading to a nuclear agreement, the Americans are constantly changing their demands and positions. Our nuclear team should stick to our red lines and not retreat from them under any circumstances; they should not give in to U.S. threats and pressures. They should not worry that strong stances against threats and pressure will damage the talks. 37 years of experience have shown that the other side will think Iran is weak and will increase its greed, threats and pressure if we do not confront their threats directly and strongly. Under such circumstances, not only we cannot expect a 'good deal', rather we should expect the 'failure' of the talks." 

 

MAJLIS BILL TO SUSPEND NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist E'temad is outraged: "The way the signatures of MPs to the bill were obtained is dubious. The collection of these signatures was done in an immoral and unusual way. Changes in the text caused the discontent and revulsion of many MPs. Some forces are ready to resort to any inappropriate manner to hinder the most important national project. Is it possible that a few MPs resort to such tricks in order to oppose national dialogue? The move was not only immoral but also irrational." 

 

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: Conservative Quds reflects: "The Camp David summit and its outcome indicate that the U.S., contrary to what it pretends, does not want to reduce disputes and challenges with Tehran. Washington insists that diplomacy is the only way to stop Iran from producing nuclear weapons and to ensure long-term regional security. However, it continues to support the military and tension-creating policies and activities of its Arab allies at the same time. Moreover, the U.S. seeks new military and intelligence arrangements with the GCC in order to change the regional security balance. At Camp David, Barack Obama, contrary to GCC expectations, avoided signing a security and military treaty with these countries and confined himself to a verbal commitment of American support to ensure their security." 

Moderate Iran explains: "The main topics of the summit were Iran's nuclear programme and the fear of its increasing power and influence in the region. The Obama administration has been under pressure to reach a nuclear deal and is criticized for helping Iran regain power in the region by the lifting of sanctions. Obama seeks to allay the security concerns of regional Arab countries and make the nuclear deal with Iran more acceptable. He wants to attract the attention of old regional allies and to open new ways for a long-term U.S. presence in the region." 

 

U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY: Reformist Arman considers the global U.S. strategic move: "The Americans have to convince other regional players of the changes in their policies regarding the nuclear issue, their recognition of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities and that sanctions should be lifted. The Zionist regime, Saudi Arabia and to some extent Turkey have reacted negatively to this change of strategy and policy towards Iran by immersing the Middle East in chaos. By expressing their fury, they hope to force America to stop the swing in its global strategy. Shifting the centre of gravity of U.S. global policy from the Middle East to the Far East will have dramatic global political, security, military and economic impact. A more active China from the East and France from the West in Middle East affairs is visible and worth considering." 

 

TARGETING IRAN: Hard-line Javan finds enemies everywhere: "The concern among Arabs over Iran's regional policies is similar to the concerns of the West and the Zionists regarding Iran's foreign policy. This common worry has led to a three-sided front against the Islamic Republic, with the West led by America, the Zionists led by Israel and some Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia." 

 

INTEREST RATES: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami calls for more competition in the money market: "As some experts had predicted, determining the rates of interest by the money and credit council did not put an end to the chaos of the last several months; rather, it was the beginning of fresh disagreements. These disagreements reflect structural problems in the economy and the banking system. Iranian governmental banks do not follow the productivity principle in their conduct; in other words, the final cost of money is very high at these banks. Banks should be allowed to compete with one another so that non-productive banks would bring down the cost of money. Only in this way it can be hoped that loans will be available at lower rates." 

 

DEATH SENTENCE FOR EGYPTIAN EX-PRESIDENT: Reformist Sharq writes about Sissi's goal in the Mursi verdict: "The Cairo Court's sentence against ousted President Mohamed Mursi is for dramatic and publicity purposes and cannot be implemented. The goal of Sissi's government is to intimidate Muslim Brotherhood supporters and pacify them until they give up the fight against the regime." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

  

1-The ironies of the Egyptian scene

2-Keep out the PMU

3-A necessary and tiresome ally

4-Determining Yemen’s future in Riyadh

 

1-The ironies of the Egyptian scene

 

It is astonishing to see Western states, with the U.S. in the lead, intervening in the court's decision [passing a death sentence on former Egyptian president Mursi] and going even further and commenting on the justice system's rulings. Such interventions are no longer acceptable. In fact, they raise doubts concerning the West’s intentions. And this is to say nothing of the Egyptian people being fed up with such blatant interference in the country’s domestic affairs … it remains that Egypt’s judicial system knows its path and is not susceptible to intimidation. Therefore, any wager based on 'coercing the judiciary' whether on the part of the terrorist groups or the 'Western circles' that facilitate terrorism, treason and espionage via their intervention – will be futile. –Egyptian al-Ahram

 

The Egyptian regime is putting on trial rebels who broke their shackles and escaped the prisons of tyranny during a major popular revolution to which that same regime still claims to belong. It is putting on trial people accused of kidnapping and killing members of the security forces, while it totally ignores the current regime’s leading figures’ responsibility for the assassination of hundreds of unarmed [Muslim Brotherhood] demonstrators  in Rabi'a and an-Nahda squares. The ironies of the Egyptian scene in the aforementioned cases happen to coincide with a widespread Arab silence. This only highlights the erosion of the Arab political elite's moral values; an elite whose statements appear or disappear in accordance with the political leanings of the current that happens to be persecuting it --pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

We cannot rule out the possibility that the death sentences passed against Brotherhood leaders will be carried out. [Brotherhood leader] Sayyid Qutb was executed in 1966 on similar charges, namely, that of conspiring against the state. And the current political climate is similar and could lead the senior figures sentenced to death to the gallows…each of the two sides is now in a state of defiance, challenging the other. The Egyptian regime feels that the Brotherhood continues to wage war against it, while Brotherhood leaders living outside Egypt want a new Sayyid Qutb whom it can use in its political battle. It is also possible that the Brotherhood is no longer able to control the statements and practices of its external leaders’ who have become hostage to foreign powers that are seeking to deepen the conflict among the Egyptians--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

This weekend’s preliminary death sentence passed against former Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and a number of other Muslim Brotherhood members in an alleged espionage and 'jailbreak' case is an independent judicial decision based on the country's existing laws, insists the editorial in Egypt’s leading daily. Any Western intervention in this or any other domestic Egyptian affair is unacceptable. The Egyptian court's decisions are politicized and defy all logic, argues the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. What is equally reprehensible is the Arab elite’s silence in response to such actions. The death sentences passed against Muslim Brotherhood leaders are the result of the movement and the Egyptian state’s mutual entrenchment in their positions, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. The Brotherhood may also have turned into a headless organization that is being exploited by foreign powers in their war against the Egyptian state.

 

OPEN BATTLE: "Egypt is in the midst of an open battle with terrorism," writes Monday's editorial in the authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

It has never felt weak or fearful, nor will it do so in the future, when it comes to the 'difficult cost' of excising this dangerous ailment that not only threatens Egypt’s society and stability, but that of the region and its peoples and their prospects for a prosperous future as well.

In the near past, the terrorists' hands had reached Egypt's judiciary. Terrorists attacked policemen, soldiers, and innocent citizens, and before them, Media City and the journalists working there. Everyone has been affected by these threats.

However, despite the ferocity of these attacks, Egypt will not be divided. The overwhelming majority of people and the political elite are united against terrorism and the terrorists. Moreover, the Egyptian judiciary remains as splendid as ever, never wavering or being affected by threats. It provides the appropriate climate and upholds the correct procedures so as to ensure that the accused will get a fair trial.

The Cairo Criminal Court has referred to the Mufti for approval of the preliminary sentence passed on 16 people accused in an espionage case, in which the main charges are directed against deposed [president] Mohammad Mursi and ten cadres and members of the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood. The court has set a June 2nd hearing as the date for passing a final sentence based on the Mufti’s recommendation.

It is astonishing to see Western states, with the U.S. in the lead, intervening in the court's decision and going even further and commenting on the justice system's rulings. Such interventions are no longer acceptable. In fact, they raise doubts concerning the West’s intentions. And this is to say nothing of the Egyptian people being fed up with such blatant interference in the country’s domestic affairs despite the recent Christian Science Monitor report showing that the judiciary is independent from the Egyptian government, and that it operates in accordance with Egypt’s fixed laws.

It remains that Egypt’s judicial system knows its path and is not susceptible to intimidation. Therefore, any wager based on 'coercing the judiciary' whether on the part of the terrorist groups or the 'Western circles' that facilitate terrorism, treason and espionage via their intervention – will be futile.

"It seems that Washington and the West’s capitals will have to review their position and refrain from intervening in the justice system's rulings and Egypt’s domestic affairs," concludes the daily.

End…

 

REFERRED TO THE MUFTI: "The Cairo Criminal Court has referred the preliminary sentence passed in the 'jailbreak' case during the [anti-Mubarak] January 25th 2011 Revolution to Egypt’s Grand Mufti who will express the shari’a view regarding the execution of 102 accused, including deposed president Mohammad Mursi, [Qatari-based] Islamist preacher Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide Mohammad Badi'e," notes the editorial in Monday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

The court also set June 2nd as the date for passing the final sentence in these cases. It also referred the preliminary sentence in the case of 16 other defendants to the Mufti. These include the Brotherhood's Deputy General Guide Khairat ash-Shater, and Sundus 'Assem, the external media coordinator on Mohammad Mursi's team, on charges of 'communicating with foreign organizations.'

The court's decision defies both logic and reason before that of law and justice. The court has passed its sentence as a service to the ruling military and security authorities before anything else.

The first case concerns a collective jailbreak by political detainees in which acts of violence were committed and policemen were killed. But accusing an elected president and political organizations, forces, and figures of 'escaping prison', contradicts the very notion of a revolution. That obviously entails toppling a political regime and replacing it with another, something that is not possible without a conflict between the masses and the police and security forces that are trying to protect the existing tyrannical order. This has been the norm in every revolution all over the world, including the so-called 'velvet' ones.

The second sentence concerns 'communicating with foreign organizations' (the sentence specifically mentions Hamas and Hizbollah). But this is simply irrational, even when measured by the criteria of the current regime, which is also communicating with Hamas. Moreover, this regime has maintained warm relations with Iran and Iraq, and even with the Yemeni regime during its Houthi phase. These regimes' policies and practices cannot be distinguished from Hizbollah, which is linked to them ideologically and which represents them and receives financial, armament, and ‘communication support’ [intelligence] from them.

Each of the two legal sentences is self-contradictory. There is no need for any lengthy discussion of their legal shortcomings. (Those sentenced to death include six Palestinian martyrs, four of whom died before escaping prison. They also include a sentence passed against a Palestinian who has been in prison in Israel for the past twenty years). And their political logic is also risible.

The Egyptian regime is putting on trial rebels who broke their shackles and escaped the prisons of tyranny during a major popular revolution to which that same regime still claims to belong. It is putting on trial people accused of kidnapping and killing members of the security forces, while it totally ignores the current regime’s leading figures’ responsibility for the assassination of hundreds of unarmed demonstrators [Muslim Brotherhood] in Rabi'a and an-Nahda squares.

The ironies of the Egyptian scene in the aforementioned cases happen to coincide with a widespread Arab silence. This only highlights the erosion of the Arab political elite's moral values; an elite whose statements appear or disappear in accordance with the political leanings of the current that happens to be persecuting it. It complains loudly when it is subjected to repression itself, but holds its tongue when its political opponents are being subject to the same repression. And this is an appropriate title for the current state of Arab political misery.

Apart from the UN secretary-general, the U.S., and Germany's 'concern,' and apart from the denunciations by international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, we have seen no popular action in protest at the Egyptian judiciary's decisions, except in Turkey. In fact, the leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), which is a secular party, has said: 'Political executions have not and will not bring anything good to any society; on the contrary, they inflict deep and lasting wounds on it.'

Such strong moves and statements stem from Turkey’s experience of the secular elite’s attempt to cancel out the current of political Islam. For this state, which went to extreme in excising the Islamist current and keeping it out of public life ever since the declaration of the republic, has ended up witnessing that current’s sweeping popular return as successive elections have repeatedly confirmed.

We cannot fathom what messages the Egyptian regime is seeking to send via its strict death sentences and the systematic targeting of its people – not only a specific political group. But it seems that it views force as the sole root of legitimacy.

"That is a terrible idea whose horrible cost the Egyptian people will continue to pay from their flesh, unless something happens to restore some logic to this great country," concludes the daily.

End…

 

ESCALATION ON BOTH SIDES: "Escalation was both sides' choice," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The Muslim Brotherhood's leaders, who escaped the country, resorted to defiance and justifying the [ISIS inspired] killings in Sinai, issuing threats against the current Egyptian regime. For its part, Egypt’s Prosecutor General decided to file a suit against the Brotherhood's imprisoned senior leaders based on two charges, each of which is certain to invoke the death sentence: espionage and armed jailbreak.

As we wait for the Mufti's verdict and the final court session, the question remains as to whether these sentences will be carried out and whether deposed president Mohammad Mursi, the Brotherhood's General Guide Mohammad Badi'e, and the Brotherhood's strongman Khairat ash-Shater, along with a large number of senior Brotherhood figures and ministers when it was in power, are really going to be executed.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the death sentences passed against Brotherhood leaders will be carried out. [Brotherhood leader] Sayyid Qutb was executed in 1966 on similar charges, namely, that of conspiring against the state. And the current political climate is similar and could lead the senior figures sentenced to death to the gallows. Similarly, the calls for mercy and the mediations that are expected to begin after the sentences are endorsed may fall on deaf ears.

Each of the two sides is now in a state of defiance, challenging the other. The Egyptian regime feels that the Brotherhood continues to wage war against it, while Brotherhood leaders living outside Egypt want a new Sayyid Qutb whom it can use in its political battle. It is also possible that the Brotherhood is no longer able to control the statements and practices of its external leaders’ who have become hostage to foreign powers that are seeking to deepen the conflict among the Egyptians.

This is the view of one Arab Muslim Brotherhood member at least. He believes that the Brotherhood lost its real leadership when it rose then fell as part of its project to take over the Egyptian presidency, but ended up in Egyptian jail instead. When in power, the movement's leaders abandoned the caution for which they were famous; they joined the political fray and ended up as easy targets.

He also believes that the Brotherhood now is a headless organization which has allowed it to be exploited by governments that deem themselves to be at war with Egypt, and are pushing the Brotherhood into a political, military, and media confrontation with the Egyptian regime. As a result, the chances of managing the disagreements and heading towards a semblance of reconciliation or reduced judicial sentences have all but disappeared.

"No one wants to see blood in Sinai or Cairo whatever the reasons for that. But it seems that matters are now out of control, unless President 'Abdelfattah al-Sissi intervenes at the last moment and grants an amnesty, which is his constitutional right," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

2-Keep out the PMU

 

ISIS's new expansion comes at the expense of the Iraqi parties that colluded with it last June, and the U.S. and the states that are in partnership with it in the region, more than at the expense of the [largely Shiite] PMU and its allied forces. For those being killed and displaced in Anbar Province – whether they are citizens or members of army and police – are supporters of the parties that cooperate with the U.S. and the region's states. This faces these parties with a difficult choice: Either to bring in foreign forces to confront ISIS, which is impossible for many reasons, or to lose the whole of al-Anbar, or to ask for the PMU's help, thereby consolidating its logic and policies, and reducing the U.S. and the regional governments’ influence--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

It is odd, illogical, and totally irrational for the [Sunni] people of [Anbar] to sit back and watch as if they were unconcerned about ISIS's locust-like invasion of their area, while [Shiite] strangers come to fight and die in the place of these young observers and bystanders. This is why we strongly object to the deployment of PMU forces to these areas where they may face traps and ambushes set up with the aim of killing large numbers of them via well-known deceptions and ruses that have a rich historical legacy behind them. Moreover, the plan may be to ruin the PMU forces' reputation by committing a small massacre here or there then trying to pin false charges on them, or accusing them of looting refrigerators or TV or satellite dishes, and so on--Mahdi Qassem on Iraqi www.sotaliraq.com

 

ISIS's capture of al-Ramadi, the capital of the largest Iraqi province is different from the organization’s advances last June, argues a commentator in pro-Syrian Beirut daily. This time round, these advances come at the expense of the very forces that colluded with ISIS last year, which will only reduce their influence in favor of those who are opposed to them. It makes no sense to deploy the largely Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in al-Anbar to fight ISIS, when the mostly Sunni population of the province is hostile to these units and when there are sufficient numbers of Sunni youths who should be fighting to liberate their own areas, warns an Iraqi commentator. In fact, the aim behind deploying the PMU in al-Anbar could be to entrap it on hostile grounds.

 

NEW GAINS: "ISIS has achieved new gains in al-Anbar Province," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

It has taken control of most of Ramadi, the province's capital, including the most important government compound in what is the largest of Iraq's provinces with an area of some 150-thousand square kms along the borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. ISIS's new expansion, which some Iraqis say threatens Baghdad and Karbala, is different from its previous expansion last June, 11 months ago. That expansion was the fruit of three basic factors:

- First, some civilian or military Iraqi government officials’ collusion with ISIS.

- Second, U.S. backing for this expansion in an effort to use it in order to force the Iraqis to agree to two major demands: first, toppling [former PM] Nuri al-Maliki and preventing him from returning to the premiership after he won the largest bloc in parliament; and second, securing Iraq's agreement to the revival of U.S. influence via the return of hundreds of military experts.

- Third, the backing that ISIS received from some regional governments, specifically, from Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Arab world, and the Turkish state.

One can say that ISIS's new expansion in the Anbar Province is the fruit of its efforts alone. It is true regional backing for ISIS has not ceased. And it is also true that the U.S.-led coalition's air strikes have been much less effective than expected. But what is certain is that the gains achieved this time around were the result of ISIS leaders' deep conviction that they had to consolidate their positions in al-Anbar so as to foil any likely attack that aims to liberate the province soon – especially since the commanders of the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) had declared that their next step would be to liberate Anbar Province, after the liberation of Tikrit.

In this sense, and as one American general has said commenting on ISIS's advances, these gains do not mean that ISIS has once again moved from the defensive to the offensive. And in this sense as well, ISIS's new gains threaten the Iraqi government's policies and the parties that refuse to ask for the PMU's help; but they pose no real threat to the existing strategic scene in Iraq.

In other words, ISIS's new expansion comes at the expense of the Iraqi parties that colluded with it last June, and the U.S. and the states that are in partnership with it in the region, more than at the expense of the PMU and its allied forces. For those being killed and displaced in Anbar Province – whether they are citizens or members of army and police – are supporters of the parties that cooperate with the U.S. and the region's states.

"This faces these parties with a difficult choice: Either to bring in foreign forces to confront ISIS, which is impossible for many reasons, or to lose the whole of al-Anbar, or to ask for the PMU's help, thereby consolidating its logic and policies, and reducing the U.S. and the regional governments’ influence," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

NO OBJECTION: "We fully understand it when Iraqi army units, brigades or even policemen, fight ISIS gangs in al-Anbar and elsewhere," writes Mahdi Qassem on Monday on the Iraqi www.sotaliraq.com.

There is no objection or anything strange about this, since it lies at the heart of the army and security forces' duties to fight wherever necessity, duty, and exceptional or urgent circumstances require them to do so.

But the PMU forces have nothing to do in al-Anbar, not only because they are hated and not wanted by the province's people, but also because they cannot fight in areas that are hostile to them and more sympathetic to the ISIS gangs than they are appreciative and grateful for the PMU's sacrifices, even though the latter are offering their lives to liberate their areas from the new Mongol invasion.

And this is to say nothing of the fact that these areas have thousands of young men whom we have seen in the arenas of 'honor and dignity' [anti-government protests before ISIS's takeover of Mosul in June 2014]. We saw endless lines and huge youthful gatherings. They are capable of taking up arms and fighting ISIS's gangs if they so wish or want. But they do not wish, or want, or desire to do so.

We say this because it is odd, illogical, and totally irrational for the people of the area to sit back and watch as if they were unconcerned about ISIS's locust-like invasion of their area, while strangers come to fight and die in the place of these young observers and bystanders.

This is why we strongly object to the deployment of PMU forces to these areas where they may face traps and ambushes set up with the aim of killing large numbers of them via well-known deceptions and ruses that have a rich historical legacy behind them. Moreover, the plan may be to ruin the PMU forces' reputation by committing a small massacre here or there then trying to pin false charges on them, or accusing them of looting refrigerators or TV or satellite dishes, and so on.

Of course, we realize that those who are deciding to deploy PMU forces to Anbar to fight ISIS gangs have nothing to lose, no matter how many massacres these forces may suffer – just as they had nothing to lose when the Speicher massacre [of Shiite police recruits by ISIS last June] or other massacres occurred.

"A small signal is sufficient for a wise man to understand what is going on-- as the [Arab] saying goes," concludes Qassem.

Ends…

 

 

3-A necessary and tiresome ally

 

The Camp David summit has made it clear that while the U.S. will offer support to its allies, it will not fight the Arab Gulf states’ wars on their behalf, says Ghassan Charbel in today’s pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The GCC member states have come to a better understanding of the difference between how their U.S. ally actually operates and how they may wish it to act, maintains the editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. The recent Camp David summit has shown them that the U.S. will back their efforts but will not fight their wars on their behalf, and that they should accumulate the cards that would allow them to build a coalition that confronts Iran’s ambitions in the region.

 

A GIANT POWER: "The U.S. is a giant power with very complex calculations," writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

This is what both its enemies and friends know. Every state in the world feels that the U.S. is almost at its borders, that its shadow is present in its calculations, that it collides with the U.S. when it tries to expand its role, or that it relies on it to protect itself against the covetousness of a powerful neighbor. It is as if the world's countries seek American recognition of their roles or what resembles an American statement of good conduct. And it is no exaggeration to say that U.S. prestige has been the reason for deterring many adventures and adventurers.

For this reason, the world's countries try to build friendly relations with it. But this friendship is neither simple nor easy, especially in light of the decision-making process in Washington. Visitors have often found it strange that the master of the White House who commands the strongest army in the world cannot offer the kind of commitments that the leaders of the smallest countries can rapidly make. This is why friendship with the U.S. is subjected to persistent tests, especially as administrations change and as strong regional or international winds may blow. Friendship with this sort of strong power is both useful and costly.

The GCC member states have succeeded in ensuring that the ‘bomb’ of Iran's regional role was present at the Camp David summit. Before this summit they feared that the American side's concerns would be confined to Iran’s nuclear bomb. Their success was evident from what Barack Obama said during the summit to [Saudi] al-'Arabiyya TV station. It is true that the GCC states did not get all they wished for; but they did get what would help them deal with Iran’s policy of undermining stability from a position of strength. The summit showed that relations with the U.S. require continuous maintenance and a realistic reading of mutual interests and the winds that influence the White House's master. That is no easy task.

Over the past years, it was clear that Obama does not want any commitment that would bring the U.S. back into the heart of conflicts whose outcome it cannot decide. He does not wish to add new burdens or cause new wars. For this reason, he did not refrain from being frank with some of his visitors that the U.S. does not have a magical solution for the world's problems on its own, and that the states in the arenas of crises must not wager on an American role to do their work. In other words, Obama has presented the U.S. as a backer and guarantor, and not as a fighter and intervener.

The region's states have observed Obama's behavior in dealing with a number of files: Withdrawal from Iraq and the situation in this country after the U.S.'s departure. The Arab Spring and the hopes and pains it gave rise to, as well as Obama's attitude towards its various manifestations. The Syrian ‘Spring’ episode that witnessed a popular uprising that was later transformed into a civil war and a regional and international duel distinguished by the wholesale violation of Syrian territories by foreign fighters on both sides of the confrontation. Iran’s role in the region and the fears it gives rise to in the GCC. And it is no exaggeration to say that the GCC states concluded that it was their right to be concerned because of Obama's unguaranteed wager on bringing about a change in Iran’s behavior and because of his pursuit of an uncertain policy that they deem to be contributing to prolonging the Syrian tragedy.

After Camp David, the GCC states have a realistic picture of what the U.S. ally is prepared to do and its role in the coming phase. The largest burden falls on the shoulders of the GCC states to produce policies that will serve their interests and are consistent with American calculations. The main battle is over the region and the limits of the various players' roles there. This includes Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and other arenas. The Gulf states must act together and develop the largest possible regional weight to set limits to the Iranian role. They must establish a balance of deterrence that allows a search for a new regional order.

The Camp David summit was an important station. The more difficult phase starts now. Has Iran conceded on its nuclear bomb so as to secure the ‘bomb’ of a regional role? And how should the GCC states respond? And what is Egypt's position and Turkey's role in this? Is it possible to create a regional framework that forces Iran to reconsider its offensive that has contributed to undermining some of the region's maps, which were anyway lost between Tehran’s appetite and ISIS's avarice?

"In collecting the cards that will provide influence, it is inevitable to turn to a necessary and tiresome ally that goes by the name 'U.S.,' especially when its president's name is Barack Obama," concludes Charbel.

Ends…

 

 

4-Determining Yemen’s future in Riyadh

 

Today’s conference for ‘Saving Yemen and Building a Federal State’ that begins in Riyadh will set the agenda for Yemen’s reconstruction as a sovereign federal state free from outside interference, says today’s Qatari Asharq

 

The Riyadh conference that brings together the Yemeni parties that support the Saudi-led coalition begins its proceedings today (Monday) with the aim of laying the foundations for and independent and sovereign federal state that is safe from foreign schemes and interventions, claims the editorial in a Qatari daily.

 

STRONG ATTENDANCE: "The Conference for ‘Saving Yemen and Building a Federal State’ began in Riyadh yesterday with a strong attendance of representatives from south Yemen and the participation of senior figures from deposed president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's party," notes the editorial in Monday's Qatari daily Asharq.

This confirms the conference's importance and the fact that it is representative of a broad Yemeni spectrum that thirsts for the return of legitimacy to the capital Sana'a as embodied by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and where he can exercise his powers and exert efforts to restore security and stability to this brotherly country. He will be backed in this by Operation Restore Hope launched by the [Saudi-led] Arab coalition after Operation Decisive Storm.

The Riyadh meeting is no ordinary conference. It is an exceptional political achievement for Saudi Arabia and the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states that have responded to the call of legitimacy in Yemen and President Hadi's call to hold this conference. It brings together over 400 patriotic, political, and party-political Yemen figures that wield great influence amongst the various sectors of the Yemeni people. It will be crowned with success and produce the results expected from it, backing the march to peace in Yemen, as well as dialogue based on constitutional legitimacy, and an accord that aims to complete the national dialogue based on the [2011] Gulf Initiative that is also backed by the international community as evident from UNSCR 2216. Furthermore, this conference represents a historical opportunity for all Yemeni parties and forces to determine their country's future and achieve its security, stability, and sovereignty without any external pressure or intervention.

Based on a quick review of its agenda, it is clear that it will be discussing a constructive and positive roadmap that will ensure Yemen's future. It addresses three major issues: The political file and the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions; the economic file that concerns reconstruction of the damaged areas; and the security file that concerns the means of creating a national Yemeni army that is not loyal to any specific figure or group.

The conference also aims to work towards a draft constitution for the country that can be presented to the Yemeni people with the aim of holding a referendum on the outcome of the national dialogue.

"In this way, the conference lays the grounds for an independent and united republic that is safe from foreign schemes and interventions," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 18.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

No majority too small

 

On the day after Jerusalem Day – the anniversary of the unification of the city in 1967 – Israel Hayom leads its Monday edition with a quote from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech. Speaking at the official ceremony at Ammunition Hill, Netanyahu said that Jerusalem has only ever been the capital of the Jewish people, and so it will remain. 'This is our home and here we will stay,' the prime minister added.

Netanyahu stressed that Israel ensures that Jerusalem will be an open and tolerant city. 'Only under Israeli rule is the freedom of worship in Jerusalem guaranteed for all religions,' he said. 'Believers pray at their holy sites, not despite our control over the city but because of it.'

President Reuven Rivlin, addressing the same gathering, said that his Jerusalem is Zion and Zionism, but the city does not belong only to its history – it belongs first and foremost to its people, and all its residents: secular, religious and ultra-Orthodox, Arabs and Jews.

Earlier in the day, police were deployed in heightened numbers throughout the city to secure the Jerusalem Day festivities. Thousands of youths took part in the traditional flag procession through the city that ended at the Western Wall Plaza. At Safra Square, left-wing activists held a counter demonstration against the flag demonstration. Four police officers were lightly hurt in clashes with Palestinian demonstrators in Jerusalem's Old City. Six Palestinians were detained on suspicion of throwing rocks and assaulting police officers.

Yedioth Ahronoth continues to lead with the protests by residents of the southern town of Dimona, where dozens of people face dismissal from their jobs at the Israel Chemicals factory on the outskirts of the town. According to the report, Netanyahu has decided to establish a ministerial committee to address the issue of employment problems in the south. The team will be headed by the minister of economy and Negev and Galilee Development, Arye Deri. The decision to form the team was made in a meeting attended by Netanyahu, Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon, Economy Minister Deri and Dimona mayor Benny Biton.

Deri, during a visit to Dimona, expressed hope a solution would be found soon to the planned layoffs. According to reports, the Histadrut labor federation and Israel Chemicals were reportedly close to a deal that would end months of labor actions on the planned layoffs. According to reports, the deal would reduce the number of planned dismissals to about 40, instead of more than 100.

Haaretz leads with the first day of work for new ministers in Netanyahu's fourth government, headlining comments from Culture and Sport Minister Miri Regev. Specifically, Haaretz focuses on Regev's comment that she 'won’t lend a hand to undermining the image of the State of Israel, Israel Defense Forces soldiers or the state’s heritage as a Jewish and democratic state.'

Meanwhile, Israel Radio reports that – in the first sign that the opposition intends to live up to its promise to make life hard for the new government – Zionist Union MK Omer Bar Lev told fellow members of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the IDF needs to take action against tunnels that Hamas is actively digging into Israeli territory. 'Hamas is digging attack tunnels that breach Israel's sovereignty and action must be taken against them as soon as tonight,' he stressed. 'The defense minister and prime minister's indecisiveness harms deterrence against Hamas and Hizbollah, and abandons the residents of the Gaza Belt to their fates. The weak and fawning policy that typifies Netanyahu encourages Hamas and Hizbollah to tighten the rope against us,' he charged.

Bar Lev added that it is quite possible that one of the tunnels being dug from Gaza into Israel has already crossed into Israeli territory. He said that if he were defense minister, he would take immediate and urgent action against it. 'There is now a moral justification, and even a moral compulsion, to take proactive action against any tunnel that crosses the fence,' he added.

In related news, Army Radio reports that, earlier this month, the Shin Bet, in a joint operation with customs inspectors at the Nitzana crossing, succeeded in preventing an attempt to smuggle diving suits into the Gaza Strip. According to the import documentation, the shipment was to have contained sports clothing, but upon closer inspection by the Nitzana customs officials, the container included 40 diving suits, which require special documentation for import into Gaza, which had not been provided.

Bar Lev's boss – Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog – also lambasted Netanyahu over the dismissal of Communications Ministry Director General Avi Berger. Netanyahu, who is currently the Acting Communications Minister, fired Berger over the phone on Sunday night. Writing on his Facebook page Monday morning, Herzog accused the Prime Minister of taking a page out of the playbook of repressive regimes in the region.  'Is Bibi learning from neighboring countries? An all-out war against the media? Did he fire the Communications Ministry Director over the telephone, so that everyone will know the new boss has arrived? He should not be able to,' Herzog added.

Finally, Army Radio reports that three mortars exploded in northern Israel on Sunday. According to an IDF assessment, the shells landed in Israel because of badly-aimed firing from the civil war inside Syria, and were not intended to hit Israel. The mortars landed in the area of Alonei Bashan, on the Golan Heights. No warning sirens went off, but there are no reports of injuries.

 

THE HOUSE ON BALFOUR STREET: Writing in Calcalist, Yoel Esteron says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's fourth government is hugely problematic – because of its leader and because of the people he has chosen to surround himself with.

"Who would have believed that we'd end up missing Avigdor Lieberman as foreign minister? Well, maybe that's a bit of a stretch. But compared to Tzipi Hotovely – the new deputy foreign minister, who said that the prime minister promised her she wouldn’t have a boss overseeing her – Lieberman at least understood the importance of Israel's strategic relationship with the United States. Hotovely seems to think that ties between Jerusalem and Washington are 'fine.' She will explain to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his European counterparts the error of their ways. But, as someone who has refused for reasons of modesty to shake the hands of male colleagues, what will she do if one of them extends his hand?

The choice of Hotovely as deputy foreign minister is not the exception in the fourth Netanyahu government. Some ministers are natural choices for their positions – Moshe Ya'alon in the Defense Ministry, Moshe Kahlon at the treasury and Yaakov Litzman at the Health Ministry spring to mind. But most of them look like they are completely out of their depths; they know little or nothing about the subjects that they are supposed to oversee and they are alienated from (and in some cases hostile to) the professionals who staff their ministries. It's arguable whether this is the most right-wing government in Israel's history, but it's unquestionably its most capricious.

No one had any high expectations for this new government, but Binyamin Netanyahu managed to disappoint even them. There are some good people in the Likud, but the prime minister has decided to keep them at arm's length or to humiliate them – and if possible, both. Silvan Shalom desperately wanted to return to the Foreign Ministry and was hugely insulted when he was forced to accept the Interior Ministry, which had much of its authority stripped from it. He was also thrown a bone in the shape of the meaningless title of deputy prime minister. What are the chances of any meaningful reform taking place at the Interior Ministry during Shalom's tenure?

Arye Deri, for his part, dreamed of returning to the Interior Ministry, but was forced to give up on the dream and take a position that means much less to him. The Economy Ministry is not exactly the place from where he can provide payback for the people who elected him. Industry? Manufacturing? These are not the issues that Deri has specialized in. But let's be optimistic: as far as we know, he doesn't loath industrialists.

What can we say about Communications Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and minister without portfolio designated to serve in the Communications Ministry, Ofir Akunis? Netanyahu and Akunis loathe the free press and they have made no secret of their intentions. Netanyahu made sure to keep the Communications Ministry within his grasp and he will exert intense pressure on his coalition partners to support anything he decides to do in that area.

Ayelet Shaked will not be the first justice minister not to have a legal education. But, judging by some of her comments against the Supreme Court and the attorney general, appointing her was a clearly hostile move by Netanyahu against the independence of the law and the legal system. Netanyahu’s election promises that he would undermine the Supreme Court are, it seems, worth exactly as much as all his other promises.

Naftali Bennett, meanwhile, is a sworn enemy of the liberal and secular team that makes up Israel's state-run education system. He comes from the ranks of the national-religious camp, but he lacks the tolerance of the previous generation. Miri Regev could have been a good welfare minister, which is the position she wanted. Instead, she's culture minister. In one of her first statements in that position, she insisted that cultural institutes which receive state funding 'will have to be balanced – and if I have to exercise censorship, I will.' Our culture minister despises culture. The only one who is suited to his position is Benny Begin; he's minister without portfolio, without purpose and without point.

This is not the first time that the State of Israel has had ministers who were unworthy, who did not suit the job they were given and who were even antagonistic toward their ministries. But there has never been one like Netanyahu's fourth government. It won't attack Iran; it will attack itself and its citizens. There's no point even talking about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, of course, but there's also no hope of progress on the social and economic front.

This is Israel's 34th government in 67 years. As Netanyahu said in his speech to the Knesset on Thursday night, that's an average of one every two years – which makes stable government almost impossible. Bibi's right; we do have a problem with our electoral system. But the bigger problem we're facing is the dementia of the current resident of the house on Balfour Street."

Ends…

 

THE FIRST KISS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that he cannot escape the feeling that most Israeli politicians are merely going through the motions when they protest government policies.

"On Thursday night, the Knesset plenum convened to vote on a new government. After the prime minister gave his speech, the head of the opposition, Isaac Herzog, delivered his response. His was a very aggressive speech. If I am not mistaken, it was the speech of his life. He attacked Netanyahu personally, mercilessly, and accused him of alienating Israel's minorities, of plotting to undermine the legal system, of orchestrating political and military failures, of selling out the country and its values and of giving in to extortion. He called the establishment of Binyamin Netanyahu's fourth government a 'circus.'

Netanyahu squirmed in his seat uncomfortably. Then he did what so many previous prime ministers have done when they don't want to listen to the harsh truths coming from the podium: he turned to speak to the ministers sitting next to him around the government table. But they were only half present: they were present because occasion demanded their presence; they were absent because of the insulting way that Netanyahu had treated them. When Tzipi Livni stood up to address the plenum, Netanyahu decided that enough was enough and walked out.

Once the voting was over and the new government approved by the slenderest of majorities, there was a swearing-in ceremony: each minister took to the podium and swore allegiance to the government and to the State of Israel. The ceremony lasted until close to midnight. The commercial television stations had resumed normal broadcasts long before. As is usual, members of Knesset congratulated the new ministers on their special day. Among those who extended their blessings were members of the opposition. That politeness is something that we should welcome: it's good to know that Israeli politicians are capable of behaving like human beings.

But some Knesset members did not stop at a simple handshake. They gathered like sheep at the foot of the podium, waiting to see who will be the first to embrace the new minister, who will plant the first kiss on his or her cheek. Among those vying to be the first to congratulate the new ministers were Likud backbenchers – but there were also some senior figures from Zionist Union, including the chairman himself, who fought for the first kiss.

Anyone watching this spectacle could be forgiven for asking themselves what is real and what is just for show. Where is the real Isaac Herzog? Is he to be found in the heart-felt speech or in the eagerness to embrace? Where are the real opposition MKs, like Stav Shaffir and Mickey Rosenthal, who have promised to be a fighting alternative to the government, yet who found themselves fighting to be first to congratulate the new ministers?

Israel's fifth president, Yitzhak Navon, recently published a fascinating autobiography – which I highly recommend – titled 'All the Way.' The following anecdote did not make it into the book, but Navon told it to me several years ago. In the seventh Knesset, he related, he served as deputy speaker. He was chairing a session at which ultra-Orthodox MK Meir Porush delivered an impassioned speech about religion. In the heat of the debate, Porush tore up a prayer book published by the Reform Movement, which he just happened to have brought with him. The Knesset was in uproar: How can Porush dare to desecrate a book that many Jews hold sacred? Porush explained that his outburst was entirely spontaneous. He was so angry, he said, at the Reform Movement, that he was unable to control himself.

But here's the thing: as Porush walked up to the podium, he whispered to the speaker, saying 'Just wait to see what kind of uproar I'm about to cause.' Tearing up the prayer book was preplanned and was just for show.

On many levels, politics is like theater. The famous line in Shakespeare, which tells us that 'all the world's a stage,' can go some way to explain the behavior of politicians. But there's a limit. When the play is over and the audience is applauding, we expect Julius Caesar to embrace Brutus; we hope that Iago will present Desdemona with a bouquet of flowers; and we know that Lady Macbeth will kiss all of her victims. We don't expect similar behavior from politicians. Not so soon after their archrivals have been sworn in. When that happens, there's a sense that all the bad things we say about politicians – about their hypocrisy, their inconsistency, their duplicity – are grounded in the truth."

Ends…

 

WAS ISN'T OVER: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that, while the assassination of ISIS commander Abu Sayyaf is an important milestone in the war against the organization, it is not a significant turning point and that the battle goes on.

"The assassination of senior ISIS commander Abu Sayyaf by U.S. Special Operations forces does not represent a turning point in the West's war against these barbarians. But it is an important milestone.

For the first time since coalition forces, headed by the United States, launched their airstrikes against ISIS, an American force carried out a ground operation. In the past, an operation to rescue an American hostage who was being held on the Iraqi-Syrian border ended in failure. The Delta Force began its mission, one can assume, from Iraq. Travelling in helicopters, it landed close to the target area and, during the firefight that ensued, Abu Sayyaf was killed, and his wife, who was his partner in some of the acts of terror and cruelty, was apprehended. During the course of the operation, a Yazidi woman who had been enslaved by ISIS was freed. Dozens of ISIS members were killed during the raid, including Abu Sayyaf's personal bodyguards. The American forces returned safely to their base in Iraq.

This successful operation proves that American intelligence services had accurate, up-to-date and reliable information about Abu Sayyaf's location, which allowed them to carry out their raid. It would appear that U.S. intelligence – with the help of their partners in the war on terror and on ISIS: the Kurds, Iraq, perhaps Iran and opposition forces in Syria – has significantly improved its intelligence-gathering capabilities.

The operation highlights the willingness of U.S. President Barack Obama to take a decision in an uncertain situation, when success is not guaranteed. He is willing to take risks. We saw similar character traits when Obama gave the go ahead for the operation in which Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan. It's safe to assume that, if the intelligence is adequate, the U.S. president will not hesitate to launch similar operations in the future.

Abu Sayyaf was a mid-level member of the leadership of ISIS. He was not one of the organizations highest-level commanders. An American intelligence expert compared the operation to the FBI assassinating Al Capone's accountant. Abu Sayyaf was responsible for managing the oilfields that ISIS captured, for selling the crude oil and for laundering the money it raised. Oil money from fields in areas captured by ISIS is an important source of income for the organization, but it is not its main one. Despite the moral blow that ISIS sustained with Abu Sayyaf's demise, it's safe to assume that a replacement will quickly be found.

The war against ISIS is in no way close to ending. The successes that ISIS recorded a year ago, when it captured Mosul and shocked the world by starting to move toward Baghdad, have been reversed. At the moment, ISIS is on the defensive. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was injured in an airstrike and is unable to lead his forces. Nonetheless, this week saw publication of a recording of him, urging his followers to continue fighting. The airstrikes have given the West many successes, such as killing hundreds if not thousands of ISIS members and freeing Iraqi territory – a stretch of land almost as big as the entire State of Israel – that fell to the organization. Nonetheless, ISIS still exists and is showing no signs of capitulating. The war continues."

Ends…

 

NO MAJORITY TOO SMALL: Writing in Maariv, Meir Uziel says that, while he would like to have seen a broader government established, he knows that Israeli politicians are incapable of putting national interest above their own, so his dream of a unity government is absurd.

"At long last, Israel has a government that is unified behind a lucid idea and a government that has a clear agenda. This may be a government with a majority of just one in the Knesset, but, when it comes to realizing human values and ensuring the survival of the State of Israel, there is no such thing as a majority that's too small. A majority is a majority and the will of the people is best expressed, in this case, by the 61-member government that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has established.

If it strikes you as strange that such sentiments should be expressed on the opinion pages of a newspaper, then you're probably right. But these are the very same sentiments that would be expressed everywhere if – instead of a right-wing government – the left had established a 61-member government.

In fact, you would probably be reading and hearing comments that are far more inspiring than anything I could come up with. There would be an impressive avalanche of rhetoric about the wonders we can expect from a new government headed by the left. Let's assume that Zionist Union and Meretz had won the election and formed the government. Yair Lapid, Moshe Kahlon and a few of the ultra-Orthodox parties, along with a handful of defectors from Likud (who would have changed overnight from enemies to darlings) would have joined without hesitation. Perhaps even Avigdor Lieberman would be on board. There's no doubt that the left would have praised him to the skies over his decision not to back Netanyahu.

None of that happened, of course. Therefore, all we will hear from now on are messages of rage and shock about a government with such a small majority. Leaders of the left will say, time and time again, that this government does not have the legitimacy to carry out any of its policies. That, of course, is totally fallacious. A government with a majority – any majority – can make good decisions; just as a government with an absolute majority can make terrible decisions.

I would like to have seen a broader government established, but how could Netanyahu have brought unity when the chasm in the nation remains even after the election and when division conquers the common sense of unity? This week, several people asked me to explain to them the absurd situation that is unfolding in Dimona, where people who have been laid off from their places of work are demonstrating against the government's economic policies. 'This government has absolutely no compassion,' people told me. 'These striking workers voted for Netanyahu, who is doing exactly the opposite of what is in their best interests.' Between the lines, the statement they were making was: These Sephardim who voted for Netanyahu out of tribal habit deserve whatever they get. It is utterly bizarre to suggest that Sephardi Israeli – unlike their Ashkenazi counterparts –vote in accordance with what is best for the country, rather than what is best for them personally.

Is a 61-member government – which includes ultra-Orthodox lawmakers who do not support the existence of a Zionist entity for religious reasons – the kind of government that we should rejoice in? Of course not. It would have been much better if any of the Zionist parties which are now in opposition had thought a little about the national interest. It is not too late for them to join the government and to help run this besieged and crazy country with a little more unity. They could have done so without inflating an already bloated cabinet.

It should not have been impossible to form a government with 18 ministers. In its current composition, that would mean nine Likud ministers and nine from other parties. By law, the prime minister was entitled to appoint no more than 18 ministers. So what did he do? He changed the law. By the same token, what's to prevent the average citizen from deciding that his house is too small, so he will simply expand it?

If everyone in the Knesset – members of the government and members of the opposition alike – were to put the good of the country before their own personal interests, the situation would improve beyond recognition and there would be some kind of harmony in the Knesset. But our expectation that MKs think about the general good – something they appear incapable of doing – is so ridiculous that there's little point even discussing it."

Ends…

 

SAVE ISRAEL FROM NETANYAHU'S DANGEROUS STALEMATE: In its editorial on Monday, Haaretz says that the opposition parties in the Knesset must raise their voice and pose alternatives to the government's iron wall facing the Palestinians.

"Simple logic strongly suggests that the new government formed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will not bring peace, certainly not on its own initiative. Netanyahu renounced the two-state solution during his election campaign, does not consider Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas a partner, and sees the United States administration as the enemy. All this is enough to suppress any hope for a diplomatic turnaround.

But apparently Abbas is still interested in giving the diplomatic process a chance, and in a speech he gave to mark Nakba Day reiterated his terms for renewing negotiations – a halt to construction in the territories, the freeing of prisoners jailed before the Oslo Accords and continuous negotiations for a year, at the end of which a timetable will be set for ending the occupation in 2017.

One might raise an eyebrow at Abbas’ seeming naiveté or apparent disconnection from reality. One could also remind him that in an interview U.S. President Barack Obama gave to the Al Arabiya network he stated that peace between Israel and the Palestinians is not possible in the coming year. (Incidentally, it’s permitted to wonder about and even object to Obama’s declaration, since who but the U.S. could pressure the Israeli government into changing its policies?) But it is precisely within this reality, which at the moment looks unchangeable, that a dangerous dynamic lies.

Europe, particularly France, is unwilling to put up with this deadlock. The United Nations General Assembly that will convene in September is more ready than ever to make tough decisions that will support the Palestinians’ demand for recognition of their independence. More and more organizations are joining the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement against Israel. Several European countries have announced that they recognize the Palestinian state or that they are prepared to do so. In the West Bank itself there is a growing feeling of despair over ever reaching a diplomatic solution, and one cannot count on the quiet there being maintained forever.

These thick clouds threaten the State of Israel and each of its citizens. When the government doesn’t recognize the danger inherent in a diplomatic stalemate, the opposition must raise its voice. This opposition must be combative and not make do with responses or slogans. It must adopt Abbas’ conditions as the opening negotiating position and declare that he is a worthy partner. It must operate domestically and internationally to recruit leaders and states into a multinational coalition that will push for diplomatic negotiations and present a realistic plan that will convince the public, both in Israel and abroad, that there is an alternative to the iron wall that the Netanyahu government has erected."

Ends…

 

EGYPT'S GAME OF THRONES: Writing on the i24 website, Ksenia Svetlova says that Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi should learn from his predecessors' mistakes in tackling extremists and warns that the death sentence against former President Mohammed Mursi could backfire.

"He used to work for NASA; was awarded the title of 'World’s Best Parliamentarian', completed a PhD at the University of South Carolina and owned his own newspaper. Two years ago this smiling bearded man held meetings with Catherine Ashton and John Kerry at the presidential palace and traveled to Tehran to participate in the gathering of the OIC (Organization of Islamic countries). Now Mohammed Mursi‘s only dream is to have his life spared and his death sentence commuted to life in prison.

In theory the only person authorized to do that is Egypt's Grand Mufti, Shawki Allam, although many in the country doubt that the honorable Mufti will make this decision on his own. One should also keep in mind that under Egyptian law, judges are bound by the Mufti's decision. There is also an appeal option, as was the case with another jailed Egyptian president - Hosni Mubarak. And yet, the judges have chosen to stress the importance of the Mufti's decision, unwilling to carry the burden by themselves.

Do Mursi and an additional 104 defendants in this trial actually deserve capital punishment? Some Egyptian critics say the charges are bizarre; that Lebanese Hizbollah couldn't possibly be a part of the Muslim Brotherhood; that Mursi couldn't possibly have committed all these crimes during his short rule; that he was illegally arrested on January 28, 2011 only to prevent him from participating in the Tahrir revolution, and so on and so forth.

But in today's Egypt facts don't always count. Otherwise it would have been rather difficult to explain why, along with Mursi, three well-known Palestinians were sentenced to death. One of them, who goes under the name of Hassan Salame, is serving 42 prison terms in an Israeli jail. The other two were killed a few years ago. Asked by a reporter how someone who is already dead or is serving time in an Israeli prison can be executed, the judge got furious and answered that 'there is no way to establish the real condition of these criminals.'

It is of no real importance whether Mursi was a spy on behalf of Iran and al-Qa’ida, secretly promised the Palestinians two-thirds of the territory in northern Sinai and wanted to blow up the Pyramids. The only thing that matters is whether the Egyptian regime wants to have its 'IS' moment. If the execution happens, Mursi will become Egypt’s first elected president and first Egyptian president ever to be put to death.

On the one hand, Mursi is known for past escape attempts and as long as he is imprisoned there will be forces working hard to set him free, provoking mass protests by his followers. On the other hand, incumbent President Abdelfattah al-Sissi should have learned a lesson from the unsuccessful experience of his predecessors who also fought Islamic extremism and terror. In 1954, when Gamal Abdel Nasser got rid of the country’s first president, Mohammed Naguib, he decided to put him under house arrest, thus neutralizing the competition till Naguib’s death. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were soon thrown into prison, where they wrote books that galvanized the masses.

Twelve years later, Nasser decided to execute a few dozens of the Brotherhood’s top leaders, including Said Qutb, the father of all radical Islamic Sunni movements. That move achieved the exact opposite. Qutb turned from a relatively unknown radical Islamist to a symbol, a martyr, a role model and a spiritual leader for millions.

Mursi never wrote anything except controversial presidential decrees, and he cannot be compared to Qutb. Nonetheless if executed, Mursi will forever be remembered by all as the innocent victim, framed and murdered by the competition for the greed of power.

The other example is former President Anwar Sadat, who fought the extremists, then flirted with them and was eventually killed by them. So the Grand Mufti - or whoever is making decisions on his behalf - should consider all the facts carefully. A mistake could cost al-Sissi's regime a fortune, and perhaps his life.

Yet, despite the media’s preoccupation with Mursi, it is hardly the most pressing issue on the Egyptian regime’s agenda. When assuming power on July, 2013, Al-Sissi, then minister of defense, pledged to tackle dire economic and security problems. Not a day goes by in the northern Sinai Peninsula, as well as in the cities of the Suez Canal, the Delta and Upper Egypt without some kind of terrorist activity. The jihadist Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis are successful in killing soldiers, policemen and judges, and the riots of the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters in the universities go on uninterrupted. The question is whether the terrorists will turn to Cairo that had been peaceful most of the time due to increased security arrangements. Because no matter what happens in the periphery towns of Al-Arish, Sheikh Zweid or Minya, Egyptians will always look up to Cairo as the ultimate barometer for safety.

Al-Sissi’s regime is struggling. It has banned all 'Ultras' organizations and the April 6 and other protest movements. But the battle has only begun. It is not even close to a culmination. Al-Sissi is also struggling in the economic arena due to the sharp decline in tourism revenues, as well as a massive influx of workers escaping Libya and other Arab countries. Despite the generous Saudi and Emirati help, there has been no relief for the poor and the weak in Egypt. With so many promises he made to his people and such high expectations of him, al-Sissi does not have much time. He will need to provide solutions soon in order to forestall dissent and criticism.

So the Mursi verdict is no more than the tip of the iceberg. It is a temporary distraction that will not last long and will certainly not solve Egypt’s burning problems."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS: Mehmet Tezkan is dissatisfied with the current political climate in centrist Milliyet: "The currant atmosphere is bad for this country but very convenient for the opposition. No matter which issue one may choose, one can take aim at the government. There are many issues at stake. The government has nothing to say. The country is in ruins. Under this government, trust for the judiciary has hit rock bottom. All decisions are taken based on political considerations."

Mustafa Unal believes the electorate has been let down by the ruling AKP (Justice and Welfare Party) in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The truth is that the ruling party began well and initiated revolution-like reform packages. It continued in a good manner. It took Turkey closer to Europe. Its star shone in the region with its advances in democracy and freedom. It became a role model, and it received its reward at the ballot box. But the era of hegemony has not been good for it. It has turned into an era of weakness. It moved toward the Ankara [as opposed to the EU] criteria. The public has been truly deceived."

Sibel Eraslan suggests that the elections’ results have been predetermined in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Looking at the AKP’s electoral graph over the past decade and in the recent public polls, an election victory has already been decided. And whether the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] will pass the 10% electoral threshold or not is not a strong enough factor to affect the outcome in favor of the AKP, although it will affect the arithmetic in parliament. That is why, no one expects a radical surprise or an election earthquake".

Mehmet Seker anticipates an about-turn from opposition leaders in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "If the leaders keep their word, only one party leader should remain in his chair after the elections. But our experience gives us no confidence. We cannot clearly say that the others will not still be there after the election. An appropriate explanation will be found. Although this may not be logical, those who will not resign will claim 'this was not what I meant by resignation'."

 

DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT GRAFT PROBE OFFICIALS: Orhan Kemal Cengiz berates the government for its crackdown on state corruption probes in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "What we should understand is that any policeman, prosecutor or judge who conducts an investigation that affects the government will soon be put in prison and have their career ruined. Depriving people of their profession, academic credentials and daily bread just because they disturb the authorities can never be tolerated under a democratic regime. Suppressing the people who stand up against the state can only be the wish of totalitarian or fascist regimes. It shows in which direction the country is moving."

Hasan Cem issues a rallying call in independent Internet T24: "In a country where judges are imprisoned because of their verdicts; where prosecutors are imprisoned due to the results of their probes, how can we talk about any law? In a country where the president says that he has suspended the constitution, how can one talk about the law? In a country where the president is using campaign rallies to advance his propaganda, how can one talk about the law? Will we accept this? No, we will fight against it."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Delusions and hotheads

2-Obstinacy and conceit

3-ISIS and Kurdish independence

 

1-Delusions and hotheads

 

The Obama administration will be careful to explain [its position on Syria and Iran] to the Gulf states; but it may offer them some concessions such as speeding up the delivery of arms to the moderate opposition in Syria. But this is much less than what the Gulf states want; for they care little who rules Syria after Assad's departure. As for security, the Gulf states will seek to establish relations with the U.S. similar to those between the U.S. and the European states. But there are limits to what the U.S. can promise to the Gulf states even in this regard. The U.S. was and remains a guarantor of the Gulf's security against any foreign attack. In other words, it will be easy for the U.S. to promise not to allow any state to attack the Gulf states, deeming a war on them as tantamount to war on the U.S. itself. This has been the basis of the relationship between the Gulf states and the U.S. so far, but the U.S. cannot go any further than that--Mohammad Yaghi in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

A broad climate of disappointment and sense of being let down pervades the Gulf’s political and media circles. Many simply could not believe that Washington would not fight their wars on their behalf. Delusion took such hold of one media figure as to criticize 'American dual loyalty,' sometimes siding with Riyadh and sometimes Tehran – as if our academic friend forgot in his fit of 'bad temper' that the capital of the U.S. is Washington, and that the U.S. administration's loyalty is to Washington first and last. Some criticisms are mixed with remonstration and sometimes with a deep sense of shock, after discovering the truth that money cannot buy everything…It seems that we shall have to wait longer before certain hotheads and some disturbed psyches calm down. But the sad thing is that the torrents of blood implicit in this logic will continue to flow and in force, before some of us learn the lesson well, heed the voice of reason, logic and wisdom, and veer towards the option of negotiation, dialogue, and a political solution--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The Gulf leaders currently meeting with President Barack Obama at Camp David want the U.S. to topple the Syrian regime and establish security relations similar to those between the U.S. and Europe in compensation for the nuclear deal with Iran, argues a Palestinian commentator. But it is highly unlikely that the U.S. is either willing or able to offer them what they want. Regardless of the rhetoric that may emerge from it, the Camp David summit will not yield any of the results that the Gulf leaders are seeking from it, warns a leading Jordanian commentator. But sooner or later, the 'hotheads' in the region will come to realize that Washington's loyalty is primarily to itself, and that they cannot block the nuclear agreement with Iran or buy everything with their money.

 

AN EXCEPTIONAL MEETING: "U.S. presidential meetings with the Gulf’s leaders is a tradition that has been observed for decades," writes Mohammad Yaghi in Friday's leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Such meetings are usually held a few months after the U.S. presidential elections and are used to exchange views and for the U.S. president to acquaint himself with his counterparts among the Arab kings, emirs, and sheikhs.

Yesterday's meeting at Camp David with the leaders of six Gulf states is an exception. First, because, it comes as the U.S. president's second term in office is approaching its end, and, second, because it is being held with the leaders of the six Gulf states collectively. And this is precisely what makes the meeting significant.

The Gulf states' leaders have come to Washington bearing 'major' concerns about the U.S. administration's policy in the Middle East. The most important by far is the U.S. and the European states’ imminent signing of an agreement with Iran that ends its economic boycott, in return for monitoring its nuclear activities and reducing the number of its centrifuges. And this is what is aggravating the Arab Gulf states. They believe that such an agreement will not put an end to Iran's nuclear capabilities, will allow it to free its frozen assets in the U.S. and the European states estimated at tens of billions of dollars, and will make it a partner to most Middle Eastern issues.

Unfreezing Iran’s assets is of particular concern to the Gulf states quite simply because they believe that it will acquire a financial surplus to spend on its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza. This is something that the Arab Gulf states do not want; after all, they have been trying to topple Assad’s regime in Syria, end Hizbollah’s presence in Lebanon, subject the Houthis in Yemen to their terms conditions, and tame the [Hamas] resistance in Gaza.

From the perspective of Gulf calculations, if Iran retains its technical ability to enrich uranium together with an advanced program for nuclear research managed by knowledgeable experts, this means that it will ultimately be able to acquire nuclear weapons. This is another source of threat, since the Gulf states believe that the possession of such weapons will transform Iran into a power that cannot be ignored in anything having to do with Middle East security, and will consequently compel them to offer concessions to Tehran that they do not wish to make.

According to The New York Times, [former Saudi intelligence head] Prince Turki al-Faisal has 'toured the world' warning that Saudi Arabia will make sure to acquire every capability that Iran obtains – that is, that it will try to obtain nuclear technology at any price. According to the newspaper, Prince Turki spoke of the U.S. as a 'former friend,' in reference to the depth of the gap that separates the Obama administration from the Gulf states' leaders.

But the U.S. has paid no heed to Prince Turki's threat to obtain nuclear technology. And this is understandable, of course, since the precondition for obtaining any 'technology' is the existence of the necessary human resources for handling and managing it. Neither Saudi Arabia alone nor the Gulf states collectively have such capabilities. As for statements indicating that the U.S. is no longer an ally, these are too insignificant for Washington to pay them any attention. After all, the security of the Gulf and its economic structure – and specifically the companies in the oil sector – is linked to that of the Western states and the U.S. in particular.

So the Gulf states really do not have any means of pressure to impose their terms on the U.S.. However, they will try to get something from the Americans in return for the deal with Iran in two domains: Toppling the Assad regime in Syria, and obtaining new security guarantees.

Toppling Assad also means ending Hizbollah’s presence in Lebanon, thereby weakening Iran’s influence on one of the Middle East's fronts. The Gulf states have been trying to achieve this for four years now, and they have not refrained from backing the takfiris to fulfill this mission. But they have not succeeded so far. If they manage to convince the Obama administration to declare war on Syria, they would have obtained what they want.

Yet it does not seem that the Gulf states have any chance of success because the basic balance in Syria has not changed. Russia still adheres to its position in support of Assad. And Iran is unwilling to lose both Assad and Hizbollah without a war in which everyone, including Israel, will be implicated. As for the U.S., it sees no alternative to the Assad regime on the horizon.

Moreover, war with the takfiri groups in Syria is one thing, and a war with the U.S. is a different matter altogether. The former may be restricted to Syria's geographical area, and what it requires is to compensate for the Syrian regime's human losses and ammunition consumption, which is what Iran is doing today. But war with the U.S. that leads to 'the end of the regime in Syria' and 'the end of Hizbollah in Lebanon' is of a different character and will be conducted according to different standards. And Iran and its allies will engage in it based on new rules that will ensure that its arena will expand.

The Obama administration will be careful to explain all this to the Gulf states; but it may offer them some concessions such as speeding up the delivery of arms to the moderate opposition in Syria. But this is much less than what the Gulf states want; for they care little who rules Syria after Assad's departure.

As for security, the Gulf states will seek to establish relations with the U.S. similar to those between the U.S. and the European states. But there are limits to what the U.S. can promise to the Gulf states even in this regard.

The U.S. was and remains a guarantor of the Gulf's security against any foreign attack. In other words, it will be easy for the U.S. to promise not to allow any state to attack the Gulf states, deeming a war on them as tantamount to war on the U.S. itself. This has been the basis of the relationship between the Gulf states and the U.S. so far, but the U.S. cannot go any further than that.

But the issue is more complicated. It is not necessary for Iran, for example, to intervene in these states directly; it can back the domestic opposition, which is more worrisome as far as the Gulf states are concerned. This is what the Gulf states believe is already happening in Bahrain and in Yemen; and it is what Saudi Arabia fears will happen inside its borders. Here, it appears that the U.S. is not ready to offer any guarantees to protect these states because the enemy will be a domestic one in this case.

Obama spoke of this in his interview with The New York Times about a month ago when he said that the Gulf states' problems do not all stem from Iran, adding that the youth in the Gulf countries suffer from unemployment, alienation and exclusion, and that addressing these problems is these countries' responsibility and not Iran's.

But perhaps more important than all the above is the absence of the Palestinian issue from this summit which is an indicator of the extent to which the Palestinian cause has retreated.

"Be that as it may, the Camp David meeting between the Gulf states' leaders and President Obama may help to clarify how both sides understand the Middle East's new realities; but it is unlikely to push the U.S. to change its policies," concludes Yaghi.

End…

 

SETTING A LOW CEILING: "In advance of the U.S./Gulf Camp David summit, Washington set a low ceiling for its expected results," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Friday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

President Obama makes light of the Iranian threats to the Gulf's security and places the terrorist threat ahead of them. He speaks of threats from inside the Gulf states that are more dangerous than the threats from outside. His advisors have made it patently clear that 'there will be no defense treaty' and 'no written security agreements.' As for arms and armament, the entire matter is determined by the ceiling of the U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative and strategic superiority in the region.

Washington will proceed with its negotiations with Iran leading to a nuclear agreement whether its allies want this or not. And such an agreement requires an end to the siege and sanctions imposed on Iran. This is regardless of the details of this process and all the Gulf proposals and questions reaching Washington such as: What will Iran do with the 120-billion dollars of released frozen assets? – questions that are ridiculed by Washington and are not treated seriously at all.

From now on, the bilateral U.S./Iranian channel will operate vigorously in order to deal with the region's crises and burning fires. In fact, Washington has not waited till June 30th to do this; it has already taken the initiative to contact and coordinate with Tehran over the Yemeni crisis, something that is now known to all. And it is not unlikely that after the summer and if the nuclear issue proceeds well, Washington will seek to play the role of 'honest broker' between its old allies and its new friend.

Contrary to the eloquent 'gibberish' that is music to the ears of leaders in the region, the torrent of American statements welcoming the Gulf's leaders and placing a high value on relations with the Gulf since the time of Roosevelt, have not produced a single serious idea that would quench the Gulf's thirst for safety and reassurance. All that has been issued is no more than an expression of 'good intentions' and a 'definite desire' to expand the arms trade, provided they do not 'break the balance' with Israel, of course. Apart from that, we have not read of any specific qualitative idea or initiative that would make any difference or suggest any change in the U.S. approach to the region.

When we survey the regional crises, we can see that the U.S./Gulf differences are still the same. Washington is more serious about its efforts to pursue a political solution for the Yemeni crisis. Even though it backed the Saudi war on Yemen at the logistical, intelligence, and political levels, it has continued to call for a political solution with the participation of all parties since the very first day of the war. It also took the initiative to demand an end to Operation Decisive Storm and exert pressure to declare a humanitarian truce.

These positions were not to the liking of many 'hotheads' in the region who facilely call for decisions to go to war without any deep understanding or precise calculation of its likely consequences and repercussions.

In the region, Washington believes that the war on terrorism is the first priority that should not be preceded by any other. The Gulf's position – some of the Gulf at least – heads in the opposite direction. In fact, some Gulf states are implicated in backing groups that are classified as terrorist from Syria to Libya via Yemen. And the unprecedented openness to the [Syrian al-Qa’ida- affiliated] Nusra Front is not approved in Washington; in fact, it gives rise to much concern and many fears.

In Syria, the tone of Operation Decisive Storm has risen against the regime and its allies. Money and balance-breaking weapons have been pumped into the country, while meetings and gatherings are being hastily arranged to pave the way for the Riyadh [opposition] conference which will discuss the post-Assad era – as if the war in Syria were about to end, and the only thing left to do is to discuss 'the day-after scenario.'

But Washington is still sticking to its wait-and-see position on Syria. It wants Assad, but does not want him. It wants a political solution, but backs the option of arming and training opposition fighters. It speaks of the priority of fighting ISIS in the region, but it deals gently with ISIS in al-Raqqa. In contrast, some Gulf states seem to have made up their mind and have apparently decided to try 'the Afghani scenario' and go all the way against the regime.

A broad climate of disappointment and sense of being let down pervades the Gulf’s political and media circles. Many simply could not believe that Washington would not fight their wars on their behalf. Delusion took such hold of one media figure as to criticize 'American dual loyalty,' sometimes siding with Riyadh and sometimes Tehran – as if our academic friend forgot in his fit of 'bad temper' that the capital of the U.S. is Washington, and that the U.S. administration's loyalty is to Washington first and last.

Some criticisms are mixed with remonstration and sometimes with a deep sense of shock, after discovering the truth that money cannot buy everything, that it is not available in this region alone, and that its glitter does not capture everybody’s heart, including that of the Pakistanis [who refused to join the Saudi war in Yemen].

Some pursue their erroneous ways, and promise to replicate a Decisive Storm in other arenas and theaters but without bothering to ask the obvious question: Has the 'Storm scenario' succeeded in Yemen for it to be reenacted in other arenas and theaters? It seems that we shall have to wait longer before certain hotheads and some disturbed psyches calm down.

"But the sad thing is that the torrents of blood implicit in this logic will continue to flow and in force, before some of us learn the lesson well, heed the voice of reason, logic and wisdom, and veer towards the option of negotiation, dialogue, and a political solution," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Obstinacy and conceit

 

[Iran’s] bullying tactics [challenging the naval blockade on Yemen] comes at an embarrassing time for President Obama's administration, which seems desperate to conclude a nuclear deal with Tehran, even though one would have thought it is the Iranian regime that needs this deal and that should prove its good intentions and behavior. Anyway, it is clear that by threatening the Saudis and Gulf Arabs, the Iranians are sending messages to the White House-- which is trying to reassure the Arab leaders-- to the effect that Iran’s understanding of reconciliation with the U.S. is different from the American interpretation, and that Obama should not offer any commitments to protect the Gulf as a price for the awaited nuclear agreement. Unfortunately, Iran's history since the mullahs came to power [1979] is rife with tension. Iran retreats before the discourse of force, not that of diplomatic reconciliation--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Asharq al-Awsat

 

[Saudi/Iranian] tension is great and the wars of words may lead to a military confrontation. We cannot understand why the two sides do not initiate a dialogue in order to reach an understanding and find solutions for the disputed issues between them. After all, Iran has negotiated with the Great Satan (the U.S.) why, then, does it not negotiate with Saudi Arabia, which is an Islamic state? And why does Saudi Arabia not follow in the footsteps of the U.S., which is a superpower, and hold negotiations with Iran? We are posing these questions even though we already know their answers. Most can be summarized in a few words: 'Obstinacy,' 'conceit,' and the readiness to offer concessions to the West but not to our Muslim and Arab brothers--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

As the Camp David summit between the U.S. president and the GCC leaders was underway, Tehran warned the Saudi-led coalition not to attack an Iranian ship it alleges is carrying humanitarian aid to Yemen, notes a veteran Saudi commentator. This only confirms the Gulf Arabs' worst fears that Tehran will use the nuclear agreement to further push its weight around and expand its regional influence. Recent unprecedented attacks on Saudi Arabia by senior Iranian officials indicate that the two countries are heading towards an open and direct confrontation rather than the proxy wars they have been waging so far, predicts the editorial on an online pan-Arab daily. It is difficult to understand why they do not initiate a dialogue and try to deal with their problems.

 

DELIBERATE THREAT: "Almost simultaneously with U.S. President Barack Obama's attempts to mollify the angry GCC leaders, Iran has deliberately threatened Saudi Arabia via the commander of its ground forces," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Obama brought together the Gulf leaders at Camp David yesterday to tell them: 'Do not worry about the nuclear agreement with Iran.' And they told him: 'It does not take our countries' security into consideration.' The latest threats remind Obama that this is the monster whose cage-door he wants to open.

Tension in the region as a whole has reached dangerous levels. It has reached as far as it can go in Syria and Iraq, and more recently in Yemen where Iran continues to defy the UN Security Council's resolutions and insists on violating the naval blockade imposed by the coalition members to prevent the [Houthi] rebels against legitimacy from receiving arms and ammunition.

Tehran has sent a ship accompanied by Iranian warships claiming that the former is carrying humanitarian aid. But the suspicion is that this is a new attempt to supply the rebels with weapons. And what fuels these suspicions is the fact that Iran refuses to have the ship searched by the UN, which has a team in the nearby port of Djibouti. The ship's destination is the Yemeni port of Hodeida, which is controlled by the Houthi rebels, Tehran's allies.

Iran tried to do the same thing earlier. Two weeks ago it sent a ship under the same pretext of bringing humanitarian relief. But when the American warships rushed to search it near Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea, it turned back and returned from whence it had come. This time round, the ship comes protected by a number of Iranian warships. Iranian military officials have threatened to attack Saudi Arabia if coalition forces try to search the ship.

This Iranian bullying tactic comes at an embarrassing time for President Obama's administration, which seems desperate to conclude a nuclear deal with Tehran even though one would have thought it is the Iranian regime that needs this deal and that should prove its good intentions and behavior. Anyway, it is clear that by threatening the Saudis and Gulf Arabs, the Iranians are sending messages to the White House-- which is trying to reassure the Arab leaders-- to the effect that Iran’s understanding of reconciliation with the U.S. is different from the American interpretation, and that Obama should not offer any commitments to protect the Gulf as a price for the awaited nuclear agreement.

Unfortunately, Iran's history since the mullahs came to power [1979] is rife with tension. Iran retreats before the discourse of force, not that of diplomatic reconciliation. A year ago, Iran tried to send a ship it claimed was carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, but when an Israeli commando force attacked and searched it, it discovered that it was carrying arms covered by cement bags. Despite this, Iran did not dare do anything other than issue verbal statements of denunciation.

Iran will try to ensure that the war in Yemen will continue to rage by urging its allies to reject reconciliation and by supplying them with more weapons, as it is doing in Syria. It believes that in doing so it is initiating more wars, after Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain, as part of its attempt to impose itself as a domineering power and dictate its policy to the region's states.

"In light of all this we are not optimistic that the framework nuclear agreement will offer the path the U.S. president imagines it to be. On the contrary; it will make the [Iranian] regime act in an even more demonic manner," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENTS: "The strongly-worded and unprecedented statements made yesterday by 'Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Chairman of the Iranian Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran [the Shura Council] at a press conference in Damascus in which he attacked Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz in terms that deviate from customary political and diplomatic conventions, reflect the extent to which Saudi/Iranian relations have deteriorated, nearing the brink of an all-out confrontation," writes the editorial on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Mutual accusations are nothing new between the Saudi and Iranian sides. But when accusations of 'treason' are made by a man of the standing of Mr. Boroujerdi, who is seen as one of the five most important leaders in Tehran, this reflects the extent of Iranian 'anger' at the new Saudi/Turkish alliance that has upset the balance of power on the battlefronts in Syria in favor of the armed opposition. This alliance has intensified its financial and armament support for this opposition over the recent period.

Mr. Boroujerdi is visiting Syria and meeting with its President Bashar al-Assad at a very carefully chosen moment in order to achieve a number of aims, including the following:

- First, to confirm Iran’s absolute support for the Syrian president and dispel all rumors and reports that claim that Iran’s nuclear agreement with the six major powers led by the U.S. will require Tehran to abandon the Syrian president and his regime. This is why Mr. Boroujerdi insisted on denying such rumors, saying: 'We came to Syria to once again declare that our support for its government and people is fixed and permanent, and that we are proud of this backing.'

- Second, to coordinate with the Syrian leadership as to how to shift the balance on the battlefield in the Syrian Arab Army's favor. This comes after the armed opposition backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey has made a number of gains, the most important of which has been the capture of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour in the northwest and Bosra ash-Sham in the south near Der'a. It is still not known if Iran will send special forces to take part in the fighting on the Syrian army's side as its Lebanese ally Hizbollah has done, or whether it will confine itself to ending military advisors and advanced weapons and ammunition.

One sentence worth noting at the end of Mr. Boroujerdi’s press conference was when he said that 'Iran is working hard to change Turkish policy towards Syria.' But he did not specify how this was to be achieved or the tools that Iran will use in this regard. Are these economic or political or diplomatic, or perhaps even military tools?

In our view, there are numerous means of pressure that Iran can deploy if it wishes to change Turkish policy in Syria. Most important is that of economic cooperation between the two countries. The size of trade exchange between them currently stands at around 30-billion dollars annually. In fact, Iran's dependence on Turkey may diminish if the economic siege imposed on the country is lifted in accordance with the requirements of the agreement with the major powers.

The other means of pressure that is mere wishful thinking has to do with the fact that the two countries share borders. Iran may back certain armed groups while ethnic and sectarian minorities in Turkey (the Kurds, the Alevis) can be stirred up against the government. But this is a double-edged weapon that bears many risks.

The Saudi/Iranian conflict is escalating and getting more heated with each passing day. It is moving rapidly from the phase of political confrontations and proxy wars to a direct military confrontation, unless it is contained via a serious dialogue that aims to deal with the heated regional issues in which the two countries are involved.

The tension is great and the wars of words may lead to a military confrontation. We cannot understand why the two sides do not initiate a dialogue in order to reach an understanding and find solutions for the disputed issues between them. After all, Iran has negotiated with the Great Satan (the U.S.) why, then, does it not negotiate with Saudi Arabia, which is an Islamic state? And why does Saudi Arabia not follow in the footsteps of the U.S., which is a superpower, and hold negotiations with Iran?

"We are posing these questions even though we already know their answers. Most can be summarized in a few words: 'Obstinacy,' 'conceit,' and the readiness to offer concessions to the West but not to our Muslim and Arab brothers," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-ISIS and Kurdish independence

 

ISIS and implicit American collusion in Iraq’s partition have served to make Kurdish independence an impending reality, says Mohammad Noureddin in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

ISIS's advances in Iraq over the past year have indirectly helped the Kurds to extend their control over significant areas of the country and move closer to realizing their longstanding dream of statehood, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a Gulf daily. And this seems to be in line with American schemes that go back to the 1990s to partition Iraq in the service of Western and Israeli interests.

 

BARZANI SPEAKS: "After his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, the President of Iraq’s Kurdistan Province Mas'ud Barzani said that Kurdistan's independence was a natural right, and that the Kurds were treated unjustly after the Second World War," writes Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

He also said that the Kurds were divided against their will, and added that they were now advancing towards full independence with each passing day, one that is no longer far off. And Barzani also noted that 'every part of Kurdistan had its own special conditions, but the situation has changed since the ISIS attack; I do not recall speaking of a Kurdish state in the past, but today there are many states that support us and there is no state that opposes our independence. Now there is no obstacle before Kurdistan's independence.' And he went on to say: 'The Kurds nation's fate is determined by that nation; we are happy at the dialogues we are holding, and if any obstacles remain, they are very few.'

Barzani's statements reflect the climate he personally experienced in the U.S. in support of Kurdish independence. This is nothing new. Nor is the official American adoption of Iraq's partition into three states – Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni – anything new either. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden confirmed this even when the U.S. was still occupying Iraq.

Americans and Westerners often work first on preparing the psychological atmosphere in favor of the idea of partition. This is exactly what happened with the establishment of the Zionist entity for which the 1917 Balfour Declaration paved the way. The countdown to the psychological preparation for partitioning Iraq began in the 1990s after the [Iraqi] invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent liberation when Washington declared no-fly zones for Saddam Hussein's warplanes in northern and southern Iraq. It was as if it were drawing the preliminary borders of partition between a Kurdish north, a Shiite south, and a Sunni center.

A few years after the [2003] invasion of Iraq, Biden declared that the solution lies in partitioning the country into three areas. Biden repeated these claims just a few days ago but in circumstances different from before, and that are more amenable to implementing this idea. Moreover, the Congress has urged Obama to deal with Iraq financially and militarily as if it were divided into three areas, Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish, and to thus allow weapons to be sold to these areas directly without having to pass via the central government in Baghdad.

A glance at the reality on the battlefield in Iraq would show that the U.S. was never serious about fighting ISIS. It has confined itself to air raids that did not always hit ISIS targets and that did not prevent ISIS from advancing in many Iraqi areas. In fact, and despite ISIS's 'invasion' of Iraq and its subsequent collision with Kurdish peshmerga forces in areas of Kurdistan and its threat to Irbil before being repulsed, and despite the bloody clashes between ISIS and the Kurds in 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in Syria, ISIS’s actions have implicitly helped achieve strategic Kurdish aims. For from the very first day that ISIS entered Iraq in June 2014, peshmerga forces took the initiative and entered Kirkuk and its surroundings, declaring that the so-called ‘Kirkuk problem’ had been resolved, and thereby cancelling out the Iraqi constitution's requirement to hold a referendum regarding the area's fate, and whether it will join Kurdistan or remain under the central government's authority.

The annexation of Kirkuk to Kurdistan Province achieves the greatest dream the Kurds have had in their history. It is no less important than the federalization of Iraq in the constitution. For Kirkuk is a major symbol for the Kurds; they deem it to be equivalent to Jerusalem. In fact, the Kurds went on to describe the disputed areas with Baghdad as ‘Kurdish areas’ after they captured them.

Iraq’s Kurds have successfully exploited the developments on the battlefield resulting from ISIS's invasion. In light of Iraq’s ethnic and confessional divisions, and the fact that all sectors are busy with the confrontation with ISIS, none of the Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni sectors of society is able to subdue the other; but none seems to have the desire to coexist with the other either. This is especially true in light of another reason, namely the cunning manner in which the U.S. has managed the domestic and regional conflict such that it serves Western and Israeli interests and renders the cancer of partition an inevitable reality. The only thing that can limit this would be a miraculous renaissance of which there is no sign on the horizon.

"But the spark of hope that the region will once again be united and free, if only in a thousand years’ time, has not been extinguished," concludes Noureddin.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Not very welcomed

 

Fifty-five days after the election, the Knesset voted Thursday evening, by 61 votes to 59, to approve Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's fourth and Israel's 34th government. The ceremony began at 9 P.M. – two hours after the original scheduled time – as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu scrambled to finish appointing ministers from within his own Likud party. With the clock ticking, Netanyahu decided to unveil his new government without finding positions for at least two of his key fellow Likudniks – Gilad Erdan and Silvan Shalom.

As expected, the vote was preceded by a heated debate in the Knesset between coalition and opposition. As Netanyahu addressed the Knesset to present his new government, he faced a raucous, disrespectful plenum. Three Arab MKs were ejected from the plenum, one after the other, as Netanyahu began speaking, due to loud and incessant interruptions.

Netanyahu's speech focused primarily on the need to change Israel's electoral system, which, he said, made it impossible for anyone to establish a stable government and condemned the country to having elections every two years on average. He urged opposition leader Isaac Herzog to help stabilize the government by bringing his Zionist Union party into the coalition – which would provide them with a government broad enough to push through a new electoral system.

In his response, Herzog made it abundantly clear that he has no intention of taking Netanyahu up on his offer. 'This is not the government the people wanted and not even the government that half of the people wanted,' he said. 'You bought power with lies. After such negotiations, you still dare give the world advice about negotiations with Iran?' Herzog also criticized the decision to expand the number of ministers. 'My way is not your way,' he said. 'No respectable leader will join your government.'

Netanyahu had hoped that Herzog would take the currently vacant foreign minister position – which both Erdan and Shalom had been lobbying for. Their hopes were dashed when Netanyahu told Tzipi Hotovely that she would serve as a deputy in the ministry while he tried to convince Herzog. Tzachi Hanegbi was announced as coalition chairman and the chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. 

This is the full list of the ministers, deputy ministers and ministers without portfolio in the new government: Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (also serving as Foreign Minister, Health Minister, Communications Minister, and Minister of Regional Cooperation); Moshe Ya'alon (Likud) - Defense Minister (returning); Silvan Shalom (Likud) - Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister; Yuval Steinitz (Likud) - Minister of Energy and Infrastructure; Ze'ev Elkin (Likud) - Absorption Minister and Strategic Affairs Minister; Ofir Akunis (Likud) - Minister without portfolio; designated to serve in the Communications Ministry; Benny Begin (Likud) - Minister without portfolio; Gila Gamliel (Likud) - Minister of Senior Citizens and Equality; Yisrael Katz (Likud) - Transportation Minister (returning); Yariv Levin (Likud) - Public Security Minister, Tourism Minister, and Ministerial Liaison Between the Government and the Knesset; Miri Regev (Likud) - Culture and Sport Minister; Danny Danon (Likud) - Space and Technology Minister; Haim Katz (Likud) - Welfare Minister and Social Affairs Minister; Tzipi Hotovely (Likud) - Deputy Foreign Minister; Ayoub Kara (Likud) - Deputy Minister of Regional Development; Moshe Kahlon (Kulanu) - Finance Minister; Yoav Galant (Kulanu) - Housing and Construction Minister; Avi Gabbai (Kulanu) - Environmental Protection Minister; Naftali Bennett (Habayit Hayehudi) - Education Minister, Diaspora Affairs Minister; Uri Ariel (Habayit Hayehudi) - Agriculture Minister; Ayelet Shaked (Habayit Hayehudi) - Justice Minister; Rabbi Eli Ben-Dahan (Habayit Hayehudi)  - Deputy Defense Minister; Aryeh Deri (Shas) - Economy Minister, Minister of Development of the Negev and Galilee; David Azoulay (Shas) - Religious Affairs Minister; Yitzhak Cohen (Shas) - Deputy Minister in the Finance Ministry, Ministry for the Negev and the Galilee, and the Economy Ministry; Meshulam Nahari (Shas) - Deputy Education Minister; Yaakov Litzman (United Torah Judaism) - Deputy Health Minister; Meir Porush (United Torah Judaism) - Deputy Education Minister.

All the newspapers use the swearing in of new government to make lead headlines out of their top commentators. On the front page of Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth and Dan Margalit get top billing; the former castigating opposition leader Isaac Herzog for his Knesset speech, the latter bemoaning the haphazard way the government was put together. On the front page of Yedioth Ahronoth, Sima Kadmon goes much further than Margalit – she says that the coalition negotiations and the unveiling of the new government were nothing less than shameful. Haaretz's Yossi Verter offers a variation on that theme, saying that the right-wing government has got off on the left foot.

In the United States, President Obama said that he still believes that Israel's long-term security is best served by reaching an agreement to live alongside a recognized Palestinian state. Obama, speaking shortly after the swearing-in, was speaking at a press conference at Camp David, where he is meeting Gulf leaders for talks on the impending Iranian deal.

'I know that a government has been formed that contains some folks who don't necessarily believe in that premise, but that continues to be my premise,' he added. Noting that he was speaking at Camp David, Obama referred back to a 1978 deal negotiated at the same presidential retreat that brought peace between Israel and Egypt. 'Israel is better off for it. I think the same would be true if we get a peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians,' he said. 'That prospect seems distant now, but I think it's always important for us to keep in mind what's right and what's possible,' added Obama. Obama declined to comment on the Vatican's recent decision to recognize the state of Palestine.

At the same press conference, Obama also said that leaders of Gulf allies have agreed that a comprehensive, verifiable deal that blocks Iran's pathway to a nuclear weapon would serve everyone's interests. He added that the United States and the Gulf nations had pledged to work together to address threats to the region, including those blamed on destabilizing behavior by Iran. Obama pledged America's 'ironclad commitment' to the Persian Gulf nations to help protect their security, pointedly mentioning the potential use of military force and offering assurances that a potential nuclear agreement with Iran would not leave them more vulnerable. He said the U.S. would join the Gulf Cooperation Council nations 'to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state's territorial integrity.'

Elsewhere, Israel security forces are on high alert today as Palestinians commemorate Nakba Day. As part of its preparations, the IDF has reinforced its troops stationed in the West Bank by six companies. The IDF's preparations are aimed mainly at containing potential riots and disturbances at locations where they commonly take place, including Qalandiya, Betuniya, Ni'ilin and Bil'in.

 

 

WINNERS AND LOSERS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth admits that the process of forming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's new government has not been elegant, but says that the problem is with the electoral system itself.

"The birth of the State of Israel's 34th government was not an easy one. And now that it has, at long last, been born, it faces many problems. There will be harsh criticism from the opposition, as well as from the media. In other words, the camp that lost the election will be criticizing the winners. But that's to be expected when memories are short and when people forget that a one-vote majority is still a majority.

Is appears that members of the Israeli opposition have forgotten that an election was held here just two months ago and that the people of Israel had their say. The election may only be an unimportant detail for Tzipi Livni, if we are to judge by her comments in the Knesset last night. She said that she is worried for the fate of Israeli democracy. Perhaps she wants the job of forming the government to be given to the losing party? That's Livni-style democracy.

Livni's partner, Isaac Herzog, doesn't want to be foreign minister. He wants to be prime minister. And, in order to become prime minister, he first of all needs to continue being the leader of the Zionist Union. And in order for him to remain at the helm of his party, he must flex his muscles and fight off all those who want to replace him. Between you and me, he didn't deliver the goods he promised, did he? Didn't he promise that he would form the next government?

And that's exactly what Herzog did yesterday in the Knesset: he flexed his muscles in an aggressive and belligerent speech. He wants to show the world that he's leader of the opposition. He just forgot one small thing in his highly unstatesmanlike speech: he was the loser in the general election. In fact, every member of the opposition seemed to forget that small and unimportant detail during the coalition negotiations which were, let's admit it, far from elegant.

And now to the coalition negotiations themselves – 42 days that were not a pleasure to witness and which highlighted yet again the problems inherent in the Israeli electoral system. Because of this system, every election is followed by a period of extortion and blackmail. And the person who is subjected to this unpleasantness is always whoever won the election. That's just the way it is in our country.

In this election, the people make their voice heard very clearly. The right-wing bloc should have been able to put together a coalition of at least 70 members. But the three seats won by Eli Yishai's Yahad party – which failed to cross the electoral threshold – went down the tubes and the six seats that Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party won belong to the rightist bloc – but Lieberman made his choice and opted to sit on the opposition benches.

In the end, Netanyahu finds himself with a coalition of 61 Knesset members. That's a wafer-thin majority. But that's the reality. Let's hope that he manages to expand his government. Even if he does not, let's hope that the 34th government of Israel is a successful one.

The speech that Herzog delivered in the Knesset yesterday evening was a clear message to Netanyahu. The post of foreign minister remains vacant. Gilad Erdan would no doubt be delighted to be handed it. Silvan Shalom, who is deputy prime minister, would also make a fine foreign minister. Netanyahu could have thought about that earlier.

Yesterday's events do not add honor to Israeli politics. Not because of the minimal majority with which the new government was approved. There have been governments that were just as narrow. Let's not forget that the Oslo Accords were passed by a single-vote majority – which didn't seem to bother the left at the time – and we all remember how easily ministers and lawmakers can be bribed to change their vote. Of course, things can be different. But for that to happen, we must change the electoral system. But when the Likud based its early election campaign on a promise to change the electoral system, the voters were far from enthusiastic.

Maybe the time has come to find the right formula and to ensure that, next time, the winner of the election isn't treated like the loser and the loser doesn't have delusions of victory."

Ends…

 

TO DIE OF SHAME: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Sima Kadmon says that the fourth Netanyahu government is an embarrassment and that the people of Israel – and even members of the prime minister's own party – deserve better.

"No matter which political camp you belong to, the scenes we witnessed in the Knesset last night were enough to make anyone die of shame.

There have been embarrassing scenes in the Israeli parliament before, but yesterday a new record was set: the prime minister taking a crumpled piece of paper from his pocket and reading the list of ministers in his new government – many of whom were hearing about their appointment for the first time and others who discovered that they had been given jobs that they had not agreed to accept.

The swearing in of the new government, which was the final scene in a two-month charade of negotiations, proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the formation of the fourth Netanyahu government was put together in the most negligent and dishonorable way possible. And this is a prime minister who has the audacity to preach to the president of the United States about how best to conduct his negotiations with Iran?

After 55 days and with 30 Knesset seats, this is what Netanyahu has managed to present to the people. Not only is he the leader of a narrow coalition, which everyone agrees will have a very short shelf-life, but he also handed out ministerial appointments to members of his own party in the most haphazard way imaginable: ministries were deconstructed so that he could satisfy the power lust of politicians who were not happy with what they were offered. In addition, the authorities of some ministries were transferred to others without any logic or reason. And so we find ourselves in the absurd situation whereby the Transportation Ministry is also responsible for intelligence matters and the minister for immigrant absorption is also in charge of strategic threats. And when there are no more jobs to hand out, our prime minister anoints a rank-a-file Knesset member as 'minister.' Minister of what? Who knows? When it comes to appointing ministers, Netanyahu is trigger happy.

Take Benny Begin, for example. His father – Menachem Begin – was mentioned during the Knesset debate last night, but, ironically, by Herzog. What must Benny Begin have felt when he heard for the first time that Netanyahu was making him a minister? And what must Tzachi Hanegbi – a serious, experienced politician and one of Likud's most eloquent spokesmen – have thought when he heard that, in addition to being chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, a position he has held for years and which he has asked to be relieved of, he was also made coalition whip – a thankless task that he didn't ask for and didn't agree to take on? As if all this were not enough, Netanyahu had another surprise up his sleeve: Hanegbi and Ofir Akunis would be switching jobs in a year from now. Hanegbi will become a 'minister' and Akunis will take over as Netanyahu's lapdog.

And then there's Gilad Erdan – who won top place in the Likud primary, who is the Netanyahu family's most loyal servant and who committed hara-kiri in the television studios to defend the behavior of Mr. and Mrs. Netanyahu. How must he have felt when Netanyahu called on him to join the government –but failed to leave a single position open for him? How ungrateful does one have to be to do something like that to a loyal servant who has never once gone against the wishes of his prime minister?

After Herzog's excellent speech – which left no room for doubt that the Zionist Union will not be joining the fourth Netanyahu government – the prime minister would be well advised to appoint Erdan as his foreign minister. As of yesterday, there can be no more excuses. There is no point in hanging on to the position of foreign minister, since there is no one to hold it for. Silvan Shalom – who had demanded the Foreign Ministry job otherwise he wouldn't serve in the government – capitulated in exchange for a position that isn't worth the paper it's written on: deputy prime minister. Just that morning, Shalom slammed the door on the offer to become interior minister; by nighttime, after he was offered a meaningless position, he opened the door again.

The fourth Netanyahu government was born last night. Mazal tov. It's a narrow coalition between the Likud, the ideological right and the ultra-Orthodox. From now on, our representative in the international community is Tzipi Hotovely, who has been busy encouraging Jewish worshippers to visit Temple Mount. Some people will say that we got what we deserve. But that's not true. No one deserves a government like this."

Ends…

 

 

SAME OLD STORY: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini comments on how the new Israeli government will be viewed by opponents of the Jewish state overseas – and adds that newly appointment Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked will not have the power to change anything.

"The formula is a familiar one: The more right-wing the government of Israel appears to the world, the easier it is for the anti-Israel campaigners to do their work; an increase in Israel in anti-Arab statements and incidents leads to a fall-off in support for Israel among Jewish students on U.S. campuses; and the more organizations like Breaking the Silence and B'Tselem create the distorted impression that Israel is committing crimes on an ongoing basis, the easier it is for the BDS activists to tout their case.

The starting positions are problematic – not only due to the composition of the new Israeli government, but primarily in light of the geopolitical situation. The absurd thing is that under current circumstances, Israel's control over the territories is the lesser evil. A hasty political settlement that the U.S. administration and the European Union are pushing for, with the encouragement of a bunch of Israelis who support the Palestinian demand for unilateral recognition of statehood – would be a disaster for the Palestinians. A Hamas takeover would only be a matter of time. This has nothing at all to do with the composition of the Israeli government. Isaac Herzog would encounter the same geopolitical situation; and Tzipi Livni, too, would encounter Palestinian opposition to any peace deal. After all, the Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert governments made very generous offers to Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas respectively – to no avail.

Nevertheless, not all is lost. Assuming that Israeli control over the West Bank is not going to end anytime soon, a right-wing government can still promote a series of measures that would better the lives of Palestinians but would not undermine Israeli security in the slightest – in the field of water infrastructure, for example. Funds have been donated for rehabilitation projects; a start can be made. And the same goes for projects in the fields of health, construction and infrastructure. Israel hasn't been the one to delay development. On the contrary, since the beginning of Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza, there have been huge improvements in most areas. In 1967, for example, just four Palestinian communities were hooked up to running water for domestic use; by 2004, however, 643 of the 708 communities were on the water grid. But there is still much to improve. It's not only a Palestinian interest, but an Israeli interest too.

There's something foolish about the fact that the international community is pushing the sides into a political settlement that will only make things worse for the Palestinians. But there are some things that can be done even without a peace agreement. Whether or not improving the situation is in Palestinian interests remains unclear. An improvement is clearly in Israel's interests.

Meanwhile, the manifestations of chauvinism in light of the appointment of Ayelet Shaked as justice minister are nothing more than a small blemish compared to the attempt to present any proposal for change as an assault by the forces of darkness on the forces of light. Even European officials, it has been reported, are monitoring with concern any initiative that could undermine Israeli democracy. Interesting – because Shaked's criticism of the judicial system has been voiced in the past by professors and leftists. They sparked similar responses. After all, anyone who questions something becomes a member of the forces of darkness – regardless of the fact if the individual in question is an Israel Prize laureate, like Ruth Gavison and Daniel Friedmann, or a political figure like Haim Ramon. Anyone who thinks different is immediately labeled dark. This is the democracy of the forces of light. The response from Europe falls into the same category. After all, the proposals raised by the so-called forces of darkness are based, inter alia, on the common practice in many European states.

But just to make things perfectly clear, Shaked has no chance of changing anything. The judicial oligarchy has already proved itself too strong. And this is more proof of the problem."

Ends…

 

THE LAST SIX WEEKS: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that the U.S. and the West are looking for a way to improve relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially over the Ukrainian crisis, but that the main concern for the Obama Administration remains the nuclear deal with Iran.

"Contrary to popular opinion, it isn't Israel that is making life hard for the White House to finalize the nuclear agreement with Iran. It isn't even the opposition expressed by the six leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the United States' accelerated rapprochement with the Islamic Republic that's got the White House upset. As we enter the final stages of the protracted negotiations between the six world powers and Iran, it's Russia – one of the key members of the P5+1 – that has taken upon itself to be Washington's worst nightmare and to be the joker in the pack.

While President Barack Obama was busy trying to reassure the Gulf leaders that the deal with Iran – their arch nemesis in the region – was a good one, Secretary of State John Kerry was initiating and spearheading a highly publicized diplomatic drive to bury the hatchet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and to renew fruitful dialogue between Washington and Moscow.

Kerry's meeting with Putin took place on Wednesday in the resort town of Sochi – and represented the top U.S. diplomat's walk to Canossa. But the need to get Putin and the Kremlin on the same page as the other Western powers is so pressing and so critical that Kerry's meeting will be followed by one between Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Moscow on Sunday.

The Kerry-Putin summit was the first such high-level meeting between the two powers for two years. Both sides admitted that the meeting did not yield any breakthroughs. Kerry added that, while the discussions did not produce any concrete progress, the atmosphere was good and the talks constructive. 'There is no substitute for talking directly to key decision-makers, particularly during a period that is as complex and fast-moving as this is,' he said. 'We are now coming into the last six weeks of negotiations [with Iran] ... and we all understand that unity has been key to bringing us where we are today.'

Kerry stressed the importance to U.S. foreign policy of dialogue and cooperation with Russia. Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, analyst Fred Weir saw the meetings between Russian, American and German officials as a possible return to the pragmatism that once characterized relations between Russia and the West. According to Weir, Western governments are now in damage-limitation mode, following the diplomatic unpleasantness of the virtual boycott of Russia's military parade, marking the 70th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany.

In Washington, however, there's an altogether less complimentary interpretation of this wooing of Putin. It would appear that senior U.S. administration officials and their counterparts in European capitals have reached the conclusion that sanctions against Russia – imposed after it annexed the Crimean Peninsula and gave its backing to Ukrainian separatists – have made little impact on Putin, who has maintained a rather contrarian policy in his dealings with the United States and the West. According to top diplomats in New York, Ukraine will continue to be the main cause of tensions between Russia and the West, with several predicting a flare-up between government forces and the separatists in the near future.

But in the upper echelons of the White House and the State Department, the main concern remains how to get the deal with Iran over the finishing line. The Obama Administration is facing possible obstacles from two of its supposed partners: on the international stage, Russia, and, on the domestic front, Congress."

Ends…

 

THE SECRET WEAPON: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that Israel is turning to the media and diplomacy to head off an almost inevitable new round of confrontation with Hizbollah.

"In a prominent article on Wednesday, The New York Times reported detailed Israeli allegations about Hizbollah’s military deployment in Shi’ite villages in southern Lebanon. The paper cited a briefing by Israeli military officials as its source, added an evasive response from 'a Hizbollah sympathizer in Lebanon,' and noted that the Israeli claims 'could not be independently verified.'

The Times cited data, maps and aerial photographs provided by the Israel Defense Forces in regard to two neighboring villages, Muhaydib and Shaqra, in the central sector of southern Lebanon. The former, according to Israeli military intelligence, houses 'nine arms depots, five rocket-launching sites, four infantry positions, signs of three underground tunnels, three antitank positions and, in the very center of the village, a Hizbollah command post' – all in a village of no more than 90 homes. In the latter village, with a population of 4,000, the IDF claims to have identified no fewer than 400 Hizbollah-related military sites.

Throughout southern Lebanon, Israel has identified thousands of Hizbollah facilities that could be targeted by Israel, according to the report by Isabel Kershner. Israel, Kershner writes, is preparing for what it views as 'an almost inevitable next battle with Hizbollah.' According to the IDF, Hizbollah has significantly built up its firepower and destructive capability, and has put in place extensive operational infrastructure in the Shi’ite villages of southern Lebanon – a move which, Israel says, 'amounts to using the civilians as a human shield.'

Although Kershner’s Israeli interlocutors don’t claim to know when or under what specific circumstances war will erupt, they pull no punches about its likely consequences. In such a war, the Times report says, the IDF will not hesitate to attack targets in a civilian setting, with the result that many Lebanese noncombatants will be killed. That will not be Israel’s fault, an unnamed 'senior Israeli military official' says, because 'the civilians are living in a military compound.' Israel 'will hit Hizbollah hard,' and make 'every effort to limit civilian casualties,' the military official said. However, Israel does 'not intend to stand by helplessly in the face of rocket attacks.'

The Times reports that Hizbollah, as part of the lessons it drew in the Second Lebanon War, in 2006, moved its 'nature reserves' – its military outposts in the south – from open farmland into the heart of the Shi’ite villages that lie close to the border with Israel. That in itself is old news; Hizbollah began redeploying along these lines immediately after the 2006 war. In July 2010, Israel presented similar data to the local and foreign media, which revealed in great detail Hizbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The village that was singled out then was Al-Khiyam.

On all these occasions, Israel made it clear that in the event of a war it would have to operate in the villages, and that civilians would inevitably be harmed. In the current incarnation of warnings, as conveyed in this week’s Times report, the potential consequences of the situation are noted by two former senior officials of the defense establishment.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin, a former director of Military Intelligence, is quoted as saying that the residents of villages in southern Lebanon do not have full immunity if they live close to military targets. Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, formerly head of the National Security Council, asks why the international community is doing nothing to prevent Hizbollah’s arms buildup. A few years ago, at the instruction of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Amidror, as head of the NSC, presented similar aerial photographs and maps from Lebanon to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

The question is: Why again now? The IDF says that the briefing by the senior officer, together with the information provided to the Times, is intended to reinforce the ongoing Israeli messages to Hizbollah and the international community. The essence of those messages is that Hizbollah is continuing to violate UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by smuggling increasing quantities of arms into Lebanese territory and by deploying its forces south of the Litani River; that Hizbollah’s military infrastructure is an open book to Israeli intelligence and that the IDF can inflict serious damage on it when needed; and that, because Hizbollah chooses to shelter among a civilian population, strikes at its military targets will entail the non-deliberate killing of innocent persons.

An additional explanation for why these points were emphasized in the briefing to the Times lies in the spirit being dictated to the IDF by the new chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot. In his view, the army’s mission, under his leadership, is 'to distance war.' This involves preparing the IDF as thoroughly as possible for the next possible confrontation – alongside an active effort, in the sphere of public diplomacy and to a degree even in the state-policy realm, to prevent war. This is the reason for the frequent emphasis on training as the IDF’s first priority, following a lengthy period of compromises and budget cuts in that sphere. Recent weeks have seen a fairly extensive series of training exercises by the ground forces, a trend that is slated to continue in the months ahead.

Proper management of the daily risks to Israel, most of which stem from possible indirect consequences of the region’s chronic instability, could reduce the danger of an all-out war. At the same time, a higher level of fitness and readiness displayed by the IDF could help deter Hizbollah – at present, the most dangerous and best-trained enemy Israel faces – from setting in motion a deterioration of the situation that would lead to war.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon also hinted at this, in a talk he gave at a meeting of officials from regional councils on Tuesday. Ya’alon warned that 'Israel could unite all the forces in the region against it, if it acts incorrectly.' Israel’s approach, he said, consists of 'surgical behavior based on red lines, and those who cross them know we will act.' Those lines include 'violation of sovereignty on the Golan Heights, the transfer of certain weapons.'

Israel is apparently deeply concerned by Hizbollah’s effort to improve the accuracy of its rockets. The organization has in its possession vast numbers of missiles and rockets – 130,000, according to the latest estimates – but upgrading its capability is dependent on improving the weapons’ accuracy, which would enable Hizbollah to strike effectively at specific targets, including air force-base runways and power stations.

'There are some things for which we take responsibility and others for which we don’t, but we do not intervene in internal conflicts unless our red lines are crossed,' Ya’alon reiterated.

In other words: Israel is upset at the smuggling of weapons by the Assad regime in Syria to Hizbollah, but understands that launching a lengthy, systematic series of attacks is liable to affect the delicate balance in the north, generate a confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah, and, as a consequence, foment a change in the civil war in Syria. Israel does not wish to see any such change, preferring a continuation of the status quo."

Ends…

 

THE GOVERNMENT THE WORLD WILL LOVE TO HATE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's fourth government will have its work cut out in persuading the international community that it has good intentions.

"By appointing Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely as deputy foreign minister on Thursday, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may have tried to solve some internal Likud problems, but he did not help Israel’s position in the world.

One can only imagine the cables diplomats from the U.S. to New Zealand, Britain to Spain, sent their home offices regarding the new government: 'A narrow hard-right government with the Foreign Ministry to be run day-by-day by Hotovely, a proponent of a one-state solution who believes Jews should be allowed to pray on Temple Mount, and is very close to the settlement community.' In other words, Hotovely represents the opposite of everything much of the world, including U.S. President Barack Obama, wants to see in Israel.

On Wednesday Obama said he wanted to see policies and actions from both Israel and the Palestinians that would show their commitment to a two-state solution. On Thursday Netanyahu sent to the Foreign Ministry as his deputy a one-state advocate who believes Israel should apply sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, give the Palestinians full citizenship and live with a large Arab minority.

Netanyahu’s refusal to appoint a full-time foreign minister, and to instead keep that portfolio for himself for the time being, is an indication that he is holding that job open for someone else who he hopes may join the government down the line. Preferably, from his point of view, this would be the Zionist Union’s Isaac Herzog, but quite possibly Avigdor Lieberman, if and when he gets tired of sharing the opposition benches with Meretz’s Zahava Gal-On and the Joint List’s Haneen Zoabi.

Diplomatic officials in Jerusalem said Wednesday that there would probably not be any significant diplomatic fallout from the appointment – Ze’ev Elkin, another opponent of the two-state solution, served in the deputy foreign minister post recently and the roof did not fall in. Furthermore, Avigdor Lieberman, with his views at odds with much of the world, was a full-fledged foreign minister and Israel’s foreign relations did not collapse.

But the problem with Hotovely’s appointment is both the mixed message it sends, and what could have been. Regarding the mixed message, the world will once again see in the Foreign Ministry a right-wing and strongly ideological personality who, like Lieberman, does not agree with some of the fundamental diplomatic policies of the prime minister.

And regarding what could have been, Netanyahu – well aware of the country’s difficult diplomatic standing – could have put in that position a face that would have been 'presentable' to the world: someone like former U.S. ambassador Michael Oren, from Kulanu, or even a Yuval Steinitz, Gilad Erdan or Tzachi Hanegbi from the Likud; someone who may have been able to put a more moderate face on a right-wing government the world is just going to love to hate.

Political considerations made that impossible. So instead, Hotovely gets the nod, something that – at a time of tremendous diplomatic challenges – is not going to make Israel’s ability to maneuver on the international stage any easier."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT GRAFT PROBE PROSECUTORS: Mehmet Tezkan has no sympathy for the dismissal of anti-government graft prosecutors in centrist Milliyet: "Those judges and prosecutors who threw the law into the waste paper basket are in the headlines again. In the past they were accusers; today they are the accused. In the past, the people they were accusing were screaming for the 'law'; today they are groaning about the 'law' themselves. There is nothing left to say. They are the ones who got rid of the law themselves."

Orhan Bursali laments the absence of the rule of law in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The AKP (ruling Justice and Development Party) government has created a system that is lawless, arbitrary, has no judiciary, and is ruled by the orders of President Erdogan. If there is no law, there is nothing. If there is no law, there can be no human rights and freedoms. No justice. No democracy. Nothing. Turkey has sunk. If the law sinks, this means that nothing will be left apart from those who have power and who assume that they will survive."

Mumtazer Turkone questions the government’s motives in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The dismissal of four prosecutors and a judge did not take place according to legal procedures. Their defence was not accepted, the time limits were not taken into consideration. Apparently, Erdogan is trying to make a show of power. If the law is no longer valid, then politics has ended and we are only talking about palace intrigue. Only one logical question is left: What goal is served by this naked lawlessness that will wound the public conscience just before the elections?"

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS: Hakan Aksay describes a campaign of government intimidation in independent internet newspaper T24: "Erdogan is gaining strength from the tension, the infighting, the polarization and other divisions. He is frightening everyone. He is doing so consciously. Sometimes he casts such angry glances around that even the people watching him on the TV screens are inclined to pay attention as to how they sit."

Taha Ozhan blames the parliamentary system in centre-right, pro-government Star: "After experiencing the crisis caused by the current system for half a century in the severest manner, Turkey was able to move towards normalization with the AKP government. The AKP’s coming to power alone has been one of the most significant dynamics of this transformation, as well as its complex and deep political and social meaning. The only source from which the opposition finds succor and tries to gain strength in the 2015 elections, however, is the parliamentary system structure that produces instability."

 

SYRIA CRISIS: Cengiz Candar casts doubt on Turkey’s ambitions in Syria in centre-left Radikal "Can a giant Turkey, which also lays claim to the 'Ottoman heritage', achieve the result it seeks in Syria by tagging along behind the Saudi Arabian regime, hand in hand with the Wahhabism that appeared as a revolt against the Ottoman state? Cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia has brought about Idlib and Jisr al-Shughour’s fall [into Syrian Islamist opposition hands] and revived speculation about the Assad regime’s life span. It is true that the Damascus regime has received a severe blow. However, it is doubtful that its days are numbered. Unless Iran and Russia abandon the Damascus regime, it can survive a lengthy 'war of attrition'."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Resalat accuses the U.S. of perfidy: "The U.S. has shown it is untrustworthy before and during the negotiations; it will also do so in the future. The recent agreement between Congress and the White House on the nuclear agreement shows the enemy's duplicity! Unlike our truthfulness, the U.S. continues its harmful behaviour by playing the game of 'good cop-bad cop' between the White House and Congress." 

Reformist E'temad calls for better planning to retrieve Iran’s share in the oil market: "The parties have not yet reached a common view on how to remove sanctions. We should not waste time waiting for the final agreement. We should make plans and start dialogue to ensure the return of Iranian oil to the world market. It should be taken into account that the oil market may not return overnight and that we can revive our share only through proper management." 

Reformist Mardom Salari is in a hurry: "The American administration is pressurized by Congress. To keep them happy, President Obama sometimes uses unconventional diplomatic language on the nuclear issue. We should recognize that both the American administration and Iran have concluded that the nuclear case should be settled as soon as possible through an agreement. This will lay the groundwork for limiting the influence of other players currently and in the future." 

 

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL: Conservative Hemayat does not trust the West or international organizations: "As the nuclear negotiations continue in Vienna, Yukiya Amano, the International Atomic Energy Agency chief, called on Iran to retreat from its red lines. Amano, however, did not clarify how applying the Additional Protocol can force a country to grant access to its military facilities. The protocol has not passed through all legal phases to be endorsed by Iran. It is not logical to rely on and trust organizations and other countries. That it is why we should listen to the wise remarks of the Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Khamenei when he says: 'I am not optimistic about the negotiations.'" 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is adamant: "Why does the West and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] insist that observers have access to Iranian military sites?! This demand has been frequently raised by IAEA chief Amano and the Americans. We assert that our military facilities cannot be observed and be accessible. The agency's head has had his own interpretation of the Additional Protocol of the NPT, but there is no clarification in that Protocol about visiting military sites. The agency is entitled to supervise nuclear facilities, but visiting military facilities is not within its mandate." 

Conservative Khorasan worries about interpretations: "There is serious concern that interpretations of the additional protocol by Amano and people like him may become the benchmark for inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities. Such interpretations may broaden to include military facilities. When writing the final nuclear agreement, care should be taken in regard to security aspects of this protocol; the scope for personal interpretations should be excluded."

 

IRAQI PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO IRAN: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami reminds: "The visit to Iran takes place at a time when Iraq faces many problems, in particular the foreign conspiracy of ISIS and terrorist attacks. One purpose of this visit is to expand ties to counter security threats. It was the Islamic Republic that extended a helping hand to the army and people of Iraq to confront ISIS attacks as soon as the central government requested help. Iran proudly passed this test." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan overstates: "Recently, Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspapers al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat in various articles urged Iran, particularly Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to help resolve the conflict in Yemen. This indicates that Saudi Arabia has reached a dead-end in this war and is looking for Iran's help." 

Reformist Arman comments: "The peaceful resolution of problems in the Middle East is in everybody's interest. However, Saudi Arabia considers Yemen its backyard and tries to persuade other countries that Iran is interfering in Yemen. Saudi Arabia feels Iran is turning into a dominant power. The Saudi bombing of Yemen indicates that Saudi Arabia will lose its status in the region soon."

 

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: Reformist Sharq warns: "American remarks about the agenda at the Camp David summit are disappointing because they emphasize the resumption of previous mistaken political games in the current chaotic situation in the region. Saudi bad behaviour, the expansion of terrorism and the emergence of Iran as a great power in the region are some outcomes of that game. The American-led wars in Kuwait, Afghanistan and Iraq led to Iran's triumph. Of course, the U.S. did not start these wars with such goals in mind." 

Hard-line Javan reads: "The fact that the cease-fire in Yemen and the summit at Camp David coincided raises the possibility that the main goal of the U.S. from the cease-fire has been the creation of a suitable psychological climate for the summit. Evidence indicates that America is trying to manage a new phase of Iran phobia by encouraging Persian Gulf states to accept the new U.S. missile defence system and normalize their relations with the Zionist regime."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- The charged beginning of a new era

2-Hizbollah raises the flag

3-Breaking Iraq apart

 

1- The charged beginning of a new era

 

Despite the American attempts to underplay the significance of the absence of most Gulf leaders, no one disputes the fact that the Saudi and Bahraini monarchs’ decision to boycott the [Camp David] summit – given that neither Sultan Qabus nor the president of the UAE were expected to attend from the start – is meant as a message of anger and frustration regarding the U.S.'s positions over the past few years…Whatever the explanations, the images from the Camp David meeting today will depict the momentous erosion of U.S. influence and interest in the Gulf and the region, as well as the Obama administration’s weakness. They will also reflect the profound disappointment felt by some of Washington's traditional allies, despite the tens of billions of dollars they have invested in bilateral relations in the form of huge arms deals that recent developments have shown are insufficient to ensure their security--pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi

 

What the Gulf states – specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE – want from the U.S. are strong security guarantees against any foreign aggression. They also want the U.S. to confront any foreign party that tries to incite domestic parties, and to commit to seriously confront the expansion of Iranian influence from the eastern Mediterranean to Yemen. In addition, they want the U.S. to supply them with advanced weapons and institutionalize cooperation between the two sides by holding an annual summit and holding joint military manoeuvres, for example. President Obama, however, does not want to make any new security commitments he believes would tie his hands or undermine the chances of reaching a historic nuclear agreement with Tehran. After all, all of Obama's Arab initiatives or policies so far have only yielded contrary results, or have led to the persistence of the dangerous stalemate from Libya to Yemen via Syria, Iraq and the [Palestine/Israel] peace process--Hisham Milhem in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The level of participation at the summit and the statements by some Gulf official, as well as what is being said in the Gulf's media, all give the impression that the gap between the two sides is much greater than the U.S. administration's ability to bridge... For this reason, the ceiling of expectations regarding the results of the Camp David summit seems to be modest in light of the two sides’ differences over fundamental issues. The U.S. alliance with the Gulf states will remain strong regardless of the current disagreements. But both sides are in the process of defining this relationship anew. The Camp David summit represents the charged beginning of a new era--Fahd al-Khitan in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The absence of four out of six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders from today's (Thursday's) Camp David summit with U.S. President Obama sends a clear signal of the Arab Gulf's disappointment at American policy in the region, especially as regards Iran, maintains the editorial in a Qatari-owned pan-Arab daily. Nothing tangible is likely to emerge from this meeting that can address the Gulf's concerns regarding Iran, besides the sense of a continuous erosion of U.S. power and influence. The Gulf leaders want security guarantees from the U.S. administration which Washington is unwilling to provide, says a Lebanese commentator. In particular, they want President Obama to stem Iranian influence when he is more concerned about reaching a nuclear agreement with Tehran. This new Gulf attitude towards the U.S. represents a significant shift from the 1970s and 80s. The Gulf states' disagreements with the U.S. over Iran's role in many areas in the region seem to be too severe to be contained by Washington’s offers of security guarantees, maintains a Jordanian commentator. The results of the Camp David summit are therefore likely to be modest, but they do represent the beginning of a new era in relations between the two sides.

 

CONFLICTING SPECULATION: "U.S. President Barack Obama will meet today with leaders from the GCC at the Camp David retreat near Washington," notes the editorial in Thursday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This meeting will be held amidst conflicting speculation and analyses regarding its potential outcome. But it is clear that the spectre of Iran and the expected nuclear agreement with it will haunt the meeting and be its main focus.

As to its form, and despite the American attempts to underplay the significance of the absence of most Gulf leaders, no one disputes the fact that the Saudi and Bahraini monarchs’ decision to boycott the summit – given that neither Sultan Qabus nor the president of the UAE were expected to attend from the start – is meant as a message of anger and frustration regarding the U.S.'s positions over the past few years.

When Obama took the initiative a few days ago and called King Salman to try and convince him to attend, the answer was that the Saudi monarch would be 'busy supervising the humanitarian truce in Yemen.' One does not need to be an expert on Saudi affairs to realize that it would have been possible to delegate this mission to any government minister had the head of state intended to attend. Meanwhile, and until yesterday evening, no official explanation had been issued as to the Bahraini monarch's absence.

Whatever the explanations, the images from the Camp David meeting today will depict the momentous erosion of U.S. influence and interest in the Gulf and the region, as well as the Obama administration’s weakness. They will also reflect the profound disappointment felt by some of Washington's traditional allies, despite the tens of billions of dollars they have invested in bilateral relations in the form of huge arms deals that recent developments have shown are insufficient to ensure their security.

As for the true explanation of King Salman's position, it is most likely linked to the complications of bilateral relations, the topics that the summit will discuss, and the real aims behind it. The Saudi monarch cannot forget that Obama backed down from attacking Syria at the very last moment at the end of 2013 after Bashar's regime had used chemical weapons. Nor can he disregard Obama's recent unprecedented statements that 'the real threat to the Gulf comes from within and not from outside,' or the fact that he did not consult with Riyadh before reaching the memorandum of understanding regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

Even if the U.S. is no longer dependent on the Gulf's oil as it was in the past – China is now the main purchaser of Gulf and especially Saudi oil – Obama cannot justify a policy that his allies view as a form of ingratitude or even betrayal. As for the meeting's agenda, the Gulf states may try to obtain security guarantees in the form of American binding legal commitments. Washington has rejected this, and is most likely to confine itself to issuing a joint press statement stressing its commitment to 'ensure security in the Gulf as a common interest it shares with its states.' Such an American position, which is careful not to get involved in any war with Iran, contains almost nothing new, nor is it enough to compel the Obama administration to adopt any defensive measures [against Iranian schemes in the Gulf].

Gulf officials therefore seem to realize that the American goal behind this meeting is almost exclusively for PR purposes rather than anything else. Its aim is to 'mollify' the Gulf leaders as the date for signing the final agreement with Iran approaches. Yet this may not be the sole aim behind the meeting. Washington will ask its old allies to tone down their public criticism of the nuclear agreement and focus on the fact that it ensures that Tehran will not produce nuclear weapons, thereby achieving a Gulf as well as a regional and international interest.

As for the possibility of Washington cutting Iran’s role in the Syrian, Yemeni, Iraqi, and Lebanese files down to size, Obama will have no problem saying what the Gulf states want to hear. The most recent such statement was that 'Iran sponsors terrorism' and that he is 'committed to the Gulf's security.' He may add a commitment to exert efforts with Tehran to convince it to reconsider its positions. But past experience has shown that Obama will back down from any practical implementation of these statements as soon as the moment of truth arrives.

Some Arabs may see in the American media positions that will be issued today as a sort of 'psychological victory' or a justification to pursue their habit of wishful thinking. This is the habit that is leading them to believe for example, that Iran– which backed the Syrian regime when it was under siege and economically exhausted – is going to abandon this regime after the sanctions have been are lifted and it is officially recognized as a regional superpower, which will lead to the collapse of the Syrian regime soon.

Washington will naturally not volunteer to correct such illusions that serve one of its strategic aims – namely to 'smuggle through' the agreement with Tehran as soon as possible and with the least possible cost. As for the other possibility – that the agreement will give Iran a free hand and strengthen its regional influence, which explains why it is in a hurry to sign the agreement – this will not be in Washington's interest to discuss at all.

"This is especially true given that Washington has no coherent strategy for securing its vital interests in a region that is boiling over with conflicts, let alone for guaranteeing the security that its allies are demanding," concludes the daily.

End…

 

OLD AXIOMS CHALLENGED: "The first summit between President Barack Obama and the leaders of the GCC will be held at Camp David amidst unusual security conditions, and in the shadow of political changes in the Gulf and the U.S. that have challenged some of the old axioms that have governed relations between the two sides," writes Hisham Milhem in Thursday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

Among the most important of these changes are the signs of weakness and breakdown in some of the states that were born almost a century ago, including Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In addition, there is the emergence of alternative forces that are acting outside the framework of states, that are in control of lands and cities and that behave as if they were states. Most important of these is ISIS, which claims to represent the Sunnis in an Islamic state established on Syrian and Iraqi land, and to a lesser extent, the Shiite militias and organizations in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, with Hizbollah and the Houthis at the forefront.

This phenomenon has been accompanied by the weakness and marginalization of some of the most important 'historic' political centers in the Arab world – from Cairo to Baghdad to Damascus – and ferocious Sunni/Shiite fighting across a broad front, stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean that has been unprecedented since the dawn of Islam.

These Arab collapses have coincided with Iran's emergence as a state that seeks a central and focal role in the Middle East and Central Asia via the Gulf, after proving its ability to mobilize and use armed Shiite organizations and movements in its wars with the Sunni Arabs. In fact, Tehran has succeeded in turning proxy wars into a military art. Its tactical management of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq offers stark evidence of this fact. And in addition to all the above, the U.S. has grown near to becoming the largest energy producer in the world.

What the Gulf states – specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE – want from the U.S. are strong security guarantees against any foreign aggression. They also want the U.S. to confront any foreign party that tries to incite domestic parties, and to commit to seriously confront the expansion of Iranian influence from the eastern Mediterranean to Yemen. In addition, they want the U.S. to supply them with advanced weapons and institutionalize cooperation between the two sides by holding an annual summit and holding joint military manoeuvres, for example.

President Obama, however, does not want to make any new security commitments he believes would tie his hands or undermine the chances of reaching a historic nuclear agreement with Tehran. After all, all of Obama's Arab initiatives or policies so far have only yielded contrary results, or have led to the persistence of the dangerous stalemate from Libya to Yemen via Syria, Iraq and the [Palestine/Israel] 'peace process.' This partially, at least, explains Obama's insistence on reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran and his unwillingness to anger it in Syria and Iraq.

When the Carter Doctrine was announced in 1980, the U.S. had forces in the region deployed ‘beyond the horizon,’ or as one clever analyst put it to the Americans: 'We want you to be like the wind; we want to feel you, but we do not want to see you.'

"How different the situation is today!" concludes Milhem.

End…

 

NOT MUCH TO OFFER: "The U.S. does not have that much to offer its Gulf allies who are angry at its policies in the Middle East," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Thursday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

In an interview with the Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat on the eve of the Camp David summit scheduled for today, U.S. President Barack Obama sought to dispel the Gulf leaders' doubts concerning his country's commitment to their countries' security and interests. But he also reaffirmed his administration's public positions that are not in accord with the Gulf states' policies.

What worries the Gulf states most is the nuclear agreement with Iran. For Obama, this agreement represents the sole strategic success for his Middle East policy that he cannot abandon regardless of Iran being 'a state that sponsors terrorism,' as he put it himself.

The U.S. administration shares the Gulf states' worries regarding Iran's role in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and its intervention in the affairs of some Gulf states. But at the same time, it prefers diplomatic solutions to a military confrontation as the best means of dealing with these issues. The American approach to Syria is also not very satisfying for the Gulf states. Even if the U.S. finds no role for Bashar al-Assad in Syria's future, it still clings to political solutions and rejects a military solution to this crisis.

At present, the U.S. gives priority to defeating the terrorist ISIS, before thinking of toppling Assad's regime. The program of training moderate Syrian fighters managed by Washington in cooperation with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, aims to end ISIS's control in Syria, primarily and before anything else. Even if they support this program, the Gulf states have ambitions to expand the list of targets to include Assad's regime. There have been wide-ranging calls in Gulf capitals for a ‘Decisive Storm’ in Syria, similar to that that Saudi Arabia is waging in Yemen.

In Iraq, the Obama administration is relying on cooperation with PM Haidar al-'Abadi's government to destroy ISIS and adopt policies of reconciliation with Iraq's Sunnis that would bring them back into the fold of the country's political life. The Gulf leaders are not keen on this policy; they still view 'Abadi's government as the other face of [former PM] Maliki's [pro-Iranian] government. They believe that Iraq as a whole has been 'occupied' by Iran, as more than one Gulf official has said.

The U.S. administration's basket contains many programs for military and security support for the Gulf states, via which the U.S. wishes to reconfirm its commitment to the region's security in confrontation with the likely Iranian threats. The Obama administration believes that the plans it is proposing to deploy a missile defense shield to protect the Gulf states' security are sufficient to dispel the Gulf leaders' fears that an agreement with Iran will come 'at our expense,' as Gulf officials repeat.

But how effective will this American offer actually be in reassuring the Gulf states and containing the tension in relations with Washington? The level of participation at the summit and the statements by some Gulf official, as well as what is being said in the Gulf's media, all give the impression that the gap between the two sides is much greater than the U.S. administration's ability to bridge by this offer.

For this reason, the ceiling of expectations regarding the results of the Camp David summit seems to be modest in light of the two sides’ differences over fundamental issues.

The U.S. alliance with the Gulf states will remain strong regardless of the current disagreements. But both sides are in the process of defining this relationship anew.

"The Camp David summit represents the charged beginning of a new era," concludes Khitan.

Ends…

 

 

2-Hizbollah raises the flag

 

By raising the flag over the heights of al-Qalamoun, Hizbollah has sent a number of critical messages to Syria, Lebanon and Israel, says today's Lebanese daily as-Safir

 

The relative ease with which Hizbollah and the Syrian army have captured a strategic mountain peak in the mountainous Qalamoun area along the borders between Syria and Lebanon where thousands of Syrian opposition fighters have been deployed, has numerous implications for Lebanese domestic scene, the Syrian regime's security, the Syrian opposition, and – last but not least – Israel, maintains an analysis in a Lebanese daily.

 

QUALITATIVE ACHIEVEMENT: "Days after the start of the Qalamoun battle and with successive operations that have gradually taken over the positions controlled by the armed [Syrian opposition] elements in the barren lands of 'Assal al-Ward, Brital and at-Tufail, Hizbollah has secured a qualitative achievement that may represent a turning point in the conflict with these armed groups," writes an unattributed analysis in Thursday's left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

The party captured the Tallat Musa peak that lies at around 2580 meters above sea level and that allows whoever is in control to have the longest arm in the Qalamoun's barren areas.

The scene of a Hizbollah fighter raising the party's flag at this peak after the armed elements’ expulsion from it sends a clear symbolic message. It recalls the achievements of the resistance during the confrontation with the [pre-2000] Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

Well-informed sources have told as-Safir that the capture of the crucial Tallat Musa position means that the overall battle of Qalamoun has now been largely decided and that it is approaching its end. What remains is to mop up some scattered sites and consolidate and fortify the new positions captured by the resistance and the Syrian army.

These sources have also noted that the large-scale operation in the barren Qalamoun areas has achieved its main goal that was specified by Hizbollah’s leadership in advance as fortifying the security of the Lebanese interior and improving the resistance and Syrian army's positions in Lebanon's eastern mountain range. The same sources have also noted that the process of 'fortification and improvement' is now almost complete, and that the resistance has succeeded in protecting itself and its people, as planned.

What happened in the Qalamoun’s barren areas yesterday may be said to imply the following:

- It confirms Hizbollah’s combat readiness and ability to determine the outcome of battle at the appropriate time, despite the difficulty of fighting in these barren areas and their complex terrain.

- It confirms the professional management of the battle and the use of the appropriate tactics that are in harmony with the nature of the terrain and the enemy. This allowed the resistance to capture Tallat Musa with the least possible loss compared to the peak's strategic importance. This, after all, is the highest point east of the international Beirut/Damascus road via al-Masna' [border post]. Although it lies inside Syrian territories, it is around one kilometer away from the Lebanese borders.

- The battle has readjusted the balance of power after the [Syrian opposition] armed factions’ recent success on the ground in northern Syria, especially in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour.

- The capture of the mountain peak provides a security umbrella for the Lebanese areas neighboring the Qalamoun barren areas, reaching deep into Lebanese territories; it also protects the back of the city of Damascus.

- The capture of this position offers fire control over wide areas on both the Lebanese and Syrian sides of the border. It severs the supply arteries for the terrorist groups and controls the crossing points that pose a threat to Lebanon via which car bombs and explosive belts have been smuggled in to the country.

- The area in which the terrorist groups were deployed has shrunk and their ability to move has been diminished. The operation has therefore restricted the options available to the armed elements who will now find themselves confronted with the possibility of fleeing to 'Irsal's barren lands or Raqqa inside Syria, surrender, or the certainty of death. (And this is to say nothing of the clash between ISIS and the Nusra Front in tandem with the start of the battle).

- The battle of Qalamoun points to the possibility of altering the new battlefield equation in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour. Both may now be affected by the Barren Lands Storm and the impetus and momentum it may generate.

- The battle sends a message to Israel that the resistance is still in the best of conditions and that the war in Syria has not hemorrhaged it, but on the contrary, has enhanced its expertise and power.

"In this sense, Hizbollah’s operations in the Qalamoun's barren lands may represent a dress rehearsal for a similar scenario whose arena may be the occupied Upper Galilee in any future war [with Israel] if it were to break out," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Breaking Iraq apart

 

A new Congressional bill threatens to partition Iraq and redraw the regional map, warns Yusuf Makki in Saudi al-Watan

 

The recent bill presented to the U.S. Congress calling for offering separate military aid to the various constituents of the country represents a serious threat to Iraq's unity that is only a step towards an old scheme to partition it, as a prelude to redrawing the map of the rest of the region, warns a veteran Saudi commentator.

 

TEN YEARS AFTER: "Less than ten years after the U.S. Congress's vote in favor of a non-binding bill to partition Iraq into three states, the Vice-Chairman of the Senate's Armed Services Committee Senator Mac Thornberry has proposed a bill asking the U.S. secretaries of defense and state to require the Baghdad government headed by Haidar al-'Abadi to give the Sunnis and the Kurds a greater role in ruling the country, and more specifically, in combating ISIS," writes Yusuf Makki in the Saudi daily al-Watan.

Then senator and Barack Obama’s current Vice-President Joseph Biden presented the original non-binding Congressional bill. It crowned the political process engineered by then U.S. ambassador Paul Bremer; namely, that that shaped 'the new Iraq' on the basis of distributing power between the various sects and minorities, doing away the concept of citizenship.

This process coincided with the systematic destruction of the Iraqi national state, the disbandment of the Iraqi army, and a campaign of persecution of those opposed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. It also coincided with a shu'ubi [Iranian anti-Arab] onslaught on Iraq's history, destroying its inherited cultural foundations, which included an attack on the Iraqi Museum, Baghdad University and libraries, as well as destroying state institutions. The leaders of the sectarian militias that came from outside Iraq with the occupiers and on the back of their tanks led this destruction process with a green light from the occupation forces.

Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense at the time, had no qualms about declaring that the anarchy and destruction that was unfolding in Iraq was the first exercise of democracy by a nation unaccustomed to freedom, and described what happened as 'creative anarchy.'

The adoption of Biden's non-binding bill to partition Iraq coincided with a series of writings and reports from a number of Western research centers on the issue of Iraq's partition, arguing in its favor as a practical solution that would guarantee U.S. interests. This also coincided with the U.S. Armed Forces Journal revelation of the 'Blood Borders' map that includes a plan to partition the Arab world and redesign its map in a manner that creates mini-states on sectarian and ethnic bases to replace a number of existing Arab states. At the time, a number of strategic analysts noted that the implementation of this scheme had already begun in Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, and Somalia. It later stretched to include Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

Biden's project included a plan to partition Iraq into Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni entities on the pretext of putting an end to the violence and preventing the country from turning into a totally anarchic state. Although Biden's bill was non-binding, everything that Iraq has witnessed since its occupation suggests that partition of this age-old country has been implemented relentlessly.

The new bill proposed by Vice-Chairman of the Senate's Armed Services Committee Senator Mac Thornberry did not mention the issue of partition publicly; but it took practical steps towards this end. The bill made U.S. military aid to the Iraqi government contingent on the involvement of the Sunnis and the Kurds in governing the country. In addition, it made ending government support for the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), a precondition for providing American aid. And it called for urgent action in drafting legislation for creating a National Guard.

Although these demands may sound logical, what follows from them is a case of 'a true statement with malign intent.' The Senate's Armed Services Committee has threatened that unless its demands are satisfied, it will refrain from delivering 60% of the remaining aid to the Iraqi government and deliver most of it to the Kurds and Sunnis. And this assumes the presence of institutions that represent the minorities and various sects that can receive this aid on their behalf.

The proposed law allows for the delivery of military aid to non-governmental groups, referred to as ‘minorities in Iraq’. It openly states that 25% of U.S. military aid will be delivered to these minorities, while adding that management of this aid will be coordinated with the Baghdad government. But it returns to deception, thereby confirming the intention to partition the country by adding that 60% of this 25% will be sent directly to the Sunnis and the Kurds, if the Obama administration decides that PM Haidar al-'Abadi's government has made no 'satisfactory progress' in dealing with the problem of merging the minorities into the government, releasing prisoners who have not been charged, and addressing the unjust political treatment of some groups.

There is no doubt that what is dangerous about this project is the American decision-makers’ desire to deal with the Kurdish peshmerga forces and Sunni clans' fighters as two entities that are separate from the Iraqi army, thus allowing the U.S. to provide them with direct support to without first referring back to the Iraqi government. This prepares the ground for implementing the aforementioned notorious Biden project to partition Iraq. It delegates to the peshmerga forces and the Sunni clans' forces the mission of preserving national security in their areas. Moreover, the planned Sunni National Guard will be the equivalent to the peshmerga forces in the Kurdish areas and the Iraqi army in those areas that will remain under the authority of Baghdad. As a result, Iraq will break apart into three separate states, with no central government control over any of them.

The statement by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, that the Congress's bills do not necessarily reflect the administration’s foreign policies, and that this does not represent President Barack Obama who has the right to veto Congress's bill, makes little difference. It recalls the claim that Congressional demand to move Israel's capital to Jerusalem does not represent the [official] American point of view.

Past experience of our relations with the U.S. has repeatedly confirmed that Congress's decisions are not sidestepped simply because a long time has passed on them. On the contrary, they only pave the road to future and more decisive bills. The fact of the matter is that the American desire to partition Iraq did not begin today; it has been discussed ever since the 1970s, viewing Iraq as a soft target. This desire to partition Iraq has been reconfirmed in various ways since 1990 with the no-fly zones projecting an image of the Iraq of the future.

There is talk of a Sunni triangle, a Kurdish area, and a Shiite state in southern Iraq. All these aims highlight the U.S.’s aims and the European intentions behind it to partition Iraq.

Rejection of Iraq's partition is not a mere slogan issued by those forces that have contributed to the country's destruction. The most significant step in opposing it begins by rejecting the political process on which the current regime was based, achieving national reconciliation, building a strong Iraqi army, disbanding the sectarian militias, bringing Iraq back to its Arab environment, cancelling the decision to de-Baathify the country and rehabilitating the country's identity that created its history.

"Unless the above is achieved, the only thing lying in wait for Iraq will be more fires, further sedition, and greater eruptions of anger," concludes Makki.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

A new government is born

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Thursday editions with news that, almost two months after the election, the 34th Israeli government is due to be sworn in on Thursday, even as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu continues with intensive negotiations with his Likud colleagues over who will get the ministerial positions that have not already been promised to his coalition partners. Netanyahu is expected to present his new government to the Knesset on Thursday evening. Following the debate, a vote will be held, and if the government is approved, the ministers will be called up to take the oath of office.

On Wednesday, Netanyahu announced that Likud cabinet minister Yisrael Katz will continue to serve in the new government as transportation minister. Katz will also assume the intelligence affairs portfolio, and be a member of the security diplomatic cabinet. Netanyahu's meeting with Likud minister Gilad Erdan on his cabinet appointment was inconclusive, and the two are expected to meet again on Thursday to continue discussions.

Netanyahu has at least 12 portfolios to distribute among Likud Knesset members, after the Knesset passed second and third readings of a measure removing the limit on the number of ministers allowed to serve on the cabinet. Prior to the vote on the revision, the size of the cabinet was limited to 18 ministers. Ministries to be assigned include Public Security, Communications, Culture and Sports, Immigration and Absorption, National Infrastructure, Energy and Water, Tourism, Welfare and Social Services, Strategic Affairs and Home Front Defense.

Yedioth Ahronoth's lead story also reports that Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein has told Netanyahu that while there is no legal reason preventing the appointment of Shas chairman Aryeh Deri to the cabinet, it would be difficult for him to defend the appointment before the Supreme Court. In an opinion to the prime minister, Weinstein wrote, 'it is a decision that raises legal difficulties, considering Deri's criminal record and the damage to the public's faith in the government's integrity and in its proper conduct, which could be caused by Deri's appointment as a minister, given his background.' The attorney general said that his legal opinion must not be construed as 'public, moral or any other form of approval for Deri's intended appointment.'

Meanwhile, the coalition guidelines that detail what Netanyahu and his government hope to achieve during their four-year term was published yesterday. Haaretz points out that, despite exhortations from the Obama Administration, the guidelines make no explicit commitment to create a 'Palestinian state' or to implement a 'two-state solution.' The paper also points out that neither of Netanyahu’s two previous governments mentioned the two-state solution in their coalition guidelines.

Rather, the guidelines merely state that, 'The government will advance the diplomatic process and will strive for a peace agreement with the Palestinians and with all our neighbors, while guarding security interests, the historic and national (interests) of Israel. If such an agreement is reached, it will be brought for authorization by the government and Knesset and if there will be the need for it as required by law, to a national referendum.'

In related news, two new diplomatic storms appear to be brewing. The first is between Israel and the Vatican, after a treaty was finalized yesterday between the Holy See and the Palestinian Authority. According to the Associated Press, the agreement uses – for the first time – the phrase 'Palestinian state,' much to Israel's chagrin. In response, Israel expressed its grave disappointment with tacit recognition that the treaty – which deals with the activities of the Catholic Church in Palestinian territory – grants to the Palestinians.

While the Vatican had welcomed the decision by the UN General Assembly in 2012 to recognize a Palestinian state, this new treaty is the first legal document negotiated between the Holy See and the Palestinians and constitutes an official recognition, according to a Vatican spokesman. It was finalized days before Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas visits Pope Francis at the Vatican. Abbas is heading to Rome to attend Francis' canonization Sunday of two new saints from the Holy Land.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry said that the Vatican's move does not promote the peace process and distances the Palestinian leadership from returning to direct and bilateral negotiations. The statement noted that Israel will study the agreement and will consider its steps accordingly.

Meanwhile, Haaretz reports that strategic consultations between Israel and France last week deteriorated into an argument over French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius’ initiative to advance a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the United Nations Security Council, with Israel arguing that Paris was operating behind Israel’s back.

The report goes on to say that European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini is due to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority next Wednesday, for talks expected to focus on the peace process. During the one-day visit, Mogherini is expected to meet in Israel with Netanyahu and opposition leader Isaac Herzog, and in Ramallah with the Palestinian leadership. Upon her return to Brussels she will brief the EU foreign ministers on her discussions.

While Israel is at loggerheads with France, the European Union, the Vatican and the Obama Administration, it did get some support from Florida Senator Marco Rubio – the Republican presidential candidate who appears to have the backing of casino tycoon Sheldon Adelson.

According to Haaretz, during a Q&A session following a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Rubio was asked whether he would continue to support a two-state solution if elected president. 'I don’t think the conditions exist for that today,' he responded. 'The conditions for a two-state solution, at this moment, do not exist.'

Settler-run news service Arutz 7 reports that an unnamed senior Israel official says that, should the United States begin pressuring Israel on the Palestinians issue now, it would only be to topple the new government. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there are signs that the U.S. will first pressure Israel into keeping its soldiers out of Area A. He explained that such a move would be very dangerous for West Bank settlers.

Finally, in breaking news this afternoon, three Israeli teens were injured in what security forces are treating as a terrorist vehicular attack in the West Bank. According to Army Radio, three 16-year-old boys were wounded after being run over by a Palestinian motorist at the entrance to the West Bank settlement of Alon Shvut. The victims are all described in light to moderate condition. The Palestinian driver fled the scene immediately after committing the attack, but was detained by security forces shortly after. A resident of Hebron, he is now being interrogated by the Shin Bet.

 

 

THE GERMAN OBSESSION: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Guy Bechor says that Germany does not have the right to interfere in Israel's affairs – and that; in any case, the call for the establishment of a Palestinian state reflects a profound lack of understanding on Berlin's part.

"In an open letter to the people of Israel marking the 50th anniversary of relations between Israel and Germany, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier wrote this week that 'the security of a Jewish and democratic State of Israel cannot be guaranteed without the establishment of a sustainable and democratic Palestinian state.'

Unfortunately, that sentence is not just insultingly condescending – once again, Germany believes that it knows best when it comes to what's good for the Jews – it is also a gross interference in our national affairs. Can you imagine what would happen if an Israeli politician were to tell the German people that their security cannot be safeguarded unless they grant autonomy, including the imposition of Sharia law, to the ever-growing Muslim population in their country? After all, that is a demand that will one day be made. The Germans would not countenance such behavior. So why would Steinmeier feel that he has the right to say something like that to a country that he claims is Germany's ally?

Let's take a look now at the substance of the issue. What about the demand for a democratic Palestinian state? Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas officially ended his term of office six years ago; he was elected in January 2005 for a four-year term (thanks in large part to Israel's support and protection) and he is now supposed to be a private citizen. He dissolved the Palestinian parliament as soon as he was elected, because Hamas won a majority there. In any case, the parliament's term ended five years ago. There has been no fresh election in the Palestinian Authority and there is no agreement among the Palestinians to hold one, since Hamas will take control of every elected body – just as, in 2007, it grabbed control of the Gaza Strip in a violent coup, two years after Israel withdrew and handed it over the Abu Mazin. The Gaza Strip is controlled by a terrorist organization, while a corrupt gang that lacks any legal or moral justification runs things from Ramallah. That is Palestinian democracy: they are not ready for statehood. They have no national institutions, no economy, no political system, no sources of income, no parties and no common ground between the various factions.

As for security, surely Steinmeier knows that the establishment of an independent Arab entity in Judea and Samaria would mean the end of the Jewish state that Germany is so keen to protect. Does the German foreign minister know that the border of the Palestinian state he is so keen to see come into existence will run just 2 kilometers from the Knesset – and that, if he were to address the Israeli parliament, he would be within sniper-range of Palestinian gunmen? Does he know that Abu Mazin plans to bring hundreds of thousands of people from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon? These are highly dangerous terrorists, whose missiles can easily reach Israel's main international airport, as well as Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. Will Steinmeier and his colleagues come to save us then? Did he lift a finger to save the hundreds of thousands of fatalities in the Syrian Civil War, in Libya, in Yemen and in Egypt? Did he do anything to help the Ukrainians? The reunification of Jerusalem served as an example for the reunification of Berlin – so why does Berlin now want us to partition Jerusalem again?

Any reasonable person would ask himself why the Germans are so obsessed with the Palestinians, given that the Palestinians are the only Arabs in the Middle East who live comfortable and protected lives – thanks to Israel. This is not occupation; this is a rescue effort. If it were not for Israel, the Palestinians would be at each other’s throats, just like Arabs are across the entire region. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen have all been destroyed; millions of new refugees have been created and hundreds of thousands of people have been killed. Perhaps the Germans aren't obsessed with the Palestinians, but with the Jews.

Have the Germans found a solution for the millions of Muslims seeking to relocate to Europe and who threaten to radically alter the demography of the entire continent? Have they dealt with the growing tide of anti-Semitism, which is once again rearing its ugly head on German soil? Did they think that by agreeing to give us a discount on four patrol boats they had bought themselves the right to interfere in our affairs? Do they not realize that we could have bought those vessels from any one of a dozen different countries?

When Germany talks about the Jewish state, they have no right to criticize, to chastise or to give advice. After all, it was the Germans who carried out the most heinous, most evil and most monstrous genocide in the history of humankind – and they did so against the Jews."

Ends…

 

THE EXCUSES AFTER THE WAR: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ariela Ringel Hoffman comments on a television program in which Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz and Dan Halutz – who were prime minister, defense minister and IDF chief respectively during the Second Lebanon War – gave their accounts of what happened nine years ago.

"Nine years after the end of the Second Lebanon War, after dozens of military investigations, hundreds of articles and studies, three books and the highly critical Winograd Report, the three architects of that war – Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz and Dan Halutz – look and sound worse than we imagined; worse than we knew. Instead of showing us that they have learned from hindsight, that they have taken stock of their mistakes and that they recognize the error of their ways, they used the opportunity given to them by a Channel 2 investigative report to give us nothing more than schoolboy excuses.

Dan Halutz, who was IDF chief of staff at the time, was the worst offender. He spent most of the time smiling – although it's far from clear what he's got to be so happy about. He cited another senior officer – Gadi Eisenkot, who is now IDF chief himself – as saying that the General Staff would do everything in its power to make sure he failed. That is a very serious allegation and it would be interesting to hear the response of Eisenkot to such claims, which can only be described as collective mud-slinging at his fellow members of the top IDF brass.

Halutz kept on reminding us that he was an outsider; that he came from the Air Force, while the other members of the General Staff were all from the army. He failed to mention, of course, that before he was named chief of staff, he had been a full and equal partner in the General Staff's decision-making process for at least a decade: he was Air Force commander for five years, head of the Operation Directorate for two years and for another two years served as deputy IDF chief. In other words, if he was taken by surprise – as he claimed time and time again – by the poor state of the army, then one of two things is true: either he failed to see what was happening around him or he didn't bother to look.

From Halutz's perspective, the Second Lebanon War provided him with a first opportunity to discover exactly what state the IDF was in and to examine the performance of the officers – many of whom were appointed by him directly, including the head of the Northern Command, Udi Adam. 'It wasn't my army,' he said. 'I did not grow up in the ranks of the army.' Even the death of 12 soldiers from a Hizbollah rocket at Kfar Giladi was not his fault; it was 'part of the events of the war.'

According to Halutz, he was even directed to carry out the insane three-day ground operation that came at the end of the war. He was not asked by whom and he gave no direct explanation of what he meant by that, but, judging by Olmert's comments later in the program, one can understand that there were retired officers involved. Olmert quoted Halutz as telling him that, 'they are stomping their feet' and that 'they are in a dangerous position.' To Olmert's credit, he did recognize how dangerous the ground operation could be, and he told Halutz to withdraw them. At the end of the interview, Olmert admitted – and he was the only one of the three who did so – that, in retrospect, the ground operation was superfluous.

Throughout the interview, Halutz kept on saying – with all the elegance of a bull in a china shop – that he refused to argue with bereaved families. He was also the first IDF chief who saw fit not to visit them during their mourning period. His summary of the Second Lebanon War was to say that, since then, the northern border has been 'quiet.' How is it possible that, after so many years, Halutz doesn't understand that the main problem that many people have is not with the decision to go to war – even though that was a rash and negligent decision in and of itself. The main complaint is how the war was conducted after the first few days – during which the IDF achieved everything that it would achieve throughout the conflict: destroying Hizbollah’s stockpiles of long-range rockets and attacking targets in Hizbollah’s Beirut stronghold. The Second Lebanon War should have been over in 60 hours, but it lasted for over a month.

Those 60 hours encapsulated everything that was wrong with the way the whole war was conducted: Halutz was absent from a key discussion because he was in a television studio; Peretz, who was defense minister, ignored the advice of his professional aides, who warned him about the dangers of the operation – and now he complains that he was looked down on, while ignoring his own lack of experience and knowledge; Olmert, who was unable to reply to Shaul Mofaz’s question as to what he would say to the bereaved families, nonetheless gave the green light for the IDF to go to war.

The Channel 2 program did not bring any new facts to the public discourse on the Second Lebanon War. It's importance is in the clear message that it sends to all of Israel's decision makers, to the prime minister, the defense minister and the IDF chief of staff: retrospective excuses, attempts to deflect blame and smart-guy comments cannot change the overall picture. They cannot rewrite history. Not one year after the war, not nine years after the war and not 40 years after the war."

Ends…

 

UNITED IN RACISM: Writing in Israel Hayom, Reuven Berko takes issue with Arab Knesset members, who tried to use the protests by Ethiopian Israelis to drive a wedge between Jews and to reassert their claims that the Land of Israel does not belong to the Jews.

"Members of the Joint Arab List took a self-righteous satisfaction from last week's demonstrations by Israelis of Ethiopian descent. The same people who referred to Condoleezza Rice as a 'slave girl' are now playing the 'Israeli apartheid' card and accusing the 'evil police state' of racism and discrimination. They also got some mileage from 'Breaking the Silence,' which issued a report claiming to present the testimonies of soldiers who say that they were ordered to commit war crimes during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza last summer.

Hamas openly calls for the murder of Jews and the Palestinian Authority honors the memories of terrorists who killed Jews by naming streets after them. Is there any Palestinian lawyer who has looked into the crimes of the PLO and Hamas against Israeli citizens? Has a Palestinian terrorist ever complained about the crimes his people committed against us, as our soldiers go to Breaking the Silence and to their commanders to report improper behavior during a battle? Arab Knesset members who made use of Breaking the Silence's lies, which are supposed to be based on soldiers' testimonies, were ironically highlighting the very morality that they claim the IDF lacks. Thanks to the fact that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, Ahmad Tibi and his ilk have the opportunity to denigrate the State of Israel whenever and wherever they want. But the shadow that they want to cast on Israel is actually the reflection of the murderous fire which sees Arabs killing Arabs in inconceivable numbers across the Middle East. This is a fire that consumes everything in its path, destroys temples and historic sites, kills nations and races, blacks and whites, innocent and guilty.

When the flames are high, even the shadow cast by dwarves is huge. The Palestinians have always condemned the Zionist ingathering of exiles, saying that it is a falsification and that it comes at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian population, who are the true people of this land. In addition to that slanderous claim, they also make the following racist assertion: 'The dark-skinned Ethiopian Jews have nothing in common with the blued-eyed Russian and Polish Jews – apart from the fact that they all live in the same plundered Palestine.' It's time we remind the Palestinians that the State of Israel brought these Jews home from far away – black and white alike – while endangering the lives of its finest.

These Arab MKs put on a show on identifying with the Ethiopian Jews. They did so using the language of hatred, demagoguery and duplicity. They also tried to drive a wedge between Jews, by saying that the black Jews are treated as second-class citizens by the ruling white Jews. This is a repeat of their failed attempts in the past to drive a wedge between Sephardi Jews and their Ashkenazi brethren. They say that, compared to the Arabs, the Ethiopians have got it good; when Palestinians demonstrate, the police don't just beat them, they open fire. While there is never any justification for shooting civilians, Arab rioters show exactly the difference between a demonstrator and a terrorist: the Ethiopians, unlike Arab rioters, did not throw firebombs at the security forces, did not hurl rocks with the intention to kill and did not shoot or stab police officers. Unlike the Arab MKs, who encourage their people not to participate in any kind of national service, Ethiopian Israelis are decorated veterans of the IDF and many have laid down their lives in the service of this country.

Much has already been written about the real origin of the so-called 'Palestinian natives' who moved here in response to the emergence of Zionism as a political movement. They came from Egypt, from Morocco and from Syria. Not even the Islamic holy writings – including the Quran itself, which clearly states that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jews – can back up their patently false claims."

Ends…

 

PLAYING CHICKEN WITH THE ICC: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yonah Jeremy Bob says that the refusal to recognize Palestine as a state is a gamble that has worked for Israel before – but warns that it might not work this time.

"Israel is playing a high- stakes game of chicken with International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda over its preliminary examination into alleged war crimes from the 2014 Gaza operation.

Bensouda has recognized a 'State of Palestine' since January and has adamantly defended her position on the issue. She is not alone, with support from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the UN General Assembly and, maybe most importantly, the president of the Assembly of State Parties, which governs the ICC.

Jerusalem has rejected this position just as adamantly. Moreover, it appears to be moving in the direction of no official cooperation with Bensouda – even as the IDF continues with its own investigations of alleged war crimes – and Israel may, as it has in the past, use third parties to make its eventual case before the ICC prosecutor.

The ICC’s recognition of Palestinian statehood is a key part of what makes the Palestinians eligible to call for the court’s intervention. The refusal to recognize Palestine as a state is a gamble that has worked for Israel before, in countering the 2009 Goldstone Report and other UN reports. It is also Israel’s strategy regarding the UN Human Rights Council’s McGowan-Davis Report, which is due on June 29. But it may not work this time.

The Goldstone and McGowan-Davis reports emanated from the UNHRC, which has no binding power and can easily be blocked by a U.S. veto at the UN Security Council. However, other than its admittedly substantial indirect diplomatic power, the U.S. has no such veto over ICC decisions and cannot even threaten to withdraw funds, as it is not an ICC member. If U.S. diplomatic power was going to stop Bensouda, she likely never would have recognized Palestine in the first place.

Israel’s only plays, if Bensouda opens a full criminal investigation without its cooperation, are an appeal to the ICC judges that she overreached her powers in recognizing Palestine, or a diplomatic push to discredit or indirectly pressure her office into dropping the issue before indictments.

All of this signals that Israel may be passing up a chance to stake its big fight on complementarity – the idea that its own investigations are reasonable enough that Bensouda cannot initiate a full criminal investigation or get involved at all. This is because the ICC is a court of last resort and cannot get involved in a country’s business unless that country is unwilling or unable to self-investigate.

Israel points out in its argument against a 'State of Palestine' that the U.S. and Canada agree with its position. But if Israel were to center its argument on asserting that its investigations are reasonable – rather than on trying to discredit Palestine as a state and thereby remove it from the ICC’s jurisdiction – it could potentially rally a larger number of Western democracies around the idea that the ICC should not be second-guessing democracies that have systems for self-investigating (as opposed to dictatorships and developing countries that are actually unable to self-investigate). Such an argument might find many more allies than trying to keep fighting the Palestine statehood wave.

As such, the statehood strategy is surprising – unless Israel has concluded that it would be too risky to trust Bensouda and the ICC judges to give Israel’s internal investigation a fair hearing, or that Jerusalem can afford to take a riskier tack because a possible return to a diplomatic process with the Palestinians could deter the court from pursuing the case anyway.

Of course, Israel could try to re-invoke complementarity even once a criminal investigation was, theoretically, initiated. But at that point, legally speaking, Israel’s back would be further against the wall, Bensouda would already be more committed, and the state would already have suffered a significant diplomatic embarrassment.

Knowledgeable sources have said that the ICC prosecutor is still far from D-Day on Israel-Palestine, and maybe Israel will make more of a case if it sees the court is really digging in. But as of now, the game is on, and while fighting against Palestine as a state is a knockout winner if it works, it is also a dangerous game with less room to maneuver."

Ends…

 

THE ABANDONED GENERATION: Writing in Haaretz, Ari Shavit warns that Israel is neglecting one of the most important fronts in its battle for survival – the campuses of American universities.

"The Jewish students at UCLA will never forget the night of February 25, 2014. For 13 nightmarish hours, they were confronted with the hateful words and wild eyes of hundreds of fellow students — supporters of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement — who alleged that defending Israel was tantamount to defending racism, genocide and infanticide. For one long night they experienced a debate on boycotting Israel that turned into a horror show of persecution.

They had not been prepared for such a near-violent conflict, and many of them were emotionally wounded. Thus when the vote — on whether the university should divest of companies that ostensibly profit from the occupation — went narrowly in their favor, they felt no sense of triumph; on the contrary. More than a hundred students left the meeting at dawn, hugged each other on a campus lawn and cried.

In recent months I have visited 27 American universities. I did not come to preach, but to listen. I tried to conduct an open, candid dialogue with the sons and daughters of a new Jewish generation that faces a challenge their parents and grandparents never did. Day after day I sat for entire days with groups of Jewish students — more than 100 groups in all — and asked them to share with me what was on their minds and in their hearts.

In Hillel houses at Princeton, Brown, Yale, Dartmouth, Michigan, Northwestern, the University of California San Diego and 20 other campuses, I repeatedly heard variations of the same heartbreaking story: Jewish students who (still) love Israel and (still) feel close to it, but who are asking tough ethical questions that Israel has no answers for. These are students facing near-overt anti-Semitism who themselves have harsh questions about the Jewish state that the Jewish establishment forbids them to express.

Thousands find themselves in a very tough jam. In front of them are professors and students who argue that Israel is Goliath, but behind them there’s no Israel proving that it is a David.

We feel like we’ve been abandoned on the battlefield, many of them told me. The anti-Zionists, they said, are accusing us of collaborating with evil, but Zionism doesn’t understand us and doesn’t speak to us; instead, it’s busy building more and more and more settlements. That’s why their internal struggle is so agonizing and their pain so deep. That’s why many of their in-depth conversations with me came to tears, too.

The contemptible, sophisticated and well-oiled offensive by the BDS movement is a strategic threat to Israel. If it isn’t halted, it could position the democratic Jewish state as the South Africa of 2020. But the real existential threat facing the Jewish people is the increasing tension between the liberal identity of most young American Jews and the distorted image of Israel as an unjust oppressor and occupier.

As a result of this tension, some come out against Israel, some are confused and many are simply indifferent. For too long, the right has been telling these young people that everything here is great – startups, Tel Aviv parties and cherry tomatoes.

For too long the left has been telling these young people that everything here is awful — checkpoints, discrimination and the exclusion of women. For too long these intelligent, impressive and warm young Jews have not heard a strong Israeli voice talking with pride about the Israeli miracle while acknowledging that Israel does have some flaws.

Birthright has done wonders and lit a Jewish-Israeli spark in the hearts of hundreds of thousands in the past 15 years. But since Zionism has not provided a reliable, relevant and inspirational narrative to galvanize these millennials, many are simply keeping their distance. And when they arrive on campus and are exposed to anti-Israel venom, the Jewish and pro-Israel identity of many of them collapses.

There is no greater danger to Israel and the Jewish people than this collapse. Our fate will not only be determined on the country’s southern or northern borders, but on the quads of American campuses. To win the hearts and minds of young American Jews, we must define a revitalized, moral and liberal Zionism. If there is still a Jewish national leadership in Jerusalem, New York or Los Angeles, it must wake up and take immediate action. As things stand now, the Jewish future is slipping through our fingers."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKEY/SYRIA: Gonul Tol detects a U.S. shift towards Turkey’s position on the Syrian crisis in centre-left Radikal: "The U.S. seems to have changed its attitude about the jihadist groups in Syria. Previously it was supplying arms to the groups it was supporting on condition that they stay away from the jihadists, and it was refusing to cooperate with such groups. The recent Idlib [takeover by the Nusra al-Qa’ida affiliate] operation shows that Washington is now much more flexible about working with these groups. In brief, Washington seems to have moved closer to Turkey and Qatar's position on Syria to a certain extent. In return for that, and with the approval of the Saudis, Turkey is pressuring Nusra to sever its links with al-Qa’ida."

Nedret Ersanel expects further developments in Syria to the detriment of the regime in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The balance is rapidly changing in Syria. Only a limited area along the Syria-Israel border remains in the regime’s hands. The opposition is gaining strength in Syria and the regime is losing. Without doubt, the claim that 'friendly regimes in the region have a role in the growing strength of the opposition' indicates that developments are underway regarding the future of Damascus."

 

RUSSIA/WEST: Beril Dedeoglu concurs with Russia’s suspicions of Washington in centre-right, pro-government Star: "NATO is known to have recently held a series of military exercises near the Russian border. Apparently, Russia has also taken a sharp stance against NATO. Looking at Putin's speech on the May 9th V-E Day ceremony, it is clear that he sees the West as responsible for this tension. Putin is right on this issue. The U.S. has made a great effort to turn Russia into the 'other' so as to stem the likelihood that Europe would drift away from the U.S. It has apparently persuaded Putin of this as well."

 

DEATH OF 1980’S COUP GENERAL EVREN: Cengiz Candar seeks to settle accounts with Turkey’s former military regime in Radikal: "There has been no true settling of accounts with the September 12th 1980 military coup, and thus with its [recently deceased] leading general Kenan Evren, not even in the 2000s, which bear the stamp of the AKP (ruling Justice and Development Party), let alone in the 1990s. The 'New Turkey' that the AKP aspires to cannot be established unless Kenan Evren and not only the 1980 coup but the entire system it initiated are truly confronted.”

Ali Bayramoglu singles out the Kurdish issue as Evren’s main legacy in Yeni Safak: "Evren and September 12th mean crimes against humanity: Torture, execution, massive arrests, deaths in custody. The left considers itself to be the target of September 12th. However, the target was all political movements, the entire country in all its various identities. But if there was a separate group among them, it was the Kurds. The Kurdish issue is one of the legacies that Evren left behind. This legacy in all its dimensions is what Turkey needs to cleanse itself of, settle accounts with and face."

Deger Ozergun sounds a warning in centrist Millet: "Death sentences were passed on 517 people. 124 were approved. 50 were carried out. This is the balance sheet left by Kenan Evren. Now, he is being held responsible for what he did. Unfortunately today, as well, some people [in authority] seem to have adopted the former dictatorship regime as their model. They are looking at numbers, making calculations. They forget that they will be held responsible for what is happening today as well!"

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman contends that the Arabs will pay: "Iran’s nuclear case greatly influences the international order. Whether it is resolved in a comprehensive deal or not, the region should be ready for huge changes. A major gap is developing between the Arabs and the United States. Some Arab states, who claim to be the core of the Arab world, are concerned that if a nuclear agreement is reached, they will have to accept obvious defeat and even pay a high cost in the region in the future." 

Conservative Resalat urges a response to U.S. intransigence: "Americans speak about holding nuclear negotiations with Iran while stating their refusal to lift sanctions. By flaunting imaginary military options, they continue their insensitive extortions. American repeated threats demonstrate that they do not seek a fair nuclear agreement and do not recognize Iran's nuclear rights. Our diplomatic apparatus should clearly and firmly respond to the rudeness and excessive demands of the American side once and for all in order to remove doubts that some people have about the nuclear talks." 

 

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: Conservative Quds reports: "In the Camp David summit, the U.S. is going to brief six Persian Gulf countries about Washington's new policies after a final nuclear deal with Iran. Some Arab countries worry that the final agreement and the removal of sanctions will lead to the expansion of Iran's influence in the region. The American president will brief these Arab countries about U.S. policies after a possible agreement with Iran." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami shows the Arabs the right way: "The U.S. aims at the Camp David summit to sign multibillion arms deals under the pretext of a security agreement. The best option for these regimes that are aligned with Israel is to become a little self-reliant, stay away from ignorant prejudices and return to Islam. Instead of looking for foreign support, they should try to provide security inside their countries and in the region. They should know that a big and powerful neighbour, such as Iran, provides a big umbrella of protection against foreign greed." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA: Reformist Mardom Salari claims that Saudi Arabia is a loser: "Saudi Arabia competes with Iran at the regional and geopolitical level. In this rivalry Saudi Arabia is the loser; the fury resulting from this loss is fully evident in its behaviour. The reason for Saudi violence against the Yemeni people is the defeat they suffered in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq."

Reformist E'temad explains: "Saudi King Salman believes that his country needs fundamental changes. He wants to send the message that the recent changes are not only political, but also ideological. This will be challenging for the Saudi kingdom, since Wahhabi clerics will not easily accept changes. By changing his title from king to Imam, Salman wants to tell Wahhabi clerics that his word is final and they must accept it. This doesn't seem to be easy."

Hard-line Keyhan is disappointed: "The strange and unfortunate remarks of Mr. Mohsen Rezai, the Expediency Council secretary, that ‘in case Saudi borders are violated, Iran would be the first country to rush to the aid of the Saudi people’ were made about a puppet regime that has betrayed Islam during its shameful existence and is currently brutally massacring the innocent people of Yemen. Can Mr. Reza'i deny these terrible crimes against humanity? After Saudi cruel attacks on Yemen, people of this Muslim country have the legal and religious right to respond. Indeed, they have attacked several military bases in Saudi Arabia. Mr Reza'i should be asked whether it is the duty of Iran to defend Saudi borders against Yemeni attacks. Mr. Reza'i, please judge yourself! Do you know what you are saying?!" 

 

CHINA/RUSSIA: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reads the message: "The joint naval exercise of Russia and China points to military and security convergence in the framework of fighting terrorism and countering security threats. The exercises convey a message to the West and their allies that crossing the Chinese and Russian security red lines will have serious consequences." 

Hard-line Javan reads another message: "Choosing the Mediterranean Sea for staging the drill conveys a clear message to Europe and the U.S.. It clearly conveys that both Russia and China no longer accept the Western unipolar approach and aim to consolidate their military presence in that sensitive region to create a multipolar balance." 

 

KURDISTAN: Conservative Khorasan is harshly critical: "The President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mas'ud Barzani visited the U.S. after a Congress bill that considered Iraqi Kurdistan an independent country. Barzani's tyranny is encouraged by some U.S. power institutions. Although Barzani personally seeks to partition Iraq, he actually represents the U.S. neoconservative will."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Acting independently

2-Riyadh in a corner

3-Futile elections

 

1-Acting independently

 

[Gulf/U.S. differences] make it likely that the [Camp David] summit may turn into yet another occasion for further disagreement. This will not undermine the alliance between the GCC states and the U.S.; but it may boost the GCC's tendency to act with a vision that is totally independent from Washington despite the logistical and political difficulties confronting a policy that adopts major and decisive attitudes (as in the case of the war in Yemen) without coordination with Washington. Moreover, such independence will further ruin the climate between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE on the one hand, and Washington on the other, over the Iranian file – bearing in mind that Qatar and Oman have a different attitude towards Iran. For these reasons, the summit may produce further U.S./Gulf disagreements contrary to its intended aim--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Today…there is confidence in the Gulf's decisions and its ability to act independently, despite the Obama administration's reservations. This situation may complicate the U.S. administration's calculations and push for political changes and developments on the ground in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria that may not be to Washington's liking. A White House official recently complained about the Syrian opposition's advances in the north on the grounds that this 'helps the jihadis and the Nusra Front.' But regardless of this official’s mistaken political assessment, his stance does not have the same impact that a superpower's position could have had, had it not been for four years of American hesitation and wavering in Syria. In both form and content, the Camp David summit will consolidate greater independence for the Gulf states and less strategic influence for Barack Obama's administration--Joyce Karam in pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

 

Tomorrow’s (Thursday’s) Camp David summit between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the U.S. may further aggravate the existing Arab Gulf/U.S. differences rather than overcome them as intended, argues a Palestinian commentator in a Jordanian daily. The disagreements between the Gulf states and the U.S. that were manifest in the run-up to the summit suggest that the Gulf states will become more independent from Washington in their policies, and that the U.S. will lose more of its influence in the region, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi-owned paper.

 

EACH STATE ON ITS OWN: "The U.S. prefers to deal with the Gulf states each on its own," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

For example, it refused to hold negotiations over free trade agreements with the GCC as a whole as the EU did; Washington insisted on negotiations with each state separately instead, which gave rise to disagreements when it reached an accord with some states before the others.

So why does U.S. President Barack Obama want to hold an unprecedented meeting with all these states together at Camp David this week?

Under former U.S. president George Bush Jr., there was a framework for meetings that went by the name of '6 + 2' and that included the GCC states plus Jordan and Egypt. This came to an end, perhaps after Obama took office, the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the change of [the Mubarak] regime in Egypt. So, will Thursday's summit lay the foundations for a new framework for action, or is it just a mere and passing PR exercise?

The absence of the Saudi and Bahraini kings from the summit with Washington came as a surprise. Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id of Oman who rarely takes part in collective political summits anyway will also be absent, as will UAE President Sheikh Khalifa Al Nahyan, whose absence may be for health reasons.  These absences lend credence to the belief that the summit will not address anything practical and clear, unless there is some measure of prior agreement on certain issues. According to The Wall Street Journal, the failure to make progress towards a common stance on the Syrian and Iranian files lies behind the Saudi monarch's absence. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's meeting with the Saudi monarch last Thursday and with the GCC's foreign ministers [in Paris] suggests that something is being prepared and was discussed, and that the summit will not be a mere passing event.

The fact that it will be confined to the GCC states without Egypt and Jordan supports the belief that Iran will be the focus of this meeting. According to the London-based [Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily] al-Hayat, the meeting is likely to produce an agreement on a missile defense system. If this materializes, it seems the U.S. will proceed with its strategy regarding an agreement with Iran while simultaneously preparing for military and political confrontation with it should diplomatic efforts fail to secure the hoped for results. This is also intended to win the support of GCC states and reassure them regarding future relations with Iran.

On the other hand, if the reports of disagreements between the GCC and the U.S. prove to be true, this will be an indication of the Gulf’s concern not only about Iran's nuclear program, but more importantly, about normalizing Iran’s international relations and the likelihood that Tehran will exploit this in order to expand in the Arab states and intervene in their affairs.

One could envisage an American attempt to help establish a united Gulf security system and develop frameworks for Gulf action in order to confront issues such as Syria and Yemen. But the fact that neither Egypt nor Jordan has been invited to the summit makes any such wide-ranging regional arrangements less likely.

As the Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Qarqash has put it, Gulf/U.S. relations can best be described as a two-way street, and not one in which one side (the U.S.) determines the shape and course that these relations may take alone.

It is not unlikely that Washington will reach an agreement with the GCC over some relatively minor issues, such as setting up a defensive system. But without greater efforts and meetings to bridge the gaps and overcome the differences in opinion such as the different views of how to deal with Syria and the absence of a decisive American position on Yemen; and more importantly, the lack of decisiveness in dealing with Iran's status in the region; the lack of agreement over how to deal with ISIS; the failure to overcome the disagreement stemming from the fact that Washington did not oppose the Arab Spring or the fall of Husni Mubarak's regime in Egypt and Zein el-'Abedine's regime in Tunisia; and the fact that the U.S. did not refuse to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood – all these issues make it likely that the summit may turn into yet another occasion for further disagreement.

This will not undermine the alliance between the GCC states and the U.S.; but it may boost the GCC's tendency to act with a vision that is totally independent from Washington despite the logistical and political difficulties confronting a policy that adopts major and decisive attitudes (as in the case of the war in Yemen) without coordination with Washington. Moreover, such independence will further ruin the climate between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE on the one hand, and Washington on the other, over the Iranian file – bearing in mind that Qatar and Oman have a different attitude towards Iran.

"For these reasons, the summit may produce further U.S./Gulf disagreements contrary to its intended aim," concludes 'Azm.

End…

 

NOT HOSTAGE TO UNCLE SAM: "That fact that only two GCC leaders will attend the Camp David summit that begins tomorrow points to a change in the diplomatic and geopolitical pattern that governs relations between Washington and the region," writes Joyce Karam in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

It is a message to President Barack Obama to the effect that the region is not hostage to Uncle Sam's influence and that it has begun to seek alternatives.

According to a senior diplomatic source, the meetings that preceded the summit were tense and did not suggest that the GCC states are comfortable in dealing with the Obama administration. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry asked his [GCC] counterparts at the Paris meeting [last week]: 'Why are you afraid of Iran when your defense budget is ten times the size of Iran's budget?" But the question itself manifests naivety in viewing Iran’s role and understanding the Gulf's fears. For Iran's influence is not the sort that can be dealt with by means of a conventional defense budget. Tehran is fighting from Yemen to Iraq to Syria to Lebanon via militias and financial aid that transcend what the Excel sheets and PowerPoint presentations used by Washington can understand.

The pre-summit meetings also exposed the low ceiling under which Washington is moving in dealing with the Gulf states. The draft of the summit's final communiqué, which al-Hayat has seen and that may be amended before it is officially published tomorrow, does not constitute an agreement between the two sides. It does not include a common defense doctrine of the sort Jimmy Carter offered in the 1970s. In its current draft, the final communiqué does not offer to sell F-35s for fear of raising Israel’s objections that its military superiority is being threatened. It does not speak of any measures in Syria that go beyond Obama's talk over the past four years that 'Assad has lost legitimacy' and 'support for the moderate opposition.' This is just more of the same and the glitter of the Camp David summit will not alter their stereotypical character.

All that the administration wants is to secure regional acceptance and cover for a comprehensive agreement with Iran that Obama may sign by July. This will also not go beyond the Gulf states' repeated public position that any 'verifiable' agreement that prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons is in the region's interest. The mechanism and clauses of this agreement will be determined by the five major powers and in the hallways of the UN and the U.S. Congress, which will also decide whether the agreement will be 'comprehensive'; and the verification will be manifest in the extent to which Iran will implement or violate the agreement's stipulations.

In one of the preparatory meetings, an Arab official told the American side: 'Do we have the right to enrich uranium like Iran does?" The question annoyed the White House and the response was: 'After this exhausting track with Tehran, do you want to become another Iran?' This is also a futile discussion that only reflects the gap that separates Washington's understanding from the new reality in the regional states. There is today a greater Gulf shift towards the Asian market and the Chinese giant. And there is confidence in the Gulf's decisions and its ability to act independently, despite the Obama administration's reservations.

This situation may complicate the U.S. administration's calculations and push for political changes and developments on the ground in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria that may not be to Washington's liking. A White House official recently complained about the Syrian opposition's advances in the north on the grounds that this 'helps the jihadis and the Nusra Front.' But regardless of this official’s mistaken political assessment, his stance does not have the same impact that a superpower's position could have had, had it not been for four years of American hesitation and wavering in Syria.

"In both form and content, the Camp David summit will consolidate greater independence for the Gulf states, and less strategic influence for Barack Obama's administration," concludes Karam.

Ends…

 

 

2-Riyadh in a corner

 

Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve its military goals in Yemen and now has no politically viable alternative to pursue, says Luqman 'Abdullah in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Saudi Arabia has painted itself into a corner in its war in Yemen, argues an Arab commentator in a left-leaning Beirut daily. It has adopted unachievable aims for its war, and failed to back them via political steps that would offer it a face-saving way out of its predicament.

 

POINTS NOT KNOCKOUT: "The manner in which the Saudi regime announced the aims of its aggression on Yemen meant that if these aims were achieved, the [Houthi] Ansarullah would have suffered a crushing defeat," writes Luqman 'Abdullah in Thursday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

But whoever drafted that plan ignored the fact that the Ansarullah represent a major constituent in that country, and that in such conflicts, victory is at best achieved by points not by knockout. The reason for this, quite simply, is that it is impossible to defeat an entire nation.

Six weeks have passed so far without any of the aggression's aims being achieved. The results have been confined to killing, destruction, and human tragedy. Contrary to what Saudi Arabia wanted, there is no sign of any political initiative on the horizon. Moreover, no real pressure is being exerted to end the aggression. The most that any efforts have done is to reach an agreement on a five days humanitarian truce that may be extended.

Al Saud [Saudi royal family] decided to escape from the truth. They insist on dealing with the Yemeni people in a domineering and condescending manner, as they have done for many long decades past. But they are ignoring the major changes that have occurred. They are refusing to acknowledge the reality that resulted from the change that the Yemeni people benefited from after the [2011] popular revolution against former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh.

One could argue that the Arab Spring in the Arabian Peninsula consisted of the Yemeni people's leaving the framework of Saudi hegemony. This may explain the ferocious desperation with which Al Saud's war is being waged. The Saudi royal family wants this war to end with a clear winner and a clear loser. But they are ignoring political and regional calculations, and even international and humanitarian considerations. And they are ignoring what is even more basic – namely, that even if we assume for the sake of argument that Riyadh manages to twist the Yemeni people's arm and crush their army, that would not be in Riyadh’s interest in the long run.

Saudi Arabia has now resorted to another ruse. Al Saud have invited certain Yemeni parties to a dialogue in Riyadh. But everyone already knows that Riyadh has very narrow options and faces a dearth of solutions. This is especially true since most constituents of the Yemeni scene will not take part in such a dialogue – from the major tribes, the most important of which are Hashed, Hamdan and others, to the northern parties taking part in defending the country together with the army and Ansarullah. These forces' logic is clear; they ask: How can we take part in a dialogue held under the umbrella of the aggression's capital? In fact, Saudi Arabia was shocked by the fact that most of the Southern Action [Hrak] forces refused to take part in the dialogue, despite the breach in their position by [former president] Ali Salem al-Beidh.

The participants in the meeting will include 'escapee' President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his team. But everyone knows that this group lacks any popular base. As for the Nasserite and Socialist parties, they suffered from severe leadership splits and divisions as soon as they announced they would take part. This leaves the Islah Party, which is the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. But this faction that is on the Saudi list of terrorist organizations; and how can it take part in a dialogue held and sponsored by Riyadh?

But the fundamental point here is that there is no agenda for the dialogue. There is no hostility between those attending the Saudi calls for a dialogue. Dialogues are usually held between forces that differ or are in conflict with each other, and who head to a dialogue as the preferred means of finding common denominators formulated in a manner that takes into consideration the interests of these forces based on their respective sizes.

And this calls for the following question to be put to the participants: ‘You have taken part in domestic dialogues that lasted for many months, and you almost reached a comprehensive agreement; and you know that what foiled this agreement is the country that is now hosting you (Saudi Arabia) as confirmed by former UN Security Council envoy Jamal Benomar; so what are you doing now?’

‘Moreover, is it not strange for you to accept the sponsorship of a state whose warplanes are killing your people, violating your country's sovereignty, and destroying its infrastructure and installations? Do you not realize that by this action you are breaking the ties that connect you to your fellow citizens and the main constituents of your people, and that this renders it difficult to expect any real chances for any dialogue or solutions?’

In short, just as Saudi Arabia has acted in a manner that requires the defeat of a nation, it is now confronting a crisis by ensuring that the fact that its aggression's aims have not been achieved represents an effective defeat for it.

"No serious options are being proposed, and the goals that have been set are unrealistic. So what is to be done in light of all this?" asks 'Abdullah in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-Futile elections

 

Despite their talk to the contrary neither Fateh nor Hamas want elections; moreover, elections under occupation only serve the occupier, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Neither Fateh nor Hamas really want general elections to be held, despite repeated claims to the contrary because maintaining the current status quo serves their interests best, argues a leading Palestinian commentator. But holding elections under Israeli occupation is anyway an anomaly that has only bestowed legitimacy upon that occupation without bringing any benefit to the Palestinian national project of liberation and statehood.

 

BACK ON THE AGENDA: "The question of elections is back on the agenda after President Abu Mazin [Mahmoud Abbas] has asked for a written agreement from Hamas to that effect, after which he would invite the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to convene, pass a new electoral law and issue a decree to hold the elections without committing to a specific date," notes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Hamas has not agreed to sign any such document; but it has renewed its agreement to hold the elections. Yet nothing has happened. Between the two sides, the elections have gone missing.

The truth is that many people do not believe that the two sides want elections to be held. As the [Arabic] saying goes, 'if it was going to rain, it would have clouded over.' The president is using Hamas' written agreement as a pretext, even though he does not need such a document since he is armed with the [2012] Cairo Agreement which calls for elections, as well as the [2012] Doha Declaration and the [2014] Shati' Statement, both of which stressed that they should be held. In addition, he is armed with the PA’s Basic Law that states that the president can issue decrees to hold elections when the president and the PLC's legal terms end. Both terms have actually ended – in 2009 for the president, and 2010 for the PLC. Moreover, Hamas could sign the document and deny the president that pretext. But it wants the elections to be held as part of a comprehensive deal that includes the implementation of all the reconciliation agreement's clauses rather than deal with them selectively.

The disagreement over the elections' date is one of the most prominent apparent reasons that have prevented the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The president has insisted that holding the elections is the only way to end the disagreement on the grounds that the results would decide which side has a majority. In that case, that side would have the right to rule in accordance with its program, while the other side would have to abide by majority rule. This is despite the fact that Palestine is under a settler-colonial occupation that is consistent with the principle that the majority should rule the minority, but that also calls for the formation of a broad national front based on common denominators and the struggle against a common enemy.

Moreover, implementing the Doha Declaration was postponed because the president has insisted that elections should be held three months after the formation of the government, while Hamas has insisted that this period of time is insufficient to prepare the appropriate climate for holding elections and implementing the Cairo Agreement. And after the Shati' Statement was signed, it became apparent that neither side insists on holding early elections, so much so that the statement called for holding elections six months after the formation of the national accord government without specifying an upper limit on how long after that the elections should be held. And here we are today, more than a year after the statement was signed with no specified date for the elections.

Based on the above, we may conclude that the occasional talk of holding elections is nothing more than a maneuver aimed at deceiving public opinion and convincing it that the other side is opposed to holding them. Neither the president nor Fateh nor Hamas want to hold elections without being sure of their results, and without first securing American, international, Arab, and – most importantly – Israeli green light.

Abu Mazin will not head to elections before knowing their function, 'the fate of the peace process', and whether negotiations can be resumed or not, and if so, in what form and based on what terms of reference. This is because holding elections in the shadow of suspended negotiations and with the 'peace process' in intensive care, and without formulating a new alternative path to the [1993] Oslo Accords would mean that the president and Fateh's chances of success are not guaranteed.

Moreover, the president will not head to elections without finishing the job of 'putting the Fateh household in order', holding the 7th Fateh Conference, what to do about [former Fateh security official and Abbas critic and potential competitor] Dahlan and his supporters, and reaching some formula regarding Fateh's candidate for the next presidency. This is especially significant in light of the president's repeated declarations that he will not run for a second term. If he does run, he would seem to have broken his promise. Therefore, he prefers to maintain the current situation since all powers are now in his hands.

Here, the issue of the identity of Fateh's presidential candidate emerges in light of the number of contenders who will compete if Abu Mazin does not run for a second term, and in light of [Israeli] imprisoned Marwan Barghouti insistence on running in any future presidential elections even from behind bars. After all, opinion polls indicate that he is the candidate most likely to win even if Abu Mazin runs for a second term. In fact, if he wins, this could be his last chance of being released in the hope that his victory would lead to international pressure on Israel to release an imprisoned elected Palestinian president.

For its part, Hamas, is wary of holding elections in the shadow of the continued siege of the Gaza Strip, the employees' salaries crisis, the lack of progress in reconstruction of the Strip, the specter of a new Israeli aggression looming over Gaza, and after the fall of [former Egyptian president] Mohammad Mursi and the hostility between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling regime in Egypt. It also fears that it may lose or win fewer seats than in the previous elections. This is despite the fact that it should lose whatever happens. This is because, if it wins, it will be unable to rule, especially in the West Bank, for the same reasons having to do with Israel's opposition, the International Quartet's preconditions and the Egyptian regime's hostility towards it. For this reason, Hamas also prefers the current status quo to persist with its control over the Gaza Strip while it wagers on new Palestinian, Arab, regional, international, and Israeli developments.

The elections issue raises many major questions including the following: Will they be held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Will they be held on the same bases that governed the previous elections, especially in regard to abiding with the obligations of the Oslo Accords now that Israel has completely ignored them? Or will they be held on the basis of what happens after international recognition of the Palestinian state, with the entire Palestinian people taking part in the vote wherever they can, thereby paving the way to a new course that is capable of saving the cause, the nation, and the land?

And will Israel agree to elections in a Palestinian state or any elections that unite the Palestinians? Of course it will not. It is also doubtful whether it would agree to elections for a self-rule authority after stripping it of all of its powers, and after the formation of the most extreme Israeli government since the establishment of the state; a government that will only agree to elections in return for a very steep price. Moreover, it will refuse to hold them in Jerusalem, 'the eternal united capital of Israel.' And it may refuse to allow any Palestinian bloc to participate that does not abide by the existing limited self-rule [PA] authority, which is committed to recognizing Israel, security coordination, economic dependency, and renouncing violence.

And even if Israel were to agree to the elections, it would be because it will secure great benefits as a result, including a guarantee that the inter-Palestinian split would persist and be consolidated, and become a permanent division. After all, the occupation is not an external factor; it is a major factor that may intervene at any point and decide whether elections may or may not be held; and it can intervene if the elections' results do not suit it and 'confiscate' these results as happened after Hamas won the previous [2006] elections and it arrested tens of MPs and ministers.

But the root of the issue is that the source of legitimacy in any country under occupation by another that is the embodiment of a racist, settler, colonial project does not stem from the ballot box. It stems from resistance that clings to its aims and to rights, and that seeks the national interest and is based on national accord.

The heresy of holding elections under occupation, which was one of the results of the Oslo Accords, was based on the assumption that they would be held only one time and would help to reach a final status agreement that ends the occupation and establishes a Palestinian state within five years. General elections were held in 1996, bestowing legitimacy upon the authority that emerged from the Oslo Accords. But the five years passed and the occupation deepened instead of being ended. [Presidential and parliamentary] elections were also held in 2005 and 2006 to renew the PA's legitimacy which had eroded, and to include Hamas and the other forces that had boycotted the first elections, bringing them all under the ceiling of the Oslo Accords. But the results contradicted the expectations, with all the consequences that ensued.

Rather than replicate the same mistakes and head for elections that bestow renewed legitimacy to the occupation and present it in a manner that contradicts its true nature, granting it a golden opportunity to try and liquidate the Palestinian cause, we should draw the necessary lessons and morals. Elections are one of the forms of the embodiment of freedom and sovereignty; and there can be no freedom or sovereignty under occupation.

Any elections held in the shadow of a deep vertical and horizontal split and in the absence of a political horizon, without opening the doors to confrontation with the occupation, without national accord, and in tandem with campaigns of incitement, detention and mutual summoning, and in the presence of factional security services loyal to the conflicting parties but not to the general public interest, would be nothing less than a leap into the unknown.

In such a climate, elections cannot be free and open, or express the will of the people. And it is very likely that the losing side will not accept their results and that they will be subjected to forgery.

Anyone who truly wants general elections must provide the climate suitable for holding them. This includes, for example, the separation and independence of the three powers in order to ensure supervision, accountability, and answerability. Moreover, the PA government and the PLO’s various institutions must fulfil their roles. If the PA's institutions cannot operate freely, this may be compensated for by rehabilitating and empowering the PLO's institutions. Those who really want general elections should also ensure freedom of the media, human rights and basic freedoms, and regular elections at the various local and sectorial levels.

"General elections have no value if they are not held on the eve or after, the occupation's defeat and unless they occur in the context of redefining the national project, reviving the Palestinian cause, uniting the nation wherever it is present, radically renewing the national movement, and rebuilding the PLO's institutions to include all shades of the political and social spectrum," concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Ships from Germany

 

There's an odd hotchpotch of stories on the front pages of Israeli newspapers on Wednesday. Yedioth Ahronoth leads with a planned protest in the southern town of Dimona, where municipal workers will be joining a day-long strike on Sunday to protest the planned closure of several factories there. Israel Hayom leads with the earthquake yesterday in Nepal – the second to strike the country in the past two weeks. Haaretz leads with comments from President Reuven Rivlin, who criticized the move by Prime Minister Netanyahu to expand the government.

 Rivlin told the Walla! news website that 'such things are not good regarding Israel's unwritten constitution. They undermine public confidence.' According to the president, who is visiting Germany to mark 50 years of diplomatic relations between the two states, 'it would be better if they would observe the laws they pass. To break something that has constitutional traits ad hoc is something the public should not support or believe in. It would be better if they would determine once and for all the things that constitutionally oblige us and should not be deviated from in the blinking of an eye.'

While in Germany, Rivlin met with the German foreign minister and emphasized the fears Israel has about Iran and how it supplies weapons to Hizbollah and Syria. The two leaders also discussed the importance of increasing the trust between Israel and the Palestinians in order to be able to reestablish bilateral negotiations.

U.S. President Barack Obama also spoke about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process yesterday, saying that he has not given up hope for a two-state solution, but that regional tensions and 'serious questions about overall commitment' have made progress difficult. 'It's no secret that we now have a very difficult path forward. As a result, the United States is taking a hard look at our approach to the conflict,' Obama said in an interview with London based Arabic newspaper Asharq al-Awsat.  Obama said Washington is looking to the new Israeli government and the Palestinians to demonstrate, through policies and actions, a genuine commitment to a two-state solution.

In related news, the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor warned Israel on Wednesday that if it didn't provide reliable information on Operation Protective Edge, she would open a full-scale investigation based solely on Palestinian claims of Israeli war crimes. Fatou Bensouda told The Associated Press that she hadn't received any information from either side about the war in Gaza last summer. She then urged both Israel and the Palestinians to provide information for her preliminary probe. 'If I don't have the information that I'm requesting,' Bensouda stated, 'I will be forced to find it from elsewhere, or I may perhaps be forced to just go with just one side of the story. That is why I think it's in the best interest of both sides to provide my office with information.'

The Palestinian Authority accepted the ICC's jurisdiction in mid-January, officially joining the body on April 1, amidst a wave of other unilateral attempts for statehood. While the PA is certain to provide the ICC with evidence of alleged war crimes during the Gaza conflict, Israel appears less forthcoming, consistently denouncing the PA's action as 'scandalous.'

Bensouda told AP that her office is 'making attempts' to reach out to both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The prosecutor has already received information 'from others regarding the preliminary examination.' She did not, however, elaborate on who those sources and groups were. Bensouda revealed that her office was trying to get a copy of the recently published Breaking the Silence report 'to see how it can assist us in the preliminary examination phase.' The report, which includes allegations of indiscriminate fire on civilian targets by IDF soldiers in Gaza, was tellingly ordered and financed by a Palestinian Foundation based in Ramallah called the Arab Human Rights Fund (AHRF). Bensouda acknowledged that the preliminary probe was certainly a hot button issue, but she stressed it would 'be conducted in the most independent and impartial way, devoid of any political considerations.'

Army Radio reports that Egypt has expanded its buffer zone between Gaza and Sinai to one kilometer. In order to do so, it has destroyed numerous villages and thousands of homes. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have condemned Egypt's forcible evacuations and home destructions, but there have been no comments from the United Nations, no large protests in Europe or America, and no calls to sanction Egypt. Along with an update on the buffer zone, Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sissi further announced that Egypt has destroyed over 80 percent of the tunnels on the border. He blamed foreign agents for the trouble his country is currently experiencing.

Finally, Channel 2 News dedicated much of its evening broadcast on Tuesday to the final stages of Netanyahu's coalition-building woes. According to the broadcast, the Likud is expected to retain 12 portfolios in the new government, but to Netanyahu's chagrin there are more top party officials than available positions.  Netanyahu has remained mum on whom he plans to gift with a portfolio and was unwilling to meet with senior Likudniks until after the expansion bill's victory is assured in the Knesset on Wednesday. Still, rumors over who will receive what abound, particularly as Netanyahu plans to swear in his government as early as Thursday.

After being passed over for the Foreign Ministry when Netanyahu decided to keep the post for himself, ministers Yuval Steinitz, Silvan Shalom and Gilad Erdan are now all fighting for the interior portfolio. Erdan, who held the post in the last Knesset, personally met with the Prime Minister, Channel 2 reported, and insisted he should receive the public security portfolio as well.

So far, two specific Likud MKs have been promised portfolios: Benny Begin, who just returned to political life this year, and Haim Katz. Other likely possibilities to receive portfolios are previous ministers - Moshe Ya'alon, Yisrael Katz, Steinitz, Erdan, and Shalom – as well as MKs Ze'ev Elkin and Yariv Levin, who conducted coalition negotiations on behalf of Likud.

 

LIEBERMAN'S WAITING GAME: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan says that, when Binyamin Netanyahu's 61-member coalition runs into trouble, the prime minister will have no choice but to ask Avigdor Lieberman to shore it up – and then the Yisrael Beiteinu will be able to demand a much greater dowry.

"Let's try to bring some order to proceedings: nothing that is happening at the moment in terms of forming a new coalition is new. Unlike Haydn, there aren't even variations on a theme. Events are unfolding in strict accordance with the template created by politics; and our politicians are doing everything they can to perpetuate it. There have been accusations of hypocrisy. Very true, but hypocrisy is political oxygen.

The only person who deviated from the path of empty words was Avigdor Lieberman. Not only did he have a lot to say, he walked away from the coalition negotiations. Whether or not one agrees with what he did, one has to admire him for moving beyond the usual shtick. Lieberman deserves to be praised – within reason. After all, the justification that he presented for what he did cannot exactly be described as the epitome of political integrity and honesty. He accused Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of deceiving the voters, but that's not exactly the crime of the century. It's like accusing the sun of rising in the east. In fact, such behavior isn't exactly foreign to Lieberman. He used this kind of behavior exactly when he tried to explain why he wouldn't join Netanyahu's government.

I see little point in repeating Lieberman's justifications; rather, I want to focus on what I believe his real motives were. First and foremost, he was motivated by mathematics. With just six seats in the Knesset, it would have been hard for Yisrael Beiteinu to function within the government. For there to be any point in him joining the coalition, his party would have had to win many more seats. The negotiations that took place since March 17 were done under intense pressure – both in terms of the deadline and the pressure from Likudniks who wanted key positions saved for them – making it even harder for Lieberman to join the government.

Why not wait a little, then? What's so urgent? After all, it is clear to everyone that a government with a paper-thin majority will find it almost impossible to function properly. It will be in a constant state of fear that its days are numbered. And that could happen at any moment, in any vote. Since there is a large and vocal opposition, you can be certain that there will be more no-confidence votes than in any previous Knesset. In order to survive, Netanyahu needs to enlarge his coalition. Many people are looking toward Isaac Herzog for this – but it would be a mistake to think that his Zionist Union is a realistic option. Netanyahu wouldn't risk alienating the right – which has kept him alive for so long – by joining forces with Herzog. Doing so might save his fourth government, but it would almost certainly mean that there would be no fifth Netanyahu government.

So that leaves Lieberman, who accused the prime minister of lying to the public. That isn't the worst accusation leveled against Netanyahu in his long political career; and he has swallowed worse-tasting frogs than that. So Lieberman is hoping that Netanyahu will come wooing him. Crawling, in fact. And then the former foreign minister will be able to demand whatever takes his fancy. He will get far more than Netanyahu was willing to offer him originally. He could demand that Moshe Ya'alon be removed from the Defense Ministry without any great drama, freeing up a key position for Lieberman.

Such considerations are far more important for someone like Lieberman, despite his heroic efforts to persuade us that his motivation was purely ideological."

Ends…

 

THE BEDOUIN LEND A HAND: Writing on News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem says that Bedouin in the Sinai are joining forces with the Egyptian military to fight against Ansar Bait al-Maqdis.

"On May 10, state-run Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported that tribes in the northern Sinai Peninsula were uniting against Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which is affiliated to ISIS. Ansar Bait al-Maqdis has been waging an all-out war against the Egyptian army and police and has been carrying out almost daily terror attacks against official targets. Several months ago, Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi ordered extra forces to be sent to the northern Sinai and, of late, even extended by an additional three months the presidential edict declaring a state of emergency in the Sinai.

Ansar Bait al-Maqdis did manage to recruit some of the Bedouin tribesmen to its ranks, but more recently it attacked members of the Tarabin tribe, after tribal leaders refused to allow members to join the group. Meanwhile, it continues to try to recruit from other tribes in the Sinai, since they know the area better than anyone else and can help Ansar Bait al-Maqdis track the movement of Egyptian troops – which would make it easier to carry out terror attacks.

The Bedouin have had enough, however. Ten tribes are due to hold a gathering in the coming days, at which they will condemn Ansar Bait al-Maqdis and will each allow 50 of their members to join the Egyptian security forces' antiterrorism drive. Representatives of these tribes also said that they would be willing to identify for Egyptian authorities those members who have joined Ansar Bait al-Maqdis.

What is happening in the Sinai is similar to events in Iraq, where several tribes have also joined the war against al-Qa’ida and ISIS. The tribes in the northern Sinai have already paid a heavy price. In some areas, they are under a curfew imposed by Egyptian forces fighting against the terrorists and some of them have been forced to leave their homes along the border with the Gaza Strip, where Egypt is trying to set up a wide buffer zone to prevent smuggling from the Sinai into Gaza. If these Bedouin tribes do indeed join forces with the Egyptian military to fight Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, there is no question that the war on terror in the Sinai will benefit greatly."

Ends…

 

WIN-WIN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Shlomo Shapira says that the Israeli-German deal for four patrol boats is good for both countries: Israel gets to upgrade its naval capabilities and the Germans safeguard jobs and expertise in the shipbuilding industry.

"The deal for Israel to purchase four patrol boats from Germany adds another layer to the military and naval cooperation between the two countries, which has been operating successfully for the past 60 years. German shipbuilders are the best and most experienced in the world when it comes to advances and relatively small vessels, which is exactly what the Israeli Navy needs. It does not need American shipbuilders, who tend to specialize in designing and building massive warships and aircraft carriers and who are not able to provide the kind of vessel that Israel needs to protect its shores and its offshore gas platforms.

In the first years after Israel's establishment, the navy had only a handful of old and unsuitable vessels, most of which had been converted from the ships that brought immigrants from post-Holocaust Europe. These vessels were not suitable for operational purposes and did not contribute to the war against Arab states. The navy wanted to purchase new ships, but there was an arms embargo imposed by the United States across the Middle East and many Western countries refused to sell to Israel. In 1956 and 1957, Germany secretly sold Israel two patrol boats, which were manufactured at the Burmester Shipyard in northern Germany. These vessels were launched by the Israeli navy as the INS Jordan and the INS Yarkon, in order to conceal their origin and create the impression that they were manufactured in Israel.

However, these two small vessels, along with two old destroyers that were purchased from the United Kingdom as surplus after World War II, did not provide an operational answer to the growing threat from Arab states, which were being provided with advanced vessels by the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, Israel began work on designing a new type of ship – the Sa'ar missile boat – which represented a revolution in Israel's naval/military thinking. Navy commanders recognized that a small country like Israel could not maintain a large fleet of destroyers and warships, so they decided to focus on smaller vessels. Secret negotiations between Israel and Germany led to a three-way agreement: the ships would be designed by Lürssen in Germany, but manufactured by the CMN shipyard in Cherbourg in northern France.

Some of these vessels never made it to Israel, however, because of the arms embargo that President Charles de Gaulle imposed on Israel. They were subsequently smuggled to Israel in a daring operation carried out by Mossad and the Israeli navy in late 1969. Navy officers and Mossad agents, who disguised themselves as merchant sailors, infiltrated the CMN shipyard, where the vessels were anchored, and, while French police and security guards were busy celebrating New Year, the ships snuck out into open water and, after a tough journey, arrived in Israel. These vessels were the backbone of the Israeli navy for many years and allowed Israel to record several stunning operational successes during and after the Yom Kippur War.

The deal that was signed this week closes a circle that has remained open for the past 60 years: they will be built at the same Burmester Shipyard in Germany which provided Israel with its first vessels. It is important to bear in mind that it is also very much in Germany's interests that this deal goes ahead. Global demand for warships has dropped dramatically in the past decade. The economic crisis – coupled with cuts to defense spending in many countries – have effectively frozen demand for new warships. Instead of purchasing new vessels, many countries are renovating old ones and are upgrading them with electronic systems and new missiles – some of which are manufactured right here in Israel.

The German government is very keen to maintain its ability to design and build these vessels, especially given that there are precious few orders for new ships. By agreeing to fund around a third of the cost of the four new vessels, Germany is, of course, giving Israel a generous and most welcome gift. But it is also the Germans' way of indirectly subsidizing their shipyards, in order to safeguard jobs in areas where the industry has been hit hard by the Eurozone crisis and the drop in demand. This deal will allow Israel's navy to better prepare itself for the naval challenges of the decades to come."

Ends…

 

AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: Writing in Maariv, Avraham Tirosh comments on the appointment of Ayelet Shaked as justice minister – and how the bad blood between her and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will impact on her performance.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu chose a particularly ugly and reprehensible way to express his dissatisfaction with the appointment of Ayelet Shaked as justice minister – an appointment that he was forced into by Habayit Hayehudi chairman Naftali Bennett.

At the end of the joint press conference between Likud and Habayit Hayehudi officials, Netanyahu ignored Shaked and declined to shake her hand, leaving her standing like a statue with her arm extended. Yuck. Such pettiness. The prime minister must have been acting on instructions from his wife – who has despised Shaked ever since the Habayit Hayehudi MK was in charge of Netanyahu's bureau and refused to listen to orders from Mrs. Netanyahu. The prime minister, it seems, didn't shake Shaked's hand because he knew that, if he did, he'd be in all sorts of hot water when he got home.

One can also see that shameful moment as a harbinger of the relationship that will exist between the prime minister and his justice minister for however long this government lasts. Usually, justice ministers – most of whom are experienced and respected jurists – previously served as legal advisers to the prime minister. They could often be seen standing behind him, whispering legal advice in his ear. There is zero chance of that happening during the term of the government that will be sworn in next week. Bibi refused to even shake Shaked's hand, so he certainly won't let her give him advice. Shaked and Bennett are very much personae non grata at the prime minister's official residence on Balfour Street.

Only once in the history of the State of Israel has there been another example of complete disconnect between the prime minister and his justice minister. That happened when the Dash Party, headed by Yigael Yadin, joined the first-ever Likud government, headed by Menachem Begin, several months after the 1977 election. The prime minister was forced to accept the appointment of Shmuel Tamir as justice minister, despite the fact that he deeply despised him. A decade earlier, Tamir tried and failed to oust Begin as leader of the Herut Party.

The level of cooperation between Begin and Tamir was minimal. The justice minister, for example, was not invited to participate in the peace talks with Egypt, despite the fact that any agreement would have to be approved by legal experts. But Begin was nothing if not polite; he would not leave someone standing like an idiot with their hand extended, even if he hated that person.

Shaked's appointment was greeted with mixed reactions. Some of them were extreme and forced police to assign bodyguards to the minister-designate; others were downright sexist and dealt only with her looks. The relevant reactions, which came primarily from the right of the political map, praised her capabilities and her leadership and organizational skills. They reminded everyone that some of Israel's most successful justice ministers were not lawyers by training – Yossi Beilin and Meir Sheetrit are two prime examples – and argued that there is no reason that Shaked should not be a success.

Those who oppose Shaked's appointment – mainly left-wingers – focused on her age (she's not yet turned 40, after all) and her relative lack of political experience. They also focused extensively on her ideological positions, expressing concern that her right-wing views and her antagonistic dealings with the High Court would turn her term into a particularity fraught one.

It's worth remembering, however, that the justice minister cannot carry out reforms to the legal system without the support of the prime minister and without his cooperation. It will be interesting to see whether she gets them.

Many on the right – and in the Likud in particular – share Shaked's concerns about the High Court; Netanyahu himself shares her views. But there's a good chance that Netanyahu's desire to see her fail (a desire shared by his wife, of course) may dictate his handling of her proposed reforms.

I have extreme reservations about the way that, in recent years, certain politicians have taken a shortcut from the back benches to a ministerial appointment. In many cases, up-and-coming politicians were promoted too high and too quickly. These days, MKs feel as if they deserve to be appointed minister after serving one term in the Knesset. Shaked is one of them.

Nonetheless, if it were not for the terrible relationship between the prime minister and his justice minister (which is not the latter's fault in any way, shape or form), I would place my money on her being a roaring success. She's got what it takes. The problem is that there is no guarantee that she will still be justice minister six months from now."

Ends…

 

IT WON'T LAST FOREVER: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel warns Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that German largesse will not last forever and that political realities will soon interfere with the harmonic relationship between the two countries.

"The major transaction announced Monday, involving Israel’s purchase of four corvette naval ships from Germany at a cost of 430 million euros ($480 million), to be used to protect natural-gas drilling sites off Israel's Mediterranean coast, will fill a substantial gap in the defense of Israel’s economic assets. Israel’s increasing dependence on the gas supplies and the high expectations generated by the discovery of the offshore reserves (which has provoked harsh public criticism over how the profits are to be divided) also heightens interest in the rigs on the part of the country’s adversaries.

The drilling platforms are relatively exposed to attack, and a major strike on them could cause Israel huge financial losses. These are facts that all of the forces in the region, most notably the Lebanese-based Hizbollah militia, understand well. Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has already hinted in the past that he would put Israel's strategic-infrastructure targets in his sights as a way of creating a balance of deterrence with Israel – this in light of Israeli threats to hit similar infrastructure in Lebanon in the event that another war breaks out there.

Hizbollah certainly has the operational capacity to hit the drilling sites in the sea, whether by dispatching terrorists on a commando raid there or by firing missiles from shore. The Chinese C-802 missile, which hit the Israeli Hanit missile boat during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and the Russian Yakhont missile are already in Syria’s possession.

The four corvettes from Germany will provide the main component of a defensive solution to protect Israel’s 'economic waters,' the zone in which the rigs are located. In addition, however, there will be a number of other components involved in this effort – ranging from command and control systems and intelligence-gathering, to use of unmanned aircraft and also anti-missile defense systems (currently, the Israeli-made Barak 1 surface-to-air missile, and the more sophisticated Barak 8, expected to be declared operational toward the end of the year).

The negotiations between the governments of Germany and Israel were conducted for nearly two years, and based on the timetable announced this week; the four vessels will be supplied within five years. That means that until then, the Israel Navy will have to maneuver with what it has in its possession to secure the gas-production sites, relying on its current fleet.

The agreement was signed during a visit here by German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Each of the four ships in question is about 90 meters long, smaller than a destroyer, highly maneuverable and weighing about 2,000 tons. Once they arrive in Israel, they will be outfitted for the navy by Israeli defense firms with various special weapons systems. The new ships will be deployed hundreds of kilometers from shore.

The purchase of the vessels is funded through a special budget that is not part of Israel's general defense budget. The agreement states that the German government will underwrite just over one-quarter of the purchase price through a 115-million-euro grant. In addition, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, the company building the ships as well as a total of six Dolphin submarines for the Israel Navy, has committed to invest about 700 million shekels ($180 million) in future procurement of Israeli equipment and in Israeli research and development.

This is another impressive indication of Germany’s generosity with respect to everything related to military assistance to Israel, especially after it was reported that the Germans had funded about half of the even heftier cost of the Dolphins. At a later stage, just prior to the signing of a contract for the sale of the first submarines, there was also disclosure of aid that German companies provided to Iraq’s chemical weapons program in the 1980s.

Of course, the acts of generosity come against the backdrop of the long, sad history involving the memory of the Holocaust. Moreover, the latest grant to Israel again reflects the major reliance the country has on outside military aid, and not just from the United States. In the case of Europe, one cannot count on the generosity lasting forever; certainly in light of the demonstrable differences of opinion with Germany over the future of the peace process with the Palestinians.

At this week's joint news conference with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, von der Leyen stated that there is no other country with which Germany has such close defense ties. The incoming government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will need to see to it that this defense cooperation continues over the coming years, despite diplomatic differences of opinion."

Ends…

 

FIVE STEPS TO PEACE: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Doug Lamborn says that there are five steps the United States can take to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.

"A new Israeli coalition and government is taking form. Warnings have surfaced regarding the right-leaning government and its ability to cooperate with the Obama Administration. The chief worry on the mind of the White House is the hawkish character of this Israeli government that, in their mind, may hinder any efforts to reach a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Recently Under-Secretary of State Wendy Sherman indicated that the U.S. support of Israel in the international arena will depend on whether the new government will meet the administration’s expectations on support for a two-state solution. This was a hint that the President might support a U.N. Security Council resolution to force Israel’s withdrawal from the disputed territories.

Speculations on this change of policy are not new to the Administration. Last December, Secretary of State John Kerry chose to remain ambiguous and refused to clarify whether the U.S. will use its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to thwart unilateral action by the Palestinians. The resolution failed so the hinted threat was never tested.

This should really worry anyone who wants to see stability and quiet between the two parties in our lifetime. A forced solution to the conflict will not bring the two sides closer but would only generate more tensions and conflict.

A basic condition for the success of negotiations is that each side has an incentive to negotiate. Every party must believe negotiating will allow it to reach chief goals and therefore render some concession worthwhile and profitable. A resolution that will dictate a solution to the conflict will remove this element for both sides.

Dictating the borders or a time of Israeli withdrawal from the territories will allow the Palestinians to achieve the majority of their feasible goals. However this will remove any incentive to compromise on the remaining issues. This will undermine any hope of moderation or the recognition of the state of Israel.

This should not be left to President Abbas’ good will. Abbas’ record on incitement against Jews and Israel does not seem promising. More importantly, portrayed by the State Department as the last moderate leader and over 80 years of age, the question remains what will happen the day after Abbas.

Israel for its part will hardly be persuaded into cooperation with a forced resolution. Failure to follow a Security Council resolution will likely bring about additional pressure to the little state. Yet, as Israel learned many times before, conceding land and following U.N. resolutions does not secure the international community’s support. Sadly it may also carry a heavy price of lost lives. The last war in Gaza serves as a good example on both accounts.

Faced with the current impasse it seems wise and necessary to review and revise our policy. Here are some suggestions:

1. De-sanctify the two-state solution.

Having two states living side by side may be the end result of the conflict, and it may not. What is clear is that prematurely confining the negotiations to one final result constrains the flexibility of both parties, and makes finding a solution all the more complicated.

2. Moderate our short-term goals.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks on the feasibility of a two-state solution reflect what any observer of the conflict realized long ago. Neither side is ready to sign a final clear-cut treaty to end the conflict. Insistence on such a demand frustrates all parties and portrays the failure to achieve that goal as political incompetence and failure. Our aim should be incremental steps of increased political, economic and security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. This is in both parties’ interest — and ours.

3. Promote grassroots cooperation and tolerance.

Recently the Palestinian Authority declared a boycott on basic Israeli products. At the same time the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign has been gaining traction not only in Europe but here in the U.S. as well. Such actions are not helpful; they feed the incitement and radicalization narrative that rejects any understanding between Israelis and Palestinians.

4. Prevent American money from supporting educational institutions and camps that teach incitement.

Some will challenge that conditioning transfer of funds to the Palestinian authority and UNRWA upon compliance will cause instability in the west bank, however we can’t a become hostages of our own policy. Allowing American funds promote incitement of young students will prove destructive to our policy on the long run.

5. Incentivize business and economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in the private sector realm.

Creating grassroots cooperation and mutual business dependence may result in pressure on the political leadership of both sides for stability and quiet.

These steps will not bring an immediate solution. However as Van Gogh once said: 'Great things are not done by impulse, but by a series of small things brought together.' Surely Van Gogh was speaking of art; successful foreign policy is in fact a form of art."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

DEATH OF 1980’S COUP GENERAL EVREN: Hikmet Cetinkaya laments the legacy of former 1980 coup leader general Kenan Evren in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Evren was a coup maker who exploited Kemalism and religion; a dictator who was the enemy of democracy and freedom. He stole the lives of the generation of 1968 and 1978; he ordered the hanging of 50 people including children (such as Erdal Eren who was in only 17 years old). He was a cruel man who ordered the arrest of 650 people and murdered 178 people by torture. He had no conscience! He died at the age of 98. Besides, he went without being held accountable for what he did: stealing our youth and our lives. However, the political, social and legal order that he founded continues to grow at an accelerated pace."

Umit Kivanc sees little change over the past decades in centre-left Radikal: "[Evren’s] September 12th 1980 coup represents the epitome of the anti-democracy culture that has successfully taken root in this country. September 12th is a record of the fact that the evil the state can inflict on this society has no limit. There have been many aides, collaborators and accomplices in this. The social atmosphere, the institutional structure and the operational style created by September 12th is still fully in charge today." 

Melih Asik argues that Evren’s regime is still growing in centrist Milliyet: "The state and the government are not going to offer their condolences. But was Evren not hosted at Cankaya presidential palace by former president Abdullah Gul? Did anyone object to this? Why this sensitivity now? Kenan Evren is being criticized for the constitution he put in place as well as his coup crimes. The current constitution is being described as the 1980 coup constitution. It is quite ironic that those in power today have suspended even this narrow constitution." 

Gungor Mengi adopts a historical perspective in centrist Vatan: "September 12th is one of the two most significant coups in Turkey’s republican history! History does not forget coups no matter if they are civilian or military even after a thousand years. The September coup and Kenan Evren's role in it will not be forgotten either. In recalling what this coup brought about, one first remembers the issue of the 'independence of the judiciary' and the 10% electoral threshold". 

Mumtazer Turkone insists that Evren’s system remains in place in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Evren has died, however, the government system he formed remains in place. Turkey is still being ruled by the Evren constitution. The 10% election threshold, which is also Evren’s invention, is being used by the new owners of his chair as a means of controlling politics. Even if it has lost some of its power, the National Security Council is busy pursuing missions similar to those of the Evren era."

Fadime Ozkan has nothing good to say in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Evren will be taken to a state grave today via a military ceremony. When the imam asks 'how do you know him', we will see who will say what. May God forgive him. The coup’s courts ordered the hanging of 50 people, including Erdal Eren. And Evren tried to prove how fair they were by saying 'we hanged one from the right wing and one from the left'. Today no one looks to him either from right or left. The capital is silent."

Ali Bayramoglu looks for constitutional change in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Despite all the legal changes that have been made, Turkey is still being ruled by the Evren constitution and its remedies are standing there at the centre of everything. The death of Evren should remind us at least of why we need a new constitution. It should remind us that a constitution gives sense and order not only to the state’s inner powers such as a presidential or parliamentary system, but to state-society relations as well."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

U.S./IRAN: Hard-line Javan is hard line:" The foreign ministry’s decision to engage American officials on expanding offices for Interests Sections is hasty and against our national interests regardless of the outcome. As we show flexibility in the nuclear talks, the West issues more excessive demands. If the expansion of the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran is for the purpose of gradually changing it into an embassy, such an action will be detrimental to our national interests. Those who pursue this consciously or unconsciously serve the interests of the U.S. rather than Iran." 

 

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: Reformist Mardom Salari explains: "America needs Iran's support and help to resolve a variety of matters. The only key to opening this lock lies in resolving the nuclear issue and lifting hostile sanctions. The Islamic Republic and the United States have many common interests despite their radical positions about each other. Except for ideological disputes, these common interests push away from enmity towards friendship. Following the Lausanne agreement, the concern of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has turned into fury and even rebellion against their biggest supporter; the U.S.. Some Arab leaders are not going to participate at the Camp David summit, where the White House hopes to win Arab support for the nuclear deal with Iran. The Arab spring and the lack of U.S. support for the dictators allied with Washington have reinforced the view among Gulf Arab dictators, especially Saudi Arabia, that U.S. Democrats have prepared velvet revolutions for them that will become operational after the agreement with Iran." 

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Arman expects success: "The nuclear talks are in Iran's favour because of disputes between Russia and the U.S.; Iran stands to gain from these disputes. The Americans want to prolong the talks to resolve all their problems with Iran and normalize ties. However, Iran is not willing to sit at the table with the U.S. on any issue other than the nuclear one. The problem in the current talks is not the negotiating parties - but Saudi Arabia, some Gulf countries and the Zionist regime. Their sabotage and interventions cause difficulties. Because of Iran's strong role in the region, its importance for America has grown and this is why the U.S. wants to resolve its problems with Iran; therefore these talks can be expected to succeed." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Conservative Khorasan sounds ominous: "The Yemen crisis is the first taste of a new Saudi strategy in the region. Following events in Syria, the Iraqi crisis and Saudi incapacity, Saudi Arabia is trying to stabilize its position as the region's main player. Saudi brutal air attacks on Yemen cannot be stopped by merely relying on military tactics like asymmetric warfare. Saudi threats cannot be countered merely by relying on traditional diplomatic language and foreign policy interactions." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami is pessimistic: "Judging by past performance, it seems unlikely that the Saudi ceasefire will hold for long. With the ceasefire, Riyadh hopes to stop the growing advance of tribal forces within its territory and to get an opportunity to revise its defeated and failed strategy."  

 

SAUDI/U.S. TIES: Reformist Sharq observes: "The Saudi government is not pleased with President Obama. It does not want to accept that the Middle East has changed. Two years have passed since Hassan Rowhani came to power, and his moderate government has tried hard to break the anti-Iran climate in the world and negotiate with the West. His administration has been successful to a great extent. Intractable Saudi behaviour and mistakes regarding ISIS and groups related to Al-Qa’ida have diminished Western trust in them. It is obvious that the absence of the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Oman at Camp David would reduce the effectiveness of the meeting and will further weaken relations between Arabs and the U.S.." 

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Quds surveys: "Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran/Saudi relations have been turbulent. During the era of the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi relations with Tehran turned sour because Saudi Arabia was a main supporter of Saddam. Iran and Saudi Arabia have different interests in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and even Palestine. Extremist elements in the Saudi foreign policy establishment and the cooling of ties have blocked possible ways for resolving these differences." 

 

UK/EU: Conservative Khorasan expects Cameron to play a balancing act: "Officials in Brussels do not want to see Britain leave. The Union does not want to be humiliated and reach the verge of collapse because of Britain leaving. Benefiting from these circumstances, Cameron will try to win further privileges from the EU. He also knows that to leave the EU will have political consequences, most important of which is isolation in Europe." 

 

CRITICISM OF ROWHANI'S ADMINISTRATION: Hard-line Keyhan is censorious: "One of the flawed views of the government is thinking that the world means the P5+1! This bitter approach, which unfortunately has been fully institutionalized in the Rowhani administration, does not only relate to nuclear negotiations; it is prevalent in most of the affairs of the current government. The government's administrative body is extremely weak. It is so weak that even some of the strong supporters of the government have been compelled to raise their voices!" 

Reformist E'temad is constructive: "Though the government properly identified its main priority, that of resolving the nuclear issue, it made a big mistake by ignoring domestic policy. What can overshadow the possible positive outcome of the nuclear talks after the end of negotiations, are the serious gaps that exist in the domestic policy of the government. The argument that there are internal disruptions of the government is comprehensible, but it cannot be accepted as an excuse to justify not paying attention to domestic issues. The government has only one way to succeed and satisfy society, and that is the restoration of domestic policy. It should start with repairing the cabinet, which sometimes seems to act even contrary to the policies and inclinations of the president". 

 

TURKEY/SYRIA: Conservative Resalat does not welcome Davutoglu’s visit of Syria: "After the failure of his theories and strategies in Syria, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has decided to enter Syria himself. Davutoglu who is responsible for many crises in the region, does not intend to change his wrong and doomed policies towards Damascus. His illegal visit to Syria is unjustifiable. Davutoglu's confusion about developments in the region in recent months has reached its peak. Washington and Ankara have been the main supporters of ISIS, but currently; disputes have arisen between them over how to manage this terrorist group."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-No consolation for the deceived

2-Old delusions, premature expectations

 

1-No consolation for the deceived

 

[The U.S.] acts in accordance to its interests first, and second, based on the ability of those who are asking it for something to impose their demands and conditions. The White House’s various residents, including Obama, have promised the Arabs much. The ink of his two famous speeches to the Arab and Islamic worlds in Cairo and Ankara and his promise to establish the Palestinian state has dried a long time ago without any such promises being fulfilled. Rather than starting a number of small proxy wars with 'Iran's Arab minions' and uselessly asking for help from the U.S., the Gulf's leaders would have done better to launch a 'political Decisive Storm' based on a collective and united Arab position that imposes a direct dialogue with Tehran as an equal. That could have restored the lost balance and forced Washington to reconsider many of its Arab axioms--Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

While the Americans wish to concentrate on issues having to do with a missile defense shield, the offer of guarantees of the Gulf's security and the sale of weapons, the Gulf states' real concern extends beyond that and has to do with the regional repercussions of the U.S./Iranian deal. In other words, the Gulf is concerned about Washington's attitude towards Iranian influence and its current expansion in the Arab region. Such demands and concerns, of course, require the U.S. to back down from President Barack Obama's current policies that not only lead towards a nuclear agreement with Iran; but to its appeasement and avoiding anything that would annoy it, refraining from confronting its efforts to expand its regional influence. These policies, in other words, appear akin to a barter deal, one that trades Iran’s nuclear bomb in return for an Iranian regional role. And this is what annoys the Saudis and Gulf Arabs specifically; and it is this that Obama seems unwilling to concede or to appease the Gulf Arabs about--Mohammad Abu-Rumman in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Throughout, [President Obama] was seeking a strategic alliance with Iran at the expense of his traditional Arab allies. Well, let him and Iran enjoy their alliance; but there will be no consolation for the deceived. Had he been really serious about 'appeasing' his guests and confirming his respect for them, their states and his alleged strategic alliance with them, President Obama would have done better to go to them himself, to Riyadh for example, and meet with them there. This would have been better than summoning them to the notorious Camp David retreat that has been linked in the minds of the Arabs – including the Gulf Arabs – to the agreements of humiliation, shame and absolute surrender to Israel, squandering all fixed Arab and Islamic principles, tearing up the Arab region, and sowing the seeds of breakup and division in them--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Because these [Arab Gulf] fears are legitimate, and since their signs have begun to loom on the horizon, the GCC states want a clear American position regarding the U.S. approach to the various issues; one that is not shrouded in mystery or ambiguity. Therefore, they call for specific American guarantees that Washington will not place its interests above any consideration or conclude agreements and strike deals that may secure its own interests regardless of the interests of others. There are many precedents to this effect and a long record of American policies whereby friends and allies have been let down. The only exception is the U.S.'s strategic relations with Israel, which have not changed or altered, and are based on a single fixed principle – namely, that Israel's security is part of U.S. national security--Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

The Arab Gulf leaders who are heading to Camp David to hold talks with U.S. President Barack Obama later this week will be focused on Iran and the means of restraining its influence in the region, while Obama will try to convince them of the benefits of the nuclear agreement with Tehran, maintains a Lebanese commentator. But the Arabs are focusing on the wrong issue and opting for the wrong policies. The absence of some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders from the summit is an indication of new alliances that are taking shape in the region, suggests a Jordanian commentator. There are indications that the UAE and Oman are not in full agreement with Saudi policies in Yemen, while Riyadh has drawn closer to Doha and Ankara regarding Syria. The GCC leaders who have refused to comply with President Obama's 'summoning' of them to Camp David were right to do so, maintains the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. For Obama has deceived them and is dealing with them in an arrogant and condescending manner like all previous American presidents. The GCC member states have legitimate fears that the U.S. may be about to abandon them in pursuit of its own narrow interests, as it has done with many of its friends and allies in the past, maintains the editorial in a UAE daily. This is why they need unequivocal guarantees that the U.S. will take a clear stance on Iranian expansionism and the conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

 

ILL REPUTED VENUE: "Obama is slated to meet with Gulf leaders at Camp David [on Thursday]," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

This venue, which has a bad name in the Arab world, is where Egypt left Arab ranks [after the 1978 peace agreement with Israel]. It was also there that the Palestinians were dragged into making concessions that did not lead even to a project for establishing a mini-state [in 2000]. And nothing indicates that the third Arab experience will produce any better result than the two previous ones.

Iran will be the main course at the attendees' table. The U.S. president has already spoken frankly about this before specifying a date for the meeting: 'The real threat to the Gulf is not from foreign attack, but from the anger of the youth inside its states.'

In other words, Obama will not share his guests' views that Iran is an absolute evil. Instead, he will try to sell them his awaited nuclear agreement and convince them that this achievement is also in the Gulf's interest. He will reassure them that the U.S. will not cast aside its deep 'friendship' with their states after signing this agreement. He will tell them that the American concern is to maintain the balance in the region, and that there is no difference – as far as the U.S. is concerned – between an Arab, a non-Arab, and a Jew, except to the extent by which they abide by Washington's policies and do not 'sing out of tune.' And he will promise them security cooperation and to open up the U.S. arms industries for concluding deals with them, which means they will have to pay the highest price for old wares.

For their part, the Gulf Arabs will try to restrict the discussion on how to contain Iran’s expanding influence in the region. They will warn against its further expansion thanks to the financial returns that the nuclear agreement will provide Tehran and as a result of America’s likely withdrawal from the region. They will also urge the president to intervene effectively in Syria and back the armed opposition on the grounds that defeating the regime in Damascus is the necessary 'cauterization' that will treat the Iranian 'ailment.'

But the president will explain at length the benefits of reaching an agreement and opening up to Tehran. He will focus on ISIS and its sister organizations, and ask the Gulf Arabs for greater involvement in his international coalition's campaign against terrorism (which has consolidated the Iranian role in Iraq rather than cutting it down to size as hoped). And he will urge them to restrain their 'decisiveness' in Yemen even before their 'storm' achieves any of its aims of confronting Iran's Yemeni friends.

Washington is not a 'supermarket' that sells its clients whatever political positions and weapons they need for cash. Nor is it a charity organization that provides aid to the needy. It acts in accordance to its interests first, and second, based on the ability of those who are asking it for something to impose their demands and conditions.

The White House’s various residents, including Obama, have promised the Arabs much. The ink of his two famous speeches to the Arab and Islamic worlds in Cairo and Ankara and his promise to establish the Palestinian state, has dried a long time ago without any such promises being fulfilled.

Rather than starting a number of small proxy wars with 'Iran's Arab minions' and uselessly asking for help from the U.S., the Gulf's leaders would have done better to launch a 'political Decisive Storm' based on a collective and united Arab position that imposes a direct dialogue with Tehran as an equal.

"That could have restored the lost balance and forced Washington to reconsider many of its Arab axioms," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

End…

 

CLEAR SIGNAL: "A Washington Post report has explained the absence of Saudi monarch King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz from the awaited U.S./Gulf Camp David summit scheduled for the day after tomorrow as a clear signal of Saudi Arabia's dissatisfaction and displeasure with the U.S.," writes Mohammad Abu-Rumman in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

What lends credence to this explanation is that the announcement that Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif will attend the summit instead of the king came only hours after the White House had announced that the king would attend.  But what lies behind this message on the summit's eve, when there were great hopes and high expectations of results that would diminish and limit Saudi Arabia's concern about the recent Iranian/American rapprochement?

The answer, apparently, is that there is a gap between the Saudi/Gulf and the American side's understanding of what is required from this summit. While the Americans wish to concentrate on issues having to do with a missile defense shield, the offer of guarantees of the Gulf's security and the sale of weapons, the Gulf states' real concern extends beyond that and has to do with the regional repercussions of the U.S./Iranian deal. In other words, the Gulf is concerned about Washington's attitude towards Iranian influence and its current expansion in the Arab region.

Such demands and concerns, of course, require the U.S. to back down from President Barack Obama's current policies that not only lead towards a nuclear agreement with Iran; but to its appeasement and avoiding anything that would annoy it, refraining from confronting its efforts to expand its regional influence. These policies, in other words, appear akin to a barter deal, one that trades Iran’s nuclear bomb in return for an Iranian regional role. And this is what annoys the Saudis and Gulf Arabs specifically; and it is this that Obama seems unwilling to concede or to appease the Gulf Arabs about.

And here lies root of the problem according to (American analyst) John Alterman. What the Gulf Arabs are asking for, the U.S. is unable – or 'unwilling' – to provide. This does not mean that we are heading towards a Gulf/U.S. divorce; on the contrary, this may diminish the intensity of the growing crisis between the two sides. However, it confirms at least the deep suspicions that have begun to eat into this historical alliance and to raise questions about its future and point.

For his part, American expert on Iranian affairs, Karim Sadjadpour, goes beyond the phase of questions and suspicions and speaks of 'a new realization' that is growing in the White House that 'the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are friends but not allies, while the U.S. and Iran are allies but not friends.' It is clear therefore that the imminent summit will not alleviate the 'doubts' that some used to describe as mere illusions in the past. It will consolidate them as real facts that everyone must recognize instead. Foremost among these facts is that significant changes have occurred and much water has passed under the various U.S. administrations’ bridges with Saudi Arabia since 9/11, leading to Obama's foreign policy that coincides with the major upheavals in the region.

These doubts are not limited to Saudi Arabia's relationship with the U.S., pushing both sides to recognize the gap that separates them from each other. It will also affect relations within the Arabian Gulf itself. According to Saudi politicians and intellectuals, the statements by [Dubai's Head of General Security] Dahi Khalfan regarding former Yemeni president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh reveal the Emiratis true attitude towards the current war on Yemen, despite Emirati Foreign Minister 'Abdullah bin Zayid's attempts to contain these statements. The same goes for Omani positions and Saudi Arabia's relations with its Arab friends. Riyadh's relations with Turkey and Qatar have improved greatly after the clear change in the Saudi foreign agenda.

"Alliances, relations, and priorities are being redrawn in tandem with developments on the battlefields, but without making much noise, and despite the fact that these changes are not being clearly and frankly announced by the parties and the international and regional powers concerned," concludes Abu-Rumman.

End…

 

LITTLE WEIGHT: "The summit that will be hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama with a number of GCC leaders, reflects what little weight he accords us Arabs, both as peoples and rulers," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Tuesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Therefore, the fact that some Gulf leaders will not attend this summit represents a strong slap to the American president's face and a strong response to this insult that comes at the appropriate moment, whether these leaders have intended this or not.

President Obama engaged in all sorts of arrogance and conceit when he issued a decree 'summoning' the GCC leaders to Washington, as if he were the headmaster of an elementary school. His aim was to 'appease' these leaders and sugar-talk them after he 'betrayed' and deceived them and stabbed them in the back when he negotiated with Tehran behind their backs, and in one of their capitals (Muscat).

And he did this while beating the war drums and mobilizing aircraft carriers and concluding arms deals with these same leaders to the value of over 150-billion dollars in preparation for a confrontation he insisted was inevitable. But it later became clear that, throughout, he was seeking a strategic alliance with Iran at the expense of his traditional Arab allies. Well, let him and Iran enjoy their alliance; but there will be no consolation for the deceived.

Had he been really serious about 'appeasing' his guests and confirming his respect for them, their states and his alleged strategic alliance with them, President Obama would have done better to go to them himself, to Riyadh for example, and meet with them there. This would have been better than summoning them to the notorious Camp David retreat that has been linked in the minds of the Arabs – including the Gulf Arabs – to the agreements of humiliation, shame and absolute surrender to Israel, squandering all fixed Arab and Islamic principles, tearing up the Arab region, and sowing the seeds of breakup and division in them.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the architect and godfather of this meeting, said recently that his president would offer 'a new security agreement to the Gulf states,' adding that 'we are formulating a series of new commitments that will create a new security era.' This sort of talk effectively means concluding more arms deals in which the Arabs will purchase arms that are less advanced than those the U.S. sells Israel. It means spending tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars and the establishment of additional [U.S.] military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, transforming the Gulf states into American 'protectorates' – a move of more than one-hundred years back to the era of the British Empire-- in a new 'blackmail' operation that is even greater than the preceding ones.

This new security agreement that Secretary Kerry speaks of and his president Obama will propose at the Camp David summit will not halt Iranian expansion in the region. On the contrary, it will consolidate it, assuming it is a reality to begin with. This is because anyone relying on the U.S. or any other foreign power is certain to be disappointed. We, in the Arab region, are among those who have been scorched most by the U.S.'s fire and 'bitten' worst from the American snake pit.

Based on a review of still relevant precedents, we ask: Has the U.S. and its missile defense shield protected Ukraine from Russian expansion, or prevented Moscow from taking over the Crimean Peninsula? Did the U.S. prevent Russia from expanding in Georgia and annexing Southern Ossetia?

So far, the only state to which the U.S. has been faithful has been Israel. But even Israel will face what Ukraine or Vietnam (Saigon) or Afghanistan or post-Saddam Iraq has faced, in the near future. We are good at reading history, and the coming days will prove how right we are.

If Washington were truly serious about preventing Iranian expansion in the region, why did it occupy Iraq and topple the president of an Iraqi regime [Saddam Hussein] that fought Iran for eight consecutive years, preventing its revolution’s flood from spilling over into the western part of the Arabian Gulf? Why did it hand over power in Iraq to Iran's friends?

Our problem as Arabs is that everyone deals with us as if we are stupid, and we confirm this fact to them on a daily basis. So we should not be surprised if President Obama and other Western leaders were to deal with us based on the same logic.

I have followed all the Gulf and American analyses and statements regarding the proposed summit throughout the past month in the hope that I would find a single signal to confirm – if only peripherally – that its agenda will include the Palestinian cause, Israel’s aggression on Arab and Islamic holy sites in Palestine, or the settlements that are swallowing up Jerusalem. And as God is my witness, I have not found a single reference, if only a passing one, to this effect; nor have I heard any of those who will take part in the summit say that they will demand that the U.S. administration and its president should respect their promises and commitments regarding the Palestinian cause. Is it not our right to express our friendly disappointment, not to say our anger, at such disregard?

If Iranian expansion actually occurs on the ground, it will do so for many reasons, including this clear – not to say deliberate – disregard for the central Arab cause that embodies the Arab nation's honor and dignity as we, along with tens not to say hundreds of millions of Arabs like us, believe.

In an interview with The New York Times and with one of its most prominent journalists, Thomas Friedman, President Obama said that Iran does not pose the greatest threat to the Gulf states and that the domestic threat stemming from these states' youths' anger at the absence of reforms, job opportunities, and equality is much greater. We add to this the absence of [the Arab Gulf states’] concern in the manner that we would hope for the central cause that is the sole cause that unites all or most Arab peoples behind it.

Like all previous U.S. administrations, President Obama's administration has sold out the Gulf states and the Arabs behind them twice: Once to Israel, and once to Iran. Acceptance of the first sale is what has led to, and is leading to, the second. Any attempt to 'patch matters up' is doomed to failure.

There are those who may deem us to be idealistic or claim that we are raising issues that they have long left behind. But we believe the exact opposite. For Jerusalem, its Aqsa Mosque, and the whole of Palestine has always been the compass of the honorable and upright.

"May you enjoy your stay in Camp David in President Obama's company and enjoy his hospitality. But please excuse us if we were to remind you of what you wish to forget, at least for the moment," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

COMPLICATED AND DANGEROUS CONDITIONS: "The Camp David summit between the GCC and the U.S., is undoubtedly exceptional because it is being held in extremely complicated and dangerous conditions, and in the shadow of unusual regional developments that will have repercussions for the region as a whole over the coming months and years," writes the editorial in Tuesday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

For this reason the discussions between the two sides will deal with the hot and important issues that affect the security of the region's states and the common interests shared by the summit's participants. And for these reasons as well, the GCC states view the summit as a focal point for determining the horizon of bilateral relations with the U.S. and for specifying the means for confronting the likely challenges for which we must prepare.

There are heated and urgent issues that call for a decisive and clear position such as the Iranian nuclear file whose final agreement is currently being drafted. And there are the conflagrations in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, all of which affect the Gulf states' security. These issues are thorny and complex, affecting regional and international relations. In addition, we have direct regional intervention in the domestic affairs of GCC states as evident from the Iranian role in Yemen and elsewhere; a role that has become suspicious and that cannot be passed over in silence, or disregarded for the sake of narrow American concerns.

In light of this, the GCC states fear the likely consequences of such issues and their impact on the regional conditions in general. These are legitimate and justifiable fears, especially if the threats facing these states were to develop and worsen, becoming difficult to confront in the absence of prior coordination at every level. Such coordination is necessary so to ensure that their repercussions do not come as a surprise or beyond all calculations.

Because these fears are legitimate, and since their signs have begun to loom on the horizon, the GCC states want a clear American position regarding the U.S. approach to the various issues; one that is not shrouded in mystery or ambiguity. Therefore, they call for specific American guarantees that Washington will not place its interests above any consideration or conclude agreements and strike deals that may secure its own interests regardless of the interests of others. There are many precedents to this effect and a long record of American policies whereby friends and allies have been let down. The only exception is the U.S.'s strategic relations with Israel, which have not changed or altered, and are based on a single fixed principle – namely, that Israel's security is part of U.S. national security.

Since the U.S. cannot establish other relations equal in status to those with Israel for reasons stemming from the nature of the exceptional relationship between the two because of the role that Israel plays in the region – the GCC states believe that the U.S. should refrain from pursuing a policy based on double standards in specifying its regional options.

It must deal with all problems that concern the GCC states transparently and honestly, since the region's heated issues are heading towards further escalation and their threat will spare no one – especially since terrorism has begun to be an additional source of danger. All this calls for a common effort since the battle against this terrorism is one and the same.

"At the Camp David summit, the issues will be posed clearly because the current phase calls for a frank confrontation in which the correct choices must be made," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-Old delusions, premature expectations

 

The Syrian ‘moderate’ opposition is reviving its former delusions of replacing the regime, but this is a highly unlikely prospect in any future scenario, says ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in today’s Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) is reviving its old delusions that it makes much difference on the ground in Syria or anywhere else, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. But it is clear that it has no place in Syria whether the regime wins or whether the armed Islamic opposition factions manage to take hold of the country.

 

RAISING ITS TONE: “The opposition SNC has raised the ‘tone’ of its discourse and positions,” writes ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday’s Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

For one thing, it has informed the UN secretary-general that it is boycotting the Geneva-3 consultations UN Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura is holding; for another, it has decided to boycott the Cairo-2 conference scheduled in a few days’ time; and for a yet third, it has not only returned to its impassioned talk of ‘toppling Assad and his gang,’ but has revived, and with even greater passion, its claim to be the Syrian people’s ‘sole legitimate representative.’

Feeling self-satisfied with the victories that the [al-Qa’ida-affiliated] Nusra Front has achieved in the northwestern countryside and in some southern provinces, the SNC is once again climbing up to the top of the tree. It dismisses the UN, its envoy, the ‘political process,’ and ‘Geneva-3,’ and now gives priority to the clatter of gunfire and the discourse of a decisive military victory and terms such as ‘topple’ and ‘overthrow.’

This is despite the fact that only a few months ago, its lexicon was subject to much change and adjustment in line with the 'balance of power' on the ground, and in harmony with the international community's tendency towards dealing with Assad as part of the solution, and not only as part of the problem.

Ecstatic with the gains achieved by the 'martyrdom-seeking' fighters of the Nusra Front and other jihadi organizations, the SNC is once again dealing with the remaining constituents of the Syrian opposition in a condescending manner, based on the assumption that it is the 'sole legitimate representative' of the Syrian people. And once again, this is despite the fact that it all but identified with the smallest of these constituents in the recent period, treating them all as equals.

The SNC is now back to its old habits. Its members have returned to the path taken by the former National Council, which had barely brought thirty opposition figures together, before granting itself the role of 'sole legitimate representative' excluding all other forces and dismissing their weight, presence, history, and sacrifices.

The SNC's problem today, which is an extension of its problem ever since its foundation, is that it is no good at reading developments and that it confines itself to listening to the communication officers of the Turkish and friendly Arab security agencies. These same agencies had once convinced it to begin the countdown to the last days of Assad and his regime. It did so then with great enthusiasm; but the countdown went on and on without a ray of hope suggesting that this goal would be achieved. Today, and against the background of Operation Decisive Storm and the 'breakthroughs' on the Idlib/Jisr-ash-Shughour front, and heeding the advice of its same backers, the SNC is once again resuming the countdown to the regime's last days.

This does not mean that the regime is currently in the best of conditions; nor does it mean that the 'balance of power' in Syria is fixed and will never change. Under no circumstances should the impact of the painful blows administered by the armed Islamist factions to the regime over the past few months be underestimated. In fact, we may agree with many assessments that suggest that the regime is passing through a phase of confusion the likes of which it did not experience even when it was at its weakest in 2012.

But we do wish to stress two things:

--First, that it is too early to write the regime's 'obituary' or spread the illusion that its fall is inevitable or imminent. The regime continues to have its hands on the main levers of Syria’s geography and the country's main centers of life, economy, and population. Moreover, the regime has regional and international allies who have not yet had their final say. More importantly, it is still able to take the initiative on the ground and wage counter-offensives, and to advance on numerous fronts, in fact.

--Second, those who are achieving the advances or, more accurately, 'breakthroughs' on the ground are not from the SNC; nor do they recognize it or are loyal and subservient to it. The strike force with the clearest imprint on these achievements is the Nusra Front and it holds the SNC to be an apostate force just like the regime. And it is certain that the Front's next bullet after 'toppling Assad' – assuming it ever manages to do so – will be aimed at the SNC and its members' chests, and the remaining few who still view it as the 'sole legitimate representative.' In fact, the Nusra Front may decide to fire the bullet at the SNC's chest or back and put it out of its misery before it wins 'the mother of all of its battles' with the regime in Damascus.

The polarization in the Syrian crisis has reached such a point where the SNC and its ilk are now totally irrelevant. They have no place if the regime continues to hold the reins of power in Syria; and they have no place if the armed Islamist factions led by the Nusra Front – ISIS's little sister – take hold of the country and its people. And this renders the SNC's exaggerated machismo posturing no more than pathetic and risible nonsense. For the SNC's participation in the Geneva dialogues will not advance or delay matters one iota, and its boycott of the Cairo-2 conference will make no difference either.

"The dynamics of the Syrian crisis are somewhere else the SNC has yet to put its finger on," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 12.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Passing the first hurdle

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with the first victory for Netanyahu's new coalition: the approval of a bill to expand the number of ministers in the government, which will allow the prime minister to hand out jobs to all of his coalition partners. The new bill – which was passed by 61 votes to 59 – will allow Netanyahu to appoint as many ministers as he wants. As the vote suggests, all the members of the new coalition voted for the bill, while all opposition Knesset members voted against it.

The lead headline in Israel Hayom quotes unnamed Likud officials slamming all those who voted against the bill as 'hypocrites,' while Yedioth Ahronoth slips the word 'barely' into its description of the coalition's success. The Jerusalem Post describes the bill as 'controversial' in its lead headline.

The papers also report that Zionist Union has submitted a bill to disperse the Knesset – less than two months after the March 17 election. Zionist Union head Isaac Herzog said it would be preferable to use money that the coalition agreements give to sectarian interests on new elections. 'Netanyahu will try to survive with a coalition of 61,' Herzog said. 'I don’t intend to help him. I intend to replace him. If not in this Knesset, then after new elections.'

Netanyahu told a meeting of Likud parliamentarians that he will continue working to expand his narrow 61-member government, but noted the job of forming a working coalition was not easy. He said that his new government will work for all Israelis on important issues such as security and the cost of living. He also said that despite many concessions to smaller parties in the coalition, the Likud will lead government policy.

Elsewhere, Yedioth Ahronoth reports that the head of the IDF's Southern Command said yesterday that Hamas rule in Gaza is better than the alternatives – namely, IDF rule from without and chaos from within. 'There is no substitute to Hamas as a sovereign power in Gaza,' Sami Turgeman said during a meeting with regional leaders. 'The alternative is the IDF and chaos in the government. Israel and Hamas have mutual interests in the current situation. It's quiet and calm for growth and prosperity. They do not want a global jihad, it threatens Hamas and us,' Turgeman added. 'There is also a common interest to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.'

He added: 'The struggle against Hamas is not a military one. Anyone who thinks that fighting between Israel and Hamas is only due to military force against each other does not have the facts right. We cannot prevent Hamas from growing stronger, let's face it. We need to understand every few years there will be a round of fighting. As I understand it, the alternative is to try to find periods of quiet as often as possible.'

Channel 1 News reported on Monday night that Syria is believed to have succeeded in transferring chemical weapons to Hizbollah. According to the report, it appears chlorine gas bombs have made their way from Syria to Hizbollah’s hands, despite IDF efforts to interdict the transfer. Forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have recently been using chlorine gas against civilians in the ongoing civil war, despite Syria's having supposedly gotten rid of its chemical weapons stockpiles, in an agreement brokered by the Obama administration.

Channel 1 noted that the IDF has recently been repeatedly targeting convoys and facilities along the Syria-Lebanon border because of these developments. The report added that Assad's use of chlorine bombs in recent months obviously indicates that he has the ability to use such weapons successfully. It would be a relatively easy matter to transfer the weapons a few kilometers across the border into Lebanon and into Hizbollah’s hands, it noted.

On the Iranian front, several websites have picked up on a story from the Financial Times, which says that Iran's second-largest airline, which has been blacklisted in both the U.S. and Europe, has attempted to circumvent sanctions through a series of private agreements with some European companies and a small Iraqi airline. Western security sources told the paper that over the weekend Iraq had transferred nine planes to Iran which the Iranian Mahan Airlines had acquired but had been stored in Iraq. Both companies have denied the report.

Finally, Army Radio reports that Israeli security forces are gathering in large numbers near the Gush Etzion settlement of Tekoa, in anticipation of the demolition of two buildings by the Civil Administration authorities, at the approval of Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon. A resident of one of the houses evacuated himself from the building of his own accord during the night.

 

WE ARE NOT ALONE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth says that there are plenty of other countries in the Middle East who share Israel's concern over the Iranian nuclear deal – and who are not afraid to let U.S. President Barack Obama know.

"In the latest issue of the respected British publication The Economist, there is an editorial cartoon depicting the reaction that U.S. President Barack Obama got when he unveiled the nuclear agreement with Iran.

At first, the president is seen showing the deal to Israel, which responds with an almighty cry of despair. Then he shows the agreement to Saudi Arabia – which responds in exactly the same way. Next up, he shows the framework deal to the Gulf States. They, too, respond by screaming. When Obama shows the deal to Congress – represented by the elephant and the donkey of the two parties – he tells them not to scream. But, of course, they do.

In the end, Obama is left alone in the room. And what does he do? He, too, screams, like some modern version of Edvard Munch's famous painting. The Economist's cartoon highlights perfectly the fact that Israel is very much not alone when it comes to concern about the nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers.

The U.S. president has decided to launch a public relations campaign for his agreement, even if his behavior thus far has shown nothing but disdain for the United States' allies and even if he has been courting its enemies. Obama appears to have recognized that there is a price to pay for this. For example, under President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, the Egyptians are chasing Russian investment and are buying fighter planes from France.

Now it's the turn of Saudi Arabia to humiliate Obama. King Salman announced that he would not be attending a Camp David summit of U.S. and allied Arab leaders. He was quickly followed by the rulers of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman – all of whom felt unwell and sent understudies. Only the emirs of Qatar and Kuwait decided to attend in person. This is how the Arab world responds to a U.S. president who decides to gamble on Iran.

Salman decided that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is also interior minister, would lead the Saudi delegation and the king's son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is defense minister, will also attend. Salman himself would remain in Riyadh, where he will continue to oversee the recently agreed ceasefire in Yemen. This is a pretty good excuse from the new monarch, who cannot afford to tell people that he's sick.

Although Riyadh tried to intimate that it's all business as usual, commentators across the Gulf were full of praise for their leaders, whom they said have stood up for national pride by refusing to rush off to a conference organized by an American president who sought to restore Iranian-American relations.

So what will happen next? The Gulf State will demand extra security and will seek to obtain equilibrium-breaking weapons. In Jerusalem, concern will only increase and, in the end, nobody will be happy – apart from Tehran.

Even before Obama's doomed summit gets underway, the Saudi king has given it his vote of no confidence."

Ends…

 

SOON WE'LL BE SHIPBUILDING: Writing on the NRG website, Amir Rapaport goes behind the scenes of yesterday's announcement that Israel will purchase four patrol boats from a German shipbuilder – to be funded in part by a grant from the German government.

"Let's start with the dry facts: the Defense Ministry's procurement manager, along with his counterpart in the Navy, yesterday completed the negotiations over the purchase of four new and advanced vessels for the Navy, as part of a procurement plan that was approved by the government to protect Israel's 'economic waters' – the gas exploration and production platforms in the Mediterranean Sea. The deal is reportedly worth some 430 million euros.

Additional details about the deal have also emerged: around one third of the purchase will be funded by a special grant to Israel from the German government, worth around 115 million euros. Not only will around a third of the cost of the deal be met by German tax payers (it is in the interest of the German government to create jobs in Kiel which is one of the major ports of the German Navy and a leading centre of German high-tech military and civil shipbuilding), the Germans have also promised that they will make a reciprocal purchase from Israel, valued at around 700 million shekels.

The Germans will supply the vessels to Israel and the expensive systems aboard these ships will be supplied by Israeli defense companies. Here's one piquant detail: the shipyard where the vessels will be constructed, TKSM, which also constructed the submarines that Israel purchased from Germany, was bought out a few years ago by Arab investors from the Gulf. The four vessels in question will mainly be used to protect Israel's gas installations in the Mediterranean.

Now for the real story: the purchase of these vessels is part of a process of renewal by the Israeli Navy. Currently, Israel's most advanced ships are the Sa'ar 5, which, by all accounts, went into service over 20 years ago and are not expected to remain in service for much longer. The original plan was for the Navy to start the process of replacing the Sa'ar 5 several years ago, but this never happened, since the company that Israel was planning to buy them from – Lockheed Martin – cancelled the relevant project.

In order to forge ahead with the renewal process, the Navy at first looked for massive, 2,000-ton vessels; then it was decided that 1,300-ton ships (like the Sa'ar 5) would be enough. Eventually, it was decided that smaller, 1,000-ton ships (like the Sa'ar 4) would suffice. In terms of its nautical strength, therefore, the Israeli Navy's long-term plan is for smaller vessels, since its current fleet was becoming obsolete and there were no plans to build large replacements.

But, on the path to yesterday's announcement, the Israeli defense establishment managed to drive the whole world to distraction. One of the possibilities that were examined was to purchase ships from South Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries, which is the largest shipbuilding company in the world. Officials from the Navy even looked into the possibility of building a suitable ship right here in Israel; the plan was to use the blueprints for the German-made MAKO-100, but that was quickly shelved due to the high cost.

And then, close to two years ago, Israel and Germany decided that the Navy would purchase ships manufactured in Kiel by TKSM. However, the Israelis kept on adding more and more demands – including a larger grant from the German government and better payment terms – until the Germans reached the stage where they were so infuriated that they called the whole deal off. It didn't help, of course, that they were also upset at the suspension of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Six months ago, there was a breakthrough, however, when the German option was put back on the table. The terms of the deal were finalized relatively quickly. The bottom line is that the deal provides maximum benefit for Israel, but does nothing to improve our standing among German officials and politicians, who believe that they were extorted. The deal will also not address the issue of decreased Israeli naval might in the Mediterranean Sea in the long term."

Ends…

 

RESPECT AND SUSPECT: Writing in Israel Hayom, Zalman Shoval says that the proposal for a pan-Arab military force can be a positive thing – but warns that Israel must be aware of the potential downside of any such army.

"One of the direct consequences of the United States' changing policy toward the Middle East – especially the measures Washington has taken to revive relations with Iran – is a growing sense among its traditional Arab allies in the region that they can no longer count on the United States to safeguard their security. If we add into this equation ISIS, the general chaos that has enveloped the Middle East and the uncertainty surrounding the future of Syria, as well as the strategic ramifications of these developments, we can start to understand why the Arab League decided to urgently set up a unified Arab army.

Some two weeks ago, the chiefs of staff of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and the Gulf States gathered in Cairo for an emergency summit, at which it was decided to set up a joint military command. Arab leaders will meet before the end of June to discuss implementation of the proposal in practice and it is safe to assume that not everyone in Washington is thrilled by this initiative (and not only because it is a clear indication that they have major concerns over the diplomatic policies that the Obama Administration is pursuing regarding Iran and its intention to sign a nuclear deal with the ayatollahs). In response, Washington decided to act on two fronts: officially, it welcomed the Cairo decision, but, at the same time, it intimated to the Arab officials involved that the joint military force is unnecessary, since the United States not only has no plans to withdraw from its involvement in the Middle East, but is determined to prove its commitment by supplying massive quantities of arms and weapons systems to several Arab states.

Indeed, as reported last week by the Washington Times – a newspaper with close ties to the American security establishment – the administration is considering offering Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States advanced weaponry, which, thus far, has only been sold to Israel. France also recently signed a major arms deal with Qatar.

It is clear to all those involved that these developments will have security and economic implications for the State of Israel. These implications are mostly positive, but there are some potentially negatives ones as well. On the positive side, it is again apparent that the United States' Sunni allies share Israel's concerns over the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers. On this issue, at least, there is a de facto unified front of opposition, stretching from Jerusalem to Riyadh, via Cairo, Amman and other Arab capital cities.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry may have described opposition to the nuclear deal as 'hysteria,' but, in truth, it is nothing more than the natural response of responsible countries to a very real Iranian threat. Speaking at a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the West's victory over Nazi Germany, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu spoke about this regional consensus. He talked about the possibility that this could also lead to progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. In this context, it is worth noting that, while this is purely theoretical at the moment, one of Israel's basic demands in relation to the establishment of a Palestinian state is that it is not only totally demilitarized, but that it does not have the authority to enter into military agreement with other countries.

Israel cannot ignore the possibility that, given the instability of the region as a whole, there will be negative ramifications to both the establishment of a joint Arab military force and the supply of advanced weapons to some Arab countries. Washington may have promised that the supply of these arms to Arab states will not impact on Israel's strategic edge and, indeed, it is committed to do so by force of a Congressional decision from 2008. However, Israel has discovered in the past that there can always be loopholes in this commitment.

When the United States makes its strategic decisions, it does not have to take into account the possibility of attack from its neighbors, Canada and Mexico. But Israel does not have the luxury of overlooking the very fluid situation in the Middle East and must take into account every possible development, even when it comes to countries with which it has signed a peace accord. This is especially true when it comes to a united Arab military force, which will include soldiers from countries with which there is no peace deal. The establishment of a pan-Arab military force to thwart the expansionist tendencies of Iran and its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, the Sinai and Yemen is a positive thing – as long as we remember that even things which at first appear to be benign can soon become a grave danger."

Ends…

 

A MAN OF HIS WORD: Writing in financial daily Globes, Mati Golan says that Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog is right not to promise to join Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's government – since circumstances can change and he does not want to be seen as someone who does not live up to his word.

"Isaac Herzog is under constant attack, from within his own party and from without. People are demanding that he swears a solemn oath not to join Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's coalition – no matter what happens and under no circumstances. Herzog refuses. And, in response, his party 'colleagues' are lambasting him in public. I see things rather differently, however. I am impressed and surprised by Herzog's refusal to bow to this pressure. And I will tell you why: Because this is the behavior of a politician with integrity. That's why.

What would the average politician do in Herzog's position? He would tell himself: 'Members of my party – some of them or most of them, senior and junior alike – want me to make a commitment. They know as well as I do that any such commitment is worth very little indeed. After all, if circumstances change and there is every justification for joining the government, will all those who demanded a commitment change their tune? Will they then demand that we join the government, only to find that they can't because they forced me to make a promise? No, that's not what will happen. Instead, they will scramble around to find any excuse to break the promise that they demanded I make. They will fight like lions for a ministerial posting. And, of course, they will place all of the blame at my doorstep. They will call me a doormat, who promises one thing and then goes crawling into the government. How can we possibly follow a man like that?'

In short, as far as Herzog is concerned, the easiest thing to do is what most politicians would do under similar circumstances: promise whatever party members want, just to get them off his back. After that, all bets are off. Even if he were to violate his promise, what could party members do? Sue him? File a High Court petition. A fat lot of good that will do.

Herzog said something very simple. He said that, at the moment, his position is that the Zionist Union should not join the coalition under current circumstances. But what if the ultra-Orthodox parties bolt the coalition? What if Naftali Bennett decides that the new government isn't right-wing enough for him? How would Menachem Begin act under these hypothetical circumstances? We're not talking about the PLO here. Why should Herzog be forced to tie his own hands and his party's hands, just because current conditions dictate that it would be wrong to take his party into the government. If conditions change and there is a good reason for the Zionist Union to join Netanyahu's government, then he will do so. Why should he make a commitment now? Just to give political commentators another reason to criticize him?

 Herzog wants to remain true to his word. He doesn't want to make a commitment he cannot live up to. He's not a prophet. He doesn't want to commit to something that may, in the future, be to his detriment and to the detriment of the Israeli public. Instead of respecting Herzog's position, there are those who, because of their populist ideologies and hypocrisy, criticize him. I personally hope that Herzog does not capitulate and that we can finally say that one of our leaders knows what it means to be a man of his word."

Ends…

 

BLAMELESS BIBI: Writing in Haaretz, Chemi Shalev explains why Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu won't to be blamed for any misfortune that befalls Israel as a result of his government's policies – since the right has created plenty of scapegoats to take the brunt of the criticism.

"Binyamin Netanyahu’s hard-to-handle, 61-MK coalition of right wing and religious parties is being viewed by many on the left as a godsend in disguise. Let’s see what they can do when left to their own devices, the thinking goes, on the obvious assumption that the new government will soon run aground. Given enough rope, this coalition will hang itself.

It will be ungovernable and extortionable. It will capitulate to Haredim and settlers. It will promote right-wing extremists. It will introduce radical legislation. It will inflame Israeli Arabs. It will expand West Bank settlements. It will alarm Washington, enrage Europe, antagonize the world, alienate Diaspora Jews and advance the anti-Israeli boycott. It will finally show its’ true, unreasonable colors.

And then Israelis will finally see the error of their ways. They will understand that the nationalist-religious complex will inevitably lead Israel to international isolation as well as internal dissent and decay. When the next elections come around, the right wing’s virtual chokehold over power will finally be broken. Happy days will be here again.

The logic, though couched in modern democratic terms, is an extension of the famous Russian revolutionary maxim chem khuzhe, tem luchshe 'the worse the better.' It is said to have been coined by 19th century Russian firebrand Nikolai Chernyshevsky, author of 'What is to be Done,' which has been described as both the worst novel and the most important book in Russian history. 'It supplied the emotional dynamic that eventually went to make the Russian Revolution,' as the late Professor Joseph Frank wrote in a review.

According to Chernyshesky’s maxim, adopted by Vladimir Lenin, the more miserable the working classes become, the more likely they are to revolt against the oppressive capitalists. It’s a nice theory about which 20th century history has provided very mixed results: even in Russia it was the select Bolshevik few rather than the oppressed proletarian masses who seized power. When Italian Fascists came to power in 1922 the Italian communists were sure it would be a passing phase that would collapse under its own weight and soon be automatically supplanted by glorious socialism. History, in Germany and elsewhere, proved otherwise.

Wars, especially cataclysmic wars such as the 20th century’s two global conflicts, do indeed foment dramatic political changes. But the cost of worsening political or economic conditions in and of themselves isn’t always born by the government in power - especially one headed by a politician so accomplished in the art of deflecting blame and pointing fingers at everyone else.

Political scientists and sociologists have a name for this behavior: scapegoating. In times of economic and social distress, a group’s pent up anger and frustrations are often taken out on others: Southerners blamed African-Americans for their economic hardships in the early 20th century, leading to a demonstrable uptick in violence and lynching; Europeans view immigrants and foreigners and other aliens as being responsible for their current travails, just as they did close to a century ago; poor Israelis in Tel Aviv only recently vented their frustrations and anger over their own decades-long economic hardships at the newly-arrived African migrants in their midst. And there are always politicians conveniently close by, ready and willing to lend a helping hand.

Israelis already have a proven record of ignoring the mirror in front of their eyes and pinning the blame on anyone but themselves for their predicaments, especially in the international and political arena. Is the 47-year occupation, ongoing political disenfranchisement of the Palestinians and recurring outbreaks of mutual violence to blame for Israel’s dire international standing and the erosion of its support among European and American liberals? Of course not, silly: it’s Muslim money, and/or anti-Semites and/or perfidious leftists, and/or nefarious NGO’s who are culpable. Are Israeli extremists, ideologues, religious fanatics or plain old fascists responsible for tarnishing the country’s image? No way: It’s the UN/NIF/BDS/J-Street devil’s consortium that is the source of all our problems. And when all else fails, we’ll always have Barack Obama.

Hard times are just as likely to breed prejudice, animosity and belligerence as a sudden recognition of the values of equality, pluralism and peace that the Israeli left supposedly espouses. If and when the policies of the new government make Israel’s international predicament reach crisis point; if the country is boycotted, isolated, ostracized and reviled; if its’ current relatively stable and thriving economy begins to stall; if the judiciary is contained and civil liberties are restrained and Israel’s democracy grows authoritative and suffocating, as many leftists predict – who are Israelis likely to blame? Their own government? Themselves, for repeatedly voting it into power? Hardly. That’s not the Israeli way.

They will take out their anger on Israeli Arab saboteurs, then on disloyal leftists, then on misguided American Jews, then on Muslim-loving, Holocaust-ignoring liberals throughout the world and then on everyone or anyone who doesn’t see things our way. They’ve been doing for many years, rather successfully, when things haven’t been bad at all. Imagine how effective Netanyahu and his supporters will get when it becomes a matter of their own survival.

This doesn’t mean that Zionist Camp should rush off to join the government to save it from itself or that a national unity government is a lesser evil, necessarily. It does mean, however, that things can go from bad to worse and from there to catastrophic, and even then, they don’t necessarily get any better.

The left and center of Israeli politics cannot rely on Netanyahu and his partners to voluntarily convince Israeli voters of their own, disastrous shortcomings. To change Israeli politics, moderate politicians and their supporters, in Israel and abroad, will have to roll up their sleeves and do the work themselves. It’s OK to hope for the best, I guess, as long as you go about preparing for the worst."

Ends…

 

JUST SAY NO TO LAND-FOR-TERROR: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Michael Freund says that, with so much conflict raging across the Middle East, now is hardly the time to be pushing Israel to make dangerous concessions.

"Although Israel’s new government has yet to be formally sworn in, international pressure on the Jewish state to resume peace talks with the Palestinians is already beginning to mount. Over the weekend, an unnamed Palestinian official told the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper that Western diplomats are pushing to arrange a joint meeting between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

And on Friday, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, congratulated Netanyahu on forming a coalition, but stressed the need 'to re-launch the Palestinian/Israeli peace negotiations as soon as possible.'

And so, showing little regard for the disastrous consequences of their previous attempts at so-called peacemaking, American and European officials now seem intent on banging their heads – and ours – against the wall yet again. Needless to say, they continue to adhere to their misguided conception of what the outcome of such talks should be, even before they have begun. As Mogherini put it in her statement last week, the aim is 'achieving a comprehensive agreement towards the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State living side by side with Israel in peace and security.' It is the same mantra that Western peace-processors have been repeating ad nauseam for decades, as if asserting it over and over again somehow makes it sensible.

But before attempting to rush into yet another fruitless round of diplomatic wrangling, the reckless advocates of Palestinian statehood would do well to take a quick look back at recent history. After all, it was just 21 years ago this month that Israel and the PLO signed the May 4, 1994 Cairo Agreement, also known as the Gaza-Jericho accord, under which the Jewish state withdrew from Jericho as well as nearly 60 percent of the Gaza strip, all of which was turned over to Palestinian control.

The agreement was based on the quintessential formula of 'land for peace,' whereby Israel relinquished territory and the Palestinians promised to prevent violence and combat terrorism. Subsequent deals, such as the Oslo II accord of September 1995, the January 1997 Hebron protocol and the October 1998 Wye agreement were all based on the same principle.

In each case, Israel handed territory over to the Palestinians in exchange for promises of peace. And in each instance, without fail, Israel’s gestures were reciprocated with still more violence. The 1994 Cairo Agreement unleashed a wave of unprecedented Palestinian terrorism, which included suicide bombings that shook the core of the nation. 'Land for peace' quickly devolved into 'land for nothing' before crumbling into 'land for terrorism.'

Is this really a pattern worth revisiting? Moreover, the situation on the ground in the region is far more complex, and far more dangerous, than it was just 10 or 15 years ago. All around us, the Middle East is in flames, as at least five Arab governments have been busy bombing their own territories in recent months.

In Yemen, government warplanes have been used by the president and the rebels to bomb each other in Aden and elsewhere. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad has deployed military helicopters to drop barrel bombs on Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, showing little concern for the indiscriminate killing of numerous civilians. In Iraq, the nation’s air force has been used to attack Islamic State (IS) rebels, while in Libya and Sudan, governments have deployed air power against their own people.

With so much conflict raging across the Middle East, now is hardly the time to be pushing Israel to make dangerous concessions. Indeed, the Palestinians themselves are irreparably divided, with Hamas controlling Gaza and 80-year-old Abbas in charge in Ramallah.

Even if Israel were to somehow reach an agreement with Abbas, who has shown little desire to end the conflict, of what value would such a deal be? It would not obligate the Hamas fundamentalist regime in Gaza, and who knows if any subsequent Palestinian leadership would feel duty-bound to uphold it.

And with Iran moving ever closer toward its goal of building a nuclear arsenal, one that would threaten Israel’s existence and destabilize the entire region, there are far more pressing issues worthy of Western attention.

Nonetheless, it appears almost certain that Washington and its European allies will soon be turning up the heat, seeking to get the Jewish state to sit down with its implacable foes and offer them still more in the way of compromise. Netanyahu’s new government needs to stand firm and reject any such pressure. To give up tangible assets in exchange for a dubious peace is something that Israel tried back in the 1990s with disastrous results."

Ends…

 

 

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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Fax: 020 7052 96 09

 

Editorial and Enquiries:

Tel: ++ 44 773 4426 113

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

MIDEAST MIRROR 11.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

DEATH OF 1980’S COUP GENERAL EVREN: Reflecting on the death of former army head and military dictator Kenan Evren, Oral Calislar sees little progress towards genuine democracy in centre-left Radikal: "It is a fact that Kenan Evren was a coup maker. We may also define Evren as the 'biggest reactionary' and strongest supporter of the status quo in recent Turkish history. The regime he and his colleagues established was an authoritarian and conservative anti-freedom, anti-justice and anti-equality regime. Despite all the changes that have happened in recent years and the fact that the military tutelage regime has been eliminated to a great extent, the basic structure of the system that was established has not yet been destroyed. Turkey has not yet achieved even the 'constitutional impression' of a genuine and permanent democracy."

Kadri Gursel laments the fact that Evren was never brought to account in centrist Milliyet: "The September 12th 1980 coup was the greatest disaster that happened to this country in the recent past. Kenan Evren, who became the leader of the coup by coincidence, was the worst accident that this country has suffered since the foundation of the republic. If the September 12th coup had been led by a pasha who was not as short-sighted, conservative, cruel, remorseless, uncultured and anti-intellectual as Kenan Evren, the country would also have been destroyed to a great extent, but the 'Evren accident' caused this collapse to happen to an even more extraordinary extent. I am very sad because Kenan Evren departed this world without accounting for the evil he did to his country and its people."

Orhan Miroglu has hopes for change in centre-right, pro-government Star: “Evren died without accounting for the crimes he committed. The wounds opened in the hearts and bodies of those who suffered from the regime of cruelty he founded are still bleeding. One of the evils he committed was to address the Kurdish problem on the basis of violence. This issue remains on the same basis, but our [government’s] election promises are heralding the promise of a new constitution."

Suleyman Seyfi Ogun regrets the decision to hold a state funeral in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "I felt very sad about Evren's death. I wish he could have lived a bit longer to see the verdict of a life sentence passed on him, and being stripped of his rank at least. But this did not happen. As the leader of a pro-torture movement that cost this country dearly and brought grief to many households, a state ceremony will be conducted for him. This cold ceremony, which will be conducted based on an unfeeling protocol reflex, will damage the honor of the nation once again."

Hasan Cemal notes a bitter truth on Internet daily T24: "We failed to settle accounts with our coups! We failed to totally get rid of their residue. We could not face our history, which created coups and a pro-coup mentality in this country, either. And for all these reasons, for years we have been unable to open the path towards a first-class democracy and a state of law in Turkey. Unfortunately, this is the truth."

 

UK ELECTIONS RESULTS: Ergin Yildizoglu draws some lessons from this week’s UK elections in center right Cumhuriyet: "The results of the UK general elections may offer a lesson to Turkey as well. The leaders of the parties who lost the election soon resigned. The elections showed that 'clear' and reasonable propaganda wins votes. The Conservative Party pursued an election campaign that consisted of easily understandable issues, underling how experienced they were and that the Labor Party cannot manage the economy, but also a campaign that was tightly committed to the interests of the class it represents. The Labor Party and the Liberal Democratic Party on the contrary, failed to highlight the points that made them different from the Conservative Party."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan is harshly critical: "If we remove the nuclear negotiations from the Foreign Ministry's portfolio, what will remain? If the same talks are dropped from the record of the government, will that leave anything else? Today, not only critics are concerned about the lack of early planning; the feeling of concern among supporters of the government is also growing. Hardly anyone calls the Geneva agreement the 'the greatest victory of all victories' and the Lausanne statement as 'a brilliant historic victory' anymore!" 

Reformist Mardom Salari seeks legal clarity and equivalence: "The nuclear talks are the result of an agreement with the P5+1 states; the positions of their other institutions are not legally relevant. If a bill is proposed in the U.S. against the outcome of the talks, the administration will be responsible; just like bills proposed by the Majlis can damage the commitments of the Iranian government. The Majlis could offer its suggestions to the negotiating team, although it is not right for it to disrupt the talks. In the talks, the U.S. may declare that the implementation of the final deal is subject to Congress verification; this must be mentioned in the text of the agreement. In which case, Iran can also state that the final deal should be verified by the Majlis." 

Reformist Sharq cannot hide its disdain: The unprofessional urgent bill presented by some MPs to suspend the nuclear talks is due to their ignorance of foreign policy and Iranian positions; it is simply a political reaction that lacks logic. Those who proposed the bill either lack sufficient understanding of foreign policy and national interests, or simply want to posture. They ignore that one should not posture in foreign policy. National interests will be trampled if this principle is not respected."

Reformist Arman counts on the Security Council: "Although UN Security Council resolutions against Iran pleased some Arab countries and the Zionist regime; the international community is not in favour of the continuation of this situation. Obviously, a nuclear agreement can impact the Middle East positively. Obstruction by opponents of an agreement from both sides are common, but personal remarks, especially by Congressmen are not very effective because they are not the voice of the majority on this issue where there is strategic consensus. If the deal goes to Congress, Congress will approve it. An agreement must be approved by the Security Council and the sanctions must be lifted following such approval. By validating this agreement, the UN limits the freedom of action of the U.S. Congress and others." 

 

SAUDI EXECUTION OF SHIITE CLERIC: Conservative Hemayat links two issues: "There have been conflicting reports about the possible execution of warrior/scholar Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. If Saudi officials intend to do so and have managed to receive King Salman's approval, it will have serious consequences that cannot be predicted. By declaring an execution date (May 14), Saudi Arabia clearly shows that it is worried about a likely nuclear agreement between Iran and the West." 

 

YEMEN: Conservative Khorasan compares and contrasts: "The Zionists and Saudi Arabia are killing civilians to stop their resistance. They use the argument that they are in danger and their security is under threat. The Zionists can at least refer to some resistance operations inside the occupied lands to mislead the world, but Saudi Arabia has never been threatened by any Yemeni group. Saudis will be as successful in Yemen as the Zionists have been in Gaza." 

Conservative Resalat considers the hidden agenda of the war: "In recent years, the U.S. has obtained a great deal of information about Iran's military capabilities and became well aware that they do not have the power to engage in a direct war with Iran. Therefore, they intended to follow their evil goals by paving the way for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen. First they tried to legitimize an illegal and unfair war via the UN and through involving Western countries. Then, they hope to get Iran and Saudi Arabia directly or indirectly involved in possible clashes over Yemen."

 

NEW ISRAELI CABINET: Hard-line Javan draws a comparison: "Arab and Islamic communities in the region have been so overwhelmed by Saudi aggressive policy in Yemen that they have completely forgotten the danger that threatens Palestinians and Arabs from Netanyahu's new cabinet. The Saudi war in Yemen serves the aggressive goals of the Zionist regime and its new cabinet. The extremist cabinet of Netanyahu is no different from the new cabinet of Saudi Arabia; they are the greatest threat to the region. The main victims of these aggressive policies will be Yemenis and Palestinians." 

 

U.S./SYRIA: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami comments: "The U.S. declared yesterday that it has begun training anti-Syrian government forces. It is disgraceful for Washington and its Western and regional allies that they have failed to achieve their evil objectives in Syria despite four years of using all possible means. The Syrian regime is increasing its internal strength and its status in the world grows stronger. The new plan is a plot by the Zionist regime, executed under American guidance. Reactionary rulers of the region, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, play the role of bellboys and foot soldiers." 

 

FRANCE/CUBA: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz pronounces: "Francois Hollande is the first French president to visit Cuba for some time. The visit is not to show the good intentions of the West; rather it is a sign of the failure of the West in their policies to bring Cuba down to its knees. Cuban resistance has driven the West to adopt a political option. In the meantime, the visit reflects competition between France and America to gain more privileges in Cuba and Latin America."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 11.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- The U.S. steps in

2-Iran’s two bombs

 

1- The U.S. steps in

 

Because the U.S. is committed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states’ security and because it has vast interests in this region, it does not want this [Yemen] war to continue for any longer. The fear is that it may spin out of control, and confront the U.S. with difficult choices including the prospect of direct participation in the war, rather than merely supporting it, providing it with logistical backing and selling more weapons to the countries taking part in it. This is why the truce was timed to coincide with the Camp David [Gulf] summit; in fact, the repeated extension of this truce represents the best way out of this dilemma--Hamidi al-‘Abdullah in Lebanese daily al-Bina’

 

Secretary Kerry does not just want a temporary five-day truce in order to allow humanitarian aid – whether from the Houthis’ supporters or their enemies – to reach the Yemenis after their suffering has spread due to the suffocating naval, aerial and land siege imposed on Yemen by the Saudi-led Arab coalition. He wants a permanent ceasefire that totally ends this war after the aerial bombardment has begun to yield the exact contrary results. Most important is al-Qa’ida’s expansion and growing strength after its forces have taken control of the city of Mukalla, its port, and prison; the growing power of the Houthis whose forces have captured most of Aden; the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s fall from power and the postponement of his return to Aden; and the gradual but rapid change among the Yemenis in opposition to the war and the emergence of a patriotic sentiment among them--pan-Arab www.railayoum.com

 

After a month-and-a-half of a scorched-earth policy in Yemen in general and Sa’da in particular, the human cost of this war is growing, as are the international community and humanitarian organizations’ pressures to declare a ceasefire and allow them to provide relief to those who need it in this already poor country. The infrastructure, which was weak before the war, has been subjected to methodical and systematic destruction, and its construction will require many long years and billions of dollars. As a result of this war, and as one of its consequences, al-Qa’ida has managed to expand and extend its influence. While, the Yemeni army was able to contain al-Qa’ida’s momentum and to deliver severe blows to it before the war, the organization’s hands and feet have now been unshackled. This is an especially worrisome situation for the U.S., which views al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni branch as the most dangerous of its offshoots for U.S. security-- ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The truce announced in Yemen may provide Saudi Arabia with a way out from its predicament there, argues a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. Having given Riyadh sufficient time to prove itself in Yemen, Washington has finally decided to step in and phase down the war for fear of being impacted in a direct role there. The Houthi alliance with former Yemeni president Saleh realizes that the Saudi-led coalition faces a dilemma because it cannot achieve anything significant via its aerial bombardments and does not dare wage a ground invasion, notes the editorial in an online Arab daily. The alliance also recognizes that the truce proposed by the U.S. secretary of state for ‘humanitarian’ reasons represents an American attempt to extract the Saudis from their predicament.  After a month-and-a-half since the start of the war in Yemen, it has become clear that it is a futile exercise, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. Even worse, it threatens to spill over into Saudi Arabia and is merely strengthening al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in the region.

 

EXPECTED FROM THE START: “The truce that was initially discussed during U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Riyadh [last week] after which the Saudi foreign minister announced a five-day extendable truce staring [tomorrow] May 12th only hours before the summit between the U.S. president and Gulf state leaders, was expected from the first moment Operation Decisive Storm began,” writes Hamidi al-‘Abdullah in Monday’s pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina’.

The fact that the U.S. president specified May 13th as the date for the summit with the Gulf states – that is to say, over a month after the start of this war – was intended to provide enough time for testing Saudi Arabia and its allies’ ability to achieve the aims they announced at the beginning of their assault. These were the destruction of the Ansarullah [Houthi] Movement, forcing them to hand over their weapons and withdraw from the cities and sites they had captured.

These were the declared aims at least. But there were also undeclared aims that provided the basis for launching a war on Yemen. Most important was to prevent the [Yemeni] army and the Ansarullah from advancing in the southern Yemeni provinces, especially Aden. This was meant to ensure that this city would be preserved as a stronghold for [fugitive] President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi whose term in office has already expired, and to protect him and consolidate his hold over the southern provinces even if this led Yemen’s partition; a de facto partition at least, as in the case of Cyprus.

But after 45 days of war, Saudi Arabia has proven to be unable to achieve any of its declared or hidden aims. All that has been achieved is killing large numbers of Yemenis, inflicting terrible damage on public installations, especially airports, factories and the roads linking provinces, and killing members of the army and the Ansarullah. But these losses have not prevented their alliance from advancing and capturing most of the southern provinces, including taking control of over 90% of Aden.

Today, and after so much time has passed, this war has not only failed to achieve any of its publicized and hidden aims; its repercussions now pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s internal stability, and at the regional level. Over the past two weeks, fighting started on both sides of the borders between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Houthi-supported] Tribal forces have infiltrated Saudi Arabia and taken control of areas inside its borders.

Pursuing the conflict now poses the threat of a war of attrition that will affect Riyadh and its allies taking part in the war, just as much as it is hemorrhaging Yemen itself. Moreover, prolonging the war will not alter the balance of power that existed before Operation Decisive Storm; in fact, it has forcefully consolidated it and at a pace that is no different from what the Yemeni crisis was witnessing before the operation.

Because the U.S. is committed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states’ security and because it has vast interests in this region, it does not want this war to continue for any longer. The fear is that it may spin out of control and confront the U.S. with difficult choices including the prospect of direct participation in the war, rather than merely supporting it and providing it with logistical backing and selling more weapons to the countries taking part in it.

“This is why the truce was timed to coincide with the Camp David summit; in fact, the repeated extension of this truce represents the best way out of this dilemma,” concludes ‘Abdullah.

End…

 

TWO REASONS: “When Operation Decisive Storm’s warplanes destroy Sayyid Hussein al-Houthi’s mausoleum, former president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh’s family home, and a main mosque in the city of Sa’da, this is for two main reasons:” writes the editorial on the pan-Arab www.railayoum.com.

First, because the military target bank has run out after six weeks of war; and, second, in order to send a message of ‘intimidation’ to the Houthis and their ally president Saleh that the carpet-bombing that could totally destroy Sa’da and ‘Omran, will continue.

This is the bombing that precedes the ‘truce’ that emerged from the Paris meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Saudi counterpart ‘Adel al-Jubeir after the war in Yemen had entered a new and dangerous phase; that of ‘city wars’ in which the Houthis shelled the cities of Jizan and Najran in the Saudi south.

Secretary Kerry does not just want a temporary five-day truce in order to allow humanitarian aid – whether from the Houthis’ supporters or their enemies – to reach the Yemenis after their suffering has spread due to the suffocating naval, aerial and land siege imposed on Yemen by the Saudi-led Arab coalition. He wants a permanent ceasefire that totally ends this war after the aerial bombardment has begun to yield the exact contrary results.

Most important is al-Qa’ida’s expansion and growing strength after its forces have taken control of the city of Mukalla, its port, and prison; the growing power of the Houthis whose forces have captured most of Aden; the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s fall from power and the postponement of his return to Aden; and the gradual but rapid change among the Yemenis in opposition to the war and the emergence of a patriotic sentiment among them.

Two things that Kerry has said confirm the conclusion that he is seeking to end the war via a rolling extendable humanitarian truce:

- First, his statement that the truce will begin on Tuesday (tomorrow) provided that the Houthis agree to no shelling or shooting, no movement of forces, no maneuvers with the aim of redeploying their forces and no movement of heavy weapons. What may be gleaned from these terms is that the ball is now in the Houthi alliance’s court, which is supposed to be the ‘weaker party,’ such that the decision as to whether Secretary Kerry’s mission will be successful or not is up to it and not in the hands of Operation Decisive Storm and those waging it.

- Second, Secretary Kerry’s insistence that this truce is ‘renewable’ – that is, that the five-day period may be extended and subsequently turn into weeks or months, after which negotiations can begin; or rather, during which the climate may be prepared for such negotiations. And they will certainly not be held in Riyadh [as called for by Saudi Arabia] but in a ‘neutral’ capital.

This turnaround in the Yemeni scene stems primarily from a number of Katyusha rockets and mortar shells that were fired from the caves of Sa’da and ‘Omran at the two largest southern Saudi cities– Jizan and Najran – with the result that schools and airports were temporarily closed.

[Former] President Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh may have been closer to the truth, if only for the moment, in summarizing this scene and its future implications. Standing on the ruins of his destroyed home, he declared: ‘The balance of power in the region will radically change’ as a result of what he referred to as the ‘aggression’ on Yemen. And he urged the coalition forces to wage a ground invasion to ‘see how the Yemenis will receive them,’ in what was a clear and revealing challenge.

It is difficult to respond to Saleh’s invitation and wage a ground invasion; otherwise, the coalition would have done so since from the first week the war began. For what ‘rational’ actor would take this risk and cast themselves into the furnace of the fiercest fighters in the globe, regardless of which trench they may happen to belong to?

Former president Saleh’s provocative challenge is meant to say that he and his allies are unfazed by the aerial bombardment, not because he is unable to do anything in response, but because he realizes that he bombing will not last forever and must stop one day in the near future without achieving most of its aims as long as it is not coupled with action on the ground. The man knows Yemen well and spent thirty years of his rule in continuous wars, six of which were against the Houthis.

The Houthis have agreed to the truce after very carefully and calculatedly playing hard to get and dragging their feet. They certainly want this truce to catch their breath, at least, and because any extension would mean that the current status quo would remain as is.

“In other words, they will not withdraw from Sana’a or Aden or hand over their weapons; nor will President Hadi return to Yemen. What more could they possibly want?” asks the daily in conclusion.

End…

 

TOTALLY POINTLESS: “Why does the war on Yemen seem totally pointless?” asks ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

After a month-and-a-half of intensive shelling by air, land, and sea, no fundamental change has occurred in the battlefield. The advances by the Houthis and Saleh’s followers on the ground have not ceased, especially in Aden. The ‘Sunni’ coalition has not succeeded in securing a single Yemeni city to which President Hadi may return. The Houthis have not surrendered or laid down their arms; nor have they withdrawn from the city centers; while the armed forces loyal to Saleh have not witnessed any significant splits.

After a month-and-a-half of a scorched-earth policy in Yemen in general and Sa’da in particular, the human cost of this war is growing, as are the international community and humanitarian organizations’ pressures to declare a ceasefire and allow them to provide relief to those who need it in this already poor country. The infrastructure, which was weak before the war, has been subjected to methodical and systematic destruction, and its construction will require many long years and billions of dollars.

As a result of this war, and as one of its consequences, al-Qa’ida has managed to expand and extend its influence. While, the Yemeni army was able to contain al-Qa’ida’s momentum and to deliver severe blows to it before the war, the organization’s hands and feet have now been unshackled. This is an especially worrisome situation for the U.S., which views al-Qa’ida’s Yemeni branch as the most dangerous of its offshoots for U.S. security.

There are urgent questions posed by American and Western diplomats as to whether certain coalition members are wagering on using al-Qa’ida and its affiliated clans in combating the Houthis and whether they may have ‘facilitated’ the entry of ‘mujahidin’ to Yemen for this precise purpose. This is a worrisome development for Washington, which is expressing its growing interest in ending the war, even if on humanitarian grounds. But its concerns are really of a security and political nature, stemming from the fear that Yemen may turn into a major and safe haven for al-Qa’ida and the terrorists.

In recent days, the war has moved on to border areas. Southern Saudi villages, towns, and cities were bombarded by mortar shells and rockets. Daily life, including schools and airports, was disrupted; some inhabitants fled the area; attacks on Saudi troops and patrols increased and border clashes occurred whose results are not being revealed, according to many sources. And this means that if the crisis persists, Saudi Arabia itself will be a theater of operations and not only Yemen. This explains the intensity and force of the Saudi reaction to the border clashes and the violence of the Saudi bombing of Sa’da province.

Alarming and very worrisome assessments have reached decision-making centers in the Gulf capitals regarding the cost of the armament deals that the U.S., Britain, and France hope to conclude with the Gulf states, which, in light of the fall of oil prices, are capable of emptying their sovereign wealth funds set aside for future generations of all their content. They will also have the worst consequences for these states’ economic plans to confront the challenges of unemployment and development, compensate for the drop in oil returns, and appease and satisfy the needs of broad sectors of the public.

There is no political horizon for this war. This is what various Western diplomatic sources have been repeating. This is what they repeatedly say in closed meetings and in their media and research establishments.

For this reason, the focus now is primarily on the following:

- The need for an urgent ceasefire (if only on humanitarian grounds); providing Yemen – the whole of Yemen – with food, medical aid and other necessary aid; and emphasis on an international sponsorship for an inter-Yemeni dialogue, proposing neutral capitals for hosting it, despite the text of UNSCR 2216.

- The renewed priority for the fight against terrorism as the main and greatest regional challenge, and refraining from drowning the region in confessional wars and conflicts between axes from which only ISIS, the Nusra Front, and al-Qa’ida will benefit.

Western circles are worried at some coalition members’ ‘openness’ to groups and forces in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq that are classified as terrorist.

“And there is a growing fear that the anti-ISIS international coalition may collapse and that the war on terrorism will fail,” concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Iran’s two bombs

 

The Camp David [Gulf] summit is asked to clarify the American attitude towards the two Iranian bombs: first, its nuclear program; and second, Iran’s regional role. The GCC refuses to view the agreement on the first bomb as a statement of good conduct that would provide Iran with the required resources it needs to protect and expand its second bomb. The issue goes beyond the proposed Gulf missile defense shield and the provision of a deterrent arsenal. It has to do with the U.S.’s view of its interests in the coming phase and the depth and seriousness of its commitments to its allies in containing the Iranian momentum in the region, and its commitment to provide irrevocable guarantees in this regard--Ghassan Charbel in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The Gulf/Iranian rift is greater than any rag can patch amidst Iran’s interventions in domestic affairs and against the background of spreading sectarianism’s poison in the Arab body and planting hostile cells inside and around the Gulf states. This renders it difficult to believe that Iran will opt for peace and stability, as Washington is claiming. Without written guarantees, it would be easy for the Americans to have a different understanding of what had been agreed orally. Therefore, it is only via such deeds that the U.S. can restore warmth to its relations with the Gulf states and prove that the nuclear deal, in its awaited final version, will not brook any ambiguous interpretations that could shroud its details--Salman ad-Dosari in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

The U.S. has been dealing with the regional problem as that of an Iranian nuclear bomb, maintains the Lebanese editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. But the Gulf states believe that there is a more important ‘bomb’ that the Americans are not addressing, namely, Iran’s role in the region. The success or failure of the Camp David Gulf summit will depend on how it addresses this second bomb. President Obama is trying to keep two balls in the air at the same time; special relations with the Arab Gulf states and with Iran, maintains the editor-in-chief of another Saudi daily. But this is impossible because of Iran’s hostile interventions in the Gulf states’ affairs. What is needed is written unequivocal guarantees from the U.S. to the Gulf states that are not open to interpretation.

 

NO TO THE POLICEMAN’S ROLE: “The U.S. does not want to play the role of Middle East policeman,” writes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday’s Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

It does not want to spend billions of dollars and shed its own blood. But it certainly cannot turn its back on the fate of this part of the world. This is not only because of oil and Israel’s security, but because of the U.S. and the West’s security as well. Experience has shown that the Middle East’s ailments are contagious and that its deep-rooted terrorism threatens the safety of New York, Washington, Paris, Berlin, and elsewhere.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Camp David U.S./Gulf summit is an exceptional occasion that will leave its imprint on the Middle East’s fate for years or decades to come. What the summit needs to produce goes beyond distributing consolation prizes and guarantees. The situation is far too serious to be treated by painkillers and good wishes. What is needed, quite simply, is to determine the features of a new regional order that restores the required balance and provides safety valves that would end the series of collapses, coups, and breaches. It is clear that Iran’s shadow, bearing two bombs, will be present at the summit.

The summit will be held in the shadow of a number of extremely significant developments. The first is the drift towards concluding a nuclear agreement between the great powers and Iran before the end of June, and Barack Obama’s insistence on securing this agreement. The second development is the war that Yemen has been witnessing after the Houthi/Iranian adventure there. The third development is the war on ISIS and similar organizations, and its faltering pace due to the domestic confessional fragmentation in Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s clear involvement in these two countries’ wars.

The first message that the current war in Yemen has sent is that the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC’s) problem with Iran cannot be reduced to Tehran’s nuclear program. The GCC states believe that Iran’s role, which stems from the [1979] revolution’s burning coals rather than the Iranian state’s commitments, is the true bomb that threatens the Gulf’s security, the Arabs’ stability and their role in the region. As a result, the Gulf’s demand at the Camp David is that of adopting measures to restrain Iran’s regional role parallel to restraining its nuclear ambitions.

Camp David is being held at a time when the Middle East seems to be rushing towards an unprecedented abyss. Never have so many wars and collapses coincided as is happening today. Some are direct wars, and others are proxy wars. What is common between all that is happening is extreme fear; countries fearful for their borders or fearful of what is happening within them; the resounding collapse of international borders; the terrible destruction of coexistence.

Maps have been violated from outside, while states have been torn up from within. Major armies have fallen apart then sought refuge in confessional militias. National identity has melted and the identities of islands that hate each other has been awakened. New forces armed to the teeth have left their strongholds and adopted new suicidal practices or roles that are surrounded with risks on the arenas where they are acting. ISIS has turned into a regional power that violates whatever it wishes here or there. Hizbollah turned into a regional force that intervenes in nearby and faraway states.

The international management that can tame the region’s tigers or wolves went missing. Obama preferred to stick to the backseat. Vladimir Putin chose a policy of revenge along Syria’s peripheries, as a result of which winds have been blowing that resemble what was happening during the Cold War.

In light of all this, Saudi Arabia together with the GCC member states decided that ‘Iran’s role in the region is the more dangerous bomb.’ They have deemed Iran’s role to be responsible for dominating Baghdad’s ability to decide and dismantling Iraq’s basic structure. They have deemed it responsible for prolonging the war in Syria and transforming it into a confrontation that has turned the Sunni/Shiite divide into a line of fire. They have deemed it responsible for the emergence of ISIS and its spread across the Iraqi and Syrian maps. They have also deemed it responsible for the Lebanese state’s exhaustion and for keeping it headless [without an agreed president]. And when it became clear that this bomb/role had raised its head in Yemen, Saudi Arabia took the decision to break its encirclement and led a coalition to secure this aim. The decision was an expression of the Arabs’ rejection of maintaining their countries an arena for continuous Iranian coups while the U.S. was busy dealing with the nuclear file unilaterally.

For this reason, the Camp David summit is asked to clarify the American attitude towards the two Iranian bombs: first, its nuclear program; and second, Iran’s regional role. The GCC refuses to view the agreement on the first bomb as a statement of good conduct that would provide Iran with the required resources it needs to protect and expand its second bomb. The issue goes beyond the proposed Gulf missile defense shield and the provision of a deterrent arsenal. It has to do with the U.S.’s view of its interests in the coming phase and the depth and seriousness of its commitments to its allies in containing the Iranian momentum in the region, and its commitment to provide irrevocable guarantees in this regard.

It is not possible to build a viable regional order without restoring the balance. The Iranian role/bomb conflicts with this required balance. Any American hesitation in dealing with the role/bomb firmly and seriously, will detract from the summit’s significance and intensify the Gulf concerns about Obama’s ‘Iran policy.’ American hesitation will also lead to a flare-up in the regional confrontation, especially in the Syrian case, with the aim of breaking the lines of communication between the constituents of the role/bomb.

“The Camp David summit’s failure to act as a two-bombs’ summit will only pour petrol over the terrible Middle East’s fires,” concludes Charbel.

End…

 

THE MOST IMPORTANT MEETING: “The planed Camp David summit may be the most important Gulf/U.S. meeting in the past fifty years,” writes Editor-in-Chief Salman ad-Dosari in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

This is not because this is the first time that an American president meets with the Arab Gulf leaders. It is because Washington realizes – and this is no secret – that the U.S./Gulf alliance is passing through a period of tension and a crisis of confidence. And – who knows? – the summit may offer a chance for placing the historical alliance’s train back on the track from which it has deviated in recent years.

The summit will be a chance for the U.S. administration to move away from merely stacking up words to the realm of action, a chance for it to dispel all doubts concerning its credibility in the region which is now being put to severe test beginning with the Syrian crisis, passing through its shaky attitude towards what is going on in Bahrain, Egypt, and Iraq, and ending with its awaited, ambiguous, and secret agreement with Iran.

A point in the U.S.’s favor is that it ruled by institutions and not the White House alone. It is not enough for the president to adopt certain positions – no matter what they may be. The Pentagon has its own positions, and there is also the intelligence community that cannot be excluded from the decision-making circles. Then there is Congress, the legislative body that can foil the president’s decisions in a constitutional manner.

There is no disputing the fact that all these institutions are aware of the negative consequences that U.S. interests may suffer if its alliance with the Gulf states were to be undone. Of course, it is certainly not necessary for both sides’ policies to be identical; but it is also illogical for U.S. policies to target Gulf interests, after which we would discover that American interests in the region are being harmed as well. That would indicate that Washington’s policies towards the region have taken a totally wrong turn.

A point in the Gulf states’ favor is that they have not reacted in an angry manner that would dismantle the link between their strategic interests and those of the U.S. For despite their anger at the surprising American positions in the region, these states – led by Saudi Arabia – have maintained their ties with the U.S., even when U.S. officials say one thing in the daytime and do the opposite at night. This is what happened in the case of Obama’s famous ‘red line’ that would be crossed if Bashar al-Assad’s regime were to use chemical weapons.

The Gulf Arabs have never had to deal with such conflicting American positions before. Yet they did not adopt a path of escalation with Uncle Sam. They never threatened – not in secret or in public – by reminding it that there are other superpowers that wish they could secure half the interests that the U.S. enjoys in the region.

We assume that President Obama will not meet with the Gulf leaders merely to reassure them verbally regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran. This has happened once, twice, and three times in the past. What is certain is that President Obama has a clear project that translates American words into deeds – as was revealed in a statement by an American official last Thursday which was published in Asharq al-Awsat regarding the ‘unprecedented’ military cooperation that is expected to be announced at the Camp David summit.

In addition, it is important for any American guarantees to be written, as Abu-Dhabi’s Ambassador to Washington Yousef Al Otaiba has said. The Gulf/Iranian rift is greater than any rag can patch amidst Iran’s interventions in domestic affairs and against the background of spreading sectarianism’s poison in the Arab body and planting hostile cells inside and around the Gulf states.

This renders it difficult to believe that Iran will opt for peace and stability, as Washington is claiming. Without written guarantees, it would be easy for the Americans to have a different understanding of what had been agreed orally. Therefore, it is only via such deeds that the U.S. can restore warmth to its relations with the Gulf states and prove that the nuclear deal, in its awaited final version, will not brook any ambiguous interpretations that could shroud its details.

The U.S. wants to hold two apples in one hand – special relations with the Gulf states and Iran simultaneously. This is an impossible balance to achieve, not because the Gulf states hate it, but because the Iranian regime is based on hostility towards its Arabian Gulf neighbor, and all its policies tend towards intervention in their affairs.

“This all there is to it, Your Excellency President Barack Obama,” concludes Dosari.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 11.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Cabinet politics

 

Israel Hayom and Yedioth Ahronoth lead their Monday editions with a rapidly expanding criminal investigation, centering on a top lawyer, a former prosecutor and several senior figures from the legal system. Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post lead with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's efforts to form a new government.

Almost two months after the election that saw Netanyahu reelected for a fourth term, Israel is on the verge of getting a new government. As of Monday morning, there were two final obstacles that needed to be overcome before Netanyahu can swear in the latest and narrowest incarnation of his coalition – this time, with Habayit Hayehudi, Kulanu, United Torah Judaism and Shas.

The first – a High Court petition filed by Yesh Atid against Netanyahu's proposal to expand the cabinet in order to have more ministerial positions to divvy out among his coalition partners – was overcome on Monday morning. The court rejected Yesh Atid's petition, allowing the Knesset vote to go head. Assuming that Netanyahu can get his wafer-thin coalition to vote in favor of the planned expansion – and, if he can't, then he's in more trouble than anyone imagined – there will be enough ministerial positions for the four parties that will join his government.

The second obstacle – which members of his own Likud party will get which ministries – appears to be much less bothersome for Netanyahu. While there are several seasoned politicians vying for the handful of ministries that remain unallocated, none of them are likely to rebel if they get passed over. This is good news for Netanyahu, who knows that it just takes one member of his coalition to vote against the government in the Knesset and his majority will disappear. According to The Jerusalem Post, all of this may force Netanyahu to postpone the swearing in of his new government – which was due to happen on Wednesday – until next week.

Meanwhile, according to the lead story in Haaretz, defeated Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog is facing mounting pressure from within his party not to join the Netanyahu-led coalition. Describing the issue as 'the elephant in the room,' a senior party official called on Herzog to lay to rest rumors that he may take the Zionist Union into government – rather than serving as a combative opposition, as he has been promising since March 18.

At a meeting of activists on Sunday, MK Itzik Shmuli slammed his party for failing to unequivocally rule out joining the government. 'Until we remove this cloud that’s hovering over our heads, we’ll have great trouble truly functioning as a fighting opposition,' he warned. 'The most important component of succeeding as an opposition is public trust. But where exactly will we get this if they think every move we make is aimed at serving a future rush into Netanyahu’s arms?'

MK Miki Rosenthal echoed that, saying the party’s voters would punish it for joining Netanyahu’s government. 'Joining him would be a betrayal of the voters’ trust, with a corresponding price,' he said. Speaking to Israel Radio on Sunday, Herzog admitted that he had 'looked into the feasibility of creating an alternative' to the 61-seat governing coalition that’s slated to be sworn in later this week. He said he had 'maintained ambiguity' in part 'to preserve flexibility within the political arena.'

The Haaretz report goes on to say that senior Likud officials believe that, if Netanyahu wants Herzog in the government, he will offer him a package attractive enough to land him. Netanyahu would insist that Herzog join without Tzipi Livni one source said. 'But in exchange, he’s likely to give eight ministries to Labor, work toward some kind of diplomatic agreement with the Palestinians and maybe even offer a rotation for the fourth year,' meaning Herzog would become prime minister if the government lasted that long.

In other news, Army Radio reports that Khalil al-Haya, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, has denied reports of the presence of a branch of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Gaza. The denial comes despite threats by a Salafi group in Gaza that is affiliated with ISIS to kill Hamas members 'one by one' in retaliation for the arrests of its members. Last Friday, those threats appeared to be edging to fruition, after an ISIS-affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula claimed it launched two 'bombs' at Hamas posts in Gaza.

Speaking with the Palestine newspaper on Sunday, al-Haya claimed that the Hamas-controlled authorities in Gaza will not allow any entity to harm the security of the region and that anyone who violates the law will be severely punished. 'Hamas is not deterred by threats of any kind by ISIS or Israel,' said al-Haya, who accused Fateh and the Palestinian Authority of deliberately inflating reports of ISIS presence in Gaza.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, Israel Radio reports that, according to an unnamed but senior Palestinian official, officials from the United States and the European Union are pressuring the Palestinian Authority to renew negotiations with Israel. The source told Al-Quds Al-Arabi that a proposal was raised for a meeting between Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in an European country or Washington in order to discuss saving the negotiations from the current impasse.

 

BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND DC: Writing in Maariv, Alon Ben-David comments on the situation in Syria and the upcoming United States presidential election.

"Will there be a war this summer? Many Israeli seem to think so. But the truth is that the chances of that happening are slim. Hizbollah is preoccupied with its wars in Syria and Lebanon. Hamas is bending over backwards to intimate that it has no interest in another conflict at this time and that, if Israel agrees to lift the blockade of the Gaza Strip, it is open to a long-term ceasefire. Iran, meanwhile, is heading toward a nuclear agreement with the West and will not do anything to upset the applecart. The IDF, however, is behaving as if war is just around the corner; it is holding training exercises at a dizzying pace. Just last week, the air force held a major training operation, there were two exercises in the Jordan Valley and reservists were training on the Golan Heights. In terms of the amount of training exercises going on, last week was extremely unusual, but IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot would like this to be the norm: an army that never stops training.

Concern about further attacks from Hizbollah, in response to Israeli airstrikes in Syria, has faded. The terrorists – apparently led by Samir Kuntar – who tried to place a bomb on the border fence, were spotted and killed. It now seems that Hizbollah does not have the time or the luxury to deal with revenge. It has shown over the past two weeks just how stretched it is, given its involvement in Syria.

The counteroffensive that Hizbollah planned, along with Bashar al-Assad's forces on the Golan Heights, has been blunted and turned into a defensive battle. The rebels – members of the Free Syrian Army and the al-Nusra Front – are attacking Assad's troops and Hizbollah from the rear, while they hunker down in Quneitra and the northern Golan Heights. These two organizations have also started to attack members of Shuhada al-Yarmouk, which recently joined forces with ISIS, and is enjoying success there too.

Hizbollah, which for weeks prepared its spring offensive along the Qalamoun mountain range close to the Syria-Lebanon border, suddenly discovered that it is no longer relevant. The rebels routed Assad in Idlib and Aleppo, and are now threatening the Alawite enclave in the coastal city of Latakia. Hizbollah was quick to move its fighters in order to protect that strategic port city – and has sustained many casualties in the Qalamoun area.

Assad himself, who for weeks believed that he had managed to stabilize the situation, is no longer sleeping soundly at night. ISIS has captured the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus and rains down rockets and mortars on the area of the presidential palace, where the elite of the Baathist regime live.

The war in Syria, which appeared to be static for the past 12 months, is once again dynamic; Assad is on a downward slope from which it will be impossible for him to recover. Syria is rife with rumors of a massive Alawite exodus from the Damascus region to the coast. It's hard to verify these rumors, but what is clear is that the Makhlouf family – Assad's maternal relations – has left Syria en masse. This is a total vote of no confidence in the way that Assad is handling the war.

Assad's inner circle is also starting to crack: Rustum Ghazaleh, the influential head of the Syrian National Intelligence Agency who dared to criticize growing Iranian involvement in the country, was severely beaten by the commander of Syria's Military Security branch, Rafik Shehadeh, and his bodyguards. A month later, Ghazaleh died of his injuries. Shehadeh was subsequently dismissed from his position. There is a growing sense that the Assad regime is on its last legs and that its demise is imminent. Hizbollah and Iran will do whatever they can to prop it up, but it’s doubtful whether even they have the power to prevent it collapsing.

In Israel, meanwhile, there is continued talk about Syria, but the truth is that there is no longer any such entity. Syria as we knew it and as appeared on the Sykes-Picot maps in 1916, no longer exists and will not come back into being. To Israel's north-west there is a jumble of organizations, each at war with its neighbors, who are trying to impose some kind of order over the territory they control. The Israeli Air Force is currently updating its list of targets in Syria; in addition to targets belonging to Assad and Hizbollah, there are also those belonging to ISIS and the al-Nusra Front, which is affiliated to al-Qa’ida. These are our new neighbors.

Iraq, too, will not go back to resemble anything we knew in the past. It is doubtful whether any power will emerge that is strong enough to rule Iraq in its old borders. The same can be said for Libya. The Middle East is once again reverting to the kind of regime that was prominent a century ago: familial, tribal and religious. Apart from Egypt, it is hard to find a single Arab entity that has a clear national identity.

But none of what is happening in the Middle East – not the revolutions and not the bloodshed – can deter the Americans from pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif are now meeting on a weekly basis. After every meeting, Zarif's smile seems broader than before. Kerry, it seems, is already working on the speech he will give when he is awarded the Nobel Prize for peace. Iran, which is seen by most players in the Middle East as the biggest regional problem, has become the solution, according to the Obama Administration.

In an interview with Channel 10 News, Kerry argued that Jerusalem's reaction to the Iranian nuclear deal was 'hysterical.' In contrast, Kerry himself appears to be in a state of euphoria. But beyond the attempt to insult Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Kerry's comments – coupled with recent statements by President Obama – would seem to indicate that Washington wants to rebuild its ties with Israel. Obama's political rivals long ago stopped adhering to the normal rules of polite discourse and even some of his allies have raised their eyebrows over his inexplicable obsession with Iran.

Hillary Clinton, who is the leading candidate to snag the Democratic nomination for the 2016 presidential election, has taken great care to distance herself from the president's positions. She knows he can only harm her chances of getting elected. If she is to win, however, Obama must start tempering his policies so as not to alienate Jewish donors and voters. Despite previous warnings, Obama has already told key Jewish groups that the United States will use its veto to block any United Nations Security Council resolution that would recognize a Palestinian state. This could help to forestall a planned European Union boycott of Israel.

It is not yet certain, of course, that Clinton will be the Democratic candidate in 2016. Even though she has been at the epicenter of American decision-making for decades, she will find it hard to market herself as a new force. Just like Americans felt enlightened and liberal because they voted in a black president, Clinton will try to instill them with the same sense of achievement for electing a female president.

That is why it is incredibly important who the Republicans select. Jeb Bush appears to be the candidate with the most hands-on experience, but he will also find it hard to position himself as something new. Clinton will easily be able to portray him as belonging to yesterday. In contrast, Marco Rubio – the senator from Florida – may be conservative and inexperienced, but he will offer voters the opportunity to elect a Hispanic president for the first time.

In any case, there will be intense battles within both parties for the nomination. Those Jews who support Israel – including many who have been bitterly disappointed by Obama – have still not decided who they will vote for. There is one thing that almost everyone agrees on: whoever is elected cannot be worse for Israel and the entire Middle East than the current administration."

Ends…

 

EUROPEAN HYPOCRISY: Writing in Israel Hayom, Omer Dostry says that, since the European Union is both biased and hypocritical – Israel should take its condemnations of fresh construction in Jerusalem with a pinch of salt.

"Last week, the United States criticized the Israeli decision to build 900 new housing units in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo. This week, the European Union added its voice to the criticism, saying that 'the decision endangers the two-state solution.' In addition, European foreign ministers called – in an obtuse and absurd statement that was issued on Holocaust Remembrance Day – for a boycott of Israeli products by means of special markings on those products manufactured in the settlements. On top of all this, during a United Nations discussion on the standing of women, Israel was accused of harming Palestinian women.

The frequency and virulence of international condemnations of Israel are testimony to the dangerous hypocrisy of the international community toward Israel – especially for its 'sin' of continuing to develop its country and for providing its citizens with somewhere to live. Meanwhile, thousands are still being killed in the Syrian Civil War; the American-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria is killing dozens of innocent civilians and Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting for control of Yemen and not showing any great concern about innocent lives.

Israel's sanctification of life – which expresses itself through construction, development and prosperity – is viewed by the international community as a crime against humanity. The problem is that many of the other 'crimes against humanity' being committed on an almost daily basis across the world are not criticized by the same people who seem to be obsessed by Israel. In fact, it seems that they may not even be aware of them.

The Ramat Shlomo neighborhood of Jerusalem – which is already home to more than 17,000 people – has been compared by European Union officials to an illegal outpost in Judea and Samaria. Yet the international community has willfully decided to turn a blind eye to the path of death and destruction that the Palestinians have chosen. Our so-called partners in Ramallah organize riots and terror attacks across Jerusalem. These are a direct result of incitement against Jews, of the sanctification of terrorists and of active encouragement of terrorist attacks. And the roots of all this can be found in the Palestinian education system and in the Palestinian media.

The diplomatic moves that the past two Netanyahu governments have carried out – coupled with the concessions they made (such as the 10-month settlement construction freeze and the release of terrorists) as part of a package of good-will gestures to the Palestinian Authority, which needed a bribe before it was willing to even engage in negotiations with us – disappeared without a trace. And when they did, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas reverted to his policy of rejectionism; as soon as the gifts dried up and the concessions came to an end, he decided to stop negotiating with Israel.

The European Union's accusations of illegal construction sound even more absurd when that very same body is guilty of funding construction that also impedes implementation of the two-state solution. In the past few months, for example, there have been revelations that the European Union is funding illegal Palestinian construction in Area C of Judea and Samaria – which is under complete Israeli control – with more than 400 homes built for Palestinian families. This is another case of blatant external interference in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The past few years have shown anyone with half a brain and without vested interests that it is not Israel's settlement policy that is an obstacle to peace, but Palestinian Authority rejectionism and its ongoing and deeply rooted incitement. The European Union – which has adopted a deliberately blind policy, driven by cynical political motives – cannot, therefore, be seen as an honest broker. Its condemnations of Israel must been seen in this light."

Ends…

 

WHO NEEDS ASSAD?: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Gilad Sharon says that, if Bashar al-Assad's regime was to fall, the border between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights would remain as chaotic as it is now – but the border with Lebanon would become quiet, since Hizbollah would lose its direct patron.

"As long as the northern border was quiet, it was in Israel's interest that Bashar al-Assad clings on to power. A weakened dictator who takes pains to keep the border quiet – until recently, Israel's most peaceful border, in fact – is better than the chaos and terror of ISIS gangs. We're better off with a familiar if crazy neighbor, with whom we have certain understandings about how the border zone will behave, than new neighbors that are just as insane but who abide by no rules.

This was true as long as the rules were observed. But now that the border on the Golan Heights is starting to become a terror border – now that the situation has been reversed and the Lebanon border is relatively quiet while the Syrian border has seen a spike in terrorist activity by Hizbollah, which is made possible by the chaotic situation in Syria – we need to rethink what is good for Israel.

The fall of Assad's regime will open the door for ISIS to set up shop on our borders – and that's a problem. But it would also be a death blow for Hizbollah. Without the Assad regime and the Hizbollah-Syria-Iran axis, the threat from Lebanon would significantly decline. That will not happen overnight, but it will doubtless happen.

The quiet on the Golan Heights was, to a certain extent, a warrantee for the survival of the Assad regime. It was thanks to this quiet that we experienced an increased threat from Lebanon, in the shape of a militia armed and trained by Iran – Hizbollah – which posed an even greater threat to Israel's national security than Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Now there is no quiet and Assad's warrantee should expire. If the Golan Heights has become a battleground again, then Israel has no interest in the continued existence of Assad's totalitarian regime. Unlike Assad and unlike Hizbollah, there is an international coalition which is fighting against ISIS. Israel would not have to face this new threat alone, as it is facing the Iranian threat alone. There would be no international pressure for Israel to give back the Golan Heights – and that’s a good thing. The Golan will remain an integral and vital part of Israel forever.

That is not to say that we should welcome such an insane organization as ISIS on our border, but it cannot be any worse – and may even be better for us – than Hizbollah, which is the Lebanese proxy of the ayatollah regime. The people who operate Hizbollah do not pay the price for the organization's aggression and the decision to launch attacks against Israel is taken far away in Tehran. The reasoning has nothing to do with regional issues, but is more connected to Iran's global aspirations. Iran – a strong and powerful country – is providing Hizbollah with money and arms, which makes the Lebanese organization far more dangerous to Israel than ISIS. If, in any case, there is going to be chaos on our border with Syria, then at least we can enjoy increased security on the Lebanon border.

In short: who needs Assad? I am not calling for direct intervention in the Syrian Civil War, but it's good to know what's good for Israel. Sometimes when you wish for something, it happens by itself."

Ends…

 

HELP SAUDI ARABIA: Writing in Haaretz, Amir Oren says that, if Israel wants to ensure that Iran does not have a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East – or duopoly with Israel, as Iran’s foreign minister claims – it should help the Saudis achieve parity.

"If Iran violates the deal taking shape with the world powers and insists on obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel’s response must be the opposite of its traditional line. Israel shouldn’t keep threatening to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities; this would produce short-term gains. Instead, it should warn that it will obstruct an Iranian nuclear monopoly in the Persian Gulf by helping Saudi Arabia obtain a nuclear capability.

This runs contrary to the traditional approach, in which Israel fears a chain reaction of a nuclear Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia once Iran gets the bomb. It’s a nightmare for strategic planners in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (and Washington).

A different tack would aim to convince the Iranians that it’s better to forgo the bomb. Incentives so far have centered on economic sanctions (and the lifting of them). The Israeli and American threat of military action remains in place, but its operational and political credibility is a problem.

Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons, which arose during the shah’s regime, stemmed from a mix of motivations: the ethos of Iran as an ancient and proud regional power, prestige and a fear of falling behind in the race — not with Israel but with Iraq, the enemy next door that was pursuing a nuclear program. The first-ever assault on a nuclear facility (a failed assault) was a sortie of Iranian Phantom jets against the reactor on Baghdad’s outskirts in October 1980.

Nuclear weaponry comes into the world arithmetically. The Americans had it, so the Soviets needed it, and then the Chinese, who were afraid of the Soviets. But a nuclear China triggered a nuclear India, then a nuclear Pakistan. And if the Americans cooperate with the British, you can be sure France isn’t about to forgo a nuclear weapon.

The key question is when the nuclear club gets closed to new members. Any candidate wants to be the last one in and adopt the veterans’ opposition to new members. That has remained the main argument for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty since it became a key effort of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and in the 45 years since its passage: closing admission to the club and keeping tabs on anyone forgoing the treaty’s rights and responsibilities — India, Pakistan and Israel. The treaty also envisions oversight of signatories trying to play tricks — Iran, Iraq and North Korea, and in the past South Korea, Taiwan and South Africa.

So far, regional nuclear arms races have been scuttled in two ways: through an agreement between two competitors of equal power (Brazil and Argentina) or through American guarantees to defend allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) against nuclear aggression (from North Korea or China). In addition, there is a general commitment to NATO members that have kindly eschewed nuclear weapons, notably Germany.

Without a reliable American nuclear umbrella, including defending the kingdom from Iranian regional power, Saudi Arabia might go the complicated path of acquiring a nuclear weapon. There have been signs of this in recent years; it could buy a finished product, particularly from Pakistan. Israel would see this as a negative, but there are positives.

Israel, as an observer at the nonproliferation treaty’s review conference in New York, could announce that it will not let Iran have a nuclear monopoly (or duopoly with Israel, as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif would have it). Instead, it could help the Saudis achieve parity. In the process, Iran would have to reexamine the advantage of going nuclear. It would face a new choice. Its huge investments would be offset; it wouldn’t be the nuclear club's only member in the region."

Ends…

 

JERUSALEM JUBILANT AS TORIES TRIUMPH: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Herb Keinon says that there was palpable relief in Jerusalem when it became clear that David Cameron and his Conservative Party had defeated Ed Miliband's Labor Party in the UK general election – since the Tories understand what Israel is up against.

"The rapidity with which Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu congratulated British Prime Minister David Cameron on his reelection Thursday tells the whole story: Jerusalem is pleased that it is Cameron, not Labor’s former leader Ed Miliband, who will lead the next British government.

Netanyahu posted a congratulatory message to Cameron on Twitter early Friday afternoon, and called him personally on Saturday night. 'I look forward to continuing to work together with you on behalf of peace and security in the region, as well as to deepen the cooperation between Israel and Britain,' he told Cameron in an understatement that belies the real sense of relief in Jerusalem.

With Cameron’s reelection there will be more of the same in British-Israeli ties. Though more of the same is no honeymoon with London, with which Jerusalem has had its disagreements during Cameron’s term in office since 2010, it is far better than what was expected under Miliband, whose tone has been much more critical of Israel. Cameron, according to diplomatic sources in Jerusalem, understands what Israel is up against, which is why the official statements from London last summer during Operation Protective Edge were much milder than the mood on the street or some of the comments made by British politicians.

One of those politicians was Miliband, who said in Washington last July immediately after meeting U.S. President Barack Obama and National Security Adviser Susan Rice that 'we oppose the Israeli incursion into Gaza. I don’t think it will help win Israel friends,' he said. 'I don’t think this will make the situation better. I fear it will make it worse.'

And during a speech to a Labor forum last summer he said, 'I defend Israel’s right to defend itself against rocket attacks. But I cannot explain, justify or defend the horrifying deaths of hundreds of Palestinians, including children and innocent civilians.'

The concern in Jerusalem prior to Thursday’s election was that if Miliband had won, then the public tone – reflecting those types of comments – would have changed for the worse, even if London’s policy toward the Middle East would not have undergone any radical change. And that policy, at least from Israel’s perspective, has been mixed.

On the one hand Britain is among the strongest critics of Israel’s settlements policy inside the EU, and its foreign minister was among the 16 EU foreign ministers who signed a letter to EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini last month calling her to move swiftly to ensure the labeling of settlement products. But by the same token, at the UN Security Council vote last December on a Palestinian Authority resolution that would have set the parameters for a peace deal as well as a two-year deadline, the British helped torpedo the resolution by abstaining in the vote, denying the Palestinians the nine yes votes needed for it to pass, or at least needed to trigger a U.S. veto. Britain and Lithuania abstained in the voting, while two other EU countries – France and Luxembourg – voted in favor.

Cameron, during a warm speech to the Knesset last year, said that many people come to the Israeli parliament from around the world 'and talk about maps and population numbers and processes and deadlines. They tell you how to run your peace process. I will not do that. You know I want peace and a two-state solution. You don’t need lectures from me about how to get there.'

The concern in Jerusalem is that had Cameron lost, Israel would have been in for a great deal of lecturing from Miliband and the Labor Party. Arye Mekel, Israel’s former ambassador to Greece, who is currently a senior research fellow at Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, put Britain somewhere between Germany – Israel’s strongest supporter inside the EU – and France, which has announced that it will push its own resolution in the Security Council, much to Jerusalem’s chagrin.

That position on the EU scale is now unlikely to change. Under Miliband it very well may have."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: Murat Yetkin argues that President Erdogan will bear the consequences of both defeat and victory in centre-left Radikal: "One may believe that PM Davutoglu forming another AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] government alone would constitute an election victory in Turkey, as it would in other democracies. But if the elections’ results fail to bring a constitutional majority that take President Erdogan to a presidential system, it will be a defeat in the president’s eyes. In short, Erdogan has put himself in the arena. He has turned these elections into a kind of a primary for his presidential ambitions. He wants to own victory, but if it turns into defeat, it will belong to him as well."

Cuneyt Arcayurek accuses the president of having a monumental ego in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Erdogan, who is not satisfied with the opportunities he has had to govern the state alone for years, has prepared a plan to turn Turkey into his father's farm. This man’s ambitions are greater than Hitler's and Mussolini's. At least their goal was to deceive their country in the name of the people. But this man is seeking to satisfy his own desires for office with lies that will deceive the people!"

Okay Gonensin shows faith in the electorate’s reason in centrist Vatan: "All the polls are indicating that Erdogan’s name will have great weight in the June 7th elections, as it did in the past two elections. For some voters, love of Erdogan is a significant reason to vote for the AKP. And for others, opposition to him has taken the form of a serious inclination to vote for the HDP (pro-Kurdish leftist alliance). Let us not forget that Turkish electors always vote in a logical manner by evaluating all the elements. They do not want an adventure."

Mumtazer Turkone fears for the law in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "If the HDP passes the 10 electoral threshold, it will be thanks to its leader Selahattin Demirtas' words to Erdogan that 'we will not let you create a presidential system'. To what extent would main opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu's promises aimed at the poor be convincing, were it not for Erdogan's new presidential palace [that is criticized for its luxury]? Can MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) leader Devlet Bahceli's sharp criticism miss this open goal? The law is being massacred. And this is being done openly to terrify the people."

Beril Dedeoglu explains the electorate’s preferences in centre-right, pro-government Star:  "The real actor that will determine the result of the elections is the ruling party. Whether it is seen as successful or not, will determine the tendency to vote for other parties. Turkish voters look at the street, their jobs and meals with one eye, and at the politicians with the other. They vote for the party they believe will narrow the gap between the two. In that case, the party that positions itself closer to the street will gain most in the election."

Emin Pazarci argues that the HDP is playing a critical role in center-right, pro-government Aksam: "No matter what anyone says, the luckiest party in this election is the HDP. Some groups have already allowed it to fly and pass the threshold! Besides, this support seems to be constantly growing. Even the structures that were in conflict with the HDP until yesterday have remained silent. With this attitude, they are providing covert support for the HDP. This is because the HDP is the most important participant in this election. Hostility to Erdogan is being channeled through the HDP even before the elections."

 

UK ELECTIONS Sami Kohen comes out in praise of the British Conservative Party in centrist Milliyet: "A one party government is generally considered to be the guarantee of stability. Multi-party coalitions can be fragile and cause conflict. But it is not correct to conclude that coalitions always cause political and economic instability. The harmonious and successful record of David Cameron's coalition offers an example of that. Besides, forming a coalition in situations where parliament cannot produce a single-party government is an established democratic practice when it comes to reflecting the preferences of various parts of society."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

 

1-Blackmail, common interests and freedom

2-ISIS prepares the ground for partition

3-Window of opportunity

 

1-Blackmail, common interests and freedom

 

 

Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that this [proposed] American 'missile shield' is necessary for the Gulf's security and for reassuring and dispelling the Gulf's nations and rulers' fears, why have the Gulf governments spent tens of billions of dollars on anti-missile Patriot systems, specifically meant for Iranian missiles?  And why is the U.S. administration speaking of an arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth over 150-billion dollars, not to mention the French Rafale jet fighters that Qatar has bought and the UAE is negotiating to buy, which will add another 20-billion dollars to the Gulf’s arms’ expenditure? This is a clear case of American/French 'blackmail' of the Gulf states that is meant to rob them of their resources and recycle their financial assets so as to ensure that they return to the West's banks without the Arab nation benefiting from them to help them emerge from their economic and social crises--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The fact that the U.S. secretary of state informed his Saudi counterpart of the talks between the '5 + 1' and Iran regarding its nuclear program-- that the GCC foreign ministers will discuss in Paris – confirms the importance of the Kingdom's political role in bolstering regional security. Kerry also made it clear that Iran now poses a real threat to its neighbors. But this talk of Iran only emerged so frankly after Operation Decisive Storm exposed the Persian project in the region and stripped it naked before the world. This forced Washington to refrain from its courtship with Tehran…There are other issues that are certain to be discussed at the Camp David summit in a few days' time, as Kerry made clear. But all indications are that the Iranian nuclear file [blackmail] card has begun to lose its value, and that the region is on the verge of radical changes that will promote the interests of the moderate states--Saudi al-Watan

 

The U.S. has already said that its policies in the Middle East are not confined to its alliance with the Arabs, and that it can reach an understanding with Iran, as well as being on the side of the Israeli occupation – as it has always has. Moreover, it can shut its eyes to what is happening in Syria, reach an understanding with Iran in Iraq, and remain unconcerned with what is happening in Libya, Egypt, and Lebanon. What was said best by the Arabs was said by Amman: The Arabs should not wait for an American decision, especially after their success in Operation Decisive Storm. In fact, this operation is not momentous because of its military implications; it is so because it indicates that the Arabs have released themselves from the need to 'ask for permission' or wait for an American decision to act--Tareq Masarwah in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The U.S. and the West in general are blackmailing the Gulf Arab states into buying more and more of their weapons by setting up Iran as a 'bogeyman', even though an agreement will be signed with it to ensure that its nuclear program remains peaceful, warns the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. And the Arabs seem willing to spend their fortunes on such arms deals, oblivious of the fact that they are being deceived. The U.S. was forced to change its tune on Iran after the success of Operation Decisive Storm that exposed Tehran's regional schemes, claims the editorial in a Saudi daily. As a result, Saudi/U.S. relations have greatly improved, as evident from the results of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Riyadh yesterday (Thursday). The recent sale of French warplanes to Qatar against the background of Operation Decisive Storm shows that the Arabs should end their reliance on U.S. protection and waiting for Washington’s permission before taking matters into their own hands, maintains a Jordanian commentator.

 

A WELL-DEVELOPED PLAN: "The U.S. administration is pursuing a well-developed plan to scare the Arab Gulf states and spread concern among their peoples and leaders," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The object is to push these states to spend their vast financial reserves – estimated at around two trillion dollars – on arms deals. And the use of Iran as a card or as a 'bogeyman' lies at the heart of this plan.

The Gulf states are supposed to be worried and terrified come what may, whether the U.S. is preparing for the military option against Iran and is mobilizing its aircraft carriers in preparation for such an assault, or whether it enters negotiations with Tehran behind these states' backs to reach a peaceful political solution – which is what actually happened.

We would understand it if the U.S. were to convince the Gulf states to spend billions of dollars to buy modern warplanes and advanced missiles to protect themselves against any threat stemming from Tehran's nuclear ambitions. But we cannot understand its pursuit of the same line after signing an agreement that will ensure the Iranian nuclear program’s peaceful nature for at least ten years to come; an agreement, moreover, that subjects that program to international monitoring. Why, then, acquire weapons en masse and squander Arab fortunes on purchasing them?

Had these weapons been intended to be used in the Arab nation's battles against Israel with the object of liberating the holy sites, such a step would have been gratifying indeed, and would have warranted our support. But the U.S. as well as the other European states – whose leaders have turned into arms salesmen and middlemen for their arms’ companies – cannot sell a single rocket to any Arab state if they knew that it would strike Tel Aviv, rather than Tehran or Damascus or Baghdad.

Reports from Washington indicate that President Obama will renew his efforts to reassure the Gulf leaders during next week’s meeting with them at the Camp David retreat. He will propose the deployment of a 'missile defense shield' system intended to protect the region against Iranian missiles, and express his willingness to sell them advanced weapons and intensify joint military maneuvers as well.

But why set up this missile shield in the Gulf region, similar to what happened in East European states such as Poland and Romania, and expose it to certain threats in any future war between the superpowers? The system, which consists of missiles that can be equipped with nuclear warheads and that was set up in a number of Eastern European states, was introduced with the aim of confronting any Russian missile threat. Is Iran more advanced than Russia, for example? And does it possess the nuclear warheads with which to equip its missiles?

If Iran’s missiles pose an existential threat to the Gulf states and endanger their security and stability – as may be the case – of what use then are the American bases (in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait), the French bases (in the city of al-Dhafra in Abu-Dhabi), and the British base that will return to Manama? Why are they present on these lands if they cannot provide protection for the countries that host them and perhaps cover their costs directly or indirectly as well?

Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that this American 'missile shield' is necessary for the Gulf's security and for reassuring and dispelling the Gulf's nations and rulers' fears, why have the Gulf governments spent tens of billions of dollars on anti-missile Patriot systems, specifically meant for Iranian missiles?  And why is the U.S. administration speaking of an arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth over 150-billion dollars, not to mention the French Rafale jet fighters that Qatar has bought and the UAE is negotiating to buy, which will add another 20-billion dollars to the Gulf’s arms’ expenditure?

This is a clear case of American/French 'blackmail' of the Gulf states that is meant to rob them of their resources and recycle their financial assets so as to ensure that they return to the West's banks without the Arab nation benefiting from them to help them emerge from their economic and social crises.

The U.S. set up a 'missile shield' system in Poland and Romania; but it did not blackmail them by forcing them to conclude deals to buy advanced American weapons and warplanes worth tens of billions of dollars. In fact, the exact opposite occurred: Washington offered them billions of dollars financial and investment aid as a reward for hosting these missiles. But the irony is that the presence of these American 'missile shield' systems in Poland and Romania, Ukraine's two neighbors, did not prevent the recent Russian military and political intervention in Ukraine, or the Russian takeover of the Crimea, or the break up of the country's eastern parts by its Ukrainian allies.

The Gulf's sovereign wealth funds, which may lose most of their monies financing arms deals, are supposed to kept as a financial reserve for future generations; a sort of 'white’ penny to be saved for unexpected ‘black’ days. They are supposed to be reserved for times of need, which seem to be imminent in light of the drop in oil prices to half their previous level and possibly more as we draw nearer to the time when the siege imposed on Iranian oil exports is lifted, and as Russia increases its oil exports.

The U.S. and the European West are falling on the Gulf region to consume as much as they can of its financial cake. They are using scare-mongering techniques and the intimidation card very adeptly. Only recently, Obama told the American journalist Thomas Friedman that the greatest threat to the Gulf states was not from Iran, but from the frustration among these states' peoples, hinting at the levels of youth unemployment amongst them, as well as the absence of equality and justice in the distribution of wealth. Today, Obama and his French counterpart Francois Hollande (who was an honored guest at the recent Gulf consultative summit) are saying that the threat comes from Iran, and that they have to arm themselves to confront it. This is a strange contradiction that exposes what little respect these leaders have for the Arabs and the Muslims.

Of course, no one is speaking of the Israeli threat any more, perhaps because it is no longer so. Israel must remain the militarily superior power in the region as evident from the fact that the weapons already sold or will be sold to the Gulf states will not include the American F-35, which the Hebrew state has already received, becoming the sole state other than the U.S. to acquire this warplane.

We Arabs have turned into a laughing stock,' with the U.S. toying with us as it wishes, looting our monies, tearing our states apart, drowning us in civil wars, and creating hostilities among us. And we are being led into its bloody trap with eyes wide open. This is the epitome of tragedy and insult.

"If anyone believes otherwise, let them offer their evidence," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

COMMON INTERESTS: "The only way to describe Saudi/U.S. relations is that they are firm and imposed on both sides by their common interests," writes the editorial in Friday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

But at the same time, they are relations between equals, where there is agreement on many complex regional and international issues, as well as disagreement over a number of contested issues in the region. In fact, this sort of disagreement is only normal in politics where new developments occur every day, especially in times of crises such as those currently taking the region by storm. Yet, relations between Riyadh and Washington remain at their peak because the vital interests of both countries demand this.

With its economic weight, religious depth, strategic position, and political stability, Saudi Arabia is the safe and promising oasis in this heated region. Its stability is an international necessity since it protects 40% of the global economy from facing a true crisis – which would happen if this country were to suffer any harm (God forbid!).

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived yesterday to discuss a number of important regional issues with the Kingdom's leadership. The Yemeni file was one such issue, and Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir announced that 'the Kingdom has adopted a five-day truce to allow aid to reach our brothers in the Yemeni people, provided that the [Houthi] rebels lay down their arms.' He added that the Kingdom and the U.S. do not intend to send ground forces to Yemen.

As for Iran, the fact that the U.S. secretary of state informed his Saudi counterpart of the talks between the '5 + 1' and Iran regarding its nuclear program-- that the GCC foreign ministers will discuss in Paris – confirms the importance of the Kingdom's political role in bolstering regional security.

Kerry also made it clear that Iran now poses a real threat to its neighbors. But this talk of Iran only emerged so frankly after Operation Decisive Storm exposed the Persian project in the region and stripped it naked before the world. This forced Washington to refrain from its courtship with Tehran.

Kerry also noted that his country has 'provided weapons and is raising the level of naval activity by deploying a number of warships to the region,' reflecting a real sense of the potential Iranian threat.

"There are other issues that are certain to be discussed at the Camp David summit in a few days' time, as Kerry made clear. But all indications are that the Iranian nuclear file [blackmail] card has begun to lose its value, and that the region is on the verge of radical changes that will promote the interests of the moderate states," concludes the daily.

End…

 

HOLLANDE’S SATISFACTION: "President Hollande made no secret of his satisfaction at the warplanes deal whose signing he attended in Doha," writes Tareq Masarwah in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

His satisfaction is primarily of an economic character. Dassault Aviation [which manufactures the Rafale] will now reemploy thirty thousand employees who had lost their jobs because its warplane did not succeed in the European arms market. After all, Europe has its own warplanes, and so does Britain. France only managed to sell them to India and Egypt. And now, Qatar has bought them.

From Qatar, the French president attended the Gulf summit as a guest of honor who sells Rafale warplanes, as well as political positions in a region whose problems never seem to end.

We do not concur with the analysis that says that the Gulf leaders’ aim was to ensure that the U.S. administration would clearly understand their stance before meeting with President Obama at Camp David later this month: ‘It is true that we are your strategic allies; but, at the same time, we are allies of France and other countries.’

We do not agree with this analysis, because the U.S. has already said that its policies in the Middle East are not confined to its alliance with the Arabs, and that it can reach an understanding with Iran, as well as being on the side of the Israeli occupation – as it has always has. Moreover, it can shut its eyes to what is happening in Syria, reach an understanding with Iran in Iraq, and remain unconcerned with what is happening in Libya, Egypt, and Lebanon.

What was said best by the Arabs was said by Amman: The Arabs should not wait for an American decision, especially after their success in Operation Decisive Storm. In fact, this operation is not momentous because of its military implications; it is so because it indicates that the Arabs have released themselves from the need to 'ask for permission' or wait for an American decision to act.

An administration such as President Obama's is not happy to play the role of the world's sole superpower. This places a huge burden on its shoulders, since global interests are not one and the same. There are other world powers with which the U.S. has to maintain reasonable relations. Russia is one, so is China, and so is India; and before them, Europe is also a power now that there is no Soviet threat.

And in addition to these international powers, there are regional powers that should not be handled by waving a stick – as happened in the case of Iraq and Libya, and has been threatened in the case of Iran and Turkey. Nor is it proper to ride on the back of some of these regional powers, as in the case of the Arabs.

The Arabs should end their policy of relying on American protection. Japan, which developed and flourished thanks to such protection, is now trying to free itself from it. Had it not been for North Korea's megalomania, South Korea would have followed Japan. After all, Seoul is an economic power and can easily become a military and nuclear power.

"The Arab Gulf leaders will head to Camp David after Operation Decisive Storm to discuss their own issues, Iran's issues and the region's issues, freely and in a new spirit. And they will find in the U.S. president an ally who is willing understand their interests and policies and work to adapt to them," concludes Masarwah.

Ends…

 

 

 

2-ISIS prepares the ground for partition

  

 

Talk of partitioning Iraq is not new, but what is noteworthy today is that ISIS is playing a major role not only in partitioning this country, but in fragmenting Syria as well, says 'Othman Mirghani in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

Against the background of the draft law under discussion in the U.S. Congress to arm Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds directly without passing through the Baghdad central government, ISIS is playing a major role in promoting Iraq's partition, argues a Sudanese commentator in a Saudi daily. The organization's puzzling rise appears to be linked to schemes to implement such partition plans.

 

OLD/NEW SCHEME: "At the end of June 2014, the American weekly Time was published with a cover that caused much uproar bearing the headline 'The end of Iraq'," recalls 'Othman Mirghani in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The article spoke of an old/new scheme to partition Iraq into three mini-states – a Shiite one in the south, a Sunni state in the center along the borders with Syria, and a Kurdish state in the north that includes Kirkuk. But the article did not stop there. It went on to speak of severing territories from the Arab states bordering Iraq and annexing them.

The article was published at a time when the mystery-shrouded ISIS was rapidly expanding its alleged Islamic state, bypassing border lines, and creating more confusion and uncertainty in the demographic map by targeting minorities, and pouring oil on sectarianism's fires.

Today, one year on, an argument is raging over another scheme linked to the war on ISIS, namely the U.S. Congress's Armed Forces Committee's proposed law to offer direct military aid to the Sunnis and Kurds, in tandem with aid to the central government. The Shiite MPs in the Iraqi parliament have protested against this move because they do not want U.S. weapons to reach the Sunni clans, even if they are to be used to fight ISIS.

The irony is that even among the Sunni clans in al-Anbar, there were those who expressed their reservations about the American armament project. The Sunni clans have long been complaining that the central government in Baghdad is not supplying them with sufficient arms to confront ISIS, claiming that sectarian motives lie behind this stance. This is why these clans quickly welcomed the U.S. Congress' armament law. But this did not prevent certain clan dignitaries from coupling their welcome with their open opposition to any other ‘hidden’ aim having to do with schemes to partition Iraq. This is because of their suspicion of the U.S., which they hold responsible for what has befallen them since it invaded Iraq.

This argument has intensified along with the reemergence of voices both inside and outside Iraq, calling for the country's partition into three provinces or mini-states on the grounds that the united state has actually collapsed, and because the failure of the formula for government and coexistence in post-invasion Iraq, the sectarian and regional tension, and the intensification of the regional conflict and its effects on Iraq, mean that there is no solution left for the crisis other than accepting partition, which is a de facto reality on the ground anyway.

In this regard, and within this same conceptual framework, ISIS is playing a major role, whether by accident or design. Like al-Qa'ida, ISIS has played a major part in fanning the flames of sectarianism and turning the various Iraqi constituents against the Sunnis. Before ISIS, al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia under Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi tried to stir sectarian sedition by targeting the Shiites, Christians, and other minorities with bombings and forced displacement. When ISIS dominated the scene after its rapid and 'puzzling' rise, it has pursued the same path, but on a broader scale and via a fiercer war, declaring the alleged Islamic state that expanded in a strange way and captured a broad swathe of territory stretching from Syria to Iraq.

But ISIS's role did not end there. The war on it, in turn, contributed to pouring more oil on the fire of sectarian sensitivities and revived the fear of partition. When the Shiite 'popular' militias, backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, become the spearhead of the operations that have been continuing for months to expel ISIS from the areas it has captured near Baghdad, this provokes fear among the Sunnis and elicits their hostility, especially after the reports of major violations during these operations, such as stealing, looting, and attacks on people and property in the Sunni areas.

In this manner, ISIS has contributed to giving Iran a free hand in Iraq to take part publicly on the side of the Iraqi Shiite militias, with American air cover, in operations to regain control of the areas near Baghdad, and in entering certain Sunni areas.

In the context of confronting ISIS as well, the Kurdish peshmerga forces received Western weapons, increased their power, took control of Kirkuk and consolidated their contacts with Syria's Kurds by playing a major role in the operations to regain lands and cities from the alleged Islamic state organization.

So if the scheme to partition Iraq, which many have called for including some American politicians, were to be implemented in the manner presented in the maps published in Time and other periodicals and studies, ISIS would have contributed to this, whether by linking together the Sunni areas that stretch into Syria, or by linking Iraqi Kurdistan to the Kurdish areas inside Syria. To complete the picture, weapons are also being distributed to the Sunni Arab clans to fight ISIS, as happened before in the case of al-Qa'ida.

Talk of partitioning Iraq is not new; such proposals have been made at various times. But what is noteworthy now is that ISIS is playing a major role, not only in partitioning the country, but in fragmenting Syria as well.

"And it may play the same role later in Libya and other areas as well," concludes Mirghani.

Ends…

 

 

3-Window of opportunity

 

A surprise meeting in Beirut may revive the hitherto blocked prospects of Fateh/Hamas reconciliation, suggests Talal 'Awkal in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Fateh/Hamas reconciliation has proven unachievable for almost a decade now, despite the formation of a Palestinian national accord government, notes a Palestinian commentator. But there are signs that the preoccupation of major regional powers, primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with other more burning issues, is creating a window of opportunity for an inter-Palestinian dialogue that may finally lead to such a reconciliation.

 

SURPRISE MEETING: "While there is growing talk of an active Saudi role in the inter-Palestinian reconciliation file that may produce a Mecca-2 agreement [after Mecca-1 in 2007], and as leading Hamas figures raise their voices calling for a Saudi role, everyone was taken by surprise by a meeting between a Fateh delegation headed by 'Azzam al-Ahmad and a Hamas delegation headed by Dr. Musa Abu-Marzouq in the Lebanese capital, Beirut," notes Talal 'Awkal in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This meeting – that nothing had suggested would occur on 'neutral' grounds that are not part of the calculations of the parties that are likely to play a role in the Palestinian reconciliation file – represents an attempt to 'return the baby to its mother's womb.' In other words, no external force can succeed in achieving the reconciliation unless the two parties concerned are willing to do so themselves.

The truth is that there are no objective indications that either Saudi Arabia or Egypt are seriously interested in resuming their efforts to achieve this reconciliation. If reconciliation depends on action by either of these states, or any other state for that matter, then the Palestinians will have to wait for a very long time.

Egypt exerted enormous efforts that succeeded in reaching an agreement that bears its capital's name; but that was not enough to bridge the gap between the two sides. Each makes its calculations on different bases in accordance with illogical visions that are more likely to prolong and deepen the split, rather than the opposite. Although both parties – Fateh and Hamas – admit that they cannot bypass Egypt’s role for numerous reasons, Egypt’s current political climate that is hostile to Hamas prevents it from being in exclusive charge of this file, even though it may preserve the right to veto any role for any other state.

Resorting to Saudi Arabia as an alternative is possible; but this requires it to exert an enormous effort that may or may not succeed in lifting the Egyptian veto. It may also produce a situation in which Egypt could play a positive role in ending the split. But Saudi Arabia will not risk its relations with Egypt for either Hamas or Fateh’s sake.

Realistically, all talk of changing Saudi Arabia's policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood, or perhaps only towards Hamas, is exaggerated, even if it may be grounded in realism. This is because the entire Palestinian file and all the parties to it are not the subject of great Saudi concern or interest today.

Saudi Arabia is up to its ears in major issues of strategic consequences, carrying threats and risks for the country and the entire Arab Gulf. The first is Yemen, in all its dimensions and repercussions, due to Iran’s aspirations to control the Bab al-Mandab Straits in addition to the Straits of Hormuz. This is over and above the threat that it poses to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf sisters' stability, now that Tehran's nuclear agreement with the great powers has allowed it to devote its attention to the region's issues.

The Syrian and Iraqi files are two other major issues at the forefront of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf sisters' concerns. This is because Saudi Arabia is involved in the conflicts raging in these states. Moreover, it is not safe from the possibility of the fire of terrorism reaching it.

The question is this: What place do Hamas or Fateh or the entire Palestinian file and all its various parties have in Saudi Arabia’s calculations regarding those issues it sees as its priority? What direct interest will Saudi Arabia serve by risking joining the reconciliation fray that will be unsafe for it, especially after the failure of the [2007] Mecca Agreement that barely stood its ground for three months?

Heading to Beirut was the right option, which spares the Palestinians the need to pursue other options that may anger Egypt even more. Furthermore, it does not discomfit Saudi Arabia, which is up to its ears in other files.

This meeting was necessary, and perhaps even more than necessary. But it is also imperative for it to occur within a broader national framework that has been always vital for enabling the two sides overcome their separate calculations. This is because there is a need for a strategic dialogue that produces a national accord on the basic policies and options in a phase that is certain to bear great risks.

A considerable time has passed since the national accord government has been trying to do what it can to get the wheels of the reconciliation in motion. But despite all its attempts, and all the understandings and decisions that have been reached, it has failed to push the carriage one inch forward. It faced numerous problems during its ministers’ last visit to the Gaza Strip, which forced them to return to the West Bank after only 24 hours.

The truth is that it is no longer useful to issue verdicts and hold this or that party responsible for the government's failure. Both parties are not concerned about what is said about them, and each seems determined to proceed down its own path in accordance with its own vision. Nothing shows this more clearly that Hamas's continued implementation of the so-called 'Solidarity Tax Law,' even though the national consensus is opposed to this, and the PA continues to pursue its security coordination with Israel even though the national consensus is against this.

The ministers' return to the West Bank and their failed attempt was due to political reasons, not because the government does or does not want to succeed. Their return to Ramallah was requested by the presidency and not by the PM, who had asked them to remain in Gaza.

If that were the case, it would be logical to argue that the government's success depends on the resumption of dialogue at the political level. There are sufficient reasons and bases for believing that Fateh now wishes (or needs) to overcome the obstacles facing the government regarding the issues that the reconciliation is blocking.

"This is not to deny that the current dialogue does not rise to the requisite level," concludes 'Awkal.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Hangover

 

The dust is still settling on the last-minute coalition deal that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu secured with Habayit Hayehudi, allowing him to inform President Reuven Rivlin that he had managed to form a government before the deadline expired.

With the coalition partners all signed up – Habayit Hayehudi, Shas, Kulanu, United Torah Judaism – and with those parties having been promised certain ministries, attention now turns to the Likud and the remaining portfolios. Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom both lead with 'tension within Likud' as their main headline, explaining that the remaining dozen or so ministries will be keenly fought over by more than 20 possible candidates. Among the key positions that Netanyahu still has to fill are defense, foreign affairs, interior, intelligence and internal security. Some of these positions have been sort-of promised to strategic allies – Moshe Ya'alon, for example, is expected to remain as defense minister – and both papers say that Likudniks are disappointed with the slim pickings that Netanyahu has left them.

Indeed, several Likud MKs have already found a way to put their leader under pressure ahead of next week's swearing in of the new government. With the Knesset due to vote next Monday on a bill to expand the maximum number of ministers, which was limited following a demand by Yesh Atid head Yair Lapid in the last government, several Likud MKs are threatening not to support the bill unless they are expressly told by Netanyahu what positions they will receive, according to a report on Channel 2 News on Thursday night.

Since the bill constitutes an amendment to a Basic Law, it will require a Knesset majority of 61 votes in favor to pass. Netanyahu's coalition government consists of exactly 61 MKs, meaning he will need every vote. And the prime minister is exerting pressure on Likud MKs to vote for the bill by postponing his announcement of how the ministerial positions will be distributed until after the vote.

Channel 10 News reports that Negev and Galilee Minister Silvan Shalom is threatening not to support the bill unless he is appointed foreign minister, saying if he doesn't receive it 'I'm out,' possibly indicating he will not support either the bill or the government. Ministers Gilad Erdan and Yuval Steinitz also reportedly are demanding the foreign affairs portfolio, with Netanyahu said to be inclined to appoint Erdan as internal security minister instead. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Netanyahu is planning to keep the foreign affairs post for himself – or for Isaac Herzog, if the Zionist Union eventually agrees to join the coalition.

In its role as mouthpiece for Netanyahu, Israel Hayom quotes unnamed Likud insiders who reject these threats from within the Likud. 'Anyone who threatens, knows that these are idle threats. No one is going to topple the government,' the sources said.

Speaking on Thursday night at a ceremony marking 70 years since the defeat of the Nazis, Netanyahu said that the government he will present next week will face many challenges in many spheres: security, diplomacy, economics and social issues. Netanyahu said the greatest challenge of all is Iran's effort to acquire nuclear arms, while launching a terror front in the Middle East surrounding Israel's borders.

U.S. President Barak Obama, meanwhile, congratulated Netanyahu and the people of Israel on their new government. In a statement from the White House, Obama wrote that he is 'looking forward to working with the new Israeli government.' The statement also emphasized Washington's 'close military, intelligence and security cooperation with Israel, which reflects the deep abiding partnership between both countries.' The statement continued, 'We also look forward to continuing consultations on a range of regional issues including international negotiations to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and the importance of pursuing a two-state solution.'

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, for his part, said that after a new Israeli government has been sworn in he will investigate with Netanyahu whether there are 'realistic options' for a return to peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. In a statement, Ban also expressed concern over the recent announcement by Israeli authorities of plans to build 900 new housing units in east Jerusalem. The White House also condemned the plan to build in Jerusalem's Ramat Shlomo neighborhood, saying it is damaging to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In other news, all the papers report that the U.S. Senate has overwhelmingly passed legislation giving Congress the right to review and perhaps even reject a nuclear deal with Iran, the culmination of weeks of wrangling over how to hold Tehran to account. The bill passed 98-1 after overcoming initial objections from Obama. It comes amid intense negotiations between world powers and Iran on a nuclear deal.

Republican Tom Cotton was the lone member voting in opposition to legislation that would give lawmakers at least 30 days to review any final Iran accord. If the bill becomes law, it would also prevent President Obama from easing economic sanctions against Tehran during the review period. The legislation would also compel the president to assert to Congress every 90 days that Iran was complying with the deal. The bill now heads to the House of Representatives, where it has the support of the chamber's Republican leaders. A White House spokesman said that President Obama has said he would sign the legislation in its current form.

 

THE HANGOVER: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's new government may not even have been officially installed yet – but already people are talking about its inevitable demise.

"Any time that Ariel Sharon found his natural maliciousness clashing with his sense of national responsibility, he would claim that he 'wouldn't get any pleasure from this funeral.' If Sharon were with us today, he would no doubt say something similar in response to the establishment of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's fourth government.

Over the course of Israel's 67 years of independence, we have had all kinds of governments: narrow, broad, successful, failed, short-lived and those that lasted their full term. Most of them were only established after complex negotiations and countless crises. Irrespective of events leading up to their establishment and irrespective of events that followed, these governments had one magical evening of celebration – like a couple on their wedding night. The comparison between a coalition deal and a nuptial agreement is not coincidental: they both end with an embrace between the signatories, with the families singing and dancing, with a group photograph of everyone positively glowing with joy for posterity. In political life, there is nothing that more resembles a wedding than the signing of a coalition deal.

But the enthusiasm, the optimism, the freshness, sometimes even the innocence, with which previous coalition governments were installed is conspicuously missing this time. Israel's 34th government is beginning its life with a sense that it has no horizon, no future. There was precious little talk this week in political circles about weddings and a lot of speculation about divorce: when, how and at what cost. Netanyahu's new government has not yet been officially established, and already its end is in sight. It reminds me of the famous Israeli supermodel who got married in order to avoid being drafted into the IDF: her wedding was also held in the shadow of a rapidly approaching deadline, just like the wedding between Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett is.

Indeed, David Shimron – the Netanyahu family's private lawyer and the man who represented the Likud family at the coalition negotiations – was spotted early this week at the President's Residence, trying to ascertain whether, perhaps, President Reuven Rivlin would agree to extend the deadline that the law set for the establishment of a new government. Instead of the deadline expiring on Wednesday at midnight, Shimron sought an extension until Thursday at midnight. In order to justify this, he used a special counting system that only attorneys, it seems, can understand. It was pathetic. Rivlin rejected the proposal out of hand: the law is the law, he said. Rivlin has already stretched the law as far as it can go without breaking it by agreeing to wait until midnight, despite the fact that, by the letter of the law, the negotiations should have ended by 5 o'clock in the afternoon – the time that Netanyahu was asked, way back on March 25, by the president to form the next government.

In the meantime, Netanyahu and Bennett played a game of Russian roulette. They both held the gun to their own heads. Bennett risked being accused of thwarting the establishment of a right-wing government and paving the way for Isaac Herzog to form an alternative coalition; Netanyahu risked having to go back to the president and inform him that he had failed to build a coalition. Within Habayit Hayehudi, they were hard at work on a fall-back plan: if they failed to reach an agreement with Netanyahu, they would propose that the president ask a different member of the Likud to form the next government – Moshe Ya'alon, Silvan Shalom or anyone that the Likud selected, in fact. Netanyahu did not have a contingency plan. His threat – that he would ask Herzog to join his government – was not taken seriously. There was no way that the prime minister could have made good on this threat in the day or two before his deadline expired. Left without any choice, Netanyahu capitulated. He swallowed all the bitter pills that Bennett cooked up – primarily appointing Ayelet Shaked as justice minister. That was a knockout victory for Bennett.

Nonetheless, if I were Naftali Bennett, I wouldn't be celebrating too hard. In Israeli politics, victory is just a prelude to a future defeat. It's a question of hubris, of compensation and of justice. This is what prevents the political system from becoming unbalanced. If Bennett has not learned the lesson from his outstanding success of two years ago, which led to the resounding failure at the last election; then he has learned nothing. Netanyahu's most pressing agenda item for his new government will be to find a way to get Bennett and his party out of office. Forget Iran and the Palestinians: Netanyahu's new main enemy is a domestic one.

Netanyahu has been in this situation several times during his long political career. It took him time to understand that failure is not the end of the world: one doesn't need to resign and one doesn't need to pack one's things and bow off the political stage. Instead, one girds one's loins and starts afresh. It is unclear whether Netanyahu has learned the corollary of this lesson, that victory can be a disappointment, a hollow and treacherous thing. On March 17, Netanyahu cannibalized votes from other right-wing parties. He was giddy with victory. He was certain that the whole world would say 'Amen' to him – from Moshe Kahlon to Barack Obama. This week, Netanyahu finally understood what it means to wake up with a terrible hangover."

Ends…

 

WAITING FOR LABOR: Writing in Israel Hayom, Mati Tuchfeld says that, by playing hardball in the coalition negotiations, Naftali Bennett lost the support of Likudniks – many of whom would now prefer to see the Zionist Union in the government instead of Habayit Hayehudi.

"One of the outcomes of the tough and ultimately successful coalition negotiations that Naftali Bennett conducted was that he turned Likudniks against him. Six weeks ago, they all wanted Habayit Hayehudi in the coalition; now many of them would prefer to see Isaac Herzog's Zionist Union sitting next to the Likud in government.

In the immediate aftermath of the March 17 election, many Likud members were afraid that Netanyahu would prefer to form a broader government, with Herzog, rather than a more homogeneously right-wing government with Bennett. They were delighted when the prime minister opted to go with Bennett. The idea that the fate of a right-leaning government would be in the hands of Herzog, Tzipi Livni and their colleagues on the left was anathema to them. They were mightily relieved when Netanyahu chose Habayit Hayehudi over the Zionist Union.

Now, however, they've changed their tune. If Netanyahu decides, a few months down the line, to boot Habayit Hayehudi from his coalition and to bring in Labor instead, they will give him a standing ovation. No one will say as much in open, but Bennett – who could have used Likudniks as his insurance policy against Netanyahu's capriciousness – has lost their support because of his uncontrollable greed for ministerial positions and concessions in the final stretch of the coalition negotiations.

Netanyahu’s negotiating strategy – stringing everyone along until the deadline was imminent – did not prove itself to be effective. Instead of his coalition partners dropping their demands as time elapsed, they added more demands on a daily basis.

With the benefit of hindsight, where everyone has 20:20 vision, we can now say that if Netanyahu had conducted short and to-the-point negotiations, he could have taken advantage of the shock that descended on the political system over Likud's stunning victory to form a government at a much cheaper price. But after six weeks of negotiations, the glow has faded from his victory; all of the parties he was negotiating with saw what other coalition partners were being promised – and, in the end, the Likud has been left with plenty of ministers – but few of the really important ones.

I am not convinced that, in real time, Netanyahu could have avoided all of the pitfalls. The Likud negotiating team was made up of people with plenty of experience in solving political conundrums. Irrespective of how the negotiating process ended, no one can say that Netanyahu made a mistake by naming them to his team.

One of the key problems in these coalition negotiations was that there was no real alternative. Even though Likud won 30 seats in the Knesset, it was clear that the Zionist Union was out of the picture, as was Yair Lapid. Meretz was so far beyond the pale that no one even mentioned it. The other parties knew that this was the case and they took full advantage of the situation.

That's how Moshe Kahlon managed not only to snare the Finance Ministry, but another medium-sized ministry – the Housing Ministry – and, at the same time, to split the authority of the Interior Minister. Several important functions that were once the domain of the interior minister have now been transferred to him. And since we all know that the sight of food increases the appetite, Aryeh Deri demanded compensation for losing the Interior Ministry to an as-yet unknown Likudnik, and Bennett demanded no less than the Foreign Minister or the Defense Ministry."

Ends…

 

A NEW STUMBLING BLOCK: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir comments on the current state of negotiations between Iran and the six world powers, and says that the automatic re-imposition of sanctions if the Islamic Republic violates the agreement is the new stumbling block.

"Negotiations between Iran and the six world powers, who are working to turn their framework agreement into a final deal, are continuing at full steam ahead. The problem is not just the number of centrifuges that Iran will be allowed to operate or the extent and nature of the inspections. The latest issue to merge as the main stumbling block is the American demand that the agreement not be dependent in the future on any independent moves by Russia and/or China.

On Wednesday, another round of discussions between the Iranian delegation, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) came to an end. The discussions, which lasted almost a week, were held on the sidelines of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty conference and will continue next week in Vienna.

According to diplomatic sources, the United States and its Western allies have no particular problem renewing sanctions that were initiated and imposed against Iran in a unilateral manner and bypassing the Security Council. But the United States and the other world powers want to ensure ahead of time that the cancelling of the UN sanctions against Iran will be reversible and that they will have the authority to impose them again if needed.

The Americans insist that the phrasing of the final agreement include a special clause that ensures that, if Iran violates the terms of the deal or if it becomes clear that it is not abiding by its commitments, the sanctions will be imposed afresh and that this happens automatically, without the need for a new Security Council resolution – since this would give Russia and China the chance to use their power of veto to prevent sanctions being re-imposed.

The Americans are concerned that, just as Russia opposed international interference in the Syrian Civil War, which prevents the Security Council from taking any operative measures to implement a resolution calling for Bashar Assad to be removed from power, Moscow will side with Iran and, even if the Islamic Republic violates the agreement, will not allow the Security Council to re-impose sanctions.

Speaking this week, the American ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, said that Washington wants an agreement 'that doesn't require Russian and Chinese support or a vote for snapback… because we are in a different world in 2015 than we were when the sanctions architecture was put in place.' According to officials at the UN headquarters in New York, this American demand, which has the support of the Western members of the P5+1, will not be welcomed in Moscow and could lead to the Russians dragging their feet over the final stage of negotiations. Given that there is a June 30 deadline looming, this would be bad news for the United States. One senior Western diplomat told me that, 'the mood in the Kremlin today is not exactly pro-American.'

There are deeply contradictory assessments currently doing the rounds in New York regarding the outcome of the current talks. The Iranians have been making optimistic noises. Araghchi said this week that, 'the atmosphere at the talks was good and there is every chance of reaching a deal by June 30.'

In contrast, Western sources involved in the talks said this week that, 'the sides are still far from an agreement.' One of the main reasons for this is the issue of sanctions and differences of opinion over the nature and role of the international inspectors."

Ends…

 

USEFUL IDIOTS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini accuses 'Breaking the Silence' – the group which this week published damning testimony from soldiers who fought in Operation Protective Edge – of deception.

"The report released by Breaking the Silence is already making waves around the world. Isn't it simply wonderful to preach human rights? It's a position in high demand. The thing is, we're dealing here with another piece of major deception, another link in the chain of efforts to turn Israel into a living monster and help the BDS campaign.

Why deception? First, when Israel is accused of harming civilians, or when people talk about proportionality, one has to ask: What are the proportions? It turns out there aren't any – and not by chance either. Because every comparative review definitively shows that Israel causes less civilian casualties than those witnessed on other similar battlefields. Yes, there have been reports here and there about extensive civilian casualties elsewhere. But no one has launched a global campaign. No one has run around university campuses in the United States or Europe to distribute horror stories about anomalous incidents involving British, American or NATO forces. But the activists from Breaking the Silence do the job with glee.

Second, a country like Britain also has anti-war organizations. But no foreign country supports exposing the testimonies of British troops who have returned from conflict zones. So why the hell does Britain allow itself to finance Breaking the Silence? Why do the British think their dual morality is morality?

Third, four other countries – Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark – are funding a Ramallah-based organization, the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Secretariat, which also aids Breaking the Silence. HRIHL funds a series of groups such as Al-Haq, BADIL, Al-Mizan and others, which are a part of the BDS campaign network. We're not dealing with criticism of Israel, but an ideology that opposes the very existence of Israel. This is the ideological environment of Breaking the Silence report.

Fourth, the organization refuses to reveal the identities of the complainants, despite the fact that such individuals have never been taken to task for speaking out. The Israel Defense Forces wants to review the testimonies and investigate the claims, but the organization won’t budge. There's no way of verifying or refuting the testimonies. So how can they be taken seriously?

Fifth, the IDF is not perfect, and not all IDF soldiers are angels. Some of the claims may be true. There are anomalies – in every army in the world and on every battlefield. But when these deviations from the norm are put on display, without any background context, without proof, without a comparative picture, without presenting the fact that a Hamas-issued document ordered the organization's fighters to take cover among the civilian population, hide in population centers, the report released by Breaking the Silence is not merely deception; it's manipulation too.

'Blessings to all the commissions, individuals, civil society groups and human rights organizations that worked to break the siege on Gaza and who fought against the fence and the settlements. Moreover, we bear in mind those liberals of the world who stood by our cause and against the Zionist war on our land,' Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh declared in a speech in October 2013. In the same speech, Haniyeh made clear that he opposes any political settlement, and that the struggle is for 'all of Palestine.' Legend has it that Vladimir Lenin delivered a similar speech about his followers. But he didn't call them human rights activists; he called them by their true name – useful idiots."

Ends…

 

MIDAS NO MORE: Writing in Haaretz, Yoel Marcus says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems to have lost his political Midas touch, judging by the mess he's made of the coalition negotiations.

"What happened to Binyamin Netanyahu, the campaigner who, within a matter of hours at the end of the March Knesset election campaign, managed to garner 30 seats for his Likud party? But then in the 35 days that he had at his disposal, he barely scraped through forming a government in the time allotted. What happened to his prowess? If that’s how he runs his small shop, how can he be trusted when he is negotiating with the world’s great powers? How can such a victor as he sees himself trip himself up like that? How did he get into a situation in which not only can he not stand his Likud party colleagues, they cannot stand him either?

Bibi had a team that conducted the coalition negotiations for him. It was headed by attorney David Shimron, who has also been his emissary in handling sensitive matters around the world, but it didn’t help. And now, even after informing President Reuven Rivlin that he had accomplished the task of forming a government, Netanyahu might be told what former Prime Minister Ehud Barak said at the time about the Oslo Accord – that it was as full of holes as Swiss cheese.

Netanyahu distributed cabinet portfolios in a disproportionate manner, not, for example, providing a cabinet post to coalition partners in a ratio reflecting every three or four Knesset seats held by the coalition parties. One might jokingly suggest that the small parties got more cabinet posts than they have Knesset seats.

And how did Bibi get himself to a point in which after he had Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman around the prime minister’s little finger, the situation was actually reversed and Lieberman crossed over to the opposition? And why did Bibi refuse to give Yisrael Beiteinu MK Orli Levi-Abekasis the chairmanship of the Knesset Labor, Welfare and Health Committee? If Bibi had given the task to her father – none other than former Likud minister David Levy, who for 48 hours was a candidate for president – it would have been accomplished within 24 hours.

Does anyone know where Bibi disappeared to over the course of the weeks that he had to form a government? Is it possible that his absence from the negotiations was due to his focus at the time on the critical matter of how to trip up Kulanu leader Moshe Kahlon as finance minister, as Netanyahu did with his predecessor, Yair Lapid? The truth is that the answers are not that important. What is important is that Bibi has put together a very bad government, a government in retreat, withdrawing in every sphere except withdrawal from the West Bank. There is a total absence of anything innovative. Bibi wants to go after the media and harm the powers of the Supreme Court – and then there is the matter of legislation negatively affecting Israeli Arabs.

Lieberman’s refusal to join Bibi’s coalition is the best thing that has happened to the country. What was Lieberman’s motive? He simply can’t stand Bibi, and the truth is, that’s understandable. Lieberman calls Bibi a waffler on policy, accusing him of making concessions to the Arabs and deeming him a leader who can be pressured. All of that is correct.

It’s not just Bibi. Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett is also in a bind with his own supporters. And on his turf, the battles are never-ending too, with everyone doing battle against the others’ plans. It’s not a cabinet. It’s a fire station.

Okay, so a peace cabinet this will not be in any event, but even in other policy sectors, Bibi’s influence will be close to nil. He is like a prime minister who has been shorn of his power. So at night he dreams of Bougie – Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog. At the moment, Bougie is the guardian angel. If Bibi makes Bougie an offer that is hard to refuse, Herzog would probably not say no. Anyone who thinks Herzog’s No. 2 in the Zionist Union, Tzipi Livni, would veto such a move would be mistaken. In politics, there are no grudges, just political interests.

The problem is that this puts Bibi in an embarrassing situation. A coalition of a bare minimum of 61 seats rather than the 67 he anticipated is like a gun in the first act of a play. Kahlon had said that he wouldn’t sit in a coalition of 61. So he said it. Even though Bennett threatened not to sit in a government if his party colleague Ayelet Shaked had not been given the post of justice minister, he would have done so in the end. At any price. He didn’t have a real alternative. It was all talk. Bennett’s luck is that it is true what they say about Bibi: He can be pressured, to the greatest extent possible. The minute that he is caught in an embarrassing political situation, he is forced to pay the full political price. As they say in the vernacular, he takes the hit."

Ends…

 

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ELECTION: In its editorial on Friday, The Jerusalem Post takes issue with Saeb Erekat's dismissal of the new Israeli government as 'anti-peace,' saying that, instead of casting aspersions on the Israeli coalition, the senior Palestinian official should look to rectify the problems with Palestinian democracy.

"A 'government of war which will be against peace and stability in our region' was the way chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat chose to describe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s newly formed narrow coalition.

This was hardly an auspicious start to renewing relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Erekat does not surprise with his criticism, made to an AFP reporter Thursday, but he does open himself up to painful comparisons with his Palestinian government.

Disparage it as you will, our incoming government came into being through a fair, democratic process; it represents the will of the majority of Israeli voters; and it is a legitimate political leadership. The same cannot be said about Erekat and his political cronies in the PA.

Take Mahmoud Abbas, for instance. Among the hats he wears, which include chairman of the PLO and president of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas also calls himself the second president of the 'State of Palestine,' taking over from the late Yasser Arafat. He was sworn in as president of the 'State of Palestine' on May 8, 2005 – exactly 10 years ago. But what was supposed to be a four-year term has stretched to a full decade. Due to the split between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fateh on the West Bank, Palestinians have failed to muster the requisite unity to hold a presidential election since 2005 or a national election since 2006.

Israel has held four completely democratic and transparent national elections during that time. So while Israel’s governments might not be to the liking of Palestinian politicians like Erekat, they can make the claim to represent their voters, a claim that Abbas, Erekat and other PA politicians cannot make.

A deal signed with Israel would be binding and legitimate. A deal signed with Abbas and Erekat would not. Promoters of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal recognize this crucial flaw. Palestinians who have been left indifferent and apathetic to a political leadership have as well. Both have called on Fateh and Hamas to put aside their differences and hold elections.

This suggestion was made most recently and prominently by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter and former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, both members of 'The Elders,' a dozen veteran human rights activists first brought together in Johannesburg in 2007 by Nelson Mandela and Desmund Tutu.

But conducting elections without first putting in place basic democratic institutions – such as a free press, governmental transparency, human rights, religious freedom and an independent judiciary – can be disastrous. Egypt provides a good example of the dangers of a premature election, when the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power and proceeded to undermine the very democracy that empowered it in the first place.

Palestinians face similar risks. As Jerusalem Post correspondent Khaled Abu Toameh points out, 'free and democratic elections are the last thing the Palestinians need now,' because they would most likely be won by Hamas. That’s what happened in January 2006. An ominous sign of the direction political winds are blowing was provided recently by the crushing victory of the Hamas-affiliated Islamic Bloc in the student council election of Bir Zeit University, just north of Ramallah.

This state of affairs is not so much about Hamas’s popularity among Palestinians (though alarming numbers do support this anti-Semitic, fundamentalist, terrorist organization) as it is about the PA’s corruption, cronyism, incompetence, and repression of critics that have alienated so many Palestinians.

Instead of pressuring the Palestinians to hold new elections, well-wishers like The Elders should be demanding the sort of accountability and transparency that would put an end to the PA’s kleptocracy. They should be championing human rights for women and religious minorities – particularly in Gaza – and freedom of the press. They should also urge the PA to allow the emergence of new leaders who will replace the corrupt old guard.

Palestinian critics of Israel’s incoming government like Erekat are in need of a dose of a little self-criticism. Instead of being so quick to point out Israel’s imperfections, Erekat and others should focus instead on Palestinian politics’ many pathologies.

Then again, bashing Israel is much easier."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS/KURDISH PEACE PROCESS: Dogan Heper ponders the uncertainty of politics in centrist Milliyet: "This election may produce a result different to that of the past. Which party or parties will come to power remains unclear, as are the chances that the promises the leaders have made will be fulfilled. For example, if he fails to receive 35 per cent of the votes, will CHP (main opposition Republican People's Party) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu resign as he has said, or will he stay in his post, making up various excuses? The great majority wants the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] to pass the 10% electoral threshold and enter parliament; but will that happen? What is interesting is that the great majority wants to see the HDP in parliament, although they will vote for other parties."

Writing in the same paper, Ergun Babahan argues that President Erdogan is disconnected from reality: "The AKP’s [ruling Justice and Development Party’s] real aim is not peace or turning Turkey into a democratic country, but staying in power and looting. That is why they want the HDP to remain under the electoral threshold. They are preventing the HDP delegation from meeting PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] leader Abdullah Ocalan in Imrali prison. The AKP's bright era has long been over; its era of regression has begun. This is a fact that they will try to suppress with different tactics but will have difficulty doing so. The problem is that Erdogan has lost his connection to reality."

Mustafa Balbay detects a sweeping sense of popular anger in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "One could say that the agenda of the people and that of politics have coincided to a great extent because the CHP has focused its election manifesto on the economy, and other parties have followed suit. The empire of fear that the AKP wanted to establish has collapsed. However, it is clear that many other anxieties have appeared instead. On the streets, in the market places, city centres and even in the parks where people do their morning exercises, the strongest feeling is anger."

Sahin Alpay accuses the ruling party of pursuing a witch hunt against the Gulen movement in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Incredibly, the AKP is accusing Fethullah Gulen, who represents the most respectful approach of Islam to different faiths, of being a 'terrorist' in order to remain in power. Or to put it more accurately, President Erdogan is doing this in order to fulfil his desire to create a presidential system. For that purpose, the AKP is taking the MGK [National Security Council], which is the basic tool of military tutelage and the ‘Red Book’ that determines the main threats against the Republic of Turkey in tow. It is inciting hatred against the Gulen Movement and is pursuing a witch hunt against it."

Mehmet Metiner charges the Kurds’ political movement with bad faith in centre-right, pro-government Star: "There cannot be weapons on one hand, and politics on the other. Trying to secure a political result with the help of force is not consistent with the spirit of the peace process. Apparently, this process means nothing to Kandil [PKK northern Iraq leadership] and the HDP. There is no equivalent to Ocalan's determination that the 'era of armed struggle has ended' and the call 'to lay down arms' on the Kandil and HDP side. This is because Kandil does not intend to lay down arms. And for its political survival, the HDP sees Kandil's arms as a sine qua non."

Markar Esayan sees the HDP playing a double game in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The HDP is not a Kurdish party anymore. It can deceive the youngsters. The Kurdish citizens among us in the West might sense the joy of the credibility that the AKP has gained after 150 years, and feel sympathy for the HDP that has an ethnic tendency. However, the conservative Kurds in the east and southeast know very well what they faced on October 6-7 2013 [pro-PKK street riots] due to the government's allegedly ignoring ISIS pressure on the Syrian Kurds and the kind of pressure they are still under. That is why, the HDP is submitting the election issue to the PKK in the southeast, and playing the democracy game in the West."

Hasan Cemal laments the state of the nation independent Internet newspaper T24: "What does our constitution say? It says that the president is not a member of any party; he/she is neutral. What Erdogan does every single day is a violation of the constitution! Besides, he does not hide this 'constitutional crime'. He has confessed himself that 'he has kept the constitution waiting'. This is a country where the police do not listen to the attorneys. We have a country where the attorneys do not care about court verdicts. We are living in a country where judges are being imprisoned due to their court verdicts."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist E'temad is defiant: "In next week's nuclear talks in Vienna, our team should convey the Supreme Leader's message to the American side and stress that continuing this process to no end is not an option and Iran is not willing to remain at the table. The American side should understand that our dignity and national sovereignty is more important than any agreement or lifting of sanctions. They must understand that Iran is different from any other country that they have been involved in negotiations with. The 35-year history of the Islamic Republic proves that America does not have much power against us. Only through balanced negotiations, a win-win outcome could possibly be reached while preserving dignity and mutual respect. It would be better for the Americans to break their habits and avoid pursuing imprudent behaviour." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami has not given up: "In the coming two months, if the other side does not indulge in irrational behaviour and selfish demands, there is a high likelihood of reaching an agreement that can clear the international atmosphere from the imposed crisis fabricated by the West." 

Conservative Khorasan presents its strategy for reaching a deal: "When the American president, his vice president and secretary of state brazenly speak about military threats during talks, Iran should also react aggressively. These threats, although unrealistic and with political goals, show that we should not have any doubt about improving our defence capabilities. If the Americans understand that military threats will have no result, it is due to our exemplary defence capacity. Therefore, our power should be boosted and threat and humiliation should be confronted with threat and humiliation so that conditions for a good deal are provided." 

Hard-line Javan sets the bottom line: "The nuclear issue and negotiations should be a national subject; partisan judgement should be avoided. The Iranian nation has been stressing its nuclear rights for more than a decade. The most severe economic sanctions in history were imposed, but we moved forward irrespective with dignity and honour. The expectation from the government is not to ignore our rights, interests and independence at the negotiation table under any condition."

Conservative Hemayat warns: "As nuclear negotiations get closer to the final phase, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vice-President Joe Biden have made military threats against Iran with insulting words to help them with their excessive demands in the negotiations.  In American vocabulary, negotiations mean surrender and the imposition of their ideas on other countries. Nations' rights are unimportant for the U.S.. They should know, however, that countries will not abandon their rights and will defend them." 

Conservative Quds references the Supreme Leader’s remarks: "The Supreme Leader's remarks yesterday once again stress that the Iranian nation will stand against the excessive demands of enemies, in particular, Americans. In contrast to Western allegations, sanctions did not persuade Iran to negotiate. The Supreme Leader has always clearly announced his stance towards the negotiations. Iran will not allow anyone to even think about invasion. If anyone does so, they should know that they will endanger their interests in the entire world."

 

UK ELECTIONS: Conservative Resalat writes of tricky Cameron: "British Prime Minister David Cameron has devised a complex puzzle for UK elections. The country faces one of the most unpredictable polls in its modern history. Cameron has promised that in case of victory, he will renegotiate with Brussels, especially on immigration, and a referendum will be held in 2017. This political trick is aimed at the supporters of the Labour Party, UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. Currently, political calculations favour Cameron." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is not optimistic about Cameron’s prospects: "Conservative Party Leader David Cameron has led a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats for four years. He now faces serious challenges that could result in his defeat and removal from the political scene. His government has not managed to fulfil economic promises and satisfy the British people. There are suggestions that the country's economic situation is worsening." 

 

SAUDI ATTACKS ON YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan explains: "Intoxicated with the smell of oil and money, Saudis believe the illusion that everything can be purchased. The force that was hired for the war in Yemen is a clear example. What is the real reason that some African and Asian countries that do not have any commonalities with Saudi Arabia are joining in to fight the barefooted Yemenis? Poverty and financial dependence is the common reason for all these countries. In almost all the serious confrontations in history between Yemenis and Saudis, Saudi Arabia has been defeated. What is the reason of their ineptitude? Look for a hired army, purchased politicians and people without passion."

Reformist Sharq is concerned that next stop will be Syria: "If the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen succeeds and achieves its goals, Saudi Arabia and its allies may be encouraged to repeat such experience in other parts of the Middle East, particularly in Syria. The rapprochement of Iran's three regional rivals; Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar since the beginning of the Yemeni crisis confirms this speculation. The Huffington Post reports that Turkey and Saudi Arabia with Qatar's mediation have begun negotiations to create a military coalition with the aim of overthrowing the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. According to an official participating in these talks, if the negotiations between Riyadh and Ankara are successful and yield results, the military intervention in Syria will be executed regardless of U.S. support." 

 

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: Moderate Iran foresees the end of sanctions: "The new chapter of Indian investment in Iran's infrastructure along with the new phase in relations with Russia, the promotion of Iran-China cooperation, the expansion of regional ties with neighbouring countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus demonstrate that the Iranian government is not relying on the outcome of the nuclear talks with the West. These developments also prove that the wall of sanctions has already cracked regardless of the outcome of the nuclear talks." 

Reformist Arman lists some of the needed measures for best use of foreign economic ties: "In order to expand economic and trade ties with foreign countries, officials of the government of prudence and hope [Hassan Rowhani's government] should adopt appropriate and thoughtful policies; the private sector should be consulted to fully use opportunities and the banking system should provide the necessary tools to expand economic ties."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Yemen and the limits of power

2-Hizbollah’s critical role

3-The worst is to come

 

1-Yemen and the limits of power

 

The [Yemen] conflict may be ended by a conclusive victory – which is almost impossible in light of the presence of multiple forces – or by achieving sufficient victories to convince the other parties to sit at the table and negotiate – which is the main goal of the battle. Alternatively, the war may be protracted until the various parties tire; then each party will hold on to its victories, in line with the Afghani model… The most important factors in the Yemeni conflict are not shells and bullets. More important than the intensity of fire is the dismantlement of the domestic Yemeni tribal and party-political alliances. There is need for extensive efforts to convince the various tribes to dump Saleh and the Houthis and join the legitimate [Hadi-led] government that is the sole guarantor of Yemen's unity and independence--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

We must therefore admit that Riyadh's current impetus reveals a dynamism and means of pressure that have been hitherto absent from the Kingdom's foreign policies. Yet despite their positive outcome from the Saudi perspective, they are most likely to be short-lived. For they lack an extensive legacy of alliances to back them (in their current form), and they are not aided by a clear vision of the course of events in the medium- and long-terms. This is not to denigrate the Kingdom's ability to strike at its enemies; but it does raise questions regarding the possibility of making use of these strikes without creating considerable side-effects, as well as regarding the possibility of collecting the cards of the 'jihadis' who are beyond control – a move that will be necessary once the time for settlements arrives--Rabi' Barakat in Lebanese as-Safir

 

Because numerous parties are fighting it out in the ongoing Yemen war, it is almost impossible to end the conflict with a conclusive victory for any one side, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. The best way to win the war is to try to dismantle the pro-Houthi tribal alliance inside Yemen. While the new Saudi leadership has displayed unprecedented dynamism in taking the initiative in the region especially in Yemen and Syria, there are limits to Saudi power that will soon be evident, maintains a Lebanese commentator. Most importantly, the new Saudi leadership does not seem to have a clear vision of what may happen in the medium and long terms.

 

THE MAIN AXES: "The truth is that there are many different parties to the Yemeni crisis, but the main axes are represented by the followers of deposed president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis on one side, and the Yemeni government-in-exile along with the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia, on the other; and then there is al-Qa'ida as well," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Because of these multiple axes, the war could last for months and perhaps even more, unless Saleh and the Houthis’ capabilities are degraded. This is not only to be achieved via military confrontations, but also by winning over most of the military and tribal forces that Saleh has dominated to the government's side.

The war now is wide-ranging and is no longer confined to the twin capitals, Sana'a and Aden. The four major abovementioned forces are now fighting it out in ten Yemeni provinces. That is to say, in half the country, which is divided into twenty-one provinces. In addition, the Houthis have expanded the battle by opening a front against Saudi Arabia by shelling Saudi border towns – a move that was expected from the beginning as a means of exerting social and propaganda pressure on the Kingdom.

Outside Yemen, the Iranians and their allies are trying to raise the heat of the propaganda war by intensifying their coverage, so much so that the Yemeni conflict is now receiving the widest coverage in the Middle East. They are acting in the belief that Yemen will be a Saudi quagmire that will divert its efforts from the Middle East’s other hotly contested areas. This is in addition to their relentless efforts to bolster the Saleh/Houthi camp by sending weapons and more experienced fighters to the battlefields, and that have so far failed-- thanks to the naval and aerial blockade.

The conflict may be ended by a conclusive victory – which is almost impossible in light of the presence of multiple forces – or by achieving sufficient victories to convince the other parties to sit at the table and negotiate – which is the main goal of the battle. Alternatively, the war may be protracted until the various parties tire; then each party will hold on to its victories, in line with the Afghani model.

What about the Houthis' threats to invade southern Saudi Arabia, which were accompanied by pictures of burnt-out houses in the city of Najran? The Houthis' attacks against border points and their shelling of nearby cities cannot represent the large-scale invasion they are threatening. Najran is a city that lies exactly along the borders with Yemen, and the same goes for the city of Jizan, which is on the coast. Geography is the major barrier in much of the long borders between the two countries. The Houthis are unable to fight and cross over to the north; they can continue to set off fires by shelling from across the borders and suspend civilian life in the nearby areas for a while; but they cannot alter the political course of the battle.

The most important factors in the Yemeni conflict are not shells and bullets. More important than the intensity of fire is the dismantlement of the domestic Yemeni tribal and party-political alliances.

"There is need for extensive efforts to convince the various tribes to dump Saleh and the Houthis and join the legitimate [Hadi-led] government that is the sole guarantor of Yemen's unity and independence," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

REMARKABLE DISPLAY OF DYNAMISM: "The days separating us from the Camp David summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and the leader of the Gulf states in mid-May have been distinguished by a remarkable display of Saudi dynamism," writes Rabi' Barakat in the left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

A consultative Gulf [GCC] summit was held with the French president as its guest, setting a unique precedent for such summits. The spectrum of military alliances was further expanded, recently adding soldiers from Senegal to 'defend Mecca and Medina,' as the foreign minister of this African country put it. Training sessions for Yemeni fighters have been held, and they have begun to bear fruit with the graduation of groups prepared for the fight. Troops have been landed inside Yemen as a prelude to a ground war that leads to advances against the [Houthi] Ansarullah and the Yemeni army units allied to them.

In the background to all of this lies a Saudi desire to confirm to those concerned – both in the region and internationally – that the Kingdom has entered a new phase in dealing with the region's files. What is certain is that Riyadh has left the circle of hesitation and has moved to where it takes initiatives. This is the first implication of the Yemen war.

The new order that has taken charge of the main levers of power in the Kingdom since King 'Abdullah's death has reassessed Saudi foreign policy, which was characterized by withdrawal from the fray for at least two-and-a-half decades. The result reflects the change that has occurred in the very structure of the regime: For the first time, someone from the third generation [of King Saud's offspring] is now crown-prince, and a number of hawks from the security administration of previous phases – from the jihad in Afghanistan to 'the war on terrorism' – have been appointed in sensitive posts. As a result, the Kingdom has taken 'daring' steps and grabbed hold of the steering wheel, after having previously confined itself to the backseat by financing wars instead of determining their course.

At the upcoming Camp David summit, the Kingdom aspires to reach a memorandum of understanding with Washington that sets the broad outlines for a policy of containment of Tehran after the planned signing of the nuclear agreement, even though it would prefer to reach more serious and solid treaties in this regard.

In relation to its American ally, Riyadh is arming itself with ammunition whose outcome it is daily trying to display: Its soft power is based on unlimited supplies of money, which is adding states to its military alliance and luring others to provide political and diplomatic backing; and its hard power – specifically its aerial power – has been subjected to its first serious test that has allowed it to declare its hegemony over the region's airspace without any competitor.

So far the pace of the battles near the Kingdom's borders remains under control. In northern Syria, the 'jihadis' have been united in coordination with the regional intelligence agencies that have participated in achieving their recent victories. In Iraq, Washington has begun to threaten to pull the rug from under the central government's feet via a draft resolution in Congress allowing the U.S. to arm Iraqi [Sunni and Kurdish] groups without first passing through the central Iraqi state. This may suggest that the U.S. intends to deal with the country's constituents directly, flinging the door open for Riyadh to directly sponsor certain social, political, and military forces in Iraq. As for Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition has tightened the noose around the country and its people, turning 25 million Yemenis into prisoners of the combat zone but without any serious side damage being done to the Kingdom in return.

But despite its power and its measured pace as mentioned above, this Saudi momentum has limits it cannot objectively exceed. The humanitarian situation in Yemen cannot bear the weight of a war that is strangling an entire nation in order to 'stop Iranian intervention', and the permission granted al-Qa'ida to thrive in some of the country's southern parts will not keep the Kingdom safe from that organization's evils for long.

In this regard, we could point to some of the strikes carried out for mere display purposes against ISIS for the last eight months without recording any significant achievements in either Iraq or Syria. We can appeal to this fact to claim that playing the card of this organization may no longer be possible, as its sleeper cells in Saudi Arabia itself are spreading, tens of whose members have been uncovered so far. Moreover, it is useful to bear in mind that escalation in any of the region's main hot zones may have uncalculated consequences, such as the rise of international oil prices to near their previous levels, after Riyadh has tried hard to bring them down as a means of pressuring Tehran, and Moscow behind it.

Talking of the limits of Saudi Arabia's power is not meant as propaganda exercise or intended to belittle that power. It is similar to talking about what Iran can do in its own environment, and the lines that it cannot cross on the other hand. For Tehran is also unable to ensure a role for itself that would provide it with the ability to be in total control of decisions in the region. The international players' logic will not allow any unilateral control of decisions in the region, and the regional balance of power will not permit it either; nor, for that matter, does Iran's allies' need to live with their neighbors help to secure such control.

Thus the need to share influence goes without saying, regardless of the final outcome of the duels that are now taking place in more than one geographical location. This does not concern Tehran and Riyadh alone, but their allies as well, both in the political/organizational sense (regimes or parties, apart from those that may fall in the confrontation), and in the social sense (sectarian or ethnic or tribal environments whose interests and needs intersect with those of both Riyadh and Tehran).

We must therefore admit that Riyadh's current impetus reveals a dynamism and means of pressure that have been hitherto absent from the Kingdom's foreign policies. Yet despite their positive outcome from the Saudi perspective, they are most likely to be short-lived. For they lack an extensive legacy of alliances to back them (in their current form), and they are not aided by a clear vision of the course of events in the medium- and long-terms.

"This is not to denigrate the Kingdom's ability to strike at its enemies; but to raise questions regarding the possibility of making use of these strikes without creating considerable side-effects, as well as regarding the possibility of collecting the cards of the 'jihadis' who are beyond control – a move that will be necessary once the time for settlements arrives," concludes Barakat.

Ends…

 

 

2-Hizbollah’s critical role

 

As the Syrian regime comes under growing pressure from all sides, it would appear that Lebanese Hizbollah will play a decisive role in determining its future, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Syrian regime's loss of ground in the northwest and the south has led to a drop in morale and the spread of a spirit of despair and despondency that is being intensified by the campaign of rumors and psychological warfare waged on it by its enemies, notes the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. It is most likely to try to overcome this by reversing its recent defeats and via Hizbollah’s likely achievements in the imminent battle in the Qalamoun area.

 

BEARING FRUIT: "The pressures that the new tripartite Turkish/Saudi/Qatari coalition is exerting on the U.S. administration to change its position in Syria and restore priority to toppling the Syrian regime appear to have begun to bear fruit in one form or another," writes the editorial on Thursday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This is clear from the latest unexpected statement from the U.S. UN Envoy Samantha Power in which she declared that 'the problem of the Islamic State in Syria and other areas in the Middle East cannot be resolved as long as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains in power.' In an interview with the U.S. public television station PBS, she added that Assad's supporters should understand that the regime is illegitimate, and that the civil war will not end unless Assad steps down.

The U.S. administration had recently changed its priorities in Syria, making destruction of the Islamic State [ISIS] as its absolute first priority that takes precedence over toppling the Syrian regime. It became party to undeclared coordination with the regime in order to prevent ISIS forces from expanding as a first step to destroying them. But its sudden change in attitude may be part of the ferocious psychological war that is meant to spread pessimism and defeatism among the regime supporters' ranks.

The new American stance comes almost one week before the Camp David summit that President Barack Obama will hold with the leaders of six Gulf states, and that is intended to reassure them of his country's commitment to defending them and strengthening its alliance with them despite the fact that the U.S. will be signing an agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program.

President Obama's aim may be to emphasize his intentions by expressing the change in his country's attitude towards the Syrian file. After all, he realizes that most Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, seek political and military 'compensation' from the U.S. that would bolster their efforts to limit the expansion of Iranian influence in the region at their expense.

What further indicates that Ambassador Power's statements were in direct response to Saudi demands in this regard is that they were almost identical to what Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz said in his inaugural speech at Tuesday’s consultative Gulf GCC summit. He said: 'There is no role for President Assad in Syria's future.' And he announced that his country would host a broad-based meeting for the Syrian opposition for the first time since the crisis began.

These political developments coincide with military developments on the ground, whereby the Syrian opposition, backed by the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari tripartite alliance, is making progress on various fronts, as evident from its capture of Jisr ash-Shughour and Idlib and the Qarmid camp in the northwest, and the city of Bosra ash-Sham and the Nasib crossing with Jordan in the south.

These losses have created anxiety among the Syrian regime's allies both inside and outside Syria. The fall of Jisr ash-Shughour and Idlib have placed the opposition forces backed by the Nusra Front and the Jayshul Fateh at the gates of Latakia and northern coastal area, the largest reservoir of President Assad and his Syrian Arab Army's supporters. The Syrian opposition has exploited this situation and has sought to make further use of it by focusing on weakening the domestic Syrian front loyal to the regime and spreading numerous 'rumors' in this regard.

President Assad's rare appearance in Damascus on Wednesday, his visit to a school for the sons and daughters of Syrian army martyrs, and his admission that his forces have suffered a setback in the north, declaring that 'losing a battle in the war does not amount to defeat; there are thousands of battles and there are advances and retreats, gains and losses, rise and fall', was all aimed at raising the Syrian army's moral and confronting the schemes intended to spread 'the spirit of despondency and despair as a result of a loss here or there,' as he put it.

President Assad's appearance on Martyrs' Day and his visit to the martyr's sons and daughters' school in the capital’s suburbs will help, albeit partially, to confront the rumors and to boosting his soldiers and supporters' morale. But advances on the military fronts, recapturing cities from the opposition, and victories on other fronts would be more important in dispelling the anxiety and lifting morale again.

For his part, the leader of Lebanese Hizbollah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, and at a carefully calculated timing, emerged on al-Manar television on Tuesday to reconfirm his support for his Syrian ally and stress his determination to fight the battle for the Qalamoun area and defeat the opposition forces there, after the Lebanese army's failure to do this and release its [ISIS-Nusra held] captive soldiers, as he put it. But he did not specify any date for this battle; dismissing rumors that Iran has abandoned Syria as 'nonsense,' and adding that the loss of Jisr ash-Shughour is 'just one round that does not mean that the Syrian army has lost the war.'

Sayyid Nasrallah's commitment to stand by his Syrian ally is beyond doubt. Reconfirming this commitment goes without saying. This is because the fall of the Syrian regime would represent an enormous blow to the Lebanese resistance. Hizbollah intervened in force in the Qusair battle [in 2013] and decided it in the regime's favor; and it is not unlikely to intervene again and again in other battles in the foreseeable future. This is because it is defending its own existence and future at the same time.

But the most important stance in our view is that of the Iranian leadership and what it can offer its Syrian ally in confronting the current political and military assault on it. For it has not announced any significant position in this regard despite the Syrian defense minister's visit to Tehran last week to ask for aid, and despite the many rumors that that it has abandoned its ally in Damascus because of its nuclear agreement with the U.S. and the growing burdens placed on its shoulders by the Syrian war; shoulders that are already burdened by many weights and commitments.

The Iranian leadership's silence, and its few words regarding greater support for Syria, is explained by some as due to its commitment to a strategy of not angering the U.S. or taking any step that would undermine the nuclear agreement with it that will be signed by the end of June. But some two months separate us from that date, and any new victory for the Syrian opposition on the ground – which is not unlikely in light of the vast financial and political support it is receiving from the Saudi/Turkish/Qatari tripartite coalition that is also backed by the U.S. – could intensify the despair among the regime's supporters and armed forces, according to neutral analysts.

The most dangerous thing that the regime in Damascus may face is the spread of the spirit of despondency and despair that President Bashar al-Assad spoke of in his statements yesterday, and the intensive campaign of rumors that is being promoted and that has achieved some success in this regard. Therefore, it is not unlikely that Syria will witness military moves in the coming days that aims to overturn the equations on the battlefronts, primarily from Hizbollah.

"And the party is the most able to achieve this simultaneously difficult and dangerous mission, which is why the imminent Qalamoun battle may be the true test in this regard," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-The worst is to come

 

A survey of the current state of the region suggests that this summer will witness a serious escalation on all the major fronts, says 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

A survey of the situation in the region – from Syria to Iraq to Yemen to Lebanon to Palestine to Libya – clearly indicates that the coming summer will be one in which these various crises will witness a major escalation, possibly leading to direct confrontations between the leading regional players, predicts a leading Jordanian commentator.

 

NO WAY TO A SOLUTION: "None of the region's simultaneous and parallel crises appears to be on its way to either a political solution or a decisive military victory,” writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This means that the entire region is waiting for another hot summer.

Only the Iranian nuclear program crisis may find its way to a solution and a settlement, but without leaving any likely immediate and direct impact on the rest of the region's crises.

Syria, the mother of all these crises, is almost back at square one. On the ground, the 'discourse of decisive victory' has been revived to replace the discourse of compromise. The opposition and its supports are is a state of ecstasy as a result of their victories in the south and the northwest. Ferocious battles are imminent in Sahl al-Ghab, the Qalamoun, the Eastern Ghouta, and up to the northwest.

On the political front, talk of 'toppling Assad' has resumed in an unprecedented manner as a precondition for a solution and as the aim of any settlement, after a period in which it was withdrawn from circulation in favor of official and semi-official statements to the effect that 'Assad is part of the solution.' And it is certain that Operation Decisive Storm’s impact on Syria will be enormous, as evident from the statement issued by the Gulf consultative summit [demanding Assad’s departure].

Iraq is haunted by the specter of partition. U.S. VP Joe Biden's [alleged partition] plan dominates the political climate in which the various Iraqi officials and constituents breathe. Kurdistan Province President Barzani is in Washington in an attempt to make use of the moment and campaign in favor of an independent Kurdish state. The Sunni Arabs are facing a crisis of identity, representation, and leadership. They have found in Congress's discussions [about directly arming Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds] elements that have tickled their fancy; after all, partitioning Iraq is no longer the worst scenario for a large sector of them.

None of the plans and schemes discussed for restoring balance to the political process and the Iraqi political regime has made any progress. Meanwhile, the government forces and their allied Shiite militias and Sunni clans are facing major difficulties in restraining ISIS's momentum and stopping its expansion. All indications in the Iraqi situation lead to the conclusion that the country's summer will be hot, not only because of ‘climate change’, but also because of the fierce battles we will witness on all fronts of the confrontation with ISIS.

Which takes us to Yemen six weeks after Operation Decisive Storm and the daily killing machine that does not stop, and the Saudi air force that pours its fire on installations, infrastructure, airports, state institutions, army positions, and the Houthis' centers. The humanitarian crisis has peaked in a country that was already partially suffering from such a crisis even before the war. The tragedy has reached its most dramatic heights with the unprecedented ground, naval, and air siege imposed on the country.

There is no prospect of a political solution based on UNSCR 2216, or in accordance with [fugitive] President Hadi's call for a dialogue in Riyadh on May 17th. The common assessment is that the war in and on Yemen will continue for a long time to come, perhaps in the hope of establishing 'safe zones' or partitioning the country based on the principle that 'if you cannot have everything, this does not mean you should leave it all'; a principle that seems to be guiding the coalition states actions.

For its part, Lebanon, is most likely to enter its second year without a president to the pace of itinerant security crises and the sword of dangers and threats hanging over its sons and daughters' heads, whether because of the [jihadist] sleeper cells that the security agencies continue to discover, or because of the threat along its borders, or because of the deeper and more dangerous internal split that seems to need no more than a lit match for the fire of confessional, sectarian, and political confrontations to be unleashed. If this small country has escaped relatively unscathed so far thanks to the regional and international 'safety net' it enjoys, this is not certain to remain the case. This is especially likely if the crisis worsens, and if the conflict reaches the point of no-return or the moment of breaking bones.

On the Palestinian track, the picture is not that different. Israeli PM Netanyahu is trying to weave the fabric of a government that consists of the extreme religious and nationalist right, and is doing so in a manner that shuts the door tight in the face of any chance of realizing a 'two-state' solution. The reticent initiatives now circulating in the UN's hallways are merely means of sowing dust in eyes that are already sore thanks to the raging regional conflicts.

As for the inter-Palestinian reconciliation file, it is moving to the tempo of the regional wars between sects and axes. Fateh does not wish to lose the Egyptian card, and it is certainly disturbed by Riyadh’s decision to join the reconciliation fray, perhaps via the Hamas gateway. And Hamas, which has suddenly woken up to the urgency of reconciliation, wants to use it to emerge from the cocoon of isolation and pave a path that circumvents Cairo, so as to return (together with its mother organization [the Muslim Brotherhood]) back to the lap of Sunni Arab sponsorship. It is seeking this, even if it requires a long-term truce [with Israel], the suspension of the resistance project, and the establishment of a [Hamas-run] state with provisional borders in the Gaza Strip.

We will not say much about Libya. The number of victims in the Mediterranean's waters is enough to convey an idea of the situation in this country. The statements by the UN envoy to Libya brim with pessimism regarding the prospects of reaching a solution. A quick survey of the names and affiliations of the forces fighting it out suggests that the country has bid farewell to stability, development, unity, independence, and sovereignty until further notice, and that the sparks from its exacerbating crises will continue to fly to neighboring and far away countries, also until further notice.

It is not only the proxy wars and the growing role of non-state players that threatens the region. The area as a whole is moving closer to direct regional conflict. Iran ceaselessly mobilizes its Revolutionary Guard and its Iranian volunteers on more than one front. Saudi Arabia has turned the leaf on hesitation and reserve, and has directly entered the labyrinths of the Yemeni conflict. A direct regional confrontation can no longer be ruled out, as it was only a few weeks ago.

All of this proceeds amidst unprecedented Western enthusiasm for militarization and encouraging arms races, concluding deals worth billions of dollars with many [Arab Gulf] states on the grounds that this is the most efficient means of re-cycling petro-dollars and retrieving them from the oil-producing countries so as to be invested in the banks of the arms-exporting countries.

"So, a scorching hot summer awaits us. So, the most difficult days are still ahead of us. May God help us!" concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Duck

 

The big news of the day is, of course, that Binyamin Netanyahu has managed to put together a coalition of 61 Knesset members, which will be sworn in next week. By then, Netanyahu will tell Likud MKs who will be a minister and who will not – although Moshe Ya'alon is expected to carry on as defense minister.

After weeks of negotiations, the prime minister put the final piece of his coalition puzzle together with just two hours to go before the deadline expired. He was made to sweat for the last few hours by Habayit Hayehudi – and it's Naftali Bennett's party that is the subject of most of the headlines and analyses in the Thursday editions.

Although Israel Hayom leads with a banner headline proclaiming the arrival of 'The fourth Netanyahu government,' it goes on to report that the big winner of the recent horse-trading was Habayit Hayehudi, since it has managed to grab the Justice Ministry for Ayelet Shaked and the education portfolio for Bennett. As most commentators point out, for a party with just eight seats in the Knesset, these are two very senior ministries. Bennett and Shaked will both be members of the inner security cabinet. The Jerusalem Post, Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth also lead with Netanyahu's last-minute success in cobbling together a coalition and they all manage to refrain from editorializing in their lead headlines.

Opposition leader Isaac Herzog (Zionist Union) reacted to the news on Thursday, reiterating that his party went to the opposition as promised from the beginning. 'We don't have to say it every minute on every street corner. I don't have an intention nor did I have to be a fifth wheel of Netanyahu. I intend to replace Netanyahu,' he said. Herzog went on to say that, 'This morning the countdown to building a government ended and now begins the countdown to its toppling.' He rejected suggestions that he will take the role of foreign minister: 'I won't be Netanyahu's corkscrew and I won't be used as a fifth wheel.'

Herzog's partner in the Zionist Union, Tzipi Livni, made similar comments in an interview on Army Radio on Thursday morning, accusing Netanyahu of 'capitulating' to his coalition partners. 'The main problem is the nature of this government,' Livni asserted. 'The distribution of funds to sectors and not to the Israeli people as a whole, looking not at the state of Israel, rather at survival, and basically buying the votes of so-called natural partners who can support him and ensure he stays in the job. It's just moving backward.' When asked if there was a possibility Zionist Union would join Netanyahu's coalition, Livni flat out stated her party was headed for the opposition.

Nonetheless, Netanyahu's top media advisor, Nir Heifetz, said Thursday that the prime minister has not yet chosen a foreign minister because he is holding the position for Herzog.  'Netanyahu wants to continue running the government, and after he succeeded in building a coalition, he will want to expand it. He knows the opposition. He is keeping the foreign ministry for Herzog, should things work out,' said Heifetz.

There have even been reports that Netanyahu would agree to let Herzog serve as prime minister for the last 18 months of the government, in a power-sharing deal, in exchange for joining the government now. Heifetz criticized former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for betraying the choices of the voters during his tenure.

According to AFP, meanwhile, reactions to the new Israeli government from Ramallah have been predictably acerbic. According to senior Palestinian official Saeb Erekat, the new Israeli government 'will be one of war, which will be against peace and stability in our region.' Erekat added that the right-leaning government will 'set its sights' primarily on settlement expansion in the West Bank – land the Palestinians want for a future state along with the Gaza Strip.

In other news, Haaretz reports that Israeli defense officials believe that the cell that intended to place an explosive charge on the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights 10 days ago was operated by Samir Kuntar, who was working on instructions from Iran. The incident, in which four militants were killed, took place less than 48 hours after an air strike attributed to Israel had destroyed weapons that were supposed to be handed over to Hizbollah.

Despite the proximity of the events, Israel believes that Iran had operated the cell, rather than Hizbollah. Israel also believes that the air strike in April was not connected to the attempt to plant explosives on the Israel-Syria border. Israeli officials believe the cell’s activity near the border fence could be part of Kuntar’s attempt to reinstate the network he had set up in the Golan Heights.

 

DUCK: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit comments on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's new coalition, which he says will find it close to impossible to implement any reforms and – unless the Zionist Union joins – will not survive very long.

"Avigdor Lieberman's revenge was meticulously planned and perfectly executed. Lieberman is one of a small number of people who know from personal experience the significance of a Netanyahu government in which Naftali Bennett is a senior minister and Ayelet Shaked is not only justice minister but also a member of the security cabinet.

Lieberman knew precisely what Netanyahu has been going through over the past couple of days and he knows exactly what the prime minister will be going through in the next couple of weeks. Until three days ago, Netanyahu was working on a cunning plan to keep Shaked out of his government. Now he's stuck with her – like a thorn in his side. Not only is she going to be a member of his inner cabinet, she's going to hold one of the key ministerial positions that are vital for perpetuating his role – the minister responsible for appointing Israel's next attorney general.

Netanyahu would much prefer for Raviv Drucker to become justice minister; anybody apart from Shaked, who was driven out of his bureau several years ago by the prime minister's wife but who then made a spectacular comeback. It's not too early to start complaining about the new cabinet, even if it will only be convened a handful of times. Netanyahu is starting to feel a sense of longing for the good old days of Yair Lapid.

Having said all that, I do have a good word to say about Shaked. Of all the heroes of the right, she is the only one who agreed to take on such a dangerous ministry. Over the past several weeks, almost everyone whose name was linked to the position has refused to be even considered as a candidate. Statistics don't lie and MKs from the Likud and other parties can reel off the names of all those who almost became justice minister only to get cold feet at the last minute. Shaked was warned about the dangers of allowing herself to be handed this poisoned chalice and she is well aware of the bitter battle that she will have to wage as justice minister – yet she was still happy to accept it.

Despite some commentators' panic, I do not think that Shaked will be a disaster as justice minister. True, she is a keen ideological rightist, but she's not crazy and she's not corrupt; she has a head on her shoulders and a keen mind. The legal system needs a good shake up – as the latest corruption scandal involving a former top prosecutor and a leading attorney proves – and we can rely on Moshe Kahlon to protect the Supreme Court from Habayit Hayehudi's interference. So let's all just calm down a little.

Netanyahu entered into these coalition negotiations as the big winner and came out as a little loser. He made every mistake in the book. Netanyahu was drunk on the election result, which was a total surprise to everyone – himself included – and he forgot that after Election Day comes the day after Election Day. He has sold off almost all of his assets at a ridiculously low price and he's about to launch a fragile, divided, conflicted coalition with a paper-thin majority. His survivability is minimal and his ability to push through reforms even lower.

His own Likud party, meanwhile, is hugely frustrated by everything that has happened since March 17. Within the ruling party there were some who joked yesterday that Israel should be eternally grateful to the Lord Almighty that Netanyahu is not negotiating with the Palestinians. If he were, they quipped, the Palestinians would just have to ask for Jerusalem and Netanyahu would give it to them.

All that is left for Netanyahu to do is to hope and pray that Isaac Herzog will change his mind and that, in a few weeks from now, he will agree to bring the Zionist Union into the coalition. In order for that to happen, Netanyahu will have to offer him a power-sharing agreement, in which Herzog takes over as prime minister for half of the term. Until that happens; Netanyahu's government looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck. Even our prime minister has to agree – his new government is a duck."

Ends…

 

GAZAN INTERESTS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Giora Eiland argues that, since Israel's only interest in Gaza is security-related, it makes no sense to block the rebuilding process there.

"There are several reasons for a growing sense of concern in the Israeli defense establishment that another military conflict in the south of the country is imminent: the rocket that was fired from the Gaza Strip at Israel on Independence Day, the reports that Hamas is working overtime to rebuild its tunnels and the general sense of disquiet among the people of Gaza. So what should Israel do? The answer, as always, must be based on a clear and precise definition of national interest.

When it comes to Gaza, Israel's only interest is security-related and is two-pronged: maintaining the quiet for as long as possible and reducing Hamas' stockpile of weapons and missiles. Israel has no other interest when it comes to Gaza – not territorial, not political and not economic. There are three possible ways of promoting our national interest. The first is to reach some kind of long-term arrangement with the Palestinian Authority, which would also resolve the Gaza issue. Secondly, Israel can continue to put economic pressure on the Gaza Strip, until such time as the Hamas regime is overthrown. And thirdly, Israel can bolster its common interests with Hamas, thereby preventing any further outbreak of violence. Only the third of these options is in any way realistic.

But how can it be done? The ceasefire agreement that was reached after Operation Protective Edge determined that, within a month, the second stage would begin and that an Egypt-led panel would start to rebuild Gaza. It has been eight months since then and there is no panel and very little chance of one being set up. The reason is simple: the two parties which are supposed to spearhead the rebuilding effort – the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – have no interest in seeing Gaza rebuilt. Moreover, they are indifferent to the possibility that there will be another round of fighting between Israel and Hamas. We find ourselves in the strange situation where Israel and Hamas have common interests, while, on the other side, there is a coalition of forces (including Egypt and the Palestinian Authority) which do not really care about the suffering of the people of Gaza and wouldn't be too worried if the suffering and the frustration explode into violence.

The insistence of Israel and the rest of the international community that only the Palestinian Authority be given the resources to rebuild Gaza is a terrible mistake. Under these circumstances, it's up to Israel to spearhead an international effort to rebuild the beleaguered Strip. The resources must be given to the only effective government in Gaza – which just happens to be the Hamas government. Since our interest in Gaza is purely security-related, Israel can afford to be generous on every other front, including the establishment of a seaport in Gaza; in exchange, we can demand a powerful international regime of inspections that will prevent these resources from being misused or misappropriated. Absurdly, since there is no agreed-up international apparatus to oversee the process, the cement that Israel sends to Gaza is easily repurposed for building tunnels.

If there is another war between Israel and Gaza this summer, some will say that it is a result of Israel's failure to create an effective deterrence. The truth, however, is that there is effective deterrence, but that's not enough. We will only be able to avert another war if we use the carrot and the stick: the stick of deterrence and the carrot of economic and political incentives. Those who oppose this approach argue that rebuilding Gaza will only bolster political support for Hamas. That might be true, but what's wrong with it?

By insisting on expanding Israel's interests in Gaza to the political sphere and by defining our political goals to include bolstering Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas' standing there, we are endangering our one true interest: preventing a war."

Ends…

 

THE PUBLIC GETS WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber says that the people of Israel got what they wanted and deserved – a right-wing government that will find it almost impossible to function properly.

"On March 17, when Israelis went to the polls, a significant proportion of them voted for right-wing parties, so that they would get a right-wing government. That is what the people wanted and that is what the people got. In the next few days, a right-wing government with the slenderest of majorities in the Knesset will be installed.

By saying that 'the people got what they wanted' I am in no way being condescending. It's a fact, even if it is disappointing to many – including the sizeable number of people who believe that what Israel needs now more than anything is a unity government, which would be best able to deal with the political, diplomatic and security challenges that we will be facing in the near future.

A government of 61 Knesset members is a living hell for members of the coalition, especially whoever ends up being named coalition whip. Whoever gets that thankless task will have to ensure that all 61 members of the coalition vote with the government, otherwise no laws will be passed and no reforms will be pushed through. With such a paper-thin majority, every minister and every parliamentarian will have to be present in the Knesset almost around the clock. There will be no agreements between the opposition and the coalition over vote-swapping. Any time a minister wants to travel overseas, he or she will have to take a member of the opposition along, to ensure that the balance of power in the Knesset remains in the government's favor. Ministers will barely be able to take a bathroom break, because the opposition – which has promised to make life as hard as possible for the government – will be keeping a close watch on all 61 members of the coalition, just waiting for an opportunity to defeat it in a vote. The coalition whip will have to be something of an acrobat, a magician and a juggler in order to ensure that the government always has a majority in the Knesset.

These are just the trivial problems facing Netanyahu's new government. The unmistakably right-wing government that will be sworn in next week will have to fight a diplomatic war against almost the entire world – and it may also have to fight a real war against Hamas in the south, Hizbollah in the north and Islamic terrorist organizations that will try to set the Golan Heights alight. This kind of government will spend long hours debating the best way to resolve Israel's security, economic and social problems. With such a slender majority, it will be almost impossible to live anything like a normal life in Israel in the next few months.

Things may turn out very differently, of course. I hope and pray that they will. But that's what the people wanted and that's what the people got. And it serves them right."

Ends…

 

LONG, HOT SUMMER: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem comments on recent developments in the Syrian Civil War and how this is being influenced by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

"There have been two important statements about Syria this week, both of which reflect the character of the struggle to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and how this is linked to the crisis in Yemen.

The first statesmen – as reported by Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar – came from Hizbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who told General Michel Aoun (the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and a former Lebanese prime minister) that Assad and his regime cannot fall, as it would also mean the fall of Hizbollah and the so-called axis of resistance. The second statement was made yesterday by Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid Al Attiyah, who announced that Syrian opposition factions would hold a conference in Riyadh to discuss their plans for the day after the fall of the Assad regime.

In addition to these two statements, there has also been a wave of rumors about the precarious situation of the Alawite minority in Syria (as well as the Assad family itself and their cronies). These rumors, it seems are part of the psychological war that the rebel forces are waging against the regime.

The Syrian Civil War is getting worse – if that's even possible – and the facts speak for themselves. The Idlib region in the north of the country has fallen into the hands of rebels affiliated to al-Qa’ida and the strategically important town of Jisr al-Shughour has also been captured, granting rebel forces complete control of the road leading to Latakia.

In southern Syria, too, there have been intense battles near Daraa between the Syrian army and rebels; as a result, the rebels have taken control of the Nasib border crossing between Syria and Jordan. The rebels hope to reach Damascus and to capture it quickly; they claim that they can do so within a few weeks. Despite their successes, however, the rebels have not managed to defeat the Assad regime. They continue to fight in several provinces simultaneously, in an effort to break through and take Damascus.

Now the fighting is focusing on the Qalamoun area – a mountain range on the border between Syria and Lebanon. The fighting there will be intense. Nasrallah promised that he would 'take care' of the situation there, but he did not specify how or when.

The rebels' recent successes stem, in part, from the fact that they managed to forge a unified coalition with a shared operations room. This coalition, which goes by the name Jaish al-Fateh, includes several rebel groups and has managed to arm itself with advanced antitank missiles. Jaish al-Fateh enjoys military and financial support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and the changes that have been happening in Syria are directly linked to the situation in Yemen. The protagonists in both cases are the same protagonists.

King Abdullah, the Saudi monarch who passed away three months ago, decided as far back as 2011 to back the Syrian rebels, but internal differences and power struggles between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey on the other hand, prevented him from providing the rebels with material support. As a result, Iran and ISIS increased their influence.

When King Salman took over on the death of his brother, the situation changed; he decided to launch a military operation in Yemen, with the support of his Sunni coalition partners, and he decided to become heavily involved in events in Syria, with the stated goal of overthrowing the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia's new strategy, therefore, is to try and put pressure on Iran by escalating the war in Syria. The success of the rebel forces in Syria will go some way to mitigate the failure of the operation against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Earlier this week, at a consultation meeting with leaders of the Gulf States, Salman said that 'Bashar al-Assad will have no role to play in the future of Syria.' That is why he also decided to allow the Syrian opposition forces to hold a conference in Riyadh; thus far, such gatherings have always been held in Doha or Istanbul.

The comment by Nasrallah encapsulates Iran's policy regarding Syria. For Iran, keeping Assad in power will allow Tehran to continue controlling Syria. That is why it will do whatever it takes to keep him in power. The fall of the Assad regime would increase the power and influence of jihadist groups and would intensify the battle between Shiites and Sunnis. Iran will not allow this to happen.

Tehran, however, will only take off its gloves once it has signed the final nuclear agreement with the world powers and once sanctions have been lifted. Once that happens, it will use the full force of its military in Syria, in order to save the Assad regime. Until then, Iran has no intention of sitting quietly on the sidelines; its immediate reaction to recent developments will be to intensify the fighting on the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border. There have already been attacks by Houthi rebels along that border and they are expected to intensify in the coming days and weeks. The next few months will be critical for the survival of the Assad regime and the coming summer promises to be very hot indeed."

Ends…

 

THE LAST LAUGH: Writing in Haaretz, Yossi Verter says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has finally managed to put together his fourth government – by bleeding out most of his party's ministerial assets.

"The fourth Netanyahu government was put together with blood, sweat, and tears – Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s and Likud’s.

The last twist in the plot, as if devised by some brilliant scriptwriter, came when the former secretary, an abomination in the eyes of the prime minister and his wife but who became a senior member of the sister party, is suddenly catapulted to the position of justice minister and full member of the security cabinet. Now we must wait for coming episodes of the new season – because there will be a sequel, and it, too, will be bloody.

Much will yet be written about these negotiations that ran until the last minute and left Likud without most of its ministerial assets. Meanwhile, the common assumption is that Netanyahu will seek to expand the government right after the 2015-16 budget is approved at the end of summer.

According to political sources, secret meetings have been taking place all along between members of Likud and the Zionist Union who support a unity government. According to these sources, Zionist Union has set a number of conditions for joining the government. They include resuming negotiations with the Palestinians; removing Habayit Hayehudi from the coalition; creating an agreed-upon mechanism for 'joint leadership' between Netanyahu and Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog; and a partial rotation of the premiership. Herzog vehemently denies that there have been messages of this type conveyed to Likud, but acknowledges that efforts are being made by various emissaries representing only themselves.

Another possibility that cannot be discounted, since around here anything’s possible, is that Netanyahu will prefer to approach Yesh Atid, with its 11 MKs, whose price for joining would be far lower. He would have to give Yesh Atid only three ministries, foremost among them the Foreign Ministry for its chairman, Yair Lapid. Political observers believe that United Torah Judaism won’t veto Lapid so long as all its coalition wishes are fulfilled. The question is whether Lapid is prepared to commit political and electoral suicide to become foreign minister.

If we’re already dealing with scripts, one cannot ignore the revenge motif that has characterized the process of setting up the State of Israel’s 34th government. Readers can decide whose revenge was sweeter – Yisrael Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman’s on Netanyahu, or Habayit Hayehudi chairman Naftali Bennett’s on Netanyahu. The former walked out at the 119th minute, leaving the prime minister quivering and totally exposed to pressure and extortion. The second pounced on the opportunity and turned the tables; now the man who until a few days ago was condemned to be the rejected stepchild is now dancing on the table, shoulder to shoulder with Ayelet Shaked.

One cannot ignore the irony – most of this government’s senior portfolios will be held by Likudniks who abandoned ship and succeeded. Moshe Kahlon will be finance minister, Bennett education minister and Shaked, who three years ago almost ran in the Likud primaries, justice minister. The veteran Likud members, who all remained loyal despite the scars on their backs from the Bibi-Sara experience, will have to make do with the leftovers."

Ends…

 

SURVIVAL: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler says that, in order for his government to survive, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu must broaden it.

"Following weeks of unedifying horse trading, threats and extortions, compounded by personal malice, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has finally cobbled together an untenable coalition with only a single-seat majority -- which any single Knesset member in the coalition could bring down. To survive, it must be broadened.

Most Israelis are disappointed that a national unity government could not be formed at a time when we are faced with daunting political and diplomatic challenges, in particular further major tensions with the Obama administration. Yet, there is still considerable speculation that, despite public protestations to the contrary, both Netanyahu and Isaac Herzog would prefer to create a unity government and that at a later stage, the coalition will be expanded to incorporate the Zionist Union or as a last resort, even Yesh Atid.

Excoriating Netanyahu for capitulating to unreasonable demands from minority parties that run counter to the will of the people is fine for populist armchair critics. But the responsibility rests with our dysfunctional political system and those voters who supported the small parties. Were Herzog in Netanyahu’s shoes, he would have behaved in exactly the same manner. To form a government, Netanyahu was forced to forfeit the best available candidates for ministerial positions and even appoint utterly unsuitable ministers. In addition, he was obliged to submit to demands of small one-dimensional parties -- adopting policies that Likud and the vast majority of Israelis strongly oppose.

Ironically, despite restricting Netanyahu to a hairline majority, the calculated decision of Avigdor Lieberman to undermine Netanyahu and join the opposition will delight most Israelis. Lieberman was the antithesis of what Israel required for the role of foreign minister. Cynically claiming to be motivated by ideological principles was pathetic for Lieberman, who is notorious for his political zigzagging. Besides, aside from having a penchant for coarse statements that may appeal to his constituency but alienate the rest of world -- such as his call for disloyal Arab Israelis to be 'beheaded' and the public condemnation of his government during the Gaza war -- Lieberman was probably Israel’s least successful foreign minister.

Naftali Bennett and Habayit Hayehudi were treated shabbily by Netanyahu, who capitulated to Shas at their expense. Nevertheless, had he agreed to Bennett’s demand to become foreign minister, this also would have been disastrous. Bennett is articulate and charismatic but he is repeatedly on record vowing that he would never contemplate a Palestinian state and favors annexation of the territories, which would have provided Obama with all the ammunition required to orchestrate a massive global anti-Israel campaign.

That he initially spurned the offer of the Education Ministry was regrettable. Education should be the paramount concern of Habayit Hayehudi. Bennett has a vision of Israel and Jewish values beyond the religious arena and understands how to reintroduce Jewish values into the secular education stream without religious coercion. The courage he displayed in his previous political forays suggests that he could be an outstanding education minister and achieve major reforms in the system.

The last-minute appointment of Ayelet Shaked to the Justice Ministry was Bennett’s payback for Habayit Hayehudi’s shabby treatment. Although she has no legal background, Shaked is extremely competent and, aside from creating tensions by seeking to reduce the excessive power of the High Court, she will hopefully curtail the control over the rabbinate sought by Shas.

There is considerable disgust with the negative moral implications of appointing Shas leader Aryeh Deri, a convicted felon, as a minister. Fortunately, public outrage and petitions precluded him from obtaining the Interior Ministry which he coveted and had controlled when he was indicted. But it still shames us that such a person could be appointed as religious services minister as well as economy minister.

With such a razor-thin majority, another major disadvantage of the government is that innovation will be severely limited and constructive policies can be vetoed not merely by the absence of the unanimous support of all the small parties but by any individual government Knesset member. As in the past, an absence of cabinet responsibility and Netanyahu’s inability to impose discipline should his ministers act as rulers of independent fiefdoms and maintain their practice of publicly criticizing their own government will likely continue.

In the coming months we will face enormous pressures. Not merely from the Europeans but from the U.S. administration. Once Obama is no longer directing all his efforts towards consummating an agreement with Iran, effectively transforming it into a threshold nuclear power, he is likely to revert to Israel. All indicators suggest that he intends to implement his threat that if Israel fails to toe his line, the U.S. would no longer employ its veto at the United Nations.

His clearly stated policy is that Israel’s borders should be based on the (indefensible) 1949 armistice lines with mutual swaps (which could never be achieved with the intransigent Palestinians), division of Jerusalem, and an indefinite freeze of all settlement construction which, in this context, includes settlement blocs and Jewish east Jerusalem.

Needless to say, Israel will not be able to make such concessions and will need to display a united front in order to ensure that American public opinion and the U.S. Congress will inhibit negative Obama initiatives. Much will depend on the opposition. The Zionist Union has acted commendably since the election in relation to the Iranian issue. Hopefully, it will continue to avoid demagoguery and populism and endorse government policies affecting our national interest.

Indeed, most Israelis hope that even if it leads to the defection of a few of its far left extremist back benchers, the Zionist Union will ultimately become partners in a national unity government that should urgently bring about highly overdue electoral reforms to prevent a repetition of the current intolerable situation."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: Fuat Keyman reveals the root of the ruling party’s approach in centre-left Radikal: "We are getting closer to the [June 7th] elections. As they approach, the parties are using harsher terms in criticizing each other. There is no doubt that this will be the most crucial election of recent years. The AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] is not facing these elections with its usual degree of comfort. The great uncertainty about the results is causing it severe discomfort. The AKP will continue to rule Turkey; this is still a strong possibility, but exactly how strong remains unclear for now. That is why keeping the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] from passing the 10% electoral threshold forms the basis of the AKP’s election strategy.”

Mehmet Tezkan depicts a deeply concerned president in centrist Milliyet: "The president [Erdogan] switched tack on Sunday; he shifted gear. He bombarded the opposition leaders. He began establishing a basis for entering a polemic with them. In his heart, he was not pleased by AKP’s progress. He was not satisfied with PM Ahmet Davutoglu's performance. The opinion polls he sees are not pleasing. Sensing that the situation is not good, and that the ruling party has begun to slide down hill, he felt that he had to take charge."

Cuneyt Arcayurek sees no limit to the president’s ambitions in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "President Erdogan is not imprisoned by the fear of losing power or all these opportunities alone. If the remedy to every problem lies in the Qur’an, then let us know which verse tells us how we are going to resolve the problem of a presidential system. This man [Erdogan] is neither secular, nor a democrat. There is nothing he will not do to satisfy his desires."

Ibrahim Kiras argues that the opposition has chosen a non-ideological approach in centrist Vatan: "The common point between the various opposition parties' election manifestos is the economy. They seem to have given up their former efforts to win the people’s support by pursuing an ideologically driven agenda. This is because the AKP’s 13 years in power allow it to resist ideological attacks thanks to the support it has received from society because of its economy-based performance, and it has always been the winning side in any ideological-based fight due to its centre-right party identity."

Oya Baydar assails the president for violating the constitution in independent Internet T24: "President Erdogan is violating the most basic principles of the constitution every day and at every moment. And, fearlessly, he relies on having been elected by the 52 per cent of the people to legitimize this violation. Everyone knows that even being elected with 100 per cent would not legitimize the violation of the constitution."

Ibrahim Karagul detects a change in the opposition’s discourse in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Is anyone paying attention to the discourse that [HDP leader] Selahattin Demirtas has been using in his election campaign? Are they aware of the shift from ethnic nationalism to settling accounts with Islam? He forgot the fight for Kurdish language rights, and launched a war against 'religion' instead. Such a rapid transition from a political discourse based on 'language' to one based on 'opposition to religion' is quite surprising even in a country such as Turkey where the political battle fronts are very harsh."

Kurtulus Tayiz charges the HDP with planning violence in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Without waiting for the elections’ results, we have begun to discuss the HDP's ‘Plan B’ should it fail to pass the election threshold. Demirtas must believe that his party will not pass the threshold since he is already talking about his post-election plans rather than his election plans. What is being described as 'Plan B' is no more than an open threat; if the HDP does not enter parliament, it will activate the Kurdish streets. Unfortunately, the HDP's axis rapidly shifted even before the elections; the Kurdish movement has left the democracy path. Moving closer to the CHP [main opposition Republican People' Party] and the Gulen movement, they moved away from the peace process and democracy."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is downhearted: "As time passes, the problems and obstacles in the nuclear talks do not seem to have been resolved; rather they have increased. On the eve of an agreement, new problems posed by the U.S., UK and France have appeared. With new difficulties in various fields; the new challenges in the negotiations have created serious problems for reaching an agreement." 

 

GCC/FRANCE: Conservative Khorasan berates the French: "French President Francois Hollande's attendance of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council’s summit continues the opportunistic path of his country and that of some Arabs. The socialist government of France is involved in commercial activity in the region. In return for its political support of Arab requests, the French government sells weapons and enjoys Arab investment in France. This policy has reduced France from a natural player with diplomatic status to a trivial trader. This policy will lead France to lose its credit in the region."

 

IRAN-SAUDI RELATIONS: Reformist Sharq laments a lost opportunity: "If Ayatollah Hashemi-Rafsanjani as head of Iran's Expediency Council had paid a political visit to Saudi Arabia to lead the two countries out of the dark political atmosphere to a brighter future, the American anti-Iranian front would not have emerged and the Saudi order of succession would probably not have been reshuffled. The effects of this lost opportunity will be felt more in the future." 

 

SAUDI ROLE IN THE REGION: Reformist E'temad opines: "The weakening of Iraq, Egypt and Syria and, to some extent, the withdrawal of American forces from the region has led Saudi Arabia to abandon its conservative and supportive role in the region and seek to play an active and aggressive part. Saudi Arabia has started its aggression from Yemen, the weakest point in the region. The abandonment of the path that Saudi Arabia has chosen would be costly and will aggravate the power gap in the Arab world. The U.S. and its western allies might not accept such a gap. The absolute defeat of Saudi Arabia will be heavy and unacceptable and the consequences of failure would possibly impact Saudi domestic affairs." 

 

ISIS THREATS TO GERMANY: Conservative Resalat is puzzled by German inaction: "German authorities are anxious about Takfiri and Salafi manoeuvres in their country. German Security agencies have repeatedly voiced their anxiety in this regard over the past year. The unification of Takfiris and Salafis in Germany with ISIS has further strengthened these groups. Why have German officials remained silent about Salafi activities in their country and even supported them? Saudi Arabia has financially supported many of them. Currently, German authorities frequently warn over terrorist activities in their country; these warnings seem to have come a bit late!"

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- A scorching hot summer

2-Last chance in Geneva

3-Necessary but not sufficient

 

1- A scorching hot summer

 

We can confidently predict that we are on the threshold of a hot summer in the region, one that may be scorching hot in fact. Operation Decisive Storm may have run out of targets in Yemen and is beginning to yield negative results... We believe it is not unlikely for it to move now to Syria, albeit in other forms. The imminent battle of Qalamoun may be the first sign in this regard. The attrition in Yemen may be paralleled by attrition in Syria in the battle of endurance currently raging there. The question is this: Who will scream out in pain first? The Saudi leadership fully realizes that as it resorts to escalation in Syria, it has a short timeframe that does not exceed two months to achieve the most gains. This is because Iran's hands and feet will be shackled during these two months as it focuses on signing the nuclear agreement with the six major powers by the end of June at the latest. It does not wish to do anything that could jeopardise this agreement--'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

There is no doubting the fact that Decisive Storm and Restore Hope have repaired the situation in the region and altered the balance of power in the Arabs' favor. It is because Saudi Arabia – with the backing of its sister GCC states and its Arab Islamic brothers – has led these operations and restored the status of Arab action to the forefront of the political scene, that this summit enjoyed great international interest. This is especially relevant since these operations took place before the summit that will bring the U.S. president and the Gulf leaders together at Camp David on May 13th --Saudi al-Watan

 

The results of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consultative summit that was held in Riyadh yesterday (Tuesday) suggest that the region – especially Syria and Yemen – is on the threshold of a major escalation, warns the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab online daily. But it is not clear whether the GCC states can live with the consequences of the escalation they are pushing for. The Riyadh summit expressed the Gulf states' desire for good relations with Iran on condition that Tehran refrains from intervening in domestic Arab affairs and ends its backing for various terrorist militias, says the editorial in a Saudi daily. The summit also crowns the recent operations led by Saudi Arabia that have tilted the balance of power in the region in the Arabs' favor.

 

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS: "Three major developments cast their shadow, in one way or another, over the Gulf consultative summit held in Riyadh on Tuesday," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Wednesday’s pan-Arab online daily www.raialyoum.com.

This may have an impact on the three issues that headed the summit's agenda – the Syrian crisis, the Yemeni crisis, and Gulf/Iranian relations:

-- The first such development was the announcement by Houthi Ansarullah Politburo member Bakhiti that 'dialogue between the various political forces was going on in Sana'a till the [Saudi-led] aggression began; we demand to return to that dialogue and to the point at which it ended, but any other dialogue in Riyadh or elsewhere does not concern us.' This means that the Houthi current will not accept Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's invitation to take part in a dialogue in Riyadh on May 17th. Heading to Riyadh and taking part in that dialogue could be explained as raising the white flag and signing a document of surrender that admits defeat.

-- The second such development was the decision taken by the Education Department in the Saudi city of Najran near the borders with Yemen to suspend classes in all schools and halt all flights to the city's airports until further notice. This was because mortar shells fired by the Houthi Ansarullah from inside the Yemeni borders had fallen in the area. Operation Decisive Storm's spokesman, Brigadier-General Ahmad 'Asiri threatened that this action would not pass without response, suggesting Saudi plans for an even fiercer bombardment.

-- The third development was the Senegalese government's deployment of ground forces consisting of 2100 soldiers to 'defend' Saudi Arabia. This came after new Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir’s statements about ending Decisive Storm's air raids, and Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz’s announcement that a center for providing relief for the Yemenis has been established in Riyadh. No such relief work can be done while the air raids continue. Therefore, it is if as the Senegalese are 'going to perform the Hajj while everyone else is on their way back' [as the Arab saying goes].

When we say that all these developments are connected, what we mean is that it is impossible to separate the Syrian and the Yemeni files from each other because those involved in both are the same, and are fighting each other either directly or by proxy. But what may be gleaned from the Saudi monarch's inaugural speech at the GCC consultative summit is that the Gulf states and their allies have decided to escalate forcefully in Syria to compensate for any failures in the Yemeni file, and to intensify pressures on Iran in this regard.

The Saudi monarch was clear about this when he stressed in the abovementioned speech using a few carefully written words, that 'there will be no role for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Syria's future.' At his press conference, Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid Al Attiyah confirmed this escalatory path when he announced that a conference for the Syrian opposition would be held in Riyadh to 'draft a plan for administering the interim phase after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime.'

Escalation in Syria – including moving the Syrian opposition's conferences and meetings to Riyadh, the new and most important supporter of that opposition, after these conferences kept shifting between Doha and Istanbul throughout the past four years – may lead to counter-escalation in Yemen, specifically along the Saudi/Yemeni borders. This may have already begun, with the firing of mortar shells, and it is not unlikely to develop tomorrow or the day after into rocket fire that may stretch from Najran to Jizan, and perhaps to Abha, the capital of 'Assir Province. A senior Yemeni official I met in London by accident a few days ago confirmed this. According to him, the Houthis self-restraint may not last for long.

This escalation in the Syrian file – both at the political level (the planned opposition conference in Riyadh) and at the military level (the recent intensification of financial and armed support for the opposition) which led to the capture of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour in the north, and Bosra ash-Sham in the south, and French President Francois Hollande's attendance of the GCC's consultative summit as the first foreign leader to do so since the Council was formed in 1981, will together or separately influence the agenda of the planned Camp David summit called for by U.S. President Barack Obama on May 13th. They are intended as pre-emptive messages to the U.S. president.

To explain more, by inviting the French president as a dear friend, the GCC summit aimed to warn President Obama that it has already begun to search for alternatives to the U.S. as its main ally and source of armament. Therefore, it was no coincidence that following Egypt the UAE and Qatar, both bought French-made Rafale jet fighters in arms deals exceeding 20 billion dollars.

We can confidently predict that we are on the threshold of a hot summer in the region, one that may be scorching hot in fact. Operation Decisive Storm may have run out of targets in Yemen and is beginning to yield negative results because of the deteriorating humanitarian conditions, the destruction of the country's infrastructure, the closure of airports, the siege to seaports, and the collapse of health and other services. But we believe it is not unlikely for it to move now to Syria, albeit in other forms. The imminent battle of Qalamoun may be the first sign in this regard. The attrition in Yemen may be paralleled by attrition in Syria in the battle of endurance currently raging there. The question is this: Who will scream out in pain first?

The Saudi leadership fully realizes that as it resorts to escalation in Syria, it has a short timeframe that does not exceed two months to achieve the most gains. This is because Iran's hands and feet will be shackled during these two months as it focuses on signing the nuclear agreement with the six major powers by the end of June at the latest. It does not wish to do anything that could jeopardise this agreement.

The various files are now all mixed up together and their dossiers are interconnected. But the most significant development is that the Yemenis – and this may be true of the Syrians before them as well – have begun to grow accustomed to the bombardment, the noise of warplanes breaking the sound barrier, and the exploding missiles. Nothing surprises them anymore, and they also have nothing to lose anymore. This is similar to what happened to the Lebanese before them during their [1975-89] civil war, or to the people of the Gaza Strip who have had to live with Israeli naval, ground, and aerial bombardments for weeks if not years. This is despite the fact that we admit that there are numerous differences between these various cases.

The most pressing question here is whether the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, can bear the consequences, extensions, and outcomes of this war. In return for what? And to what end?

"We may find the answers to these questions from the developments of the coming weeks and months," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

RAPIDLY UNFOLDING EFFECTS: "The Gulf summit was held in Riyadh yesterday," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

This summit naturally addressed the most important regional issues and their rapidly unfolding effects on Arab security, from Yemen to Iraq to Syria to Libya to the occupied Palestinian lands.

The results of the summit have highlighted the GCC states’ close points of view on most issues. The GCC leaders praised Operation Decisive Storm and the legitimate aims for which it was launched in response to the request from our brothers in Yemen, the important results the operation has achieved paving the way for Operation Restore Hope with the aim of consolidating Yemeni legitimacy, and the resumption of the political process in accordance with the [2011] Gulf initiative, the Conclusions of the National Yemeni Dialogue, and the UN Security Council's resolutions. The GCC also praised Saudi Arabia's decision to establish a center on its territories meant to coordinate all the efforts to provide aid to the Yemeni people.

One of the most important items in the summit's final communiqué spoke of 'the GCC member states' concern for building balanced relations with Iran that contribute to consolidating the region's security and stability.' These relations should be based on respect for the principles of good neighborly relations as well as respect for the sovereignty of states, rebuilding trust in accordance with the principles of international law and the UN which ban any intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, and any threat or use of force.

This reference to the Gulf states' attitude towards Iran is a reflection of their desire to ensure security and stability in the region, giving priority to diplomatic solutions over any other solution to the political crises between the GCC states and the Iranian Republic. But as the GCC has stressed, this desire is coupled with clear preconditions that cannot be ignored. It is dependent on an Iranian initiative that transparently reflects the Islamic Republic's good intentions, and its commitment not to intervene in the domestic affairs of the region's states, ending its backing and financing of terrorist groups and militias in a number of Arab states, and refraining from the use and politicization of the confessional card.

There is no doubting the fact that Decisive Storm and Restore Hope have repaired the situation in the region and altered the balance of power in the Arabs' favor. It is because Saudi Arabia – with the backing of its sister GCC states and its Arab Islamic brothers – has led these operations and restored the status of Arab action to the forefront of the political scene, that this summit enjoyed great international interest.

"This is especially relevant since these operations took place before the summit that will bring the U.S. president and the Gulf leaders together at Camp David on May 13th," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-Last chance in Geneva

 

The current UN-sponsored talks in Geneva may be the last opportunity for a political solution to the Syrian crisis before extremism and the regime’s collapse make any deal impossible, says Amin Qammouriyyeh in today’s Lebanese an-Nahar  

 

The Geneva-3 Syria Conference may be the last opportunity for the country to end the war raging there, argues a Lebanese commentator. But this really depends on the various Syrian parties’ acceptance of each other as partners in the same country, and the acknowledgment on behalf of the foreign powers sponsoring the war in Syria of the need to save the country from total destruction.

 

INK ON PAPER: "The [June 2012] Geneva-1 Syria Conference concluded with a document that remained mere 'ink-on-paper," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The [January 2014] Geneva-2 Conference ended before it began. And the preludes to the [current UN- sponsored] 'Geneva Dialogue Workshop' do not suggest that a better outcome can be expected. For it seems to be a waste of time to try to change the Syrians' political mentality, regardless of their political and sectarian affiliations.

This time round, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the Coordination Committee, the Cairo Gathering and the other opposition groups are heading to the Swiss city armed with the battlefield advances achieved by their extremist counterparts in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour. Hoping that these 'victories' will roll towards Latakia and Damascus, these opposition groups have returned to singing their old tune: All power to the opposition, and Assad to his home or to trial!

On the other hand, the regime continues to live in denial. It pays no heed to the rapid regional developments that are now no longer in its interest. It views the developments in the field as no more than a storm in a teacup that will soon die down. And, as is its wont, it is wagering on the time factor in the hope that the violence of terrorism and extremism will once again open the doors of the Western and Arab capitals that are now shut in Damascus's face. And it implicitly wagers on the failure of the Arab coalition's 'storms' in Yemen in the hope that this will tilt the balance in its favor.

The SNC, the Coordination Committee, and other similar moderate opposition groups are officers without soldiers in the field. Their wager that the extremists loyal to al-Qa'ida and ISIS will march on the regime's strongholds recalls the wager of the Afghani 'mujahidin' on the extremists who paved the way for the Taliban's rule a short while after the fall of Najibullah in Kabul. That will certainly not be in the interests of the 'moderates' or the patriotic opposition or Syria, its people, and the entire region.

On the other hand, when it was at the peak of its military power, when its allies were surrounding it on all sides during the battle raging in Syria for the past four years, and when its enemies were all scattered, the regime was unable to keep half of Syria's area under its control. We may expect what the situation will be like in light of its successive military setbacks, and the unification of the military efforts of some of the hard-line opposition groups after the emergence of a military coalition that includes a number of states hostile to the regime and that is threatening to inflict a black fate upon it.

There is no doubt that the rapid collapse of the regime in the absence of a patriotic alternative and a regional and international coalition that embraces this alternative will be a disaster – not only for the minorities that have so far not been secure and safe under any opposition group, but also for Syria itself and its united social fabric.

For this reason, the battlefield and political balance that is a reality today may have made Geneva-3 the ideal moment and the last opportunity for saving Syria from the worst. But is there any genuine conviction among any of the Syrian parties that they should accept the other as partners?

"And, more importantly, do the foreign sponsors of the Syrian war truly seek the country’s salvation?" asks Qammouriyyeh in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-Necessary but not sufficient

 

International and regionally sponsored-moves to revive Fateh/Hamas reconciliation are welcome, but are not enough to create a new and effective Palestinian political presence, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The prospects for an inter-Palestinian Fateh/Hamas reconciliation will be radically influenced by the new Saudi leadership’s opening to Hamas as part of Riyadh’s policy shift towards the regional Qatari/Turkish/Brotherhood alliance, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. Egypt’s aversion to this alliance, however, may complicate such reconciliation against the background of a Palestinian situation already riddled with many ailments. Meantime, there may be renewed pressures to revive the ailing two-state solution whose demise would open the door to a new era of uncertainty in the region.

 

CARTER’S TOUR: “The new thing about former U.S. president Jimmy Carter’s tour of the region is his meeting with the Russian president who expressed his willingness to host an inter-Palestinian dialogue, and with the Saudi monarch who said he was ready to host a meeting between President Abu Mazin [Abbas] and [Hamas Politburo head] Khalid Mish’al, if such a meeting were to have any prospect of success,” writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Carter told King Salman that Mish’al was ready and prepared to push for the meeting’s success, provided that it was preceded by an inter-Palestinian factional meeting to discuss the details of implementing the [2012] Cairo Agreement based on the [2006] Prisoners’ Document.

One noteworthy aspect of Carter’s tour is that it did not include a visit to Egypt or a meeting with President Sissi, despite the fact that his tour was intended, as he said, to help end the Gaza siege, speed up [Gaza] reconstruction, achieve [Fateh/Hamas] reconciliation, and revive the efforts to achieve a two-state solution. This omission stems from the fact that Egypt is currently in no position to divert its attention away from its domestic situation, even though it welcomed ‘Carter’s initiative’ and wished it success.

For his part, Abu Mazin told Carter that there was no need for new dialogues and agreements, and that what was needed was to implement the agreements that have been already concluded, one step at a time, but speedily. The most important thing, he said, was to hold the presidential and legislative elections, after which a government can be formed to address all issues, adding that he was ready to issue a presidential decree to hold elections as soon as he secured a written agreement from Hamas to hold them. He will also invite the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to meet to ratify the electoral law on whose basis the elections will be held.

Abu Mazin also called for convening the [2014 Fateh/Hamas] Temporary Leadership Framework (TLF) at any place agreed, including Ramallah, with whomever can attend from Hamas either directly or via video-link for those who cannot attend. He also stressed that he does not link Gazan reconstruction to the reconciliation, but to the deployment of the [PA’s] police and Presidential Guard along the borders and crossing points, because this is the precondition set by the international community and the PA’s donors.

According to its public statements, Hamas has agreed to elections, but has not agreed to sign a written document to that effect. It now insists that its employees should be present at the crossing points, but no longer insists that presidential, PLC, and Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections should all take place simultaneously-- even if it does insist on a commitment to hold PNC elections when the conditions are appropriate.

The above suggests some potential ‘movement’ in the reconciliation file despite the fact that the indications suggest that we are still trapped in the same old circle of maneuvers, conditions, and counter-conditions, as evident from the insistence on linking convening the TLF to Hamas’s written agreement to hold the elections, dealing with this issue in a manner that excludes the Islamic movement and that insists on unilateral control of the situation. And all this assumes that Israel will agree to elections without setting preconditions that will be difficult for the Palestinians to accept. After all, elections in the absence of a national accord and in the shadow of the occupation, the surrounding circumstances and past experience, are a certain recipe for consolidating and deepening the inter-Palestinian split, transforming it into a breakup.

The most that ‘Carter’s initiative’ can yield in light of the Palestinian parties’ unwillingness to achieve unity is to convene the TLF in Mecca or elsewhere. This is both good and necessary; but it is certainly not sufficient. The reasons that prevented the [2007 Fateh/ Hamas] Mecca-1 Agreement from success, leading to its collapse three months after the national unity government was formed, are the same reasons that have prevented all subsequent agreements reached from being implemented. But the obstacles are more formidable today, now that the split has taken deep roots both horizontally and vertically.

Just as a reminder, we should note that the most prominent obstacles that have prevented an end to the split so far and that are still in place, consist of the PLO’s paralysis with no priority given to rebuilding its institutions so as to include the various shades of the spectrum; the wager on developments and foreign parties – whether states, especially Israel and the U.S., or other parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; the persistent illusion of reaching an agreement with Israel; the existence of a self-rule authority on the West Bank without any powers; the establishment of a [Gaza/Hamas] state with temporary borders in Gaza; the exclusion of the mass of the people from decision-making; the absence of any substantial political debate and the attempt to forge common denominators out of the reconciliation agreements and the foundations of partnership; the attempt to rule and dominate unilaterally; the two parties’ mutual exclusion of each other; the absence of a strong and effective third party that arms itself with a popular movement that can impose the people’s will on both parties and  create the required balance; and last but not least, the priority given to the struggle for power and serving private and factional  interests over the national interest.

To this I would add another new obstacle, consisting of Abu Mazin’s fear of a Saudi/Brotherhood/Hamas rapprochement that may save Hamas from its current predicament. For its part, Hamas seems to be most concerned with mending its relations with Saudi Arabia, which would enable it to survive without complying with Abu Mazin’s preconditions for reconciliation that aim to strip it of almost everything in return for recognizing it as a party that has no ability to affect Palestinian decisions.

The most important factor in this regard is the change in the Saudi position that was adopted after the failure of the Mecca Agreement and up till now. Since then, and until recently, Saudi Arabia has avoided any involvement in the reconciliation dossier. It held Hamas responsible for the failure, which, in turn, led to an estrangement between Riyadh and Hamas. That subsequently developed into hostility between the late Saudi kind and the Muslim Brotherhood, which Saudi Arabia deemed to be part of the Turkish/Qatari alliance – later to include ISIS; one that Riyadh viewed as the second most important threat facing it along with the primary Iranian threat.

After King ‘Abdullah’s death and after King Salman came to power, an important change occurred in Saudi policy. The Iranian threat was perceived as of the utmost priority, which eventually led to Operation Decisive Storm [in Yemen], which Riyadh decided to launch before the [March] Arab summit. In fact, it confronted the summit with a fait accompli that the summit could not but support, despite the Saudis’ unilateral decision and their behavior at the meeting. For as soon as he finished delivering his speech, King Salman left Sharm el-Sheikh and took the Yemeni president with him, even though the main reason the summit was held had been for the sake of the latter’s country, which required him to stay till the end. But he is no more than ‘a slave who takes orders’ and cannot oppose the message that Salman wanted to deliver to everyone, namely, that the debate was over with his speech, and that the summit had to endorse what he wants.

The change in Saudi policy was the result of President Obama’s advice to Salman to open up to the Muslim Brotherhood during the former’s visit to offer his condolences for the death of King ‘Abdullah. That change manifested itself in a review of the Saudis’ previous attitude towards the Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood alliance. There are growing signs that Saudi Arabia has now joined this alliance. This was further consolidated by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and its Yemeni branch in particular, have sided with Saudi Arabia in Decisive Storm. Moreover, the Brotherhood is fighting the Syrian regime; in other words, it sides with the rulers of Ankara, Riyadh, and Doha. Furthermore, Hamas has backed legitimacy [Yemeni president Hadi] in Yemen and has publicly begun to demand a Saudi role in the inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

The question now is this: What position will Egypt adopt, especially if the new Saudi position extends to demanding reconciliation between President Sissi and the Muslim Brotherhood? If the matter remains confined to Saudi Arabia’s joining the fray in dealing with the inter-Palestinian reconciliation, this may be accepted by Egypt, especially since that dialogue will be focused on implementing the reconciliation agreement sponsored by Egypt and control of the basic elements of this file will remain in its hands, enabling it to influence it positively or negatively whenever it wishes.

For Cairo will be satisfied if Saudi Arabia manages to convince Hamas to allow the PA to take control of the borders and crossing points, which would ensure Egypt’s security by shutting down the threat resulting from the cooperation between the takfiri jihadi organizations in Sinai and Gaza, either with the direct help of the Hamas Gaza authority there or via it turning a blind eye to it.

In this regard, some believe that the Egyptian/Saudi ‘honeymoon’ is about to end because Cairo does not share Riyadh’s view that the Iranian threat is the sole or most salient threat, and because there is a different Egyptian approach for dealing with Iran and Syria that gives priority to fighting terrorism and confronting the Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood alliance. If this proves true, it would have a negative effect on any Saudi effort to achieve inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

Carter’s efforts may coincide with an Arab/regional effort to achieve inter-Palestinian reconciliation together with a long-term truce with Israel that would, prevent the Palestinian situation from exploding in a region that is already rife with various explosions, at least, and that would, at most, seek to prepare the climate for reviving the two-state solution. That solution is breathing its last, and there are various international efforts to save it before it expires.

“Should that occur, it would fling open the doors to the unknown in the region,” concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 06.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

61 at midnight

 

With the deadline for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to present his new government to President Reuven Rivlin fast approaching, Israeli newspapers lead their Wednesday editions with what Israel Hayom calls 'last-minute wrangling.' Shas, Kulanu and United Torah Judaism are already on board. Netanyahu's attention is now focused on Habayit Hayehudi, which – with eight seats in the Knesset – would take his coalition up to 61 members in the 120-member parliament.

But Habayit Hayehudi leader is playing hardball, according to the lead story in all the papers. Having already been told that he will not get the position of foreign minister, Naftali Bennett has agreed to make do with the education post. But he's also demanding that party member Ayelet Shaked be appointed justice minister. According to reports on Wednesday morning, Likud officials say that he's likely to get his way. Shaked has spearheaded the right's attempts to curb judicial activism, and the left has been expressing its distress in recent days over the possibility she will become justice minister.

'We are likely to accept Habayit Hayehudi's appeal for the justice portfolio,' one senior Likud official told Haaretz. 'Bennett extorted us, and in this case, it seems his extortion will work for him. But extortion comes at a price, and Bennett will have to pay dearly in the future.'

'It seems Netanyahu has managed to consolidate a coalition of 61 Knesset seats and he can inform the president of such.' he added. 'What's going to happen after that? Will the Zionist Union join? A decision has still not been made about that.'

In other news, the Internet news sites report on another alleged Israeli airstrike on a missile stockpile in Sudan. A London-based Arabic news outlet reported early Wednesday that officials and residents of the Sudanese city of Omdurman said foreign warplanes struck a military installation nearby late Tuesday night. A Sudanese army spokesperson denied that any Sudanese facilities had been struck, confirming only that anti-aircraft fire had been directed against an object in the sky.

Witnesses in Omdurman said they saw and heard large explosions at a military site near the city, which sits across the Nile River from the capital Khartoum, the Al-Araby al-Jadeed news outlet reported. Witnesses told the paper they thought the planes had come from Israel, which has been fingered for airstrikes in Sudan in the recent past. Early unconfirmed reports of the strike indicated the jets may have targeted a missile depot holding arms destined for Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces did not immediately respond to the reports, Army Radio reported. According to the report, Sudanese forces fired anti-aircraft weapons at the planes. A Sudanese official told al-Araby al-Jadeed that the explosions were the result of airstrikes from a 'foreign entity.' But, a spokesman for the Sudanese military told Sky News in Arabic that there had been no attack identified. He said anti-aircraft fire had been shot at something in the sky resembling a missile or jet.

Finally, Ynet reports that the Israeli government announced Wednesday that it has cancelled its plan to sell drones to Ukraine. Senior officials said that the decision occurred after a telephone conversation between Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

 

BENNETT'S BLUNDER: Writing in Israel Hayom, Mati Tuchfeld warns Naftali Bennett that if he pushes Binyamin Netanyahu too hard, he could discover that the prime minister prefers to establish a less right-wing government with Isaac Herzog instead.

"Anyone who is keeping close tabs on the never-ending saga of coalition negotiations will find it hard to understand the disconnect between the people and the politicians. The election ended weeks ago – it was so long ago that we've almost forgotten it even happened – but instead of getting down to work and carrying out the reforms they promised, the politicians are still preoccupied with themselves and with grabbing more and more titles and portfolios. They will use up every minute that the law allows them to.

After every election campaign – and this has been true for decades – someone will kick up a stink about the bloated government, the number of ministers and other officials. But no one has been complaining about the latest phenomenon, in which party leaders demand at least three ministries and in which every minister feels underprivileged if he or she isn't in charge of at least two budget-rich offices.

Habayit Hayehudi leaders and members are disgruntled over the outcome of the coalition negotiations. But the leaders and the rank-and-file members have very different reasons to feel discriminated against. Naftali Bennett is extremely agitated by the fact that he has been forced to give up his dream of becoming foreign minister and, instead, will have to make do with the education position. Even when he tried to tell us that education minister is the position he always wanted, very few people believed him.

Habayit Hayehudi voters, meanwhile, are primarily angry that their party has ceded exclusive control of the Religious Affairs Ministry and the rabbinical courts to Shas. Their anger is directed at Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Bennett is using that anger to justify his latest efforts to get more ministerial postings out of the negotiations. But the truth is that it was Bennett himself who gave away the Religious Affairs Ministry and the rabbinical courts. The coalition agreement between Likud and Shas was shown to the Habayit Hayehudi chairman at least 24 hours before it was signed – but he did not respond.

It is still not clear what the situation will look like when Netanyahu's deadline for forming a new coalition ends at midnight tonight, although the general consensus is that the prime minister will be able to inform President Reuven Rivlin that he has formed a new government. After Avigdor Lieberman's great betrayal of right-wing voters two days ago, Bennett must surely know that he will be playing a dangerous game if he follows a similar path. Lieberman's supporters are not the same as Bennett's supporters. Those who voted for Habayit Hayehudi, unaware perhaps of what is happening behind closed doors in the coalition negotiations, are angry with Netanyahu – but to translate that anger into a move that would overthrow a right-wing government would be a serious error of judgment. After all, no one on the right has forgotten how the Shamir government was booted out of office by right-wing parties protesting at his participation in the Madrid peace conference – and how the subsequent election paved the way for the Rabin government, which went on to sign the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. If Netanyahu is prevented from forming a new government, it will almost certainly spell the end of Bennett's political career as well.

Even if Bennett wins this disconnected game of 'who will blink first' and even if he gets the honors that he feels he deserves, he could soon find out that it was a pyrrhic victory. Likud voters want a right-wing government to be installed. But if they feel that the prime minister they voted into power has been the victim of political extortion even before his government has been formed, they will give him the green light to replace Bennett with Isaac Herzog and his Zionist Union party at the first opportunity. All the signs are that Herzog is sitting at home next to the telephone, just waiting for Netanyahu to call."

Ends…

 

FIVE QUESTIONS: Writing in Maariv, Amos Gilboa has five questions about U.S. President Barack Obama's policy regarding Iran and the Middle East in general – and concludes that he wants the Islamic Republic to be the United States main ally in the region.

"There are five questions that I would like to pose, in an effort to understand what is behind U.S. President Barack Obama's Middle East policy in general and his handling of the Iranian nuclear issue in particular.

Question 1: From the outset, Obama's stated goal was to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He believed that doing so would encourage stability across the region and would allow Israel to form a strategic alliance with 'moderate' Arab countries – mainly Saudi Arabia – against the Iranian threat.

The obvious and simple question is: What prevented the Obama Administration from forming exactly that kind of anti-Iranian coalition without Israel? Why did he need Israel to be involved? Why have we not witnessed any concerted American effort to create such an alliance? Why, instead of focusing on Iran, has Washington been so obsessed by Israeli construction in the Har Homa neighborhood of Jerusalem?

Question 2: In the summer of 2009, Iran held a presidential election, which saw Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reelected. The reelection of the hard-line leader sparked mass protests on the streets of Tehran, in what was popularly known as the 'Green Revolution.' The repressive ayatollah regime was under threat and the West's hope of regime change in the Islamic Republic looked like it was coming true. The ayatollahs, however, brutally put down the embryonic revolution. The protestors on the streets of Tehran, like many other people in the West, looked to the Obama Administration – the symbol of liberalism – to come out firmly in favor of the protestors. But Obama remained silent, the protestors were massacred and the 'Green Revolution' was crushed. Why did Obama not speak out?

Question 3: It is in Iran's national interests to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria; he is a vital channel for Iran's sphere of influence and for Hizbollah, its ally in Lebanon. And yet, in the summer of 2013, Obama refused to launch a military operation against Syria, even though Assad and his regime had been using chemical weapons to attack their own people. Instead, Obama agreed to a Russian proposal to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons. In exchange, Assad remained in power, the United States stopped demanding his unconditional resignation and he was given the green light to continue massacring his own people with chemical and conventional weapons. Given Obama's propensity to weep bitterly over every child killed in Gaza, why did Obama act in this way?

Question 4: In its handling of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the Obama Administration displayed three main policy traits: it was more hesitant than the European Union in imposing crippling sanctions; it was genuinely afraid that Israel would attack Iran's nuclear facilities and invested all its time and energy in trying to prevent that from happening; and it demonstrably refused to create any credible threat of American military action against Iran, preferring instead merely to reiterate, time after time, that 'all the options are on the table.' Why?

Question 5: In March 2013, the Obama Administration began a series of top secret meetings with officials from the Ahmadinejad government, some five months before the allegedly moderate Hassan Rowhani was elected. The meetings were concealed from all of the United States' allies, including Israel. Why?

The answers to all the above questions are, of course, complex and varied. But there is one possible answer that needs to be examined: that the Obama Administration's strategic goal is to promote Iran – the fastest-growing regional power – to a central position in the Middle East, in the hope that this would encourage stability and would allow the United States to focus on its new strategic goal – China. If this is true, then it has countless ramifications, but one stands out: the United States' obsessive pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran is the main tool that the Obama Administration is using to turn Iran into its key Middle Eastern ally."

Ends…

 

HERE WE GO AGAIN: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber says that, if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu can only put together a coalition of 61 lawmakers, it's only a matter of time before we are asked to go back to the polls.

"If Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu ends up with a narrow, 61-member government, Israeli citizens would be justified in recalibrating their course and starting to prepare for the next election. It will only be a matter of months before they are once again asked to go to the polls. And if that happens, Netanyahu will have to use all of his considerable political acumen and acrobatics to remain in office.

Make no mistake about it: there have been governments in Israel that have been based on the slenderest of parliamentary majority, yet have managed to do great things. The second Menachem Begin government, for example, only had the support of 61 Knesset members – yet still had the audacity of spirit to launch the first Lebanon War. Ariel Sharon only managed to pass his disengagement plan with the help of the Labor Party and the second part of the Oslo Accords only became official government policy by two votes. So is there a chance that Netanyahu will follow in the footsteps of Begin, Sharon or Rabin? But Netanyahu is no Begin, Sharon or (especially) Rabin. He's Bibi, for better and for worse.

More significantly, however, times have changed. What has happened in Israeli politics of late to make governing the country so hard and what is it that will force us (or give us the opportunity, depending on one's point of view) to hold fresh elections? With all due respect to democratic life here – and I have every respect – it seems that the brunt of blame can be placed at the feet of the various political parties' primaries. What was once a symbol of the democratic process has become an axe that is chopping up Israeli democracy.

Allow me to explain. The key to success in Israeli politics today is name recognition. Success in primaries is based first and foremost on how famous the candidate is. A candidate could be a war hero, a great statesman or a stand-out figure from any walk of life, but if the public doesn't know his name, he won't get elected. Every candidate knows this to be true: in internal primaries, party members often vote for the most well-known candidate. That is why political hopefuls are willing to do almost anything they can to ensure that their name is mentioned as much as possible.

The first person to recognize this change in the nature of Israeli politics was Binyamin Netanyahu, who first came to public attention because his surname is associated intuitively by Israelis with the raid on Entebbe (where Netanyahu's brother, Yoni, lost his life). Even today, many Israeli erroneously believe that Yoni Netanyahu was the commander of that operation, thanks to the prime minister's constant referencing of his late brother. In fact, Dan Shomron was the commander of that daring operation. By the time the next Likud primary comes around, Oren Hazan will be the most recognized name in Israeli politics. He can thank his lucky stars that the media went crazy when it discovered that his last job was manager of a casino in Bulgaria and that his father – former MK Yehiel Hazan – was infamous for being caught on camera voting in place of an absent colleague on a key piece of economic legislation. That may be ridiculous and almost funny – but it's the truth.

When politicians place well in internal primaries, they automatically think that they have achieved success by themselves and that they don't owe anyone anything. Every bastard's a king, after all. Therefore, MKs today allow themselves to do things that their predecessors would never do: they ignore higher-ranking decision makers and do whatever they want – both as individuals and as a collective. There is no better way to draw up a list of candidates for a party's slate than primaries, but it's worth remembering that primaries got us into this mess in the first place. I know many people who have no problem with this, but Israeli citizens are paying the price."

Ends…

 

REFUGEE CRISIS: Writing on News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem describes how Palestinian officials have been engaged in dialogue with Hizbollah, Syria and Lebanon over the fate of Palestinian refugees in those countries.

"The PLO is extremely worried by events in the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, where ISIS appears to have taken control. A Palestinian delegation, headed by the chairman of the organization's Executive Committee Dr. Zakaria al-Agha, left the West Bank for Syria on Monday. The delegation met with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad and with representative of the various Palestinian factions in the country.

The meeting dealt with how best to get ISIS fighters out of the Yarmouk refugee camp and how to get food and other supplies in. The discussions between the Palestinian delegation and representatives of the Syrian regime came after Arab sources reported last week that President Bashar al-Assad was furious with the Palestinian Authority for launching a rescue mission to free two Swedish hostages who were held by the al-Nusra front on Syrian soil – without first informing Damascus of its intentions.

One of the Palestinians' main concerns is that ISIS or similar jihadi groups will use the precedent of the Yarmouk refugee camp to try and take control of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon – especially the Ein al-Hilweh camp near Sidon.

According to a report in the Rai-alyoum newspaper on May 3, senior Palestinian officials have been negotiating with Hizbollah over how best to prevent violence on the part of radical jihadi elements, who might use any kind of disturbance to overrun Palestinian refugee camps inside Lebanon. These elements hope to take advantage of the tensions between the Lebanese government and Hizbollah in order to advance their goals. Sources close to the radical Salafi organization Jund al-Sham recently kidnapped and killed a Hizbollah member close to the Ein al-Hilweh camp in the hope of provoking a response inside the camp itself.

In the dialogue between the Palestinian Authority and Hizbollah, it was agreed to implement several measures designed to reign in radical Islamic groups within Lebanon; it was also decided that the two parties would set up a joint committee. The PLO committed itself to not interfere in any way in domestic Lebanese affairs.

Among those Lebanese officials involved in the talks with the Palestinians was General Abbas Ibrahim, the director of the country's General Directorate of General Security, who has met several times with Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas in Jordan and was a key player in efforts to broker a rapprochement between Abbas and his main domestic rival, Mahmoud Dahlan – who has recently increased in influence within the Palestinian refugee population of Lebanon.

The PLO's policy, which was ratified in a vote on the organization's Executive Committee, is not to take any stand or support any side in the domestic battles between jihadi organizations and regime forces in Lebanon and Syria. The PLO doesn't have the military wherewithal to get involved in any significant way in these clashes and it is petrified that they will repeat past patterns of behavior that butchered Palestinian refugees. The PLO is not involved in the bloody battles between Sunni and Shiite forces in Syria or Lebanon, but – given that it is aware of the dangers facing Palestinian refugees in both those countries, it has been forced to cooperate with Hizbollah and the Lebanese government."

Ends…

 

WITHIN ZIONIST UNION, WITHOUT ZIONIST UNION: Writing in Haaretz, Ravit Hecht urges Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog not to come to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's rescue by agreeing to join a unity government with him.

"Likudniks and supporters of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu should apologize to the media, to Zionist Union campaigners and to the beleaguered Israeli actress Anat Waxman: The right’s 'anyone but Bibi' campaign is far more effective.

The hatred within Likud and the loathing in Habayit Hayehudi, which had not previously yielded practical measures, have been joined by Avigdor Lieberman’s stunning maneuver (no wonder one of Yisrael Beiteinu’s coalition demands was chess instruction in schools), which raveled Netanyahu’s government in the making. Netanyahu has descended from being the election’s clear victor to having a fragile right-wing government whose premature death seems nearly inevitable.

Lieberman seems to be going for the jackpot — that is, Bibi’s head. Moshe Kahlon, who everyone is lionizing now in order to destroy with equal fervor later, declared after his friend’s dramatic announcement that 'a government with 61 Knesset members is a bad government. ... I personally, after having signed the [coalition] agreement, am a little constrained.' Bridegrooms who feel 'a little constrained' the day before their wedding are generally 'much freer' and somewhere else a few months later.

The ultra-Orthodox parties are satisfied, their loyalty assured, and despite its last-minute muscle-flexing Habayit Hayehudi has little choice. It’s a captive audience, like its left-wing twin, Meretz. Where would it go if it were to trip up Netanyahu now? But Likud, Habayit Hayehudi and the ultra-Orthodox do not a coalition make.

It is therefore ironic that the only one who can save Netanyahu from the nightmare of a 61-member coalition is Isaac Herzog, who will presumably be called at some point to rescue Bibi from the predators of his own political bloc. Zionist Union voters could find themselves turned into Netanyahu’s safety net. Some, who champion the influencing from within doctrine that was so successful when Ehud Barak joined Netanyahu’s government in 2009, might even rejoice.

Given the silence of both Herzog and Labor MK Shelly Yachimovich on the ethical and political issues surrounding the coalition talks — from the efforts to weaken the Supreme Court to giving the World Zionist Organization’s settlement division to Uri Ariel, from meddling in the media to the protests by Ethiopian Israelis — it would be naïve to ask them to open an ideological front against Netanyahu. They want to be ministers, and their party’s DNA does not genuinely oppose the occupation, with its injustices and frequent rounds of violence.

Still, the current task of the Labor Party’s leaders is to bring Netanyahu’s rule to an end. That is the mandate they were given by their voters from across the center-left spectrum. Any other action would be a betrayal of that mission.

A narrow right-wing government, with its aggressive legislative initiatives, is a frightening prospect. Losing power and influence — in the courts, in academia, in the media — is also a frightening prospect. But a narrow right-wing government is inevitable, first of all because that is what the democratic will of the people has demanded. Disappointed Likud voters voted for Kahlon after he promised that he would not join a coalition that is dependent on the Arab parties, while Kahanism fell just short of getting enough votes to return to the Knesset in the form of the Yachad party. Second, because the peace camp, even if it is in the minority, must rebuild itself — mainly by regaining its pride and self-confidence and developing a clear foundation of principles.

It is inconceivable that a person for whom 'leftist' and 'treason' are companion words should benefit from the whitewashing services of left-wing voters. It is inconceivable that a person who claimed to be an alternative to government by Netanyahu and the right should destroy that alternative just a few months later. After all, if Netanyahu’s well-known core values are so acceptable to Labor that it would consider joining his coalition, then why not just merge with Likud instead of insisting on being a more polite and less popular version of that party?"

Ends…

 

SAY IT AIN’T SO, BIBI: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Gil Troy says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's concessions violate the Likud’s constitution calling for creating conditions for a flourishing free economy.

"All the electoral chaos seems about to produce a flimsy 61-vote coalition, with the average Israeli taxpayer the biggest loser, again. Say it ain’t so Bibi, say it ain’t so. Can you imagine just how opportunistic you must seem when Yisrael Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman emerges as the man of principle? Are you really so desperate to stay in power that you needed to auction off Israel’s future? What kind of a nationalist are you? What kind of a Zionist? Clearly, I am not as smart as our prime minister.

I do not understand how someone who calls himself a Zionist can promise hundreds of millions of shekels for ultra-Orthodox education which is proudly, flamboyantly, often crudely anti-Zionist. I do not understand how someone who calls himself a nationalist can abandon the progress his last government made in demanding all Israeli schoolchildren learn core curriculum subjects such as modern Hebrew, English, math and science – where in the Torah is knowledge banned? I do not understand how someone who calls himself a security hawk can mortgage Israel’s future just to stay in office, producing more draft-dodgers and job-shirkers, inducing some Israelis to take from the state not contribute to it. Last time I sang it, 'Hatikva' culminated with the line 'to be a free people in our land.' I thought our Zionist anthem championed independence not dependence, educating for competence not incompetence in the modern world.

Binyamin Netanyahu’s surrenders violate the Likud’s constitution calling for creating conditions for a flourishing free economy. Depriving children of basic skills mocks those goals. The Likud’s forefather, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, would be disgusted and disappointed.

Jabotinsky believed in sticking to principle not succumbing to blackmail. At what point does holding onto power for its own sake become pointless? Doesn’t Binyamin Netanyahu hope to leave a legacy beyond mere longevity? And why won’t he stand by the important reforms he implemented in 2003? Back then, Israel was overtaxing and under-incentivizing too many citizens, bribing them to procreate, discouraging them from working. Netanyahu’s cutbacks helped trigger Israel’s economic miracle then, what will his cave-ins accomplish now? I am not angry at the United Torah Judaism negotiators.

True, they secured so many goodies the ultra-Orthodox weekly Mishpacha ran a headline proclaiming: 'The Famine Has Ended.' But just as it is hypocritical to label left-wing protests 'democratic' but ultra-Orthodox ones 'undemocratic,' give the Haredi bosses their due. They did what Israel’s malfunctioning coalition system and what the current prime minister masquerading as Chicago ward heeler encourage them to do. As New York’s corrupt nineteenth-century Tammany Hall pol George Washington Plunkitt boasted: 'I’ve seen my opportunities and I took ‘em.'

In fairness, let’s also acknowledge how correct Netanyahu has been regarding Iran. If Netanyahu’s domestic capitulation is craven and costly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s 'not on my watch' international submission to Iran is delusional and dangerous. The Lausanne aftermath has demoralized proud Americans and worried Westerners who understand that American power maintains international stability.

The Iranian insults to America are piling up like headless corpses at an Islamic State rally: continuing the 'death to America' rhetoric, exporting violence to Yemen and Syria, escalating the genocidal threats against Israel, seizing a civilian ship of another American ally, the Marshall Islands.

Netanyahu’s appeasement puts added pressure on Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett if he becomes education minister. The Haredi sellout constrains everyone else financially and contradicts Habayit Hayehudi's founding principles, too. His party’s vision statement endorses nurturing a 'Jewish-Zionist identity' among 'all the state’s children,' teaching about 'Herzl and the founders of Zionism, David Ben-Gurion and the leaders of the nation.'

The pressure is on Moshe Kahlon too. Kahlon vowed that his party, Kulanu, would keep Netanyahu centered and protect the average taxpayer. The base of 'Kulanu' – all of us – is tired of being mugged. Hijacking current government funding to bankroll freeloaders and train even more to expect handouts is counterproductive. Turning the budgeting process into a political auction is exactly the kind of bad-government practice Kahlon’s good-government promises pledged to end. Kahlon and his party members should beware. If they start weak, they will become another impotent minor party.

Our politicians should address the Ethiopian crisis as a Zionist crisis too. Let’s redirect the haredim’s billion-shekel ransom toward these hard-working, taxpaying, army-serving patriots. The Ethiopian rescue is one of the great Zionist adventures of recent times – we should make their successful adjustment one of the great Israeli success stories of all time.

And watching the IDF’s heroics in Nepal, one wonders, how can one security establishment – the army – be so good and a second security establishment – the police – so jinxed? Did any coalition partners demand a thorough police reform, weeding out sexual harassers and removing racists? Will the new government effectively target organized crime and disorganized but rampant home burglaries, two of Israel’s biggest policing challenges today? If the search for Cabinet-issued Volvos trumped those issues in Bibi’s bazaar, shame on all our leaders.

My Zionist critique ends with a Zionist reaffirmation. My current anger will not sour me on our state or our mission. Just as I can support Netanyahu regarding Iran – and other matters – while criticizing him when necessary, I can distinguish between my current, immediate, completely justified anger at this coalition sellout and my ongoing, deep commitment to Israel and the Zionist enterprise. I don’t see any Americans, Left or Right, abandoning the America of Baltimore and Ferguson, no matter how angry they might be. We should not abandon Israel – while reminding our country and ourselves about the core Zionist mission to create the model Jewish Democratic state at least some of the coalition partners, and most of Israel’s citizens, desire. Let’s build it together, in hope not despair, in optimism not cynicism."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

JUNE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: Murat Yetkin takes note of a new potential coalition in centre-left Radikal: "As President Erdogan underlined in Diyarbakir on May 3rd, he is not expecting to secure the votes of 400 MPs (which would guarantee the presidential regime he seeks) from the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] alone this time round. If the AKP cannot open the presidential door to Erdogan, whose support would he seek for this purpose? The HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] seems to have ruled out such a possibility. Opposition CHP [Republican People's Party] leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu also did so long ago. Thus, only one party is left, and that is the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]. Erdogan and PM Davutoglu have apparently begun to calculate the prospects of forming an alliance with the MHP, after seeing that the AKP cannot guarantee the goal of a full presidency."

Mehmet Tezkan describes a dysfunctional system in centrist Milliyet: "The president claims that this election is that of a transition to a presidential system. The other parties, including the ruling AKP are not in the same mood. Is the president acting like a president as defined in the constitution? No. Is the current system that of parliamentary system? No. Does the current regime have a name in the existing political literature? No, it does not. This unnamed regime will continue. If one were to ask until when, no-one would have the answer!"

Mustafa Balbay blames the president for a host of ills in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "As we head towards the June 7th elections, Turkey’s most serious problem is Erdogan, who is currently occupying the presidential chair. In every sphere, ranging from the manner in which he uses the media, to his AKP support that extends beyond the government; from his approach to Turkey's basic problems to his intervention in politics; we are dealing with a president who is not only constitutionally irresponsible but in every other manner as well. The state has turned into a tool in the hands of the government, and Erdogan is responsible for this."

Mumtazer Turkone believes the president is leading his party towards defeat in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Erdogan's election campaign is going well. Since his name is not written on the ballot paper, the party that is losing is the AKP. Erdogan's insistence on the presidency and his effort to turn the elections into a referendum to pass a presidential regime are not the sole reasons behind this paradox. Democratic rivalry must be conducted in equal and fair conditions. This is not only valid between the parties; it is also one of the priorities of the electorate that is going to vote. The president’s use of his constitutional position in a manner that damages the climate of equal and fair competition has become a direct source of vulnerability for the AKP. The hegemony that Erdogan has established over the elections by using every opportunity before him, is dragging the AKP towards inevitable defeat." 

Hakan Aksay takes comfort in that nothing lasts forever on independent internet T24: "Erdogan, who began to rule us when he was 49 years old, is now 61, and he continues to do the same job with even greater enthusiasm. Apart from heading his party, he has been prime minister three times, and was elected as president last summer. Now he has fixed his eye on a full presidency. Who knows what will enter his mind later on. We know that a man may make the mistake of thinking that his era is eternal. Erdogan's time to rule (as president of the republic, as full president, as sultan and party chair) will also end one day. It has already begun to crack over the last few months."

Ergun Babahan argues that Erdogan has reached his political end in centrist Millet: "One issue that President Erdogan is right about: The Republic that we know is almost at an end. This is directly due to the person leading it. Turkey is witnessing a president who is making election propaganda for a party and openly violating the constitution, while ignoring almost a hundred years of tradition, his oath to obey the constitution and the condition that he should stand at equal distance from all parties. When a politician takes the Quran in his hands at the election arena, this means he has come to the end of his political life."

Resul Tosun makes a case for a presidential regime in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Our politicians see their opponents not as rivals but as enemies. This approach is affecting the electorate as well, and people who belong to different parties now see each other not as parties to a sweet rivalry, but as enemies in different camps. I would not be exaggerating if I say that the presidential system will diminish this polarization. Because the sharp division of forces springs from a system in which attention is not focused on parties but on their performance."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Sharq is sceptical: "Since America has been the main opponent of Iran's nuclear programme, the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 have turned into direct and bilateral negotiations between Tehran and Washington. There is hope that if problems on the nuclear issue between Iran and the U.S. are resolved, a final agreement will materialize. These talks have led to many feats such as the Geneva deal and the Lausanne statement, but it is clear from remarks by U.S. officials that even acting in accordance with their fact sheet, will not work." 

Conservative Resalat does not trust:" The P5+1 have left no room in their historical and political record for Iran to trust them! If the texts and confidential information related to the nuclear talks are published, none of the P5+1 will have a good reputation with Iranians. We should not forget that the other side has the potential and readiness to violate transparent and firm agreements; it is clear how they would act towards an agreement that has a little syntactic ambiguity or a legal paradox." 

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Khorasan calls for unpleasant realism: "Since Saudi King Salman took power, despite all the positive steps by Iran, no positive Saudi response has been registered. Up till now the two countries have had different views, but now, we should acknowledge that our strategic interests are in conflict. The probability of a nuclear deal has increased Saudi concerns about Iran's power in the region. The young Saudi leaders have not left any room for revision of their insane policies of supporting terrorism and fighting the resistance. Our best policy is not to cut the diplomatic channel while fundamentally revising our strategic ties with Riyadh. The visit of a high-ranking Iranian official will not make Saudi Arabia change its approach as some claim. No Saudi leader is willing to establish stability in the region." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan reflects: "Saudi Arabia's irrational and brutal attacks on Yemen were planned by the U.S. and the Zionists. Forty days of attacks have achieved nothing for the Saudis. On the contrary, the Yemeni people are more supportive of the Houthis and political turmoil in Saudi Arabia has intensified, as demonstrated by the royal succession changes and the absence of a number of princes from the allegiance ceremony of the new crown prince." 

Conservative Hemayat insists that Iran has been an inspiration: "Yemen's recent uprisings to change the political structure of this poor and tribal country were completely a domestic issue. The majority of Yemenis are affected by the Islamic and humane school of thought. Despite significant ups and downs in the past 36 years, our Islamic revolution has never stopped influencing others. Even with foreign pressure and Saudi airstrikes, the Yemeni people seek to follow the pattern of the Islamic revolution of Iran and will never give in to foreign threats." 

Conservative Khorasan argues that the goal is to divide Yemen: "Saudi Arabia seeks to divide Yemen in order to maintain its access to Bab-el-Mandeb. The Saudis have convinced the U.S. and Israel of the danger of a unified Yemen dominated by the Houthis. The attack on Yemen is in accordance with Saudi Arabia's Western supporters."

 

TERRORISM: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami insists that the U.S. and the West are the main supporters of ISIS: "21 countries supply weapons to ISIS and America is the largest contributor. The West and its regional allies are the main source of weapons for terrorist groups active in the region, especially ISIS. Last year, the U.S. together with some Western countries and regional affiliates formed the so-called anti-ISIS coalition, which was a sham. After nearly a year, it has been fully proven that this coalition is useless. Selling weapons to regional countries, suppressing anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist resistance groups, safeguarding the existence of the Zionist regime and harming the reputation of Islam are the objectives that the colonial powers and the Zionists are trying to achieve in their secret political and military support for the terrorist groups." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz accuses many: "America's focus on the Middle East will diminish in the next decade. France seeks to fill America's place in the region; the UK and Germany are also interested. Regional players are helping to change the regional balance using terrorists to fulfil their unfulfilled dreams." 

 

U.S./AFGHANISTAN: Conservative Quds contends that the U.S. is only attentive to its own interests: "One of the most important reasons for the Afghans signing a security pact with the U.S. was their hope that foreign forces will establish security and fight terrorism. Former President Hamed Karzai declined to sign this pact, which was strangely and hastily signed in the first days after the inauguration of President Ashraf Ghani. Months have passed and instability has considerably and unexpectedly increased across the country; foreign troops have not fulfilled their commitments and only observed. The U.S. commitment to provide Afghan forces with modern weapons was not honoured. It is clear that the deal paved the way for the U.S. to fulfil its demands, while Afghanis were left alone in the battlefield."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Dangers and delusions

2-France steps in

3-The possible and the probable

4-A dangerous end to power-sharing in Iraq

 

1-Dangers and delusions

 

These [Syrian opposition] gains are likely to expand amidst reports of the Syrian regular army’s exhaustion and growing regional support for the anti-Assad factions. These include the Nusra Front, of course, since it is the faction best able to secure results on the ground. This change on the battlefield should have offered an opportunity for a serious Arab/international push for a new Syrian regime that ends the rule of the Baath Party, which has suffocated the country for decades. Instead, however, it is liable to lay the grounds for a new tragedy that is no less harmful than one-party rule if the Nusra Front-type jihadi groups succeed in achieving further victories, thereby consolidating their role in determining Syria's future--Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Where was [Syrian opposition leader] Khoja deluded and where did he commit a mistake? The head of the Turkish SNC's zeal – in fact, naivety – is no different from the zeal whipped up by those who preceded him but who have ended up forgotten and marginalized. He should realize that the American/Turkish training program for those described as his 'moderate opposition' which will begin in the country whose nationality he bears (Turkey) on May 9th is, in effect, an acknowledgment that there is no military solution for the Syrian crisis and that the only solution is via negotiations that abandon all preconditions and leave delusions and cock-and-bull stories behind--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The Nusra Front, which is the Syrian branch of al-Qa’ida, has spearheaded the Syrian opposition’s recent advances in the north of the country, notes a Lebanese commentator. This poses a challenge to the opposition’s supporters, making it more urgent for them to back the more moderate and pluralistic factions as a real alternative to the regime. The leader of the moderate Syrian opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) Khaled Khoja, is deluding himself if he believes that groups loyal to him achieved the latest advances, says a Jordanian commentator. This is evident from the fact that the SNC’s provisional government has not been allowed to pursue its activities from the new areas taken over from the regime.

 

CRUCIAL ROLE: "The Syrian regime's recent battlefield setbacks in the north and south of the country have once again highlighted the Nusra Front’s crucial role," writes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The Syrian branch of al-Qa’ida, which has been playing a major role in the ongoing battles in Syria for over four years, has recently forcefully returned to the forefront after being in competition with ISIS’s savage practices since 2013.

The fall of the city of Idlib and subsequently Jisr ash-Shughour in April under blows from a coalition led by the Nusra Front and that included Jund ash-Sham, Jayshul Sunna, Liwa' al-Haq, Ajnad ash-Sham, and other Islamist groups, was not only a reflection of the Nusra's fighting strength. It also underlined that organization’s power of attraction for the small Islamist organizations and these factions' ability to achieve significant breakthroughs once they set aside their infighting, and focus on a single aim.

These gains are likely to expand amidst reports of the Syrian regular army’s exhaustion and growing regional support for the anti-Assad factions. These include the Nusra Front, of course, since it is the faction best able to secure results on the ground. This change on the battlefield should have offered an opportunity for a serious Arab/international push for a new Syrian regime that ends the rule of the Baath Party, which has suffocated the country for decades. Instead, however, it is liable to lay the grounds for a new tragedy that is no less harmful than one-party rule if the Nusra Front-type jihadi groups succeed in achieving further victories, thereby consolidating their role in determining Syria's future.

There are those who believe that the Nusra Front is not as ugly as ISIS. Despite the fact that the two groups have the same aim of establishing an Islamic emirate, there are those who believe that the Nusra has an advantage over its competitor in that it has more Syrian than foreign fighters, unlike ISIS, which has turned into a magnet attracting jihadis from all over the world. And there is no doubt that the Nusra Front's declared aim of toppling Assad has gained acceptance in the opposition community, contrary to ISIS with its suspect goals that extend beyond the Syrian borders.

The Nusra Front’s 'Syrian identity' has undoubtedly secured it poplar backing and support from the villages it enters. In light of the group’s recent gains, certain foreign research centers have begun to ask the West not to place Nusra in the same basket as ISIS, and to ignore its ideological affiliations and try to encourage its 'pragmatism' as a means of ending the Syrian conflict. But these calls are very risky, especially since the Nusra Front is nothing but al-Qa’ida under a different name, and since its record is no less bloody than that of ISIS.

The new Syrian scene that is taking shape poses a serious threat to the Friends of Syria (FOS) and the international community. It highlights the need for a coherent Syrian policy that focuses primarily on the rise of moderate political and military forces. This may include pushing the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) into the Syrian interior and implementing the promised programs to train the [moderate] opposition.

"In this manner the SNC can assume the role it was intended to play to begin with, and can prove itself as a pluralistic and democratic alternative to the regime," concludes Freiha.

End…

 

EVERYTHING AND NOTHING: "One need not read the interview that SNC head, the Turkish national Khaled Khoja, so ‘graciously’ granted [the Saudi daily] Asharq al-Awsat two days ago," writes Mohammad Kharroub in Tuesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

In that interview, Khoja said everything and yet said nothing. Instead, he resorted to regurgitating the same old vacuous mobilization discourse that the leaders and heads of the various Syrian opposition groups have made it their wont to repeat on every occasion.

Most of these leaders have emerged from their 'voluntary' exiles in Europe, and especially the U.S. Most, if not all, are nationals of the states where they have 'voluntarily' resided for so long. Some have totally assimilated in these states' societies, as evident from the fact that they speak Arabic with European or American accents, and their Arabic language skills have failed to provide them with the terms they seek to deliver their political messages. As a result, they need 'translators' who make clear what they are really trying to say.

This has been the practice of the 'freedom-fighters' of the Istanbul coalition [SNC], whose most recent 'achievement' was to make a Syrian Turcoman who is also a Turkish national [Khoja] its president. In fact, some reports say that the man is also a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara.
Khaled Khoja, who 'rebelled' against everyone, who sought to strike out all other domestic or foreign Syrian opposition groups and who made his attendance at the meetings in Moscow or Cairo conditional on recognition of the SNC as a sole legitimate representative of the Syrian opposition (and the Syrian people, of course,) was astonished to see himself at an 'official' meeting with the 'very capable' head of U.S. diplomacy John Kerry (and with [French President] Francois Hollande before him).

He could hardly believe that he was standing side-by-side with Kerry to deliver statements to the press, and he believed that he had really become Syria's 'primary' man, who will enter Damascus as a conqueror at the head of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades. These brigades, he believes, are fighting battles on all fronts to force the regime to take the obligatory path that will be determined for it by the rebels and the revolution's inspiring commander, Khaled Khoja. This obligatory path is to hand over power to the SNC without prior conditions. This is the demand that Khoja will refuse to sit at the negotiations table unless satisfied.

These are the very same delusions that once took hold of the minds of [former SNC heads] Burhan Ghalioun, George Sabra, 'Abdelbasset Sida, Ahmad al-Jarba, and before them all the rebel Sheikh Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib. But Khoja would have done better to ask himself: Where are they all and others like them – headed by Syria's ‘De Gaulle’ [defected Syrian army officer] General Salim Idriss – as well as those such as Zahran 'Alloush and Nusra Front's leader Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani now?

The Nusra Front? Yes. For the freedom-fighter and leader Khaled Khoja has struck out this organization and is not including it in his calculations, because he believes that the latest military 'achievements' were the work of the FSA [Free Syrian Army-- SNC’s military wing], and that the Nusra Front is only a 'media phenomenon' that has benefited from its presence in the [Gulf/Turkish sponsored Islamist front] Jaysh al-Fateh formations, which stormed the city of Idlib and later Jisr ash-Shughour.

As a result, Khoja went on to sing the praise of his [FSA] 'army' even though many people including Syrian opposition groups, are unanimous in proclaiming that it no longer exist and that its existence is a mere media tool used by the Turkish SNC to secure a foothold in the future negotiations that are certain to take place.

These negotiations will take place regardless of whether their venue will be at the third Moscow Forum or Geneva-3, or even at the Geneva consultations (merely to listen to the various parties) led by UN Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura or in Cairo – even though the SNC refuses to head to Cairo for reasons stemming from the identity of those who control this Turkish coalition, namely the Muslim Brotherhood – or in Riyadh or Jeddah, according to unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia plans to call for such a conference that is confined to the Syrian opposition groups.

What we are dealing with here therefore is a delusion that Khaled Khoja wants to revive in an effort to benefit from the latest developments in the Syrian northwest. These developments were no more than a blatant Turkish invasion using Syrian or Chechen tools. In fact, not even the American, European or Turkish media themselves were able to disguise Turkey’s role in that invasion with large numbers of armed elements using advanced weapons, primarily [U.S. made] TOW anti-tank missiles.

At the same time, Khoja brings us the glad tidings that anti-aircraft weapons are on their way to his 'rebels' as the Obama administration is reconsidering its former decision not to arm the Syrian opposition, because it does not want such weapons to fall into the terrorists' hands – as the American claims soaked in hypocrisy and lies keep repeating.

Where was Khoja deluded and where did he commit a mistake? The head of the Turkish SNC's zeal – in fact, naivety – is no different from the zeal whipped up by those who preceded him but who have ended up forgotten and marginalized. He should realize that the American/Turkish training program for those described as his 'moderate opposition' which will begin in the country whose nationality he bears (Turkey) on May 9th is, in effect, an acknowledgment that there is no military solution for the Syrian crisis and that the only solution is via negotiations that abandon all preconditions and leave delusions and cock-and-bull stories behind.

Moreover, how can Khoja explain why the 'rebels,' the majority of whom he claims are members of his FSA, have refused to allow the SNC's provisional government to move into Idlib to pursue its activities from there?

"Or does he still believe that the Americans can or want to establish a no-fly zone in the Syrian north?" asks Kharroub in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

2-France steps in

 

Paris and the major Arab Gulf capitals have found common ground in seeking to provide an alternative to the traditional U.S. role in the region, says Mohammad Barhouma in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is forming new partnerships with countries other than the U.S. in an attempt to escape their exclusive reliance on Washington in determining their policies, notes a Jordanian commentator. This is evident by the recent arms deals with France, which has adopted positions closer to those of the GCC in recent years, and by the growing trade links with France in various fields.

 

WORTH NOTING: "French President Francois Hollande's attendance at the Riyadh consultative GCC summit in preparation for the Gulf leaders’ meeting with President Obama in mid-May at Camp David is worth noting," writes Mohammad Barhouma in Tuesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Observers had previously said that French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius’s visit to Saudi Arabia last month was an important political and diplomatic signal that led analysts to comment on a current turning point in French regional diplomacy. The French daily Le Monde asked whether France had now become the Gulf's Sunni countries’ most valuable ally in the context of their competition with Tehran to the tempo of the many conflicts in the region.

The growing French/Gulf rapprochement stems from Paris's desire to pursue the notion that 'politics is nothing but intensified economics.' To this should be added the Gulf's desire to get rid of the consequences, perhaps burdens, of its exclusive relations with Washington, and diversify its economic, political, and military partnerships as a result.  This is a policy that has provided Abu-Dhabi and Riyadh, in particular, with practical expertise in this field for some years now. Anyone who fails to realize this factor will fail to correctly interpret these two capitals' moves in the regional arena.

Here is it important to note that [former French president] Nicolas Sarkozy's France preferred Doha as its Gulf partner. Today, however, Riyadh and Abu-Dhabi seem to be at the forefront of France's interest, in addition to Doha which recently bought twenty-four French Rafale fighters in a deal worth some seven billion dollars.

The growing importance of the military approach in exerting pressure on Bashar al-Assad to accept a political solution that would speed up an end to the Syrian crisis represents a point of intersection between Paris, Riyadh, and Doha (as well as Ankara.) The Gulf states will not forget Paris's hard-line stance (so far) towards the Iranian nuclear program. Moreover, France has deemed Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to be a preemptive strike by means of which Riyadh and its Gulf and Arab allies are defending their borders and legitimacy in Yemen.

Paris does not have the capabilities that would enable it to compete with Washington in influencing the Gulf states or to form partnerships with them. But Paris is naturally trying to benefit from its political stance by securing commercial and economic gains in return. Laurent Fabius provided a frank example of this when he said that he was optimistic that the Rafale deal would be followed up by other commercial achievements to be added to France's achievements in the Egyptian and Indian markets.

For their part, the Gulf states are trying to emerge from the circle of their exclusive alliance with the U.S. This is evident from the growing calls for self-reliance in forming security and regional partnerships, as well as investments in French -and other sorts of- partnerships.

"And an indication that Russia has not been forgotten in all this was provided by its abstention in the UN Security Council vote regarding on Yemen (2216); a significant signal that the door has been left open and that the sort of extremism and sharp positions that could block Russia’s 'way back' [to the region] will be avoided," concludes Barhouma.

Ends…

 

 

3-The possible and the probable

 

The most important obstacle preventing an Israeli war on Hizbollah is Washington’s opposition to any such Israeli move in the current circumstances, says Yihya Dabouq in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Israel and Hizbollah may appear to be on the brink of a large-scale confrontation, but maintaining calm between them is equally possible, argues a Lebanese commentator. The crucial factor is the attitude of the U.S. administration, which is most likely to view any move by Israel to initiate a war as a direct challenge to American regional policies at this juncture.

 

BORDER TENSIONS: "The tension along Israel's borders, whether with Syria or with Lebanon, could yet develop into a large-scale confrontation, or not; both are possible, even if they are not equally probable," writes Yihya Dabouq in Tuesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

For its part, Israel, insists that it will not allow any qualitative weapons, which could alter the balance of power with Hizbollah, to be brought from Syria into Lebanon. While it admits that some qualitative and accurate capabilities have already entered Lebanon and are currently in the party's possession, this does not mean – as evident from Israeli statements and attacks in Syria – that it has abandoned the red line it has determined to prevent 'balance-breaking' weapons from being deployed in Lebanon.

As for Hizbollah, it has kept silent. It has made no comments, and issued no denials or admissions. Its strategy has been based on surrounding its position and assessments of its operational activities with a cloud of uncertainty as it confronts Israel’s efforts to set red lines.

Despite this, things are more complex and more serious than may seem at a first glance. Previous Israeli attacks and the responses to them offer no sign that similar attacks and responses will assume the same pattern in the future; they may be either more or less intense. But what is certain is that both sides are acting based on very dangerous rules of engagement that may drag them into a large-scale confrontation that neither may want.

Is it possible that conflagration might break out? Yes, it certainly is. But this is almost as likely as the maintenance of calm, and neither side ultimately being dragged towards a large-scale confrontation. Israel is apparently serious about defending the red lines it has set to prevent the arrival of balance-breaking weapons to Hizbollah, or to block additional quantities to those that have been already been received. And it is playing a dangerous game of brinksmanship, risking the outbreak of a large-scale military confrontation it continues to insist that it does not want.

There is no doubt that Israel's main interest lies in ending Hizbollah’s threat, or at the very least, weakening the party to such an extent that ends its status as the primary strategic threat to it – as it has been described by more than one Israeli official recently. On the other hand, however, and despite having many motives for action, the tools at Israel's disposal and its readiness to use them are subject to great doubt, especially if judged by its actual ability to achieve its aims.

Moreover, the international situation is unlikely to permit Israel to make use of its capabilities against Hizbollah at this particular point in time – assuming that Israel itself believes that it can achieve the results it hopes for from such a war. In fact, there is no doubt that it has learnt from the 2006 war [with Hizbollah] that going to war in haste without careful prior consideration of whether it can achieve its aims and whether its costs are bearable, is a very dangerous matter indeed.

The situation between Israel and Hizbollah is truly on the brink of war. The distance separating them from a confrontation is very small, and both sides are walking on a very thin tightrope. This may lead to a war, or a violent round of confrontation at the very least, which has been described by one Israeli commentator as 'a very long day of fighting.' But who can guarantee either side that this one-day will not develop into many long days of conflict?

Despite all the above, no assessment or analysis of the situation would be complete unless it takes the U.S. attitude into consideration. Does the administration have any interest in the outbreak of a large-scale confrontation or even a limited confrontation that could escalate into a large-scale one? This question has preoccupied the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the semi-official voice of the Zionist lobby in the U.S. According to the Institute's analysis, should Israel decide to go to a war of this sort, it would face enormous U.S. pressure, and the U.S. president would view it as an Israeli attempt to undermine the nuclear agreement with Iran.

"But whatever happens, Hizbollah has enough abilities to assess the possibilities of a future war in advance. For the outbreak of any 'third Lebanon war' will be caused by Israel, since it is Israel that is initiating the attacks, and the party is only responding to them," concludes Dabouq.

Ends…

 

 

4-A dangerous end to power-sharing in Iraq

 

The U.S. decision to bypass Baghdad in arming Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds constitutes a body blow to the country’s post-Saddam political system, with far-reaching consequences, says Wafiq as-Samerrai in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

Iraq’s Sunni political groupings committed a catastrophic strategic mistake by walking out of Iraqi government vote rejecting the U.S. congress's decision to arm the Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis directly without passing through the central government, maintains a former Iraqi chief of intelligence who defected from Saddam’s regime. This spells the end of the phase of accord between Iraq's constituents that has existed since the fall of the former regime in 2003, and exposes the Sunni Arabs to severe threats.

 

UNPRECEDENTED STANCE: "In an unprecedented stance since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi parliament took a resolute decision to reject an American congressional move to arm the Kurds and the Sunnis directly rather than via the Iraqi government, unless that government abides by specific preconditions for national reconciliation," notes Wafiq as-Samerrai in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Congress’s decision was seen as an attempt, not only to implement U.S. VP 'Biden's project to divide Iraq into provinces,' but to partition the country into three states – Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish.

The Iraqi decision was taken by the Shiite National Coalition Bloc, which enjoys a comfortable majority in parliament. But the Kurdish and Sunni blocs refused to vote and left the meeting. And with this begins the journey of disregarding the policy of accord that Iraqi politicians have grown accustomed to over the past 12 years since the fall of Saddam's regime.

While the Kurds’ rejection and boycott of the Iraqi decision may be natural – since the Kurds’ aim has been and remains that of working towards independence, using all circumstances and conditions to prepare for secession – the Sunni bloc has committed a major strategic mistake it should have avoided.

There are many reasons for saying this, most important is the fact that the points of fateful intersection between the Sunnis and Kurdish interests are very weak, especially in light of the schemes that the Kurdistan Province presidency [Mas’ud Barzani] has manifested to take over the lands liberated from ISIS, its refusal to withdraw from Arab villages, as well as preventing their inhabitants from returning to their homes, with reports that thousands of these homes are being demolished.

Congress’s decision cannot be relied upon. Its impact on the Sunni Arabs will be destructive, because the Americans are not ready to fight any ground wars in Iraq. The bitter and difficult taste of the previous battles they fought there are still in their mouths. Moreover, nothing threatens their strategic interests in the medium-term. Nor is it likely that American forces will supply the Sunni clans with heavy weapons that are superior to the advanced weapons in ISIS fighters’ possession. Finally, it is not easy to encourage the Sunni clans to resort to large-scale mobilization after the terrible losses they have suffered, and after [ISIS] terrorists have infiltrated some of their ranks.

Since the Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) are being blocked from participating in the military operations by some Sunni politicians, the brunt of these operations will have to be borne by members of the Sunni clans. And the price they will pay is many times beyond the capacity of Anbar Province's ability to withstand, especially since the other Sunni regions are unwilling to fight outside their borders. For localism has struck deep roots in people's minds, and the advocates of a Sunni [federal] province have failed to develop any form of cooperation between the people of these regions.

These new factors will shock the Americans before anyone else. And since the Shiite voice has forcefully begun to unite, talk of accord and a national guard and allocating government posts on the basis of sectarian power-sharing will head in a direction that is far from accord, giving priority to the rules of the [Shiite] political majority in light of the results of the elections.

In that case, the central government will be able to take strong decisions that will not be influenced by the need to comply by the rules of power sharing. And this means that the Sunnis’ political voice will retreat as a result of the mistake committed by leaving the recent parliament meeting. That was a catastrophic strategic decision that was taken under pressure from failed politicians who failed to properly estimate the very dire consequences that will ensue.

The bitter truth is that the policy of accord and power sharing has been enormously destructive for Iraq. The Sunni Arabs have not benefited from it at all, except for certain politicians, corrupt people, and 'thieves.' The Sunni constituent at large did not benefit from the appointment of Sunni officials in certain posts, with some officials authorizing their relatives and offices to determine government posts in the various Sunni cities in return for bribes, in one form or another. As a result, they became extremely rich, so much so that it would not be wrong to describe the political system as that of distributing shares between the corrupt, and as one that enriches them at the expense of the poor and deprived who have been deceived by sectarian slogans and are today paying a price that will destroy them as a result.

The American decision to arm the Sunnis and the Kurds has broken the back of the system of share-distribution and accord, and there is no doubt that the Sunni Arabs will be harmed most by it. The Kurds will also suffer from the reactions from the center, and from rising voices demanding separation from them in conditions that are not suitable for the establishment of a Kurdish state. American weapons will arrive at Kurdish airports, especially Irbil Airport that is controlled by Mas'ud Barzani's security agencies, and deep and serious disagreements will emerge with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and with the Kurdish Movement for Change. This is because Barzani's party will deny them their share of weapons. In these circumstances, Baghdad will have broad margins of maneuver. And in addition, Kirkuk Province, which is controlled by the PUK, will be in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Kurdistan Province presidency.

"So we should forget the existence of accord over strategic issues, and realize that we are now faced with a phase of legitimate [Baghdad-based Shiite-led] centralism," concludes Samerrai.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 05.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

A diplomatic boon

 

Two stories dominate the front pages of Israeli newspapers on Tuesday: the weekend of protests by Israelis of Ethiopian descent and the ongoing efforts by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to forge a new coalition.

The protests by Ethiopian Israelis were sparked by a video that depicted two police officers in what appeared to be an unprovoked attack against a black IDF soldier. On Sunday, members of the Ethiopian community demonstrated in Tel Aviv, blocking main thoroughfares and bringing the city to a standstill. There are contradictory claims regarding how an originally peaceful protest turned violent – some claim that agents provocateurs from the left sparked the violence, while others blamed heavy-handed policing. By the end of the day some 50 people had been treated for injuries and the protests had become a major talking point in Israel and overseas.

On Monday, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin both met with representatives of the Ethiopian community in an effort to diffuse tensions. During a three-hour meeting, Netanyahu called for the 'eradication of racism,' adding that he would appoint a ministerial committee to address the problems the Ethiopian community complained of. Attending the meeting were Internal Security Minister Aharonovitch, Police Commissioner Yohanan Danino and Ethiopian MK Avraham Neguise – as well as the Ethiopian Israeli soldier who was beaten by police officers.

The prime minister said at the start of the meeting that he was shocked by the video documenting the beating, calling it unacceptable and adding that the situation must be changed. Police Commissioner Danino publically apologized for the assault on behalf of the police force. He said the police officers had immediately been fired.

Rivlin, meanwhile, said that the difficult scenes from the recent protests revealed an open and raw wound at the heart of Israeli society – the pain of a community crying out over a sense of discrimination, racism and of being unheard. Rivlin said Israelis must look directly at this open wound and admit that Israeli governments have not done enough.

The other main news story of the day – and the lead story in all the newspapers – was the decision by Avigdor Lieberman to resign as foreign minister and to take his Yisrael Beiteinu into the opposition, rather than join the new Netanyahu-led government. At a press conference in Jerusalem on Monday evening, Lieberman said that 'principles were more important than portfolios. What's being built is not a government of the national camp, but a government that smacks of opportunism.'

At his press conference, Lieberman said that one of the major reasons for leaving the coalition talks was the disappearance of the controversial nationality bill. 'Someone vetoed the issue and suddenly it's off the agenda,' he said. 'The coalition does not reflect the national camp position.' Lieberman also slammed the Likud agreement with United Torah Judaism, which he says will result in the cancellation of many reforms agreed upon in the last Knesset including bills regarding the military draft and the ultra-Orthodox.

With Yisrael Beiteinu officially out of the coalition, the best that Netanyahu can hope to achieve by Thursday's deadline is a narrow coalition of just 61 out of the 120 Knesset members.

Hours after making his announcement, Lieberman was interviewed by Channel 2 News, where he predicted that Netanyahu’s new coalition will be short-lived. Lieberman said he is convinced that elections will be held as early as 2016, and perhaps even later this year, but he refused to take responsibility for this possibility, claiming only the Likud is at fault. 'It's hard to function with such a government of 61 MKs,' he said, adding that when there is a narrow government 'one can pass a vote of confidence, but the parliamentary committees cannot function this way. I have a direct connection, but the Likud is responsible for this. The Likud closed a deal in advance with the ultra-Orthodox and effectively closed all options for Yisrael Beiteinu to join the government,' he said.

It is not clear at this time who will replace Lieberman as foreign minister, although speculation is rife that Netanyahu – if he does not manage to convince Isaac Herzog to bring the Zionist Union into the government – will give the post to one of two Likud stalwarts: Silvan Shalom or Yuval Steinitz.

Before yesterday, Netanyahu had only inked coalition deals with Kulanu and United Torah Judaism. On Monday night, Shas became the third party to sign on the dotted line. Shas leader Aryeh Deri will head the Economy Ministry, replacing Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett. Shas will also receive the Religious Affairs Ministry and the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, as well as a deputy minister position in the Finance Ministry. After signing the coalition deal, Deri called on Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog to join the government, saying that, 'There's a true opportunity for a socially-oriented government.'

Meanwhile, in order to cross the line and reach 61 seats, Netanyahu now has only Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett left to recruit. According to Haaretz, Likud party officials said that they have made an 'unprecedented offer' to Bennett, which includes the Education Ministry, the Diaspora Affairs portfolio, the Agriculture Ministry, the Culture and Sport Ministry and a deputy ministerial position in the Defense Ministry. In addition, Bennett was offered membership in the Security Cabinet, and control of the Settlement Division.

The Likud said in a statement, 'If Habayit Hayehudi rejects this offer, there's only one alternative to a national Likud government: A left-wing government headed by Herzog, in which there will be no representation of the religious-Zionists. A left-wing government that will evacuate settlements, compromise on Jerusalem, hurt the religious-Zionist public and capitulate to international pressures.'

The Habayit Hayehudi faction convened an emergency meeting last night, after Shas signed its coalition agreement, and authorized Bennett to continue coalition negotiations with the Likud ahead of tomorrow's deadline. Habayit Hayehudi secretary general Nir Orbach said the party is demanding another top-ranking portfolio, in addition to those offered so far in the coalition talks. According to Israel Hayom, one of Habayit Hayehudi's demands would be the highly sought-after Foreign Ministry post .However; the prime minister has already rejected this demand. Instead, he is reportedly offering Habayit Hayehudi the Education Ministry.

In other news, Breaking the Silence – an organization that works with former IDF soldiers who witnessed violations of international law during their military service – issued its report into last summer's Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. According to the testimonies gathered by the organization, there are allegations that ground troops were asked to regard everything inside Gaza as a 'threat', that they should 'not spare ammo', and that tanks fired randomly or for revenge on buildings without knowing whether they were legitimate military targets or contained civilians.

Testimony was provided by more than 60 soldiers and, according to Breaking the Silence, this raises serious questions over whether Israel’s tactics breached its obligations under international law to distinguish and protect civilians. In their testimonies, soldiers depict rules of engagement they characterize as permissive, 'lax' or largely non-existent, including how some soldiers were instructed to treat anyone seen looking towards their positions as 'scouts' to be fired on. The group also claims that the Israeli military operated with different safety margins for bombing or using artillery and mortars near civilians and its own troops, with Israeli forces at times allowed to fire significantly closer to civilians than Israeli soldiers.

Finally, Army Radio reports that the Defense Ministry carried out a test of its new rocket propulsion system on Tuesday morning. The noise startled commuters in southern and central Israel, but the Ministry stressed that the rocket launch was simply a pre-planned test. 'The test was planned by the defense establishment long in advance, and was carried out as planned,' it said. Many residents saw a long cloud of smoke trail appearing in the sky, accompanied by an ear-splitting noise. No further details were provided on the experiment, but several Israeli news sites say that the test was a ballistic missile test. 

 

 

STRAIGHT AND NARROW: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that, following Avigdor Lieberman's decision not to join the new government; Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will have a narrow coalition that can be toppled on a whim by anyone of its 61 MKs.

"In Israel's coalition democracy, there is only one thing worse than losing an election – and that is winning one.

In the 2013 election, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud Party suffered a serious blow – but the government that was established in the aftermath of that election served him well for two years. Now, with a record number of seats in the Knesset, Netanyahu is trying to put together a coalition even though, in political terms, he is stark naked. A government that is based on 61 Knesset members is not the kind of government Netanyahu wanted or is used to. It is a government of Oren Hazan: if the 33-year-old freshman Knesset wants to, he can keep the coalition's head above the water. If not, however, he can drown it. It all depends on what sides of the bed he wakes up on or who he argues with in the afternoon.

Hazan, of course, is not the only one in that position. Bezalel Smotrich, the Habayit Hayehudi MK, will also find it hard to support the government if Netanyahu's speech isn't rightist or Jewish enough for him. And then there are the left-leaning members of Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party, who will be hard pressed to support the government if it turns out that Hazan, Smotrich or some other backbencher has been given a sweetener by Netanyahu. When you're running a country with a 61-MK coalition, any slip of the tongue can become a crisis and every sigh is proof of an impending storm.

There have been Israeli governments that have survived despite having just a single-seat majority in the Knesset. There have even been minority governments. What kept them together were the authority of the prime minister and the fear of fresh elections. The members of the incoming government may be afraid of a new election, but there's very little respect toward the prime minister's authority. This lack of respect was clearly visible during the coalition negotiations, when everyone, it seems, was able to extract from the prime minister concessions in terms of money, legislation, authority, governance and all the things that Netanyahu preached about during his long political career. Netanyahu conducted a clearance sale. And what for? For an Oren Hazan government.

Avigdor Lieberman waited patiently until the last moment – and then he delivered his blow. The choice facing him after his election failure was a stark one: he could either allow himself to be appointed foreign minister in the new government, or he could join the opposition ranks. As foreign minister, he could have continued traveling the world, visiting those countries where he is still welcome, and he would have had to come to terms with the fact that this is his – and his party's – last hurrah. Next time, Yisrael Beiteinu would not cross the electoral threshold.

It's not certain that the party Lieberman founded will survive in opposition, but at least it now has a fighting chance: it will be the only party that is situated to the right of the new government. As such, it will enjoy plenty of space for rhetorical fun and games. It will be able to criticize the new government time and time again on all matters political, diplomatic and civil; it will be able to slam Netanyahu for capitulating to the ultra-Orthodox and for making far-reaching concessions to the national-religious camp.

The truth is that Lieberman had an even simpler choice to make: either join the opposition now or join it in two years. He opted to do so now for purely emotional reasons: he wanted revenge for Netanyahu's treatment of him – and he wanted it now."

Ends…

 

LIEBERMAN'S GONE: Writing on the NRG website, Shalom Yerushalmi says that Avigdor Lieberman's decision not to join the new coalition leaves Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu with the slenderest of parliamentary majority – but adds that Isaac Herzog and his Zionist Union could soon boost the numbers in the coalition.

“There is one principle that has guided Avigdor Lieberman throughout his political career: harming Binyamin Netanyahu as much as possible. Lieberman is furious with the prime minister and his new and old coalition partners; if he can rain on their parade and impinge on their celebrations – and perhaps shorten the lifespan of the fourth Netanyahu government even before it has been established, thereby dragging the country to another election – then why the hell not?

Much has been said and written about Lieberman's profound hatred of Netanyahu. The outgoing foreign minister, who announced yesterday his resignation and said that he would not be taking Yisrael Beiteinu into the coalition, believes that Netanyahu is a machine, driven by self-interest and devoid of any sentiment. As those close to him put it, Lieberman thinks that Netanyahu 'isn't a human being.' Netanyahu and Lieberman have known each other for 30 years; their relationship has had its ups and downs. Now, however, it's at an all-time low.

Lieberman would never admit as much in public – his favorite putdown for such things is to call them 'science fiction' – but sources close to him have implicated Netanyahu in corruption charges against Yisrael Beiteinu, which almost wiped the party off the political map.

Netanyahu spend many, many hours with Lieberman during the coalition negotiations and offered him the foreign and immigrant absorption ministries – even though Yisrael Beiteinu only has six MKs in the new Knesset. Lieberman understood that this was part and parcel of the game that Netanyahu plays to protect his own interests, since the prime minister did not want Yisrael Beiteinu to be in opposition. That, he knew, would leave him with the slenderest of parliamentary majorities – just one single seat. In contrast, Lieberman failed to understand why Netanyahu was so keen to keep Yisrael Beiteinu off the Knesset's Labor and Welfare Committee; given that he believes that one member of his party – Orly Levy-Abuksis – would be the perfect person to serve as chair.

Throughout the day on Monday, senior officials from the Prime Minister's Office pressed Lieberman to remain in the coalition. They agreed to several more of his demands and even offered him chairmanship of that much sought-after committee. Pressure intensified after NRG reported exclusively that Lieberman had decided to join the opposition benches, but by then it was too late.

Lieberman had already written his j'accuse letter about Netanyahu and, at a press conference he convened later in the afternoon, he called the new coalition 'opportunistic' and explained why he and his party would not be joining it. He accused it of not representing the nationalist camp, he criticized the way that coalition negotiations had been conducted, he slammed wasteful agreements between Likud and its new partners, he had harsh words for Netanyahu's decision to backtrack on several important bills on civil matters and – of course – he accused the prime minister himself of being irresponsible and indecisive.

Netanyahu, therefore, is now left with a coalition of 61 MKs. It is possible to build a government with such a slender majority, but it's hard to survive. Netanyahu will start with a narrow government, therefore, and try to expand its wingspan in the future. Lieberman is sure that the Zionist Union is waiting around the corner to join the coalition. I, too, would take with a pinch of salt the denials by Isaac Herzog, who insists that he will not take his party into the Netanyahu government. If Herzog does not join forces with Netanyahu now, he can do so later. After all, the alternative facing him – and facing Netanyahu, too, for that matter – is rather grim.

Ends…

 

THE DESTROYER OF THE RIGHT: Writing in Israel Hayom, Mati Tuchfeld accuses Avigdor Lieberman of political opportunism and says that the former foreign minister has joined forces with those who want to overthrow Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

"The few remaining Knesset members from Yisrael Beiteinu – a party that came close to being wiped out in the March election – are usually nothing more than scenery for the party leader. Even they found it difficult yesterday to contain themselves when they heard the reasons that party chairman Avigdor Lieberman cited as the explanation for his decision not to join the new Likud-led coalition.

Lieberman's convoluted and bizarre arguments, which he explained for more than half an hour at a press conference yesterday, came after a series of critical statements that he has made in recent weeks – some of which sounded justified, others were rather detached from reality. But they failed to address one simple yet key question: How can Lieberman explain the façade that Yisrael Beiteinu has put on for months, whereby it claimed to be part of the right-wing camp?

There's no question that the coalition that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is about to unveil will be the most right-wing in recent years. Unlike previous governments, which always contained some left-wing elements, the next coalition will be formed from exclusively rightist parties. The national camp has not been this homogenous or this strong for a generation. The entire political system, from the right and the left, believed that the new government will serve its entire four-year term.

Lieberman's decision not to join the coalition means that he will be remembered from now on as the politician who tried to destroy the right. Every time the Knesset fails to pass a right-wing bill, every time the leftist opposition manages to thwart the government, every party that Netanyahu is forced to bring into the government in order to fill the void and – god forbid – when the prime minister is forced to call an early election, will have one clear address: Lieberman, who has hoodwinked voters more than any other politician since Ariel Sharon and his disengagement from Gaza.

Lieberman claimed yesterday that Netanyahu's coalition deal with United Torah Judaism effectively sold out the country to the ultra-Orthodox. He himself was a member of a coalition with ultra-Orthodox parties in 2009 and he agreed to sit with them in the previous government – under exactly the same conditions. After all, Isaac Herzog and even Yair Lapid agreed to those same conditions. Lieberman said that the new government does not represent the nationalist camp and he cited the failure to push through the so-called Jewish state bill as a prime example. He would appear to have forgotten, however, how he rushed to join the Kadima-Labor government when Ehud Olmert was prime minister. At the time, Olmert was working on his own version of the disengagement – the so-called Convergence Plan – and was willing to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.

All of a sudden, the most important thing on the Yisrael Beiteinu leader's agenda is the Jewish-state bill? Why? Because he's not a rightist. Lieberman does whatever he thinks is best for Lieberman. In this case, motivated by a strong sense of vengeance against the people he believes have destroyed his party, he reached the conclusion that his interests would be best served by joining forces with all those who want to overthrow Netanyahu – in Israel and aboard. He has thrown in his lot with the rich and powerful, who wield massive influence over the media. His dream is that, one day, these people will help him to rebuild his battered party."

Ends…

 

TENSION: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem comments on rising regional tensions and points the finger of blame at Iran.

“On April 28 the Syrian defense minister, General Fahd Jassim al-Freij, made a surprise visit to Tehran where, with the backdrop of the escalating battles in Syria and the weakening of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, he met with his Iranian counterpart.

In a joint press conference in Tehran, the two emphasized that 'Syria and Iran, and the resistance axis, will not allow the enemies to achieve their goals in the region, and Iran supports Syria unstintingly in its strategic relations with it.'

Iran is very concerned about the situation in Syria. The military assistance it gives the Assad regime for its war against the rebels has turned out to be insufficient. Nor has Hizbollah’s role in fighting alongside the Syrian army stopped the rebels’ progress toward Damascus and the city of Latakia on the northern Syrian coast.

The rebels have formed a coalition of several organizations, including the Islamic State under the name Jeish el-Fateh, which has scored successes on the battlefield. They have conquered the Idlib province and effectively cut off the capital, Damascus, from the city of Aleppo. They have also taken control of the town of Jisr al–Shughour on the Idlib-Latakia route, and on April 20, 2014 fierce battles were waged in the Latakia area, which is considered one of the strongholds of the Alawite regime. And in the southern Daraa region, rebels managed to seize the Nasib border crossing, which has served as a free trade area between Jordan and Syria.

If the rebels’ advance toward Damascus from the east and north continues, Iran will not be able to stand aside; it will have to intervene even more significantly in the battles. It is in this context that one should see the Syrian defense minister’s visit to Tehran. Iran is determined to do all it can to save Assad’s regime.

According to various sources, Qatar has been able to persuade the new Saudi king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, to halt his alliance with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates against the Muslim Brotherhood and, instead, forge a new triangle with Turkey and Qatar that will strongly support the Islamist rebels’ coalition against the Assad regime.

In Yemen, despite Saudi Arabia’s announcement on April 21, 2015 that it was stopping the aerial bombing, the battles continue. Iran has no intention of giving in, and the Houthi rebels exploited the halt in the bombing to try and make military gains. Over the weekend there were also clashes along Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia announced that the Houthi rebels had attacked across the Yemeni border and that the Saudi army had killed dozens of their fighters.

The tension with Iran exists in both the naval and aerial domains. After Saudi Arabia announced it was stopping the aerial bombings in Yemen, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif declared a new Iranian naval strategy called the 'broader Persian Gulf strategy.' On May 1, the official Iranian news agency IRNA, citing Iranian naval commander General Habib Allah Siyari, reported the Iranian navy plans to dispatch its fleet’s ships on July 11 to the area of the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

In the aftermath of the incident on April 28 in which five Iranian battleships intercepted the Marshall Islands-flagged container ship Maersk Tigris and forced it to sail to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, American destroyers have moved into position to protect American-flagged container ships crossing through the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran claims that the April 28 incident stemmed from a commercial conflict over a financial debt, the Pentagon has issued a statement calling the incident a 'provocation.'

It appears that Iran took this step in response to USS-Sterett destroyer searching a Panamanian-flagged ship Saisaban on April 1 in waters near Yemen, suspecting it was carrying Iranian weapons for the rebels in Yemen.

To this one should add an aerial incident that occurred in Yemen on April 28, 2014 after an Iranian 'relief' plane entered Yemeni airspace and tried to land at Sana’a’s airport, on the claim that it was Yemeni rather than Saudi airspace. To prevent the plane from landing, Saudi air force pilots bombed the runway at the Sana’a airport.

Iran will not allow itself to lose the strategic strongholds it has gained in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, nor its de facto control over four Arab capitals (Baghdad, Damascus, Sana’a, and Beirut). It appears, then, that on those fronts where its allies are losing strength, Iran will have to ramp up its direct military involvement so as to safeguard its gains."

Ends…

 

 

ISRAEL'S SURPRISING DILEMMA: Writing on the website of i24 television station, Danny Rubinstein comments on Israel's dilemma regarding the fate of the Palestinian Authority.

"In recent days reports have surfaced regarding efforts to bring about reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Is such reconciliation possible? And what is the goal of the governments in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Cairo?

The recent efforts included a statement by Ramallah spokesman Ehab Bsseiso that the prime minister of the Palestinian national consensus government, Rami Hamdallah, and a group of ministers were about to visit Gaza. He did not give a date, or the names of the ministers. Such a visit took place more than two weeks ago and ended with great embarrassment. Prime Minister Hamdallah decided to travel to a conference in Indonesia instead of Gaza, and his ministers who traveled from Ramallah to Gaza left disappointed.

Now the new UN Envoy to the Middle East, Nikolay Mladenov, is trying to promote reconciliation. Such reconciliation is necessary to accelerate efforts to rebuild the Strip and take Gaza and its 1.8 million residents out of the cycle of wars that has devastated the enclave thrice in the last eight years.

But reconciliation is a moot point for one simple reason: Hamas won’t give up control of Gaza - specifically of the security forces. Hamas is only willing to cede control of civilian affairs to the government in Ramallah. 'Hamas wants us to pay the salaries of its people in Gaza without having any responsibility as to what happens there,' one of the spokespeople in Ramallah said recently.

Meanwhile, violence between Hamas supporters and opponents in Gaza is escalating. Over the weekend, youths who call themselves 'The April 29th Movement' held a demonstration in Gaza, calling for reconciliation, but it ended in clashes with police.

Policymakers in Israel appear to have accepted the fact that reconciliation is impossible and that Hamas will continue to rule the Strip. Last week Israeli media reported that Mohammed Deif, who was thought to have been assassinated by Israel in the summer 2014 Gaza war, had returned to lead the Hamas military wing and that relations were tense between him and the political leadership in Gaza which is inclined to adopt a long-term truce with Israel.

Many in Ramallah believe that Israel supports continued Hamas control of Gaza. This could well be true. Clearly, despite the ongoing military preparations to attack Israel, such as digging of more assault tunnels - Hamas seeks to maintain the truce put in place at the end of the war last August, at least for the coming year. That is why it has been preventing, by and large, the firing of rockets at Israel. Given the political struggle between Jerusalem and Ramallah, Israel is likely happier with a weakened Palestinian Authority than with one empowered by receiving control of Gaza.

But the Israeli position is also inconclusive. Outgoing Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has demanded time and again that the new government (which will probably be installed next week) clearly declare its intention to bring down Hamas. There is no doubt that Israel is capable of conquering the whole Strip in a short time. But the problem is not of capability, but rather of willingness to do so. And that willingness is missing.

A correct reading of the political map indicates that the only option for ending the Hamas reign in Gaza is to let it collapse. Politically, Hamas is besieged and isolated. Egypt considers it a terrorist organization and has been blocking the Rafah crossing between the Strip and the Sinai, which is a vital lifeline for Gaza and its impoverished residents. Hamas is attempting to forge ties and obtain aid from other Arab countries, but the only country willing to do so is Qatar, and it is unclear how much longer that support will last. Turkey helps out a bit, but Hamas attempts to get assistance from Saudi Arabia and Iran have not been very successful. Ideologically, Hamas, as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, is considered an enemy of both Tehran and Riyadh.

Hamas does not have the money to pay its 40,000 employees. This month, between 50 and 65 percent of their salaries were cut, with the minimum set at NIS1,000 (about $250). Hamas chiefs are accusing Ramallah of preventing the payment of salaries, and UN envoy Mladenov is continuing his efforts to guarantee payment for the civilian government clerks in Gaza, most of them employees of the education and health systems hired by Hamas in recent years. How long can Hamas hold on? Hard to say. What is clear for the time being is that Hamas is not angling for another war, not yet. Given the region’s instability, that, too, is a lot."

Ends…

 

DEMISE OF THE TOP DIPLOMAT: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Gil Hoffman comments on the resignation of Avigdor Lieberman as foreign minister, saying that it seems logical that the real reason for the decision is personal, rather than ideological or political.

"Yisrael Beiteinu's Avigdor Lieberman may have done a service to Israeli public diplomacy when he announced his departure from the Foreign Ministry Monday.

He did this not by quitting and giving up a chance to remain foreign minister for another few years – Foreign Ministry staff has said that, despite criticism, he ran the ministry well and appointed the right diplomats in the right places. Rather, the service Lieberman did to Israeli public diplomacy came in his words when announcing his resignation. In his diatribe, Lieberman repeatedly slammed Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu from the Right.

In an attack that could make it easier for diplomats around the world to defend Netanyahu’s new government, Lieberman painted the prime minister as the ultimate dove. Netanyahu would not commit to building in settlements and in Jerusalem neighborhoods over the pre-1967 lines. He won’t pass the nation-state bill. He refused to commit to toppling Hamas. He transferred money to the Palestinian Authority. He reiterated his support for a Palestinian state. So much for the hard-line, extreme right-wing government the international media has portrayed Netanyahu as building.

An interviewer on Al-Jazeera sounded amused with Lieberman's characterization of Netanyahu Monday. After hearing Lieberman's principled argument, the interviewer asked for the real reason for his decision.

Decisions made by politicians tend to have three components: Ideology, politics and personal issues.

Lieberman's ideology can be questioned. He has shifted leftward and rightward at a dizzying pace over the past year. He is against bloated governments but served in many. He is against concessions to the ultra-Orthodox but joined coalitions in which plenty of those gestures were made. But, from his point of view, Lieberman has remained ideologically consistent and his word remains his bond.

Politically, the move makes no sense. Lieberman is giving up the chance to become Israel’s longest-serving foreign minister, passing the legendary Abba Eban. Instead of receiving an enhanced Foreign Ministry that for the first time would include authority over relations with the United States and tackling the Iran issue, he will sit in the opposition next to Meretz leader Zahava Gal- On. The Russian immigrants who were almost all but half a mandate of Yisrael Beiteinu's electorate will not have Sofa Landver to serve them in the Immigration and Absorption Ministry. But, if he brings Netanyahu down soon, he could expedite his own political renaissance.

That leaves personal. Sources close to Lieberman said he is frustrated with years of working with Netanyahu and can no longer stand him. They said he still has not recovered from the incident in which Netanyahu committed to consult with him on which presidential candidate other than Reuven Rivlin to support and then Lieberman heard on the radio that Netanyahu had endorsed Rivlin.

Another source close to Lieberman said the investigation against Yisrael Beiteinu, along with the recent death of his mother, had hit him especially hard. He thought he was done with investigations for good, and his mother would see him advance to the top, but it was not meant to be.

Lieberman caused the election by refusing to let Netanyahu form a 61-MK coalition with Shas and United Torah Judaism last December. His departure now will result in the very same 61-MK coalition dominated by the ultra-Orthodox he sought to prevent.

The influence of the ultra-Orthodox will not make the government look too palatable to the international community and much of Diaspora Jewry. But perhaps the world will be able to rest a bit easier knowing that, at least according to Lieberman, the government won’t be right wing."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.05.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

KURDISH PROBLEM/TURKISH ELECTIONS: Rahmi Turan argues that the government has changed its tune on the Kurdish peace process in secular, Kemalist tabloid Sozcu: "The peace process is blocked for now, according to HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] member Sureyya Onder. This was only to be expected. For years, we have been saying that sitting at the table and negotiating with terrorists who have weapons in their hands was sheer nonsense. Tayyip Erdogan, who was then prime minister, insisted on a settlement, and said they were going to resolve the Kurdish problem. Now the same Erdogan is saying the complete opposite. The ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) is apparently panicking because it can see its votes shifting toward the opposition parties. That is why its narrative has changed."

 

MAY DAY PROTESTS: Guneri Civaoglu fears for what may happen at today’s planned May Day protests in centrist Milliyet: "May 1st poses a painful challenge once again. The government has closed Taksim Square [Istanbul site of previous protests]. The worker-civil servant unions and NGOs are determined to gather at Taksim. I hope there will be no incidents. What is behind this mutual attitude of obstinacy?"

Oral Calislar calls for peaceful celebrations in centre-left Radikal: "Due to the tense climate, May 1st has not been celebrated in Istanbul as the festival of workers for a long time. The workers cannot express their demands. Let us accept that the party actually responsible for this is the government that does not open the square to demonstrations. But are those who insist on entering the square despite the ban, not preparing the atmosphere for those irresponsible elements that just want to confuse matters? It is possible to celebrate May 1st in a peaceful manner despite the ban."

Gungor Mengi charges the government with over-reaction in centrist Vatan: "They say that 40,000 policemen will be on duty at Taksim today. 40,000 policemen will be deployed to a square where there will be 10,000 demonstrators at most. Why? Is it necessary to be afraid of Taksim Square forever? With the impending general elections, and if chaos is not the object, is it impossible for the police to take the necessary measures beforehand and open Taksim to both workers and unions on a day that is globally celebrated as the Workers' Festival? We all want May 1st to end without incident, but one should not also forget that the right to celebrate festivals and demonstrate is also a constitutional right."

Emre Kongar suggests that the government suffers from political agoraphobia in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Democratic governments are not afraid of streets and squares, because democratic governments arise from there! Democracy does not live behind closed doors, but on the streets and squares. Governments of countries on whose streets and squares there is no democracy, are not democratic! Agoraphobia means the fear of open spaces and crowds." 

Ihsan Caralan accuses Ankara of police terror tactics in leftist Evrensel: "The Istanbul governor and the AKP government behind him who have ordered the May 1st ban on Taksim and defended it by absurdly evoking six legal articles, seem to have achieved their goal this year. In fact, they have declared martial law in Istanbul today. They want to suffocate the city with tear gas and water cannons, and leave it to police terror." 

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.05.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Kicking the Syrian ball

2-De Mistura’s mistake

3-Gulf changes

4-Connected fronts

 

1-Kicking the Syrian ball

 

The pro-resistance public has no real reason to reconsider its confidence in victory or to cast doubt on the resistance's choices. It can blame the resistance axis for demonstrating too much leniency, for its hastiness in reaching settlements before the end of battles, for its excessive concern for its enemies, and for an unjustified tendency to ensure that they do not lose face even though they want nothing but humiliation for the resistance axis. The public expects responses from its leaders of the sort that leave no doubt about what Israel is claiming regarding air raids that have been carried out in the Qalamoun and that have targeted resistance sites and arms shipments and that have remained without response. The public wants responses of the sort that would regain Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, confront Turkey and Jordan with the possibility of border wars, deliver unhesitant Yemeni messages of strength to Saudi Arabia, and set aside the formal obstacles to the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMU) participation in Iraq's battles to drive back the threat from al-Anbar. The public wants Syria to be given sufficient power to allow it to threaten a border war, or to receive similar support to that that its enemies are receiving on the other side of the borders, at least--Nasser Qandil Lebanese al-Bina'

 

It is as if we were dealing with a ball that is being passed between the feet of the players fighting in and over Syria. Whenever the regime makes some advances or ‘breaches’ on some battlefront, its discourse assumes a tone that mocks the opposition. Its spokespersons assume a condescending aspect that tends towards the logic – or illogic – of ‘decisive military victory.’ And the same thing, sometimes couched in ‘muscular’ tones, happens whenever the various opposition groups succeed in advancing or making breaches on some front. Reaching the Presidential Palace in Damascus and dismantling and reconstituting the army and the security forces then become the opposition groups’ ‘minimal’ program. The conclusion is that no one seems to have benefited from the lessons of the past four bloody years that have inflicted the worst, most painful and most far-reaching losses on Syria as a state, nation, and society.  The fact is that the recent gains achieved by the opposition on more than one front will remain tentative until further notice, and open to reversal until the opposite is proven to be true-- ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

The pro-Iranian-led resistance’s public appears to be increasingly concerned because of the opposite Saudi-led axis’ recent advances on a number of fronts, and the leniency with which these advances have been addressed so far, notes the editor-in-chief of a Lebanese daily. But it seems that the month of May will be the month of resistance responses. There are good reasons why it may be too early for the Syrian opposition groups to celebrate the regime’s setbacks in the north and south of the country, warns a leading Jordanian commentator. Such setbacks have usually proven reversible in the past, indicating that there is no military solution for the crisis, and that it can only be finally resolved via a regional political agreement whose moment has yet to arrive. But meanwhile there is the genuine prospect of Syria’s partition.

 

WORRIED PUBLIC: "The public that supports the pro-resistance axis – which stretches from Iran to Iraq to Syria to Lebanon to Yemen – is worried," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The source of its concern is a sense that there has been an incomprehensible leniency in dealing with the Saudi/Turkish/Israeli triangle's successful counterattacks. There is also a sense that this triangle has moved to an all-out counteroffensive, making use of the feeling of victory that swept the pro-resistance axis after the in-principle nuclear agreement between Tehran and the '5 + 1' states, and after Saudi Arabia announced the end of Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen.

According to the public's criticism of its leaders, the patience and caution displayed as the Houthi current's has refrained from retaliating to Saudi attacks in Yemen and which was meant to leave space for a Saudi retreat, have produced a war of attrition instead, whose price is being paid by the Yemenis and that is only fuelling the level of Saudi conceit. There was no action along the borders, no [Houthi] missiles were fired [at Saudi Arabia], and the Bab al-Mandab Straits was not shut down.

Moreover, the pro-resistance public is confident that all this was and remains possible, especially after they heard the resistance's [Hizbollah’s] leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah say the resistance remains capable of action. For they have grown accustomed to hearing nothing but accurate assessments from him, and have total confidence in him and believe that he is most credible to both friends and enemies alike. We also heard [Yemeni Houthi leader] Sayyid 'Abdelmalik al-Houthi talk about ‘all options being on the table’ to his forces, which only added to the public’s optimism. But the Saudis announced an end to the war without actually ending it, thereby allowing them to continue it but without eliciting any punishment in return.

But what has especially aggravated concerns is what has happened in Syria, especially after the dramatic and successive fall of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour into the opposition’s hands. For had that been part of a plan to retreat as a means of luring the enemy into a trap, we would have witnessed the results by now. Moreover, what was strange was that these retreats seem to have occurred without any fighting that preceded or obstructed them. Meanwhile reports from al-Anbar in Iraq do not bear any glad tidings either. This has been followed by suspect behavior on the part of the U.S., which seems to be proceeding with plans to partition Iraq by way of distributing quotas of weapons to the various sects.

The result of all this is that the resistance axis has seemed somewhat weak as if its forces have lost control, and as a consequence of which they have grown soft and lost the wind in their sails. Their forces seem to lack mastery of the art of defensive fighting, even though they previously offered a model of how to achieve victory in offensive combat.

At the same time, the pro-resistance public counts as a point in the resistance leaders' favor that they have politically and diplomatically succeeded in Yemen by undermining the Saudi wager on the UN Security Council. They also count this as a point in Iran's favor, because it displayed a spirit of defiance on both land and in the air when it tried to land a plane filled with supplies at Sana'a Airport, and when it impounded an American ship and led it by force to an Iranian port – a display of power that demonstrated who has the upper hand in the Gulf's waters and air.

Yet the above does not satisfy the anger of the pro-resistance axis's public. This is especially true in light of the rising American voices in parallel with the attacks in Syria that are using the language of the past and its machismo posturing once again. At the same time, Syrian opposition leaders have emerged on the eve of the Geneva talks, using a tone other than that they have been using over the previous year when they were in a state of utter confusion, moving from one failure to another.

Moreover, in Iraq, and after the victories in Tikrit when ISIS leaders were on the retreat, these same leaders are taking hold of the initiative again. And in the Yemen war, and after the Saudis appointed Yemeni PM Khaled Bahah as Deputy President as a prelude to a settlement, they are now again clinging to [President] Mansour Hadi, with the same conceited discourse of revelry raising its head once more.

But the pro-resistance public has no real reason to reconsider its confidence in victory or to cast doubt on the resistance's choices. It can blame the resistance axis for demonstrating too much leniency, for its hastiness in reaching settlements before the end of battles, for its excessive concern for its enemies, and for an unjustified tendency to ensure that they do not lose face even though they want nothing but humiliation for the resistance axis.

The public expects responses from its leaders of the sort that leave no doubt about what Israel is claiming regarding air raids that have been carried out in the Qalamoun and that have targeted resistance sites and arms shipments and that have remained without response. The public wants responses of the sort that would regain Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, confront Turkey and Jordan with the possibility of border wars, deliver unhesitant Yemeni messages of strength to Saudi Arabia, and set aside the formal obstacles to the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMU) participation in Iraq's battles to drive back the threat from al-Anbar. The public wants Syria to be given sufficient power to allow it to threaten a border war, or to receive similar support to that that its enemies are receiving on the other side of the borders, at least.

As for the time factor, the public knows what its leaders know – that there is little time left before the end of June, the date for signing a final nuclear agreement, and that there is a race with time to impose a fait accompli by force before that deadline. For this reason, this public believes that Washington is not far from what has been happening, trying to barter a victory for a defeat, and preparing the negotiating table based on a balance that achieves what Washington wants, namely, an unstable equilibrium and an end to the Iranian challenge by allowing the nuclear understanding to pass without cost.

Sources close to the resistance axis's leaders say that the month of May will be that of responses. They draw attention to the fact that such a response has already begun via the Yemeni borders; that Syria is preparing to react; and the Qalamoun has a date with major change, and the same in al-Anbar.

"As for the means of dealing with Israel's Hollywood-style posturing, that is a different matter with its own calculations, one that will be addressed when the time comes," concludes Qandil.

End…

 

QUALITATIVE OPPOSITION BREAKTHROUGHS: “The confrontations of the past three months have clearly ended in disappointing results for the Syrian regime and its allies,” writes ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

The armed opposition movements, with the Nusra Front at their core, have made qualitative breakthroughs on numerous fronts – from the southern provinces, to Idlib, to Sahl al-Ghab, to most recently, Jisr ash-Shughour. The regime has been at the receiving end of painful and ‘strategic’ blows on all these fronts, spreading anger, concern, and wariness in its ranks and those of its allies and supporters.

But the psychological warfare and hostile media coverage that have accompanied these blows have gone too far in assessing their importance. They have exaggerated their significance and repercussions for the overall conflict in Syria, so much so, that some have already begun to speak of Assad’s imminent fall. Some ‘zealots’ have gone even further, and have demanded the regime’s dismantlement and reassembly. An opposition military spokesman has promised to reach the Presidential Palace in Damascus soon, while others are speaking of a Syrian ‘Ta’if Agreement [1989 Saudi-sponsored agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war] that Riyadh is now trying to organize without Assad and at his expense.

The campaign that has accompanied the military strikes has succeeded in reaching the ranks of the regime and its supporters. The official Syrian media’s tone betrays a sense of gloom and is riddled with ‘self-consolatory’ terms: Escalation in the discourse that calls for backing and rallying around the Syrian army and that expresses confidence in its ability to achieve victory; criticism of Damascus’s Iranian allies in the media that is close to this axis because of the Iranians’ suspicious silence that reeks of a reluctance to back the Syrian army; and assessments and speculations that are flying around in every direction.

But the most dangerous thing about this debate that is raging parallel to what is happening on the battlefield is the renewed talk of a ‘decisive military victory’. It is as if we were dealing with a ball that is being passed between the feet of the players fighting in and over Syria. Whenever the regime makes some advances or ‘breaches’ on some battle front, its discourse assumes a tone that mocks the opposition. Its spokespersons assume a condescending aspect that tends towards the logic – or illogic – of ‘decisive military victory.’ And the same thing, sometimes couched in ‘muscular’ tones, happens whenever the various opposition groups succeed in advancing or making breaches on some front. Reaching the Presidential Palace in Damascus and dismantling and reconstituting the army and the security forces then become the opposition groups’ ‘minimal’ program.

The conclusion is that no one seems to have benefited from the lessons of the past four bloody years that have inflicted the worst, most painful and most far-reaching losses on Syria as a state, nation, and society.

The fact is that the recent gains achieved by the opposition on more than one front will remain tentative until further notice, and open to reversal until the opposite is proven to be true. For they have come against the background of escalating foreign intervention after Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara have agreed to set aside their disagreements and focus on backing a mini Decisive Storm waged on Syria. But this cannot be taken for granted for long in a rapidly changing region that sleeps to one map of alliances and positions, only to wake up to another.

Furthermore, the major winner in the battles of recent months is the Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida’s ‘exclusive agent’ and official branch in Syria. And this gives rise to fears and concerns among numerous parties for various reasons:

- First, the U.S., the West in general, and some Arab and regional states still view the Nusra Front as a terrorist faction. They have not accepted the claim by the tripartite [Saudi/Qatari/Turkish] axis that it is a potentially ‘moderate’ movement, part of the ‘revolution,’ and one of the factors pushing for change and a solution in Syria.

- Second, while it is true that the Nusra Front has adopted more flexible tactics than those that ISIS’s Islamic state has accustomed us to, the history of Nusra’s relations with its armed opposition allies– including the Islamists – is an exceptionally bloody one. It is not unlikely for it to turn against today’s allies who will become tomorrow’s enemies and become legitimate targets for assassinations, car bombs, and pursuit. Once that happens, we will be back at the scene of continuous splits in opposition circles and the opposition groups’ endless internal squabbles that usually enable the regime to achieve gains on the ground with the least amount of loss.

- Third, the regime and its allies have yet to have their final word regarding the fate of the areas they have lost. Has the regime accepted the fall of Idlib, Jisr ash-Shughour, Bosra ash-Sham, the Nasib border crossing [with Jordan], and Sahl al-Ghab into its enemies’ hands? Or will we be witnessing battles in which advances and retreats occur? Did similar things not happen on numerous battlefronts before?

If there is a lesson to be learnt from the past month’s developments on the ground, it is that a ‘decisive military victory’ is not an option for Syria. A political solution is the sole way out of the current cul-de-sac. Moreover, the states that have been partners to the creation and exacerbation of the Syrian crisis cannot unilaterally secure the exclusive agency to resolve that crisis. There is no alternative to a regional accord on the need for a political solution for this crisis; otherwise, we will continue to be trapped in the same vortex of killing, death, and destruction for many years to come.

The preconditions for such a solution still do not exist. But the region is on the threshold of significant developments over the coming two months. Most important are, the fate of the Lausanne nuclear agreement and whether or not it will be complemented by a final agreement, and the fate of the conflict in Yemen and how the parties will deal with it, and what priority they will give it.

So far, it is not possible to say that Yemen is more important than Syria in the Iranian and Russian calculations of their priorities. It is true that it is ahead in Saudi calculations, for example; but the failure to achieve any breakthrough on the Yemeni front may push Riyadh into seeking a victory on the Syrian track. In that case, it would find eager partners who are willing to go all the way with it till the end of the line – from Doha and Ankara, to some Western capitals.

If the course of confrontations in Syria continues along the same track, and if the regime and its allies continue to retreat and squander their chances, it is not unlikely that [Turkish President] Mr. Erdogan will succeed in achieving his old/new dream of imposing a buffer zone and a no-fly zone in northern Syria. Aleppo may then be the second target of the Antioch [opposition] operations room. In that case, we would be facing an actual partition of Syria that may be followed by other similar partitions in the Syrian south.

Such a scenario may be implemented under the banner of ‘reconstituting the balance of power as a prelude to a political solution.’ But the various parties’ conflicting interests and the escalating pace of regional intervention in the Syrian crisis may render a supposedly temporary solution into a permanent one. In that case, Syria’s partition would become the sole realistically possible solution. For is this not the most realistic scenario in neighboring Iraq, for example?

“The battle remains open to various possibilities and it is difficult to build on the current ‘victory celebrations’ that have been launched here or there. Syria is now part of the regional/international scene. And there are no solutions for the Syrian crisis in isolation of the struggle that this region is fighting out against itself across all its maps,” concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-De Mistura’s mistake

 

It would be a grave mistake if UN Envoy de Mistura were to invite Iran to attend next week’s Geneva consultations without first dropping Tehran’s support for the Syrian regime, says today’s Saudi al-Watan

 

It would be a grave mistake on the part of UN Syrian envoy Staffan de Mistura to invite Iran to next week’s scheduled Geneva consultations on the Syrian crisis, warns the editorial in a Saudi daily – unless Iran has come to the conviction that it should end its support for the Assad regime and is now willing to allow it to fall.

 

MANY QUESTIONS: "UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura's insistence that Iran should be party to the international consultations over the Syrian crisis which will be held in Geneva next Monday, raises many questions," writes the editorial in Friday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

The entire world now knows that Iran is part of the problem in the Syrian crisis, and a major focal point for all the region's crises. In fact, Tehran's leaders no longer have any qualms about stating this publicly.

If de Mistura believes that Iran can cooperate with the international community and contribute to ending the Syrian crisis, he is heading down the wrong path – unless Tehran has reached the conviction that the Syrian regime has ended and its days are numbered, and that it has been wagering on a losing horse and has reached a dead-end in defending it and sending its Revolutionary Guard fight on its behalf, and thus wants to extract itself from the crisis with the least possible loss, presenting itself to everyone as a peace-loving state.

Moreover, the imminent Geneva consultations come at a time that is awkward for the Syrian regime, which has begun to teeter on the edge and lose one area after another. The statement made by head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC) that his group will take part in the consultations but reject 'any political settlement that does not include Assad's departure' will be embarrassing for Tehran, which is fighting on the Syrian regime's side, and for Moscow as well, which is backing that regime and supplying it with weapons.

The fear remains that these consultations are a mere palliative that will revive the Syrian regime. The fact that they are planned to last for some six weeks grants the Assad regime an opportunity to catch its breath and try to regain some of the areas it has lost, in the hope that it would then be able to negotiate from a position of strength. But this seems impossible in light of what is happening on the ground.

De Mistura's problem is that he has so far failed to link the terrorist organizations to the terrorist regimes. He has forgotten the terrorist regimes or those that support terrorism, even though he has noted that the terrorist organizations will not take part in the Geneva consultations.

In short, if Iran wishes to contribute to resolving the Syrian crisis and the other crises in the region, it can do so if it displays good intentions. But perhaps the best indication that it is pursuing a path opposite to that of peace comes from its desperate attempts to provide the Houthi putschists with weapons, despite the UN Security Council resolution banning this under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

"So what peace can this be that is based on the destruction of countries, coups against legitimacy, and taking sides against the will of nations?" asks the daily in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

3-Gulf changes

 

The recent wide-ranging changes at the top in Saudi Arabia suggest a new Saudi foreign policy and some possible new moves on Yemen, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The two most important features of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministerial meeting yesterday (Thursday) were the absence of veteran Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal who has been replaced by a new Saudi foreign minister, and the attendance of the Oman foreign minister, which suggests that an Omani peace initiative regarding Yemen may be imminent, maintains the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily.

 

PREPARING FOR THE SUMMIT: "GCC foreign ministers held a meeting in Riyadh yesterday (Thursday) to prepare for next Tuesday’s consultative [Arab Gulf] summit to discuss the Yemeni crisis and its developments, and reach an agreement on a united position towards the issues that the Gulf leaders will discuss with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington and at the Camp David retreat on May 13th and 14th," writes the editorial on Friday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Two major features of this meeting cannot be ignored in trying to understand what is happening in the Arabian Gulf:

- First, this is the first time in almost forty years that veteran Saudi former foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal is absent from GCC foreign ministers' meeting. The new Foreign Minister Mr 'Adel al-Jubeir replaced him, contrary to most predictions that this 'sovereign' ministerial portfolio would be reserved for a member of the Saudi ruling family.

- Second, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin 'Alawi attended the meeting, even though he had absented himself from the urgent meeting called for by Saudi monarch King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz on March 21st to discuss the means of backing Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the possibility of carrying out air strikes to end the Houthi forces' advance on Aden.

There is no doubt that Prince Saud al-Faisal's absence will leave a huge vacuum. He has been the major player in all the GCC's foreign ministerial meetings since 1981. But change is the nature of life and one of the most important requirements of government. Moreover, the man's health is not so good. Signs of exhaustion were clearly visible on his face during his participation at the recent Sharm el-Sheikh Arab summit. His hands were trembling and his speech was incomprehensible. This is only normal for someone like him who has had seven operations on his back, with rumors that he suffers from Parkinson's Disease. In fact, he admitted as much when he responded jokingly to a question about his health at a press conference, saying that it was similar to that of the Arab nation these days!

Prince Saud al-Faisal's departure from his 'den' at the Foreign Ministry was part of a 'white coup' led by the new Saudi monarch. This involved over 37 royal edicts that toppled more than 15 ministers, as well as the former crown-prince (Prince Muqrin), consolidating the power of the two most powerful emirs in the Kingdom – new Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif, and Mohammad bin Salman who is now Deputy Crown-Prince and Defense Minister.

This 'coup' seems to have elicited the least negative reaction from within the ruling family circles. A number of signs support this assumption, most notably the fact that deposed crown prince Muqrin bin Abdelaziz went to the Royal Palace in Riyadh to pledge allegiance to the new regime and crown-prince. There is also the Saudi monarch’s noteworthy visit to Prince Muqrin's palace, perhaps to appease him and win him over – even though no reports have been leaked in this regard, nor any signal as to whether this visit occurred before or after Muqrin's pledge of allegiance.

The GCC's foreign ministerial meeting in Riyadh came amidst intensive calls at the meeting for launching a national dialogue with the participation of the various parties to the Yemeni crisis. This confirms the importance of Mr Yusuf bin 'Alawi's attendance. There is much talk these days that the Sultanate of Oman is about to launch an initiative calling for such a dialogue and perhaps hosting it given its 'neutral' stance towards this crisis.

Now that Operation Decisive Storm has completed its first month without achieving most of its aims – restoring the legitimate president [Hadi] to Yemen, or ending the advances by the Houthis and their allies president Saleh in the southern provinces – it has become inevitable to search for peaceful ways out of the crisis. This is especially urgent in light of the Yemeni citizens' suffering after the breakdown of electricity and water supplies, the destruction of Yemen's airports, and the dearth of basic food and medical supplies in a country that is one of the twenty poorest in the world, if not the absolutely poorest.

It was not strange for the GCC foreign ministers not to take any important decisions at their meeting on Thursday. Such decisions will be left to next Tuesday’s consultative meeting. The one new and noteworthy aspect of this meeting was the new Saudi Foreign Minister 'Adel al-Jubeir's attendance. This is one of the most prominent signs of change in Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy.

"That policy will be totally different to that that preceded it, even though it may be difficult to issue any verdict regarding its nature or predict its outcome," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

4-Connected fronts

 

The Golan Heights, South Lebanon and the Israeli-Hizbollah balance of power have all become part of the same dangerous scene that could lead to a deepening Israeli involvement in Syria, says Randa Haidar in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah has become extremely complicated this year and is now intimately connected to the war raging in Syria, maintains a Lebanese commentator on Israeli affairs. A limited confrontation between the two sides could easily develop into a large-scale war that could drag Israel into the Syrian conflict in a manner that it has so far been trying to avoid.

 

RECENT EVIDENCE: "Now that more than four years have passed on the civil war that has been raging in Syria, it has become clear that any future confrontation between the Israeli army and Hizbollah will not occur in isolation of the bloody war that is raging on Syrian soil," writes Randa Haidar in Friday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The most recent evidence of this comes from what has recently happened both in the Golan Heights and the Lebanese/Syrian borders.

These events have been confusing because they have occurred on more than one front, the ambiguity surrounding them, Israel's silence in response to reports that it was responsible for bombing a missile silo at a Syrian army military base, its rush to deny that it was behind another attack against a Syrian military base near the border with Lebanon, and the killing of four people it accused of planting a bomb near the border fence with the Golan Heights. 

All these events point to the extent to which the front with Lebanon has now become intimately connected to the front in the Golan Heights and the fierce battles raging there between Assad's regime and the opposition forces. And this link is complicating any potential future confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah, forcing both sides to take the strong possibility that a limited clash between them could develop into a huge explosion into consideration.

Since the civil war in Syria began, Israel has been careful to steer clear of what is happening there. It deemed the Syrian army's fragmentation and Hizbollah deepening involvement in the battles raging there to be in its interest. The longer the war lasts, the more this would serve its interests. However, since the war began, it determined a red line that Hizbollah should not cross, namely, Syria’s delivery of 'balance-breaking' weapons to the party. And it has defended this line in recent years via Israeli air force raids against what it claims were shipments of advanced weapons.

Meanwhile, Israel has been following with growing concern the growth of Hizbollah's military power and the extensive fighting expertise the party has gained by taking part in the fighting raging in Syria. But the most important point for Israel has been to maintain its deterrence in response to the development of the party's military power and to ensure that the latter would not violate Israel’s red lines. Nonetheless, the limited confrontation between Israel and the party earlier this year, and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah's talk of ‘changing the rules of the game’ have awakened fears of a potential large-scale deterioration, and the events of recent days have only exacerbated such concerns.

"A scrutiny of Israel’s positions indicate that it currently does not wish to head towards a large-scale confrontation that would cause it to slide towards a war in Syria – unless some major event occurs that turns the situation upside down," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.05.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Let them bleed

 

Israel Hayom and Yedioth Ahronoth lead their weekend editions with the fallout from the first coalition deals that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has signed with Kulanu and United Torah Judaism. According to the lead headline in the increasingly anti-Netanyahu Yedioth Ahronoth, part of the coalition agreement with UTJ will see 1 billion shekels transferred to the ultra-Orthodox education system, at the expense of state-run secular schools. Israel Hayom leads with the same headline that Haaretz had a day before – that Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party has managed to get Netanyahu to promise to increase tax and duty on second homes.

The Jerusalem Post fronts a story that appears prominently in all the papers: the demonstration by Ethiopian-born Israelis and second-generation immigrants from Ethiopia against police brutality and racism. Hundreds of Israelis of Ethiopian descent participated in the demonstration, which was called after video footage emerged on Monday, showing policemen beating an Ethiopian-born IDF soldier, who said later that he was the target of a racist attack.

At least 10 protesters and three police officers were injured in scuffles that erupted during more than nine hours of demonstrations in the capital. Protesters who tried to march on the prime minister's residence clashed with police and threw rocks and glass bottles at them. The protestors afterwards blocked the entrance to the city near the chords bridge.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu condemned the police brutality toward the IDF soldier, and also urged the protesters to avoid violence. 'I strongly condemn the beating of the soldier from the Ethiopian community and those responsible will answer for it,' Netanyahu said in a statement. 'But at the same time, no one should take the law into their hands. Immigrants from Ethiopia and their families are dear to us, and the State of Israel is making great efforts to ease their integration.'

President Reuven Rivlin also commented on the controversial video in a meeting earlier in the day with Ethiopian-Israeli students. Rivlin expressed shock at the images, but also praised police for acting swiftly to carry out a thorough investigation. He added such incidents 'must serve as a warning sign, and an opportunity to conduct some genuine and thorough introspection on the issue of the relationship between law enforcement services and the different communities that make up Israeli society.'

Haaretz leads with an interview with Fatou Bensouda, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In the interview, Bensouda told Haaretz that if she decides to open an investigation of war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza, low- and middle-rank Israeli soldiers could potentially be investigated for the purpose of 'bringing stronger cases against those most responsible.' However, Bensouda emphasized that the court is now only examining whether such an investigation is warranted, and that if there is a decision to go forward with one, the investigation 'will of course look into the alleged crimes committed by all sides to the conflict' beginning in June 2014, the eve of Operation Protective Edge.

Bensouda was asked whether the ICC’s strategic plan to investigate lower- and mid-level operatives means that every Israeli soldier who ever served in the West Bank and Gaza should be worried. 'If an investigation is opened in any given situation, my office will be guided by a policy of investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for committing mass crimes,' she replied.

In other news, Israel Radio reports that the United Nations envoy to the Middle East, Nikolay Mladenov, visited Gaza for the first time on Thursday, and called on Israel to lift the blockade on the Strip. 'The UN and the international community are committed not only to the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip, but also to the removal of restrictions on the movement of residents and the entry of goods into its territory,' said Mladenov.

Finally, Haaretz reports that Israel is blaming its Arab neighbors for the failure of progress toward achieving a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, saying that 'if a serious regional effort has not emerged in the Middle East during the last five years, it is not because of Israel.' The statement by Israel, distributed Thursday to a global conference on a landmark disarmament treaty, is the country's first public comment since it showed up as a surprise observer.

 

 

LET THEM BLEED: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman warns that Israel could find itself being dragged into the conflict in Syria, if it expands the range of targets that it attacks on the Golan Heights.

"The official policy that Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon has presented to the security establishment in light of developments on the Syrian front is very simple: Let them bleed. In other words, on a strategic level, we are not interfering on anyone's behalf. As far as Israel is concerned, this is a war that Iran is waging against members of the global jihadi movement and Syrian Islamist organizations, in order to safeguard the regime of its most senior client in the Middle East; that of President Bashar al-Assad. Israel has not yet decided which of the protagonists it would prefer to see as its neighbor on the northern front. Until a decision is made, therefore, let them go on killing each other.

Israel may not be interfering in the Syrian Civil War, but when it comes to Israel's interests, there are those who claim that it is involved up to its neck. Nothing that happens on the border with Syria happens by chance. It is highly unlikely that the aerial vehicle that took out four terrorists who were trying to plant a bomb on the border fence in the Golan Heights last week just happened to be hovering in the region for no good reason. A similar attack, some 18 months ago, in which a senior IDF officer was injured, was also the work of Druze Syrian nationalists operated by Hizbollah. It is safe to assume that the people responsible for that incident are also no longer with us – and that they did not meet a natural demise. That also includes the deputy of freed prisoner Samir Kuntar, who was responsible for organizing all hostile activity emanating from the five Druze villages on the Syrian part of the northern Golan Heights. He too, according to reports in Lebanese media, has been dispatched to meet his maker.

In addition, the timing of the attack on a convoy including Jihad Mughniyeh, who was responsible for Hizbollah activity on the Golan Heights, was not coincidental; it happened just three days after a very belligerent interview by Hizbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, in which he threatened to punish Israel for its alleged attacks in Syria. Someone in the Middle East took him seriously and decided to turn the table on Hizbollah. Ya'alon said at the time that Hizbollah’s infrastructure on the Golan Heights had been destroyed; that was true at the time, but did not remain so for much longer.

Israel is making a massive effort – in terms of intelligence and in operational terms – along the border with Syria to prevent the fighting from spilling over into its territory. This daily struggle, which the IDF refers to as 'the war between the wars,' is, it seems, the reason that Unit 504 (Military Intelligence's human intelligence unit) was recently decorated for its work. The results of Unit 504's work are there for all to see along the border. It has created a viable deterrence factor and has prevented infiltrations. Indeed, since most of the Syrian army has been driven back from the border area and its positions taken by radical Islamic organization like the al-Nusra Front, there has not been a single incident of a jihadi group attacking Israel. This would seem to indicate that Israel has total control – intelligence and operational – over both sides of the border.

There are two exceptions to the 'let them bleed' strategy. The first is when Israel's sovereignty is violated and the second is when certain weapons spill over from Syria into Lebanon. In most of the cases when foreign media sources say that Israel has attacked targets inside Syria – apart from cases of deterrence and retribution – these are low-profile military operations that do not leave behind fingerprints and for which Israel does not take responsibility. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War four years ago, this tactic has proved itself to be effective. In some cases, the party that is attacked assumes that Israel was responsible, but refrains from carrying out revenge attacks, since opening up a new front against Israel is way down its list of priorities. Syria, Iran and Hizbollah are well aware of Israel's red lines. As long as Israel sticks to its own rules and only carries out low-profile attacks that do not directly serve the interests of the anti-Assad rebel forces, they are willing to swallow their pride.

It is safe to assume that the selection of targets and the way that military operations are carried out is designed to boost the deterrence factor; to send a message to the other side that it should not try to transport weapons that might limit the Israeli air force's freedom of operation in Lebanese airspace. This calculated risk has proved itself thus far – and therein lays the danger. The more time that elapses – and this is true of the operational branch as well as the decision-makers in Jerusalem – the more there is a tendency to be overly happy with the results; to increase the stakes and to take more risks. The choice of targets will become less and less selective, there will be more assumptions made about the weakness of the enemy and Israel could find itself becoming an integral part of the conflict in Syria. So even if Hizbollah has fewer advanced and accurate missiles in Lebanon, the Golan Heights will become a conflict zone. The defense minister and the prime minister have a key role in ensuring that this does not happen."

Ends…

 

THINK TWICE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yaakov Amidror urges the government and the defense establishment to resist the temptation to launch a preemptive strike against Hizbollah, since the ramifications – political and military – would not be worth the risk.

"Following rumors last week that Israel had attacked targets inside Syria, the explanation was given that the alleged Israeli attack was approved in order to prevent the supply of advanced weapons to Hizbollah. Analysts asked whether there was any point in the attack, since, according to the information available, the Shiite organization already has more than 100,000 missiles and rockets in its possession – so what difference it makes if we destroy a few dozen more. It's just a drop in the ocean, they say, so why risk escalation for such a small payback?

The answer to that question came from various sources; the main gist of the explanation is that Israel uses aerial force only when the weapons in question are much more accurate or have a far greater range than anything currently in Hizbollah’s arsenal. It is safe to assume that only in such cases does Israel do whatever it takes to prevent such weapons reaching their destination and that in these cases it is willing to risk the wrath of the Lebanese terror organization.

These risk-management calculations are based on Military Intelligence's profound knowledge of Hizbollah – especially the lessons that it learnt from previous conflicts. Given the price that it paid in the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah has been exceptionally cautious since 2006; he does not want a repeat of what happened then. Moreover, he is currently in a far more complicated situation now, because of his organization's involvement in the fighting in Syria, which has split his force into two.

Hizbollah cannot simply abandon its massive involvement in Syria, even though it is paying a very heavy price in terms of fatalities and resources. So much so, in fact, that it is now less able to operate against Israel. This is because keeping Bashar al-Assad in power is a critical goal. If Syria falls into Sunni hands, Hizbollah will face an existential threat and its Lebanese stronghold will be under constant threat. Without Syria – which is Hizbollah’s bridge to Iran and the source of all its weaponry – the organization will find it very hard to protect everything that it has worked so hard to create in Lebanon. This would also prevent it from rearming in the future. Hizbollah is fighting in Syria, in part, because its fate is indelibly linked to that of the Alawite regime.

The lessons of 2006, coupled with the need to invest its energy and resources in Syria, are forcing Nasrallah to respond cautiously – or not to respond at all – to alleged Israeli attacks in Syria, even if the targets destroyed belong to Hizbollah. Nasrallah may have said that he would respond differently to an attack on Lebanese soil, but the only time that a recent incident involved Lebanon, when several members of the organization were killed when a listening device exploded, Hizbollah responded with extreme caution. Even when there were almost open reports that Israel had attacked a convoy on the Golan Heights, killed senior Hizbollah and Iranian officers, the organization responded with the same degree of caution.

From the other side, equally weighty questions are being asked: Why does Israel not attack Hizbollah directly? What are we waiting for? Why not take advantage of the temporary weakness of Hizbollah, which is deployed on two fronts, to strike it before it is better able to defend itself? These are legitimate questions.

Israel has launched preemptive strikes in the past. The advantage of such attacks is obvious: the element of surprise allows the IDF to use intelligence to better inform its decisions and to strike at an unprepared enemy, causing it much greater damage than otherwise.

But preemptive strikes also have a down side. In the modern age, when world leaders are utterly opposed to military action that is not a response to clear provocation, the international response to any preemptive Israeli operation in Lebanon would be furious.

Any such war would be long and painful, and Israel would take many months of rocket attacks. The air force would launch intensive airstrikes against targets across Lebanon and the IDF's ground forces would fight battles on Lebanese soil. Many Israelis would be killed – civilians and soldiers alike – as well as many Lebanese civilians, since Hizbollah has deployed its missiles in the heart of population centers. Many buildings used to store missiles would also be destroyed and the scenes of destruction would be powerful. The international community would not be able to turn a blind eye to it and would point an angry finger at Israel.

The truth is that it is hard to envisage any such operation enjoying the support and agreement of Israelis – many of whom would be targeted by Hizbollah rockets. Even if the government was able to convince Israelis that the war was just, the international community would be highly critical. It would not allow Israel to continue fighting for very long.

A preemptive attack against Hizbollah, therefore, is something that should be kept to one side and only used under exceptional circumstances. It is highly tempting to strike the first blow against Hizbollah, but the government and the defense establishment must think twice, three times or more before doing so."

Ends…

 

JUST NOT LIEBERMAN: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that Avigdor Lieberman must not be allowed to remain as foreign minister – if Israel is serious about improving its relationship with the international community in general and the White House in particular.

"The good news is that Naftali Bennett has dropped his demand to be appointed foreign minister in the next government. The slightly less good news is that Avigdor Lieberman will, it seems, remain in that office. Bennett is better equipped than Lieberman to fill that role. He is better educated and he speaks better English. He can express himself better and he has more energy. He is also a religious Jews and is utterly dedicated to the idea of the Greater Land of Israel.

As foreign minister, Bennett would have been better able to explain to the United Nations, to Washington and to other Western governments why the two-state solution is a ridiculous idea. Bennett would have been capable of explaining to the international community that there is no chance of Israel reaching an agreement with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future. Bennett would have proudly and confidently stood up before the General Assembly and told representative of every country in the world – with the innocent smile of a good Jewish boy – to leave Israel the hell alone.

It is precisely because of these talents that Bennett's decision not to pursue the foreign ministry post has averted a diplomatic disaster, coupled with a rapid deterioration in Israel's international standing. But allowing Lieberman to remain in his position is not just a sure-fire recipe for diplomatic disaster in the future, it is not just a mistake – it is political masochism.

There are no signs of an imminent thawing in relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The diplomatic blockade of Israel is getting tighter and the European Union is already talking about imposing sanctions. Allowing Lieberman to remain as Israel's top diplomat is like appointing a pyromaniac as fire chief.

There's no need even to speculate about what we can expect from Lieberman as foreign minister. He showed us exactly what he is made of in the five years that he has been in the position. He has done nothing positive of note and has made no significant decisions. His visits to Western capitals have not yielded any political fruits and have not changed their critical attitude or warmed up their cool policies toward Jerusalem. His occasional visits to UN headquarters in New York have been seen as diplomatic catastrophes.

Israel can expect a tough few months on the diplomatic front. The new government has a golden opportunity to restore the Foreign Ministry to its position as the most influential ministry in the government and to place it front and center of Israel's diplomatic battles. Lieberman, who has also lost some of his domestic political clout, is simply not up to these challenges.

While it is true that Israel's foreign policy is determined by the prime minister, leaving Lieberman to serve alongside him as foreign minister sends a message to the world that it can expect very little of Israel – especially when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The job of rectifying Israel's tattered relationship with the White House is Netanyahu's. In order to succeed, he needs a foreign minister with a certain type of personality serving alongside him: someone moderate, who knows what it means to be conciliatory. Lieberman just doesn't fit the bill.

Leaving Lieberman in the Foreign Ministry also sends a message that Jerusalem is unaware of the complex challenges that it has to face. Most of all, it relays a message of indifference. Israel needs to work with the White House, to have good working relations with the European Union and the Security Council and, most importantly, it has to tiptoe its way through a diplomatic minefield and safeguard vital national interests.

If anyone in Israel seriously believes that Lieberman is the right man for the job, let him stand up now. No one? I thought not."

Ends…

 

MINOCRACY: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini says that the government Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems likely to install will not represent the will of the people or the will of most members of the Knesset.

"The die appears to have been cast. Israel is in for a narrow government – narrow and problematic, to be more precise. It won't offer that 'expression of the will of the people' that opponents of a national unity government have been going on about endlessly for the past month. A narrow government is not a democracy. It's a 'minocracy,' in which the minority imposes its will on the majority.

The majority, including most Likud voters too, is in favor of sharing the burden. The majority, including most Likud voters too, oppose the Nahari Law, which required local authorities to fund non-state, ultra-Orthodox schools that don't teach core curriculum subjects, thereby encouraging Haredization and separatism at the taxpayers' expense. The majority, including most Likud voters too, doesn't want the government of Israel to promote the nightmare vision of 'one large state.' But this is what is about to come crashing down on the heads of the majority, which is opposed to the rule of the minority.

It's not just the people. It's the Knesset too. There's no parliamentary majority for a significant portion of the government guidelines that are likely to be adopted. After all, most of the Kulanu party's Knesset members are freaking out these days. Yes, the world of politics requires compromises. But we're not dealing here with compromises. We're dealing with capitulation. With respect to two fundamental issues, the Nationality Law and laws related to the judiciary, they demanded and received a veto right. But where do they stand when it comes to the issue of sharing the burden? Where do they stand when it comes to the Nahari Law? After all, your voices, distinguished Knesset members, can and should be the voice of the majority – not of the left, or of the right, but of a majority that represents the Zionist and national interest.

This is your moment of truth. But when it comes to these issues, you have disappeared and gone silent. You won't be the only ones to pay the price. The entire country will pay."

Ends…

 

TALKING TO HAMAS: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel comments on the reported secret talks between Israel and Hamas and says that the organization's political wing is in favor of dialogue, while its military wing opposes it.

"Far from the public’s eye, negotiations are happening that could, under certain conditions, effect an important change on the Palestinian front. The indirect talks between Israel and Hamas on a long-term cease-fire in the Gaza Strip, which have been reported primarily in the Arab media, are ultimately likely to produce an agreement. Such a deal, if achieved, would significantly affect the balance of power among Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and could also affect the close ties between Israel and Egypt.

The talks have been conducted intermittently for months. Media reports say numerous intermediaries are involved, including officials from the United Nations, Europe and Qatar. Thus the talks are happening via several different channels, with only partial coordination among them.

The goal is to extract a commitment to a humanitarian cease-fire from Hamas, perhaps accompanied by third-party guarantees. Hamas would promise to refrain from any hostilities against Israel for a given period, possibly three to five years. In exchange, Israel would significantly ease its partial blockade on Gaza and take other steps to help Gaza’s economy. Later – though this seems unlikely – Israel might even reconsider ideas it has rejected in the past, like letting a seaport be built in Gaza under external supervision.

Such a deal could appeal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, because it would enable him to portray last summer’s war in Gaza as a long-term achievement instead of a highly controversial, unfinished job. Just as former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert retroactively defended a much worse war, the Second Lebanon War of 2006, by boasting of the quiet on the northern border since then, Netanyahu could retroactively justify the Gaza war on similar grounds and say Hamas’ agreement to a long-term cease-fire proved that Israel won.

An indirect deal wouldn’t require Netanyahu to make any major concessions like recognizing Hamas or ceding territory. Moreover, it would enable him to outflank PA President Mahmoud Abbas and rebut some of the international criticism of his lack of movement on the Palestinian front. And if Netanyahu thinks tensions with Hizbollah might lead to war in the coming years, a long-term cease-fire in Gaza would temporarily relieve the army of a headache and let it focus on the far more dangerous enemy to the north.

Hamas’ political leadership in Gaza apparently favors a deal. After three military conflicts against Israel in less than six years, each of which wreaked devastation in Gaza, it seems unlikely that Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and his colleagues would want another round anytime soon. Khaled Mish'al, the Qatar-based head of Hamas’ political wing, also seems to have moderated the hardline positions he took during the war a bit; this might be connected to the rapprochement between Hamas’ political wing and Saudi Arabia.

At the moment, Hamas seems readier to accept a deal than Israel is. Some Israeli defense officials think it’s better to continue the status quo, with minor changes, than to tie Israel’s hands with rigid obligations.

But in any case, numerous obstacles remain. The PA objects vehemently, fearing a deal would bolster Hamas at its expense and perpetuate the freeze in its own talks with Israel; this has been reflected in the West Bank’s negative press coverage of the emerging deal. Ramallah accuses Hamas of abandoning the demand for a solution to the Palestinian problem and of acquiescing in the separation of Gaza from the West Bank.

Egypt, which recently deferred legal proceedings for declaring Hamas an illegal terrorist organization, also remains skeptical of Hamas’ intentions.

But the principle obstacle is Hamas’ military wing. On Wednesday, the Israeli media reported that military wing leader Mohammed Deif, who survived an Israeli assassination attempt during last summer’s war, had resumed full-time activity. Deif dragged Israel and Hamas into the last conflict by planning a tunnel attack near Kerem Shalom in early July, then escalating after the army thwarted the attack.

Since the military wing is currently at loggerheads with the political leadership and has also renewed its ties to Iran, one can confidently assume it isn’t enthusiastic about the idea of a long-term truce. Thus, as the negotiations progress, the chances of the military wing launching attacks on Israel, in an effort to thwart it, increase.

The military wing is working hard to restore its operational capabilities, which suffered substantial damage during the war and have also been harmed by Egypt’s clampdown on arms smuggling to Gaza. Though Hamas is now churning out its own rockets in Gaza, they don’t match the capabilities of the arms it used to smuggle from Iran. But rebuilding its network of attack tunnels has proved easier, and it’s reasonable to assume Hamas will try to use them if another war breaks out."

Ends…

 

STABILITY NOW: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Gil Hoffman comments on the ongoing coalition negotiations and says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is taking measures to ensure that his fourth government is also his most stable.

"Since 2003, whenever governments in Israel are formed, the coalition negotiations have taken place at Ramat Gan’s Kfar Hamaccabiah Hotel. Delegations from the parties make statements to the press with great fanfare upon entering the negotiating room, and again when they depart. Journalists would wait there for hours, hoping for headlines.

Sometimes, the real news was actually happening elsewhere. For instance in 2003, though coalition teams from the National Religious Party and Shinui came to Kfar Hamaccabiah, their leaders actually negotiated a deal at the home of Ehud Olmert, who had just left his job as Jerusalem mayor to return to national politics.

This time, there was no facade of facilitating the work of the press, and no apparent attempt to trick the media. Journalists were for the most part just ignored. The talks took place at the Knesset, just down the hall from the reporters’ offices. But there was not much point in coming to the building. When deals were reached, the reporters who waited around all day for the signing ceremonies were not even invited in. The event was recorded by the party spokespeople and sent out later. The coalition negotiating teams did not say much to the media before or after negotiations. The parties have defied precedent by not sending the coalition agreements to the press, and the elements that were leaked have been relatively dry.

The Likud negotiating team of MKs Yariv Levin and Ze’ev Elkin and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s lawyer David Shimron can be described as a geek squad, in the best sense of the term. They are smart, hard-working, efficient, committed and unapologetically boring; Elkin even boasted about working on the coalition talks for as much as 22 hours a day. They are not good at making headlines, which could be vexing to the press. But they could be successful in achieving what the public wants – which is stability.

The last government supplied plenty of headlines. The infighting began before the government was even formed; there were alliances, betrayals and plenty of revenge. But there was no stability, and consequently, the coalition broke down less than 21 months after it was formed. Netanyahu’s team and the coalition partners are trying to learn from past mistakes and return the stability of the prime minister’s previous term, which lasted four years from 2009 to 2013. They have taken several steps to achieve that vaunted stability.

The aforementioned mix of ignoring and boring the press is step toward stability No. 1. As a case in point, Channel 2’s star reporter Amit Segal tweeted the following in Hebrew as coalition deals were reached with Kulanu and United Torah Judaism Wednesday, 'Drama at the Knesset: An agreement reached orally in November 2014 [with UTJ] was officially signed at the end of April 2015.' He also tweeted, 'Drama at the Knesset 2: A man who declared in December 2014 that he would be finance minister and a man who promised him the Finance Ministry in March 2015 agree as May 2015 approaches on an appointment as finance minister.' And finally, 'Stay with us for even more drama: The foreign minister will surprisingly be appointed foreign minister and two parties that said they would sign with Likud signed with Likud. So many heart attacks in one round of negotiations.'

That cynicism is a sign of the Likud’s success. Political journalists thrive on the very instability that the coalition talks are intended to avert. The negotiators serve the public – not them – so if Segal is bored, they just might be doing something right.

The second step toward stability is to keep the finance minister happy. Finance minister is a very important job, especially in a government with no diplomatic aspirations and plenty of work to do on the socioeconomic front, so autonomy is appreciated by those who hold the post. The best recent example was the government that was formed in the aforementioned coalition negotiations of 2003. Then-prime minister Ariel Sharon not only appointed Netanyahu finance minister, he promised him complete freedom to implement whatever policies he wished.

Netanyahu was so satisfied and so busy implementing his policies that he did everything possible to avoid leaving the government, even as it was passing the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip that he claimed to oppose. He did eventually quit, but too late to prevent the evacuation.

Kulanu leader Moshe Kahlon had every reason to smile when he signed the deal – besides the fact that he smiles all the time anyway. He sought the posts, the tools and the freedom to implement all his proposed reforms, and he got what he wanted.

Another element required for stability is a lack of prime ministerial aspirations among coalition partners. The first thing that doomed the last government was a statement by Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid the day after the election that he expected to succeed Netanyahu as prime minister. From then on, Netanyahu did not trust him, nor did he offer him much help to ensure his success.

When Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman and Habayit Hayehudi head Naftali Bennett displayed their own delusions of grandeur, it created even more instability. This time, Bennett and Lieberman are entering the government badly bruised by an election in which Netanyahu showed them who is boss. Kahlon could be prime minister someday, but only if he is a great success as finance minister, and he may have to return to the Likud.

History has proven that it is also easier to achieve stability when haredi parties are part of the government. Netanyahu knows that, and that is why he was willing to pay their asking price despite screaming headlines accusing him of giving up the store. Netanyahu is as secular as it gets. But he worships on the altar of political quiet, and that is what UTJ and Shas will give him.

Having alternative coalitions at hand also helps. It is not clear whether Netanyahu has that, but he did insist on including a clause in the coalition agreement that could assist in the creation of a national unity government with the Zionist Union later on. That could be enough to achieve the deterrence necessary to keep people like Bennett and Lieberman in line.

The final step toward stability is electoral reform. Netanyahu’s associates reiterated this week that the prime minister intended to enact reforms that will strengthen the largest parties, and ease the political extortion and horse-trading that mar coalition talks.

All six of those steps could help bring about a government that will not last its entire term - which ends in November 2019 - but could endure far longer than many are expecting. But Netanyahu needs to be careful not to go too far. In the past, he has harmed himself by letting his power go to his head and become his own worst enemy.

Reports of him considering keeping the communications portfolio for himself and taking steps to limit an already weakened media could backfire. A bored media is a recipe for stability; an angry press could cause chaos. Netanyahu will have to tread that thin line successfully to build a government that can last."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TENSION WITH NORTHERN CYPRUS: Kadri Gursel identifies the sources of President Erdogan’s discontent with the new Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) president in centrist Milliyet: "President Erdogan has wasted no time attacking Mustafa Akinci, who has been elected as new TRNC president with 60.5 per cent of the vote. Erdogan's discontent stems from three main reasons: The first is that Akinci's victory symbolizes the resistance of a secular and unique Turkish Cypriot identity. And this is not an outcome desired by Erdogan's AKP (ruling Justice and Development Party). The second reason is that the TRNC headed by Akinci will make it difficult for the AKP to maintain the tutelage regime that it established during former TRNC president Dervis Eroglu era. We should also remember that if Cyprus takes the path towards a peaceful solution, Turkey's EU bid, which was left to die, would come to life again."

 

KURDISH PROBLEM/TURKISH ELECTIONS Cengiz Candar links between the Kurdish problem and the upcoming general elections in center-left Radikal: "If there was no Kurdish problem and if talking about it is separatism (as Erdogan claims), logically, there would be no solution left to achieve. On all issues, Erdogan has been consistent with himself. We will have to wait for June 7th to see any progress on the Kurdish peace process. It is impossible for any such progress to happen without the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance]. The HDP should clear the 10% electoral threshold barrier and, more importantly, it should resist acts of provocation."

Orhan Bursali detects some electioneering tactics in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Is Erdogan really altering his peace process policy fundamentally? Should we interpret what he has said recently as a permanent new policy, rather than an attempt to win votes before the election? The latter seems to be a strong possibility. The AKP is trying to prevent the HDP from entering parliament."

Mehmet Metiner comes to the president’s defense in centre-right, pro-government Star:  "Erdogan has to resolve the Kurdish problem by giving up on the previous policies of rejection, denial and assimilation. Thus, saying that the ‘new Turkey’ does not have a Kurdish problem anymore does not entail the denial of the Kurdish people and their rights. The Kurds of this country are very aware of what Erdogan did for them."

Writing in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak, Ali Bayramoglu has low expectations of change in the HDP: "If the HDP clears the electoral threshold, would this put it on track to be a Turkish party with a stable voter base? This is very uncertain. The HDP is split between the option of becoming a national Turkish party, or remaining a purely Kurdish project. Combining the two would require the HDP to become relatively independent from the other elements of the Kurdish movement, namely, Imrali [imprisoned PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) leader Abdullah Ocalan] and Kandil [Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq]. But I guess that this is not a very realistic expectation."

Hasan Cemal puts Erdogan’s stance on the Kurds in historical perspective on independent internet T24: "Let us think calmly. If there is no Kurdish problem, no parties, no negotiation table, where have all the gains of the past two years come from? Did the improvement in relations between Ankara, Imrali and Kandil help Erdogan to win time and an election? Apparently, this is the case. In saying that there is no Kurdish problem, Erdogan is expressing his own opinion. In other words, whatever the conservative leaders of the past may have thought about the Kurdish problem, Erdogan thinks the same. Whatever the Kemalist leaders believed, Erdogan believes the same. Erdogan is also a Turkish nationalist, just as they were.”

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

SAUDI RESHUFFLE: Reformist Aftab-e Yazd is calmly concerned: "The seismic changes in Saudi Arabia will affect Iran/Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia will possibly redouble its efforts to undermine the nuclear talks. Events in Saudi Arabia are linked to Iran more than ever. We should not, however, be unduly concerned about the impact of such measures on the talks, but if we do not preserve ethical diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, bilateral relations will become tense." 

Conservative Resalat warns of an impending coup: "The recent political earthquake in Riyadh is a sign of a chronic crisis that will bring the ailing king and his son to their knees in the near future. The generational change in the ruling family has turned into an acute calamity. Riyadh is in a critical condition; some princes will not accept the changes and will go for a coup." 

Reformist E'temad is dramatic: "All these changes in Saudi Arabia are a game of Western intelligence services. Adel al-Jubeir as foreign minister will not help relax tense relations with other regional countries including with Iran, but may lead to further tensions. Following the Islamic awakening in Arab countries, the house of Saud has been concerned that unrest might spread to Saudi Arabia. But the crisis in Saudi Arabia is much deeper and cannot be resolved by the coming and going of a number of princes. The problem of Saudi Arabia is rooted in its autocratic political system; Saudis have no role in political decision-making and determining their own destiny, which is left to foreign powers that play a significant role in determining their fate." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz gives two reasons for the changes: "What are the main reasons behind this change and why has Salman followed this path? Because of his old age, Salman understands that he is not able to manage the country and wants to keep his son in power. Saudi decisions are formed in line with Western demands and after the death of King Abdallah, the West insisted on moving to the next generation of the royal family." 

Conservative Hemayat has a simple explanation: "Current developments in Saudi Arabia are a cover to prevent a political earthquake inside Saudi society that will trigger opposition to Saudi illegitimate and unacceptable authorities who seek to suppress democracy movements in Bahrain, Syria and Iraq and stay in power." 

Moderate Iran predicts a total collapse: "Recent changes in Saudi Arabia are caused by deep differences among Saudi princes over the Yemen attacks. Saudi failure to form an international coalition against Yemen has angered King Salman as Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal failed to take advantage of the country's diplomatic capabilities in order to convince the world over the necessity to attack Yemen. The changes show that Saudi Arabia seeks military hegemony, but this extremism will lead to the collapse of the ruling family, because world public opinion, especially in the region, is seriously against Saudi policies. The gap, which has been created among Saudi princes increases with each passing day and will lead to the collapse of this regime." 

 

YEMEN: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami writes of a Saudi defeat: "The war in Yemen continues with Saudi atrocities and the shedding of the blood of the defenceless Yemeni people. The Saudis have even prevented humanitarian aid from reaching war victims. However, these measures cannot cover up Riyadh's defeat and failure. With the announcement of the end of 'Operation Decisive Storm', Riyadh tried to cover up its retreat as a tactical move." 

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Javan is adamant: "We have shown that we need negotiations and are interested in their results. We have been playing by the enemy’s rules. With this decision, we provided the biggest service to our enemy and inflicted the highest damage to the national interests of Iran." 

Hard-line Keyhan is gloomy: "Sanctions have depleted the government's funds and brought hardships. What is the government's plan to fight and change this situation? Let us be a little more explicit! The government plans to promote an open economy through dialogue and reconciliation by signing an agreement with those who have created the problems in the first place. Is it reasonable and practical to expect economic prosperity through the same people who are responsible for the current situation? There is strong and undeniable evidence that the West will not abandon the sanctions weapon, because they have nothing else to use against the Islamic Republic but this weapon." 

 

IRAN/U.S.: Reformist Arman is well pleased: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has great power to resolve regional issues. The problems of the United States and Western governments in the Middle East are numerous and they know well that their traditional allies are unable to resolve these crises. The fact that, contrary to Saudi Arabia and the Zionist regime's will, the American administration has entered a dialogue with Iran shows that U.S. strategies in the Middle East are changing. Secretary of State John Kerry's symbolic move of entering Iranian territory at the UN in New York, which was unprecedented for at least three decades, indicates that if things go well in Iran, the Americans are willing to take the initiative and take a step forward. This is a historical opportunity, by which Iran can strengthen its status further among its regional rivals, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia."

 

ELECTIONS: Reformist Mardom Salari rejects discrimination that favours current MPs: "Giving lifelong rights to MPs is an obvious example of injustice and negligence of the Islamic revolution’s values. Determining the candidates' eligibility has become a point of conflict and political dispute because many people disqualified by the Guardian Council did not belong to any political wing and were disqualified merely based on consultative supervision." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Fork in the road

2-Prelude to Iraq’s break up

 

1-Fork in the road

 

The Sudairi wing of the Saudi ruling family has returned to tighten its hold over the levers of power in the Kingdom. But it has done so via young faces and by means of daring and resolute decisions this time around. The urgent question now is, will this process of change stop at this point, or will it continue? And what will be the reaction of the rest of the royal family princes who have been bypassed in the regime’s new structure, especially the grandsons of the founder-king – and they are many? It would be wrong to issue a hasty verdict. The ink in which the new edicts were written has yet to dry. We need to wait until the dust settles and the main features of the picture are clear. But what can be said is that the new Saudi monarch's path is filled with pitfalls, and riddled with threats and perhaps surprises as well-- pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

[The latest Saudi changes] represent the blows of someone who acts with closed eyes driven by a dream or a vision. Of course, neither the [Saudi] king nor those around him will admit that nothing they are doing can preserve this decaying edifice. Even the corpses of the people who are dying to prop up its pillars cannot help. The curse of Yemen will speed up the collapse of the last kingdom of repression in our nation, leaving only the Kingdom of Israel. The coming phase will expose how flimsy this regime is, and how far its main pillars do not trust each other. We will hear of the discovery of more ISIS cells every day. In fact, they may conjure up claims about the discovery of Houthi or other sorts of cells tomorrow. For they can feel the noose tightening around their necks. And every time they will lash out and strike whatever is before or around them, they will only hit themselves--Ibrahim al-Amin in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

We are optimistic about these successive royal decrees. They share a number of factors in common, the most important of which is the empowerment of the younger generation to serve their country, as well as the reliance on qualifications and success as the criteria for choosing new leaders. In fact, the early signs of these new leaders’ success are already evident. Moreover, the other ministerial reshuffles prove that the Kingdom's leadership appreciates the importance of rapid modernization in the various sectors of state. Our country, led by our King, backed by the 'two Mohammads' [bin Nayif and bin Salman] moves forward decisively and with confidence. We are full of hope and trust in a brighter and more prosperous future for our blessed country, thank God--Saudi al-Watan

 

It is obvious that this [internal] struggle was expected. In fact, it may be that the person who expected it most was King 'Abdullah bin 'Abdulaziz who issued a number of royal edicts before his death in which he sought to consolidate Muqrin as Crown-Prince and protect him against any possible change. This is why it is possible to say that deposing Muqrin amounts to a coup in the full sense of the word. After these changes that are tantamount to a coup, and after the risky adventure of waging war on Yemen, Saudi Arabia is entering a fork in the road that is unprecedented in the Third Kingdom's history. The coming weeks and years will be full of surprises in the 'Kingdom of Sands'--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The radical reshuffle of top government posts carried out by Saudi monarch King Salman yesterday (Wednesday) amounts to a major coup that breaks with the previous phase and paves the way for a new generation of Saudi rulers, maintains the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily. But it is too early to judge whether these changes will proceed smoothly or whether they will face resistance from members of the ruling family. The Saudi monarch's latest decisions have pumped new blood into the Kingdom’s ruling body, with the right men chosen for the right posts, says the editorial in a Saudi daily. The changes in Saudi Arabia were motivated by two main forces: The U.S. and its concern to ensure a smooth transition of power to its trusted men in the ruling family, and the struggle for power within the third generation of the Saudi princes over who has the right to accede to the throne, argues a Lebanese commentator. The changes at the summit of power in Saudi Arabia are reminiscent of those carried out in the last days of the Soviet Union, insofar as both will be useless in preventing the ruling regime from collapse, maintains the editor-in-chief of a left-leaning Lebanese daily.

 

NO EXAGGERATION: "It may be no exaggeration to say that the unexpected and 'decisive' royal edicts issued by Saudi monarch King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz at dawn on Wednesday amount to a 'coup' that is only matched by what his late brother Faisal bin 'Abdulaziz did in 1965 when he deposed his brother King Saud, despite the many differences between the two cases that we do not need to go into here," writes the editorial on Thursday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz deposed his brother Prince Muqrin as Crown Prince only a few months after he was appointed. He replaced him with Prince Mohammad bin Nayif, and promoted his own son Defense Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman to the post of Deputy Crown-Prince, the post that Prince Mohammad bin Nayif had occupied for only three months.

The basic rule set by the late Saudi monarch King Fahd bin 'Abdulaziz grants the king the power to appoint and depose the crown prince. He may have devised this rule in order to change his own crown-prince 'Abdullah, and appoint his son Prince 'Abdulaziz bin Fahd in his place. But Prince 'Abdullah's eruption of anger, the backing he received from his non-Sudairi brothers, the fact that the National Guard forces were his power base, and the fear of conflict within the ruling family's ranks, separately and collectively contributed to convincing King Fahd to alter his plan and issue an edict endorsing Prince 'Abdullah as his successor, in the hope that circumstances would change later. But illness did not give him enough time to realize his plans.

The new Saudi monarch’s edicts relied on that basic rule. He did not refer to the 'Succession Body' established by late King 'Abdullah which includes senior princes who are the sons of the founder of the Kingdom to choose the successor to the throne. In his speech to the people in which he announced these changes, King Salman said that Prince Muqrin had asked to be relieved of his post, and that he [the King] had complied with his wish.

However, ever since he came to power, it has been clear that King Salman has wanted to get rid of his predecessor King 'Abdullah's legacy, and to change the structure of the regime by pumping new blood into it under the banner of modernizing the main instruments of state. This is why he appointed Prince Mohammad bin Nayif as deputy crown-prince, and his son Prince Mohammad bin Salman as Defense Minister. He also replaced nine ministers and had previously deposed the former head of the royal diwan Mr. Khaled at-Tuwaijari from his post, even before the late king was buried.

The signs that Prince Muqrin would be deposed were clear for all to see. His role had totally shrunk recently, and he has been absent from the inner decision-making circle. His appearance on official occasions became limited and a matter of mere protocol. Some may argue that he did represent the Kingdom at the Cairo Arab summit a month ago; but while true, this was also a matter of mere protocol and did not carry any real political weight.

When a Saudi king takes major and crucial steps such as those at dawn on Wednesday, it is only natural for rumors to grow and multiply, and for the social media to be rife with stories and explanations. Some claim that Prince Muqrin opposed the Saudi military intervention in Yemen; others said that his mother is not Saudi; and so on and so forth. But such stories and others remain unproven, and it is difficult to accept them as the truth.

Nonetheless, we may pass a verdict regarding these decisions and the events that preceded them over the past three months based on matters as they appear on the surface. And on that basis, we may conclude that from the first day he came to the throne, the new Saudi monarch was determined to change the regime and push new faces to the forefront, departing from customary practice. The change was not confined to the crown-prince, but reached the seasoned foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal as well, who was deposed from his post after serving there for forty years. He was replaced by Mr. 'Adel al-Jubeir, the Kingdom's ambassador to Washington. This is one appointment worth considering because it is the first time that this post has been occupied by someone who is not from King Faisal's family and goes to someone who is not, in fact, royal.

The other no less important issue is the exclusion of Prince 'Abdulaziz bin 'Abdullah, the son of the late king, who was deputy foreign minister. Most speculation indicated that he was the most likely candidate to succeed Prince Saud al-Faisal. This act of exclusion falls within the same context in which his two brothers – Mish'al the Emir of Mecca, and Turki the Emir of Riyadh – were ousted. The only son of the late king who remains in a ministerial post is Prince Mutaib bin 'Abdullah who is Minister of the National Guard. But even this post is not guaranteed, and his replacement may be only a matter of time.

Operation Decisive Storm that has been the most prominent Saudi foreign policy surprise under King Salman bin 'Abdelaziz has not been confined to bombarding Yemen, intensifying intervention in Syria, and joining the Turkish/Qatari axis at the expense of the Egyptian/Emirati axis. It has begun to have an impact inside Saudi Arabia itself by affecting the regime's makeup and changing it radically, without taking any other matter into consideration. These include the late king 'Abdullah's edict appointing Prince Muqrin as crown-prince, stressing that he should not be changed or deposed until after he dies, and insisting that he should be made king if the post went vacant.

The Sudairi wing of the Saudi ruling family has returned to tighten its hold over the levers of power in the Kingdom. But it has done so via young faces and by means of daring and resolute decisions this time around. The urgent question now is will this process of change stop at this point or will it continue? And what will be the reaction of the rest of the royal family princes who have been bypassed in the regime’s new structure, especially the grandsons of the founder-king – and they are many?

It would be wrong to issue a hasty verdict. The ink in which the new edicts were written has yet to dry. We need to wait until the dust settles and the main features of the picture are clear.

"But what can be said is that the new Saudi monarch's path is filled with pitfalls, and riddled with threats and perhaps surprises as well," concludes the editorial.

End…

 

CONTINUING THE MARCH: “At the hands of King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz, the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines, our country continues its march towards renewing the youthful character of this young national entity, working towards providing the opportunity for more young blood to serve this blessed country," writes the editorial in Thursday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

King Salman believes that change and development provide the bases for progress and renewal. The successive modernization of state institutions and its senior posts is nothing new. This is the custom of the renewing kings who have served this state, and who understand the requirements of every phase and its rapid changes.

The royal decrees issued yesterday morning, declared a new phase of stability for our homeland. Prince Mohammad bin Nayif is now Crown-Prince, Deputy PM, and Interior Minister. This comes after Prince Muqrin – may God preserve him – asked to be relieved of his post. Prince Mohammad bin Salman is now Deputy Crown-Prince, Defense Minister, and second Deputy PM, based on what Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif had requested. In addition, the symbol of Saudi foreign policy Prince Saud al-Faisal has been relieved of his post in compliance with his own request in light of his health condition– may God cure him and reward him for all he has done for his homeland and nation – and 'Adel al-Jubeir has been appointed Foreign Minister.

The royal decrees were not confined to ministries, government institutions and bodies. They affected the very ruling establishment by consolidating a smooth process of transfer of power to the new generation, the grandsons of King 'Abdulaziz – may God rest his soul – who founded this state, once again demonstrating that wisdom and ability are the bases on which the King chooses his men and entrusts them with our country's future.

Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif has major achievements to his credit in confronting and destroying terrorism. This is in addition to the successive leaps in the services provided by the Interior Ministry, one of the ministries that are closest to the citizens' concerns.

For his part, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, has proven within a short period of time that he is the right man in the right position. Operation Decisive Storm and the later Operation Restore Hope have shown that King Salman has a sharp and correct eye when it comes to choosing strong men. Princes Mohammad bin Nayif and Mohammad bin Salman – the King's two main pillars of support – also enjoy growing popular support, love, and loyalty.

We are optimistic about these successive royal decrees. They share a number of factors in common, the most important of which is the empowerment of the younger generation to serve their country, as well as the reliance on qualifications and success as the criteria for choosing new leaders. In fact, the early signs of these new leaders’ success are already evident. Moreover, the other ministerial reshuffles prove that the Kingdom's leadership appreciates the importance of rapid modernization in the various sectors of state.

"Our country, led by our King backed by the 'two Mohammads', moves forward decisively and with confidence. We are full of hope and trust in a brighter and more prosperous future for our blessed country, thank God," concludes the daily.

End…

 

MAJOR CHANGES: "Saudi King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz has introduced major changes, some of which were not expected, at least not by people in general," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Thursday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

Prince Muqrin bin 'Abdulaziz has been relieved of his post as Crown-Prince, and Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif has been appointed in his place. Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman has been appointed Deputy Crown-Prince. In addition, Saud al-Faisal has been relieved of his post as foreign minister, and Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Washington 'Adel al-Jubeir has replaced him. At first glance, it may seem that the man behind these changes is King Salman himself. But the fact is that two parties are really behind them:

- The first is the U.S. It is well-known that Prince Mohammad bin Nayif, who is now the exclusive Crown-Prince, is among the Saudi princes closest to U.S. policy. Even inside the Kingdom and among the other princes, he is known to be the man most trusted by the Americans, regardless of whether the administration in Washington is Democrat or Republican. This is because, during his service as Interior Minister, he succeeded in establishing close relations with the American ruling elite and in gaining their absolute trust.

What further confirms that Washington is behind these changes is the appointment of Saudi Ambassador to Washington 'Adel al-Jubeir as Foreign Minister. This is the first time that the Saudi foreign minister does not come from the ruling family.

Moreover, all of those who have been targeted since King Salman acceded to the throne have been princes who have dared to criticize U.S. policy on a number of issues, seeking to provoke Washington by threatening to establish relations with Russia and other states that are classified as U.S. enemies or competitors. Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Prince Saud al-Faisal are well known to have been among the princes who have criticized U.S. policy severely for failing to deal with certain issues.

In fact, the changes by which Muqrin and Saud al-Faisal were toppled resemble those that Qatar witnessed when Prince Hamad and his prime minister Hamad bin Jassem –-who was known as the main engine of Qatari policy – were toppled, before Hamad's son Tamim became Emir of Qatar.

- The second factor responsible for these changes is the struggle that was expected to break out in light of the fact that the throne was going to move from the sons of Saudi Arabia's founder King 'Abdulaziz to his grandsons; a struggle over who has the right to accede to the royal throne. This struggle is now being renewed.

For it makes little sense for Prince Saud al-Faisal and Prince Muqrin to ask to be relieved of their posts for health reasons, similar to how the Emir of Qatar justified conceding the throne to his son Tamim. After all, while Saud al-Faisal suffers from many ailments, nothing indicates that Prince Muqrin suffers from any diseases sufficient to relieve him of his post. In fact, even the royal decree making these appointments and relieving others of their posts mentioned health reasons only in Saud al-Faisal's case – and even these were not serious reasons.

It is obvious that this struggle was expected. In fact, it may be that the person who expected it most was King 'Abdullah bin 'Abdulaziz who issued a number of royal edicts before his death in which he sought to consolidate Muqrin as Crown-Prince and protect him against any possible change. This is why it is possible to say that deposing Muqrin amounts to a coup in the full sense of the word.

After these changes that are tantamount to a coup, and after the risky adventure of waging war on Yemen, Saudi Arabia is entering a fork in the road that is unprecedented in the Third Kingdom's history.

"The coming weeks and years will be full of surprises in the 'Kingdom of Sands'," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

POINTS OF SIMILARITY: "Salman Al Saud is very similar to Mikhail Gorbachev," writes Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Thursday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

Gorbachev led a process of disintegration of the great Soviet Union, one that many people think was inevitable. And now Salman is inaugurating the process of the disintegration of Al Saud's not-so-great kingdom. In fact, the points of similarity are restricted to the belief that the problem lies in the identity of the figures who are appointed to the country’s most senior posts.

The last of the Soviet Union's leaders deluded himself into believing that the problem of freedom in the country could be treated via the word 'Glasnost' or transparency. That was a word whose importance Langley [the CIA] later discovered when it decided to fill the world with thousands of non-governmental organizations and societies demanding transparency. Then the Communist Party's secretary general carried the torch of change further by calling for the younger generation to rule the country. But that was a dull game that lasted no more than a few months before the main foundations were destroyed and the building began to crumble.

Today, Salman – or, more accurately, whoever controls Salman's mind – has concluded that dealing with the crisis of the Kingdom of Repression consists of destroying the pillars on which the choice of its prominent officials has been based ever since Al Saud captured the Arabian Peninsula. From the first moment when the family doctor declared his predecessor 'Abdullah dead, he has been deposing one man and appointing another in various posts. But although his 'royal edicts' seem pre-prepared and organized, they do not point to any real planning or any genuine awareness of the nature of the problem. On the contrary, they reflect the putschist mentality that controls this Bedouin mind.

This usually leads to an attempt to try to take hold of everything and addresses only those matters that cannot be ignored. In this case, Salman and his team’s modesty towards Nayif’s family is not a manifestation of respect for its status or family tradition. It is a measure forced upon Salman because the U.S. has agreed to provide a cover for everything he wishes to do, provided he does not touch Mohammad bin Nayif. From the very first day, the Americans told Salman: ‘You can rule, but Mohammad bin Nayif is a true partner in government’. And this, in fact, is what is happening.

The aggression on Yemen came to lift the veil and show that the first changes had failed to achieve any aim. And yesterday's decisions came to reveal the second part of the coup to the public; but they did not bring anything new either. Everybody knew that Muqrin was crown-prince in name only. Everybody knew that 'Adel al-Jubeir was the foreign minister from day one. Everybody knew that broad changes were being introduced in the Royal Diwan and some state institutions, and that the time had come to make them public.

The sole problem that remains is Mutaib bin 'Abdullah who heads the National Guard, but who knows that he is besieged from every side. And now Mohammad bin Nayif has resorted to the new-fangled idea of creating armed units from the tribes that are under his direct control and that will be charged with main missions along the southern and then the eastern borders. These will constitute an additional hard core for the Interior Ministry’s strike force, which runs parallel to all other Saudi military frameworks.

Gorbachev's perestroika flung the door open to the destruction of the largest and greatest of the world's states within no more than two years. It destroyed a huge edifice of economic, military, social, and political structures. It drove some nations hundreds of years backwards. It brought a powerful mafia to the centers of power where they enriched themselves and took control of the country's resources. And these mafias could only have been formed from the opportunistic corpus that was present and that wielded influence in the days of iron rule.  For who else would shift the rifle from one shoulder to the other than them? Who else would sell their country's dignity to the outside world? Who else would commit crimes in the name of releasing freedom, justice, and … transparency?

As for Al Saud's changes, they represent the blows of someone who acts with closed eyes driven by a dream or a vision. Of course, neither the king nor those around him will admit that nothing they are doing can preserve this decaying edifice. Even the corpses of the people who are dying to prop up its pillars cannot help. The curse of Yemen will speed up the collapse of the last kingdom of repression in our nation, leaving only the Kingdom of Israel.

The coming phase will expose how flimsy this regime is, and how far its main pillars do not trust each other. We will hear of the discovery of more ISIS cells every day. In fact, they may conjure up claims about the discovery of Houthi or other sorts of cells tomorrow. For they can feel the noose tightening around their necks. And every time they will lash out and strike whatever is before or around them, they will only hit themselves. And this is a process that will continue until the body crumples and collapses without further screams.

What is now happening in the Kingdom of Repression is a dance of madness. One tries to reach the opportunists who have never been accustomed to this level of dancing to find out what they think, but one finds that no secret passwords have been distributed to them from the regimes of conspiracy. They have no option but to remain silent and be wary, preparing to pledge allegiance once the orders have been issued. But these opportunists can be very patient before saying all that needs to be said at the appropriate moment. Anyway, the only sort of state loyalty these opportunists know is that of loyalty to the ruler.

We can take as an example our future PM Sa'd al-Hariri who barely finished his statement mourning the death of the former king [Abdullah] before he issued a statement congratulating the new one. And he had barely ended his visits to congratulate the new leaders, before he had to issue a new statement praising the 'leadership's wisdom' in deposing the very same.

"And he will sit at home and review with those who work with him how to build contacts with the new rulers. But his problem will remain one and the same: How can he appease Mohammad bin Nayif [whom he described as a 'thug' in a tape aired on the Lebanese New TV a few years ago]?" concludes Amin.

Ends…

 

 

2-Prelude to Iraq’s break up

 

A Congressional bill will allow Washington to arm Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish militias with dangerous consequences for the country’s unity, but the problem began when Baghdad allowed Iran to arm the Shiites, says today's pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The debate over a draft law in Congress that would allow the U.S. government to provide direct military aid to Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish militias by bypassing the central authorities in Baghdad, flings open the door to Iraq's partition or even its destruction along sectarian lines, warns the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. But the Iraqi government itself is to blame for allowing Tehran to provide such aid to Shiite militias.

 

DRAFT LAW COMPLICATIONS: "In an initiative that will exacerbate Iraq’s existing complications and that violates the most basic principles of international law, the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Forces’ Committee is supposed to debate a draft law this week that allows direct American financing for Kurdish peshmerga and Sunni security forces, with the understanding that these forces will be defined as 'states' so as to satisfy the preconditions for receiving direct American financing as required by the Constitution," writes the editorial in Thursday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This may set a precedent whereby one state decides to intervene in a country that is supposedly sovereign by providing aid to some specific group in it, totally bypassing its government. Such intervention remains peculiar even if it comes from the U.S. which occupied Iraq without legal justification – unless the aim this time round is to partition the country or tear it apart given the provocation this poses to the other sectarian [Shiite] constituents of the country.  And, in fact, the leader of the [Shiite] Sadrist Current Muqtada as-Sadr has threatened to strike at American interests inside and outside Iraq if this law is adopted, stressing that this would be 'the beginning of Iraq's partition.'

Although the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has tried to dismiss Congress' project as unimportant, insisting that Washington backs a united Iraq, the fact is that this law would offer the U.S. a wide margin of freedom in providing direct military aid to Sunnis and Kurds and to train their forces without requiring the prior consent of the Iraqi state, exploiting the fact that wide areas of the country are now outside Baghdad's control.

Iraqi PM Haidar al-'Abadi has reticently criticized Congress's moves. He said: 'there is no room for foreign parties to have double standards in dealing with the government. We stress that no armament will occur unless via the Iraqi government and in accordance with its military plans.' But the fact is that 'Abadi's position concerns the Sunni Arabs alone. What is now referred to as Iraqi Kurdistan is already securing direct military aid from numerous Western capitals, bypassing the Baghdad government. But the obvious question is this: Why did 'Abadi allow the (Shiite) Popular Mobilization Units [PMU] to receive direct and public support from Tehran whereas he is now refusing similar aid from Washington to other constituents of the Iraqi people?

We do not mean to justify any intervention in Iraq regardless of where it may come from. But clarifying the double standards that 'Abadi is speaking of should perhaps come from Baghdad itself before anywhere else. In other words, the government that dragged its feet in arming the [Sunni] tribal forces in al-Anbar may have forced them to demand Arab or even American intervention to rid them of ISIS.

The fact of the matter is that this American law, assuming it passes, is merely the embodiment of an old tendency within Congress. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, members of Congress have publicly called for Iraq's partition into three states – Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni – as a means of overcoming the problems of distributing government posts and shares.

As for President Barack Obama's administration, which speaks of a 'united Iraq' when it knows perfectly well that such an Iraq no longer exists and may have become part of history, it may imagine that the law permits it to solve its current predicament in Iraq. For Washington realizes that inviting 'Abadi to visit it was not sufficient to weaken his alliance with Tehran. Moreover, it is now clear that its air raids [on ISIS] have failed to change the balance of power on the ground, especially now that Iraqi army officials have themselves acknowledged their inability to confront ISIS without backing from the PMU. But the U.S. rejects the PMU because of the Iranian influence they represent, and so do the majority of the people of al-Anbar who fear a repetition of the violations these forces perpetrated in Tikrit.

In conclusion, slamming the door in the face of foreign intervention calls for a reconsideration of the Iraqi government's policies first, and urgent action in coming to the rescue of the Anbar's people by providing them with the support they need to ensure that they do not find themselves having to ask for or receive aid from outside the country.

"But maintaining the current situation can only lead to Iraq’s explosion along confessional lines, not only its partition. And the effects of this may not remain confined to within Iraq's borders," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 30.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Crawling toward a coalition

 

Domestic politics is back in the headlines on Thursday. With exactly a week to go before Binyamin Netanyahu's deadline for presenting his new coalition to President Reuven Rivlin, the prime minister has finally inked deals with two parties. The first parties to officially join Netanyahu's fourth government are Kulanu – the party of popular former Likud minister Moshe Kahlon – and the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party.

According to the lead headline in Haaretz, Kahlon's demands have been met almost in full – including the demand that Netanyahu drop a controversial bill defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Commentators say that this concession by Netanyahu has now become a major stumbling block for Naftali Bennett to bring his Habayit Hayehudi party into the coalition.

UTJ has managed to get Netanyahu to repeal bills passed by staunchly secular Yesh Atid during the term of the previous government. Under the terms of the coalition agreement, criminal sanctions against ultra-Orthodox men who refuse to serve in the IDF will be removed and reforms to the religious conversion process will be frozen. Yaakov Litzman will serve as deputy health minister and Moshe Gafni as chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee.

Reactions from politicians on the left of the political spectrum to Netanyahu's first coalition partners have been predictably scathing. Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog – who is also likely to be the leader of the opposition in the next Knesset, blasted a clause in the agreement with Kulanu that would limit the Supreme Court's ability to cancel Knesset laws and interfere in the Knesset's authority. 'They are threatening the judges; they are threatening journalists; they are threatening Israeli democracy. We will not allow it!' wrote Herzog on his Facebook page.

Tzipi Livni also reacted to the agreement, writing on Twitter, 'The prime minister-elect is canceling the same initiatives that the former prime minister supported: equal burden, easing of the conversion process for immigrants and the protection of the Supreme Court. The veil has been lifted. Now that he is free of any barriers, it turns out that throughout all the years that Netanyahu talked about enemies, he actually meant the media, democracy and the Courts,' she added.

On the Iranian front, Israel Radio reports that the U.S. Senate has rejected an effort to make easing sanctions on Iran conditional upon Tehran ceasing to support acts of terror against Americans. A handful of Republicans joined Senate Democrats to reject the proposed amendment offered by Republican Senator John Barrasso that would have added the terrorism clause to a bill subjecting an international nuclear agreement to review by the U.S. Congress. Netanyahu has said that such a demand should be made of Tehran in an accord on its nuclear program. The White House spokesman said that President Obama would veto any legislation with amendments that would undercut a deal reached between his administration and U.S. lawmakers over the role of Congress. Spokesman Josh Earnest said that President Obama would also not back any bill that would interfere with the negotiations with Iran.

Iran's foreign minister, meanwhile, declared that his country and world powers are to meet Thursday to start drafting a comprehensive nuclear deal, with meetings starting Monday in Europe to finalize all the elements. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said at an event on Wednesday in New York that even though Iran certainly wants to meet the June 30th deadline for an agreement, 'no deadline is sacrosanct.' Zarif said that Iran expects United Nations sanctions to be lifted within a few days of a deal. He expects President Barack Obama to stop implementing U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Elsewhere on the Iranian front, Ynet reports that Britain has warned the United Nations that Iran is actively trying to obtain nuclear material through two blacklisted companies. 'The UK government informed the Panel on 20 April 2015 that it 'is aware of an active Iranian nuclear procurement network which has been associated with Iran's Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) and Kalay Electric Company (KEC)',' said a representative. Tehran has been trying to evade international sanctions on its nuclear program for years using tactics like these. As part of the current international negotiations, Iran insists that sanctions be lifted and that the world should trust that the Islamic Republic is not interested in building nuclear weapons.

On the northern front, Army Radio reports that in the area of the Quneitra crossing on the Golan Heights, light weapons fire spilled into Israeli territory on Wednesday. Several bullets struck orchards belonging to Kibbutz Ein Zivan. There were no injuries or damage reported. The radio adds that clashes continue in the area of the crossing between Syrian rebels and regime troops.

Finally, on the Palestinian front, Haaretz reports that The United States and several other countries – including Arab states – have asked the French government over the past two weeks to postpone its initiative for a United Nations Security Council draft resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian issue – at least until after the June 30 deadline for reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran. Senior U.S. officials and European diplomats told Haaretz that the message was also relayed to French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, as well as to French diplomats at the UN headquarters in New York and to officials in Washington and in other capitals. 

According to the American and European diplomats, the messages relayed to the French stressed that the Obama administration – as well as other powers – are currently focused on reaching a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Taking action on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, they said, would only distract from and disrupt this goal. A senior American official said that the administration is also worried that such a move by France would harm efforts to win the support for the Iran deal from Democratic congressmen and senators. He added that Israeli opposition to negotiations with Iran is already hindering the efforts to win support in Congress; therefore there is no need for a Security Council showdown over another issue which Israel views as harmful to its interests.

 

 

WHEN ISRAEL ARMS HAMAS: Writing in Maariv, Ariel Kahane accuses Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon of allowing Hamas to rearm itself.

"Knowingly arming the enemy, providing terrorists with weapons, turning a blind eye to the ever-growing threat and walking calmly into the next war; this is not a description of the United States' policy regarding Iran, but of Israel's policy regarding Hamas.

Even though they know that the cement that is allowed into Gaza is being used to build tunnels, even though they can see that the steel is being turned into rockets and even though they know that Hamas is readying itself for the next round of fighting – Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon continue to allow Hamas to rebuild its military strength.

There were reports again yesterday that thousands of tons of cement are being allowed into Gaza, which will let terrorists emerge from tunnels and attack our communities. It's as if our leaders have forgotten that there was a war less than a year ago; they have learned nothing from it. Remember how the Rabin government in its stupidity armed Arafat's people with guns? Well, we're making the same mistake in 2015. Our eyes are wide open yet we are arming Hamas and enabling it to attack Israeli citizens. Even as I write these words, I find it hard to believe.

According to the politicians in Jerusalem, Israel wants 'quiet' in the Gaza Strip. They say that we cannot allow thousands of Palestinians to remain without homes and they insist that everything is being closely monitored. Does anybody believe those make-believe stories? We are told that the situation is complex, that there are a lot of conflicting interests at play. They say that unemployment in Gaza is just as much a threat as missiles in Gaza. Well, I'm sorry to say that our leaders appear to be suffering from some kind of blindness. Obviously, the situation is complex and I do not believe that our leaders really want to strengthen Hamas. But we have seen in the past situations whereby the political leadership of the country refuses to see things that the average man in the street sees very clearly. Call it a 21st-century version of the emperor's new clothes, if you will.

Just two weeks ago, we marked Remembrance Day for Israel's fallen soldiers. The prime minister said that, before he orders soldiers to go to battle, he tries to imagine that each and every one of them is his son. But if that were true, how is it possible that the prime minister himself is allowing the same people who killed our soldiers less than a year ago to rearm themselves under our very noses? Incidentally, I asked the Prime Minister's Office exactly that question and I am still waiting for a response.

What is even more amazing is that we have been in this situation before. Before Operation Protective Edge, I asked Israel's security bosses why they were allowing concrete into Gaza if they knew it was being used by Hamas. Then, too, I got a series of explanations that did not really answer the question. Today, after we saw what Hamas was doing with the imports, after we discovered how hard it is to destroy its bunkers and after we paid a heavy price in human life, I cannot understand why we are making the same mistakes.

Add to this insanity the fact that Egypt has changed its policy. Until recently, most of the contraband that entered Gaza did so via the Rafah border crossing, since Mubarak didn't care and Mursi actively supported Hamas. Now that Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi has got Hamas in a stranglehold, Israel is allowing it to get up off the floor.  Hamas is under siege, and Israel – its bitterest enemy – is helping it. Can somebody please explain just what the hell is going on here?

As we await the formation of the fourth Netanyahu government, there are two politicians who should take it upon themselves to shout out about this insanity: Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett. They both expressed their reservations about the security policy of the previous government. They are both now in a better position to rectify the situation in the next government. If they could just set aside their personal rivalry and present Netanyahu and Ya'alon with a united, hawkish, responsible and sane front, they would not just be doing themselves a favor – they would be doing a service to the whole of Israel."

Ends…

 

DEAD OR ALIVE: Writing in Israel Hayom, Shaul Bartal explains why Mohammed Deif – who Israel has tried to assassinate five times – is such a symbolic figure for Hamas in particular and the Palestinian people in general.

"After months of speculation, we finally got an answer to one of the questions that has been bothering Israel since the end of Operation Protective Edge: Is Mohammed Deif dead or alive. Deif – whose real name is Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri and who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Khaled – was born in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip in 1965. He was attracted to religion from an early age and was active in the Muslim Brotherhood before joining Hamas. In May 1989, he was sentenced to 16 months behind bars for membership of the organization's armed wing. When the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades were established, he rushed to join its ranks, where he was a student of Yahya Ayyash – Hamas' chief bomb-maker – until Ayyash's assassination by Israel in 1996.

Deif was selected to replace Imad Akal as head of Hamas' armed wing in Gaza. Over the years, as Israel continued to arrest or assassinate Hamas leaders, especially in the West Bank, Deif's authority within the organization rose and he became the unchallenged leader of its military wing. Following the assassination of Salah Shehadeh in July 2002 – along with 14 members of his family – Deif was officially appointed head of Hamas' armed wing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

There have been five Israeli attempts to assassinate Deif and the fables about his courage and his ability to survive Israeli assassination attempts have given him an aura of mystery – much like what Yasser Arafat enjoyed. The most recent attempt to assassinate Deif was on August 21, 2014, toward the end of Operation Protective Edge. His death would have been the highlight of Israel's achievements and would have been a major blow to Hamas' morale. Deif, however, was not killed; like in most of the previous attempts on his life, he was merely injured. During all three of the Israeli campaigns in Gaza – Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge – Deif has broadcast a victory speech, in which he urged the Palestinian people to be patient in their battle against the crimes of the occupier, which include the murder of women and children – including his own. The last of these videotaped messages was recorded on July 29 last year – following the Hamas infiltration to the IDF outpost at Nahal Oz, in which five soldiers were killed. Deif warned Israel of a second holocaust and bragged about the glorious victory that Hamas fighters had enjoyed.

Deif is a unifying figure in Hamas. He has wide experience in kidnapping soldiers and organizing suicide attacks in which hundreds of Israelis have been killed. He is held in high esteem not only within Hamas but throughout Palestinian society. His CV includes the production of home-made mortar shells and providing Hamas with the ability to fire its own rockets; he is responsible for the construction of attack tunnels and for plans to use them to launch multiple simultaneous attacks on Israeli communities and to kidnap civilians and soldiers; he established Hamas' naval and aerial force and has forged operational ties with other Palestinian organizations, with Hizbollah in the north and with ISIS in the Sinai. There is also full coordination between Deif's forces and Islamic Jihad's military wing, the al-Quds Bridges.

As a byproduct of the close coordination between all the terrorist groups based in Gaza, Hamas has also become closer to Iran and enjoys help from Tehran in its rearmament plan. Although Deif's approach is nothing new – in fact, it finds its roots in the 1990s – it is often the cause of friction within the organization. The more moderate members of Hamas want to become closer to and get aid from Saudi Arabia; as long as Deif remains in control of the organization's armed wing, however, there is little chance of a change in its approach and it will not evolve into anything like a disciplined army under his command.

Israel's inability to assassinate Deif is portrayed by Hamas on various social media sites as divine providence. He is the symbol of the resistance and the symbol cannot be killed or defeated by the Jews. As long as Deif remains alive, he will be a symbol of Israel's helplessness and tendency to get embroiled in the Gaza quagmire. Hamas' slogan is 'Victory or martyrdom.' More than any other person, Deif is the living manifestation of that sentiment. He has been Hamas' commander in chief for the past 13 years and he will continue to fight against Israel until Palestine is liberated or he is killed."

Ends…

 

NO COINCIDENCES: Writing in Makor Rishon, Amnon Lord comments on the situation in Israel's north, saying that the best course of action for the IDF is to defend the border without setting up a buffer zone on the Syrian Golan.

"Even if the two mortar shells which slammed into Kibbutz Ein Zivan on the Golan Heights on Tuesday were 'spillover' from the fighting on the other side of the border, the incident was not just an unfortunate coincidence and the IDF must adopt a new policy for its operations on the Golan.

Over the past few days, there has been a series of activities between the Qalamoun area of Syria and the border fence near Majdal Shams. Even the mayor of Majdal Shams believes that the mortar shells were no coincidence and that, as long as Samir Quntar is given a free hand in the northern part of the Golan Heights, there will be more and more such incidents.

The two incidents in the Qalamoun area – and alleged Israeli airstrike on a warehouse storing missiles and a ground operation against Hizbollah, for which the al-Nusra Front is being blamed – are seen by Hizbollah as Israeli interference in the Syrian Civil War. If Israel is seen as a protagonist in that conflict, then Hizbollah will start to use more and more of its units to attack us.

The localized conflict between Israel and Hizbollah on the Golan Heights – a conflict that is being conducted on a low flame – must be seen in the context of the broader conflict between Israel and Hizbollah on the Lebanese front. It is fairly clear that Israel is not interested in an all-out war on its northern border – even if the IDF continues to prepare for exactly that eventuality. Hizbollah, too, it seems, does not want war. After all, the Lebanese organization needs to focus all its strength and resources on propping up the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. As a result, Israel and Hizbollah would both prefer a limited confrontation on the Golan Heights to all-out war on the Lebanese front.

Should Israel simply accept the fact that there is a low-intensity war happening on the Golan Heights, as long as it remains limited to the border area? What alternatives are there? Firstly, Israel could engage the enemy on the other side of the border, in the hope of pushing them back from the perimeter fence and establishing a buffer zone. Secondly, it could launch an offensive designed to defeat the enemy and to permanently occupy a strip of land inside Syria. Finally, it could limit itself to a defensive operation close to the border.

It seems that the option Israel has chosen is to launch a pinpoint operation in response to any incident, followed by rocket fire at the source of the mortar. If Israel were to try and capture any land within Syria – even a buffer zone of a few hundred meters – it could find itself dragged into an all-out war in Lebanon. Hizbollah would use the fact that Israel has unilaterally established a buffer zone as an excuse to pepper the Israeli Golan and the Galilee with rockets from Lebanon.

Despite the tensions of the past few days, it seems to me that the IDF's best option is a defense operation from within Israeli territory. In this respect, former IDF chief Benny Gantz left his successor a tolerable situation on the Golan Heights – thanks to the field security operations he established there and the defensive measures he took to protect the perimeter fence."

Ends…

 

THE JEWISH VOTE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Guy Bechor explains why the Democratic Party is losing the Jewish vote and why this could have an impact on the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.

"Two recent opinion polls have shown that the seemingly unbreakable bond between American Jews and the Democratic Party is falling apart. The main cause of this rift appears to be the policy of U.S. President Barack Obama toward Israel. This change could have a critical impact on the identity of the next American president.

The Gallup polling company published unsurprising figures about the level of support for Obama among American Jews: from almost 80 percent support when he was first elected to around 54 percent today. Senior Democrats surely understand this drop in popularity is due to Obama's cool – some would say hostile – relationship with Israel, along with his emotional detachment from the Jewish state, the hostile leaks to sympathetic journalists, the diplomatic initiatives of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry – which, if implemented would have led to disaster for Israel and the Palestinians alike – and the hesitant support of Israel during Operation Protective Edge. According to the Gallup poll, the more religious the respondent is, the less likely he or she is to support Obama: among Jews who attend synagogue at least once a week, his approval rating is just 34 percent.

Another indication that this is an ongoing trend can be found in the voting patterns of Jewish Americans. In last year's Congressional election: just 66 percent voted Democrat, compared to a recent average of 80 percent.

Obama is reaching the end of his term of office and the big question is how much damage has he done – and how much damage will he yet do – to continued Jewish support of the Democratic Party, which began when the Democrats were more supportive of Israel in its formative years than the Republicans. This support will have an impact on the next presidential election – an election that is likely to be extremely close – in two ways. First, there are at least three key states where the Jewish vote could tip the balance in one direction or the other: Florida, which has an ever-growing Jewish population, Illinois and Pennsylvania. Any candidate who has serious aspirations of winning the presidency must take Florida. Second, Jews are known to be generous donors to the Democratic Party. Now, with American Jews moving to the right – like Israel itself – the number of Jews donating to the Republicans has increased dramatically.

There is another reason for the Jews' shift to the right: the policies of both parties toward Israel. Since Gallup started to poll on this issue, the Republicans have fared badly. In 1988, just 47 percent of Republicans identified more with Israel than with the Palestinians. Today, some 83 percent of Republicans identify more with Israel, which is a record level. This can partly be explained by the large number of Jews who have switched allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans.

During the same period – between 1988 and today – Democrats have only had lukewarm support for Israel: it was rare that more than 50 percent of them identified more with Israel than with the Palestinians. Today, that figure stands at 48 percent. Between 1993 and 2001, only 35 percent of Democrats identified more with Israel than with the Palestinians. So many Jews are now asking themselves: If the Democrats are not exactly enamored with Israel, why should we vote for them?

In the 18 months that Obama still has in office, he will determine whether the rift between American Jews and the Democratic Party is widened or whether he and his party will make the effort to halt the mass exodus to the GOP. For most Jewish voters, Hillary Clinton – the leading candidate to win the Democratic nomination for president in 2016 – is still something of a riddle when it comes to Israel. If Obama continues to be unfriendly toward Israel or if his policies cause security or diplomatic harm to Israel – many more American Jews will consider voting for the Republicans. If that happens, no one in the Democratic Party will need to ask why."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S MORAL HYPOCRISY: Writing in Haaretz, Gideon Levy says that Israel doesn’t have to go all the way to Kathmandu to save lives; it would be enough to lift the siege it imposes an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and let Gaza be rebuilt.

"The uniform is the same uniform. It’s the uniform whose wearers blew up hundreds of homes and schools and clinics in Gaza last summer. It’s the uniform whose wearers periodically shoot teenagers and children throwing stones and peaceful demonstrators in the West Bank. It’s the uniform that every night invades homes and brutally pulls people out of bed, often for needless and politically motivated arrests. It’s the uniform that blocks people’s freedom of movement in their own land. It’s the uniform that’s been abusing an entire people for decades.

Now its wearers are saving lives for the cameras. The evil army in Palestine has become the salvation army in Nepal.

The Israeli rescuers in Nepal are certainly infused with good intentions. The reserve soldiers among them told of dropping everything to join the effort. They are definitely good people who enlisted to help Israelis and Nepalese. It’s very moving to see a preemie being carried to safety by an IDF soldier.

But we cannot forget that wearing that same uniform, the IDF kills babies by the dozens; a B’Tselem report released last week listed 13 instances in which homes were blown up in Gaza, killing 31 babies and 39 children. He who did this to dozens of babies needs an intolerable measure of chutzpah to dare be photographed with a baby rescued from an earthquake and to boast of his humanitarianism.

Because after all, boasting is the name of the game. That’s a fact. Let’s show ourselves, and particularly the rest of the world, how wonderful we are, how the IDF is really the absolutely most moral army in the world.

'Have you seen any Iranian rescue planes?' asked a propagandist in disguise yesterday. 'A model state,' 'The beautiful Israel,' 'The Israeli flag among the ruins,' 'The pride.' 'Our delegation of ministering angels represents the universal values of our people and our country,' the president said. 'These are the true faces of Israel – a country prepared to assist at any distance at such moments,' the prime minister said.

Ministering angels? The country’s true face? Perhaps. But that angelic face also has a dark, satanic side, one that kills babies, not only saves them. When that’s the case, one cannot speak of 'universal values.' One cannot speak of values at all. There is simply no right to do so. To see Avigdor Lieberman, the bully who preaches at every turn to bomb, shell and destroy, speak of humanitarianism?

There are countries that aren’t providing as much generous aid as Israel, but there isn’t a single country behaving with such hypocrisy – killing in Gaza, saving in Nepal, and presenting itself as Mother Teresa. There is no other country that so exploits every opportunity to propagandize and shower itself with syrupy, embarrassing self-adulation ad nauseam.

Babies die in the child warehouses at the Tel Aviv central bus station not from some force majeure, but because of a cruel immigration policy. The IDF isn’t saving those babies. There was an earthquake in Gaza during Operation Protective Edge; the rubble has not been cleared to this day, and most of those who lost their homes remain homeless. No one has visited Gaza recently without being shocked to their very core. And that earthquake was manmade; it was the work of the IDF, the same IDF that’s in Nepal.

Israel doesn’t have to go all the way to Kathmandu to save lives; it would be enough to lift the siege it imposes an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and let Gaza be rebuilt. It would be enough to allow the 2 million people who live there a bit of freedom. It would be enough to decide that during the next attack, which is inevitable, the IDF will act differently. That the same IDF now engaged in rescue will not commit more war crimes. That it will uphold international law, and perhaps even those 'universal values' Israel is gloating about now. That the same IDF now hugging babies will not bomb homes with babies inside them.

But all this is of course much harder than sending a 747 to Kathmandu and setting up the largest possible, best-equipped field hospital in front of the accompanying army of reporters, and applauding the beautiful, virtuous, moral Israel."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S DUTY: Writing on the website of i24 television station, Yakub Halabi says that the State of Israel has a moral duty to create a humanitarian security zone in southern Syria.

"The main lesson that Israel should draw from the Holocaust is that Israel should always be ready to act as a gatekeeper for protecting minorities facing the threat of genocide or mass murder. After all, Israel persists in criticizing western allies for not having done enough to help save the Jews during World War II. During the last few years, however, minorities in Iraq and Syria, such as the Yazidis, Druze and Christians, have been threatened with mass murder and the question now is: what should Israel do to help them? Minorities in the Middle have been Israel’s best allies in the region even before the establishment of the state, including the Maronites in Lebanon, the Circassians and above all the Druze.

The Druze in Syria are currently stuck between a rock and a hard place: the Assad regime on the one hand and the Islamic State (IS) group on the other. They must either fight for the former's fascist regime or else suffer under it and if, God forbid, their province falls into the hands of IS; they will be doomed to mass extermination. They are faced with either fighting an unjust war and sacrificing their young men, or a threat to the existence of the whole community; neutrality for them is out of question. A few weeks ago, a delegation from Jabal al-Druze (Mountain of the Druze) was invited to the presidential palace in Damascus and was told rather bluntly by Assad’s close adviser, Luna Shibil, that 'you must fight with the regime, whether you like it or not.' IS forces have reached the outskirts of Sweida province and the Druze understand that their fate would be similar to that of the Yazidis in Iraq if the jihadist group manages to reach their region.

Under these circumstances, Israel should pursue humanitarian intervention in Syria by creating a security zone in southwestern Syria that will extend from the Golan Heights in the west to the Sweida province in the east. This security zone should be founded on the same model as the 'Security Belt' that Israel established in southern Lebanon up until the year 2000. Based on this model, Israel would occupy the area and establish an army composed of local citizens who would protect it. This zone should mainly constitute a refuge for Syrians who are fleeing the fighting, but are blocked from either entering neighboring countries or seeking shelter in Europe.

Unfortunately, U.S. air raids in Syria and Iraq as well as the training of the Free Syrian Army have hitherto failed to alter conditions on the ground. Establishing a security zone in southern Syria would be a game changer. The Southern Front (another rebel group) could join forces with the Free Syrian Army in defeating both the Assad regime and IS.

Since the Syrian civil war's inception, Israel’s aid to the Syrian people in their harsh time has been confined to admitting a few hundred wounded citizens to its hospitals. Yet, given the long Jewish history of persecution, Israel cannot look the other way as innocent people are killed in a neighboring country. After all, Israel should demonstrate that it is ready to do all that is possible to prevent what befell the Jews during the Holocaust from happening to other minorities living next door to it. Israel’s humanitarian intervention is not purely humanitarian, however. The potential liquidation of these minorities means that Israel would lose its best sub-state allies in the Middle East. These minorities have always been the gatekeepers of secularism and modernity in the Arab/Muslim world.

Finally, Israel should declare that it would have no intention of occupying this security zone forever and that it would withdraw from it once Syria is stabilized under a humane regime."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

DISPUTE WITH NORTHERN CYPRUS: Cengiz Candar notes a significant change of direction in Northern Cyprus in centre-left Radikal: "The fact that the people of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) have elected Mustafa Akinci as president with a significant number of votes, sends a very important message to Turkey. Whereas former TRNC president Dervis Eroglu represented the status quo and was opposed to any negotiated solution for the Cyprus problem, Mustafa Akinci represents 'change', the search for a solution and the need to establish equality between Turkey and the TRNC. Turkish President Erdogan, however, supports the status quo, and adopts the position that the best solution is no solution."

Sami Kohen detects a growing interdependence between the two countries in centrist Milliyet: "Akinci's election has been welcomed on both the Greek side of Cyprus, and within the international community at large. Turkish Cyprus’s reputation has improved. At this point, the humiliating words that are coming from Turkey represent a dilemma. Akinci's rhetoric about the 'mother land' is actually an expression of the desire to act much more independently and stand on one’s own feet, rather than a challenge to Ankara. And this highlights the fact that the Turkish Cypriot identity has become stronger. The TRNC still needs Turkey; but Turkey also needs the TRNC, especially in strategic and military affairs."

Ozgur Mumcu accuses Turkey of excessive paternalism in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Erdogan has apparently prepared himself for this ‘motherhood’ role. He has approached Akinci and thus Turkish Cypriot society as a child to whom he is offering pocket money. In fact, this is Turkey’s general approach to the TRNC."

Hasan Cemal adds quasi-colonialism to the list of charges in independent internet news outlet T24: "I do not recall such strong criticism directed against an elected president of the TRNC from Ankara, especially at the presidential level. This is truly unbelievable. Leave aside state protocol, this is a paternalistic style that is inconsistent with any kind of manners. It represents an insult to Mr Akinci, the post that he represents, and the Turkish Cypriots who voted for him! Erdogan has long shown that he does not care about democratic values, those values that the EU represents as a peace project. It is impossible for him to understand and to recognize his attitude towards the TRNC as if it were a Turkish a colony."

Ibrahim Kiras suggests that the new Cypriot president may be on a learning curve in centrist Vatan: "The new TRNC leader’s words are not as innocent as presumed. What he said was not just any simple thought that suddenly popped into his head. There are days ahead in which he will have to act and talk in a manner that is consistent with the realities of Cyprus. But if there had not been such a shocking reaction from Turkey as voiced by Erdogan, it would have taken much longer for him to get wiser as someone who has just come to power."

 

GOVERNMENT/GULEN TENSIONS: Guneri Civaoglu argues that the current government tensions with the Gulen movement represent a threat to democracy in Milliyet: "Someone arrested by one judge has been released by another. An attorney does not heed the ruling that a suspect must be released. Another judge finds this ruling null and void. It is so complicated that I cannot offer any healthy analysis. With all respect to the judiciary in principle, I want to say that this picture makes me sad. The rule of law is the basis of a democratic state project. If it collapses or is threatened with collapse, the democratic state structure cracks, and is liable to collapse as well."

Abdulkadir Selvi calls for a fight till the end in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The latest incidents show that we are just at the beginning of the fight against the [alleged Gulen-led] parallel structure. Unless this structure is eradicated from the judiciary, we are going to be the subject of repeated coup attempts."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Mardom Salari provides an overview: "The Lausanne Statement should have been binding for all parties; its legal status should not have been questioned. We should have asked that the U.S. be committed to this statement. We possess the knowhow to enrich uranium to 20 per cent, which means that we can enrich uranium up to 90 per cent. Therefore we have no problem regarding uranium enrichment. Stockpiling uranium is of no benefit for us since the Russians have agreed to provide fuel for the Bushehr power plant. Due to the sanctions and being accused of military nuclear activity, we cannot export enriched uranium. Our officials insist that we do not seek nuclear military activity. Low percent enrichment is all we need. Therefore, we have not lost anything in these talks. Our nuclear negotiators have been able to find an honourable solution for lifting sanctions, without closing down our nuclear industry." 

Reformist Arman overstates: "U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to the residence of Iran's envoy in New York signifies a change in U.S. hostile policies and an achievement for the nuclear talks that should result in the resolution of our economic problems and the immediate lifting of sanctions after a nuclear agreement. It can be said that with this move, America, with all its pride, has apologized in a diplomatic way to Iran for its former behaviour."

 

YEMEN: Hard-line Javan incites: "The Saudi war against the oppressed Yemeni nation is an example of their enmity to Muslims. The Yemen war revealed the links of the Saudi ruling family with the U.S. and the Zionist regime more than ever. Muslims have properly identified this triangle of the main enemies of Islam. Muslims should stage uprisings against the Saudis as the hypocrites of the Muslim world and punish them for their actions and crimes."

 

IRAN ELECTIONS: Conservative Khorasan cautions MPs: "Our MPs’ frequent tampering of election laws in the last year of their tenure and on the eve of new Majlis elections reinforces the suspicion that they are protecting their personal interests. According to Election Law, candidates who have been MPs are already eligible for elections, while others need to obtain eligibility, which is evident discrimination and is inconsistent with some articles of the Constitution. Such fiddling will not remain unnoticed and may produce opposite results."

Hard-line Keyhan writes of a tsunami of lies: "Why are some people trying to demolish the past and scare the public!? Two factors are behind this behaviour: First, election aspirations; second, the lack of planning. Apparently, victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections is much more important for government authorities than carrying out their responsibilities and previous promises to address people's needs!" 

 

EGYPT: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami opposes the current regime: "Egypt is passing through a sensitive phase. The oppressed desires of people along with security issues and economic problems have left the country unstable. Egyptians know well the objectives of the junta ruling the country. Taking Egypt back to the era before the revolution and the period of the previous corrupt regime is the real aim of the regime. The acquittal of former president Hosni Mubarak is the first phase of this conspiracy." 

 

TURKEY: Conservative Resalat is on the side of Gul versus Erdogan: "Turkey's role in Kobani, Ankara's constant support for ISIS and al-Nusra and their friendship with the new King of Saudi Arabia and support for Riyadh's intervention in Yemen are serious and costly mistakes of President Erdogan. Turkey faces isolation in the region. At this critical juncture, Abdullah Gul, the former president of Turkey and the main founder of the Justice and Development Party has declared his opposition to changing the country's parliamentary system to a presidential one. This is an indication of Gul's rebellion against Erdogan and the beginning of the formation of a new political party. Most of the supporters of the Justice and Development Party will definitely join Abdullah Gul." 

 

BALTIMORE PROTESTS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reports: "Most of American cities are facing protests. The protests that began several months ago have not yet ended and the white police continue to kill black people. The American political echelons from the White House to Congress have not come out against the police's inhuman attitudes. President Barack Obama declared that the people's fight against the police is not acceptable." 

Conservative Khorasan is befuddled: "For months, Americans have been witnessing the death of black people in many of their cities. It is interesting that despite the slogans of American officials, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan's attempts to stop the protests have not included a call for dialogue!" 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-A strategic threat

2-Collapsing borders

3-Camp David agendas

 

1-A strategic threat

 

Erdogan's Turkey is pursuing its colonial Ottoman project in Syria and advancing towards achieving it via public and qualitative steps, while the Iranians are steering clear of the scene, insisting on avoiding a clash with Ankara. This is a new lesson for Arab patriots to learn. No matter how principled states may be, they ultimately remain hostage to their own interests. Turkey after all is Iran’s major economic partner. Once the sanctions are lifted, it will become its first partner in joint investments and trade. Moreover, and more importantly, and in compliance with Iran’s request, the Turks have steered clear of joining the Saudi aggression on Yemen. And the ongoing conflict in and over Yemen may have the absolute priority for the Iranians today because of its potential for hemorrhaging Saudi Arabia, Tehran's number-one enemy in the region--Nahed Hattar in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

The axis hostile to the Syrian regime has been in a state of 'ecstasy' ever since Operation Decisive Storm was launched against Yemen, and that was then crowned by the radical changes on the Syrian battlefield. As a result, it has given free rein to new visions and equations, dealing with them as if they have already been secured. Be that as it may, the rapid and unexpected developments in the Syrian north require the pro-Damascus axis to speed up the Qalamoun battle [along the Syrian/Lebanese borders]– unless this axis still holds some cards and unused capabilities to respond and restore the balance in other areas. This, in fact, is what the axis's sources in Beirut are saying, insisting that retreats and advances are inevitable in war, and that what really matters is the final outcome, especially in Yemen and Syria--Ibrahim Bayram in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The strategic threat posed by the fall of Jisr ash-Shughour cannot stand without a response that matches the scale of the 'aspiration' that tickles the fancy of the alliance that supports these terrorists. For it is unlikely that there will be a long pause before shells and perhaps even an attempt at invasion will reach [the regime’s heartland] Latakia. Should that happen, it would mean a major setback is about to occur, and that a decision has been taken that should sound the alarm bells in the capitals of the 'axis' that backs Damascus. This axis cannot accept such a development, let alone the transformation of these aspirations – more accurately, illusions – into facts on the ground. In fact, the pro-Damascus axis will simply not allow this--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

Tehran’s silence regarding Turkey’s blatant military intervention in northern Syria may be cause for concern since it suggests that Iran is now focused on Yemen to the detriment of the struggle in Syria, warns a Jordanian commentator in a left-leaning Beirut daily. That would be a grave mistake and stab in the back to the Syrian army whose steadfastness alone has allowed Iran to achieve so many gains in recent years. In light of the Syrian regime’s setbacks in the north, it has become urgent for it and its allies to launch the battle of Qalamoun against Islamist opposition groups along the Lebanese borders, maintains a Lebanese commentator. It is already clear that this battle will have regional implications and will be more complex than may seem at first glance. The fall of Jisr ash-Shughour in Syria’s northwest to armed Syrian rebels may eventually lead to a regional war between the pro-opposition axis and the axis that backs the Syrian regime, warns a commentator in an Amman daily. The city's fall threatens the Syrian coast and the regime's survival, something that its regional supporters will never tolerate even if this were to undermine the imminent nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington.

 

A TERRIBLE SILENCE: "Barely a day passes without some Iranian official issuing a heated denunciation of the Saudi aggression on Yemen," writes Nahed Hattar in Wednesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

Yet we hear nothing but a terrible Iranian silence towards the Turkish invasion of northern Syria. This silence, and its complicated motives that stem from the bilateral friendly relations between Tehran and Ankara, have provided a political margin of maneuver for Turkey’s open military and security action in Idlib, its countryside and Jisr ash-Shughour, in these difficult days that Syria has been living for more than a week.

Turkish intelligence is now working at three unprecedented levels:

- First, based on its new alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has united the terrorist groups in the targeted areas, primarily under the Nusra Front, which is affiliated to al-Qa'ida. And the Nusra, as is well known, has been internationally classified as a terrorist organization. Yet it is receiving generous supplies of American TOW missiles that are highly effective against armored vehicles.

- Second, Turkey has brought in at least 5 to 7 thousand highly-trained fighters from groups that are directly linked to Turkish intelligence. These are made of Chechen terrorists and other terrorists from Central Asia, and have been deployed by the Turks to the battlefronts in an organized and concentrated flow.

- Third, Turkey is providing the attackers with intelligence and logistical support for their military operations that are being directed by Turkish, Saudi, Qatar, Emirati, Hamas, and other officers.

The Turkish invasion is clearly observable to the naked eye. Yet Tehran has not uttered a word about it. It also remained silent last year when the Turks carried out a similar invasion of the Kasab border area. Erdogan's Turkey is pursuing its colonial Ottoman project in Syria and advancing towards achieving it via public and qualitative steps, while the Iranians are steering clear of the scene, insisting on avoiding a clash with Ankara.

This is a new lesson for Arab patriots to learn. No matter how principled states may be, they ultimately remain hostage to their own interests. Turkey after all is Iran’s major economic partner. Once the sanctions are lifted, it will become its first partner in joint investments and trade. Moreover, and more importantly, and in compliance with Iran’s request, the Turks have steered clear of joining the Saudi aggression on Yemen. And the ongoing conflict in and over Yemen may have the absolute priority for the Iranians today because of its potential for hemorrhaging Saudi Arabia, Tehran's number-one enemy in the region.

We are not, of course, claiming that Iranian/Turkish collusion has facilitated the Turks' invasion of northern Syria. And we are still convinced, based on the evidence that Iran continues to provide military and economic aid to the Syrian state. (Let it be clear, however, most of this aid is based on financial considerations, including putting up [Syrian] government land and buildings as collateral for Iranian loans). But this not the issue. The issue stems from the fact that the Turks have secured an opportunity for a blatant intervention in Syria by exploiting the existing political vacuum. And they have made good use of their alliance with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the tangible improvement in relations with Tehran and their expected future prospects. In particular, Turkey has steered clear of joining a 'Sunni' alliance hostile to Iran in the Middle East. But all this remains contingent on the two sides' interests, and the remaining period before the final signing of the Iranian nuclear deal.

We may also note that Iran has noticeably refrained from joining the political/media campaign stemming from the Turks’ denial of the genocide committed against one-and-a-half-million Armenians in 1915. Public Iranian policies have always stressed that Iran takes a principled stance in favor of those who have been unjustly treated. But the unjust treatment of the Armenian nation – the harshest in modern history – has not elicited any Iranian comment. This is a kind of double standard, exactly the same as Iran’s denunciation of Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas for backing the Saudi aggression on Yemen, while keeping totally silent in response to Hamas doing the same.

By contrast, Russia commemorated the Armenian genocide, and President Vladimir Putin took part in marking its hundredth anniversary. This led Turkish officials to issue provocative statements against Russia, going so far as to impertinently hint that Turkey could join the Western campaign against the Russians' return to the Crimea. And this threat has some measure of seriousness to it, compared to the [Turkish] call to settle scores with the Pope over the Spanish expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Andalusia [after his denunciation of the Armenian genocide].

Unlike Iran, Russia adopts a systematic and determined path in its political, economic, and defensive support for Syria. This is because Syria is a priority for the Russians who do not share the Iranians' enthusiasm for the events in Yemen and continue to pursue diplomatic efforts to find a political solution for the Syrian crisis; one whose features remain unclear.

The Syrian armed forces – which have proven their unprecedented capability and heroism over four years of a ferocious war – will not consider surrender or retreat as an option. And the Syrian leadership will not offer any concessions that violate Syria’s sovereignty and its political path under any form of pressure. But the Syrian army, whose steadfastness was primarily responsible for improving the terms under which Russia joined a multi-polar international order, and that has had the main and most important role in enabling Iran to expand its regional role and achieve a reasonable nuclear agreement that will lift the international sanctions on it-- this brave army is a noble horse that is dragging all of the resistance axis's carriages by itself.

"Do not leave this horse to labor alone!" concludes Hattar.

End…

 

INEVITABLE BATTLE OR EMPTY TALK? "Is the battle of Qalamoun [along the Syrian/Lebanese borders] now inevitable, or is talk of it mere empty threats by members of the pro-Syrian axis?" asks Ibrahim Bayram in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

So much has been said of this battle in political and media circles for months now that the matter has turned into a puzzle and source of confusion. This is especially so at the moment when the Qalamoun’s snows have all but melted, which means that the pretexts for postponing this promised battle have disappeared.

Over the past few days, there has been renewed talk that the zero-hour for attacking the Qalamoun has been specified, especially after reports that mobilization and logistical preparations have begun by those who have been trying to end the presence of over 3000 [Syrian Islamist opposition] fighters in this area for more than three years. But this has been accompanied by statements attributed to the armed groups that the threat of attacking this area is empty and no more than an attempt to exert pressure on them, adding that preparations have been made to deter the attackers and repulse them should they try to implement their threat.

Despite this climate that suggests that more fires will break out, there are still those who continue to question the seriousness of this battle, its true dimensions, possibilities, and its relationship to the recent storms in the region.

This battle, which remains no more than a possibility so far, is certain to have serious repercussions on the Lebanese situation. If it takes place, it will occur on Lebanon's borders, and specifically along the point of contact with the countryside of the Lebanese town of 'Irsal. This town is one of the strongholds of terrorism that has been in open and public confrontation with the Lebanese army.

At another level, a Lebanese party, namely, Hizbollah, will be one of the main participants in this battle. This is especially likely since it has revealed that it has had a significant military presence in these areas for some time for strategic and tactical considerations having to do with the situation in the northern and central Bika’a Valley, the western Bika’a and up to the Hasbayya/Marjayoun line in the south.

As is their wont, the concerned circles in Hizbollah have refrained from discussing the details of this battle or specifying the zero-hour for the order to attack. But the party's media has told the TV news stations to prepare to head to the northern Bika’a at any moment. This has given observers the impression that the battle is both imminent and inevitable. In fact, those in contact with the party have formed an impression based on two assumptions: First, that the outcome of the battle has already been decided; and, second, that preparation for it began a long time ago on the ground that it is an unavoidable follow-up to the confrontations that began in al-Qusair [in 2013] then stretched to the Qalamoun's other towns.

While this implicitly suggests that the promised battle has nothing to do with the latest developments on the ground in the Syrian north and the armed [opposition] groups’ advances there, it is clear that the Syrian regime and its allies are in dire need of an immediate achievement on the ground that would restore the balance of morale with the opposition on the one hand, and put an end to the rumors that the Syrian regime's enemies have moved on to a new and advanced phase whose aim is to take control of its strongholds along the Syrian coastline as a prelude to tightening the siege on Damascus and toppling the regime or driving it towards further confusion and loss, on the other.

The axis hostile to the Syrian regime has been in a state of 'ecstasy' ever since Operation Decisive Storm was launched against Yemen, and that was then crowned by the radical changes on the Syrian battlefield. As a result, it has given free rein to new visions and equations, dealing with them as if they have already been secured.

Be that as it may, the rapid and unexpected developments in the Syrian north require the pro-Damascus axis to speed up the Qalamoun battle – unless this axis still holds some cards and unused capabilities to respond and restore the balance in other areas. This, in fact, is what the axis's sources in Beirut are saying, insisting that retreats and advances are inevitable in war, and that what really matters is the final outcome, especially in Yemen and Syria.

One noteworthy development regarding the anticipated Qalamoun battle has to do with the reports of more than one Israeli air raid against Syrian army positions in this area in particular. It is also worth noting these reports come exclusively from parties that are hostile to the Syrian regime, since neither Damascus nor Israel have revealed the true nature of what has happened over the past few hours in a manner that ends all doubt.

If such Israeli air raids have really occurred, they would represent a new factor that will play a role in determining the situation on the ground in this area. Tel Aviv has routinely justified its air raids on Syria on the grounds that they aim to prevent the transfer of balance-breaking weapons to Hizbollah in Lebanon. Now, however, it seems clear that Israel is sending a message that its renewed intervention in the Syrian crisis via the Qalamoun gateway indicates that it remains a partner to the anarchy that has spread across the whole of Syria, and that it refuses any change in the status quo in the Qalamoun because it understands the strategic importance of this area for Damascus and Hizbollah.

In this sense, Israel is refusing any change in the rules of the game and the existing equations in both Syria and Lebanon. In addition, and via these air raids, Israel would be voluntarily assuming its position in acting with others on confronting the nuclear agreement between Iran and the West whose final ratification will occur soon.

But regardless of the accuracy of these conclusions, it is clear that the regional dimensions of the Qalamoun battle have begun to become clear even before the battle has begun. And this suggests that it will not be easy and that its consequences will be complicated.

"This is especially likely since the axis hostile to Damascus is behaving as if it is able to alter the reality on the ground," concludes Bayram.

End…

 

STRANGE QUESTION: "Are we close to a regional war?" asks Mohammad Kharroub in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

The question may seem strange now that we have overcome the hurdle of Operation Decisive Storm, if only to a limited extent. Even though it was announced that this operation has ended after achieving its aims (as the [Saudi-led] coalition's spokesman declared), it has continued at a lower tempo. And it is being accompanied by a media exchange whose vocabulary and idioms are crafted with 'caution,' in a manner that allows each side to respond but without straying beyond the media war into the arena of actual military confrontation.

Our question, however, stems from the calculated and pre-planned escalation on the Syrian fronts. This seems more akin to a risk-laden venture, rather than an attempt to improve the terms of negotiation or adjust the relative balance of power prior to heading to Moscow-III or Geneva-3 – or even to the consultative (Geneva) conference to which the UN Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura is preparing to invite all Syrian and regional parties (including Iran).

His aim is to pave the way for a new plan based on his proposal to 'freeze' the fighting in Aleppo – which was not implemented. That proposal was lost between the regional capitals' maneuvers, especially between the various armed groups whose aim was to foil the Syrian army's attempts to encircle the city and therefore proposed a 'ceasefire' in Aleppo and its countryside, something that Damascus rejected with the result that de Mistura and his plan were postponed.

It is no coincidence that Jisr ash-Shughour fell immediately after certain armed groups that have nothing in common other than their Turkish and partial Arab points of reference succeeded in taking control of Idlib. They achieved this after pouring into the city from the Turkish borders in an organized, pre-planned, and programmed manner, heavily-armed and benefitting from advanced and sophisticated logistical and intelligence and direct support from across the Turkish borders.

Reports suggest that they receive their orders from an operations room in the nearby city of Antioch in Iskandarun [Turkish Hatay] Province. And they operate under the temporary and provisional name of Jayshul Fateh [the Army of (Islamic) Conquest]. They are a mixture of armed elements and terrorist groups, and most are foreigners with a majority of Chechens and Gulf Arabs as evident form the images and videos they have posted themselves. They number more than twelve-thousand armed men – a figure no one armed faction or group has ever been able to deploy since the start of the current global war on Syria as a state, stance, people, and history.

Idlib fell under pressure from this large number of terrorists who wallowed in death, destruction, and devastation in the city. This was part of the alliance that backs these terrorists’ attempt to redraw the map in northern Syria after the plan to threaten the capital Damascus in the south failed – or was verging on failure – especially after Bosra ash-Sham and other villages near to the strategic triangle of Damascus's-countryside/Der'a/al-Qunaitra fell to the regime.

But the strategic threat posed by the fall of Jisr ash-Shughour cannot stand without a response that matches the scale of the 'aspiration' that tickles the fancy of the alliance that supports these terrorists. For it is unlikely that there will be a long pause before shells and perhaps even an attempt at invasion will reach [the regime’s heartland] Latakia. Should that happen, it would mean a major setback is about to occur, and that a decision has been taken that should sound the alarm bells in the capitals of the 'axis' that backs Damascus.

This axis cannot accept such a development, let alone the transformation of these aspirations – more accurately, illusions – into facts on the ground. In fact, the pro-Damascus axis will simply not allow this. It publicly threatened a regional war if Turkey were to intervene in northern Syria, especially after ISIS succeeded in entering 'Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and after Ankara began to mobilize its forces in a clear display of power after publicly welcoming ISIS at the border crossing near the town – even though this new 'neighbor's' [ISIS's] presence did not last long.

The armed gangs’ continued control of Jisr ash-Shughour means that we may slide towards a probable regional confrontation-- one that will become certain if these groups stand their ground before the Syrian air force’s attacks and the growing military mobilization that has begun to regain control and pursue the armed elements and expel them from Idlib and beyond. This is especially likely given that the Syrian army's supply lines to Aleppo, Hama, and the two cities' countryside will be threatened and may be completely cut off if the armed elements’ presence in Jisr ash-Shughour is consolidated.

And the situation will be even worse if these elements succeed in declaring an 'Islamic' Emirate of Idlib led by al-Qa'ida (or the Nusra Front, which Washington classifies as a terrorist group) with the participation of the [Saudi-supported] Islamic Front led by Zahran 'Alloush. The latter is now a dignified and honored guest of the Turkish government that seems to have adopted him as a freedom fighter on behalf of the Syrian people (!!).

"We will not need to wait too long before we know the course of the serious successive events in the Syrian north. This is especially likely given the failure of the wager of those who believe that Tehran (and Moscow) will not risk the Lausanne framework agreement and the imminent final agreement expected by the end of June, for the sake of the Syrian coast and Latakia, or even for the sake of the Syrian regime itself," concludes Kharroub.

Ends…

 

 

2-Collapsing borders

 

Jordan needs to rethink its approach to border security the conflict in Syria and Iraq escalates, says 'Amer as-Sabaileh on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Jordan needs to reconsider its previous approach based on steering clear of the fighting in Iraq and in Syria, urges a commentator in a pan-Arab online news site. With attacks on the Iraqi and the Syrian sides of the border crossings with Jordan, the old strategy of relying on Sunni clans inside Syria and Iraq to keep terrorist factions away from the country’s borders has collapsed.

 

IMMEDIATE THREATS: "Notable developments on two border fronts are leading Jordan towards the need to confront a series of immediate threats that may affect the country's borders and its domestic scene," writes 'Amer as-Sabaileh on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Over the past years, Jordan has sought to prevent any terrorist threat or even direct confrontation from reaching its common borders with Syria or Iraq. Many theories have emerged to account for this approach, the most important of which (and that seems to dominate the mentality of Jordan’s decision-makers) calls for building a defensive line based on the so-called Sunni clans inside Iraq and Syria, arming them to confront ISIS in a manner that prevents that organization from reaching the Jordanian borders.

This Jordanian approach that was based on previous experiences in Iraq, is now facing threats and complications that are much greater than those of the past. This is in addition to the dangers implicit in the above approach, making it sometimes seem more akin to wishful thinking rather than a clear strategy that is capable of being implemented and whose results are assured.

Iraq’s political and security situation in addition to the map of Iraqi forces at this juncture, point to the real difficulties facing the implementation of the 'security buffer zone' theory. Moreover, the mere fact that ISIS suicide bombers reached the Turaibil [Iraqi/Jordanian] border crossing a couple of days ago, means that the planned security zone has already been breached, and that Jordan must be ready for various scenarios of direct confrontations along its borders in the coming phase.

As for the Syrian front, Jordan’s challenges emerged after the fall of the Nasib border crossing. Regardless of the faction that controls the Syrian side of the borders today, the fact that this area has now become a rallying point for terrorist cells and numerous organizations also confronts Jordan with daily challenges that are only likely to develop.

And this is to say nothing of the problems and dangers surrounding the notion of creating a security zone inside Syria. The Syrian situation may witness further direct escalation in the coming phase, which may force Jordan into a direct confrontation along its northern borders. This is especially likely since the scenario based on escalation in most Syrian cities and on all fronts is now clear. And this, in turn, means that the areas south of Damascus are likely to witness serious future escalations whose repercussions that will affect all points of Jordanian/Syrian contact.

The challenges facing Jordan are becoming more and more numerous. Preparing for a continuous escalation in Iraq and Syria means that it is now essential to seek effective alternatives so as to confront the growing security threats. This is especially necessary after the notion of establishing security zones inside Syria and Iraq has failed.

"All of which forces Jordan to think of different strategies that will serve the aim of steering clear of any direct confrontation along its borders, thereby preventing them from spilling over into Jordan itself," concludes Sabaileh.

Ends…

 

 

3-Camp David agendas

 

The upcoming 2015 Camp David Gulf/U.S. summit will be an attempt to bring together two conflicting agendas, says today’s pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The Arab Gulf states' leaders are preparing to head to Washington and Camp David in a couple of weeks amidst a regional scene dominated by two major developments: The demise of Egyptian and Iraqi power, and the rise of Iranian power in their place, maintains the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. This confronts the Gulf states with major challenges that threaten their very survival. 

 

IN THE ARABS’ MEMORY: "According to Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Khaled al-Hamad, the Arab Gulf states' leaders will meet in Saudi Arabia next week to pave the way for their planned summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on May 13th in the White House, then at the Camp David retreat," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

That retreat’s name is linked in the Arabs' memory with the famous 1978 Camp David Accords between the late Egyptian president Anwar as-Sadat and then Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, sponsored by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter.

The practical effect of that agreement was to suddenly sever Egypt from the Arab region and the Middle East, inaugurating the gradual retreat of its major role that had already begun with the 1967 defeat and the slow disappearance of the vast shadow cast by Jamal 'Abdel Nasser, his political influence that crossed borders, and the Arab nationalist ideology whose banner he had raised.

The second major earthquake that the region suffered was the Iranian Islamic Revolution, which occurred one year after the Camp David Accords. That flung the door open to the notion of an 'Islamic state,' and the ideologies of the Shiite and Sunni currents of political Islam. It indicated that the taboo on these forces' coming to power had been broken. That, in turn, led to a series of developments and dynamics, the horizontal and vertical fragmentation of whose widespread manifestations we are witnessing today: Shiite militias of various forms, names, and colors; armed and infighting salafi movements; tame salafi parties; and so on; in addition to the Muslim Brotherhood current. In the latter case, the Arab Spring revolutions and the mechanisms of democratic elections opened up the possibility that it may come to power in more than one Arab country.

These two major developments – the retreat of the Egyptian role along with the collapse of nationalist ideologies (which provided the intellectual and political cover that matched Egypt's political and economic weight at the time) and the rise of Iranian power in parallel with the rise of the Islamic state's ideology and the project of 'exporting revolution' across the borders, together effectively constituted the momentum that drove the new mechanisms of change in the Arab world.

The impact of the collision between the 'Islamic state' in its revolutionary Iranian version and the 'Arab order' and the nationalist ideology in its Iraqi Baathist version was enormous. The 'Arab order' may have been able to contain that collision, had it not been for Israel that was terrified of Iraq's power after the end of the [1980-88] war with Iran, and for the American neo-con current with its delusions that it was able to destroy and restructure the world in accordance with its wishes.

The deployment of unrestrained American power under George Bush Jr.'s leadership to remove Saddam Hussein's regime (with all its uncountable repressive practices) from the equation, effectively handed the Arab region over to Iran. As a result, Iran controlled Iraq and the Levant (Syria and Lebanon) in what was a major symbolic fall of the two historical centers of the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Sunni caliphates into Shiite hands. This was one of the reasons for the extensive Sunni reaction that turned into a lethal conflict that has destroyed the social fabric of the Arab East.

But the shift of Iranian imperial ambitions towards Yemen via the Houthis has threatened the Gulf states' stability after taking control of the Arab East. This has forced some of these states to redirect their political agenda and end their suppression of the Sunni currents of political Islam so as to devote their attention to confronting the Iranian onslaught that is threatening their borders from three sides.

This is the broad scene that provides the context for the agenda that the Arab Gulf states' leaders will discuss and whose details they will negotiate with the U.S. administration.

For its part, Obama's administration has its own priorities that have not changed. It deems the armed salafi currents such as al-Qa'ida and ISIS to be its primary enemy. And it is preparing for a new phase of political normalization with Iran, with the two sides dividing up aerial and ground operations in their common war against ISIS, its predecessors, and its sister organizations in Iraq and Syria.

In this context, the 2015 Camp David Gulf/U.S. meeting will be an attempt to bring together two conflicting agendas. The outcome, whatever it may be, will not cover up the huge abyss that opened up as a result of the ebb of the Egyptian and Iraqi power, and the rise of Iranian power. But it will be an expression of the Arab Gulf states' will to survive, which will confront these states with major challenges.

"Will they be able to overcome them?" asks the daily in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 29.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The window

 

Israel Hayom leads its Wednesday edition with Nepal, where two of its correspondents are 'embedded' with the Israeli search and rescue teams. The devastating earthquake continues to provide the paper with an opportunity to highlight Israel's good deeds in disaster zones and its front page reports on 'the Israeli flag proudly flying among the rubble.'

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the news that the new Israeli government – which Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is still struggling to cobble together – will revoke several reforms introduced by Yesh Atid during the previous government's tenure. Describing the decision as a 'victory for the ultra-Orthodox,' the paper reports that Netanyahu's Likud party will today sign a coalition deal with United Torah Judaism, which will rescind laws relating to the IDF services of ultra-Orthodox men and funding for yeshivas.

The agreement with UTJ was slammed by centrist Yesh Atid head Yair Lapid as a 'complete surrender' by Netanyahu to the demands of the ultra-Orthodox party. Lapid accused Netanyahu of selling out the citizens of Israel by agreeing to UTJ’s demands on these changes. 'What we’re seeing today is a ‘fire-sale’ on what is important to Israeli society and is at the expense of Israeli taxpayers. This is a complete surrender on the part of the prime minister to an anti-Zionist party at the expense of the tax-paying and IDF-serving public,' Lapid said.

The prime minister is racing the clock in order establish a new government by the May 7 deadline. Under Israeli election rules, if Netanyahu fails to form a coalition by that date, President Reuven Rivlin can assign someone else the task of doing so.

Haaretz leads with a report that Mohammed Deif, the commander of the Hamas military wing whom Israel tried to assassinate during last summer’s war in Gaza, is alive and involved in Hamas’ military decisions, according to both Israeli and Palestinian assessments. The efforts of Hamas’ military wing are now focused on drafting fighters and rebuilding battalions, mainly in the areas of Beit Hanun, Shuja'iya and Khan Yunis, which were hard hit during the fighting. New attempts are also being made to dig both attack and logistical tunnels.

Elsewhere, Army Radio reports that Israel's UN Ambassador Ron Prosor warned of the threat Hizbollah poses to Israel, following the most recent military confrontation in the Golan Heights. In a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and to the UN Security Council, Prosor wrote that Hizbollah was preparing for an open and violent confrontation with Israel and demanded that the international community stop ignoring the threat of Hizbollah attacks. Prosor wrote: 'Israel will not show restraint when attacked on its territory and will take the necessary steps to protect its citizens.' The ambassador also called on the Security Council to condemn the recent attack.

In related news, Syrian Defense Minister General Fahd al-Freij arrived in Iran on Tuesday for a rare two-day visit – the first such visit since civil war broke out in Syria in 2011 – and was reportedly told by his Iranian backers to attack Israel. Al-Freij was told by senior Iranian sources that Syria and Iran's terror proxy in Lebanon, Hizbollah, need to open a war front against Israel on the Golan Heights, according to Channel 10 News. Iran told the Syrian defense minister to stir up conflict against Israel on the Golan, with the Islamic Republic apparently unperturbed by the significant damage the move will cause to the Syrian regime.

In other news, The Jerusalem Post reports that the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate on Tuesday turned back an attempt to elevate any nuclear deal with Iran into a treaty that would have given momentum to lawmakers trying to pass a bill giving Congress a chance to review and possibly reject an agreement with Tehran. The amendment, filed by Republican Sen. Ron Johnson, failed 39 to 57. Supporters want the bill passed free of controversial add-ons they claim could scuttle negotiations with Tehran, draw a presidential veto or leave lawmakers with no say on a national security threat.

As written, the legislation would block President Barack Obama from waiving congressional sanctions for at least 30 days while lawmakers weigh in on any final deal the U.S. and five other nations can reach with Iran. It would stipulate that if senators disapprove the deal, Obama would lose authority to waive certain economic penalties — an event that would certainly prompt a presidential veto.

The bill has gained tacit approval from Obama. He says he will sign it as written, but the White House warns that he will reconsider if the measure is substantially changed. Sen. Bob Corker, a leading sponsor of the bill and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the measure in its current form, has 67 backers, enough to override a presidential veto.

Finally, Israel Hayom reports that President Reuven Rivlin met yesterday with the U.S. ambassador in Israel, Dan Shapiro, and told him that Israel will do everything it can to thwart unilateral efforts to impose a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that any solution must be the result of negotiations.

 

 

THE WINDOW IS CLOSING: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Aviad Kleinberg says that, if Israel wants to use the common fear of radical Islam to forge regional alliances, it must first resolve the Palestinian issue, since the moderate Arab countries will not cooperate with the Jewish state as long as it is still occupying Palestinian land.

"The State of Israel came into existence because the leaders of the Jewish entity in Mandatory Palestine were able to take advantage of a window of opportunity. After World War II, there was a moment when the Eastern bloc saw recognition of Israel as a way to goad one of the main Western powers – Great Britain – and to hasten the dismantling of the British Empire, which controlled many regions in which the Soviet Union had a vested interest. That was good for the Jews. The Soviet Union and its allies voted in favor of the establishment of a Jewish state on November 28, 1947. More importantly, the Soviets approved an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which provided the nascent state with arms that the West refused to provide.

Shortly after this brief warming of relations, there was a cooling down. Although Israel was ruled at the time by the workers' party, it was unhesitatingly aligned with the West. In response, the Eastern bloc transferred its support to the Arab countries and became the main supplier of arms to some of Israel's major enemies – primarily Egypt. By then, however, Israel was already in existence. And the rest is history.

Today, Israel has a new window of opportunity. The attacks launched by radical Islam – Sunni and Shiite alike – against Western and pro-Western countries have created a new map of shared interests in the Middle East. Countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and some of the Gulf States view radical Islamic terrorists as the main threat to their regimes – not Israel. They justifiably view the Gaza Strip – which is under the control of Hamas – as a dangerous Islamist enclave and they treat it accordingly. The Egyptian regime's open hostility toward Hamas during Operation Protective Edge is proof of this.

In the past, Arab countries used the Palestinian issue to divert attention away from domestic problems and to win points from the international community. This is no longer the case. Israel is now a natural partner for pro-Western Arab regimes. They have no interest in undermining the stability of their own regimes, which could lead to their overthrow.

This does not mean that the so-called moderate Arab states can turn their backs on the Palestinians entirely. Official Arab recognition of Israeli annexation of the territories and the settlement enterprise would lead to a harsh reaction from their own people, who are naturally less concerned about realpolitik than their leaders. In order for Israel to become an official ally and be included in the regional strategic coalition, these countries need for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be resolved. The price Israel will have to pay in exchange is significantly lower than in the past. Our potential allies will be far more willing than ever before to exert pressure on the Palestinians to compromise. They would be willing to help Israel protect its valid security demands in a variety of ways. Islamist control of Palestine is just as bad for them as it is for us. This is a window of opportunity.

It should be in Israel's interests to find a solution. Inaction – Israel's de facto policy since the Oslo Accords – will turn the Jewish state into a binational state before too long. Separating between Israelis and Palestinians will become even harder – some would say impossible – the more settlers there are in the West Bank. In practice, Israel would have to choose between two equally bad options: the establishment of an officially non-egalitarian regime (that is, an official announcement that there are two classes of citizen in Israel: those with full civil rights and those with none) or granting full rights to a large and hostile Palestinian minority.

The former option will lead to Israel being ostracized by all of the democratic nations in the world. The latter option will kill off the Zionist enterprise. It will be a miracle if anyone can come up with a third way, which would allow Israel to continue ruling over the Palestinians while conducting an effective regional policy of cooperation with moderate Arab states.

I don't believe in miracles. Israel did not come into existence through miracles. It exists because its leaders had an impressive understanding of power blocs and because they took advantage of an opportunity when it presented itself. While we are preoccupied with Nepal, the coalition and the latest reality show, this window of opportunity is slowly closing."

Ends…

 

BIBI'S BONUS: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yossi Beilin says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is making a mistake by refusing to discuss with the United States what security-related benefits it needs in light of a nuclear agreement with Iran.

"Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is generally seen as the most vigorous opponent of the nuclear deal that the United States and Iran are currently negotiating. The ferocity of his opposition to the interim agreement and, thereafter, to the framework agreement that was reached in Lausanne, causes one to believe that he views even the fact of negotiations as a bitter mistake, since any negotiating process leads to concessions and any concession to Iran would allow it to maintain some of its current capabilities. At the time, Netanyahu did not believe that Iran would honor the interim agreement; he totally rejected the details of the agreement that were published and urged the world powers to find a better agreement, which – in all likelihood – Iran would reject.

There are those who agree with Netanyahu, who believe that the current regime of sanctions should be maintained or even intensified – despite the impatience of some countries to restore their relations with Iran. They believe in the importance of maintaining a credible military threat, which, they opine, could force the Islamic Republic to dismantle its entire nuclear program. I believe that the policy of the United States and of the Obama Administration is the right one, because there can be no better deal – in practical terms – than the one that the Americans are working on and that, if there is significant inspection of Iran's nuclear facilities, the threat of Tehran obtaining a nuclear weapon will be postponed for many years. Not even the military threat can do that.

But even if Netanyahu's arguments are correct and even if his opposition to Obama's policies justifies the personal confrontation with the American president, this cannot explain or justify the lack of immediate dialogue over the additional security elements that Israel would demand. The fact that Israel is refusing to even discuss, before the agreement is signed, the new security-related elements that the agreement with Iran would contain, will not prevent it being finalized. If the deal falls through, it will be for different reasons. It will, however, weaken Israel's position when the post-agreement dialogue with the United States begins.

Israel should do whatever it can to avoid being put in that uncomfortable position. Netanyahu is perfectly entitled to announce that his opposition to the framework agreement remains strong, that he will continue to push for a better agreement and that if there is no such better deal, he would prefer no deal at all. At the same time, he must start engaging in meaningful talks about the safeguards that Israel will demand if the agreement is violated by Iran.

The leaders of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were invited to a summit meeting with Obama at Camp David, in order to hear his explanation of the deal that will likely be finalized by June 30 and to be told what security 'sweeteners' the United States is willing to give them in light of the new situation. None of them will emerge from this meeting as supporters of the deal; they will all tell Obama exactly why they oppose the deal, but they will gladly take whatever the United States has to offer them. There is no reason in the world for Israel not to do exactly the same thing."

Ends…

 

COULD BE WORSE: Writing on the Walla! website, Amir Tibon comments on Israel's response to the UN report into the damage done to its Gaza facilities during Operation Protective Edge.

"Officials in Jerusalem are busy analyzing the United Nations report on the damage caused to its facilities in the Gaza Strip during last summer's Operation Protective Edge. They are doing so with the kind of statistical analysis that is usually reserved for major sporting events. Both sides – Israel and Hamas – were criticized by the report. Jerusalem was also praised for the way it cooperated with the report's authors. But the final outcome, the bottom line, is that Israel lost this particular battle by a slender margin or, at best, was tied. According to the report, Hamas used three UN facilities to either store its weapons or to fire rockets from. Israel, in contrast, hit seven UN facilities in Gaza, leading to the deaths of 44 Palestinian civilians.

Despite the condemnation contained in the report, the message coming out of Jerusalem is that it could have been much worse. When the investigating committee began its work, Israel tried to prevent it or to scale back significantly the mandate of the investigation. That effort failed and once it did, it was decided at the highest level to cooperate with the investigation, in the hope that this would prevent it from reaching biased or blatantly anti-Israeli conclusions.

Members of the committee, including retired officers from Western armies, met with senior IDF officers and officials from the Justice Ministry, who presented them with the findings of the IDF's internal probes into various incidents. Israel also allowed members of the committee to enter the Gaza Strip, knowing full well that they would be investigating the seven cases of Israel hitting UN buildings; they also hoped, however, that they would look at the incidents when Hamas used UN faculties for military purposes – a flagrant violation of international law.

The tough language that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon used when he spoke about Hamas' behavior certainly goes some way to sweeten the bitter pill it has been forced to swallow. Jerusalem insists, however, that the real test will be whether his unequivocal condemnation will force Hamas to refrain from similar behavior in the future.

The main lesson that Israel's political and military establishment learns from this report and from its relatively balanced conclusions is that Israel's decision to cooperate with members of the committee paid off. In response to publication of the report, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement, in which it said that, 'When asked to assist in a professional and unbiased inquiry, Israel responded in a collaborative, open and forthcoming manner.'

This was a clear reference to another UN report into the operation as whole, which was, until two months ago, headed by Canadian jurist William Schabas – whom Israel has accused of harboring a pro-Palestinian bias. 'Our decision to cooperate with this probe has proved itself,' a senior official involved in the issue told Walla!. 'The report contains some harsh criticism of Israel, but there is also praise for the way we gave the committee our full cooperation. In addition to criticizing Israel, the report also contains harsh criticism of Hamas.'

The Foreign Ministry’s response also highlighted the fact that the IDF has conducted its own probes into some of the incidents mentioned in the UN report and that, in general, Israel has conducted thorough investigations into its troops' behavior during Operation Protective Edge. These investigations were openly criticized by some Israeli politicians during the election campaign – most notably Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett – but many in the Israeli diplomatic community believe that the very fact that Israel investigated itself positively impacts on the country's international standing.

Similarly, there was satisfaction in Jerusalem with Ban's veiled criticism of the Palestinian Authority, when he said that, just as Israel investigated its own behavior during the operation, he would hope that the Palestinians would do the same. Ban drove this point home when he said that all those involved should conduct their own investigations in accordance with international standards.

Jerusalem believes that, given the praise Israel earned for some of its behavior during Operation Protective Edge, the Palestinians will continue to focus their diplomatic campaign against Israel not on the issue of the Gaza war, but on settlement construction."

Ends…

 

RUNNING INTERFERENCE: In part of his weekly column for Yedioth Ahronoth, Eitan Haber comments on Israeli criticism of a veiled American threat to withdraw support for Israel in international forums if the new government does not change its position on the two-state solution.

"In the next few days, the name of U.S. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman will be cursed and excoriated in the corridors of power in Jerusalem. In her impudence, Sherman hinted that the United States is not automatically in Israel's pocket and that, if the new government that Binyamin Netanyahu is due to establish in the coming week does not at least consider the possibility of implementing the two-state solution, the Obama Administration will have a difficult time continuing to assist its efforts to halt international initiatives on the Palestinian issue at the United Nations.

Some Israelis would argue that this is another example of blatant American interference in Israeli politics and that the Americans have absolutely no right to tell us what to do. I would respond to that by asking just what Netanyahu thought he was doing when he accepted an invitation to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, which he used to roundly attack President Barack Obama's policy regarding the Iranian nuclear talks. Was that not a case of an Israeli leader blatantly interfering in American politics?"

Ends…

 

SYRIAN SPILLOVER: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that, while it is tempting to see the security-related events in the last few days as connected, it seems that, this time, this is not the case.

"The series of incidents over the past few days on the northern border could be misleading. First, on Saturday morning, Arab media reported an attack on weapons stores at a Syrian military base near the border with Lebanon. The attack was attributed to Israel, which neither confirmed nor denied it. On Sunday evening the Israel Air Force killed four terrorists who were placing an explosive device in the Golan Heights, near the Israel-Syria border. A few hours later, on Monday, came the report of an attack on a Syrian camp near the Lebanese border. This time, too, the attack was attributed at first to Israel. The latter took the very unusual step of denying its involvement, and later it emerged that a Syrian opposition group was responsible for it. On Tuesday afternoon mortars fired from Syria landed in Israeli territory on the Golan, near the border town of Majdal Shams.

It is very tempting to see these events as a chain of action and reaction, but this time it does not conform to reality. Israel's opposition to the transfer of advanced weaponry from Syria to Hizbollah is known and according to foreign media this is not the first time the IAF has acted over it. But Hizbollah does not usually respond as quickly as the mere 36 hours between the bombardment of the Syrian base and the laying of the explosive device.

The squad who laid the explosives, all of whose four members were killed, appears to have been fairly amateurish. The connection of the four to the Assad camp is clear - two of the men killed were the sons of a Druze supporter of the Syrian regime who moved from Majdal Shams to Syria, and all four came from the area under the control of the Syrian government - but they could have also been dispatched by either Iran, Syria or Hizbollah.

Meanwhile the mortar that fell on Tuesday in the Golan turns out a case of exchanges of fire between Assad's army and the rebels on the Syrian side of the border, accidentally 'leaking' a few hundred meters into Israeli territory.

The bottom line is that this seems to be a chance accumulation of events, which does not signal unusual escalation, but merely illustrates how complex, dangerous and difficult the situation is to understand, not to mention to predict. Sometimes Israeli intelligence needs a few days to ascertain who is behind a certain incident and what their considerations were. The problem is that when so many elements are involved in the civil war in Syria, which sometimes slips into Lebanon, it is difficult to keep Israel entirely isolated from the implications of the fighting.

The more dramatic news in Syria is that in recent months, when it seemed that for the first time President Bashar Assad was stabilizing his position, his regime has been struck with failure after failure. After the defeat in the northern city of Idlib last month, the nearby, tactically significant town of Jisr al-Shughour fell on Saturday to insurgent forces; in southern Syria the regime, aided by Hizbollah, failed in its attempt to mount a major offensive. Damascus itself, from the airport right to the presidential palace, is ever more threatened by rebels and recent days have seen expanded fighting with more extreme elements, Islamic State and Nusra Front, in the area of Qalamoun, near the Lebanese border.

The Washington Post on Tuesday went so far as to say that the regime is facing the greatest danger to its existence in the past three years. According to the paper, additional escalation in the face of a weakening Assad might require the United States (which officially continues to criticize the Assad regime) to once again divert efforts against ISIS from Iraq to Syria.

Israeli security officials who were asked about this on Tuesday chose a more cautious approach. According to those officials, the continuous erosion of Assad’s power over the years has grown somewhat worse recently. However, they believe that Assad has already proven that he can survive despite all predictions. And so there is no reason to eulogize him now although his government is losing its grip on more areas of the country and effectively now rules only about a quarter of Syria."

Ends…

 

DOWN BUT NOT OUT: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Yonah Jeremy Bob says that Israel has reason to be relatively pleased by the United Nations report into the damage to its Gaza facilities during Operation Protective Edge, since there were no allegations of war crimes in it.

"Israel came out of its first major round of UN reports on alleged war crimes during the summer 2014 Gaza War bruised, but likely far better than might have been publicly expected. Of the seven IDF attack-incidents reviewed in UN Secretary General’s Ban Ki-Moon’s Board of Inquiry (BOI), three lead to multiple Palestinian deaths, in total killing 44 (as of now presumed civilians), while others led to injuring 277. While Ban condemned the deaths in the harshest language and laid responsibility for the incidents at Israel’s feet, the report did not accuse Israel of war crimes.

Part of that relates to the BOI’s function more as a fact-finding mechanism suggesting strategic lesson to be learned as opposed to offering legal conclusions. In contrast, the next UN round, the UN Human Rights Council report expected to be released on June 29, may have harsher legal conclusions, both because the UNHRC takes a harsher stance with Israel in general and because it is much more of a legal report.

But part of not mentioning war crimes was Ban’s respecting (so far) IDF investigations in rooting out any illegalities, with him repeatedly citing those investigations as the next step to keep an eye on. In the incident most likely to lead to indictments of IDF soldiers by the IDF prosecution, 12-14 died and 93 were injured. The IDF had already announced a criminal investigation of this incident in September 2014.

Still, the UN narrative recognizes that the IDF issued warnings and that 80-90% of civilians had in fact evacuated. If the IDF soldiers involved claim they thought the warnings had been heeded they might have a criminal defense, even if they might face disciplinary action for loose judgment.

Also, the IDF claimed that there was rocket fire emanating from areas around the school. Though the UN interviews of people in the area yielded the view that rockets were not fired from nearby, there is always a debate as to whether Palestinian civilians always see Hamas’ fighters, who move around fast, and even if they do, if they are intimidated into pretending they do not.

The UN implicitly admits this in another section of the report where it discusses three UNRWA facilities where Gaza fighters illegally kept weapons and two facilities where it essentially admitted fighters had used the facilities as stations to fire rockets. Discussing the hidden weapons, it admits that they were missed in UNRWA inspections and in each case the weapons were completely or partially removed without UNRWA noticing the removal until it was completed.

From the report, it appears that rocket attacks and hiding and removing weapons was likely accomplished at the UN facilities through a combination of what Ban himself called weak security and inspection procedures and from UNRWA hiring around 900 local Palestinian temp-security personnel. These personnel may have missed security breaches either because they were underpaid (which Ban criticizes) and did their duties poorly or because they were mass-hired fast without proper vetting and included Hamas sympathizers or double-agents.

If the IDF determines that firing at the rocket firers, including the school, was a military necessity and a military object, the soldiers again might have a criminal defense and might only face disciplinary proceedings. For the soldiers to be indicted and convicted, IDF prosecutors would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the school was not a military object or that the attack blatantly failed the proportionality test regarding the expected risk to civilians. They would also need to prove that the soldiers fired on it or close to it despite excessive risk to civilians out of illegal considerations like anger or otherwise disregarding the law of armed conflict. If the IDF does not have a detailed explanation of why the attack was proportional, this, in the worst case, could be a fault-line where the UN could press for ICC intervention.

In another deadly incident, the IDF admitted the UN was hit, but said the UN was not the target. While the IDF is investigating, that means that the attack was likely a misfire. If so, the two likely scenarios have no consequences at all for the IDF soldiers involved if the misfire is viewed as solely technical or disciplinary actions if they violated or were sloppy about the rules of engagement and thereby contributed to the misfire.

The third incident is the least likely to have criminal charges though disciplinary charges are possible. It appears that the Palestinian civilian deaths in the UN facility were caused by an IDF missile attack on three Islamic Jihad members on motorcycle, with the impact on the Palestinians being caused by the power of the blast which hit the motorcycle close to the facility. The IDF told the UN that it would not have targeted the motorcycle at the moment it did had it realized that it would hit it so close to the UN facility, but by the time the missile was fired and the proximity was noticed, it was too late.

This is a known regular problem and fault-line in the law of armed conflict with striking moving targets. It is unlikely the IDF will find criminal charges and disciplinary charges would only be if the air force personnel involved were loose in considering the area where the motorcycle was moving.

The IDF had a variety of explanations for the other four incidents, but none of them involved Palestinian deaths so they are least likely to get ICC attention.

In all, for seven attacks on UN facilities leading to 44 Palestinian deaths and 277 injured, probably only one incident might lead to ICC intervention, and even that only if the ICC does not file indictments itself or fails to give a thorough explanation, puts Israel in much better shape than it might have expected as the fog of the Gaza war lifted in late August."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GOVERNMENT/GULEN TENSIONS: Oral Calislar claims that the Gulen movement is seeking to manipulate the judiciary in centre-left Radikal: "The [alleged Gulen-led] 'parallel structure' is organized inside the state, and it is still strong.  It is not possible for a political system to accept or legitimize such a structure. We cannot accept that a structure organized inside the state can do whatever it did in other court cases so as to save its own men under the guise of a 'legal act'. There will always be lawyers who have different political preferences, of course. They may include those who have sympathy for the religious [Gulen] community. But it is not normal for those who are members of the system to manipulate the judiciary for their own purposes."

Bulent Korucu calls for freedom for the judiciary in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "One cannot talk about judges' security after the judges who issued the decision to release [Gulen prisoners] have been suspended from their duties, and have been assaulted by the supporters of the justice minister and the HSYK [Supreme Court of Judges and Prosecutors]. Can judges hand down rulings that will be disliked by the government? For example, can a judge, who is the head of an election council, confirm fraud without any qualms? If the answer is no, we should do something before it is too late."

Writing in the same paper, Sahin Alpay depicts a deliberate government campaign of distortion and cover-up: "First they [the government/ruling party] hid the millions they stocked in their houses and thus exonerated themselves, and then they stopped the biggest bribery and corruption investigation in republican history with nonsense about the 'parallel structure'; then, armed with the same nonsense, they set about nullifying the rule of law and the independent judiciary, step by step."

Mehmet Metiner accuses the Gulen Movement of an assault on the law in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The [U.S.-based] Gulen Movement’s leader gives orders and some people act. This is blind obedience. A civil servant runs to the scene on an issue that is not under his authority and usurps the authority of others. This is akin to supporting a coup. They [the Gulen movement] have been pursuing an open coup attempt against the legal system using the judiciary. This is a continuation of the December 2013 coup attempt [based on corruption and bribery claims against the government]. We are face to face with murder of the law."

Ali Bayramoglu portrays a defense of democracy in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "With the attorney general’s refusal to release the [Gulen] prisoners, this farce has ended. But what does all this tell us? It is not about the intervention of the government in the judiciary, of course. On the contrary, what it tells us, is about the intervention of an informal structure; a group that is aggregated inside the judiciary and that uses the judges’ authorities in dispensing justice. Once again it has been revealed that this negative reality inside the judiciary continues to exist. There is no doubt that the measures that will be taken against it are equal to the continuation of democracy."

 

DISPUTE WITH CYPRUS: Murat Yetkin, blames the Turkish president for disturbing relations with the newly-elected president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in centre-left Radikal: "Calling for brotherly relations did not bring new TRNC President Mustafa Akinci any benefit. Similar to all other living creatures, he has also felt President Erdogan's lashings. Erdogan's general discontent about the events of recent weeks has gradually begun to be much more evident. This may be because there are no longer any advisors around him who are ready to appease him 'in a brotherly manner', or maybe because the June 7th election polls have not shown that he can secure a new constitution that will bring him the super presidency.”

Guneri Civaoglu detects the winds of change in centrist Milliyet: "The Mediterranean countries are tired of the status quo'.  Societies are fed up with politicians of the same ilk. The face of the status quo may change but the people’s problems are always the same. That is why, societies now want new and young leaders who do not look like the previous ones and are not representatives of the status quo. I think the winds of change have reached Cyprus as well.”

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Resalat prepares for the blame game: "Republican senators have intensified their efforts to pass a bill empowering Congress to review any Iran nuclear deal, which can overshadow the negotiations and even lead to the failure of the talks. President Obama will no longer be able to decide with total authority on the final agreement and lifting of sanctions. If this happens, the U.S. should be held accountable for the failure of the talks." 

Hard-line Javan urges vigilance: "Apart from the difficulties that our negotiating team faces in the talks, such as preserving our red lines and ensuring national interests, they also have to deal with countries whose announced goals significantly differ from their hidden ones. The Supreme Leader's approach and peoples' support have already defeated the policies of the hegemonic system, but we cannot be indifferent to the gradual effects of the enemy's games, which comply with the demands of some domestic political activists." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reminds: "A number of individuals and groups do not believe in the Iranian nation's resistance to unwarranted U.S. demands. Over the past 35 years, Iran has been under serious sanctions imposed by America and its allies. But, we managed major achievements during that time. Our progress has angered and confused the U.S.; they do not know how to treat us anymore. Fellow Iranians should bear in mind that agreeing to American excessive demands would not allow us to continue with our progress." 

 

IRANIAN DIPLOMACY: Reformist Sharq acclaims soft power: "Amid disagreements and concerns about critics and different interpretations of the Lausanne statement, Iran's soft power in the region and the world is being felt. The accurate and timely stance over Saudi Arabia's attack on Yemen unveiled our soft power more than ever, at a time when no sign of Iranian military intervention or weapons has been found in Yemen." 

 

DOMESTIC POLICIES: Hard-line Keyhan is unforgiving: "After the American-Israeli post-election sedition of 2009, the deception and hypocrisy of the polluted current claiming reforms was unveiled. The ugly plot was exposed. They tried to spread the old U.S.-Israel-UK lie that the Islamic Revolution was a medieval and anti-Islamic movement like the Taleban and bloody and predatory like Saddam. That sedition is the most undeniable proof of treason by the current claiming reforms." 

 

ISIS: Reformist Arman is clear: "ISIS has no chance to survive without Saudi Arabia. The Saudis know well their role in corrupting the world. When countries like Iran act rationally, Saudis, who lack the necessary tools for rationality, become more isolated in the region and the world."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami puts Zionists and Arab reactionaries in the same bag: "ISIS and an-Nusra terrorists commit atrocities in Syria as desired by the Zionists. These atrocities have not been condemned by the reactionary Arab regimes; on the contrary, they tilt towards them and are even involved in backing the perpetrators with political, financial and media support." 

 

"DIRTY MONEY" IN ELECTIONS: Reformist E'temad targets corruption: "Since the Interior Minister started his revelations about dirty money, we witnessed harsh reactions from a number of MPs. The Minister's action was a brave and admirable move, but unfortunately some MPs have not realized the importance of this issue and instead of thanking the Minister and assisting the government to fight corruption, they are creating problems. The truth is that, unless state institutions try hard to combat such corruption, there will be concern that dirty money would not only create deep economic crisis, but would also bring about negative changes in the political system."

 

AFGHANISTAN: Conservative Hemayat revisits: "After the occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S. imagined that it would be able to completely change the country’s political structure, establish a new colony and sabre-rattle over Iran, Russia, China and India. The U.S./Afghan security pact of 2014 was to cover the failures of the U.S. invasion and to justify wrong policies. This pact is a betrayal of both the Afghan and American people and all the countries that participated in that unproductive war."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The allies’ rebellion

2-Golan resistance

3-Jordan’s borders under threat

 

1-The allies’ rebellion

 

Washington's project based on training a ‘moderate [Syrian] opposition’ is no longer convincing to any of its major allies in the region. The latter have apparently taken it upon themselves to rely on their salafi, jihadi, and Muslim Brotherhood allies and supporters. They have had enough of the civilian opposition's fragmentation, and the limited influence of Syria's secular opposition. And they do not believe in civilian and secular forces to begin with anyway. Their preferred historical choice is restricted to an 'Islamist pluralism' that ranges between moderate salafism to jihadi salafism, and ends with the Muslim Brotherhood, and includes all shades of the religious spectrum.  These forces are being prepared to settle score with Iran in Syria, as well as with Syria and its current regime -- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Washington realizes that its war on terrorism has now become more difficult than ever before in light of the rebellion of its regional allies that joined the coalition it formed to fight ISIS in September 2014. America’s faltering weakens its grip over Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf in general) when it comes to issues of this sort, especially in light of the Gulf’s rage stemming from the assumption that the U.S./Iranian rapprochement threatens to topple all of America’s 'favorites', who are slated to become 'former favorites' in the coming phase. But the Saudi/Turkish game today seems akin to an all-out gamble that risks all their credit -- 'Abdelmun’im Ali 'Issa in Syrian al-Watan

 

The Syrian opposition’s recent advances in northern and southern Syria are mostly by the Qa'ida-affiliated Nusra Front, which clearly enjoys the backing of certain Arab states and Turkey, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. The question is whether the U.S. will allow this to proceed as a 'consolation prize' for its Arab allies so as to facilitate the passage of its nuclear agreement with Iran.  It is beyond doubt that Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are playing the major role in the latest attacks in Syria and are behind the recent opposition advances there, maintains a commentator in a pro-regime Syrian daily. Riyadh and Ankara seem to have decided to wager everything they own on this battle; but the Syrians’ steely determination will ultimately defeat them.

 

OPPOSITION SATISFACTION: "The head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC) Mr. Khaled Khoja whose headquarters are in Istanbul made no secret of his great satisfaction at the victories achieved by 'Syria's rebels' against 'Assad's forces'," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Tuesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

He described this week’s Jisr ash-Shughour battle as the gateway to liberating all of Syria’s occupied territories – ‘occupied’ by the regime of course, since he does not have the [Israeli] occupied Syrian Golan Heights in mind. And he urged the international community to upgrade the form and level of its support for the 'Syrian revolution' so as to speed up the toppling the regime, cut short the suffering, and reduce the sacrifices.

When Khoja and the SNC's Arab and Turkish backers speak of 'Syria's rebels,' they unabashedly have 'the Nusra Front's mujahidin' in mind. The forces that entered Idlib and followed that up by taking over Jisr ash-Shughour, then certain areas in Sahl al-Ghab, are Islamist elements and factions that have the Nusra Front as their backbone. Certain salafi and jihadi groups as well as military formations affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood have joined these forces as well. This is the sole form of 'pluralism' that is allowed in today’s Syrian opposition scene.

The media opposed to Assad's regime are deliberately obscuring the Nusra Front's role. They speak only of 'revolution' and 'rebels', so as to avoid the sensitivities of those in the West who still view the Nusra Front as a terrorist group and a branch of al-Qa'ida. The fact of the matter is that a regional coalition began to take shape a few months ago, bypassing its old sensitivities and secondary disagreements. This coalition currently seems busy producing a new Operation Decisive Storm, but in new forms and deploying new tools to be used against the Syrian regime this time and not the Houthis and Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's forces in Yemen.

Within a single month alone, the term 'a massacre of tanks' was used twice in the Decisive Storm [Arab Gulf] media directed at Syria. There was talk of such a ‘massacre’ in the Der'a's countryside, and another in the Jisr ash-Shughour countryside. As to how it was possible to carry out these two 'massacres,' it is certain that the Nusra Front has received qualitative anti-tank weapons from its regional backers.

It is also certain that a centralized decision has been taken to ignite the war fronts on the various axes in Syria under the supervision of a regional operations’ room and relying on the Nusra Front and Chechen elements affiliated to Turkish intelligence, as well as on the other factions and groups backed by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This by itself is enough to explain the unexpected breakthroughs on numerous fronts from Syria's north to its south. Some believe that these attacks are meant to precede the Geneva-III meetings that [UN Syria Envoy] de Mistura has called for, and that may last for eight weeks during which the UN envoy will meet separately with delegations from the political and armed opposition and the regime.

But a close scrutiny of the battlefield situation and the political and diplomatic moves accompanying it would lead to the conclusion that the aims of this escalation go much further than mere 'chatter on the shores of Lake Léman' [Geneva]. They have to do with Syria's entire future, and the open regional conflict and proxy wars between Iran and its supporters’ camp, and that of Saudi Arabia and its allies. In fact, monitoring the latest Turkish statements, which are once again raising the issue of establishing no-fly and buffer zones, as well as some voices calling for a ground intervention in Syria, provides us with a clearer idea of the aims of this comprehensive escalation.

It seems that Washington's project based on training a ‘moderate opposition’ is no longer convincing to any of its major allies in the region. The latter have apparently taken it upon themselves to rely on their salafi, jihadi, and Muslim Brotherhood allies and supporters. They have had enough of the civilian opposition's fragmentation, and the limited influence of Syria's secular opposition. And they do not believe in civilian and secular forces to begin with anyway. Their preferred historical choice is restricted to an 'Islamist pluralism' that ranges between moderate salafism to jihadi salafism, and ends with the Muslim Brotherhood, and includes all shades of the religious spectrum.

These forces are being prepared to settle score with Iran in Syria, as well as with Syria and its current regime. On the surface, the supporters of this alliance claim that 'ISIS's steel' can only be broken by that of an-Nusra Front, since both are made of the same material. But the course, aims, and priorities of the latest battles were all directed at the Syrian regime [not at ISIS]. We no longer remember when the last time the Nusra Front clashed with ISIS. The exact same situation is occurring in Yemen. For while some two thousand aerial sorties were carried out against the Houthis and the Yemeni army, not one Al-Qa'ida for Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) target received any sort of blow.

The fact that these attacks were launched from areas very close to the borders with Turkey with such large numbers of fighters armed with advanced weapons, undoubtedly exposes the extent of Turkish/Arab involvement in this war on the one hand, and the fact that this coalition has dropped all its former reservations towards the Nusra Front, on the other.

Battlefield developments and the [Arab Gulf] political and media coverage that accompanies them now tend towards 'merging' the Nusra Front with the list of 'Syria's rebels,' even after its ‘Emir al-Fateh Abu-Mohammad al-Jawlani’ has time and again rejected various pressures and mediations that have sought to dismantle his official link to al-Qa'ida and to 'liberate' him from his 'pledge of allegiance and obedience' to Ayman az-Zawahiri.

There is no doubt that these and similar facts are known to Washington, which still classifies the Nusra Front as a terrorist organization and gives priority to the war on terrorism, contrary to its allies who are focused on confronting Iranian expansion. The question is this: How will Washington behave in the coming days? Will it exert pressure on its allies to control the pace of the war on terrorism that it is leading?

"Or will it offer then a second 'consolation prize', after the first such prize that took the form of Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, in order to facilitate the passage of the nuclear agreement with Iran?" asks Rintawi in conclusion.

End…

 

‘NEW IDEAS’:"For months now views and opinions have been circulating in the Saudi and Qatari hallways as to the war on Syria," writes 'Abdelmun’im Ali 'Issa in Tuesday's pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan.

These have been published by Saudi journalists here or there, based on instructions issued from the concerned political decision-making circles. They were based on new ideas that what is more than urgent today is to turn a new leaf with the terrorist organizations operating on Syrian territories. (The same goes for Yemen, where al-Qa'ida has become the Saudi coalition forces’ sole remaining ally after Operation Decisive Storm was launched on 25/3/2015.)

This new sense of urgency stemmed from a conviction that has taken deep root in the minds of the regional powers supporting the armed Syrian opposition, namely, that it is no longer possible to wager on any force outside the framework of the salafi, jihadi, takfiri organizations, if the goal is to topple the Syrian regime. And this conviction may have stemmed from what Barack Obama said on 20/6/2014 when he sounded the death knell for the previous illusion that the 'moderate' Syrian opposition could defeat the Syrian regime. That was in fact understood as an invitation to opt for alternatives outside the former framework.

On 25/3/2015, the formation of the Jayshul Fateh [The Army of Islamic Conquest] was announced. The backbone of this new body consists of the Nusra Front and the Ahrar ash-Sham Movement, with open Saudi backing and Qatar and Turkey’s support whose geographical location allows it to offer wide-ranging logistical backing which can be extended further if need be.

What happened in Jisr ash-Shughour on 25/4/2015 could not have occurred had it not been for the broad backing that confronted the Syrian army with NATO-type technologies coupled with the most advanced achievements of Wahhabism in brainwashing, which has yielded 'immersion' fighters. These are 'super-fighters' who fight with their individual weapons until they run out of ammunition, after which they become suicide bombers.

After the military operations began in Idlib, it was not difficult for an observer to come to the conclusion that a joint operations room located in Turkish territories near the Syrian borders was managing military operations. These began with the entry of thousands of fighters (whom opposition sources report number some ten thousand) from deep inside Turkey; the operations then included providing live satellite images that showed the changes on the battlefield and that could locate the points of vulnerability and the gaps that could be exploited; and it reached advanced American jamming means aimed at paralyzing the communications between the Syrian high command and its fighters on the ground.

All this was coupled with Saudi backing that recently rushed to saturate these fighters with advanced weapons, as evident from many signs. For example, an advanced American missile whose price is over thirty thousand dollars was fired at a checkpoint manned by nothing more than a heavy machine gun whose price is no more than two thousand dollars. Another same sort of missile was fired at an unmanned motorcycle that was parked on the side.

What happened in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour is part of an old but renewed scheme that aims to take control of a geographical area that is free of any presence for the Syrian army. This scheme extends to the furthest point of southern Syria in al-Qunaitra and Der'a, via Hama, Idlib, Deir az-Zour, and ar-Raqqa in the furthest northeast of the country. And this can later be transformed into a no-fly zone based on the pretext of protecting the 'moderate' Syrian opposition if conditions were to mature sufficiently for implementing this idea despite the fact that this notion has been totally excluded from American political calculations for considerations stemming from the regional balance of power, including the realization that it would give the upper hand to a Turkish role that may allow Ankara to impose its specific terms on any future negotiations.

The most imminent round of negotiations is apparently Geneva-III that is meant to be held late this summer. This may have a better international prospect than Geneva-I (in June 2012) and Geneva-II (in January 2014). American arrogance foiled the first of these conferences, while the Ukrainian crisis toppled the second.

Turkey today is playing a hidden role based on operating al-Qa'ida's branches via its intelligence services together with its regional counterparts that are known by all. It is also prepared to be directly involved (under the guise of the Syrian opposition) if need be – and that need does often arise. The leaders of the military operations in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour have been announced and they include 'Abdullah al-Moheisini (Saudi) 'Abdelmun’im Zeineddin (Syrian) and Amir Muslim (Chechen). These provide conclusive proof of direct Turkish involvement; since the same three figures played a role in the attack on Kasab in March 2014, with direct Turkish backing as well.

Turkey’s role is expected to escalate soon against the background of many recent signs that have added up to show that the Decisive Storm that Riyadh was trying to implement in Syria was not possible. Riyadh's call for establishing a joint Arab force was the first step in that direction. But statements from Cairo in the past few days that there would be no Syrian Decisive Storm and that President Assad is an important part of a political settlement represent a disappointment to Saudi Arabia. In light of this, a Turkish/Saudi 'understanding' was reached to launch a Decisive Storm using Syrian hands backed by strategic Western technologies in the coming phase.

Meanwhile, the U.S. stands puzzled or, more accurately, in a grey zone from which it has been unable to emerge up till now. This is evident from its faltering effort to establish a regional balance that seems very difficult to achieve at a rare moment in the region. Washington realizes that its war on terrorism has now become more difficult than ever before in light of the rebellion of its regional allies that joined the coalition it formed to fight ISIS in September 2014. America’s faltering weakens its grip over Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf in general) when it comes to issues of this sort, especially in light of the Gulf’s rage stemming from the assumption that the U.S./Iranian rapprochement threatens to topple all of America’s 'favorites', who are slated to become 'former favorites' in the coming phase.

But the Saudi/Turkish game today seems akin to an all-out gamble that risks all their credit. Meanwhile, wariness seems to be the distinguishing mark of the Jordanian, Emirati, and Kuwaiti positions, reaching the point of genuine panic in Egypt because of Riyadh and Ankara’s backing for takfiri forces. For in addition to being included on the international and American lists of terrorist organizations, these forces pose a direct threat to Egypt itself before anyone else. And in light of the fact that Sinai remains an open wound that may get worse, this threat can multiply many times over if Cairo once again makes errors in its calculations – even if it does not seem to be doing so at the moment.

Pakistan’s position was unique and strong. Islamabad gave priority to the voice of reason and wisdom over all other oil-related and banknote-related or confessional voices. At the same time, it seemed aware of the dangers of being dragged into what Riyadh was seeking. It therefore decided to step aside, which has created a deep rift in Pakistani/Saudi relations that will be difficult to mend.  There are numerous signs of this, the most important of which may have been Riyadh's growing reliance on India (especially its naval capabilities), whereas the latter is Pakistan's traditional and primary enemy. And despite the realism of Pakistani policies, [Saudi] relations with India may be seen as provocation that may never be forgiven.

In 1943, the German forces occupied 90% of the city of Stalingrad, while the defenders fortified themselves in the remaining 10%. But their will did not break or soften. They continued to send couriers from one site to another to deliver reports, until the map of military control was overturned. The invading forces left the Soviet borders at the end of the battle.

"The fighters later documented and recounted that experience in which their will proved harder than steel," concludes 'Issa.

Ends…

 

 

2-Golan resistance

 

For the first time in decades, Israel is facing the first indigenous resistance movement on the Golan Heights, says Ibrahim al-Amin in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Israel’s attack on the Golan Heights on Sunday in which four Syrian resistance fighters were killed is of great significance since it shows that Hizbollah has already managed to create resistance cells whose members are from the Golan area, maintains the editor-in-chief of a left-leaning Lebanese daily. The fact that the operation failed is not as important as the fact that Israel now faces the prospect of an indigenous Syrian resistance on the Golan.

 

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: “'The problem does not stem from the fact that an [armed] attempt was made; the problem stems from the reality that we are confronting a wide-ranging project. And if we succeeded in foiling it this time, we may not succeed the next'. Such phrases have often been used by the enemy’s army and intelligence officers when commenting on the resistance forces in Lebanon and Palestine,” writes Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Tuesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

Now, it is Syria's turn. The [Israeli] comments on the Golan Heights operation published yesterday hark back to the same phrases and the same square. When the enemy attacked vehicles carrying resistance fighters from Hizbollah near the occupied areas in Syria [in January 2015], Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon declared that this had foiled a Hizbollah scheme in the area. He knew, of course, that the martyrs who fell that day were not on their way to carry out a military or security operation. But what Ya’alon and those concerned also know is that the very idea that Hizbollah fighters are close to the occupied Golan Heights is of great significance.

No matter how loudly the enemy's lackeys among the armed elements or other Syrian opposition factions who do not view fighting the [Israeli] enemy as a priority may raise their voice, Hizbollah's main interest in southern Syria has to do with the front with Israel. This is not to deny the fact that Hizbollah is publicly engaged in the battle to defend the Syrian state and the regime there.

But the source of Israel's problem, as well as that of its supporters among the Syrian armed elements, is that Hizbollah knows what may yield the best results. Regardless of its exact relationship to the group of heroes who were martyred two days ago, what concerns the enemy and satisfies the resistance is that those involved in direct military operations against Israel are the people of the land – that is to say, the Syrians who live in that area, both that occupied by Israel and that it occupies via its armed Syrian proxies.

Certain conclusions will soon be reached by investigations that are intended to find out what led Israel to uncover the [resistance] cell, and whether the source of that failure was a leak or an operational mis-move or some special Israeli monitoring mechanism or the eyes of Israel's spies. For those in charge of this action, these conclusions will offer a lesson that will be used to address future challenges, requiring the martyrs' comrades to uphold a greater degree of professionalism and accuracy.

Furthermore, even if there were those who believe that this was an individual act, the result of excessive zeal or whatever, what has occurred sends the strongest signal as to what interests the resistance and terrifies the enemy; namely, that young men living in this area have manifested an operational readiness to carry out the most dangerous of missions against the Israeli occupation forces. In doing so, they have not only defied the lethargy that has dominated this front for many decades; they are also sending a signal that all the [armed Syrian opposition’s] repression and normalization [with Israel] in and around the Golan Heights have not extinguished the spark of resistance in people's hearts.

They are also sending a signal that the fact that Syrian proxies are protecting the occupation forces will not prevent resistance fighters from reaching where they need to reach. They are providing evidence that all the latest security and military measures introduced by the enemy in that area have proven to be useless in preventing resistance fighters from reaching the points closest to where the occupation forces operate. This alone explains the enemy's concern and its declaration: The next attack is on its way!

Moreover, the enemy has additional cause for concern. This has to do with the fact that those facing it not only measure their steps in relation to the confrontations with the Syrian armed elements on the ground. That, alone, is sufficient to say that the enemy first and foremost realizes that the resistance has not been distracted by its engagement with the conflict inside Syria – despite the fact that these battles require men and equipment. It is still focused on hurting the [Israeli] enemy, a mission that has its own men in charge and that is not linked to what is happening on the other fronts. And these men have sufficient time to survey, prepare groups, train, choose targets, and fulfil missions. That in itself is the most important and powerful response to whoever deludes himself that the resistance has lost its way.

What about the repercussions of what has happened? This is all part of a long track. One station along that track was when the enemy assassinated the martyrs of al-Qunaitra, and the resistance's operation in response in the occupied Sheba'a Farms, as well as Hizbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s political response. A new front has been opened, not only against Israel, but for the resistance which can now do more to protect itself, consolidate its power, extend its margin of operations, and direct more painful blows at the enemy's body.

While the enemy is concerned with finding ways to adapt to this new situation, it is more concerned about trying to impose rules for the game in that area. What is new is that it is not unsure as to what the resistance’s next steps may be. The failure to produce a comprehensive assessment may drive the enemy into committing mistakes and acts of folly. And this not only allows the resistance to lure the enemy into a trap here and an ambush there, but to ensure that the initiative does not remain in the enemy's hands alone on this front.

"And this is the essential point," concludes Amin.

Ends…

 

 

3-Jordan’s borders under threat

 

With the Nusra Front in Syria and ISIS in Iraq drawing closer to Jordan's borders, Amman has a lot to worry about says Tareq Masarwah in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

The Syrian and Iraqi states have lost control of most of their borders with the outside world, including Jordan, with a resulting impact on the trade and psychology of both conflicts, notes a Jordanian commentator. While Amman prefers to have stable states on the other side of its borders, it is not its job to ensure their stability, and it must attend to taking care of its side of the border alone if necessary.

 

DANGEROUS AIMS: "The suicide attack on Turaibil crossing point with Iraq and the previous attack on Nuweiseeb crossing with Syria; the armed groups' control of the Syrian part of the occupied Golan Heights which is in effect Syria's borders with Israel; and the armed opposition's moves along the borders with Lebanon’s 'Akkar and the Lebanese/Syrian Qalamoun – all point to the Syrian and Iraqi oppositions’ dangerous aim," writes Tareq Masarwah in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

Its most important dimension is the psychological impact created by the fact that [Syrian] national sovereignty has now been severed from its points of contact with the outside world. And then there is the physical effect of cutting off outside trade, in what resembles an economic blockade imposed from inside Syria on the Syrian state; one that should be added to the sanctions imposed by the international powers via the UN or because of their hostility towards the Syrian regime.

We have focused above on Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. But the erosion of state sovereignty extends to all of Iraq's northern and eastern borders, and all of Syria's borders with Turkey and Iraq and with Lebanon's eastern borders.

This is an issue that Damascus and Baghdad may not be too concerned about, and that Lebanon is trying to circumvent but to no avail. But it is clear that it is eating away at these countries’ political regimes, and undermining their economies and the living conditions of their exhausted peoples who are seeking salvation – sometimes by seeking refuge in neighboring countries, and sometimes taking the sea route to Europe. And Europe's leaders are now surveying the means of blocking the sea before this human deluge, half of which makes it to European shores in a miserable state, and the other half drowns in the Mediterranean.

Over the past years, we were trying to contain the difficult situation along our northern and eastern borders. We provided humanitarian aid and exported our agricultural products to markets that were in direst need of them. Meanwhile, all we heard from Assad's regime were allegations that we were training and aiding the armed opposition and allowing it to enter via our borders. But Syria’s citizens before anyone else lent no credence to these risible charges, since they knew that their collapsing regime was seeking excuses for its impotence and its ferocity in destroying Syria's cities and villages and killing its own people.

Our policy in dealing with our unsettled borders was to maintain the border points with the state in Syria and the state in Iraq, because dealing with states, even if they are collapsing, is better, easier, and more likely to uphold mutual interests. With the Iraqis, we did everything in our power to ensure that ISIS remains far from our borders. Amman received Sunni and Shiite leaders, and is now receiving Kurdish leaders. Our foreign minister carries messages to [Iranian President] Rowhani, while our young ambassador to Tehran has been very active.

This is because a stable Iraq that controls its capital and borders is our interest, as is a stable Syria. From our side, we have established free-fire zones that the terrorist gangs are unable to cross; but we are not in the business of defending regimes that are unable to deal with their own people via flexible political means that are meant to convince them.

Why should we protect the Assad regime or the confessional [Shiite-led] power-distributing regime in Baghdad? We are concerned only with our own country, and we can help within the limits of our traditional policies that have not changed ever since the martyr [King] 'Abdullah bin al-Hussein laid down the first brick in the construction of the Jordanian state.

"As for the others, they must pull out their thorns with their own hands," concludes Masarwah.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 28.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Collision Course

 

With the exception of Haaretz, Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with the continued rescue mission in Nepal. Yedioth Ahronoth leads with a feature from its correspondent in Kathmandu, who arrived in the Nepalese capital on one of the first planes – including two jumbo jets – carrying IDF search and rescue experts. The arrival of the Israeli delegation is the lead headline in Israel Hayom ('The IDF comes to help') while The Jerusalem Post focuses on efforts to locate 68 Israelis trapped in areas heavily impacted by the earthquake, which has already killed at least 4,000. In many cases, the Post reports, the Israeli trekkers are in locations where all roads are blocked and they can be reached only by helicopters. Some have sent messages to their families begging for help and warning that they are almost out of food.

Haaretz leads with comments by U.S. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, who told a meeting of Reform Jews in Washington that, if the new Israeli government does not demonstrate its commitment to the two-state solution, the U.S. will have a difficult time continuing to assist its efforts to halt international initiatives on the Palestinian issue at the United Nations.

Sherman said that the U.S. has always supported Israel. 'We have always had Israel's back in the international arena, even when it meant standing alone,' Sherman said. 'This will continue to be the case.' Nevertheless, she said, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's actions during the election period 'raised questions about his commitment to the two-state solution.' 'We will be watching very closely to see what happens on this issue after the new government is formed,' Sherman said. 'If the new Israeli government is seen to be stepping back from its commitment to a two-state solution that will make our job in the international arena much tougher... it will be harder for us to prevent internationalizing the conflict.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, a United Nations inquiry published on Monday blamed the Israeli military for seven attacks on UN schools in Gaza that Hamas claimed were being used as shelters during Operation Protective Edge. The inquiry was headed by Patrick Cammaert, a retired Dutch general and former force commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

'I deplore the fact that at least 44 Palestinians were killed as a result of Israeli actions and at least 227 injured at United Nations premises used as emergency shelters,' Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a letter to the Security Council. Ban added that Hamas and other groups put such locations at risk by hiding rockets in three UN schools. 'The fact that they were used by those involved in the fighting to store their weaponry and, in two cases, probably to fire from is unacceptable,' said Ban.

In a statement, Foreign Ministry spokesman Emmanuel Nahshon said, 'All of the incidents attributed by the report to Israel have already been subject to thorough examination, and criminal investigations have been launched where relevant. Israel makes every effort to avoid harm to sensitive sites.' Nahshon's statement added, 'The executive summary of the report clearly documents the exploitation by terrorist organizations of UN facilities in the Gaza Strip.'

Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad Malki said, 'We will take the report and present it to the International Criminal Court, especially as they are looking at our request to do a preliminary study.' Malki also praised the UN for releasing the report after a delay, saying he had been worried that Israel was trying to suppress it.

Hamas, for its part, welcomed the report. The group’s spokesman told the AFP news agency that the report was important since it proved Israeli 'war crimes against Palestinian civilians in the (UNRWA) shelters.' 'We call on the world to send the murderous occupation leaders to international courts, and we call on the Palestinian Authority to investigate this report and to persecute the occupation in international courts,' the spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri, said.

On the Iranian front, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Monday that the world is 'closer than ever' to reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Speaking to a global gathering on nuclear disarmament, where he and Iran's foreign minister met on the sidelines, Kerry warned that work on a deal is far from over and that key issues remain unresolved. 'I know as well as anyone that we have a long way to go' on the path to a nuclear-free world. Israel is attending the conference as an observer.

At the same conference, Iran demanded that all countries possessing nuclear weapons scrap plans to modernize or extend the life of their arsenals, while branding Israel a threat to the region due to its nuclear stockpile. Speaking on behalf of the 120-nation Non-Aligned Movement, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told signatories to the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that there should be no limits on the transfer of nuclear technology and know-how to NPT signatories. 'We call upon the nuclear-weapon states to immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing and extending the life span of their nuclear weapons and related facilities,' Zarif said. Reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons,' Zarif said.

Finally, the Shin Bet announced Monday that six members of an alleged Palestinian terror cell have been arrested. The suspects are all from the same village and are believed to have thrown pipe bombs and Molotov cocktails at communities in the West Bank at least five times in January and February. Security officials pointed out that small locally-based cells like these are extremely dangerous due to their high motivation and the difficulty of uncovering them.

 

BORDER COMPLEXITIES: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dr. Yehuda Blanga comments on the complex alliances and interests that are shaping the battle between anti-Assad rebels, Hizbollah, Israel and the Syrian regime on the Golan Heights.

"Ever since the Syrian Civil War erupted four years ago, the border with Israel has become extremely tense and has dragged various protagonists into the fighting. The entrance of ISIS to the fray and the activities of the al-Nusra Front – at first as ISIS protégé and, thereafter, as its rival – have completely changed both Israel's handling of the situation on the border and the need for the Syrian regime and its allies to provide some kind of response to the growing threat of radical Islam. This is where Iran and Hizbollah enter the picture.

In the first year of the fighting in Syria, Iran and Hizbollah were careful not to get involved. Since July 2012, however, when the regime of President Bashar al-Assad suffered one of its most serious setbacks in its fight against the rebel forces – when an attack on the headquarters of Syria's national security council in the al-Rawda area of Damascus killed three of Assad's top advisers – the Tehran regime and Hizbollah started to become openly involved in the campaign. For them, the survival of Assad is paramount, since Syria is an important strategic player in the 'resistance camp' and gives Iran greater influence across the Middle East. Thousands of Hizbollah fighters were dispatched over the border into Syria, along with members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, to prop up the Assad regime. In a sense, Hizbollah began to fill the military vacuum that the Syrian regime left behind.

The fall of Quneitra to rebel forced, headed by the al-Nusra Front and the Free Syrian Army, led to significant changes in the behavior of the Assad regime and its allies. First, Syria, Iran and Hizbollah joined forces in a major effort to retake the town. Thus far, they have only been partially successful. Second, they started to use the threat posed by the al-Nusra Front – a branch of al-Qa’ida – to the minority groups living in the area and in southern Syria in particular, to recruit them to fight for the regime. This is how Christians and Druze found themselves being trained by Hizbollah and Iran and fighting alongside Assad's troops against the rebels; they were united by a common fear of the threat of radical Sunni Islam and a shared desire for survival.

The main repercussions of these developments for Israel is that, for the first time in the conflict between the Jewish state and Hizbollah, the Shiite terror group now has a presence on a new front – the Syrian front – in addition to its traditional presence in southern Lebanon. If Hizbollah manages to establish a permanent presence on the Syria Golan Heights, and if it manages to retake the Quneitra crossing from rebel forces, the level of threat against Israel will increase in three main ways: Hizbollah will expand its capability to gather intelligence about the IDF and Israeli communities on the strategically important Golan Heights; it will try to deploy some of its thousands of rockets in this area too, thereby expanding the area of Israel that is exposed to a missile threat; and it will try to recruit fighters from within the minorities who live in Israel – Druze, Palestinians and Israeli Arabs – as an additional force capable of carrying out terror attacks against targets within Israel. The most tangible evidence of this is the fact that two of the four terrorists who were killed by the Israeli air force on Sunday while planting a bomb along the perimeter fence were from the Druze town of Majdal Shams, which has remained loyal to Syria and to the Assad regime.

However, Hizbollah is not the only threat to Israel; the presence of rebel forces on the Golan Heights also exacerbates the potential for violence. In the end, the rebels are a coalition of forces that include terrorist organizations and Israel is very much one of their future targets. On several occasions in the past few months, forces loyal to Abu-Mohammad al-Jawlani, the leader and emir of the al-Nusra Front, have been spotted on the border, where they have fired their weapons in the air as a declaration of intent. The problem is that these rebel forces could, if they feel that their struggle against Hizbollah and Syria is going nowhere, carry out an attack on an IDF patrol on the Golan border, in an attempt to drag Israel into a conflict with the Syrian regime and, by extension, with Hizbollah. The understanding that the IDF alone is capable of halting Hizbollah in its tracks – and the belief among many observers that only the IDF can deliver the death blow to the Assad regime and to hasten his fall – is playing a key role in the considerations of all of the rebel organizations – Islamists and secular alike."

Ends…

 

HIT AND MISSILE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ephraim Sneh says that the government must invest in the David's Sling missile defense system, which is the only system capable of protecting Israel from Hizbollah’s long-range missiles.

"Irrespective of whether or not Iran and the six world powers sign a nuclear agreement this summer, the Islamic Republic will continue and even intensify its efforts to impose hegemony over the Middle East. It is important to understand, however, that this is just an interim goal for Tehran, which ultimately seeks global dominance and a role as leader of the Muslim world. And make no mistake about it: the Iranians are blessed by seemingly endless patience.

The possibility of a conflict between Israel and Iran's proxy on our northern border – Hizbollah – refuses to go away and recent events in both Syria and Lebanon prove that such a conflict is fairly likely. We have already learned the hard way that we must prepare ourselves in accordance with the enemy's capabilities, not its intentions. The high-trajectory weapons that it has in its possessions – reportedly more than 100,000 rockets and missiles – give Iran massive offensive capabilities against Israel. It is far from certain that Hizbollah will have the willpower to refrain from using these rockets. The organization's leader, Sheikh Hassam Nasrallah, has boasted recently about the Fateh-110 missile, which can carry a payload of half a ton of explosives to any point in Israel with frightening accuracy. And that is not even the most advanced weapon in Hizbollah’s arsenal.

According to a recent briefing by the outgoing head of the IDF Home Front Command, Brigadier General Eyal Eisenberg, Hizbollah would fire some 1,500 missiles at Israel every day in the event of renewed conflict. The Israeli home front would sustain massive damage if that were to happen – in terms of human life and physical damage. Key centers of industry, energy, transportation and medicine would not be able to function for a prolonged period of time.

During Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, a total of 4,500 missiles and rockets were fired at Israel. The performance of the Iron Dome missile defense system kept the damage to a minimum. However, the same number of rockets fired during the 50-day campaign last summer would be launched in a three-day period in any future war with Hizbollah. Massive destruction on the home front will cancel out any successes that the army records on the front. The Iron Dome is incapable of intercepting missiles with a greater payload that are more accurate and have a greater range. That is why Israel has been developing the David's Sling defense system, which was successfully tested most recently late last month.

If it were not for the foot-dragging of the Israeli government – especially because of budgetary issues – David's Sling could now be operative. The government must make an active decision to fast-track the procurement of this system, which can protect the country and its citizens from Hizbollah’s missiles with the same effectiveness that the Iron Dome protected us from Hamas rockets. This is no simple task, since the number of rockets aimed at us from Lebanon is many times greater than the number of interceptor missiles that the IDF possesses.

David's Sling interceptor missiles are much more expensive that those of the Iron Dome. There is a severe funding problem, for which the government must find unconventional solutions – without harming the IDF's preparations for conflicts in other areas. The first and most simple option is to allocate for this project the superfluous tax revenues that have recently been reported on in the Israeli media. When one takes into account the massive expense of rebuilding the country after a hugely damaging war, one understands that David's Sling will quickly cover its own costs.

If the government does not want to invest in a missile defense system that will be effective for years to come, there appears to be little choice but to ask the United States to include the full cost of manufacturing the new system in the defense aid that Washington gives Israel every year. Today, the United States funds around two-thirds of the cost of developing David's Sling. American defense contractor Raytheon has partnered with Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in developing the system; the 'smart' elements of the system – the homing devices, the radars and the control and command systems – are based entirely on Israeli knowhow.

Time is of the essence here and the government must give top priority to an effective missile defense system that can protect the country, the home front, IDF installations and vital industrial and economic sites. If these are not adequately protected, the IDF's offensive capabilities are severely curtailed."

Ends…

 

COLLISION COURSE: Writing on the NRG website, Amir Rapaport says that Israel and Hizbollah are on a clear collision course and that any mistake or miscalculation could spark a war.

"Israel's northern border – and especially the border with Syria on the Golan Heights – is already proving to be 2015's hotspot. The events of the past few days have merely highlighted this even further. Even before this most recent flare-up, the embers on the northern border have been glowing for many months, fanned by the stated policies of Israel and Hizbollah. Israel has consistently and aggressively warned that it will do whatever it takes – including airstrikes on targets inside Syria – to prevent the transport of 'strategically significant' weapons from Syria to Hizbollah. Hizbollah, for its part, is equally adamant that each and every Israeli operation is met with some kind of military response. These respective policies put Israel and Hizbollah on a collision course.

The previous collision between Israel, Syria and Lebanon – with deep Iranian involvement, of course – came in early 2015, when Israel attacked a convoy of senior Hizbollah and Iranian officers, who were planning on turning that part of the Golan border area into a battleground. Among those killed in the strike was Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of the Hizbollah commander who Israel allegedly assassinated in 2008. Following that attack, Hizbollah curtailed its infrastructure operations in the area, but it did target an IDF patrol on Mount Dov, killing two soldiers.

That mini-cycle of violence ended by mutual killings, but things flared up again last week, when Israel allegedly attacked a missile storage facility in Syria's Qalamoun region on Wednesday, then again on Saturday. Israel did not take direct responsibility for these attacks, but, judging by comments made by Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon on Sunday evening, it certainly appears that Israel is making good on its stated policy. However, just as Ya'alon was speaking, a four-member cell crossed the border into the Israeli side of the Golan Heights and prepared to plant a bomb. They were spotted by the IDF and an aerial vehicle was sent to attack. Three of the four were apparently killed.

It may very well be that Hizbollah was trying to extract its revenge for the alleged Israeli attacks of the previous days. But the tension didn't end there: on Monday morning, al-Jazeera claimed that Israel had struck for a third time in the Qalamoun region and that, unlike the previous attacks, there were Syrian fatalities this time. As usual, Israel did not respond, but there were intimations this time that the IDF wasn't behind the attack. This may just be Jerusalem's attempt to lower the flames somewhat, but it is also possible that rebel forces carried out this particular operation.

What is certain is that Israel's north is back up to its highest level of alert, that Hizbollah will continue its efforts to carry out revenge attacks and that any mistake, any miscalculation or misstep by either side could lead to a quick and violent escalation – even if neither side wants to spend this summer fighting the Third Lebanon War."

Ends…

 

NO CHANGE: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that, despite threatening noises coming from certain quarters in the United States; Washington is unlikely to change its policy of backing Israel at the most important international forums – such as the UN Security Council.

"There was nothing new or surprising in the most recent comments yesterday by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman. She was not expressing a shocking new policy when she told a conference of the Reform Movement that, if the new Israeli government continues to distance itself from the principle of the two-state solution, the United States would find it hard to defend Israel in international forums, including the United Nations Security Council. At a recent meeting with Jewish leaders at the White House, U.S. President Barack Obama made similar comments, in response to a direct question from one of the attendees.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's pre-election comment, in which he said that a Palestinian state would not be established on his watch, was met with great anger and frustration by White House officials. Netanyahu's comments were interpreted as an official rejection of the principle that has formed the heart of any possible agreement or discussion between Israel and the Palestinians. Netanyahu's subsequent attempts to clarify his position and to alter the perception of them in the United States did not convince anybody; Obama's closest circle of advisers was not reassured by Netanyahu's half-hearted backtracking.

Sherman's comments yesterday at a gathering of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism in Washington are an expression of the deep concern and lack of trust that still exist in the White House toward the Israeli prime minister when it comes to the two-state solution.

One important Jewish leader who attended the White House meeting with Obama told the press that he does not expect there to be any change in how the United States votes on Israel-related resolutions at the Security Council. Diplomats based in New York also believe that the Americans will continue to back Israel at the UN. According to well-placed sources, the U.S. is acting behind the scenes to postpone or nix any Security Council debate or resolution connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Americans argue that any such discussion must wait until after the formation of a new Israeli government; so that the international community will know better what guidelines Israel will adopt regarding the future of the negotiations with the Palestinians. Even after the new government is installed, the Americans would prefer to hear from the prime minister himself what his current thinking is about the two-state solution.

There are currently three proposals doing the rounds of the Security Council. There is a Palestinian-Arab resolution that calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state; a French version that includes a framework for issues and parameters that will be discussed as part of the negotiations and there's a resolution drafted by New Zealand, distributed for the first time last week, which calls for the resumption of negotiations.

The United States remains loyal to its current policy of not involving the Security Council in diplomatic efforts to find a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. insists on remaining the sole mediator between Israel and the Palestinians – and despite recent setbacks, this does not look like changing any time soon."

Ends…

 

NASRALLAH WILL HAVE THE FINAL WORD: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that whether or not Israel attacked Syria again on Monday, the chance of sliding down a slippery slope into a major conflict grows every day.

"Events on Israel's northern front over the past few days have been occurring at a rather dizzying pace.

Early Saturday morning, Syrian army weapons storehouses near the border with Lebanon were bombed from the air, in an attack which Arab media attributed to Israel. Sunday evening the Israel Air Force killed four terrorists who were trying to plant an explosive device inside Israeli territory, near the Syrian border on the Golan Heights. Then this morning there was another report – whose veracity looks, for now, to be questionable – of another aerial attack by Israel in the Qalamoun mountains, the same area attacked on Saturday.

The conventional wisdom in the Israeli defense establishment has been – for the past few years – that three or four mutual attacks are too many. According to this approach, a prolonged round of offensive incidents (for which Israel never admits direct responsibility) and counter-attacks could very well lead the various sides into an overall conflict.

For over four years in which the horrible civil war in Syria has been going on, and sometimes spilling over into neighboring countries, Israel has successfully maintained a relatively consistent policy: publicly signaling the red lines it will not allow to be crossed (foremost among them, the supply of advanced weaponry from Syria to Hizbollah), preserving a certain 'range of ambiguity' as to the bombing attacks attributed to it, and making significant attempts not to allow the exchange of blows to lead to a broader war.

During this period, Israeli intelligence officials explained that they have not identified interests, on the part of any of the parties, in starting an all-out war. But that is a statement that must be taken with a grain of salt. Similar sentiments were voiced last summer too about the escalation of hostilities in the Gaza Strip, but nevertheless the situation deteriorated and Israel and Hamas fought a war that lasted 51 days.

As the hours pass, the view in Israel is that Monday's strike was the work of the extremist Sunni group Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliated with Al-Qa’ida. Battles have been going on for the past few days in the Qalamoun region between the Sunni rebels and Hizbollah and the Syrian army. It is possible that rockets were fired at the Syrian army base there, or that a car bomb was detonated.

But the final word on the matter will most likely belong to Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. If the secretary general of the militant Islamist organization publicly accuses Israel of the attack, it could signal his intentions to initiate a revenge operation.

For its part, Israel's intelligence community has over the years become used to taking Nasrallah’s speeches very seriously. The Shiite leader may sometimes exaggerate in his conspiracy theories and baseless threats, but in most cases he carries through on what he says. All the major operations of Hizbollah in recent years – which were mostly attempts to establish a 'balance of deterrence' that would prevent Israel from attacking inside Syrian and Lebanese territory – were prefaced by rather explicit declarations on Nasrallah’s part.

From the Israeli perspective, of most concern is the possibility of a Hizbollah attempt to equip itself with more accurate missiles that would allow improvement of its capability of targeting Israeli infrastructure sites and air force bases well beyond the borders. The growing worry about such a scenario has been reflected in public announcements over the past few weeks, and especially since the international declaration of the framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue in Lausanne.

There is no doubt that Hizbollah is now the military force of most concern to Israel – not just because of the strength and experience the group gained in recent years, but also due to its ability to influence what is happening in neighboring countries. The organization’s soldiers are active well beyond the borders of Syria and Lebanon. Small numbers of Hizbollah troops were sent recently to help the Shiites in Iraq, too, and probably also to assist the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are backed by Iran.

In his speech Sunday, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said Israel is committed 'to act with responsibility and careful consideration, not to be tempted by easy and superficial solutions, to respond in a clear, precise and determined manner – but also not to fire from the hip.' Given the complex security situation that continues to develop along the northern border, we must hope that the Israeli leadership will continue to act in line with what it is preaching, and avoid as much as possible being dragged into the inferno that is consuming Syria and so severely threatening the unity of its neighbors."

Ends…

 

BETTER THAN NOTHING: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Paul Kawika Martin says that a nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers will be good for Israel – despite the legitimate concerns being expressed by Jerusalem.

"The historic framework to control Iran’s nuclear program reached by the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France, plus Germany (P5+1), when finalized, will make Israel and the world more secure by thwarting all of Iran’s pathways to make a nuclear weapon and using unprecedented inspections and monitoring to ensure compliance. Without an agreement, by contrast, Iran could produce enough fissile material to make one crude nuclear weapon in a matter of weeks, should it choose to do so, and the threat of war would increase dramatically.

To be sure, there are legitimate concerns for Israel. After sanctions relief, an economically stronger Iran could potentially increase support for organizations like Hizbollah. It is important to note however, that only sanctions aimed at Iran’s nuclear program will be lifted. Those involving human rights and other issues will remain and can be strengthened if needed.

Both sides of the political spectrum and the vast majority of nonproliferation and nuclear weapon experts and organizations think this framework, once completed and signed, will make the world safer. Similarly, diverse Israelis such as former Israeli chief of military intelligence Amos Yadlin, former director of the Mossad Efraim Halevy, some Israeli media and some American Jewish groups praise the Iran framework and ongoing negotiations.

The finalized agreement will block all four paths by which Iran could produce a simple nuclear bomb. It would decrease by 95 percent the stockpile of material that could possibly be made into fissile material for 15 years. It would limit the quantity (by 2/3) and quality of centrifuges that could make highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon for 10 years. It would permanently reconfigure the Arak nuclear reactor (and secure its spent fuel) so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And most critically, the accord will block any covert nuclear activities by implementing exhaustive inspections and comprehensive monitoring for 20 years or more.

No agreement is perfect, but under the conditions outlined above, if Iran decided it wanted to build a nuclear weapon, it would take at least a year to make the fissile material required for even a single crude bomb. This does not include the time it would take to figure out the technology to miniaturize a bomb to fit on its existing missiles, build a missile capable of a larger payload or test any resulting system. These technical hurdles could add years to the time it would take Iran to have an effective nuclear warhead and delivery system.

In short, the agreement that has been negotiated sharply limits any progress Iran might make; rolls back their prior program, establishes a strict verification regime and provides Israel and the international community with more than enough time to act in the event that the pact is broken.

It is critical as well to underscore that the agreement with Iran on its nuclear program is better than any imaginable alternative. Military strategists, such as retired U.S. Air Force colonel Sam Gardiner, have said repeatedly that a military intervention in Iran would at best slightly delay any nuclear program and at worst start another Middle East war and force Iran to build a nuclear weapon even if it had no such program.

Additionally, support from the international community on the sanctions regime is starting to falter. A failed agreement that is seen to be the fault of the U.S. may cause some sanctions to collapse without getting any benefit in return. While some argue that we should abandon the agreement in favor of even tighter sanctions on Iran, even if more sanctions could be mustered, they would likely only embolden Iranian hardliners and strengthen their argument that negotiating with the international community is fruitless.

Thinking about Iran’s internal politics, former U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, says supporting the agreement buttresses reformists in the country. Another potential benefit to Israel is that a finalized agreement with Iran on its nuclear program may pave the way for more talks on issues like human rights and regional security that will further reduce Middle East tensions. Remember the naysayers about peace with Egypt? That agreement, started with small steps, has lasted over 25 years and brought major undoubted security benefits to Israel.

President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and their security team have met with U.S. Jewish leaders and organizations assuring them that a final accord will be in Israel’s best interest. Still, supporters of Israel should continue to pressure the White House and the U.S. Congress for the best outcome possible. But that pressure should not kill the deal by pushing Congress to pass bad legislation or voting to disapprove the accord.

At the very least, those skeptical that a deal with Iran on its nuclear program is in the best security interest of Israel should withhold final judgment until the June 30 deadline to see what is in the final accord and allow time to see how Iran complies with the agreement. Once finalized, it will be extremely clear that no other good options exist and the steps Iran takes on its nuclear program – verified by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) – will keep it from building a nuclear bomb or let the international community know immediately if it deviates from the agreement."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

GOVERNMENT/GULEN TENSIONS: Ekrem Dumanli accuses the government of criminal actions in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "When the suspects are disliked by the authorities and even assaulted by them with lies and slander every day, there can be no mechanism for justice. Moreover, injustice is committed quite openly, with thieves replacing policemen and buffoons paid by the intelligence services replacing real journalists. Everyone who is delaying the release [of alleged pro-Gulen policemen and journalists] that was ordered last night is committing a crime by exceeding their authority."

Orhan Kemal Cengiz also gives the government no quarter in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "Whatever the excuse, refusing to free someone who has been released by a court decision or delaying such a release represents a serious human rights violation. By delaying and preventing the release of journalist Hidayet Karaca and the accused policemen, the authorities are openly committing a crime by curtailing their freedom. This is being done with the support of the political establishment and it creates the impression that Turkey’s internal legal system has disappeared. The only place left to seek rights and justice is the European Court of Human Rights."

Hikmet Genc mocks the leader of the Gulen movement in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The chief Imam of Pennsylvania [leader of the Gulen movement Fethullah Gulen] prayed a couple of days ago, saying 'May the members of the parallel state [members the Gulen movement] be released as soon as possible'! But God did not accept his prayer. His curses against the government are backfiring, and targeting the parallel state instead."

 

JUNE GENERAL ELECTIONS:  Tarhan Erdem disapproves of the president’s elections tactics in centre-left Radikal: "President Erdogan should abstain from creating enemies for himself, at least for now. Instead of talking like a provincial ruling party boss, he should seek to establish unity in the country so as to secure more votes. If the president of the republic has something to tell the opposition, he should invite its members and say it to them, rather than saying it in front of the people."

Yaman Toruner offers a prediction in centrist Milliyet: "It has become quite clear that the ruling AKP [Justice and Development Party] has not been successful in foreign policy. That is why we will see the AKP lose votes. However, the Erdogan factor, the power that comes from being the ruling party, and its rivals’ weakness will once again bring the AKP to power, either on its own or as a coalition partner." 

Nasuhi Gungor detects a change in the leader of the opposition’s stance on Syria in centre-right, pro-government Star: "During the election process, foreign policy has not occupied a significant place on the agenda. We talked about foreign policy a little when discussing the events of 1915, but this probably will not continue. For this reason, CHP [Republican People's Party] leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu's remarks that he would send Syrian refugees back to their homes have not been sufficiently discussed. First of all, I want to say that I believe he is right. No one on earth should be driven from their homes by force, or be forced to seek a new, peaceful place to live. That means the CHP leader has dropped his understanding of the Syrian regime as one of the last 'secular castles of the Middle East' and a 'model', developing a new humanitarian-centered policy instead. If not, he should not be worrying so much about the return of Syrian refugees, who are facing one of the biggest tragedies in history, back to their homes!

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan has decided: "The main objective of the U.S. in the current talks is to keep Iran busy and to deceive it in other aspects; at least to slow down the pace of its progress and development. Another U.S. goal is to keep Iran waiting, create suspense, inaction and imprudence." 

Reformist Sharq appeals: "On the eve of the talks, we should show goodwill to our caring and honest negotiators. Our efforts and theories should help encourage and motivate them even more. We ask all our friends and critics inside the country to avoid raising unreal claims and not to blame our officials for hiding details of the nuclear agreement or insist on the release of a fact sheet." 

Reformist Arman is not for releasing details: "There are some fanatics who wish that an agreement is not reached. Among them Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia and the Zionist regime. There is no need for all the information to be accessible to everyone. If MPs force the government to release the details of the agreement, it will benefit opponents of the deal in the U.S. Congress who will pressurize the U.S. administration. Such pressure can prevent a final agreement to be signed." 

 

YEMEN/SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Khorasan contends that Saudi credibility is diminishing even among its friends: "The West has remained silent about the bloodshed in Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, while expecting Saudi Arabia to be able to explain the results of its action in Yemen. Saudi attacks in Yemen have no conventional military justification. The recent adventurism of Riyadh diminishes its political credibility even in the West." 

Hard-line Javan expects the Saudis to become more aggressive: "The war against Yemen, regardless of its consequences for Saudi Arabia, signifies a transformation in the security behaviour of Saudi Arabia, which is the result of a change of its relations with the U.S.. It is too early to read U.S. behaviour in the Yemen war as a weakening of its bond with Saudi Arabia. However, the importance for Iran is the possible adjustment in Saudi foreign policy in the region. The lessening of U.S. security commitment will probably lead the Saudis to adopt more aggressive policies." 

 

ISRAEL/PALESTINE: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami harshly criticizes: "The hegemonic Western powers and reactionary Arab regimes that are supposed to support the Palestinian cause are among the supporters of the Zionist conspiracy to Judaize holy Quds. The leaders of reactionary Arab regimes collaborate with the Zionists through passivity and silence! Regimes like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar commit genocide against Muslims and participate with the Zionists in the conspiracy to Judaize occupied Jerusalem." 

 

UK ELECTIONS: Conservative Resalat analyses: "David Cameron has not been able to satisfy the British over issues like economic reforms. There will be an escalation of disputes between the Labour and Conservative parties in the next ten days. However, some Labourites do not want Ed Miliband to win, while EU leaders are counting on him and the Labour Party. David Cameron in power in 10 Downing Street is equivalent to holding a referendum to leave the EU in 2017." 

 

U.S./EGYPT: Conservative Hemayat simplifies: "The Islamic revolution in the Arab world with the participation of Egypt made Washington anxious. The U.S. has tried hard not to be the loser in the new Arab world, particularly in Egypt. Washington has not altered its double-standard policies and will continue on that path. The Americans seek not to lose public support in Egypt and to prevent the formation of an Islamic regime independent from the West." 

 

CYBER SECURITY: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz claims the U.S. uses cyber threats as an excuse: "The American National Security Agency’s assessments suggest that Iran, China, Russia and North Korea are a threat to the U.S.. The Americans have stressed the need for urgent attention to cyber threats. These concerns come at a time when the U.S. is the first country active in cyber wars. The U.S. has executed most of its military and hegemonic plans using cyber war. Responding to cyber threats is just an excuse; America, who faces international pressure for lifting sanctions on other countries, is justifying its refusal to lift sanctions and even extend them by alleging cyber threats."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Regional counter moves

2-Standing in the queue

 

1-Regional counter moves

 

If we were to link ISIS’s growing activity in Iraq to the advances made by the Nusra Front in northeastern Syria where, together with other factions, it has captured Jisr ash-Shughour after taking control of Idlib and the Nuweiseeb crossing with Jordan, we may come to the conclusion that a regional counter-move is underway that is intended to exert pressure on the Iranian/Syrian/Iraqi axis that has opened up the Yemen front in order to hemorrhage Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies. What leads us to this conclusion is the change in Saudi Arabia’s priorities. It is now acting on the principle that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’ This explains why Operation Decisive Storm’s warplanes are not attacking any al-Qa’ida targets in Yemen--‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood position ultimately leads to one single aim: How is it possible to use the model of the aggression on Yemen in their vigorous battles in Iraq and Syria? Is it possible for the two states to make use of the world's preoccupation with the Yemeni crisis, and to succeed in creating a new reality on the ground in Iraq and Syria, one they can subsequently transform into a launching-pad at a later time that accords with the [Saudi] slogan calling for 'waging a new storm' on Syria? All that this camp is now studying and discussing concerns this task, to the exclusion of all others. In this regard, the camp is working on a deal with the Al Saud: It will provide backing, if only formal, for the latter’s aggression on Yemen, in return for a battlefield accord having to do with the supervision of the armed opposition in Syria--Ibrahim al-Amin in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Turkey [has] concluded that it needed to secure some battlefield achievement that matches or goes beyond what Saudi Arabia is doing, in the belief that it can secure something equivalent to the supposed Saudi gains in Yemen, on the Syrian battlefield. With this in mind, it drove thousands of the armed elements that it has well-equipped and trained and who are acting under almost direct Turkish command onto the battlefield in effort to match Saudi actions in Yemen, and capture a significant area of Syria's northwest. Turkey was in harmony with the psychological warfare being waged by Saudi Arabia that claims that the Saudi-led Decisive Storm will move onto Syria after completing its mission in Yemen; a warning that Saudi Arabia's UN ambassador was impertinent enough to issue with his public threat of direct military intervention in Syria-- Amin Huteit in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Recent ISIS advances in Iraq have blunted the Iraqi government’s drive to recapture the areas controlled by the Islamist group, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. If we were to add to this, the Nusra Front’s latest advances in Syria, we would seem to be witnessing a Saudi-inspired counter attack on the Syrian/Iraqi/Iranian axis in retaliation for opening the Houthi front in Yemen. The Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood coalition wants both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to be defeated in Yemen, argues the editor-in-chief of a left-leaning Lebanese daily. Meanwhile, the two countries are working on a deal with Riyadh whereby they will back its operations in Yemen in return for being granted a free hand in Syria as a prelude to the major confrontation that seems to lie in wait for the country. Ankara been playing the main role in the recent attacks in northwest Syria, planning, training, equipping, and managing the war waged on the Syrian army there, which has led to the loss of a number of strategically important positions, maintains a former Lebanese army general writing in an official Syrian daily. Ankara’s main goal is to secure its role as the region approaches a decisive phase that will determine its future.

 

SURPRISE ATTACKS: “At a time when many regional states, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, are preoccupied with the events of Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen and the aerial bombardment of Yemeni infrastructure, Houthi groupings, and the forces of the Houthis’ ally, former president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, Islamic State (ISIS) forces have surprised many people with a number of attacks that confirm that they have regained the initiative, at least in Iraq, after the severe setback they suffered by losing Tikrit, the center of Salahuddin Province,” writes Editor-in-Chief ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on Monday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This sudden ISIS military ‘awakening’ can be summarized in four attacks, each of which has its own implications and special significance:

- First: ISIS forces succeeded in capturing the Nazem ath-Tharthar Dam on the Euphrates to the northeast of Baghdad (some 50 kilometers from the capital). This dam is a major barrier that prevents floods from sweeping over Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. 146 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the attack, including a general, a colonel, and a number of senior officers. In addition, 52 soldiers were captured and then slaughtered before a large crowd, and a large amount of military equipment and weapons was seized including tanks and armored vehicles.

- Second: The suicide attack that targeted the Iraqi side of the Turaibil border crossing with Jordan. This was carried out by three ISIS fighters; a Frenchman, a Belgian, and a Senegalese. Its first result was the death of five border guards and nine others wounded, and the crossing’s closure for many hours throughout Saturday.

- Third: ISIS’s tightening control over the city of Ramadi, the capital of al-Anbar Province, with the result that thousands of families living in the city have sought refuge elsewhere.

- Fourth: The assault on Baiji oil refinery, which provides 50% of Iraq’s energy needs, killing a large number of defending troops, and burning down two fuel depots.

ISIS’s capture of Tharthar dam may have been intended to compensate for the loss of Tikrit, while the attack on Baiji oil refinery confirms the fact that while Iraqi forces may have regained control of it and ISIS forces left it, this does not means that the refinery is safe. As for control of al-Ramadi, it completes ISIS’s grip over most of the Anbar Province.

But the attack on Turaibil border crossing with Jordan is perhaps the most important development for a number of reasons: The first is that this was intended as a message to the Jordanian government before the Iraqi government. It says that ISIS can reach Jordan, or its borders, at least. Secondly, the harassment of Jordan came after a ‘long silence,’ specifically since the ugly burning alive of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh. Thirdly, the attack was meant as a message to those guarding the Saudi border, which is not far from the crossing, warning Riyadh that it is not immune from a similar attack.

These attacks and their messages to numerous regional parties may explain the report that the Iraqi authorities have decided to postpone next month’s planned attack to regain the city of Mosul from ISIS till after the month of Ramadan [in July].

It is certain that the Iraqi government and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) forces’ elation after they regained the city of Tikrit, and that fuelled an optimistic belief in a great and imminent victory in Mosul, has evaporated, if only temporarily. The latest attacks have forced the Iraqi authorities to review their calculations and alter their priorities, focusing on protecting the capital Baghdad which is now threatened both by a flood resulting from releasing the Tharthar Dam’s waters, or by unexpected attacks intended to undermine its security and stability. The three car bomb explosions that shook the capital on Saturday are just one early warning in this regard.

It is worth noting that ISIS’s strong ‘revival’, which came at a time when many believed that the Tikrit setback had weakened it, has coincided with a drop in PM Haidar al-‘Abadi’s government’s popularity, with growing accusations that it has failed to represent most shades of the Iraqi confessional spectrum, following in the footsteps of [former PM] Nuri al-Maliki’s government in its policies of exclusion, marginalization, and bias in favor of one confessional group against another [Shiites over Sunnis].

If we were to link ISIS’s growing activity in Iraq to the advances made by the Nusra Front in northeastern Syria where, together with other factions, it has captured Jisr ash-Shughour after taking control of Idlib and the Nuweiseeb crossing with Jordan, we may come to the conclusion that a regional counter-move is underway that is intended to exert pressure on the Iranian/Syrian/Iraqi axis that has opened up the Yemen front in order to hemorrhage Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.

What leads us to this conclusion is the change in Saudi Arabia’s priorities. It is now acting on the principle that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’ This explains why Operation Decisive Storm’s warplanes are not attacking any al-Qa’ida targets in Yemen and why they have not prevented the latter’s forces from capturing the city of al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadramaut, or why they have postponed any such actions, for the moment at least.

This does not mean that an alliance is taking shape between the Saudi authorities and ISIS. This is confirmed by the fact that their mutual hostility is still at its peak, as evident from the Saudi security forces’ foiling of an ISIS attack in the heart of the Saudi capital Riyadh.

It is true that there is a split in salafi ranks over Operation Decisive Storm, with some backing it, others opposing it, and a third party that has maintained its silence such as [Jordan-based] Sheikh Abu-Mohammad al-Maqdissi. As regards the latter, the well-known [Arab] saying – ‘I did not ask for it, but it does me no harm’ – applies. The Storm is striking two of its enemies with the same single stone.

“In the end, God knows best,” concludes ‘Atwan.

End…

 

SATISFIED BROTHERHOOD: "No one can be as satisfied as the traditional Muslim Brotherhood is about Al Saud's involvement in Yemen," writes Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Monday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

The Brotherhood has many organizations and many governments and backers helping it. It also has its supporters within the Arab nationalist and leftist currents. And while it is true that the Brotherhood’s backers may no longer have all the ideological qualities they would have chosen for them, the more obvious truth has to do with these parties’ attitude towards the ongoing aggression on Yemen.

Those who may have believed that others would make use of Al Saud's war have been rapidly disillusioned. And just as many states and groups have rushed to shirk their responsibility for this war, the Brotherhood is now facing a difficult problem in this regard.

The Brotherhood lies at the heart of the events in Yemen. The difficulty of their position stems from the fact that they want to see a Yemeni regime in which [the Houthi] Ansarullah do not have the upper hand because they view this group as an ideological, political, confessional, even social opponent. But they also do not want Ansarullah to be defeated at the hands of Al Saud's kingdom because it represents evil incarnate in their eyes.

But they are unable to resist that kingdom today. Therefore, the more appropriate ending from their point of view would be for the aggression to achieve different results, namely, for Ansarullah to receive a painful blow that prevents them from being a decisive factor in Yemen, while Al Saud receive a blow that stops them from assuming their role of suzerainty over the country. In other words, all the Brotherhood's prayers these days end with an entreaty that goes as follows: 'God, please strike the unjust against the unjust, and help them destroy each other. But do not allow any of them to emerge victorious from this war. Please God; give us a settlement in which we are the decisive partners. Amen!'

But Yemen's Brotherhood, as represented by the Islah (Reform) Party, cannot simply stand by and observe what is happening. It first joined the attempt to weaken Ansarullah, then it became a party to the aggression. Some of its members have become mercenaries who fight on behalf of the [Saudi] aggressor against their country. Their argument is borrowed either from the aggressor, who claims to be combating Iranian influence, or from their competitors from the forces that call for the South's secession and who speak of 'an invasion by the north,' or from their enemies from the salafi currents of both the jihadi and proselytizing varieties who claim that they are fighting the rawafid [Shiites] in Yemen!

In all cases, the Islah is fighting others’ battles, but with its own blood and on its own land. And it has absolutely no confidence that it will receive any major prize, or even mere consolation prize in return. On the other hand, if it withdraws from the battle completely, it rightly believes that it would totally collapse; for in that case, its public would move to wherever seems most appropriate, either towards the tribal and clannish frameworks whose stance differs from the Islah, or towards the jihadist banners that cast them into al-Qa'ida's lap.

But the Islah's sponsors in the Gulf and the region want something different from the same war. It is true that Turkey and Qatar have no objection to Yemen's Brotherhood abovementioned prayer; nor do they mind a settlement that restores the Islah to its previously powerful presence in the new political scene. But the two states have other concerns.

For while it is true that they would not mind if Iran's allies in the Arabian Peninsula were to lose, they cannot brook an Al Saud victory at the same time. Nor do they wish to see the emergence of a new leadership for the Arab coalition that is confronting the [Iranian-led] resistance axis in the region. This is especially true because Ankara is satisfied with the absence of a strong Arab leadership, while Qatar would not even dream of any role or position if a formula arises whereby Egyptian/Saudi supervision over the Arab League and the Arabs' action mechanisms in various heated areas were to be established [at its expense].

Therefore, the Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood position ultimately leads to one single aim: How is it possible to use the model of the aggression on Yemen in their vigorous battles in Iraq and Syria? Is it possible for the two states to make use of the world's preoccupation with the Yemeni crisis, and to succeed in creating a new reality on the ground in Iraq and Syria, one they can subsequently transform into a launching-pad at a later time that accords with the [Saudi] slogan calling for 'waging a new storm' on Syria?

All that this camp is now studying and discussing concerns this task, to the exclusion of all others. In this regard, the camp is working on a deal with the Al Saud: It will provide backing, if only formal, for the latter’s aggression on Yemen, in return for a battlefield accord having to do with the supervision of the armed opposition in Syria.

And this camp is apparently ready to reach a settlement provided that the only faction that remains outside is ISIS, on the grounds that it is not interested in becoming part of any such comprehensive understanding today since it is benefiting from the [regional] mobilization against Iran and Syria in both countries.

But the essence of the Turkish/Qatari/Brotherhood mission lies in creating a force that brings together the Nusra Front, Jayshul-Islam, and other [Syrian opposition] 'brigades' either by making use of the Jayshul-Fateh operations room or via other means, ensuring that coordination is effective and coordinated, from Syria's south to its north, with a special focus on Damascus's surroundings.

"And this means that a major battle lies in wait for Syria!" concludes Amin.

End…

 

SURPRISE MOMENTUM: "Observers of the terrorist escalation and the armed [opposition] groups’ moves in northeast Syrian – the area east and south of the borders with Turkey, specifically in Idlib and its countryside, as well as in Aleppo's western countryside and parts of the Latakia countryside, would want to understand the background to this escalation and its objectives after it has acquired a momentum that may have come as a surprise," writes Amin Huteit in Monday's official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

The first thing that they would note was that Turkey is behind this momentum, supplying the terrorists with all they need for their movements and combat – beginning with planning and training, moving on to equipment, armament, and ammunition supplies, as well as all the necessary battlefield intelligence information. As very evident from the battlefield, Turkey is totally behind the large-scale terrorist attacks in that area; and no reasonable person could dispute that.

Here, the question changes, and may be posed in a somewhat different manner: Why did Turkey escalate its intervention in Syria at this particular point in time and in a manner that goes beyond its previous interventions, even though they have never ceased ever since the beginning of the aggression on Syria [in 2011]? Turkey remains a major instrument for carrying out this aggression.

In seeking an answer to this question, we believe that three reasons lie behind Turkey’s push to escalate its aggression in support of terrorism in Syria. These are the following:

- The first is directly linked to the Syrian arena, and especially after the terrorist groups’ retreat over the past month in the wake of the Syrian Arab Army and its supporting forces’ significant military successes. These occurred in the north around Aleppo, and stretched all the way to the south, especially in the Damascus countryside. As a result, Turkey began to sense that its influence on the Syrian battlefield was beginning to wane.

This was accompanied by Syrian consultations in search for a political resolution but without Turkey having the role it has been dreaming of in any such settlement. The Moscow-2 meeting [between the regime and opposition elements] took place without the participation of the Turkish puppet known as the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). As a result, Turkey decided to forcefully back the terrorists by supplying them with armored vehicles and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, in the belief that this would block the path before the accumulation of Syrian battlefield successes and obstruct the efforts to reach a peaceful solution that excludes Ankara. At the very least, Turkey hopes that this would restore part of its role, which had begun to shrink in light of recent developments in Syria and Iraq, and the two countries' achievements in fighting terrorism, especially ISIS and the Nusra Front, both of which are sponsored by Turkey.

- The second reason has to do with Saudi Arabia's military actions whereby Riyadh has tried to project the image of strong and decisive power that is ready to impose its policy by fire and force. It headed to Yemen under the banner of Operation Decisive Storm and has been waging an aggression that has preoccupied the media for four weeks with its criminal 'heroics.' In doing so, Saudi Arabia has gone beyond the actions of the other regional states with which it is in competition over leadership of the region and the Islamic world.

In this context, Turkey concluded that it needed to secure some battlefield achievement that matches or goes beyond what Saudi Arabia is doing, in the belief that it can secure something equivalent to the supposed Saudi gains in Yemen, on the Syrian battlefield. With this in mind, it drove thousands of the armed elements that it has well-equipped and trained and who are acting under almost direct Turkish command onto the battlefield in effort to match Saudi actions in Yemen, and capture a significant area of Syria's northwest.

Turkey was in harmony with the psychological warfare being waged by Saudi Arabia that claims that the Saudi-led Decisive Storm will move onto Syria after completing its mission in Yemen; a warning that Saudi Arabia's UN ambassador was impertinent enough to issue with his public threat of direct military intervention in Syria (one that elicited a harsh response from the Syrian ambassador to the UN in return).

- The third reason is linked to the international noose tightening around Turkey's neck regarding the Ottomans' [First World War] crimes against the Armenians. An international environment has emerged that has been exerting pressure on Turkey on the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Ottoman genocide against the Armenians and other Christians. A clear international consensus has taken shape that the Ottomans were the first to commit genocide, to use the legal term for what happened. There were those who believed that Turkey would come to terms with its crime by acknowledging it, apologizing to the Armenian nation and finally expressing its readiness to offer material and moral compensation to those deserving to receive this.

But Turkey did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it did the exact opposite, insisting on denying any wrongdoing and rejecting what history and the facts have demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt. That stance reveals yet another fact that lies behind it, namely Turkey’s readiness to repeat what it has done without any religious, moral, or legal qualms.

Turkey then confirmed its terrorist behavior by intensifying its support for the terrorists in Syria, pushing them into the area between Jisr ash-Shughour and Idlib in particular, just a few kms away from Iskandarun (Turkish Hatay) Province which it usurped from Syria. And it has provided the terrorists with major resources to help them attain their battlefield goals that Turkey is relying on to turn the tables and respond to Syria’s successes over the previous month.

For these reasons, and as is consistent with the main object behind its aggression, Turkey has effectively joined the war in Syria on the terrorists' side with all the weight it can throw into the battle. Its aim is to return to Syria at an extremely critical juncture when the respective weight of the various forces will be determined in light of their respective victories and defeats.

In addition to the above, we cannot ignore the possibility of linking the current Turkish intervention to what we have described elsewhere as the fourth plan for aggression on Syria. This is the plan that the U.S. has hatched after the failure of ISIS’s plan, and for which it has chosen Israel, Jordan, and Turkey to implement. And this is the plan that Syria has confronted and blocked in the south, as those who have followed the battles in the Qunaitra countryside and Der'a would know.

"But Turkey apparently sought to fulfil its part of the plan, motivated by the aforementioned reasons, and ignoring the fact that the forces defending Syria can confront it and foil its aggression, just as they have foiled the other three previous plans," concludes Huteit.

Ends…

 

 

2-Standing in the queue

 

Washington has clearly sold out the Arabs in favor of Tehran, but will they do more than simply stand in the queue and await their fate? asks Abdelmuhsin Salamah in Egyptian al-Ahram

 

The declared end of Operation Decisive Storm without achieving any of its aims, and the Americans’ welcome of this decision and their call for the urgent resumption of unconditional negotiations that should include all parties suggest that Washington has effectively ‘sold’ the Arab region to Iran which is now being groomed to become ‘the region’s policeman,’ warns an Egyptian commentator.

 

SOLD OUT TO IRAN: “Has the U.S. sold out the Arabs to Iran against the background of the war in Yemen?” asks ‘Abdelmuhsin Salamah in the authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

Numerous questions have forcefully imposed themselves after the sudden end of Operation Decisive Storm even though the situation on the ground remains the same, with [former president] Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi forces expanding across Yemeni territories. In fact, Saleh emerged to defy everyone and announce that he refuses to leave Yemen. Meanwhile on the ground, rebel forces are trying to take control of Aden, Taiz and other areas of the country. The Houthi and Saleh’s forces have not declared that they are laying down their arms and accepting the relevant Arab and international initiatives.

It is also interesting that the announcement of the end of Decisive Storm followed shortly after the Iranian deputy foreign minister’s announcement that he expects the [Saudi-led] coalition forces’ military operations in Yemen to end, thereby highlighting Iran’s efforts in this regard and its desire to end the fighting.

No sooner was it was announced that the aerial bombardment would stop, than Washington rushed to declare its support for this move and call for the urgent resumption of unconditional negotiations. U.S. National Security Council Spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan said that the U.S. welcomes the announcement by Saudi government and its partners in the coalition that Decisive Storm’s operations in Yemen would end, and that Washington looks forward to the resumption of unconditional negotiations between all parties as soon as possible.

It was also strange for U.S. President Barack Obama to urge Iran to be part of the solution, which sends a clear signal that the U.S. understands and accepts Iran’s blatant intervention in Yemeni affairs and its support for the Houthis against the Yemeni people’s will.

Iran’s role in the region is growing noticeably against the background of the retreat of the Arab role and the ‘predicament’ in which the region finds itself after the Arab Spring revolutions. As a result, Iran is expanding in Arab territories and now holds the keys to solutions in more than one Arab state. This began in Lebanon, then it was Iraq and Syria’s turn, and now it is happening in Yemen.

Meanwhile, the Arabs have stood aside hesitant and preoccupied with their domestic problems, and the spread of violence and terrorism. This continued until Operation Decisive Storm occurred and an attempt was made to revive the spirit of hope in joint Arab action with the start of the aerial bombardment.

But the sudden end of the operation raises doubts about the Arabs’ ability to act jointly – unless this was part of a political deal that includes President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his government’s return to Sana’a, the resumption of negotiations, and the withdrawal of the [Houthi] rebel forces from army posts, police headquarters and the government buildings they occupied, all within a framework that aims to finally resolve the crisis. But is there such a deal, or are these demands mere wishes and mirages that have nothing to do with reality?

The announcement of the end of Decisive Storm raises the prospect of the deal proposed by former Yemeni foreign Minister Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi, who visited Riyadh recently. This includes an agreement whereby Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh would go into exile, any political role for him and his family members in Yemen’s future would end, the Houthis would hand over the army and police weapons they have captured, and would withdraw fully from all cities and government buildings they had occupied by military force during the past months.

But the announcement that Operation Decisive Storm has ended did not point to any advance towards a political solution, other than the release of the brother of Yemeni President Hadi and the defense minister in his government. Meanwhile, confrontations between the rebels and the [Hadi-backed] popular committees have continued, and the coalition’s air raids have resumed on Houthi positions.

All of which points to confusion and uncertainty, suggesting that what is happening is simply an attempt at ‘take the pulse’ and test the parties’ credibility. It is not clear that there is any guarantee of a political solution in light of Iran’s growing role in the region and the American rapprochement with Tehran, which began with the nuclear negotiations some time ago.

The in-principle agreement that was reached in these negotiations confirms this rapprochement and the U.S.’s desire for Iran to play the role of regional ‘policeman’ in light of Arab impotence.

“So will the Arabs awake before it is too late? Or will they remain in their coma, with the result that Yemen will become the fourth Arab state handed over to Iran, with the rest waiting in queue?” asks Salamah in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 27.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Look North

 

The Golan Heights and Nepal compete for dominance of the front pages of Israeli newspapers on Monday. Yedioth Ahronoth and The Jerusalem Post lead with the tragedy in Nepal. Yedioth reports in its lead headline on urgent calls for help from some of the 600 or so Israelis who were believed to be there when a massive earthquake struck over the weekend, while the Post reports that the death toll continues to rise.

Israel Hayom splits its front page equally between Nepal and events on Israel's northern border over the past two days. On Nepal, it used the opportunity for some 'feel-good' reporting, with photographs of Israeli rescue teams on their way to Kathmandu, under the headline 'Blue and white aid.'

The second half of Israel Hayom's front page, as well as Haaretz's lead headline, reports on what at first appeared to be an Israeli airstrike on a cell placing a bomb on the border between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights.

Despite the fact that all the papers report that the Israel Air Force was behind this latest strike – the second in as many days – Israeli security sources have denied any involvement. According to reports in several Arab-language websites, the alleged Israeli airstrikes on Sunday night took out Hizbollah rocket launchers at Syrian army sites along the Qalamoun mountain region of Syria near the Lebanese border.

According to security sources, the IAF did not conduct the airstrikes, but rather the strike was conducted by Syrian rebels. The report Sunday night was the most recent of three such reports in Arab media, following news of Israeli strikes on a weapon transfer last Wednesday and on a Scud missile depot this Saturday, all said to be in the Qalamoun region. Earlier on Sunday Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon warned that Israel will strike Iranian attempts to smuggle advanced weapons to Hizbollah, in what was viewed as a subtle confirmation that Israel had taken out the Scud transfer the day before.

'Iran continues to try and arm Hizbollah, even in these very days, and it hopes to equip the Lebanese terrorist organization with advanced and precise weapons,' said Ya'alon. 'We won't allow Iran and Hizbollah to establish a terrorist infrastructure on our border with Syria, and we will know how to put our hands on all those who threaten the citizens of Israel, along all our borders and even far from them.'

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu also spoke about the alleged Israeli operations, saying that, 'any attempt to harm our soldiers or our citizens will be met with a decisive response like tonight's IDF operation that prevented a terror attack. I commend the vigilant IDF soldiers that acted quickly and accurately.'

In other news, Yedioth's Alex Fishman reports that, over the past several weeks, Israeli government and defense officials have been engaged in dialogue with Hamas in a bid to reach a long-term calm.

Meanwhile, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat expressed skepticism on Sunday about peace prospects with the next Israeli government, following comments made by Netanyahu during the recent campaign. Speaking to international reporters Sunday, he said Netanyahu's comments were irresponsible and would cause despair among Palestinians.

 'I’ve been told that this will be the most extreme government in Israel,' said Erekat. 'If the prime minister doesn’t want to accept a Palestinian state, what will I talk to him about?' he asked. 'We will hold the Israeli prime minister accountable for any crimes committed against Palestinians,' said the negotiator. 'It will not be cost-free legally.' Erekat also accused Israel Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman of wanting to 'destroy the prospects of a Palestinian state.'

Finally, all the papers report that – according to Reuters - Israel will take part as an observer in a major nuclear non-proliferation conference that opens at the United Nations on Monday, ending a 20-year absence in hope of fostering dialogue with Arab states. Quoting a senior Israeli official, Reuters reports that the unnamed official said that, 'We think that this is the time for all moderate countries to sit and discuss the problems that everyone is facing in the region. I see this, coming as an observer to the conference now, as trying to demonstrate our good faith in terms of having such a conversation. We need direct negotiations between the regional parties, a regional security conversation, a conversation based on consensus. This (attendance at the NPT conference) is meant not to change our policy. It's meant to emphasize our policy.'

 

TIME FOR A RETHINK: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yoav Limor comments on the tensions of the past two days on Israel's northern front and urges the new government to rethink its strategy regarding Syria and Lebanon.

"The IDF was careful yesterday evening not to officially accuse Hizbollah of responsibility for the thwarted terror attack on the Golan Heights, but it seems highly likely that the Lebanese organization was, indeed, behind the operation. Senior officers firmly believe that Hizbollah was trying to extract quick revenge for the alleged Israeli airstrike on Syrian soil – with minimum risk.

Past experience teaches us that Hizbollah takes a few days to execute any retaliatory strike, except in cases when it uses rockets to attack Israel – which is a readily available course of action that does not demand a large amount of planning. However, it is entirely possible that the organization has prepared 'contingency attacks,' which can be launched at a moment's notice, and that one such attack was carried out last night. This becomes even more likely when one understands that the area that the terrorists came from is under the control of the Syrian regime and that a similar pattern was used last March, when a roadside bomb injured an officer and several IDF soldiers on the Lebanon border.

It remains unclear whether the successful thwarting of the operation brings to an end this round of events on the northern front. Hizbollah could decide that the alleged Israeli operation – which, according to reports in the Arab media, targeted a shipment of weapons heading for Lebanon – has not yet been avenged and that the score has yet to be settled. If the assumption that Hizbollah wants revenge but is worried about sparking an all-out conflict is correct, then it seems likely that the organization will continue looking for a military target – on the Golan Heights or Har Dov – which would ensure that things do not spiral out of control. It is possible that, like in the past – including, possibly, yesterday – Hizbollah will use a proxy to attack Israel, so that the finger of blame cannot be pointed directly in its direction.

One could be forgiven for thinking that these events are occurring according to a familiar dynamic, but there is a danger: this dynamic could spiral out of control, even though neither side is keen for this to happen. This is a dangerous game of ping-pong: each incident becomes potentially more explosive than the previous one and each incident increases the need for both sides to respond with increasing ferocity.

If we assume that Israel will again strike weapons convoys heading for Lebanon – as Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon stated quite explicitly last night – Hizbollah will continue to respond. Last night Israel may have thwarted Hizbollah’s response thanks to a combination of intelligence, ground forces and air cover (which was watched the whole time by the top IDF brass, which had been summoned to Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv), but there is no guarantee it will succeed next time.

Given all of the above, Israel needs to reexamine its fundamental assumptions about its deployment in the north. The establishment of a new government in Jerusalem is the perfect time to do this. The new security cabinet would be well advised to rethink Israel's strategy regarding Syria and Lebanon, in order to ensure that the country's deterrence capability is maintained and – most importantly – that the situation does not deteriorate in a dangerous direction."

Ends…

 

THE EDGE OF CONFLICT: Writing in Maariv, Alon Ben-David says that Hizbollah’s greater daring – rather than its desire for all-out war – would lead to the kind of escalation that neither Israel nor the Lebanese organization wants.

"There are those in Israel who believe that, at some stage, Israel will find what is known as the 'ticket,' and will reach a situation where every time it is accused of attacking in Syria or Lebanon, Hizbollah will respond.

Hassan Nasrallah said as much in February 2014, when – according to foreign news reports – Israel's air force attacked a target within Lebanon and injured several Hizbollah members. After Israel was accused of assassinating Jihad Mughniyeh on the Golan Heights in January, Nasrallah ordered an attack on a Givati convoy on Mount Dov.

The extent of each attack that is blamed on Israel will be determined by the amount of media coverage it garners. A successful attack carried out at night, for example, will not meet the same kind of response as a nocturnal strike which is not filmed and which does not claim any causalities. The Lebanese and the Syrians would be able to remain in the zone of deniability.

Last night's attempt to infiltrate the Israeli side of the Golan Heights and to place a bomb can be seen as Hizbollah’s knee-jerk reaction to Saturday's airstrike, but its proper revenge will not come so quickly. It takes time to plan an operation large enough to be considered adequate payback, so Hizbollah is not in any hurry. Its preferred target is Mount Dov, where it feels that it has legitimate cause to attack, or the northern Golan Heights, which is the only part of the Israel-Syria border that is still under the control of Bashar al-Assad and Hizbollah.

In the near future, the IDF will have to keep a low profile on the northern front in general and near Mount Dov in particular, in order to refrain from creating easy targets for Hizbollah. There will be no unnecessary convoys of officers, like the one that was attacked four months ago, and there will be no ostentatious and obvious operations.

The problem is that Israel's deterrence regarding Hizbollah has been eroded over the past nine months since Operation Protective Edge. The organization, which for eight years did not dare to carry out any attack along the border, is no longer afraid of confrontation with Israel. When Hizbollah fired six antitank missiles at an IDF convoy in January, it intended to kill as many soldiers as possible; it was not afraid of the Israeli response.

That does not mean, however, that Hizbollah is hoping for all-out war with Israel. On the contrary: it is in no position to fight such a war at this time. But it is now once again willing to take things to the edge of conflict, thereby increasing the chances of a war that neither side wants."

Ends…

 

100,000 MISSILES: Writing on the News 1 website, Yehuda Drori says that there are four steps Israel needs to take in order to be better equipped to deal with the threat posed by Hizbollah and its massive arsenal of rockets.

"Every time I hear a senior Israeli defense official tell us that Hizbollah has 100,000 rockets aimed at us, several questions pop into my head: Why on earth are they trying to frighten us? How do they expect us to react to this news? And are they, in fact, merely preparing their excuses for the 'day after,' so that they can tell us, 'we told you so'?

These are the natural questions that any citizen would ask him or herself. But there is one question that the defense establishment must answer here and now: What are you capable of doing to prevent a disaster, if and when Hizbollah decides to launch dozens, hundreds or even thousands of these missiles at us?

If Hizbollah does decide to attack, it is generally assumed that the first wave would see an attack of at least 1,000 missiles. These missiles are already much improved from the version that was fired at us from the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge and, despite the Iron Dome and David's Sling missile defense systems, a large proportion of them will hit our infrastructure, our population centers, our factories, our airports and even our gas platforms. The damage would be massive, the loss of life would be in the hundreds and thousands of injured people would find it hard to get treatment at hospitals that would be unable to deal with the pressure. This, therefore, raises another question: Are we capable of dealing with this kind of situation? Are we willing to accept this situation and, most importantly of all, are we capable of preventing it?

In order to properly answer any and all of these questions, there are several issues that we need to get straight. First of all, it does not appear at all likely that Hizbollah wants another conflict with Israel. The organization's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has said as much time and time again; there's no reason not to believe him, since he has already publicly admitted that he erred when he forced Israel into the second Lebanon War. In fact, Lebanon has still not fully recovered from the damage that conflict caused. Secondly, Hizbollah is currently focused on Lebanon itself and on its battle against al-Qa’ida and ISIS. Hizbollah’s struggle against those rival organizations will not end any time soon. Our problem, however, is that we know that Hizbollah is the armed wing of Iran on our northern border, but we do not know whether Nasrallah will act immediately if and when he gets the order from the ayatollahs. Our fundamental assumption must be that Hizbollah will obey the orders from Tehran if and when the time comes.

Israel's military leaders – at the very highest levels – must start work today on a plan to deal with a massive Hizbollah attack; they must make a series of preemptive decisions to forestall any such onslaught.

First and foremost, we must make it abundantly clear to Iran that any attack by Hizbollah against the State of Israel would be viewed as a direct attack by the Islamic Republic and that Israel will respond with full force against Iran's civilian and military infrastructure – and against Iranian population centers. Secondly, we must make it clear to the government of Lebanon that we hold it responsible for failing to control Hizbollah and that it, too, will be targeted. Every target in Lebanon – civilian, military, economic and infrastructure – would be seen as legitimate in order to prevent further attacks. Thirdly, we must see ourselves as free to launch preemptive military action if there is intelligence suggesting that Hizbollah is about to launch a massive missile strike. Fourthly, we must decide that any and all weapons at our disposal will be used in the event of a massive Hizbollah rocket onslaught. This would include the use of non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse over Lebanon in order to prevent additional attacks.

It is no less important to relay a message to the United States, to other countries in the Middle East and to the broader international community, highlighting these four points. This is to ensure that there are no surprises and that Israel's warnings are taken seriously. This is vital, since U.S. President Barack Obama is currently trying to foster ties with terrorist Iran and to install it as the main regional power – which could lead Tehran to the false conclusion that Israel's hands are tied by Washington and that it can do whatever it likes with impunity.

The main problem, as I see it, is that our top-level decision-makers have not internalized the four steps that are needed to ensure our security. Unless they do so soon, by the time the next war comes around, it will be too late."

Ends…

 

STRAIT TALK: Writing on the Walla! website, Ehud Eilam comments on the common interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel, which center on keeping the Bab el-Mandeb strait open.

"Saudi Arabia has announced the end of its military operation in Yemen, but it will continue to wage some kind of war against its rival there – the Houthis and their Iranian patrons.

Yemen controls all of the eastern shore of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait. Every single day, some four million barrels of crude oil pass through Bab el-Mandeb, on tankers bound for Europe, the United States and the Far East. Keeping the strait open is in the vital national interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel alike. Recently, Bab el-Mandeb has become the gateway to Africa, India and the Far East. Israel would need this passageway to remain open especially if its economic ties with the European Union are harmed by differences of opinion over the Palestinian issue. The only alternative for Saudi Arabia and Israel to Bab el-Mandeb is circumnavigating Africa. But that is a much longer and more expensive route.

As far as Saudi Arabia and Israel are concerned, there is a threat not only to the southern outlet from the Red Sea - Bab el-Mandeb – but also to the northern passage, the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia has given billions and political support to Egypt in order to ensure that the current regime remains in power in Cairo, in part to ensure that President Abdelfattah el-Sissi and his military are capable of keeping the Suez Canal open to maritime traffic. Israel has similar concerns, since the Suez Canal is vital for cargo ships coming to and from Israel; therefore, Israel is cooperating with Egypt in its operation to repress terrorist attacks in the Sinai. Both sides know that these attacks could disrupt and even halt traffic in the Suez Canal. In recent years, RPGs have been fired at vessels using the Suez Canal. Israel and Saudi Arabia, therefore, are both doing their bit to ensure that the Red Sea remains navigable: Israel from the north and Saudi Arabia from the south.

Because of its geographical location in the very center of the Arab world, Israel has always been extremely sensitive to its maritime passages; it needs them in order to maintain contact with the wider international community. Despite the improvements in air travel, open waters were and remain a key Israeli interest. The closure of the Straits of Tiran – Israel's way out to the Red Sea – by Egypt in 1955 and 1967 was one of the reasons for war between the two countries.

Saudi Arabia, along with its allies, hopes to continue its military operation in Yemen – but with a lower profile, partly to prevent arms by Iran reaching the Houthis. Israel will remain out of the Yemen conflict. Israel could consider, though, attacking specific targets in Yemen by airstrikes. That may become necessary if Iran uses Yemen as a warehouse for its arms and ammunition, before they are shipped to Hizbollah or to the Gaza Strip. This is especially true if Iran deploys land-to-sea missiles along the coast of Bab el-Mandeb. The Saudi Arabian air force may not be able to destroy these missiles – and might not even try to do so – if they pose a threat to Israeli vessels alone. The Israeli air force already has a similar mission, when it is called upon to destroy the land-to-sea missiles in Hizbollah’s possession that threaten Israeli vessels and sites in the Mediterranean, such as gas platforms.

The Israeli air force has a history of carrying out long-range sorties to attack targets in far-off Arab countries: it attacked in Tunisia in 1985 and in Sudan in 2012, for example. Unlike those missions, however, attacking targets in Yemen has one clear advantage: a small part of the flight path would see Israeli jets travelling along the coast of Egypt – which is Saudi Arabia's ally in the war in Yemen and which is cooperating with Israel in antiterrorist operations in the Sinai. The rest of the flight path would take the jets close to Saudi Arabia – or perhaps even in its airspace. Under the circumstances, Israel would not have to worry that its planes could be detected by Saudi or Egyptian radars. Similarly, although Yemen does not have any aerial defense system that could threaten the Israeli jet, technical mishaps are always a possibility. If this happens, the flight crew could have no alternative but to eject over Saudi Arabia – where they can expect a relatively friendly welcome and a speedy return to Israel.

All in all, there are differences of opinion between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian issue, of course, remains the main bone of contention. But they do have common interests, such as ensuring that the Red Sea remains navigable from both ends. Israel and Saudi Arabia, therefore, can continue to act independently to promote their national interests, while cooperating with each other behind the scenes."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL'S SECRET COOPERATION WITH HAMAS: Writing on the Ynet website, Alex Fishman says that, for several weeks now, official representatives of the Israeli government and defense establishment have been holding a real dialogue with Hamas in a bid to reach a long-term calm on the Gaza border.

"The rocket fired at the Gaza vicinity area at the end of Independence Day placed the spotlight back on a somewhat forgotten front. But this spotlight reveals a different reality: No escalation, no tension – but rather the opposite. The Israeli airstrike in response to the rocket fire was mainly aimed at hitting the headlines.

It turns out that for several weeks now, official representatives of the Israeli government, members of the defense establishment, have been holding a real dialogue with Hamas – partly direct, partly indirect – in a bid to reach a long-term calm between the sides.

Three months before the elections, Israel received a concrete and detailed proposal from Hamas for an agreement on a calm period of five to 10 years. Official Israel did not respond. But life is stronger, and both sides' interests dictate cooperation. And that is what is actually happening in the Strip today without the government or cabinet making a formal decision that changes Israel's strategy towards Hamas. Not to mention the fact that the Egyptians and Americans don’t like the Hamas initiative that bypasses the Palestinian Authority.

Israel is rolling into a dialogue with Hamas, even if it isn't making a decision about it. So they are talking about rebuilding the Strip, a possibility of creating water and electricity infrastructures, and even an independent seaport which will serve Gaza is no longer considered a bad word. Recently, for example, it was reported that senior Qatari officials had turned to Israel at Hamas' request and offered to mediate between the sides. The Qatari representative to the Gaza reconstruction talks even visited Israel. The Swiss attaché in Ramallah is also notably active in mediating between the sides. Emissaries – not Hamas people – are arriving in Israel from Gaza. Even the Egyptians want to get back into the picture.

Defense establishment officials believe that the absence of a dialogue that will help ease the living conditions in Gaza will lead to an armed conflict in the summer, and Operation Protective Edge will be perceived as a colossal failure. The person pushing for talks with Hamas is the coordinator of the government's activities in the territories, in cooperation with new IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and with his encouragement, while the political echelon is making these moves possible. Official Israel continues to conceal the dialogue with Hamas: It would have disrupted the elections, it's not good for the image of a right-wing government, and it gets in the way of continuing to define Hamas as a terror organization in the world.

The PA is fuming with anger. The media in Ramallah are accusing Israel of helping Hamas in Gaza establish itself as a rival leadership. There is some truth in that. The PA is failing to take control over the Strip's reconstruction, and Israel has no time to wait. The coordinator of the government's activities in the territories is allowing the Palestinian unity government ministers to travel every week from the West Bank to Gaza for discussions, but nothing has come out of it. Besides, the dialogue with Hamas also serves as a sort of whip in Israel's hands against an oppositional PA in Ramallah: Is Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatening to open the economic and security agreements with Israel? Well, Israel can adopt an oppositional policy of its own.

The dialogue between Israel and Hamas created motivation in the organization to prevent deterioration on the Gaza border. As important is the fact that Hamas had aspired to expand the boundaries of the conflict to the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and on the Israel-Syria border. So far, that hasn't happened.

Meanwhile, the big funds from the donor countries have yet to arrive, but the numbers speak for themselves. Eighty-five percent of the residents whose houses were destroyed reported that they had received construction materials to rebuild their homes. Sixty percent of them (about 50,000 people) reported that they were in the midst of the renovations. Since the beginning of 2015, about 33,000 trucks have passed through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, carrying more than 990,000 tons of equipment: About 440 trucks a day compared to 255 a day last year. In April, the number reached an average of 523 trucks a day.

The first quarter of 2015 recorded 40,000 entries into Israel through the Erez Crossing, half of them by merchants. As of this year, Israel is allowing Hamas to export agricultural produce to the West Bank, abroad and to Israel as well, using the excuse of a shmita year. And today they are talking again about the possibility of laborers from Gaza working in the Gaza vicinity and bringing work from Israeli factories to the light industry in Gaza.

It will be no surprise if the next rocket from Gaza is launched by someone opposing the Israeli-Hamas dialogue. It might even be someone close to the PA."

Ends…

 

NOW IT'S BIBI'S TURN: Writing in Haaretz, Eric Yoffie comments on Elliott Abrams' admission that settlements do indeed make it harder for Israel to reach a two-state solution.

"A prominent right-wing American Jew has finally admitted that Israel's settlement policies are putting an end to the possibility of a two-state solution, and harming ties with the United States along the way.

Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, served in the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations. A seasoned diplomat and a thoughtful man, Mr. Abrams has been arguing for years that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been building settlements mostly in the major settlement blocs, while severely constraining settlement growth beyond them. Since the blocs are likely to remain part of Israel in any future peace agreement, Abrams has insisted, Netanyahu’s settlement construction does not jeopardize the possibility of a two-state solution. Abrams has gone so far as to attack Obama administration officials for 'knee-jerk condemnations' of Netanyahu over his settlement policies.

But now, in an article for Foreign Affairs that he co-wrote with Uri Sadot, Abrams is going back on his words. After admitting that it is 'remarkably difficult to discern what is going on outside the blocs,' Abrams states that according to his most recent calculations, there were 73,000 settlers living outside the security fence in 2009 and 93,000 in 2015. If the new Netanyahu government continues to settle at this rate, there will be 115,000 settlers outside the blocs by the end of the government’s term.

The implications of this growth, Abrams writes, is that it will be exceedingly difficult and costly to make a two-state solution happen under these circumstances. Yet, even while pointing out the problems, it should be noted, Abrams still did not bring himself to call on Netanyahu to freeze settlement construction. Instead, he offered a bizarre proposal that some Jews remain as 'resident aliens' of a future Palestinian state, while acknowledging that implementing such a plan would be immensely problematic.

Abrams’ about-face demonstrates the fallacy of the right-wing argument, frequently heard both in Israel and the United States, that settlement activity is simply not a problem. During Netanyahu’s tenure, the right-wingers say, the settlements haven't expanded that rapidly, and, in any case, those that are being built are located in areas that will remain part of Israel under the terms of any eventual peace treaty. But, as Abrams admits, neither of these propositions is true.

The question that emerges from Abram’s lengthy article is why he sees the settlement question as especially important now. Abrams keeps coming back to settlements, I suggest, because he senses something that he never directly states: common values are what bind America to Israel even more than strategic interests. And when settlement policy runs amuck, destroying the possibility of a two-state solution and assuring endless occupation, it threatens the alliance with America on which Israel’s existence depends. And all of this is true even if a two-state solution is not possible in the foreseeable future.

Israel, confronting an intractable Palestinian foe, need not deliver a peace agreement, but she does need to keep the option of such an agreement alive by limiting her settlement activity. Abrams knows this, and thus desperately contends that Netanyahu remain open to two states, even while the thrust of Abrams' own argument suggests exactly the opposite.

While Abrams offers little reason for hope, it would be a mistake to despair. Among American Jews, there are some reasonable voices promoting moderation, sanity and good sense on these questions. The Israel Policy Forum, for example, has just issued a Statement of Principles that is impressive and centrist. It argues for a two-state approach that could unite American Jews and win support from both major political parties.

Israel's commitment to a two-state solution has implications for the crisis over Iran, too. The United States is promoting a profoundly problematic deal with Iran, but in any conceivable scenario, the grave security threats posed by Iran — and Hizbollah — will require direct military and political support from America over the long-term. The best way for Israel to assure such support is to stop building outside the settlement blocs, demonstrate a commitment to the two-state solution, and offer support for American efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

I, for one, have not given up completely on the possibility that Netanyahu will surprise us. Elliott Abrams, after all, is a man of the right, and as good a friend as Netanyahu has in America’s political/scholarly establishment. Abrams dances around and pulls his punches, but his message comes through nonetheless.

It's now Netanyahu's turn to recognize the problem of settlements and come up with a plan that keeps the two-state option on the table. Perhaps, just perhaps, given the urgency of the matter and the sympathetic source, this time the prime minister will decide to listen."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

100th ANNIVERSARY OF 1915 EVENTS/ARMENIAN GENOCIDE CLAIMS:  Emrah Altundis believes it is Turkey’s moral duty to acknowledge today’s 100th anniversary of the 1915 events and Armenian Genocide claims in centre-left Radikal: “Other than a handful of appointed/nationalist historians who receive their salaries from the Republic of Turkey, there is almost no social scientist in the world who does not define what happened in April 1915 as a genocide. Unless Turkish society faces up to the cruelty of 1915, we cannot move forward. Confronting all the massacres, including the genocide, and asking for justice, is our humane duty and an ethical necessity.”

Mehmet Tezkan wonders how Turkey will react to Russian President Putin’s stance in centrist Milliyet: “U.S. President Obama who attaches significance to relations with Ankara, once again refrained from using the word genocide and preferred to say ‘great calamity’. But Russian President Putin did not attach any significance to relations with Ankara and said ‘genocide’. He said there could be no excuse for massacres committed based on ethnic identity. Will [Turkey’s] reaction against the Pope be directed at Putin as well? Will the warning sent to the European Parliament ‘not to exceed its limits’ be sent to Putin as well?”

Nuray Mert seeks to shed the ghosts of the past in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: “For long, and in order not to face the 1915 Armenian slaughter, Turkey has been using the excuse that this is a Western demand. This year, on the 100th anniversary of this shameful incident, conservatives, seculars, Islamists and Kemalists have joined hands in revolt against the Papacy and the EU Parliaments’ ‘genocide’ statements. Commemorating the First World War Gallipoli victory on the same day as the Armenian commemorations is a cheap trick. But there is something we should understand: In order to walk towards the future in a healthy manner, one needs to get rid of the ghosts of the past.”

Sevgi Akarcesme calls for a meaningful gesture in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: “Every year, April 24th looms in Turkey’s foreign affairs and before its society as a nightmare. But this does not alter the fact that the [Armenian] deportations, i.e. the forced migration, actually sent people to their death. That is why the best definition is the ‘Armenian Slaughter' as it is called in Anatolia. Acknowledging humanitarian suffering, apologizing, and making some meaningful gesture would decrease the pressure on Turkey. A permanent state of denial only fuels the attempt to describe the events as genocide in foreign parliaments.”

Hasan Cemal feels the Armenians’ pain on independent Internet newspaper T24: “Unless one is ready to face the past, pain does not stop pursuing a human being. Getting rid of the ‘fear of history’ and liberating captive minds, entails walking down the path towards peace and democracy; opening the doors to live in peace with all our differences. These words will not please those, including President Erdogan, who have become so insensitive that they say the Armenians will be talking to themselves on April 24th on a day when a deep pain is being commemorated, shared and felt. I am ignoring such people.”

Sibel Eraslan argues in favor of an offer of condolences in centre-right, pro-government Star: “We have spent the last 100 years destroying ourselves with planned enmities. 100 years ago, some 800 thousand Armenians lost their lives in six months. Rather than arguing over how to describe this, we should first be aware that it remains a terrible pain. This state of mourning is not ending or disappearing because no condolence has been offered yet.”

Ozlem Albayrak is unconvinced by the genocide claim in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: “Although I believe that we should not defend the sins of the Ottoman Unionist Party, I also do not believe that the Armenian deportation decision taken by them was not meant as a genocide. I believe that these questions call for an answer: ‘if the aim was genocide, why were the Armenians not killed wherever they were, but forced to migrate?' or ‘if what happened was a genocide, why were Armenians other than those in East Anatolia not forced to migrate and massacred?'”

Ufuk Ulutas suggests that the genocide claims are being exploited for political purposes in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: “The Armenian issue has turned into an industry where money is spent, lobbying companies hang around, MPs of foreign parliaments gather money for their political campaigns, and some countries do not stop holding over Turkey as the Sword of Damocles. Turkey and Armenia are both being damaged by this. If so much effort and money had been spent, not for the political exploitation of historical incidents, but in order to find a new discourse, we could now be somewhere very different.”

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Spillover effects

2-Stalemate and appeasement

3-No time for UN resolutions

 

1-Spillover effects

 

Those who claim that [Decisive] Storm achieved its aims and ended in a ‘glorious’ Saudi victory suggest that the Kingdom should now seek a similar victory in the Syrian crisis. And those who claim that the Storm failed to achieve any of its main objectives, and that it was no more than a ‘painful disappointment’ for Saudi Arabia in its first military test, equally believe that Riyadh is now likely to try to secure gains in Syria that would ‘compensate’ for its defeat in Yemen.  In short, analysts with varying biases believe it likely that there will be an escalation on the numerous war fronts from Syria’s north to its south, east, and west--‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

[Iranian President] Rowhani’s boast that his forces are raising Iran’s flag from the Arab Gulf (and it shall remain Arab whether Rowhani wishes so or not) to the Gulf of Aden, and from the Sea of Oman to the Mediterranean, amounts to an admission of Iran’s expansionist schemes. But what he fails to acknowledge is the fact that Decisive Storm has totally crushed these schemes and toppled Iran’s flags in the Gulf of Aden. As for the Mediterranean, the Syrian regime and Hizbollah will not last for long. The winds of righteousness will blow them away sooner or later, and Iran’s banners there will also fall--Saudi al-Watan

 

The confrontation in Yemen is now very likely to spill over into other areas where proxy wars are being fought between Saudi Arabia and its allies on the one hand, and Iran and its allies on the other, predicts a leading Jordanian commentator. Syria is now likely to be the arena for the most intensive such confrontations. Iran’s and its allies’ forces will soon be expelled from Syria and the shores of Mediterranean, as they have been from Yemen and the Gulf of Aden, exclaims the editorial in a Saudi daily.

 

SHARP VERBAL EXCHANGE: “The sharp verbal exchange between Syrian Ambassador Bashar al-Ja’fari and Saudi Ambassador ‘Abdullah Mualimi at the UN in New York points to the future course of Syrian developments just hours after the end of the Saudi Operation Decisive Storm,” notes ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Friday’s Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Al-Mualimi hinted that the Storm’s ‘decisiveness’ will now be extended to deal with the Syrian crisis, and al-Ja’fari responded by threatening to ‘cut off’ any hand that dares touch his country.

All this coincided with assessments and speculations that the Syrian crisis, that has recently experienced a notable escalation in the pace of military confrontations on more than one front, is likely to witness further escalation in the coming days always against the background of the unfolding events in Yemen. This is regardless of the differing assessments of the results of Operation Decisive Storm.

Those who claim that the Storm achieved its aims and ended in a ‘glorious’ Saudi victory suggest that the Kingdom should now seek a similar victory in the Syrian crisis. And those who claim that the Storm failed to achieve any of its main objectives, and that it was no more than a ‘painful disappointment’ for Saudi Arabia in its first military test, equally believe that Riyadh is now likely to try to secure gains in Syria that would ‘compensate’ for its defeat in Yemen.  In short, analysts with varying biases believe it likely that there will be an escalation on the numerous war fronts from Syria’s north to its south, east, and west.

For our part, we, who were taken by surprise by the decision to end the Storm before it had achieved any of its main declared aims, believe that Operation Decisive Storm may have ended but that the war in and on Yemen has yet to come to an end. The ground battles between the two Yemeni camps have become more intense, and the Saudi air force has carried out a number of air strikes in support of the Kingdom’s supporters and allies. Reports speak of a change in the tools, means, and tactics of the war, while all parties have placed their forces on maximum alert and battle readiness.

According to numerous sources, Aden in particular, but perhaps the cities of south Yemen in general, will be the next target of the forces being raised from President Hadi’s supporters and the loyal and salafi tribal forces and military ‘brigades’ of various schools, as well as some elements of the Southern Action Movement, aimed at expelling the Houthis and Saleh’s supporters from these cities. The air support for the Storm’s allies on the ground two days ago represents a model that is likely to be repeated in the coming days and weeks.

Since the Storm has settled without any political agreement to resolve the Yemeni crisis, the various parties are expected to engage in successive waves of armed clashes in an attempt to adjust the balance of forces on the ground and impose the ‘appropriate conditions’ for reaching a final deal.  The Houthis and their supporters will try to capitalize on the gains they have achieved on the ground since September 2014, while their enemies will fight till the end to regain some of the cities and provinces that have fallen into the Houthis’ hands, at least in order to enter negotiations from a position of parity, not on the basis of victor and vanquished.

In Yemen, we shall witness the intensive deployment of monies to buy loyalties and consciences and organize defections. We shall witness ‘qualitative’ aerial operations in support of allies. We shall witness an intensive psychological war intended to break the will of the ‘leader’ Saleh’s people and rupture his alliance with the Houthis. And we may witness systematic assassinations, bombings, and attacks that proceed in tandem with the effort to repair the dialogue table under international sponsorship and intensive international pressure.

And because the war in and on Yemen has spilt over into the region and beyond the country’s borders, the notion of ‘linkage’ will once again leave its harmful imprint on the other crises in the region. So until further notice, no accord president will be elected in Lebanon. Syria will be the open address for the effects and repercussions of this theory. But the effects on Iraq will remain minimal because the U.S. leads the anti-terrorism international coalition there, and because of its close cooperation with the Iraqi government.

The first effects of the ‘Yemeni developments’ on the Syrian crisis have already begun to appear in the Syrian northeast and the southern Syrian provinces. The Nusra Front, the [Islamist jihadist] Jayshul al-Fateh, together with a mix of various other factions, all backed in terms of logistics, armament, and intelligence by the Arab and regional parties that are allied in Yemen, have succeeded in creating a breach on the Idlib front. They have taken control of the city of Idlib and are in the process of expanding their ‘emirate’ into the city’s countryside.

In the southern provinces, the Syrian army and its allies are facing a difficult situation confronting an assortment of forces led by the Nusra Front, especially in light of confirmed reports that these groups have received new weapons and anti-tank missiles. The Eastern Ghouta front together with Yarmouk [Palestinian refugee] Camp and the Jawbar neighborhood, are back in the headlines. Meanwhile, Turkey is witnessing intensive activity on the part of the leaders of the armed opposition factions in an attempt to coordinate their efforts and operations. And Ankara has resumed its calls for a ground intervention and air cover, simultaneously with renewed talk of ‘humanitarian buffer zones’ along Syria’s borders with its neighboring countries.

“We are thus facing a new wave in which the confrontation will be ‘heated up’ in the ongoing proxy wars stretching from Yemen to Syria. What is certain is that the recent clash between ambassadors Mualimi and Ja’fari will be repeated many times in the coming days and weeks,” concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

STARK FALSIFICATION: “Iranian President Hassan Rowhani’s statements on Iranian Armed Forces Day can only be described as stark falsifications, a futile refusal to admit the facts, and an attempt to mislead the Iranians and raise their morale based on nothing,” writes the editorial in Friday’s Saudi daily al-Watan.

Rowhani said his country’s army is a model for the region’s armies, as if a model based on Tehran’s criteria is that of an army that undermines the region’s security, intervenes in the affairs of neighboring countries, and sends its Revolutionary Guard to spread ruin in them. He forgot to say that it does no honor to the region’s armies to emulate his army, because they are built to uphold what is right, not to defend and support what is wrong, as in the case of Iran’s army.  And Operation Decisive Storm is but the strongest message from the loyal and clean armies of the region that refuse to sully their principles and that represent the best model for any peace-loving army that bolsters stability.

The Iranian president should know that the region’s armies, that have pounded the snake-pits of Tehran’s lackeys – the Houthis and the followers of deposed president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh – are today famous for their glory around the world. The entire Arab nation sings their praises, their Arab chivalry, and their heroism that has crushed Persian schemes and totally annihilated them in Yemen.

Rowhani should also know that his call to be inspired by the lessons of the Iranian army is cause for mockery and pity. An army that teaches lessons must be one that works in the service of humanity and peace for nations. Saudi Arabia’s army and those taking part in Operation Decisive Storm represent the true model of armies that teach lessons to those who wish to consolidate the legitimacy on which there is a popular consensus.

Iran’s army can never be a model, this army that is acting against legitimacy in Yemen, arming and defending the gangs of agents of Tehran, sending its members to crush the people of Iraq for sectarian purposes, and killing Syria’s civilians and deeming them to be terrorists merely because they dared to say ‘No’ to a bloody regime that takes its orders from Iran’s ruling jurisprudent.

Rowhani’s boast that his forces are raising Iran’s flag from the Arab Gulf (and it shall remain Arab whether Rowhani wishes so or not) to the Gulf of Aden, and from the Sea of Oman to the Mediterranean, amounts to an admission of Iran’s expansionist schemes. But what he fails to acknowledge is the fact that Decisive Storm has totally crushed these schemes and toppled Iran’s flags in the Gulf of Aden.

“As for the Mediterranean, the Syrian regime and Hizbollah will not last for long. The winds of righteousness will blow them away sooner or later, and Iran’s banners there will also fall,” concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-Stalemate and appeasement

 

Contrary to what everyone has been claiming, the [Yemen] war has not had any truly decisive results in the interest of any one party. It has not produced any immediate and tangible military results. However, it has sent an angry message and degraded a significant part of the Houthis’ capabilities. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has not declared a total end to the military campaign, only a change in its course and aims. On the other hand, the Houthis have failed to impose their total control over Yemen, and have not destroyed their enemies. At the same time, they have not been defeated and have not retreated--Mohammad Abu-Rumman in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

It is difficult for us, and others as well, to imagine stability in Yemen or a political or military resolution of its crises without appeasing [former president Saleh] in one way or another, or without getting rid of him and his legacy. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the Saudis (the Saudi government, that is) are biting their fingers in regret for having lost a valuable opportunity and allowing him to return to Sana’a after his medical treatment was complete. They ignored him, marginalized him completely, and failed to assess how dangerous he can be or the cards he holds and can deploy with amazing adeptness. It may be possible to appease president Saleh by granting his son Ahmad a role in any future arrangements for ruling Yemen... On the other hand, getting rid of him is even more difficult; he is part of an extremely complex political, tribal, and military system, as in the case of the entire Yemeni situation--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Riyadh’s war in Yemen did not succeed in roundly defeating the Houthis, but the latter have not succeeded in fully eliminating their opponents either, argues a Jordanian commentator. The result is an unstable stalemate. Events have proven that there can be no solution for the Yemeni crisis without appeasing former president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, argues the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. But it is not clear what exactly would appease him.

 

MILLION-DOLLAR QUESTION: “The one-million-dollar question concerns the sudden Saudi decision to bring Operation Decisive Storm to an end and move on to a new phase, whereas previous moves had suggested a ground war, Special Forces, and numerous other scenarios,” writes Mohammad Abu-Rumman in Friday’s Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

Did ‘back-channel’ negotiations succeed in finding a specific formula for a political solution? And what could it be? To which local or regional party does it give the upper hand? And will Saudi public opinion be convinced by this result, after becoming emotionally involved and rallying behind the Saudi leadership’s decision to declare war in a manner unprecedented in recent decades? This offered an important card to the Saudi leadership, especially the third generation of Saudi leaders (Prince Mohammad bin Nayif, and Prince Mohammad bin Salman.)

We will not have to wait long to find the answers to these questions. We are confronting a burning issue whose results are already becoming apparent. The leaks, especially from the Western and American media will soon emerge. However, it is already possible to offer numerous observations that may be useful in clarifying what lies ahead:

- First, the results of Operation Decisive Storm fell far short of the Saudis and their Arab allies’ ceiling of expectations. Weakening the Houthis does not count as a real achievement. The Yemenis allied to Saudi Arabia now find themselves suspended in mid-air, waiting for the political results, while the Houthis’ statements and the balance of power on the ground so far do not serve the fundamental Saudi goal of restoring ‘legitimacy’ and the elected president [Hadi] to power, or cutting the Houthis down to size, or excluding [former president] Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, his children, and his camp from any future political arrangements.

On the contrary, the preliminary results and indications support the claim that the Houthis (in other words, Iran) have become the main ‘difficult element’ in the Yemeni equation, and that Saudi Arabia has failed to prevent ‘another Hizbollah’ from emerging along its southern borders. The Houthis today are both a political and military force, and they will have a crucial say in determining Yemen’s future political choice.

- Second, a huge ‘wound’ that has so far been unpublicized is soon likely to appear between Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies in particular. For despite the formation of an Arab/Islamic/Sunni coalition to confront Iranian expansion, internal Arab disagreements have begun to rise to the surface. Jordan saw this war as a diversion from the strategy it deems to be its priority, that of confronting ISIS. The UAE feared that these latest Saudi moves would eventually roll back its [hostile] stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood and its support for the Arab counter-revolution. As for Sissi’s Egypt, it is not known for its strategic, frank, and clear attitude to any of these files and disagreements.

More important than all this is that the awaited support from Pakistan and Turkey, specifically, for a ground intervention, did not materialize. Pakistan hid behind its parliament’s decision. As for Turkey, its special circumstances do not allow it to engage in such military adventures. And the involvement of Egyptian ground forces would have been enormously costly financially without guaranteed results. As for the Saudi army, it is simply not prepared for such complex and difficult wars.

These soft ‘splits’ in the Saudi-led coalition have confronted the new [Saudi] leadership with a genuine ‘problem’ and a difficult dilemma. It is the party that began the war and took the decision to initiate it, and it had clear and fully comprehensible justifications for doing so. But both its military and political wagers on pursuing this war or ending it are subject to much doubt, especially after disagreements began to rise to the surface.

- Third, contrary to what everyone has been claiming, the war has not had any truly decisive results in the interest of any one party. It has not produced any immediate and tangible military results. However, it has sent an angry message and degraded a significant part of the Houthis’ capabilities. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has not declared a total end to the military campaign, only a change in its course and aims.

“On the other hand, the Houthis have failed to impose their total control over Yemen, and have not destroyed their enemies. At the same time, they have not been defeated and have not retreated,” concludes Abu-Rumman.

End…

 

UNRESOLVED FATE: “The fate of former Yemeni president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh remains unresolved,” writes the editorial in Friday’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Some say he left Sana’a together with all his family aboard an Omani plane to Muscat. Others insist that he has accepted an Omani initiative one of whose most important clauses is that he should leave Yemen and undertake not to play any future political role there – in other words, totally refrain from any political activity – in return for President Hadi’s Deputy PM Khaled Bahah becoming president as a compromise solution.

Such speculation regarding the former president’s fate may be just one chapter of the intense ongoing psychological warfare currently being waged by [pro-Saudi] Decisive Storm media circles. But if this is so, it means that the man is still a major player in the Yemeni crisis.

Reports that president Saleh has fled to Muscat have not been confirmed, just as repeated claims by Yemeni Foreign Minister Riad Yassin, currently residing in Riyadh, that Saleh left for Moscow three years ago aboard a Russian airplane carrying Russian subjects have proven to be false. What Saleh has written on his Facebook page – i.e. that no power on earth will force him to leave Yemen – disproves these claims.

Saleh, against whom millions of Yemenis marched in order to topple his regime accusing him of corruption and dictatorship, remains a difficult element in the Yemeni equation both in times of peace and of war, despite the international resolutions criminalizing him and the travel bans on him, his eldest son Ahmad, the leader of Ansarullah ‘Abdelmalik al-Houthi, and others.

Saleh is like ‘a cat with seven lives,’ to invoke the popular Arab saying. He has survived wars and crises. He, together with his regime, managed to survive the 1994 war of [Southern Yemeni] secession, as well as many subsequent coup attempts. He managed to remain alive after the bombing of the presidential mosque at the height of the popular uprising in 2011 that demanded his departure. He actually left for Saudi Arabia to receive medical treatment when his life was in extreme danger, only to return on the back of the 2011 Gulf initiative that provided him with judicial immunity, only to resume his schemes seeking revenge against his opponents, one after the other.

Foremost among them are the Islamic Islah Party, the sons of Sheikh ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar the party’s founding leader, his cousin Mohsen al-Ahmar who rebelled against his rule and joined the revolution together with many officers and men, and finally Saudi Arabia which provided him with shelter and treatment, and guaranteed his safe return to his home in Sana’a, sound, and immune from any trial, fair or unfair.

The biggest mistake committed by the Gulf states, and primarily by Saudi Arabia, was to misjudge this man’s power, cunning, the cards in his possession, ‘pragmatism,’ even his political ‘opportunism’ which enables him to alter his position if necessary in order to survive and try again, once the dust settles.

Former president Saleh allied himself to the Houthis, whom he fought six times without defeating them, even though he prevented them from expanding – contrary to his successor President Hadi. This may be the final card in his hands, but until these words were written, it was a winning card not only because it restored him to the circle of decision-making, but because it provided him with a powerful tool to haggle over his own and Yemen’s fate, and over Yemen’s political and economic future, and its relations with its neighboring countries.

It is difficult for us, and others as well, to imagine stability in Yemen or a political or military resolution of its crises without appeasing this man in one way or another, or without getting rid of him and his legacy. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the Saudis (the Saudi government, that is) are biting their fingers in regret for having lost a valuable opportunity and allowing him to return to Sana’a after his medical treatment was complete. They ignored him, marginalized him completely, and failed to assess how dangerous he can be or the cards he holds and can deploy with amazing adeptness.

It may be possible to appease president Saleh by granting his son Ahmad a role in any future arrangements for ruling Yemen. This will be difficult after Operation Decisive Storm and the desire for revenge on which it is focusing and that has come to determine much of its course. On the other hand, getting rid of him is even more difficult; he is part of an extremely complex political, tribal, and military system, as in the case of the entire Yemeni situation. In addition, 2500 [Saudi-led] aerial sorties backed by American monitoring and intelligence reports have failed to achieve this goal.

A source close to UN envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar, who recently resigned his post, summarized the entire situation in a communication with raialyoum saying: ‘It is impossible to solve Yemen’s problem without solving president Saleh’s problem.’ When we asked what president Saleh’s problem was from his point of view, he said: ‘To rule’; and he repeated this three times without providing any other details.

We do not believe that president Saleh wants to return to power, because this seems impossible. Much water has run under this particular bridge. He may wish to become a ‘king-maker.’ But which king does he want to make? Is it ‘Abdelmalik al-Houthi, or is it Ahmad Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, or is it compromise candidate Khaled Bahah?

“The coming days and developments of Operation Decisive Storm or its offspring Operation Restore Hope, and the Omani initiative – assuming it exists – may together or separately provide an answer to these questions,” concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-No time for UN resolutions

 

The New Zealand initiative to pass a new UN Security Council resolution on Palestine will only add to the pile of previous ignored resolutions: what is required instead is international action to end the occupation, says today’s Palestinian al-Quds

 

The New Zealand initiative to pass a new UN Security Council resolution intended to re-launch Palestinian/Israeli peace talks will be futile in light of the peace process’s official death after Israeli PM Netanyahu’s rejection of the two-state solution, cautions the editorial in a Palestinian daily. There is no point adopting yet another Security Council resolution on the Palestinian cause that will join many other such resolutions that are gathering dust on the UN’s shelves. The international community should act collectively and separately to end Israel’s 48-year-old occupation instead.

 

COORDINATED UN MOVE: “Reports a few days ago spoke of a draft Security Council resolution being prepared by New Zealand in order to ‘re-launch the peace process’ between the Palestinians and the Israelis, in coordination with Jordan, the Arab bloc in the UN and France,” writes editorial in Friday’s semi-official Palestinian daily al-Quds.

These reports raise a number of logical questions, not regarding the initiative itself, but regarding its content, effectiveness, and its prospects of success.

To begin with, draft resolutions as well as resolutions that the UN has actually adopted ever since the Israeli occupation in 1967 up to the present already crowd the UN’s shelves. The new resolution, even if adopted, and even if it escapes an American veto, European dithering, and the loyalties of some states that have been stripped of their political will and blindly follow the West’s desires, will surely find its place among the thousands of similar resolutions that have accumulated dust for years, suffering from disregard and indifference as time goes by.

There already are international terms of reference for dealing with the continuing occupation and settlement activities in defiance of the international community’s will. The issue is not one of more documents and texts that denounce settlements and call for an end to occupation – even though such new resolutions are neither likely nor possible in light of the current international balance of power.

The Security Council has turned down resolutions – or, rather, the U.S. has repeatedly used its veto against them –that were mere reiterations of previous resolutions that the Council itself adopted years ago. That, itself, is a notable irony in the history of the Security Council and that of the UN in general.

The neutralization of the mechanisms used by the international community to deal with the Palestinian cause is the product of the protective political umbrella that Israel enjoys in international forums provided by the successive American administrations. But it does not absolve the various international blocs, as well as individual states, from their legal and humanitarian duties and responsibilities towards the Palestinian people and the question of justice in global terms.

The international blocs and individual states must work together to secure our people’s right to freedom, national sovereignty, and self-determination. Colonialism in the rest of the world has come to an end, but Palestine alone continues to suffer from the longest occupation in history, while its people are threatened by settlement activities that are uprooting them from their land and replacing them with settlers; activities that have been continuing for the past forty-eight years.

For those who do not remember or do not wish to remember, the peace process was launched in the late 1980s, after the path towards it was paved via moves and initiatives that occurred a decade before. This means that it is now around a quarter-of-a-century old, which sets a record for peace processes throughout history, but without bearing any fruit other than desperation and frustration for the Palestinians, and lack of faith in the future of a process that has been teetering on the edge from the start. This is because the Israeli side did not take it seriously; but dealt with it instead as an opportunity to gain time and implement successive settlement schemes.

But the question now is this: Has this process come to an official and final end after Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu has publicly rejected the two-state solution which lies at the heart of the so-called peace process? If so, what is the point of re-launching a process that has effectively ended, and no longer has any tangible presence in reality?

What we now need are steps from individual states as well as regional and international blocs that would exert pressure to end the occupation and settlement activities. The time is long past for resolutions that Israel rejects and that the UN preserves in drawers filled with the dust of disregard and forgetfulness.

It is certain that many states have mechanisms they can resort to if they have the will, moral sense, and humanity to influence Israel and force it to withdraw its army and settlements from the lands of the occupied Palestinian state.

“This will bring peace and stability to this area of the world in an effective manner, and not via resolutions that, with the passage of time, represent nothing but a storm in a teacup or a fading ink stain on papers filled with the dust of forgetfulness,” concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 24.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Code Red

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Friday editions with the rocket that was fired from the Gaza Strip yesterday evening – the fourth such incident since the end of Operation Protective Edge last summer. Israel was still celebrating the 67th anniversary of its founding when the Code Red missile alarm system sounded in the western Negev for the first time since December. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, the rocket exploded in an open area in the Sha'ar Hanegev region. No one was hurt and no damage was caused.

In response, the IDF overnight struck the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas sources said IDF tanks fired two shells at a training camp in the Beit Hanun area. An IDF statement confirmed the retaliatory attack, saying that it had targeted 'terrorist infrastructure' in the north of the Strip. A spokesman for Gaza's emergency services said nobody was wounded.

According to Haaretz, Israeli defense establishment sources believe that the rocket was fired by a rogue faction in Gaza. This is backed up by a report from Channel 10 News, which reported that Hamas has intimated to Israel that it was not responsible for Thursday evening’s rocket attack and that it is working to find and arrest the shooters. A senior security official said, however, that Israel holds Hamas responsible for the attack. 'We see Hamas as responsible, and expect it to enforce order in Gaza. Hamas is the ruling power in the region and it must maintain quiet; if not it will be held responsible. We will not accept a trickling of rocket fire,' the official said and added that Israel will not tolerate a drizzle of rockets on its territory.

In the wake of the rocket fire, it was decided that the Erez border crossing would remain closed on Friday. Hamas ordered the complete evacuation of its headquarters, training centers and public offices in the Gaza Strip, according to a report in Israel Hayom.

Housing Minister Uri Ariel called on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to respond forcefully to the rocket attack, 'so that the event does not again turn into a series of drizzles that will upset the routine and security of residents of the South.' MK Miri Regev welcomed the Israeli response to the incident, saying that, 'The message is loud and clear that any shooting aimed at Israel will be answered with even a more painful response to Hamas. We will not permit Hamas to raise its head.'

According to Brig. Gen. (res.) Zvika Fogel, Hamas is definitively preparing for another war against Israel. 'Rocket production continues,' Fogel, a former head of the IDF's Southern Command, told Army Radio. He predicted another war by 'the end of 2015 or early 2016.' Part of the problem, he indicated, is that Hamas is purposely neglecting its Palestinian Arab population, goading them into painting Israel as an even bigger scapegoat for their poverty and poor governance. 'The population in the Gaza Strip since Operation Protective Edge has been neglected, and pressure on Hamas is growing,' he noted.

Meanwhile, Air Force Commander Major General Amir Eshel sent an unequivocal threat to Hizbollah making it clear that the IDF is prepared for a military strike – if the need arise. 'We do not deal in theories, we are a pragmatic organization, and we need to produce relevant, practical tools. I have been saying for years, since they have started their actions, and we have refined and updated our weapons,' Eshel said referring to the military options.

In other news, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden announced that the United States will deliver new F-35 fighter jets to Israel next year to help its ally maintain its military edge in the Middle East. Speaking at an Israel Independence Day celebration organized by the Israeli embassy in Washington, Biden described the aircraft as 'our finest, making Israel the only country in the Middle East to have this fifth-generation aircraft.' Biden vowed that the United States would make sure Israel maintains its 'qualitative edge.'

Israel's Defense Ministry announced in mid-February that it had signed a deal with the United States to purchase 14 more F-35 planes for the Israel Air Force at $110 million dollars each. The deal is considered the continuation of a purchase agreement signed in 2010, when it was decided that 19 F-35 planes would be transferred to the Israel Defense Forces. The first two planes are scheduled to land in Israel by the end of next year. The rest of the aircraft are expected to arrive by 2021. Biden also defended the Iran nuclear deal being worked out between Tehran and six world powers, saying it is based on 'hard-hitting, hard-headed compromises and assessments.'

In political news, finally, the Likud will resume its coalition-building efforts today, with 12 days left for the prime minister to present his new government to President Reuven Rivlin. According to Israel Radio, representatives of Netanyahu's party will meet with members of Shas – which is at loggerheads with Habayit Hayehudi over the religious affairs portfolio. Neither party has responded yet to a Likud proposal to appoint a religious affairs minister from Shas, and a deputy minister from the Jewish Home party. The Likud is set to renew talks with Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu on Sunday. Netanyahu is also scheduled to meet Friday with Yisrael Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman and, according to one report, with Habayit Hayehudi chairman Naftali Bennett.

 

 

SIXTY-SEVEN: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Yoaz Hendel explains why he would prefer Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to establish a broad unity government, rather than a right-wing coalition with the ultra-Orthodox parties.

"The most important number at the moment in Israeli politics is 67.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is on his way to form a coalition with 67 members: a right-wing government, with ultra-Orthodox parties and with Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party. This – according to one former American official who was my guest over the Independence Day festivities – is a surefire recipe for disaster. My guest is also worried about the '67 borders. I, however, am more concerned about the diplomatic dilemma that Israel is facing.

Let's start with a conclusion: I am in favor of a national unity government. Why? Because of people like my guest. Because of the Europeans and the Obama Administration. Because of Jimmy Carter.

And now the explanation. We have made two major mistakes here over the past 20 years. The first was the recognition of the two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders. There is nothing holy about those pre-war lines. Zionism is Jewish sovereignty over the land – as much land as possible with as few Palestinians are possible. This was the assumption that Yigal Allon reached in 1967. He drew a map with separation lines that granted the Palestinians independence under Jordanian auspices, while Israel had other areas that were of greater strategic importance. According to Allon, Israel was supposed to annex the Jordan Valley in order to create an eastern border for the Jewish state, as well as some of the historic parts of the West Bank; Jerusalem was to be the capital. That was the last time that anyone on the Israeli side came up with a realistic plan, but Allon disappeared from the map and so did his plan.

This leads us to the second mistake: the faith in the status quo and the belief that we don't need to do anything to make things work. The first change came with Menachem Begin at Camp David, when he promised to give the Palestinians autonomy. After that, in 1991, there was the Madrid Conference. That was the first time that Shamir and Binyamin Netanyahu (who was deputy foreign minister at the time) spoke to representatives of the Palestinian people about a peace accord. Two years later, the Oslo Accords were signed and the Palestinian Authority was formed.

All those who protested the Oslo Accords – myself included – were, it seems, right to urge the government not to give the Palestinians weapons. Arafat and his people were armed and we got another intifada. 40 percent of Judea and Samaria was handed over to the Palestinian Authority. The Land of Israel was whole no more – apart from in election campaign slogans. Netanyahu completed the deal by handing over Hebron. A demilitarized Palestinian state was established in everything but name. A state with no Jewish residents. That last change came a decade ago with the disengagement and the subsequent status quo.

Jerusalem is the best example of this. For the past 18 months, there has been a de facto construction freeze in the capital, on the orders of the Netanyahu-led government that also includes Naftali Bennett and Uri Ariel. Since the government collapsed, we cannot even blame Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid for the freeze, yet the freeze is absolute. Last week, the government secretariat issued an order to cancel a tender for 1,000 housing units in the Har Homa neighborhood. This week, for political reasons, work on apartments in the Ramot neighborhood was put on hold. Both of those neighborhoods are very much within the Israeli national consensus. Every Israeli government – left and right alike – has built there. I cannot think of any other capital city in the world where apartments cannot be expanded because of international pressure.

It's Jerusalem Day soon and our politicians will no doubt speak at length about the unity of the city. In practice, however, they are dividing it. The Palestinian Authority is already present in some eastern parts of the city. There are some neighborhoods that Israelis simply cannot enter. The status quo is no more.

My guest is an intelligent man; he's a Jew who supports the State of Israel. His nightmare vision worried me, but it does not surprise me. He believes that European pressure will increase, since there is no plan other than the two-state solution and the '67 borders. The Palestinians will continue with their political intifada and, behind the scenes, the Obama Administration will exert its pressure.

My guest's conclusion is that a 67-member government will strengthen the '67 borders. 'If there's chance of a peace accord, as you argue, then you'll have to pull off some kind of political magic,' he told me. There are some on the Israeli left who want to see a right-wing government installed, in the hope that we will pay a heavy price. This is Leninist logic: the worse things get, the better. On the right, there are those who want a right-wing government because they are blind to the potential harm. I am afraid of the snowball effect. Now the cat is out of the bag: I am afraid of recognition of the '67 lines which cannot be implemented, of the BDS movement that will intensify its calls for a boycott of Israel and of international resolutions that will be impossible to overturn. I am afraid that we will lose sovereignty over our capital city while rightist parties are in power – warning us that the left is endangering the future of Jerusalem.

I prefer a unity government in order to create an Israeli initiative that allows us to forget the utopian dream of peace with the Palestinians and to move beyond a status quo that no longer exists. The numbers show that I am in a minority – but there's nothing holy about numbers."

Ends…

 

HERE WE GO AGAIN?: Writing on the Walla! website, Amir Buhbut asks – in light of yesterday's rocket attack from the Gaza Strip – whether a war between Israel and Hamas is imminent.

"Will there be another war between Israel and Hamas this summer? There is no clear answer to this question, but there are several signs that highlight what is happening on Israel's southern front. Gadi Eisenkot sent out a clear message when he decided that his first working visit after taking over as IDF chief of staff would be to the headquarters of the Gaza Division. Darting the course of his visit, Eisenkot asked the commanders there very pertinent and intricate questions. He tried to relay to the officers stationed on the Gaza border that, while the main threat posed to the State of Israel comes from the northern border, where the IDF is in a constant state of readiness against Hizbollah, the most potentially explosive front is Gaza. If that were not enough, Eisenkot paid another visit to the Gaza Division at the start of the Passover holiday, where he spoke again with officers and inspected Hamas facilities from afar. His secondary message to commanders was also crystal clear: I will tell you what your mission is and you will tell me how to carry it out.

Residents of Israeli towns and communities adjacent to the Gaza border don't need Eisenkot to tell them about the tension in the air. In the past few months, they have been hearing the thuds coming from Hamas' new training facilities in the northern Gaza Strip – facilities that were built on the ruins of two Israeli settlements evacuated during the disengagement. Two weeks ago, a bullet accidentally fired during one of Hamas' exercises hit the window of a house in an Israeli community just over the border. By a miracle, no one was hurt. That was just a reminder of how fragile the quiet is.

Hamas armed wing is investing all its resources in rearming and training. The funding for all this comes from Iran. Hamas has made no effort to conceal the extent of the training it is carrying out on land, at sea and in the air. The organization has turned Egyptian airspace in the Sinai into a training ground for its drones, which are capable of delivering bombs, collecting intelligence or merely proving that Hamas has the capability to violate Israeli airspace.

Some of Hamas' recent activity can be seen with the naked eye; some is online, on social networks. So what, then, has Hamas changed? The answer is as simple as it is worrying: the extent of the rocket threat and the daring of its attacks. Last summer, 15 Hamas terrorists could be seen emerging from one of its tunnels. Now, Hamas is training for an operation that would include 30 terrorists carrying out cross-border raids, covered by artillery fire, antitank missiles and machinegun fire – with the whole operation being orchestrated by a dedicated war room. The goal of all this is to carry out a killing spree or to kidnap Israelis and extract a heavy price from Jerusalem. The tunnel capable of allowing motorcycles to infiltrate Israel, which was uncovered toward the end of Operation Protective Edge, was more than a declaration of intent by Hamas. It was a foretaste of a future operation and proved how far Hamas is willing to go. Unlike Hizbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, the threats made by Hamas armed wing have proved that it is capable of taking the fighting to Israel.

In the past, the relationship between Hamas' overseas leadership, its Gaza leadership and its military wing remained relatively stable. After Operation Protective Edge, however, things changed. In the aftermath of that war, the commanders of the armed wing saw their influence grow and they are now challenging the organization's political leaders for ascendancy. Irrespective of whether Mohammed Deif was killed, Marwan Issa has effectively taken over as commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, along with Muhammed Sinwar. They have not been able, however, to recreate the charisma and power of Ahmad Jabari, who was assassinated by Israel on the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense, yet they are already posing a threat to the political leadership of the organization.

As far as Hamas is concerned, the next war against the IDF is just around the corner. And like any other professional organization, Hamas' armed wing has taken measures to become more efficient: it has conducted in-depth probes, poor commanders have been ousted and its offensive strategy has been improved. It is currently busy building long and wide tunnels and no one should be surprised if, during the next war, Hamas terrorists emerge from these tunnels riding on sand buggies. Hamas is also not resting on its laurels when it comes to developing new missiles. In addition to increasing its production of rockets, the organization has recently carried out several test firings of missiles into the sea. Hamas doesn't care that these activities come at the expense of the people of Gaza. After all, military considerations come first. That is why Hamas allows itself to openly build new outposts and headquarters, while countless Gazans remain homeless.

It's worth pointing out that many of Hamas' attacks during Operation Protective Edge failed, but it did record two significant achievements. Its leaders read the situation and, toward the end of the operation, recognized that the Israeli communities closest to the border were Israel's Achilles heel. In addition, and in contrast to the IDF assessment at the time, which opined that Hamas was not interested in war, the organization managed to continue fighting for all 50 days of the operation.

Today, the IDF is speaking very differently. There is less analysis of what Hamas intends to do and more focus on obtaining intelligence about its capabilities. At the same time, Israel is trying to prepare itself for surprises. The defense establishment now believes that, at the current time, Hamas armed wing has absolutely no interest in renewed violence. But there are complex relationships at play within Hamas and between Hamas and the other organizations in the Gaza Strip, as well as with several states in the region. Therefore, it remains impossible to accurately predict how it will act.

Israel's defense establishment is leaving itself plenty of room for maneuver. Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon has ordered the military to expand on the successes of Operation Protective Edge, to continue deterring Hamas from attack and to do everything it can to forestall the next round of fighting, in order to stabilize the region. One example of this is the increased number of trucks carrying produce that Israel allows into Gaza, despite Hamas' efforts to smuggle banned goods. Nonetheless, the process of rebuilding Gaza is progressing at a snail's pace and the huge sum of money pledged has simply not been delivered. On the ground, officers admit that if there is another war in the summer, then Operation Protective Edge will have been a failure.

Preparation and improved strategy are the name of the game. The IDF's Gaza Division has been busy doing just that and the results are already visible. The border fence has been fortified, a secondary barbed-wire fence has been erected to delay any incursion, new technology has been introduced and patrols have been boosted around Israeli farms and communities. The terrifying possibility that, at any moment, dozens of Hamas terrorists could emerge from a tunnel is the main concern of the Gaza Division. That scenario obligates the IDF to alter its thought processes and to improve defensive preparations – as well as more attacking options."

Ends…

 

A MESSAGE FROM HAMAS: Writing on the NRG website, Amir Rapaport comments on last night's rocket attack from the Gaza Strip and says that it should be seen as a message from Hamas to the government of Israel.

"The firing of a rocket at Israel from the Gaza Strip yesterday evening – at the end of Israel's Independence Day celebrations – is a clear message from Hamas: the quiet that residents of southern Israel have enjoyed since the end of Operation Protective Edge is very fragile. In the past few months, the Code Red alarm has sounded several times in the south, but those alarms were caused by Hamas test firing a missile, often into the sea. Last night, however, was the real thing. A rocket was, indeed, fired at Israel. At the time of writing these lines, security forces are still looking for the remnants of the missile that fell.

The rocket was fired a few minutes before 9:00 P.M., exactly at the time that Israel's security chiefs were convening in Tel Aviv for the defense minister's traditional ceremony marking the end of Independence Day festivities. Naturally, they immediately started to discuss the best way to respond. Since Operation Protective Edge, Israel's policy has been to respond to every attack from Gaza. When, for example, a lone rocket was fired on October 20 last year, Israel attacked Hamas structures in Khan Yunis. Despite the risk of escalation, Israel also responded to last night's attack.

In any case, last night's incident will not lead to the start of a fresh round of violence, so it should be seen as a reminder of several basic facts. The first fact is that it is not in Hamas’ interest to spark another confrontation with Israel. Hamas is actively trying to prevent members of other organizations in the Gaza Strip from attacking Israel and has been doing so for the past several months. In one case, a few weeks ago, the IDF inadvertently opened fire and injured one Hamas member who was engaged in such activity.

Despite the fact that, in the short term, Hamas prefers quiet, the fundamental conditions that led to Operation Protective Edge last summer have not changed: Like last summer, Hamas is isolated politically and is facing a severe economic crisis, because of Egypt's energetic efforts to thwart smuggling via the network of underground tunnels between Gaza and the Sinai. In addition, the land crossings are closed most of the time. The Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria is stingy in its transfer of funds to the Gaza Strip and even Hamas oil-rich patrons in Qatar have taken a step back because of intense international pressure to stop bankrolling Hamas.

Hamas and the other organization in Gaza are using all means at their disposal to manufacture more long-range missiles, to replace those that were either used or destroyed during Operation Protective Edge. Moreover, there is a ceaseless effort underway to rebuild the tunnels; indeed, some offensive tunnels are already capable of being used to carry out attacks inside Israel, despite the IDF's efforts to locate and destroy them.

If Hamas again reaches the point that it feels it has nothing to lose, one rocket launch could lead to a major campaign. And it could happen quicker than anyone imagines."

Ends…

 

OBAMA OFFENDED: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that U.S. President Barack Obama has been deeply offended by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's behavior toward him – and that he told Jewish leaders who visited the White House last week that he won't be inviting the Israeli leader to Washington any time soon.

"For more than a week, the New York Times tried to persuade Jewish leaders who met with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House to speak about the contents of their meeting. But the Grey Lady found it hard to break through the wall of silence that these leaders had erected. In the end – on the eve of Israel's Independence Day – the newspaper reported that, in response to one of the participant's questions, the president replied that he would not be inviting Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to the White House any time soon. Instead, he said, any invitation would have to wait until after the June 30 deadline for the Iranian nuclear talks.

One does not have to be an investigative journalist to report that Obama and Netanyahu would not be meeting in the near future. Every commentator in Washington who knows the mood inside the White House and among the president's closest advisers knows that such a meeting is not even close to being on the president's agenda at the moment. The Jewish leaders who were invited to meet with Obama asked him a lot of far more significant and piercing questions than the one about when and if he would extend an invitation to the Israeli prime minister.

What the New York Times published about Obama's meeting was just a tiny fraction of what was said and discussed there. The self-imposed silence that the Jewish leaders have undertaken – which, it must be said, is totally out of character – is, to a large extent, the result of their surprise and astonishment at the depth of the sense of insult that Obama feels over Netanyahu's behavior toward him. During their meeting, Obama listed for the Jewish leaders everything that he and his administration have done for Israel. 'And this is how I get repaid?' he asked. There was no room to question whom Obama's anger was directed at.

In contrast, the Jewish leaders were genuinely moved by the warmth with which Obama spoke about his commitment to Israel and how he genuinely appears to have Israel's best interests at heart. 'I was moved by the effort that the president made to make it clear how deep his friendship with Israel is and how much he supports the Jewish state,' one of the Jewish leaders said.

According to some of the participants in that meeting, the president is unlikely to make any special effort in the foreseeable future to broker a détente between the White House and the Israeli prime minister. But they do not predict any problems regarding the United States' support for Israel in the United Nations Security Council.

In terms of a presidential invite for Netanyahu, much depends on what kind of government he forms and how that government acts in its first few weeks. Only then will the White House and the State Department even start thinking about a summit in Washington."

Ends…

 

HIKE THE DEFENSE BUDGET: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, David Weinberg argues in favor of a massive increase in Israel's defense spending, arguing that the IDF must be ready for unrelenting combat over the coming decade.

"Israel’s military urgently needs an infusion of cash. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the apparently incoming finance minister Moshe Kahlon must significantly boost the defense budget, despite other priorities. Israel will likely fight several wars over the coming decade. The IDF will need to knock-back the Iranian-proxy armies and jihadist militias camped on our borders. It may need to 'decommission' Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow and Arak. And only God knows what kind of instability Israel may yet have to overcome on its eastern border. 

Given America’s stampeding retreat from overseas commitments, and President Barack Obama’s creeping repeal of the protective diplomatic umbrella America has extended to Israel for many decades, Israel may be fighting truly alone.

Consider the situation in Lebanon. To rout Hizbollah and destroy its missile stockpiles, in the next war Israel will have to reconquer southern Lebanon on the ground. Even with the Israel Air Force working intensively from above (including massive leveling of Lebanese infrastructure), Israel could be facing eight weeks of real and unrelenting combat.

Readying the IDF for this requires a rollback of the misguided 'Teuzah' multi-year plan for the IDF promulgated in 2013 by then chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz. That plan accepted a significant decrease in overall funding to the IDF and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire. Indeed, the ground forces budget was cut by 25 percent between 2002 and 2006. This trend was suspended pursuant to the 2006 Second Lebanon War, but was resumed soon afterwards in the Gantz era.

According to Amir Rapaport, publisher and editor of Israel Defense Magazine and a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Gantz accepted the relative weakness of the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces as a given. He did not think that the IDF would need to fight a conventional force in the foreseeable future, nor have to conduct large-scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

As far back as December 2013, Dr. Eitan Shamir and Dr. Eado Hecht of the same think-tank have been warning that this is a mistaken prism. 'Neglect of the IDF’s ground forces poses a risk to Israel’s security. There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hizbollah armies,' they wrote. Operation Protective Edge in Gaza proved them right.

Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, the new IDF chief-of-staff, along with Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, with the support of Kahlon, must now fix this. Here is how:

    -Training: A gargantuan increase in training of front-line troops is necessary. It is a well-known secret that many of the infantry and armored forces that went into Gaza last summer were insufficiently trained for combat in built-up areas. Alas, training is expensive, especially for combined arms high intensity conflict, which involves multiple branches of the military working together. Training of the reserve forces is even more expensive. And unfortunately, budget lines for training are usually the first thing to be cut when the overall military budget is slashed, as it has been in recent years.

-Platforms: The army needs to reverse the demobilization of armored formations and buy and deploy many more Namer armored personnel carriers, equipped with the leading-edge Iron Fist active defense system; and Merkava main battle tanks, with the Trophy system. This will cost hundreds of millions of shekels, and it is necessary. We can’t have a repeat of the tragedy in Shujai'iya, Gaza City, where an anti-tank missile was fired into an old, lightly armored personnel carrier, killing seven Golani soldiers.

-Stocks: The IDF used up a lot of its ammunition reserves during the 50-day conflict with Hamas last summer, especially its stocks of precision-guided shells and missiles. And for a brief period, Washington held up resupply of Hellfire missiles. The takeaway is that the IDF needs to stockpile much larger reserves of weaponry for the likely lengthy wars of the future with Hizbollah and Hamas. Again, this requires more money with guaranteed funding over a multi-year plan.

-Navy: Elements of radical Islam are gaining control across the eastern Mediterranean basin, from Libya to Syria and Turkey. Israel and Greece are the only Western-oriented countries in the region. Professor Efraim Inbar and Admiral (res.) Eliezer Marom argue that Israel needs a much more powerful navy, with a long reach, to counter the strategic realignments under way, and to protect from terrorist attack the substantial natural gas fields we have discovered at sea. The Israel Navy wants more than $5 billion in new ships, subs, weapons systems and personnel over the next decade for this, and its request is both justified and essential.

-West Bank: Should security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority collapse – a remote but real possibility – Israel will need to pour more troops and treasure into policing Judea and Samaria. This will be an enormous drain on the military system. There is talk of establishing an additional division for tightening control of the territories, and we should do this before a security crisis erupts. Again, this is a big budget item.

-Jordan Valley: Many voices in the defense establishment are calling for the building of a well-fortified security fence along Israel’s long border with Jordan, as has been done along the Sinai, Lebanese and Golan borders. The fluidity of the political and security situation to our east requires this, and it needs to be budgeted for expeditiously.

-Satellites and missiles: Because of budget cuts, some satellite projects (such as the development of 'mini satellites') are in real danger. This is a mistake, since outer space is expected to evolve into an actual battlefield. The development of Israel’s Jericho-4 surface-to-surface missile must not be delayed either. The same goes for the state-of-the-art, long-range intelligence-gathering networks required to identify targets and connect them in a matter of seconds to the various types of fire delivery elements.

-Iran: If worse comes to worse (and every day it indeed seems that worse news comes from Washington about its strategic capitulation to Iran), the IDF and IAF may have to act against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities. Then Israel will have to deal with the fallout from Iran’s potential military retaliation – and we had better be ready both militarily and on the home front. We probably need two squadrons, not one, of the F-35 futuristic jet fighter to overcome the S-300 air defense system that Russia is now selling to Iran. And we need quite a few more Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile defense batteries. A small fortune.

'We must be willing to defend Israel at all cost,' was said repeatedly on Remembrance Day earlier this week. Well, cost it will! Israel dare not skimp in this regard. Our independence depends on robust defense readiness."

Ends…

 

HOW TO AVOID ANOTHER YARMOUK: Writing on the website of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), Kenneth Jacobson comments on the plight of Palestinian refugees in the Yarmouk refugee camp, saying that the only way to avoid a repetition is to close the refugee camps and integrate Palestinians into their host countries.

"It’s happening again — Palestinian refugees are caught between warring factions in the Middle East and the world is reacting too slowly to their plight.

In earlier times, Palestinian refugees found themselves in the crosshairs at the Sabra and Shatila camps, when Lebanese Phalangists massacred them while Israeli forces stood by. Now it’s the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, where militants from the Islamic State have targeted Palestinian civilians in a reign of terror that Ban Ki-moon, the U.N. secretary-general, has called the 'deepest circle of hell.'

Some have used the Yarmouk tragedy to point out, appropriately so, that the world is relatively silent about the suffering of Palestinians at the hands of ISIS. The point is made that it is only when the Jews can be blamed for what is happening that the international community rises up. Otherwise it couldn’t care less. I reach a similar conclusion but from a different perspective. If the world truly cared about the situation of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East, it would not wait for a humanitarian crisis to erupt before acting to fundamentally improve their quality of life and end the circumstances that set the stage for these disasters.

Yes, we know the arguments for maintaining the status quo regarding Palestinian refugees. Many of those Palestinians in the camps await the time they can return to their homes in what is now Israel. This, of course, is a non-starter since it has always been clear that this would lead to the demographic demise of the Jewish state. Without denigrating the motives of many Palestinians who long for their old homes, for the Palestinian leadership, the refugee issue has been a primary vehicle for sustaining the war against Israel.

Then there’s the argument that the refugee camps need to be sustained until the Palestinians achieve a state of their own — and indeed, a Palestinian state should be the first option for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees. But it hasn’t happened yet, mostly because the Palestinian leadership turned down multiple opportunities to create such a state. Yet even without a state, there is no reason why the condition of Palestinian refugees cannot be improved.

All of which points to one inevitable conclusion that the tragedy at Yarmouk should reinforce: The world needs finally to treat the Palestinian refugee issue like the many other refugee situations that have plagued the world over many decades. The goal must be to end their refugee status as soon as possible. There needs to be international pressure on Lebanon, Syria and other Arab states to dismantle these refugee camps and institute an orderly procedure to integrate Palestinian refugees into their societies.

Integration of refugees is always a challenge and one should never underestimate them — particularly in Syria, which is going through its own hell because of President Bashar Assad’s aggression and the brutality of ISIS. But the idea of dismantling the camps and integrating their residents has never been on the agenda. Now it should be introduced, with the understanding that once there is an independent Palestinian state, some of the former refugees, if not most, might consider moving there.

But the most egregious example of this state of affairs is not in Lebanon or Syria, but in the Palestinian territories themselves. Every time I read about an incident in a refugee camp in the West Bank or Gaza, I can’t help but ask myself: Why are there still camps in territories where Palestinians are in control? At least in Syria and Lebanon, one must acknowledge the resistance by ruling governments to integrating these outsiders. But in the territories under Palestinian rule, there are no outsiders and nothing to stand in the way of the immediate dismantling of the camps.

Here, more than anywhere, the cynical motives of Palestinian leadership are apparent. Here, where the ability to transform the lives of people living in camps is in their hands, they do nothing. But that is no excuse for the failure of the international community to act.

Let me be clear: None of this is an effort to sidestep the need for renewal of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians to achieve a two-state solution. That remains an imperative and the best long-term solution for the Palestinians. But for now, to avoid future Yarmouks, to finally take Palestinian refugees out of this nebulous position they’ve been in for decades, a qualitative change in the international approach must take place.

It is not a simple solution, but it is a beginning for a people who have suffered far too long, with the unfortunate acquiescence of the international community."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

ARMENIAN ISSUE: Cengiz Candar has some blunt words to say in centre-left Radikal: "Obama has not got a personal problem describing the 1915 events as 'genocide', because he does not believe that Ankara's 'denial of the genocide' is correct. We know this from his statements when he was a frontrunner for the presidency in 2008. But whatever word Obama will choose does not alter the reality of what happened 100 years ago. What we should care about is not what Obama will say, but the liberality of the people of Turkey. The 'reality of 1915' is the extermination of the Anatolian Armenian people. This is the simple truth."

Dogan Heper blames the Armenian diaspora for inciting hatred in centrist Milliyet: "The Armenian 'diaspora' continues to stir enmity. It seeks tension rather than peace. The wealthy diaspora ignores how people living in Armenia suffer from poverty and incites them against Turkey. And they have supporters in Europe. However, let us say that what happened lies in the past and look at how things stand today. There are almost 200,000 illegal Armenians in Turkey from Armenia, who are permitted to work; they are sending their income to their families from Turkey. If the border is opened, Armenian workers can live happily in Turkey. The diaspora and foreign powers cannot understand that they are acting against the interests of the Armenians of Armenia."

Writing in the same paper, Asli Aydintasbas argues that the government is playing the denial game:  "Even if you bring ministers from various African and Balkan countries, Prince Charles from the UK and our old friend Emir of Qatar for the 'alternative ceremony' in Istanbul, the world's historians, states and politicians share an opinion on what happened in 1915. That is why this manoeuvre only shows that Turkey is in 'denial' once again, and that it is nullifying the 'historic' statement it made last year."

Orhan Erinc takes a hard line in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "I am against using the word 'genocide'. And I am not talking about the law. There are two simple reasons: First, it is a mistake to say that the Ottoman Armenians who were called 'the loyal nation', were forced to migrate without any reason and it ignores the common pains. Second, if there had been such a genocide why were orphanages and schools opened to raise the surviving children properly when their elders were being killed? During the alleged genocide process, Armenian ministers, undersecretaries, advisers and translators in the Ottoman government continued with their jobs."

Ali Yurttagul seeks common ground in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen in Zaman: "The Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey rapprochement is to the benefit of all three countries and has the potential to change political geography. Murdered Armenian journalist Hrant Dink saw this and was working for democracy in Armenia as well as Turkey. The Armenian and Turkish nationalists' hatred for him and our deep love and sympathy for him were no coincidence. Healing the wounds of what the Armenians call a 'great calamity', our nation calls the 'Armenian slaughter' and Hrant calls 'genocide', begins with understanding and sharing the pains."

Ali Bayramoglu shifts the responsibility onto past rulers in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "1915 is not a product of Turkish society but of the [then ruling Ottoman] Party of Union and Progress and it is its responsibility. It is not the Turkish nation that is in the dock. Since the nation is not being accused, there is no reason to turn a blind eye to history. We should distance ourselves from those who spread hatred by relying on 1915 or using the 'Turkish nation' argument to cover up for the 1915 events. As a state, Turkey is under historical and political pressure because of these incidents."

Oya Baydar calls for acknowledgment of the genocide in independent Internet newspaper T24: "It is not important whether Europe has called it a genocide; or Obama did or did not call it such. Genocide is a legal and political concept and its official acceptance might have consequences, such as compensation claims being made on the state. On the other hand, the countries that are pushing ahead with the concept of genocide, especially Germany, which was the adviser and accomplice of the Ottoman Party of Union and Progress, should accept their part as well. I call it genocide, not for political reasons but as a matter of conscience, because I believe that unjust treatment cannot be measured or discussed. Conceding the genocide and offering an apology is not a concession to the Armenians, but a favor to ourselves, that is to say the Turkish nation."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Hemayat repeats: "Negotiations with the P5+1 have begun with the aim of lifting sanctions. There are disagreements inside the ‘arrogance front’ over when to lift sanctions. Differences between the White House and Congress have reached a peak and Congress has tried, under pressure by the Zionist lobby, to control the agreement with Iran. We seek to bring transparency to the deal and pursue simultaneously the complete lifting of sanctions on the day the agreement is signed." 

Reformist Arman beams with hope: "Our negotiating team has shown that it can link rationality with wisdom. We will achieve an agreement, which will allow us to jump through the nuclear gate to a higher position in the region and the world. The agreement will lead us towards globalization in all its socio-political dimensions and bring a better future for Iranians."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami would not tolerate impediments: "This phase of talks will determine the fate of many months of negotiations. Any obstruction and unconsidered measures contrary to the spirit of understanding will not be acceptable by any justification." 

 

YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan insists that the Saudis have failed to achieve their objectives: "What was the reason for stopping Saudi attacks? What of their objectives have the Saudis achieved and most importantly, what will be the consequences of these developments? The answer is clear: the Saudis have failed to achieve their objectives. President Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi has not returned to Yemen and stays in Riyadh. Houthi military capability was not destroyed and they fully control the strategic Strait of Bab al-Mandab. This fact alone is enough to reflect the defeat of the Saudi-American-Zionist puppet coalition fighting Yemeni revolutionaries." 

Conservative Resalat concurs: "After four weeks of military aggression against Yemen, Saudi Arabia ceased ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ without achieving any of its political objectives. Saudi Arabia could not reinstate Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi or strengthen the al-Qa’ida network to prevail. The Saudis could not break this proud nation along religious lines and inflame a civil war." 

Conservative Khorasan lectures the Arabs: "Arab military cooperation against Yemen did not bring diplomatic and military returns. Arabs should understand that being diplomatically smart is different from being puppets. King Salman’s only ally is the Zionist regime that consoles him and presents him as the winner of this war. Saudi Arabia and Israel are fighting a current that has resisted foreign penetration and plots for years. The resistance network does not belong to one group in the region; it is an indigenous mass power that has no other desire but freedom and independence."

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz salutes Yemeni resistance: "Saudi Arabia launched a full-scale war imagining a prompt victory. The war is a reminder of Zionist crimes in Gaza. Using all its military capabilities, targeting infrastructure, killing women and children and using phosphorus bombs are a small part of Saudi crimes in Yemen. The 27-day-war points to the important fact that nations, by relying on themselves, their religious morale and resistance, can create an epic. The people of Yemen did so despite being among the 10 poorest countries and managed to win victory against an armed to the teeth and rich Saudi Arabia." 

Conservative Quds exaggerates: "After 27 days of airstrikes against the defenceless Yemenis, Saudi Arabia has been finally persuaded to raise the white flag of surrender. Saudi blind airstrikes failed to force the Yemeni people to surrender and boosted national convergence. Saudi Arabia has lost its legitimacy in the region and in the world for using weapons of mass destruction against the Yemeni people. It will face serious security challenges in the future." 

Hard-line Javan writes of a strategic Saudi defeat: "Contrary to Saudi claims of victory in Operation Decisive Storm, a close look at this operation shows that the Saudis have suffered a historic and strategic defeat. The oppressed people of Yemen achieved a historic victory at minimum cost. By the end of the operation, the position of the Houthis has strengthened. This means that by committing a strategic mistake and killing innocent Yemenis, the Saudi royal family has paved the way for its own collapse." 

Moderate Iran derives the lessons: "The ceasefire and the move to resolve disagreements over the Yemeni crisis on the negotiation table have two important messages. First, the era of extremism and militarism has ended in the region and hence, countries should put down their weapons and send their diplomats to follow up their goals. The second message is that regional and global powers are able to persuade and force disobedient actors to show flexibility and abandon warmongering ways."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

67

 

There were no newspapers published in Israel on Thursday, as the country comes to a virtual standstill to mark 67 years of independence. Overnight, the Internet websites were dominated by the speeches delivered by Israeli leaders at various official ceremonies across the country. By this morning, however, many have moved on to harder news.

The websites of Haaretz and Times of Israel lead with a report from the New York Times, which claims that U.S. President Barack Obama told Jewish leaders last week that he would not be inviting Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to visit Washington until after the June 30 deadline for the Iranian nuclear talks. Obama told the group that he was concerned Netanyahu would publicly vent his complaints about White House policies, specifically the ongoing negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program. He told the delegation that he would speak with Netanyahu over the telephone in the meantime. Ynet reports that an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had conducted a phone conversation with his American counterpart, John Kerry, about the nuclear deal.

In other news, Army Radio reports that there has been an increased Israel Air Force presence on Thursday morning in the Golan Heights. According to the report, the spike in activity is due to intensified fighting on the Syrian side of the Golan.

 

BURYING THE HATCHET: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem says that efforts to broker a détente between Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas and Mohammed Dahlan have been renewed, but that there are some in Ramallah who will do anything to prevent this from happening.

"Last week, the Palestinian court for corruption in Ramallah made a rather surprising announcement. It announced that it was dropping charges against Mohammed Dahlan, the former Fatah official who was ousted from the movement over graft allegations and following a very personal spat with Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas.

The court explained its decision by saying that charges had been brought against Dahlan before his immunity as a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council had been lifted. Because of the ongoing conflict between Fatah and Hamas, it was almost impossible to convene the PLC, so Abbas published a presidential edict lifting Dahlan's immunity. The corruption court, however, decided to ignore that edict and dropped all charges against Dahlan.

The rivalry between Abu Mazin and Dahlan, who was the Palestinian president's protégé for many years, erupted in 2011 and steadily got worse – until Dahlan was ousted from Fatah and was put on trial in absentia. Since then, there have been efforts by several parties to broker a rapprochement between the two. Even Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi tried to mediate between them, but his efforts were rebuffed.

The decision by the court in Ramallah led to a wave of rumors about new, behind-the-scenes efforts to end the spat between Abu Mazin and Dahlan. It would appear that any such détente now hinges on whether the Palestinian Authority will formally appeal against the decision to drop charges.

Sources in Fatah close to Dahlan confirm that efforts to end the five-year spat with Abu Mazin have been renewed, in light of Dahlan's growing strength and popularity in the Gaza Strip and in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Over the past few months, Dahlan has also been gaining support in the refugee camps near Nablus and Jenin; there have even been armed clashes between his supporters in the Balata refugee camp and forces loyal to Abu Mazin in Nablus.

Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar published a report identifying the latest would-be mediator between Abbas and Dahlan. According to the report, the Lebanese government is keen for the two Palestinian leaders to bury the hatchet, since it believes that this would encourage stability inside Palestinian refugee camps on Lebanese soil, in light of ISIS’s recent incursion into and control of the Yarmouk camp in Damascus.

According to al-Akhbar, the mediator is the director of Lebanon's General Directorate of General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, who recently initiated a meeting with Dahlan in the United Arab Emirates and reached certain agreements with him. After meeting with Dahlan, Ibrahim met with Ashraf Dabbour, the Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, who relayed messages from the Lebanese government and from Dahlan to Abbas in Ramallah. Abbas responded positively to the overtures and contacts continued. Ibrahim proposed a media ceasefire between Abbas and Dahlan, which both sides now appear to be honoring.

Samir Masharawi, a senior Fatah figure in Gaza and a confident of Dahlan, confirmed that contacts had been renewed with Abbas, but denied that there was any connection between the hoped-for détente and the court's decision to drop charges against Dahlan. Masharawi claims that the only impediment to a full rapprochement between Dahlan and Abbas is the opposition expressed by some of the Palestinian president's supporters to allowing Dahlan to return to active involvement in Palestinian politics. Their major concern is that Dahlan has enough regional and international connections to become a viable candidate to replace Abu Mazin as president.

Abbas is an octogenarian and some members of his Fateh movement – including one of Dahlan's main rivals, Jibril Rajoub – see themselves as potential successors. They, it seems, will do anything to prevent a détente between Abbas and Dahlan, in the hope that this will scuttle any talk of Dahlan succeeding Abu Mazin."

Ends…

 

CRAZY: Writing on the E-Mago website, Dr. Eli Nachmias of Haifa University postulates that, in order to protect itself in a violent neighborhood, Israel may have to adopt some of the characteristics of what Professor Yehekzel Dror termed 'crazy states.'

"It was Professor Yehezkel Dror who first coined the term 'crazy states.' He did so in his book 'Crazy States: A Counter-conventional Strategic Problem,' which was published in Hebrew in 1973 and translated into English in 1980. In the past, the State of Israel has been perceived as a moderately 'crazy' state, but, more often than not, it has been seen as a 'normal' state.

In defining what makes a 'crazy state,' Dror argued that a country (or a terrorist organization such as Hamas or Hizbollah) is seen as crazy when it fulfills the following criteria: it attempts to impose a new ideology on the world; it adheres to its goals and is totally willing to pay a very heavy price to achieve them; it is willing to make extreme sacrifices to do so; it has a tendency to take risks and has an extreme preference for high-stakes risks; there is an inverse correlation between its means and its goal (that is, decision makers, in a state of 'delirium,' do not claim that there is any connection between the means and the goals, a situation that is seen as absurd by Western civilization); and its leadership is characterized by dogmatism and there is a tendency to adopt patterns of behavior which violate accepts norms (such as ISIS, which attempts to terrorize its victims by use of barbaric tactics).

Under normal circumstances, the international community is shocked by these crazy states and organizations and organizes to take dramatic action against them, since in the end they pose a threat to Western civilization.

At the same time, a country is perfectly capable of playing a political game and can pretend to be on the very edge of 'craziness.' In the first three decades of its existence, the State of Israel acted in a way that can be described as 'crazy.' It is possible that Israel had no choice in the matter, since its existence and survival were on the line; it was (and still is) the target of 'crazy' organizations like Hizbollah and Hamas – and who knows what kind of threat ISIS may still pose to the Jewish state.

During the first 30 years of its existence – right up to the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War – Israel, as part of its defensive strategy, adopted a policy of partial craziness. The main elements to this policy were unpredictability, a willingness to launch an independent response in order to achieve its goals, a tendency to take major risks in order to achieve tactical and strategic goals, dogmatism at the highest levels of leadership and a tendency to ignore the accepted patterns of behavior. The problem is that the Westernization of Israel since then has obligated it to adopt more normative and proportional patterns of behavior. This would appear to have severely damaged Israel's deterrence capabilities. Strategic and tactical decisions started to take into account considerations of cost-benefit. There was also a significant decline in Israel's willingness to launch unconventional operations against terrorist organizations that targeted it.

The question, therefore, is whether Israel should once again become a state on the verge of craziness and, if so, how it should achieve this. Should Israel's foreign and defense policies include elements generally seen as verging on the crazy? The answer can be found in a strategic decision taken by Israel's policy-makers and its government. That is to say – has Israel adopted some crazy elements in its policies? If the answer is positive, then Israel needs to coordinate its strategic planning with its international political policy.

It must be remembered that any strategy aimed at countering a crazy organization (usually a terrorist group), must include unconventional operations. Israel must decide to selectively attack terrorist organizations and must be willing to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers to do so. This must be preceded by preparations, as well as propitious international circumstances, such as a global war on terror, international cooperation and a broad consensus. Beyond this, Israel must ensure that its enemies perceive it as unpredictable and willing to take actions seen as not being normative. Such tactics, however, must be used sparingly. While declaring itself to be unpredictable, Israel must ensure that it does not lose the element of surprise.

Having said all this, it is vital that Israel not take any action that could lead to more threatening and potentially fatal consequences. This does not mean that Israel needs to become a fully militaristic state like North Korea, but, a country that is facing an existential threat, which is concerned with nothing more than physical survival and which espouses democratic values has the right to try and adapt itself to its surroundings – near and far.

It is possible that this approach, while reprehensible under normal circumstances, is perfectly acceptable given the neighborhood that we live in."

Ends…

 

I SWEAR I WON’T BOYCOTT: Writing in Haaretz, Akiva Eldar comes out against the High Court's decision to uphold a law making it illegal for Israel to back any kind of boycott against the settlements.

"I promise I will not propose to anyone to boycott goods produced on occupied land, refuse to recognize Israeli institutions of higher education that operate over the Green Line, or to keep away from cultural institutions established on non-Israeli territory.

From now on I will only say the following things: It is forbidden to harm Jews who work night and day to transform Israel into a binational state, or an apartheid regime. It is forbidden to encourage a boycott against the settlements and unauthorized outposts which were established through land theft, forgery of documents and paying bribes to collaborators, as well as through the gross trampling of the planning and building laws. We must file away the reports of the state comptroller that describe the injustices of Israeli rule in the West Bank and the report on the unauthorized outposts. It is completely and totally forbidden to say that the settlements are a violation of international law – someone could very well understand that as a call for law-abiding nations to boycott their products. And in addition, how is it possible to harm Jewish communities that bring us, year after year, the World Cup in international protest and condemnation?

It is forbidden to harm the source of the sustenance for Israeli pioneers, who in their spare time harass Palestinian shepherds and vandalize the vineyards of their helpless neighbors. Far be it from a respectable citizen to deviate from those Jews who interpret the saying 'You have chosen us from among all the nations' as a license to deprive another people of their freedom, honor and rights. We must not harm the young men and women who declare that the only command they honor is the divine one. We must shut up and open our wallets, in order to finance guarding them and to send the finest of our sons to the Israel Defense Forces, in order to be spat on by them.

It is forbidden to boycott a project that without which the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization – the national carrier for public funds to the settlement enterprise, and it is also suspected to the pockets of public officials – has no right to exist.

It is forbidden to propose to academic institutions to avoid any connections with a college that an organization belonging to the mechanism of the occupation (The Council for Higher Education in Judea and Samaria) has granted the status of a university and the Israeli Education Ministry supplies its budgets. It is forbidden to criticize artists who appear in the hall surrounded by Arab villages whose residents need a special permit from the occupation authorities to participate in the wedding of a relative in an Arab village in Israel.

From now on, whenever a European diplomat asks me if I support his government declaring a boycott against the settlements, I will say: 'God forbid! How can anti-Semitic Europe even think about boycotting Jews, who the State of Israel has been sending for 48 years to settle the land of their ancestors?' And what will I answer to that very same goy if he wants to know why then the time has not come for Europe to impose a boycott against the State of Israel? I will tell him that in the only democracy in the Middle East it is forbidden to answer such questions."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 23.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

 

From ‘Storm’ to ‘Hope’

 

 

Did Saudi Arabia step back because of an Iranian threat to widen the confrontation? This is uncertain. But what is clear is that the Saudi leadership found itself forced to review its plans in Yemen. In practical terms, Saudi Arabia failed to achieve the aims for which it launched Decisive Storm. These were public and clear: The Houthi militias’ withdrawal from the Yemeni cities and towns; their disarmament, and the return of legitimacy as represented by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. It decided to substitute these aims with a new list that can be achieved by means that combine diplomacy with the threat of force. And to overcome the predicament facing Decisive Storm, that operation itself was replaced with a new operation under a new title that bears no military connotations: Operation Restore Hope-- Fahd al-Khitan in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

There is now room for two main moves: Backing the pro-government Yemeni resistance to liberate the areas occupied by the Houthis and controlled by Saleh's forces; and, second, opening the gates to a peaceful solution. In my view, if deposed president Saleh is excluded from the new political equation, political reconciliation will become possible based on the 2011 Gulf Initiative. This is the initiative that the Houthis and Saleh first accepted then turned against. And it remains that the aim behind using military power is not to destroy opponents, but to drive them towards reconciliation. Saudi Arabia has displayed wisdom in dealing with the Yemeni crisis by ending the aerial war early, refraining from heading towards a ground war, backing the legitimate government forces – the resistance – and giving a chance to a political solution--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

[As regards] Iran and its influence, there is really no need to offer an explanation or go into great detail. Suffice to note that the first to declare that the aggression has ceased was not a Saudi or Arab, or even a Western official, but Iranian Deputy-Foreign Minister Hussein Amir 'Abdollahian, who stated clearly that the aggression would cease in a few hours' time. Meanwhile, Iranian warships were taking up position across the Gulf of Aden and in the Red Sea. This was accompanied by Iranian statements that made it clear to all concerned that these warships would act unilaterally without referring or coordinating with any power so as to provide aid to the Yemeni people. In the coming days, we shall be before a test of the limits of confrontation, now that the Iranians have announced that their current priority is to provide all sorts of humanitarian aid and relief to the Yemeni people--Ibrahim al-Amin in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

This is not a time for celebration or gloating. Priority should be given to alleviating the suffering of this nation [Yemen] that has faced hunger over and above its usual deprivation, poverty over and above its usual penury; this nation that faces very harsh conditions, with its infrastructure destroyed, and a bloodstained future whose final prospect remains uncertain. We hope that the reports of an Omani peace initiative are true, and that all parties will comply with it to end the bloodshed and curtail the losses, provided that the main party responsible war bears the full consequences and takes upon itself to rebuild the country and restore the Yemeni people’s hope for a better future. Otherwise, the revenge of this honorable and chivalrous and proud nation will be even worse than many may imagine--‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

 

The storm has ended, and we may rest assured that ‘decisiveness’ will not return. As for ‘hope,’ it lies in the Yemenis’ success in absorbing the lessons of the catastrophe that their country has experienced. The hope is that they will initiate a serious national dialogue, without foreign intervention and diktats whether from Iran or the Gulf, and with the aim of constructing a new political regime for Yemen that neither excludes nor marginalizes any of its constituents. This regime should lay the foundation for a democratic civilian state, consolidate security and stability, and place Yemen back on track to being Arabia Felix once again-- ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

 

Operation Decisive Storm seems to have been just a passing moment in Saudi policy, after which Riyadh is expected to return to the traditional pragmatic approach for which it has long been known, says a Jordanian commentator. The Saudi leadership displayed wisdom in ending its aerial campaign in Yemen after destroying most of the Houthis' military capabilities, refraining from a ground offensive, backing the pro-Hadi forces, and pushing for a peaceful solution consistent with the 2011 Gulf Initiative, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. A comparison between Operation Decisive Storm’s declared aims at the start and those allegedly achieved at its end shows that it has been a total failure, argues the editor-in-chief of a left-leaning Lebanese daily. But this does not mean that the aggression has ended, since plans are still underway to try and reinstate President Hadi in Aden. Although it may be too early to conclude that the war has finally ended or which side has won and which has lost, there are a number of questions as to whether Saudi Arabia and its allies have achieved their goals, says the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. The Saudi justifications for the decision to end Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen raise numerous questions for which there has been no convincing answer so far, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. Nor is it clear what role regional and international intervention has played in bringing about this decision.

 

THE PROFESSOR COULD NOT ANSWER: "The Saudi professor of political science could not find an answer to a question put to him by al-Jazeera satellite TV two nights ago, regarding his country's unexpected decision to endOperation Decisive Storm and launch Operation Restore Hope," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Thursday's Jordanian dailyal-Ghad.

He appeared to be disappointed by the declaration that the campaign had ended, and described the Saudi military spokesman's statements as contradictory. The Gulf media in general also seemed to be in a state of shock after the Saudi statement was issued. It tried hard to justify a step that seemed incomprehensible to most commentators, especially since it came only hours after a Saudi decision to deploy the well-trained National Guard forces in Operation Decisive Storm. Observers read this as a military escalation, suggesting an imminent ground intervention in Yemen.

However, contrary to these expectations, a sudden U-turn occurred. And the first signs came from Tehran, which, in itself, suggests a number of things. A few hours before the Saudi statement was issued, Iran’s deputy foreign minister said that there would be an imminent announcement of the end of military operations in Yemen. Analysts did not take this statement seriously at first. But after Saudi Arabia officially announced that Operation Decisive Storm was over, it became clear that various moves behind the scenes had achieved their aims. This was further confirmed by reports in the pro-Iranian media regarding the details of Iranian/American/Saudi contacts that included a threat from Tehran to resort to force should Saudi Arabia continue its aerial assault on Houthi positions.

Did Saudi Arabia step back because of an Iranian threat to widen the confrontation? This is uncertain. But what is clear is that the Saudi leadership found itself forced to review its plans in Yemen.

In practical terms, Saudi Arabia failed to achieve the aims for which it launched Decisive Storm. These were public and clear: The Houthi militias’ withdrawal from the Yemeni cities and towns; their disarmament, and the return of legitimacy as represented by President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. It decided to substitute these aims with a new list that can be achieved by means that combine diplomacy with the threat of force.

And to overcome the predicament facing Decisive Storm, that operation itself was replaced with a new operation under a new title that bears no military connotations: Operation Restore Hope A new package of aims of a purely political nature was set up for this new operation: Resuming the political process in accordance with UNSCR 2216, the [2011] Gulf Initiative, and the conclusions of the Yemeni National Dialogue; as well as other aims of a humanitarian nature.

In short, the new operation is meant to lead the situation back to where it was before Decisive Storm, taking into consideration the results of the air strikes that have weakened the Houthis and their ally deposed President Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, and exploiting these changes to impose a new political reality for the coming phase.

The little information available regarding what happens next suggests an in-principle agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran by whose terms President Hadi will depart the scene and PM Khaled Bahah will be appointed president for the country instead. But the current reality does not suggest that the Yemeni parties are ready to enter into a political dialogue and end the confrontations on the ground that have continued from both sides even after the Saudi ceasefire announcement.

The sudden change in Saudi Arabia's position gives rise to the impression that Decisive Storm was but a passing and temporary moment in Saudi policy, one that politics soon bypassed, so as to return the Kingdom to the traditional realism for which it has long been known.

"In conclusion, the Saudi storm has ended, but the crisis in Yemen continues," concludes Khitan.

End…

 

EXPLOSIONS IN THE SUBURBS: "Two days before the military spokesman in Riyadh announced the end of the first phase, which was Operation Decisive Storm, fires and successive explosions were seen and heard in Jabal Faj 'Attan in the suburbs of the Yemeni capital Sana'a," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

Warplanes raced with time to destroy the stores of heavy weapons and Scud-B ballistic missiles that the Houthis were expected to use to attack southern Saudi cities such as Jizan, Abha, and Najran. There are concerns that they may also have Scud-D missiles that can reach as far as the city of Jeddah if fired from Sana'a.

The air campaign has ended, now that the main threat has been eliminated, as the official [Saudi] statement said, and the most important such threat was from these ballistic missiles. The bombardment may resume if the military finds that it must pursue the armed [Houthi/Saleh] groups or back resistance operations.

Iran tried to repeat what it has done in south Lebanon by establishing an armed group that poses a continuous threat to southern Saudi Arabia. The [Houthi] Ansarullah militias are a carbon copy of Hizbollah in Lebanon, and Iran aims to dominate Yemen and threaten its northern neighbor. When the Houthis captured the Yemeni capital, they also captured these Scud missile systems. Once this happened, the Houthi Ansarullah militias began to pose a threat to Saudi Arabia; it was no longer a Yemeni problems alone.

Having destroyed the Houthis’ command and control centers, communications network, weapons’ stores, heavy weapons, air force, and various other military installations, Operation Decisive Storm did not have many more targets to hit. Moreover, the recent UN Security Council resolution banning weapon supplies to the [Houthi] rebels contributed to imposing an international naval embargo on ports along the 2900-kilometers long Yemeni coast.

This has prevented the Iranians from supplying the Houthis with weapons, and has helped defang their militias. And the other important development in this regard was U.S. President Barack Obama's announcement that he has warned the Iranians against any attempt to provide support for the rebels in Yemen. The American navy began to search ships suspected of transporting weapons from Iran to Yemen.

With all this, there is now room for two main moves: Backing the pro-government Yemeni resistance to liberate the areas occupied by the Houthis and controlled by Saleh's forces; and, second, opening the gates to a peaceful solution. In my view, if deposed president Saleh is excluded from the new political equation, political reconciliation will become possible based on the 2011 Gulf Initiative. This is the initiative that the Houthis and Saleh first accepted then turned against. And it remains that the aim behind using military power is not to destroy opponents, but to drive them towards reconciliation.

"Saudi Arabia has displayed wisdom in dealing with the Yemeni crisis by ending the aerial war early, refraining from heading towards a ground war, backing the legitimate government forces – the resistance – and giving a chance to a political solution," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

LAUNCHING THE SECOND ROUND: "Al Saud and their allies’ silence regarding the political and military fruits of the first round of aggression in Yemen will not change soon," suggests Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim al-Amin in Thursday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

Yesterday, they decided to launch the second round, which will focus on the south with the specific aim of regaining control of Aden, as part of an overall policy of lowering the ceiling of their ambitious aims, and securing a battlefield result that would be sufficient to allow them to claim that they were heading towards negotiations in which they can impose some of their terms and conditions.

But as we wait for the difficult confrontations in the coming hours and days, it may be useful to go over a preliminary evaluation of the first round’s results.

At the beginning of the aggression, the Saudi regime declared that the military operation was in compliance with a request from the legitimate Yemeni government headed by 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The aims of the operation were specified by military spokesman Brigadier-General Ahmad al-'Asiri as such: 'Protecting legitimacy in Yemen, deterring the Houthi militias, preventing them from threatening Yemeni citizens, destroying their military capabilities, and preventing the Houthi militias from threatening neighboring countries, primarily Saudi Arabia's southern borders.'

When the end of operations was announced, 'Asiri asserted that 'the Storm’s main aims have been achieved – legitimacy has been protected, Yemeni citizens are not as threatened as they had been previously, and the Houthi militias have lost a substantial part of their capabilities.' But he added a new aim – 'protecting the city of Aden and preventing the Houthi militias from entering and capturing it.'

Al Saud's spokesmen specified the operation’s main political aim as restoring legitimacy as represented by fleeing President Hadi to Sana'a after 'the Houthis withdraw from it and all cities, and after they unconditionally hand over all their heavy, medium, and light weapons to a national committee whose job will be to receive these weapons and establish a full inventory of them.' Moreover, 'tribal forces will then be in charge of administering the capital Sana'a for a short while until authority is restored to the army after it has been reorganized by Hadi.' Furthermore, Hadi 'must return to Sana'a together with his government, with all its members exercising their full authority.'

New demands were added, including 'stripping former president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh and his family of their immunity, preventing them from engaging in any political activity, banning them from travel, freezing all their assets, and restoring these assets to the state's coffers.' Moreover, 'a new president should be appointed to head the General People's Congress now headed by Saleh, while the Houthis must declare themselves to be a political party if they wish to take part in any political activity in the state.'

Furthermore, 'all appointments and decisions taken by the Ansarullah group must be rescinded.' And the fleeing president [Hadi] naturally did not forget to personally declare that the war would continue until 'the flag of the Yemeni Republic is raised on Maran Mountain in Sa'da to replace the Iranian flag.' This was identical to statements issued by the Saudi foreign minister that called for an end to Iranian influence, a point repeated by Al Saud’s media that insisted that the war’s aim was to achieve a balance with Iran and expel it from the southern Arabian Peninsula.

In effect, the operations carried out by Decisive Storm have shown the following:

- In military terms, the Yemeni army is actually based on ground forces. Contrary to Al Saud’s claims, it does not possess any real air force; nor does it have an advanced air defense system. As for the ballistic missiles, we are talking of some old generation 300 Russian-made Scud missiles. These are in storage and not ready to be used. Yet according to Yemeni army and Ansarullah sources, the aggression did not manage to destroy more than 10% of these missiles.

- The air aggression did not succeed in limiting Ansarullah or the army’s offensive capabilities, or stop the advance of hundreds of armored vehicles and thousands of soldiers towards Yemeni provinces in the center, east, and south. As for the Saudi claims of striking at communications system and other similar claims, it is sufficient to point to the actual coordination on the ground that indicates otherwise. Or perhaps one needs to draw Al Saud's attention to the fact that there are unconventional means of communication that can deal with such matters.

- On the political front, the fleeing president has remained in his chosen place of exile in Riyadh. And there is nothing to suggest any likelihood of his return to Sana'a or his former post. Most of Aden is under the control of the army and the Houthis. Reinstating Hadi would require troops on the ground if only by way of the sea – something that is currently being discussed.

- There is no accord over any framework for a political solution – neither a preliminary nor a final one. All the proposed initiatives remain less than what is acceptable. Ansarullah's leadership is saying clearly that no solution is acceptable if it is in compliance with pressure from the forces of aggression, and that the only acceptable framework for intervention that is open to study may be from the UN, but only in accordance with the scheme initiated by UN Yemeni envoy Jamal Benomar.

- As for Iran and its influence, there is really no need to offer an explanation or go into great detail. Suffice to note that the first to declare that the aggression has ceased was not a Saudi or Arab, or even a Western official, but Iranian Deputy-Foreign Minister Hussein Amir 'Abdollahian, who stated clearly that the aggression would cease in a few hours' time. Meanwhile, Iranian warships were taking up position across the Gulf of Aden and in the Red Sea. This was accompanied by Iranian statements that made it clear to all concerned that these warships would act unilaterally without referring or coordinating with any power so as to provide aid to the Yemeni people.

"In the coming days, we shall be before a test of the limits of confrontation, now that the Iranians have announced that their current priority is to provide all sorts of humanitarian aid and relief to the Yemeni people," concludes Amin.

End…

 

CONTRADICTORY EXPLANATIONS: “There have been many explanations, mostly contradictory, of why the Saudi political and military leadership has decided to end Operation Decisive Storm and move on to [the humanitarian] Operation Restore Hope,” writes Editor-in-Chief ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on Thursday’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This has caused confusion and bewilderment among those celebrating victory, as well as among those who claim it was a defeat, each depending on their position on the conflict raging in Yemen.

What has fuelled this confusion is the fact that Decisive Storm’s air raids continued the next day (yesterday), as did ground military operations. The Houthi/Saleh coalition continued its advances in Aden and other Yemeni provinces, while the [Saudi-led] aerial bombardments have continued with even greater ferocity. And this means that those celebrating victory were too hasty in doing so, or may have misread the Saudi statement.

The situation remains unclear. The political and military situation in Yemen has not changed; in fact, it has become more complicated. And it is too early to pass a definite verdict on who was victor and vanquished in this war.

A number of points may be gleaned from the reactions and inaccurate readings of the Saudi statements that may be summarized as follows:

- First, if Operation Decisive Storm has successfully achieved all of its aims, as the Storm’s spokesman Brigadier-General Ahmad al-‘Asiri said, why has the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi not returned ‘either to the permanent capital Sana’a or the temporary capital Aden’ [as previously demanded by Riyadh]? And why have the Houthis not withdrawn to Su’da and handed over all the weapons they captured from the Yemeni army? [as also demanded by Riyadh].

- Second, ‘Asiri said that after 2432 air raids by the coalition’s air force over almost four weeks of bombings, the Houthis’ ability to threaten Yemen’s neighboring countries has been destroyed. Also destroyed were the ballistic missiles in their possession. All this may be true; but, as far as we know, the Houthis and their supporters did not pose a threat to Decisive Storm member states such as the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Sudan, or Saudi Arabia, for that matter. Nor did we ever hear of the Houthi alliance acquiring short-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. We hope that Brigadier-General ‘Asiri will clarify this point for us at his next press conference.

- Third, there have been numerous reports of an Omani initiative to end the conflict peacefully, and there are many different accounts of its terms. Some claim that it includes eight points, while others say it has ten, and yet others speak of twelve points. No statement has been issued by the Omani authorities either confirming or denying that such an initiative exists so far.

- Fourth, if Operation Decisive Storm has ended or has achieved its aims in weakening, and perhaps destroying the Houthis’ military capabilities, why did the Saudi monarch summon the Saudi National Guard consisting of one-hundred-thousand troops with Apache helicopters as well as tanks and armored vehicles, and deploy them to defend the Kingdom’s southern borders across from the borders with Yemen? Has war moved on to the borders between the two countries? What is really happening there?

- Fifth, if the states taking part in Operation Decisive Storm are united, what is their attitude towards the claim that the Storm has ended? Were they consulted about moving on to the new phase – i.e., Operation Restore Hope? If so, then how are we to explain [former] president Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh and his son Ahmad’s ‘courtship’ by Dubai’s Head of General Security Lieutenant-General Dahi Khalfan on his private Twitteraccount?

- Sixth, why did we first hear that Operation Decisive Storm had ended from Iran, and via Iranian Deputy-Foreign Minister Hussein ‘Abdollahian? Was this because of some intelligence coup on Iran’s part? Or was a deal reached behind closed doors? If so, what are its details, and how long should we wait before we discover its various clauses?

- Seventh, aerial bombardments usually end when a number of conditions have been realized: The target-bank has been consumed – which is not true in this case as evident from continued air strikes; or in preparation for a ground invasion – which has not been confirmed; or in preparation for negotiations aimed at reaching a political solution – but this is unlikely due to the fact that the balance on the ground remains unaltered and the Houthis alliance continues to create new facts.

- Eighth, Brigadier-General ‘Asiri said that Operation Decisive Storm was launched in compliance with a request from the ‘legitimate’ Yemeni president [Hadi], and ending it was also in compliance with his request. But is President Hadi in a position to make independent decisions? And can he refuse or disagree with his hosts and their government in Riyadh’s point of view?

We waited almost a day before commenting on this second unexpected Saudi decision, after the first that launched Operation Decisive Storm, in the hope of understanding what really lies behind it, the reasons that led to it, and the military and political changes it may bring about. But it seems that we, like many others, will continue to face difficulties because of the dearth of information, the official Saudi statements’ ambiguity, and the fact that we were taken by surprise.

We do not know when the dust will settle and the facts emerge. But what we do know is that the Saudi leadership, as well as all parties implicated in the Yemen war, is facing a predicament from which it is difficult to emerge. And we know that this conflict is likely to exacerbate and persist.

We can sense the awkward situation in which those celebrating victory and who have exchanged congratulations may find themselves, just as we can understand the position of those who are casting doubt on it. This is because we are aware of their motives and which trench they stand in. And we repeat that we find it difficult to see a victor and a vanquished in this war. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say that defeat in all its forms is the final outcome, and that the poor and destitute Yemeni people are the primary victim of this war that was imposed on them, one they did not choose.

For this reason, this is not a time for celebration or gloating. Priority should be given to alleviating the suffering of this nation that has faced hunger over and above its usual deprivation, poverty over and above its usual penury; this nation that faces very harsh conditions, with its infrastructure destroyed, and a bloodstained future whose final prospect remains uncertain.

We hope that the reports of an Omani peace initiative are true, and that all parties will comply with it to end the bloodshed and curtail the losses, provided that the main party responsible for the war bears the full consequences and takes upon itself to rebuild the country and restore the Yemeni people’s hope for a better future.

“Otherwise, the revenge of this honorable and chivalrous and proud nation will be even worse than many may imagine. For Yemen was and will remain the graveyard of invaders. And those who have any sense will learn from the lessons of others,” concludes ‘Atwan.

End…

 

ENDED AS IT BEGAN: “As far as its form is concerned, Operation Decisive Storm has ended as it began – in an unexpected and ‘stormy’ manner, and via a Saudi decision based on a request by President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi,” notes ‘Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday’s Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

And we are supposed to believe that Hadi is the man who decides on war and peace on the Yemeni front.

As far as its content is concerned, four main aims were set for Operation Decisive Storm: (1) Expelling the Houthis and their supporters from the cities they had entered (2) stripping them off the heavy and medium weapons they had captured from the Yemeni army’s arsenal (3) restoring the ‘legitimate’ president [Hadi] to his residence in Sana’a or at least Aden; and (4) launching an inter-Yemeni dialogue in Riyadh based on the [2011] Gulf Initiative.

Today, the storm has subsided or died down without achieving any of its declared aims.

In the ‘overall tally’ presented by the spokesman for the Storm, statistics, and very high percentages were displayed: 98% of air defenses were destroyed; 80% of missiles; 90% of the command-and-control centers; a vast number of vehicles and bridges – so much that one should conclude that the Houthi phenomenon is now a mere chapter of ancient history.

But if these figures are accurate, why were the air strikes not followed by a ground war to finish off what Houthis remain, restore Hadi to his Presidential Palace in Sana’a, and manage a dialogue in Sana’a to implement the Gulf Initiative under the Gulf’s supervision?

There are one or more ‘hidden stitches’ in the official account of ending the war and its Storm. What, in particular, has transpired during the intensive political contacts that the decision-making capitals have witnessed in recent days? There was advice from Putin; pressure from Obama, and political initiatives from Algeria, Iran, and Oman; there were also moves by [former Yemeni foreign minister] Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi and efforts by [former South Yemeni president] Ali Nasser Mohammad in Cairo. There is hardly anyone who did not intervene to end this war, even Indonesia.

What convinced Riyadh to end its military operations? Did Washington make it clear to the Kingdom in a manner that left no room for doubt that it was ‘uncomfortable’ with the negative impact this Storm was having on the international anti-terrorist coalition?  Was it the deep American conviction, at least as far as Obama and his administration are concerned, that Iran should be dealt with as part of the solution, not only as a cause of the problem?  Did the Storm exceed the timeframe granted by Washington as an occasion [for Saudi Arabia] to flex muscles, regain confidence, project an image of power, and regain a measure of balance with Tehran after the Lausanne agreement? We do not know which of these American factors were decisive.

And what did Putin say to [Saudi King] Salman? Did he give an undertaking that Russia would join the list of  ‘guarantors’ of the Kingdom’s security and stability in confronting Tehran’s ‘expansion’ and its nuclear program? Did he read to him some chapters from the book of Russian/Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and warn him that Yemen could turn into a second Afghanistan, but this time for Saudi Arabia, not the Russian Federation? Did Putin undertake to work to bring the Houthis down – with the Iranians’ help – from the top of the tree they had climbed up, especially after reaching Aden?

And what about the international and humanitarian pressures exerted by the UN and the humanitarian and human rights organizations? These placed the Kingdom and its coalition members in ‘the eye of the storm’ as a result of the growing numbers of civilian deaths and the targeting of Yemen’s already impoverished industrial, educational, health, and other infrastructure.

Was it the feeling of being ‘let down’ after allies and ‘brothers’ walked away, rather than rushing to deploy their armies and ground forces, preferring to play the role of ‘honest broker’ and to abide by the rules of the democratic game in their countries (Pakistan)? Or was it the possible medium and long-terms domestic repercussions in light of the confessional overlap and common origins of the two countries’ inhabitants, especially in the Kingdom’s southern and eastern provinces?

What led the Kingdom to take the decision to end this war in this urgent and unexpected manner at a time when many assessments predicted that we were facing a prolonged crisis, and a war that was open to various possibilities – and, moreover, only hours after the decision to involve the Saudi National Guard in the Yemeni war?

The storm has ended, but the war in and on Yemen has still not come to an end. We may be closer to a ‘truce’ or ‘calming down’ formula in the absence of any accord or political solution. The irony is that the Storm whose aim was to end the Houthis, will, according to current speculation, end the ‘legitimate president’ [Hadi] instead. All eyes are now focused on PM Khaled Bahah’s potential future role.

The storm has ended, and we may rest assured that ‘decisiveness’ will not return. As for ‘hope,’ it lies in the Yemenis’ success in absorbing the lessons of the catastrophe that their country has experienced. The hope is that they will initiate a serious national dialogue, without foreign intervention and diktats whether from Iran or the Gulf, and with the aim of constructing a new political regime for Yemen that neither excludes nor marginalizes any of its constituents. This regime should lay the foundation for a democratic civilian state, consolidate security and stability, and place Yemen back on track to being Arabia Felix once again.

“So will the Yemenis prove that ‘wisdom is still Yemeni’ [as the Arab proverb says]? Or will they expose their country to regional and international storms and schemes once again?” asks Rintawi in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

HDP ELECTORAL MANIFESTO Murat Yetkin welcomes the pro-Kurdish leftist alliance HDP's electoral manifesto in centre-left Radikal: "The manifesto presented by HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag matches the party’s goal of moving beyond acting as a Kurdish party, and developing objectives for all of Turkey. This is what ‘normalization’ means; it entails having an opinion on the problems facing the entire country. Regardless of whether the HDP passes the 10% electoral threshold or not, it has already begun to normalize, and to enrich not only Kurdish, but Turkish politics as well."

Asli Aydintasbas sees a net gain for Turkey in centrist Milliyet: "The HDP has already become a Turkish party. Actually, the idea of uniting the left first came from imprisoned PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) leader Abdullah Ocalan. However, even Ocalan could not imagine that the HDP project would develop so rapidly and create its own dynamics. No one can tell the HDP anymore that 'you are a Kurdish party'. Its election manifesto was about all the problems facing Turkey, ranging from women's rights to the LGBT, from the minimum wage to the use of the Internet. Even this, namely, an ethnic-based movement turning into a political coalition that produces solutions to the country’s problems, represents a serious gain for Turkey."

Gungor Mengi calls for greater clarity from all sides in centrist Vatan: "Human rights and democracy cannot be realized via force and terror. The ruling AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) election manifesto says that there will be a transfer of authority to local administrations, and that the state system will be totally changed; so it must discuss in detail what this will result in and share its findings with the people. And the HDP must also make it clear whether [PKK] arms will be laid down for peace and security, and whether it will support the creation of a presidential system or not, rather than resort to vague slogans."

Fadime Ozkan emphasizes the need to lay down arms in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The Kurdish political movement is showing the courage and strength to address Turkey for the first time. This is a significant success for Turkish politics and the peace process. However, as in the case of the CHP (main opposition People’s Republican Party), the HDP also makes the mistake of repeating what has no equivalent, or what is already being done. What the HDP must now do is not to be provoked by a handful of marginal elements, but to see that the main body of the Turkish society has distanced itself from violence and has a problem not with the Kurds, but with the PKK, and that it support the peace process on condition that the PKK lays down its arms."

Abdulkadir Selvi gives credit to the president in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "If the HDP is talking about becoming a Turkish party today, they have come to this point along the path opened by Erdogan. It is possible to criticize Erdogan, even fight to prevent him from being elected president. But was he hostile to [the Kurds] you"?

 

ARMENIAN ISSUE: Melih Asik warns of a slippery slope in centrist Milliyet: "PM Davutoglu published the 'April 24th condolences' message [to the Armenians] in a hurry yesterday. He has come much closer to offering an apology. The 1915 incidents, which no one recalled during the first 50 years after the deportation, have come on to the world agenda with the [Armenian] ASALA terror since 1974. This issue has gradually turned into a crusade against our country. Those who ruled the country during the last 12 years could not find strength to defend the truth. Every year, several more steps back are taken."

Joost Lagendijk looks for bold leadership in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The calls on Turkey from foreign governments and parliaments to acknowledge the Armenian genocide are damaging. They are strengthening the nationalist reflex that denies any kind of mistake, and that weakens the brave attempts that seek to get Turkey to come to terms with this dark page of its history. After April 24th, we need fearless politicians who will dare speak the truth, and guide Turkey toward a better understanding of its history, while volunteering to regulate relations with neighbouring Armenia as well."

 

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz reviews the pre-agreement landscape: "The final nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has not yet been achieved, but some are optimistic that there might be an accord. The situation is characterized by substantial ups and downs. There have been major disagreements between the two main American political parties over the issue. The American side insists that in case of an agreement, nuclear sanctions will not be terminated, but will be lifted gradually. If that is the case, positive economic effects for Iran cannot be expected." 

Reformist Sharq glimpses at some developments in light of Lausanne: "The Lausanne statement has affected the political scene. President Putin's decision to lift the ban on delivering the S-300 air defence missile system, President Obama's supportive stance on the issue and the emergence of a coalition of eight Arab countries for the war on Yemen are some of the positive and negative consequences of the Lausanne statement." 

Conservative Resalat writes of a powerful Iran: "The acceptance of a powerful Iran is neither idealistic nor abstract; it is realistic. It is not a surprise that a pragmatist like Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter's presidency, has openly urged Bush and Obama to accept a powerful Iran and change their previous wrong path. In other words, whatever has forced America and other members of the P5+1 to sit around a table, negotiate and make concessions, shows their incapacity to confront a powerful Iran." 

 

YEMEN: Reformist Arman goes to the heart of the matter, "when the Houthis have the upper hand on the ground, they will go to negotiations with greater power. A new government will be installed in Yemen that will protect the interests of Shiites, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, Yemen has the potential of turning into another Syria and fall in the hands of Al-Qa’ida. If this happens, Iran will not lose; it is Saudi Arabia and its Western supporters that will be severely damaged. These factors have led Iran and Saudi Arabia to reach a common understanding on Yemen without negotiating with each other."

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami comments: "The Saudi attacks on Yemen have increased international odium for them and revealed Saudi incapacity to subdue the Yemeni people. Above all, the exposure of their brutal nature showed that they have surpassed the Zionists in the killing of a Muslim nation." 

Hard-line Keyhan expects Saudi Arabia to pay a heavy price: "After 28 days, the Yemen war has reached its end point. It is possible that the aggressor may continue for a few more days, as it has not achieved even its minimum goals in this unjust war. The Americans did whatever they could to prevent the defeat of Saudi Arabia, hence, they are partners in all the crimes committed against the innocent people of Yemen and should be held accountable. This war leaves a profound impact on our region. Saudi Arabia now has a serious enemy along its borders. From today, every action of this enemy against Saudi Arabia will be morally justified even from the perspective of international rights. The Saudi regime will pay a heavy political and security cost to overcome this reality." 

Conservative Khorasan sounds ominous: "The Saudi-led attack on Yemen was a proxy war by Israel against a part of the Muslim world. The Saudis, both in terms of military dominance and dignity, are the biggest losers of this crisis; Saudi princes should expect severe domestic and external shocks because of their historical mistake." 

 

IRGC: Hard-line Javan defends the IRGC: "By focusing on the activities of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC] and accusing it of violence, coup attempts, terror and being politicized some pro-liberal revisionist media outlets try to tarnish its popularity among the people. They are trying to accuse the IRGC of moving beyond its legal duties and responsibilities and deviating from its course." 

 

IRAN-WEST: Conservative Hemayat contends that the West does not give up its machinations: "After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, various conspiracies and hostile measures have been carried out against the Iranian nation in the shape of terror, bombings and imposed war. Since 1985, Western intelligence and security organizations have concluded that they cannot fight Iran and overthrow the people’s regime. The West deploys its pawns to crush Muslim countries. The war between Taleban and ISIS is a show aimed at achieving Western goals." 

 

EGYPT: Reformist E'temad sees a wider goal: "The Egyptian government seeks greater goals by sentencing ex-president Mursi to 20 years in jail; it wants to remove its opponents from the political scene through legal means. The Egyptian government not only deprives the leaders of one of the most important opposition political parties from participating in the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, but also denies them any political activities. In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood will not be able to use its influential political power in any future elections." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The end of the storm

2-The paradox of Egypt’s deep state

3-Under pressure from Washington

4-An agreement is possible

 

1-The end of the storm

 

In his letter yesterday to [Saudi Monarch]…Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi expressed his and all the Yemeni people's profound gratitude and appreciation for the momentous historic stance taken by the Kingdom and its allies in the coalition, one that has restored legitimacy to Yemen and blocked the path before the aggressors. He added that Yemen now wishes to move on to a new phase in which it turns the leaf on the past and focuses on reconstructing the country. This is why the coalition states have issued their statement declaring the end of Operation Decisive Storm after it has achieved all its aims, as explained by the coalition member states--Saudi al-Watan

 

Saudi Arabia was defeated in Yemen. It committed war crimes against the Yemenis. It killed children, women, and old folk. It destroyed installations, bridges, public buildings, and infrastructure. It suspended the daily cycle of life for families, workers, and students. But it was unable to achieve its declared aim of restoring 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi to power. Nor was it able to fulfil its undeclared mission of enabling al-Qa'ida to defeat the Yemeni people, or tear this proud nation apart along confessional or factional lines, and ignite a civil war-- Nahed Hattar in Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

After Operation Decisive Storm has achieved all of its set objectives, Saudi Arabia and its fellow coalition members have declared that it has ended, proclaims the editorial in a Saudi daily. Yemen can now proceed to rebuild itself and resume its natural role among its Arab brothers. The end of Operation Decisive Storm is a clear and total Saudi defeat, maintains a Jordanian commentator in a left-leaning Beirut daily. And its effects will not be confined to Yemen or the Arabian Peninsula; they will also have repercussions in Syria and Iraq, and will lead to changes inside the Kingdom itself, affecting both its regional and global role.

 

ALL AIMS ACHIEVED: "Operation Decisive Storm has ended after achieving its aims," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

It began in response to a call from Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi to achieve the following aims: Confront the aggression against Yemen committed by the Houthis and the forces loyal to Ali Saleh, which are also backed by foreign forces [Iran]; deter them from threatening the rest of Yemen’s provinces and cities; protect Yemeni legitimacy; sever the lines of supply of weapons, ammunition, and all sorts of foreign support to the Houthis and the deposed president's [Saleh’s] forces; destroy all their military capabilities; and protect Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries from any possible aggression from Yemen's enemies from within Yemen.

In his letter yesterday to [Saudi Monarch] the Servant of the Two Holy Shrines King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz, Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi expressed his and all the Yemeni people's profound gratitude and appreciation for the momentous historic stance taken by the Kingdom and its allies in the coalition, one that has restored legitimacy to Yemen and blocked the path before the aggressors. He added that Yemen now wishes to move on to a new phase in which it turns the leaf on the past and focuses on reconstructing the country.

This is why the coalition states have issued their statement declaring the end of Operation Decisive Storm after it has achieved all its aims, as explained by the coalition member states. The statement stressed the urgent need for resuming the political process based on UNSCR 2216, the [2011] Gulf Initiative, and the conclusions of the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

The statement also stressed the coalition's continued protection of civilians as well as its pursuit of the fight against terrorism and opposition to the Houthi militias and their allies’ military moves and operations, and its intention to prevent them from deploying the weapons they have looted from the army's camps or those they have smuggled into the country from outside Yemen.

In light of this, the Saudi Defense Ministry has issued a statement confirming that Saudi forces and those of the Kingdom’s sister states will end their participation in Operation Decisive Storm after Saudi troops have admirably fulfilled their duty in this regard.

Saudi Arabia and its fellow coalition members’ only aim was to protect Yemeni legitimacy in compliance with a request from the legitimate president [Hadi] and the Yemeni people, to deter Houthi aggression and repulse the foreign infiltration that had crept into Yemen, protect the Kingdom's borders, and destroy the military capabilities of the enemies of the Yemeni people. And all of these aims have been achieved, thank God.

Yemen will now enter a new phase of rebuilding and reconstruction. As a follow-up to its honorable role in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has already contributed 248 million dollars to relief work there.

The hope is that the dear Yemeni people will now regain their security and stability free from any foreign diktats, unite their ranks and rally around their legitimate leadership.

“A felicitous Yemen will then be able to return to fulfilling its natural role, together with its Arab brothers," concludes the daily.

End…

 

NO OTHER INTERPRETATION: "Saudi Arabia was defeated in Yemen," writes Jordanian commentator Nahed Hattar in Wednesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

This is the patently obvious result of the Saudi aggression on the Yemeni people, one that is open to no other interpretation.

After four weeks of black hatred, the aggression ceased with an announcement that Operation Decisive Storm had ended. But it failed to achieve any of its political aims. The [Houthi] Ansarullah did not bend under pressure from the barbaric bombardment. Their forces did not withdraw from any inch of the ground they have taken control of. Their legitimate struggle against al-Qa'ida terrorists in Hadramaut and elsewhere has not ceased.

Saudi Arabia was defeated in Yemen. It committed war crimes against the Yemenis. It killed children, women, and old folk. It destroyed installations, bridges, public buildings, and infrastructure. It suspended the daily cycle of life for families, workers, and students. But it was unable to achieve its declared aim of restoring 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi to power. Nor was it able to fulfil its undeclared mission of enabling al-Qa'idato defeat the Yemeni people, or tear this proud nation apart along confessional or factional lines, and ignite a civil war.

The Yemenis confronted the aggression with courage and dignity, without complaint or groaning from pain. They confronted it united and with patience, and prepared for the worst. As for those who backed the aggression, the dregs of the Muslim Brotherhood and other tattered political parties, they have only issued a verdict against themselves, denouncing themselves as traitors to the homeland and the people.

Saudi Arabia was defeated in Yemen. And its defeat was inevitable. It had only two options from the very start: The first was to be compelled to end the 'air strikes' without achieving any political aim, which would amount to complete defeat. The second was to be implicated in a ground aggression, which would have haemorrhaged Saudi Arabia and weakened Al Saud's hold on a kingdom that is already threatened with partition into four provinces: The occupied Yemeni provinces (Jizan, Najran and 'Assir); the occupied Bahraini provinces in eastern parts of the Arabian Peninsula; the colonized Hijaz; and Najd.

Al Saud ultimately chose to admit political defeat so as to save their Kingdom from an inevitable fate. And the irony is that those who supplied Riyadh with the ladder to climb down from the tree of its desperate aggression are those that Riyadh views as its enemies – Russia and Iran. Both moved to save Saudi Arabia from its madness, and chose the path of peaceful initiatives and calming the situation down.

While Moscow allowed an international resolution to pass that saved the Kingdom's 'face,' President Vladimir Putin pursued a policy intended to contain Saudi Arabia's suicide. He warned King Salman against the serious consequences of the aggression, and invited him to visit the Kremlin to reach an understanding. Russia is ready to guarantee Saudi Arabia's security in return for ending its wars in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Along this same path, and based on an understanding with Russia, Iranian diplomacy has proceeded to suggest a formula that would not only put out the fires in the Arabian Peninsula, but in the Arab East as well.

The failed Saudi aggression on Yemen was directly intended to prevent the Yemeni people from achieving their independence. It was aimed at preventing an Iranian/Russian presence in the Kingdom's neighboring countries. But panicked by Western recognition of Iran as a major regional power, and the Iranian/Russian alliance, Al Saudi opted to escalate against this axis in what they referred to as Operation Decisive Storm.

But that was a reflection of their phobia at the strategic transformations at the regional and international levels. These include: (1) The agreement between Tehran and the international community on a resolution of the nuclear file and lifting the siege imposed on the Islamic Republic. (2) Iran's move towards membership in the Shanghai defensive alliance, and Moscow's lifting of the freeze it imposed on the S-300 missile deal. (3) U.S. President Barack Obama's statement that the threats facing the Gulf states stem from within because of the occluded political and social horizon facing their peoples – and not from Iran.

After its defeat, Saudi Arabia has no option but to recognize the new regional and international balance of power. In fact, its future survival is now dependent on the strategic understandings it has reached with Moscow and Tehran.

After this defeat, the next goal will not be a new Operation Decisive Storm against Syria. It will be negotiations to end the conflict in this country under the ceiling of President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. The only discussion here will be about the procedural measures for bringing acceptable opposition factions into the national political process.

After the defeat, Saudi Arabia will have to confront a challenge it has often tried to avoid in Iraq, that of recognizing the new Iraqi state with its regional relations and its inevitable membership of the [Iran/Syria/Hizbollah] axis of resistance.

After this defeat, King Salman will head to Camp David to listen carefully this time to America’s diktats regarding the priority of domestic political, cultural, and religious reform. For the West, which has often used Wahhabism and its terrorist by-products as a political tool in our countries, is today feeling its own head.

"The old/Wahhabi/terrorist Saudi Arabia has turned into a threat to the entire world, and the world has no option but to put an end to the previous Saudi formula. It will either renew the regime or get rid of it," concludes Hattar.

Ends…

 

 

2-The paradox of Egypt’s deep state

 

As it pursues its war against the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s deep state is charging former president Mursi with crimes that it has committed on a much wider scale, notes today’s pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

The farcical and unfair prison sentence passed against former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammad Mursi yesterday (Tuesday) only serves to highlight the new Egyptian regime's existential crisis of legitimacy, argues the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. It exposes the manner in which the Egyptian judiciary has become a tool of repression in the regime's hands.

 

RECITING FROM THE QUR’AN: "Judge Ahmad Sabri Youssef of Cairo's Criminal Court yesterday passed a 20-year jail sentence on former Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi in the case known in the media as 'the events of al-Ittihadiyya'," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

Before passing his 'historic' sentence, the judge recited two verses from the Qur'an, which can be interpreted in various ways. But the simplest explanation of why he did so may be an attempt to deploy the Qur'an's symbolic weight to justify what Egypt’s official judicial mechanisms otherwise cannot.

The events of the case in which Mursi was sentenced to twenty years in prison occurred in December 2012, when clashes broke out between Muslim Brotherhood members and demonstrators opposed to the Complementary Constitutional Declaration that Mursi had issued the previous month.

Nine people were killed in these incidents, of which eight were Mursi supporters. Their families formed a league that filed legal suits against a number of Egyptian politicians, including former presidential candidate Hamdin Sabbahi, accusing them of inciting their supporters to demonstrate and lay siege to Ittihadiyya Presidential Palace.

The league also filed complaints against a number of journalists, including Wael al-Abrashi and Lamis al-Hadidi, accusing them of media incitement. But Egypt’s Public Prosecutor simply ignored the complaints of the families of Mursi's supporters who were killed, and accepted other complaints that concerned the only victim who was not one of his supporters, opposition journalist al-Husseini Abu-Deif.

The struggle over Egypt's presidency has had an enormous impact on the Egyptian judiciary. The decision to remove Public Prosecutor 'Abdelmajid Mahmoud who was linked to deposed president Husni Mubarak's regime was taken by Mursi during his presidency. But the Egyptian 'deep state' responded by reappointing Mahmoud. And after he resigned, it appointed another Public Prosecutor, Hashim Barakat on July 10th 2013, who was sworn in before interim president 'Adly Mansour.

The result has been that a long list of charges has been levelled at Mursi, most of which lead to the death sentence. These include 'participating in the detention and torture of citizens,' 'acting to kill,' 'bullying, displaying power, and ‘intimidation of citizens,' 'storming prisons,' 'contacts and attempts at contacts with Hamas,' and so on.

But the dark paradoxes of Egypt’s judiciary are just a product of the country’s major political paradoxes. Heading the list, of course, is that all of these charges (with the exception of that of contacting Hamas of course!) which are terribly unfair, unbalanced, and unjust, apply almost equally to the head of the current regime and the heads of his security forces who are responsible for ending peaceful [Muslim Brotherhood] sit-ins in Rabi’a al-'Adawiyya and an-Nahda Squares using excessive force, and causing the death of hundreds of protestors.

To this should be added a long list of items, all of which indicate that the ancien Egyptian regime has returned and is seeking revenge. But it is using much more vigorous engines of tyranny. From this perspective, the Egyptian judicial system's decision to exonerate deposed president Husni Mubarak and its verdict clearing him of the charge of shedding the blood of hundreds of demonstrators killed during the [2011] revolution against his regime when he headed the executive power, contrast with the death and prison sentences passed against Mursi and his supporters – all this is but an additional detail that confirms what many wish to hide out of hatred for the Brotherhood.

The facts indicate that the Egyptian regime does not seem very concerned about whether people believe its charges, as much as it is interested in passing a death sentence on ideas as such. Foremost amongst these ideas, is that of electing a civilian president, let alone one who belongs to a political current; and perhaps also applying the death sentence to the very notion that the Egyptians' can choose their president freely.

The sentence passed against the former president will only aggravate the Egyptian regime's existential crisis. Mursi remains an elected president who was removed by a military coup. The accumulation of caricature-like charges and death and prison sentences, and even the world's acceptance of the rule of force in Cairo, cannot alter this simple fact.

"Unlike people, the truth cannot be imprisoned," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Under pressure from Washington

 

The upcoming Camp David U.S./Gulf summit is likely to witness growing American pressure on the leaders of the Arab Gulf states, predicts Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Clear messages in the run-up to the May Camp David summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and the leaders of the Arab Gulf states point to the conclusion that the Gulf leaders will be subjected to strong American pressure, predicts a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Syrian Beirut daily.

 

EXPECTED TO MEET: "The Gulf states' leaders are expected to meet with the U.S. president at a summit held at the latter's invitation in Camp David on May 13th," notes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in the pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But why did President Obama summon the Gulf leaders to this summit? And is there any relation between this invitation, and Operation Decisive Storm that is being waged by Saudi Arabia and its allies on Yemen? And what are the expected subjects of the talks between President Obama and the Gulf leaders?

It is difficult for analysts and observers to provide an adequate answer to such questions in the absence of any official information regarding what may happen at the summit. But one may explore the political climate that is being prepared, and consequently develop some notion of what the Obama administration intends to propose. This is possible from the messages that have begun to emerge in public clearly and forcefully, and that are only getting clearer and more forceful as the date for the summit approaches:

- The first such message may be gleaned from the reemerging interest in the Gulf states' role in the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., and from the U.S. media's reinvigorated debate of an issue that many believed had long been shelved or set aside in favor of strengthening relations with the Gulf states. And this will naturally result in a new wave of U.S. pressure on the Gulf governments.

- The second message can be derived from President Obama's public and unprecedented accusation of certain Gulf states of being behind the escalating violence in Libya. It is also only natural to believe that the timing of his statements less than three weeks before the summit, together with the reinvigorated discussion of the Gulf governments' relationship to the 9/11 attacks, was no coincidence. Nor was the time between these messages a mere unintended coincidence.

- The third message was President Obama's announcement that the U.S. was not surprised by Russia's decision to supply Iran with S-300missiles, and that the surprise was that Russia had delayed delivering them for so long. The U.S. president also said that these missiles were defensive, and were not included in the sanctions regime, and that when Moscow froze the deal with Iran, this was in compliance with a request from the U.S. president, not because international law forbade these arms from being sold to Iran.

We know that when President Putin commented on his decision to unfreeze the deal with Iran, he said that the missiles were defensive in nature and part of the effort to bolster Iran's deterrent capabilities, especially after the outbreak of the war on Yemen, as Putin put it. And this means that this move was also aimed at the Gulf governments, either by Moscow or by Washington; and it may be intended as a joint [U.S./Russian] message to the leaders of Gulf states.

"The fact that these indications have occurred at this point in time less than three weeks before the summit, and what is common between them regarding the Obama administration's attitude towards the Gulf governments, provide us with a good idea of what will take place at the summit and its likely results," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

4-An agreement is possible

 

The competing Palestinian factions Fateh and Hamas must find a new path towards a revived national program, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian daily al-Ayyam

 

The failure to achieve an inter-Palestinian Fateh/Hamas agreement on any major issues stems from the fact that all the main issues are inter-related; therefore agreement on any one issue cannot be achieved without agreement on all, maintains a leading Palestinian commentator. But such a comprehensive agreement is still possible and can be implemented in phases based on an agreed timetable.

 

THE MAIN ISSUE: “In this article, I will focus on what prevents the agreed Temporary Leadership Framework (TLF) from convening,” writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

I will thus ignore important issues, such as the existence of interest groups that have invested in the inter-Palestinian split, have grown in influence and wealth during it, and want it to continue. These groups exist inside and outside the PA and the various factions.

I will also ignore issues such as the fact that the president [Abbas] wants reconciliation on his own terms that would insure his exclusive and sole leadership; that each of Fateh and Hamas wants a reconciliation that eliminates the other, thereby guaranteeing their sole control of decision-making and positions of influence; and the roles of foreign parties, especially Israel.

Any genuine national unity first requires reconstruction and reform of the PLO’s institutions in a manner that is consistent with the new realities, makes use of the acquired expertise, and ensures the participation of the various shades of the political and social spectrum, including the Diaspora, women, and the youth.

The starting point is the PLO. It is the supreme political point of reference, the sole legitimate representative, and the legitimacy that is recognized as such at the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels. Moreover, Israel’s ability to influence it and its decisions is less than its ability to influence the PA. This is especially true if – as it is supposed to do – decides to base some of its leaders and its institutions inside the homeland, and others outside, provided that an important part of them are located in Gaza, since the occupation there assumes the form of siege, aggression, and incursions, which is different from the direct occupation of the West Bank.

And the starting point in the PLO lies in the activation of the TLF as called for by the Cairo [Fateh/Hamas] Agreement. That agreement states that the ‘PLO’s committees’ should be activated as a temporary leadership framework whose decisions cannot be suspended, provided that this does not encroach on the PLO’s Executive Committee’s powers, until the Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections are held.

The TLF has only convened two or three times since and at long intervals from each other, and without assuming any of its agreed-upon powers. This is despite the fact the agreement states that it should convene within five weeks of signing the [2014] ‘Shati’ Declaration.’ So what has obstructed the TLF from convening despite that the Palestinian ‘consensus’ calls for this, and even though it would have provided the all-inclusive national institution that could organize a comprehensive national dialogue and assume responsibility for reaching decisions regarding on all the Palestinian people’s affairs?

People close to the president say that he sent a message to Egypt after the Shati’ Declaration was issued. In that message, he asked for a TLF meeting; but he did not receive a written response. The response came, it said that Cairo welcomes a TLF meeting, but without Khaled Mish’al’s participation because of the enmity between him and the Egyptian leadership. And that meant that the meeting could not be held because Hamas would not attend without its Politburo head; nor would it be possible to hold the meeting in Gaza because this would require Hamas’s Qatar-based leadership to come to Gaza via Egypt.

In light of all this, there were proposals to hold the TFL meetings in Kuwait when the latter headed the Arab summit; or at the Arab League since it is supposed to be the Arabs’ ‘home’; or in Amman because this is where the PNC is located; or in Algeria because it has good relations with all parties.

But the weak point of all of these proposals is that they have dealt with the issue of the TLF meeting as if it were a technical matter stemming from the inability to find a venue, not as a political problem having to do with numerous issues without a solution for which the hoped-for result cannot be achieved.

- The first issue obstructing a TFL meeting – and it is one of the issues preventing the president from seriously trying to convene it – has to do with the extent to which he may be ready to suffer the consequences of Hamas and Islamic Jihad joining the PLO, since that might lead to the withdrawal of American, Israeli, and perhaps even European and international, recognition of the PLO.

In fact, other sanctions may be imposed on the PLO since there is an international position demanding that Hamas and Islamic Jihad should accept the International Quartet’s terms before taking part in a national unity government, or joining the PLO. The 2009 Palestinian national dialogue in Cairo was foiled as a result of the two organizations’ refusal to accept the Quartet’s preconditions, and the national unity government formed after the 2007 Mecca Agreement was boycotted for the same reason.

Yet there is a view worth considering here that claims that conditions are different from what they were during the 2007-2009. This is because the illusions of that time regarding the possibility of resuming bilateral [Israeli-Palestinian] negotiations and reaching an agreement no longer exist. At the time, inter-Palestinian reconciliation was viewed as a factor that could help to launch the peace process, undermining the pretext used by the Israeli government after the split, namely, that there is no Palestinian partner since President Abu Mazin no longer represents all the Palestinians and his PA no longer rules Gaza.

Now, and after the results of the Israeli elections, there are no illusions left about resuming bilateral negotiations. The European and international position is less intransigent towards Hamas and Islamic Jihad joining the PLO. However, new illusions have emerged regarding the possibility of imposing an international solution on both sides via negotiations to be held as part of an international conference and setting a timeframe for ending the occupation.

This gives the Palestinian leadership a margin of manoeuvre during which it may contribute to these efforts but it would be obstructed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad joining the PLO without agreeing to the Quartet’s unfair preconditions that are prejudicial to the Palestinian people’s rights.

One attempt to resolve this problem suggests distinguishing between Hamas and Islamic Jihad joining the TFL, and joining the PLO. In other words, attending TFL meetings does not mean immediately joining the PLO; moreover, the PLO Executive Committee will remain the final and legitimate decision-maker until PNC elections are held and the new institutions are formed.  So the TFL can meet and reach an accord on issues that do not become effective until the PLO Executive Committee endorses them.

But will Washington and Tel Aviv accept this formula? And will Palestinian decisions remain hostage to their acceptance? Or is it time to adopt a new approach that steers clear of mistaken wagers?

Whether this formula is sufficient or not and it can be a temporary way out, it is no substitute for an agreement over a comprehensive package that includes agreement over a political program for the PA/Palestinian-State that safeguards national rights, is based on international law and UN resolutions, and respects signed agreements if the Israeli government respects them as well, but without abiding by the Quartet’s preconditions.

Anyway, we ought to bear in mind that successive Israeli governments have totally bypassed these agreements, at least since Yitzhak Rabin’s [1995] assassination up till now. Nothing remains of them except the Palestinians’ commitments.

- The second issue has to do with Egypt’s opposition to convening a TFL meeting in light of the continuing enmity between Egypt and Hamas. It would be futile to belittle this problem or to try to be ‘clever’ and seek another venue for the meeting. This is because Abu Mazin [Abbas] will not risk angering Egypt, which is the sponsor of the reconciliation agreement and has huge weight and an important role in Palestinian affairs in light of its geographic location.

The appropriate way out lies in finding a solution for the Egyptian/Hamas enmity by creating sufficient distance between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is at loggerheads with the Egyptian regime. The idea is that Hamas is part of the Palestinian national movement and, given the justice of the Palestinian cause and its need and ability to secure the backing of all Arab parties no matter how intense the disagreements between them, this requires that no Palestinian party should intervene in internal Arab affairs.

The Palestinians should recognize the current presidents and rulers whether or not these are chosen by their respective peoples. In return, the Arab states should not intervene in internal Palestinian affairs. This should go in tandem with the Palestinian people, their leadership, and various forces’ concern to defend the right to self-determination, development, justice, democracy, and respect for human rights and basic human freedoms.

In this regard, this policy of steering clear that the PLO is pursuing in Egypt’s case applies to the events of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya as well. It is no use for the PLO’s leadership to be all in favor of neutrality in Syria but to side together with Hamas with Operation Decisive Storm and Yemeni ‘legitimacy.’

- The third issue obstructing the TFL meeting is that Fateh believes that the PLO – the Palestinian people’s most important historical achievement under its leadership – is the last united institution led by Fateh without any serious competitor. It is unlikely that Fateh will allow its main competitor, Hamas, to join the PLO at the time when the latter is in control of the Gaza Strip and on occasions that are not so rare makes no secret of its intention to control the PA and the PLO’s means of decision and leadership.

Therefore, if we wish to convince Fateh to open the PLO’s gates to Hamas, and if we wish to convince Hamas to relinquish its control of Gaza, this must be within the framework of a new vision and an agreement that includes the ‘bases of the supreme national interest’ (the National Covenant) a national program, and the bases of partnership.

It must ensure the participation of all shades of the political spectrum within the context of implementing an accord-based democracy that matches the special character of the Palestinian situation, based on the realization that Palestine is in the phase of national liberation and that priority belongs to ending the occupation and defeating the settler colonial project.

What we may conclude from the above is that an agreement to convene the TFL is impossible. In other words, it would be impossible to agree on one thing without agreeing on everything. This is because all the issues and problems are connected to each other.

“But it is possible, and it must be the case, that an agreement must include numerous issues as a single package, based on the understanding that their implementation will be in phases and an agreed timetable,” concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 22.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Heads bowed

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Wednesday editions with Israel's Remembrance Day for its fallen soldiers and victims of terrorist attacks. All the papers dedicate most of their pages to the day of mourning, which moves sharply to celebrate Independence Day this evening.

A siren was sounded at 8 PM on Tuesday and again on Wednesday morning. President Reuven Rivlin opened Memorial Day ceremonies at the Western Wall in Jerusalem with a plea for Israelis to fight for the country's character, not just its survival. He urged Israelis to consider the meaning of the sacrifice of the nation's 23,320 fallen, calling on Israelis to honor their memory by fighting for the 'essence and idea for which the State of Israel was established.' 'The deaths of those who died defending our home force us to deepen our commitment to building that home as a more just home, a more compassionate home, a home where not only those who have fallen, but all those within it are equal,' Rivlin said.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu mourned the loss of Israel's fallen soldiers at the Yad Labanim memorial in Jerusalem. He spoke of his personal grief for his brother Yoni, who died in the Entebbe rescue mission 39 years ago, and told bereaved families that they could take some solace knowing that their sons and daughters had died ensuring the future of the Jewish people. 'There is no future for the Jewish people without the state of Israel,' he said. 'As the threats from our enemies to destroy our homeland grow, our determination to defend our homeland grows,' Netanyahu said. 'We saw this last summer during Operation Protective Edge, such courage, unity and sacrifice,' Netanyahu added, referencing the 67 IDF soldiers who died during the Gaza war.

In other news – which is barely mentioned in any of the newspapers – Britain and France urged the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday to set a framework for peace between Israel and the Palestinians as council member New Zealand said it had started working on a draft resolution to kick-start the process. France said last month that it planned to begin talks on a draft text to lay out 'parameters' for ending the Middle East conflict and that it hoped to win over the United States, which has traditionally shielded Israel from any UN action.

'It's the responsibility of this council to adopt a consensual and balanced resolution that sets the parameters of a final status and a timeline for the negotiations,' French UN Ambassador Francois Delattre told a Security Council meeting. France and New Zealand signaled that now was the time for the Security Council to act after Israel held its election last month and before the U.S. presidential campaign ramps up ahead of a November 2016 poll.

'We have been working on a text that might serve the purpose of getting negotiations started,' said New Zealand's UN Ambassador Jim McLay. He added that New Zealand was prepared to see how the French-led push for a resolution played out first. 'We have not seen the latest French text, but if it has a chance of succeeding, New Zealand stands ready to engage and to be helpful,' McLay added.

Britain's UN Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant said that Britain saw merit in a council resolution 'setting out the parameters for a peaceful and negotiated solution.' U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power said Washington remained committed to a two-state solution. 'It is critically important that leaders urgently reengage in efforts to achieve peace, which is the most effective way to prevent such tension from escalating, as it has too many times before,' Power told the Security Council.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, the Palestinian Finance Ministry has announced that it will pay Palestinian Authority civil servants on Wednesday, after deductions were made to their salaries over recent months. From December through March, the Authority paid only 60 percent of the salaries because of the Israeli freeze on tax revenue transfers to the Palestinian Authority. On Monday, Israel handed over nearly two billion shekels. In Ramallah, Palestinian officials are promising to start paying debts owed to the Palestinian private sector beginning next week, after the Authority had taken out loans to continue operating.

 

BULLY THE BULLY: Writing in Globes, Zvi Stepak says that a policy of containment regarding Iran will not work, since the Islamic Republic has a history of concealment and deceit.

"Iran, it seems, is the world's leading terrorist superpower. Directly or via a proxy, its long tentacles reach everywhere imaginable. In Syria, Iran is involved in helping to keep Bashar Assad in power; in Lebanon, the Islamic Republic uses Hizbollah to exert its influence; it is behind the Yemenite rebels who could potentially take control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; in Iraq, it has joined forces with the government and hopes one day to turn its former enemy into a protectorate; and it threatens Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and even Jordan. The entire world, it seems, is within Iran's terrorist grasp.

Experts are divided over the benefit of the framework agreement that Iran and the six world powers reached in Lausanne – a statement that still needs to be forged into a final agreement by the end of June. Some, like former Mossad chief and National Security Adviser Ephraim Halevy, say that Iran has made some significant compromises. Others, like nuclear scientists Professor Uzi Even, say that there is a major lack of understanding on the part of the West, since it is the heavy water facility at Arak, where Iran can manufacture a plutonium bomb, which is the real threat that the Islamic Republic poses. The ink on the Lausanne agreement had not yet dried before Iran reiterated that it would not sign any agreement that did not ensure the immediate and full lifting of economic sanctions and that it would not agree to international inspection of its military facilities.

Israel, for its part, has adopted a policy of containment on several fronts. In Lebanon, it is trying to contain the threat posed by Hizbollah and in Gaza; it is trying to contain the threat posed by Hamas. One could say that its policy regarding the Palestinian Authority is also one of containment.

It is possible to agree with this policy and it is possible to reject it. But a policy of containment of the Iranian threat is a very different kettle of fish. Iran is a terrorist state, a religious fanatical state, which is seeking to become a regional superpower and which openly talks about the need to destroy the State of Israel. Over the past 35 years, Iran has proved itself to be duplicitous and untrustworthy; it has concealed and deceived the international community on too many occasions. Iran is not a country that can be trusted.

We are reassured that there will be tight supervision of any deal with Tehran. But why should we believe this? By its very nature, supervision becomes less tight and less rigorous over the years; inspectors come and inspectors go. The Iranians are experts at finding loopholes and Achilles heels. And let's assume that the inspectors discover that Iran has violated its undertakings. What then? Will sanctions be applied anew? Will the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities be bombed? No. My guess is that there will always be an excuse for any violation. The Iranians will claim that the violation is merely a technical matter and that there's no need for the West to be upset. And that will be that until the next violation, which will also be accepted as 'technical.' After all, no one wants war and fatalities.

When it comes to Iran, the overall picture is crystal clear. Iran does not really need nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that is not the reason it has invested so heavily in its nuclear program over the past two decades. Everyone knows exactly what its goals are. Everything else is technical details: the number of centrifuges, the types of centrifuges, the percentage to which Iran enriches uranium and so on. These may be important details, but they are not the main issue. The main issue is that it is patently clear what direction Iran is heading. Under these circumstances, trying to buy 10-15 years of quiet – which will be followed by God knows what – is like simply closing one's eyes and hoping the problem disappears. U.S. President Barack Obama is a great believer in problem-resolution via peaceful means. So am I. But in the case of Iran, common sense and past experience must lead us to one clear and inescapable conclusion: when dealing with a bully, you need to act like a bully and you need to be smart.

Iran would never have agreed to participate in the G5+1 talks if it were not for the sanctions and for the regime's fear of domestic strife. All of that will change in one fell swoop the moment sanctions are lifted. All that Iran will have to do then is wait for propitious international circumstances before it charges toward military nuclear capability – and then it will present the world with a fait accompli.

World leaders – especially Obama – must have a clear message for the Iranians: You don't need nuclear capability for peaceful purposes, we don't believe you. Close all of your nuclear facilities. If not, there will be no sanction relief and we will bomb you. This would be a high-risk policy from an Israeli perspective, but the dangers posed to the Jewish state by the Lausanne agreement are far greater."

Ends…

 

A PETULANT PROTEST: Writing on the Walla! website, Ilil Shahar says that Israel's decision to send a low-level delegation to a Russian ceremony marking the anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany – apparently to protest the S-300 deal with Iran – is a petulant and ill-advised protest.

"The announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin that his country will go ahead with the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran has – quite justifiably – greatly chagrined Israel. Putin decided to sign the deal with Iran eight years ago, but, due to pressure from Israel and the United States, it was put on ice for several years. This advanced system would make it much harder for anyone to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, if and when the decision was taken to do so.

Israel's response to the decision is somewhat odd. In a briefing for journalists, it was announced that Israel had decided to scale down its representation at an event that Putin will host on May 9, marking the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. Instead of sending a ministerial-level delegation, headed by the Minister of Immigrant Absorption Sofa Landver, Israel would only be represented by its ambassador in Moscow, Dorit Golender.

The linkage that Israeli decision-makers have made between the two issues is peculiar. Israel should send a high-ranking delegation – perhaps even higher than the junior minister it was planning to send – to an event marking the defeat of Nazism. It must encourage others to mark such events, especially at a time when anti-Semitism is rearing its ugly head in Europe once again. From a historical perspective, it is important to remind the world again and again about the horrors of Nazism and what the Nazis did to the Jews and others.

Events of this kind help to keep World War II and the Holocaust in the minds of generations that did not experience the tragedy first hand. To a certain extent, ceremonies of this kind – and the level of delegation that Israel sends to them – remind the world of the connection between victory over the Nazis and the establishment of the State of Israel – a national homeland for Jews everywhere.

The defeat of Nazism is something that is very close to Putin's heart. Two years ago, he paid a special visit to Israel for the unveiling of a monument to the Red Army's victory over Germany. The strength of relations between two countries is measured in terms of their ability to understand the heritage of each other and to honor that heritage – by drawing a very clear line between contemporary political issues and shared historical values.

How would Israel feel if a European country were to boycott or send a low-level delegation to a Holocaust Memorial Day ceremony to protest Israel's settlement construction policy or some other element of Israeli policy? Or to protest the massive destruction to Gaza during Operation Protective Edge, for that matter?

When Putin decided to go ahead with the sale of the S-300s to Iran, he did not do so in order to harm Israel. Russia's economic situation is dire and it needs the money it will get from the sale. If approval of the deal was designed to harm anyone, it's U.S. President Barack Obama, whose relationship with Putin is extremely strained. In addition, it is important to remember that this is not an offensive weapon which would allow Iran to attack Israel; they are anti-aircraft missiles which will make it harder for anyone to attack Iran – an attack that Putin in any case opposes, since he believes it would do more harm than good.

Israel is right to protest the sale of the S-300 to Iran and it must maintain a robust diplomatic dialogue with all levels of the Russian leadership. But the apparent attempt to protest by lowering the level of representation at a ceremony marking the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany is not the way to do it."

Ends…

 

THE DISASTER JUDAISM WON’T SURVIVE: Writing in Haaretz, in an article not published in the English Edition, Tomer Persico warns that, if Israel becomes exclusively 'Jewish'; democracy will be dealt a bitter blow, and Judaism will become synonymous with apartheid, oppression and despotism.

"Five weeks after the election, we can declare the advent of a new genre among those who write about Israel in the international media: the lamentation. It’s hard to find a media outlet, certainly in the Western democracies, that hasn’t given a platform to a writer who will explain, whether with sentimentality or cold didacticism, that in the wake of the shelving of the two-state-for-two-peoples vision, Israel will not be able to continue being both Jewish and democratic.

Examples include Jonathan Freedland, a senior editor and columnist in The Guardian; David Blair in The Telegraph; Bettina Marx on the Deutsche Welle website; Michael Cohen in The Boston Globe; Dana Milbank in The Washington Post; and of course Thomas Friedman in The New York Times. All of them point out in plain language why the demographics between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean will leave two options and two only in the future: either Jewish tyranny or binational democracy. The word 'apartheid' is also increasingly coming into use in connection with Israel. On April 13, Vox.com published a long article by Max Fisher whose headline summed up the matter clearly: 'Israel’s dark future: Democracy in the Jewish state is doomed.'

Let’s leave to one side the question of how likely it is that these nightmare scenarios will be realized, and concentrate on the present. The approach that is gaining ground right now, which pits Israel’s Judaism against its democracy, is genuine cause for concern. The current situation, in which important voices are eulogizing Israeli democracy and viewing Judaism as little more than a fading ethnic phenomenon, in the best case, and as a license to apartheid, in the worst case, betokens the crisis that has already struck us: the ugly distortion of Jewish culture in the early 21st century.

When our best friends, the countries with which we like to boast that we 'share values,' increasingly perceive Israel’s Judaism as an antithesis to the state’s democratic character and a threat to the liberal approach and equality of rights to which Israel committed itself in its Declaration of Independence – it appears that we are closer than ever to having the Jewish tradition relegated to the abhorrent status of communism in the past and of Salafi Islam in the present. We are witnessing Judaism being tarred-and-feathered, and the charges will stick to it more than any anti-Semitic calumny in the past, simply because this time no blood libel will be involved.

In November 1975, when Israeli President Chaim Herzog tore up United Nations Resolution 3379, he was protesting the equation of Zionism with racism. Forty years later, and after an election campaign in which Herzog’s son was defeated in his bid to become prime minister, the Western world is becoming used to thinking that Judaism is tyranny.

Most tragic of all, perhaps, is that not only internationally but in Israel itself the distinction between the state’s Jewish character and its democratic regime is growing more acute. According to data of the Israel Democracy Institute, in the past five years there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of Israel’s Jewish citizens who consider the fusion of democracy and Judaism important. If in 2010, 48.1 percent of Jewish citizens replied that the two elements are equally important to them, in 2012 this fell to 41.9 percent, and in 2014, it was 24.5 percent. At the same time, the proportion of Israeli Jews for whom the Jewish element is the most important rose to as high as 38.9 percent; 33.5 percent of the respondents opted for democracy as most important.

The story here is not only the fact that for so many, Judaism 'outranks' democracy in importance, though that is a disturbing situation in itself. The crux of the matter is that for the majority of Israel’s citizens the belief that the two of them can exist simultaneously is becoming increasingly impossible. The tragedy, then, is that, as in the Western world, in Israel, too, more and more people consider 'Judaism' and 'democracy' to be mutually exclusive entities.

The debacle here is above all cultural: It concerns the failure of Israeli society to forge a Judaism that is substantively democratic, a Judaism that self-evidently does not contradict democracy but, on the contrary, buttresses it. Instead, Judaism is being shaped as a violent ethnic identity, a Spartan religion of a nation of masters, an atavistic, nationalist entity, which instead of conducting a dialogue with modernity is choosing to divest itself of liberal traits it had already internalized, including some that were always ingrained in it.

This cultural debacle will become a historical disaster if, heaven forbid, Israel truly becomes exclusively 'Jewish' in the future. Democracy will obviously suffer in that case, and along with it the population between the Jordan and the sea. A terrible period will ensue, but as with every past tyranny, this one, too, will collapse. When that happens, the true tragedy will be revealed: It will emerge that for the whole world, Judaism has become synonymous with apartheid and occupation, violence and oppression, despotism and subjugation. Judaism has survived many disasters. This is one disaster it will not survive."

Ends…

 

 

HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY?: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that, as Israel marks its 67th year of independence, it is a country without borders, with one foot stuck in the throat of another nation.

"A grumbling, angry, scared, divided and hate-filled country is marking its independence today. A country without borders, with one foot stuck in the throat of another nation, is celebrating its success in reaching its 67th year.

Independence Day is an Israeli holiday, in other words the holiday of Israeli Jews. As though it were a religious holiday. Because the independent state is still waging a 'war of survival' against roughly one fifth of its citizens. Although this country won international recognition, it behaves as though it is still a candidate for such status. As though the community that approved its independence may revoke recognition of it, or harm its sovereignty.

Time after time, Israel invents a new test of the international community’s loyalty to its decision. For example, rejecting the existence of a Palestinian state is a test for recognition of Israel’s right to exist. In other words, anyone who supports a Palestinian state is automatically overturning Israel’s right to exist. Never mind, the nations of the world are suspected of Jew-hatred in any case.

But it’s also a test for the Jews, in Israel and worldwide. Here the sword divides two worlds. Support for Palestinian independence revokes the title of 'Zionist' from both Israeli and non-Israeli Jews. Because anyone who is not a Zionist, according to the state, is displaying defective Judaism. After all, Zionism is the diplomatic and political Jewish infrastructure, without which there is no reason for the existence of the Jewish state as a national entity, and not solely a religious one.

But Israel isn’t satisfied with fulfilling the Zionist dream; it is trying to be the refuge for all the world’s Jews. The problem is that by its definition as a Zionist state, only Zionist Jews can consider Israel a country of refuge. The Jews of France, the United States and Great Britain, who identify firstly – and sometimes exclusively – with the country of their citizenship, are considered non-Zionists and in any case anti-Israel, as if they are questioning the reason for the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

The paradox inherent in this equation is that Israel is the only country that is in need of dual recognition – that of the international community, which is already in its pocket, and that of the Jewish people, the part that has yet to see the Zionist light. This paradox is placed like a millstone on the shoulders of every Jew who lives outside Israel, whether he is a yored (a Jew who has left Israel) or a Jew who does not intend to 'make aliyah.'

Each of them is a traitor to the idea of the Jewish state. He is eroding not only the demographic foundation required to maintain a Zionist majority in Israel, he is also questioning the principle of the 'country of refuge' and the very claim that Israel is the only country where Jews can realize their Judaism. After all, what’s the point of a country of refuge if the potential clients turn their backs on it?

This identity crisis has characterized the state since its establishment, and it fires the state’s insatiable pursuit of recognition of its raison d'être. But it is precisely this pursuit that fuels the doubt. Can a country that is unsure of its identity be considered independent? Is a nation-state that is unable to convince most of the nation to settle in it allowed to describe itself as a country of refuge, and to base the reason for its independent existence on that?

These questions do not arise in any other country. Because independent countries are countries that belong to their citizens, all their citizens, even those whose ethnic or religious origins lie elsewhere. On the other hand, a country that conditions its right to exist on the loyalty of Jews who are citizens of other countries will find it hard to convince even itself of its independence. It will always doubt its ability to realize its vision. Israel’s independence will be complete the moment it agrees to recognize the independence of Diaspora Jewry and their right to decide where they will live, and makes do with being the state of the Israelis, those who live within the sovereign borders that were recognized by the international community."

Ends…

 

WHY WE HAD TO FIGHT IN GAZA: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Gil Troy says that, as he mourns Israel's fallen soldiers, he also reminds himself why last summer's war in the Gaza Strip was unavoidable and just.

"Soldiers died so that I and my family may live.

I approach this Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Remembrance Day, feeling inadequate and guilty. Our oldest son turned 18 on the eve of Remembrance Day. Our joy in him presents a particularly devastating contrast, especially this year; as the parents, grandparents and siblings of those killed this summer mourn 67 young heroes his age from the Gaza War, among the 116 soldiers and civilians killed this year. 'They all look like kids from my high school,' our 14-year-old said this summer when seeing photographs honoring those killed. I try to identify with each of the new mourners intensely even as I know that I have (thankfully) no way of accessing such anguish and, alas, no way of helping them cope with their infinite, unfathomable, loss.

The guilt is compounded because Palestinian terrorists have targeted us all. The terrorism victims who died literally paid the price for me, my friends, my loved ones, or a different stranger in the wrong place at the wrong time. The soldiers died so that I and my family may live.

On Sunday, Yedioth Ahronoth published some writings by a fallen soldier, detailing his goals as he became a sergeant. Daniel Pomerantz was one of the Golani soldiers killed in Shujaiyeh this summer. A real kid, not some superhero, he wanted to work on staying fit, getting stronger, cursing less. He would consider himself successful if 'my soldiers will enjoy themselves as much as is possible in an army, if they will respect me, and if they will become good, disciplined soldiers, and the best fighters they can be.' And, he wrote, 'I am willing to give my soldiers everything and anything,' using the Hebrew word 'hakol.' Pomerantz, along with the other 23,319 fallen soldiers and victims of terrorism we mourn today, certainly gave it all. The brutality of our situation, the cruelty of a world that consumes such beautiful people, is heartbreaking yet inspiring.

Fallen heroes like Daniel give us the gift of life. This year it is clearer than most. They died so rockets would stop falling on my cousin’s kibbutz, Nirim. They died so no rockets would reach us in Jerusalem. They died so that Hamas’s Mass-Murder-By-Tunnel plan would only remain an elaborate plot The New York Times and other media outlets can continue to ignore, rather than a bloody reality memorialized today. And they died not only to stop the Hamas killers from Gaza, but to prevent murder from West Bank terrorists and east Jerusalem terrorists, from Hizbollahfanatics and Islamic State jihadists, from Iranians and Syrians, from enraged individuals and standing armies.

Mourning is not enough. Thanking these heroes – or now their loved ones – is a moral necessity. We also must remember why they fought because much of the world has forgotten.

In too many headlines, in too many hearts, the Gaza war of just months ago is not about Hamas attack tunnels and Qassam rockets targeting civilians. It is only about an exaggerated Palestinian death toll, blurring together terrorists who fought, random citizens who died of disease or old age, with the unfortunate number of innocent bystanders who perished in that awful, preventable war – which never would have happened without repeated attacks from Hamas and its proxies.

Astonishingly, the New York Times, which often finds room to print detailed reports about some idiot Israeli parliamentary backbencher’s foolish anti-democratic proposals that will never be enacted, has yet to find room to expose the elaborate plan Israel uncovered to swarm Israeli villages in a massive, murderous attack, perhaps last Rosh Hashanah. The murder-by-tunnel plan is so unfamiliar in the U.S. that in October, Vanity Fair ran a big scoop about the plot. Although it felt compelled to run a cautious, speculative, headline, 'Did Israel Avert a Hamas Massacre?,' the hard-hitting piece provided the scary 'story behind the Gaza tunnel plot, from Israeli intelligence officials.'

True, inconvenient facts won’t stop the Blame Israel Firsters from finding us guilty. But today, on Yom Hazikaron, overwhelmed with grief and gratitude, I thank Daniel Pomerantz and his family; I thank the inspiring lone-soldier who first tasted Israel through a Birthright Israel trip, Max Steinberg, and his family; I thank all who sacrificed, all who served, all who will serve – including my son now that he has reached that age.

I know, so many of us know, that every moment we experience living in this land is because someone is staying up late, suffering privations, sacrificing their leisure and safety to protect us. I know, so many of us know, that every breath of freedom we take in this extraordinary place called Israel, is due to someone who is no longer around, who sacrificed it all, for us. And I know, so many of us know, that it is not only the people of Israel who are defended by IDF soldiers and protected by those who died: the entire civilized world benefits by having one stable, moral, powerful, democratic stabilizing force fighting terrorism, chaos, Islamism and totalitarian dictatorship in the Middle East.

May all these heroes be blessed. May their parents and grandparents, siblings and friends find some comfort from the good they did. And may we all find a true peace very soon.

And let us celebrate those beautiful lost souls by remembering the words of Daniel Pomerantz, who left his parents a 'just in case' note, read at his funeral: 'It’s important that you know that I am glad I was born to this family. I am happy I enlisted in the Golani Brigade. If you are reading this, it means I have finished my career, but at least I fought honorably and I am happy. You can be sure I am happy.'

Amen."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

This email is intended for the recipient only.

Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

The materials available through Mideast Mirror are the property of Alef Publishing Ltd or its licensors, are protected by copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws.

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Fax: 020 7052 96 09

 

Editorial and Enquiries:

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

OPPOSITION PARTY ELECTORAL MANIFESTO: Murat Yetkin in centre-left Radikal: " Leader of the main opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) Kemal Kilicdaroglu is apparently pursuing two tactics in this election: First, not to quarrel, but start a debate with President Erdogan and the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party]. Second, not to focus on ideology but on economic issues. Rather than criticize what the government does, he is saying what he wants to do himself. After so many years, the CHP is pursuing an election campaign by highlighting social issues and social democracy concepts and it seems that this is having an impact on the voters."

Ali Saydam warns of a ‘boomerang effect’ in moderate, pro-Islamic and pro-government Yeni Safak: "Despite all the confusion and exaggerated promises, the CHP is pursuing an economic-based campaign without attacking the AKP and its leaders. This is an important improvement. However, the promise-trust equation and the 'boomerang effect', which we have often noted, should not be forgotten. If the promises do create a feeling of trust, they return like a boomerang and hit the side making the promise."

Ahmet Sagirli accuses the opposition of peddling fairy tales in centre-right, pro-government Turkiye: "If the CHP comes to power, would it be able to offer pensioners two bonus payments? Yes, it would. Would it be able to make the minimum wage 1,500 liras? Yes, it would. These are theoretically possible. But what benefit would that have in practice? This economic system will take back whatever it may offer. The purchasing power of tomorrow's 1,500 liras would be less than today's 1,000 liras. This is not a story of good and bad men: ‘The bad men will go and the good will come and help the poor’. This only happens in fairy tales."

 

CONDOLENCES FOR ARMENIANS: Serkan Demirtas remarks on condolences for Armenians in Radikal: "Ankara's aim is to make this message circulate much more, stay on the agenda by being discussed and affect the probable decisions to accept the Armenian genocide claims before April 24th. Although the expressions used are not different from the previous years' statements and will not satisfy the Armenian public, this statement can still be evaluated as a significant development that strengthen Turkey's will to understand the April 24th  phenomenon."

Ali Sirmen in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "For a state that could not get rid of the stain of responsibility in Armenian journalist Hrant Dink's murder, it is difficult to be convincing in its statements on 1915. It is absurd to expect the state, which crashed the freedom of press and deported a journalist who said there had been genocide in 1915, to be convincing on the genocide issue. It is difficult for the country whose president talked about the probability of deporting the Armenians who do not have the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey, to be convincing on its 1915 statements."

 

MIGRANT DISASTER Abdullah Muradoglu moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The contemporary West has turned the Mediterranean into a wall of shame for the Africans at the end of which there is death. The Mediterranean is not bringing together the civilizations, cultures but divides, kills and destroys them. The North/South divide has never seemed as clear in any other era of history. The EU is only concerned with the effort not to make the poor Africans reach their shores. The solution they found is to repulse them. Actually, they are saying 'go back to the hell you are living in'. The powerful Westerners are pursuing a hypocritical policy."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan believes it is time to speak up: "What is mentioned in the explanatory notes of the U.S. State Department clearly differs and in some cases, contradicts what our negotiating team claims to be the Lausanne agreement. The American fact sheet informs of 'cash incentives' and 'credit promises'. The intention to destroy our nuclear facilities is evident. Our faith in our team is sufficient to give precedence to their version over the other side’s interpretation, but a comparison of the State Department's interpretation with the original text shows that in many cases, the U.S. fact sheet is consistent with the contents of Lausanne provisions! For a final judgement, there is no other option than releasing an Iranian fact sheet." 

Moderate Iran clarifies: "The most stressful conflicts in Washington over the past decades were not about the nuclear issue. The challenge that caused the most dreadful conflicts between the U.S., Israel and hostile Arab states is the change in the U.S. strategy regarding regime change in Iran. If Obama's policy of engagement leads to a final nuclear agreement, it will be a new chapter in the political history of Iran and the region. It will not be easy for Obama; the political life of all those moving along the path to a nuclear agreement will not be without risk." 

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Reformist Arman lists the theatres of conflict with the Saudis: "The bombing of the defenceless Yemeni people and the assault on two Iranian teenage boys at Jeddah airport have made the prospects for Tehran/Riyadh ties unclear. Despite high Islamic commonalities, ties have never been agreeable. Saudi Arabia worries about Iran's influence. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia's policies resulted in some political and religious groups standing against the resistance. With American orders, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have allocated $36bn in aid to the terrorists in ISIS, al-Nusrah Front and the Free Syrian Army in the four years of the Syrian crisis. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia has played a totally destructive role since 2003 and has tried to promote a tribal religious war. Since 2011, Saudi Arabia has resisted the Yemeni people's will for a change in the political structure of their country and has prevented the emergence of a national unity government."

 

REACTIONARY ARABS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami condemns: "The reactionary Arab proxy war against regional nations swelled the pockets of American arms manufacturers and helped them resolve their financial problems. The New York Times wrote that Middle East wars have been a blessing for the U.S.. Saudi fighters drop several tons of bombs every day on the defenceless and deprived people of Yemen and shamelessly justify their crimes as counter-insurgency and self-defence. Regional reactionary rulers have spent billions of dollars of Muslim funds to buy these weapons without firing a single shot at the enemies of Muslims. The reactionary Arab rulers are unaware that such measures and compliance to colonial powers will never ensure the survival of their thrones." 

 

YEMEN: Conservative Khorasan claims that Saudis have no strategy for Yemen: "Those, who claim to be Yemen's government and receive money from Saudi Arabia, have demanded that the Houthis must be disarmed. They do not know that crises can be resolved only with a realistic approach. The Houthis' military capability emerged from cultural and ethnic realities. In a country where non-governmental military players are much more important than classical armies, the demand for the disarmament of Ansarallah is more like a joke, which makes it clear more than ever that Saudi Arabia has no strategy for Yemen and believes it can achieve results only by shedding blood."

Hard-line Javan explains: "There are two explanations of the Saudi-led attacks on the Yemeni people. The nature and the strategies of the attacks comply with Zionist and colonialist approaches. The attacks are led by regimes that have been formed to serve the colonial interests of the Zionists and protect them. The Saudi ruling family and the reactionary coalition have attacked Yemen due to perceived threats from the spread of Iranian influence."

Reformist Mardom Salari revisits double standards: "Despite appearing to support Yemen, Russia abstained from the vote against the Houthis at the UN reflecting Kremlin's hypocrisy. Comparing Russia's performance in Ukraine with what Saudi Arabia does to maintain its hegemony over Yemen shows that members of the Security Council are ruthlessly set on their interests. The result is the double standard policies in Yemen, Syria and Iraq." 

 

IRAQ/TURKEY: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz disapproves: "Iraqi President Fu'ad Ma'sum is due to visit Turkey. Baghdad insists that Turkish policies towards Iraqi Kurdistan have resulted in political tensions and even fuelled the country's division. Ankara should frame its policies in Iraq based on relations with the Iraqi central government and its principles. Turkey has also broadly supported terrorist groups, particularly in Syria on behalf of the U.S.. Apart from developing economic and political ties, the visit comes amidst popular criticism of Turkey." 

 

EGYPT/ISRAEL: Conservative Resalat is harsh on Sissi: "Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's dependence on Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sissi cannot be hidden! The current dictator of Cairo is seeking to use the influence of Americans to restore peace and stability in Egypt and push back the supporters of Mohamed Mursi and the Muslim brotherhood. Sissi has met with many Americans including William Burns and most of his actions are under the supervision of the Zionists and Netanyahu."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Europe’s shame

2-‘Today Yemen, tomorrow Syria and Lebanon’

3-Facing both Washington and Moscow

 

1-Europe’s shame

 

The European states are turning a blind eye to these deaths after they have adopted a criminal policy of disregard and foot-dragging in coming to the relief of these immigrants, despite their vast capabilities in this regard. The object behind leaving hundreds, even thousands of people, including children and women, to drown at sea is to deliver a message to those who are waiting to board similar boats that they will face death by drowning…The NATO countries that destroyed Libya and turned it into a failed state that has no control over its two thousand kms long coast along the southern shores of the Mediterranean are responsible for the catastrophe that has befallen this country. And now, these same NATO countries sins are coming home to roost in the shape of waves of 'illegal' immigrants pouring into Europe, not only from Libya and the Maghreb, but from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Kurdistan, and even from the Gaza Strip --pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

In light of Europe’s immoral disregard of the roots of the problem, it should be no surprise if the waves of illegal migration were to expand, now that the possibility of death by drowning on the way to Europe has become a more attractive option for millions whose lives have become uglier than death itself. In fact, most are selling all they own and borrowing money so as to secure the dollars required to reserve a place in one of these 'death-boats.'  In the absence of a comprehensive strategy based on courage, transparency, responsibility, patriotism, and humanity, and in which equal emphasis is placed on security, politics, the economy, culture, and education, Europe has to prepare itself for further migrations and further tragedies of the sort unprecedented in the history of humanity--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

NATO’s repeated military interventions in the region's countries that have resulted in the destruction of the latter’s state institutions, are primarily responsible for the waves of immigrants now pouring into Europe, argues the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. Turning away while immigrants drown at sea will not resolve this problem, but will constitute a blight on the West’s alleged humanitarian conscience. European politicians are dealing with the death of hundreds of illegal migrants off their shores as a mere electoral issue, preferring to attract anti-immigration voters rather than give precedence to the moral and humanitarian values that the West continues to preach, maintains the editorial in a pan-Arab daily.

 

DAILY DROWNINGS: "Shame on the European states for the daily scenes of hundreds of Arab and African immigrants drowning at sea!" writes the editorial on Tuesday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

These immigrants seek a dignified future on the other side of the Mediterranean, after life has become too difficult for them in their own countries due to poverty, hunger, unemployment, and destructive civil wars.

The European states are turning a blind eye to these deaths after they have adopted a criminal policy of disregard and foot-dragging in coming to the relief of these immigrants, despite their vast capabilities in this regard. The object behind leaving hundreds, even thousands of people, including children and women, to drown at sea is to deliver a message to those who are waiting to board similar boats that they will face death by drowning. The hope is that this may convince them, or at least some of them, to change their minds and return to their respective countries.

The overwhelming majority of these immigrants board decrepit boats and fall victim to heartless middlemen and smugglers with no conscience, whose sole aim is to collect dirty money by any possible means. They do not care what happens to these immigrants at sea as long as they get what they want and are paid in advance.

The NATO countries that destroyed Libya and turned it into a failed state that has no control over its two thousand kms long coast along the southern shores of the Mediterranean are responsible for the catastrophe that has befallen this country. And now, these same NATO countries sins’ are coming home to roost in the shape of waves of 'illegal' immigrants pouring into Europe, not only from Libya and the Maghreb, but from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Kurdistan, and even from the Gaza Strip.

The West’s military intervention led by the U.S. that began in Afghanistan then moved on to Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, has undermined the region's stability and created more than five failed or semi-failed states. It has mired these states in civil or sectarian wars in compliance with pressures from pro-Israeli and Jewish lobbies whose aim is to tear the regional states apart, exhaust their armies, and tie them down in domestic and confessional wars of attrition and conflicts, so as to ensure that Israel remains safe as the strongest nuclear and military power in the entire region.

NATO, whose intervention in Iraq led to the death of over a million people and turned some four million children into orphans, is now paying dearly by having to deal with this flood of immigrants. And it is NATO's responsibility to save and absorb these immigrants in its countries, providing them with a dignified life, having invaded many of their countries of origin, changing their regimes under the banner of democracy, human rights, and a dignified life.

Last year, 2014, the corpses of over four thousand immigrants who drowned at sea were found. This figure is expected to triple this year. Last week alone, some one thousand immigrants or refugees died at sea. Around eleven thousand luckier ones reached Italy’s shores. And there are half-a-million waiting in Libya for the chance to board a boat and cross over to Europe. For them, it is only a matter of time before they do this. Nor will they be deterred by the fact that some of those who preceded them have drowned, because they do not fear death. They want to end the misery of living in their respective countries as a result of the long history of exploitation of their resources by Western states and companies during and after the colonial era.

NATO, which carpet-bombed Libya for months and killed thousands of innocent people, failed to spend a single cent on reconstructing what it had destroyed after it succeeded in toppling the Libyan regime. It did not build any security or military institutions, but left the country to armed militias to spread fear and terrorism among its people. They left the country to governments that are looting its resources. Some 150-billion dollars of the Libyan people's monies are estimated to have been stolen in the past four years alone.

The European states can choose from a number of solutions to confront the immigration and refugee problem they are experiencing these days. Some are short-term, while others are long term:

- First, there is need for a political solution that restores stability to Libya. After all, the European states that intervened militarily on pretexts that were mostly false – and with the blessings of then Arab League secretary-general 'Amr Musa and the participation of a number of Gulf states – are those that have drowned Libya in the bloody anarchy it faces today. They destroyed Libya's institutions. They must correct the wrong they have done.

- Second, hundreds of billions of dollars must be set aside for investments in the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean as a means of overcoming unemployment and reviving their economies. This is similar to what the European states are doing to save the Euro-basin states, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. The northern Mediterranean shores' states cannot remain secure, while the people on its southern shores are starving to death.

- Third, all European policies regarding immigration should be reconsidered. Foremost among them is that of refraining from rapid intervention to save those at sea. Shelter should be provided for these immigrants and they must be distributed between all European states and not left 'imprisoned' on the small Italian island of Lampedusa that is only a few square kms wide.

"Leaving the immigrants to drown in the Mediterranean while European fleets and ships turn their face away from them is an unforgiveable 'war crime'. It must be ended as soon as possible," concludes the editorial.

End…

 

THE EU STANDS AND WATCHES: " 'The EU stands back and watches, while hundreds of immigrants die off its shores': Is this the most accurate description of the catastrophe of historic proportions that occurred off an Italian island in the Mediterranean two days ago, in which it is now feared that some 900 immigrants may have died rather than 700 as initially believed?" asks the editorial in Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

Some European human rights activists will answer 'Yes'. They will insist that with its enormous capabilities and had it wanted to, Europe could have saved more than the mere 28 immigrants who survived the death-boat that drowned after it left Libya, and before it reached 'the promised paradise' on the other side.

Yes, the interior ministers and heads of police of 28 European states rushed to an 'urgent' meeting in Luxembourg in order to discuss what measures can be taken to stem the flow of illegal immigrants via the Mediterranean. Italian PM Matteo Renzi and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini made strong statements such as 'there is no justification for the EU not to act immediately to end this tragedy.' But will the European governments introduce real changes in their policies towards illegal immigration?

Sadly, most predictions suggest that they will not. This is due to the deep divisions inside Europe over the policy of 'cutting immigrants more slack' against the background of fears that this may serve right-wing parties that are hostile to immigrants.

Just consider what has happened in Finland recently: The True Finns Party, which should have changed its name to 'The Populist Party Hostile to Immigrants,' came second in the general elections, and is expected to join the next government. This is a clear message that the British government will not ignore as it stands on the threshold of general elections itself. In light of this result, the last thing that British Home Minister Theresa May will do is to take a decision that could provoke voters and push them to vote for UKIP, the [right-wing] party that is hostile to immigrants.

Some claim that Germany led by Chancellor Angela Merkel is even opposed to expanding relief efforts for migrants when death-boats carrying them sink. She claims that this 'will only encourage smugglers to send more illegal immigrants', as if the death of hundreds in numerous similar incidents has done anything to sap the enthusiasm of either smugglers or potential immigrants.

According to official statistics, the Italian Coast Guard managed to save forty thousand immigrants last year. In addition, another twenty thousand immigrants succeeded in reaching Europe this year. The number of those who have drowned since the beginning of the current year now stands at over one thousand.

In less diplomatic terms, the lives of immigrants – whether in their hundreds or their thousands – is no dearer than the choice of voters for the European governments, who never tire of giving lessons in human rights to their neighbors in the south. But there remains a legitimate question regarding the noticeable rise in popular hostility towards immigrants in Europe, which is expected to manifest itself in more than one country, even if current policies remain without any change.

The answer can be found by casting a quick look at the atrocities, crimes against humanity, and humanitarian catastrophes that are unfolding in the Middle East, including the rise of extremist and terrorist organizations, and the massacres of civilians against political or sectarian backgrounds in countries that are not that far from Europe’s shores. The fact is that we have turned into countries that export nothing but images of blood, extremism, savagery, and hatred to the world, after turning into the twenty-first century’s biggest 'bloodbath'.

In light of Europe’s immoral disregard of the roots of the problem, it should be no surprise if the waves of illegal migration were to expand, now that the possibility of death by drowning on the way to Europe has become a more attractive option for millions whose lives have become uglier than death itself. In fact, most are selling all they own and borrowing money so as to secure the dollars required to reserve a place in one of these 'death-boats.'

"In the absence of a comprehensive strategy based on courage, transparency, responsibility, patriotism, and humanity, and in which equal emphasis is placed on security, politics, the economy, culture, and education, Europe has to prepare itself for further migrations and further tragedies, of the sort unprecedented in the history of humanity," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-‘Today Yemen, tomorrow Syria and Lebanon’

 

There is nothing new about tension between the various Lebanese parties. But what is new today is the Lebanese's people extreme anxiety. In his hard-edged speeches, Hizbollah's secretary-general [Hassan Nasrallah] has shifted the crisis from an argument between politicians, to an angry popular dispute. His violent attack on Saudi Arabia and the Saudis has included an unprecedented confessional [Sunni/Shiite] dimension. He made open and false claims about Saudi Arabia's history. He confused religious positions with historical events. He stirred Sunni/Shiite tensions among the Lebanese. In fact, Nasrallah used to be more cautious in his defense of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Today, however, he uses a discourse that is riddled with unfair judgments and confessional fanaticism--Dawood ash-Shiryan in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The confrontation has now become akin to a direct and open war, and all that is lacking is the clamor of clashing swords…today Yemen, and tomorrow Syria and Lebanon: This is how Hizbollahunderstands the Saudi war on Yemen. It also believes that Riyadh launched this war in the certain belief that it would achieve a speedy and major victory in Yemen, which it would inevitably be able to extend towards Syria and defeat Bashar al-Assad, and hence towards Lebanon to inflict defeat onHizbollah and its allies as well…if Hizbollah believes that it is its duty to side with the Yemeni people in confronting the Saudi war, the party also believes it is only natural for it to help itself to confront the Saudi aims that ultimately have it in their crosshairs--Nabil Haitham in Lebanese as-Safir

 

Hizbollah Secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s no-holds-barred attack on Saudi Arabia and the Saudi royal family has led Lebanon into an even more charged political climate than that it faced after the 2005 assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri, warns a leading Saudi commentator. The unprecedented tension between Saudi Arabia and Hizbollah against the background of the war in Yemen is a consequence of the party’s calculated decision to break the ‘halo’ surrounding the Saudi ruling family after years during which the Saudi-affiliated media has been seeking to destroyHizbollah’s image, says a Lebanese commentator.

 

VIOLENT ATTACKS: "Hizbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has been waging successive violent attacks on Saudi Arabia, its people, creed, and history," writes Dawood ash-Shiryan in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Lebanon’s ‘Future Current’ [Sunni] leader Sa'd al-Hariri is responding to these attacks. The two sides' media have been in confrontation ever since Operation Decisive Storm began. And Lebanon has been in a state of tension it has not witnessed ever since Hizbollah declared that it was intervening in the war on the Syrian people. Moreover, Hassan Nasrallah has never gone so far in defending his party's role in Syria, as he is in defending the Houthi rebels. Furthermore, and despite the ongoing dialogue sessions between the Future Current and Hizbollah, everyone is tense, and this climate may lead these dialogues to be frozen for a long time to come, perhaps turning them into a long gone memory.

There is nothing new about tension between the various Lebanese parties. But what is new today is the Lebanese's people extreme anxiety. In his hard-edged speeches, Hizbollah's secretary-general has shifted the crisis from an argument between politicians, to an angry popular dispute. His violent attack on Saudi Arabia and the Saudis has included an unprecedented confessional [Sunni/Shiite] dimension.

He made open and false claims about Saudi Arabia's history. He confused religious positions with historical events. He stirred Sunni/Shiite tensions among the Lebanese. In fact, Nasrallah used to be more cautious in his defense of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Today, however, he uses a discourse that is riddled with unfair judgments and confessional fanaticism.

During last Friday’s rally in Beirut's southern suburbs under the banner of 'Solidarity with the Mistreated People of Yemen,' he said: 'There is a threat to the Two Holy Shrines [Mecca and Medina] from ISIS, which has announced that the Caliphate State was ready to destroy the Ka’ba because it is a mere pile of stones that is worshiped instead of God and contradicts monotheism.' He added: 'The Prophet's Shrine is under threat from Wahhabi thought and culture from within Saudi Arabia.'

This sort of unrestrained talk has angered the Sunnis in Lebanon, and some Lebanese have concluded that Hassan Nasrallah is threatening a confessional war between Muslims, one that Lebanon has never witnessed in the past and that he is seeking to stir sedition among the Lebanese Sunnis in order to serve Iranian aims. Moreover, they have concluded that he has dragged Lebanon towards becoming an arena for settling regional scores, which is something that the country cannot withstand.

This verbal war has raised some investors’ fears and has undermined the hopes of reviving tourism in Lebanon. And this has further fueled the tension within Lebanese popular circles that now exclaim: 'Is it not enough for Hizbollah to implicate us in the Syrian war, creating political and economic problems for us that have exacerbated unemployment and the economic recession, for it now to add the Yemen crisis to all of this?'

There is no doubt that Hizbollah secretary-general's sharp stance on Operation Decisive Storm will not only end the dialogue between the Future Current and the party. It will also force a reconsideration of the aims of the dialogue between them and the issues to be discussed. DisarmingHizbollah will now be a more pressing item than at any time before on the dialogue's agenda. It is clear that the party's secretary-general's attitude towards Saudi Arabia and his verbal attacks on it in this manner have led Lebanon into a more dangerous phase than it witnessed after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.

"Lebanon is facing a difficult and thorny political situation because of Hassan Nasrallah's stance towards Saudi Arabia," concludes Shiryan.

End…

 

COMPLEX HISTORY: "A complex history links Hizbollah to Saudi Arabia," writes Nabil Haitham in the left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

Relations between them have rarely been good; in fact, they were often tense and unsettled. At best, they were marred by mutual mistrust.

Yet, they never faced off in public. They usually clashed by proxy. Or, rather, Hizbollah was a major party to such confrontations, while Saudi Arabia was careful not to appear as directly implicated, but acted via its allies with [Hariri's] Future Current at their forefront.

Suddenly and without any preliminaries, Hizbollah has shed all its previous reservations, taboos, prohibitions, or cosmetic exercises in dealing with the Kingdom. The Yemeni crisis has opened the gateway to what party members refer to as 'a state of public and open hostility towards Saudi Arabia' with an unprecedented ceiling of escalation, attack, and blows directed both above and below the belt, reaching the point of a direct assault on the Saudi ruling family. And this raises the question: How far will Hizbollah go in this attack?

Party sources say that Hizbollah will go as far as it can. Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has deliberately avoided setting a ceiling. He went on the maximum offensive, following this up by saying: 'regardless of the consequences.' And behind such talk, there must have been a major decision to ignore all considerations and end the period of courtesies and solicitation. But why target the Saudi kings directly, including the Saudi monarchy’s founder, King 'Abdulaziz Al Saud? Party sources offer the following response:

- First, the party's decision was taken after in-depth study and evaluation. Hizbollah will abide by its decision, although it will not ask its allies to emulate it. But neither is it in any way willing to comply with the wishes of some of its allies and retract this decision.

- Second, this decision seems based on a clear policy to retroactively 'destroy the Saudi ruling family's halo.' For if we were to review the past recent years’ chapters, we would find nothing but an [Saudi] attempt to destroy the reputation of the forces of resistance in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, and especially of Hizbollah.

- Third, the decision appears to be intended to send the following direct message to Saudi Arabia: 'we have remained silent for a long time; we have endured much; we bit on our wounds; and we suppressed our anger. Now, however, our words will cut like a sword. We have ignored your threats, for you can no longer blackmail us as you once used to with politics, or dialogue, or with the cabinet, or with security, or with confessional incitement, agitation or sedition, or with fate of the Lebanese [Shiites] living in the Gulf. Hizbollah has publicly declared its choice, and it will not allow you to defeat it, but it will defeat you.'

- Fourth, during his latest appearance, Sayyid Nasrallah specified the reasons that have led the party to take off its gloves and enter the boxing ring with Saudi Arabia directly and violently. The confrontation has now become akin to a direct and open war, and all that is lacking is the clamor of clashing swords.

- Fifth, today Yemen, and tomorrow Syria and Lebanon: This is how Hizbollah understands the Saudi war on Yemen. It also believes that Riyadh launched this war in the certain belief that it would achieve a speedy and major victory in Yemen, which it would inevitably be able to extend towards Syria and defeat Bashar al-Assad, and hence towards Lebanon to inflict defeat on Hizbollah and its allies as well.

- Sixth, if Hizbollah believes that it is its duty to side with the Yemeni people in confronting the Saudi war, the party also believes it is only natural for it to help itself to confront the Saudi aims that ultimately have it in their crosshairs. It believes that it is only natural to try to undermine these aims and 'upset the Saudi agenda by various means and methods whether by raising the level of party readiness, alert and vigilance in Syria and Lebanon, or via direct and morally effective media appearances and coverage of the events in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia views as its backyard.'

- Seventh, Hizbollah is adamant in predicting the 'negative results' that will rebound on Saudi Arabia as result of the war in Yemen. It is certain that the failure of the military solution there means the failure of the Saudi war, and that failure on the Yemeni arena will inevitably be transformed into failure in other arenas as well.

But does Hizbollah not fear that its intervention in the Yemen conflict will create domestic [Lebanese] tensions and confessional agitation that opens the door wide to Sunni/Shiite sedition?

Party sources say: ‘had there been any signs or possibility of a sedition they would have emerged by now. It is possible to assume that such sedition has been bypassed by now. We used to hover on the edge of sedition after any simple development. Today, however, this cannot happen, because when Saudi Arabia is directly preoccupied with one matter, it cannot turn its attention to another. Moreover, no one is convinced by [Riyadh’s] characterization of the war on Yemen as part of the ongoing Sunni/Shiite tension.'

"And it is precisely at this point that Sayyid Nasrallah's Arab nationalist discourse is meant to remove all the fuses of sedition in its Sunni/Shiite and Arab/Persian manifestations, and to place the Yemeni war within its true context," concludes Haitham.

Ends…

 

 

3-Facing both Washington and Moscow

 

 

The Israeli PM finds himself at verbal war with both Washington and Moscow at the same time, says Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

 

Having failed to prevent the U.S. from reaching a framework nuclear agreement with Iran at Lausanne, Israeli PM-designate Benyamin Netanyahu has picked a quarrel with Russia over the delivery of S-300 ground-to-air missiles to Iran, threatening to respond by delivering lethal weapons to Ukraine, notes a Jordanian commentator. But this may be all part of Netanyahu’s attempt to cover up his failure and to intimidate his right-wing allies into dropping their preconditions for joining his new coalition government.

 

FAMOUS SPEECH: "Netanyahu's famous speech before the two houses of the U.S. Congress did not prevent President Barack Obama from proceeding with his efforts to reach an agreement with Iran over its nuclear program via the '5 +1' group," writes Mohammad Kharroub in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

This agreement was recently concluded in Lausanne, as a result of which Netanyahu lost his cool. He attacked Obama, accused him of spinelessness in the face of the Iranians, and lack of concern for Israel's security which would be exposed to an 'existential' threat should Tehran acquire a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu added that Tehran was in fact about to produce such a weapon, now that the Lausanne agreement has recognized it as a nuclear-threshold state. Moreover, Obama himself has publicly admitted that Iran can produce a nuclear bomb within a year of the end of the agreement in ten or maybe fifteen years' time. (That matter is yet to be settled in the final agreement that will hopefully be signed in June.)

Netanyahu's speech in Congress, which took place two weeks before the twentieth Israeli Knesset elections on March 17th, brought him stinging criticisms from both left and right in Israel. There are those who deemed it to have had the most negative effect on Teal Aviv's relations with Washington ever since it moved from being a French protectorate before 1967, to being under full American sponsorship after that date.

Netanyahu began to try and gradually contain these criticisms; but according to leaked reports it seems that the Obama administration is showing no flexibility on this matter, especially if Netanyahu forms a new government. In that case, Obama’s remaining time in office until January 2017 is unlikely to witness 'normalized' relations between the resident of the Israeli government's headquarters on Balfour Street in occupied Jerusalem, and the resident of the White House in Washington.

This is the likely situation unless the region reaches an unprecedented level of anarchy, wars, and confrontations that force the two parties –two strategic partners, in fact, – to coordinate, consult, and or exchange top-secret information and fight a common battle. In that case, Obama will not hesitate to view Israel with unbounded sympathy and support 'as he has always done'. The fact that he has been the U.S. president most supportive of Israel in security, military, and financial terms in its entire history, is something that Israel’s leaders publicly and frankly admit.

There is no need to spend too much time highlighting Netanyahu's arrogance and conceit in his relations with Israel's 'tender mother,' the U.S., despite all what it means for Israel as a guarantor of strategic relations that are not enjoyed by any NATO country, including 'Great Britain' (so-called when it was still an imperial power to be reckoned with).

Now, however, Netanyahu is defying the Kremlin by implicating himself in the Ukrainian crisis. Neither Europe nor (especially) the U.S. wanted to cross a red line there, that may lead to a war in the Old Continent, namely that of providing Kiev with lethal weapons. They therefore confined themselves to economic sanctions in a number of sectors whose harsh nature and damage have been acknowledged by Moscow and even by President Vladimir Putin himself.

On the other hand, these sanctions were beneficial to Moscow at some level, because ' something harmful can also be beneficial' [as the Arab saying goes]. They drove Moscow to adopt alternative plans and address some of the negative effects of the Russian economy’s 'submission' to Western economies, when Russia fought with noticeable zeal to win membership in the International Trade Organization, which leads to the globalization of the Russian economy.

But because Netanyahu does not accept half-measures or submits to any 'blackmail,' he rushed to announce the delivery of 'lethal' weapons to Ukraine in response to Russia’s decision to lift the ban on the S-300 ground-to-air missiles whose price Tehran had paid almost a decade ago, and whose delivery date has passed more than once. In fact, at his weekly cabinet meeting last Sunday, Netanyahu said that Israel takes the Russian decision to supply Iran with ground-to-air missiles ‘very seriously’, and that Israel will do whatever is necessary to defend its citizens.

Putin did not take long to respond in person. In clear and unambiguous words, he warned against the negative effect of such an Israel decision. He said that Russia would not permit any change in the balance in the Ukraine, and that it will punish whoever seeks to do so, adding, moreover, that any such step would change nothing on the ground, but will only lead to more bloodshed.

So where do we go from here?

Whether Israel claims that the delivery of the S-300 will upset the balance with Iran, or whether the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry's Political Security Division Amos Gilad claims that this system is not defensive but is a challenge to Israel, relations between Tel Aviv and Moscow are heading towards further tension and perhaps collapse. This is so even if Netanyahu fails to carry out his threat to supply Kiev with lethal weapons.

"The media exchanges and political 'skirmishes' are part of a domestic Israeli game by which Netanyahu wants to cover up his failure to stop the Lausanne process in its track, and to frighten his right-wing and Haredi allies to ease their terms for joining the government coalition he is trying to form," concludes Kharroub.

Ends… 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 21.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Gang of Four

 

As Israel readies for its annual commemoration of Remembrance Day for fallen soldiers and terror victims, quickly followed by Independence Day celebrations, the main daily newspapers dedicate more and more space to those two events. Israel Hayom, Yedioth Ahronoth and The Jerusalem Post lead their Tuesday editions with Remembrance Day stories and photographs and their inside pages are dominated by features and personal recollections by bereaved families.

The only newspaper which does not lead with Remembrance Day is Haaretz, which instead focuses on the latest obstacle that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is facing as he tries to put together a new coalition. According to Haaretz's lead headline, Kulanu leader and finance minister-designate Moshe Kahlon is balking at Likud's insistence that all future coalition partners agree to support planned legislation to undermine the authority and power of the High Court of Justice. Sources within Kahlon's party told the paper that, while they would refuse to commit to supporting any such legislation, the negotiations have not yet reached crisis point. In fact, they said, Netanyahu does not even appear to want to pass the bills in question, having nixed them during the previous Knesset. Rather, they speculated, he is counting on Kahlon to refuse the demands, which would then be dropped, allowing Netanyahu to tell Habayit Hayehudi and Likud hardliners that Kulanu torpedoed the bills.

According to Walla!, Netanyahu and Kahlon are inching closer to an agreement. 'During the meeting, progress was made in the coalition negotiations between the two sides,' the two parties said in a joint statement. 'At the same time, the negotiating teams of Likud and Kulanu met at the Knesset this evening to form the agreement. A further meeting between the two leaders has been set.' A source involved in the talks between the parties told Walla! after the meeting, 'Significant progress has been made. We discussed all the economic issues, from the deficit to the details of the reforms that Kahlon wants to implement.' The source further told the news website, 'Today (Tuesday) we will find out whether an agreement in principle is possible, but we are still far from a signed agreement.' According to Walla!, during Monday’s meeting it was agreed that Kulanu would receive the finance, housing and environment ministries. The party with which Likud is closest to signing is the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism.

In other news, all the papers report that Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin have heeded the Foreign Ministry's advice and decided not to meet former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland when they visit the region. Carter and Brundtlend will arrive on April 30 for a three-day trip to Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where they are expected to meet Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Israel officially decided to boycott Carter's visit, although it will not prevent him from entering Israel or entering the Gaza Strip through the Erez crossing. Sources in the Foreign Ministry said the reason they were boycotting Carter's visit was because he consistently helps delegitimize Israel and that any meeting with an Israeli official would only contribute to this process. Carter has visited Israel in the last few years and former President Shimon Peres would generally meet him – even when he spent the meetings criticizing the former president's views.

Carter will arrive in the region on an emergency mission, mainly intended to mediate between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in Gaza, which he believes is nearing a breaking point. Carter has been vocally critical of Israel in recent years. He has referred to Israeli 'apartheid' numerous times. Last year Carter wrote that 'Hamas cannot be wished away, nor will it cooperate in its own demise. 'Only by recognizing its legitimacy as a political actor – one that represents a substantial portion of the Palestinian people – can the West begin to provide the right incentives for Hamas to lay down its weapons.'

On the Palestinian front, Haaretz – citing a report from AFP – says that ministers and officials of the Palestinian consensus government on Monday ended a visit to Gaza a day after arriving for talks on salaries of thousands of public employees. A government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that the trip, which was to last a week, was cut short on the orders of Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah over a thorny employment dispute between Abbas’s Fateh and Hamas, the de facto power in Gaza. On Sunday, eight ministers and about 30 senior officials arrived in the coastal strip for talks on the issue, but on Monday Hamdallah told them their mission was over, blaming 'differences of opinion with Hamas', according to AFP. 'The delegation was prevented from bringing its assignment to a successful conclusion,' the government official quoted him as saying.

Elsewhere, Army Radio reports that the International Atomic Energy Agency's monthly report has determined that Iran has honored its commitments since the signing of the interim agreement with the P5+1 and has not been working to further its nuclear development program. According to the report, Iran has not enriched any uranium above a concentration of five percent or violated the restrictions imposed on it at either of its nuclear facilities and the Arak heavy water reactor.

Finally, all the Internet sites carry the news that a court in Cairo has sentenced former President Mohammed Mursi to 20 years in prison over the killing of protesters while he was still in power. Mursi and several other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were accused of inciting supporters to kill a journalist and opposition protesters in clashes outside the presidential palace in late 2012.

 

THE GANG OF FOUR: Writing on the News 1 website, Yehuda Drori calls for a mutual defense pact between Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, which, he says, would benefit all four countries far beyond the military advantages.

"The four most threatened countries in the Middle East – Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt – must sign a mutual defense pact, to counter the threat posed by Iran, ISIS, Bashar al-Assad, Hizbollah and al-Qa’ida. Such a pact is necessary since Russia, China and now even the United States have decided to back Iran as the regional superpower, despite the fact that it supports terrorism and despite the progress it has made toward obtaining a nuclear bomb.

Over the past few years, we have learned that we cannot rely on U.S. President Barack Obama, whose Middle East policy has been capricious at best, and we cannot rely on NATO (of which Turkey is a member). Therefore, the four countries could, by signing a mutual defense pact, neutralize most of the threats they are facing and could create a strong front against Iran. This pact could even include an Israeli nuclear umbrella to protect its new partners.

Even though the State of Israel is strong enough to protect itself from any aggression – and the same could possibly be said of Egypt and Saudi Arabia – a mutual defense pact would intimate to any would-be aggressor in the region that it is facing a coalition capable of defeating it in double-quick time. A pact of this kind would increase the confidence of the countries involved and, as a bloc, would improve their bargaining power in their dealings with the United Nations, the United States, Russia, China and other world powers.

Even today, relations between these four countries are improving. While there are no open contacts, there are behind-the-scene discussions and exchanges of intelligence, which have been going on for many months. For obvious reasons, these contacts have been kept from citizens of the countries involved. The goal of a mutual defense pact would be to bring these contacts into the open in order to create a deterrence factor and to send a message to would-be aggressors, as well as the international community in general.

A mutual defense pact does not require the kind of diplomacy that is involved in a peace accord; there would not even be any need for commercial ties between Israel and, say, Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, a mutual defense pact would lead to such ties being established over time; a military pact would pave the way for civilian and economic ties.

Most importantly of all, a mutual defense pact between Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would allow those involved to start working on a plan to resolve the Palestinian problem; it could even force the Palestinians to accept such a plan, since the terrorist entity that is the Palestinian Authority exists in the geographical heart of the pact I am proposing and poses a constant threat to the security of the four countries in question. The Palestinians would find it very hard to reject a peace plan put forward by Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan know full well that an alliance of this kind with Israel would not only bolster their security, but would also help them economically. Israel would be willing to share with them agricultural technology and high-tech knowhow. There is no reason on earth for a state of enmity between these four countries, especially since they share a common enemy: radical Islam.

This may sound like a fantasy, but let me assure you that it is not. It is based on an understanding of the regional geopolitical situation that has come into existence in the Middle East."

Ends…

 

BEWARE OF BENNETT: Writing in Maariv, Uri Savir warns that, if Naftali Bennett is included in the next Netanyahu government, he will take Israel even further to the right and even further away from being a Jewish and democratic state.

"The media is covering Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's coalition negotiations as if they were a sporting event. Will there be a coalition agreement or not? Who will get the better of whom in the talks? The truth is that, if Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett joins the coalition on his terms and under current political circumstances (without Yair Lapid or Tzipi Livni, who were members of the outgoing government), Israel would find itself on the path to a massive ideological shift toward the extreme right. One just needs to listen to Bennett himself to understand how far to the right he would take the country. The Habayit Hayehudi chairman says what he means. The problem is that he also means what he says.

In a Bennett-inspired Israel, the religious and halakhic elements would take precedence over democracy. Habayit Hayehudi and its right-wing partners would pass laws to undermine the Supreme Court. Israel's democratic anchor would disappear. A Bennett-inspired Israel would cease to be a democracy. It would pass racist legislation against Israel's Arab minority and would erode their rights – either by passing the nation-state law or by some other means. The NGO law would prevent left-wing organizations from carrying out their legitimate business, which, for the most part, seeks to promote coexistence between Jews and Arabs. The media is full of comments about how the left is treacherous and dangerous.

At the very core of Bennett's beliefs is the settlement enterprise. He will ensure that thousands of housing units are built in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in order to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. He would also ensure that Israel annexes Area C of the West Bank. The political ramifications of this would be clear: the end of Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state and the continuation of the slow march toward a binational state. Not to mention the fact that Bennett's plans would be the catalyst that sparks a third intifada and widespread regional violence.

A Bennett-inspired Israel would lose its identity. It would be isolated by the international community – perhaps even boycotted – and would find itself embroiled in constant regional conflict. The Habayit Hayehudi chairman wants to be appointed foreign minister or defense minister. It appears that, instead, he will get the Education Ministry. But he would probably do less damage to the country as Foreign Minister. In both of the other positions he would endanger a new generation of Israelis.

Israel' international standing cannot get any worse. A decade ago, anyone reading these lines would think that I was describing a surreal nightmare. But this is the reality that we could be facing for the next 10 years.

The truth is that Bennett is not primarily to blame for Israel's dire international standing; rather, Netanyahu is the main culprit. After all, it was the prime minister who veered sharply to the right in order to rebuff American efforts to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and in order to win over the right-wing voters who swept him back into power."

Ends…

 

BETWEEN ARAFAT AND THE AYATOLLAHS: Writing on the NRG website, Ariel Kahane says that, just as Israel turned a blind eye to Palestinian violations of the Oslo Accords, so the United States is willfully ignoring Iranian violations – current and future – of the Lausanne agreement.

"Whenever Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei screams 'Death to Israel, Death to America,' the White House responds by saying that he is merely doing so for domestic consumption. And when Iranian President Hassan Rowhani insists that, 'We will continue to enrich uranium and the sanctions will be lifted in one fell swoop,' the State Department tries to persuade us that he is merely presenting his own people with a more positive spin on the nuclear agreement. Other Iranian officials say that they will never allow international inspectors into the country's nuclear facilities – only for top American officials to explain that the final details of the agreement have yet to be ironed out.

For anyone who lived in Israel in the 1990s, these pathetic American explanations may sound familiar. They are an eerie throwback – using almost exactly the same words, in fact – to Israel's post-Oslo response to Palestinian terror. At best, Israel's behavior at that time was a terrible case of self-delusion; at worst, it was a willful decision to adapt the facts to suit a particular narrative. The similarities are so striking, in fact, that anyone who hears Obama Administration officials talking today about Iran could be forgiven for thinking that they were reading directly from the notes of Israeli officials in those terrible days after the Oslo Accords.

On the day after the Lausanne talks produced a 'framework' agreement, the Iranians were already calling for 'Death to America.' Similarly, as Yasser Arafat was signing the Oslo Accords, he was also telling Jordanian television that the whole thing was part of his plan for the gradual destruction of the State of Israel. At the time, Israel was enchanted by the illusion of peace and didn't want to believe. Today, it's the Americans who are willfully ignoring the writing on the wall.

In a speech at a Johannesburg mosque on May 10, 1994 – a speech that was supposed to remain a secret, but was transcribed and broadcast by the Israeli media – Arafat said that, 'I do not consider this agreement to be anything more than the agreement which had been signed between our prophet Muhammad and Quraish.' In other words, it was an agreement that was designed to be broken. His Israeli interlocutors were, at first, astonished. But then they decided simply to deny it all. Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin insisted that Arafat's comments were for domestic consumption and that the Palestinian leader had not yet internalized the new reality. While their partner-in-peace was declaring his intention to violate the agreement, they did what American officials are doing today: they buried their heads in the sands of blind optimism.

When Arafat made his triumphant return to the Gaza Strip, he smuggled weapons and wanted terrorists in his car. The Shin Bet knew that this was happening, but the government concealed the information from the public, in order not to ruin the celebration. This reminds me of the assertion by former U.S. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, who wrote in a Wall Street Journal article that there are clear indications that Iran is continuing to violate the interim agreement at its heavy-water reactor in Arak, but that these reports had been concealed in order not to poison the atmosphere in Lausanne.

Yasser Arafat and the other members of the Palestinian leadership not only violated the small print of the Oslo Accords, they violated the very spirit of that agreement. They encouraged terrorism and they incited violence – a total violation of the agreement that was supposed to lead to peace. That's what the Iranians are now doing, too. But even graver than the verbal violation are the actions. Just as Iran continues to expand its military capabilities and still engages in international aggression (in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere), so Arafat set up terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and invested heavily in Hamas' armed wing. He was preparing for the day when he would launch an all-out attack on Israel – just as Iran is doing today; an aggressor will always remain an aggressor. A leopard cannot change its spots.

Two decades ago, Israel saw exactly what was happening but elected to turn a blind eye. Time after time, government officials warned that if the Palestinians violate their agreements with Israel, the IDF would be dispatched to the West Bank without hesitation. In practice, however, they were too afraid to do anything. Exactly the same lack of initiative is being displayed today by the Americans. Just a few days ago, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, said that all options are still on the table, including the military option, if diplomacy fails. You can rest assured that, just like Arafat sat in the Muqata’a laughing at the Israeli threats; the ayatollahs are hardly worried by Dempsey's empty threats. It is clear to them, just as it is clear to the Americans that the United States would not dare to use its military force against the Islamic Republic.

What happened in the end with the Oslo Accords? As every Israeli knows (and too few Americans know), a wave of terror and bloodshed covered Israel; thousands of people paid with their lives. How will the nuclear agreements with Iran end? In exactly the same way – but with several times more fatalities. Because the Oslo Accords, despite the fact that they were important and despite the fact that violations were ignored, were a localized problem. The Lausanne agreement, which is a de facto international agreement, has regional and global implications. When the Lausanne agreement collapses, the price could well be nuclear war."

Ends…

 

PREOCCUPIED: Writing in Maariv, Shlomo Shamir says that the international community is too preoccupied with other issues – the 2016 presidential election in the United States and how to harass Israel in the European Union – to deal effectively with the thousands of African migrants who are drowning as they attempt to reach Europe.

"The free world's priorities are – excuse the expression – screwed up. Something is very wrong and very jarring with the agendas of Western nations, including members of the European Union, which are considered democratic and enlightened. According to the most conservative estimates that I have heard from Western diplomats in New York, some 10,000 people who tried to flee Africa in boats that were barely seaworthy have drowned in their desperate attempts to reach European shores.

With the humanitarian tragedy getting ever more dire and with thousands of illegal migrants dying in their efforts to escape poverty, repression and discrimination in their home countries, the European Union has found itself too busy to address the problem. Why? Because it is preoccupied with discussions about how to mark Israeli products that were manufactured in the settlements.

It was only after 700 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea this week that ministers from the 28 members of the European Union found the time to convene a special summit to discuss the problem of mass illegal migration to Europe. One senior and veteran diplomat in New York told me that, 'The sad truth is that, given the economic crises that some European countries are going through, and given the atmosphere of racism, extremism and xenophobia in Europe right now, no one expects any practical or efficient measures to be taken to resolve the problem of illegal migrants.'

The Syrian Civil War is entering its fifth year. Innocent civilians, including thousands of women, children and old people, are still being slaughtered. The number of fatalities in Syria is closing in on 300,000. In a discussion held last week at the United Nations Security Council, ambassadors were shown video evidence which proves that Syrians civilians were being killed by chemical weapons. The videos were graphic and shocking and several diplomats had tears in their eyes.

But even today, the Security Council has not managed to pass a single operative resolution to enforce a ceasefire in Syria that would put an end to the massacre of civilians. In contrast, France – one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, has already drafted and prepared a resolution which it believes will put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The French are just waiting for a new government to be installed in Israel before they put forward their resolution for discussion and a vote.

Just this week, ISIS published a video showing dozens of its captives being led away to be executed. In an act of solidarity, American clergymen decided to start wearing orange clothes, similar to the jumpsuits that ISIS' captives wear when they are executed. But the U.S. media, rather than focusing on the horrors of the Middle East, is too busy trying to interest the American public in an election that is still almost two years away.

Newspapers, too, are guilty of the same crime – even the ones that are considered high-brow. Their pages are filled with reports and analyses about which politicians are maybe planning to run for president in 2016. 'The problem,' one commentator said on NPR, 'is that the vast majority of the coverage is nothing more than gossip about who plans to run; there's almost zero coverage of their ideologies, their policies and the positions on social issues.'

At a conference of senior Republicans last weekend in New Hampshire, there were three politicians who have already declared that they intend to seek their party's nomination to run for president – and 16 more that have been named as possible candidates. The main issue under discussions – in fact, the only issue being discussed – was the fact that Hillary Clinton would likely be the Democratic candidate. The economy, social issues and foreign policy were not on the agenda and, if they were mentioned at all, it was as an aside in someone's speech. If the main issue troubling Republicans at the moment is Hillary, then God help America."

Ends…

 

HOW INDEPENDENT IS ISRAEL?: Writing in Haaretz, Nehemia Shtrasler says that – economically, politically and militarily – Israel is not an independent state, but an American protectorate.

"In two days’ time we will celebrate Israel’s 67th Independence Day, and the question is whether we are really independent? Are we standing all on our own?

A quick survey of our economic situation reveals that it is not bad at all – it’s even rather good. From a country of 600,000 people in 1948 we have become a nation of 8.3 million people. From a standard of living of $3,000 per person we have taken off to a level of $35,000 – because of the transformation from a socialist economy under government management to a competitive market economy. Our foreign currency reserves are at an all-time high: $86 billion; and that is after the dollar warehouse was almost emptied out in 1985. The national debt stands at 67 percent of GDP, which is not the greatest, but is also not so dangerous. After all, it is mostly internal debt and not external.

Inflation is at an unprecedented low, something around zero, compared to 449 percent in 1984; and today you can take out a mortgage for 20 years at an interest rate of 3 percent not linked to inflation – which is a miracle in its own right. Our labor market has reached its lowest unemployment level, 5.6 percent, half of that in Europe; and Israel is ranked 19th in the world in the welfare index, which is a weighted index of income levels, life expectancy and education levels.

Israel is also ranked quite high on the innovation index. From a country whose main exports were Jaffa oranges, we have turned in a nation of startups and high-tech; and from a situation of chronic deficits in the balance of payments account, we have become a country with larger exports than imports.

So if all this is true, we have reached independence.

Not exactly. On the security side Israel is the only country in the world that is exposed to threats of annihilation, and is constantly in danger of one war or another. In order to face all these threats we have our 'big friend' that provides us with a military advantage: They give us the most advanced airplanes, the engines for the Merkava tank and the money to develop the Iron Dome anti-missile interceptor system. They provide us with weapons systems worth $3 billion every year, which they are not willing to provide to any other country. This is the qualitative advantage that allows us to survive. In more direct language, we are dependent on the United States for our lives – truly.

We are dependent on the U.S. on the economic level, too. It would be enough for U.S. President Barack Obama to declare that he is 'reconsidering' relations with Israel for the stock market to collapse and the dollar-shekel exchange rate to jump. In such a situation, global banks would stop granting us credit, the UN Security Council would impose paralyzing economic sanctions (which they have so far avoided doing because of the U.S. veto), and all the pretty economic numbers would be flipped over all at once into a black picture of a crash.

After all, Israel is very dependent on exports; 30 percent of our GDP goes to exports. That is why a boycott against Israeli exports is a prescription for the death of the Israeli economy. And by the way, there are already signs of such a boycott: 16 foreign ministers from the European Union recently called for mandatory labeling of every product from the settlements. This is one step before imposing a real boycott. The residents of the Arava can tell from their own experience what happens to farmers who are unable to sell their peppers in Europe.

It is also worth remembering that when we ran into economic crises in the past, we always received support from Uncle Sam, in the form of special grants or loan guarantees. And who can be sure that such crises will never come back to threaten us?

So it may be that we are important to the U.S., since we serve as a land-based aircraft carrier in the crazy Middle East. But they can give up on these services and continue on with their lives. We cannot exist without them, and that is all the difference in the world. That is why, when we celebrate Independence Day on Thursday, we will know in the depths of our hearts that we are very far from true independence. We are no more than an American protectorate."

Ends…

 

TIME TO ATTACK IRAN: Writing on the Arutz 7 website, David Rubin says that, given recent developments on the international stage, Israel must begin planning its military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

"The recently-signed framework agreement between the P5+1 group of nations and Iran, currently being promoted by the Obama administration and its many Democratic lackeys in Congress, has greatly increased the likelihood of  a massive Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Even though American (and other) sanctions on Iran haven’t officially been removed, the wall has already fallen, as the psychologically weakened and, as always, money-hungry international community rushes to engage the ayatollahs. Russia’s Putin was the first and most notable, finalizing an agreement to ship his countries S-300 missile defense system to Iran. Australia soon followed, reaching an intelligence-sharing agreement with the Islamic state.

These ominous signs on the horizon are only the beginning of a dangerous process of capitulation to Iran, as the world quickly recognizes what is evident to almost everyone aside from U.S. President Obama and his clueless Secretary of State John Kerry, that Iran is being given the international green light to become a nuclear nation. Therefore, the world wants to get into its good graces.

If Iran was seeking nuclear power for peaceful purposes, it would be quite different, but the third largest oil-exporting country has absolutely no need for nuclear energy, unless it truly aims to fulfill its often declared goal of destroying Israel and exporting its Islamic revolution around the world, the latter of which it is already doing.

An Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s many nuclear facilities will not be easy. It will require a massive lightning assault that will be denounced by virtually every nation, but the longer Israel waits, the inevitable, subsequent diplomatic onslaught will be that much greater. There is no choice. Even renewed and increased American sanctions, however praiseworthy, and however well-intended by their Congressional advocates, will not stop the death march of the ayatollahs. The clock is rapidly ticking. Sadly, it must finally be understood that the military option is the only realistic one. In two weeks, the new Israeli governing coalition will be officially established and government policy will be set in place. Let the planning begin."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

OPPOSITION PARTY ELECTORAL MANIFESTO: Ugur Gurses praises the opposition Republican People's Party’s (CHP's) election manifesto in centre-left Radikal: "There are two main differences between the CHP and AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] election manifestos. First, while the AKP is looking at the past, the CHP is looking towards the future. Second, while the AKP has adopted a pro-security policy framework, the CHP’s manifesto has designed a framework that addresses the individual at every level, protects individual freedoms and talks to the younger generation. The pluralism and participation that are largely lacking today have been highlighted, and the manifesto has settled on a much more social democratic line."

Mehmet Tezkan is impressed by the CHP’s economic program in centrist Milliyet: "The CHP wants to challenge the government with the economy. In short, it has targeted the seven million unemployed and 17 million poor people, the tradesmen who cannot pay their debts, the farmers who cannot work, the pensioners who have problems making ends meet, those who have to work even after retirement, and the five million people who have been stuck in an interest rate quagmire after they could not repay their loans. But when we look at the manifesto in a much more comprehensive way, we can see that Turkey will be rebuilt. CHP will address every single area."

In another piece in the same paper, Murat Aksoy detects a significant shift to European style social democracy: "The manifesto is the most specific form of the slow but determined change in the CHP. It reflects the structural change that took on a significant aspect with the primary elections to select candidates inside the party. Going back on this change is not possible anymore. The election manifesto stands up as a document that is not only aimed at the elections, but takes the CHP out of its narrow environment and turns it into a European, leftist and social democratic party."

Centrist tabloid Posta endorses the CHP manifesto: "The CHP’s promises are extraordinary. They are almost all financial promises that will reach the citizens’ pockets. Every vow that CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has made saying 'I give you my word' represents the basic necessities of social democracy. That is why there is significance to his principle 'we will first produce, and then share'. The most positive thing in the CHP manifesto is that it neither mentions nor criticizes the ruling AKP, nor the other parties, but simply focuses on its own goals!"

Cigdem Toker approves of the CHP’s priorities in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "Its goal is to reduce poverty and create employment, and then move on from a labor-intensive economy, to an information-intensive one. It encourages an economic growth with innovative technology in agriculture and other production areas. The first priority is to end poverty."

Abdulkadir Selvi only sees old wine in new bottles in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The CHP did not make a move similar to the AKP’s 'New Turkey pact'. It was not ambitious enough to allow Kilicdaroglu to declare it as a 'vision document that is beyond an election manifesto'. It was nothing but a document that targets the streets and presents the old Turkey in a new package. The dominant thing was the populism of [former Turkish politician] Suleyman Demirel who said 'I am offering more than what the other parties are doing'."

Kurtulus Tayiz charges the CHP with looking backwards in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Even if the CHP's election tactics change, its vision for Turkey does not. It has no dream of a new Turkey and that is reflected in its entire election manifesto. Some 200 pages of promises reflect a deep nostalgia for the old Turkey instead. With a very retrograde political rhetoric, the CHP is trying to bring back the old Turkey."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

SUPREME LEADER’S SPEECH: Hard-line Javan writes of empty threats: "The Supreme Leader remarked on the contradictory behaviour of the West towards Iran's defensive power. The current strategic configuration indicates that U.S. military threats against the Islamic Republic are unrealistic and nonsensical. These empty threats have been made in order to force Iran to abandon its military plans. The West and the Zionists are targeting our military programme in the nuclear talks." 

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Khorasan is defiant and confident: "Any trust in the West is pure naiveté. Iran's strategy for the path ahead is not to trust the opposite side and test their political will. Any future cooperation with any of these countries will be based on their current behaviour in the talks. The Saudis and their oil dollars, Israel and the influential Zionist lobbies, Congress and its little-informed pretentious senators can destroy diplomacy more actively than before. U.S. punitive measures against Iran's commercial partners have lost their logic for some time. The failure of the talks caused by the incapability of the West to fulfil its commitments will lead to the loss of consensus on sanctions against Iran. Therefore, the failure of the talks will not necessarily mean further sanctions. This is a reality that will force some in the West to try to reach an agreement." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz compares Wahhabism to Zionism: "If a nuclear agreement is reached, regional countries will exhibit mixed reactions. Some will continue hostile policies against Iran and others will proceed with friendship. The methods adopted by the Saudis and some other Arab countries do not strengthen the Muslim world. The dictatorial leaders of these countries will do anything to stay in power and fulfil the goals of their masters. Saudi Wahhabism is no different to Zionism. Both of these evil ideologies seek to weaken the Muslims." 

Reformist Arman complains about local sceptics: "It is natural, that there will be more pressure because of U.S. Congress and it will be more difficult for Iran to reach an agreement with the U.S.. However, the basis of an agreement is unlikely to be distorted. Despite all the achievements, those Iranians concerned about the course of the talks are still putting pressure on our negotiating team. Iran's stance is clear and there is no need for an Iranian factsheet. It is natural that our diplomats should bargain in the talks and try to defend our national interests." 

Conservative Resalat targets the Saudis: "The Saudi ambassador to Washington has announced his support for a final nuclear deal with Iran on condition of the gradual removal of sanctions and intrusive inspections. These are the remarks of the representative of a country known as a symbol of terror and barbarism. Riyadh's ambassador has conveyed to the White House Riyadh's distrust of U.S. claims regarding the Lausanne statement. Meanwhile, the Arab leaders of the Gulf have been invited to Camp David to be personally briefed by the President. The Arab-Jewish lobby, headed by Riyadh and Tel Aviv, seeks to stand against Iran in the region by any possible means."

 

IRAN/RUSSIA: Conservative Hemayat foresees a new partnership with Russia: "The unexpected consent of President Putin to hand over the S-300 missile system to Iran is important for both Moscow and Tehran. Russia was due to deliver this system in 2010 but refused because of sanctions. Iran was able to manufacture domestically a more advanced type of the S-300 missile system, which surprised even Russian experts. Iran expects Russia to determine its security and military policies based on its own national interests. Putin seeks to attract new partners. With its high political and military capabilities, Iran is a reliable future partner for Russia. The dispatch of the S-300 missile system will create new opportunities for Moscow and Tehran. Iran and Russia hold similar views on the risks of terrorism to regional countries." 

 

IRAN/AFGHANISTAN: Moderate Iran is for better relations,"the Afghan President's visit to Iran is a sensible measure for expanding ties within the framework of preserving the national interests of both countries. There are some regional countries that seek to weaken the friendly ties between Tehran and Kabul. For instance, on the issue of Yemen, the Saudis tried to force the Afghani government to adopt a stance contrary to that of its public opinion. Iran and Afghanistan face challenges in the region that cannot be resolved without coordination and cooperation."  

Reformist E'temad is a tad patronizing: "It is clear for President Ashraf Ghani that Afghanistan cannot have the same commonalities that it has with Iran, particularly cultural and religious ones, with any other country. The common border between Iran and Afghanistan cannot be ignored; these borders can lead to vital and constructive ties between the two countries. Ashraf Ghani's visit to Iran can be very effective in improving relations. Afghanistan cannot ignore its significant neighbour on its path to development and progress; hence it should try to always have Iran's support."  

 

YEMEN: Reformist Sharq vilifies British return to the Gulf: "When the British announced they were seeking to establish a military base in Bahrain and return to the Persian Gulf after more than four decades, it became clear that the situation in this strategic region will change and that peace would depart from the region. Today, as Yemen becomes more chaotic and on the threshold of turning into another Syria, Libya or Iraq, one can understand the reason behind Britain's military return to the Gulf. Yemen is different from other countries because of its location in the Peninsula; this is why Yemen faces unpleasant events."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The spreading fire

2-The Arabs’ only address

 

1-The spreading fire

 

Saudi Arabia is gradually being sucked into the burning hot quicksand. It finds itself fighting alongside al-Qa’ida. In fact, it is fighting on that organization’s behalf without prior coordination with it... It would be no surprise if the options that [Houthi leader] Sayyid al-Houthi spoke of on Sunday included expanding this war’s ambit by resorting to long-range rockets and artillery [attacks on Saudi Arabia]. Yemen now is Saudi Arabia’s responsibility, and a heavy burden on the Kingdom, whether during this war or after it ends. The war will be costly in both human and material terms, and it will only get costlier the longer it lasts, just as peace will be costlier because reconstruction will require tens, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars in various investments in order to appease the Yemeni people and secure their friendship-- ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

In a risible explanation of the reasons for Decisive Storm, al-Houthi claims that Saudi Arabia and the coalition states are seeking to back al-Qa'ida in Yemen! That is an implicit sectarian explanation of the military operations' aims. But al-Houthi may have been led by Nasrallah and 'Tehran's turbaned leaders' to forget that Saudi Arabia has been fighting this extremist organization and other similar organizations for over a decade and a half; and that it is still doing so today. Al-Houthi was naturally trying to portray this ‘storm’ to the simple-minded and the naïve as an act of aggression and an assault on the Yemeni people. He forgot that most of the Yemeni people, as well as their legitimate government, were those who invited this ‘storm’ to cleanse Yemen of his group and the remnants of [former president] Saleh's men-- Saudi al-Watan

 

Saudi Arabia has wagered heavily on this war. The Saudi-affiliated media have played a decisive role in expanding its aims and exaggerating its expectations and anticipated results. Some say that the war points to an 'Arab awakening'; others repeat the slogan that 'life has returned to the [Arab] nation'; yet others speak of a 'vibrant patriotic wave' that is sweeping over Saudi society; and others speak of 'Iran's defeat' and the retreat of its 'Shiite/Persian' project; still others hope to restore balance to the regional order; and so on and so forth – all of which goes well beyond Yemen's borders and the war on it, to cover the entire region. If the 'political solution' that the Saudi monarch and the U.S. president have both agreed is necessary in Yemen is of the sort that Saudi Arabia spoke of at the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm, my guess is that it will be a long time before the guns fall silent in Yemen--Urayb ar-Rintawi Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Had the billions of dollars being spent on this futile war been offered as aid to the Yemeni people, the country’s situation would have been much better than it is today because this war has only exacerbated its suffering and destroyed an already weak infrastructure.  Aid to the Yemeni people would have allowed them to live in dignity, instead of creating a new focal point of tension in the Arab world that will give birth to more extremist religious movements in our homeland. A political solution is the sole way out of the war being waged on Yemen. Let all parties without exception sit to the dialogue table, for if the situation continues as it is, there is the threat of a real disaster that will not stop at Yemen's borders. The fire will spread to Saudi Arabia and the entire Arabian Gulf. This is something to fear in the midst of an Arab political and social reality that is driving the entire region towards total anarchy--Jihad al-Moheisin in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Yesterday’s (Sunday’s) speech by the Yemeni Houthi leader ‘Abdelmalik al-Houthi was very much a war speech that suggests that the conflict will escalate and intensify, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily.  It is now clear that this will be a protracted and extremely costly war for all sides, but especially for Saudi Arabia, which will have to finance the war from its diminishing oil returns. Al-Houthi's speech was a risible attempt to mislead the Yemenis into believing that Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Israel were waging a war on them, says the editorial in a Saudi daily. It was merely a repetition of Iran and its regional allies’ claims resulting from Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm’s shock-effect on them. There seems to be a growing disagreement over the war between Washington on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies on the other, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. Riyadh does not want the war to end before achieving an unambiguous military victory, while Washington is apparently not convinced that this is possible. If it does not end soon, the Yemen war threatens dire consequences for the entire region, especially for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, warns another Jordanian commentator. Rather than supporting UN humanitarian aid for Yemen, Saudi Arabia would have done better to stop its war on this country.

 

NO POLITICAL HORIZON: “Anyone hearing what the leader of the Ansarullah Movement Sayyid ‘Abdelmalik al-Houthi had to say during his Sunday evening speech on the movement’s TV station al-Maseera would understand that the Yemeni crisis is going to last for a long time to come, that the war will get even more ferocious, and that there is no political solution on the horizon,” writes Editor-in-Chief ‘Abdelbari ‘Atwan on Monday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Sayyid al-Houthi, who appeared for the first time after an absence of 24 days amidst numerous reports leaked by his enemies insisting he had died in a coalition air raid on his headquarters in the city of Sa’da, did not propose any peace initiative. He did not offer any concessions. Nor did he show any signs of fear because of the intensive aerial assault on his forces and other targets in Yemen. Throughout, he quoted Quranic verses that speak of injustice and aggression, and that ask for steadfastness; and throughout, he stressed that he ‘relies on God, while they rely on the U.S.’

This was a rallying call in the full sense of the word. He spoke of a certain victory, of patience, of the inevitable defeat of those who surrender, of the other side’s billions of dollars compared to the Yemeni people’s poverty, hunger and deprivation, and of American participation in the [Saudi-led coalition’s] operations room.

All these subjects were carefully chosen to have an impact on the vicious psychological war that is unfolding alongside the confrontation on the battlefields. So far, the battle has been one-sided – aerial bombardments without the other party having the ability to respond in kind.

It was worth noting that Sayyid al-Houthi never mentioned [fugitive] Yemeni President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi or his Deputy Khaled Bahah. He confined himself to some ambiguous references to ‘legitimacy’ when he said that it belongs to the side that has right on its side, and that this is the legitimacy of the Holy Qur’an and that of confronting aggression, as he put it.

The other side, which stands in the opposite trench in Operation Decisive Storm, has been waging a fierce media counter-offensive after a long period of silence. It is using its media to transmit its messages so as to reach the broadest sphere possible. This counter-offensive can be summarized as follows:

- First, it was no coincidence that Sayyid al-Houthi’s speech came only two days after that delivered by Hizbollah’s leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah at a [Lebanese] popular rally ‘in support of Yemen’. He launched a ferocious attack on Saudi Arabia in which he used very strong words, accusing it of spreading ‘takfiri thought and terrorism.’ The response came from Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Qarqash and from the Emirate of Dubai’s Head of General Security Dahi Khalfan using even stronger terms.

- Second, [Iranian supreme leader] Sayyid Ali Khamene’i issued instructions to the Iranian Defense Ministry to deploy its resources, raise the level of alert and military readiness of the army, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and all related agencies, declaring that ‘the Iranians are a nation that has proved its ability to defend itself if it suffers any attack.’

- Third, Sayyid ‘Abdelmalik al-Houthi’s speech, which lasted for over forty minutes, included a clear incitement against Saudi Arabia and its allies, threatening to resort to all available means against them. He also invoked the threat posed by al-Qa’ida as a means of warning the West, claiming that this organization that is in control of the Yemeni south is the main beneficiary of the current events– as if reminding everyone of the threat posed by Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria.

- Fourth, and according to American reports, Tehran has deployed over thirty warships to the Bab al-Mandab Straits, and its media has given prominence to these reports. This sends a message that Iran will not abandon its allies in Yemen.

We do not know precisely what effect Sayyid al-Houthi’s speech will have on the different shades of the Yemeni people’s spectrum– those who support Operation Decisive Storm, or those who oppose it. And we also do not know what the Saudi/Gulf response will be. But what we are quite sure about is that the war in Yemen is expanding, and that the prospects of a political solution are on the wane. Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that it may stretch for many weeks, or months, or even years to come.

The ground war that many have expected after the aerial bombardment has failed to achieve any of its aims – most prominently, the reinstatement of the ‘legitimate’ President ‘Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi– now seems very unlikely after Pakistan has retreated, Egypt is dragging its feet and Turkey’s clear commitment to a political solution.

Saudi Arabia is gradually being sucked into the burning hot quicksand. It finds itself fighting alongside al-Qa’ida. In fact, it is fighting on that organization’s behalf without prior coordination with it. General Ahmad al-‘Asiri, the coalition’s military spokesman and advisor to the Saudi Defense Minister now talks of daily losses among Saudi troops in border clashes south of the Kingdom along the borders with the Yemeni provinces controlled by the Houthis. It would be no surprise if the options that Sayyid al-Houthi spoke of on Sunday included expanding this war’s ambit by resorting to long-range rockets and artillery [attacks on Saudi Arabia].

Yemen now is Saudi Arabia’s responsibility, and a heavy burden on the Kingdom, whether during this war or after it ends. The war will be costly in both human and material terms, and it will only get costlier the longer it lasts, just as peace will be costlier because reconstruction will require tens, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars in various investments in order to appease the Yemeni people and secure their friendship.

“The problem lies in the continued retreat of revenues from oil due to the drop in oil prices. This problem may become even more complicated after Iranian oil returns to the markets in force in the wake of the nuclear peace deal, which would entail a further drop in prices,” concludes ‘Atwan.

End…

 

CARBON COPIES: "Abdelmalik al-Houthi's speech last night said nothing new," writes the editorial in Monday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

We can say that his speech was almost a carbon copy of Hassan Nasrallah's two most recent speeches: The same terms speaking of resistance, and the same slogans of delusory mobilization, and a risible attempt to deceive the Yemeni and Arab citizens into believing that Operation Decisive Storm is a Zionist/American/Israeli scheme led by Saudi Arabia.

Al-Houthi criticizes the coalition’s members that include Arab and Islamic states. He even criticizes the legitimate Yemeni state because it called for Yemen's salvation. He criticizes the international community as represented by the UN, which recently adopted a resolution on Yemen under Chapter VII of its Charter. In other words, al-Houthi criticizes the entire world – of course, except for Tehran's politicians! For him, 'Iran is a major Islamic state'!

This is how al-Houthis spoke yesterday, after hurling his insults at Saudi Arabia. In light of this, any ignoramus would understand the implications of al-Houthi's speech. Any ordinary human being would simply note the clear elements shared by Khamenei, Qassem Soleimani, Nasrallah and 'Abdelmalik al-Houthi’s political discourse. He or she would realize that there are those who are seeking to promote a confessional [Shiite] project so as to spread their influence and impose their control over the region.

In his tense and embellished speech, and in a risible explanation of the reasons for Decisive Storm, al-Houthi claims that Saudi Arabia and the coalition states are seeking to back al-Qa'ida in Yemen! That is an implicit sectarian explanation of the military operations' aims. But al-Houthi may have been led by Nasrallah and 'Tehran's turbaned leaders' to forget that Saudi Arabia has been fighting this extremist organization and other similar organizations for over a decade and a half; and that it is still doing so today.

Al-Houthi was naturally trying to portray this ‘storm’ to the simple-minded and the naïve as an act of aggression and an assault on the Yemeni people. He forgot that most of the Yemeni people, as well as their legitimate government, were those who invited this ‘storm’ to cleanse Yemen of his group and the remnants of [former president] Saleh's men. He did not mention the Yemenis who marched in support of the ‘storm’ carrying pictures of [Saudi] King Salman.

Was it not Saudi Arabia that led the [2011] Gulf initiative to end the political crisis in Yemen? Were the Gulf states not those who invited the various Yemeni parties to the negotiating table? But Ali Saleh refused, and used the situation to haggle, while al-Houthi and his group also refused and proceeded to try and take control of Aden with the aim of liquidating the country's legitimate president and occupying the whole country.

Al-Houthi did not mention the Kingdom and the Gulf states' diplomatic efforts to end the Yemeni crisis. What happened was that al-Houthi rejected dialogue and turned against Yemeni legitimacy. He continued to tamper with Yemen until he reached Aden; and he wagered on Iran and its regional project. But the response fell on him like a bolt of lightning. It is as simple as that!

"So, there is nothing new in the speech. It is a mere set of tense reactions riddled with insults and claims of conspiracy. And this is because the ‘storm’ has had a powerful effect," concludes the daily.

End…

 

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES: "The Saudi monarch and the U.S. president reportedly agreed on the need for a 'political solution' for the Yemeni crisis in a telephone conversation a few days ago," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This is understandable from Washington's perspective for many reasons. But what about the Saudi perspective?

Anyone who closely scrutinizes the American stance towards the Yemeni crisis would understand that the U.S. did not want a new front to be opened in this region which is already boiling over with burning political, ideological, and confessional conflicts and wars, wars between axes and camps, and wars by proxy. But since its priority is the nuclear agreement with Tehran, it could find no other way to 'reassure' Saudi Arabia and some of its Arab allies other than by offering them some 'consolation prize' – as we have suggested in a previous article. This consists of logistical and intelligence support for Operation Decisive Storm. And we also asked what sort of 'consolation prize' would be offered to Israel, the second state [after Saudi Arabia] that is hostile to Iran is opposed to any agreement with it.

Washington has been careful not to be directly involved in the fighting in Yemen. Even the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes by U.S. aircraft occurs outside Yemeni airspace, which sends a symbolic signal that has its own implications. This is despite the fact that Iran and its regional allies in particular have insisted on describing what is happening in Yemen as 'an American/Saudi aggression.' Yet a calm reading of the situation as it appears from Washington, does not support this claim.

Furthermore, according to a certain understanding in Washington of what is happening in Yemen, the U.S. is all but losing the war on terrorism in that part of the world, where al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has a strong and growing influence. This is the most dangerous branch of al-Qa'ida in the view of the American security establishment. In fact, Republicans and Democrats alike fear that al-Qa'ida is the main beneficiary of the war in and on Yemen. As a result, there seems to be a degree of impatience to turn the page on this crisis and reestablish the priority of the war on terrorism, rather the wars between confessional groups, the wars over regional roles, and the wars by proxy that are raging in the region. After all, American military and security attacks on al-Qa'ida have all but ceased since the outbreak of Decisive Storm, which is now in its fourth week.

In fact, a number of Arab governments that have joined the war on terrorism to varying degrees, share this view with the U.S.. Jordan heads this list. It still gives absolute priority to the war on ISIS, so much so that King 'Abdullah II said in a recent press interview that Jordan alone has stuck by the U.S. in this war, and that the Arab and regional states are no longer participating in military operations [against ISIS]. This is despite Jordan's official support for Operation Decisive Storm and even its 'symbolic' participation in the Saudi-led regional coalition.

Pressures are mounting on Washington to find a political way out of the Yemeni predicament, in light of the international and humanitarian organizations’ reports that speak of a catastrophe threatening the Yemenis as a result of the war and the Saudi-led coalition’s siege of the country. The effects of this catastrophe will not be alleviated by the Saudi offer of a grant to the UN to provide urgent humanitarian aid and relief to the Yemenis. From the Yemenis' perspective, the war should be ended rather sending aid to help its victims. The root of the problem should be addressed first by preventing more victims from falling.

But the question regarding the various parties' positions seems to be both more important and more complicated when it comes to Saudi Arabia. According to sources close to possible mediators in the war that has been imposed on Yemen, they are not that eager to use their good offices. The main reason is that Saudi Arabia prefers 'a decisive military victory' to any political solution in Yemen. At the very least, it wishes to achieve a clear and unambiguous victory that is not open to interpretation, before initiating any moves to convene a dialogue or set up a negotiations table.

Saudi Arabia has wagered heavily on this war. The Saudi-affiliated media have played a decisive role in expanding its aims and exaggerating its expectations and anticipated results. Some say that the war points to an 'Arab awakening'; others repeat the slogan that 'life has returned to the [Arab] nation'; yet others speak of a 'vibrant patriotic wave' that is sweeping over Saudi society; and others speak of 'Iran's defeat' and the retreat of its 'Shiite/Persian' project; still others hope to restore balance to the regional order; and so on and so forth – all of which goes well beyond Yemen's borders and the war on it, to cover the entire region.

If the 'political solution' that the Saudi monarch and the U.S. president have both agreed is necessary in Yemen is of the sort that Saudi Arabia spoke of at the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm, my guess is that it will be a long time before the guns fall silent in Yemen. For the preconditions for this solution from the Saudi perspective are tantamount to a surrender document and [the Houthi/Saleh alliance’s] 'white flags' raised in Sa’da and Sana'a. But I do not believe that Decisive Storm has achieved sufficient progress in its fourth week to impose such terms and diktats on the targeted party.

On the other hand, if the proposed political solution is closer to a 'no-winner/no-loser' formula, then I suppose that that would amount to a slap in the face of 'decisiveness' and its 'storm,' since it amounts to a proclamation that the operation has failed to achieve its intended aims.

But there is a third scenario for explaining this 'American/Saudi accord.' According to this scenario, each side meant something different when speaking of 'a political solution,' and the announcement that there was a mutual accord was a softened diplomatic turn of phrase that was meant to postpone any public expression of disagreement and difference.

What lends further credence to this third scenario is the Saudi (and Gulf) reaction to Ban Ki-moon's statements in which he called all parties fighting in Yemen to accept an immediate end for the first time since the outbreak of the ‘storm’. His statement annoyed a number of Gulf capitals, including Riyadh.

"And there are reports of intensive activity that will now begin in Washington and New York to contain these statement's repercussions," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

THE MAIN LOSERS: "The Arab peoples are the main losers in the futile wars that are now raging in the region," writes Jihad al-Moheisin in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

Most of the victims are civilians, and there are losses at every political, military, and economic level. Moreover, and especially in the Yemeni and Syrian cases, the main losers are the states where the wars are raging, as well as those that are backing their proxies in these wars.

The Zionist enemy and the Western and American arms and pharmaceutical companies are the parties that are securing any real gains and economic benefits, as will the companies that will subsequently be in charge of reconstruction. Once the war ends, the situation will move from pointless slaughter to economic reconstruction, whose main beneficiaries will be the multinational corporations that first seek wars then reconstruction contracts. All of which confirms that there is no political side or force that is taking the Arab peoples or the states that govern them into account.

I wish that the peace initiative for Yemen that was presented by Iran had been Jordanian or Egyptian or Algerian, or that some other Arab country had proposed it. But the Arab order has reached unenviable levels of impotence and defeatism. Parties far and near – Russians and Iranians – are coming forward with initiatives and plans to extract the Arabs from their problems, while we pursue our ignorance, killing each other with the swords of Sunnis and Alawites as if it were the nation's fate to be doomed to fighting over the history of people who lived centuries ago, even though there is much doubt about the truth of the stories that have been recounted about them.

As an Arab pained by the wars between the sects in which we find ourselves, I seek any ray of hope that may save the wretched of the earth from the lethal fire that is burning them. The four-point Iranian plan for peace in Yemen proposed to the UN calls for an end to the 'futile' aerial campaign that Saudi Arabia is leading in Yemen. It calls for an immediate ceasefire and for all foreign military operations to cease and for the urgent delivery of medical and humanitarian aid, the resumption of political talks, and the formation of a national unity government.

We are in direst need of a solution to the war being waged on Yemen. Had the billions of dollars being spent on this futile war been offered as aid to the Yemeni people, the country’s situation would have been much better than it is today because this war has only exacerbated its suffering and destroyed an already weak infrastructure.

Aid to the Yemeni people would have allowed them to live in dignity, instead of creating a new focal point of tension in the Arab world that will give birth to more extremist religious movements in our homeland.

A political solution is the sole way out of the war being waged on Yemen. Let all parties without exception sit to the dialogue table, for if the situation continues as it is, there is the threat of a real disaster that will not stop at Yemen's borders. The fire will spread to Saudi Arabia and the entire Arabian Gulf. This is something to fear in the midst of an Arab political and social reality that is driving the entire region towards total anarchy.

Yemen has been burnt by the curse of oil. The irony is that Saudi Arabia has decided to grant 274-million dollars to the UN to finance humanitarian operations in Yemen.

"Would it not have been better to end the war altogether?" asks Moheisin in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

2-The Arabs’ only address

 

Pakistan’s refusal to join the war in Yemen suggests that the Arabs’ should only rely on themselves and develop their own nuclear capabilities, says Mohammad Barhouma in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries should seriously reconsider their reliance on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent in ensuring Arab security after the Pakistani parliament’s decision not to take part in Operation Decisive Storm, urges a Jordanian commentator in a Saudi-owned daily. They should henceforth proceed based on the assumption that Arab security can only be ensured by the Arabs.

 

PRUDENCE BALANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERESTS: "Whether we understand the background and reasons for the Pakistani parliament's decision to remain neutral in Operation Decisive Storm, or whether we feel let down and develop a subconscious sense that 'we are alone', what has happened merely confirms that politics is a matter of prudence, balance, and the management of interests," writes Mohammad Barhouma in the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

It also confirms that our diplomatic and political skills are measured by our ability to convince others to take our interests into account, making them part of their own interests that do not add any burden upon them.

Pakistan's parliament's decision on Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen amounts to a test of some friends. It should add to Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies’ sense of the significance of self-reliance, leading to the conviction that 'Arab security is an Arab responsibility and its primary address is an Arab one.' This does not mean that alliances and friendships are unimportant, or that we should belittle the role played by great powers; nor is it a call to isolate ourselves from others and the world.

In recent years, there was a great deal of Arab investment in relations with Russia; yet at the end of the day, Moscow did not shy away from supplying Tehran with the S-300 ground-to-air missile system. Experts say that Iran's possession of the M-1 system and Moscow's agreement to supply it with the S-300 will now mean that Iran will have a comprehensive air defense system that is sufficient to protect its airspace and various nuclear installations. This is why analysts urge the Arab states to pursue the Japanese model, namely, to become a nuclear threshold state that can produce nuclear weapons if necessary in the future.

In this regard, there are reports that U.S. President Barack Obama may propose the idea of an American ‘nuclear umbrella’ in his upcoming meeting with Gulf officials at Camp David so as to confront the Arab states’ threat to proceed with uranium-enrichment projects, and prevent certain Gulf states from possibly obtaining nuclear military technology. Despite the many international obstacles facing this last option, the theoretical cause for it is the emergence of an Arab sense of dissatisfaction with reliance on the U.S. in securing strategic Arab interests. This view is spreading among the Gulf’s intellectual and political elite on the grounds that such reliance 'would limit Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states' freedom and their ability to maneuver outside the framework of American calculations and interests.'

When the UAE signed its agreement regarding its nuclear program, it voluntarily relinquished its right to enrich uranium locally. That is a sovereign Emirati decision that Abu-Dhabi believed to be consistent with its vision, interests, and circumstances. At the time, the U.S. described this agreement as an 'ideal model.' But it does not bind anyone else in the Gulf or the Arab states, especially since the in-principle nuclear agreement with Iran permits it to enrich uranium to 3.8% and use it for civilian purposes.

In the past, eyes would turn to Pakistan when the Gulf considered the issue of nuclear arms. Today, and after what has happened in the Pakistani parliament in response to Operation Decisive Storm, it seems necessary to calculate more carefully, create alternatives, and work seriously on developing the notion that 'the main address for Arab security is an Arab one'," concludes Barhouma.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 20.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

14 more days

 

Two days before Israel marks the official Memorial Day for some 23,000 people killed in 67 years of wars and attacks, Israel Hayom is already dedicating most of its front page to the event, with large photographs of the IDF chief of staff and bereaved families laying wreaths on the graves of fallen soldiers. The paper's lead headline is taken from a preview of an interview with the IDF officer who commanded the operation in the eastern Gaza City neighborhood of Shujaiyah, where dozens of Palestinians and 13 Israeli soldiers were killed last summer during Operation Protective Edge. The officer is quoted as saying that the heavy death toll on both sides is 'the price of war.'

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the growing wave of protest, following publication of a report which found a high incidence of cancer among children who live close to a cluster of factories in the Haifa area. According to the report, local residents gathered at the entrance to the Carmel Chemicals plant and demanded its closure. Meanwhile, one of the refineries in the area ordered a crane to remove a garbage truck placed there by Haifa Municipality to block the entrance to the site. Haifa Mayor Yona Yahav ordered the measure on Sunday, in the wake of a damning report on air pollution in the city.

Haaretz leads with the latest twist in the negotiations that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is frantically engaged in to form a new coalition. The first deadline for forming a government was due to expire on Wednesday, although the prime minister-elect formally asked the president for a two-week extension – which was granted on Monday morning. 'I am giving you another 14 days to put together a government,' Rivlin told Netanyahu in remarks broadcast live on Israel's main radio stations.

According to Haaretz's headline, Netanyahu's Likud party will require any future coalition partners to vote in favor of bills that would weaken the Supreme Court. Likud and Habayit Hayehudi lawmakers are planning a series of controversial laws that would change the face of the Supreme Court, Haaretz reports, including changing the seniority policy in the appointment of the Supreme Court president, and reducing the number of Supreme Court justices on the Judicial Appointments Committee, all of which would give the government more control over the court. Likud on Sunday presented to Kulanu the list of bills involving the judicial system that it intends to promote in the next Knesset; Kulanu is expected to give its response over the next few days. Likud and Habayit Hayehudi are concerned that freeing Kulanu from coalition discipline on these bills would dissolve the automatic majority needed for the bills’ passage.

In other news, Netanyahu opened the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday by reiterating his opposition to Russia's decision to supply Iran with advanced S-300 missiles – especially at a time when Iran is stepping up its aggression in the region and around the borders of the State of Israel. Netanyahu said Israel also views with grave concern the fact that there is no reference to this aggression in the nuclear agreement emerging between major powers and Iran. He said there is no stipulation that the aggression be halted, whether at the start of the agreement or as a condition for the lifting of sanctions. Netanyahu stressed that Israel will do whatever is necessary to defend the security of the state and its citizens.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin also had a warning for Israel over the weekend. In an interview with the state-run Rossiya channel on Saturday, Putin warned Israel not to supply weapons to the Ukrainian government, saying that the move would be counterproductive to efforts to reach peace in east Ukraine. 'It's their right to do what they think is appropriate,' he said. He warned that if it is a lethal weapon, he thinks it will be counterproductive. It will only lead to another round of conflicts, to a rise in the number of victims, and the outcome will be the same, he added.

The main story of the weekend was the deal reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the fate of hundreds of millions of dollars in tax monies owed to the Palestinian Authority, after Jerusalem had delayed the transfer of funds since early January as a punitive measure following the Palestinians joining the International Criminal Court. The agreement was reached following a meeting between the PA's Minister of Civil Affairs, Hussein al-Sheikh, Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, and IDF's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Maj. Gen. Yoav Mordechai.

Last month, Israel indicated it would release the frozen funds, but the payment remained held up over a dispute regarding the size of the PA's unpaid bill to the Israel Electricity Corporation. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refused to have Israel deduct electricity costs and said that if the issue remains unresolved, he would turn to The Hague.

According to al-Sheikh, Israel will transfer the tax monies owed for the months of March and April without deducting the Authority's debt for electricity, water and medical services. Al-Sheikh added that the rest of the money owed by Israel for the months of December to February would be transferred with a deduction of the said costs. The transfer of about $471,113,000 from Israel to the PA will take place Sunday or Monday, al-Sheikh said. A special committee comprised of Israeli and Palestinian officials is set to convene in the near future in order to resolve all remaining debt claims between the two sides, he added.

Under an economic agreement signed in 1994, Israel collects and transfers to the PA tens of millions of dollars each month in customs duties levied on goods destined for Palestinian markets that transit through Israeli ports. Israel has imposed a freeze on the transfer many times, though the sanction has rarely lasted more than one or two months. Blocking the money prevents the PA from paying its roughly 180,000 employees, which cost almost $200 million a month.

 

 

RUSSIA AND IRAN: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ephraim Halevy comments on the role that Russia is playing in the Middle East in general and in the negotiations with Iran in particular.

"The focus of attention over the past week, in terms of the Iranian issue, was on the United States and Russia. To start with, we followed the political drama unfolding in Washington, where, in the end, Israeli government representatives celebrated a compromise that was reached on Capitol Hill, whereby the president's ability to push through an agreement with Iran – if the world powers manage to negotiate one – has been curtailed. Jerusalem did not change its tone even after Russia announced that it was lifting its ban on the sale of the S-300 anti-missile defense system to Iran – a decision that our elected officials said was the direct result of the 'bad deal' that the United States reached with the Islamic Republic. The campaign against U.S. President Barack Obama is still going ahead at full steam, while, at the same time, it was reported that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called Russian President Vladimir Putin to express Israel's disappointment with the Kremlin's decision.

A day later, there were also public comments. Netanyahu, who delivered the keynote speech at the Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony at Yad Vashem, used his address to speak at length about the Iranian threat and said that the West's handling of the crisis was akin to its behavior on the eve of World War II. He warned the Israeli public that Israel may be forced to act alone to safeguard its future and its security.

Putin, for his part, defended his decision; saying that the S-300 system was defensive in nature and that it does not pose a threat to Israel or any other country. He also said – quite correctly – that the decision is not a violation of the international sanctions imposed on Iran. He said that it was a response to the flexibility shown by Iran in the nuclear negotiations and promised that Russia would continue to cooperate with its partners in the P5+1, in negotiating with Tehran. In addition, he hinted that providing Iran with a defensive weapons system was in keeping with the goal of preventing the Middle East from descending into violence and that it gives the Iranian regime greater legitimacy.

U.S. President Barack Obama was quick to respond, saying that he was surprised that Putin had waited this long before reviving the deal with Iran. He said that the final agreement with Iran may have to include elements that would make it easier for the ayatollahs to convince the people of Iran that it is a good deal for them.

There are two issues here that need addressing. The first is the somewhat surprising effort by Washington and Moscow to cooperate openly on the Iranian nuclear issue. This is in sharp contrast to the other areas of international interest where the two countries are at loggerheads – primarily over Ukraine. For more than 70 years, the Middle East was the staging ground for tensions between the United States and Russia; these tensions reached a peak during the Yom Kippur War, when the two superpowers were on opposing sides and when they threatened each other with nuclear war. In terms of how the superpowers are now aligned, Israel must adapt itself to a new reality.

The second issue that needs to be addressed is the bilateral relationship between Jerusalem and Moscow. In recent years, Israel has treated Russia and its leaders with the utmost respect, while Russia delayed for years the supply of certain weapons systems to Iran and Syria – in part because of Israeli pressure, which was backed up by the support of the United States. This is changing in front of our very eyes. Russia's desire to stake a claim in Syria, as well as in Iran, coupled with its desire to once again be seen as a major regional power – both in the Arabian Peninsula and in Iraq – not only obligates us to be alert and to deal in a level-headed way with Moscow, but also to take the Russians into account when considering any operation that could be seen as a divergence from the policy pursued in Washington.

In the historical overview of the 1930s that Netanyahu delivered on Holocaust Remembrance Day, he forgot to mention that there was another player on the European scene – Russia – which also faced the threat of Nazi Germany. Netanyahu has consistently compared the Iranian nuclear threat to the threat posed by Hitler and his henchmen. But Russia, unlike Neville Chamberlain, did not try to appease the Germans. It entered into an alliance with them."

Ends…

 

UNITY NOW: Writing on the NRG website, Yaakov Ahimeir says that a national unity government is the best way for Israel to deal with the various threats it is facing – first and foremost the Iranian nuclear threat.

"The post-election period is one which brings out the ugly side of the political process. It is a time when political commentators are preoccupied with coalition horse trading, while television shows and newspapers are full of unlearned comments about the off-the-cuff comments of some actress or another.

In the meantime, a storm of blood, fire and pillars of smoke is brewing on the borders of our tiny country. Heads are rolling, thanks to the bloodthirsty barbarism of ISIS; according to the IDF, tens of thousands of missiles are being aimed southward at Israel on our northern border; Russia is about to provide Tehran with the most advanced surface-to-air missiles in the world; the Iranian leadership is still celebrating what appears to be the draft of an agreement that will do nothing to address the nuclear threat to Israel and the other countries in this region; the Palestinian Authority is about to file its war crimes complaints against Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague; the European Union is on the verge of calling for a general boycott of Israel or, at the very least, of marking products manufactured in Judea and Samaria.

Because of all this, what is needed now more than ever is an alternative to the government that it appears we are going to get. The fourth Netanyahu government needs to be different; it needs to be infused with the spirit of Winston Churchill.

Netanyahu is known as a huge admirer of Churchill. They have a lot in common. They are both great orators, for example. Churchill has rightly been credited with spearheading the victory over Nazi Germany, while Netanyahu will go down in history as having waged a determined war against Iran's nuclear program. That particular struggle is far from over and that is perhaps the main reason that Netanyahu needs to stop pussyfooting around. He needs to change path – a path that is leading all-too-predictably to a narrow government with his natural partners. After all, a narrow, right-wing government will not be able to overcome the obstacles in the way of rebuilding our relations with the United States and will not be able to handle the Iranian threat properly.

The head of the outgoing government and the incoming government must halt his problematic sprint toward a narrow government, even if he gets to appoint the ministers that he wants. There is an alternative, but to implement it Netanyahu will have to be more Churchillian than ever before. He will have to appear before the people of Israel and tell them that he doesn't want a narrow government. He has to tell his people that what Israel needs right now is a unity government. He must call on the leaders of Zionist Union to enter fast-track negotiations toward a coalition that better suits our circumstances.

For their part, the leaders of Zionist Union would face something of a moral dilemma. After all, they campaigned on a platform of 'Anyone but Bibi' and they would be criticized from all sides if they now agreed to join his coalition. They would be targeted – rightly so – by every satirical show on television. There could even be a rebellion against them from within their own party. But they must put all that to one side and do what's best for the country.

A national unity government has a much better chance of dealing with the international political siege of Israel that appears to be on the horizon. As far as we can tell, Netanyahu himself wants a unity government and it's very much up to him to create one. After all, who knows better than Bibi that a unity government is in the national interest?"

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU'S DREAM GOVERNMENT: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit explains why Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu wants an 18-minister government in the short term and how he plans to expand it in the future by bringing Isaac Herzog and his Zionist Union party into the coalition.

"What Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu really wants is a government with 18 ministers – as the law dictates. He's always been a law-abiding leader. It's not clear whether he will manage to realize this rather odd vision. There are many people who oppose him; almost every politician who has aspirations of being a minister in the next government, for example. But Bibi would prefer a smaller cabinet. Not for the right reason, of course. Not because it's cheaper, more effective and less wasteful. No, he has very different reasons.

In a government with just 18 ministers and deputy ministers, the formula by which jobs are divvied out would change: at the moment, assuming that the government will expand to 22 or 23 ministers, parties will get one minister each for every three votes they bring to the coalition. But if Netanyahu decides not to alter the law and stick with an 18-member government, that will change and parties will have to make do with one minister for every four seats. That would mean that Netanyahu's pals in Habayit Hayehudi, for example, would only get two ministerial positions instead of three. And that, in turn, means that Ayelet Shaked would not be a minister in the fourth Netanyahu government. It would be a mistake to downplay this strategic issue. There is a clear order from above not to make Shaked a minister. That order came from none other than Sara Netanyahu herself.

There are other reasons, too. An 18-minister government would be lean and effective, Netanyahu would enjoy greater representation for Likud lawmakers in key Knesset committees and he would be able to impose party discipline over the deputy ministers. Most importantly, however, a government of this kind would falter, since the international community would impose a boycott against a rightist-ultra-Orthodox-conservative Israeli government. Then Netanyahu would be able to come to the rescue by bringing Isaac Herzog (with or without Tzipi Livni) into his government.

Netanyahu and Herzog would both then be able to say that they kept their promise to their respective voters: they promised not to set up a unity government straight after the election – and they didn't. They only set up a unity government a few months after the election, when Israel's back was to the wall, in order to save the country (and themselves, of course). If Habayit Hayehudi threatens to bolt the coalition over Herzog joining, Netanyahu will let it. He would prefer that it remained in his coalition; after all, Naftali Bennett, Ayelet Shaked and Uri Ariel would be far more dangerous to him from the opposition benches, but he won't force them to stay. And then, at least, he would be able to expand the government to the size that he really wants (22-24 ministers), in order to save some key positions for Herzog and his followers. Why? Because of 'the situation.' How will he then persuade the settlers and Bennett supporters to vote for him in the next election? By doing exactly what he did in this election. If it worked once, he reckons, it will work again.

This is Netanyahu's two-stage plan for setting up a broad coalition with Herzog without breaking his campaign promises. It's not clear whether it will actually happen. The chances that Netanyahu will be able to withstand the pressure from would-be ministers to set up a small government are not great. In the end, the closer we get to the deadline, the more Netanyahu's fear will grow and the more he will want to seal the deal and get his fourth government sworn in."

Ends…

 

A LOYAL SERVANT: Writing in financial daily Globes, Mati Golan recommends Yuval Steinitz as Israel's next foreign minister.

"Assuming that, once the mission of forming a new government has been completed, Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud Party keeps the Foreign Ministry for itself, the prime minister would be well advised to consider appointing Yuval Steinitz as his foreign minister. I know that a recommendation of this kind needs explaining – not because people think he is unqualified for the job, but because he has gained something of a reputation as Bibi's lapdog. And that's a reputation which is richly deserved. Steinitz has taken great care over the years never to utter a word of criticism against his boss – or his boss' wife, for that matter. Not everyone is willing or able to make himself the target of mockery and lack of respect. So it's got something to do with character – but it's a lot more than that.

Politics is full of people who take bets on this horse or another. Steinitz is one of many who bet on Netanyahu. That bet did not always pay off, but Steinitz – unlike his boss – never wavered. He opted to go with Netanyahu and he stuck with him through thick and thin. You can call that being a lapdog if you want, but I would prefer to see it as something that is sorely lacking in Israeli politics: loyalty. In return, it should be pointed out, Netanyahu remained totally loyal to Steinitz as well.

In my opinion, Steinitz remained loyal to Netanyahu because he genuinely believes in him and perhaps even likes him; but there's no question that it was also motivated by self-interest. After all, Steinitz has held a ministerial position for years. In political terms, Steinitz has lost nothing from the path he chose to advance his political career. But he has lost out because of how he is perceived by the general public.

Steinitz is far more worthy than his public image. He is hugely intelligent; he's got a PhD and he is a lecturer in philosophy; he is a cultured and affable man. Even his right-wing views are far from extreme, because nothing about him is extreme. These characteristics make him the ideal candidate for foreign minister, especially with the current circumstances.

We are about to enter a period where the main mission of the Foreign Ministry will be to rectify relations with the United States and to rebuff the diplomatic offensive from the European Union. To do this, the Foreign Ministry needs someone conciliatory, not vengeful. Avigdor Lieberman and his ilk is the last thing we need. Another advantage that Steinitz enjoys is that there is total trust between him and Netanyahu. It is not good for the country when the prime minister and the foreign minister don't get on and don't share the same views. It's much more effective when they are singing off the same hymn sheet and when they spend their time getting things done, rather than squabbling."

Ends…

 

FORGET PARIS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben-Dror Yemini explains why Israel is well within its rights to withhold Palestinian tax revenue – even if this is a violation of the Paris Protocol.

"Agreements should be honored. Agreements between people, between countries and even between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. According to the Paris Protocol, which is the economic part of the Oslo Accords, Israel collects tax revenues and Value Added tax on behalf of the Palestinians for all goods and produce entering the Palestinian territories via Israel's sea and airports. This is Palestinian money in every respect, which Israel has no right to confiscate or delay.

However, honoring agreements is supposed to be a two-way street. Anyone who honors their side of the agreement will get the same treatment in return. But anyone who violates agreements has no right to complain when the same is done to them. The custom of giving the Palestinians an exemption from this rule smacks of racism. The Palestinians are human beings. The Palestinian Authority is a body that should not be seen as being above international law. We're not dealing with a backward child here. We're dealing with a legal and political entity. The Palestinian Authority owes huge sums of money to Israel. It owes, for example, close to 2 billion shekels to the Israel Electric Corp. Does the PA have the right to violate its own agreements?

People warn that, if Israel does not transfer these tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority, it will collapse and there will be a third intifada, or worse. These are certainly considerations that must be taken into account. However, there's something else that needs to be taken into account, too: the money that Israel transfers to the Palestinian Authority is not used to better the lot of the Palestinian people or to promote coexistence. It is used to fund the incitement in the Palestinian education system which the PA is responsible for. Even worse, the PA uses some of this money to give a monthly stipend to people who carry out terror attacks and their families. That includes, for example, the people who butchered the Fogel family in March 2011. And it will also include Khaled Qutina, the East Jerusalem man who, just a few days ago, drove his car into a crowded bus stop and killed Shalom Yohai Sharki.

It is not in Israel's interest to topple the Palestinian Authority. But Israel must not play any part in providing the PA with the funding it uses to encourage terrorism, murder and hatred. It must cut off this funding. All the threats of a third intifada become utterly irrelevant when the PA itself is funding the killers and supporting the families of killers. Even if there is no clause in the Paris Protocol giving Israel the right to withhold money for these reasons, common sense and natural justice grant us the right to do just that."

Ends…

 

IRAN IS NOT THE ONLY DANGER: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that, while Iran has been occupying the thoughts and minds of the Israeli military leadership in recent years, the greater threat lies on the northern border.

"Iran in possession of a nuclear weapon is an ever-present danger in our minds. Especially in light of the framework agreement signed by the United States and the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany [the P5+1], which provides Iran with legitimacy for its vast nuclear infrastructure and reduces the break-out period for an Iranian nuclear weapon to a minimum.

But it is not the only great danger hovering over Israel. In addition, there are more than 100,000 rockets and missiles in the hands of Hizbollah in Lebanon all pointed at Israel, plus thousands of rockets in the hands of Hamas in Gaza. They put all of Israel’s civilian population at risk. Which is the greater danger?

We can get some indication of the severity of the danger facing us by attempting to calculate the expectation, or the expected value, of the physical damage that might be caused by the occurrence of either of the two events: an attack by an Iranian nuclear weapon; or an attack by Hizbollah missiles and rockets. There is no way of assigning objective probabilities to these events, but we can make some intuitive guesses.

A nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranians would have a large-scale, negative geopolitical effect on the Middle East, but the probability that the weapon would actually be used is extremely small. However, the physical damage caused if it were to be used is essentially infinite. With the withdrawal from Sinai, Israel became a point target for a nuclear bomb. The product of the probability and damage incurred is, therefore, incalculable.

The probability of Hizbollah launching its reservoir of missiles and rockets against Israel is substantial. The theories discussed about our ability to deter them from taking such an action are not on very solid ground. Multiplying such a subjective probability by the damage that is likely to be incurred produces a result, which although indefinite, should be of grave concern to all.

Whereas the Iranian nuclear threat has been occupying our civilian and military leadership these past years – and constant efforts have been made to slow down the Iranian nuclear program – excepting civil defense programs conducted by the Israel Defense Forces Home Front, Israel’s answer to the Hizbollah rocket and missile threat has been limited to a reliance on a dubious theory of deterrence. The opportunity to destroy Hamas’ rocket capability in Gaza was missed during Operation Protective Edge last summer.

From year to year, Hizbollah’s rocket and missile threat has grown in numbers, range and accuracy. Despite the efforts that were made over the years to interfere with the supply of weapons to Hizbollah from Iran and Syria, the Shi’ite group’s capabilities to cause severe damage to Israel’s civilian population and infrastructure has continued to grow. It should be clear that the hope that Israel will be able to deter Hizbollah from utilizing this capability cannot be considered an adequate strategy for Israel.

This threat to Israel’s civilian population has grown over the years. At first, years ago, short-range rockets endangered civilians in towns and villages in the north. The response was Operation Peace for the Galilee [aka the first Lebanon war, in 1982], which established a security zone in southern Lebanon that put these rockets out of range of Israel’s northern border. After that came successive IDF withdrawals and increased ranges of Hizbollah rockets and missiles, until gradually – and almost imperceptibly – all of Israel came under threat.

Successive Israeli governments 'learned' to live with the threat and deterrence became the prevailing strategy. This strategy failed during the 2006 Second Lebanon War and also against Hamas in Gaza.

The first and essential component of an effective strategy designed to protect Israel’s civilian population against the rocket and missile threat must be an IDF capability to neutralize the Hizbollah arsenal within 24, or at most 48, hours. That capability gives Israel a number of options to free itself of this threat."

Ends…

 

APPLYING THE ‘OBAMA DOCTRINE’ TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Elie Podeh says that, if the Israeli government involves itself in domestic American politics, there is no reason why the United States cannot do the same.

 "Thomas Friedman’s interview with President Barack Obama on the Iranian nuclear issue evoked many responses, both positive and negative. In this interview, Friedman attempted to describe Obama’s policy toward pariah states such as Burma, Cuba and Iran as a comprehensive strategy that Friedman coined the Obama Doctrine.

The essence of this 'doctrine' is that a combination of engagement and satisfaction of core strategic needs could serve American interests far better than sanctions and isolation. America, in Obama’s opinion, with its overwhelming power, should have the confidence to take some calculated risks to create important new opportunities.

He believes that the United States is sufficiently powerful to test new diplomatic propositions without putting itself at risk. Although Obama hopes to see a change in Iran’s position in the forthcoming years, leading it to discontinue or slow its nuclear journey, America will be in a position to use its deterrence capabilities and military force if no such change develops. According to this argument, a superpower with a defense budget of $600 billion should be able to ward off any threat emanating from a nation with $30b. budget.

Time will tell whether the Obama Doctrine with regard to Iran (and pariah states in general) was successful or merely wishful thinking, but no one can deny the logic of this reasoning, even if doubts regarding the sincerity of Iranian intentions persist. Interestingly, the logic underlying this doctrine appears to be even more relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case.

A self-confident Israel, with a defense budget amounting to NIS 57billion, is a superpower in comparison to the approximately $1billion budget of the Palestinian Authority (the figures for Hamas are more problematic although there is obviously a wide gap there as well). According to the Obama Doctrine, such a gap allows Israel to take risks and offer some substantial concessions with regard to the occupied territories. Israel’s consistent argument that it does not have the luxury to test this proposition is disingenuous because its military might could easily undo whatever has been conceded. Moreover, an agreement with the Palestinians would be supported by security guarantees provided by the United States, the European Community and perhaps other parties in the region, which would help deter Israel’s potential enemies.

Unfortunately, the chances that the newly composed rightwing government will adopt this line of reasoning are slim at best. For Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his political allies, there is no partner on the Palestinian side. While he may be correct with regard to Hamas, placing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas firmly in the 'no partner' square is a mistake. The problem, however, goes far beyond the policy of the current government, as most Israeli governments were reluctant to take the initiative in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was even reluctant to formally endorse, or even positively respond, to the Arab Peace Initiative, which might have served as an umbrella for advancing an agreement with the Palestinians.

The conclusion must be, therefore, that the chances for an independent Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough initiated by Israel are close to zero. This leaves the Obama administration as the only viable player that can ignite the process by offering a blueprint for a solution. If Obama applies his doctrine to the Israeli-Palestinian case, we can expect the Obama Doctrine to be followed by the Obama Peace Plan or the Obama Peace Parameters.

In contrast to Clinton, who offered his vision in his final days in office in December 2000, Obama has sufficient time in office to promote his plan if he acts now. While the chances of this eventuality seem remote in view of the failure of the Kerry mission in 2014, coupled by Obama’s reluctance to further antagonize the Israeli government following the controversy over the Iran deal, perhaps Obama might be ready to take the chance of offering his own vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After all, the deal with Iran was similarly driven by the conviction that it was 'the right thing to do.' Such a proposal would surely arouse heated political debate in Israel and may lead to internal changes. But if the Israeli government involves itself in domestic American politics, there is no reason why the United States cannot do the same."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS Murat Yetkin highlights the president’s role in the upcoming June parliamentary elections in centre-left Radikal: "For President Erdogan, preserving the AKP's [ruling Justice and Development Party] power alone is not a criterion for the success for this election. Erdogan expects an AKP majority to bring him a constitution that will pave the way for his super-presidency. This election is so important to him that it cannot be left to PM Davutoglu. Secretly or openly, Erdogan will make speeches to the people almost every day and expect them to be broadcast by as many national TV stations as possible. Thus, the AKP’s election campaign will be pursued via two channels; officially by Davutoglu and de facto by Erdogan."

Cuneyt Arcayurek anticipates further staged violence in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "If the [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] HDP passes the 10% electoral threshold, the AKP will be unable to insist on a new constitution providing for a presidential regime and its ability to preserve its sole power will be in danger. This is why both the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and those in the state who want the AKP to receive the necessary number of votes might stage terror incidents similar to what happened in Agri [where the Turkish army and PKK militants clashed this week], so that the HDP may be blamed and fail to pass the threshold."

Mustafa Unal is unimpressed by the AKP’s electoral manifesto in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Voters do not choose parties by reading long documents [the AKP's recent elections’ manifesto]. While the presidential system was being developed, there were expectations that it would be explained to the public, and that it would then be debated so as to ensure that the citizens know what they are voting for. Obviously, the issue that the government and opposition parties will talk about most is the presidential system. The manifesto is far from answering these questions."

 

EU VOTE ON ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: Sami Kohen takes a relatively calm view of the EU parliament's vote on the Armenian genocide issue in centrist Milliyet: "The decisions taken by the European Parliament are not legally binding. It means that this vote is unlikely to damage the Turkish-EU negotiation process, or pave the way for any sanctions. This is why Ankara did not panic so much, apart from the official reaction to the decision. But it may also be observed that Turkey has an 'image problem' as a result of its domestic issues and foreign policy shifts."

Resul Tosun denies the genocide altogether in centre-right, pro-government Star: "First the Pope and then the EU parliament have used the word 'genocide' to describe the 1915 incidents. Since it is the 100th anniversary of these events, we will witness similar developments later this year. The goal is obvious. It is to corner Turkey and eventually demand compensation and territory. But this is impossible because the reasons and approach are fatally flawed. There was no genocide, and history cannot be written based on the Pope's or Western parliaments' decisions."

Ibrahim Kiras detects a Christian conspiracy in centrist Vatan: "The EU parliament which uses every opportunity to deny accusations of being a 'Christian club', has accepted a draft decision that includes a reference to the Pope's words! There is nothing surprising here. The Europeans’ approach to the Armenian issue has been in place for the last 100 years as part of its 'Christian solidarity'."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Bears and foxes

2-Anger not paranoia

3-Abadi’s dilemma, Obama’s warning

 

1-Bears and foxes

 

The [Saudi-led] military intervention in Yemen will inevitably aggravate the crisis. It will lead to large-scale casualties among civilians and non-civilians alike. And at the end of the day, there is no alternative to a political solution-- one that the various political and tribal parties in Yemen can believe in.  If President Hadi stepping down creates the climate appropriate to dialogue in order to reach this solution, we do not believe that he will be the obstacle in this regard. He is a man who tends towards 'peace,' and who is very flexible, as evident from his dialogues with the Houthi current and the many concessions he offered in order to avoid the outbreak of civil war and prevent innocent victims from falling--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Yemen represents a predicament for everyone. The vortex of military conflict will produce nothing but a daily pile of corpses that are a psychological as well as a moral burden on a country that we have always said lives below the poverty line. But Russian diplomacy now is speaking of a deal: 'You take Sana'a and we take Damascus.' Is this the dramatic equation that will extinguish the region’s fires? Hours after lifting the ban on delivering S-300 strategic missiles to Iran, the Russian representative did not deploy his veto against the UN Security Council resolution [on Yemen]. Who said that it is only bears that dance to the beat of drums? Note that there is a Russian Foreign Minister called Sergey Lavrov and he is known as … the fox!--Nabih al-Burji in Lebanese ad-Diyar

 

There are reports that Yemeni President Hadi may be about to step down and make way for his newly appointed deputy PM Khaled al-Bahah, notes the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. This may be the prelude to a face-saving political solution for the Yemeni crisis. Russia's abstention in the vote on a UN Security Council resolution regarding Yemen earlier this week may be part of a deal to trade Sana'a for Damascus, suggests a Lebanese commentator. Anyway, the Russians believe that Yemen represents a predicament for Saudi Arabia, and that Riyadh will eventually have to seek a way out via some sort of regional compromise.

 

NUMBERED DAYS: "Yemeni President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's days in power seem numbered, and his residency in Riyadh seems unlikely to last much longer," writes the editorial on Friday on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This is not because the Houthi current and its allies refuse to recognize his legitimacy or hold a dialogue under his umbrella. It is because his hosts in the Saudi capital have begun to prepare a replacement for him in a gradual yet evident manner.

Anyone watching PM Khaled al-Bahah's first press conference after the presidential decree issued by President Hadi appointing him deputy-president while retaining him in his present post [of PM], would emerge with the impression that they were watching Yemen's next president. For Mr Bahah may be the compromise candidate acceptable to most, if not all, Yemeni parties, unlike President Hadi himself.

What confirms this is former Yemeni president Ali 'Abdullah Saleh’s reported initiative a few days ago, in which he suggested the formation of a presidential council headed by Mr Bahah, and a cabinet headed by 'Abdelghani Jamil, the current mayor of Sana'a.

At his abovementioned press conference, Mr Bahah spoke in conciliatory tones. He sent a message of 'peace' to the Houthi current in particular when he insisted on an end to the fighting in Aden as a precondition for talking of any initiative to resolve the crisis. He also stressed that 'the Houthis are part of Yemen's social fabric and that we welcome all among them who lay down their arms and turn into a political constituent.'

Mohammad al-Bakhiti, who is a member of the Houthi Ansarullah Politburo, immediately picked up on this message or olive branch. He said: 'We still call for a return to the dialogue table without any preconditions,' adding that 'ending the [Saudi-led] aggression is not a precondition for dialogue.'

We do not believe that Mr Bahah would 'court' the Houthi current in such a positive manner without prior coordination and consultation with his Saudi hosts who have intervened militarily in the Yemeni crisis, and whose warplanes are bombing Houthi targets as well as forces loyal to former president Saleh. At this same press conference, Mr Bahah did not insist on President Hadi's return. He did not demand that the Houthi current should withdraw to its headquarters in Sa'da; his only precondition was that of an end to the fighting in Aden.

Further confirmation of the above comes from leaks in the Saudi press according to which President Hadi is suffering from a difficult medical condition, that he is too old (he is in his early 70s), and that he has had a heart operation. This appears to be the indirect prelude to him stepping down soon in favor of his new deputy, Bahah, who has 'suggested' to Hadi that he should issue a decree appointing him in his new post.

The military intervention in Yemen will inevitably aggravate the crisis. It will lead to large-scale casualties among civilians and non-civilians alike. And at the end of the day, there is no alternative to a political solution-- one that the various political and tribal parties in Yemen can believe in.

If President Hadi stepping down creates the climate appropriate to dialogue in order to reach this solution, we do not believe that he will be the obstacle in this regard. He is a man who tends towards 'peace,' and who is very flexible, as evident from his dialogues with the Houthi current and the many concessions he offered in order to avoid the outbreak of civil war and prevent innocent victims from falling.

"The UN Security Council resolution, which has stressed the principle of dialogue and a political solution, may be the ladder that all parties can use to climb down from the top of the tree. It provides the appropriate formula that would save everyone's face," concludes the daily.

End…

 

BUYING AND SELLING: "'We will sell you in Yemen and buy from you in Syria': Could this really be Russia’s policy?" asks Nabih al-Burji in Friday's Lebanese daily ad-Diyar.

Only the naïve would say that we should not confuse the philosophy of the market with that of state strategy, especially in Yemen.

Moscow confined itself to abstaining during the vote on a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter (which paves the way for military intervention) regarding the situation in Yemen.

When Russian diplomats are asked about this, they say that the resolution is effectively meaningless.  For what effect will it have on [Houthi leader] 'Abdelmalik al-Houthi? As for 'importing arms,' how can arms be delivered if warships are patrolling all of Yemen's shores, if the Saudi borders are impossible to traverse, and if all of Yemen's airports have either been shut down or destroyed?

The Russians do not want any further shocks to their relations with Saudi Arabia. They are wagering on a diplomatic role that would make them a major partner, not only to any Yemeni settlement, but to other settlements in the region as well. Therefore, there is no need to go too far in speculating about the Russian vote in New York, since other things are happening behind the scenes.

The Russians realize that the Saudis will never forgive any party that takes a stance against them at this charged moment. King Salman bin 'Abdulaziz's has decided to proceed with this war till the very end. Saudi officials say that they will not accept 'that knife in our back,' going so far as to reject any compromise, unless all the parties are fully under the Saudi umbrella.

Saudi Arabia has mobilized all its resources so as to ensure that Yemen remains in its clutch. As for the Russians, they believe that war there is very complicated and that it would be difficult if not impossible to wager on a decisive military victory in the absence of a 'magical charismatic' figure who can secure the support of all of Yemeni forces, tribes, and currents.

It is true that 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi has been 'decked out' and presented as the epitome of legitimacy in Yemen. But one can barely find a single Yemeni who believes that Hadi is the figure who can hold Yemen’s knotted strands in his hands. He is not even adequate for a transitional phase. This is a problem. There is no political figure, not even one that replicates the characteristics of Afghanistan's [former president] Hamid Karzai.

The Russians say: 'A compromise is inevitable, and we are ready for it.' The wager on a crushing victory is a losing one in the Yemeni situation, and is prevented by the very nature of Yemen’s terrain. It would be best if negotiations were to be prepared from now, as long as countless obstacles prevent a ground intervention. For when Pakistan, which has an impressive military strike force, refrains from taking part for fear of domestic repercussions, for fear of internal collapse, in fact – who is left to dare take the risk?

The Egyptians are very wary. In Sudan, there is opposition to a ground intervention; and it is a country whose problems are boundless anyway, unless [Sudanese President] 'Omar al-Bashir were to pick up his Field Marshal’s baton and advance at the head of an enormous army, however, he is fearful for his own post despite the recent caricature elections held there.

Regardless of all that has been written in the Arab press, Pakistan’s position, and that of all the countries that have been wagered on to carry out a ground offensive, came as something of a shock. This is what Western diplomats repeat. In fact, one may conclude from what they say that there are those in Washington who hope that Saudi Arabia would face a predicament after being accused of trying to obstruct the U.S. administration’s strategic decisions on more than one occasion.

These diplomats also say that Iran committed a grave mistake when it drove its Houthi allies towards Bab al-Mandab, which is effectively equivalent to Mecca's gates, or even the gates of the Saudi Royal Palace for Saudi Arabia. But war has broken out and certain media reports are now claiming that the Houthis are seeking to obtain chemical weapons (imagine!); these claims that are meant to lure Washington into taking more effective operational steps on the ground, or to provide cover for a ground offensive, or to pressure the countries that are wavering.

Yemen represents a predicament for everyone. The vortex of military conflict will produce nothing but a daily pile of corpses that are a psychological as well as a moral burden on a country that we have always said lives below the poverty line. But Russian diplomacy now is speaking of a deal: 'You take Sana'a and we take Damascus.' Is this the dramatic equation that will extinguish the region’s fires?

Hours after lifting the ban on delivering S-300 strategic missiles to Iran, the Russian representative did deploy his veto against the UN Security Council resolution. Who said that it is only bears that dance to the beat of drums? Note that there is a Russian Foreign Minister called Sergey Lavrov and he is known as … the fox!" concludes Burji.

Ends…

 

 

2-Anger not paranoia

 

The Arab Gulf states are not paranoid about Iran, they are angry that the nuclear agreement with Tehran addresses Western concerns alone, says 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in today's Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

Arab opposition to the Iranian nuclear deal is not merely a case of excessive and paranoid suspicion, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. It is based on the very real threat that Iran has been posing to the Arabs' security for the past decades, and that have not been addressed by the agreement that satisfies the West alone.

 

HEATED ARGUMENT: "We have been in the midst of a serious argument because of the West’s consent to Iran’s nuclear program, and in the run-up to the Camp David summit that U.S. President Barack Obama has decided to convene with Arab Gulf leaders to discuss the agreement and its consequences; and the argument is getting more and more heated," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

The latest person to praise the nuclear agreement is Vali Nasr, an expert on the region's affairs, writer, and a professor of political science and advisor to a number of official circles in Washington. He wrote in The New York Times that he fails to understand why the Arabs are dissatisfied with Iran’s agreement with the West, which he believes is in their interest.

He believes that the agreement will integrate Iran into the global economy, which alone will restrain Tehran’s policies and actions in the region. And Nasr criticizes the Arab states, which he says have so far been acting based on the precisely the opposite logic because they believe that Iran is the party mainly responsible for their instability, and that its aggressive nature cannot be contained. And he adds that the Arab states now have a great chance to devote their attention to developing their economies, which is the true challenge facing them, benefiting from the Iranians' commitment to the agreement.

Nasr's views replicate what U.S. President Barack Obama said in his recent interview with [New York Times journalist] Thomas Friedman, namely, that the Arabs tend to blame their neighbor Iran, when the real threat to them comes from within.

So are we afflicted with some sort of paranoid personality disorder regarding Iran, or is Mr Nasr a mere second-hand car salesman who believes he can induce us to buy what the U.S. administration has failed to sell?

First of all, we are not in a state of panic but of anger as a result of the agreement. The Arabs had hoped that Obama would be interested in more than thwarting Iran's nuclear capabilities, while remaining silent in response to its aggressive policies and behavior. Iran is not Cuba. It is not an old and decrepit communist country whose maximum ambition today is to sell cigars and tourism to Americans, and whose threat ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union' in the early 1990s.

In fact, Iran is more like North Korea; a state that believes in power and confrontation and that resorts to deception. This is not paranoia on our part, but a judgment based on a long record that shows Iran's adoption and sponsorship of violence in the region. In fact, Iran's officials publicly brag about their militias' presence and participation in the fighting in Syria and Iraq. It is the country that has sponsored the Houthi rebels in Yemen for years, something that was recently confirmed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry himself.

I find it strange that a professor like Nasr would say that Yemen has been riddled with ethnic wars for three decades anyway, and that Iran should not be blamed for them. This is not true. It may be true of Somalia or Lebanon, but Yemen is a country whose Sunnis and Zaidis [Shiite offshoot to whom the Houthis belong] cohabited in peace. Its tribal conflicts are limited, and for many years the only clashes were those between the Houthis and the central government. As for the Sunnis and the Zaidis, they only joined in the clashes last year!

The problem with Iran is not sectarian, even though it publicly adopts and finances Shiite extremists such as Lebanese Hizbollah. Financing various armed groups lies at the heart of its policy in fact, including Sunni ones such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

We cannot be accused of being excessively suspicious when what we have before us is an Iranian record of sponsoring chaos that stretches back thirty years in the Middle East. The irony is that Iran's aggressive activities have multiplied during the course of its negotiations with the '5 + 1' group over the past months.

Nasr proposes that the Gulf states should benefit from the years of a freeze on Iran’s nuclear capabilities so as to attend to developing their economies, rather than focusing on resisting Iran. But how does he show us this?

A visit to the two shores of the Gulf will demonstrate that the nature of the regimes on its opposite sides are an exact replica of the differences between North and South Korea. On the eastern shores of the Gulf, where Iran lies, we find abandoned beaches, empty mountains, and huge military camps. On the other side, where the six [Arab] Gulf states are, we find flourishing and modern cities, huge petrochemical facilities, oil refineries, and numerous industrial cities.

In short, Iran has nothing to lose if it targets the Gulf states because it has spent most of its savings on developing its military capabilities. So what does Vali Nasr expect it to do when President Obama decides to free it from its cage? Are the Gulf states supposed to place their trust in the agreement and sleep on a pillow stuffed with ostrich feathers?

After all, the agreement is restricted to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear arms for at least ten years; but it does not address its other hostile activities and aggressions, which are more dangerous for the Arabs. It is as if the West were to sign a nuclear agreement with North Korea, and then withdraw its forces from the neutral zone. Would we trust North Korea not to launch its army against Seoul? And the challenges facing us with Iran are not only military; they are also of a security nature.

What more could have been achieved in the agreement with Iran but was not? I suppose it could have included clauses that address the sources of tension for all parties. These could have included guarantees that reassure Iran that will not be attacked by Israel or the West, since it consistently claims that this is the reason why it is developing its conventional as well as nuclear military capabilities.

The same sort of guarantees could also have been extended to the Arab states in the region near Iran who believe that they are the targets of Iran's armament. Moreover, those countries that are concerned about tension with Iran, including Israel, could have been included so as to draft an agreement that reassures everyone and defuses the tension.

When the U.S. negotiated with the Pyongyang government over its nuclear program, it involved the concerned region's states, including Japan and South Korea. In the case of the Iranian file, however, all the region's states were kept in the dark, and they only heard news of the agreement from reports leaked in the Israeli and American press.

"The agreement is ambiguous and address the West's concerns alone," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

3-Abadi’s dilemma, Obama’s warning

 

Now that Iraqi PM] Abadi’s government has discovered the consequences of its hasty calculations, it finds itself in a dilemma, trapped between asking for the [largely Shiite militia] PMF’s help and thereby risking a sectarian war that runs parallel to the campaign to liberate al-Anbar, or confining itself to intensifying the American air raids, whose failure has been demonstrated on the ground. As for the people of al-Anbar, they face an impossible choice: Either to remain in the frying pan of terrorist takfiri rule, or to jump into the fire of seeking help from sectarian militias formed in response to a fatwa by Ayatollah as-Sistani, which brings with it Iranian influence and the threat of civil war. The only escape from this predicament continues to lie in creating a new and united Iraqi army that will be for all Iraqis, and that will be based on purely professional and patriotic grounds, free from any political considerations or sectarian infiltration-- pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

After meeting with ‘Abadi, Obama said that the ‘coordination between us has improved.’ This means that previous such coordination was weak, and that what is needed is greater coordination. This is the first message. And the question here is this: What are the limits of this required coordination? And what does this have to do with what Washington claims is Iran’s role in Iraq and Obama’s statement about ‘the need for foreign aid to support Iraq against ISIS to go via the government so that we feel that it is in charge of its own affairs and its sovereignty’? And here is the second message: The U.S. has its reservations about the extent and nature of Iraq’s relationship with Tehran. And this is not directed only at the Iraqi government, but at those regional parties that are upset about the nuclear agreement with Iran and fearful that it will result in [U.S.] acquiescence to an extensive Iranian role in Iraq and the region as a whole--Salem Mashkour in Iraqi as-Sabah

 

The Iraqi PM may have been too hasty in declaring that his forces can liberate Anbar Province from ISIS easily and quickly after Tikrit’s liberation, argues the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. His and Anbar’s predicament is that the Iraqi army cannot achieve this aim even with air cover from the U.S., while the Shiite militias that can help to fulfill this mission are unacceptable to the Anbar Sunni clans. U.S. President Obama delivered a number of crucial messages to Iraq during the Iraqi PM’s recent visit to Washington that Iraq can only ignore at its peril, warns an Iraqi commentator. Most have to do with the U.S.’s wariness of Iran’s role in Iraq and the need for of all of Iraq’s constituents to play a greater role in running the country.

 

FALTERING CAMPAIGN: “Speaking from Habbaniya military base west of Baghdad a week ago, Iraqi PM Haidar al-‘Abadi promised to liberate Anbar Province, which constitutes one-third of Iraq’s total area,” writes the editorial in the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

He said: ‘our next battle and meeting will be here, in the land of Anbar, after we have totally liberated it. We shall be victorious, as we were in Tikrit.’

But successive military and political developments in the province have shown that the government’s campaign has faltered. According to Iraqi security sources, ISIS has intensified its attacks in al-Ramadi and was able to occupy new areas within the city and its surrounding areas

With the government forces’ high morale after their success in taking control of Tikrit, the local government in al-Anbar on Tuesday asked the central government for help after escalating attacks by ISIS, which enjoys a strong presence there that goes back to more than a year – that is, before its capture of Mosul and Tikrit in a surprise attack last summer.

‘Abadi may have been relying on the coincidence of a number of basic factors. These include the intensification of U.S. air raids intended to sever ISIS lines of supply and provide the necessary air cover for a ground advance. But the Obama administration, which does not want to present Iran with a new victory in Iraq, has insisted that the [largely Shiite] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are publicly supported by Tehran, should not participate in any attack in al-Anbar.

Similarly, a number of Sunni clans in the province have announced their opposition to the PMF’s participation after the transgression it committed in Salahuddin Province after the liberation of Tikrit, and that elicited widespread international condemnation. These clans also complain of government ‘discrimination’, which denies them arms while the Shiite militias are showered with the most advanced weapons.

Even though Abadi retired a large number of army commanders and ordered his forces not to commit any violations and to refrain from raising sectarian slogans or pictures before he traveled to the U.S., this was not enough to resolve the Anbar problem. The province has long borders with Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It is a strategic link for ISIS’s two branches [in Syria and Iraq]. In fact, the U.S. needed to deploy ten thousand troops to capture Fallujah alone in 2004.

Since last summer, al-Anbar has provided additional evidence of the fact that aerial bombardment cannot determine the outcome of military battles. ISIS was able to expand its presence there despite the hundreds of air raids waged by the U.S.-led coalition. In addition, a number of ‘unidentified’ planes, as some press reports have described them, have dropped food and weapon supplies to ISIS’s positions instead of attacking them with rockets and missiles. There is no doubt that these planes will rush to rescue this organization if necessary so as to ensure that its supply lines are not cut off.

Now that Abadi’s government has discovered the consequences of its hasty calculations, it finds itself in a dilemma, trapped between asking for the PMF’s help and thereby risking a sectarian war that runs parallel to the campaign to liberate al-Anbar, or confining itself to intensifying the American air raids, whose failure has been demonstrated on the ground.

As for the people of al-Anbar, they face an impossible choice: Either to remain in the frying pan of terrorist takfiri rule, or to jump into the fire of seeking help from sectarian militias formed in response to a fatwa by Ayatollah as-Sistani, which brings with it Iranian influence and the threat of civil war.

The only escape from this predicament continues to lie in creating a new and united Iraqi army that will be for all Iraqis, and that will be based on purely professional and patriotic grounds, free from any political considerations or sectarian infiltration. But this can only be achieved if there is a genuine political will to do so, based on a foundation of transparency and courage, which requires the admission that it is impossible to reform what remains of the Iraqi army since its collapse after Mosul fell last June [2014] and it subsequently broke up into groups of factions and militias.

“This will not be easy, of course, in light of the prevailing sectarian polarization in the country. For nations require real leaders for such fateful battles, those who can give priority to the national interest and its demands over everything else,” concludes the daily.

End…

 

A TOTALLY DIFFERENT REGIME: “The PM’s visit to Washington coincides with the anniversary of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow by the Americans in 2003 and the establishment of a new Iraq regime whose characteristics are totally different to that of its predecessor,” writes Salem Mashkour in the semi-official Iraqi daily as-Sabah.

The PM’s visit comes only days after an agreement has been reached over Iran’s nuclear file. It also coincides with major advances against ISIS’s gangs by an Iraqi force based on the PMF, despite the sensitivity that Washington has expressed – even before some Sunni politicians – about this military role that has political consequences that the U.S. does not want.

Is there a link between Abadi’s visit and the above, as well as other factors? This cannot be denied. All the region’s affairs are connected, and Washington is the point at which they all intersect. ‘Abadi’s response to an American invitation at this particular point in time sends numerous implicit messages which, if disregarded, will have results that no one wants or expects.

Americans often resort to delivering their messages and at various levels and in indirect ways. These begin with messages sent ‘between the lines’ and reach a point where they may be extremely sharp. In fact, our conditions since 2012 and up till now provide testimony for this.

After meeting with ‘Abadi, Obama said that the ‘coordination between us has improved.’ This means that previous such coordination was weak, and that what is needed is greater coordination. This is the first message. And the question here is this: What are the limits of this required coordination? And what does this have to do with what Washington claims is Iran’s role in Iraq, and Obama’s statement about ‘the need for foreign aid to support Iraq against ISIS to go via the government so that we feel that it is in charge of its own affairs and its sovereignty’?

And here is the second message: The U.S. has its reservations about the extent and nature of Iraq’s relationship with Tehran. And this is not directed only at the Iraqi government, but at those regional parties that are upset about the nuclear agreement with Iran and fearful that it will result in the [U.S.] acquiescence to an extensive Iranian role in Iraq and in the region as a whole.

Obama also spoke of the PMF. He said that ‘it must be under the government’s command so that it can hold anyone who commits human rights violations accountable.’  This is the third message; but it is closely connected to the second. Nor is it unconnected to the content of Obama’s fourth message, when he said that backing for Iraq would be provided, when the world was assured that there is a government in Baghdad that represents all of Iraq’s constituents. This is more or less the same as the previous message, which raises many questions as to its motives, the parties at which it is directed, the extent of the Sunni/Kurdish participation to which Obama referred, and whether that has anything to do with confronting Iran in Iraq.

These are clear messages. In the past, decision makers either failed to understand them or decided to ignore them, with very costly consequences. At the same time, they are clear preconditions for complying with any Iraqi request for American arms.

Relations between states are based on interests. Washington’s political messages, which Obama expressed in his short speech before the media after meeting with ‘Abadi, gave expression to the U.S.’s political and security interests. America’s economic interests will be raised at other meetings, without suggesting in any way that these are not central or that they do not take precedence.

“Will we understand the need to work in pursuit of mutual interests without compromising our sovereignty?” asks Mashkour in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 17.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The horses have already bolted the stables

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Friday editions with the funeral of the Israeli man who was killed in a suspected attack in Jerusalem on Wednesday night. Shalom Yochai Shriki was killed when a Palestinian man drove his car into a bus stop in the French Hill neighborhood of the capital. Police chief Yohanan Danino said yesterday that security forces are treating the incident as a 'terrorist attack, especially in light of the fact that the incident occurred on the eve of Holocaust Remembrance Day.' He added that he has 'instructed the Jerusalem District commander to strengthen the special security preparations, including constant readiness in the part of the road where several attacks took place in the past year.'

Haaretz leads with an exclusive report from Barak Ravid, of a letter sent by 16 European Union foreign ministers to the EU's foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, urging her to advance the process of separate labeling of Israeli products from the West Bank. The letter was signed by the foreign ministers of France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Malta, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Hungary, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. Germany is the only one of the five big European states not to sign.

The ministers argue that such labeling of settlement goods is necessary to prevent consumers from being 'misled by false information.' 'European consumers must have confidence in knowing the origin of goods they are purchasing,' the ministers write. 'Green Line Israel and Palestinian producers will benefit from this.'

There has been no official response from the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, but unnamed officials told Israel Radio on Friday that the letter is apparently meant to deliver a message to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu as he works on setting up a new government. The unnamed diplomats also criticized the timing of the letter, on Holocaust Remembrance Day, calling it 'especially offensive.'

Ynet also carries unattributed Israeli reaction to the letter. 'It seems some European nations now want to put a yellow patch on Israeli products,' one unnamed Foreign Ministry official said. 'We know that what begins as marking Israeli products quickly deteriorates into an overall boycott of Israeli goods,' they said.

Silvan Shalom told Israel Radio on Friday morning that the Europeans foreign ministers' letter does not help to promote the two-state solution. Rather, he accused them of distancing it by supporting the Palestinians. Shalom said that the Europeans accuse Israel of freezing the negotiations with the Palestinians, while they themselves advance unilateral steps on behalf of the Palestinians, rather than encourage compromise. On the EU foreign ministers push for the labeling of products, Shalom said this tactic had been tried 10 years ago, and had not accomplished anything.

According to NRG, Yesh Atid chairman Yair Lapid spoke to Mogherini directly, and told her of Israel's disappointment with the letter and the demand for West Bank products to be labeled separately. 'This is an irresponsible demand, and portends the potential to cause a disaster, and wreak havoc on the Israeli economy,' Lapid said. 'And it is a stain upon the European Union. The State of Israel will fight to prevent this from going into effect,' he added.

The center-left also had little praise for the initiative, according to Ynet, but said it was a response to the current government's reluctance to either move forward with the two-state solution or present an alternative. 'The Europeans have had enough with Israel jumping through hoops just not to implement the two-state solution without outlining an alternative policy', the Zionist Union's MK Nachman Shai said.

In other news, all the papers report on the continued fallout from Russia's decision to go ahead with the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin explained that Iran's drive to find a solution in talks over its nuclear program had spurred his decision to renew a contract to deliver S-300 missile defense systems to Tehran. 'With the progress of the Iranian nuclear track – and that is obviously positive – we do not see any reason to continue to keep the ban (on the delivery of the S-300) unilaterally,' Putin told his annual marathon call-in show with Russians.

White House spokesman Josh Earnest suggested that Moscow's move shows the weakness of Russia's economy after being hit by sanctions. He reiterated Washington’s concerns over the move, and said the administration had spoken to senior government officials in Russia about the decision. But he suggested Moscow may have been driven by economic desperation rather than just a desire to stir trouble for the West. 'It isn't a particular surprise that Russia may be pretty desperate to generate some income,' Earnest told reporters. 'It actually does indicate that Russia's willingness to engage in a controversial transaction like this one is an indication of how weakened their economy has become,' he added.

On the coalition front, Channel 10 News reported on Thursday evening that President Reuven Rivlin is working behind the scenes for the formation of a national unity government made up of Likud and Zionist Union. According to the report, Rivlin has been saying in private conversations that 'we need to have the broadest possible government'. The president reportedly spoke about the issue with Netanyahu before the official Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony at Yad Vashem on Wednesday evening, and is also in contact with Zionist Union chief Isaac Herzog to persuade him to join a Likud-led government.

The Channel 10 report comes several days after Channel 1 reported about a secret meeting held earlier this week between Netanyahu and Herzog. The report sparked unrest among members of the Labor Party, who demanded that Herzog clarify whether such a meeting had indeed taken place. Herzog has rejected the reports, saying, 'It never happened – [the report is] completely fabricated. [Netanyahu] did not offer anything and we have not negotiated. This is unbelievable - every day my spokespeople and I have to fend off another rumor.'

Elsewhere, settler-run news service Arutz 7 reports that a senior Hamas spokesman insists that the organization is still committed to the ceasefire it signed with Israel in August, but that it retains the right to 'respond with force' to any 'Israeli violations.'

Mushir al-Masri – an MP and a senior member of the group's political leadership – told Palestinian newspapers on Thursday that the various Palestinian factions were 'closely monitoring' the IDF's major exercise this week close to the border with Gaza, and were watching for any 'Israeli violations' of the truce. 'The ceasefire was based on an agreement and any renewal of hostilities will be met with hostilities.'

Finally, Haaretz reports that a senior Lockheed Martin official said Wednesday that two Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) will arrive in Israel in December 2016, making the Israeli Air Force (IAF) the first outside of the United States to receive the combat jet. Israel has ordered 33 additional F-35s and intends to acquire another 17 in the coming years, to form two full squadrons. According to IHS Jane's Defense Weekly, IAF sources said that a squadron commander and five pilots from Nevatim Air Base in southern Israel have been selected to become the country's first F-35 pilots and instructors.

 

THE HORSES HAVE BOLTED: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's stubborn refusal to accept the framework deal over Iran's nuclear program – and his campaign to scupper its approval by the U.S. Senate – is hastening the demise of Washington's political support for Israel.

"On Monday, the U.S. Senate returned to work after the Easter holiday. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee immediately began painstaking negotiations over the phrasing of the bill that will accompany the nuclear agreement with Iran. The Republicans wanted a law that would give the Senate the power to approve or reject the deal. The president announced that he would exercise his right of veto over any such bill. Representatives of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu urged members of the committee to add two new demands into the bill: that the Iranian government recognizes Israel and that it promises to end its support of terrorist organizations.

To the surprise of many, a deal was reached within a day. Both sides contributed to the compromise: Obama lifted his veto threat and agreed to allow Congress to oversee the negotiations with Iran; the Republican majority in the Senate lifted its demand that the framework deal be approved by the Senate and agreed to wait until the end of June, when the Iranians are due to sign the final agreement. The two Israeli demands disappeared in a puff of smoke. I will return to the Israeli demands – and to the bitter smile that they put on Obama's lips – later.

In practical terms, the Senate compromise gives U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his team a first-class ticket to Lausanne: the Senate will not bother them again until the end of June and will not bother the Iranians at all. If the negotiations end in failure, the Senate will no longer be relevant; if, on the other hand, an agreement is reached, it will be debated in Washington once China, Russia, France, Britain and Germany sign it and promise to lift the sanctions. The rest of the world will follow suit. With or without the U.S. Senate, the horses have already bolted the stables.

The fate of the Iranian nuclear facilities now rests with the ayatollahs and them alone. Iran's status as a nation on the threshold of nuclear capability has been recognized by the international community – including the United States. For Israel, this is a major blow. Historic, even! The massive public relations drive that Jerusalem launched came to nothing. Not only was it ignored by the international community, now our closest friends on Capitol Hill – the people who represent constituencies with large Jewish populations and who enjoy the generous support of Jewish billionaires – are doing the same. A responsible government would now stop and would rethink its course of action.

A new course of action must start with the Obama Administration. In Washington there is an understanding of what the nuclear deal with Iran means to the United States' allies in the Middle East – primarily Israel. They are looking for a way to balance it, to compensate America's allies and to limit the damage. Obama is willing to go far on this issue – much further than his predecessors ever did. But Netanyahu is digging his heels in: judging by the speeches he has delivered in the past few days, he seems to believe that everything is still open; he seems to think that members of Congress are still sitting in the auditorium and applauding him. He's like the Emperor Nero, who fiddled while Rome burned.

'Even if we are forced to stand alone,' the prime minister said in his Holocaust Remembrance Day speech at Yad Vashem on Wednesday night, 'our hearts will not be fearful.' Netanyahu sounded as if the role of lone victim, with the world against him, was exactly what he wanted. In his imagination, he doesn't live in the Prime Minister's Residence on Balfour Street; he lives in an underground bunker; he is not the leader of a country that, according to foreign news reports, has a nuclear arsenal of its own and is capable of razing to the ground any Iranian city it likes. Levy Eshkol mockingly called Israel 'the poor Samson.' In Netanyahu's speeches, Israel is even weaker, even more wretched, than that.

Barack Obama is getting increasingly angry with Netanyahu's Holocaust-infused analogies. No American president would be willing to hear an Israeli prime minister compare him to Neville Chamberlain; no American president would be willing to hear an Israeli prime minister accuse him of facilitating the next annihilation of the Jewish people. Ariel Sharon did the same thing once when he visited President Bush – but he never repeated the mistake. Netanyahu makes the same mistake every day.

In private conversations, Obama expresses his nostalgia for the old Israel, the Israel of 1967 – which fought for its future, which was a pioneer, which was democratic. An Israel that was admired by all the American Jews he knew. One can argue over whether that impression of Israel was real or a myth, reality or wishful thinking, but one cannot argue with the strength of the image. Israel today, Obama says, is not the Israel I fell in love with. It is an arrogant country, which continues to build settlements and which cocks a snook at the entire world; it is an Israel that denies the existence of the Palestinians and which treats them like a ghost nation.

I am basing these assumptions about Obama on comments I have heard from people who have sat down with the president recently. The quotes reflect the spirit of his comments and are verbatim quotes. That is why I do not present them as direct quotes. France and New Zealand, Obama says, are about to present the UN Security Council with a resolution on the Palestinian issue. It will contain all of the phrases that Israel finds so important, but, at the end, it will call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The government of Israel expects us, the United States, to impose a veto. I cannot say yet how we will respond; we haven't decided yet. But I have to ask myself why Israel allows itself to do whatever it wants and still expects us to veto a resolution that accurately reflects our long-standing policy. Why should the United States of America veto itself?

The United States' automatic support of Israel will not last forever, Obama has warned. There has been a shift in public opinion. Look what's happening on American campuses. Ask students what they think about Israel.

Then Obama turns his attention to the campaign that Netanyahu is waging against the agreement with Iran. We were willing to reach all kinds of understandings with Israel, he says. We were even willing to consider a defence pact. Netanyahu refused to even listen. He decided that he will nix the agreement no matter what. He rejected everything we proposed. But that didn't stop him from demanding that I continue to impose the U.S. veto on every anti-Israeli resolution in every UN body.

Obama has no illusions about the true nature of the Iranian regime. He openly says that it is anti-Israeli and anti-American. It is anti-Semitic, too. But the demands that Israel made after the framework agreement was signed – that the Iranians recognize Israel and that they undertake to stop aiding terrorism – made Obama smile wryly. Sure, why not, he said. And while we're at it, why not demand that they oust the ayatollahs from power and put them on trial; why not insist that they allow the Shah's son to return to Tehran and make him their leader. Why not demand that they allow Israel to open an embassy in the very heart of Tehran? That would be nice, but it's totally disconnected from reality. We started negotiating with Iran in order to halt its nuclear program. If anyone has a better idea of how to do that without going to war, please speak up now. The simple truth is: even Netanyahu doesn't have a better idea.

One of the people closest to Obama recently said that the White House was surprised by the discipline that the international community showed in abiding by the regime of sanctions against Iran. Russia and China – both of which need Iranian oil – resisted the temptation and did not quit the negotiations. Even India honored the sanctions. And they did so at a cost of billions of dollars. The era of restraint is over. Russia's announcement that it is lifting the ban on the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran was the first harbinger of this. Iran is back in the game. Officials from the Israeli defense establishment and the Foreign Ministry are well aware of what is going on. They assume that, in the end, Netanyahu will come to his senses. They hope it won't be too late. They want to tell him: Don't be right; be smart."

Ends…

 

WISHFUL THINKING: Writing in Israel Hayom, Yaakov Amidror examines three possible scenarios regarding the Iranian nuclear deal and concludes that the Islamic Republic is more likely to realize its nuclear potential because of Lausanne.

"U.S. President Barack Obama has described the framework deal thrashed out between Iran and the six world powers as 'historic.' Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu says that it's a 'bad deal.' My considered opinion is that they are both right: the agreement totally alters Iran's standing in the international community, in exchange for a temporary slowdown in its nuclear program. In this respect, it is historic. It also grants Iran the formal status of a regional power, gives it a certificate of approval for remaining on the threshold of nuclear capability and leaves the decision on when and whether to cross that threshold entirely in Iranian hands. In this respect, it is a bad deal.

The United States changed its tactics during the course of negotiations. At first, it demanded that Iran dismantle its ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb; then it engaged in negotiations designed to limit those capabilities and how the international community would monitor Iran's nuclear facilities, as well as how long Iran would be subjected to inspections and constraints. The framework agreement clearly shows that the United States has, to all practical intent, come to terms with the fact that Iran will one day possess military nuclear capabilities, and that, at the end of the period of the agreement, there will be no way to prevent the Islamic Republic from realizing its nuclear potential.

Obama himself said as such in an interview to NPR – before his aides rushed to explain that he had misspoken. Even if this was not the intention beforehand, his comments – before they were corrected – are a reflection of the reality that the Lausanne agreement has created – if it is finalized and signed by all sides. There are three possible scenarios for the rest of the process:

1.The Iranians will despair or will voluntarily decide against taking advantage of an agreement which, in the end, permits them to manufacture a nuclear bomb. There are those in the Obama Administration who believe that this is a likely outcome and that, by backing moderate forces within Iran – which, they say, the Lausanne agreement does – there will be domestic change. Iran, they say, will become more moderate in general and specifically in relation to its nuclear aspirations.

2.The Iranians will stick to the terms of the agreement for 10, 13 or 15 years; they will use this period to rebuild their economy, to improve their regional standing, to strengthen their allies (Hizbollah and others) and will improve their nuclear knowhow. And then, once the period of the agreement is over and when they decide that the moment is right, they will resume their military nuclear project with added impetus.

During the course of the negotiations, the United States tried to postpone for as long as possible the date on which Iran would be able to 'go nuclear.' The Americans argued that, if Iran abides by the terms of the agreement, its nuclear program would effectively be on ice for at least a decade. The excuse that the Obama Administration gives for agreeing merely to postpone Iran's nuclear breakout time is that the alternative to an agreement is a military operation, which would not even put a dent in the Islamic Republic's breakout time. Therefore, they argued, it's better to reach an agreement.

3.The Iranians will wait patiently for a more convenient moment before violating the agreement. They would almost certainly wait until sanctions have been lifted and many other countries have started to reinvest in the Iranian economy, which would be a major disincentive to launch any kind of military action. The Americans have promised that the agreement will ensure that International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have at least a year to identify any Iranian violations of the agreement and that they will impose a strict regime of inspections, which is both credible and intrusive.

Will the agreement guarantee that Iran changes its policies and drops its dreams of becoming a nuclear-armed state? It seems to me that the opposite is true. The agreement will, in the medium term, only strengthen Iran's desire to realize the potential that it has been given. Any hope that the Lausanne framework will spark a more positive process in Iran is based on nothing more than wishful thinking."

Ends…

 

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: Writing on the News 1 website, Chelo Rosenberg says that Israel is in grave and immediate danger, because Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has alienated the United States and the European Union to an unprecedented extent.

"Publication of the letter that the director general of the Foreign Ministry, Nissim Ben-Sheetrit, wrote to Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman provides very worrying evidence of Israel's dire position on the international stage. According to the letter, which was revealed by Haaretz's Barak Ravid, Israel's isolation, the crisis between Jerusalem and Washington over the Iranian nuclear deal and the policies of Western European countries regarding the Palestinians could all be hugely damaging to the State of Israel. This is not my analysis; this is what the professional head of Israel's Foreign Ministry says.

'Security coordination with the United States is extremely vital from Israel's point of view,' Ben-Sheetrit wrote, 'if we are to deal with the challenges facing us. But, under current circumstances, with relations between Israel and the United States in a severe, ongoing and public crisis, Israel could pay a heavy price.'

These are very worrying comments, which prove that Israel is in very real danger. The ink on the framework agreement reached in Lausanne was not yet dry before Russia announced that it was lifting the ban on the sale of the S-300 system to Iran and the White House was forced to admit that this was not a violation of sanctions. This is totally opposed to the Israeli position and it is another ramification of the terrible and dangerous relationship between the current Israeli government and the Obama Administration. Nonetheless, our prime minister and his ministers continue to stick to their current course, which will lead to catastrophe.

Later in his letter, Ben-Sheetrit details the very real dangers that Israel will have to face in the near future, in light of Palestinian attempts to get the UN Security Council to unilaterally recognize their right to exist as a sovereign nation, their efforts to get Israel indicted for war crimes at the International Criminal Court in The Hague and the anti-Israeli initiatives at various international bodies which it is in our interests to cooperate with. Ben-Sheetrit says that, without the support of the United States, Israel has very little chance of emerging unscathed from these entanglements. We need to cooperate closely with the Obama Administration, he wrote. But something that is patently obvious to the director general of the Foreign Ministry seems to be beyond the ken of the prime minister and his ministers, who continue to work tirelessly to nix any agreement with Iran.

The situation on Israel's borders is more explosive than it has ever been, according to Ben-Sheetrit's letter. This is especially true of our northern borders – and especially of the border with Syria, where Hizbollah – with Iran's support – is setting up a massive terrorist infrastructure. The dangers are clear. Ben-Sheetrit writes in his letter to Lieberman that, 'without close coordination with the United States, dealing properly with this issue is almost mission impossible.' These are not just empty words; they should be seen as a warning bell ahead of a political and diplomatic tsunami. Yet, in Jerusalem, our government continues to ignore all the warnings.

I have written many times about these dangers and I was accused of using scare tactics over a phantom threat. Ben-Sheetrit's letter confirms all of these warnings in full. The prime minister has decided to go head-to-head with President Obama and his ministers continue to lambaste the U.S. administration. There is broad support for Netanyahu's policies among the Israeli public. Netanyahu and his government are merely carrying out the will of the people. But there will be a price to pay. Israel is facing very real dangers because of its crude and inexplicable behavior toward the United States and members of the European Union. Anyone who is aware of the mood in Europe cannot be anything but extremely worried by the threat of a boycott of the Jewish state. Special marking on products manufactured in the territories is just the beginning.

We can strut around like Samson and mock everything that the international community says and does against us. The problem is that Israeli citizens will pay a heavy price. Without getting into the details, let's just say that, at the end of Operation Protective Edge, Israel's security situation was problematic and it was only thanks to Obama and his administration that we emerged relatively unscathed. Our government needs to start addressing reality as it is and not through the prism of an ideology that in no way reflects our dire situation."

Ends…

 

THE ZIONIST UNION'S DUTY: Writing in Haaretz, Israel Harel urges Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog to join Binyamin Netanyahu's new coalition, given that he already agrees with the prime minister on the most important issue facing Israel today – Iran.

"Zionist Union’s recent position paper supporting the main points of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s policies on Iran’s nuclear program is commendable. The document, while taking issue with the style of Netanyahu’s battle, states firmly that 'we are committed to a comprehensive and determined struggle to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons ... and toward that end there is neither coalition nor opposition in Israel.' Finally.

The media party waged a hate campaign against Netanyahu. Additional parties joined in, first and foremost Zionist Union, which also got carried away into using irresponsible rhetoric regarding the most basic national interests. During the election season, which coincided with the government’s fight against the developing international agreement with Iran, certain figures in Herzog’s party rejected and even dismissed and denounced Netanyahu’s stance, voicing support to Obama’s appeasement.

The foreign media, especially the American media, gleefully seized on the Israeli criticism of Netanyahu on the Iran issue. If half of Israel, including its best-known security experts, believes Netanyahu is exaggerating and in a panic, they reasoned, Obama’s appeasement must be correct.

Now that election fever has cooled, Zionist Union seems to have recovered its balance. The position paper (stressing the party’s commitment to a 'comprehensive struggle' against Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons) proves that Herzog is inclined to help carry the stretcher of national interests, as this column earlier advised him to do. The slogan 'our strength is our unity' is as true today as always.

Unity in Israel encourages Jews and Israel’s other allies in the United States to persist in this battle. A united Israel that keeps up the pressure, together with a determined majority in the Congress that does not permit the president to ignore the numerous holes that remain in the 'understandings' reached with Iran may plug critical loopholes.

Better late than never, as the saying goes. Still, it is impossible to ignore the fact that during the election season, individuals representing large and important groups within Israeli society were incapable of rising above short-term partisan interests, even at the risk of harm to national security. Zionist Union is busy searching for the reasons it lost the election. I suggest they consider their conduct on the Iran issue, among other things. The last-minute return of voters to Likud, that is to Netanyahu, was not only out of 'tribal identification' or the incitement against the 'droves of Arabs streaming to the polls.' Many voters who were deeply disappointed with Netanyahu’s conduct voted for him again because they viewed the campaign messages of the left, including Zionist Union, as irresponsible, unpatriotic and anti-Zionist.

As expected, as soon as the position paper was released an aggressive attack on Herzog began. Even though he did not announce agreement to a unity government, he was already denounced as a collaborator. On social media, he was called a traitor. Apparently there are people in Israel whose hatred of Netanyahu trumps their fear for the status, well-being and even security of their country. If Herzog were foreign minister, goes the lament, he is liable, heaven forefend, to improve Israel’s international image. Truly a disaster! 'Let Netanyahu reap the whirlwind,' suggested Uzi Baram.

Let’s assume a storm is approaching. It won’t be directed at Netanyahu personally (he has a fallout shelter). All of us — men and women, young and old — could be victims. Isn’t that the truth? If it is, then doesn’t Zionist Union have a duty to join the government in order to prevent the coming storm? Isn’t responsibility a part of Zionism?"

Ends…

 

EGYPT’S DANGEROUS STALEMATE: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Zvi Mazel says that, despite his all-out effort to defeat Islamic terrorism and insurgency, Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi has yet to achieve the results needed to prevent the country slipping back into anarchy and chaos.

"Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sissi is fighting for his country’s survival – and his own. Islamic terrorism is not abating, hampering vital efforts to bring a better life to the people through a revitalized economy and political stability. Sissi knows he has to show results soon to prevent Egypt from slipping back into anarchy and chaos.

Despite the army’s all-out effort to defeat Islamist insurgency in Sinai, there is no end in sight. F-16 fighter planes and Apache helicopters have joined the campaign, security forces have killed or wounded hundreds of terrorists, destroying their haunts and their training groups – but more keep coming.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis gunmen, who have pledged allegiance to Islamic State, continue making daring raids against police stations and other security targets, leading to loss of life and heavy damage. In one instance on April 14, the commander of the central police station of El-Arish was wounded in a raid; the assailants were able to escape.

For all intents and purposes the situation has reached a stalemate, though the army has managed to contain the terrorists in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula, preventing them from extending their activities to the south and to the Suez Canal – where they could have inflicted untold damage to economic and security infrastructure, and severely undermined public morale.

However, there are still sporadic terrorist attacks in Cairo and other parts of the country. Bombs explode, killing and maiming; power lines are blasted. A number of terrorist groups are involved, from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and the so-called Soldiers of Egypt to the ever-present Muslim Brotherhood; many of their members have been arrested, their leaders sentenced to death – though no one has been executed yet – but they keep on demonstrating against the regime (though in diminishing numbers).

In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthi tribes are poised to take over the strategic Red Sea straits, threatening free passage to the Suez Canal – a reminder, if one was needed, of the fact that Islamic terrorism knows no border. Vainly did the Egyptian president try to convince the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State to extend its activities to the whole Middle East. But U.S. President Barack Obama is unwilling to acknowledge that there is a regional and international dimension to the movement.

The fact remains that Islamic State dispatches terrorists and weapons to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula from Libya, where there is an unlimited supply of both. No matter how many guerrillas are intercepted or killed by the Egyptian army, more are coming through the vast mountainous and desert region, along the 1,200-km. border between the two countries.

Then there is Gaza, where terrorists can find refuge, regroup and train, and where new weapons can be tested. Cairo is desperately trying to cut off the peninsula from the Strip. The Rafah crossing is closed most of the time, and when it opens it is under the strict supervision of Egyptian authorities. More than 2,000 contraband tunnels have been destroyed and a 1-km.-deep sanitized zone has been installed; thousands of families have been uprooted. They have been compensated but resentment is high, and the move has prompted widespread condemnation by human rights associations.

Against this backdrop, the regime is weighing extending the zone to 5 km. and making the digging of contraband tunnels punishable by life imprisonment. A court in Cairo has forbidden Hamas activities in Egypt, and another has declared Hamas a terrorist organization; however, the central government is appealing that decision for the sake of its ongoing dialogue with Gaza’s leaders on the Palestinian issue.

The Iranian-Houthi threat has led Sissi to call for the creation of a rapid-response Arab unit, as Saudi Arabia has rallied neighboring states to form a coalition against the rebels in Yemen – who are threatening its border in the south, and were about to take control of the strategic port of Aden. Though the creation of a united Arab unit was decided at a summit in Sharm e-Sheikh last month, implementation will not be easy. A number of states such as Lebanon and Iraq have warned they would not allow any infringement to their sovereignty; some Gulf States and Jordan have been more forthcoming, and meetings between army commanders are scheduled.

The problem is that these countries are not keen to risk their troops in a ground operation in neighboring states. Armies are the traditional bulwark of Arab regimes; a failed intervention outside their borders could cause their downfall. Nevertheless, since the West is largely indifferent to what is happening, Sissi and his Gulf allies have no choice but to unite against the common threat of Islamic terrorism, be it Sunni or Shi’ite.

On the home front, Sissi has launched a series of impressive projects – a new canal parallel to the old one to enable simultaneous crossing in both directions, thereby doubling receipts; an industrial, commercial and tourist zone between the two canals; 3,000 km. of modern roads. Perhaps his most ambitious project is the creation of a new administrative capital city east of Cairo, at an estimated cost of $45 billion. Arab states have rallied to his side, pledging billions of dollars at a special economic summit last month; international groups have indicated their interest in some of the projects – a significant victory for the embattled president. But Egypt’s endemic problems – population explosion, illiteracy leading to widespread unemployment and enduring poverty, as well as corruption on an epic scale – are not making Sissi’s task easier.

He is also calling to reform Islam by purging it of its extremist discourse, and has already instructed the Education Ministry to eliminate extremist content such as the call to jihad and attacks on other religions.

Meanwhile, the political situation is still unclear and elections are repeatedly postponed, allegedly because of ambiguities in the election law. The fact is that the president has not been able to secure a large enough block to ensure his electoral victory, while the Muslim Brotherhood – though banned – and other Islamic parties can still muster a sizable vote.

Can Sissi win all his battles? How long will the Egyptian people wait for some much-needed economic results? Egypt is going it alone, still waiting for the West to understand that Cairo remains its best ally against the rising tide of terrorism now lapping at its shores."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

RULING PARTY MANIFESTO: Cengiz Candar challenges the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP’s) rhetoric on the economy in centre-left Radikal: "The government led by President Erdogan's AKP has benefited greatly from its rhetoric of 'economic success'. But what we have arrived at in 2015 suggests that this same government is now dragging Turkey towards 'economic collapse'. The June 7th general election is not just one in which PM Davutoglu will compete for Turkey’s administration. The people will also be giving a 'yes' or 'no' answer to an 'economic collapse' that seems inevitable under this administration."

Mehmet Tezkan warns against a ‘hyper presidential’ system in centrist Milliyet: "PM Davutoglu has announced his party's election manifesto called the 'New Turkey Agreement'. If one were to ask what is its significance, the answer would be none. Let us call it a declaration of intent. The PM's post has its legal authority but, de facto, he is not prime minister. The president makes decisions, he is the only one who enters a polemic with political rivals and who responds to criticism. What the AKP apparently wants is not a presidential system but a hyper presidential system."

Ahmet Insel seeks an answer in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The election manifesto read by PM Davutoglu yesterday was expected to turn the ruling party's presidential initiative into something concrete. But the 'New Turkey Agreement', which consists of 100 articles, did not meet this expectation. The only explanation for the need to introduce a presidential system in the manifesto is to end the ambiguity over the prime minister and president’s powers. But there is no answer to the question 'what ambiguity are we talking about since the president and the prime minister toe the same political line?"

Orhan Miroglu gives pride of place to human dignity in centre-right, pro-government Star: "The 'New Turkey Agreement' read by PM Davutoglu at the meeting to introduce the AKP candidates aims to give precedence to human dignity. The EU constitution, whose first article is to protect the human dignity, has been forgotten. The EU has turned into a community that is not seeking integration, but one where each member is looking after itself. But with a new manifesto based on human dignity, Turkey is moving along the path towards the New Turkey of 2023; this is the path that began 12 years ago."

Ali Bayramoglu argues that the AKP manifesto heralds a new social contract in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "The AKP announced its election manifesto in an assertive manner. It is possible to read this document as a 'promise of a new agreement between the state, society and the individual' as regards Turkey’s new institutional structure, which will be shaped by the new constitution. Looking at its clauses one by one, what can be said is clear: this document seeks to create an agreement between state and society based on the principles of democracy." 

 

ARMENIAN GENOCIDE DEBATE: Sahin Alpay opts for a pragmatic approach to the Armenian genocide debate in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The insistence on recognizing 'genocide' does not help a potential Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, but on the contrary, it hampers it. The Western parliaments’ decision to accept the Armenian genocide and the laws meant to penalize its denial are perceived as an insult and blackmail in Turkey. Unfortunately, the protocols that Ankara and Yerevan signed in 2009 providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of borders have remained ink on paper. Those who sincerely favor Turkish-Armenian normalization should focus their efforts not on ratifying the 'genocide' protocols, but on the implementation of these practical measures."

Gungor Mengi adopts a defiant stand in centrist Vatan: "Will the Armenian lobby’s ceaseless activities in the West achieve their goal? Will they succeed in making Turkey go down in history as the 'country that committed the first genocide of the 20th century'? Even if the U.S. and the EU were to accept the Armenian massacre as genocide, Turkey should never do so. Those who suggest that Turkey should face its history and recognize ‘reality’ should carefully examine their own history and archives first before attempting to do this."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Hemayat is doubtful: "The U.S. defence secretary's military threats in case of the failure of the nuclear talks, President Obama's acceptance of the Republican plan for Congress supervision of the nuclear agreement and EU sanctions imposed on 32 Iranian companies are some of the ominous fruits of the so-called tree of democracy and freedom. The truth is that national interests are at the foundation of American foreign policy, which means that the U.S. is pursuing its excessive demands and is not committed to fulfilling its obligations."

Reformist Sharq opines: "The vigilance of Iranian diplomats in the nuclear talks marginalized those who promote Iran phobia and made them nervous. The Iranian nation should act with discernment and avoid falling into the deceptive traps of malicious people."

Conservative Khorasan presents the alternative: "Claiming that only Obama is on the other side of our dealings is a mistake resulting from ignorance of the realities of U.S. governance. In American history, the administration has never been able to make strategic decisions on its own. Accepting Iran with peaceful nuclear technology means accepting an independent regional power, which for 35 years has been beating the drum of opposition to the oppressive international system led by the U.S.. This means that the future international system will be based on a new foundation, where America will not be the only axis. If the U.S. does not allow an agreement to reach its final stage, our goal should be only the 'resistance economy', including economic cooperation with Russia and China." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami is unsure: "The new round of nuclear talks is a chance to test Washington's sincerity about its commitments. The U.S. 'fact sheet', whose text is inconsistent with some of the joint statement in Lausanne, is an example of an unconstructive U.S. measure." 

Moderate Iran is confident: "Lawyers believe that after signing a nuclear agreement approved by the UN Security Council, the U.S. Congress cannot violate it. Even if the American president agrees to submit the agreement to the Congress for ratification, it will not harm the implementation of the treaty, unless an unfortunate situation occurs and opponents intensify their pressure to a level that will make President Obama declare that the agreement is void or invalid. This is almost impossible to happen as it will inflict heavy international and domestic costs on the U.S.." 

Conservative Resalat is pleased either way: "The nuclear talks started 12 year ago. The current government, which is the last ring in this process, carries a big responsibility. Under the shadow of the sacrifices of nuclear martyrs, Iran's 12-year nuclear resistance produced 19,000 centrifuges and forced our opponents to make concessions that until recently were considered to be a red line. Our diplomatic capability has put the P5+1 in a difficult situation. The national perspective on the nuclear talks should replace any other view because either an agreement or no agreement will be a great success for the Iranian nation and regime." 

 

IRAN/RUSSIA: Reformist Arman writes of a Russian card: "With the delivery of the S-300 system to Iran, President Putin conveys a negative message to the U.S.. The Russian government is under financial pressure and by selling weapons to Iran and other countries; it seeks to strengthen itself. Besides, Russia tries to cooperate with Iran in areas other than arms sales. Iran and Russia are important countries and Iran has shown that no change in the region will take place without coordination with it. Russia can also establish strong and strategic relations with Iran. However, Iran/Russia cooperation will weaken by the strengthening of Iran's ties with the West. As a result, Iran can play with the Russian card to show the international community that it is not empty-handed."

 

YEMEN: Hard-line Keyhan implicates the U.S.: "Saudi Arabia's attack on Yemen is in line with the American doctrine of 'shock and awe'. It would be naive to think that the decision about the war was made in Riyadh. The Americans claim that they have not directly joined the war and only provide intelligence and logistics support, however, the realities of the battlefield reveal another story. Barack Obama in August 2011 revealed the U.S. role in the Libyan war, which he called as 'leading from behind'. The Americans are once again implementing the same strategy in Yemen; hence, this war must be considered as one between the U.S. and Yemen." 

Hard-line Javan targets the Saudi Defence Minister: "The steering wheel of Saudi Arabia's war machine is now in the hands of Saudi Defence Minister Prince Muhammad bin-Salman, the 34 year old son of the current king. He expects something special from the invasion of Yemen and is promoting himself as a hero. Bin-Salman, who does not have more than four years of experience in the political field, is trying to introduce himself as a well-known figure in the world and a symbol of power in Saudi Arabia's political equations." 

Conservative Quds is displeased: "The UN Security Council's approach towards the aggression against the Yemeni people was contrary to expectations and cannot be justified at all. In Yemeni people's view, this resolution is regarded as a disgraceful spot in the Security Council's dossier."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

  

1-The prerequisites of Yemeni peace

2-The FSA turns on an-Nusra

3-Regional implications of the nuclear agreement

4-Small steps, hidden plans

 

1-The prerequisites of Yemeni peace

 

There is no room for any talk of dialogue, negotiations, and settlements when tens of Yemenis are losing their lives, homes, schools, and hospitals, and their infrastructure is being destroyed every day. And if it proves impossible to reach an immediate and comprehensive end to the fighting and hostilities, nothing less than repeated humanitarian truces will do...And a political solution must be based on dialogue and negotiations between the various parties on neutral grounds, and in countries whose governments have not been implicated in shedding Yemeni blood and are not totally biased in favor of one side against another. But none of the current calls for an inter-Yemeni dialogue are serious. They reveal less of a genuine desire to reach a solution, and more of the desire to impose the terms of surrender on one Yemeni/regional camp in favor of another. But this will simply not happen, not even if the war were to continue for another year--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Saudi Arabia needs to radically revise its regional policies, not only as regards the Yemeni issue. The time has come for it to understand that the U.S. has no permanent friends or allies in the region, only permanent interests. Therefore, Riyadh should extract itself from this predicament via an initiative proposed by states that have not been implicated in the [Yemeni] war and that have proposed a political solution for the crisis from the very start – Oman, for example, which hosted the Iranian/U.S. negotiations. This should take place via a political initiative that all the Yemeni people's constituents agree to and that ends the war, and that leaves the Yemenis the freedom to choose their leaders free from foreign suzerainty or intervention--Rassem 'Obeidat in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

It should now be clear that the only way to end the Yemeni crisis is via a political solution to which all parties are paying lip service, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. But this cannot consist of imposing diktats and surrender on only one side; this would only sow the seeds for future wars. Saudi Arabia needs to recognize that it is facing a predicament in Yemen, and that it should extract itself from this war as soon as possible via a political solution, urges a Jordanian commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. The fact is that the countries it was hoping would join its coalition have their own agendas, and most of them do not seek what is best for Saudi Arabia.

 

HIDDEN AGENDAS: "None of the players have dropped the idea of a political solution for the Yemeni crisis from their calculations," notes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This is also true of the parties implicated in the aggression against this brotherly nation. The Saudi-led Arab coalition states speak of a 'political solution' at the end of the road. They have presented their views – in fact, preconditions – for such a solution. And acting on behalf of 'the other axis,' Iran is preparing to launch a political initiative to end the daily cycle of killing civilians that is disturbing the international humanitarian and human rights organizations, and to stop Yemen from sliding further into the abyss of anarchy, desolation, and collapse.

But not everyone who speaks of a 'political solution' means exactly what they say. Many have other hidden agendas. There is a difference between a political solution on which there is an accord and that is accepted by the main forces because they can live in its shade and comply with its requirements, and some other proposed solutions that are akin to 'terms of surrender' that some wish to impose on one camp but not the other. Such approaches disguise the worst of intentions towards Yemen and only reflect the naivety behind some readings of the complex Yemeni scene.

A political solution in Yemen begins by ending all military action. There is no room for any talk of dialogue, negotiations, and settlements when tens of Yemenis are losing their lives, homes, schools, and hospitals, and their infrastructure is being destroyed every day. And if it proves impossible to reach an immediate and comprehensive end to the fighting and hostilities, nothing less than repeated humanitarian truces will do, allowing the people to catch their breath and evacuate their dead, wounded and displaced, and permit food and medical supplies to reach them. Nothing less than keeping civilians out of the fierce battles raging in the land of what once was known as 'Arabia Felix'.

And a political solution must be based on dialogue and negotiations between the various parties on neutral grounds, and in countries whose governments have not been implicated in shedding Yemeni blood and are not totally biased in favor of one side against another. But none of the current calls for an inter-Yemeni dialogue are serious. They reveal less of a genuine desire to reach a solution, and more of the desire to impose the terms of surrender on one Yemeni/regional camp in favor of another. But this will simply not happen, not even if the war were to continue for another year.

A political solution calls for honest brokers that are free of any agendas having to do with the regional war between confessional groups, axes, and camps. Here it is possible to suggest a possible role for Algeria and the Sultanate of Oman. It is also possible to coordinate such moves with the regional triumvirate: Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, in addition to Riyadh, of course, that heads the Decisive Storm coalition. And whatever happens, it would be impermissible to exclude a role for the UN and its special Yemen envoy, for there is no value to any talk of a political solution without an international safety net.

A political solution in Yemen begins where previous dialogues between its various parties ended. For it makes no sense to pretend that the hands of the clock have stopped at the [2011] Gulf Initiative, which has tangibly been proven to be a cause of the problem, rather than a path to a solution. In fact, it seems to have been especially designed to block the path before the winds of change that blew on Yemen in the context of the Arab Spring. Its main aim was merely to keep the old order in place along with some 'cosmetic surgery,' removing president Saleh and bringing in his deputy in the party and the state [Hadi] to replace him.

A solution in Yemen must be based on the results of the Movenpick dialogues and the Peace and Partnership Agreement, as well as on the demands for 'transitional justice made by the youthful and popular action movement [Hrak]. It must end with the designation of a political system based on 'decentralization' or federalism, which is not booby-trapped with the worst of intentions, as was the 'six-provinces' project adopted by the escapee president [Hadi] and that he desperately defended on behalf of his backers from the neighboring countries.

A political solution in Yemen must go beyond the merely procedural/formal aspect and move towards addressing the core of the Yemeni problem – namely the exclusion, marginalization, and elimination of certain Yemeni constituents. It must try to build the foundations for a just state that stands at equal distance from all its citizens and constituents, regardless of their political, ideological, or confessional leanings or views.

A political solution in Yemen must take into account the need to rid this country of the forces of extremism and terrorism that use it as a safe haven to attack targets in the Arabian Peninsula, the region, and the world.

A political solution on which there is an accord in Yemen must be based on the formula of 'no-winners/no-losers', with no side that is victorious or defeated. Any other settlement will sow the seeds for a future split and lay the foundations for future wars. Any insistence on imposed solutions, diktats, and prior conditions will betray the worst of intentions towards Yemen. And it is no secret that there are numerous parties that want Yemen to remain weak, fragmented, poor, and starving.

What is really unfortunate is that the regional preconditions for such a solution have yet to emerge. It is consequently difficult to claim that these preconditions have emerged at the national Yemeni level. And it is perhaps for this reason in particular that this crisis is expected to last for long, and that its effects are likely to spread to neighboring and regional countries.

"It is as if we were before a new, expanded, and revised edition of the ongoing burning crises in Syria, Libya, and Iraq," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

NOTHING DECISIVE: "There is nothing 'decisive' about the Saudi Operation Decisive Storm other than its name," writes Rassem 'Obeidat in Thursday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

The coalition that Riyadh tried to build for waging its war of aggression against the Houthis based on the pretext of restoring 'legitimacy' to the fleeing Yemeni president [Hadi] whose term had already expired, was meant as a clear message to Tehran that Saudi Arabia would not remain silent in response to its expansion in Yemen and its control of navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Straits, thereby marginalizing Saudi Arabia's Arab and regional role.

Saudi Arabia tried to form this coalition in the belief that the 'charity' and the monies that it had bestowed upon the coalition's supposed members would ensure that they would work for it and back it in its hasty war on Yemen. In fact, it seems that certain international, regional, and Gulf parties – primarily the U.S., Qatar, and Turkey – have sought to implicate Saudi Arabia in this aggression in order to promote their own aims and serve their own interests. Each has its own reasons and rewards to achieve from this war, even though it will yield nothing but a pure loss to all parties because the [Sunni] confessional Saudi coalition carries the seeds of its own disintegration and includes many contradictions within it.

Saudi Arabia believed that the war on Yemen would not last long, but would be a short picnic that will deter the Houthis. It believed it would succeed in restoring the president it wants for Yemen. In fact, even as it waged its war to secure his return, it had no vision or strategy for any future political process based on participation in decision-making and rule that included all constituents of the Yemeni people. Instead, it wagered on splits in the army and rifts in the Houthis' command. But, so far, we have witnessed no signs of weakness or retreat or rebellion against the Houthis who do not seem to fear a ground war, but are eager for it to begin.

Saudi Arabia failed to read the map well. The Arab/Islamic coalition it formed to wage the war broke down from the start. Qatar, which is competing with Saudi Arabia over the leadership of the Arab world, has yet to forgive Riyadh's incitement of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to impose sanctions on Doha for embracing the Muslim Brotherhood, for siding with deposed Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi, and for inciting against the current Egyptian regime headed by President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi. It has employed its media arms to incite against Saudi Arabia.

As for the U.S., and in an interview with the American journalist Thomas Friedman, President Obama announced that the U.S. was not ready to fight on behalf of Saudi Arabia or any other of its allies and that that time has passed. Instead, it will protect its allies against any regional threats. But it is no secret that Washington encouraged Riyadh to wage this war, which has allowed it to conclude its nuclear agreement with Iran. Moreover, extending this war does not harm the U.S. in any way; the war is proceeding in accordance with the strategy it has set for the region and which calls for self-destruction at the hands of its own people, resources, and choices, while at the same time reviving and adding to the growth of the American economy by stimulating the arms industry.

For its part, Turkey is in the midst of a struggle with Saudi Arabia over leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. Therefore, weakening Saudi Arabia may provide it with the opportunity to lead the latter into Turkey’s alliance with Qatar.

It never occurred to Saudi Arabia that despite all the monies it has spent on Pakistan and its help in developing its nuclear program, Islamabad would not join the war on the Houthis. The Pakistani parliament rejected any action by Pakistani forces outside the country’s borders. Similarly, and during his recent visit to Tehran, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for a peaceful solution for the Yemeni crisis. As for the other parties to the coalition, their participation remains symbolic – as in the case of Egypt and Jordan. For these countries have other security, economic, and military priorities that take precedence over the war on Yemen.

Those eager to expand the Saudi war on Yemen and to move from an aerial campaign to a ground war do not want what is good for Saudi Arabia. A large part of them wants to see it writhing over the fire of the war it has waged and from whose consequences it will not be safe. The Houthis will not stand back with folded arms, receiving Saudi blows. After absorbing the initial strike, they seem to be moving towards the phase of response.

The war is thus likely to expand and last for a long time to come, and the American and Western aim will be realized – that of having the region destroy itself and then to restructure it geographically based on confessional and sectarian grounds.

Saudi Arabia needs to radically revise its regional policies, not only as regards the Yemeni issue. The time has come for it to understand that the U.S. has no permanent friends or allies in the region, only permanent interests. Therefore, Riyadh should extract itself from this predicament via an initiative proposed by states that have not been implicated in the war and that have proposed a political solution for the crisis from the very start – Oman, for example, which hosted the Iranian/U.S. negotiations. This should take place via a political initiative that all the Yemeni people's constituents agree to and that ends the war, and that leaves the Yemenis the freedom to choose their leaders free from foreign suzerainty or intervention.

"Saudi Arabia has created vendettas with the Yemeni people that will be difficult to heal regardless of whether this war will stop or end soon. For innocent citizens were killed by the Saudi bombardment which has destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and medical, educational and civilian establishments," concludes 'Obeidat.

Ends…

 

 

2-The FSA turns on an-Nusra

 

A new front is brewing up between the Syrian moderate opposition and the al-Qa’ida affiliate on the southern front, notes pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Reports that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has asked an-Nusra Front fighters to withdraw from the southern Syrian front is an indication of some Arab Gulf countries’ failure to convince an-Nusra to sever its ties with al-Qa'ida as a prelude to rehabilitating it as part of the ‘moderate’ opposition, argues the editorial on a pan-Arab website.

 

LIKELY MILITARY CONFRONTATION: "When the armed Syrian opposition factions fighting under the FSA's umbrella on the Southern Front in Der'a Province announce that they refuse to cooperate with the Nusra Front, and when they force an-Nusra to withdraw from the Nasib border crossing with Jordan, this means, first, that the FSA is severing its ties with an-Nusra, and, second, that there is a growing likelihood of a military confrontation between the two groups," writes the editorial on Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This may also drive an-Nusra or many of its fighters to ally themselves to the Islamic State (ISIS) in one way or another.

In an Agence France Presse interview via Skype on Wednesday, the FSA spokesman for the Southern Front, 'Issam ar-Rayyess, said that 'the Nusra Front's links to al-Qa'ida have diverted the revolution from its proper path and aims; we do not want Syria to become a base for jihad or for expanding [ISIS ‘Caliph’] al-Baghdadi's state's influence.'

The FSA speaks of the Nusra Front’s 'transgressions' and currently classifies it as a 'takfiri' organization. This can best be explained as a reflection of foreign influences or diktats. For statements issued by FSA officials in the past used to call for coordination with an-Nusra and reject its description as 'terrorist.'

The timing of this turnaround in the FSA Southern Front's attitude towards the Nusra is worth examining. In recent months, Qatar has contacted the Nusra Front in an attempt to convince it to sever its official ties to al-Qa'ida and to renege on its pledge of allegiance to that organization’s leader Dr. Ayman az-Zawahiri, as a prelude to removing the Front from the American list of terrorist organizations and 'legitimizing' its financing by Qatar and other Gulf states. But an-Nusra's leader Ahmad al-Jawlani has rejected this step. According to some press reports, he has insisted on maintaining his affiliation with al-Qa'ida.

The FSA Southern Front’s rejection of an-Nusra may narrow the gap between the latter and ISIS, pushing them to build closer ties, and perhaps, ultimately, to merge within a single organization. What lends credence to this belief is the accelerating pace of coordination and cooperation between the two organizations on more than one front in recent weeks, especially in Yarmouk [Palestinian refugee] Camp. ISIS fighters withdrew from the camp and made way for their counterparts from the Nusra Front. Moreover, ISIS fighters had fought hard battles side-by-side with the Nusra Front against the Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis organization, which used to control many parts of the camp and which, according to many reports, is affiliated with Hamas.

The Syrian scene is rapidly changing. We do not exclude the possibility that the Jordanian authorities that have refused to open the Nasib crossing, have been behind the insistence on the Nusra Front's withdrawal from the area as a precondition for re-opening it. This was the only border crossing that officially remained open after all the other crossings were closed.

But at the same time, we cannot exclude the Israeli factor. The Israeli press has spoken of the Israeli security establishment’s growing concerns about the presence of Nusra Front forces near the borders with the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. There are, after all, no real problems with the leadership that operates under FSA's umbrella or its allies. Some FSA wounded have been treated in Tel Aviv and Israeli field hospitals near the borders, and there is military and intelligence and cooperation with the Israeli army.

"Israel’s concern stems from its distrust of most of the Nusra Front's fighters because of their hard-line Islamist ideology and their loyalty to al-Qa'ida. The fear is that the Front's calm dealings with the Israelis so far may be no more than a temporary tactic that will be abandoned at a later phase," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Regional implications of the nuclear agreement

 

Iran’s nuclear deal is likely to drive other regional powers towards nuclearization and may auger a new U.S.-Iranian alliance, says Yusuf Makki in Saudi al-Watan

 

The region will not be the same after the Lausanne Iran nuclear agreement, argues a leading Saudi commentator. For one thing, the major Arab countries will try to acquire nuclear capabilities; for another, Iran's economy will flourish and its relations with the U.S. will head towards an alliance.

 

A MATTER OF STABILITY AND SECURITY:  "Talking about the Lausanne Iran nuclear agreement is not just a matter of political analysis; it is an important issue that has to do with the stability and safety of the entire region," writes Yusuf Makki in the Saudi daily al-Watan.

We live in one and the same region, and our relations with Iran have ebbed and flowed and have not been politically stable, at least, not since the establishment of the Islamic Republic [in 1979].

As far as the Iranian nuclear file is concerned, it was not easy to find a solution for the crisis between Iran and those opposed to its nuclear program before today, despite the harsh blockade imposed on Tehran and the repeated threats to wage war on it.

Any exploration of the motives that have led Iran and the U.S. to make calculated concessions over this issue cannot be separated from the rapid changes in the international balance of power, heading towards the end of the period when a single pole reigned supreme, replacing it with a multi-polar world.

The agreement ensures that Iran can continue its nuclear activities, but within set bounds. It also imposes a tight international monitoring system on these activities for ten years after signing the agreement. In other words, ten years after that date, Iran will be able to pursue its activities without ongoing monitoring. In fact, President Barack Obama has noted that Iran's possession of a nuclear bomb is very likely, but that this does not pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the region because of the enormous power that the U.S. can deploy in any confrontation with Iran.

The agreement, as published, will create new facts in the region. The Arab states, whose past fears were confined to the Zionist entity's possession of nuclear weapons, and who worked via the Arab summit institutions and the Arab League to make the region a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, now realize that the Zionist entity is not alone in having a nuclear capability, and that Iran is now a member of the nuclear club.

One local consequence of this situation is that those countries that have the money and ability will feel the danger of another likely threat, and recognize their failure to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They will thus redouble their efforts to join the nuclear club. And the 'international community' will have no pretext to prevent them from doing so. As a result, nuclear technology will spread in the region.

In fact, there have already been successive statements from a number of Saudi and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) officials to the effect that Iran's possession of nuclear capabilities will force them to review their policies and work towards acquiring such a capability in order to ensure their security and independence.

The other Arab countries whose role is central in protecting Arab national security, but that lack the financial resources, will also not hesitate about acquiring this technology themselves even if this comes at the expense of their development plans or satisfying the basic needs of their citizens. The result will be a widening circle of poverty in these countries.

This predicament can only be resolved within the framework of an Arab order that rehabilitates pan-Arab security and is grounded in a comprehensive Arab defense strategy that takes the newly emerging facts into consideration, namely, the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in numerous countries that are neighbors of the Arab nation. Foremost among them are India, Pakistan, the Zionist entity, and most recently Iran.

In clinging to the acquisition of nuclear capabilities for an entire era, Iran has been wagering on some strong cards, one of which is its geographical location. Since the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq early this century, and specifically after the 9/11 attacks, Iran added a new significant element to its other negotiating cards. Its allies in the two countries occupied by the U.S. – especially in Iraq – have ended up leading the political process that unfolded after the U.S. occupation of the two countries.

There is no doubting the fact that Iran's strategic relations with Iraq's new rulers have enabled it to extend its strategic depth westward and reach the Mediterranean basin. This has added to the political weight of the cards it holds in its hands. The Americans invested a lot in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they could not have achieved even a relative success in either country without their strategy being coordinated and complemented by Iran's.

From the Iranian point of view, and as President Rowhani has said, the agreement turns a new leaf in the country’s relations with the world and contributes to ending the conflicts in the region. It also safeguards Iran's nuclear rights.

The six states that negotiated with Iran believe that the Lausanne agreement restricts Tehran’s nuclear activities that will now be solely devoted to peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed to reduce the number of the centrifuges it uses to enrich uranium from 19,000 to 6014, of which only 5060 will operate in accordance with this agreement.

The Iranian leadership feels that it has paid a high price for the economic siege that has been imposed on it, and that its financial responsibilities in the region have multiplied and become a burden on it. It also believes that, via this agreement, it will be able to address its economic crisis, maintain its nuclear facilities, avoid being constantly on the brink of war, and preserve its strategic gains in the region as a whole.

Furthermore, from now on Tehran's relations with the U.S. will no longer be with the 'Great Satan,' as Tehran's media has claimed ever since Khomeini's revolution. They will slowly draw closer to a state of alliance. The doors will be flung open to American companies and investors to work in the various Iranian economic sectors and to compensate for what has been missed for almost five decades.

"What is certain is that the entire region after this agreement will not be what it was before. But the matter continues to all for broader and deeper analysis in future explorations, God willing," concludes Makki.

Ends…

 

 

4-Small steps, hidden plans

 

Israel’s recent moves to improve the Palestinians’ quality of life are no substitute for ending the occupation, says Hani Habib in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

The Israeli occupation authorities’ recent 'small steps' easing restrictions on the Palestinians' movements and improving some aspects of their daily lives are intended to disguise the real 'big steps' that the occupation is taking such as settlement activities, detentions, and the Judaization of Jerusalem, argues a Palestinian commentator. Such 'small steps' are no alternative to ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

 

FAR FROM POLITICS: "Far from politics and politicians, and without any agreements, accords, or negotiations, or any effort or ‘American pressures’, and without any intervention from the International Quartet, the [Israeli] security establishment has taken the matter into its own hands and initiated a number of unexpected and tangible steps intended to 'improve the Palestinians' daily lives'," writes Hani Habib in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

A few days ago, Palestinian police centers were opened in the towns near Jerusalem, specifically in the village of al-Ram, after criminal elements had taken advantage of the Palestinian police's absence and the Israeli forces' preoccupation with confronting so-called 'terrorism'.  The result was that these areas became playgrounds for common criminals and organized crime. The Palestinian reaction was positive, and al-Ram's mayor deemed to be one small step that will be followed by others towards national independence.

In another small step on Tuesday, and for the first time in fifteen years, Israel permitted Palestinian cars to enter occupied Jerusalem. One hundred doctors from Bethlehem and al-Khalil [Hebron] were able to enter the Palestinian capital using cars with Palestinian number plates. The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories [the West Bank and the Gaza Strip] Yoav Mordechai said: 'Other steps of this sort will be taken soon, allowing businessmen to enter Jerusalem with their Palestinian cars.'

A short while ago, Israel allowed Palestinian men aged 55-years and above and women aged 50-years and above, to enter Jerusalem without permits. On more than one occasion, and for limited periods of time, it has allowed groups and individuals to enter Israel after securing permits relatively easily. Meanwhile, Israel announced that it has agreed to the establishment of two industrial zones in al-Khalil and Qalqilya in what are classified as Areas-C that is under total Israeli security control.

'Small steps' indeed, but each must be placed within the proper framework of priorities and demands. And more important than all this, is 'the price' being asked in return for each step. Had these small steps been taken within the framework of negotiations political discussions between the two sides, it would have been obvious that no such step would be taken without being accompanied by a reciprocal move from the other side.

The surprising thing about these small steps is that they were taken at a time when the Palestinian leadership has adopted the PLO Central Council's decision to end all forms of coordination with Israel, including security coordination. And this raises a number of puzzling questions.

The Israeli media has described these steps as returning – slowly and cautiously, but surely – to the situation that existed prior to the [1993] Oslo Accords. This is the result of directives from the security echelons– the army and the intelligence agencies – that believe that the Palestinians' growing frustration at the restrictions imposed on their movement and trade will lead to the outbreak of a new intifada that no one can withstand, sooner or later. They argue that improving the Palestinians' daily life is the most effective means of ending any thought of staging such an intifada.

At the same time, such small steps will not prevent entire areas under the PA's control from being treated as if they were in Area C. After all, Israeli forces can go and come across the entire West Bank as they please and can take security measures wherever they wish without any restrictions and regardless of any alphabetical classifications [Areas A, B, or C]. And the situation can remain as such if need be.

Moreover, the Palestinian decision to end security coordination has remained effectively frozen. Despite the voices calling for its implementation, these 'small steps' will encourage [PA President Abbas] Abu Mazin to ensure that the decision to end security coordination remains without any practical value. He can rely on these Israeli steps to justify suspending the decision to end security coordination – or at least so says some of the Israeli media that has sought to explain the security echelon’s timing of these small steps without the involvement of the political establishment.

Israel can now claim that it is taking clear and successive steps to improve the Palestinians' quality of life 'without getting anything in return,' whereas the Palestinian side is taking unilateral steps by heading to the UN and the International Criminal Court and deciding to end security coordination. But despite all this-- so Israel will argue-- all the pressure is being exerted on it, accusing it of raising obstacles before the negotiations, and holding it responsible for the failure to find a solution for the pending issues that have obstructed a two-state solution. So these latest steps should convince the international community to direct their blame and pressure at the Palestinian side, rather than at Israel, which is offering the Palestinians a better life.

Because they have to do with the Palestinians' daily life, these 'small steps' in fact disguise the real 'big steps' that the occupation continues to implement on a daily basis as part of its strategic plans, such as settlement construction, the ongoing 'Judaization' of the Palestinian capital [Jerusalem], and the daily detention and pursuit of activists in the West Bank's camps, cities, and villages. And this is to say nothing of the economic motives behind these steps.

"But most important, is the fact that these steps are in no way an alternative to the Palestinians resorting to every possible means to uproot the occupation and establish their independent Palestinian state on all the occupied territories, including the Palestinian capital!" concludes Habib.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 16.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Holocaust Memorial Day

 

Holocaust Memorial Day dominates the front, inside and op-ed pages of most Israeli newspapers on Thursday. Israel Hayom, Maariv, The Jerusalem Post and Yedioth Ahronoth all take their lead headlines from Wednesday night's official ceremony at Yad Vashem, where Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin both delivered speeches.

According to the lead headline in The Jerusalem Post, Rivlin's key message was that Israel is not a compensation to the Jewish people for the Holocaust. 'We came from Auschwitz, not because of Auschwitz,' the president said. 'We cannot let the pogroms, the bellowing smoke of the crematoria blind us or blur our abilities to recognize our past, our identity, our heritage – which are stronger than those who wish to destroy us,' he added.

Netanyahu, for his part, used the speech to continue his campaign against the nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers. Indeed, several Israeli journalists who were given printouts of his speech highlighted the various sections in different colors: red for the Holocaust, yellow for Iran and blue for sundry comments on different issues. The yellow section, they point out, is by far the most dominant.

In his speech, Netanyahu said that Israel reserves the right to defend itself against a nuclear Iran, and went on to compare the Tehran regime with that of the Nazis. 'Even if we are forced to stand alone against Iran, we will not fear. In every circumstance we will preserve our right and our ability to defend ourselves,' Netanyahu said. 'Appeasing tyrannical regimes will only increase their aggression and is an approach that is liable to drag the world into larger wars,' he added. 'The bad deal with Iran signals that the lessons of the Holocaust have not been learned. The Nazis sought to crush civilization and have a master race rule the Earth while destroying the Jewish people. In that same way, Iran seeks to dominate the region and to spread outward from there, with the declared intention of destroying the Jewish state,' he said. Iran has a two-pronged plan of action. The first is to develop its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capacity. The second is to use terrorism to take over large portions of the Middle East and to impose a Khomeini-style revolution, he said.

The Times of Israel carries comments from the commander of the Nevatim Air Base, Brig. Gen. Lihu HaCohen, who spoke to reporters about the Russian decision to allow the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran. 'The S-300 is a challenge,' HaCohen told a group of reporters. 'The Air Force is preparing for an array of scenarios, including with this system. In the event that it will need to provide a response, the Air Force will know how to respond to the challenge.'

In other news, one of the two people seriously hurt in Wednesday night's possible car-ramming in north Jerusalem has died of his injuries in hospital. A car driven by an Arab from north Jerusalem struck a man and a woman who were waiting at a bus station in the Ramat Eshkol neighborhood. It was not immediately clear whether the incident was intentional or an accident. The driver of the car, who was lightly hurt, was taken to Hadassah Mount Scopus hospital. Police are questioning another man who was in the car at the time.

Elsewhere, all the papers report that the High Court of Justice has upheld the Boycott Law passed last year by the Knesset, while striking down a part relating to the payment of punitive damages. The law permits legal appeals for damages against those who call for an economic cultural or academic boycott of Israel. The decision taken by nine justices determined that a call for a boycott goes beyond the normal right of free speech, since it is asking to force Israel to take positions through the use of economic and other means. The court ruled that in some cases, the call for a boycott is an act of political terror and it is legitimate to limit those who take part in such actions. At the same time, the court struck down the part of the law that would have allowed courts to order payment of compensation in lawsuits, without requiring that evidence be shown of damage caused by the boycott call.

 

FIVE POINTS: Writing on the News 1 website, Ariel Levine comments on the Russian decision to allow the sale of the S-300 defense system to Iran, as well as reports from the Gaza Strip about renewed Hamas activity there.

"1. This week, Russia announced that it was overturning its self-imposed ban on the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran, after bowing for several years to American and Israeli pressure to call off a deal that had already been signed and sealed – but not yet delivered. Now that Iran and the six world powers have reached a framework nuclear agreement in Lausanne, Russia was quick to take advantage of the likely lifting of sanctions against the Islamic Republic and announced that it would supply the S-300 after all.

In an analysis of the decision on the Ynet website, Ron Ben-Yishai explained why Iran getting its hands on the S-300 would not necessarily make a military strike against the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities impossible. It is still unclear exactly what model of the S-300 Iran will be supplied and the Israeli and American air forces have held training exercises designed to study the Russian model of the system. It is likely that they already know how to bypass them. In any case, it appears that there are already systems in place that are capable of bypassing and deflecting the S-300. The commander of the Israel Air Force base at Nevatim, Brig. Gen. Lihu HaCohen, hinted at this when he met yesterday with reporters. He told them that the S-300 presents a 'challenge,' but added that the Air Force 'is preparing for an array of scenarios, including with this system. In the event that it will need to provide a response, the Air Force will know how to respond to the challenge,' he added.

While people are looking at the S-300 and asking themselves 'What if,' it is important to remember how it came to pass that Iran is about to take shipment of this system. The Lausanne agreement and the lifting of sanctions are the reason that Russia is now in a position to supply Iran with this advanced weapons system. These are the first buds of that agreement. The real concern is what happens when these buds start to fully blossom.

2. Now that Iran and the six world powers have reached a framework deal in Lausanne, the question everyone is asking is, 'What happens next?' The ball is very much in Iran's court. It could take advantage of the Lausanne process and announce that, by agreeing to the framework deal, it is proving that it wants regional peace and stability. If it were to do so – and were to back this kind of declaration up with action – the United States would rush to its side. That would increase bilateral trade between the two countries, would encourage external investment in the Islamic Republic and would go a long way to rebuilding the shattered Iranian economy.

But any upturn in the Iranian economy would allow the ayatollah to continue funding Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This, it seems, is the second time in history that so many people are rushing so quickly to achieve a peace that means so little. The first time was in 1938, when Neville Chamberlain and Adolph Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. And we all remember what that led to.

3. Israeli officials warned this week that Iran has, over the course of the past few weeks, intensified its efforts to arm Hizbollah in Lebanon, as well as Hamas militants in Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights. These efforts came sooner than anyone in Israel expected, and they should set the alarm bells ringing – but for a slightly different reason.

The supply of the S-300 to Iran and the accelerated transfer of arms to Hizbollah would appear to signify that Iran is worried about a possible military strike against its nuclear facilities. We have to ask ourselves why Iran is now worried about that possibility, given that it has already agreed to the framework of a nuclear agreement. The answer is obvious: Iran has no intention of giving up on its nuclear program and will continue to pursue a nuclear weapon. Now it is trying to protect itself, so that when the day of the attack comes, it will have an effective defense system and Hizbollah will be able to act as its proxy for retribution attacks. That is why it is now arming the organization.

An enemy that says it wants peace but continues to arm itself and its allies is proving that its long-term goal is not peace. The United States and the other world powers must act as quickly as possible to neutralize Iran's nuclear capabilities.

4. Reports coming this week out of the Gaza Strip suggest that Hamas has started to use excavators to continue its tunnel-building operations. There have also been reports that Hamas has decided to manufacture as many short-range missiles as possible, in response to the successful interception of medium- and long-range missiles by the Iron Dome missile defense system.

Not only is Hamas not resting on its laurels, it is also continuing to arm itself ahead of the next round of fighting against Israel. If we can learn anything from the previous wars against Hamas, it is that there is a set pattern which precedes any conflict: rocket fire from Gaza, aerial attacks by Israel followed by increased rocket fire. From there, the downward spiral into all-out war is certain.

During Operation Protective Edge, Hamas took Israel by surprise with its underground tunnels and with attacks from the sea. When Hamas decides that the time is right for another war against Israel, it will try to carry out a major attack so that, once the operation is over, it will be able to claim that it carried out the first attack. In order to prevent this from happening, the Israeli response to that first Hamas attack must fall exactly on the thin line between escalation and de-escalation, in order to prevent another Gaza war. If Hamas is still spoiling for a fight, it will be given a reminder of the high price it will have to pay.

5. There was a wave of arrests this week in Judea and Samaria, with 29 Hamas operatives detained by the Israeli security forces. They were arrested on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks against Israelis, the funding for which was supposed to come from foreign sources. In the event of any escalation of tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, we must not overlook Judea and Samaria. Hamas' activity in Gaza makes it easy to forget what is happening in Judea and Samaria, where it has the capability, the desire and the intent to carry out suicide attacks. Just as is the case in the Gaza Strip, Hamas decides whether the situation in the West Bank will also deteriorate."

Ends…

 

OBAMA'S WHITE FLAG: Writing in Israel Hayom, Avraham Ben-Zvi says that U.S. President Barack Obama was forced to capitulate to the demands of lawmakers over Congressional oversight of the Iranian nuclear deal.

"The reports from officials in Washington about the 'compromise' reached between Capitol Hill and the White House are easy on President Barack Obama; their purpose is mainly to save him from embarrassment and to provide him with some semblance of achievement. In practice, however, the president waved the white flag in order to avoid a humiliating defeat in the Senate. He knew that defeat would mean the suspension of the negotiations over a nuclear agreement with the ayatollah regime.

The fact that an increasing number of Democratic lawmakers began supporting the Corker-Menendez bill was becoming a major concern for the president and his people. This is because the first version of their proposed legislation contained a demand for Iran to stop its involvement in terrorist activity and to change its behavior on the international stage as a precondition to ratification of the nuclear agreement.

So, with his back up against the wall and because the far-reaching legislation threatened to ruin a key element in the legacy he hoped to leave behind, Obama decided to take a risk and sign off on the compromise bill. As far as he was concerned, and given current circumstances, this was the lesser of two evils.

Now any future agreement between the United States and Iran is likely to be held hostage by Congress, which will spend at least a month examining in minute detail every clause of the deal before deciding if and under what conditions to approve it.

In light of this development, we can say that, in the current stand-off between the executive and legislative branches of the United States government, Congress has clearly got the upper hand. Obama's only 'achievement' in this struggle – and it must be scant consolation for the president – is that lawmakers dropped from the bill any references to Iran that are not related to its nuclear activity.

In the end, despite the strong objections of the White House, the path has been laid for Congress to pass a new law that will significantly limit the room for maneuver and the freedom of action of the president over the Iranian nuclear deal. At the same time, it will slow Obama's unrestrained rush to reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic at any price."

Ends…

 

AN HONORABLE MAN: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's efforts to recruit Zionist Union to a coalition – on the condition that it dumps Tzipi Livni – will fail, since Isaac Herzog is an honorable man.

"Binyamin Netanyahu would find it very hard to form a coalition without the assistance of Channel One's veteran political correspondent Ayala Hasson. She is the funnel through which messages are relayed between the various political parties. Take, for example, her 'scoop' from earlier this week, in which she claimed that Netanyahu had met with Zionist Union chairman Isaac Herzog. Both parties deny that any such meeting took place, but that hardly matters. What matters is that there are almost certainly contacts between Likud and Zionist Union officials. It's only natural that representatives of the two largest parties would meet after a general election.

In the meantime, there are rumors that the main obstacle to a coalition partnership between the two parties is Tzipi Livni. According to these rumors, which originate in the Prime Minister's Office, the message to Herzog is that Netanyahu will not allow Livni to be part of his coalition. One cannot help but wonder why. Netanyahu gladly agreed to sit in the same coalition as a convicted criminal – Aryeh Deri – so why is Livni beyond the pale? The answer, it seems, is that Netanyahu has a value system that only those who voted for him can possibly understand.

Over the past few days, we have seen a concerted effort to drive a wedge between Livni and Herzog. In my opinion, this effort will not succeed. Why? Because it is an unfair campaign waged by officials, politicians and journalists who did not say a single word against Deri and other corrupt officials. Let's not forget that Labor's electoral performance was greatly enhanced when Livni joined forces with Herzog to form Zionist Union. She is joint leader of that party – a position that she earned. She has a key role in deciding Zionist Union's policies, including its coalition negotiations. If Netanyahu thinks that he can dictate to another party which of its members is kosher enough for his coalition, he would be well advised to start with Shas.

In any case, I do not believe that the anti-Livni campaign will succeed. Not on Herzog's watch, in any case, because he is a man of honor and not in the ironic sense that Shakespeare called Brutus an honorable man. Herzog is not the kind of politician who makes promises today that he knows he will not honor tomorrow, like certain people we know. He is cut from a different cloth. Anyone who wants a leader who will stab Livni in the back without blinking will just have to wait for Ehud Barak to make his political comeback. And don't worry – he'll be back. Actually, that's a good reason to worry."

Ends…

 

ONLY THE HAGUE: Writing in Haaretz, Gideon Levy says that the IDF's lenient handling of the soldier who shot an unarmed 16-year-old Palestinian to death proves that the International Criminal Court is the only way to effectively address Israeli war crimes.

"It was murder. There’s no other way to describe the killing of the teenager Samir Awad, and there’s no reason to keep on sanitizing the words. Murder. I don’t think I’ve ever used that word to describe what Israeli soldiers have done. But at the separation barrier near the village of Budrus late on the morning of Tuesday, January 15, 2013, a murder was committed.

Samir, 16, had finished a science test and gone with six friends to where the fence had a breach. It was a test of courage they played: To get near the fence that imprisons their village. His friends stayed back and he crossed the breach. He didn’t know that armored-corps soldiers were lying in ambush between the cacti and the ditch alongside the barrier.

They shot and wounded him in the thigh. Bleeding and terrified, he fled for his life toward the village. One of the soldiers grabbed him by the arm, but he broke free. He made his way up the rocky hillside and they shot him again, this time from behind. They shot an unarmed and already wounded youth with two live bullets. It was a distance of about 10 meters; one in his back, one in his head.

The picture of the body left no room for doubt: He was shot from behind. The next day, when I arrived at the scene, all that was left were bloodstains on the rocks — and a new ambush of soldiers, whose commanders ordered them to fire tear gas 'in direct fire' at any youths who approached the fence. The bereaved father Ahmed was at home wearing a shirt of the Modi’in Ecological Farm, where he lectured once. He was crying bitterly.

The months passed and the Israel Defense Forces of course didn’t lift a finger. After about a year the father, with the help of the rights group B’Tselem, petitioned the High Court of Justice, to require the military advocate general to decide whether to put the soldiers on trial or close the case.

The IDF prolonged the investigation another year, as it always does. The soldiers were released from the army and went back to their civilian lives, the case was transferred to civilian prosecutors, and two days ago there was a decision: The soldiers, it’s not clear who, will go on trial on two grotesque charges — recklessness and negligently handling a weapon.

That’s what an investigation that should have lasted two hours, maybe two weeks or in the extreme case two months spawned after two years — and only because of a lawsuit. The excuse this time: It wasn’t clear which of the soldiers fired. It’s not hard to guess what would have happened if Samir and his friends had shot at the soldiers and killed one. A brief investigation and the entire 'cell' would have been sent to prison for life.

That’s how it is with 'the most moral army in the world.' The killing of an unarmed Palestinian youth, who endangered no one, who fled for his life, is considered 'recklessness.' Live fire at close range in the back of a fleeing youth is 'negligently handling a weapon.' Recklessness and negligence — what a happy pair.

Oy, you reckless and negligent soldiers, the IDF is a bit angry about your recklessness and negligence. Keep firing at youths and keep killing them, the way you do nearly every week. Just don’t do it recklessly or negligently.

This is the example that should finally convince every supporter of justice: only The Hague. Only at the International Criminal Court will it be possible to put on trial those who commit war crimes like the murder of Samir Awad. Anyone who objects to The Hague wants the crimes to continue. Anyone who fears The Hague knows he has a lot to hide.

There’s no chance at all the IDF will ever seriously investigate itself — not the crimes of Black Friday during the Gaza war, not the firing on UN shelters in Gaza and not the murder of Samir Awad, the youth whose father promised he’d pay for his university studies if he did well on his science test. It was held on the last day of his very short life."

Ends…

 

FRANCE’S MIDDLE EAST FLIMSINESS: Writing on the website of the i24 television station, Emmanuel Navon takes issue with Paris' Middle East policy, which he says is confused and absurd.

"Israel’s position in today’s Middle East is somewhat similar to that of France in Europe during the Thirty Years' War, in that it is surrounded by neighbors who kill each other for religious reasons. As opposed to Cardinal Richelieu, however, Israeli leaders don’t need to betray foreign coreligionists for the sake of 'raison d’État' (national interest). In today’s parlance, Realpolitik has replaced raison d’État, but both terms express the same policy of which Richelieu was a master: the interests of the state precede moral considerations. Richelieu was a cynic, no doubt, but at least he knew how to identity and defend his country’s interests. The same cannot be said of France’s current foreign minister, Laurent Fabius.

Fabius recently made a point of expressing support for Saudi strikes in Yemen, and he also indicated that France would support an upcoming United Nations Security Council resolution on Palestinian statehood. Both moves show the trickiness and pitfalls of selecting 'good guys' in the Middle East, not least because embarrassing details were recently revealed about the involvement of Saudi Arabia and of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in terrorism.

Iran’s ruthless attempt to take control of Yemen should indeed be resisted, but the Saudis are hardly freedom fighters. They might be the least of two evils, but evils they are. Two days before Fabius’ official visit to Riyadh, lawyers representing Saudi Arabia filed papers in Manhattan’s federal court asking the judge to reject claims by families of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that the Saudi government 'directly and knowingly' helped the hijackers who blew the Twin Towers. According to al-Qaida member Zacaria Moussaoui (who is serving a life prison sentence for conspiring with the 9/11 hijackers), Saudi Arabia did not cut ties with al-Qaida and with its ringleader Osama Bin Laden after 1994. Lawyers for the families of 9/11 victims claim that they have amassed new evidence suggesting that the Saudi government, or senior Saudi officials, individually funded al-Qaida. While this claim still needs to be fully substantiated, describing Saudi Arabia as a pro-Western ally is a fraud.

The same goes for the PLO. At the United Nations Security Council, France is working on a resolution that would impose the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1949 armistice lines between Israel and Jordan, including in east Jerusalem, as well as a 'fair' solution to the refugees issue. France insists that it is promoting a Palestinian state on behalf of the PLO ('the good guys') and not on behalf of Hamas ('the bad ones'). This, despite the fact that Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas added Hamas to his government last summer; that Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections; that Hamas would likely win the first (and last) elections held in a newly established Palestinian state; that Hamas’s regional backer is Iran; and that Iran has declared that it would actively arm a Palestinian state once it is established in the West Bank. So France is both supporting the anti-Iranian coalition in Yemen and the establishment of an Iranian base west of the Jordan River.

Attempts to invent a dichotomy between the PLO and Hamas are absurd not only because both organizations jointly run the PA, but also because the PLO has never ceased its terrorist activities –a fact that was also brought to the attention of a New York court recently. Less than two months ago, a New York jury ruled that the PLO and the PA were the catalysts for terrorist attacks in Israel between 2002 and 2004, and it ordered them to pay $218.5 million to the victims and their families.

Fabius’ two recent Middle East initiatives defy logic, and both rely on assumptions whose flimsiness was revealed (or is being disclosed) in U.S. courts. 'Deception is the knowledge of kings,' wrote Richelieu in his Political Testament. In the Middle East, this knowledge is not the privilege of royals."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKISH ARMY/PKK CLASH: Cengiz Candar believes the government has engineered the latest clash with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in centre-left Radikal: “It was clear that the incident was a government provocation faced with the growing probability that the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] will pass the 10% electoral threshold. The greatest fear of President Erdogan and those who are around him is the loss of power, or that this process will begin after the June 7th general elections. It seems that there is nothing that Erdogan and those in his inner circle will not do to prevent this from happening. Look at Agri where the latest clash took place between the Turkish army and the PKK and note that this may be repeated from now on.”

Cuneyt Arcayurek blames the local governor in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: “The Agri incident is the work of the local governor from start to finish. This incident once again proves that all the governors will follow the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party]. The Agri governor ordered the gendarmerie to join the clash. If you leave the Turkish Armed Forces under orders from governors who lack military knowledge, similar incidents, which will not be approved by the public, will follow the Agri incident. From Ankara, to the other provinces, the state is facing a backlash!

Mustafa Unal believes that the peace process is in retreat in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: “It is true that the peace process has been driven into the background. It may be too early to say that it is ‘dead’ but it has been ‘paralyzed’ for sure. Even Imrali's [imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s] Nowruz call to gradually lay down arms has been forgotten. It was claimed that the PKK would convene its congress to lay down arms and that the government would take some steps in response. What has happened to the 10 articles that the state and the PKK/HDP agreed on in the Dolmabahce Agreement? This does not seem to interest even the apostles of a solution.”

Halime Kokce calls on the HDP to show its true colors in centre-right, pro-government Star: “If the HDP has undertaken the mission of becoming a Turkish party (at least in theory) this is because the Kurdish problem has been resolved, thanks to the AKP governments. Now, what lies ahead is to take the PKK terror organization out of the equation. If the HDP will continue to back the PKK as it happened in Agri, it would be better for it not to talk about becoming a Turkish party. Because this is not convincing, and it leads it into taking a risible position.”

Ibrahim Kiras demands that the HDP should demonstrate its commitment to peace in centrist Vatan: “In order for the HDP, which is defined as the ‘political wing of the PKK', to win extra votes it should first demonstrate that it has put a meaningful distance between itself and terror. If the HDP really wants to pass the electoral threshold, then this is its homework. But is it doing its homework properly? Unfortunately, it is not. On the contrary, it seems to hope for support from the PKK that is seeking to control the people of the region through force of arms.”

Kurtulus Tayiz argues that the HDP has lost its way in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: “By moving away from its founding aim, the HDP has turned into an influential component of the anti-AKP coalition. This party, which was founded to become the political actor of the era of peace, has turned into a political actor that the pro-status quo bloc has pinned its faith on to block the new Turkey. This has turned the HDP and its leader Selahattin Demirtas into a project of the old Turkey. The power centers that want to protect the status quo have united behind the HDP.”

 

POPE’S ARMENIAN GENOCIDE STATEMENTS: Mustafa Balbay charges the government with failure and manipulation in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: “The AKP, which understands swearing at the Republic, attacking Ataturk and planting the seeds of grudge and hatred when talking about history, was naturally not quite prepared to deal with the Armenian claims either. Most probably, the European Parliament will take a decision today regarding the Armenian Genocide claims that will bind all EU members. The EU Minister in Turkey will grumble like an empty volcano. The government will rage as the elections approach. While the Pope is making a genocide service, the AKP is seeking to win over its electors; calculating through which tension it can win more votes.”

Rahmi Turan argues that the West is acting out of spite in secular, Kemalist tabloid Sozcu: The ‘Christian world’ will never be able to get rid of fanaticism. Even if a spiritual leader such as the Pope, who is surely a reasonable person, blathers saying that 1915 incidents were the first genocide of the 20th century', this arises not from lack of information and negligence, but from the Christians’ spirit of enmity towards Turks and Muslims! Both Europe’s politicians and its priests want to provoke enmity against the Turks and the Muslims, and gain their interest from that! If the pains experienced in history are brought onto the agenda once again, and societies attempt to question each other, this will be of no use to the people in the past, on the contrary, it will cause severe damage to the people living today!”

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

IRAN/RUSSIA: Reformist Mardom Salari hails a new dawn: "The lifting of the ban on the transfer of the S-300 missile system on Putin's order reflects a change in Iran's international status and the start of Russian competition with the West for Iranian markets. The effects of the Lausanne understanding and a possible final agreement will be noticed not only in foreign ties, particularly economic and commercial, but also in security and defence matters. Even before a final agreement, the Russians are ready for a new phase of military cooperation. The barter agreement on the exchange of Iranian oil for Russian goods reveals Russian haste to upgrade economic ties more than the West. The Kremlin has officially started competing with its industrial rivals for Iranian markets."

Reformist Arman sees a bright future for ties: "With the decision to deliver the S-300 system to Iran, Russia is opposing the U.S. after Western and American sanctions on Russia following the events in Ukraine and Crimea. Some believe that the delivery of the missiles is the result of the imminent lifting of sanctions on Iran. Of course, the resolution of the nuclear case and the expansion of ties with the West will not damage Iran/Russia ties; relations will expand increasingly. For the first time, the two countries have taken steps to develop intelligence, military and security ties; they have a lot in common in the region, especially in Syria."

Reformist Sharq is sceptical of Russian motives: "The lifting of the ban on the S-300 system is in line with Iranian interests, but Russia's change of heart at this moment raises many questions. Russia is under international sanctions due to the Ukraine issue. If Iran reaches a nuclear deal with the West, Russia will lose its exclusive access to Iran's markets because of the sanctions. Russia will also have a serious rival in the gas and energy field. Allowing the transfer of the S-300, when the U.S. administration is under pressure by Republicans, extremists and the Zionist regime, is a card for Russia to play with the West rather than a measure in line with Iran's interests. Russia has extracted concessions from the West many times over Iran's nuclear programme."

 

NUCLEAR DEAL: Hard-line Keyhan introduces the Supreme Leader’s homilies to the debate: "The slogan chosen by the Supreme Leader for this year-the year of understanding and unity between the government and the nation- should not be treated as a simple slogan and needs to be mulled over. If there is a strong will to hide the enemy's cunningness, will it lead to unity? In the Geneva deal, it was decided that until a final agreement, no other sanctions will be imposed on Iran. However, over the past one and a half years more than 100 sanctions have been imposed against the Iranian people! Some people try to hide this breach of promises and the enemy's deceit, or describe these actions as 'irresponsible', 'contrary to the spirit of the deal' etc., but what measures have been taken to increase awareness and promote true unity with the esteemed government!? Does such conduct lead to unity or harms popular confidence in the authorities? The Leader's emphasis on informing the people should be well understood." 

Reformist Sharq exudes realism and promotes transparency: "The Lausanne statement, when most people were waiting with dread and hope for the final results of several years of negotiations, raised optimism and social vitality. In this crucial time, Iranian officials should convey complete and truthful information to the people about the details of the statement. People should understand that our country's problems are not only the result of the sanctions, and will not be all resolved after the removal of sanctions either."

 

HILLARY CLINTON: Reformist Arman is sympathetic: "Hillary Clinton is a connecting loop between action-oriented Democrats and realistic Republicans. Despite the risk in the candidacy of a formerly failed candidate, the Democratic Party has accepted that if she is able to pass the internal-party process, then there will be a good possibility of her success in the elections. The Republicans have not yet presented an experienced candidate worthy of the United States of America."

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Moderate Iran argues that the Saudis have taken a wrong turn: "Saudi rulers, with their accurate understanding of Iran's capability and the risks of creating challenges with Tehran, tried in the past to have a balanced and rational behaviour in the region. This approach has now been undermined by the new lot of inexperienced rulers. Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud al-Faisal, by announcing that 'Saudi Arabia is not fighting against Iran in Yemen', has tried to lessen the consequences of Riyadh's recent imprudent behaviour, but the fact remains that Saudi Arabia's current approach lacks rationality. In Saudi Arabia's viewpoint, the involvement in Yemen is an effort to establish a geopolitical balance with Iran. They believe that Riyadh has scored some achievements so far in this regards. Highlighting Iran's alleged expansionist policy and claiming that Tehran is meddling in some regional countries including Yemen is also a part of the justifications for a media war against the Yemeni people." 

 

PAKISTAN/YEMEN: Conservative Quds salutes Pakistan: "Pakistan’s parliament rejected Saudi demands for military intervention. The move has been welcomed inside and outside the country, but caused anger in Saudi Arabia and in a number of countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Pakistan's neutrality in the Yemen war would cost Islamabad heavily; Pakistan would be deprived of financial support from the Persian Gulf. Thousands of its workers may be deported from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Pakistan defused the plan of making the war in Yemen sectarian, so, it is a historic measure." 

 

UPCOMING ELECTIONS: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami is concerned about dirty money: "People expect determination by the authorities to fight the infiltration of dirty money into politics. They expect elections to be free of dirty money. If the government fails to meet people's expectation, it would reveal weakness about one of the most important popular demands, which will create great difficulties for government activities. It is important that those who will be engaged in elections are strong, honest and independent; this can guarantee fair elections." 

 

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION CONFERENCE: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz questions: "According to reports, this meeting in Israel will be convened in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western countries. A number of Arab countries will also attend under the pretext that it is an international conference. This is questionable and ambiguous. How can Arab countries, which claim to support Palestine, attend this meeting, which is hosted by the first enemy of Palestine and the Muslim world?" 

 

U.S./IRAQ: Conservative Khorasan is doubtful: "America's approval of Iraq's military requests will provide for the renovation of its worn out army, which is a step towards a powerful Iraq in the region. Naturally, America would postpone this request or oppose to it. American strategy, despite vast propaganda against terrorism, is based on controlling ISIS and not to completely destroy it. ISIS is a lever that has always been used by the U.S. to create crisis in the region. Baghdad's deep ties with Moscow and Tehran will lead the U.S. to a doubt-based mistrust; due to this America is careful in supporting Iraq." 

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Selling missiles to Tehran

2-Shifting priorities

3-Worrisome words in Gaza

 

1-Selling missiles to Tehran

 

Israel’s anger at the delivery of these [S-300 Russian] missiles to Iran was not the only one its kind, even though it was the only one that was made public. There is certainly a similar but undeclared Saudi anger. Saudi Arabia is fighting a proxy war against Iran in both Syria and Iraq, and a direct war in Yemen. It relies totally on its air force, which is the strongest in the region after the Israeli air force. If the war spreads and changes into a direct war between Tehran and Riyadh – which is unlikely – Iran's advanced Russian missiles will allow it to stand up to the Saudi air threat better than ever. And in this regard, we have to bear in mind that Russia is Tehran's strongest ally and supports Iran's backing for the 'Houthi/Saleh' coalition in Yemen--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's admission that air defense systems are important for Iran, especially in light of the situation in Yemen, amounts to a clear Russian line-up alongside the camp opposed to the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis. And after the harsh words addressed by [Saudi FM] Saud al-Faisal to Putin during the recent Sharm el-Sheikh Arab summit against the background of Moscow’s support for President Bashar al-Assad's regime, it seems that the confrontation between the two sides is spreading to the Yemeni crisis.  The Russian position also intensifies the pressures on the U.S. administration. The Kremlin's decree was issued at a time when diplomats from the six great powers and Tehran are busy redrafting the arms’ monitoring system imposed on Tehran. The form and content of the new measures are still subject to the final negotiations; but Moscow's recent decision sends a signal that it intends to undermine any possible restrictions on the export of weapons to Iran and paves the way for more arms deals with it--Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Moscow’s decision to lift the ban on the delivery of S-300 ground-to-air missiles to Iran will tilt the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor, maintains the editor-in-chief of an online Arab daily. In addition to Israel’s open anger at this Russian move, Iran's Gulf enemies, especially Saudi Arabia, are also certain to be livid. This Russian decision sends a clear signal that Moscow has joined the camp opposed to the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen, maintains a Lebanese commentator. It also signals that Russia intends to have a free hand in concluding arms deals with Iran, regardless of the nuclear negotiations that are still underway between Iran and the six major powers.

 

TWO SLAPS IN THE FACE: "Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu has received two strong slaps on the face within less than a month," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Wednesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

The first was when President Barack Obama's administration paid no heed to his 'bark' and proceeded towards a framework agreement with Iran over its nuclear program. The second was when the Russian leadership lifted the ban on supplying Iran with S-300 ground-to-air missiles that can prevent or obstruct any Israeli aggression on Iran aimed at destroying its nuclear installations – an action that Netanyahu has been threatening to carry out throughout the past six years.

Lifting the ban was the direct result of Iran’s nuclear framework agreement with the six major powers. The ban had been imposed under pressure from the U.S., which was then threatening to resort to a military option against Iran as a means of pressure to force it to offer concessions in the nuclear negotiations. But now that a peaceful agreement has been reached, the ban no longer has any real value.

In a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, Netanyahu expressed his anger at this Russian move. But this no longer makes any difference, one way or the other. For who is Netanyahu to impose his diktats on the Russian leadership, defy Barack Obama the president of the world's greatest superpower, and use the Jewish lobby's influence in Congress to prevent a framework agreement with Tehran from being signed?

This is the epitome of Israeli impertinence and arrogance. Israeli leaders imagine that they are able to use the entire world and deploy it in the service of their expansionist policies of aggression. They have failed to realize that the world has reached a stage of disgust at this impertinence, and now views their blackmail and provocations with disinterest and denunciation.

The world is changing, even if at a slow pace. It is no longer fooled by Israeli lies as it once was, sixty or even thirty years ago. Moreover, Israel and its lobbies' domination and influence over the traditional – especially Western – media has begun to erode, and has gradually lost its power with the rise of the social media. Today, 77% of Western youth rely on the latter for their information.

Israel’s military experts are now licking their wounds, claiming that Israeli warplanes can overcome the threat posed by these missiles. Why then did Netanyahu go to Moscow twice during the past year alone in order to convince President Putin not to deliver them to Iran?

We do not know whether the delivery of S-300 missiles to Iran as a prelude to supplying Syria with them as well. This is not unlikely in light of the undeclared aerial coordination between the Syrian leadership and its American counterpart. The U.S. warplanes that are raiding Islamic State (ISIS) headquarters and groupings –3500 such raids have been staged so far – have not faced any 'harassment' from Syrian ground defenses.

It is now clear that Russia had hitherto refused to hand these missiles over to its allies in Tehran and Damascus in compliance with both pressures and deals with Washington. The U.S. feared their use against its own warplanes when it was threatening to bomb both countries. But after Syria has relinquished its chemical weapons and Iran has abandoned its ambitions to produce nuclear weapons -even if only temporarily- these fears have dissipated. The reasons for the ban have disappeared, which means that Israeli pressures are secondary and are no longer effective.

Israel’s anger at the delivery of these missiles to Iran was not the only one its kind, even though it was the only one that was made public. There is certainly a similar but undeclared Saudi anger. Saudi Arabia is fighting a proxy war against Iran in both Syria and Iraq, and a direct war in Yemen. It relies totally on its air force, which is the strongest in the region after the Israeli air force. If the war spreads and changes into a direct war between Tehran and Riyadh – which is unlikely – Iran's advanced Russian missiles will allow it to stand up to the Saudi air threat better than ever. And in this regard, we have to bear in mind that Russia is Tehran's strongest ally and supports Iran's backing for the 'Houthi/Saleh' coalition in Yemen.

We are not military experts; but we do not need to exert any great effort to find out their views that are available in abundance on the specialized websites on the Internet. Their views confirm that these missiles will change the balance of power in Iran’s favor in the foreseeable future. Here we are speaking of foreign experts, not of their Arab counterparts who appear on [Arab Gulf-owned] satellite TV stations with their laptops. Their information and expertise hark back to the Second World War, and their judgments and analyses are rarely correct. This is because some have the tendency to bend in whichever direction the wind may blow, and to speak based on the wishes of whichever television station may open its screens to them.

Unfortunately for its enemies, Iran is achieving gains in the conventional arms race, having leapt ahead in the nuclear arms race. It is way in front compared to those who are trying to catch up with it. What is worse is that the two superpowers, Russia and the U.S., are competing with each other in winning it over, viewing its Arab enemies with great contempt.

"But there is no consolation for the weak," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN HINTS: "The last time Russia said that it intended to deliver S-300 missiles to Iran was in response to the West’s hints that it may arm Kiev," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

Whether its official announcement on Monday that it will lift the ban on this air defense system was an attempt to curry favor with Tehran and preserve its share in the promising Iranian market, or whether it was intended to enhance its influence among the great powers regarding the heated issues that begin with Syria but do not end with Ukraine, the very fact that it took its decision at this particular point in time will only pour oil on the fires raging in the region.

President Vladimir Putin's signature to a decree lifting the ban on delivering S-300 missiles to Iran that had been imposed by former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev in 2010, paves the way for selling and delivering these missiles by sea, land, and air. And although it is still unclear whether Moscow will deliver these weapons any time soon, they have always been seen as 'breaking the fragile balance' in the region even if they are defensive in nature, and the decision itself has provoked Washington and Tel Aviv and left the impression that Moscow intends to strengthen Tehran's position in its open wars in the region.

When Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal was asked at his joint press conference with his French counterpart about Russia’s attitude towards arming the Houthi militias, he answered jokingly: 'If we knew their attitude, we would have been able to finalize the draft resolution [Gulf draft resolution at the Security Council]. But whenever we reached an agreement, a second issue emerged.' And he added, addressing the questioner: 'If you find out what the Russian position is, please let me know.'

The Kremlin's announcement dispels some of the ambiguity that shrouds the Russian position. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's admission that air defense systems are important for Iran, especially in light of the situation in Yemen, amounts to a clear Russian line-up alongside the camp opposed to the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis. And after the harsh words addressed by Saud al-Faisal to Putin during the recent Sharm el-Sheikh Arab summit against the background of Moscow’s support for President Bashar al-Assad's regime, it seems that the confrontation between the two sides is spreading to the Yemeni crisis.

The Russian position also intensifies the pressures on the U.S. administration. The Kremlin's decree was issued at a time when diplomats from the six great powers and Tehran are busy redrafting the arms’ monitoring system imposed on Tehran. The form and content of the new measures are still subject to the final negotiations; but Moscow's recent decision sends a signal that it intends to undermine any possible restrictions on the export of weapons to Iran and paves the way for more arms deals with it.

"Such signals will undoubtedly intensify the opposition to the nuclear agreement in Congress. And they face Binyamin Netanyahu with difficult choices, one of which is the option of proceeding with a military adventure against Iran before the latter secures the ability to deter him," concludes Freiha.

Ends…

 

 

2-Shifting priorities

 

Al-Qa’ida in Yemen survived and is expanding, but this time with direct and indirect support from regional and Arab powers that have begun to view it as the least of two evils, and as a potential ‘temporary ally’, at least, in confronting the more extreme threat represented by Tehran and its allies. In Syria, the matter is even clearer. The Idlib attack [last month] that ended with the Nusra Front's taking control of the capital of Idlib Province could not have occurred had it not been for coordination and direct support from certain Arab and regional capitals. Some of these capitals are at the helm of Operation Decisive Storm, while others still believe that the key to resolving all the region's problems begins with toppling Assad's regime even if [ISIS ‘Caliph’] Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi were to succeed him and restore the 'glory' of the Caliphate to Damascus, now that Iraq has begun to squeeze him out--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Let us set aside the lies or exaggerations that the SNC's [Syrian National Coalition] representatives and the remnants of the corpse that is the FSA [Free Syrian Army] keep fabricating in an attempt to preserve their role which came to an end after their friends, financiers, and sponsors have exposed their true nature. The latter have dusted their hands of them and their vacuous discourse, and no longer rely on them or wager on the possibility of extracting them from their stumbling and flimsiness, and especially, their corruption. Setting all the above aside, the new regional climate is likely to speed up the burial of these two organizations, heading towards a reconsideration of the crises that have broken out across the region. For it is no longer possible to disguise the roles of the main players in regional and international capitals. And there is no longer any role for the chorus –i.e. the foreign-based Syrian opposition groups – in this phase where the 'lead players' have to place their cards on the table and begin a dialogue or negotiations aimed at reaching understandings and accords that put an end to the futility, bloodshed, and conspiracies that have never ceased in capitals that are known for their vicious behavior and their deluded belief in their ability to impose their conditions--Mohammad Kharroub in Jordanian al-Ra’i

 

There are growing signs that the anti-terrorism global alliance is breaking apart, with some regional and Arab states showing a growing readiness to ally themselves with terrorist Qa'ida-affiliated groups in confronting Iran and Shiite 'expansion' argues a leading Jordanian commentator. Amidst all this, Washington stands at a loss, uncertain how to act. The foreign-based 'moderate' Syrian opposition has now run its course and fulfilled its role, as the main regional and international players in the Syrian crisis are now taking over and revealing their cards, argues another Jordanian commentator. The ‘moderate’ opposition’s delusions and its flimsiness have been exposed, even as the U.S. begins training 500 of its members to fight the regime and ISIS in Syria.

 

DANGEROUS REPERCUSSIONS: "We have previously warned of the dangerous repercussions of Operation Decisive Storm with its known context and priorities for a 'third global war on terrorism'," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Wednesday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Today, we are witnessing the beginning of the breakdown of the international anti-terrorism coalition and a rapid return to the former foolish notion of 'redirecting salafi jihadism' in order to confront 'the Shiite threat.' This same thesis was very adeptly used to confront 'the communist threat' [in Afghanistan] three decades ago.

Reports are flowing in regarding a change in priorities and alliances. In Yemen, and ever since the winds of the Decisive Storm began to blow, not a single attack by a pilotless drone has been carried out against a target believed to belong to al-Qa'ida, while over one hundred daily aerial sorties are being carried out by the Saudi-led 'Arab coalition' against the Houthis and Yemeni army. Al-Qa’ida in Yemen survived and is expanding, but this time with direct and indirect support from regional and Arab powers that have begun to view it as the least of two evils, and as a potential ‘temporary ally’, at least, in confronting the more extreme threat represented by Tehran and its allies.

In Syria, the matter is even clearer. The Idlib attack [last month] that ended with the Nusra Front's taking control of the capital of Idlib Province could not have occurred had it not been for coordination and direct support from certain Arab and regional capitals. Some of these capitals are at the helm of Operation Decisive Storm, while others still believe that the key to resolving all the region's problems begins with toppling Assad's regime even if [ISIS ‘Caliph’] Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi were to succeed him and restore the 'glory' of the Caliphate to Damascus, now that Iraq has begun to squeeze him out.

Yarmouk [Palestinian refugee] Camp, which is very close to the heart of the capital Damascus, could not have fallen under the control of 'salafi jihadi' fighters had it not been for this ongoing support and reckless and unprecedented openness to such forces by these very same capitals. And there are very reliable reports that efforts are underway to mend the rift between the two jihadi factions, the Nusra and ISIS, or to neutralize their disagreements at the very least, so as to ensure unity in confronting the Iranian march and the rafida [pejorative term for Shiite] expansion.

The same goes for the operational orders that the 'jihadi' factions in the southern Syrian provinces have received, which have redefined the meaning of common interests between them and the various constituents of the armed opposition in this area. This has enabled the Nusra Front to be ensconced along our northern [Jordanian] borders, amidst ceaseless attempt to convince it of the need to sever its official links to al-Qa'ida. [Nusra head] 'Al-Fateh Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani' has resisted these attempts so far, but it is likely that the initiative may come from the one remaining historical Qa'ida leader, Ayman az-Zawahiri. The jihadi bases await a statement from him that absolves the Nusra of its pledge of allegiance and its burdens, in a clear attempt that reflects an understanding of an-Nusra and its regional backers, and so as to avoid further embarrassment. This would then allow for the organization to be rehabilitated in order to become the vanguard of the armed and ‘moderate’ Syrian opposition.

Talk of the need to rehabilitate and bolster an-Nusra no longer takes place in small gatherings or salons or intelligence cellars. It has now gone public. Journalists very close to the centers of decision-making in many Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are now publicly speaking of the need to turn a new leaf with the Nusra so as to confront the Syrian regime, Hizbollah, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, with the aim of shifting the balance of power in Syria. This comes after the futility of the wager on a moderate opposition that is outside the salafi jihadi womb has become evident to them.

In this context, openness to the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, Syria, and the region in general goes without saying. We have seen the [Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood] al-Islah Party being revived after being roundly defeated by the Houthis and their allies, and after suffering from the severe isolation and repression at the hands of its traditional Gulf allies.

Such developments gladden some Arab and regional hearts, and anger others. Turkish policy in Syria has been revitalized thanks to this new coalition that stretches from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. It is reviving its failed dreams of controlling northern Syria, as a prelude to expelling Assad from Damascus. On the other hand, Egypt is worried, cautious, and reserved. It is fighting jihadi salafism on its own land and at its borders, and continues to issue death sentences against the Muslim Brotherhood figures en masse. This is a very worrisome development for Cairo, and may be one of the reasons behind its hesitation to actively join Operation Decisive Storm.

The UAE and some other moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, for example, are not happy about these developments either. First, because they believe that the war on terrorism should be the first priority on their national agenda; and, second, because they have problems with the various currents of political Islam, including the Muslim Brotherhood – in fact, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.

Amidst this complex and tricky map, the U.S. is at a loss. It stands in a grey square and has yet to depart from it. At one level, it deems terrorism to be the main threat to its security and to the region and the world's security. At another level, it is drawing closer to Iran on the basis of confronting a 'common enemy.' But at yet a third level, it maintains its historic relations and interests with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and does not wish to squander or dissipate them.

It realizes that its war on terrorism has become more difficult in light of its allies' 'insubordination' and their noncompliance with the ties of coalition. And it is trying to maintain a difficult balance in its regional relations at a moment of rare polarization in this region's history. And it awaits the outcome of its negotiations with Iran over the latter's nuclear program.

Has the anti-terrorism international coalition begun to unravel and lose its battle against ISIS?

It is too early to answer this question. There are advances in the war against ISIS in Iraq, while al-Qa'ida and the organizations it hatched are making advances on a number of fronts in Syria and Yemen. And this is to say nothing of Libya, Sinai, North Africa, and elsewhere.

"Conflicting priorities and mixed and changing alliances are ensuring that Washington's task remains extremely difficult," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

LONG-EXPECTED PROGRAM: “Today, Wednesday, the U.S. will launch its long expected program of training 500 members of the (moderate, of course) armed Syrian opposition in Turkish camps chosen in coordination with Ankara,” writes Mohammad Kharroub in the Jordanian daily al-Ra’i.

We have reports that these ‘trainees’ have been selected by ‘experts’ from the U.S. Defense Department, which chose them based on its own specific preconditions and criteria. This includes the fact that the trainees should belong to ‘marginal’ and small organizations that have a secondary role in the Syrian crisis, which means that the Americans have steered clear of the larger or main groups and organizations that receive attention in the newspapers headlines and enjoy coverage. (For ‘coverage’ here, read ‘Turkish and certain Arab advertising and media promotion campaigns).

The above points to two issues: First, that the Americans do not trust those armed groups and organizations, especially after the liquidation of the movement they tried to create for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, namely, the Hazm Movement. Second, the Americans do not trust the Istanbul Coalition [Syrian National Coalition (SNC)] headed by Khaled Khoja, a Turkish national close to the Muslim Brotherhood. They especially do not trust that frail, in fact, nonexistent edifice that goes by the name of ‘the Free Syrian Army’ (FSA) which has been scattered, and fragmented into pieces, and no longer exists except in the lying reports put about by the Arab [Gulf] satellite TV stations.

Let us set aside the demagogical and vacuous statements and the political bankruptcy they reflect that are issued by these two flimsy organizations, namely, that the elements that the Americans will train will only fight ISIS, and that their armament will be light and confined to machine guns and RPG rockets, and that they will coordinate with the regime's forces, and not fight against the regime or its troops. This is what Khaled Khoja has been saying, and the same vacuous statements have been repeated by Osama Abu-Zaid, the FSA's legal advisor.

But what is now happening in terms of the promised American training should be added to what happened at the Moscow-II forum (or dialogue) that the SNC refused to attend, even though it achieved some notable progress by the admission of their Russian sponsor (the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, headed by [Syria expert] Vitaly Naumkin). Parties of the domestic opposition also took part actively and patriotically, and showed concern for working with resolve and perseverance in order to extract Syria and its people from the current serious crisis, but especially, to safeguard the unity of Syrian territories and end the Syrians' suffering. They have been subject to an unprecedented international war that aims to out Syria as a state, a role, and a geostrategic position, turning it into a launching-pad from which to pounce on what remains of pan-Arab national identity.

Let us set aside the lies or exaggerations that the SNC's representatives and the remnants of the corpse that is the FSA keep fabricating in an attempt to preserve their role which came to an end after their friends, financiers, and sponsors have exposed their true nature. The latter have dusted their hands of them and their vacuous discourse, and no longer rely on them or wager on the possibility of extracting them from their stumbling and flimsiness, and especially, their corruption.

Setting all the above aside, the new regional climate is likely to speed up the burial of these two organizations, heading towards a reconsideration of the crises that have broken out across the region. For it is no longer possible to disguise the roles of the main players in regional and international capitals. And there is no longer any role for the chorus –i.e. the foreign-based Syrian opposition groups – in this phase where the 'lead players' have to place their cards on the table and begin a dialogue or negotiations aimed at reaching understandings and accords that put an end to the futility, bloodshed, and conspiracies that have never ceased in capitals that are known for their vicious behavior and their deluded belief in their ability to impose their conditions.

In short, none of these players can go far in pursuit of their 'project' without attending to others or taking their interests into consideration. This is regardless of their arsenals or the coffers that they may possess or the strength and number of their allies. Part of this current scene is the consequence of the Lausanne understanding between Tehran and the '5 + 1' group, even though this understanding is still the subject of argument, disputation, and attempts to sabotage or foil it.

Then there is also Operation Decisive Storm and its final results that have yet to emerge. And this is not to mention the developments on the various Syrian fronts that confirm again and again that the foreign-based opposition groups' role has come to an end, and that the delusion of toppling the regime or ending its role or negotiating with it over handing over power have all been dispelled. These delusions were never realistic or capable of being realized or implemented anyway-- not before, and certainly not now.

To this we should add the development of the situation in Iraq and the prospects of inflicting a resounding defeat on ISIS there which will alter many of the alliances and lineups in the region.

"Will the modern Syrian opposition's 'brigades' that are being prepared by the Americans succeed in bringing about a fundamental change in the existing balance of power? Ask Khaled Khoja and Osama Abu-Zaid for an answer," concludes Kharroub.

Ends…

 

 

3-Worrisome words in Gaza

 

A leading Hamas figure’s talk of establishing a ‘national authority’ in Gaza is cause for serious concern, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in today's Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Worrisome statements from a leading Hamas figure hinting at the possibility of establishing some form of Palestinian 'national authority' in the Gaza Strip are the direct consequence of the failure to achieve inter-Palestinian reconciliation and implement the ‘expanded leadership framework’ agreed between Hamas and Fatah last year, warns a Palestinian commentator.

 

DIRE CONSEQUENCES: "The recent statements made by leading [Gaza-based] Hamas figure Mahmoud az-Zahhar regarding the possibility of establishing a 'national authority, or self-rule, or civil administration', in Gaza raises many worrisome questions," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

But it is not possible to ignore the fact that the failure to implement the [Fateh/Hamas] reconciliation agreements, especially the [2014] expanded leadership framework, is bound to have dire consequences, one of which is this proposal by Zahhar.

His statements were made during last Friday’s sermon at the at-Tawwabeen Mosque in the Gaza Strip. They were coupled with denials that his movement intends to establish a separate state in the Strip, stressing that Hamas's strategic project is based on liberating the whole of Palestine, not just the Gaza Strip. He said: 'If we manage to establish a national authority or self-rule or a civil administration, this does not mean that we will relinquish a single grain of Palestine's sand.' And he concluded by waging an attack on the 'PA's cooperation with the occupation in suppressing the resistance on the occupied West Bank.'

The question that calls for a serious answer is this: How seriously should Zahhar's statements be taken? In other words, were they premeditated and preplanned, or were they mere slips of the tongue while being carried away with enthusiasm delivering a speech?

It is difficult to imagine that expressions as stark and as suggestive as 'civil administration' and 'self-rule' that the Palestinian people lost much blood and many martyrs in rejecting in the 1970s and 1980s are now being used without some thought being given to them, without being discussed inside Hamas, or between Hamas and others that may be acting as international mediators with Israel. But the question remains: To what extent does this reflect something serious? Or is it just 'extremist' thinking?

Zahhar's 'words' or 'thoughts' can be seen as one of the products of the failure of national reconciliation and the failure to resolve the Gaza Strip's problems. There are many indications that Zahhar is among those who hate the notion of 'reconciliation', or who accept it only reluctantly. But the PLO's leadership also bears responsibility for the failure to convene the ‘Expanded Leadership Framework’ agreed upon with Hamas last year, and that would block the path before Zahhar and his unjustified and worrisome proposals via strengthening different voices inside Hamas.

The second question is this: Talk of an 'authority' as Zahhar spoke of it, was tried by the PLO in 1974 when the idea of establishing a ‘national authority’ on any part of Palestine that was liberated was proposed; at the time, it was referred to as a 'fighting authority.'  In practice, however, any such arrangement cannot be achieved without understandings with the Israelis either on the basis of a truce without any real diplomatic recognition, or via what is more than a truce – unless the talk is of an authority that no one recognizes and that remains under Israeli and international siege without any source of income, thereby consolidating Gaza's current tragedy. So what exactly is intended here?

It was Zahhar who described the rocket fire from the Gaza Strip against the Israelis in 2010 as 'suspect.' It was he who, in 2008, said regarding violations of the truce with the Israelis that 'there are measures and there is an agreement with Islamic Jihad that anyone who violates this agreement whether from Hamas or Islamic Jihad, will be arrested and disarmed, because this [rocket fire] is not a program for resistance, but one for sabotaging the resistance.'

But this is the situation that we imagine will be replicated when this proposed civil-administration/self-rule/authority is established. And this raises a third question: How can a vision that is based on preventing blows against Israel, no matter how limited, be reconciled with the project to liberate the whole of Palestine?

This is especially relevant since the word 'project' entails working plans and action on the ground. For where is Hamas located apart from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Of what sort of project are we speaking here?

The fourth question is this: If Hamas has such an 'advanced' understanding as expressed by Zahhar's statements (which were published on the 'Izziddin al-Qassam, Hamas's military wing’s website) regarding when attacks and confrontations are 'suspect' when such actions are only provisional and not strategic, the question remains: Why is it not possible to reach an understanding over this with the 'other' Palestinian side [i.e. Fateh/PA/PLO]?

"Zahhar's statements are cause for great concern. But achieving reconciliation, imposing an international accord for a resolution of the Gaza Strip issue, and activation of the Palestinian Expanded Leadership Framework will block the path before such proposals," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 15.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Putin’s message

 

Holocaust Memorial Day, which begins at sunset on Wednesday, dominates the front and inside pages of several Israeli newspapers. The Jerusalem Post, Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead with a Holocaust-related feature, while the main photograph on the front page of Haaretz is taken from Yad Vashem.

Haaretz leads with the fallout from the Russian decision to allow the sale of the advanced S-300 missile defense system to Iran. Specifically, the paper headlines the urgent telephone call that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu placed yesterday to the Kremlin, during which he warned Russian President Vladimir Putin that supplying the system would merely make Iran more aggressive.

A statement issued by the Kremlin reported that Putin told Netanyahu that the missiles only had defensive capabilities and did not pose a threat to Israel.

'A telephone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu took place at the initiative of the Israeli side,' the statement read. 'In connection with concerns over the removal of an embargo expressed by Binyamin Netanyahu, Vladimir Putin explained in detail the logic of the actions of the Russian leadership.

Around the time of the phone call, Netanyahu released the following statement: 'This sale of advanced weaponry to Iran is the direct result of the dangerous deal on the table between Iran and the P5+1. Can anyone still seriously claim that the deal with Iran will enhance security in the Middle East?'

According to Israel Radio, Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has also spoken out against the decision by Russia to lift the ban, saying that it was too early to reward Iran for its agreement on the nuclear deal. Steinmeier spoke as he welcomed counterparts from the group of seven powers to a meeting in northern Germany. They are expected to discuss Iran, Ukraine and Yemen among other issues. Steinmeier told reporters 'negotiators are in the middle of a process of trying for a final deal with Iran. U.S. senators shouldn't try to obstruct further talks unnecessarily, but it is also too early to offer rewards,' he added.

In the other main Iran-related story of the day, the Times of Israel reports that Israel has welcomed the bill unanimously passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requiring Congressional oversight of any comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz called the new legislation 'an achievement for Israeli policy,' and credited Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s polarizing March address to U.S. lawmakers detailing Iran’s nuclear ambitions for the development.

'We are certainly blessed this morning,' he told Israel Radio, adding that increased oversight would prevent Iran from breaking the terms of the deal. 'It means more pressure and another hurdle in the way of a bad agreement, so the administration and negotiators will work harder to fill the gaps to reshape the deal into a better, more reasonable one that can win Congress approval,' said Steinitz, who in recent months has become something of a point man of Netanyahu on the Iran issue.

Meanwhile, Iranian President Hassan Rowhani said Wednesday that Tehran would not accept a final deal on its nuclear program that does not lift all sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic, Reuters reported.

During a televised speech in Rasht, Rowhani stressed, 'if there is no end to sanctions; there will not be an agreement. The end of these negotiations and a signed deal must include a declaration of canceling the oppressive sanctions on the great nation of Iran.' Regarding the U.S. Congress' power to review any nuclear deal, Rowhani noted it was a domestic matter and that Iran is 'in talks with the major powers and not with the U.S. Congress.'

In other news, Channel 2 reported on Tuesday night that Netanyahu promised Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett the highly-coveted position of defense minister several months prior to the elections – and then promptly broke that promise. The report exposes how Netanyahu approached Bennett in November of last year and asked him to support a decision to fire Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid and Hatnuah head Tzipi Livni from the coalition. After Yisrael Beiteinu leader, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman opposed replacing Lapid and Livni with ultra-Orthodox parties, Netanyahu turned to Bennett to garner his support for dismissing the two ministers anyway and usher in early elections.

In return for his support, Netanyahu guaranteed Bennett he would be defense minister if Netanyahu won the elections and headed the next government. Bennett pledged his support, and Netanyahu fired Livni and Lapid at the start of December – calling early elections, which he did indeed win. However, after vowing throughout the campaign that the Jewish Home was the 'natural partner' of the Likud and would be first in line to join his government, it was revealed last month that Netanyahu had gone back on his word and was refusing to grant Bennett either the defense or foreign ministries.

In other coalition horse-trading news, sources in both Likud and Zionist Union are denying the Channel One report of a secret meeting several days ago between Netanyahu and Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog. Zionist Union said no such event took place. Likud sources said Netanyahu is continuing his efforts to set up a coalition with his natural partners from the right, in order to establish a coalition of 67 members as quickly as possible. The report of a Netanyahu-Herzog meeting came against the backdrop of ongoing coalition talks and speculation over the possibility of a national unity government.

Finally, Haaretz's Barak Ravid has been studying the list of Israelis who visited the White House in 2014 – and has found further evidence of the extent to which Ambassador Ron Dermer is unwelcome there. According to Ravid's research, Dermer had precious few meetings with the president or even his senior advisers during the period in question: from December 3, 2013, to the end of 2014, he visited the White House only 11 times, but on only one of these occasions, on June 25, 2014, was there a business meeting with Obama’s then senior Middle Eastern affairs adviser Philip Gordon.

 

FROM RUSSIA, WITH LOVE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman comments on Israeli efforts to persuade Russia not to sell Iran the advanced S-300 missile defense system, and the ongoing argument over the Lausanne nuclear agreement.

"Happy times have arrived in the Middle East. It seems that it’s easier for the prime minister of the State of Israel to pick up the phone and chat with Russian President Vladimir Putin than with U.S. President Barack Obama. The White House needs to take note of the fact that Israel appears to have plenty of channels of communication with the Russians – at every level of government.

The phone call yesterday between Binyamin Netanyahu and Putin was the climax of Israel's efforts to get to the bottom of Kremlin's decision to overturn the ban on the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran. The Russians, however, are not in the habit of giving anybody yes-or-no answers or making any kind of commitment; usually, they merely say that they will take all reservations into consideration. Perhaps this is the reason that Israel's official response to the Russian decision has not been particularly harsh: Jerusalem, it seems, has recognized that Putin decided to overturn the ban on the supply of the advanced missile system – which was a deal signed way back in 2007 – but, for the time being at least, there are no negotiations between Moscow and Tehran over a new deal and it remains unclear what model would be sold as part of any new deal.

Indeed, it seems that Israel understands that the Russian announcement was more declarative than practical; its ramifications are political in nature and will not have any immediate or significant impact on the Middle East. And since Israel, in any case, wields very little influence over the Kremlin's decision-making process, it was decided in Jerusalem to keep the protests low-key and to reserve Israel's righteous indignation for the Lausanne agreement and the White House. Why should Israel argue with two superpowers at the same time, when it can limit itself to just one? Especially if the Russians are actually doing some of Israel's dirty work for it, by making it harder for Obama to get Congress to approve any final-status deal with the Islamic Republic.

Obama and the Democratic candidates for the 2016 presidential election will be given a hard time by Russia – not only over the sale of the S-300 system to Iran, which their Republican rivals will make hay from, but also because Putin continues to cock a snook at Obama. One example from the past day or two: Russian planes have been dispatched to European airspace with the sole purpose of harassing American spy planes.

In this battle, Obama's Republican rivals have even more effective ammunition: the framework agreement that Iran and the six world powers signed in Lausanne, which has yet to be made public. The big question is who is telling the truth: the Iranians, who claim that, the moment the final deal is signed, all sanctions will be lifted, or the American administration, which insists that the process of sanctions relief will be gradual.

The general consensus is that publication of the Lausanne document will embarrass the Obama Administration, since there is already a resolution before the UN Security Council to annul all sanctions against Iran – especially the lifting of the economic sanctions, which have been a thorn in the ayatollahs' side ever since they were introduced. In addition, when the secret document is eventually unveiled, it will apparently become clear that the Americans made more concession than the Iranians ever dreamed of. For example, Tehran will be allowed to continue limited operations at the Arak nuclear facility, even though they said that they would be willing to close it entirely. In addition, the document does not include Iranian agreement to inspections of its military facilities. But the problem is not just with what is not included in the deal. Critics say that the wording will be too vague and it seems unlikely that Congress will allow Obama to ratify it without major changes."

Ends…

 

A DANGEROUS DEAL: Writing in Israel Hayom, Omer Dostry says that the Russian decision to allow Iran to purchase the advanced S-300 missile defense system is proof that the Lausanne deal is dangerous.

"In recent years, Russia has refrained from supplying Iran with the strategic S-300 missile defense system – in part because of the concerted effort made by Jerusalem, which recognized that if Iran were to get its hands on such a weapon, Israel would find it even harder to launch military action designed to destroy the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities. As part of these efforts, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu visited Moscow in February 2010, where he tried to persuade the Kremlin not to go ahead with the deal. Even though the Russians already had a signed contract to sell the S-300 system to Iran, it was cancelled during Dmitry Medvedev's time as president. Israel's tireless efforts may not have been the most immediate or significant reason for the Russian decision to halt the sale, but there is no question that they played some role and that they bore fruit.

Now, however, Russia has reversed that decision. One could ascribe the about-face to the rather strained relations between Moscow and the West and to the heightened tensions following the civil war in Ukraine, where the two protagonists are fighting over influence. However, this seems to stretch the truth someone – especially when one takes into account recent comments by high-ranking Russian officials.

These officials freely admit that the decision to revive the S-300 deal with Iran stems from one main thing – the framework agreement that was signed last week in Lausanne between Iran and the six world powers. When Russia announced that it was suspending the deal back in 2010, it said that it was doing so because of the regime of international sanctions that had been imposed on Iran. These sanctions, which were approved by the United Nations Security Council, barred the supply of weapons systems like the S-300. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said quite clearly this week that the decision to allow the deal to go through was directly linked to the nuclear talks. 'We believe that at this stage there is no longer need for this kind of embargo,' Lavrov stated, adding that, 'from the Russian side it was unilateral and voluntary.'

Russia's decision, therefore, is the direct result of the conciliatory foreign policy of the Obama Administration, which is now allowing the unprecedented sanctions – which got the rare approval and backing of all the world's major powers – to evaporate into thin air. This is happening despite the fact that no final agreement has been reached and the Lausanne deal is nothing more than a set of verbal understandings. In addition, the Americans are demanding that sanctions be lifted gradually, in accordance with the extent to which Iran lives up to its commitments. We are already seeing the more dangerous ramifications of the Lausanne agreement – even before the Iranians have been asked to sign a single clause of it.

Last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter hinted that America could launch military action against Iran, if it fails to abide by the terms of the nuclear agreement. However, the international legitimacy that the agreement grants Iran – coupled with the missile defense system it is due to receive from Russia and the general support that Moscow gives it – have emptied any such American threat of content."

Ends…

 

HAPPY WITH HILLARY: Writing in Makor Rishon, Ariel Shenbal says that Jerusalem should be delighted that Hillary Clinton is running for U.S. president, since – unlike Obama – she grew up believing in the importance of the special relationship between Israel and the United States.

"In November 1960, the United States held a presidential election between Republican Vice President Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy of the Democratic Party. Nixon lost by just 112,000 votes. The Republicans claimed that there had been irregularities at polling stations and, four days later, a teenage girl took to the streets of Chicago and went house to house in the city's poorest neighborhoods, in an effort to prove that voter fraud was responsible for the Republicans' defeat. That girl was Hillary Rodham – later to become Hillary Clinton. Yes – the woman who wants to become the Democratic Party's candidate in the 2016 presidential election grew up an ardent Republican – as befits the daughter of an opinionated and proud conservative.

Since then, of course, Clinton has changed her views and her political ideology. But the above anecdote just goes to show that she is very much part of the American establishment who embodies the values that both parties – Republican and Democrat – have espoused for decades. One key element in these values is the 'special relationship' between the United States and the State of Israel.

Barack Obama, as everyone knows, does not have a father who was a Republican. He was born in Hawaii, an American territory that is physically distant from the continental United States; as such, it is also disconnected to a certain degree from the powerful traditional processes that are an integral part of American political life. At the age of six, Obama and his family moved to Indonesia for three years, where it is highly doubtful that he was exposed to the same cultural messages which Clinton was exposed to from birth.

As baseball legend Yogi Berra one famously said, 'It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future.' Nonetheless, after six years of Obama in the White House, when relations between Israel and the United States reached an all-time low (and even Netanyahu's greatest detractors must be honest enough to recognize that the U.S. president played his part in this deterioration), and assuming that the next two years will not see a renaissance in the relationship, Clinton's run for president is something that Jerusalem must surely welcome. Clinton is known to be an ardent supporter of the Jewish state, whereas Obama's relationship with Jerusalem is, at best, correct.

Clinton, it seems, is a shoo-in for the Democratic nomination. The Israeli prime minister, meanwhile, may secretly be hoping that whoever the Republicans chose to challenge Clinton – with the possible exception of Rand Paul – wins the race for the White House. However, even if the Republicans lose and Clinton is elected president, it certainly won’t be seen as a disaster in Jerusalem.

One thing is for sure: if Clinton wins, she won't allow herself to be photographed chatting to Netanyahu on the telephone with her feet on desk in the Oval Office."

Ends…

 

BIBI'S CHOICES: Writing in Maariv, Yitzhak Ben-Ner says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's obsession with the Iranian nuclear threat – coupled with the patronage that he receives from a Republican-backing American tycoon – has done severe damage to the State of Israel.

"Who and what are we talking about when we talk about Binyamin Netanyahu? We're talking about a seasoned politician, a modern-day Machiavelli who believes that everything is permissible in order to remain in power; we're talking about the master of rhetoric, zigzags, lies, threats and promises he has no intention of keeping; we're talking about a leader who has decided to ignore his obligations toward proper government and, instead, focuses on the justified battle against Iran's nuclear aspirations. Netanyahu has spent the last several years issuing threats and warnings, making endless attempts to persuade the world and – according to unconfirmed reports – has spent billions on building a force that would allow him to exercise the military option against the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities. Thus far, however, our prime minister has not persuaded anyone and has not attacked anything.

As a politician, Netanyahu decided that the only way to prevent an almost-complete nuclear deal with Iran from becoming reality is to go head-to-head with the president of the United States – the embodiment of the hand that feeds us and behind whose narrow back we take political shelter. It should not come as a surprise to anyone that while Bibi was waging an all-out verbal war against the Iranian-sponsored apocalypse, the enemy has increased its strength and its abilities many times over and, by virtue of its brutal methods, has expanded its influence to every corner of this region where it identified a vacuum (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip). Netanyahu, meanwhile, continued to spout platitudinous threats and, at the same time, to clash with the U.S. president – much to the delight of the Republican Party. Maybe he's hoping to be the Republican candidate for the 2016 presidential election. After all, he's more Bush than Jeb.

When weighing up our prime minister's attributes and abilities, it is important to bear in mind his benefactor and patron over the ocean – the tycoon who gambles on whatever horses suit his interests best, in Washington and Jerusalem alike. As someone who made his fortune in the gambling industry and who created an unbreakable link between (Republican) politics and capital, Sheldon Adelson knows exactly who to invest in. Without his patron and the propaganda tools that he funds, Netanyahu would now be nothing more than a puppet on a string, moving only when someone manipulates him. He would be an aging, worn-out leader who is hesitant and weak; an orator who finds it hard to make tough decisions, who suffers from paranoia and believes that everyone around him is plotting against him. He believes that he was born to rule and that he is the founding father of the Netanyahu dynasty.

By providing our prime minister with massive financial and political support, the tycoon who owns and controls Netanyahu also owns and controls us through him, and allows him to continue fooling and deceiving us. Take the coalition negotiations, for example. If I had to, I would guess that there will not be a unity government. After all, the Vegas-based benefactor would not be able to stomach having someone in the Israeli government who believes in rectifying relations with Obama, who would welcome Hillary Clinton as president and who would push for the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians. So Bibi will keep on driving us all to distraction as he prevaricates between a coalition with 67 members and one with 61 members; he will continue to suck up to Moshe Kahlon and he will continue to sideline his Likud ministers, who would not dare to launch any kind of challenge to his leadership, since they know that doing so would ruin their chances of a top job in the next government; and he will continue to humiliate the very people he described as his 'natural partners,' by giving them a minor position and expecting them to say thank you."

Ends…

 

RUSSIA AND IRAN: In its editorial on Wednesday, The Jerusalem Post says that after witnessing Russia’s disregard for the United States' red lines regarding Iran, other nations will undoubtedly follow suit.

"In January, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Tehran to sign a major military cooperation deal with Iran that included renewed missile sales, increased military cooperation and provisions for joint training exercises. The mullahs ruling Iran seemed to think their position in nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 nations (which include Russia) was strong enough, and the U.S. was desperate enough, that they could be as provocative as they wanted to be without endangering the outcome of negotiations. They were right.

Now Russian President Vladimir Putin, who never misses an opportunity to thumb his nose at the U.S., has taken the next step and lifted the ban on the sale of S-300 rockets and air defense systems, originally imposed in 2010 by then-president Dmitry Medvedev.

Possession of the air defense systems – which in their more advanced technological versions have the ability to down not just aircraft, but also missiles, at a range of 150 km. – would further complicate a U.S. or Israeli air strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Aircraft approaching Iran would come under attack at much greater distances than at present.

A senior Russian government official quoted in The Moscow Times said that Russia had started supplying grain, equipment and construction material to Iran in exchange for crude oil under a barter deal.

There are a number of lessons to be learned from this warming of Russo-Iranian relations, both for Israel and for the world. First, the Obama administration’s 'reset' policy with Russia has failed miserably. Back in 2010, when Medvedev put in place a five-year ban on S-300 sales to Iran, Obama administration officials attributed the Russian decision to successful U.S. policy. Officials said they had explained to the Russians that the sale was 'a red line that couldn’t be crossed.' So much for red lines.

Second, as Israel and other nations have warned, the framework agreement that Iran and the P5+1 nations (the U.S., the UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) reached in Lausanne has increased the legitimacy of conducting business and even arms sales with the Islamic Republic. After witnessing Russia’s disregard for the U.S.’s red lines, other nations will undoubtedly follow suit. This seriously calls into question the ability to reinstate a sanctions regime if Iran is caught cheating. The term 'snap back,' used to describe how economic sanctions will go back in place should Iran violate the terms of the agreement, may sound, well, snappy. But will it be? There is a lesson in this for Israel as well: The Jewish state has little, if any, ability to influence Russia’s foreign policy.

Israel hosts one of the largest Russian expat communities in the world, leading to close business and cultural ties between the two countries. Putin would probably never intentionally do anything to harm about one million Russian- speakers living in Israel. Israel has even hurt relations with smaller countries in an attempt to improve relations with Moscow. Out of deference to Russia, Israel scaled back its arms sales to Georgia, a country that once viewed Israel as a model and an inspiration as a small nation that survived a struggle for statehood in the face of overwhelming hostility from its neighbors. But none of these gestures and common interests have managed to deter Putin from improving his relations with Tehran.

Russia is hardly a superpower. Its economy is about the size of Italy’s. Burdened by underdevelopment, racked with corruption, and weakened by a major brain-drain, Russia is an economic basket case. Once-inflated oil prices, which had been preventing the Russian economy from entering a free fall, have since plummeted.

In contrast, the U.S. is a superpower, with the world’s most innovative and vibrant economy and the largest military force. Ties between Israel and the U.S. go beyond common foreign policy interests. They touch on deep, underlying values. Many members of Congress, not just Republicans, have sharply criticized the Iran nuclear negotiations. They are debating legislation this week that could give them power to approve, amend or kill any deal with Tehran. Let’s hope that Russia’s S-300 announcement convinces the still-undecided members of Congress that the Obama administration is in desperate need of congressional oversight."

Ends…

 

OBAMA AND THE S-300 FIASCO: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Steven Horowitz comments on the regional and global ramifications of the Russian decision to sell an advanced missile defense system to Iran.

"Russian President Putin has decided to no longer cooperate with the Obama administration on the Iran nuclear deal. It’s simply not in his interest to do so. After all, if the deal is successful, Iranian oil will flow on the world market and the price will continue to drop. This fact cannot benefit Russia. Neither can an American-Iran entente. Russia needs the U.S. to be hung up over Iran and bogged down in the region. Without a nuclear deal the U.S. will remain stuck in the Middle East, and events in Europe and East Asia will not be able to have Washington’s complete attention. Therefore, Putin has seriously broken the arms embargo on Iran by promising a shipment of ground-to-air missiles (S-300’s) by the end of the year. It’s not just Russia that has broken the sanctions regime; China recently announced a major pipeline project linking Iranian natural gas with Pakistan and India. But it is in Moscow where the real unraveling of the nuclear deal is taking place.

In a matter of two days, Putin has placed serious impediments to Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. First, the Russian foreign ministry announced that it was the American fact sheet on the nuclear framework which was the correct interpretation. This was in direct contradiction to the statement by the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. After a weeklong period without saying a word about the negotiations, Khamenei declared that all sanctions would be lifted as soon as the deal was signed. According to him, this had been agreed upon in Switzerland. Furthermore, he stated unequivocally that the inspection protocol would not include any Iranian military facilities. Both of these conditions are indeed 'deal killers'. President Obama had declared that the inspection protocol would be 'unprecedented' in its scope. But how could inspectors even know where to look for Iranian cheating without a full accounting of previous military research and access to all potential sites?

Next, and within twenty-four hours, Putin initiates the sale of advanced defensive missiles to Iran. The Russian chess master has struck again, and brilliantly. By agreeing with Obama and Kerry on the fact sheet controversy, Putin has placed the onus of any signed agreement on the Ayatollah’s capitulation. Putin knows it is far more likely that the Obama administration would relent on sanctions and inspectors, well before Iran would. And by sending advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, the Russian president not only severely complicates the military option but also emphasizes that any 'snap-back' in the sanction regime will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. So much for Obama’s much daunted Russian cooperation. The U.S. president has been bragging about his six-party nuclear coalition (G-5+1) for years. But world geopolitics have changed dramatically in the last year.

Events in Europe and East Asia have bi-furcated the global scene and made great power coordination far less likely. Once again the Obama foreign policy has been constrained by its myopia. A year ago, the U.S. was foolish to be led around by the French and the Germans over the future of the Ukraine. Obama should have put his foot down over the illegal coup by right-wing extremist groups in Kiev. Instead of pushing the Russians into a corner over further potential NATO-EU expansion, Obama should’ve been the wise leader and warned his European allies that the U.S. would not tolerate such a provocative move. But Obama is not only a poor international leader, he is a terrible negotiator. Because of a failed European foreign policy, Obama has telegraphed his burning desire for some kind of international legacy.

The Middle East has not been Obama’s strong point. He totally failed in Iraq by not supporting Ayad Alawi in the 2010 election. In fact, by throwing U.S. support behind Nouri al Maliki, Obama undid nearly four years of U.S. effort to put Iraq on the track toward a possible pluralistic democratic future. It is only the famed Obama arrogance which refuses to acknowledge the salient facts of the Iraqi election of 2010. In Syria, Obama watched indifferently as democratic forces were mowed down in the streets by Assad and his Iranian advisors. So everyone in the region knew that by cooperating with Iran, first in Iraq and then in Syria, Obama was in search of some kind of 'working relationship' with Tehran. For six-and-a-half years, this American president has totally alienated every ally the U.S. has in the Middle East. With an East Asian policy that hasn’t changed since 1945, not to mention the debacle in Europe, naturally Obama needs some kind of foreign policy legacy.

The Iranians know this better than anyone. So why wouldn’t Iran’s supreme leader hold out for even more U.S. concessions? He’s not a fool. Anyone can see a good thing right before their very eyes. In fact, the whole world has taken a measure of Barack H. Obama and found him to be less than clear on America’s role in the world, and sometimes surprisingly naïve. This has led to one foreign policy disaster after another. He has lost the reset with Russia, squandered his relationship with China over his much-advertised 'pivot to Asia', and completely unnerved all of America’s friends in the Middle East. Now, once again, he has been outmaneuvered by Putin.

So where is all this leading? The simple answer is that there probably won’t be a nuclear deal with Iran, but the negotiations will continue past the June 30th deadline. In other words, at least until the end of this year, the 2013 interim nuclear agreement will remain in place. Obama cannot afford to backslide on sanctions and verification. The Republicans will crucify Hillary Clinton and the Democrats if Obama’s 'unprecedented' inspection regime becomes anything less than that. But by the end of the year, the advanced Russian S-300’s will be in place guarding the Iranian nuclear facilities. This places everyone in quite a quandary. Has Russia decided to live with an Iranian nuclear bomb? Will America? And what will Israel do? Time is running very short.

Obama has gambled everything on a bad nuclear deal with Iran, and now the Ayatollah has decided he needs more. Putin has used the discrepancies in the dueling fact sheets to place Obama in a corner where, in order to extract himself, the young American president would have to agree to further concessions. This he simply cannot do. So in a few short months, and at the height of the American election season, Iran will be a twist of screwdriver away from nuclear weapons. They will also be in possession of the advanced missiles needed to protect their nuclear program from attack. Talk about a lack of U.S. leadership, this turn of events is slowly but surely becoming historic. Instead of a successful foreign policy legacy he could at least point to, Obama appears to be stuck with disaster.

But where does this leave Israel and the region? The nations of the Middle East must decide whether they want to stay on their current path, which is leading to a nuclear arms race sooner rather than later. Or sometime before 2016 do they want to use the offices of the Russian president (and the entire G-5+1) to begin the process of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Only such a zone could persuade President Putin to reinitiate high-level talks with Washington over the future of the Middle East as well as future European security. Certainly the lifting of sanctions against the Russian Federation would become an early element of such an important meeting."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

TURKISH ARMY/KURDISH CLASHES: Mustafa Balbay sums up the implications of the recent clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The conflicting reports and the government’s accusations directed at [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance HDP leader] Selahattin Demirtas have turned the recent clashes between the army and PKK in Agri into something much more complicated. Putting all the contradictions aside, what we can see is the following: The PKK has no intention of laying down its arms at all. A situation where there are no clashes does not mean that its arms have been buried. The AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] is pursuing its policy that is not based on solving the terror problem but on exploiting it. And the HDP does not have the power and is not in a position to control the peace process."

Mehmet Tezkan blames the slow pace of the peace process in centrist Milliyet: "The peace process was so slow that it was clear fingers would pull the trigger one day. The atmosphere created in the [mostly Kurdish] southeast was not sustainable. Frankly, the military has been ignoring the PKK for the past two years, and vice versa. The military held back from operations, and the PKK did not attack military posts. But now they have finally met. This suggests that it is wrong to deal with such issues so slowly."

Hasan Cemal accuses the president of manipulation on the independent internet outlet T24: "If the HDP can pass the 10% electoral threshold, President Erdogan's dream of altering the constitution so as to introduce a full presidential system (which needs at least 330 AKP MPs) will disappear. It appears that in order to prevent the HDP from passing this threshold, he is ready to resort to every kind of 'game' against the HDP.  Perhaps may be more correct to call this not a game, but a trap. But it is a bloody trap that can kick back. Provocation and provocative activities are naturally indivisible parts of the trap. In this respect, Agri is a sample case or a provocation. The trap was set but did not work."

Mumtazer Turkone drives two lessons from the clashes in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "How will this unnecessary show of force benefit the HDP, which will have to ensure that the resort to arms is rapidly forgotten in order to pass the electoral threshold? This is either a reflection of the officiousness of PKK members (who are facing an existential crisis) thinking 'how can we make use of these weapons?’ or that of a hand from inside the PKK that is in charge. While criticizing the government and the Turkish Armed Forces, Demirtas should first answer the question 'what were the 25 armed PKK men doing there?' Two main lessons should be learned for the difficult days ahead from the Agri incident till the June 7th general elections: First, unreasonable violence will lead the AKP to lose votes. Second, democracy is the one and only remedy for PKK terror."

 

POPE’S ARMENIAN GENOCIDE STATEMENT Sami Kohen takes issue with the Pope in Milliyet "The Pope’s attitude will have a negative impact on the notion of inter-religious rapprochement and compromise that he significantly underlined during his visit to Turkey last year. The Pope's words that emphasized Christianity will not be seen as something positive by the Muslim world, as well as create mistrust in Turkey, which can play a role in the inter-religious dialogue. The Pope's attitude might also encourage other countries, institutions and leaders to take a similar stance on the 100th anniversary year [of the 1915 events]."

Nilgun Cerrahoglu accuses the Pope of incitement in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "We see that the Pope is not 'presenting history' but directly playing politics with the 'Armenian genocide' line and determining a 'front in the third world war'. The Pope is not talking about history but about today. As all commentators in Italy agree, the Pope's statements are very harsh and distant from diplomacy, even 'radical'. With this discourse, he is serving the clash of civilizations."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Reformist Arman agrees with the government’s reaction: "The nature of the Saudi regime is such that it has problems with Shiites and the Islamic Republic. Following the sexual assault on two Iranian pilgrims that took place at Jeddah airport, there is no need for Iranians to go to the Umrah hajj. In line with this, the government has made the right decision to suspend trips to Saudi Arabia that is worthy of appreciation."

Reformist E'temad counsels prudence: "Two recent events have impacted the region; the Saudi attack on Yemen and the assault of two Iranian pilgrims by Saudi officers at Jeddah airport. Following these two events, the cyber space filled with various stories that aim at creating outrage against Saudis. The widespread publication of these pro-Shiite and chauvinistic messages that provoke religious and national emotions will escalate regional crises, forcing Iran to react seriously. People, elites and officials should be vigilant and avoid imprudent measures that may cause irreparable consequences." 

Reformist Mardom Salari expects further measures: "Saudi Arabia is a religious capital for world Muslims prior to being a country. However, the Saudi regime has not been able to play its role toward the Muslims of the world properly and has always used this status for political purposes. This has been only condemned until two security officers in Jeddah airport assaulted two Iranian teenage boys. This inhuman conduct led to strong reactions by the Iranian nation. The sources of emulation also reacted and asked for Umrah to be stopped. Iran's government decided to stop Umrah as a first step."

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Javan addresses the negotiating team: "America and the West have prioritized a strategic move to enter military discussions in order to keep open pressures and limit Iran's national and defence power. Due to their colonial nature and need to preserve the pillars of colonialism in the region as well as in order to support their regional partners, the West is not willing to remove all sanctions and is afraid of its serious economic consequences. The enemy's strategy should be foiled and our national interests should be fulfilled with the complete and immediate removal of sanctions in exchange for accepting limitation and transparency of our nuclear programme."

Reformist Arman is upbeat: "Turning the Swiss understanding into an agreement will facilitate the expansion of constructive ties. Iranians will benefit from international cooperation and Iran's regional status will be promoted. Reports that Russia will hand over the S-300 defence systems are also among the achievements of the change in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy."

Conservative Resalat comments on Mogherini’s role: "Mogherini seeks to show that the West has a unified position, but her efforts cannot change the current reality. Instead of justifying internal differences among Western states and portraying it as natural, she needs to play her actual role as the EU foreign policy chief in organizing the positioning of the other side."  

 

YEMEN/SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Khorasan argues that Saudi Arabia is alone in Yemen: "Saudi Arabia believes that it can attract Sunni support by presenting Yemeni developments as a Shiite-Sunni conflict. However, Sunni countries have realized that the conflict in Yemen is not a Shiite-Sunni one. Rather, Saudi Arabia seeks to assert its leadership of Arab nations. The only route available for a possible Saudi military victory is the deployment of ground forces in Yemen. The most likely option for Saudi Arabia is the Egyptian army, but at present the Egyptian army is involved in Sinai. Pakistan and Turkey do not have enough motivation to participate in such operations; there are no joint security pacts that justify that, nor are these countries' national security threatened in Yemen for them to send their armies there. The lack of international legitimacy for such operations is another reason prohibiting other countries from participating." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami expects dire consequences: "Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is Riyadh's worst historical mistake. None of the past or current atrocities of Riyadh can be compared to this adventure. Riyadh must understand that with the continuation of this unequal war, it will be forced to pay a heavy penalty. The intellectuals of the Arab and Muslim world consider it as an irreparable strategic mistake laced with irreversible consequences." 

Hard-line Keyhan presents its version of events: "The aggression by the illegitimate Saudi regime in Yemen and the killing of defenceless women and children is among the most unfortunate developments in the region. Unfortunately, some regional countries have joined in. Saudi Arabia, which does not drink water without the permission of America and the Zionist regime, had a green light from the two. Accompanied with an illusionary 'rented coalition', it is alone in Yemen. Will Saudi Arabia and its rented forces achieve their objectives in Yemen? Will there be a ground attack? The ground attack is more a bluff than reality. The gathering of nine countries around Saudi Arabia is due to the wrong assessments of their rulers. Dollars and substantial bribes stand behind the collaboration of many of these countries." 

Conservative Hemayat contends that Saudi Arabia is politically isolated: "The decision of the Pakistani parliament not to dispatch forces to Yemen has politically isolated Saudi Arabia. Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt and Sudan, who were due to send their forces to assist Saudi Arabia, have reconsidered their plans. This is a big Saudi political failure as it wanted to begin ground attacks. Saudi ground forces cannot enter Yemen without a unified Arab front, which is a military defeat for the regime. These military and political defeats have resulted in the country's political isolation and created disagreements among Saudi princes." 

Moderate Iran believes that conditions in the region are not favourable to Saudi Arabia: "Together with continuing attacks on Yemen, Saudi Arabia is trying to make allies and increase the number of its supporters in the military coalition. The balance of power in the region, the failure to oust Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the rapprochement between the Iraqi and Iranian governments, the increasing power of Houthis in Yemen and more importantly, the recognition of Iran as a nuclear power by the international community are not in favour of Saudi Arabia." 

Reformist Sharq has the answer: "Saudi Arabia's efforts to link the domestic crisis in Yemen with geopolitical rivalries and the escalation of tensions between Tehran and Riyadh have complicated conditions in the region. By expanding its cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey and presenting a comprehensive peace plan for Yemen, Iran can put forward the required alternative to the warmongering efforts of Riyadh and its Arab allies." 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz is certain: "Saudi Arabia insists on conducting a ground military operation as it believes that its coalition is ready to dispatch ground forces to Yemen. Are the Saudis capable of organizing ground military operations? Currently, the Houthis have a major support base comprised of the people, the army and the majority of tribes and groups in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is now facing a united Yemen. It is clear that Saudi Arabia cannot resort to a ground military operation."

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Yemen’s lethal mixture

2-The Brotherhood factor

3-Yarmouk and the right of return

 

1-Yemen’s lethal mixture

 

The precedents of Iraq and Syria have proven that foreign intervention and counter-intervention via stirring confessional, sectarian, and nationalist sentiments can only fan the flames of the conflict of lethal and destructive identities. If the sectarian infighting in Yemen is added to its proliferating tribalism, the country will turn into an explosive and lethal mixture. It seems, in fact, that thanks to the intensity and ferocity of outside intervention, Yemen will soon reserve a front seat in the bloody madness that now stretches from Afghanistan to the heart of the Great Sahara and Somalia--Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

The U.S. is totally convinced that what it and its allies failed to achieve in their wars on Afghanistan and Iraq that enjoyed unprecedented international backing, cannot be achieved by Saudi Arabia with its limited capabilities, and its allies who have their own crises to manage. Egypt and Pakistan are facing political and security crises, and cannot provide the sort of resources that were available to the U.S. and its allies. But despite their resources, the latter failed to win any of their wars. Based on its prior experience, the U.S. realizes that the Saudi military adventure in Yemen will yield more catastrophes than benefits. This is why it has shown no great enthusiasm in supporting this war, and may try to stop it-- Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Let Egypt come up with an initiative for ending the conflict and war in Yemen, and for negotiations with the aim of protecting its citizens, restoring civil peace, and salvaging the nation state via the gateways of accord, partnership, and power-sharing between all the active elements of society. Let Egypt adopt such an initiative and invite all regional and international parties to engage with it positively.  Let it steer clear of further involvement in the current military operations and steer totally clear of any military intervention on the ground. We must not squander this genuine opportunity to help the people of Yemen, and not dissipate the traditional sources of Egypt’s role and authority in Yemen-- ‘Amr Hamzawi in Egyptian Ashurouq

 

There is no hope for Yemen's salvation from either Riyadh or Tehran's interventions, warns a Lebanese commentator. Such interventions will only exacerbate the anarchy and only benefit the extremist terrorist groups in the country. While supporting the Saudi war on Yemen politically and logistically, the U.S. has not expressed any great enthusiasm for it, because Washington’s past experience in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught it that victory is unlikely even for a country with its resources and power, notes another Lebanese commentator. Egypt should steer clear of any ground intervention in Yemen, and come up with an initiative for ending the military confrontation there instead, urges an Egyptian commentator and political figure. Given its history in Yemen and the region, it is best placed to play such a role.

 

‘AERIAL DECISIVENESS’ WILL NOT DETERMINE THE STRUGGLE: "No matter how much it may rage and intensify, the Gulf's 'aerial decisiveness' in Yemen will not determine the fate of the current struggle for power by itself," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

It will not force the Houthis back into their shell in Sa'da. It will not deter [former president] Ali 'Abdullah Saleh from pursuing his favorite hobby of dancing on the heads of snakes.

It will also not provide the appropriate ground for building a parallel and coherent political front that can impose its terms, especially in the absence of a 'cleansed' geographical area that can be used as a launching-pad from which to take off towards other areas. In fact, the logic of escalation and counter-escalation does not open the door to dialogue or lead to the path of negotiation.

The Saudi intervention will not restrain Iranian intervention; on the contrary, it will provide it with justifications to intensify its political, material, and armed support for the Houthis and their allies. Moreover, the ‘heavy caliber’ verbal exchanges between the two sides at the highest level do not point to any intention to calm down the situation or be reasonable.

The precedents of Iraq and Syria have proven that foreign intervention and counter-intervention via stirring confessional, sectarian, and nationalist sentiments can only fan the flames of the conflict of lethal and destructive identities. If the sectarian infighting in Yemen is added to its proliferating tribalism, the country will turn into an explosive and lethal mixture. It seems, in fact, that thanks to the intensity and ferocity of outside intervention, Yemen will soon reserve a front seat in the bloody madness that now stretches from Afghanistan to the heart of the Great Sahara and Somalia.

The prime beneficiaries of the conflict of identities remain terrorism and extremism. Al-Qa'ida is having a feast. ISIS is preparing to compete with its 'mother' [al-Qa’ida] in its 'savagery' in Yemen. And just as these two organizations’ terrorism has provided the justification for the no less violent transgressions on the part of [largely Shiite] the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq and the 'shabbiha' [regime’s thugs] in Syria, we may soon hear of similar practices by 'sister' organizations in Yemen. And that may drag the country towards further violence, anarchy, Afghanization, and Somalization.

As for the identity of the main loser in Yemen, as well as in Syria, Iraq, Libya, or wherever the conflict of identities may settle, it is the notion of all-inclusive, modern, national state.

They claim that this poor country is still 'mired in the Middle Ages' in order to justify their neo-colonialism there. But there is much injustice in this claim. It is true that the tribal forces that are traditional to the bone control the reins of power and the public space, and have denied its people their simplest rights to an honorable life, hurling them into the furnace of futile conflicts and driving them into asking for protection from their tribes or sects, thus flinging the door open to foreign interventions.

But the Yemeni people have a long history of coexistence, peaceful management of their local conflicts, and finding accords and settlements. A majority of Yemenis have, in fact, struggled and sacrificed for change, and they still cling to the idea of a modern national state.

"But such an antidote to what is happening will certainly not come from either Riyadh or Tehran," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

End…

 

OPEN BACKING: "It is no secret that the U.S. has openly backed the war being waged by Saudi Arabia and its allies on Yemen, and that without this public and clear backing, Riyadh would not have succeeded in mobilizing those states who have joined it in its war," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Tuesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But what calls for further discussion is whether the U.S. views this war as its own, and whether it is ready to face all the consequences that may arise from it.

There is no doubt that the U.S. deems its allies' war as its war, as far as interests are concerned. This is because stability in Saudi Arabia and control of Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab Straits by its allies is a vital American interest. In fact, had the Yemen war broken out before the U.S. waged its wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, it would have waged the war on Yemen itself, and Saudi Arabia and its allies' participation in it would have been secondary.

But the U.S., its Western allies, and the NATO countries have hemorrhaged their abilities in numerous wars and have detonated many crises around the world, covering the five continents from the Ukraine in Europe, to Venezuela in the Americas, to Libya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt in Africa, to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in Asia.

In light of the simultaneity of all of these crises and their transformation into wars – some direct and some by proxy – the Western states, headed by the U.S. which has the main interest in the war on Yemen, no longer have any surplus power that allows them to go to war directly. This is why they have confined themselves to providing logistical support and military equipment whose price has been paid by Saudi Arabia in advance and in cash.

But even though it has the main interest in the war on Yemen, the U.S. is not so much in favor of it. This is not only because of absence of any effective means for confronting the rising forces in Yemen, which the Western states describe as an extension of Iranian influence, but also because the U.S. fears the war’s repercussions and the uncertainty of victory in it. This has been reflected in the reports of American research centers and in some of the media, which have described this war as a risky adventure.

The U.S. fears that Saudi Arabia will be defeated. Should this happen, the threat will not be confined to the emergence of a hostile neighboring regime that is separated from it by the sea of blood created by this war that Saudi Arabia and its allies have initiated. The threat may also turn into an open direct and indirect confrontation that could extend into Saudi Arabia itself and threaten its stability. This is something that the U.S. does not want.

Moreover, the U.S. is totally convinced that what it and its allies failed to achieve in their wars on Afghanistan and Iraq that enjoyed unprecedented international backing, cannot be achieved by Saudi Arabia with its limited capabilities, and its allies who have their own crises to manage. Egypt and Pakistan are facing political and security crises, and cannot provide the sort of resources that were available to the U.S. and its allies. But despite their resources the latter failed to win any of their wars.

"Based on its prior experience, the U.S. realizes that the Saudi military adventure in Yemen will yield more catastrophes than benefits. This is why it has shown no great enthusiasm in supporting this war, and may try to stop it," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

BASIC FACTS: “Fact-One: There is no regional and international accord over military intervention in Yemen,” writes ‘Amr Hamzawi in the Egyptian daily Ashurouq.

- Fact-Two: Military intervention will not determine the current struggle for power and will not effectively limit the power of the Houthis and their allies on the ground; nor will it change anything about the military and operational weakness of the forces that are arrayed against them. Nor for that matter will the escalatory logic of such intervention drive the parties to the domestic conflict towards the path of negotiations or convince them of the madness and futility of the wars of all against all.

- Fact-Three: Iran’s intervention in Yemen by financing, arming, and providing political and diplomatic backing for the Shiite Houthis, and the traditional Saudi/Gulf intervention by providing financial support for traditional tribal and Sunni forces opposed to the Houthis, is igniting the conflict and war of lethal identities. These two interventions are implicating Yemen and its internal dialogue in a catastrophic manipulation of sectarian, confessional, and tribal cards.

- Fact-Four: Fanning the flames of the conflict and war of lethal identities in Yemen can only destroy what remains of civil peace and the nation state’s institutions and bodies. If it continues, it will certainly lead to Somali-style dynamics of fragmentation in Yemen.

- Fact-Five: The stereotypical image of Yemen that is being promoted by some [Egyptian] regime circles as well as some of the Gulf and Egyptian media-- according to which Yemeni society is backward and ‘emerged from the darkness of the Middle Ages only a few decades ago,’ with its people overwhelmingly opposed to the very notion of a modern nation state in the total absence of coherent social and political forces that can encourage dialogue and help manage a negotiation process that protects the citizens’ right to life and preserves state and society – that image betrays nothing but ignorance of the true situation of Yemeni society and state. It is a ‘contemporary’ translation by Gulf and Egyptian official and media circles of the stereotypical colonial image of a Yemen that has still not knocked at the gates of modernity.

- Fact-Six: It is true that sectarian, confessional, and tribal forces today control the public space and are implicating Yemen’s citizens, society, and state in the current pointless conflicts and wars. It is true that terrorist groups are intensifying today’s raging bloodshed, savagery, madness, and futility in Yemen. But the various Yemeni forces do not totally lack the ability to calculate rationally or act reasonably. Moreover, these forces as well as all the social and political parties that influence the conditions in Yemen have long histories of cohabitation and peaceful management of their conflicts, as well as successive accords over various forms of power-sharing. And they are also surrounded by a geography that imposes partnership, accord, and power-sharing on them, because unilateral control and hegemony is impossible.

- Fact-Seven: Ever since the 1960s and up till today, the republican decades in Yemen, whether in their ‘North Yemen and South Yemen’ or the ‘unity republic’ formula failed to pass without having a profound social impact on the country. The claim that the majority of the Yemeni people are opposed to the very idea of a nation state and a republic is simply wrong. What is true is that the accumulated failures of the ruling elites have driven Yemen’s citizen – as well as Iraqi, Lebanese, and other citizens – to seek protection from sectarian, confessional, and tribal forces. Some regional powers – Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on the other – have openly encouraged this. But the majority of Yemenis have not totally abandoned the idea of a nation state or a modern republic. And these can be led to defend that idea if an accord is reached on a genuine negotiation and peace track that will end today’s conflicts and wars and save society and the state from collapse and fragmentation.

- Fact-Eight: Egypt is the sole regional party that can adopt and propose a vision for extracting Yemen from its current crisis based on the abovementioned facts and relying on the will to negotiate and work towards a peaceful solution. This stems from our traditional opposition to sectarian, confessional, and tribal conflicts, and may invoke the image of the congruence between Egypt role in the Yemeni people’s collective memory with the ideas of a nation state and modern republic.

Let Egypt come up with an initiative for ending the conflict and war in Yemen, and for negotiation with the aim of protecting its citizens, restoring civil peace, and salvaging the nation state via the gateways of accord, partnership, and power-sharing between all the active elements of society.

Let Egypt adopt such an initiative and invite all regional and international parties to engage with it positively.

Let it steer clear of further involvement in the current military operations and steer totally clear of any military intervention on the ground.

“We must not squander this genuine opportunity to help the people of Yemen, and not dissipate the traditional sources of Egypt’s role and authority in Yemen and its popular acceptance linked to its opposition to any manipulation of sectarian, confessional, and tribal cards, and its advocacy of the idea of a nation state and a modern republic, without submission to any regional or international party,” concludes Hamzawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-The Brotherhood factor

 

As Egypt grapples with the Muslim Brotherhood and the growing terrorist threat in Sinai, the chances that it will intervene in a large-scale manner in Yemen appear remote, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The death sentences passed against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s top echelons may not be unrelated to the rising pace of attacks on the Egyptian army and security forces in Sinai, suggests the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. But this can only complicate any Egyptian participation in the Saudi war in Yemen.

 

NOT UNCONNECTED: "We do not believe that escalating attacks on Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula over the past two days are unconnected to the death sentences confirmed by an Egyptian court on Saturday against 13 Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including the movement's General Guide Mohammad Badi'e, as well life sentences against tens of Brotherhood members and supporters," writes the editorial on Tuesday on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

At the same time, we cannot point at the movement and accuse it of being behind these attacks that were adopted by the Islamic State (ISIS) Sinai Wilayah [Islamic ‘province’] that claimed responsibility for them.

These death sentences confirm that the Egyptian authorities are determined to pursue their policy of seeking a security solution as means of uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood, regardless of the price. And this means that there is no chance for any reconciliation or peaceful political solution for this crisis for the foreseeable future, at least.

According to reports, 13 soldiers were killed and tens of others were wounded in three attacks against security headquarters and checkpoints in northern Sinai. This occurred in tandem with President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's endorsement of a number of changes of the Egyptian army’s top commanders. The most prominent was the appointment of Major General Nasser al-Assi as Commander of the Second Field Army, which is in charge of securing northern Sinai, replacing Major General Mohammad ash-Shahhat, who was appointed as Director of Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance. The latter is the post that President Sissi previously occupied for a long period.

These changes suggest that the Egyptian leadership has acknowledged its failure to destroy the 'jihadi' groups that have been waging attacks on army posts and the security forces throughout the past few years.

What happened in northern Sinai represents a major setback for the Egyptian armed forces, especially since it came after a series of strict measures had been implemented, the most important was that of creating a buffer zone along the border with the Gaza Strip, destroying the tunnels [into Gaza], deploying more security forces and army units and arming them with the most advanced weapons and equipment, and a penalty of over twenty years in prison for anyone building a tunnel.

The escalating pace of attacks by 'jihadis' from the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis organization which has pledged allegiance to ISIS, will make the involvement of Egyptian ground forces in the Yemen war a very risky move, as well an uncalculated gamble.

If Egypt’s army and security forces seem to be unable to control northern Sinai with its largely open and flat terrain, and if they are suffering large-scale losses on almost daily basis, it will be difficult for them to fight in the very difficult mountainous terrain in most Yemeni areas. Like most other Arab armies, the Egyptian army is not trained to fight a guerilla war against rebel or outlaw groups.

President Sissi seems to be facing some very difficult options. Unlike Pakistan and Turkey, he cannot adopt a 'neutral' stance towards the war that his ally, Saudi Arabia, has launched on Yemen because he is heavily dependent on Gulf and Saudi monies. On the other hand, he cannot ignore the views of his military commanders who are opposed to the deployment of any forces outside Egypt, based on an article in the Egyptian constitution that forbids such a move. These commanders prefer to focus all their efforts on the current war in Sinai, and to prepare for the likelihood of another war along the borders with Libya, as well as a possible third war with Ethiopia should the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance [‘Nahda’] Dam on the Blue Nile, the source of over 80% of the Nile's waters, affect Egypt's share.

In light of these complications in the Egyptian military and security scenes, the endorsement of the death sentence issued against the Brotherhood leaders appears to be a hasty move that sends the wrong signal and that will yield the wrong results. It will pour oil on the crisis's fire, one whose main manifestation is deterioration in the security situation.

Such verdicts and sentences add grist to the mill of the Muslim Brotherhood’s hard-line wing, which is pressuring the movement to participate in the violence in a public and open manner, abandoning its 'peaceful' approach and forming a military wing in response.

There are many indications that President Sissi will actually implement the death sentences against the Brotherhood's General Guide and his companions, similar to what the late president Jamal 'Abdul Nasser did when he executed the Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb [in 1966] after the assassination attempt on the president in Alexandria. Qutb's execution was the knockout blow after which the Brotherhood was unable to stand on its two feet again, according to some historians.

But what President Sissi and his advisors who are urging him to take the step of executing Badi'e do not seem to realize is that president Nasser had a very broad popular base and a pan-Arab project whose main banners were to fight Israeli designs and Western colonialism. He was also affiliated to a socialist bloc that provided him with significant armament and political depth.

And, more important than all this, the Arab region was not in the state that it is in today, with its main centers mired in wars of attrition, and turning into either failed or semi-failed states.

"And here, we have in mind Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt itself," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

3-Yarmouk and the right of return

 

The destruction of Yarmouk refugee camp is not only a manifestation of the ongoing conflict in Syria but part of a design to do away with the Palestinian right of return, says Talal ‘Awkal in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

All parties to the Syrian conflict have sought to draw the Palestinians to their side, especially in the case of Yarmouk Camp near Damascus, but only in pursuit of their own interests and with no regard for its inhabitants' wellbeing, maintains a Palestinian commentator. But it is now too late, since the camp is in ruins and its inhabitants have been dispersed to unknown destinations, which may have been certain parties’ intention all along. The end result is to undermine the Palestinians’ right of return.

 

NOT THE FIRST TIME: “We are not exactly sure why such concern about what Yarmouk Camp and its inhabitants (who number today no more than 15 thousand out of its almost 400 thousand original inhabitants of whom 180 thousand were Palestinians) has erupted on such a wide scale,” writes Talal ‘Awkal in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This is not the first time that the camp has been attacked or invaded by ISIS or the Nusra Front or other groups that go by many different names. So why has such concern been aroused by the arrival of ISIS fighters to Lubia Street on the northern edges of the camp, close to the Zahira/Midan area which is considered to be a Damascus neighborhood?

What is certain is that the current tumult does not represent a sudden awakening of conscience or a response to the calls for help that have been issued ceaselessly by the victims, who can find no means of saving their lives either inside the camp or by escaping to the unknown.

The uproar can be heard in the Arab and international media which has never previously shown any interest in the cause of the Palestinian refugees in Syria, except when the voices of international and Palestinian officials rose, and when the camp inhabitants’ howling has mixed with the false howling arising from more than one party.

It is as if what we are witnessing was a farewell and a turning point regarding a cause that once existed because of the presence of strong symbols on the ground, but that is heading today towards an inevitable disappearance whose beginning was drawn by hands that are clear for all those with eyes and reason to see.

Yarmouk Camp is not just a geographical location or a social or economic cause. It is also not a merely humanitarian issue. It is a political issue, and a matter of a right endorsed by international law, a right that the Palestinians have preserved wherever they have headed or settled. That right – the right to return to their homeland land, Palestine – is threatened with being squandered today.

After it was already too late, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees woke up, as did the UN deputy envoy to Syria, the PLO, and others, and began searching for solutions. But the aim was not to salvage the cause, but to seek ways of helping the remaining refugees to secure their departure from the camp, or to deliver relief and food to them if the attempt to remove them from the camp failed.

Discussions have been restricted to the official Syrian side, as if it alone were responsible for what the camp’s inhabitants have been subjected to. But if the matter is confined to the regime, why should it not refrain from protecting the camp’s inhabitants or supplying them with the medicine, food, and water they need until the moment of relief for [all of] Syria arrives?

What this means is that the camp and its inhabitants are being targeted by all parties to the conflict. The opposition is trying to storm the camp so as to position itself on the gateway to the capital Damascus and the closest point to the Presidential Palace, even if this is to be achieved over the corpses of the camp’s inhabitants.

And the regime is trying to drive the Palestinians to attack the opposition and side with the state, forcing the Palestinians to take up arms to secure the camp in the hope that this role would expand, especially since the camp is not that far from Sbeineh Camp which is inhabited by Palestinian refugees, via the areas of Taqaddum, al-Hajar al-Aswad, and other areas where the opposition is ensconced.

Some Palestinian camps responded to the regime’s call early, while others are acting on their own initiative based on their own special vision. But this has been of no use to their inhabitants; nor has it been able to protect the camps. Yet be that as it may, none of this has been necessary as a pretext for the forces that aim to topple the regime to storm the camp; they were going to storm the camp anyway.

The PLO and most of its factions still insist on the policy of keeping the Palestinians ‘neutral’, and refusing to be dragged behind the Syrian regime’s call to take up arms in defense of the camp. This position is correct at the moment, simply because the camp is no longer a camp, and because its Palestinian refugee inhabitants have evacuated it early on and in successive waves.

Therefore, to take up arms today based on the pretext of defending the camp amounts to siding with the regime, since the camp is already in ruins and is a war zone almost devoid of any human life.

But this position, which is correct today, was not correct yesterday when the camp was buzzing with life, full of people, and in need of the protection that only the Palestinians could have provided. After all, there is no party in Syria that is that concerned about the refugees’ remaining in their camps; each party has sought to win them over to its side for its own interests, and has been willing to let its people suffer the worst and pay the price for conflicts that they have nothing whatsoever to do with.

Today, we wonder about the point of a policy of neutrality regarding the Palestinian presence in the camp despite the density of that presence, and despite the fact that the camp was an active part of Syrian society. Despite their modest size, other Palestinian groupings have always constituted active ingredients in their host societies. And the tangible results of that miserable policy speak for themselves, a policy that intentionally or otherwise serves the schemes of certain Palestinian leaders to disperse the refugees as a means of undermining the very foundation of their right of return.

After the policies of resettling the Palestinians in more than one area have failed, the colonial powers that are moved by Zionist fingers had no alternative but to resort to surgery, and to do so in the appropriate historical conditions that the entire Arab region is undergoing.

Regret or lamentations are futile today. The Palestinians are not tempted by the calls to intervene to protect the camp so that its inhabitants may return to it. These inhabitants are no longer present in any specific and known location. The conflict continues without any horizon.

“The real question today is this: Will the PLO and the Palestinian factions repeat this miserable policy when it is the turn of some three-hundred-thousand Palestinians living miserable lives in Lebanon’s camps?” asks ‘Awkal in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 14.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Enter Russia

 

Israeli newspapers lead their Tuesday editions with news that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Monday lifting a ban on the delivery of S-300 anti-missile rocket systems to Iran. Russia said that it cancelled a contract to deliver the missile system to Iran in 2010, under pressure from the West following UN sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear weapons program. However, it said, now that the six world powers and Tehran have reached an interim deal on curbing Iran's nuclear work, it is lifting the ban.

The advanced missiles would make it much more difficult to strike targets in Iran from the air. The S-300 is a long range surface-to-air missile – manufactured by the Russian firm Almaz – designed to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles, and its most advanced models can also target ballistic missiles.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov defended the decision, saying that the S-300 system does not pose a threat to Israel. He said that the S-300 is an air defense missile system, which is of a purely defensive nature. It is not designed for attacks and 'will not put at risk the security of any state in the region, including Israel,' he stressed. Lavrov was quoted by Russia Today as saying that the embargo on the S-300 deliveries was no longer necessary, due to the progress in Iran’s nuclear talks made in Lausanne on April 2. In the talks in Switzerland, the sides have made 'substantial progress in resolving the Iranian nuclear program,' Lavrov said, adding, 'The political framework of the final deal agreed upon was highly praised by the international community. We believe that at this stage there is no longer need for this kind of embargo - from the Russian side it was unilateral and voluntary,' he added.

Israel was quick to denounce the Russian decision. In a statement, Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz said: 'This is a direct result of the legitimacy that Iran is receiving from the nuclear deal that is being prepared, and proof that the Iranian economic growth which follows the lifting of sanctions will be exploited by Iran for arming itself, and not for the welfare of the Iranian people. At a time when Iran denies clause after clause of the agreement declared last week, the international community has already begun easing its sanctions,' he added. 'Instead of demanding that Iran desist from the terrorist activity that it is carrying out in the Middle East and throughout the world, it is being allowed to arm itself with advanced weapons that will only increase its aggression,' Steinitz concluded.

In other Iran-related news, all the papers report that U.S. Jewish leaders met Monday at the White House with U.S. President Barack Obama, who urged them to accept the framework deal with Iran. Wendy Sherman, the head of the U.S. negotiating team in talks with Iran, has told Israeli journalists that the sides can reach a good deal by the June 30 deadline, and that it will be better than the 'alternative.' She said that the U.S. plans to consult with Israel over Jerusalem's security needs, to which, she said Washington is committed. Sherman, who serves as U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the fourth-ranking official in the State Department, said that Israel has the right to be concerned, but that the deal that was reached is the only way to stop an Iranian bomb, arguing that a military strike would be able only to push the program back by a few years at most.

In other news, another attempt to smuggle military materiel to the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing has been thwarted, according to Army Radio. A delivery from the West Bank was found to contain thousands of electrodes, apparently destined for militant groups. Authorities say that it's the third smuggling attempt uncovered in a week and a half. In the two previous attempts, engines and electronic components are said to have been found. Over the past four months, more than 100 smuggling attempts to the Gaza Strip have been thwarted.

In other security news, the Shin Bet revealed Tuesday that a military cell of the Hamas organization that had been planning an attack during this past Purim holiday was uncovered in recent weeks. Members of the cell were arrested at the beginning of the month in a joint operation between the Shin Bet, the IDF and the Israel Police. During the investigation weapons in the cell's possession were seized including a gun, a Kalashnikov rifle, and 40 rounds of ammo. An indictment will be filed against the cell members in the coming days in Judea's military court.

On the domestic political front, there are reports in all the papers that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is leaning towards a unity government with the Zionist Union. A Likud source told Haaretz that Netanyahu told him that he does not reject the idea of a unity government with Zionist Union. 'Netanyahu understands the importance of a centrist coalition, both domestically and abroad,' the senior figure said. Nevertheless, since the election Netanyahu has consistently denied he would form a coalition with Zionist Union head Isaac Herzog.

Meanwhile, Zionist Union sources claim that senior Labor faction officials, led by Herzog, have spoken with President Reuven Rivlin about joining a Netanyahu-led government. As far as is known, Rivlin is not dealing with the matter, having decided to avoid getting involved in political processes. Herzog denied having the discussion with Rivlin.

According to a report on Channel 1, Netanyahu and Herzog met several days ago outside the framework of the routine briefings between the premier and the head of the opposition. According to the report, even their close associates and aides didn’t know about the meeting.

Speaking on Army Radio on Tuesday morning, Likud minister Gilad Erdan said that if the right-wing camp can't be brought into line with the elections results, Likud would not hesitate to extend a generous offer to Herzog. 'Every day that the parties of the national camp refuse to make compromises leaves the prime minister closer to having no choice but to make a generous offer to the Zionist Union,' Erdan said.

Finally, Marco Rubio, a 43-year-old Cuban-American Florida Republican senator, announced Monday evening that he would be seeking his party's nomination for the 2016 presidential election. In his announcement speech, he vowed to bring America back to its world leadership role, and accused America's current leaders of forgetting that 'when America fails to lead, global chaos inevitably follows.'

'They appease our enemies, they betray our allies, and they weaken our military,' he said. The time has come, he added to the sound of wild cheering, 'for our generation to lead the way to a new American century.' He was more specific about foreign policy issues later in his speech when he said it was time for the U.S. to once again accept 'the mantle of global leadership' by abandoning 'dangerous concessions to Iran and its hostility to Israel.'

 

 

RICOCHETS: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman comments on the Russian announcement that it is lifting the ban on the sale of the S-300 missile defense system to Iran, saying that the decision is related to both the nuclear talks and the situation in Yemen.

"If Iran was already in possession of operational S-300 missiles and if Israel were to decide to launch a military strike against its nuclear facilities tomorrow morning, things would look very different. The obstacles that the Israeli air force would face would be much higher than they were when it took part in Operation Opera, in which Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak.

But, for the time being, the Iranians don't have the S-300 system and it seems that it will take two or three years before they do. But Israel, which refrained from attacking the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities in the past 10 years, when doing so was a much more viable option, is highly unlikely to decide to do so in the foreseeable future. This would seem to indicate that all those who have been warning about an imminent Israeli military strike can relax. However, reality is more complicated than that. We are in the middle of an ever-intensifying international crisis and we are starting to feel the ricochets.

First and foremost, this is a political issue, which proves once and for all that the regime of sanctions against Iran has collapsed. Even before an agreement has been reached between the Islamic Republic and the six world powers, the Russians have given the Obama Administration and its allies a resounding slap in the face. The announcement from the Kremlin was made at the same time as a high-ranking Iranian military delegation – headed by Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the chairman of the Iranian parliament's Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security and Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council – was visiting Moscow. This is further proof that the Iranians and the Russians have a long-term plan for closer relations and for a resumption of military cooperation – including arms sales.

If that is not enough, Moscow has said that the timing of the announcement is related to events in Yemen, where the Russians have sided with Iran and the Houthi militia and are engaged in a policy that sees them come up against the United States. Russia believes that the conflict in Yemen will lead to a direct clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia and that the Saudis will themselves attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Therefore, they decided to give the ayatollahs one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world. As far as the U.S. 5th Fleet is concerned, the possibility that Iran will have S-300 missiles and that the Saudis will be involved in an air battle is a far more concrete threat to American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf than it is to Israel.

So, while Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is busy trying to rock the boat in Washington and has barely managed to make any waves, the Russians come along and remind us that we and the Americans are basically in the same boat; when that boat takes on water, we get wet first because we are lower in the hierarchy. So maybe this is the time to stop rocking the boat and start talking seriously to the captain.

It seems that the Iranians will not take delivery of the S-300 any time soon, since the model that they ordered and which was adapted to suit their operational needs was dismantled in 2011. The Russian manufacturer no longer makes that model and its production lines have been altered to handle the more advanced S-400 model. The Russians are, in fact, planning on decommissioning the S-300 systems that their military still uses and to give them to Iran. The Russians, meanwhile, will start to use the S-400. The problem is that the S-400 production line is slow and it will take time before the requisite quantity is ready. It is also possible that the Iranians already have the Chinese-made version of the S-300.

In operational terms, the S-300 is an advanced defense system, which operates at distances and altitudes that the Israeli air force has not yet had to deal with. It is safe to assume that as far back as 2005, when the deal for Russia to sell the S-300 to Iran and Syria was being discussed, Israel started to think technologically and strategically how best to deal with this new threat. However, until such time as the S-300 is operational in Iran and its weak spots have been discovered, we can expect surprises.

Until now, Iranian airspace has been protected up to a relatively short distance – between 20 and 30 kilometers. The S-300 model that is now being offered to Tehran, however, increases that range to 150 kilometers. If it is to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, the Israeli air force will have to be able to locate and neutralize the missile's radar and to develop a special plan of action. That takes time and money – but the technological and professional issues can always be resolved. Israel's problem – as in so many other areas – is one of leadership."

Ends…

 

FOUR CONCLUSIONS: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman comments on the Russian decision to sell its S-300 missile defense system to Iran, saying that the sale makes it even harder for Israel to carry out a military strike on the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities.

"One again, Israel (and the United States, for that matter), was taken by surprise by Russia's decision to sell the advanced S-300 missile defense system to Iran. Following intense American pressure and some heart-felt persuasion from Jerusalem, but mainly for its own reasons, Russia decided several years ago to freeze its decision to sell the system to the Islamic Republic. Now the government of Vladimir Putin has announced, against the backdrop of the nuclear deal that Iran is working on with the six world powers; that it has decided to unfreeze the system and finalize the deal. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was at pains to stress that the S-300 is a missile defense system.

There are four main conclusions that we can draw from the Russia decision:

1-The united international front against Iran is now very much cracked.

2-It will be much harder for the air forces of Israel and/or the United States to launch military action against Iran's nuclear facilities once it has taken possession of the S-300. It might even be impossible. Of course, it was already close to impossible for the Israeli air force, which does not possess any stealth bombers.

3-Russia is not willing to lose Iran as its asset in the Middle East.

4-Despite its conciliatory policy toward Russia, Israel's influence over Moscow's foreign policy is almost completely negligible.

When it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, one of the main achievements of the international community, under the leadership of the United States, was to create an international consensus that included Russia and China. Even though those two countries had very different interests – interests that sometimes contradicted the interests of the U.S. and the European Union – they have [admittedly begrudgingly] agreed over the course of the past decade to be part of the regime of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council and by the West. This was achieved in no small part thanks to the policies of the United States, which fought tooth and nail for a consensual policy regarding the Islamic Republic. Without such a policy, the crippling sanctions that Israel demanded and which brought the Iranians crawling to the negotiating table (even though a final deal is yet to be signed) would not have been imposed. But now it seems that Russia has once again decided to adopt an independent policy on the Iranian issue.

The Russian decision was taken, in part, because Moscow fears that once a final-status agreement is signed, relations between Washington and Tehran will also start to improve. There are already signs of common interests between the U.S. and Iran – such as the joint struggle against ISIS. Russia will do everything in its power to make sure that Iran remains within its sphere of influence and one of its main trading partners. There are some massive deals in the pipeline, with at least $20 billion in oil, cereals and more.

In this respect, it seems that despite Israel's best efforts – efforts that were spearheaded by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and which included several trips by him and by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to Moscow to discuss the issue with Putin – one thing is clear: when it comes to arming Iran and when it comes to Russia's vital national interests, Israel doesn't even figure in its considerations.

Finally – and this may be the most important thing from an Israeli perspective – the chances of Israeli military action against Iran, which were minimal beforehand, will be even slimmer once Iran takes delivery of the S-300 and its airspace is better defended than before. The S-300 is one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world; its highly advanced radar is capable of intercepting any kind of aircraft or missile, including cruise missiles, up to a distance of 300 kilometers. The Israeli air force would still be able to launch an attack, but the risk level and the danger of aircraft being downed will be much higher from now on. The United States presumably has the ability to bypass and perhaps even neutralize the S-300 system and, as such, is capable of launching a far more effective strike than Israel could. Whether it will or not is still very much the great unanswered question."

Ends…

 

TAXING QUESTIONS: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein says that a recent recommendation by Israeli and Palestinian economists to reform the Paris Protocol on the economic relations between Jerusalem and Ramallah is unlikely to be met with enthusiasm by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's government.

"Israeli and Palestinian economists from the Aix Group – the Joint Palestinian-Israeli-International Economic Working Group – recently recommended deploying Palestinian tax officials alongside their Israeli counterparts at Israeli border crossings, such as the Haifa and Ashdod ports and the bridges over the Jordan River, as well as at the crossings into Palestinian-controlled areas. The Palestinian officials would oversee tax collection on goods and produce being transported into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which would prevent Israel from delaying the transfer of tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority.

In accordance with the Oslo Accords, Israel currently collects tax revenue on behalf of the PA and transfers these monies every month to Ramallah; there is no Palestinian involvement or oversight at all.

This recommendation takes on special importance in light of the Palestinians' refusal last week to accept the tax revenue that was frozen by Israel for three months as punishment for the Palestinians' approach to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The Palestinian refused to accept the money because Israel announced that it was deducting the Palestinian Authority's debts to Israeli companies – mainly the Israel electric Corp. and water supplier Mekorot. The Palestinians argue that Israel must transfer the full sum that was collected – some $100 million a month – since, according to the Oslo Accords, the money belongs to the PA. These funds make up the lion's share of the Palestinian budget and allow Ramallah to pay the salaries of some 150,000 civil servants, including healthcare workers and teachers. This month, the PA paid its employees just 60 percent of their salaries and was only able to do so thanks to the generosity of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinians claim that the debts to Israeli companies are commercial, not political, and that as such they should be discussed separately.

The Aix Group economists want to make alterations to the Oslo Accords, claiming that the economic reality in the Palestinian territories is far from the vision of prosperity that the sides hoped for 20 years ago. The Oslo Accords were designed for a period of five years, during which time the Palestinians were supposed to build viable economic systems with the help of international investment. One of the economists pointed out at their meeting that the Palestinians still do not have any independent economic infrastructure, such as border crossings, sea and air ports, energy and water sources, modern public transportation systems and so on. The Palestinian economy is currently suffering from a massive trade deficit and from limited exports; they are utterly dependent on outside sources, mainly Israel.

It is doubtful whether the Israeli government will accept the Aix Group's recommendation to allow Palestinian tax inspectors at the border crossings, since sovereignty over borders is one of the key elements in any country's independence; any Palestinian presence at Israeli border terminals would be seen as an erosion of Israeli sovereignty."

Ends…

 

CRACKS IN THE COALITION: Writing on the News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem explains why there are cracks appearing in the Sunni coalition that is conducting Decisive Storm against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

"Last week, Iranian Supreme leader Ali Khamenei launched a blistering attack on Saudi Arabia in wake of the military campaign that Riyadh is conducting against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Khamenei predicted that the Saudis would be defeated in their battles, saying that, 'the Saudi offensive is like the Zionists' crimes in Gaza; they will lose and they will eat crow.' He also called on Saudi Arabia to 'stop committing its crimes in Yemen' and denied that his country was involved in events there.

Khamenei went on to say that the Saudi decision was rash. 'Saudi policy has always been characterized by calm and respect,' he said, 'but a few inexperienced youths have taken control of the decision-making process and are carrying out barbarous acts.' He was referring, it seems, to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and to Defense Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

It has been almost three weeks since Saudi Arabia, which is leading a coalition of 10 Sunni nations, launched Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. At this stage, the operation is limited to massive airstrikes against rebel strongholds; it remains unclear how long the operation will last and whether it will include a ground incursion into Yemenite territory.

The operation has not yet achieved its goals; there is no significant change on the ground in military terms and it has failed to get the rebel forces and forces loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh round the negotiating table. It appears that some members of the coalition are unwilling to cross the line into a ground operation. In the background, there is intense diplomatic activity to find a political solution to the crisis and to forestall a ground incursion.

The four main Sunni countries that object to turning Operation Decisive Storm into a ground operation are Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. They all have their own reasons.

The Pakistani parliament approved a resolution last week to maintain neutrality in the Yemen conflict. At the same time, the resolution stipulated that 'Pakistan will stand by Saudi Arabia in the face of any threat or violation of its territorial integrity.' Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan and close personal friend of the Saudi monarch, visited Turkey a few days ago for consultations. He decided not to send his troops to participate in any ground operation in Yemen. Sharif is worried about possible disturbances back home, where 20 percent of Pakistani soldiers are Shiites. The Pakistani parliament's decision is a slap in the face for Saudi Arabia, which bankrolled the lion's share of the Pakistani nuclear program and which has given generous aid packages to Islamabad over the years.

When Operation Decisive Storm was launched, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was highly critical of Iran. Later, however, he toned down his comments and even headed a large economic delegation to Tehran and met with President Hassan Rowhani and with Khamenei. Erdogan wants to enjoy the best of both worlds and it seems that he is putting his country's economic interests – including a new $30 billion trade deal with Iran – ahead of conflict with the Islamic Republic. It is also possible that he hopes Turkey will be able to play the role of honest broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Immediately after the start of the operation in Yemen, Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi sent warships to Bab al-Mandeb to ensure safe passage to the Suez Canal. He declared that, 'the security of Bab al-Mandeb is as important as the security of Egypt.' Egyptian planes are also taking part in the bombing raids against rebel forces, but Sissi is hesitant to send troops to Yemen to fight on the ground against the Houthis. Like many Egyptians, he still has bitter memories of Egypt's last military involvement in Yemen, in 1962, when 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed in battles there. The Egyptian army is, in any case, preoccupied by its antiterrorism operations against ISIS in the Sinai and in guarding the long border between Egypt and Libya.

It seems that relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia have cooled of late, for several reasons: the Saudis' top priority is to halt the spread of Iranian influence, especially in Yemen, which is seen as the Saudis' back yard, while Egypt believes that priority should be given to fighting against radical Sunni Islam – especially the Muslim Brotherhood, which Cairo has declared a terrorist entity. Another reason for the cooling of relations is the fact that Saudi Arabia has tightened its ties with Turkey and Qatar, both of which support the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan has even said that closer relations between Cairo and Ankara depend on ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Mursi – a Muslim Brotherhood leader – being freed from jail and the death sentence that was issued against him overturned.

Finally; Jordan. Several members of the Jordanian parliament have reportedly said that King Abdullah opposes a ground operation against the Houthi rebels. Last weekend, he told lawmakers that, 'Jordan identifies with Saudi Arabia, but the solution to the crisis in Yemen must be diplomatic and via negotiations.' Jordan is worried that a coalition ground operation in Yemen could run into trouble and would divert Sunni countries' attention away from the war against jihadi forces and ISIS."

Ends…

 

AN OBSTACLE – BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE: Writing in Haaretz, Amos Harel says that the Israel Air Force believes any Iranian missile defense system can eventually be breached with the appropriate investment of thought and resources.

"Russia’s announcement that it was lifting the ban on supplying the S-300 missile system to Iran demonstrates the major improvement in Tehran’s status less than two weeks after the framework deal on its nuclear program was finalized in Lausanne.

The final agreement is only meant to be signed in two-and-a-half months and international sanctions have not been lifted, but the Iranians are already starting to enjoy the fruits of these understandings. Russia’s interpretation is that although the restrictions against supplying weapons to Iran are still in effect, they do not apply in this instance because the surface-to-air missiles are defensive weapons.

Russia has been toying with this deal for nearly a decade, as part of the complex balance of power it maintains with the West. In the past, it submitted to U.S. and Israeli pressure and suspended its supply of the missiles. However, the deal would resurface from time to time as a bargaining chip when relations with the United States were at a nadir – as is the case now over the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.

Former Israeli ambassador to Russia Zvi Magen described the announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a dramatic decision that poses a challenge to the West. He stated that increased Russian activism in the Middle East is meant to compensate for Putin’s failure to place a wedge between Ukraine and the West, even as it helps Moscow reestablish close ties with Tehran.

For many years Russia was the primary mediator between Iran and the West, until the Iranians decided to negotiate a nuclear deal directly with the Americans. This new development is certainly not bringing any joy to U.S. President Barack Obama, who is already under attack domestically and abroad over the many holes in the framework deal – especially given the two sides’ differing interpretations of the understandings already reached in Switzerland.

From Israel’s perspective, this deal is a disturbing development. On Monday, it still wasn’t clear whether Russia was planning on giving Iran the older version of the S-300 missiles or the latest, more effective version. Either way, it would constitute a real leap in Iran’s ability to provide air defense to its nuclear installations. While an air attack on these nuclear sites no longer seems like a realistic option given the framework agreement, Israel isn’t interested in having Iran add another layer to its defenses. Since Israel must ready itself for a scenario under which Iran violates the agreement and succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, this is an obstacle to be reckoned with.

Still, it is not an insurmountable obstacle. The Israel Air Force believes any defense can eventually be breached with the appropriate investment of thought and resources. Syria possesses relatively advanced surface-to-air missile systems; yet foreign media reports say Israel has breached its air defenses time after time. Nevertheless, the proliferation of advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the region will require the air force to make finding ways of dealing with them a very high priority."

Ends…

 

THE REAL ISSUE IS IRAN’S INTENT: Devin Sper argues in The Times of Israel that the problem in John Kerry’s negotiations with Iran is the total focus on technical considerations at the expense of dealing with Iran’s intentions.

“The fatal flaw in Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent agreement with Iran is that it focuses entirely on technical details, and not at all on the Islamic Republic’s intentions. This critical omission will cause the agreement to fail, just like so many similar treaties before it.

The most obvious example is the infamous 1938 Munich pact with Hitler, when British Foreign Minister Neville Chamberlain declared that he had achieved “peace in our time.” Chamberlain had concentrated on the modalities of granting Germany part of Czechoslovakia, while ignoring the larger context of Hitler’s open plans for continued expansion. Within one year Hitler violated the pact, launching WWII and leading to the deaths of 60 million people.

An example with even clearer parallels to the Iranian nuclear agreement is the 1994 “Agreed Framework” between the United States and North Korea. The Clinton administration focused on the diplomatic details of the agreement rather than questioning why an impoverished, starving nation was requesting aid in the form of nuclear plants. In return for U.S. assistance, including the construction of two modern nuclear power plants, North Korea pledged to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In 2003, however, that nation demanded additional U.S. concessions. When these weren’t forthcoming, North Korea simply withdrew from the agreement and expelled the nuclear inspectors. On October 9, 2006 North Korea successfully tested its first nuclear weapon.

Similarly, on January 15, 1973 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed the Paris Peace Accords with North Vietnam. Once again, a technical agreement covered subjects such as troop withdrawal and ceasefire dates without guaranteeing a change in Communist North Vietnam’s decades-long goal to conquer the South. Just two years later, the country fell to the North.

Soon after signing the Paris Peace accords, Henry Kissinger flew to Israel and began what then Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan described as ‘brutal pressure’ on Israel to hand over part of Sinai to Egypt, which had just attacked and tried to destroy the Jewish state. Far from being chastised by the collapse of his Paris Peace Accords, Kissinger continued to pressure Israel into making concessions to a recalcitrant Palestinian enemy bent on her destruction, ultimately leading to the disastrous Oslo accords. Three months after signing the first Oslo agreement, Palestinian leader Arafat began his campaign of suicide bombings against Israel. Not one of the diplomats involved, foreign or Israeli called for the Palestinians to be held to account or reexamined the premises underlying the agreement.

Like the diplomats who negotiated with Hitler, North Korea and North Vietnam, Kerry focuses on technicalities and ignores the opponent’s clearly stated intentions. Iran certainly makes no secret of its desire to destroy both the United States and Israel. In February, in the midst of the negotiations, Iran celebrated the 35th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution with posters and crowds declaring “death to America,” “death to Obama,” and “death to Kerry.” A few weeks later, Iranian TV broadcast an attack on a mock American aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. Just two days before the nuclear framework agreement with Iran was concluded, Iranian Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi asserted that “erasing Israel off the map” is “nonnegotiable.”

Kerry treats Iran as a respectable negotiating partner while she invades her neighbors, sponsors terrorism and threatens genocide against the Jews of Israel. Iran is plainly demonstrating her violent intentions, yet President Obama labels as “fundamentally misguided” Prime Minister Netanyahu’s call to link Iran’s actions to the nuclear talks. If Iran’s aggressive intentions are not the issue underlying the nuclear talks, what is?

Recent statements by Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei confirm that Iran is interested only in sanctions relief and intends to ignore her obligations under the agreement. A treaty which Iran openly plans to violate is worthless as there is no transcendent law or authority capable of enforcing an international treaty between sovereign states. The proposed agreement will not prevent Iran’s now legitimized nuclear program from producing a bomb. The type, number, and location of centrifuges allowed to Iran are irrelevant: what matters is their intended use and Iran’s ultimate goal.”

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

ARMY/KURDISH CLASHES: Oral Calislar cautions against any move away from peace in centre-left Radikal: "We have to look into what happened in Agri [eastern Turkish province] carefully and objectively. We have to understand the reality, and accept the fact that those who want to ruin peace should not be tolerated, no matter who they may be. Moreover, it is important to refrain from escalating and expanding the clashes. The election atmosphere and the issue of the 10% electoral threshold are contributing to the current political tension. Preventing clashes and keeping Turkey on track towards resolving the Kurdish problem are our top priority. We must not ignore the fact that this is a fundamental part of the democracy project."

Tunca Belgin highlights the importance of the Kurdish vote in centrist Milliyet: "The extent to which the AKP [ruling Justice and Development Party] will lose votes, and the ability of the [pro-Kurdish Leftist Alliance] HDP to overcome the 10% electoral threshold lie at the heart of the debate over the June general elections. In fact, it would be more correct to say that everything is linked to the HDP's situation, because this has a direct impact on the AKP's chances of success. If the HDP enters parliament as a third party, all the balances will be overturned. This is why the support of Kurdish voters, especially in Istanbul and Izmir, is very important."

Orhan Bursali charges the government with manipulating the clashes in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "There is a need for 'clashes' today. This government is ready to use whatever means appropriate to reach its goals. Since the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] has not taken any action recently, the government sent in the troops. The AKP is uncomfortable with the fact that the HDP is almost certain to enter parliament. With the HDP in parliament, this will increase its chances of playing the 'Kurdish card', thus reinforcing its bargaining position against Erdogan's presidential constitution."

 

POPE’S ARMENIAN GENOCIDE STATEMENT:  Murat Yetkin warns of the Armenians’ likely exploitation of the Pope's ‘Armenian genocide’ statement in centre-left Radikal: "For Pope Francis to use the word 'genocide' while commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 1915 Armenian deportation catastrophe in his April 12th Sunday service is not an insignificant development. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan's main goal is to get U.S. President Barack Obama to say the word 'genocide' not in Armenian but in English, so as to make the U.S. an official party to this issue, thus making it possible to add compensation claims to the agenda."

Ibrahim Kiras sees a Turkish failure in centrist Vatan: "The Pope's statement about the 1915 incidents was expected as it has been preceded by a number of recent clues. But, sadly, Turkey did not have the power and diplomatic means to prevent such a move. Besides, the timing for mentioning this issue is very unfortunate. Unfortunately, the 100th anniversary of 1915 has not coincided with a period in which Europe and the U.S. hold us in high esteem."

Murat Bardakci has some harsh things to day about the Pope in centre-right HaberTurk: "For many years, I have been saying that we should not take seriously other countries' parliaments, international organizations and Vatican describing the 1915 incidents as 'genocide'. This is why I do not care about what the Pope said yesterday. But for me, the surprising aspect of this issue is Pope Francis' confidence, that is to say, his readiness to scold us while ignoring so many mistakes in his own country. May the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit forgive Francis and improve his memory!"

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Reformist Sharq reassures: "The main winners of the Lausanne talks were the Iranian people who have always prioritized dignity and have patiently tolerated the outcomes of that choice. Lausanne was the result of choosing moderation. Selecting an experienced diplomat with no background of radicalism led to the desired outcome. The critics of the government should not describe this victory as their failure. Getting out of the current deadlock benefits all Iranians." 

Conservative Quds abhors the old Western discourse: "The Lausanne statement is a test of how much the West, in particular the U.S., is committed to talks with Iran. After the statement, influential Americans returned to their imperialistic approach and once again adopted a domineering discourse towards the Islamic Republic. The acceptance of some restrictions based on necessity, should not hamper our development in technology and science. Research and development should not be only limited to the Fordow facility, but should extend to academia."

Conservative Khorasan favours arbitration: "The Geneva Joint Plan of Action can be vulnerable in three cases. First, when a consensus against Iran develops because of a change in international equations; the West can then violate its commitments unilaterally with any excuses. Second, when, even without cohesion in the West, a member country takes unilateral and illegal measures against Iran. The French can be the first in this regard. Third, when Iran, regardless of its behaviour, becomes a scapegoat in other conflicts of big powers, who could try to use it to promote their policies on other issues. Russian/American disputes are a clear example. Creating a court of judges may be effective in this regard, but some in the West are against such steps." 

Hard-line Javan dampens expectations: "American foreign policy is based on pragmatism and seeks only U.S. interests. We cannot confront such a policy by relying on international law and mechanisms. Power only knows the language of power and our negotiating team should benefit from this language. Moreover, relying on the U.S. could pave the way for a great failure. There is no need for the Iranian government to promise society a final nuclear agreement, because a good agreement seems unlikely with the Americans. People should be aware of the details of the talks, in order to lift false optimism and be able to make the correct judgment about the negotiations." 

Hard-line Keyhan speaks of surrender: "A political current, which is not unknown, insists and encourages the people and the regime to surrender to America. It propagates the illusion that a bright future, including economic progress depends on giving in to the wishes of the U.S. and its allies! This current advises that we have no choice but to appease and abandon nuclear technology. In response to the question why we should accept this humiliation in front of our bloodthirsty and plundering enemies, they say that this acquiescence and acceding to the wishes of the U.S. and its allies is akin to the drinking of poison that Imam Khomeini referred to when accepting Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq war and that there is no other option!" 

Conservative Resalat rejects Western media claims: "The abuse of Western media outlets is not only restricted to the nuclear negotiations; it also exists in other international issues and will certainly continue to exist in the future. On the first days of the Lausanne talks, the Associated Press claimed that Iran has agreed to send its enriched nuclear materials out of the country. The claims were distorted from the very beginning and their adoption by the U.S. Department of State and other Western officials are worth considering." 

 

YEMEN: Reformist E'temad laments the passing of the Arab conscience: "Nothing better describes the dominance of corrupt and anti-democratic states than the poor situation of Yemen and its treatment by neighbouring countries. If Saudi Arabia spent the expenses of assaulting Yemen and killing its people on helping the people of Yemen, it would not be in the present situation. Saudi Arabia and its allies have targeted one of the poorest states of the Arab world. By resorting to false claims, they are trying to show off their power in the region, while the Arab conscience that used to react against such events, has long been silenced."

Reformist Arman comments: "Saudi Arabia is outraged that Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was not overthrown and that trust is being built between Iran and the U.S.; so it decides to take revenge on poor Yemen. America, which feels indebted to Saudi Arabia because of Syria and the Iranian nuclear case, has submissively remained silent in the face of Saudi aggression; it supports Saudi military operations like it supports military operations of the Zionist regime in Palestine. Domestic issues and the support of regimes cannot be governed by military deals, because in that case, all dictators would sign military deals with foreign countries to protect themselves." 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami predicts: "The Saudi regime, as the executor of Western plans in the region, continues its crimes against the Yemeni people by bombing residential areas, economic infrastructure and forming a Takfiri/Salafi coalition. This paves the way for barbarism, the breaking of the law, extremism and terrorism. The godfathers of terrorism will definitely not benefit from the ominous game of fire and strife in the region. As they failed to achieve their objectives in Syria and Iraq, in Yemen too, which is famous for its hard working, tenacious and invincible people, they will not succeed. This time they have inflamed the fire of terrorism in a place that will also affect them." 

 

IRAQ/U.S.: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz spins: "Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi is due to visit Washington. He and an accompanying economic and political delegation will meet senior American officials and President Obama. What is the goal of this visit? Today, the most important issue that Iraq faces is terrorism. It has been almost a year that terrorist groups have occupied some parts of Iraq, and committed crimes and killings. Al-Abadi's visit to Washington can be regarded as a complaint against the wrong and benefit-seeking policies of America on this matter."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

United Front

 

Israeli newspapers have different lead stories in their Monday editions. Israel Hayom – almost inevitably – leads with Iran. Just as inevitably, its lead headline is a quote from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In a televised statement from Jerusalem Netanyahu insisted that, 'We must not allow Iran, the foremost sponsor of global terrorism, to have an easy path to nuclear weapons that will threaten the entire world.'

Netanyahu was responding to comments by U.S. President Barack Obama, who spoke about the Iranian deal during a lengthy press conference in Panama City. Israel, Obama said, had a history of oppositional behavior toward a diplomatic solution with regard to Tehran’s nuclear program. 'Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,' Obama told reporters.

In a clear dig at Israel, Obama said Israel initially had opposed the interim deal, but now wants it to remain in place. He spoke in general about Iran during the news conference, but when referencing opponents of the deal, he immediately named Israel. Netanyahu, he said, is opposed to the framework agreement even though he has not presented an alternative. 'I have repeatedly asked: What is the alternative that you [Netanyahu] present that you think makes it less likely for Iran to get a nuclear weapon? And I have yet to obtain a good answer on that,' Obama stated.

Netanyahu provided an answer in Sunday’s public statement by insisting that continued sanctions might lead to a deal that would help safeguard the region and the world from Iranian aggression. He focused on two points that could transform the deal into a positive accord. 'First, instead of allowing Iran to preserve and develop its nuclear capabilities, a better deal would significantly roll back these capabilities – for example, by shutting down the illicit underground facilities that Iran concealed for years from the international community,' Netanyahu said. He added that he took issue with the automatic lifting of restrictions on centrifuges after a decade, as well as the ability for Iran to enrich uranium after 15 years. 'Instead of lifting the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear facilities and program at a fixed date' the prime minister stated, 'a better deal would link the lifting of these restrictions to an end of Iran’s aggression in the region, its worldwide terrorism and its threats to annihilate Israel.'

In other Iran-related news, the Internet news sites carry a report from the Wall Street Journal that claims that U.S. officials have revealed Iranian efforts to smuggle surface-to-air missiles to the Houthi militia in Yemen, to aid Iranian attempts to conquer the country and stave off a Saudi-led airstrike campaign. One of the senior U.S. defense officials quoted in the Wall Street Journal on Sunday said of Iran's efforts to supply surface-to-air missiles: 'we are looking. We know they are trying to do it.'

Ynet reports, meanwhile, that Zionist Union leaders Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni laid out their Iranian policy on Sunday and called for a 'comprehensive, intimate and in-depth strategic discussion with the U.S.' on nuclear talks between world powers and Iran, saying all issues on the table must be clarified with Washington before a final agreement is signed with Tehran. In a position paper released Sunday, the Zionist Union's leaders demand the United States to 'give legitimization ahead of time to any action Israel will need to take to protect its safety'. The party, which came in second in Israel's elections, is expected to head the opposition in the next government. Thus the document, published exclusively by Ynet, can be said to be the first clear articulation of an Israeli alternative to the deal reached with Iran.

Haaretz leads with the ongoing coalition negotiations and a report that Habayit Hayehudi will demand the right to veto any legislation on state and religious issues in exchange for joining a Netanyahu-led government. In related news, Israel Radio reports that the coalition negotiations between Likud and the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party have reached the final stages. The agreement is to include a clause guaranteeing a cancellation of the criminal sanctions in the Enlistment Law, which was led by Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi in the last coalition and sought to force ultra-Orthodox men to enlist in the IDF. Netanyahu is already planning on asking President Reuven Rivlin for a 14-day extension of the mandate to form a government, according to a report in Maariv.

Finally, Yedioth Ahronoth leads its Monday edition with Hillary Clinton's announcement that she will seek the Democratic Party nomination for the 2016 presidential election.

 

 

NETANYAHU'S CHOICES: Writing in Maariv, Ben Caspit says that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has chosen the path of confrontation with the United States and, in so doing, has undermined his justified criticism of the Iranian nuclear deal.

"The argument between the Obama Administration and Israel is a clash between two worldviews. In the long term, only history will determine who was right: Obama, who decided to pursue a diplomatic solution and recognized that it was better to earn 13-15 years of quiet on the Iranian front, rather than drag the world into a war, or Netanyahu, who says that we cannot believe a single word the Iranians say and that we need to stand up to Tehran with all our might.

Naturally, we side with Netanyahu. That's nothing new. When it comes to Iran and its intentions, there has always been consensus in Israel. Herzog, Yadlin, Dagan and Livni all agree with Netanyahu, Bennett, Lieberman and Ya'alon. They all understand the dangers. Iran is an extremist country; it is determined, it supports terror and it spreads war. It makes no secret of its desire to wipe Israel off the map. It is patently clear that Iran wants military nuclear capabilities and it is willing to do whatever it takes to get them. It has now adopted a policy of inching toward its goal while conducting negotiations with the West and perhaps even after a final-status agreement has been signed. In the end, if it really wants a nuclear bomb, it will get one. Nothing, not even an American military attack, can prevent it – as long as Iran's leaders believe that nuclear weapons are vital for the regime's survival. The trick is to convince the ayatollahs that obtaining nuclear weapons will not contribute to their survival and may even be their downfall.

The real argument I have with Netanyahu is not over the substance of his spat with the White House, but how he is conducting it. Instead of going all out against the Iranian nuclear program, Netanyahu decided to go all out against U.S. President Barack Obama. He went with the least good option. He could have been true to his word and dealt with Iranian nuclear threat alone. After all, the capabilities that Israel has purchased cost billions of shekels. Netanyahu declared that he would use them if there was no alternative. Now, surely, there is no alternative. Netanyahu had a golden opportunity, but he hesitated, he prevaricated and he was afraid – of what would happen to him personally. The two alternatives that Netanyahu had were to get closer to Obama and to try and influence him from within, or to fight Obama tooth and nail. He opted for the second path. That was irresponsible of him and in the end we will all pay for his rashness. In fact, we are already paying.

I am not entirely convinced that the decision was Netanyahu's alone. It is very possible that someone or something pushed him into declaring an all-out war on the leader of the free world and the biggest global superpower – which also just happens to bankroll our defense establishment, provides us with everything we need and gives us political backing on the international stage, from our policy of nuclear ambiguity to anti-Israeli resolutions in the UN Security Council.

Now we are at war with the United States. Israel freely admits as much. The accusations of spying that were leveled against Israel may be rather ridiculous, but we shouldn't forget that we started it. The battle was taken up a notch when Netanyahu joined the Republican effort to unseat Obama in 2012. That was unprecedented and we can only hope it never happens again. Netanyahu gambled and lost. Instead of cutting his losses and leaving the casino, however, he doubled down – as if he knew something that the rest of us didn't.

It's true that the Obama Administration is naïve and that the president's Middle East policy has not taken off – but anyone who thinks that the next president will be any better is making a bitter mistake. The next U.S. president will also be a liberal Democrat and will have been elected to extricate the United States from its various quagmires – not drag it deeper into the mud. At the same time, the next president will continue to invest heavily in Israel's security and will provide us with the kind of aid we have never enjoyed in the past.

Now that the negotiations are about to enter their final stage, Netanyahu is continuing his contrarian, hawkish and strong-arm assault on the president. Let's assume for a moment that Netanyahu is successful and that Congress manages to nix the deal. The chances of that happening are close to zero, but, for the sake of argument, let's say it happens. Does anyone really believe that, the very next day, Obama will give the order to bomb Iran? Does anyone think that the UN will not lift sanctions immediately, quickly to be followed by China, Russia and the European Union?

It has been said before, but it bears repeating: Israel would need the United States even if Iran did not exist. Our alliance with the United States is a strategic asset. Over the past two years, that asset has been damaged. Netanyahu is not even willing to make the smallest gesture of goodwill, which could go some way to fixing the damage he has done and could reopen the door to the White House before him: replacing his confrontational, Republican, Adelson-backed ambassador in Washington. But he refuses to do even that. So instead of war with Iran, we are now dueling with Obama and the United States. Does anyone really think we can win?"

Ends…

 

BETWEEN LAUSANNE AND MUNICH: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Elyakim Haetzni says that – like the Nazis – the only way to show radical Islamists that they are on the wrong path is through the use of force.

"U.S. President Barack Obama's conciliatory approach to Iran is very much in keeping with the spirit of the age in American society, which is utterly fed up with failed overseas wars. The diplomatic approach, as opposed to the militaristic approach, tries to think like the enemy and to satisfy its more legitimate desires.

When Obama was elected president, he removed a bust of Winston Churchill – a gift from Great Britain – from the Oval Office and sent it back to London. As the son of a Kenyan father, Obama was taking his revenge for the brutal repression of the Mau Mau Uprising by the British prime minister. Obama sees the world through the eyes of disadvantaged Third World countries and he includes Arab countries in that group – even though the Arabs were among the biggest participants in the slave trade.

According to Obama, the Iranian people share their leaders' aspirations to obtain a nuclear weapon. If Iran is allowed to do so and, thanks to the lifting of sanctions, becomes a wealthy society, a generation free of fanaticism will emerge – and the nuclear bomb in its possession will no longer threaten global security. In contrast, war would lead to a resumption of the very cycle of violence that Americans are so tired off; therefore, Obama believes, a diplomatic path must be found to answer the Iranians' desire for international respect, while safeguarding global security. This approach is what led to the Lausanne agreement.

The same principles guided British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when he met with Hitler and signed the Munich Agreement in 1938. Just two decades after the end of the Great War – the war to end all wars – the spirit of the time was pacifism. Germany was not alone in thinking that the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, did it an injustice; that view was shared by Britain and France, especially among those countries' intellectuals. Germany's argument that a major European country was being kept in poverty and starvation conditions was generally accepted on the continent; any act of aggression by Germany was viewed as a 'conflict' – and conflicts, after all, are resolved via diplomacy.

Chamberlain also saw the Czechoslovakian crisis as a conflict, the core of which was the legitimate demand of the Germans in the Sudetenland to be reunified with Germany – despite the fact that they had never actually been part of the fatherland. Chamberlain refused to see German tactics for what they were – an excuse to swallow up Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, for world domination. One of the participants in the negotiations, Count Ciano – Benito Mussolini's son-in-law – described in his journal how pleased the German and Italian dictators were with Chamberlain's response to the agreement. Years later, when London was burning, Chamberlain was heard to say that, if only Hitler had lived up to his end of the deal, everything would have been just fine.

Obama had plenty of opportunities to block the deal with Iran. He deliberately did not do so. Now he claims that there is no alternative. This is exactly the same as how the international community turned a blind eye to the illegal rearmament of Germany under Hitler, to his invasion of the Rhineland and to the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in March 1938. Restraint did not thwart Hitler; it merely increased his appetite. Before signing the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain also asked, 'What alternative is there?'

Is there still a chance of a diplomatic solution? The short answer is no. Only the use of force – which will entail terrible loss of human life – can save the world. A few years ago, Charles Krauthammer – one of the greatest political commentators of his generation – gave a succinct explanation. According to Nazi ideology, he wrote, German world domination was a sure thing, since they are the pure race. In order to restore some kind of sanity to their thinking, the international community needed to show Germans that their ideology will not lead to victory; they needed to be physically broken. Islamists, too, are convinced that their believers will conquer the world. And there's only one way to convince them otherwise."

Ends…

 

ALL CARROT AND NO STICK: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Avraham Ben-Zvi says that the Obama Doctrine is toothless since it does not contain any kind of effective threat against Iran.

“Despite the thick fog of uncertainty still surrounding the agreement between Iran and the six world powers, White House officials and their supporters in the media were quick to praise the deal, which they describe as the ultimate expression of a brand new political doctrine – the Obama Doctrine. With the signing of this agreement – which is highly unlikely to form the basis of a permanent agreement with the Islamic Republic – Obama joined the ranks of Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and George W. Bush, all of whom left a very real mark on their country's future thanks to the strategies they pursued and which now bear their names.

While the doctrines espoused by previous American presidents sent out a message to a powerful enemy – a message of determination, resolve and a willingness to use military force if necessary – the 'doctrine' of the current incumbent lacks any signs of power or force. It is a toothless doctrine which may suit the worldview of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, but it is utterly disconnected from international circumstances, where friction and division exist – especially in the Middle East.

President Barack Obama's effort to adopt for himself the logic of the Roosevelt Doctrine from the early 20th century sounds pathetic and grotesque. A great president, Theodore Roosevelt advocated a policy of 'speaking softly but carrying a big stick' – in other words, on the international stage he insisted on dialogue and conciliation, but he was not afraid to carry a stick in terms of deterrence and, when necessary, retribution. Under the current president, however, the United States is, indeed, speaking softly, but it seems to have forgotten about the stick. His dialogue with the ayatollahs is remarkably conciliatory and moderate, but the threat of the stick, which Roosevelt saw as a key part of his arsenal and which was designed to ensure that friendly rhetoric was not interpreted by the other side as weakness, has become, under Obama, nothing more than a symbolic and tiny twig.

The key concept in the comprehensive interview that Obama gave to his most loyal lackey in the media, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, was the idea of joining forces with and lending a helping hand to the Iranian regime. So, by means of a whole series of gestures and confidence-building measures (the most important of which is the gradual lifting of economic sanctions as the Lausanne agreement goes into effect), the White House hopes to overcome the barriers of suspicion and resentment that Iran feels toward the West. Obama hopes to put Tehran on the path of political moderation. While the president is at pains to insist that his toolbox still contains more forceful options, and that no option – including the military option – has been removed from the table, what credibility can such talk have after Obama scandalously refrained from using military force during the chemical weapons crisis with Syria in late 2012 and given the fact that his administration is currently slashing defense spending?

Given the proven eagerness of the Obama Administration to reach an agreement with Tehran at almost any price – and to market that deal as the jewel in the crown of the president’s foreign policy and as a key part of his legacy – there appears to be very little chance that he will unsheathe his sword even if it becomes totally clear that Iran's sole goal is to pull the wool over the eyes of the international community and the next president of the United States. It is little wonder, therefore, that, in light of the huge concessions to Iran that the Lausanne Document contains, Obama's efforts to sell the agreement to the American people are running into difficulties. In addition, the United States' traditional allies – primarily Israel – are also expressing their reservations about the agreement.

The renewed efforts by Congress to bypass the president on the issue of sanctions are a true reflection of the mood; dissent over the Iranian nuclear deal is no longer contained to within the ranks of the Republican Party. It is not inconceivable that the challenge to an agreement which is the very heart and soul of the toothless Obama Doctrine will lead to the Iranian nuclear deal collapsing; alternatively, it will force Obama to reach into his toolbox and take out something that is a genuine deterrence, to be used alongside the package of incentives which he has relied on this far.

If Obama were to present a stick in his dealings with the Islamic Republic, he would go a long way to answering his own question about what alternative Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu suggests to the Lausanne Agreement. The alternative is to go back in time and learn the lesson of the Roosevelt Doctrine.

Ends…

 

SAVE AMERICA FROM CAPITULATION: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan urges Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu not to give up on his struggle against the Iranian nuclear deal, saying that U.S. President Barack Obama is trying to achieve peace at any price.

"I am not yet in a position to make up my own mind about the Iranian nuclear deal. I do not think that anyone can. We simply don't have enough information. But we can form a solid opinion about the behavior of U.S. President Barack Obama and about the fact that the Iranians have managed to force him to back down from all of the positions he took at the start of the negotiation process. The lesson and the message that this sends out is just as important as a nuclear bomb itself. In fact, it is a time bomb that is just waiting to blow up.

The Iranians proved to the world that, with stubbornness and determination, the leader of the most powerful nation can be forced to compromise on an issue as central as world security. This is the view not only of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, but of experts in the field from across the globe – including the United States. Obama’s withdrawal from the positions that he originally said were critical is a fact, not an opinion. Even the president himself does not deny this. He just claims that there is no better alternative.

Obama's argument cannot be accepted at face value, because it is subjective. It stems, first and foremost, from the character and path of the president, whose overriding goal is to avoid conflict. Even if he would not define it as such, Obama's policy is one of 'peace at any price.' I find this rather odd. Obama, after all, is an intelligent man. Does he not realize that there's no such thing? Is it not clear to him that 'peace at any price' always ends with a costly conflict? Especially when one is dealing with a country like Iran, for which peace means only the victory of Islam over the infidels – in the West and everywhere in the world? Does Obama not understand that, for the Iranians, a deal over its nuclear program is merely a tactical step toward the ultimate goal that it has set itself, in the name of its religion and its prophet?

Instead of dealing with the Iranians, Obama spends his time rebuffing our prime minister. At a press conference in Panama City yesterday, Obama said that he has 'repeatedly asked [Netanyahu] – what is the alternative that you present that you think makes it less likely for Iran to get a nuclear weapon? And I have yet to obtain a good answer on that.' Is this his justification for entering into a bad deal with Iran? Is this his excuse for lifting sanctions? Why should Netanyahu have to provide an alternative? Isn't Obama the leader of the free world? Doesn't he have enough advisers and experts?

In order to reassure Israel, Obama said over the weekend that 'we've got your back.' What exactly does that entail? Clearly, the U.S. would come to Israel's aid. But, if past experience with Obama is any indication, that assistance would be little more than endless negotiations, following by total capitulation, in an effort to achieve 'peace at any price.' In the end, Israel will pay the price, of course. Netanyahu, therefore, must not let up the pressure. It wouldn't hurt if Isaac Herzog were also to play a role in this struggle. Not necessarily to nix the deal, but to save the United States and the international community from capitulation that would be a precedent for the future. Regimes like Iran are eagerly waiting to see how it all ends."

Ends…

 

STOPPING IRAN’S BOMB, DESPITE OBAMA’S MISTAKES: Writing in Haaretz, Moshe Arens says that it’s time for the winners and losers of Israel's election to give unqualified support to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in trying to keep Tehran from reaching its goal.

"U.S. President Barack Obama admitted in an interview last week that upon expiration of the deal with Tehran, Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon would be 'almost down to zero.' The presumed guarantee that this breakout time is not reached earlier, or possibly much earlier, is the verification mechanism called for in the deal.

But who trusts the Iranians? They are serial prevaricators who continue to claim that their vast nuclear project envisions only peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that nuclear weapons are the furthest things from their minds. Obama has been so eager to close this deal that ballistic missiles the Iranians developed to deliver nuclear bombs have been left off the agenda of the negotiations.

Nor for that matter, were the Iranians asked to document their nuclear activities to date so they could serve as a baseline for verification of their future activities. Iran’s record of support for terrorism, from Buenos Aires to Iraq and Yemen, and its arming of Hezbollah and Hamas were ignored. The use of the money that will flow to Iran if the sanctions are lifted can easily be surmised.

When Israel suggested that Iranian recognition of Israel be made part of the agreement, Obama called it a 'misjudgment.' Nothing should be allowed to ruffle the Iranians’ feathers. This deal, even if it is a very bad deal, must be signed. The alternative according to Obama is war — not increasing the economic pressure on Iran to cease its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, the kind of pressure that brought them to the negotiating table in the first place, but war. Obama wants to sign this deal no matter what.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will go down in history as the man who sounded the wake-up call for the entire world about the danger of the Iranian project to attain a nuclear weapons capability. He will be remembered as the man responsible for the sanctions that got Iran to agree to enter negotiations. For a while he was a lone voice in the wilderness before his message began to be heeded by many.

In Israel there was much skepticism. Some said they were tired of hearing him talking about the danger of Iran instead of the cost of living and the price of housing. And during the election campaign no blows against Netanyahu were spared. He was accused of endangering Israel by ruining the relationship with Israel’s ally the United States.

Self-appointed experts on America claimed he was rupturing the bipartisan support that Israel had traditionally enjoyed in Congress — that Israel would suffer immeasurable damage during the rest of Obama’s term. And to top it off we were told that since he had set the goal of keeping Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and did not attain that goal, he was a failure. It took the support for his position in the United States to still these voices. The support came not only from Republicans but also from Democrats — Americans who understood that the proposed deal was not only a danger to Israel but also to the United States and the entire world.

Last week Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, two highly respected former secretaries of state, criticized the framework agreement with Iran in a joint op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. 'Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of UN resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head,' they wrote.

The time has come for all Israelis, both the winners and losers of last month’s election, to give unqualified support to Netanyahu’s leadership in trying to keep Iran from reaching the bomb. The danger is no fiction — it is real. Despite the framework agreement and Obama’s resolve to sign a final agreement, it may still be possible to stop the Iranian bomb. A great deal depends on Israel. Maybe it’s not too late."

Ends…

 

REQUIEM FOR AMBIGUITY: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Louis René Beres says that the mere pretense of Iranian compliance with newly codified nuclear curtailment norms will place corollary pressures upon Israel to join the NPT, or a regional nuclear weapons free zone.

"Somehow, although it has yet to be mentioned, there is a plainly foreseeable connection between the just-completed nuclear agreement with Iran, and Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Inevitably, the mere pretense of Iranian compliance with newly codified nuclear curtailment norms will place corollary pressures upon Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or a regional nuclear weapons free zone. This is the case, moreover, even if Israel’s bomb would remain benignly in the 'basement,' that is, undeclared and unthreatening. In world politics, some truths are unassailable.

Without its nuclear weapons and doctrine, Israel could effectively become complicit in its own disappearance. More precisely, should Israel ever be compelled to accept its own de-nuclearization; that country – less than half the size of America’s Lake Michigan – might as well consent publicly to incremental dismemberment. Indeed, even if pertinent enemy states, Arab countries as well as Iran, were to remain non-nuclear themselves, these irremediable foes would still be in an enhanced position to finally defeat Israel.

In global strategy, as Clausewitz, the famous Prussian strategist, understood long before the Atomic Age, there can come a time of reckoning when 'mass counts.' In the Middle East, lest we forget, only Israel’s enemies have mass. Over the years, a number of Arab states and Iran, themselves still non-nuclear, have called disingenuously for Israel’s membership in the NPT, and for a 'nuclear weapon free zone.' Looking ahead, even if these viscerally sectarian and fragmenting states were willing to comply with any formal legal expectations of such a zone – a remarkably optimistic presumption – their more-or-less combined conventional, chemical and biological capabilities could still overwhelm Israel.

Might diplomacy help to correct any such imbalance? In principle, it would seem, expanded Israeli vulnerability might still be countered by instituting certain parallel forms of non-nuclear disarmament among the Arab states and Iran. In reality, however, any such coinciding and reciprocal steps would never be undertaken.

U.S. President Barack Obama, who calls passionately for a world 'free of nuclear weapons,' fails to realize that rhythmically stirring oratory is not always enough. In fact, for the region as a whole, nuclear weapons are not the problem per se. Rather, in the Middle East, the core issue remains a far-reaching and unreconstructed Arab/Iranian commitment to excise Israel from the map. The only primal issue here concerns a blatantly extinctive Islamic cartography.

Oddly, perhaps, Palestinian and Iranian maps reveal wholly unhidden plans for genocide against 'the Jews.' In both cases, religiously, at least, these openly contemplated crimes against humanity stem conspicuously from assorted sacred eschatologies of 'sacrifice' and 'martyrdom.' Here, too, the exterminatory doctrines stem equally from Sunni and Shi’ite sources.

With its nuclear weapons, even while still deliberately ambiguous, or 'in the basement,' Israel can deter unconventional attacks, and also most large conventional ones. While in possession of such weapons, Israel could also launch certain cost-effective non-nuclear preemptive strikes against any enemy state’s hard military targets that might threaten Israel’s annihilation. Without these nuclear weapons, any such expressions of 'anticipatory self-defense' could likely represent the onset of a much wider and asymmetrically destructive (to Israel) war.

The rationale for this argument is readily identifiable. In essence, without nuclear backup, there would no longer exist any compelling threat of an Israeli counter-retaliation. It follows, contrary to the U.S. president’s misplaced preferences for global nuclear disarmament, that Israel’s nuclear weapons represent a vitally important instrument of regional peace, and, correspondingly, a needed impediment to regional nuclear war.

Always, strategy requires nuance. In his blanket proposal for 'a world without nuclear weapons,' however, President Obama has been thinking without any differentiation or subtlety. To survive into the future, the international community will have to make various critical nuclear distinctions between individual states and national nuclear deterrence postures. In the special case of Israel, it will soon need to be acknowledged, nuclear weapons are potentially all that can prevent a grievously destructive and genocidal war. Significantly, the residual national right to threaten or even use nuclear weapons in order to survive is enshrined jurisprudentially at the 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, by the UN’s International Court of Justice.

Neither the president of the United States nor the UN Security Council can assure Israel’s survival amid growing regional chaos. In the specific matter of nuclear weapons, moreover, not all countries are created equal. For Israel, legitimately, these weapons represent the ultimate barrier to suffering violent extinction. They are, for Israel, and also for the wider system of civilized states, a latent blessing, not a curse.

Under international law, war and genocide are not mutually exclusive. Living in a world without Israeli nuclear weapons, Israel’s principal enemies could quickly drive the Jewish state into oblivion. Such expressly genocidal action could seem altogether reasonable and rational for the perpetrators. This is because, individually or collaboratively, these aggressor states could now inflict distinctly mortal harms upon a theologically despised foe, without incurring intolerable harms themselves.

For the moment, following the unwitting legitimization of Iranian nuclearization via patently futile diplomacy, Israel has the most to fear from Tehran. To be sure, if Iran’s religious leadership should ever choose to abandon the usual premises of rational behavior in world politics – that is, to risk national destruction in a presumptive exchange for purifying the Dar al-Islam, the World of Islam – even Jerusalem’s nuclear posture could fail. Nonetheless, even if Iran could sometime become a nuclear suicide-bomber writ large, Israel’s only rational strategy, moving forward, must be 1) to hold on firmly to its nuclear armaments, and, as soon as Iran crosses the operational nuclear threshold, 2) to move determinedly beyond 'deliberate ambiguity,' toward carefully selected forms of nuclear disclosure.

International law is not a suicide pact. Long before atomic weapons, Cicero had already understood: 'The safety of the people shall be the highest law.' For Israel, living uneasily in plausible expectation of renewed global pressures to renounce its nuclear weapons and posture, resisting such illegitimate pressures will remain indispensable."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Time for politics

2-Interconnected conflicts

3-Like a phoenix from the ashes

 

1-Time for politics

 

There is no doubt that the aim behind the war in Yemen is to haemorrhage the Arab capitals by driving them into a confrontation with Iran alone…It is certain that our region is witnessing the final ‘games’ in a bloody ‘World Cup’ from which no one will emerge with a genuine victory – not Iran, not Turkey, and not the Arabs. For this reason, the shortest way to ending the haemorrhage and avoiding the impending catastrophes is to ‘turn on’ the engines of politics and give priority to the logic of dialogue, reason, and wisdom over the evil demons that promise victory or revenge, but want to turn back the wheels of time-- Hussein ar-Rawashda in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Certain voices inside Pakistan’s leadership do not believe that Iran poses a threat to Saudi Arabia. They believe that the Houthis are a constituent of the Yemeni people and that any disagreements should be resolved via internal dialogue without any foreign intervention. They also believe that by waging this war, Saudi Arabia seeks to influence other ongoing crises such as Syria and Iraq, and is motivated by its competition with Egypt over leadership of the Arab region. Pakistan and its interests are in conflict with the Saudi vision in this regard. In addition, Iran can provide alternative supplies of oil and gas should Saudi Arabia resort to punishing Pakistan for its refusal to take part in its war in Yemen--Hani Habib in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

It is relatively easy to start a war; but it is much more important to know how to manage and end it – that is to say, how to emerge from it with the greatest gain and least loss. This is a lesson that the Arab members of the coalition should be aware of when dealing with the Yemeni situation. For this economically exhausted country that is suffering from chronic anarchy cannot withstand a new and long war of attrition. States do not go to war as a luxury or merely to seek revenge. War is intensive politics, and therefore one of its tools. In other words, the only reason to go to war is to achieve political aims. Therefore, the time for politics has arrived in Yemen--Bassem at-Tuweissi in Jordanianal-Ghad

 

 

Pakistan and Turkey’s reluctance to deploy ground forces to take part in the Saudi war on Yemen, may end the danger of a civil war in that country and a regional Sunni/Shiite war and pave the way to a political agreement in Yemen and between Saudi Arabia and Iran, maintains a Jordanian commentator. The Pakistani parliament’s decision not to take part in the Saudi war waged on Yemen will have one very important consequence: It will render a ground offensive unlikely, especially since Riyadh is unwilling to rely on Egyptian forces, which would give Cairo a prominent role in the region, argues a Palestinian commentator. The Saudi-led Arab coalition that has declared war in Yemen should realize that any war is fought for political objectives, cautions a Jordanian commentator. Therefore, in addition, to adopting measures to address the humanitarian situation, the coalition should remember to deploy political tools to deal with the Yemeni conflict.

 

TOTALLY CLEAR: “If we were to add the Pakistani parliament’s unanimous decision to adopt a neutral stance towards the war in Yemen to [Turkish President] Erdogan’s position that he declared from Tehran, the picture would seem totally clear,” writes Hussein ar-Rawashda in Monday’s Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

This is that the confrontation raging in Yemen – and perhaps later in those capitals that Iranian influence has reached – has now been confined to two fronts: The first front includes Iran, together with its allies in the region. The second front is that of the Arab Gulf states (with the exception of the Sultanate of Oman, along with a few other Arab states that have joined Operation Decisive Storm.)

This means that the war will be primarily an Arab/Iranian one. Moreover, it will not be a religious but a political conflict. Furthermore, the map of regional alliances, which some expected to be formed along confessional (Sunni/Shiite) lines, is falling into place, now that the two largest Sunni states – Turkey and Pakistan – have withdrawn from it.

It is possible to understand what has happened within two main contexts:

- The first is domestic, stemming from Ankara and Islamabad’s national interests, both in terms of each capital’s view of the potential course of the ongoing conflicts and wars in the Arab centers of civilization, and in terms of their fear of clashing with Iran and all the losses they would suffer if they were to side with the Arab axis. These would not only be economic losses– particularly in Turkey’s case which has just signed six agreements with Tehran – but political losses as well – as the two states are fearful of an Iranian role in stirring up minority issues inside them, namely the Shiites [in Iraq] and Alevis [in Turkey].

- The other context has to do with foreign calculations, especially after the nuclear agreement and reconciliation between Tehran and the great powers. Here, the two states’ interests – Turkey and Pakistan’s –intersect with the fruit of that reconciliation in light of the importance of their relations with the U.S. and the European states.

Parallel to that, the Arab side seems to have been particularly shocked by the Pakistani message. As a result, the former’s reactions are likely to take one of two directions:

- First, going to the furthest limit against Iran by persisting with Operation Decisive Storm with the object of weakening the Houthis and driving them to sit at the negotiating table. We may even witness changes in the war reaching the point of a ground confrontation that proceeds along with the search for political solutions via Omani mediation, and for an international umbrella via securing a UN Security Council resolution. I believe that this option will lead the entire region towards an uncalculated Arab/Iranian confrontation that everyone will pay the cost for without any gain.

- The second potential track would be to ‘exploit’ Turkish/Pakistani neutrality so as to open a channel with Iran with the aim of reaching an understanding with the Houthis and emerging with an accord that puts an end to the war. The key to such an accord is to remove deposed president [Hadi] from power and form a presidential council to manage the transitional phase. Should that occur, Operation Decisive Storm would have shifted from the war zone to that of ‘construction’ with the aim of contributing to saving Yemen and building new relations with its neighbors.

The two steps backwards taken by Pakistan and Turkey’s contribute to stemming the fear of an Islamic confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites. This may pull the rug from under the feet of those who want this war to be a religious, not a political one. But the [Gulf] Arab states’ sense that their allies have let them down and left them to confront Iran alone will deepen the rift within the Sunni framework. It will send a message to Tehran that the conflict between it and the Arab states is confined to the limits of their influence, and that it will not spill over these limits and, moreover, that others will not intervene in that war. The result is that resolving that conflict will require an Arab/Iranian accord, which could give Tehran a green light to impose its terms, or perhaps extend its influence and regional intervention.

There is no doubt that the aim behind the war in Yemen is to haemorrhage the Arab capitals by driving them into a confrontation with Iran alone. In light of the result of this confrontation, the time will come when the ‘winners’ will put their cards in order. These ‘winners’ will include Turkey.

Although I do not know whether the game is now obvious to all parties involved, it is certain that our region is witnessing the final ‘games’ in a bloody ‘World Cup’ from which no one will emerge with a genuine victory – not Iran, not Turkey, and not the Arabs.

“For this reason, the shortest way to ending the haemorrhage and avoiding the impending catastrophes is to ‘turn on’ the engines of politics and give priority to the logic of dialogue, reason, and wisdom over the evil demons that promise victory or revenge, but want to turn back the wheels of time,’ concludes Rawashda.

End…

 

FIVE LONG DAYS: “For five long days, the Saudi capital Riyadh awaited the important decision that the Pakistani parliament was supposed to reach regarding participation in the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen,” writes Hani Habib in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

Saudi Arabia requested this participation, but Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif, who took note of the divergent views in his country over this issue, deferred to parliament to make the right decision. This was a clear attempt to evade responsibility for deciding on a matter that is rife with risks on his own. And the Pakistani parliament’s decision, which was taken unanimously, was to remain neutral and to turn down the Saudi request. This dashed Riyadh’s hopes, given the decision’s political and military/security repercussions.

Ever since the ‘Decisive Storm’ coalition was put together before the [March 2015] Sharm el-Sheikh Arab summit, Saudi Arabia has sought to avoid the impression that this was an ‘Arab force’, by asking Turkey and Pakistan to take part. Moreover, in its effort to confront the Iranian/Shiite expansion, Riyadh tried to bestow a sectarian/confessional dimension on the confrontation, presenting it as a case of Sunnis confronting Shiites.

In addition, and although Saudi Arabia has accepted Egypt’s proposal to form a Joint Arab Force, it has tried to replace it in practice with another primarily made up of Arab armies force, which had dimensions that extended beyond this core. For if a Joint Arab Force were to be formed, it is clear that Cairo would play the primary and most influential role in it given the Egyptian army’s expertise and abilities compared to the other Arab armies. On the other hand, a joint coalition force that includes Turkey and Pakistan in particular would be led by Saudi Arabia exclusively, which would marginalize Egypt’s influential military role.

During the first days of the Saudi war in Yemen, Pakistani participation in Operation Decisive Storm seemed beyond question. Islamabad immediately announced that it would take part in this operation on sea and land, especially since it was holding the Samsama-5 joint maneuvers with Saudi Arabia that was meant to prepare the two countries’ forces for a war in mountainous terrain near the borders in Yemen. In other words, Pakistani ground forces were already present on Saudi territories, and once the decision was taken and the orders given, it would have been able to take part in operations immediately, especially if Saudi Arabia were to head to a ground war.

But it was then said that Pakistani ground forces might not take direct part in the war against the Houthis, but could support Saudi Arabia by deploying along the Saudi borders with Yemen as a form of protection for the Kingdom, but without intervening militarily except to foil any infiltration of Saudi borders by the Houthis.

The Pakistani leadership’s hesitation after these reports began to spread is understandable on more than one count, after numerous political, security, and religious voices were raised asking Nawaz Sharif not to intervene and to maintain a neutral position that would allow Pakistan to play a mediatory role and lead matters towards reconciliation away from the climate of war. Such a climate will affect the entire region, including Pakistan. After all, participation in Operation Decisive Storm would prevent Pakistan from playing the role of mediation for which it is well situated in light of its good relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit to Islamabad while the Pakistani parliament was still in session debating the issue of participation is likely to have played a role in influencing it to reach a consensus against participation. It helped some wavering parliamentarians to make up their minds, and to consider the dangers stemming from such participation and its impact on Shiite/Sunni relations in Pakistan.

The Pakistanis are, moreover, still suffering from their country’s intervention in the Afghani quagmire some decades ago. Even within the strictly ‘Sunni’ framework, Pakistan is still paying a daily price for this intervention in terms of its army’s blood, its economy, and its stability. The only fruit of that intervention has been a continued domestic war in the absence of total calm along the borders with India, and the Kashmir crisis continuing to fester, despite the current relative calm.

Certain voices inside Pakistan’s leadership do not believe that Iran poses a threat to Saudi Arabia. They believe that the Houthis are a constituent of the Yemeni people and that any disagreements should be resolved via internal dialogue without any foreign intervention. They also believe that by waging this war, Saudi Arabia seeks to influence other ongoing crises such as Syria and Iraq, and is motivated by its competition with Egypt over leadership of the Arab region. Pakistan and its interests are in conflict with the Saudi vision in this regard. In addition, Iran can provide alternative supplies of oil and gas should Saudi Arabia resort to punishing Pakistan for its refusal to take part in its war in Yemen.

The Pakistani parliament’s decision not to take part in Operation Decisive Storm will have a direct impact on the nature of the Saudi war on Yemen, especially by ensuring that it will not develop towards a ground war. For Pakistan’s absence makes a ground war unlikely.

“The [Saudi] wager was on an important role for the Pakistani ground forces in that war, against the background of Egypt’s ambiguous stance since Saudi Arabia is trying to marginalize Egypt’s role in that war for numerous reasons,” concludes Habib.

End…

 

CONFLICTING REPORTS: "Operation Decisive Storm that Saudi Arabia has launched in conjunction with a ten-strong Arab and international coalition, entered its third week amidst conflicting reports and a large-scale disinformation war and political propaganda," writes Bassem at-Tuweissi in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

But it seems that there has been no really significant military development and no radical change in the balance of power on the ground. The Houthi forces and those of the deposed president [Ali 'Abdullah Saleh] remain in control of most Yemeni territories. They have not retreated, but continue to hold the initiative. Meanwhile, the coalition's strikes may have succeeded in weakening these forces, but not to the extent of forcing them back or to compel them to seek a political solution.

Zero-sum wars are the worst sort of conflicts-- that is to say, domestic wars of attrition based on infighting among local factions and regionally or internationally managed forces. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed many instances of such catastrophic wars that left nothing in their wake except disasters that still cast a heavy shadow over these nations' present and future.

From the start of the coalition's airstrikes, which coincided with a provocative expansion by the deposed president and Houthis' forces, the battle of Aden has been the decisive element that will determine which side will have the upper hand as well as the fate of military operations. As the [anti-Houthi/Saleh] Popular Committees and the forces loyal to President 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi were proclaiming their readiness to wage the battle to ‘cleanse’ Aden, the propaganda campaign on the other side was talking of victories and the capture and control of new parts of the city. Meanwhile, Iranian weapons and ammunition have continued to flow into Yemeni ports non-stop.

This sort of attrition will enter a difficult phase if it continues for weeks to come with neither side scoring a decisive victory. The din of gunfire and bombardment is growing louder in the absence of any genuine political effort or any dialogue between the parties. Doubt is now being cast--even inside the coalition-- over Operation Decisive Storm's coalition's wager on President 'Abed-Rabbo Hadi and his political team. Hadi seems to be repeating the same mistakes. Meanwhile, there are growing voices from inside the coalition calling for the supporters of legitimacy [Hadi] to find a strong military leadership; one that will allow them to conduct both political and military activities.

The humanitarian conditions in Yemen’s cities and villages now pose an unprecedented challenge to be added to the difficult and fragile conditions affecting every aspect of life that Yemen has inherited from long decades of failed development and unrestrained economic exploitation resulting from the corruption and tyranny of Saleh's rule. The Houthis’ attacks have aggravated these harsh conditions, opening the door for the displacement of hundreds of Yemeni families. This alone should drive the coalition and the forces of legitimacy to speed up the formation of a caretaker government that can address this humanitarian challenge at the very least.

It is relatively easy to start a war; but it is much more important to know how to manage and end it – that is to say, how to emerge from it with the greatest gain and least loss. This is a lesson that the Arab members of the coalition should be aware of when dealing with the Yemeni situation. For this economically exhausted country that is suffering from chronic anarchy cannot withstand a new and long war of attrition.

States do not go to war as a luxury or merely to seek revenge. War is intensive politics, and therefore one of its tools. In other words, the only reason to go to war is to achieve political aims.

"Therefore, the time for politics has arrived in Yemen," concludes Tweissi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Interconnected conflicts

 

All the region’s conflicts are connected as Iran is bent on expansion, and the answer is to escalate Arab/Gulf support for Syria’s moderate rebels, says 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in today's Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

 

A glance at the region’s geopolitical map shows that its conflicts are all inter-connected, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. This is especially true of the Yemeni and Syrian conflicts. Saudi Arabia and its allies thus need to intensify their support for the moderate Syrian rebels as a counter to Iran's growing aid to the Houthis in Yemen.

 

ONE BLOCK: "The region is all one block, and its wars are all linked to each other, no matter how distant its various parts may be from each other," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

This has been especially true ever since revolutions broke out in the region in early 2011. Fighting began in Yemen on a wide-scale in the middle of last year after the Houthis captured the city of 'Omran, after which they occupied the capital Sana'a. It developed into a large-scale war over the past three months after the legitimate president [Hadi] and his government were besieged.

The fighting in Yemen is the result of the regional crisis facing Iran, specifically in Syria and Iraq where it is fighting in defense of its two allied regimes. This is a war that began on the streets, then developed into geopolitical confrontation between an Iranian and an Arab/Gulf axis.

Fearing for its ally, the Assad regime in Syria, Iran spent money, delivered weapons, and shed its own blood. It is doing the same in Iraq in order to save its allies there. For its part, Saudi Arabia had to intervene in its southern neighbor [Yemen] after the Iranians tried to overthrow the regime there via their Houthi ally together with deposed president Ali Saleh who was removed by popular protest.

The Iranians believe that tying the Saudis down in Yemen is an aim worth achieving since it would prevent them from confronting Iran's activities in Iraq and Syria. Yemen is a large country, with an area three times the size of Syria. Its terrain is more difficult and there is no central regime there that is easy to destroy. And weakening Saudi Arabia in the south would weaken the entire Gulf region, paving the way for Iran to pursue its ambitions in the region.

Because of this geopolitical link, the war in Yemen is part of the war in Syria. It is yet another chapter in Iran's project to alter the regional map and advance, exploiting the anarchy created by the various revolutions. Now Iran is trying to force its main opponent, Saudi Arabia, into a threatening pincer, trapped between Iraq and Yemen. And Iraq is a natural and political extension of Syria.

To defend itself, Saudi Arabia must offer greater support to the Syrian opposition organizations, and specifically the [‘moderate’] Syrian National Coalition (SNC). This would increase cost for Iran, which is under severe pressure there. For it is difficult for Iran to win the Syria war. As for Yemen, Saudi Arabia is better positioned to win there.

The majority of the Syrian people are hostile to the regime and have been in rebellion against it and its Iranian ally for four years. In Yemen, by contrast, most Yemenis have had strong ties to Saudi Arabia for decades. And the Saudi government has had special and longstanding relations with most of Yemen's constituents in both the north and south of the country. It has ties with Yemen's tribes, the dignitaries of its society, and its businessmen.

Iran has tried to enter Yemen to influence it many times in the past, but failed. This continued until it invested in a relationship with the Houthis built on religious and political grounds. The Houthis are not a large group by Yemeni standards, but they exploited the anarchy after the [2011 Yemen] revolution and allied themselves to the forces of the toppled [Saleh] regime.

Because Iran failed to break the siege imposed on the Assad regime in Syria on whose behalf it has been fighting for two years, it is seeking to impose a siege on the legitimate Yemeni regime by backing the rebels. I expect its support to grow significantly in the coming period, using the rebels to create a pocket that threatens Saudi Arabia from the south.

Although Iran's allies succeeded in expelling the legitimate government from the capital Sana'a, then pursued and laid siege to the government's temporary base in Aden, the Saudi military intervention and its efforts to build loyalist blocs across Yemen will foil the plan to create a pincer movement. But the anarchy that the Iranians have already created in Yemen may divert the Saudis from their regional interests and defending them.

A glance at the map of regional conflict would reveal its nature and direction. It indicates that the Gulf states must provide further backing for the Syrian revolution. The aim would be to lay siege to the Syrian regime and force Iran to accept a regional solution in which it respects the existing entities and ceases its ongoing sabotage activities ever since the 1980s.

These activities are responsible for the shaky situation in Lebanon, the [Hamas/Fateh] Palestinian split in the occupied territories, the sectarian conflict in Iraq, and the chaos in Bahrain!

"These are all part of a single narrative that reflects Iran's activities in the region that will intensify in the run-up to the Camp David conference that the U.S. president has undertaken to hold and bring the various conflicting regional parties together at a single table," concludes Rashed.

Ends…

 

 

3-Like a phoenix from the ashes

 

Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Syria may have been the victim of Palestinian differences and petty calculations, but it has demonstrated its ability to rise again from the ashes, says Younis as-Sayyid in today's Emirates’ al-Khaleej

 

The tragedy of Yarmouk Camp is that it has been the victim of inter-Palestinian divisions and self-serving calculations throughout the past three or four years, argues a Lebanese commentator in a Gulf daily. The recent invasion by ISIS, and the PLO's catastrophic dithering about liberating it by military force, once again highlight the impact of these divisions and calculations.

 

BARBARIAN INVASION: "The Yarmouk Camp's tragedy, which was renewed when the barbarians invaded it earlier this month, stems from the fact that it is a victim of the narrow calculations and interests of the Palestinians before anyone else," writes Younis as-Sayyid in Monday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.

In other words, this is primarily a Palestinian problem before being one that concerns ISIS or the Nusra Front or any similar group. The truth is that those who decided to storm the camp infiltrated it with the collusion and facilitation of some the forces that were supposed to be defending it; and they were betting that it would fall based on the principle of 'divide-and-rule', and nothing else.

This game of calculations takes us back to the first time the camp was assaulted in late 2012. At the time, some of the defending forces played the same role and allowed terrorists to infiltrate it, which led to its fall and the displacement of the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants, and then to its siege.

Voices were raised urging that the camp should maintain its neutrality in the war in Syria, rather than calling for its recapture and liberation. The idea of 'neutralization' dug deeper roots in tandem with the exacerbating inter-Palestinian [Fatah/Hamas] split that afflicts the Palestinians both inside and outside their occupied homeland.

The Palestinians' split over what is happening in Syria further aggravated the problem's complexity. Some elements allied themselves to the [anti-Syrian regime] opposition, even to the terrorist and takfiri forces, while others opted to ally themselves with the regime. All of which raises a big question concerning the very basis of the notion of neutrality, which itself is based on the assumption that the camp is the Palestinians' concern and that it should enjoy the immunity provided by the UN.

Even without a detailed scrutiny of the demography of that geographical location known as the 'Yarmouk Camp,' it is certain that Palestinian refugees have always constituted a minority. Despite this, and for numerous reasons that we cannot discuss here, the camp has turned into the Palestinian Diaspora's capital, and has become a symbol of Palestinian resistance.

Sadly, however, the game of calculations did not stop. When the Palestinian leadership sent its envoy, PLO Executive Committee member Dr Ahmad Majdalani to discuss a solution for the problem of ISIS's recent assault on the camp, he had no alternative but to accept a military solution, after hearing the unanimous views of the representatives of the 14 Palestinian factions present in Syria.

But when these factions began to implement that decision and move on the ground, the position changed in the very next day. Via its secretary Yasser 'Abed-Rabbo, the PLO's Executive Committee declared its opposition to any military solution in Yarmouk Camp, and returned to speaking of its neutrality.

We do not know if this requires negotiating with ISIS, or whether the latter will voluntarily withdraw from the camp, even though it clearly understands its strategic importance and its geographical location that brings the group very close to the center of Damascus.

Many questions are raised by the change in the PLO's position, some of which have to do with whether Dr Majdalani had any mandate from the Palestinian leadership at all. This requires clarification from Majdalani himself. But the factions that agreed on a military solution have made clear advances on the ground, and seem to be on their way to expelling the terrorist organizations and regaining the camp.

"In that sense, and free from all extraneous calculations, the camp is once again rising against the barbarians like a phoenix from the ashes. Because it has become a symbol, it may fall, but it will never die," concludes Sayyid.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

IRAN/TURKEY/YEMEN: Writing in centrist Milliyet, Sami Kohen detects a significant shift in Turkish policy after this week’s visit by President Erdogan to Tehran: "After the talks in Tehran, Ankara is coming together with Iran, which had been seen as an enemy up until now, although it has not yet officially left the coalition with the Saudis. That is to say that Turkey has become Iran’s partner on the Yemen issue. Together, they will try to end the crisis. Ankara will undertake a 'mediation' mission. If Turkey really takes charge of the Yemen file, it will have to persuade the Saudis and the U.S. to go for a cease-fire and negotiations. But even if such a compromise materializes in principle, there is a big question as to what extent it will work."

Unsal Ban anticipates further improvements in Turkish-Iranian relations in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: “President Erdogan’s visit to Iran this week projects a clear image of our country's position on Turkish-Iranian relations. As is known, if Iran gives up on its ability to produce nuclear arms, the economic sanctions applied to this country will end. As a result, lifting the sanctions within the context of the deal between Western countries and Iran will have a positive impact on our country."

Ufuk Ulutas argues that no side can win in Yemen in centre-right, pro-government Aksam: "Iran cannot win in Yemen because it has come to the limits of its operational power. Saudi Arabia and its allies cannot win either, because the Houthis are a basic constituent in Yemen and cannot be eliminated by war. In light of this negative balance, what should be done is to bring about an internal compromise that will decrease foreign intervention in Yemen. To that end, Iran should stop seeing Yemen as its backyard, as it does in all the areas where the Shiites live, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries should end their military operations."

Mumtazer Turkone compares Turkey disfavorably to Iran in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "Erdogan's Iran visit has brought together representatives of a country whose star is fading in the skies of the Middle East, and one whose star has just begun to shine. Iran's star is rising and Turkey's star is waning. Over the last decade, the proactive role that Turkey had begun to undertake with the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government now belongs to the past. Today we have a Turkey that is neither the leading country of the Muslim world, nor is there a system of balances around it any more. The government’s policy of 'precious loneliness' has run its course. After this unsuccessful experience, Turkey has to return to its traditional state reflexes."

 

UPCOMING ELECTIONS: Oral Calislar sounds an optimistic note in centre-left Radikal: "The dominant authoritarian structure of the political system in Turkey is having difficulty changing. Will a different picture replace our old, male, authoritarian and bureaucratic-looking political image? One may talk about the first signs along this route. We can say that the wind that is blowing towards democratization and 'multiculturalism' has begun to affect the political parties."

Mehmet Tezkan suggests that PM Davutoglu has only reluctantly acceded to the president’s desire for a presidential system in Milliyet: "The prime minister has broken his silence. He has said ‘yes’ to a presidential system. But this was a wary ‘yes’. More precisely, he was saying that if we secure the power to change the constitution, there is no other choice. He was saying ‘I am ready for self-sacrifice’. The president is asking for votes for the ruling party in order to establish a presidential system. He was asking for 400 seats in parliament. After the Iran visit, he brought this down to 335 seats-- which is the minimum necessary for any post-referendum amendments to the constitution."

 

 

The Iranian press does not appear on Friday

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-The price of failure

2-A step away from Israel

3-Yarmouk and the collapse of the national movement

 

1-The price of failure

 

Saudi airstrikes against Houthi positions continue; but they have, so far, failed to achieve most of their aims. The calls for ground intervention as part of Operation Decisive Storm have fallen on deaf ears, even though the war in Yemen is now almost in its third week. The region is witnessing feverish activity to find a 'political solution' for the Yemeni crisis; one that would release the main parties to the 'Sunni coalition' from having to face the awkwardness of a ground intervention. For similar, indeed, identical reasons, most if not all of these parties are not interested in such intervention--'Abdelbari 'Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Washington is pursuing its interests with Tehran without taking Arab national security into consideration and with no concern for its allies in the region. This is because American strategic interests call for giving Iran pride of place, even if this comes at the expense of U.S./Arab relations, and even, in fact, if Iran were to totally impose its influence on the region, beginning with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen as a first phase that may be followed by a second phase of Iranian invasion of Arab states. Washington’s ambiguous policy in this region of the world, one that conflicts with the bases of international law, has damaged U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and in occupied Arab Palestine as well--'Abdelaziz at-Tuwaijari in pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

A failed Saudi adventure [in Yemen] will diminish its Arab and regional influence, and it will appear to be more like a burden on its major allies, primarily the U.S. And these repercussions are more likely to create extreme political instability and anger at the ruling family at home. As a result, Saudi Arabia itself may witness political and security disturbances, sooner or later. If, on the other hand, the war were to proceed according to a different scenario; that of a long-term conflict with all the human material losses that will ensue, one that is ultimately difficult to win and that may last for many long years to come, this may also create a situation that will not serve stability in Saudi Arabia-- al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The 'Sunni coalition' that Saudi Arabia has sought to build in order to fight a ground war in Yemen seems to be facing growing difficulties from its main parties, notes the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. This may pave the way for a political solution to the crisis. The U.S.'s stance towards the Yemeni crisis is ambiguous, dithering, and indecisive, insists a Saudi commentator. This seems linked to the Iranian nuclear deal, and to the U.S.'s misreading of its own regional interests, both of which are leading to the expansion of Iranian hegemony. Whether the Yemeni war ends soon as a result of U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia, or it lasts long because of the impossibility of a decisive victory, Saudi Arabia's future is likely to more disturbed and less stable than it would have been otherwise, warns a Lebanese commentator.

 

NIL CHANCE OF INTERVENTION: "When talk of a 'Sunni coalition' that includes the major Arab and Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, its Gulf and Arab allies and Pakistan and Turkey subsides, and when there is talk of the need to head to the UN Security Council for a resolution that brings all parties to the negotiation table in some 'neutral' state and that disarms the Houthis, this means that the prospects facing this Sunni coalition and a ground intervention in Yemen to confront Iranian 'expansion' have become limited, and possibly nil," writes Editor-in-Chief 'Abdelbari 'Atwan on Friday’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

Saudi airstrikes against Houthi positions continue; but they have, so far, failed to achieve most of their aims. The calls for ground intervention as part of Operation Decisive Storm have fallen on deaf ears, even though the war in Yemen is now almost in its third week.

The region is witnessing feverish activity to find a 'political solution' for the Yemeni crisis; one that would release the main parties to the 'Sunni coalition' from having to face the awkwardness of a ground intervention. For similar, indeed, identical reasons, most if not all of these parties are not interested in such intervention.

At the press conference with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rowhani at the end of their talks in Tehran, Turkish President Erdogan, who had received Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif on the eve of his visit to the Iranian capital, mentioned all the heated issues in the region with the exception of the Yemeni file. It is clear by now that he prefers to keep all thorny issues, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, away from his ambition to expand mutual trade with Iran. It is also clear that he prefers not to adopt any position that would affect his potential future role as a mediator in the Yemeni crisis, in particular.

For his part, Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif is in a state of unprecedented confusion. He seems unable to comply with his Saudi ally's request to send ground forces to Yemen for fear of having to face a civil war and sectarian disturbances at home. After all, more than 20% of the Pakistani army is Shiite. This is why he flew to Turkey for consultations, only to find Mr. Erdogan even more confused and hesitant than he was, and for the same reasons.

There are over 16 million [Shiite-offshoot] Alevis in Turkey, as well as a ferocious right-wing nationalist opposition and an Islamist opposition that is creating problems for Erdogan as represented by the preacher Fethullah Gülen's bloc. Gülen currently resides in the U.S. and is moving his supporters by 'remote control' against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), using the social media as a lethal weapon in his war against his former [Erdogan/AKP] ally.

But the greatest Saudi disappointment may be with its Egyptian ally. President 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi whose regime has been backed by Saudi Arabia to the tune of some 15 billion dollars so far, is no less hesitant than his Pakistani and Turkish counterparts. The main difference is that Mr. Sharif has an elected parliament to 'use as a pretext' to avoid sending ground forces, while President Sissi does not have this sort of democratic 'luxury' to fall back on.

In fact, President Sissi's hesitation may explain the Saudi leadership's 'shift' towards Turkey and Pakistan, and the resulting retreat of Egypt’s role in the Yemeni crisis. It is true that there is no Sunni/Shiite 'sectarian factor' in Egypt as there is in Pakistan and Turkey that would restrain President Sissi and provide him with a pretext to avoid ground military intervention in Yemen. But there is a more important factor; namely, the bloody experience in Yemen that cost the country over 15 thousand soldiers dead after Egypt intervened in a ground war in support of the [anti-Imamate] Yemeni revolution in 1962. This also paved the way to defeat in the June 1967 war against Israel, one that was a direct consequence of the Yemeni war – so much so that the thesis that 'Egypt's army is for the defense of its lands alone' has become the binding 'military doctrine' of all Egyptian leaders since president Jamal 'Abdul Nasser.

For three days now, the Pakistani parliament has been debating the issue of ground intervention in Yemen. For his part, President Erdogan emerged from meeting the Iranian Revolution's supreme leader Sayyid Ali Khamene'i to sing the praises of a political solution for the Yemeni crisis. As for President Sissi, he is merely observing the movement of Iranian warships at the Bab al-Mandab Straits that controls the Suez Canal, abiding by the virtue of silence and studying the situation closely.

Meanwhile, Tehran has become a site of ‘pilgrimage’ for the advocates of dialogue and political solutions. Its Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif who has just finished the marathon negotiations with the six major powers over his country's nuclear program, flew to the Sultanate of Oman and from there to Islamabad, to discuss the Yemeni crisis with the leaders of the two states.  In the meantime, [Iranian Revolutionary Guardal-Qods Brigade commander] General Qassem Soleimani, who led the battle to free Tikrit from ISIS’s clutch, is preparing to 'expand' his activities into al-Anbar, as a prelude or a rehearsal for the major battle of Mosul.

As its current crisis has become more critical, it appears that Saudi Arabia has been wagering on a 'Sunni coalition' that is not too eager to become involved. The fact that crisis is escalating is clear from the leaked reports of clashes with the Houthis near the Yemeni borders [with Saudi Arabia], or the shooting incident in the heart of the Saudi capital Riyadh, which led to the death of two policemen shot by unknown parties, or the similar events in the Shiite town of al-'Awamiyah in eastern Saudi Arabia.

We do not know if the UN Security Council will respond positively to the Arab/Gulf coalition's request for a resolution that confirms the need for a peaceful political solution to the Yemeni crisis via dialogue between all parties in a neutral country – as mentioned by the UAE's Foreign Minister Sheikh 'Abdullah bin Zayid at his press conference with his Yemeni counterpart Riad Yassin in Abu-Dhabi, yesterday (Thursday).

But what we do know is that the Security Council is not as flexible as was in the days of the [2011] Libyan crisis. This is because the Russians and Chinese are extremely wary of falling victim to the same trick that the Americans lured them into during the Libyan crisis. Their veto is now ready to obstruct any resolution that they do not approve or that their Iranian allies oppose.

We cannot prophesy or speculate too much about how this crisis may end; that is the task of magicians and astrologers, and we are neither. But what we can say is that the Yemeni crisis is beginning to enter the zone of 'stalemate' and 'routine' similar to what happened to its Syrian and Libyan counterparts. Military and political spokesmen alike can find nothing new to say about it to break the tedium, at least for us pressmen.

There is a Yemeni proverb that says: 'You have to go to Sana'a, even if your travels may be long.' It can be adjusted a little to say: 'You have to go to Muscat, even if the aerial bombardment lasts long and a political solution stumbles.' In fact, we would not be surprised if it turns out that the dialogue table that includes all the Yemeni and non-Yemeni parties implicated in the crisis has already been prepared.

"The coming days will tell," concludes 'Atwan.

End…

 

UNCLEAR U.S. STANCE: "The U.S. stance towards Operation Decisive Storm has still not been clarified to the degree necessary to determine the policy pursued by the world's leading superpower in dealing with the ongoing developments in the region in light of the Iranian expansion that is growing before the world's very eyes and ears in stark defiance of international law," writes 'Abdelaziz at-Tuwaijari in Friday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

In fact, the American stance towards the developments in Yemen has remained dithering and indecisive so far. The latest statement by U.S. President Barack Obama regarding the crisis in Yemen was not enough to sow trust, remove doubt, and answer questions regarding the short and long-term aims sought by U.S. foreign policy in the Arab region.

The U.S. president was not clear, specific, and decisive in the press statements that were intended to reassure the Arab Gulf states and confirm his country's readiness to protect the region's security, and its commitment to siding with it so as to prevent any damage to its sovereignty or any threat to its territorial integrity.

This is because he confused matters in a manner that gave rise to suspicions, when he linked safeguarding the Arab Gulf's security to the political reforms he said should be introduced to address the Gulf people’s aspirations. This is the same discourse that he used during the so-called 'Arab Spring' that quickly turned into a very foggy and stormy Fall that blew away the pegs of stability in a number of Arab states that were exposed to these destructive storms.

It is as if the U.S. wanted a destructive anarchy to spread across the entire Arab world, from the furthest east to the extreme west, but was foiled by some of the targeted states’ decisive and prudent political alertness. That alert stance aborted the destructive U.S. project and repulsed the stormy waves from their lands.

We can find many explanations for the ambiguity that characterizes the American stance towards developments in Yemen in particular in the published reports issued by centers of strategic research and studies, and in the conclusions that may be derived from their analyses of successive developments and how they are linked together.

It is not possible to separate the American stance, which is not reassuring to the region's states, from the U.S.’s understandings with Iran over its nuclear program. These understandings were consistent with the result that the U.S. was aspiring to achieve on behalf of the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany, namely the 'framework agreement'.

For Washington is pursuing its interests with Tehran without taking Arab national security into consideration and with no concern for its allies in the region. This is because American strategic interests call for giving Iran pride of place, even if this comes at the expense of U.S./Arab relations, and even, in fact, if Iran were to totally impose its influence on the region, beginning with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen as a first phase that may be followed by a second phase of Iranian invasion of Arab states.

Washington’s ambiguous policy in this region of the world, one that conflicts with the bases of international law, has damaged U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and in occupied Arab Palestine as well. In the latter case, the U.S., under successive administrations, bears prime responsibility for Israel’s crimes against humanity that were committed with total and unequivocal American backing and support.

Has the U.S. administration missed the fact that the Iranian regime is pursuing an expansionist colonial policy in the region, one that threatens the Arab states and creates sedition, disturbances, and tensions that will in no way be in the U.S.'s interest?

Is Washington not aware of the sectarian Iranian scheme that aims to spread instability in the region and fan the flames of hatred and hostility, exacerbating the sectarian [Sunni/Shiite] conflict between nations that have lived peacefully and safely together in this region throughout history?

Or is it really in Washington's interest for Iran to expand, for its influence to spread, and for it to invade the region and submit it to its hegemony and control?

While the Russian Federation and Iran are primarily responsible for the terrible and terrifying collapse of the situation in Syria by siding totally with the terrorist and tyrannical regime in Damascus, the U.S. bears the same responsibility for absence of any horizon for a political settlement in which Bashar al-Assad is not a part.

This has allowed a regime that has lost its legitimacy to commit more war crimes and crimes against humanity whose victims are the Syrian people. The Syrians today are living their worst days, with over one-third of them seeking refuge in neighboring countries or other areas inside Syria, after their cities and villages have been destroyed in a terrifying manner, after fear and hunger have spread across the land, and after all hopes of a free and dignified life have been lost.

Russia and the U.S., together with Iran are politically, legally, and morally responsible for this terrible humanitarian tragedy. Had Washington acted in the right manner to protect the Syrian people and topple the tyrannical sectarian regime, the Syrian crisis would not have reached this degree of complexity and difficulty.

We can say the same about the U.S.'s attitude to Iran’s expansionist policy that it is pursuing with the object of undermining stability in the region and becoming the strongest country that determines regional policy, even if in partnership with the U.S.

Had Washington acted at the right time and done what its humanitarian, moral, and political obligations required it to do, the Yemeni crisis would also not have exacerbated, and the Houthi militias would not have been rushing to take power, topple the state, and threaten the region's countries with Iran's absolute and total support.

"For this reason, we find ourselves forced to repeat the question about the suspect ambiguity that shrouds the U.S. stance towards the Yemeni and Syrian crises. This ambiguity is harmful to our Arab and Islamic nation, even if it may be enveloped in a deceptive cover," concludes Tuwaijari.

End…

 

LONG-LASTING ADVENTURE: "Saudi Arabia’s military adventure in Yemen is likely to last for a long time with no decisive outcome soon unless the U.S. intervenes and pressures Saudi Arabia to put an end to its action," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Friday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will totally escape the consequences of this adventure.

There are two possible scenarios regarding this war's course. According to the first, the U.S. will act fast to convince Saudi Arabia to end its war either by demanding that it does so now, or via a Security Council resolution calling for an end to the war, or by getting a number of states taking part in this war to end their contribution – certain Gulf states and Jordan at least. Once that happens, Saudi Arabia would have to end the war.

If this scenario unfolds, it will have negative repercussions [for Saudi Arabia], of which the most important will be the consolidation of a regime in Yemen that is very hostile to Saudi Arabia. For it will be difficult for any Yemeni regime to forgive Saudi Arabia's sins against the country and the blood of thousands of Yemeni citizens and soldiers that has been shed as a result of Saudi aggression.

Moreover, a failed Saudi adventure will diminish its Arab and regional influence, and it will appear to be more like a burden on its major allies, primarily the U.S. And these repercussions are more likely to create extreme political instability and anger at the ruling family at home. As a result, Saudi Arabia itself may witness political and security disturbances, sooner or later.

If, on the other hand, the war were to proceed according to a different scenario; that of a long-term conflict with all the human material losses that will ensue, one that is ultimately difficult to win and that may last for many long years to come, this may also create a situation that will not serve stability in Saudi Arabia.  On the contrary, and parallel to an ongoing war with growing Saudi human and material losses, and with despair at the possibility of winning a decisive victory, popular and political anger inside the Kingdom will grow.

This is similar to what has happened in the case of both Western and regional governments that have fought long wars but failed to win them. And Saudi Arabia is not immune to similar fall out. It is thus possible to conclude that after this adventure in Yemen, Saudi Arabia's future will be different from what it might have been had it not risked it in the first place. For this war differs from all of Saudi Arabia's previous interventions in other areas.

"In all these cases, the human and financial cost was acceptable, in fact necessary in order to get rid of the Kingdom’s surplus of frustrated [Islamist extremist] youth by exporting them to the outside world," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

2-A step away from Israel

 

The spat over the Iranian nuclear agreement disguises a more significant shift in the bases of U.S.-Israeli relations, says Randa Haidar in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Despite repeated statements from U.S. President Obama reaffirming his commitment to Israel's security, the Lausanne Iranian nuclear deal has radically altered Israel's strategic situation in the region, paving the way for ending the special U.S./Israeli relations that have existed for so long, argues a Lebanese commentator on Israeli affairs.

 

DEFENDING THE UNDERSTANDINGS: "Despite U.S. President Barack Obama's repeated insistence in his recent press interviews in which he defended the understandings reached at Lausanne, that he is totally committed to defending Israel's security against any threat, these statements were unable to erase a general Israeli impression that by negotiating with Iran, the U.S. has taken an important step away from Israel," writes Randa Haidar in Friday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

At present, Israel's problem is not confined to the substance of the Iran nuclear agreement. Its problem extends beyond this, and has to do with the U.S.'s total exclusion of Israel from the negotiations for fear that it may foil them. As a result, Israel had to resort to espionage to find out what was going on in the negotiating rooms.

Relations between President Obama and Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu have worsened to such an extent that it can no longer be seen as a personal matter between the two leaders. It is beginning to be more and more clear that these worsening relations are related to Obama's strategic concept of the U.S.'s withdrawal from the region's conflicts and his style of 'managing conflicts' from behind the scenes.

Has Israel’s Middle East role that the U.S. has relied on against its traditional enemies come to an end? That is a question that comes urgently to the fore in light of the current extensive reshuffling of cards in the region, amidst a radical change in the political scene.

Iran has turned from a fierce opponent of the U.S. into a state with which the U.S. holds a dialogue and can cooperate. The U.S. has also drawn away from its traditional allies in the Sunni Arab states, holding their regimes responsible for their inability to confront their internal and not only their external, problems, as President Obama said in his [New York Times] interview with Thomas Friedman earlier this week.

As a result of the agreement between the world's major powers and Iran, the U.S. has imposed a different sort of strategic reality on the new government that Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to form. The Iranian nuclear threat, which headed Netanyahu's agenda, no longer exists; he must therefore seek another imminent threat to use in order to scare the Israelis.

If the negotiations succeed in reaching a final and comprehensive agreement with Iran this coming June, Netanyahu will have to cohabit with a hostile relationship with Barack Obama until the end of 2017. And there is always the dangling threat that Iran may violate the agreement after it secures its demand for lifting the sanctions, and that it may then rush towards the production of a bomb.

The agreement with Iran may not change the historical alliance between Israel and the U.S. It will not end America’s annual financial and military support for the Hebrew state. But it does inaugurate a new phase of the strategic relations between the two countries.

"The results will become apparent sooner or later," concludes Haidar.

Ends…

 

 

3-Yarmouk and the collapse of the national movement

 

The siege of Yarmouk refugee camp not only highlights the impotence of the Palestinians’ official bodies and factions, it marks the collapse of the contemporary national movement, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

The fighting in Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus highlights the ineffectiveness of the various Palestinian factions and their inability to influence events on the ground, maintains a Palestinian commentator. But this is the product of the overall collapse of the official Palestinian national movement that has lost touch with its popular base.

 

LAST YEAR’S QUESTION: "Around this time last year, the argument over Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Damascus had to do with the means of removing the armed elements from it; now, it is over how to remove the Palestinians themselves from the camp," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

Last year, the question was: How can we get the Syrian regime and the Palestinian factions affiliated to it, as well as the armed opposition factions and groups, to leave the camp and permit relief efforts to reach it?

But such negotiations and the question that goes along with them are impossible with a group such as ISIS that only recognizes killing and control, is not concerned about the fate of civilians, and makes no political calculations.

This was what PLO Executive Committee Member Ahmad Majdalani, who is also the head of the delegation sent by PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas from Ramallah to Damascus to follow developments after ISIS in alliance with the [al-Qa’ida affiliated] Nusra Front captured the camp a few days ago, said: 'The delegation's visit focuses on the continued humanitarian efforts and on the evacuation of the refugees from the camp, providing them with protection and medical care.'

The actual number of the camp's inhabitants now stands at somewhere between 5% and 8% of its original number before the conflict broke out. (The current number is around 18 thousand, compared to somewhere between a 250 and 360,000 inhabitants before). Therefore, the evacuation of the camp's inhabitants is actually being realized on the ground. It is also worth noting that civilian sources inside the camp have toldwww.aljazeera.net that the number of fighters inside the camp stands at around 20,000. If these assessments are true, then the number of armed elements now exceeds that of the camp’s inhabitants.

There is much talk of the Palestinian factions present in the camp. But no one is specifying exactly which factions they are. There is talk ofAknaf Beit al-Maqdis, which was formed from elements that had left some the larger Palestinian factions, especially Hamas.

In effect, this lack of clarity about the nature of the organized Palestinian forces inside the camp is an expression of the fact that the various factions are refraining from or are unable to play a real role, perhaps, because they wish to avoid being implicated in domestic Syrian affairs or be part of the conflict in Syria. But this has not saved the Palestinians from being drawn into the conflict or spared them from having to pay its price.

Refraining from being implicated in the conflict may be the right thing to do in principle; but the undeniable truth is that the siege of the camps has now been in place for almost two years. Moreover, scores have died slowly because of hunger or disease without any international, Arab, or Palestinian party having the ability or any real plan to save the camp and its people. This is exactly the same as in the rest of Syria.

What is happening at the international, Arab, and Palestinian levels, is that these parties have assumed the role of observes, watching Syria bleed till its last civilian, while mysterious fighters from all over the world come to fight in this country as members of various organizations.

The Syrian regime's calculations may include the possibility of preoccupying the various opposition factions in fighting with each other. But the practical outcome so far is that it no longer makes any sense to think of joining the confrontation with the regime in order to bring about change for the better, because everyone is confronting everyone else in Syria and because the regime's strong enemies are even more dictatorial and bloody than the regime itself. In this manner, the regime's goal has been served, even if the price for achieving it has been very high.

Yarmouk Camp’s situation appears both difficult to understand and hard to resolve. It is also difficult if we were to try to understand it via the Palestinian leadership's role in addressing the crisis when its tools and channels of action seem very limited. And the same goes for the major non-PLO factions, especially since refraining from intervention in Syria’s domestic affairs seems like the right decision to take.

The fact is that everyone – the PLO, Fateh, Hamas, and the other real Palestinian factions – have proven unable to do anything. Moreover, any effort, especially now, seems almost futile and short-lived; its main aim is to secure a place on the margins of the scene, when those who are actually shaping it are other forces, most of which remain a mystery.

But all this should be understood in the context of the manner in which the Palestinian national and political movement has been reduced to mere diplomatic and official superstructures with no real bases on the ground that would allow them to influence events.

"It may seem somewhat extravagant to say this, but what is happening in Yarmouk Camp and elsewhere is the product of the official, factional, and organized Palestinian national movement’s collapse," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 10.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

The Iran muddle

 

There were no newspapers published in Israel on Friday – the last day of the week-long Passover holiday. The electronic media – Internet sites, television and radio – continue to be dominated by Iran and domestic news.

According to Israel Radio, the U.S. State Department on Thursday rebuffed Tehran's demands for an immediate lifting of sanctions, saying that any sanctions relief for Iran as part of a landmark nuclear accord will only come once curbs on enrichment are verified.

'Sanctions will be suspended in a phased manner upon verification that Iran has met specific commitments under a finalized joint comprehensive plan of action,' State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke told reporters in Washington. 'The process of sanctions suspension or relief will only begin after Iran has completed its major nuclear steps and the breakout time has been increased to at least a year,' he said. 'That's consistent with what we said over the last week or so, and that was agreed upon by all the parties in Lausanne,' Rathke added. 'We're not going to respond to every public statement made by Iranian officials or negotiate in public.'

Earlier in the day, Iranian president Hassan Rowhani repeated a demand that world powers lift sanctions the day a final accord is signed, indicating the issue could be a deal breaker. 'We will not sign any agreement unless all economic sanctions are totally lifted on the first day of the implementation of the deal,' Rowhani said.

In related news, Haaretz reports that a poll conducted by NBC News found that 68 percent of Americans do not believe Iran will comply with the terms of a nuclear deal signed with the international coalition. About 25 percent of those polled said they had faith that Iran would hold up its end of the bargain. 53 percent said that the nuclear deal with Iran is a serious threat for the U.S.

In other news, Ynet reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet Palestinian leader Mahmoud 'Abbas in Moscow on Monday, where the issue of Middle East peace talks will be raised. 'The two leaders will hold talks concerning key aspects of Russian-Palestinian relations and their future, with particular attention on the trade, economy and humanitarian sectors,' the Kremlin said in a statement. There will also be 'an exchange of ideas on the process of Israeli-Palestinian talks and other problematic regional situations,' the statement continued, adding that North Africa would also be on the agenda.

 

FOUR SCENARIOS: Writing in Maariv on Thursday, Amir Rapaport presents four possible post-Lausanne scenarios regarding the Iranian nuclear program and the West's negotiations with Tehran.

"Mossad agents, disguised as Iranians, will take photographs of the entrances to the underground nuclear facility in Fordow, using cameras equipped with long-distance lenses. They will also take samples from the soil near the facility.

While they are busy doing that, satellites orbiting the earth will film exactly the same area again and again – as well as dozens of other nuclear sites across Iran. The goal will be to find some hint that the Iranians are fooling the entire world and are continuing to forge ahead with their military nuclear program – despite having signed an agreement with the United States and the other world power.

The above scenario is, of course, purely fictional, but there is every reason to believe that Israel's intelligence agencies will do everything in their power to prove that Iran's military nuclear program is continuing. When it comes to Western intelligence services, reality is usually not far from even the most imaginative scenario. Is it reasonable to think that intelligence agencies will be looking for proof of Iranian duplicity? Certainly. But that's not the only possible scenario. So what then are the possible scenarios now that a framework has been agreed between the sides?

Scenario 1: Continue sanctions

The framework agreement stipulates that Iran must scale back its current nuclear capabilities; it also prevents Iran from developing additional capabilities for the next 10 to 15 years and, in addition, details the rigorous international inspection that will be imposed. In terms of Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities, the agreement would neutralize some 13,000 centrifuges and the dilution or removal of some 10 tons of enriched material that is already in Iran's possession – which is enough for seven or eight nuclear bombs.

Iran will only be allowed to use first-generation centrifuges to continue enriching uranium and will not be allowed to use its remaining 6,000 centrifuges to enrich over a level of 3.67 percent. The Fordow facility will become a research faculty and there will be no nuclear material there at all. The plutonium track will be blocked by changing the core of the nuclear reactor at Arak to one which cannot create enough plutonium to manufacture a bomb. In addition, Iran will be barred from building a new heavy-water reactor or new uranium enrichment facilities for the next decade.

However, even though the Iranian nuclear program is supposed to move backwards, in practice none of its nuclear facilities will be closed. The bottom line is that this would be the realization of the nightmare that Israel has been warning about for years: the Iranians would, in the future, be allowed to possess unlimited quantities of uranium enriched to a level of 3 percent and would be able to upgrade it to 90 percent enriched uranium within a matter of weeks – at any stage that they decide to expel the United Nations inspectors. They could also do so without expelling the inspectors – a very public act of dissent – if they were to do it in secret.

With the means at their disposal, the Iranians could very easily cross the 'military threshold' of enriched uranium. There is no technological impediment; it's just a matter of the Iranian leadership making the decision. Of course, no one is currently pressuring Iran to end its involvement in terrorism or its development of long-range missiles. The most absurd thing is that the United States is informally cooperating with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, while, at the very same time, Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and with American support, are conducting a military operation against Iranian involvement in Yemen.

In any case, in order to ensure the lifting of the crippling sanctions (which, along with the collapse of oil prices, have severely harmed the Iranian economy), Tehran will need to abide by the understandings reached in Lausanne and sign a final-status agreement within weeks. Israel will do everything that it can to persuade the international community not to let this happen, since it firmly believes that continued sanctions without an agreement is better than any agreement that would allow the Iranians to develop a nuclear bomb sooner or later. Israel's ability to convince anyone at the moment is negligible, in part because of the crisis in the relationship between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama. In any case, it is far from certain a long-term agreement is even viable.

The likelihood that an agreement will be reached and sanctions will be lifted: Medium. The likelihood that no agreement will be reached by the end of June and that sanctions will be maintained or even intensified: Also medium.

Scenario 2: Iran's bluff is exposed

Whether or not an agreement is reached, the Iranians will secretly continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Intelligence agencies discover this and the United States and Israel will both have to decide how to respond. What response Washington opts for depends on two factors: when the Iranians' duplicity is uncovered and who is president at the time. The likelihood of this scenario happening is high.

Scenario 3: American military action

Obama decides that he is serious about the threat of military action against Iran – just this week, there was a leaked report that the U.S. is accelerating its production of bunker-busting bombs that could be used in any attack on Iran's nuclear facilities – and he convenes a small number of experts who have been let in on the secret. He orders them to plan and execute an attack on the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities. In theory, this is a realistic scenario, but, over the past six years, Obama has shown time and time again that he believes in the same strategy that the British adopted before World War II: do whatever it takes to reach an agreement – including making a bad agreement – and avoid war.

The likelihood of this scenario happening: As long as Obama is president – zero.

Scenario 4: Israeli military action

According to foreign news reports, Israel is consistently developing the military capabilities that it would need in order to attack key facilities in Iran; this includes air and ground weapons, midair refueling capabilities, long-range communications and real-time intelligence gathering. The IDF is also training for an attack, even if the spike in Air Force training exercises that were reported this week actually has nothing to do with Iran.

Paradoxically, the agreement reached between Iran and the six world powers increases the chances that Israel will have to carry out a military strike. The effectiveness of any such military action would be limited, however, because, in retrospect, we know that the ideal time to carry it out was in 2010. The Lausanne agreement proves, once again, that Israel can only rely on itself. Thus far, Israel's strategy has been to use any and all means at its disposal to prevent an enemy state from obtaining nuclear weapons.

The problem is that military action against Iran's nuclear facilities would only do partial damage and would almost certainly lead to retaliatory attacks against Israel by Iran and its allies, such as Hizbollah in Lebanon. In addition, if Israel were to attack against the wishes of the United States, American forces in the Persian Gulf could find themselves under attack. As long as negotiations with Iran are ongoing, Israel does not have any real possibility of attacking. Experts say that significant damage could be done to underground bunkers by using highly accurate missiles to attack the entrances. Most Israeli security experts still believe, however, that the harm done by attacking Iran's nuclear facilities would far outweigh the usefulness.

The likelihood of this scenario happening: Low."

Ends…

 

AN IMPORTANT INTERVIEW: Writing on the NRG website, Shalom Yerushalmi says that the routine of the occupation, as described by a senior IDF officer in a recent interview, is dangerous and will lead to the binational state that no one wants.

"The most important interview that I have read in recent years was published last weekend by Makor Rishon. The outgoing head of the IDF's Central Command, Nitzan Alon, spoke to my colleagues Yohai Ofer and Gideon Dukov and provided them with the following headline: 'I cannot envisage any circumstances for the establishment of a Palestinian state.'

Alon was head of the Central Command for three years. Before that, he was commander of two brigades based in the West Bank. Next month, he will take over as commander of the IDF's Operations Directorate. No one knows Judea and Samaria better than he does. Throughout his service, Alon has been branded a leftist by some settlers, who accused him of picking on them. He was accused of being a traitor and protests were held outside his house – especially against his wife, who is a member of Machsom Watch, a group of Israeli women who monitor checkpoints in the West Bank and the military courts for human rights abuses.

Let's assume for a moment that Alon does, indeed, lean to the left in political terms and that he supports a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his farewell interview, he poured cold water on the possibility that there would ever be a diplomatic solution. He referred to the possibility that a Palestinian state would ever be established in Judea and Samaria as 'purely hypothetical' and he detailed the measures that the IDF is taking to further entrench its control of the territories and to make the occupation more effective. He's pleased with the results. 'People who live here have a routine,' he says. 'I have been here for six years and I have driven tens of thousands of kilometers in vehicles that were not armor-plated.'

This routine, this satisfaction, is problematic. It could even be dangerous. Every day, we further entrench a situation in the West Bank that prevents a solution ever being reached. We are doing so knowingly and we passed the point of no return long ago. No Israeli prime minister could or would want to withdraw to the 1967 borders, to evacuate hundreds of thousands of settlers, to partition Jerusalem, to transfer control of the Old City to a consortium of Arab countries, to cede settlements in the Jordan Valley and to reach an agreement with the Palestinians over the right of return for refugees.

There is also no Palestinian leader who would settle for anything less – even if Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas said this week that he would be willing to resume negotiations with Israel with no preconditions. It is in Abu Mazin's interests to try and convince the world that he wants peace, just as, on the Israeli side, it serves the goals of the prime minister and his cabinet to pretend that they also want to reach some kind of agreement with the Palestinians. When the moment of truth arrives, however, Israeli and Palestinian leaders will all turn tail and run from having to make a tough decision – as they have in the past. In short – all is lost.

So what will happen? We will become one Jewish-Muslim-Israeli-Palestinian family, all living in the same house. Nitzan Alon explained that we are already living in a routine that everyone has become accustomed to. A military man isn’t allowed to say whether that's a good or a bad thing, but we can assume that a binational state cannot contain two peoples who have been at each other's throats for close to a century. If Binyamin Netanyahu is afraid of the two-state solution, he will get a one-state solution in which the minority – the Palestinians – sees him as no better than the leaders of ISIS. What kind of life will we be able to live in a country like that? Perhaps, after all, it will become an Islamic country."

Ends…

 

THE PALESTINIANS WILL PAY: Writing on News 1 website, Yoni Ben-Menachem explains why the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people would suffer most if Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas goes ahead with the decision to end security cooperation with Israel.

"A month ago, the Palestinian Liberation Organization's Executive Committee decided to move forward in implementing its Central Committee decision to end security cooperation with Israel. It ordered one of its subcommittees – the political committee – to meet with leaders of the Palestinian security forces and to draw up a joint plan for implementation of the decision.

That meeting was due to be held this week, but, on the orders of Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, it was postponed. Abu Mazin explained to members of the PLO Executive Committee that several Arab states – concerned that it would lead to escalation – had contacted him and requested that he delays implementation of the decision until after Binyamin Netanyahu has put together his new government. They said that the Palestinians should wait to see what direction the new Israeli government takes. Abu Mazin added that he does not believe that there will be any change in the Israeli position regarding the Palestinians, but agreed to wait to see how things pan out.

In early August 2014, the head of the Shin Bet, Yoram Cohen, held a meeting in Ramallah with Abu Mazin. Cohen informed the Palestinian leader about the arrest of a massive network of Hamas terrorists in the West Bank. According to Cohen, Israel detained 93 Hamas members who had been planning on carrying out terror attacks in order to undermine the stability of the Palestinian Authority and, eventually, to overthrow the regime of Abu Mazin.

Cohen presented Abbas with concrete intelligence to back up his claim. Abbas listened and thanked his guest. That meeting took place as part of what is generally known as 'security cooperation' between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and is an integral part of the Oslo Accords.

The decision by the PLO's Central Committee to end security cooperation with Israel is an empty threat, designed primarily to soak up anger on the Palestinian street and criticism of the Palestinian Authority. It is still worthwhile, however, to take a closer look at the issue. What, exactly, is the issue at hand?

There are two main ingredients to Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.

The security element according to the Oslo Accords: Both sides are supposed to exchange intelligence information and to safeguard security within the borders of the Palestinian Authority. Since the Israeli security forces are far more effective than their Palestinian counterparts, the PA was the main beneficiary of this arrangement. The Shin Bet warns about and thwarts attacks by radical Islamic organizations which seek to undermine the Palestinian Authority. This security element includes coordination whenever IDF forces enter the PA's territory (Area A), in order to ensure that Palestinian security forces are not caught in the middle. Similarly, in accordance with the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority is supposed to handle Israeli civilians who accidentally enter Palestinian areas and to chase after terrorists who carry out attacks inside Israel and then flee to the Palestinian Authority.

The humanitarian element according to the Oslo Accords: Any movement by senior Palestinian officials, including the president himself, from Palestinian-controlled areas into Israel or overseas must be coordinated with Israel. This includes travel from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip and vice versa. The PA has a special office which liaises with the Civil Administration in the West Bank and Gaza, via which it coordinates a series of activities: the delivery of medicine and drugs to the West Bank and Gaza; medical treatment for Palestinians inside Israel; and work permits for Palestinian laborers.

We have already established that ending security cooperation is a violation of the Oslo Accords. Beyond this, it would severely harm the Palestinian Authority and residents of the West Bank and Gaza.

It is possible; of course, that the Palestinian Authority will only end the security-related aspects of the coordination with Israel, in order to limit the harm it would do to itself – but Israel has plenty of ways of pressuring Ramallah not to do so. In any case, the Palestinian Authority would be far worse off if it were to end cooperation with Israel."

Ends…

 

ISRAEL, BEWARE OF OBAMA'S IRAN DEAL: Writing in Haaretz, Amiel Ungar says that U.S. President Barack Obama's defense of his framework with Tehran is illogical, and American platitudes for Jerusalem may yet revert to accusations of warmongering.

"It is obviously refreshing to hear solicitude for Israel oozing from U.S. President Barack Obama in his interview with New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, in contrast to his nastiness following Netanyahu's election win. Gone were the accusations that Israel spied on the negotiations with Iran and gave the information to the enemy - U.S. Congress. Gone, too, were the trumped-up charges of Israel stealing nuclear material. Obama even warned Iran not to mess with Israel, which would have been reassuring had Obama's director of National Intelligence James Clapper not removed Iran and Hizbollah from the terror threat list after the latest assault on Israel's Golan Heights by these reformed citizens and indirect beneficiaries of American intelligence.

The charm offensive is in overdrive, but there is always ample time to revert to the alternate meme – anyone who opposes the Iran deal is a warmonger. After pressuring Israel to refrain from unilateral action against Iran and leave the driving to Barack, the administration and its media surrogates will now accuse Israel of pushing the United States into a needless war with Iran.

In the Friedman interview, Mr. 'All Options on the Table' effectively dismisses his two prime options. The military option is essentially worthless, Obama says: 'We know that a military strike or a series of military strikes can set back Iran’s nuclear program for a period of time — but almost certainly will prompt Iran to rush towards a bomb.' This was of course the argument used to try to dissuade Menachem Begin from bombing Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. But 34 years later, Iraq still does not have a reactor and as a result, Kuwait did not become Saddam Hussein's '19th province' in 1991.

Sanctions also are an ineffective stopgap, Obama tells Friedman: 'We know that if we do nothing, other than just maintain sanctions; that they will continue with the building of their nuclear infrastructure and we’ll have less insight into what exactly is happening.' Thus, Obama argues the proposed deal is the best course for Israel's sake. 'Iran may change. If it doesn’t, our deterrence capabilities, our military superiority stays in place,' he adds.

Let us understand this: If we put Iran to the test and it fails, all the options that Obama just decried as futile are part of his insurance policy. Military options dismissed when Iran is still without the bomb are going to work or even be considered when the Iranian ICBMs have nuclear warheads. The sanctions that have failed to deter the Iranian nuclear program - even presuming that they can miraculously snap back into place - are going to be more effective once Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold.

Another statement in the interview may reveal why Obama felt military and economic pressure were futile. 'This [Iran] is a country that withstood an eight-year war [with Iraq] and a million people dead, they’ve shown themselves willing, I think, to endure hardship when they considered a point of national pride or, in some cases, national survival.' The Obama administration does not believe the Iranian propensity for sacrifice was exhausted in the Iran-Iraq war, and considers Iran's willingness to commit troops and militias to a ground campaign against ISIS, while others make do with airstrikes, 'positive.'

Iran's preparedness for massive bloodletting channels North Vietnam's strategy to conquer South Vietnam. It was willing to absorb 1 million dead if it could inflict on the U.S. a tenth of that body count. Hanoi reasoned correctly that the U.S. would abandon the fight before it absorbed six-figure losses.

A nuclear Iran means Israel will face the threat of a Vietnam on its doorstep, not an ocean away. If Iranian proxies such as Hizbollah are working under an Iranian nuclear umbrella, then Israel will have to think very hard before responding strongly to a provocation such as kidnapped soldiers or a missile barrage. One memory that Hizbollah carries from the Second Lebanon War was Israel's flattening of its Beirut stronghold, Dahiyeh. If Iran goes nuclear, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will be emboldened by the knowledge that Israel may not swiftly escalate, for fear of getting into a nuclear war.

This is what the Obama framework will bring. Despite the protestations of concern for Israel, the Israeli leadership should respond 'Lo Miduvsheich Lo Mi'uktsech': We want neither your honey nor your sting."

Ends…

 

OBAMA WAS RIGHT, IRAN CAPITULATED: Writing on the website of i24 television station, Ephraim Halevy comments on the Lausanne agreement and says that it is, as U.S. President Barack Obama claimed, a historic deal.

"The document approved in Lausanne is full of loopholes and lacks numerous details. There's a great deal of exhausting work to be done before the talks are completed, and we can expect some tough battles over the coming months before the formulation of a final agreement. Nevertheless, U.S. President Barack Obama was right in labeling the document a 'historic' one – and for the following reasons:

1. For decades, Iran rejected the international community's demand to hold talks of any kind with respect to its nuclear program. The interim agreement reached in Lausanne proves that Tehran capitulated, by agreeing to conduct negotiations about its plans and the nuclear infrastructure it has built up for years, primarily in secret.

2. Iran was forced to agree to the curtailment of its programs, the destruction of valuable equipment at some of its facilities, and a drastic reduction in the number of centrifuges that will remain in operation. The vast majority of the centrifuges will be removed from the production sites and stored in known locations under international supervision. The new centrifuges will be removed from the existing facilities and stored under international supervision.

3. The Fordow facility will be left with just 1,000 of its more than 6,000 centrifuges, and these will be used for research and development for civilian purposes only, under international supervision. No fissile material will remain in Fordow, and uranium-enrichment operations will not take place there for a period of 15 years.

4. Iran was forced to agree to an unprecedented regime of international supervision and monitoring of its nuclear facilities and the dismantling of critical systems. The facility in Natanz will be left with approximately 5,000 old-model centrifuges, and 1,000 new ones will be removed from the site and stored under supervision. The Arak reactor will cease production of plutonium, the original core of the reactor will be destroyed or removed from the country, and the facility will be used for research and development programs only with the approval of the superpowers.

5. Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. It has also agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to just 300 kilograms. The surplus quantities will be removed from the country or handled in a different manner, but will not remain under Iranian control.

6. Iran has agreed to implement measures, the details of which have yet to be finalized, to meet the demands for clarification with respect to trials it has carried out in the field of nuclear weapons systems.

7. Obama's speech following the signing of the framework agreement was broadcast live on Iranian state television without any censorship or breaks in the middle. Never before, since the Islamic Revolution, has an American president been afforded such a stage, and on such a sensitive subject to boot.

And thus President Obama could say there is a historical dimension to the agreement that was reached. Anyone who has followed events in Iran in recent decades or has studied the matter has to admit truthfully that he never believed Iran would ever agree to discuss these issues, let alone agree to each of the clauses I have mentioned.

According to the introduction to the understandings reached, 'Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.'

This statement, along with Obama's open invitation to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to enter into an intensive dialogue, affords the Israeli government the opportunity to improve the agreement in its final version. However, Israel's hasty response – its total rejection of the memorandum of understanding – seems to herald the beginning of an Israeli campaign designed to thwart the deal. Scrapping the deal would of course mean scrapping all the understandings already achieved.

You can't have your cake and eat it too; you can't conduct an all-out war against the president to thwart his historic achievement and, in the same breath, hold talks with him to improve the product. Moreover, taking the fight to Congress would require deeper Israeli intervention in the approaching elections in the United States.

One of the arguments being voiced against the continuation of the talks is that Iran has a history of lies and cunning, and can thus be expected to breach the agreement and deceive the world. True, the Iranians have a tendency to deceive, but they could do so even if they agreed to zero centrifuges, the closure of all their nuclear facilities, and supervision on the part of the Mossad itself. Loopholes can always be found, so there is no such thing as a 'good agreement.' The Iranians will uphold an agreement only if it is worth their while.

Netanyahu has raised a new demand – that the framework agreement should include Iran's recognition of Israel's right to exist. Clearly, Iran is not going to change its spots; therefore, anyone who voices such a demand is signaling that he doesn't want the agreement and has his eyes on an aggressive solution."

Ends…

 

WHICH WAY WILL NETANYAHU JUMP? Writing on the Ynet website, Sima Kadmon asks whether Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will veer right, and finally sign a coalition agreement with his 'natural partners', or whether he is planning a secret deal with Herzog – so secret that even the Zionist Union leader is unaware of?

"One intriguing and as yet unanswered question this week was what would be the impact of an agreement with Iran and the crisis with the United States on Israeli politics and the formation of the new government. Will these twin crises force Binyamin Netanyahu to call for a unity government? Will this be Isaac Herzog's excuse when he announces that he is joining?

It is in Netanyahu's DNA, before Iran and before anything else, to kill his opponent. To lure him into the government and ensnare him in a honey trap, which is exactly what he did to Yair Lapid. His second ambition is to lead by consensus, to present the world with a sane and moderate face. But this time it is different: the prime minister explicitly pledged before the elections that he would not establish a unity government with Herzog and Livni.

It will be hard to climb down from such a rigid position, especially when it is no longer the Labor Party of Ehud Barak in 2009. This time it is the party of Stav Shaffir, Merav Michaeli and Itzik Shmuli - the younger generation of the Labor Party that is imbued with ideology.

Were it not for his vow not to align with Labor and fear of reviving Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett from the dead by snubbing him, Netanyahu would be knee deep in secret negotiations with Herzog, winning him over as only Netanyahu knows how.

Meanwhile, his current potential partners are not making it easy. Moshe Kahlon, in Netanyahu's view, is playing with fire. Given the number of seats that his Kulanu party won, it is doubtful that he would have been given the finance portfolio. And yet Kahlon is not satisfied with such a prestigious position, he has also presented a long list of demands that to the prime minister seems provocative.

Netanyahu, who already suffers from paranoia, is certain Kahlon wants to form a government within a government. In Netanyahu's mind, Kahlon intends to establish committees and sub-committees under the guise of reform, which would bypass the Knesset committees and provide them with the powers equal to those of the original committees. He wants to render other ministries meaningless.

In short, he sees Kahlon's demands as intended to strengthen his power to rival that of the prime minister. Netanyahu is asking himself, which is better for him - to work with Kahlon, who is plotting against him, or bring in Herzog and make him into an obedient and grateful partner.

There is also the question of where Netanyahu is headed in the diplomatic sphere. Does he intend to be a little less of a Republican leader, the head of 51st state of the United States who often appears to be running against the incumbent American president? Or will he act more like the prime minister of Israel, who has identified the possibility of a new political axis with some Arab states, Saudi Arabia, for example, countries that, like Israel, see the agreement with Iran as a disaster.

If Netanyahu does indeed see such an opportunity, then Israel may be heading for a completely different track than the obvious. The Israeli political world is having trouble understanding if the prime minister is bogged down in negotiations with potential partners, or he is deliberately dragging out the final agreements so he can change direction at the last minute.

Even Likud heavyweights Ze'ev Elkin and Yariv Levin, who are managing the coalition negotiations, know nothing about Netanyahu's true intentions. The prime minister has been able to create an environment of impotence. He uses people as pawns rather than as allies he consults with. He really has no confidence in people, real confidantes, people he trusts and whose intentions he believes.

The widespread tendency to see a joint Likud-Zionist Union government as the most likely scenario could prove to be a mistake. Currently nothing is happening on this front. There is no secret channel; there is not even an overture. Shelly Yachimovich is convinced that what happened under Barak – when she woke one morning to discover that Labor had joined the government - will not happen. Perhaps Yachimovich will not wake up to such a situation. Herzog is not Barak, and he would be sure to at least update the number 2 in his party. But it could well be that this is what the Israeli public will wake up to one morning.

So what are the chances of a unity government? Probably about 50-50. And if Netanyahu does pick up the phone and Herzog does answer in the affirmative, there is a chance that the vast majority of Zionist Union would be ready to join the coalition."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-   From today’s Turkish press

 

FOREIGN POLICY: Cengiz Candar detects an opportunist foreign policy in centre-left Radikal: "President Erdogan is aware that the 'precious isolation' that the government has got into because of its foreign policy mistakes both in the region and the international arena has been of no benefit. To escape from this 'isolation', it has found the opportunity to follow Saudi Arabia and take a 'militant' anti-Iranian stance in Yemen. The ‘Qatari-Turkish Sunni sub-axis’ has now been replaced by the ‘Saudi-led Sunni axis in which Turkey is a partner’. This axis has emerged because of Yemen, but is basically aimed at Iran."

Semih Idiz makes a similar point in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "In short, the AKP's [ruling Justice and Development Party] ideological policies based on a Sunni Islamist world view have brought Turkey no benefit either regionally or globally. For some time now, Ankara's loss of its regional influence due to its serious miscalculations have eroded the admiration felt for Erdogan and the AKP on the Arab street. In the end, both the policy of 'zero problems with neighbors' and the desire to make Turkey a regional 'game setting power' have failed."

Kadri Gursel also believes that ‘Sunni’ Turkey will have no positive role to play in centrist Milliyet: "Will Turkey, with its 'Sunni actor' identity, be part of any possible Saudi Arabia-Iran tension in the future, or will it play a role in reducing this tension? Turkey’s 'Sunni actor' identity has failed to play a crisis-solving role in Syria, and it became a provocateur and part of the clash and impasse instead. In the coming tensions that are awaiting the region, Turkey, with its 'Sunni actor' identity, will have no positive role to play either."

 

GENERAL ELECTIONS: Mehmet Tezkan seeks an answer in Milliyet: "If the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance] passes the 10% electoral threshold, the situation will change. The project of a presidential system will be shelved. No matter what the government does, it will not have the number of MPs necessary to change the constitution. But supporting the HDP has both its pros and cons. We are being asked; 'if we do not support the HDP and it fails to pass the 10% threshold, a presidential system will be instituted, however, and if we support the HDP and give a higher place, we will be indirectly supporting the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]. So what should we do?' We need to provide an answer. What should be done?"

Cuneyt Arcayurek approves of the opposition’s attempt to reach out in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "If one examines the AKP’s candidates’ lists, one can easily see that the cadre whose loyalty to Erdogan has been proven, has been rewarded there. But opposition CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu is giving his party not a national but an international character by nominating candidates from all groups from Armenian to Roman, from Alevite to Sunni, in order to give the CHP color regarding its voter base."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Hard-line Keyhan rejects the Lausanne agreement: "The Additional Protocol in the Lausanne agreement allows inspectors to inspect all facilities at any time without prior notice. This protocol not only endangers our nuclear security, but our overall security. The only way is to annul the Lausanne agreement. Some refer to the undeniable fact that America cannot be trusted and conclude that there is no guarantee that America will fulfil its obligations. But the U.S. does not need to breach or disregard its commitments and obligations! Why?! Because all its demands have been met in the Lausanne agreement. Not only it does not need to breach, America would be concerned lest Iran may not conform to what was accepted in Lausanne!" 

Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz expresses scepticism: "The Lausanne statement is due to be turned into an agreement by the end of June 2015. The Americans are already raising more demands and making requirements beyond the agreement. If a deal is finally reached, there is no guarantee from the IAEA for an even-handed implementation of the agreement because the Agency has followed double-standards in its policy towards Iran. This will continue after signing an agreement."

Hard-line Javan expects an economic transformation: "If a nuclear agreement removes Western artificial barriers in the way of Iran's economic rebound, many regional countries such as Turkey will face strategic losses. Their national and regional positions and role will be undermined. A nuclear agreement that removes all sanctions would be a great economic event in the region and will change Iran's economic potential and turn the country into a great power."

 

TURKISH PRESIDENT'S VISIT: Conservative Resalat wonders how Erdogan is going to reconcile his deeds with his words: "In his meeting with the Supreme Leader, President Erdogan stressed the need for resolving the problems of the Muslim world from within and without Western interference. What steps has Erdogan taken to control ISIS and other terror groups such as the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Al-Nusrah? Instead of being a barrier for terrible Takfiris, Erdogan has become an anchor for these pawns and their Saudi, Zionist and Western supporters. Regarding the crisis in Yemen, Erdogan is standing by Saudi Arabia and others who have invaded the country. Does Erdogan see this as helping the Muslim world and ensuring their security? Is the unity of the Muslim world safeguarded by killing innocent Muslims?!" 

Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami rebukes: "Amid regional chaos and the abusive behaviour of terror supporters, Erdogan's visit to Tehran provoked special sensitivity. The Iranian nation has no problems with Turkey and the Turkish people; there are many commonalities due to cultural and religious ties. Unfortunately, the conduct of Erdogan's government in recent years towards regional crises made Turkey one of the main supporters of terrorist groups like ISIS and a factor of instability in the region. Serious Iranian objections in this visit prompted the Turkish press to call it Tehran's yellow card to Erdogan." 

Moderate Iran stresses the strategic nature of the relationship: "Erdogan's visit to Tehran and the signing of eight agreements indicate the importance of the visit as well as the two countries' willingness to expand bilateral ties. The Iran/Turkey relation is strategic and very crucial for the people of both countries and for the entire Middle East. It is necessary to safeguard this relationship very well and not allow some stances and differences that affect or undermine it. Major joint economic projects in the fields of energy, transportation, car manufacturing and petrochemical industries can help strengthen ties between the two countries and foil the plots of the enemies."

 

YEMEN: Conservative Hemayat wonders: "Due to defeats in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia is seeking to compensate and regain its lost power as the godfather of Arab countries. Saudi-led attacks on Houthi positions and civilian areas, including schools, health centres and infrastructure raise the question whether the Saudis want to target Houthis or the entire Yemeni soil with destructive bombs?" 

Reformist E'temad hopes for an Iranian mediating role:" The situation in Yemen is rapidly changing. Some Yemeni officials, who used to have good relations with Iran, have changed now in favour of Saudi Arabia and its air strikes. Afghanistan has also supported the Saudi attacks. Iran can play an effective role to establish peace in Yemen; Tehran should maintain its neutrality and play a mediating role in this crisis."

 

IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA: Reformist Arman counsels calm: "We should behave calmly and try to prevent new tensions in the region so that the nuclear negotiations reach a favourable outcome. If we maintain conditions in the region in their current state with the cooperation against ISIS continuing through supporting Iraq's government, and if Iran-Saudi disputes are not fuelled, then by the beginning of summer, when the nuclear talks reach their final phase, Iran's status will reach a new height and the power structure in the region will change."

 

KILLING OF IRANIAN GUARDS IN SOUTH-EASTERN PROVINCE: Reformist Mardom Salari is concerned by recent terrorist killings: "It is interesting that this crime has taken place while the country is in the jubilant mood of good nuclear news. Terrorist attacks on border stations, hostage taking and blackmailing will damage Rowhani's government's character and harm its policies on the way of opening foreign ties and attracting international investments."

 

OIL INDUSTRY AFTER SANCTIONS: Conservative Khorasan considers some problems: "Following the Lausanne statement, the Oil Ministry has upgraded its efforts to increase production capacity to expand the oil market. Under current conditions of supply and demand the increase in Iranian oil production will definitely strike another blow to oil prices, which may neutralize the gains resulting from oil production increases. China, at present, purchases half of Iran's oil and has invested in many of Iran's energy projects. But it is dangerous and against the policies of the Resistance Economy to create monopoly among oil customers and project contractors. With the smallest problem in the two countries' ties, big shocks will be inflicted on the economy."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Going to war in Yemen

2-The Syrian authorities’ duty

3-Fixed interests

 

1-Going to war in Yemen

 

Egypt is a major power and it needs regional relations to help confront the threats surrounding it. The same goes for Saudi Arabia that has been dragged into a war [in Yemen], which is its first for a quarter-of-a-century. But the situation today is more difficult than it was when the world was divided into two camps, with each camp fighting on behalf of its ally, while those outside both camps were left vulnerable. Today, by way of contrast, there is limited chance of relying on foreign treaties and camps. There is no longer any alternative but to develop a regional network of alliances that can counter the terror that surrounds us--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat

 

The Egyptian public has so far not been informed that a decision has been taken to take part in the ground war in Yemen. This is being left to speculation and conclusions based on putting various bits of evidence together and inferences that may be right or wrong. And the relative ambiguity surrounding this issue is most likely to be deliberate. It stems from the public's wariness when it comes to sending Egyptian troops to fight foreign battles that have nothing to do with defending Egypt's borders. This is especially true when the issue at stake is complex, is surrounded by much confusion, and its future horizons remain unknown. And this is to say nothing of the country’s collective memory that is haunted by previous costly experiences that leaves the Egyptian people wary of engaging in risky adventures of this nature--Fahmi Houeidi in Egyptian Ashurouq

 

The Tiran Islands that Israel has occupied in the Red Sea are more worthy of a Saudi attack and these states' 'enthusiasm' for defending [Saudi Arabia]. And this is to say nothing of the American and French bases in Djibouti that no Saudi and none of those who are hypocritically going along with the Kingdom, have dared to mention. Religion also is not a real reason. Islam has been repressed in the ‘Land of the First of the two Qiblas and the Third of the Two Harams’ [Saudi Arabia] for over sixty years. Yet not a single Pakistani or Turk has volunteered to liberate it…Nor is the Iranian 'threat' a real reason. Iran has long borders as well as excellent economic and political relations with both Pakistan and Turkey. So why should the Iranian threat make a trip around the world before reaching Pakistan and Turkey that are right next door?--Khalid al-Ashhab in Syrian ath-Thawra

 

Certain parties seem to be bent on ruining Egyptian/Saudi relations against the background of the continuing war in Yemen, warns a veteran Saudi commentator. But Cairo should realize that its own security is best protected by cooperation and collective action with its Saudi ally. The Egyptian authorities have been very unforthcoming and opaque about their decision to join the Saudi war in Yemen, notes a moderate Egyptian Islamist. They have thereby denied themselves the cover that the Egyptian public could provide any official decision in this regard. The main reason why some states have been hypocritically expressing their enthusiasm for joining the Saudi war on Yemen stems from their need for Riyadh’s money and its labor markets, says a commentator in a Syrian state-owned daily

 

A DIFFICULT WAR: "New F-16 fighters, Harpoon missiles, and M-1 tanks are being shipped to Egypt to join the Egyptian armed forces arsenal as they fight a difficult war in Sinai against extremist groups, and to protect the borders with Libya, their second fighting front," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Thursday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

But what is behind this sudden American love for [Egyptian President] 'Abdelfattah as-Sissi's government? It is because Washington has backtracked on its decision to punish the Egyptian authorities for toppling the Muslim Brotherhood. The American president has called his Egyptian counterpart and had a make-up conversation with him, in which he informed him of the decision to resume the American military and economic aid package that was agreed upon decades ago with the late president Anwar as-Sadat. The American administration had frozen this aid in October 2013.

In this manner, the Brotherhood leaf has finally been turned on the international arena – apart from the virtual world of Twitter and Facebook. But now that the Brotherhood has lost U.S. support for its 'legitimacy,' it is turning its attention to ruining Egyptian/Arab relations. It has spread various reports and explanations for why the Egyptian forces are not fighting alongside with their allies, the Saudi armed forces and the other Operation Decisive Storm states, claiming that these relations have suffered a setback.

But this ignores Egyptian naval activity in the Red Sea. It also ignores what is more important – namely the fact that the strategic relationship between the two countries has become firmer, and that both sides value it greatly in an era of anarchy the likes of which our region has never known in terms of scale and the multiple threats to every state. It is in light of all this that we should understand how valuable these relations are, and why they cannot be squandered simply because a few journalists hold a different view, or because there are those in opposition who wish to spoil the general climate in order to sabotage these relations.

The region needs a balance that is not shaken by disagreements, or rumor, or voices that have other agendas. As long as the vision is clear regarding the nature of the threats and storms that are surrounding us, collective relations are the most effective means of confronting any disagreements that may arise, or differences that our enemies may provoke. Amidst this jungle, collective relations represent the best means of safeguarding the region's countries, their relations, and their alliances, when they face the threat of being picked on separately and weakened by the wolves lying in wait both inside and outside these countries. For without strong relations, it will be easy to swallow up these countries one after the other.

Egypt is a major power and it needs regional relations to help confront the threats surrounding it. The same goes for Saudi Arabia that has been dragged into a war [in Yemen], which is its first for a quarter-of-a-century. But the situation today is more difficult than it was when the world was divided into two camps, with each camp fighting on behalf of its ally, while those outside both camps were left vulnerable. Today, by way of contrast, there is limited chance of relying on foreign treaties and camps. There is no longer any alternative but to develop a regional network of alliances that can counter the terror that surrounds us.

By building alliances with clear aims and commitments, it will be possible to head towards the negotiating table that the Americans are proposing in order to reach regional understandings. For it is not possible to sit at such a table with a party that is talking to you while holding a gun under the table, and openly wallowing in the destruction of the region.

Iran and its allies across the region are spreading terror. They have reached southern Syria, not very far from Jordan's borders. The Houthis’ militias that are fighting with Iranian backing have captured two neighborhoods in Yemeni Aden. The Iraqi militias, also loyal to Iran, instigated an unjustified battle near the Kuwaiti borders a month ago. And, as I mentioned above, Egypt is fighting in Sinai using heavy weapons against the so-called Sinai Wilayah [ISIS Islamic province]. And the Egyptians may find themselves forced to intervene in Libya directly because of the emergence of terrorist mini-states there.

The politicians among us do not need us to remind them of this situation and of the threats posed by the major regional war that is now raging, because they are living that war on a daily basis.

“But it may be necessary to remind them of the importance of collective thinking and action, and of the need to build a coalition that imposes itself on the calculations of both regional and foreign powers," concludes Rashed.

End…

 

OFFICIAL STATEMENT: "The official statement said that Egypt’s defense minister is visiting Pakistan at the head of a senior military delegation on a mission that will take a number of days and that aims to bolster cooperation and strengthen military relations between the two countries’ armed forces," notes Fahmi Houeidi in the Egyptian daily Ashurouq.

This was what was published in [the Cairo dailies] al-Ahram and Ashurouq yesterday. On the other hand, al-Masri al-Yawm published the same statement but highlighted it in a different manner that has its own significant implications. Its front-page headline read as follows: ‘[Defense Minister] Subhi in Islamabad and the Pakistani Parliament Discusses Intervention in Yemen.’ In other words, it cleverly situated the report within its proper context. It did not say that he was going to discuss the issue [the war in Yemen], but it did connect between the minister's visit and the current debate in the Pakistani parliament, leaving it to the reader to deduce the message.

On the other hand, at-Tahrir daily went further and was more direct. It gave priority to professional standards at the cost of political calculations. The report on its front page came under the following headline: 'Egypt and Pakistan Prepare for the Ground War in Yemen.' Even though the paper published the statement issued by the Egyptian armed forces that did not mention the true aim of the visit, it added that 'there is not the slightest doubt that the visit is closely linked to the two countries' participation in the expected ground war in Yemen.' And it drew attention to the fact that the Egyptian defense minister's visit to Pakistan occurred only hours after the Djiboutian Chief of Staff arrived in Cairo for the same reason, bearing in mind that Djibouti (which is an Arab League member) lies on the Western shores of the Bab al-Mandab Straits and is the headquarters of the international forces that guard the Straits.

At-Tahrir also noted that Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif inaugurated his country's parliamentary debate with a speech in which he said that Saudi Arabia has asked Pakistan for warplanes, warships, and troops. The paper also noted that the Pakistani ground forces had carried out comprehensive military maneuvers with Saudi troops that went by the code name as-Samsam-5 in preparation for combat in mountainous areas.

If we were to add all this up, it would allow us to conclude that an Egyptian decision has been taken to part in the war raging in Yemen. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia has asked Pakistan for military help in terms of warplanes and soldiers, it is very likely to have asked Cairo for the same. Therefore, the Egyptian defense minister's visit to Pakistan is not meant to discuss the principle of participation; the decision to participate must have been already been taken in Cairo, and the visit's aim must be to discuss the means of implementing it.

There is a difference between the two countries in terms of the degree of transparency and consultation regarding this issue. Intervention is being discussed in the Pakistani legislature, and the Pakistani defense minister has declared before parliament that his country has received a Saudi request for such intervention. In Egypt, by contrast, the matter remains wrapped in mystery. There is no open discussion of this issue. It is most likely to have been discussed at last Saturday’s meeting of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), which lasted for six hours. President Sissi subsequently said that the meeting had discussed a number of regional issues, including bolstering security on Egypt's Western borders, the development of military operations, and the overall situation in Yemen. He then noted that Egypt would not abandon its Arab brothers, not only in the Gulf, which is a red line and an inseparable part of Egyptian national security, but in all Arab countries as well. This merely reinforces what I have suggested above.

The truth is that the Egyptian public has so far not been informed that a decision has been taken to take part in the ground war in Yemen. This is being left to speculation and conclusions based on putting various bits of evidence together and inferences that may be right or wrong. And the relative ambiguity surrounding this issue is most likely to be deliberate. It stems from the public's wariness when it comes to sending Egyptian troops to fight foreign battles that have nothing to do with defending Egypt's borders. This is especially true when the issue at stake is complex, is surrounded by much confusion, and its future horizons remain unknown. And this is to say nothing of the country’s collective memory that is haunted by previous costly experiences that leaves the Egyptian people wary of engaging in risky adventures of this nature.

One interesting irony worth noting is that, while the Egyptian authorities have preferred to remain silent and have only indirectly and cautiously hinted at their decision, Egypt’s political parties have also exercised the same caution. My information indicates that some parties have discussed the issue of ground intervention, but have not express a clear view, either for or against. There have been many attempts to explain this position; the result has been that the arena has been left open to rumors that have confused the public, as well as trying to fill the increasingly wide gap between the authorities and society.

I realize that the issue is delicate and complicated. I do not know the limits of the price that Egypt is willing to pay if it agrees to take part in the war in Yemen, or if it decides to steer clear and avoid being implicated in it. After all, Yemen has a special place in Egyptian popular memory, while the Egyptian authorities have their own special calculations regarding their relations with Saudi Arabia.

I believe that transparency – if it is an option – can provide the appropriate cover for Egypt’s position, because if the voice of society is heard, it may help contain the situation and comprehend its limits and motives.

"I hope that this will not happen only after it is too late," concludes Houeidi.

End…

 

WAR OF AGGRESSION: "What could possibly possess certain regional Arab and non-Arab countries, including Pakistan and Turkey, to go along with Saudi Arabia's rulers' hypocrisy and express their willingness to send large armies to join the war on Yemen, when they are well aware that it is indeed a war of aggression?" asks Khalid al-Ashhab in Thursday's official Syrian daily ath-Thawra.

Regional security and the Bab al-Mandab straits are not true reasons. For tens of years passed, Yemen has never posed a regional security threat. In fact, the only threat to the area’s security has come from Israel, and from Somalia as a result of all that has been happening there over the past two decades. The Tiran Islands that Israel has occupied in the Red Sea are more worthy of a Saudi attack and these states' 'enthusiasm' for defending the Kingdom. And this is to say nothing of the American and French bases in Djibouti that no Saudi and none of those who are hypocritically going along with the Kingdom, have dared to mention.

Religion also is not a real reason. Islam has been repressed in the ‘Land of the First of the two Qiblas and the Third of the Two Harams’ [Saudi Arabia] for over sixty years. Yet not a single Pakistani or Turk has volunteered to liberate it. Moreover, Al Saud do not represent Islam, and have not been delegated with the mission of protecting it. Furthermore, Yemen is Muslim through and through!

Nor is the Iranian 'threat' a real reason. Iran has long borders as well as excellent economic and political relations with both Pakistan and Turkey. So why should the Iranian threat make a trip around the world before reaching Pakistan and Turkey that are right next door?

But please note that the majority of states that are eager to join the war on poor and destitute Yemen are themselves hungry states that have a large labor force in Saudi Arabia.

"Given this, why should hunger not turn from being a kafir to being a takfiri [as the Arab saying goes], especially, if it is being promised satiation?" asks Ashhab in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

2-The Syrian authorities’ duty

 

It is up to the Syrian authorities to save the lives of Palestinians suffering terrible conditions in Yarmouk Camp, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

The fighting in Palestinian Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus now threatens the lives of some 18-thousand civilians still living there, notes the editorial on an online pan-Arab daily. It is the duty of the Syrian authorities to spare their lives, despite the serious threat from ISIS fighters so close to the capital.

 

RIFE WITH THREATS: "To live in Syria or most of its areas these days, is a choice that is rife with threats because of the war conditions that the country has been experiencing ever since the crisis began four years ago," writes Thursday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

But if one is an inhabitant of Yarmouk Camp, then both one’s suffering and the threats to one’s life are multiplied many times over.

This camp, which is close to Damascus, has turned into one of the hottest points of conflict between the regime and the hard-line Islamist factions that want to take control of the camp and use it as a launching pad for their military attacks and bombardments of civilian and military targets inside the capital.

In this newspaper, we have avoided taking sides with the Palestinian victims, whether in Yarmouk Camp or in any other Palestinian camp because we draw no distinction between one victim and another in this bloody conflict, especially when these victims are innocent people. We see no difference between a Syrian and a Palestinian. They are all brothers and they all share the same creed.

What has led us to this position is not only our Islamic and Arab convictions, but the fact that some people are ignoring these days against the background of the intensifying conflict, namely, that ever since the 1948 Nakba successive Syrian governments have treated the Palestinian refugees in the same manner they treat Syrian citizens without discrimination, whether in terms of military service, education, health, social services or minor or senior posts in all institutions – with some very limited exceptions.

Today, Yarmouk Camp is back as the main headline in all the newspapers and TV news bulletins after ISIS has succeeded in imposing its control over most of the camp that is also under siege from Syrian forces, after bloody clashes with Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis that is reported to be affiliated to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).

Tens of thousands of the camp's inhabitants – some of them Syrian – have left and sought refuge in other refugee camps inside or outside Syria. This has occurred after they suffered from a severe famine two years ago, leading them to live off grass and refuse. But what was most painful was seeing their children and family members die of starvation before their very eyes. And those who managed to find something to eat would only live for a few more days before being killed by a bullet or a mortar shell or under the ruins of their bombarded homes.

The number of inhabitants in the camp has dropped from 180 thousand to 18 thousand at present. Over the past few days, two thousands of them have been forced out, while the fate of those remaining is still unknown. But that fate is risky, no matter what happens because of the raging battles between the fighters over control of the camp, and the intensification of the siege that has been imposed on it.

There are conflicting reports from the camp that reflect the various tendencies and affiliations of the groups issuing them. But when the Syrian Minister for National Reconciliation Ali Haidar announces at a press conference after meeting with PLO Executive Committee Member Mr. Ahmad Majdalani on Tuesday that the situation in Yarmouk Camp calls for 'a military solution', this means that the Syrian authorities are determined to use every means of force against these elements in the camp. This will place the lives of those still there in danger; after all, the shells and explosive barrels used in other areas of Syria where the armed opposition has fortified itself have not distinguished between civilians and armed persons in most cases.

The Syrian minister wants to hold the armed groups that took control of the camp a week ago responsible for any terrifying threat to the camp's inhabitants. He wants to accuse them of obstructing the path of reconciliation in the camp, as well as the understandings reached to spare its people further danger. But this attempt to shift responsibility to others remains unconvincing, because it is the Syrian authorities' duty to preserve the lives of innocent people by every possible means.

We are fully aware of what the presence of armed ISIS elements in a camp less than 8 kilometers south of the capital Damascus means. But we also realize that the lives of thousands of its inhabitants that have nothing to do with this bloody conflict must be preserved, just like the lives of millions of Syrians. They must be kept safe and secure.

"This can be achieved either by avoiding shelling the areas where they live, or by ending the siege on the camp in a manner that allows them safe passage if negotiations with the various parties to reach a solution that avoids bloodshed were to fail," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

3-Fixed interests

 

Washington has ended the freeze on arms’ supplies to Egypt because it has a fixed interest in doing so, says Ahmad Sayyid Ahmad in Egyptian al-Ahram

 

Many factors were behind the U.S. administration's decision to end the freeze on military aid to Egypt that was imposed in the aftermath of the June 2013 uprising against former Muslim Brotherhood president Mursi, maintains an Egyptian commentator. But this only highlights the fact that any change in U.S. policy towards Egypt takes place within strict limits that are never transgressed.

 

IMPORTANT TURNAROUND: "President Obama's decision to release some of the frozen military aid to Egypt is an important turnaround in U.S. policy towards what is happening in the country, and a reflection of the strategic relations between the two countries," writes Ahmad Sayyid Ahmad in the authoritative Cairo daily al-Ahram.

After the June 30th [2013] revolution, the U.S. administration and Congress for the first time laid down political preconditions for the annual military aid to Egypt, estimated at around 1.3-billion dollars, which Egypt has been receiving since 1979. The U.S. stopped the delivery of 12 F-16 warplanes that were supposed to be delivered by the end of 2013 in accordance with a deal struck in 2010. It also stopped the delivery of some spare parts for the Abrams tanks jointly-produced in Egypt with the U.S., as well as a number of Apache helicopters and other weapons systems.

The U.S. linked the release of these arms to the progress made towards implementing the electoral dates in the [post-Mursi] Egyptian roadmap, upholding the peace treaty [with Israel], and fighting terrorism in Sinai. This constituted a major turnabout in the U.S.'s fixed principles in dealing with Egypt and its vital interests there. After all, safeguarding the extent and nature of military aid confirms the extent to which the U.S. links its interests to Egypt's regional role in maintaining security and stability and in fighting terrorism.

The annual economic aid also changed in size, dropping from 815 million dollars in 1998, to 415 million dollars in 2008 and then to 250 million dollars by the end of Bush Jr.'s term in office. Its structure and the manner in which it is spent also changed, with a large part of aid going to support democracy and political reform in Egypt, and to financing civil society organizations, even including NGOs that are not officially registered with the Egyptian government. That has led to tension between the two countries on more than one occasion.

But by way of contrast, the U.S. administration has been concerned to maintain its military aid. In fact, when Congress passed legislation making that aid conditional by freezing or reducing or linking it to fighting the smuggling via tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, the administration used its prerogative and bypassed Congress's terms on the grounds that that is linked to U.S. national security interests and to common interests between the two countries.

For this reason, imposing conditions on military aid was somewhat perverse and exceptional within the context of U.S. policy and its fixed principles towards Egypt for over three decades, which balanced considerations of interest against the requirements of democracy. Moreover, although Congress imposed a framework for sanctions, the U.S. administration could avoid these sanctions altogether by invoking its powers relating to U.S. national security.

For this reason, the latest U.S. move has a number of implications, including:

- First, the decision to release military aid came to correct an anomalous situation that lasted for over two years and that has had a negative impact on U.S. interests in Egypt and the region, and for American weapons-manufacturers and their workforce after the freeze on the scheduled delivery of arms.

- Second, Egypt’s role in fighting terrorism in Sinai and destroying the smuggler tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, as well as in fighting terrorism in Libya, Yemen, and the region, has led the U.S. administration to reconsider its positions, especially after the Egyptian government's moves towards upholding the electoral roadmap's datelines. Most important was the [2014] promulgation of a new constitution and presidential elections; moreover, parliamentary elections are supposed to be held this year. For this reason, there were no longer any justifications for continuing to impose Congress's preconditions on the release of military aid. Furthermore, Egypt is upholding the peace treaty with Israel, which gives the administration some flexibility to release the aid.

- Third, Egypt's move toward diversifying its arms’ supplies by acquiring weapons both from Russia and France (after the recent Rafale fighters deal) has been a source of annoyance for the U.S. administration. It fears that its influence may be eroding as a result of the retreat of its weapons supplies to Egypt, especially after the strong Gulf support Cairo has received that has compensated for the freeze on both American military and economic aid. This factor has pressured the administration into releasing the weapons destined for Egypt, especially the F-16s and the Apache helicopters that play an important role in the fight against terrorism.

Although President Obama's recent decision does not mean that the military aid and weapons’ systems meant for Egypt will be released immediately since the administration has yet to testify before Congress's regarding Egypt's compliance its preconditions, a review of the administration's positions and Congress’ tendencies especially among the Republicans that are supportive of resuming aid and opposed to a continued freeze, should speed up the delivery of arms to Egypt.

Furthermore, the decision to change the nature of military aid beginning in 2018 by diverting most of it towards fighting terrorism and naval security is nothing new. It is part of the administration’s fixed principles and its standing commitment to Israel's security in light of pressure from the Jewish lobby and some pro-Israeli members of Congress. But this will have no great effect, given Egypt's diversification of its sources of arms, and the concern of U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democratic to maintain strong military ties with Cairo. "That always imposes a limit on any change in U.S. policy towards Egypt; any such changes are always about the means and never the ends," concludes Ahmad.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 09.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Between Churchill and Nixon

 

Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel Hayom lead their Thursday edition with the death of a 12-year-old Israeli girl in a fire aboard a ferry in Thailand. Haaretz, leads with an interview with the IDF's Military Advocate General, Maj. Gen. Danny Efroni, who talks about the investigations that he and his team conduct into improper behavior by soldiers – and insists that he has never claimed that the IDF is the most moral army in the world. The Jerusalem Post leads with yesterday's stabbing attack in the West Bank, in which two soldiers were wounded and their Palestinian assailant was shot dead.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, Israel Radio reports that Palestinian police said Wednesday that they had extended their security control in parts of the West Bank following a deal with Israel, launching armed patrols for the first time in towns near Jerusalem. A spokesman for Palestinian police said that 90 officers had deployed in Abu Dis, Al-Ram and Bidu, towns that had been largely under Israeli security control since the 1993 interim peace accord.

Subsequent negotiations between the two sides have failed to secure a lasting deal, but minor advancements were made on the sidelines of the now-defunct U.S.-brokered talks, including one to expand the authority of Palestinian police in some areas.

'An old agreement is being implemented today,' the Palestinian spokesman told Reuters news agency, adding that the officers, armed with rifles and pistols, would mainly be responsible for fighting crime. It was not immediately clear why the deal had been revived and Israeli officials had no immediate comment, said Reuters. Palestinian police have patrolled other parts of the West Bank, but largely in areas under the direct control of the Palestinian Authority, such as Ramallah and Bethlehem. Palestinian neighborhoods near Jerusalem have been mainly under the control of Israeli forces.

Iran remains very firmly in the headlines. Internet news sites report comments by Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, who said that Teheran will only sign a final nuclear accord with the six world powers if all sanctions imposed on the country over its disputed nuclear work are lifted on the same day. 'We want a win-win deal for all parties involved in the nuclear talks,' Rowhani said.

Elsewhere, Yedioth Ahronoth reports that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Wednesday that a final nuclear accord with Iran would demand that Tehran disclose its past military-related nuclear activities. 'It will be part of a final agreement. It has to be,' Kerry said Wednesday during an interview with PBS NewsHour. 'They have to do it. It will be done. If there's going to be a deal, it will be done.' The Iranian defense minister made clear on Wednesday that international inspectors would not be granted access to the state's military sites under the framework agreement. Kerry also discussed the mounting U.S. domestic opposition the nuclear talks face. He said Congress had a role in moving the framework agreement forward, provided it was 'constructive.'

The papers also report on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's response to U.S. President Barack Obama's interview earlier this week, in which the American leader said that, 13 to 15 years after the nuclear agreement with Iran would go into effect, the Islamic Republic's breakout time to acquire enough fissile material for an atomic bomb could be close to zero. During a family visit to the Negev, the prime minister said that the minimal breakout time 'will be the inevitable result of the automatic lifting of the sanctions, which would allow Iran to achieve a production capacity [of enriched uranium] on an industrial scale.'

Finally, the negotiations between Netanyahu's Likud party and various potential coalition partners has resumed, amid growing speculation that the Iranian nuclear deal could be the catalyst for a national unity government which includes Isaac Herzog's Zionist Union party. According to Walla!, sources close to Netanyahu have said that if Herzog does not join a Netanyahu-led government, it will be 'because of them, not us.'

On the record, a Netanyahu attorney spearheading coalition talks has made clear that if the parties with which Netanyahu's team has already been holding talks don't 'fall in line,' Likud’s team will 'explore other options.' This threat is seen as at least in part to be a tactic. However, Netanyahu's decision after the election to release frozen tax revenues for the Palestinian Authority, and now, the expanded role given to Palestinian security forces in the Jerusalem area – an old agreement now being implemented – are moves that are considered to be gestures not as much to the Palestinians, but to Herzog and his party, to show that there is common ground.

Netanyahu and his associates believe that Herzog would be ready to join under certain circumstances, and some other Zionist Union MKs are also prepared to take the plunge, however there is very strong opposition from others on Herzog's list, and he does not want a split from within.

 

NIXON VS. CHURCHILL: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea says that U.S. President Barack Obama is captivated by the idea of détente with Iran because he sees himself as the Richard Nixon of his generation – while Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu sees himself as the Winston Churchill of his generation.

"U.S. President Barack Obama invited Thomas Friedman, the acclaimed New York Times columnist, to interview him in the Oval Office last weekend. The invitation was not by chance; nor was the timing. Obama was looking at two target audiences: Democratic Senators and Israeli public opinion. Friedman is widely read by both. Israelis would be important to Obama in their own right, but they are even more important because of the indirect influence they have over the battle for the Senate.

Like in any political dogfight, this is about numbers. Of the 100 members of the Senate, 54 are Republicans. They would have no problem passing a law that would render the agreement with Iran dead in the water. The president would use his veto and the bill would go back to the Senate. In order to overcome the presidential veto, the Republicans would need a two-thirds majority. In other words, they would need the support of 13 Democratic senators. This whole battle is over the support of those 13.

Israeli governments have, in the past, tried to get the support of both houses of Congress in their battles against the White House. Most of these efforts have ended in failure. But a battle of this kind is something new; not in terms of the importance to both sides and not in terms of how deep it goes into the very heart of American politics, the U.S. president and the Israeli prime minister are trying to pull the carpet out from under each other's feet.

This is an asymmetrical game and it began with Netanyahu enjoying a major advantage. The Republican majority in Congress is at his disposal; Jewish billionaires who are willing to give generously to any Democratic Senator who sides with the Republicans are equally willing to punish those that don't. Israel and Netanyahu have the support of the American people on a very profound level, which is not something that Obama can claim about his relationship with the Israeli people.

This asymmetry is a double-edged sword, however. Netanyahu is the prime minister of a relatively small country, which is an American satellite. There are those who see his efforts to get the better of a serving American president as an act of heroism; others see it as megalomania, impudence and wanton disregard of Israel's long-term interests. The first to feel this discomfort are Democratic Senators, who are the target of Netanyahu's campaign.

There is a major rift between Obama and Netanyahu. On the Iranian issue, what divides them is much more than the clauses of the Lausanne agreement. Based on Obama's most recent comments, in public and behind closed doors, it seems that he is totally captivated by the idea of spearheading a détente with Iran. There is something romantic and emotional about his pursuit of the Iranians. This may sound odd and rather speculative, given that Obama is known to be a highly intellectual and cold politician. I will try to explain.

Obama began his first term of office with a grand gesture toward the Arab world – a gesture that reached its climax in June 2009, when he addressed students at Cairo University. I was there and I saw the expression of wonder on the faces of the audience. Obama was telling hundreds of millions of people across the Arab world that this was the dawn of a new day – that was even the headline of his speech – a new start that would bring liberal democracy, justice, equality and Western secular values to the Arab world. There was much romance and optimism in that speech, but very few signs that the president of the United States understood Middle Eastern history. Just like the farmer in the Isaiah's parable, Obama waited for a harvest of sweet grapes, but the grapes that grew were bitter.

What has happened in the Arab world since then has been nothing but disappointment for Obama. He is not a big fan of Egyptian President Abdelfattah el-Sissi, who was put into power by the military and who only continues to rule with its help. He has nothing but disdain for the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, who are wallowing in their own obscene wealth and corruption. Iran caught his eye because of its 5,000-year history, because of the injustice that the United States did it when it overthrew a legitimate government in 1953 and imposed the Shah’s regime in its place. The Iranians identified these feeling in Obama and took full advantage.

Most of all, Obama was in love with the idea that he could make his mark on American history. In less than two years, he will become an ex-president: Iran is his last chance. In conversations with American officials and commentators, I ask whether they see any similarity between what Obama is trying to do with Iran and what President Richard Nixon did with China in the 1970s – when, in one fell swoop, he overcame three decades of uncompromising enmity. In so doing, Nixon turned his back on Taiwan – a country which had a closer alliance with the United States than even Israel does today and which, for many years, had even more influence in Congress than we do.

If, in this analogy, Iran has assumed the role of the People's Republic of China, who is playing the role of Taiwan – the spurned ally? Is it Egypt? Saudi Arabia? Israel? All of them? In response, one American official told me to take a good look at where Taiwan is today. It's prosperous and happy; it has invested heavily in China and China has invested in Taiwan.

Netanyahu listens to Khamenei and sees himself as Churchill facing up to Hitler. When Obama sent a letter to Khamenei, he saw himself as Nixon meeting with Chairman Mao. That is the main reason for the gulf between them."

Ends…

 

ON PAROLE: Writing in Makor Rishon, Amnon Lord says that both Iran and the United States are 'on parole' as far as Israel is concerned – they must both be on their best behavior to gain our trust.

"The well-documented spat between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama, which reignited this week, proves that Israel is as relevant as it ever was. It doesn't matter that Obama criticizes Netanyahu; what matters is that our prime minister continues to set the agenda. His decision to make a pilgrimage to Capitol Hill six weeks ago and to address a joint session of Congress was the right thing to do. Obama tried to employ old-style Soviet tactics: he tried to crawl under the radar toward a bad deal with Iran. Netanyahu's Congress speech put Israel's arguments back in the limelight. And Israel benefitted on two fronts: the Congress front and the White House front.

Obama got the better of the initial exchanges after the Lausanne Document was signed, since it was seen by parts of the media as being better than expected. On the other hand, everyone now agrees that Obama must take Israel's concerns into account and must convince us that our security is being safeguarded. In an interview with Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, he appeared insulted that the Israeli people do not trust him implicitly. When Netanyahu was interviewed by NBC, he was asked time and time again whether he trusts Obama.

There are two players here who are out on parole. Not Obama and Netanyahu, however; Obama and Iran. Both sides must prove that they are capable of behaving properly. That means that Obama must refrain from taking any anti-Israel measures on the Palestinian front. There is nothing that would undermine Israelis' faith in him faster than a highly critical resolution in the United Nations Security Council. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas' rather vague announcement that he is willing to resume negotiations and to meet with Netanyahu would seem to suggest that the Palestinians' unilateral path is at a dead end. One way or another, Obama will prevent the passage of a UN resolution that bypasses negotiations to establish a Palestinian state. The same goes for Iran, which must also be on its best behavior; it cannot goad Hizbollah into attacking Israel in the foreseeable future.

The combination of Netanyahu and Israel's ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer, is working effectively. There is a chance that a majority in the Senate will overturn the presidential veto and will force the Obama Administration to link the lifting of sanctions to very specific clauses in the nuclear agreement; for example, the closure of the Fordow facility as a precondition to the lifting of some sanctions. If the leaders of the Israeli Labor Party stand firmly by Netanyahu’s side on this demand, even Democratic Senators could be persuaded to join the Republican-led move.

It is worth remembering that the Yom Kippur War erupted exactly as the United States and the Soviet Union were enjoying something of a détente. Israel believed that the chances of war had declined, but Anwar Sadat thought differently. An Iranian-American détente could also be derailed by rogue actions on the part of Hamas or Hizbollah. In this context, reports of an Israeli attack on an arms convoy in southern Libya, which was apparently making its way to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, are an important message. Cooperation between Israel and Egypt, along with the lifting of the American arms embargo on Egypt, shows that we are heading in the right direction."

Ends…

 

A BIRD IN THE BUSH: Writing in Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit says that, given the volatile situation across the Middle East, any deal that has a timeframe of 13 years is not one that can be relied on.

"The negotiations with Iran have been progressing at breakneck speed while, in the background, the Americans continue to sustain defeat after defeat: from Baghdad to Sana'a, from Tripoli to Damascus. Two days ago, U.S. President Barack Obama misspoke, telling an interviewer that, in 13 years from now, Iran would be able to manufacture a nuclear bomb. All those who heard him were shocked and he quickly tried to backpedal.

In an article published by Time Magazine, Ehud Barak wrote that, 'six times in the last generation, secondary nations have launched programs aimed at producing a nuclear arsenal.' Iraq and Syria were stopped by surgical Israeli airstrikes; Libya and apartheid-era South Africa bowed to international pressure and voluntarily gave up their aspirations. North Korea and Pakistan, he wrote, got the bomb – and Iran is following a similar path as them.

Without a credible military option, the West sought to reach a diplomatic understanding with Iran. That saw the drafting of the Lausanne Document, which in all likelihood will turn out to be a ruse. Then again, it may not. The gift of prophesy, according to the holy writings, was given only to fools.

As I see it, Obama is promising us a bird in the bush – not one in the hand. He cannot in all seriousness promise us 13 years free of an Iranian nuclear threat. But he is under criticism from a different direction – and 13 years cannot address the issue. What is needed is some level-headed thinking.

The Middle East is currently undergoing constant earthquakes. Across the region, there are sporadic but persistent outbreaks of violence. Even if all the sides say that the Lausanne document is merely a framework for a future agreement, it should have been weighed up much more seriously. After all, given the never-ending upheavals in this region, no one can say what will happen in 13 years from now.

After the fall of Communism, Professor Francis Fukuyama wrote a very optimistic essay titled 'The End of History.' He never imagined that groups like al-Qa’ida and ISIS would emerge and that countries like North Korea would have their own nuclear bomb. Everything has changed beyond recognition. What kind of shape will the United States be in by 2028? And what about the Middle East? In fact, even the ayatollah regime is in constant friction with its own subjects.

I once asked Menachem Begin if he was certain that the peace accord he signed with Egypt would last forever. He pointed out that, if there was such a thing as a peace deal that lasts forever, humankind would not have to have signed 3,000 such agreements over the course of history. His deal with Egypt – the best agreement Israel has ever signed – has lasted 37 years thus far and looks to be stable. But agreements of this kind must be fed and nurtured; they change shape over the course of time and, if violated, are trampled under the wheels of history. Thirteen years is a long time and provide an opportunity for Iran, too, to change. It is possible to stop the inferno."

Ends…

 

DROP THE SLOGANS: Writing on the Walla! website, Shimon Stein calls on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon to drop their slogans and start thinking clearly about Israel's response to the Iranian nuclear deal.

"At the end of the long and exhausting negotiations between the six world powers and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, a joint statement was issued. The warnings sounded by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon merely highlighted the fact that Israel played a less-than-marginal role in the process and, in the end, Israel's influence over the course of negotiations was minimal. There is little doubt that the world powers should and could have listened to the criticism that Netanyahu raised about the negotiations in general and the behavior of the Obama Administration in particular, but – at the end of the day – the way that our prime minister made his objections known almost forced leaders of the relevant parties to ignore him. Moreover, in addition to the criticism he leveled, the prime minister relied heavily on empty and clichéd slogans; he did not provide the international community with any realistic or reasonable alternatives to negotiations.

Even if the negotiations have not yet reached their conclusion, we can already determine that Netanyahu failed to achieve the goals that he set himself, which included the total elimination of Iran's nuclear intifada and, as part of this, an end to uranium enrichment and plutonium production on Iranian soil. In the time remaining until a final deal is signed, the prime minister would be well advised to start a process of damage limitation, which he can achieve by engaging the Obama Administration in quiet dialogue. Even if the negotiating parties still need to overcome several issues that remain unresolved by the time the final deal is due to be signed at the end of June, Israel must already start preparing for 'the day after' a deal – which, according to Netanyahu, will be a bad deal for Israel, the Middle East and the whole world.

In the context of 'the day after,' the response that Ya'alon gave when asked about the possibility that Israel could still attack Iran's nuclear facilities is interesting. 'We would prefer for the work of righteous men to be done by other people,' he said, paraphrasing the Talmud. 'But we know that it's more likely that we will have to act according to the principle of 'If I will not do for myself, who will do for me?' and if that is not enough, Brig. Gen. Nimrod Sheffer, the head of the IDF's Planning Directorate, gave an interview in which he refused to rule out the possibility that Israel would have to rely on 'dramatic measures' against Iran. One can assume that he did not mean diplomatic steps.

Comments like Sheffer's are nothing new. Throughout the course of the negotiations between Iran and the six world powers, Netanyahu and Ya'alon consistently said very much the same thing. They did so not only for domestic consumption, but also for the world to hear. Their comments were designed to make it clear to the international community that Israel could attack Iran's nuclear facilities in order to defend itself from what it sees as an ever-growing threat from the Islamic Republic and out of dissatisfaction with the way that the West was handling negotiations. Needless to say, this narrative would appear to have had some impact on the way that the world powers negotiated with Iran. At the same time, however, it seems likely that, once a deal that enjoys international support has been signed, sealed and delivered, Israel's ability to bring its influence to bear will be greatly weakened. Without getting into the details of whether or not Israel has the capability to take out Iran's nuclear facilities, we know for certain that military action would have far-reaching ramifications for Israel's international standing.

Since the option of other people doing the job for us seems more than unlikely once a deal has been signed, the job in hand – implementing the military option – will remain in Israel's hands. It is rather arrogant and it is a sign of exaggerated self-confidence that Netanyahu and Ya'alon believe that Israel alone can protect itself. Israel needs the political and military support of the United States, both in order to implement the military option regarding Iran and in the aftermath of any such attack. It would be a grave mistake to assume that this support would be forthcoming no matter what. Israel's security and international standing depend on the United States. Any attempt to forge a policy based on Netanyahu and Ya'alon's belief in Israel's total independence on such matters could be disastrous. Those people elected to lead this country and to safeguard its future must refrain from using empty slogans to present a false picture of reality."

Ends…

 

NOT ON OBAMA’S WATCH: Writing in Haaretz, Ari Shavit says that the Lausanne deal paves the way for a nightmarish not-so-distant future in which Iran is nuclear, the Middle East is nuclear and the world order collapses.

"Barack Obama is a sophisticated interviewee; the U.S. president knows how to hide his argument’s weak points behind cool curtains of clear, insightful and ostensibly well-balanced words. But my dear friend and distinguished colleague Tom Friedman is an excellent interviewer. Instead of being confrontational and petty, he knows how to wrench far-reaching statements out of his subject.

That’s the origin of a historic scoop that surprisingly seems to have escaped the attention of the U.S. media. 'Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch,' the president told his country’s most important journalist; The New York Times also included a video of the interview. I repeat, Obama told Friedman: 'Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch.'

Since the Lausanne deal was announced a week ago, it has provoked innumerable worrisome questions. Why is there no similarity between the Farsi and English versions of the text? Why do the Iranians insist that the sanctions will be lifted immediately and that they will be able to continue enriching uranium in high quantities and developing advanced centrifuges without restrictions?

Why, even according to the American version, will the Iranians be able to keep an underground nuclear facility at Fordow and a nuclear reactor at Arak? Why, even according to the American version, is it not clear whether the fissionable material (approximately 10 tons) will be leaving Iran and whether international inspectors will have free access to every site in the country?

And what’s supposed to happen 10 years from now? Don’t we want to live after 2025? Doesn’t the Lausanne deal pave the way for a nightmarish not-so-distant future in which Iran is nuclear, the Middle East is nuclear and the world order collapses?

The 15 words that Obama said to Friedman turn the question marks into exclamation marks. And they were uttered in his own voice as the camera whirled: 'I’ve been very clear that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch.' In other words, the man leading a hair-raising historic adventure says he’s committing that Iran will not become nuclear before January 20, 2017.

It’s not the 21st century that the president is trying to save. It’s not the next 21 years that the president is promising to stabilize. All Obama is promising is that in the next 21 months Iran will not produce or assemble its first nuclear bomb.

What are Israelis supposed to do with such a short-term commitment by the president? And what are the Saudis, Egyptians, Turks, Jordanians and Emiratis supposed to think? And responsible Europeans? And far-sighted Americans?

The Obama-Friedman interview doesn’t set off one alarm bell, it sets off a thousand. And when we add all the fateful questions about the Lausanne agreement, we get a strong feeling that something very dire is happening right before our eyes. We begin to suspect that the Obama-Khamenei agreement will not prevent Iran from going nuclear, but will only postpone the achievement by a few years.

The next 80 days are critical. History is watching us all closely. Where did we stand, what did we say and what did we do when the most important decision of our time was made? There will be no forgiveness for our mistakes. There will be no pardon for weakness, apathy or pettiness. The ordinary politics of left versus right is no longer relevant, nor is the love for Obama and hatred of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, or vice versa. This is a time of trouble for Jacob — a time of trouble for every Israeli, Arab, European and American who favors stability and sanity. In the balance is the world in which our children will live or die."

Ends…

 

THE PA’S AUDACITY: In its editorial on Thursday, The Jerusalem Post says that the Palestinian Authority's refusal to accept the unfrozen tax revenue that remained after Israel took off money Ramallah owes for electricity and water is a clear case of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.

"Rancor sometimes produces useless gestures of self-harm that are described as 'cutting off your nose to spite your face.' In normal circumstances self-inflicted malice is senseless, but the Palestinian Authority follows a unique brand of logic. Indeed, by PA criteria there could be massive propaganda advantage to cutting off its own nose and blaming Israel.

Ramallah’s refusal to accept tax revenue collected on its behalf by Israel is a cogent case in point. Israel froze these funds in December after the PA decided to join the International Criminal Court in The Hague and thereby instigate proceedings against Israel for alleged war crimes. Israel had failed to dissuade the PA, a supposed peace partner, from carrying out its cynical ploy. The revenue freeze was imposed to demonstrate that adversarial provocations come at a price.

But, as on previous occasions, Israeli punitive reactions are short-lived – no matter how justified. This time, too, the government relented following pressure from Washington and handed over to Ramallah NIS 1.37 billion.

But Israel held back a symbolic NIS 160,000 to defray a fraction of the PA’s NIS 2b. debt to the Israel Electric Corporation. The PA is also in massive arrears to Mekorot for water piped to it and to Israeli hospitals for unpaid medical bills.

According to PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ arithmetic, however, this token deduction amounts to 'a full third of the total.' Therefore, he said, he refuses to accept any of the money and is prepared to take Israel to the ICC over the matter. The Palestinian media, which Abbas controls, is already rife with threats that 'Israel’s thieving would be the first war crime on which it would be tried internationally.'

It might be absurd to presume that collecting a small portion of enormous outstanding utility bills can be portrayed as a war crime. But what holds true for other nations is not so in Israel’s case. While it is increasingly trendy overseas to condemn Israel on miscellaneous trumped-up charges – including apartheid, wholesale oppression, dispossession and much more in the same fallacious vein – few anywhere are aware that the supposedly downtrodden Palestinians essentially enjoy free electricity courtesy of average Israelis.

It might make for fascinating legal high jinks if Abbas does press this matter at the ICC, after having brazenly racked up alarming debts and then gallingly waited quite content to have Israelis pick up his regime’s tab. It would be interesting to see if anti-Israel bias could move jurists abroad to actually rule that it is an inalienable Palestinian right not to pay any bills but to enjoy free electricity, as well as other utilities and services, at the direct expense of Israeli consumers.

It is safe to assume that no such precedent exists in the annals of jurisprudence. Still, serial non-fulfillment of financial obligations by the Palestinians – in many spheres, not only vis-à-vis the IEC – has not dampened Ramallah’s chutzpah. To be sure, this is not the first time in which Israel announces it will deduct money to pay debts from PA revenues, but time and again international pressure quickly causes the government to backtrack. It would be no surprise if this episode is similarly concluded.

Nonetheless, the government cannot keep playing nice and avoid damaging our international image at a cost to the Israeli economy. The PA’s unbridled fiscal delinquency cannot be subsidized by Israeli citizens, even if the upshot would be bad press and the usual mud-slinging abroad.

Israel clearly possesses a range of options to make sure that its resources and population are not unconscionably exploited, especially by forces that lose no opportunity to ingrain enmity to the Jewish state. To then expect that state to keep bankrolling the PA is akin to extortion.

Israel must show the PA that it will not be cowed by shakedowns. Attempted blackmail will only intensify unless Israel indicates that it will not accept losses and inflict pain on its own citizens just to escape yet another demonization drive. The more Israel appears to fear slander, the more potent the weapon of slander becomes in the ongoing anti-Israel offensive."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

NUCLEAR DEAL/ERDOGAN TEHRAN VISIT: Gungor Uras anticipates some future challenges in centrist Milliyet: "Iran, Israel and Turkey. These countries are the three stars of the Middle East. The three countries will determine the Middle East’s economic and political games in coming years. But their situation is not the same. Iran has enough oil and educated people to build a nuclear bomb via uranium enrichment. Israel has no oil but it has enough educated people to build a nuclear bomb via the same means. Turkey has neither oil nor an educational system that can produce people capable of enriching uranium. As far as we understand it, the Iranians have promised not to build an atomic bomb. And, consequently, the embargo on it will be gradually lifted. This is significant for us, because in the coming era, Turkey will be the neighbor of a rival country that will gradually gain strength in our region."

Beril Dedeoglu argues that Israel and Saudi Arabia should be pleased in centre-right, pro-government Star: "Observing the Iranian people’s celebrations after the nuclear deal, they do not want Iran to be isolated from the West any more. Besides, the people are not very interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, it is clear that Israel and Saudi Arabia are deeply upset. Banning Iran from producing nuclear weapon should have pleased them both as they will not be under nuclear threat anymore."

Kerem Alkin assumes a growing Iranian need for Turkey in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "With the nuclear deal, Iran has entered a negotiation process that will last 50 years at least, and the sanctions on it will not be lifted any time soon. They will only be softened according to Iran's actions. In that case, Iran will need Turkey throughout this process. For a synergy based on mutual trust, the ball is in Iran's court from now on."

Yavuz Semerci gives credit to Erdogan in centre-right HaberTurk: "The assumption that Turkey’s support for Saudi Arabia by adopting an anti-Iran discourse in Yemen would ruin Iran-Turkey relations has been disproven. It is positive that both countries have focused on economics without mentioning the points of political tension between them. As far as I am concerned, Erdogan was wrong about accusing Iran of involvement in terrorist activities in Yemen. However, one should not forget that it was Erdogan, along with Brazil, who opened the door for the nuclear talks that created a festive mood in Iran and gave birth to the possibility of removing the sanctions."

Gonul Tol reports on how the Obama administration sees the nuclear deal in centre-left Radikal: "The nuclear deal represents a very big success for the Obama administration which has been strongly criticized for its foreign policy, and that has turned the nuclear problem with Iran into a foreign policy priority. Supporters of the administration argue that this deal will have effect beyond the nuclear issue. Thanks to this deal, they believe Iran will become a normal country, its devastating policies in the region will cease, and the prospect of acting together with the West on many issues from Iraq to Syria will be opened. They even say that Iran’s integration into the global market will contribute to the country’s democratization."

 

MP CANDIDATE LISTS: Murat Aksoy predicts continued political polarization in centrist Millet: "It is President Erdogan rather than PM Davutoglu who will have the final say in determining the AKP’s (ruling Justice and Development Party’s) electoral lists. This has opened the door to a serious crisis for the AKP. The fact that the majority of MPs are closer to Erdogan shows that the party will enter the elections by putting forward a presidential system. And this shows that the discourse and politics of polarization will continue, as has been the case so far."

Abdulkadir Selvi believes that the opposition has shot itself in the foot in Yeni Safak: "In these elections, all eyes will be on the AKP and the HDP [pro-Kurdish leftist alliance]. The HDP has failed to put together a candidate list that addresses the whole of Turkey. It has remained a regional party based on the axis of Kurds and Alevites. Thus it has added to the challenge it faces in passing the 10% electoral threshold. The opposition has given the AKP an opportunity on a silver platter."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Conservative Hemayat discusses related issues: "After agreeing to the IAEA's Additional Protocol, we suspended activities linked to uranium enrichment and allowed observers from the agency to visit our nuclear sites, including military sites on occasions. When the nuclear file was sent to the UN Security Council, the Majlis obligated the government to reduce its cooperation with the agency and repeal the voluntarily implementation of the Additional Protocol. It was expected that our negotiating team would cooperate with the Majlis. Because of U.S. past behaviour and craftiness, a serious worry about the Additional Protocol is that it could endanger Iran’s national security." 

Reformist Arman calls for reciprocity: "The Lausanne statement demonstrated readiness to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue. The two sides should act reciprocally. Iran cannot fulfil the other side's demands in one go, while they fulfil their commitments gradually over a few years. Iran has not consented to all Western demands, but has been able to create a degree of trust that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. If, as indicated in the statement, the sanctions are all lifted, then we will achieve a win-win situation."

Hard-line Keyhan censures divisive media coverage: "Anti-revolution political and media networks have tried to follow their familiar tradition of creating false domestic bipolarity in regards to the Lausanne statement. Instead of the necessary unity and solidarity against selfish and arrogant enemies, schisms have been encouraged, where one side is excited and joyful over victory while the other is frustrated with a sense of failure and the loss of everything. The suggestion of 'victory of victories' was attributed to the 'people' in programmes, visuals and reports by the BBC and Voice of America. On the other hand, claims of drinking the 'poison cup' and the 'beginning of the regime's retreat!' were made by opposition circles to undermine national empathy." 

 

IRAN-TURKEY RELATIONS: Hard-line Javan writes of possible Turkish pragmatism: "Iran has graciously disregarded President Erdogan's positions on Yemen and welcomed broader relations with Turkey. It seems, however, that Erdogan's approach to Iraq and Syria is similar to that in Yemen. Playing a diplomatic role means that Turkey cannot join Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen, but can take credit for its meditation of the bloody conflict."

Moderate Iran is upbeat: "President Erdogan's visit to Tehran and his consultation with Iranian officials came at the right time. In addition to the expansion of political, economic and cultural ties, there will be greater interaction between Tehran and Ankara to manage regional crises. Iran's nuclear diplomacy has many positive implications. The first is Erdogan's visit." 

Reformist E'temad finds cooperation inevitable: "It is not President Erdogan's first visit to Tehran but this trip is the first visit of a high-ranking official from a foreign country after the political understanding in Lausanne. It is considered to be very important. Despite expanding mutual ties, both countries have decided to expand their ties with each other. Our differences originate from regional issues. Syria, Yemen and Iraq are three important areas where Tehran and Ankara have serious differences. In Syria, Turkey seeks to change the current regime in Damascus at a time when Iran is an important supporter of Bashar al-Assad. In Yemen, Iran is the main opponent of the Saudi invasion of Yemen, while Turkey has supported the Saudi military campaign. The truth is that, in order to expand and improve their regional and international positions, both countries have no choice but to cooperate with each other. In fact, neither Tehran nor Ankara can ignore each other; they should accept the realities on the ground and cooperate with each other."

 

YEMEN/SAUDI ARABIA: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami considers Saudi woes: "In a joint meeting, Yemen's 19 political parties issued a statement expressing full support for resistance to Saudi military aggression. There is little chance Saudi Arabia can continue its crimes as fighting has brought the crisis to its eastern, Shiite-inhabited region and has added volatility to its domestic situation. Clearly, the Riyadh court was fully aware of the domestic crisis and the extent of popular discontent. To maintain internal repression, it has exacerbated the problems in Yemen to use the excuse of an external threat to put more pressure on dissidents. Once again Riyadh assessed the situation incorrectly and made a huge strategic mistake by starting the war in Yemen. The Saudi army lacks practical experience in large operations and low-intensity conflict, which means Riyadh's expectations for victory will never be fulfilled." 

Conservative Resalat comments on one consequence of the Saudi campaign in Yemen: "Saudi Arabia's invasion of Yemen has opened a new chapter of insecurity in the Middle East. The air strikes by Saudi Arabia and its allies, along with U.S. logistical support, suggest a new security situation in the Middle East. A religious gap, which we have witnessed in Iraq and Syria before, has deepened. This gap will not produce anything but more tension and violence against different religious groups." 

 

PAKISTAN: Conservative Siyasat-e Ruz looks at an important visit: "Chinese President Xi Jinping is due to visit Pakistan after a long delay.  The visit is important for both countries. It has regional and trans-regional implications, in addition to economic, political and security goals. By highlighting the visit, Pakistan seeks to warn the West that it wants to boost its relations with China in reaction to Western lack of attention to Islamabad's demands." 

Reformist Sharq is confident of relations with Pakistan: "Foreign Minister Zarif's visit to Pakistan, in addition to pursuing a policy of good neighbourliness, briefed on recent nuclear developments and the Yemen issue. Relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are deep and go beyond these issues, but it is a priority for Islamabad to have good relations with Iran. Pakistan is willing to have Saudi assistance, but not at the cost of undermining relations with Iran. This is reiterated by Pakistani officials when they say that they are ready to defend Saudi Arabia but have no justification for meddling in regional issues."

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Lines of separation

2-Yarmouk: A decisive moment

3-Erdogan the ‘economist’

 

1-Lines of separation

 

I do not know what books the U.S. president reads before he sleeps, or how he understands the events of the past three decades. The Tehran regime is closer in its thinking and behavior to al-Qa'ida. It is religious, fascist, and hostile to all those opposed to its ideology. From its perspective, the world is divided into believers and infidels. It was this regime that inaugurated violence in the region in the name of religion a decade-and-a-half before the emergence of al-Qa'ida. But to the same extent to which Obama was apologetic and generous in his gifts to the Iranian regime with this nuclear agreement, he was unjustifiably harsh towards the Arabs--'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Saudi Asharq al-Awsat

 

[Obama] refuses to have Americans pay the price in their economy and their soldiers' blood in defense of the region's regimes, or in compliance with the whims of this region’s rulers. This is because there is no real danger that is threatening them, and they are exaggerating the alleged threats they speak of. In this regard, Obama is giving expression to a pragmatic, not a moral position. Had the U.S. succeeded in its aggression on Iraq and Afghanistan, no one would have heard a U.S. president (Obama or anyone else) speaking in such realistic terms. In other words, the policy that the U.S.'s allies view as defeatism, surrender, and submission, is in fact merely a pragmatic policy--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Obama has effectively drawn the lines of separation and the borders between Washington's policies and those of its allies in the region. >From now on it will be difficult to claim that Washington and its allied capitals are on the same page. Obama has set the main features of his 'doctrine,' creating a problem for Washington's allies and friends. But what effect will this have on the region's crises that remain open to all sorts of possibilities? It is most likely that there will be growing talk of a 'joint Arab force,' of 'Arab leadership of the war on terrorism,' or an 'Arab awakening in confronting Iran.' In fact, we may even hear 'Guevara-like' speeches describing the Arabs' reaction to 'global imperialism.' But the truth is that Washington has determined the maximum ceiling of its allies’ actions. It has allowed them a bit of rope but it has kept the other end of the 'rope' firmly in its hands--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

U.S. President Obama's recent interview with New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman suggests that the president fails to see the true nature of the Iranian regime, maintains a veteran Saudi commentator. And his advice to the Arabs to attend to their domestic threats misses the point. Obama's statements represent a realistic acknowledgment of the limits of American power and an expression of his unwillingness to hemorrhage the U.S.'s resources in pursuit of the unwarranted fears and whims of Gulf rulers, maintains a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Syrian Beirut daily. The U.S. president has revealed what he will be saying to the leaders of the six Arab Gulf states he has invited to meet at Camp David in early summer, says a leading Jordanian commentator. But it is clear that none of these leaders will be too eager to hear what he has to say.

 

LOUD ECHOES: "I tried to ignore U.S. President Barack Obama's interview published in The New York Times because I am sure it is part of his propaganda campaign to promote the in-principle agreement [nuclear] with Iran," writes 'Abderrahman ar-Rashed in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat.

But the interview's echoes were too loud. It has provoked many people in the region much more than it has assuaged their fears.

Thomas Friedman is one of the most important and best-informed commentators on the region's affairs. He knows its details. It was he who interviewed the president, and this may be why he managed to lure the president into moving from justifications to disputations.

What was strange about the interview was that the president praised the Iranian regime and justified its actions – giving the impression of guilt about what the U.S. has done to Iran.

I do not know what books the U.S. president reads before he sleeps, or how he understands the events of the past three decades. The Tehran regime is closer in its thinking and behavior to al-Qa'ida. It is religious, fascist, and hostile to all those opposed to its ideology. From its perspective, the world is divided into believers and infidels. It was this regime that inaugurated violence in the region in the name of religion a decade-and-a-half before the emergence of al-Qa'ida.

But to the same extent to which Obama was apologetic and generous in his gifts to the Iranian regime with this nuclear agreement, he was unjustifiably harsh towards the Arabs. For example, he said that instead of speaking of their fear of Iran, the Arab’s should take a stance against Bashar al-Assad's crimes!

To be frank, I read this paragraph several times trying to place it within its proper context; but I was unable to understand its contradictions. The Assad regime's crimes, which have caused the death of a quarter-of-a-million human beings and displaced over ten million others, are the immediate consequence of Iran's support and intervention on its side; this is the same Iran that Obama has praised and to which he has apologized!

 But the president then criticizes the Arabs because they have not fought against the Assad regime, even though it was his U.S. government that prevented them from using qualitative weapons to stop Assad's warplanes and tanks that were bombarding cities every day. The Syrians have been defending themselves against Assad using nothing but AK47 rifles and simple mortars for four years, all because the U.S. has prevented them from purchasing or obtaining qualitative weapons from another source.

Obama then criticized his Gulf allies, saying that the threat to them was internal, stemming from dissatisfaction and the problems of extremism, terrorism, and unemployment. All this is true, of course, and no one denies that such internal challenges exist. But none of this explains why these Gulf allies should not express their displeasure at the agreement between the American administration and the Iranian regime, which has given the latter a free hand that poses a threat to them.

There is no contradiction here. It is as if we were to tell the U.S. president you should not worry about ISIS and al-Qa'ida because you have unemployment problems or medical insurance shortcomings. The two concerns are not in conflict.

We, as Arabs, are not opposed to Obama's signing an agreement leading to reconciliation with Iran. On the contrary, the exact opposite is true. Because we are the weaker party, our wish is that we would all achieve peace and end conflicts. But what President Obama is doing by lifting the sanctions on Iran is tantamount to bringing down the wall with Iran with no constraints. And all this, as we see Iran simultaneously sending its forces and generals to fight in Syria and Iraq, and financing the rebellion in Yemen.

One person who read Obama's interview with Friedman told me: Perhaps the president hopes to enter the history books by changing U.S. policy just as former president Nixon did when he opened up to China; but the difference between the two cases is vast. Iran is not China, neither in form nor in content. It is more like North Korea. China was a country closed on itself, but it was not a party to wars and terrorist activities around the world, as Iran has been ceaselessly doing for thirty years.

"What is even stranger is that after President Obama's interview, Deputy U.S. National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes emerged to make statements, all of which were directed at the Gulf Arabs, filled with praise and assurances, contradicting some of what the president had told Friedman!" concludes Rashed.

End…

 

A CLEAR AND REALISTIC STANCE: "In a televised interview, U.S. President Barack Obama took a clear stance towards some of the region’s issues, especially what is happening in Syria, and as regards Gulf/Iranian relations," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Wednesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

Obama's stance towards these two issues was realistic compared to that of his regional allies.

The U.S. president asked why those who have been demanding that he should wage a military campaign on Syria do not do so themselves. This was a reference to certain Gulf states, Turkey, and Israel.

The president seems deeply convinced that in light of its experiences in the region that are not only fresh in everyone’s memories but are still unfolding today, the region has hemorrhaged the U.S.'s economic and human capabilities. Together with a large number of other states, the U.S. mobilized huge forces in its war on Iraq and Afghanistan, with over 200,000 troops. This was when it and its allies' economies were at their strongest. Yet it was unable to win either war. Its economy suffered badly instead, giving rise to a major economic crisis.

Obama is convinced that waging a third war would only aggravate this hemorrhage. This is why he has rejected this option, both in Syria and even regarding the Iranian nuclear file. He refuses to have Americans pay the price in their economy and their soldiers' blood in defense of the region's regimes, or in compliance with the whims of this region’s rulers. This is because there is no real danger that is threatening them, and they are exaggerating the alleged threats they speak of.

In this regard, Obama is giving expression to a pragmatic, not a moral position. Had the U.S. succeeded in its aggression on Iraq and Afghanistan, no one would have heard a U.S. president (Obama or anyone else) speaking in such realistic terms. In other words, the policy that the U.S.'s allies view as defeatism, surrender, and submission, is in fact merely a pragmatic policy. It is an expression of the limits of the U.S.'s capabilities in light of its old and new experiences: Vietnam in the 1960s, and Iraq and Afghanistan in our times.

Moreover, when President Obama says that the real danger threatening the Gulf countries comes not from Iran but from these countries' own peoples, he is only confirming what is a self-evident and stark truth. Iran has been declaring day-in, day-out, that it has no intention of targeting the Gulf states, does not seek to harm them, and is willing to provide all the guarantees necessary to ensure that this is so. But the Gulf states would rather cooperate with the devil, i.e. the Israeli enemy, in order to harm Iran.

Washington is unwilling to go along with these governments’ illogical policies that have given free rein to hatred and spite. As Bismarck says, hatred is a bad guide in politics. Any government that aims to safeguard its interests would not pursue such policies.

There is no doubt that Obama's statements will stir a storm of disappointment and negative reactions from America's allies. But they will adapt to this new reality sooner or later.

"And if they insist on pursuing their risky adventures, they will pay the price for them alone," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

UNPEACEFUL RAIN: "U.S. President Barack Obama's words in his New York Times interview with Thomas Friedman will not fall like peaceful rain from heaven upon Washington's friends among the Arab 'moderates'," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

For in the midst of the incitement against Iran and its allies, someone has come to tell these 'moderates' that ISIS represents a greater threat, and that cooperation with Iran in the war on terrorism seems desirable and is something that Washington encourages.

Amidst the exaggeration of the foreign threats resulting from 'creeping Iranian expansion,' someone has come to tell these 'moderates' that the greater threat to them is internal, stemming from the dissatisfaction and frustration that has spread among their peoples; peoples who have been marginalized, youths unemployed, and a 'destructive' ideology that does not recognize the state.

We now know what the U.S. president will tell the leaders of the six Gulf states at the Camp David summer summit:

Do not expect Washington to fulfill your roles in your place. You wish to fight Assad? Go ahead and fight him. You are facing foreign threats?  We will help you build defensive capabilities that will enable you to play a greater role in dealing with regional conflicts. You need assurances in confronting foreign threats? We will provide you with them. But, hopefully, this will 'dispel your fears and lead you to consider a more fruitful dialogue with the Iranians.' In other words, the era of wars and rounds of fighting on your behalf has passed and will not return.

But more importantly, the White House’s master will tell his guests that 'internal threats' pose a greater dangerous to their security and stability than external threats. Here, Washington can provide advice and counsel; but it cannot protect regimes against their internal enemies. Consequently, these countries should open their doors wide open to effective popular participation and provide their youth with an alternative to ISIS.

Thus spoke the leader of the world's greatest superpower.

So, the U.S.'s priority remains that of the war on ISIS, despite its 'logistical/intelligence' support for the war on Yemen. The relationship between the Arab ‘moderates’ and Iran must overcome fears and obsessions, and move on to dialogue and cooperation in confronting what is a common enemy or threat. Political reform and opening up to participation are the keys to victory in the war on terrorism. Confessional [Sunni/Shiite] tensions and polarization should end and a regional dialogue over security and cooperation should begin.

But who, in the era of Operation Decisive Storm, wants to heed such talk? It is as if it was not enough for the leader of the greatest superpower to have stabbed his friends and allies in the back by initiating a ‘covert’ dialogue with Iran, and by signing a 'historic' agreement with it. Now he wants to offer advice and exert pressure to push the 'moderates' of the Sunni Arab axis to enter a dialogue with their 'neighbor/enemy.'

It is not enough for Washington to exert pressure to sever the secret chain that links some of these regimes to the various schools of jihadi salafism; it is now bringing the agenda of political reform introduced by the winds of the Arab Spring', whose leaf the Arab capitals of moderation believed had been turned once and for all, back to the forefront.

Who will be eager to meet with Obama at Camp David? In my view, no one wants to cross thousands of kilometers to listen to a lecture on the importance of political reform, 'constitutional monarchy,' participation, social justice, the rule of the law, and so on. No one is willing to undergo the hardship of travel merely to listen to a lecture on the advantages of cooperation with Iran in the war on ISIS.

Obama has effectively drawn the lines of separation and the borders between Washington's policies and those of its allies in the region. From now on it will be difficult to claim that Washington and its allied capitals are on the same page. Obama has set the main features of his 'doctrine,' creating a problem for Washington's allies and friends.

But what effect will this have on the region's crises that remain open to all sorts of possibilities? It is most likely that there will be growing talk of a 'joint Arab force,' of 'Arab leadership of the war on terrorism,' or an 'Arab awakening in confronting Iran.' In fact, we may even hear 'Guevara-like' speeches describing the Arabs' reaction to 'global imperialism.' But the truth is that Washington has determined the maximum ceiling of its allies’ actions. It has allowed them a bit of rope but it has kept the other end of the 'rope' firmly in its hands.

Some Arabs will undoubtedly, be satisfied by the U.S. president's statements. Or, rather, they will be less unhappy about their content. These include Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, as well as others, with variations between them. There is no desire to escalate the confessional discourse and polarization. In these countries, the priority is for the war on terrorism, not on Iran. There are reticent overtures directed at Tehran and some of its friends in the region. But these states are also forced to go along with their Saudi/Gulf allies and 'concur' with a war that none of them has emerged to declare: 'This is our war.'

"In fact, had Obama not reminded everyone of the need for political reform, his discourse would have been identical to that of these capitals," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

2-Yarmouk: A decisive moment

 

The battle of Yarmouk camp may well determine the fate of the Palestinian refugees in Syria and elsewhere, as well the political future of the PLO, says Mohannad 'Abdelhamid in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

As battles rage inside Yarmouk Palestinian refugee Camp near Damascus between ISIS and other factions, it has become clear that the fate of the Palestinians in Syria, indeed, outside it as well, and of the PLO as a whole, may depend on their results, maintains a Palestinian commentator.

 

A THREAT TO THE PALESTINIANS’ PRESENCE: "ISIS's entry into Yarmouk Camp threatens the entire Palestinian presence in Syria," writes Mohannad 'Abdelhamid in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

This is because the fate of nine thousand Palestinians and three thousand Syrians who are all that remains of the camp's inhabitants will determine the fate of the Palestinian refugees in Syria as a whole. For Yarmouk's predicament in these difficult times is just an extension of the camp's tragedy that began after December 2012 whose main features have been bombardment, destruction, killings, forced displacement, starvation, and siege.

The most urgent matter today before anything else is to save the besieged and the hostages as quickly as possible. This can be achieved by opening safe passages for the camp's inhabitants who have been deprived of the ability to move freely and leave since late 2012.

These are decisive days that will put all parties to the test. The [Syrian] regime and the Palestinian factions that support it that are besieging the camp can ease their siege in certain areas. If ISIS prevents civilians from leaving the camp and uses them as human shields, all the resistance factions should join together and open the paths and roads by force. Otherwise, the very justification of their presence as armed factions will disappear. The people will be in no need for them if they were to abandon their mission and their patriotic, humanitarian, and moral duty.

The PLO is the main party responsible for the camp's fate. Will it deploy its political weight and give priority to Yarmouk Camp and the Palestinian refugees in Syria, by remaining on alert around the clock?  Will they intervene with the Syrian regime, which is besieging the camp, bombarding it with explosive barrels, and arresting anyone trying to leave?

If the regime refuses to open safe passageways, then the PLO's relations with it would effectively be providing cover for killing those who remain inside at the hands of the regime, which has been besieging the camp for 600 days, bombing it with explosive barrels and other weapons. Those who do not permit unarmed civilians to leave are effectively putting their stamp of approval to the crimes being committed by ISIS, the Nusra Front, and similar organizations inside the camp.

The PLO is responsible for urging international and Arab humanitarian relief organizations and the Arab League to find solutions. And, before anything else, the PLO should mobilize its political and media discourse and raise it to the level required for saving the lives of thousands of innocent civilians trapped in Yarmouk Camp.

But saving what remains of the Camp cannot be complete unless coupled with securing a safe haven for its inhabitants both inside and outside Syria. This raises the question of the conditions of those Palestinians who have been displaced from Syrian camps and are now dispersed over various locations in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Europe, and inside Syria. It raises the issue of what these Palestinians need in terms of protection, security, and relief at present, and the issue of their fate after the political situation in Syria stabilizes.

The unknown and worrisome fate of Syria's refugees should be added to the tragic fate of Iraq and Libya's [Palestinian] refugees, and those from the destroyed Nahr al-Bared Camp in Lebanon. The refugees' current tragic conditions call for reopening the Palestinian refugees' case as a national and humanitarian issue that threatens one of the main constituents of the Palestinian people.

Why does the PLO not propose an initiative to absorb the refugees whose camps have been destroyed and whose lives remain threatened on Palestinian territories? This is an idea proposed by fellow commentator and friend Nader 'Abdullah who used to live in Jaramana Camp [in Southern Syria] and who is now in Turkey.

Israel, of course, will reject this and deem their return to be demographic threat that endangers its existence. Some Palestinians may also see it a conspiracy against the right of return to the areas from which they were expelled [by Israel in 1948].

But regardless of Israel’s rejection and any opposition from some Palestinians, coming up with an initiative to bring them back to the Palestinian territories would, firstly, have a symbolic, propaganda, and moral value today. Secondly, it could turn into a serious proposal supported and backed by nations and states, and the UN General Assembly. Otherwise, what sense is there in the clause in the [1988] Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which says: 'The State of Palestine [in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem] is the homeland of all Palestinians'?

The attitude towards Yarmouk Camp at this decisive and fateful moment could contribute to either the PLO’s collapse or its revival. These two possibilities lie at opposite ends of the spectrum: The first possibility is that, thanks to its dereliction of duty and its failure to protect the camps, the PLO will collapse. That in turn will lead to the dispersal of the Palestinian people's various constituents, the liquidation of their national cause, and foiling their right to self-determination within a short or medium-term timeframe. The second possibility is that the PLO would be revived, which would mean that it could be renewed as an institution, leadership, cadres, and political and media discourse.

The Syrian crisis has opened the door to both these possibilities. It has revealed the impotence of the establishment that has left the camps to their fate and failed to develop the plans, initiatives, or budgets to protect the Palestinians’ camps and presence in Syria – and in Libya, Iraq, and the destroyed Nahr al-Bared Camp in Lebanon before that.

This is the result of the PLO's turning its back on the Palestinians outside Palestine. and its immersion in the PA's duties towards part of the Palestinian people, namely, those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but without acquiring any sovereign decision over any issue in the shadow of an occupying state that controls everything.

The Syrian crisis has also highlighted the attempt by the youthful generation to assume the task of defending the camps and their people, and safeguarding their integrity. The new generation emerged, backed by the people’s energy and their ability to withstand harsh conditions and hold their ground before the 'retreat' of the democratic, civilian trend in the Syrian opposition.

During its rise, this trend contributed to motivating this generation and to a sense of mutual harmony between the opposition and the new generation, especially by providing the opposition with Palestinian expertise. The peak achievement was when the youthful Palestinian generation succeeded in transforming the camps into safe havens for the Syrian people who had been forcefully displaced from their destroyed homes, thus assuming a stance of positive neutrality by peacefully siding with the people.

But this golden era did not last long thanks to the counter-attack from the counter-revolution bolstered by petro-dollars, and the intervention of pro-regime organizations, and as a result of the regime's bombardment, siege, and destruction of the camps, just as it targeted the moderate democratic opposition and made every effort to crush it so as to justify its destructive war in order to remain in power.

The retreat of the democratic Syrian opposition and that of the new fedayeen (the youthful generation) left the camps, neighborhoods, cities, and countryside open to ISIS, the Nusra Front, the Jayshul Islam, and other organizations linked to the agendas and ideologies of takfir, domination, backwardness, and reaction. These organizations used Yarmouk Camp for their factional aims that do not address the bare minimum of ordinary human needs.

The factional exploitation of the camp after the [youthful] retreat should have been exposed. The democratic groups and forces should have been rebuilt and the necessary tools for regaining control of the camp should have been secured. But the attempts from inside the camp received no support from outside, including political and media backing.

"The battle to save the camp’s inhabitants who are still inside will renew the polarization. Those who contribute to salvation and rehabilitating the human rights of those who have been displaced from the Palestinian camps will also contribute to overcoming the tide of lethargy, retreat, and impotence," concludes Abdelhamid.

Ends…

 

 

3-Erdogan the ‘economist’

 

Turkey’s President is eying relations with Iran from a purely economic perspective, but he may be preparing for a mediatory role in Yemen as well, says Huda Rizq in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Turkish President Erdogan 's visit to Iran this week will make it easier to determine whether or not he will join the Saudi–led Sunni coalition, notes a Lebanese commentator. But economic considerations are paramount in the Turkish president's mind, especially after the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers.

 

ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT: "Saudi Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif’s visit to Ankara on the eve of Turkish President Erdogan's visit to Tehran raises questions regarding Turkey’s possible mediation to end the Saudi aggression against Yemen," writes Huda Rizq in Wednesday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

This is over and above what the visit will provide Erdogan in political and economic terms. In fact, the importance of this visit primarily stems from the fact that it is taking place only a few days after the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers. This will lead to lifting the sanctions on Iran, while permitting it to enrich uranium at low levels under strict monitoring conditions, and allow it to maintain its nuclear installations as well.

But the visit's importance also stems from what Turkish President's Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin has said, namely, that a resolution of the Yemeni crisis via a dialogue that includes all parties, is a matter of priority for Turkey, adding that his country is continuing its intensive efforts in this regard. And this comes at a time when Iran has stressed the need to end the Yemeni war and push the Yemenis towards a dialogue so as to reach an agreement free from foreign intervention.

Parallel to all this, and contrary to his custom, Erdogan said nothing negative about the Syrian president. He is in Iran because he fully understands his interests as an 'economist' and understands that Iran today, after the expected end of the U.S./Western blockade imposed on it in two months' time, will play an important role in the energy – oil and gas – equations, and turn into a major regional state. It will become a market that can provide his country's companies with enormous export and import opportunities as link between Iran and Europe. This will increase mutual trade, perhaps double it, and open up the possibility of huge investments in Iran's infrastructure.

Erdogan took more than five ministers with him in addition to a delegation of businessmen. In this, he was motivated by fear that a Western – and especially an American – rapprochement with Iran could come at his country's expense after his political ambitions have exceeded the limits drawn for them, and after he has failed to back down in compliance with American advice– as a result of which he has accused the Americans of conspiring against him.

Moreover, were Erdogan to join the Sunni coalition that Saudi Arabia is proposing, he could expose his country to a war with Iran that may have a negative impact on its economy and its sectarian fabric, which is his worst fear. This may turn the tables on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is not in his interest, of course, especially since he can secure the economic gains that Saudi Arabia may offer him from Iran and Russia.

In short, Saudi Arabia has been unable to present Erdogan with a political gain in Egypt by allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in power again. This is why he prefers to play the role of mediator, which would enable him to have good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Turkey cannot be part of a Sunni coalition; playing the role of 'mediator' will bring it greater gains and would be less costly than taking sides.

"The results of the Turkish president's meeting with the Iranian Republic's supreme leader [Ayatollah Khamenei] may emerge from the political stance that he will take back with him, which will make it possible to determine his positions more accurately," concludes Rizq.

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

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Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Après moi le déluge

 

For the umpteenth day in a row, Iran dominates the front pages of Israeli newspapers. This time, it's a National Public Radio (NPR) interview with U.S. President Barack Obama that grabs the lead headlines. In the interview, Obama concedes that, after 13 or more years under the present nuclear agreement, Iran will be able to use advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium faster.

Defending the deal, Obama said Iran would be kept a year away from obtaining a nuclear weapon for more than a decade. The American president was defending a deal that critics claim will allow Iran to keep on enriching uranium. He said that Iran will be capped for a decade at 300 kilograms which is not enough to convert to a stockpile of weapons-grade material. But the situation might change, he conceded in Year 13, 14, or 15 where the breakout times, which refers to how long it would take to build a bomb, might have shrunk almost down to zero.

After the papers went to print, however, State Department Spokeswoman Marie Harf tried to explain the president's comments in the interview, saying that his wording had been 'a little mixed up' and 'muddled.' Harf insisted that he had not been talking about a scenario that would result from the signing of the deal that is being negotiated, but rather the opposite – what could happen if the deal is not signed.

In other Iran-related news, Yedioth Ahronoth reports that Iran's negotiator in the nuclear negotiations and its nuclear chief revealed on Tuesday that, after a final deal is signed by a June 30 deadline on the framework reached last week, Iran will unleash its most advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment, threatening a quick turnover in producing a nuclear weapon. Iran's semi-official FARS news agency reported on a closed meeting held Tuesday by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Ali Akbar Salehi, in which they briefed members of Iran's parliament on the deal being finalized. In their statements, they said Iran's most advanced IR-8 centrifuges will be used as soon as the deal removing world sanctions against Iran begins. The report noted the two said the advanced centrifuges enrich uranium 20 times faster than the current IR-1 models, meaning they would radically reduce the breakout time needed for Iran to obtain a nuclear arsenal.

Arutz 7 reports that, according to Iranian news agency Fars, the Iranian navy has sent two military ships – a logistical ship and a destroyer – to the Gulf of Aden near Yemen and to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. According to the report, the ships will patrol the area for three months and protect maritime routes. Iran is believed to be the backer of Houthi rebels, wreaking havoc across Yemen in recent weeks.

In breaking news, meanwhile, all the Internet sites report on a stabbing attack in the West Bank, in which two IDF soldiers were injured. First to react to the incident was Habayit Hayehudi chairman Naftali Bennett, who drew a line between the stabbing and Iran. 'From Iran to Shiloh, our enemies have one goal: to hurt as many Jews as possible,' he said. 'I support the security forces that killed the terrorist. This should be the fate of anyone who hurts innocent Jews. A serious incident like this must end [with the terrorist's death] and not of dreams of being released from prison,' he added.

Housing Minister Uri Ariel used the attack to condemn Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas, saying that, 'Not even a week has passed since Abu Mazin said his hand is extended in peace, and already that hand is revealed to have hidden knives, stones, firebombs, and other weapons designed to kill Jews. Against the Arab lies and manipulations, Israel must establish a strong right-wing government that knows how to protect the security of Israel and not give in to terror. I send hopes for a speedy recovery to the wounded and congratulate the security forces on eliminating the terrorist.'

 

APRÈS MOI LE DÉLUGE: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman contends that U.S. President Barack Obama has finally admitted the truth: once the (already problematic) inspection of Iran's nuclear facilities comes to an end, the Islamic Republic's breakout time will be zero.

"In an interview yesterday with NPR, U.S. President Barack Obama effectively said that he's going to sign a deal with Iran and whatever happens thereafter is not his concern. In other words: Après moi le déluge.

To his credit, Obama was just being honest and telling the world the truth: in another 12 to 15 years, he said, once the tight international inspection on Iran expires, the Islamic Republic's nuclear weapon breakout time would be zero. The subsequent attempts by the White House to explain that the president had been misunderstood are nonsense.

Obama was not talking to Israel; he was talking to the American people and, more relevantly, to the Senate. Netanyahu doesn't interest him. He despises him, has nothing but disdain for him – and makes no effort to conceal that fact. The entire American PR machine, headed by the president himself, is taking aim at Capitol Hill. That is where the real battle will take place. In the Senate, there appears to be a majority to prevent the president from fast-tracking the lifting of sanctions against Iran. Moreover, if it turns out that the Iranians have a very different interpretation of the deal from the U.S., lawmakers will be a lot more determined to expand and intensify sanctions against the Islamic Republic. There is already talk on the Hill that, if the UN Security Council lifts the sanctions on Iran and the European Union sees itself exempt from adhering to the sanctions, Congress will have no choice but to tighten the American-imposed restrictions on Iran. So Obama and his people are not addressing Israel at this stage; all of their comments are aimed at American ears. And that's an audience he cannot afford to lie to.

So what exactly did Obama say yesterday? First of all, one can understand from his comments that there is still no agreement on how long Iran will be subjected to international inspections. Secondly, Obama spoke about the new centrifuges that Iran will continue to develop – an apparent violation of agreements that are supposed to prevent them from research and development in that field – which will propel the Islamic Republic to the status of nuclear-capable nation. It's strange: there's still no detailed agreement, yet Obama is already announcing that the Iranians will have new centrifuges, which will allow them to obtain nuclear capability almost immediately.

Everyone has spoken about tight international inspection, but it is still not clear how to ensure that the deal which is due to be signed in June will indeed include Draconian inspection, allowing for international observers to gain access anytime and anywhere in the production process – from the uranium mines themselves to the enriched material. The United States has developed outstanding inspections capabilities. The means at the inspectors’ disposal – from mobile laboratories and sensors to satellite imagery and a whole host of other exotic resources that were developed at research facilities in New Mexico – allow the United States to conduct effective inspections in theory. The problem is that the Iranians have already announced that they are not willing, for example, to allow cameras into their nuclear facilities.

This fits in perfectly with what the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said yesterday: If Iran wanted to get its hands on a nuclear bomb, he said, it has the ability to do so even today. As far as the West is aware, Salehi was exaggerating slightly, but he was apparently not far off the mark. This is more proof that inspection is the Achilles Heel of the agreement.

On the sidelines of the agreement, meanwhile, it is interesting to take a look back at the minutes of meetings convened by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in 2010 and 2011. Doing so raises some tough questions: Was it a mistake not to have attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities when it was still possible? Why did Israeli defense officials make such a concerted effort to stave off the possibility of military action? And, given the deal that looks like being signed in June, is it possible today to determine that they got it wrong?

The Israeli government cannot simply sweep these questions under the carpet. If the agreement with Iran that is signed in June is identical to the guidelines that were agreed upon in Lausanne last week, these questions will become even more relevant. After all, Israel will find itself – alone – standing up to the Iranian nuclear threat."

Ends…

 

 

OBAMA'S FANTASY WORLD: Writing in Israel Hayom, Reuven Berko accuses U.S. President Barack Obama of living in a fantasy world and says that Israel will pay the price.

"U.S. President Barack Obama has announced that the demand that Iran recognize Israel will not be part of the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic, since such a demand would 'really [be] akin to saying that we won't sign a deal unless the nature of the Iranian regime completely transforms.' At the same time, the president – who is full of empathy for the Jewish state – said that the United States would stand beside Israel if it were to come under attack. This would seem to indicate that Obama recognizes that some kind of violent confrontation will take place. And so, despite the deal that the United States and its allies are working on, Iran will continue to forge ahead with its nuclear and military plans for the destruction of Israel – and will not even be required to publically distance itself from past calls for the Jewish state to be wiped off the map.

The vanguard action in Congress to create a majority that will oppose the Iranian nuclear deal – which, in turn, is protected by a possible presidential veto – is crossing party lines. This shows that something is rotten in the American kingdom of illusions and that many Americans are listening attentively to Israel's warnings. Much to the chagrin of the Obama Administration, there are growing calls for some kind of mechanism that would allow the United States to extricate itself from the straightjacket that Obama wants it to wear – a mechanism that would allow for the immediate re-imposition and intensification of sanctions should Iran violate the terms of the deal.

At the moment, these proposals include timeframes for the inspections that will take place from the moment the deal is signed, alongside the option of redefining the agreement as a treaty – which would make it less binding. However, even these cautious and welcome measures do not take into account the manipulation and concealment that the ayatollah's agents will employ in order to hoodwink the inspectors.

So what, then, is the practical significance of Obama's commitment? Given the state of the U.S. economy and the painful losses sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan, many people – including Iranian observers – believe that Obama will not rush into any military confrontation in the foreseeable future. Given the violence and terror that his Iranian partners employ in the Middle East – without any kind of response from Washington –Obama appears to have proven this to be true from his backseat.

Obama inherited from his predecessors American failures, such as the North Korean nuclear program and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. He himself erred in his reading of radical Islam and he dreamed of a Middle East dominated by moderates. His predictions on a series of fronts were off the mark: in Iraq, where Americans are helping Shiite militias to butcher Sunnis; in Syria, where he failed to prevent Bashar Assad from using chemical weapons against his own people; in Turkey, where he failed to understand the threat posed by the Islamist dictator President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is aiding and abetting ISIS; in Russia, where he failed to prevent President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine and from meddling in the Middle East; in Egypt, where he failed to see what would happen in the aftermath of the revolution; and in fudging the fundamental demands that he himself made of Iran in the nuclear talks. Now Obama is 'determined' to fail in his efforts to force Israel to accept the establishment of a Palestinian terror state, in addition to the one that already exists in the Gaza Strip.

Given the contradictions in the agreement between the Obama Administration and the Iranians, it is clear to the American people – even when couched in the language of Hollywood that they are used to – that Iran's nuclear capabilities are still akin to the gun on the table in Act I which will inevitably be fired in the final act, even if, according to Obama, it will take up to 15 years to get there.

Postponing the inevitable is no problem for Obama and his people, whose only goal is to leave the White House with some justification for the Nobel Peace Prize that the president was awarded for no good reason soon after he was elected. For nations which cherish life, 10 or 15 years – the period of time that the Iranians now have to build a nuclear bomb – are like fleeting moments. Postponing the inevitable and promising to protect Israel are the epitome of the 'après moi le déluge' approach to international relations. And this approach always ends in tragedy."

Ends…

 

CALLING BIBI'S BLUFF: Writing in Maariv, Ran Edelist says that Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has called Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's bluff by agreeing to meet with him – without preconditions.

"For many months, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas refused to resume negotiations with Israel. In answer to his critics, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that it wasn't his fault there's no Israeli-Palestinian peace process since he doesn't have a partner. Not only is Abu Mazin personally not a partner (according to Danny Danon and Naftali Bennett he's a terrorist, after all), he's not even willing to sit down with me. Indeed, Abu Mazin refused to meet the Israeli leader because he knew he had no good reason to.

This week, however, the Palestinian leader declared that he would be willing to meet Netanyahu. 'With no preconditions,' he told Israeli-Arab newspaper Kul al-Arab. But Abu Mazin is not crawling back to negotiations and he is not, in an act of reconciliation, responding to the result of last month's election. This is clearly a trick taken from the poker table: Abu Mazin said that he is willing to meet Netanyahu in order to call the prime minister's bluff, to show that there is a partner – and to give his campaign of delegitimizing the Israeli government a boost. Abu Mazin's statement – which remained hovering in the air like a balloon – left Netanyahu looking like a poker player who now has to show his cards, which will prove to the world that he was bluffing all along.

At the recent summit of the Arab League in Sharm el-Sheikh, Abu Mazin complained that he doesn't have anyone to talk to in the new Israeli government. 'The result of the [Israeli] election proves that there is no genuine Israeli partner with whom we can negotiate a resolution to the conflict,' he told delegates. The summit was convened to discuss ISIS, Iran and so on. Netanyahu is currently wooing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, in the hope of forming a united front against Iran. This, too, is a façade, which he hopes will allow him to turn round and say: Look – I have an Arab partner, who also happens to be upset with the Obama Administration at the moment.

This is an illusion, but the prime minister's desire to prove that he can get along with Arab countries could lead to movement on the Palestinian front. I don't know which of the Arab leaders at the summit spoke to Abu Mazin, but he returned from there with this poker trick, which called Bibi's 'no partner' bluff. 'I have no problem negotiating with Netanyahu, because he represents the state of Israel,' Abu Mazin said. 'My hand is always stretched out.

In response, the Netanyahu government decided to cut the amount of tax revenue that it had previously agreed to return to the Palestinians. Israel confiscated 1.5 billion shekels in taxes that it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, in an attempt to prevent Abu Mazin from going through with his plan to join the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The Palestinians ignored the warning and joined the ICC anyway. What Israel did was nothing short of daylight robbery. The United States exerted intense pressure on Jerusalem to return the money, but Israel was engaged in an election campaign. Bennett would have jumped at the opportunity to portray Netanyahu as a weak prime minister who capitulates to every American demand – and the tax funds remained frozen.

When the decision was taken a week ago to return the loot, Israel decided to keep 500 million shekels to cover the Palestinians' debt for Israeli water and electricity. Abu Mazin demanded 'all or nothing' and he sent the money back to Jerusalem. Elsewhere, it's very much business as usual on the Palestinian front. The IDF has arrested Palestinian lawmaker Khalida Jarrar and ordered that she remain in detention – without trial, of course – for violating a travel restriction order which prevented her from leaving Jericho. When will she go on trial? When will she be released? Only the Shin Bet can answer those questions.

And let's end with a word about the latest genius idea to come from the corridors of power in Jerusalem: a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip but only autonomy in the West Bank. Welcome to the unreal world of Netanyahu and his supporters."

Ends…

 

HAPPY GOING NOWHERE: Writing on the News 1 website, Guy Doytsch comments on the latest developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front – saying that both Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas are happy with the current situation.

"Last Saturday, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas declared that he would be willing to negotiate with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu without any preconditions. A day later, he threatened to take Israel to court over its decision to withhold some of the Palestinian tax revenue to pay its debts to Israeli suppliers of electricity and water. If we didn't know better, we could be forgiven for thinking that there are two Palestinian leaders: one conciliatory and the other divisive.

It is odd that Abu Mazin has suddenly decided to drop his preconditions for resuming negotiations. In the past, he was extremely insistent. In addition, during the last round of talks, the Palestinian Authority violated its own commitments and sought membership of 15 international organizations, while Israel stood by its commitments and released dozens of Palestinian terrorists in three waves.

Abu Mazin may have called on Netanyahu to resume talks, but he did so safe in the knowledge that the Israeli prime minister would refuse. Apart from the distrust that exists between the two leaders, Netanyahu has another reason for refusing: the right-wing government he is trying to establish. Even the smallest indication that he is willing to resume contact with the Palestinians would make it extremely hard for him to establish a narrow, rightist government. There are even some lawmakers in his planned coalition who object in principle to any kind of agreement with the Palestinians. Talking to Abu Mazin while negotiating the terms of a new coalition would harm Netanyahu.

Nonetheless, Netanyahu made a mistake. He should have sent his envoys to Ramallah to see if Abu Mazin is serious. The chances are that they would have returned empty-handed, but at least Netanyahu would not have come across as a rejectionist in the eyes of the international community.

The Palestinian leader acted cunningly. He knew that the world is on the Palestinians' side. Being seen as a rejectionist would be bad for Netanyahu. In fact, he's still reeling from two comments that he made during the election campaign: firstly, that 'Arabs are voting in droves' and, secondly, that he no longer believes in the two-state solution.

Last week, the Israeli defense establishment decided that it was time to transfer the Palestinian tax revenue that had been frozen in response to Ramallah signing the Rome Covenant, which is part of the process of joining the United Nations. However, Israel held back around a third of that money to pay for the water and electricity that the Palestinian Authority consumes. Abu Mazin wants all of the money Israel is holding and is not willing to compromise. He believes that Israel no longer cares about the Palestinian Authority, so he is digging in his heels ahead of unilateral steps that could fundamentally change life in the PA and Israel.

Paradoxically, Abu Mazin is probably rather pleased that Netanyahu won the election. In political terms, Abu Mazin has been the weaker party for several years. His regime is starting to crumble. If the left had won last month's election, he would have been forced to engage in serious negotiations and would have had to compromise. Under current circumstances, however, he has to keep the embers aglow. Any light wind – such as concessions in negotiations with Israel – could extinguish his regime. In addition, Abu Mazin is also coming in for criticism from more extremist Palestinians in the territories, who are calling for a violent response to Israel and who accuse him of being a weak leader. The Palestinian leader's recent comments are not designed to promote a peace deal with Israel, but to bolster his image as a national leader among his people. Apart from a few headlines, Abu Mazin won't gain anything. In light of Jerusalem's constant criticism of Washington over the Iranian nuclear deal, the Obama Administration wants to prove to Israelis that they can rely on the United States. So the Americans will veto any Palestinian initiatives on the international stage – just as they have always done.

At the moment, it seems that neither Abu Mazin nor Netanyahu is interested in a peace deal. On the one hand, Netanyahu has forged ahead with settlement construction. On the other hand, Abu Mazin continues to try and damage Israel on the international stage. And both of them come out on top: diplomatic stalemate is good for Netanyahu, while widening gaps between the sides is good for Abu Mazin."

Ends…

 

NETANYAHU'S GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT: Writing in Haaretz, Avi Shilon explains why Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu should embrace the Iran deal as his greatest achievement.

"The coverage of the Iran dispute between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama depicts Netanyahu as suffering a defeat. With global support, Obama reached a framework agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program that Netanyahu defines as bad. And Netanyahu, in opposing the deal, has damaged Israel’s all-important ties with the United States.

But from a historical perspective, the agreement could be Netanyahu’s greatest achievement, perhaps his only legacy. If the agreement is kept, Iran will not be a nuclear power for the next decade. And the option that Netanyahu favors — continued sanctions and the threat of an attack — remains on the table if Iran tries to breach the agreement.

Even the demands by Strategic and Intelligence Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz for amendments to the deal don’t show a major gap between the Israeli position and the agreement. Moreover, the international community stands behind the deal — and that’s what Netanyahu has been seeking since the 1990s: to enlist the world to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear arms.

True, the world powers didn’t act only because of Netanyahu. The United States, Russia, China and certainly Europe have their own reasons to keep Iran from having nuclear weapons. Part of this involves the commitment to the Gulf States and the Sunni Arab countries, part involves other strategic considerations, and part is a principled position against nuclear proliferation. But since the late 19th century, Zionism's leaders have been tested by their ability to adapt the global situation to what is perceived as the good of the Jews.

This was the principle that guided Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann when they fought for the Balfour Declaration and David Ben-Gurion when he supported the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Israel isn’t strong enough to bring the world over to its side by sheer willpower. Diplomatic savvy is needed to find shared interests that will help Israel influence international events.

This is what Netanyahu did, and he did it well. It could be that one day the archives will reveal that the Israeli threat of an attack and the unremitting campaign against Iran merged with Western interests. This approach may even have spurred the parties, including the Iranians, to close a deal.

One may argue over Netanyahu’s tactics, even over his obsessiveness and his evoking the Holocaust and the image of the ancient enemy Amalek. But the bottom line is that Iran’s program will be capped for at least a decade, and without a military operation.

The irony is that precisely those who think the deal is good aren’t complimenting Netanyahu on the outcome. And why doesn’t Netanyahu claim this achievement as his own? It seems he really does prefer a better agreement.

But at the same time it’s reasonable to assume that Netanyahu, as a seasoned statesman, understands that the aspiration to completely quash the Iranian nuclear program isn’t realistic and won’t be achieved by negotiations or a military operation. And so one possible answer is that he decided that his role is to remain bitter until June, when the final agreement is to be signed, to make further undesirable compromises difficult.

Another, unfortunate, answer is that without Iran, Netanyahu’s target bank is empty. From a political point of view, he has no vision or plan other than maneuvers to maintain the status quo.

And that’s not easy. In those terms it may be said that it would have been better for Netanyahu to lose the election and be remembered as the man who made a significant contribution to prevent Iran from going nuclear."

Ends…

 

ISLAMIC STREET BRAWL: Writing on the Times of Israel website, Jonathan Russo says that centuries of despotic rule in the Arab world is coming to a bloody and brutal end.

"With the start of Operation Decisive Storm (the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen), there are now three Arab countries tearing themselves apart: Syria, Libya and Yemen. In each country the fight has now devolved into a level of factionalism that more resembles a street fight than any higher political calling. We can try to make sense of the fighting in these three countries and understand the motivations of the protagonists, but ever-increasing tribal and ideological splintering is making that difficult.

In the outskirts of Damascus in Syria, ISIS just invaded the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk, essentially a Syrian-imposed Palestinian ghetto. This has spurred Hamas fighters to resist. While they are resisting, they are also being shelled by Assad’s forces. Yet according to Erika Solomon, writing in the Financial Times, 'A pro-opposition Hamas splinter group known as Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis is believed to be fighting ISIS under a barrage of artillery from ISIS and another Palestinian faction close to the regime.' Add in the recent defection of many Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters in the vicinity to ISIS. Got that?

Where there were once Assad’s Alawites (and allies) against the semi-secular anti-Assad resistance, there are now at least four major factions fighting the regime – and each other. Not to mention Iranian Quds Force generals advising Hezbollah on how to prop up Assad. What’s more, Turkey has now sealed its borders with Syria and is pushing back against ISIS. The revved-up Saudi Defense Minister, thirty-four year old (no prior experience necessary) Mohammed bin Salman, also just accused Putin of cynically wanting peace in Syria and slammed him for supporting Assad.

For another real look at an Islamic street fight look no further than Libya. With the flood of Qatari weapons and money the local Islamists looked to be ready to rule, until ex-Gaddafi officer Khalifa Haftar drew a line in the Sahara Desert sand. As strongman of the day, he is attempting to rouse Western secular sympathies, but it’s a hard choice: secular psychopath vs. religious ones. Meanwhile the National Forces Alliance and the allied al-Sawaiq and al-Qaqa brigades are using proxy forces like the Zintani Brigades against the Islamists, and let’s not forget the Warshefana militia, which has its own issues. Hope that is clear.

The Saudi push into Yemen to counter the Iranian-backed Houthis has even managed to rouse Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah from his bunker to launch one of his usual stem-winder diatribes. This time Israel was spared; it was directed at the Saudis. However, just so the Jews would not feel totally left out, Nasrallah accused the Saudis of being aligned with the Zionists, a sure-fire argument winner. The Saudis have even accused the Houthis of hiding behind civilians and using public buildings as arms depots. Sound familiar?

Just as the Greeks imagined thunder to be the sound of fighting amongst their gods, so too is the thunder heard throughout Yemen from the fight between the ruling gods of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

So there you have it. Well over a dozen countries are slugging it out in Syria, Yemen and Libya, often through scores of proxies marginally under their control. Yet while the chlorine barrel bombs land on more civilians and the helpless refugees begin to outnumber those left behind, the fighting amongst the factions increases. It is fair to say that Syrians today are literally in the crossfire of armed groups that are metastasizing by the week.

What it all means for the superpowers beyond the Middle East may not be very much. The military intervention in Yemen by the normally risk-averse Saudis, flanked by many other Arab countries, is very significant. It means that Arab powers are finally willing to formally commit their forces to fighting in other Arab countries. With Arab countries taking such a direct role in this conflict, the ability of the world superpowers to shape developments will be ever more limited. There is no real room here for American, European Union or Asian interests.

This is beyond 'leading from behind.' The current role of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the others is to commit to action in their own neighborhood, which they previously just relegated to the United States and then complained about. It’s man-up time in the Middle East.

As for the humanitarian horror, that too will have to be confronted by the Middle Eastern powers that be. They all have very loud voices when it comes to condemning Israel for its actions in war. The beastly brutality of the Syrian civil war, the errant Saudi bombs falling on refugee camps and the civilians trapped in cities are all immeasurably worse than anything Israel ever did. So far, I have been listening in vain for the outraged voice of Prime Minister Erdogan, from his billion-dollar palace, who was so strident and pugnacious about the Gaza flotilla and its nine dead. That’s one second of Syrian violence.

The ISIS incursion into Yarmouk threatens to make the 1982 Israeli Phalangist massacre in Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila refugee camp look like a Sunday picnic. The initial reports from Yarmouk are horrific.

It is going to be hard to unwind this. Centuries of despotic rule is coming to a violent end. The failure of iron-fisted rulers is being exposed in the most violent manner. The only glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel is that the Arab and wider Islamic world will take responsibility for itself. Decency and care for human life will hopefully follow all the bloodshed to come."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

1-From today’s Turkish press

 

ERDOGAN’S VISIT TO TEHRAN: Serkin Demirtas argues that President Erdogan is arriving in Tehran today at a disadvantage in centre-left Radikal: “Erdogan's visit to Iran could not be happening in a much more negative climate than what we have today. It seems that Iran, which has resolved its decades-long 'nuclear energy' disagreement with the West with a historic deal, and has taken steps to re-integrate with the international community, will sit at the table opposite the president of Turkey, who has lost credit both internationally and regionally, with the advantage of a 1-0 win already in its hands."

Sami Kohen sounds a positive note in centrist Milliyet: "President Erdogan's visit to Iran today is being made in a tense atmosphere caused by mutually critical statements. Yet the visit offers a clear sign of the significance that both sides attach to improving the friendship and cooperation between them. At a time when the Iranian nuclear crisis is being resolved and the international community, primarily the U.S., has begun to normalize its relations with Tehran, it would be very illogical for Turkey to remain at odds with this neighbor. Even if the mutual disagreements over some regional problems cannot be totally resolved, both sides seem to be determined to improve their relations."

Ozgen Acar sees both challenge and opportunity in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "The Sultan [Erdogan] is flying to Iran at both an 'inauspicious' and a 'promising' moment! It is inauspicious because he has supported the Saudis in Yemen against the Iran-supported Shiite uprising. Mansur Hakikatpur, the deputy head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has called for 'Erdogan's visit to be cancelled. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has asked the Sultan, who 'makes strategic mistakes and pursues ambitious policies', 'to act in a responsible manner’. He will now have to conduct talks in Tehran in such an atmosphere. Yet it is also an auspicious moment, because opening Iran's money taps and its growing oil sales can make an important contribution to Turkey’s welfare as well." 

Faruk Kose has no faith in Iranian intentions in pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Akit: "All aspects of Turkey relations with Iran will be discussed in the talks that Erdogan will conduct in Tehran; there will be consultations on regional and international issues. In this respect, issues such as 'Yemen, Iraq, Syria and energy' will be on the table; 'the dangers that Iran's policies might pose in the region' will be discussed, and the message to 'act responsibly and avoid a sectarian war' will be delivered. However, I believe Iran will not heed such messages; and I do not believe that it will act responsibly. According to the Iranians, Erdogan is 'harboring the dream of reviving the Ottoman state in the Middle East'."

Ceren Kenar believes that Iran is seeking to have it both ways in centre-right, pro-government: Turkiye: "President Erdogan has made very appropriate and significant statements in the last couple of weeks on the nature of the catastrophe resulting from Iran's Yemen policy. Turkey expects Iran, with whom it 'agreed to disagree', to adopt an attitude that contributes to regional stability and security. This is what Ankara seeks. But, at the end of the day, it is up to the Iranian administration to decide what kind of path it will follow. Will it pursue power that provokes sectarianism in the region to be paid in the blood of civilians, or will it choose to be a country that resolves its problems via negotiations? It seems that both these tendencies will be on the table as Iran's foreign policy tools; paradoxically, in a manner that is not mutually exclusive."

 

SOCIAL MEDIA BAN: Hasan Cemal warns against social media bans in independent Internet news outlet T24: "The Sultan cares about neither democracy nor law. He continues to act against freedoms and to crash into them jauntily. Recently, he banned Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, which were described as the cause of social troubles during the [summer 2013] Gezi protests. Of course, I am not surprised. But I want to repeat: Turkey may see yet much worse days and be wrecked. Be prepared. Unfortunately, this is the situation."

Nuh Gonultas accuses the government of a systematic attempt to curtail freedoms in centrist and pro-Gulen Bugun: "Turkey is certain to face a new ban with every passing day. The government has made a habit of imposing a publication/broadcast ban whenever an incident occurs, and it is also introducing limitations on the people’s freedom to receive news under the guise of media accreditation. The social media are always under surveillance and control, and new bans are imposed on the social media sites every day. Yesterday as well, we, as a nation, were faced with new social media bans."

 

 

2-From today’s Iranian press

 

NUCLEAR TALKS: Moderate Iran describes one difficulty: "President Rowhani pursued nuclear negotiations over the past 18 months, despite pressure from domestic opponents and regional rivals. What makes the task of the Iranian negotiators difficult after the Lausanne statement is that, in addition to explaining the text of the framework to the people of Iran, they will also be held responsible for foreign interpretations." 

Hard-line Javan reminds that results have been achieved "We should not forget that world powers who rule the international system stipulated that Iran did not have the right to possess nuclear technology and uranium enrichment. Today, after over a decade of effort, Iran has achieved results. By allowing 5,000 centrifuges to be operational in Natanz under the Lausanne statement, Iran has been accepted as a country with nuclear technology. Those in Iran who are passionately concerned about some issues relating to the framework deal should not ignore these achievements or speak as if Iran's decade of resistance and persistence has not attained any results." 

Reformist Arman considers regional reactions: "Following the joint statement in Lausanne, some countries of the region feel threatened, including Saudi Arabia, who cannot hide its problems and its hostility to Iran. To reach its goals, Saudi Arabia prefers Iran to remain isolated. They lose when there is peace and well-being in Iran and spare no effort to ensure the non-resolution of the nuclear case. Saudi Arabia is even unhappy about the expansion of Iran-Iraq ties and worries that its attempts to return the pro-Saddam minority, which it supports, to power will be unsuccessful. Qatar is upset about losing its exclusive exploitation of the joint gas fields with Iran, but its interests require it to show more amiability. Bahrain is obedient to Saudi Arabia, which practically occupies it. To resolve its domestic social problems, it should cede rights to its people. Iran's ties with Oman, which is threatened by Saudi Arabia, will expand. Yemen will be divided into two parts. The southern part, which currently receives Saudi financial and military support, will ultimately request to join the Gulf Cooperation Council. The northern part will be forced into closer ties with Iran due to Saudi threats."

Hard-line Keyhan seeks answers: "As repeatedly declared by the government and the Supreme Leader, the lifting of sanctions is our objective from the negotiations. The key and vital question is when will the IAEA confirm our adherence to pave the way for the removal of sanctions? Perhaps, the answer will be 'after the implementation of commitments'. However, with great surprise, this approach is completely wrong! Because, even after over a decade of monitoring all our nuclear facilities, and despite hundreds and thousands of pages of documentation, the Agency was not willing to declare that our nuclear activities were peaceful! We have undertaken to give up upfront about 10,000 kg of enriched uranium, rearranged the core of the Arak reactor, completely closed the Fordow facility and implemented the Additional Protocol, all of which are irreversible. Are critics not right to object to a deal lacking guarantees? Is it reasonable, as Foreign Minister Zarif is urging, to wait three months and comment only after the final agreement, which means, when the work is over!? Would it not be important to provide an explicit answer to this simple question?" 

Conservative Resalat warns not to shed long held beliefs: "The West will have three months to accept an agreement, otherwise the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic will not accept an imposed and incomplete agreement that violates our rights. It should not be forgotten that even signing the final agreement cannot deny the unreliability of the great Satan, because the White House's cunning will never end. Any strategy that hides within it friendship with our sworn enemy or trust in America and European troikas is doomed to failure." 

Reformist E'temad engages the critics: "Although it is clear that most Iranians support the agreement, there are also some who oppose it. Critics might have wanted enrichment to be possible to an optimal extent, with tens of thousands of centrifuges. Perhaps they also wanted enrichment without restrictions, the Arak power plant to produce plutonium and monitoring to take place only within the NPT framework. Of course these demands should be respected but what if they are not accepted by the opposite side? What if sanctions continue and are intensified? Critics must identify the possible achievements and the utilization of the enriched uranium against the costs of sanctions. It will be sufficient if they explain this because, at this stage, our issue is not access to enrichment technologies, which has been achieved. The issue is about the use of enriched uranium. Critics should explain whether what Iran has lost has more benefits than the achieved concessions." 

 

IRAN/TURKEY: Centrist Jomhuri-ye Eslami expects an apology: "Today Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is coming to Tehran to expand Turkey's ties with Iran. We do not have any problems with Turkey and its people; we have a great sense of partnership because we are neighbours, as well as due to our religion and common position on many regional and international issues. While supporting the Saudi royal family’s attack on Yemen, Erdogan accused Iran of interfering in the country and dared to say that Iran is trying to replace ISIS! How can someone who has made his country a den for terrorists, especially ISIS, compare Iran with ISIS when Iran has fought against it, and has broken the backbone of its operations in Iraq and Syria? Erdogan, your rule over Turkey and your economic success is due to assistance from Iran and the special conditions that prevail because of Western sanctions on Iran. We were expecting his visit to be cancelled but now, as it is underway, there is a chance for the Turkish president to apologize to the people and the government of Iran." 

Reformist Sharq identifies the main concern: "President Erdogan is visiting Iran for several reasons. Regional and international issues, as well as bilateral and multilateral relations, are among the topics that will be discussed. Economic relations, including the sale of Iranian oil to Turkey, are also important issues for both countries. Erdogan's recent remarks about the role of Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, have overshadowed the visit. Iran’s and Turkey's influence in some parts of the region and the challenges of their foreign policies have been raised several times before. However, Turkey's support for the opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Al-Nusrah Front is the main issue." 

 

SAUDI ARABIA: Conservative Khorasan claims that Saudis are not letting go of the old order: "Who is behind the extremism and violence in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Libya, and Egypt? As control has been lost over world security, Arab sheikhs under the influence of Takfiri ideologies have propagated insecurity in the world. Other countries may, in the short-term, take advantage of the confusion created by extremism in our region. But, in the long-term, they cannot tolerate the institutionalization of the active use of terrorist groups in the foreign policy of some Arab states. As the Middle East slowly prepares to bid farewell to the influence of world powers, Saudi Arabia's bloodletting is painful. Saudi Arabia is shouting loudly that it is not ready for a new order based on mutual understanding."

 

YEMEN: Conservative Quds contends that Saudi Arabia wants the Houthis to surrender: "The recent cruel attacks by the Saudis against the innocent people of Yemen and the creation of a regional front against their poor country indicate a regional and international plot against Yemen. The goal of the Saudi regime is to target the Yemeni revolution and prevent the Houthis from reaching power, as well as to destroy Yemeni infrastructure. By creating a regional front supported by the Zionist regime, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt and Turkey, Saudi Arabia is seeking to persuade the Houthis to surrender."   

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-‘A shameful abandonment’

2-Inside the Yemeni tunnel

3-Erdogan’s fateful visit to Tehran

 

1-‘A shameful abandonment’

 

The Gulf leaders should refuse the invitation [U.S. President Obama] may extend to them to meet at Camp David. It would be better if they were to spend their time developing their own strength and steering clear of the illusion of 'American protection.' Obama's call for political and legal reforms represents a rightful demand that disguises an insidious intent. Such reforms continue to be necessary for genuine national reasons that have to do with the Gulf peoples and their regimes, and not because the White House's master has decided to use them to justify America’s chronic failure and its shameful abandonment of its allies. This is an abandonment that the Arabs have only very belatedly discovered--pan-Arab al-Quds al-Arabi

 

In the Gulf states, there is political stability based on loyalty to royalist and 'emirate' regimes. These states do not suffer from the complex of democratic parties. There are no nationalist, Baathist, or religious ideologies for the military or parties that are based on political mercenaries, to mount and use as vehicles. There is total satisfaction, and an undivided consensus regarding the ruling regimes. In addition to their political stability, the level of development and prosperity in the Gulf states is still advanced, even if some shortcomings remain. Moreover, every Gulf state is working on developing its economy and pursuing development in every field. Furthermore, the Gulf regimes' political awareness has succeeded to an exceptional degree, in overcoming the past period that has led to regional anarchy due to the Arab Spring--Saudi al-Watan

 

U.S. President Barack Obama's statements urging the Gulf states to deal with their domestic challenges that pose a greater threat to their survival than any Iranian threat send a clear message, argues the editorial in a pan-Arab daily. His stance show that the Gulf states have been relying on a false sense of security based on their trust in their American ally. The Gulf peoples are totally unanimous in their support of their royalist regimes, insists the editorial in a Saudi daily in what appears to be an indirect response to the U.S. president. This is what has spared them the tribulations of the Arab Spring and what ensures the failure of any Iranian attempt to stir confessional troubles in them.

 

UNPRECEDENTED STATEMENTS: "In unprecedented statements that may widen the gap between the two sides, U.S. President Barack Obama has expressed his intention to hold a dialogue with the Gulf states during which he will announce 'strong American support against foreign enemies,' but added that he will urge them to 'deal with domestic political challenges,' especially 'the terrible human rights’ abuses'," notes the editorial in Tuesday's Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

In an interview with well-known [New York Times] journalist Thomas Friedman, Obama said that the biggest danger facing the Arab countries is not that of an Iranian invasion. 'It is going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries, including from alienated, unemployed youth and a sense that there is no political outlet for grievances.'

Obama said he wanted to discuss with the Gulf allies how to build more effective defense capabilities and assure them of U.S. support against outside attack. '...that perhaps, will ease some of their concerns and allow them to have a more fruitful conversation with the Iranians.'

This is the first time that an American president reckons that the Gulf states are facing an existential threat from within their own countries, and denies the 'specter of foreign invasion' that the U.S. has consistently exaggerated in the past so as to justify the tens of billions of dollars these countries have spent on purchasing American weaponry.

It is also the first time that an American president criticizes the state of human rights in these countries so 'openly', let alone warns them directly against the threat posed to their regimes’ survival from the 'dissatisfaction of alienated youth', unless these regimes were to implement political reforms.

These statements pour oil on the Gulf states’ already raging angry fires resulting from last week’s nuclear agreement between Iran and the six major powers led by Washington in Lausanne. There is no doubt that many people in the Gulf will view them as 'the wrong statements at the wrong time.' But this should not stop us from understanding what these important statements are signifying:

- First, the U.S. has no intention of maintaining the role of the 'Gulf's policeman' it has been playing for the past forty years, after the strategic situation in the region has changed, and especially after Iran has become a nuclear power. If the Obama administration has refused to succumb to the Israeli pressures aimed at pushing for a military confrontation with Iran, it is more than likely that it has no intention of entering any such confrontation for the sake of any Arab state. The war in Yemen today may offer a practical translation of this message. At the moment of need, when the Houthis were posing a direct threat to its security, Saudi Arabia found that it could rely on nothing but itself and its Arab and Islamic depth.

- Second, Obama's statements reveal that the Gulf states were relying on a false sense of security throughout the past decades. This contributed to their failure to create strong armies, confining themselves to purchasing advanced weapons instead whose main purpose was to reward the U.S. and its Western allies, rather than to develop genuine Gulf defense capabilities. Meanwhile, and over the same period, Iran has succeeded in building a strategic regional balance with the U.S. and Israel.

But the irony is that the U.S. president still allows himself the right to decide what the Gulf states should or should not do. He has advised them to resort to dialogue with Iran after his administration helps to strengthen their defensive capabilities – in other words, to sell them more weapons.

- Third, Obama did not explain what has hitherto led him to remain silent about the 'terrible human rights abuses' in the Gulf states, unless he has only recently and unexpectedly discovered the threat posed by these abuses to the Gulf regimes. In that regard, an observer may feel free to ask exactly how to describe the abuses committed by the U.S. just in one single country such as Iraq, rendering the U.S. the last country on earth that has the right to speak of human rights.

The truth is that Obama's statements merely recall the Arab proverb – 'He came to apply kohl to the eye, but blinded it instead' [he sought to make things better but only made them worse]. The Gulf leaders should refuse the invitation he may extend to them to meet at Camp David. It would be better if they were to spend their time developing their own strength and steering clear of the illusion of 'American protection.'

Obama's call for political and legal reforms represents a rightful demand that disguises an insidious intent. Such reforms continue to be necessary for genuine national reasons that have to do with the Gulf peoples and their regimes, and not because the White House's master has decided to use them to justify America’s chronic and shameful abandonment of its allies.

"This is an abandonment that the Arabs have only very belatedly discovered," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THE ELEVENTH DAY: "Today is the 11th day [sic] of Operation Decisive Storm," writes the editorial in Tuesday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

This 'Storm' may last for some time, until a decisive victory is secured. This is because the circumstances in Yemen, the accumulated legacy of the [former] Saleh regime, the anarchy created by the Houthis, their insistence on swallowing up the whole of Yemen, and their defection from the Gulf and Arab system by allying themselves with Iran, all require this 'Storm' to be decisive and determined until it achieves its aims.

Iran’s reactions are only to be expected. It is trying to exploit those who are weak-spirited via a sectarian [Shiite] mobilization in the Gulf states. After all, playing the card of confessional minorities is the political mud that Iran is so good in wallowing in; but in the Gulf, it always loses. Tehran's problem is that it draws no distinction between the Gulf states, and the other Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Tehran has managed to infiltrate Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut thanks to the domestic confessional divisions in these capitals, the fragility of their political regimes, and the erosion of their national social contract because of the Baath Party's policies in Iraq and Syria, and the rift in the Lebanese political system based on confessional and religious allegiances.

But the social contract on which the Gulf states are based is totally different from the situation in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In the Gulf states, there is political stability based on loyalty to royalist and 'emirate' regimes. These states do not suffer from the complex of democratic parties. There are no nationalist, Baathist, or religious ideologies for the military or parties that are based on political mercenaries, to mount and use as vehicles. There is total satisfaction, and an undivided consensus regarding the ruling regimes.

In addition to their political stability, the level of development and prosperity in the Gulf states is still advanced, even if some shortcomings remain. Moreover, every Gulf state is working on developing its economy and pursuing development in every field.

Furthermore, the Gulf regimes' political awareness has succeeded to an exceptional degree, in overcoming the past period that has led to regional anarchy due to the Arab Spring. Gulf political positions are based on national interests, not on confessional slogans or on 'resistance' as in the case of Iran and certain regional states.

The Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia at their forefront, are opposed to terrorism and to anyone trying to undermine their security and national bodies, regardless of their confessional identity or the slogans they may raise. They oppose al-Qa'ida, ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbollah, and the Houthis. In other words, Tehran has not succeeded in luring the Gulf regimes into the sectarian equation.

In light of this, any Iranian attempt to create confusion, anarchy, or division in any Gulf state, and through which it may hope to infiltrate deep into the area, will be met with failure.

"The confessional card that Iran is trying to use in the Gulf is a failed one. In fact, it is Tehran that is facing confessional challenges in the Ahwaz [ethnic Arab populated area of Iran], and is fighting to remain in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

2-Inside the Yemeni tunnel

 

This country of the poor [Yemen] seems to be marching inside a tunnel. If a display of power is sometimes necessary to impose a balance that facilitates the political process and the search for acceptable solutions, it also needs to search further for solutions that respect the Yemenis, provide them with human, political and economic security, and consolidate their sense of dignity. For Yemen is not merely a matter of a strategic position along the Bab al-Mandab Straits and geographic borders; it is made up of human beings and youths that have human, political, and developmental aspirations. Unless this is recognized, the fall-out from these youths' anger can cause widespread injury-- Amin Qammouriyyeh in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Syria is not Yemen – so much is true. But Yemen, in turn, is not Syria either. What did not work in Syria, I do not believe will work in the Arabs' first homeland [Yemen]. Wisdom, it is said, is a Yemeni invention. In my view, and sooner than it is thought possible, everyone will realize that the war option will not work in Yemen, and that a balanced political solution via an honest mediator and on neutral grounds is the way out of this cul-de-sac. This cul-de-sac is not affecting the Yemenis alone; it is besieging their enemies as well, and perhaps in a more severe way. In fact, the passage of time is not necessarily against the interest of Yemen and the Yemenis--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Yemen is seen by regional powers as no more than a strategic location and geographic border, maintains a Lebanese commentator. But unless its people's aspirations are also acknowledged and taken into consideration, their anger may inflict serious damage on those involved in its current conflict.  There are certain suggestions that the scenario of a Saudi-led attack on Yemen may be replicated in Syria, reports a leading Jordanian commentator. But what is more likely, is that what is being attempted in Yemen represents a repetition of the Syrian scenario. It is clear that what took four years to be discovered in Syria, is already being seen as the only potential solution in Yemen.

 

AT THE PEAK OF THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST: "At the peak of the Ottoman conquest of the Arab countries, the Sultanate's actual control did not extend beyond the limits of Zubaid, al-Mocha, and Aden," writes Amin Qammouriyyeh in Tuesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

The countryside and the highlands, especially Sa'da, remained outside Ottoman control, thanks to the Yemenis' robust resistance that forced the Sublime Porte to sign a treaty with their imam.

The Great British Empire was no more fortunate than the Ottomans in dealing with this difficult corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Their great army was unable to move beyond Aden and the south and head north.

And even though he raised the banner that said that 'Yemen's revolution is our revolution,' [Egyptian leader] Abdul Nasser faced his second defeat in this country, after the [1958-61] union with Syria had failed. It was the prelude to his greatest defeat in June 1967.

Yemen is immune to foreign intervention. The wars waged against its people have only fortified their resistance. As for its rebellious youth's desire for a democratic change that transforms their country from a 'farm' riddled with clans, ignorance, and illiteracy, to a state governed by modern institutions, it collided with a tribal/religious/military structure that has renewed itself twice (after merely changing its head); once in 1962, and once in 2012, with the backing of rich neighbors that can only see their own interests in Yemen.

Today Yemen is once again facing the winds of a new 'Storm.' The pretext for launching it was that those behind it have deemed what was happening in the country to be a Houthi 'coup' backed by Iran against the [2011] Gulf Initiative for a political solution in Yemen. And the main aim of the current military operation is to break the chain that is tightening around their necks, and to restore the domestic and regional balance in Yemen as a means of placing a political solution back on track, after restraining the 'putschists' and all those behind them.

But the first yield of these military operations so far has been a flourishing season of futile death at the hands of both parties, destroying what remains of state institutions that are very fragile anyway, and a revival of extremism in all forms and colors. The current moment is opportune for al-Qa'ida to expand its bases and for its sister organization ISIS, to engage in its favorite 'pastime' of annihilating 'the rafida [Shiites]' and implement its own special brand of shari'a that wallows in slaughter and killings.  The moment is also opportune for the sectarian militias on the other side whose fanaticism and tension have only grown with every bombing that strikes at a mosque or a community that embraces them.

Saudi Arabia is seeking a rapid and decisive victory on the ground before any political development emerges that might be imposed by the rapid regional changes and international necessities. Meanwhile, geographically distant Iran is not hurt by its regional opponent’s involvement in the Yemeni quagmire. That could divert Saudi attention away from Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, and strengthen its negotiating cards in any likely solution there. All of which only brings the Yemeni people the 'glad tidings' of further repression, pain, and destruction.

This country of the poor seems to be marching inside a tunnel. If a display of power is sometimes necessary to impose a balance that facilitates the political process and the search for acceptable solutions, it also needs to search further for solutions that respect the Yemenis, provide them with human, political and economic security, and consolidate their sense of dignity.

For Yemen is not merely a matter of a strategic position along the Bab al-Mandab Straits and geographic borders; it is made up of human beings and youths that have human, political, and developmental aspirations.

"Unless this is recognized, the fall-out from these youths' anger can cause widespread injury," concludes Qammouriyyeh.

End…

 

A CERTAIN SCENARIO: "Certain political observers and analysts have been debating a scenario in which [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm moves from Yemen to Syria," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in the Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

A minority believes that such a development is likely, but there are many who argue that 'Syria is not Yemen', and that it would be difficult, even impossible, to reenact the Yemeni scene in Syria.

A close observer of developments in the Yemeni scene over the first ten days of Operation Decisive Storm would now fear a completely contrary scenario; i.e., the 'Syrian-ization' of the Yemeni scene, or replication of the Syrian scenario in Yemen. This is a legitimate concern, even though it also does not take the fact that 'Yemen is not Syria' into consideration, despite the common elements and similarities between the two situations.

The Syrian scenario began with a wager on destroying the Syrian army; and if that were to prove impossible, then it may be possible, at the very least, to split the army and kill off its commanders individually and in groups, and encourage individual and collective defections from it.

The Yemeni scenario began grounded in the same assumption. Decisive Storm's strikes have been primarily directed at the Yemeni army, its elite forces, military bases, air defense systems, strategic missile capabilities, air and naval bases – all in the shadow of a serious wager on splitting and dismantling it.

In Syria, the Syrian army was referred to as 'Assad's forces,' and in Yemen it is being referred to as '[former president] Saleh's forces.' But in short, and regardless of how these armies have been formed or re-formed, and the extent of the regime's head’s influence in them, they remain the only regular forces on the ground, and, as such, are the sole forces that can assume the task of maintaining security and the state's survival.

Destroying or tearing them apart will only make way for military and semi-military organizations and militias, the armies of sects, confessional groups and neighborhoods, to dominate the scene and determine the direction taken by the conflict and the manner in which it will unfold.

In Syria, the talk is of a regime that has lost its legitimacy; and in Yemen, there is ongoing 'crying on legitimacy's bosom' (to borrow a phrase from our friend [Palestinian writer] Rashad Abu-Shawar). In Yemen, the aim is to restore 'legitimacy' to the country and its soil, carried on the wings of F-16s; and in Syria, the aim is to bury legitimacy under the homeland's soil after it has proven impossible to uproot it via NATO's power and on the wings of 'the legitimate and justifiable opposition,' backed by regional and international capitals.

In both cases, the war is being promoted as one waged against a 'tyrannical confessional minority' that is trying to dominate a mistreated and marginalized Sunni majority.

In Syria, those behind the war had no qualms about facilitating the flow of over 25 thousand 'mujahidin' fighters from one-hundred states, via the Friends of Syria (FOS) group’s borders, backed and financed by parties that have relations of 'confessional and ideological kinship' with them. As a result, Syria's northeast has turned into a safe haven for ISIS, and for the [al-Qa’ida-affiliated] Nusra Front in its northwest and south. And this is to say nothing of the pockets here or there, control of which is shared between the various 'sister' organizations that raise the black banners of jihadi Islam.

In Yemen, those behind the war invested much in the 'Ma'rib base' near Yemen’s oil reservoirs. Hadramaut and its capital al-Mukalla became a main center for AQIP (al-Qa'ida in the Arabia Peninsula). Reports speak of an exceptional ISIS presence in the area that will take everyone by surprise one day in the not too distant future, especially after the systematic storming of prisons and liberation of senior Qa'ida prisoners.

The same game was tried in Iraq when the Maliki government was in power, and before the international community intervened in force in the war on terrorism, always with the aim of mobilizing every possible means to confront the more serious Iranian threat.

The difference between Syria and Yemen is this: In Syria, efforts are concentrated in winning the battle with the regime on the ground after it has proved impossible to induce NATO to deliver a knockout aerial blow. In Yemen, on the other hand, the most extensive air strikes in its history are underway after its enemies failed to secure a strong base on the ground inside the country. The hope is that these strikes will create splits in the Yemeni army and turn some local parties against it and the Houthis – beginning with Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood (the Islah Party); the third horse that is being betted on after the bet on defections from the army and al-Qa'ida's rise.

In Syria, the [Western-led] 'coalition' succeeded in bringing over sixty states into the FOS club. In Yemen, the war seems confined to one state alone (or two states at most), while the remainder have limited their participation to a symbolic/political level forced on them by the power of money and the clout of energy politics.

In Syria, it took four years before numerous parties began to express their weariness and unhappiness at the ongoing crisis. In Yemen, barely two weeks have passed before weariness and concern have already begun to seep into the UN's hallways in the form of draft resolutions demanding a ceasefire and a humanitarian truce.

In Syria, it has often been said that a decisive military victory is a mere illusion. In Yemen, there are those who speak of an impossible 'ground war' as soon as they finish speaking of the impossibility of a decisive victory in a war waged from the skies.

In Syria, it took a few years before the conviction that a political solution is the only alternative sunk in. In Yemen, talk of a political solution began from the very moment the first communiqué was issued declaring the start of military operations.

In Syria, the war is said to be 'futile.' In Yemen, futility itself is said to have assumed the form of war. In Syria, the bloody bill has reached unprecedented heights. In Yemen, the TV screens have begun to broadcast images of the bodies of children and women being removed from under the ruins of their homes amidst their disaster-stricken families.

In Syria, it was said to be a war by proxy. In Yemen, there has been a dearth of proxies, as a result of which a war between 'the true parties' took off without any gloves, or any curtain hiding their face or covering up their true identity.

In Syria and Yemen we have one and the same war but in two arenas, exactly similar to the wars raging in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon – which is on the brink of the abyss of war.

Syria is not Yemen – so much is true. But Yemen, in turn, is not Syria either. What did not work in Syria, I do not believe will work in the Arabs' first homeland [Yemen]. Wisdom, it is said, is a Yemeni invention. In my view, and sooner than it is thought possible, everyone will realize that the war option will not work in Yemen, and that a balanced political solution via an honest mediator and on neutral grounds is the way out of this cul-de-sac. This cul-de-sac is not affecting the Yemenis alone; it is besieging their enemies as well, and perhaps in a more severe way. In fact, the passage of time is not necessarily against the interest of Yemen and the Yemenis.

"But this assumes that there are those who read, scrutinize, and base their policies on interests and gains rather than tribal fanaticisms and the desire for revenge," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Erdogan’s fateful visit to Tehran

 

The Turkish president’s current visit to Tehran will have an enormous impact on the region's fate and the nature of the conflicts raging there, as well as on potential solutions for its many burning files, says Abdelbari Atwan on pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

As Turkish President Erdogan visits Tehran today (Tuesday), it is clear that the prospect that Ankara may join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen will be the main issue in his talks there, posits the editor-in-chief of an online pan-Arab daily. It is also clear that economic considerations will be the most important factor in determining whether he will fully join that coalition or not.

 

A VISIT AMIDST CONFLICT: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will arrive in the Iranian capital Tehran today (Tuesday) on his second official visit in two years," writes Editor-in-Chief Abdelbari Atwan on Tuesday on the pan-Arab website www.raialyoum.com.

The visit takes place amidst a sectarian and regional conflict across the entire Middle East, one that is manifesting itself in a series of wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and in which the two countries stand on opposite sides.

President Erdogan's visit comes at an extremely difficult juncture, amidst numerous major political and economic developments. And we need to pause and consider these developments if we wish to understand the scene in a more accurate manner:

- First, there is growing talk of a 'Sunni' Turkish/Saudi/Qatari coalition to confront Iranian 'expansion' in the region. This comes after Pakistan and its President Nawaz Sharif have steered clear of any ground or aerial intervention in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, for fear of a sectarian Sunni/Shiite conflict in Pakistan. Shiites constitute over 20% of the Pakistani army.

- Second, this visit follows shortly upon the 'framework' agreement between the six major global powers and Iran regarding its nuclear program. This agreement will lift the economic siege imposed on Iran and recognize its right to enrich uranium to low levels under strict international monitoring, while allowing Iran to maintain all its nuclear installations.

- Third, there is growing U.S. military cooperation with Iran regarding burning issues in Iraq and Syria. It was worth noting that American warplanes provided the air cover for the attack [on Tikrit] waged by the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) that consist mostly of 'Shiite' militias backed and armed by Iran. It was also worth noting that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that his country does not exclude the possibility of a dialogue with President Bashar al-Assad.

The Turkish president violated all the 'red lines' last month [March] when he accused Iran of trying to impose its 'hegemony' and backing terrorism in the region, demanding that it should withdraw its 'terrorist' groups from Yemen, and confirming his country's support for the Saudi Decisive Storm. He said that Iran 'has exceeded the limits of patience.' These 'unprecedented' statements led many Iranian MPs to demand that Erdogan's visit be canceled, while the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Turkish chargé d'affaires and demanded 'clarifications' of these statements, which it deemed to be harmful and provocative.

But the urgent questions today are the following; first, why did Iran not cancel this visit and, second, why is President Erdogan insisting on it, despite the fierce attacks on him by the Iranian press and Iranian MPs.

To answer such questions and others, we need to stress a number of fundamental points: The first is that President Erdogan is not an Arab leader who bases his policies and positions on emotional reactions. Second, he is an elected president who is subject to media and democratic institutions that hold him accountable for every step he takes. Third, he is skillful in separating politics from economic considerations, and places his country's interests above all other considerations.

President Erdogan is primarily going to Iran in his 'economic' capacity. He understands very well that after the American and Western siege will be lifted in two months' time (June) in accordance with the recent nuclear agreement, Iran will become a regional superpower and a major market, a state that exports oil and gas without restrictions. This may provide his country's companies with enormous export and import opportunities that could double the size of the trade between the two countries that currently stands at 30-billion dollars annually and that may exceed this in a few years' time.

There is nothing shameful about the fact that President Erdogan is acting like a 'businessmen' who wants to open up markets for his country's companies. It is precisely such 'pragmatism' that has led to his and his party's reelection three times, turning Turkey into the 17th strongest economy in the world. It is worth noting that he always includes a delegation of over one hundred businessmen on all his official visits, as well as the ministers in his cabinet specializing in economic and foreign trade issues.

The Turkish president realizes all too well that the American/Iranian rapprochement will come at the expense of his country and its economy, just as he understands that the U.S. cannot be relied upon as an ally. This is why he has pursuing the British policy that says: 'If you cannot beat them, join them.'

This is what he is doing by going to Iran himself. And why not? Are the Americans themselves not heading to Tehran after 36 years of hostility and beating the drums of war?

But while the economic dimension of President Erdogan's visit to Tehran seems agreed upon in most of its chapters, the political dimension remains sown with very explosive mines. So the question is this: How will the thorny files, such as the Iraqi and Syrian files, and the currently most heated Yemeni file, be addressed?

President Erdogan currently faces a number of very difficult options:

- First, he can respond to the Saudi hand extended to him and join the 'Sunni coalition' against the Iranian 'Shiite coalition,' and confront what he himself has referred to as Iranian 'hegemony', especially in light of the fact that Saudi Arabia is beginning to realize that it cannot 'rely' on Egypt as a major member of this coalition. That would overcome the knot of Turkish/Egyptian disagreement that has been obstructing Turkey's membership in this 'Sunni' coalition. But this option is riddled with threats and may develop into a war with Iran that will have a negative impact on Turkey’s national unity with its fragile and delicate sectarian fabric.

- Second, President Erdogan may follow in the footsteps of Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif, who visited him in Ankara three days ago with the aim of understanding his attitude towards the 'Sunni coalition.' He may therefore steer militarily and ideologically clear of the policy of sectarian axes that is forcefully raising its head in the region.

- Third, President Erdogan may make use of his 'good' relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and assume the role of a 'peace dove' or a 'mediator' who offers initiatives for solutions.

Saudi strongman Deputy Crown-Prince Mohammad bin Nayif’s unexpected visit to Ankara on Monday (yesterday) less than 24 hours before President Erdogan arrives in Tehran may play a major role in determining what option the Turkish president will pursue.

We do not know what Prince Mohammad bin Nayif was bearing in his bag in the form of tempting political and economic offers to the Turkish president. But what we do know is that Saudi Arabia is fighting a fierce war in Yemen, a war it cannot decisively win by means of aerial strikes alone. We also know that military developments on the ground confirm that the 'Houthi/Saleh' coalition is making advances. For this reason, Saudi Arabia is in dire need of Turkey, both as a partner in the ten-member coalition against Iran that supports its military option, and as a possible 'mediator' if, like Pakistan, Ankara were to 'drag its feet' about joining this coalition.

Prince Mohammad bin Nayif probably brought vast financial and economic offers to Turkey in an attempt to lure it into joining the coalition. And he probably also brought a 'basket' of proposals that may help find a political solution for the Yemeni crisis to be delivered to Iran.

The ball now is in President Erdogan's court. Whatever his final decision, it will have an enormous impact on the region's fate and the nature of the conflict raging there, as well as on potential solutions for its many burning files. In this regard, President Erdogan is like a beautiful potential bride at whose door many men stand hoping to ask for her hand, if not her love.

"All we can do is to follow this visit closely, especially the expected meeting between the Turkish president and Iran’s supreme leader Sayyid Ali Khamene’i, who is the country’s main decision-maker," concludes 'Atwan.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 07.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Skepticism

 

With the exception of Yedioth Ahronoth, Israeli newspapers continue to lead with the framework agreement between Iran and the six world powers that was signed in Lausanne late last week. According to the lead story in Haaretz, Israel will adopt two lines of attack as it tries to thwart – or at least modify – the agreement. According to an unnamed senior Israeli official, Jerusalem will first lobby the U.S. Congress to pass legislation that would make it difficult or even impossible, to approve a comprehensive deal with Iran if one is reached by the June 30 deadline. At the same time, it will continue pressing the White House for the 'improvements' Israel says must be made in the terms of the agreement, the official said.

Israel Hayom leads with a prediction that U.S. President Barack Obama is on a collision course with Congress over the deal, pointing out that the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations is due to vote next week on a proposal obligating the president to obtain Congress' approval for any final deal with Iran. The paper goes on to quote Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who said Monday that the deal should not reduce 'pressure' on the Islamic Republic. 'The administration needs to explain to the Congress and the American people why an interim agreement should result in reduced pressure on' Iran, the Republican senator said in a statement. 'The Senate will review these parameters more thoroughly' and 'respond legislatively,' he said. McConnell also repeated his pledge to examine legislation proposed by Senators Bob Corker and Bob Menendez requiring Congress to review any final nuclear deal with Iran.

The Jerusalem Post leads with the White House's comments on the deal, according to which Iran and the six world powers have not yet agreed on a fundamental component of the structure of a nuclear deal, adding that international sanctions would be lifted only gradually. The disagreement between the parties is over how to pair international sanctions relief for Iran with its demonstrated compliance with an accord. Washington stipulated that it would accept sanctions being 'phased out' only as Tehran complies with a final agreement.

Meanwhile, in comments to reporters on Monday, Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz said that taking military action against Iran's nuclear program is still an option, despite last week's framework deal. Steinitz told reporters that Israel favors a diplomatic solution, and plans on lobbying the international community to improve the deal as its details are finalized in the coming months, but that the military option is still 'on the table.'

Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu gave a series of interviews to the U.S. media on Sunday, in which he urged world powers to step up pressure on Iran as they finalize a nuclear deal in the coming months. He said there was still time to improve, what he claimed, was a deeply flawed framework agreement reached last week.

Netanyahu's appearances on multiple American TV news programs signaled the launch of what is expected to be a lobbying effort to cancel or reshape the deal. He has been targeting the vague language given in the system of inspections and the deal's failure to address issues beyond the nuclear program. According to the prime minister, the system of inspections is not as thorough as proclaimed because it does not explicitly force the Iranians to open their sites 'anywhere, anytime.'

He also claims the agreement is vague about what happens to Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium or how sanctions might be re-imposed if Iran violates the deal. While uranium is not supposed to be enriched for a period of 10 years, the deal permits limited 'research and development' of the advanced centrifuges, so this means that Iran could immediately put these centrifuges into action after the deal expires or break down.

In his TV appearances Sunday, Netanyahu noted Iran's developments of ballistic missiles, which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads and Iran's support for hostile militant groups across the region. According to a document drawn up by experts in his office and a copy obtained by the Associated Press, he believes that the deal leaves too much of Iran's suspect nuclear program intact, would give it quick relief from economic sanctions and creates an easy path for Iran to produce a bomb. 'I think the alternatives are not either this bad deal or war. I think there is a third alternative and that is standing firm, ratcheting up the pressure, until you get a better deal.' He also said the deal fails to address Iran's support for militant groups across the Middle East.

Away from Iran, Israel Radio reports that the Palestinians are 'ready and willing' to see if the UN Security Council has 'the political will' to adopt a resolution with a deadline for ending Israel's presence in the West Bank and establishing a Palestinian state, the Palestinian UN ambassador said Monday. Ambassador Riyad Mansour told reporters that adoption of a resolution with a timetable would be 'one of the most effective measures to combat extremism in our region, because extremists receive their fuel from the injustice of the Palestinian people.'

'If there is a just solution to this conflict … in a short period of time, then you'll take away from them the main source of recruitment and mobilization,' he said, adding that it would also contribute to resolving perhaps 70 percent of the 'burning issues in the Middle East.' Mansour said the United States holds the key.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has threatened to turn to the International Criminal court in The Hague over frozen tax monies owed to the Palestinians by Israel. On Sunday, Abbas confirmed that 'two-thirds of the money had been transferred but said a third of it was deducted. Why?' he added. 'The Palestinians would not accept anything expect the full amount,' he told an audience during a speech in Ramallah.

Finally, Yedioth Ahronoth leads with testimony from soldiers who were involved in one of the bloodiest incidents during last summer's conflict in Gaza, when an IDF vehicle came under attack in the Shujai'iya neighborhood of Gaza. The paper – along with Channel 10 – has published parts of the military's investigation into the incident, in which 13 soldiers were killed and Hamas abducted the body of one of them.

 

GO TO WASHINGTON, BIBI: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Shaul Mofaz calls on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama in order to rectify the damaged relationship between the two leaders and to ensure that Israel's interests are safeguarded in any agreement over Iran's nuclear program.

"The deal being worked on between the six world powers is, in fact, a confluence of interests between two strong leaders, both of whom have aspirations to make their mark on the pages of history.

Hassan Rowhani was elected in June 2013 because of two promises he made: greater freedom and improved economic conditions. On the first promise, he has already made some progress, but, in order to deliver on the second promise, he must secure the lifting of international sanctions. The Iranian electoral system allows for a president to serve two terms of five years. Rowhani wants to get reelected in 2018 and this is his overriding goal at the moment.

U.S. President Barack Obama was elected for a second term of office in 2012. In terms of foreign policy, he has adopted a strategy of 'soft power' – diplomacy with a threat of military force. Thus far, his successes have been limited and a deal with Iran would be seen as a historic breakthrough and a major accomplishment. For Obama, the time element is critical, since he has to reach an agreement before the next presidential election.

This confluence of interests led, at first, to clandestine talks, which led to an interim agreement between the world powers and Iran in late 2013. This sowed the seeds for the framework agreement that was reached last week in Lausanne, the key part of which is that the Islamic Republic will be allowed to continue enriching uranium. This is the root of all evil.

From personal experience, I can confirm that Israel has, in the past, always been kept in the loop on such vital developments. When the international community was working out a deal with North Korea, Israel was kept informed and we were even warned when Pyongyang violated the agreement. This time, despite the critical importance of the negotiations, Israel has not been informed of the details of the agreement – because of the dire relationship between Netanyahu and Obama and the United States' concern that Israel would try to nix the deal. The secret negotiations between Iran and the world powers were uncovered by Israeli intelligence – and the rest, as they say, is history.

Despite Israel's best efforts, it did not manage to halt the Iranian nuclear program. In the absence of secret understandings between the two countries and without a close relationship between their leaders, Israel will find it hard to influence any future negotiations. The well-documented clash between Obama and Netanyahu, coupled with the latter's direct appeal to Congress – over the head of the president – have not served Israel's best interests and have, to some extent, contributed to the 'Lausanne Understandings.'

These understandings are extremely dangerous, but it is doubtful whether they will be translated into a full and binding agreement. Spiritual Leader Ali Khamenei has still not commented and Obama needs to survive Congressional pressure. In the meantime, Iran continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, is involved up to its neck, via Hizbollah, in Syria and Lebanon, continues to grab new spheres of influence in Iraq and Yemen and is intensifying the confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis.

The Iranians' behavior leaves little room for doubt: they plan to hoodwink the West and remain on the threshold of nuclear capability. The final agreement is due to be signed at the end of June and we all know that two and half months is a long time in the Middle East. Israel still has time to influence the agreement and to win the diplomatic battle – before we are forced to make other choices.

Now is the time for Netanyahu to rethink his course. First of all, he must reach quiet understandings with the moderate Sunni leaders in the region and to ensure that they are on the same page. There are clear common interests between us and there is significant potential for cooperation. Secondly, he must initiate a discreet meeting with Obama. If he wants to be able to effectively halt the Iranian nuclear program, he will need to ensure that he has a good working relationship with the American president.

Netanyahu needs to visit the White House and present Obama with a series of professional requests and recommendations, backed up by his security chiefs and the leaders of all the Zionist parties in the Knesset. The most important of these demands is that the lifting of sanctions be gradual and, if necessary, reversible. The whole process should take at least a year and should be dependent on the Iranians proving their seriousness. Iran should also not be allowed to continue its nuclear researching, since it long ago enriched enough uranium to civilian levels for this purpose. In addition, Iran must be forced to dismantle the team it has assembled to work on a nuclear payload for its ballistic missiles, must downscale its arsenal of ballistic missiles and must refrain from any involvement in terrorist activity. The agreement must be for at least 15 years and must be backed up by comprehensive and thorough international inspection.

Meeting with Obama is more important than any speech Netanyahu could deliver in Congress. He must speak to the president from the heart – not via the media. He must stand up for Israel's interests, since history has entrusted him with the leadership of the Jewish state at this critical juncture.

Go to Washington, Bibi."

Ends…

 

BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND IRAN: Writing in Israel Hayom, Michael Tuchfeld compares the Iranian nuclear deal to that signed with North Korea and concludes that, like Pyongyang, Tehran wants nothing more than to pull the wool over the international community's eyes.

"Sometime back in October 2013, researchers from the U.S.-Korea Institute at John Hopkins University in New York, who were examining satellite imagery from the North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, noticed that the facility’s electrical power generating building was emitting white steam. According to the researchers, both the coloration and volume of the white steam allude to a resumption of operations at the once-defunct facility in the near future. The plutonium reactor had been closed down in February 2007 as part of the deal that North Korea struck with the six world powers. As part of that deal, the United States agreed to unfreeze $25 million in overseas bank accounts and to send food shipments. The dismantling of the reactor's cooling tower happened a few months later and was even broadcast live on television so that the entire world could watch. The United States was praised for its achievement and the president announced that his efforts to stop North Korea getting its hands on nuclear weapons had been a success.

Just a few weeks later, the same researchers found that the satellite launching facility at Sohae was being adapted to house long-range ballistic missiles. The initial agreement for the dismantling of the Yongbyon was signed in 1994. In exchange, the world powers undertook to allow North Korea to build two nuclear reactors for the production of electricity. It soon became obvious to everyone that the regime in Pyongyang was making a mockery of all the agreements it signed over the years and that North Korea was forging ahead at full steam. Thus far, the North Koreans have conducted three nuclear tests – two of them while U.S. President Barack Obama was in the White House.

One does not have to be an expert to draw comparisons between North Korea and the Iranian nuclear program. Some people compared the situation to that of Czechoslovakia on the eve of World War II. Czechoslovakia was the most progressive, democratic and prosperous country in central Europe. Unfortunately, its allies acquiesced to Hitler's ultimatum and went to extreme lengths to pressure Czechoslovakia into making far-reaching concessions to the Germans in the Sudetenland. In the end, Czechoslovakia made so many concessions that it ceased to exist. Prague itself was never invited to any of the so-called peace conferences and all discussions took place over its head. Does that sound familiar?

Instead of an agreement similar to the one reached with Libya, whereby the Libyans were forced to dismantle their entire nuclear program and to remove all traces of it from Libyan soil, the six world powers appear to be heading toward an agreement that will leave Iran with broad nuclear options. The difference between Iran and North Korea is that Iran has regional and territorial aspirations. The Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, once described Syria as a province of Iran. Iran's involvement in Yemen proves this beyond a shadow of a doubt. In addition, Iran appears to have endless quantities of cash to send to all the terrorist organizations that pop up across the region. The framework agreement signed last week in Lausanne merely gives the Islamic Republic a free pass to end its international isolation and to exert even more influence over events in Syria, Afghanistan and across the Middle East.

Just like the North Koreans, the Iranians will continue to fool the world because it is clearly in their interests to do so. The differences in how the Iranians and the world powers have described the framework agreement prove that the agreement is fuller of holes than Swiss cheese.

The eagerness with which Obama and his henchman, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, rushed into an agreement with an evil power raises serious questions about the United States' ability to provide any kind of stability to the free world and about the sustainability of democratic regimes in the region. Once again, we have seen proof that dictatorships which rely on threats and terrorism are capable of misleading world powers, who will tend to seek agreements in order to avoid conflict at any price.

In his 1951 novel 'The Wisdom of the Heart,' Henry Miller wrote that, ' No man is great enough or wise enough for any of us to surrender our destiny to. The only way in which anyone can lead us is to restore to us the belief in our own guidance.' All we can do now is hope that the U.S. Congress will listen to his words and will rein in a president who has lost his way. Many Americans are now counting down the days to the end of the Obama presidency and are praying that he will leave the White House before he manages to destroy what remains of the United States role as the leader of the free world."

Ends…

 

UNITY TO ATTACK: Writing on the NRG website, Asaf Golan calls for the establishment of a national unity government that will prepare the country and its citizens for a possible military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.

"Over the past six years, Israel has dealt admirably with the Iranian nuclear threat, under the leadership of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. According to reports in the foreign media, Israeli security has quietly been working to thwart Tehran's aspirations while, at the same time, Israeli officials have been waging an energetic diplomatic war against the ayatollahs.

However, the bottom line is that the deal that was signed this week between Iran and the six world powers proves that, in this round at least, our heroic struggle has met with failure. Too many political forces, led by U.S. President Barack Obama, have joined forces to thwart Israel's efforts. They have, in effect, managed to prevent Israel from taking action against the Iranian nuclear program.

This sad truth has been downplayed in Israel because the deal in Lausanne was signed so close to the start of the Passover holiday, which brings normal life here to halt for a whole week. Even the emergency meeting of the security cabinet that Netanyahu convened on Friday afternoon was overshadowed by preparations for the holiday.

Despite the fact that it is Passover, however, and the vacation that it forces the government to take, it is now clear that Jerusalem must reassess its positions – security and political – regarding Tehran. Such a reassessment would not be in any way an admission that past handling of the issue was mistaken – Israel has acted properly at every stage of its struggle – but there is an urgent need to address the next stage of that struggle. In other words: thus far, Israeli officials have insisted that the military option remains on the table; now is the time to decide whether to use it.

True, Iran is not Iraq and it is not Syria. The ayatollah regime has succeeded in spreading its nuclear facilities across many sites. It has even procured defense systems to protect its sites from possible attack. However, leaders sometimes have to make a choice not between good and bad; sometimes, they are forced into a situation in which doing nothing is worse than doing the wrong thing.

Because of the Holocaust, because of Iran's threats and because it is surrounded on all sides by enemies who are just waiting for a sign of weakness, Israel must seriously consider the possibility of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities – even at the cost of direct confrontation with the United States and the West. It does not need to inform its allies of its plans in advance.

In order to do so, we need to be fully prepared. This includes not only preparing the public and our national infrastructure for any eventuality, but also establishing a national unity government which would act as an emergency government. This would allow Israel to effectively camouflage its true intentions from the United States and from its key allies in the European Union. It also means that the government will have to persuade every Jewish citizen of the State of Israel that, despite the possibly high cost of attacking Iran, it has no other choice left.

Later this month we will mark Holocaust and Martyrs' Remembrance Day. When we say 'Never again,' it means that the Jewish leaders of Israel must ensure that the mistakes that were made in Europe more than seven decades ago are not repeated here today. We have to understand that, when extremists of any hue threaten to destroy the Jewish people, the threat is real. It's not just empty words."

Ends…

 

GAZA FIRST: Writing in Maariv, Amos Gilboa urges the new government to launch a diplomatic initiative – Gaza First – in order to treat the festering wound on our southern border.

"Every Passover, Jews across the world ask the Four Questions as they sit at the Seder Night table. The State of Israel, meanwhile, is facing four foreign policy and defense questions: the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers; the relationship with the Obama Administration, especially the question of whether Jerusalem will continue to do battle against the White House over the Iranian deal or whether it is time to accept it and move on; regional disintegration and the threats that this poses; and the Palestinian issue.

So much has been written in the past few days about the first three issues that I want to dedicate this column to the Palestinian issue, since this is something that Israel must deal with immediately and since it is always at the top of the Obama Administration's list of priorities. President Obama has warned that, unless there is an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, the region will descend into chaos. This is obviously nonsense, given that the Middle East is already in pandemonium and nations are falling apart before our very eyes.

Israel is currently being subjected to a political intifada by the Palestinians, who very much have the upper hand. The French are planning to ask the UN Security Council to vote on a proposal that would recognize a Palestinian state and we still don't know whether the United States will use its right of veto to block it. Moreover, there is a constant threat of unrest in the Gaza Strip and, all the while, the sword of a European Union boycott is hovering over our heads.

Israel must decide now whether to continue to be reactive and to merely defend itself, or whether it should take the imitative. There have been many calls – domestic and foreign – for some kind of initiative, accompanied by empty slogans about the Arab peace initiative. However, we have to realize that any proposal for a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this time simply isn't realistic, if only because of the fact that the Gaza Strip – where half of the Palestinian population is located – is outside the framework of a political solution. In other words, anyone who wants to see the establishment of a Palestinian state must prove that the Palestinian Authority is capable of controlling Gaza. Whether or not Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas can be seen as a partner for peace talks or not and whether he wants a deal with Israel or not, the simple fact is that he does not control events in Gaza and has no influence over what happens there. Many, including European parliamentarians who have symbolically recognized the Palestinian state, prefer simply to bury their heads in the sand and ignore this issue.

The economic situation in Gaza is dire and the billions of dollars that were pledged after Operation Protective Edge failed to materialize. A few weeks ago, a proposal was made to Hamas – apparently by the European Union – whereby the organization would agree to a long-term ceasefire lasting at least five years and, in exchange, Gaza would be rebuilt and the blockade would be lifted. Hamas has still not officially responded to that proposal but has not rejected it out of hand. Ironically, it is Abu Mazin who does not back it.

Israel has now an opportunity to launch an initiative that it could call 'Gaza First with Regional Support.' The main clauses of this initiative would be as follows: an international conference on Gaza, organized by the United States with Israeli participation; Israeli willingness to lift the blockade in stages; the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip and the launch of economic projects with the support of all those Arab countries which oppose Iran; and Hamas' agreement to a 10-year ceasefire.

The main advantage of an initiative of this kind would be political, insofar as it would help us to restore our battered relationship with the United States. But, more importantly, it would ensure that Gaza does not remain a festering wound that is consistently ignored. Either Israel bombs Gaza (as some people, who bemoan the fact that we did not destroy Hamas last summer when we had the chance) or we decide to treat it by gradually draining the pus. There are plenty of drawbacks to an initiative of this kind – as there are for every diplomatic initiative – and Abu Mazin will doubtless try to nix it. There are also serious questions about the Egyptians' willingness to play ball. But what harm would it do if our old-new prime minister and his old-new government were to at least try to launch some kind of diplomatic initiative?"

Ends…

 

DAGAN’S EXAMPLE: Writing in Haaretz, Niva Lanir asks why no one has followed the example of former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, who publicly opposed Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plans to attack Iran and was the only one who spoke out loudly against Netanyahu in the election campaign.

"Three years ago the first hints appeared in the Israeli and foreign press about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran. The hints included the word of 'senior officials' that there had never been such detailed, serious discussions in a political forum. The seven-member security cabinet held more than 50 meetings over the course of a year. Later it was revealed that the head of the Mossad, the head of the Shin Bet security service and the IDF chief of staff opposed such an attack, as opposed to the position of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak. In the end the Americans stood up on the runway, and the planes never took off.

But the Iranian danger did not pass. The Haggadah passage, 'For not just one alone has risen against us to destroy us,' has become the song of Netanyahu’s life, his fuel for the fire during the election campaign and the cornerstone of his speech to Congress. In the meantime, back here, 'quiet, darkness, no one, household utensils alone, everyone trembled together, a bit from the cold and a bit from fear.' (Nathan Alterman, 'It Happened On Chanukkah,' 1933).

'Our excellent young men,' the heads of the Zionist Union Isaac Herzog, Tzipi Livni and Amos Yadlin, and the heads of Yesh Atid, Yair Lapid, Jacob Perry and Ofer Shelah, were struck dumb. No one dared mention the fiasco of the war in Gaza last summer. '51 days without any accomplishment,' said Shelah in an interview with Amos Harel (Haaretz Magazine in Hebrew, April 3).

None of them asked what would have happened if the person responsible for the fiasco, Netanyahu, had sent the IDF to attack in Iran, and none of them called to deny him the option to conduct another war. The last election campaign was a pathetic replica of 'quiet, we’re shooting' from the days of the First Lebanon War. Shooting inside the armored personnel carrier? Not shooting? Netanyahu is playing on the field of the grown-ups, in Washington and in Lausanne. And the opposition (opposition?) sheds its tears over our relations with the United States, wipes its eyes and lays the foundation: 'The Iranian issue may well encourage negotiations over a unity government,' as members of the Zionist Union are saying.

Only one person has tried to ruin Netanyahu’s celebration – former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, who was given the Iranian nuclear file at its start. Dagan was the courageous voice of the election campaign, the only one who spoke out loudly against Netanyahu. 'Enemies do not scare me,' he said at the rally in Rabin Square before the elections.'I am worried about our leadership, the greatest leadership crisis in the history of the country. We deserve a leadership that will set a set of priorities. ... The [Gaza] campaign ended with nothing. Zero deterrence and zero diplomatic achievements. ... How can you [Netanyahu] be responsible for our fate if you are afraid to take responsibility? How did it happen that this country, so many times stronger than all the nations of the region, is not capable of carrying out a strategic act that will improve our situation?'

Three days before the election, Dagan said in an interview to Channel 2: 'I can tell what I made up my mind to do then. I made up my mind that if he decides on an attack, and he has complete authority to decide on it, I decided I would resign that very minute. ... Throughout my entire term I served the country and not the prime minister, and so my loyalty was not to Netanyahu but to the country.'

And so, how is it that Dagan was the only one to come out against Netanyahu? How did it happen that out of all the members of the cabinet when Netanyahu ran the war last summer, not one of them could be found whose criticism could be remembered like Dagan’s? Did they remain silent out of embarrassment? Is it cold out there, being a fig leaf? And if Netanyahu’s demand to add Iran’s recognition of Israel to the agreement between the world powers and Iran is not met, will they then support an attack on the updated axis of evil, Lausanne-Yemen-Washington?"

Ends…

 

THE IRAN DEAL: In its editorial on Tuesday, The Jerusalem Post says that, while there are some surprisingly positive elements to the framework deal between Iran and the six world powers, there are plenty of reasons for the skeptics to remain skeptical.

"Many self-appointed skeptics said they were pleasantly surprised by the key parameters for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program released on Thursday.

They pointed out that Iran will be allowed to keep in operation just 5,060 centrifuges, fewer than leaked estimates of 6,000 or 7,000 or 12,000. And only Iran’s most basic model – the IR-1 centrifuges – will be in operation. More advanced centrifuges, which enrich faster, will not be allowed to operate for at least 10 years.

Also, all enrichment activity will be concentrated at a single site, the Natanz facility, making inspections easier. The level of enrichment will be kept to 3.67 percent, vastly below weapons-grade. And the stockpile of low-grade uranium would be capped at 300 kilograms for 15 years. The heavy water reactor being built at Arak to produce plutonium, another possible bomb fuel, will be redesigned so that it can no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor’s current core will either be destroyed or shipped out of the country.

The agreement sets up an aggressive inspection regime. It provides the International Atomic Energy Agency access to all of Iran’s nuclear sites, including the supply chain and any sites deemed suspicious. The IAEA will be able to carry out surveillance at Iran’s uranium mines and mills for 25 years, at its centrifuge production sites for 20 years. And IAEA protocols, which Iran has agreed to sign, provide the agency with additional inspection authorities.

Yet, while there are reasons for skeptics to be surprised by what they thought would be a really bad deal, there are also quite worrisome aspects to the framework agreement, the first and foremost being that the Iranians have yet to commit formally to anything of real substance, preferring to postpone signing off until the finalization of the deal at the end of June.

In coming days we will probably be seeing the Iranians publicly rejecting elements of the detail-rich U.S. fact sheet, which Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in a tweet, has already called a 'spin.' Even if the key parameters are implemented in full, none of Iran’s nuclear facilities – including the Fordow center buried under a mountain – will be closed altogether. None of the country’s 19,000 centrifuges will be dismantled. Though Tehran’s existing stockpile of enriched uranium will be reduced, it will not necessarily be shipped out of the country.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will remain intact, though some of it may be mothballed for 10 years. When that period ends, the Islamic Republic could instantly become a threshold nuclear state. Iran will also be allowed to keep an undetermined number of centrifuges at Fordow, though it will not be allowed to enrich uranium. The quality of these centrifuges is unknown. If the Iranians can keep 1,000 high-quality centrifuges intact at Fordow, this could reduce Iran’s breakout time to just three months, according to Scott Kemp, a nuclear expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Another problem is that Iran will be allowed to engage in 'limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges' at Natanz, according to the State Department fact sheet. Israeli officials are concerned that these advanced centrifuges could immediately be put into use if the deal breaks down.

There is also the question of sanctions. The U.S. had originally hoped for a calibrated reduction in sanctions, in which Iran would have to earn each additional concession. That was seen as a constraint on Iranian behavior, and it was repeatedly stressed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to the Iranians. Though it is still unclear, because information is still fragmentary, the U.S. seems to have softened its terms on this key issue.

Not only is no mention made of Iran’s development of long-range missiles that could only be used to carry nuclear warheads, the key parameters are silent on Iran’s support for terrorism, not just in the Middle East but in far-flung locations such as Buenos Aires and Burgas. Indeed, while talks progressed between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany), Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij militia of the Revolutionary Guards, declared that 'erasing Israel from the map' is 'nonnegotiable.'

Ultimately, a nuclear deal with Iran, like any deal, relies on the good intentions of both sides. An expansionist Islamic Republic that is actively involved in nearly every military conflict in the region and that publicly calls for the destruction of Israel is hardly a reliable partner. The skeptics have every reason to remain skeptical."

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

PROSECUTOR’S MURDER: Tuesday’s kidnapping and murder of a state prosecutor investigating the death of a young boy at the hands of the police during the 2013 protests, dominates today’s Turkish press commentaries. Umit Kivanc suggests that the state may have something to hide in centre-left Radikal: "We know how the 'state' has acted in similar situations in the past. The threatening tone it has adopted after the incident and statements such as ‘we will cut off the hand that is raised against the state’ says it all. Apart from that, it is clear that the best thing that the authorities can do now is to immediately eliminate the perpetrators who might later reveal the truth, and benefit from the story of 'terrorists killing a prosecutor'. Our state is not a structure that can protect its prosecutors."

Orhan Bursali blames a ‘hope deficit’ for the violence in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "We are passing through an age of darkness, an era of political savagery. This is Erdogan’s Turkey. The authorities’ continuing injustice and oppression of rights and freedoms, and the pressure that leads to murder will produce a loss of hope. The notion that the tools for implementing justice do not work as stipulated by law will always fuel this deficit of hope."

Gultekin Avci questions the circumstances of the shooting in centrist, pro-Gulen Bugun: "The most important result of this incident is that the prosecutor’s dead body has now been heaped over that of poor Berkin Elvan [boy fatally wounded by police during the 2013 Gezi protests]. In the current situation, it is still unclear who shot the prosecutor. Was it the DHKC or the DHKP-C [far left banned Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front] militants, or was he shot 'accidentally' when the armed confrontation with police began? This is unclear."

Huseyin Yayman anticipates further such attacks in centrist Vatan: "It will be no surprise if we were to see more attacks the coming days. While Turkey is moving towards one of the most important elections in its history, there is a desire to destabilize the country. In an era when the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is about to announce that it is ready to lay down its arms, there is a demand for new organizations to be put in charge [of spreading violence]."

Mumtazer Turkone hints at electoral calculations behind the murder in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-Gulen Zaman: "The raid on the courthouse and the murder of the prosecutor have damaged the circle of sympathy around Berkin. If we turn our attention from the causes to the results, the incident has led to a result that totally contradicts the goals. An election is coming soon that has turned into a matter of life and death for the government. It is impossible to plan such an attack without thinking about the elections."

Halime Kokce believes that the killing was an anti-government conspiracy in centre-right, pro-government Star: "For Cumhuriyet newspaper, those who massacred the 12 Charlie Hebdo caricaturists in France are 'terrorists', but those who massacred the prosecutor of the Republic of Turkey are 'activists'. According to Cumhuriyet, the goal of the terrorists was to teach us a lesson, right? One may continue to believe in that lie, but the people see the reality of terrorism when they lift the cover off what some call the ‘Gezi Spirit’. What came to life at the Justice Palace [murder site] was that spirit once again." 

Abdulkadir Selvi places the responsibility on the new Greek government in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: "Attempts are being made to push Turkey towards a climate of terror and chaos via systemic attacks in the run up to the elections. This is an old but efficient game. It is a big trap. According to my information, the terrorists were in contact with the DHKP-C heads in Greece from the start. The order to execute the prosecutor came from the DHKP-C chief on the other side of the phone. After the murder of our prosecutor, Greece should act and give up those who gave this order. Let us see whether the leftist Tsipras government will display such solidarity."

 

 

The Iranian press will not appear due to the extended New Year (Nowrooz) holiday. The coverage will continue after the Easter holiday.

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1-Reshuffling the cards

2-ISIS in Yarmouk Camp

3-The wrong criticisms

4-‘Internationalization’ is not enough

 

1-Reshuffling the cards

 

All the efforts that have been exerted to isolate the terrorist organizations and to dry up their sources of popular support, especially after ISIS's rise and the execution of Jordanian pilot al-Kasasbeh, now seem threatened to be totally wasted. In my view, the 'Sunni' coalition has reshuffled the cards ever since it decided that confronting Iran was its very first priority, rather than the war on terrorism. And this priority can withstand freezing the conflict with al-Qa'ida and refraining from its 'demonization' – indeed, exploring the chances of forging alliances with some of its branches, as in Yemen and Syria--'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Based on previous regional and global experience– that of stronger armies and coalitions broader than the one Saudi Arabia is leading today – [the Yemen campaign] is unlikely to achieve anything at all.  Israel's experiences in Lebanon and Gaza, and NATO and the Western coalition's experiences in Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Iraq before that, offer indisputable evidence in this regard. Nor can Saudi Arabia deploy aerial forces that are more advanced than the aerial capabilities deployed by the U.S. against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, while it knows that any advances against ISIS in these two countries were only achieved in those areas that witnessed battles on the ground. If, despite all this, Saudi Arabia is wagering on deploying forces in order to wage a ground offensive at a later date, it will also fail to destroy the Houthis-- Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

The fear is that we will be witnessing a repetition, albeit in a different form of conflicts such as the Iraq war and the [1960's] Yemen war. These wars hemorrhaged both sides to such an extent that they have subsequently left Iraq, for example, as easy prey for those parties that wanted to destroy it. In light of the above, we must carefully attend to those who are warning that what is happening in Yemen may turn into a quagmire for Saudi Arabia, whose economic power will be hemorrhaged with each passing day in the service of new visions for the region. And, of course, Israel and the U.S. are not far from entertaining such visions--Sa'id ash-Shahhat in Egyptian al-Yawm as-Sabi'

 

The war on Yemen is driving the war on terrorism into the backseat, maintains a leading Jordanian commentator. As a result, base confessional instincts have unabashedly risen to the surface. It is also ironic that the camp fighting terrorism most effectively is the one that is opposed to the U.S. and its allies. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to achieve its declared war aim of uprooting the Houthis in Yemen, says a commentator in a pro-Syrian Beirut daily. Past experience in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere shows that superior air power, equipment, and numbers are not decisive in winning such wars. Now that seven days have passed since the war on Yemen began, there is every possibility that it will turn into a war of attrition that will hemorrhage Saudi Arabia's economic power, warns an Egyptian commentator. The only beneficiary of this will be Israel.

 

A STRONG BLOW: "The war on terrorism has received a strong blow ever since the military activities of Operation Decisive Storm began in Yemen," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Thursday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Neither al-Qa'ida nor ISIS could have wished for anything better in their wildest dreams. The confessional [Sunni/Shiite] conflict is at its most intense, axes and alliances are being formed along various confessional lines, and the change in priorities will necessarily produce changes in the map of alliances.

The past week of military operations on Yemen has included airports, seaports, infrastructure, army and Houthi positions, as well as other non-military areas among its targets. During the course of this week, we did not hear of a single attack on al-Qa'ida in Yemen, even though the Americans’ assessment is that it is the Qa'ida branch that poses the greatest threat to Western interests. But al-Qa'ida is needed in order to confront the [Zaidi Shiite] Houthis’ expansion and [former Yemeni president] Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's forces. And there are reports of operational coordination between [Saudi-based Yemeni president in exile] 'Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi's 'committees' and that terrorist organization.

In Syria, intensive work is underway to rehabilitate the [al-Qa’ida affiliated] Nusra Front, which enjoys Qatar and Turkey's backing. The Nusra's success in taking control of [Northern Syrian city] Idlib was equivalent to a 'mini-Operation Decisive Storm', coordinated between the parties allied in the war on Yemen. We have heard Saudi commentators and analysts speaking of possible changes in the Kingdom's attitude towards the Nusra Front, in fact urging such changes, so much so that one such commentator volunteered a new definition of terrorism, tailored to fit the Houthis' size, while excluding the Nusra. Terrorism, according to him, is 'rejecting partnership,' and the Houthis have rejected partnership, or so claims our friend. By contrast, the Nusra Front agreed to ally itself with Ahrar ash-Sham, Jayshul Islam, and other such groups with salafi jihadi names, which are all in essence terrorist groups.

All the efforts that have been exerted to isolate the terrorist organizations and to dry up their sources of popular support, especially after ISIS's rise and the execution of Jordanian pilot al-Kasasbeh, now seem threatened to be totally wasted. In my view, the 'Sunni' coalition has reshuffled the cards ever since it decided that confronting Iran was its very first priority, rather than the war on terrorism. And this priority can withstand freezing the conflict with al-Qa'ida and refraining from its 'demonization' – indeed, exploring the chances of forging alliances with some of its branches, as in Yemen and Syria.

Washington knows that the forces that are actually fighting ISIS and the Nusra on the ground in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, all belong to the other camp. In Syria, the fiercest battles are those raging between the Syrian army and its allies against these organizations. In Iraq, the military and security forces and the Popular Mobilization Units are fighting a crushing war against ISIS. In Lebanon, Hizbollah lies in wait for ISIS and the Nusra in the Qalamoun Mountains. In Yemen, the strike force that is confronting al-Qa'ida consists of the Houthis and no one else.

But Washington cannot bestow its support and give its backing to this camp. Its interests lie with the other camp. It finds itself forced to 'go along' with the other camp, even if this requires logistical and intelligence support for its military operations in Yemen. But this situation cannot last long. The U.S. will soon realize that it is losing its war on terrorism, because its allies' are exacerbating confessional sentiments and are aggravating the current polarization and division.

Those who saw the angry demonstrations by Islamists in Pakistan understand the scale of the threat posed by this split. The war in Yemen will have a direct impact on relations between the constituents of this multi-confessional country. The salafi discourse towards the Shiites has now become widespread, and is turning into official government discourse. Nobody is ashamed of expressing their lethal and base confessional instincts any more. And all this promotes the interests of al-Qa'ida and the other terrorist groups, whose leaders now have every right to stick out their tongues mockingly, and say: 'Did we not tell you so?'

It is unfortunate that the voice of those Arab states that have still not divorced their reason is lower than it should be. We saw their leaders at the Arab summit [last week] once again stressing the need to combat the threat of terrorism; but they did not refrain, under the influence from the pressures that we are well aware of, from going along with a confessional war, whose fodder is our sister Yemen.

"It is very sad that much of the effort exerted to mobilize Jordanian public opinion against terrorism after the assassination of the martyr Kasasbeh is suffering a serious setback today, thanks to the war on Yemen and its repercussions," concludes Rintawi.

End…

 

SAUDI WAR AIM: "Via its military spokesmen, Saudi Arabia has openly adopted uprooting of the Houthis from Yemen as its war aim," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Thursday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But will the military campaign launched by the new Saudi-led coalition succeed in achieving its declared goal?

If the campaign remains confined to aerial bombardment, then based on previous regional and global experience– that of stronger armies and coalitions broader than the one Saudi Arabia is leading today – it is unlikely to achieve anything at all.

Israel's experiences in Lebanon and Gaza, and NATO and the Western coalition's experiences in Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Iraq before that, offer indisputable evidence in this regard. Nor can Saudi Arabia deploy aerial forces that are more advanced than the aerial capabilities deployed by the U.S. against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, while it knows that any advances against ISIS in these two countries were only achieved in those areas that witnessed battles on the ground.

If, despite all this, Saudi Arabia is wagering on deploying forces in order to wage a ground offensive at a later date, it will also fail to destroy the Houthis, even if the latter happen to be the sole force confronting the Saudi-led coalition. In 1982, the Israeli army invaded Lebanon, but the PLO chose not to fight and to withdraw to the Bika’a Valley, and then to Tunisia and Yemen instead. But when the [Hizbollah-led] Lebanese resistance began – and its supporters were confined to South Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburb – it managed to defeat the occupation that was backed by the Lebanese authorities at the time. The Lebanese army was coordinating with the occupation forces, and the number of Israeli soldiers occupying Lebanon was estimated at some 80-thousand. In addition, the resistance managed to confront the NATO forces that were deployed in Beirut and along its shores, and destroyed the myth of the famous [U.S. battleship] USS New Jersey. And here, we should bear in mind that Lebanon's area is small compared to Yemen, and its population is far less.

In Iraq, the resistance that included limited numbers of the people from al-Anbar and their sympathizers in Baghdad and the south, managed to hemorrhage the Western coalition forces. The Western armies could not defeat it and control Iraq, even though the U.S. alone had mobilized 140-thousand soldiers, in addition to tens of thousands of others from Britain and the other allied states that took part in Iraq's occupation. The Iraqi resistance succeeded, even though all the region's states – with Syria's exception – backed and supported the so-called 'political process' led by the U.S. occupation after the invasion of Iraq.

Are the Houthis less daring than their counterparts in the Lebanese and Iraqi resistances? Not at all. Previous experience, including Saudi Arabia's, with these rebels in the 2009 round of fighting, confirms that they are indeed brave and able to inflict defeat on whoever wishes to destroy them and their aspirations.

Moreover, the Afghanistan experience points to the same conclusion. Deprived of any international or regional backing that is anywhere near the backing and understanding that Ansarullah enjoy, the Taliban movement succeeded in defeating NATO, which today, 13 years after the occupation began, is begging to reach an understanding with it.

"In light of all this, those betting on defeating the Houthis are wagering on a mirage and are plowing the sea," concludes 'Abdullah.

End…

 

SEVEN DAYS ON: "After seven days of air strikes against the Houthis' positions in Yemen, nothing new has transpired," writes Sa'id ash-Shahhat in Thursday's liberal Egyptian daily al-Yawm as-Sabi'.

The warplanes are still flying, reports continue to flow about losses, and the deposed Yemeni president [Hadi] remains outside the country. Opinions concerning a ground intervention continue to differ, while talk of negotiations between the various Yemeni parties and the regional coalition force is receding further and further into the background. So what does all this mean?

A few days ago, I asked in this same column: ‘What next?’ What I meant was, what will happen after the air strikes? The question remains unanswered. If the situation continues as it is today, the Yemeni crisis is likely to turn into a just routine daily news item that fails to catch our attention, as in the case of what is happening in the Syrian crisis, Iraq, and in the case of ISIS.

The tragedy of the hasty views that were expressed as soon as the air strikes began is that they spoke as if victory against the Houthis was inevitable within hours. This, in turn, gave rise to great hopes of an imminent Arab victory, in some way or another, against what some view as 'the Iranian enemy.' In such a state of mind, there was much talk of the new Arab order that will succeed the current phase. This was a very optimistic assumption based on the grounds that no previous Arab coalition had assembled a similar lineup, which suggested that an indisputable nucleus had been formed that would confront any such crisis in the future.

But the facts now indicate that we are facing a protracted crisis, and that the resources of all the parties are likely to be hemorrhaged in a war of attrition. The fear is that we will be witnessing a repetition, albeit in a different form of conflicts such as the Iraq war and the [1960's] Yemen war. These wars hemorrhaged both sides to such an extent that they have subsequently left Iraq, for example, as easy prey for those parties that wanted to destroy it.

In light of the above, we must carefully attend to those who are warning that what is happening in Yemen may turn into a quagmire for Saudi Arabia, whose economic power will be hemorrhaged with each passing day in the service of new visions for the region. And, of course, Israel and the U.S. are not far from entertaining such visions.

"Be that as it may, the hemorrhaging of any Arab power naturally enhances Israel's power, reinforcing it to levels that will ensure its superiority and advantages over us," concludes Shahhat.

Ends…

 

 

2-ISIS in Yarmouk Camp

 

ISIS’s takeover of Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus portends a terrible fate for its inhabitants, says today’s pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

With reports that ISIS forces have captured most of the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus, the camp and its inhabitants appear to be on the threshold of an unavoidable bloody fight and a harsh siege that will cost hundreds of lives, warns the editorial in an online pan-Arab daily. It is the responsibility of all parties concerned, particularly the Palestinian leadership, to prevent this from happening.

 

A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT: "If what Mr. Anwar 'Abdelhadi, the Director of the PLO's Political Department, has been reported as saying is true – namely, that Islamic State (ISIS) fighters have stormed Yarmouk Camp and captured most of it  – and it does seem to be true, then this represents a serious development," writes the editorial on Thursday's pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

It means that these fighters are now just a few kilometers away from the Syrian capital Damascus. And it may be the prelude to bloody clashes and liquidations that will affect many of the camp's inhabitants and defenders, especially those Palestinian factions that are close to the Syrian regime, as well as their many supporters who have remained in the camp.

Yarmouk Camp has been subjected to an unfair starvation siege for the past four years of the Syrian crisis. Its inhabitants have been denied the most basic requirements of survival. Hundreds have died, either as a result of the clashes inside the camp between competing Islamist and non-Islamist factions, or because of destitution and the lack of food and medicine. The result is that the number of inhabitants has fallen from 170 thousand to less than 20 thousand.

ISIS's advance inside the camp and its control of it may be a response to its retreat in Tikrit and other areas in Iraq’s Salahuddin Province thanks to the Iraqi army and the militias loyal to it, the Popular Mobilization Units’, advance. The custom has been that every time ISIS forces are confronted in one place, it resorts to 'expanding' in another. This may be inside Syria or Iraq, or in other parts of the Arab world, such as the Egyptian 'Sinai [ISIS ‘province’] Wilayah' or the Libyan 'Derna Wilayah.' Or it may be by consolidating its presence in the 'Sirte Wilayah,' the stronghold of former Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

It is also worth noting that this advance into Yarmouk comes after Nusra Front's forces have captured the city of Idlib near Aleppo and the Turkish borders, as well as the last crossing point that was under the Syrian regime's forces' control along the borders with Jordan.

Yarmouk Camp is now on the threshold of a grinding war between the Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis that is affiliated to Hamas on the one hand, and ISIS on the other. The 18-thousand or so people still living there are now in a cage controlled from the outside by regular Syrian forces. They can do nothing to save their lives in a war that has nothing to do with them. And this inevitably threatens bloody massacres, similar to those that took place in 2014 before a truce was agreed between the opposition factions in the camp and the regime, and that allowed food and medical supplies to enter and partially eased the siege imposed on the camp.

During the unfair siege that was imposed on them and the bloody fight between the regime's forces and the armed opposition, the camp's inhabitants lived on grass and rats. Sadly, this tragic scene seems likely to be repeated in the coming weeks or months.

Moreover, the presence of ISIS forces inside the camp will place the heart of Damascus within range of their artillery. This will drive the Syrian army and its warplanes to bombard the camp with rockets and explosive barrels in an attempt to silence the artillery, which, in turn, will mean that hundreds will be killed or wounded.

The hope was that the Islamist factions, such as the Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis – who had detained ISIS supporters inside the Camp in response to ISIS's assassination of Yihya Hourani, a Hamas leader – would spare the camp their conflicts and disagreements. But such a hope seems impossible to realize in a country such as Syria where everything is in chaos, and that is drowning in bloodbaths that do not distinguish between Syrians and Palestinians.

We do not know to whom we should address our entreaties in order to save the camp's inhabitants, or those that remain of them, from the death and starvation that awaits them. All that we can say is that the responsibility of saving them falls on all the parties' shoulders.

"At their head are the PLO and the PA, which have so far merely confined themselves to talking about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions inside the camp," concludes the editorial.

Ends…

 

 

3-The wrong criticisms

 

Those who are criticizing the actions of the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq are using the wrong discourse for the wrong purposes, says 'Amer Mohsen in today's Lebanese al-Akhbar

 

Tikrit’s fall to Iraqi government forces was a foregone conclusion after the past few weeks' battles around the city, maintains a Lebanese commentator. But the criticisms directed at the (largely Shiite) Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) for colluding with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition even though they halted their attack until the coalition's intervention in the battle ceased, are hard to understand.

 

THE NEXT OBJECTIVE: "Now that the city of Tikrit, or most of it, has been liberated from ISIS's domination, a question is being raised regarding the war’s next objective," writes 'Amer Mohsen in Thursday's left-leaning Beirut daily al-Akhbar.

Will the Iraqi forces head north to lay siege to al-Hawija and ash-Sharqat, or will they head west to Fallujah? Al-Hawija and ash-Sharqat are ISIS's main strongholds on the road to Mosul. They are the point of entry that will pave the way for striking at ISIS in Kirkuk and Ninawa. Fallujah, on the other hand, is a major city that remains entirely under ISIS's control; and it is worrisomely close to Baghdad.

Entering the heart of Tikrit was an important symbolic and media occasion; but it was not an unexpected military achievement. The first weeks of operations in Salahuddin Province had completed the capture and control of most of Tikrit, ad-Dur, al-'Alam, and al-Bou 'Ujail's countryside. This decided the military situation, because those armed elements that remained in the city were besieged within a small urban area whose fall was just a matter of time. And when the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) returned to the battlefield on Tuesday, the remaining neighborhoods of Tikrit were stormed within hours. (The truly 'difficult' battles were those that led to capturing Diyala, the Hamrin Mountains, and Jurf as-Sakhar).

Halting the attack on Tikrit was the result of a political disagreement caused by the Iraqi PM's call upon the international coalition's air force to intervene in the battle. This was followed by the withdrawal of the largest PMU units, and reports that Washington was planning to liberate Tikrit via Iraqi government forces exclusively with American aerial support, thus keeping 'Iran's allies' on the margins.

This disagreement was apparently resolved at a meeting last Saturday night between [Iraqi PM] 'Abadi, [Iraqi Vice-President] al-Maliki, and the most prominent PMU commanders, such as Hadi al-'Amiri, Qais al-Khazali, and others. According to a statement from [Shiite militia] 'Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, an agreement was reached on 'preventing the international coalition's warplanes from intervening in the liberation of the city of Tikrit.'

Instead of explaining this political background and the dangerous plans being hatched for Iraq’s north and west, the Arab media decided to turn Tikrit into a sort of Stalingrad. Another part of Arab media focused on attacking the PMU and accusing it of fighting under the coalition's cover.

This kind of discourse that thrives on lying in wait for cases that it deems to offer evidence of 'similar interests,' then presents this as the essence and deep secret of political alliances, is itself incomprehensible. PMU commanders and supporters are publicly attacking and rejecting the international coalition. Most of them believe that U.S. warplanes are helping ISIS and providing it with supplies. They fought against the U.S. occupation and entered its prisons.

So what are the critics trying to prove? Are they trying to prove that they know the PMU's political leanings better than the PMU commanders themselves? In that case, what interest do these commanders have in all this lying and pretense? Simply to deceive others?

This mentality that transforms politics into a kind of police investigation, allows such people to take the wrong stance and use the wrong discourse and issue the wrong criticisms.

"Meanwhile, their brothers – and they are not the same as ISIS – are fighting their battles and their wars," concludes Mohsen.

Ends…

 

 

4-‘Internationalization’ is not enough

 

The Palestinians cannot rely on action at the ICC or the UN alone, only a renewed national movement will succeed in achieving their goals, says Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

After Palestine has officially joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) yesterday (Wednesday), it is important to remember that hundreds of international resolutions have been passed in the past without being implemented, cautions a Palestinian commentator. What would be much more effective against the Israeli occupation would be a renewal of the Palestinian national movement.

 

BOGGED DOWN: "What Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu did in the recent Israeli parliamentary elections was to shorten the distance and timeframe of the futile attempts and maneuvers that have bogged down the Palestinians and Arabs along the peace process's path," writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in the Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

He is also stripping Washington of its ability to continue fabricating illusions. As a result, there are no expectations for a resumption of the negotiations, as would have happened had the [Israeli Labor Party-led] ‘Zionist Camp’ won the elections. But the solution does not lie in the internationalization of the Palestinian cause only, or in coupling such a move with popular resistance in its current form.

The Palestinian cause has now come to assume the form of small, passing eruptions. That is to say, the PA heads to the UN or some other international body and requests to join, or actually joins it; that makes Israel angry and it stops transferring the tax revenues it owes to the Palestinians; it first exerts pressure on the PA, then backs down.

While this may suggest that the Palestinians' have a certain margin of maneuver in fighting for their rights without being concerned about Israel’s reaction, it also raises the following question: What is the practical translation of steps such as joining international institutions and agreements, specifically as far as drawing closer to liberation or independence is concerned? And what practical yield do they have for the Palestinians' life in the camps in the Diaspora and inside Palestine – or, rather, when will these steps be meaningful – in parallel with Israel’s continued settler expansion?

A report in Israeli daily Jerusalem Post speaks of an American effort (or idea) aimed at reactivating the 2002 Arab (Saudi) peace initiative. That initiative proposes a Palestinian state and an agreed resolution of the refugee problem, in return for normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab and Islamic states.

A reading between and around the lines would reveal why this 'idea' is being floated now. According to the Israeli daily, such an initiative may be launched at 'an international forum' or may be proposed to 'the PA and the Israelis.' And this may mean bringing the Arabs and the international parties together again.

The Arabs may, in fact, be enthusiastic about such activity, because it relieves them of the embarrassing question: Why have you acted in Yemen and elsewhere, but not in Palestine? This, after all, would be exactly similar to the 1991 Madrid Conference, which was a small eruption that followed the international/Arab coalition to liberate Kuwait. But Madrid gave birth to a passing storm that was repeated a number of times. Of these we recall the peacemakers' conference at Sharm el-Sheikh (1996); Wye River (1998); the Camp David and Taba negotiations (2000 and 2001); the International Quartet (2002); and the Annapolis Conference (2007). Then Barack Obama and his officials came to power in the U.S., after which his Secretary of State John Kerry came to the region and tried his hand a number of times to reach agreements. But all the above produced nothing; in fact the Oslo Accords, which followed secret negotiations, eventually resulted in a large eruption [the 2000 intifada] that did not produce a real advance towards achieving the Palestinians' or their leaders' aims.

Netanyahu recently presented us with another indication of his insistence on unilateral policies. The Israelis withdrew from Lebanon and Gaza, unilaterally. In fact, they refused to even give their American partners or the Palestinians the chance of claiming that the negotiations had succeeded in achieving anything at all – such as the withdrawal from Gaza.

But the current Israeli government, which confiscated the PA’s tax returns as a punishment for the Palestinians’ application to join the International Criminal Court, has lifted its restrictions on the Palestinians' entry into the territories occupied in 1948. It is taking other measures as well, all of which can be understood as further weakening the PA by showing that it is up to Israel to grant and to take away, and not up to the PA. This is a strategy that simultaneously aims to reduce pressure on the one hand while increasing it on the other, in the expectation that this can prevent the situation from exploding.

The Palestinian leadership took a step in the right direction with its decision not to negotiate without prior agreement on the terms of reference and aims of the negotiations, and an end to settlement activities. But what Israel is currently doing is to adapt and transform the world's acceptance that the negotiations have ceased, and its slow, hesitant, and rambling search for alternatives, into a normal state of affairs.

'Internationalization' by itself is not a sufficient strategy of action. Let us bear in mind that there are hundreds of international resolutions that have not been implemented. It is very unlikely that any international measures taken against Israel will reach the same level as the sanctions that imposed a 'siege' on Iraq or Iran. And in both these cases, such sanctions did not force the 'besieged' party to retreat.

But what may produce genuine action and whip up a powerful storm against the occupation would be to rebuild the Palestinian national movement, especially the PLO, on new bases. Such an effort should recruit the Palestinian youth and their resources – academics, people working in the media, activists, businessmen, and students across the world.

"These elements can mingle with the societies and lives of many states, and formulate a strategy for a genuine confrontation on the ground," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 02.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

Waiting for the white smoke

 

With the exception of Yedioth Ahronoth, Israeli newspapers lead their Thursday editions with the ongoing talks between the six world powers and Iran in Switzerland. Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post report in their lead headlines that, after failing to reach an agreement by the March 31 deadline, the sides agreed Wednesday to extend the talks by an additional 24 hours. Israel Hayom leads with an anecdotal report on how U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to convince his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, to continue talks long after the latter had decided to call it a day.

According to Internet news sites, another round of overnight talks on Wednesday failed to reach a breakthrough and the sides are due to reconvene later Thursday. On Wednesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif told Iranian media that the efforts to find a solution have become extremely difficult. He added that political will is needed in order to make headway, which has always been an issue on the powers' side.

White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, meanwhile, told reporters at a daily briefing that even though progress has been made in Lausanne, the U.S. has yet to receive any tangible commitment from the Iranians. If the talks stall, he said, 'the U.S. and the international community are prepared to walk away' from the negotiating table.

Yedioth Ahronoth leads with the successful testing of the David's Sling missile defense system, which is being developed in partnership with the United States. According to the Defense Ministry, the system has passed advanced tests and could be deployed by next year. The system shot down targets simulating longer-range missiles like Scuds that could be fired at Israel from Syria and by Lebanon's Hizbollah guerrillas. Defense sources said the more recent tests took place last week and on Tuesday.

David's Sling and its Stunner interceptor missiles successfully hit 'threat representative targets' in the tests, according to Rick Lehner, spokesman for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, which carried out the third series of tests of the system together with the Israel Missile Defense Organization. The spokesman for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency called it a major milestone in the development of the David's Sling weapon, and said that it provides confidence in future Israeli capabilities to defend against the developing threat.'

Defense minister Moshe Ya'alon cited David's Sling as a mark of the continued vigor of the Israeli/U.S. alliance. 'We believe that next year it is going to be operational,' Ya'alon told visiting U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner. Ya'alon added his thanks for Washington's funding.

In other news, Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas said Wednesday that, if Israel plans to give the Palestinian Authority the tax money it is owed, then it must be under the conditions the PA sets. However, he added, if Israel insists on transferring the funds under the conditions of its own government, it can keep the money. Speaking at a meeting of the Central Council of the Fateh party, Abbas said that Israel had agreed to release the funds that it froze four months ago, after the PA applied to join the International Criminal Court, but was planning to deduct money the PA owes Israeli suppliers of electricity, water, and other utilities and products.

Abbas made the claim based on news reports that said Israel was planning to make such deductions. 'Israel intends to make these deductions without Palestinian coordination, even though it is Palestinian money,' he said. 'This is unacceptable, and we will refuse to accept the money under these circumstances.' The PA will fight to get its money, if necessary taking the case to the International Criminal Court, Abbas added.

Elsewhere on the Palestinian front, Finance Minister Mohammed Mustafa resigned yesterday amid growing criticism of slow progress in rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the Israeli military operation in Gaza over the summer. Mustafa blamed donor countries for the delay, saying that they are not following through on their pledges.

Finally, in the almost-forgotten coalition negotiations, Moshe Kahlon is reportedly demanding that his Kulanu Party receive not only the finance portfolio, but also the Construction and Environmental Protection Ministries, as well as control over the Israel Lands Authority and the Planning Administration, and chairmanship of the Knesset Finance Committee. Kulanu says all those positions are necessary to be in their control if they are to succeed in lowering the cost of basic commodities, and solve the housing shortage. Haaretz reports that Netanyahu's Likud is warning Kahlon that if he does not become more flexible in his demands, Likud will bring the other coalition partners into the government first.

 

UP TO HIS OLD TRICKS: Writing in Maariv, Nadav Haetzni has harsh words for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, whom he accuses of reneging on his election promise of getting tough with the Palestinians.

"In early January, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu decided to freeze the tax revenues that Israel collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. That was at the start of the election campaign and followed an announcement the previous month by Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas that the PA would be joining the International Criminal Court in The Hague and that the Palestinians would be filing war crimes charges against Israel. In response to those Palestinian decisions, Israel decided to freeze the tax funds and the Prime Minister's Office said that this was just the first in a series of punitive measures it would be taking.

Then, last week, just days after right-wing voters mobilized in massive numbers to reelect Netanyahu, who had moved significantly to the right during the course of the election campaign, the PMO backtracked on its promise that there would be significant and comprehensive measures taken against the Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu capitulated and ordered the tax revenues unfrozen. His bureau issued some unconvincing statement to the effect that the prime minister had accepted the advice of the security establishment and decided to transfer the money. 'Taking a general view of Israel's national interests at this time,' it said, 'we need to act responsibly and with a level head.'

So, just 20 days after the voters made their voices heard, Netanyahu is behaving in a way that confirms many of the accusations leveled against him during the election campaign. Netanyahu has already broken his promise to the electorate. Just days after the ideological right swept him back into power after disguising himself as another version of Naftali Bennett; he has already reverted to his evil ways. The day after the election, he had already started to backtrack on his vow from just two days previously that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch. Just a few days after that, it became clear that the freezing of Palestinian tax funds was just another empty election promise.

This is an extremely grave situation. Because if 'responsibly and with a level head' really do mean that Netanyahu has to release the tax funds, then why did he freeze them in the first place? Was the original decision irresponsible and reckless or did the Middle East change beyond recognition in the few weeks between the decision being made and then being reversed? If, as Netanyahu promised in January, Israel would not sit idly by while the Palestinians joined the ICC and the freezing of tax funds was just the beginning of the Israeli response, then where is the rest?

If defense officials really recommend that Netanyahu release the tax revenues, why did he not listen to their advice from the outset? If the Palestinians joining the ICC really is so terrible in Israel's eyes, then maybe he should not have listened to his top military officials, since their primary concern is for quiet, while he must keep his eye on the broader strategic picture.

The truth is that Netanyahu's current behavior is a direct extension of his behavior for most of the years he has been in power. He is simply afraid to rule as he sees fit. As he stated in January, the Palestinians' approach is one of intransigence and refusal to engage in dialogue. Seeking admittance to the ICC is a gross violation of the Oslo Accords – one of countless such violations by the Palestinian Authority – and it was a declaration of diplomatic war against Israel. In response, Israel must do everything it can to counter the move. This includes asking the United States and Congress to stop funding the hostile Palestinian Authority. Even though the Palestinians have positioned themselves as a hostile entity, Netanyahu has reverted to type: he talks the talk, but he doesn't walk the walk.

Incidentally, the funds in question do not actually belong to the Palestinians; they are a result of the Paris Protocol, which has been violated by the Palestinian Authority countless times. In fact, Israel should have declared that agreement null and void long ago.

As things currently stand, very many right-wing voters have fallen into the trap that Netanyahu set for them. Now all that remains is to wait and see how long it takes him to establish a national unity government with Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni. After all, the position of justice minister and minister in charge of negotiations with the Palestinians remain vacant."

Ends…

 

THE IRANIAN GAMBIT: Writing in Israel Hayom, Professor Ze'ev Maghen says that Iran is leading the West in a merry dance and has got world powers wrapped around its little finger.

"Ayatollah Khamenei was never supposed to be the Supreme leader of Iran. Hussein-Ali Montazeri, the most prominent student and the designated successor of the father of the Islamic Revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, was overlooked at the last minute because of his moderate views and for calling for 'an open assessment of failures' of the Revolution. In his memoirs, Montazeri recalls being visited by a group of parliamentarians, who sought his advice on a number of issues.

'I started by reciting for them that noble chapter from the Quran: Your Lord declared that He would surely send upon [the Children of Israel] until the Day of Resurrection those who would afflict them with the worst torment. (7:167). I explained to them that the holy writings explicitly say that the Jews will always be separate and will never enjoy peace. Then I quoted to them from the tradition of the Sixth Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, who declared three times that 'those who will eventually annihilate the Jews will be the learned people of the city of Qom.' In other words, the religious figures who currently rule Iran.

These were the words of a leader who was considered too moderate and liberal to run Iran. If that's what a moderate leader thinks about the Jewish people, then one can only imagine what Khamenei – who is known to hold more hardline, aggressive and cruel opinion – thinks. Khamenei advocated the execution of thousands of political prisoners from the Mujahedeen movement, many of whom were adolescent girls. More recently, he has given moral and material support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has butchered more than 100,000 of his own people. Whenever I hear allegedly intelligent people talking nonsense about Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's so-called scare tactics about the Iranian nuclear threat – or even about a non-nuclear Iran which currently controls no fewer than four Middle Eastern countries and many powerful terrorist organizations – I can only wonder what planet they are living on.

There is a precedent for the kind of deal that the six world powers are working so hard to reach with the Islamic Republic in Lausanne. Less than 18 months ago, Syria signed an agreement to hand over to United Nations inspectors its entire stockpile of chemical weapons. How are these inspectors supposed to know that Assad has, indeed, given them all of his chemical weapons? Simple: the Syrian president gave his word. And if that's not enough for anyone, then the promise was vouchsafed by none other than one of the world's least trustworthy leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin. From the moment that Syria signed that agreement, all talk of Western military action – indeed, of any kind of international intervention – was silenced and the Syrian dictator, who has killed many of his own people using chemical weapons, was given the green light to continue massacring people by the thousands using the same conventional weapons with which he had already butchered hundreds of thousands of coreligionists.  The West wouldn't even raise an eyebrow.

The same thing will happen with Iran. The ayatollah regime will agree to a certain reduction in the quantity of uranium it enriches. How are we supposed to know that it is living up to its promises? After all, this is a country that managed to conceal the fact that it was enriching uranium in secret nuclear facilities for many years. Will inspectors who can barely find their way around Iran really be able to ensure that Tehran lives up to its word? Or are we supposed to trust Putin again? In exchange for their concession, which, even if it is genuine, will only delay an Iranian nuclear bomb by a few months, the Islamic Republic will get a free hand to act in any way it pleases anywhere in the Middle East. It certainly will not listen to the complaints about how it is treating its own citizens or its increasingly vile threats against Israel.

As a bonus, the West will lift the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran. This will allow them to lay the economic groundwork for advancing their political and ideological goals. And if all this were not enough, the ayatollahs are currently fanning the West's fear of ISIS, in order to make the Shiites – who were once part of the 'axis of evil' – the West's most important allies. Iran did not invent chess, but it now plays a better game of international chess than its rivals."

Ends…

 

GOOD FOR IRAN, GOOD FOR ISRAEL: Writing in Yedioth Ahronoth, Giora Eiland says that Israel's big mistake was that it failed to reach an understanding with the United States over what constitutes a reasonable deal with Iran.

"The nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers – if one is ever reached – could have far-reaching ramifications for our future. Contrary to popular belief, Israel did have the chance to shape the agreement. Over the past 15 years, Israel has been highly active on the Iranian nuclear front. It achieved three main things: it raised international awareness of the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, which led to the imposition of sanctions; it provided intelligence information that was vitally important to us and to our allies; and it used clandestine measures to disrupt the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. Suffice to say that, in 2002, there were Israeli experts who were confidently predicting that Iran would have a nuclear bomb by 2005. A decade later, this still has not happened.

Alongside these successes, Israel failed in its two main missions: we failed to get Russia and the United States on the same page regarding Iran and we continued to make unreasonable demands which led the international community – including the United States – to stop listening to us.

Until 2005, the policy of the United States under President George Bush was very simple: the Iranians are part of the axis of evil and there can be no dialogue with them. Around 10 years ago, that policy changed and, on the one hand, Iran was economically and politically isolated, but, on the other hand, there was willingness on the part of the U.S. to lift that forced isolation in exchange for a reasonable deal.

One critical condition for effectively isolating Iran was that Russia, China and India cooperate fully. In order for that to happen, Russia would have to agree. Moscow asked Israel to try and persuade the United States to engage in broad dialogue with it; the Russians said that they would increase pressure on Iran if the Americans recognized that Russia's offer to take Iran's enriched uranium off its hands was the key to finding a solution. The Russian proposal suited the Kremlin’s needs as well as Israel's. Unfortunately, however, successive Israeli governments refused to help the Russians help us. The result was that Moscow turned its back on the West and, as a direct result; international pressure on Iran was only partial.

The second Israeli mistake was that it failed to adapt its position to changes on the international stage. It is true that, until just a few years ago, the entire international community shared Israel's view that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium at all. Unfortunately, the international community dropped that demand long ago and it appears to be irreversible. Under these circumstances, Israel should have moved its red line and demanded that, if Iran is allowed to enrich uranium, then it should at least be stockpiled in a third country and only sent back to the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities in the form of fuel rods, which cannot then be enriched to the higher level needed for manufacturing a nuclear bomb. A year ago, the Americans thought that this was a reasonable demand to make of Tehran, but Israel opted to stick to its anachronistic demand of zero enrichment. As a result, it remained sidelined from the real discussions.

Moreover, it would be wrong to say that the professional discussions between Israel and the United States remained open and genuine despite the political tensions between the two countries. The moment that the experts on the Israeli side were ordered to insist on unrealistic demands, their counterparts in the West stopped listening to them.

In other words, rather than reaching some kind of understanding with the Americans a year ago over what kind of deal would be acceptable – and, after all, an acceptable deal is far preferable to no deal – we preferred to be right and not smart. We opted to put all of our efforts into propaganda and public relations, telling the world that we are the good guys, the Iranians are the bad guys and the Obama Administration is just weak. We should have tried to reach an understanding with the Americans about the minimum that we could live with.

We have a tendency to believe that if something is good for our enemies – such as the lifting of sanctions against Iran – is it by necessity bad for us. This, however, is not always the case. A reasonable deal with Iran is good for Iran – and good for Israel, too."

Ends…

 

GO TO LAUSANNE, BIBI: Writing in Globes, Mati Golan says that, if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu genuinely believes that the agreement discussed in Lausanne could be hugely damaging to Israel, he should be right there in the hotel where representatives of Iran and the six world powers are meeting.

"Why the hell is Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu trying to run his campaign against the Iranian nuclear threat from here? From Jerusalem, of all places and at a time when every day, every hour and every minute could be critical? Before the election, Netanyahu jetted off to Washington to address Congress. He said that, given that the six world powers were working to finalize an agreement with the Islamic Republic, the speech was of utmost importance. So why is he now making do with statements from Jerusalem, far from the action in Switzerland? Does he not know that the important decisions are being made in Lausanne, not Israel?

Three days ago, on March 29, I wrote an article in these pages in which I urged the prime minister to fly immediately to Lausanne. I see little point in repeating what I said in that article. But I would like to highlight again a point that Netanyahu seems determined to ignore. No speech from Israel, no matter how sharply worded, can make the kind of impression needed.

If Netanyahu really wants to influence the course of the negotiations, he has to be where things are happening, where television crews and correspondents from across the world have gathered. He has to pack a suitcase and travel to Lausanne. He has to make an appearance at the same place where the negotiations are happening – and he has to make his voice heard. A hunger strike would not be totally inappropriate under the circumstance. If the prime minister really believes his rhetoric about the dire threat posed by the agreement being negotiated, then surely nothing is too much.

However, if one judges Netanyahu by his behavior, rather than his rhetoric, it appears that now he believes that he may have been exaggerating in his criticism of the deal. Because if not, if he still believes that it is a worse deal than the one Neville Chamberlain tried to cut with Hitler, then what the hell is he still doing in Israel? Why isn't he in Lausanne? Maybe he should even take Isaac Herzog with him, to show the world that he is not the only Israeli politician who is deeply worried by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. In fact, he could take one representative from every party, to show the international community that the whole of Israel – irrespective of party allegiance and ideology – shares his concerns.

According to reports emerging from Lausanne, there have been two sleepless overnight negotiating sessions. This is usually a sign that the sides are taking the talks seriously and that there is a genuine desire on all sides to reach an agreement. Perhaps this is the best way to make steady progress, but we have to ask: Progress to what end? It's a medical fact that sleep deprivation leads to tiredness, which makes it harder to think clearly. People deprived of sleep will eventually agree to anything if they are just allowed to close their eyes for a while.

The agreement being discussed in Iran is too important – too fateful, even – to be left in the hands of people too exhausted to think straight. The people working on this deal must be as alert as possible, as sharp as possible. If not, there's a real danger that they could sign off on clauses that go against the interests of the very people they are supposed to protect. After all, the people sitting round the negotiating table are no spring chickens. Even after a good night's sleep they are not exactly in their prime, so what can we expect when they're exhausted? They are not doing us any favor by negotiating when they are exhausted."

Ends…

 

A GLIMMER OF HOPE: Writing in Haaretz, Israel Harel says that there have been some indications that positions on the Iranian nuclear deal are hardening in Washington, probably due to pressure from Israel and Congress.

"The excitement began last Thursday: The French news agency reported a nuclear accord with the Iranians was near. And, surely by chance, cable television’s Channel 8 aired a documentary about the weakness and shortsightedness of the leaders who capitulated to Hitler and let him extort the Munich Agreement. Most scholars of the period believe that the Nazi army wasn’t ready in September 1938 for an all-out war against the European powers; that if not for the feeble conciliation, especially on the part of the British, the forfeiture of the Sudetenland could have been prevented; and that even if the Sudetenland were forfeited, the German seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia could have been halted by force.

But even though agreement after agreement was violated, Europe’s leaders, led by Britain’s Neville Chamberlain, ignored the cries of the trampled, the intelligence warnings and the rebukes of the few courageous leaders, derided as warmongers, who understood what was really afoot.

I don’t believe that Channel 8 was trying to use the broadcast to express an opinion on the emerging pact with Iran — for one cannot truly compare 1938 Czechoslovakia with 2015 Israel. The Iranian army cannot conquer Israel. If it uses ballistic weapons to attack from afar, even with nuclear warheads, Iran would be destroyed and Israel, though it could be bloodied, would survive.

Despite the fundamental differences between the two eras and situations, one can still point to a certain typology: head-in-the-sand conduct by the leaders of the great powers, who prefer conciliation to a total neutralization of the threat — even when, then as now, the powers have the capability to defuse the threat before the point of no return. Iran is playing the sympathy card with the aim of getting U.S. President Barack Obama to finalize his capitulation by permitting Tehran to keep some of its venomous centrifuges, so that it will be ready to strike when the time comes.

Iran is already striking even now, in Yemen and hundreds of other places where it orchestrates its terror proxies. The intelligence agencies of the great powers are well aware of this — just as British intelligence was aware of the situation in 1938 — but the diplomats are set on their own course. If not for the tremendous pressure being exerted by Israel — really, by Binyamin Netanyahu, even in the face of scornful domestic opposition — on the Obama administration and public opinion, even greater concessions would surely be offered to the Iranian terror superpower.

Instead of standing by their government, quite a few Israelis, including some who once held sensitive security positions, have fallen in line with Obama’s policy and made statements that have only strengthened the American path of concessions. That’s how deeply they are affected by the Obama administration. So who are we to complain about Western leaders who deny reality?

These lines are being written as the final scene in this theater of the absurd is being played out in the Swiss city of Lausanne, where Iran and six world powers have been holding marathon talks on Tehran's nuclear program, a scene in which Iran is liable to emerge victorious. Yet there is still a glimmer of hope that there will be a different ending. There are a few indications that positions are hardening in Washington, probably due to the pressure from Israel and Congress, and the newly sober analyses from some influential media outlets.

Even in Tel Aviv, which said no to Netanyahu on Election Day, one can sense the rumblings of a more sober assessment. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin are quieting the skeptics. And many of the 'security experts' whose hatred for Netanyahu drove them out of their minds are no longer going out of their way to justify the Americans’ conduct. Perhaps they’ve learned a lesson or two from their support for the Oslo disaster, for the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, for plans for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and for their shameful behavior on the eve of the election."

Ends…

 

THE FRENCH CONNECTION: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Douglas Bloomfield warns that if, as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu hoped, U.S. President Barack Obama backed away from trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the void could be filled by the European Union.

"A reluctant Binyamin Netanyahu endorsed a two-state concept in 2009 and was twice dragged to the peace table by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry for a series of failed negotiations doomed by the absence of a willing partner on either side of the table.

With their conflicting agendas, relations between Obama and Netanyahu steadily deteriorated. After setbacks in his first term, Obama began to feel Israeli-Palestinian peace was not possible under the present leadership but let Kerry give it a second-term try. Netanyahu’s speech to Congress last month trashing Obama’s efforts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran was the prime minister’s message that he’s thrown in his lot with the Republicans in Congress and written off the lame-duck president.

In the final hours before the Israeli election, Netanyahu said two things that drove the relationship to rock bottom. Obama didn’t buy Netanyahu’s attempt to walk back from his campaign vow of no Palestinian state by saying he only meant for the foreseeable future. Making matters worse was Netanyahu’s warning to his Jewish supporters that Arabs were voting in 'droves.' To Obama that must have sounded as if Mitt Romney had gone on the air on November 6, 2012 to tell white Republicans to rush to the polls because African Americans were voting in droves.

Netanyahu’s wish is that Obama would forget about trying to make peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. He may get that wish, or at least a retreat from active peacemaking by Obama, but the results may include a diplomatic vacuum that could be Netanyahu’s worst nightmare. Since Netanyahu has resisted American efforts to revive peace talks, the Europeans want to step in and try their hand, and Obama may be willing to let them. That should worry Netanyahu. He may have written off Obama and thrown his lot with the Republicans, but he knows that his friend House Speaker John Boehner doesn’t have a veto at the UN Security Council.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced last week that his government plans to introduce a Security Council resolution to revive the peace talks. It is expected to be similar to the one France circulated late last year setting a two-year deadline for concluding negotiations, but the United States blocked that and another by the Palestinians setting a three-year deadline for ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. Sponsors of the French initiative claim signals from Washington indicate Obama may be ready to reconsider his opposition to UN intervention.

Washington has historically insisted that Israeli- Arab peace negotiations are its turf and pushed the Europeans, the United Nations and the Russians to the sidelines. Now those powers want to play a bigger role, and they see Netanyahu’s obstinacy and his rift with the American president as their opening.

Security Council resolutions like the ones the French and Palestinians are apparently considering would not be enforceable, and the UN could not force Israel to recognize Palestine or withdraw from the West Bank. But it could lead to various states acting on their own. The EU is Israel’s leading trading partner (as well as the Palestinian Authority’s top financial backer), and there are movements in several countries to impose sanctions and trade restrictions on Israel.

The next time around, though, the U.S. president said he is undecided. He has several options. He can veto a Palestinian or French resolution, as he did in December, or abstain or even vote yes. He also can publish an American peace plan, which reportedly was prepared during last year’s failed round of talks led by Secretary Kerry. Another possibility is to publish a document detailing the positions of both sides in those and earlier talks, revealing what they agreed on already but weren’t telling their own people about.

Obama has said he is 'reevaluating' the political/ diplomatic relationship – but insists there will be no change in the strategic relationship – and is noncommittal about how to respond to the UN initiatives Israel may want blocked. If Netanyahu hopes for more U.S. vetoes at the UN, he’s got a lot of fence mending to do.

The White House has begun to tone down its rhetoric just as Netanyahu is ratcheting up his strident attacks on the administration in anticipation of a nuclear agreement with Iran, but don’t be fooled: we could be on the cusp of a major change in the Israeli-American alliance, triggered in large measure by a prime minister who mistakes local partisan politics for statesmanship and whose pre-election maneuvering has sunk his credibility here and around the world to record lows."

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

This email is intended for the recipient only.

Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

The materials available through Mideast Mirror are the property of Alef Publishing Ltd or its licensors, are protected by copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws.

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Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

MIDEAST MIRROR 01.04.15, SECTION C (TURKEY & IRAN)

 

From today’s Turkish press

 

POWER OUTAGE: Guneri Civaoglu is disturbed by yesterday’s nationwide power outage in centrist Milliyet: "The collapse of the electricity system all around Turkey - if it was not a terrorist attack - should have been thwarted by preventive measures. Is Turkey so vulnerable to electrical, electronic, communication, and cyber-attacks? Even if it were a technical fault, it should have been limited to a couple of regions. How did it expand across all of Turkey? 'What if we were in a war?'

Deniz Kavukcuoglu wonders whether a precedent has been set in secular, Kemalist Cumhuriyet: "People in the streets were debating whether the electricity cuts represented a preview of June 7th when the general elections will be held [because during the March 2014 local elections the government announced that power cuts at the time were caused by cats that had entered the power distribution system]. As as everyone knows the AKP's [ruling Justice and Development Party] popularity is on the decline and the opposition's is on the rise. Most Turks agree that the AKP will do everything possible not to lose power. I hope the 'power distribution unit cats' will not be blamed once again."

Pelin Cengiz blames privatization in leftist Taraf: "Due to privatization, the production, distribution and transmission of electricity have been taken out of state control and left to the mercy of the private sector. Electricity is a strategic asset that cannot be surrendered for the sake of profit. Anything could have caused the power cut that affected the whole of Turkey yesterday. But the important thing is that the state failed to provide necessary information, share it with the public and maintain its control over the process. The story of the outage actually begins with privatization." 

Murat Yetkin recalls previous crises in centre-left Radikal: "This was the biggest energy crisis that Turkey has faced since the great Marmara earthquake that caused the death of 17,000 people in 1999. As the signaling system on the railways and the traffic lights in the cities went out, transport was in a terrible situation. Due to the cooling systems in hospitals, there were mounting concerns about vaccine stocks. According to Energy Minister Yildiz, the problem might have been caused by the failure of a power plant during the intense morning hours, which produced a domino effect on other power plants due to overload. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that they were investigating all kinds of probabilities including a 'terrorist attack'. Unfortunately, just an hour later, the news of a terrorist attack indeed came from Istanbul [see below]."

 

PROSECUTOR’S MURDER: Writing in Cumhuriyet, Aydin Engin is concerned about the ruling party’s potential exploitation of the murder of a leading public prosecutor: "The prosecutor in charge of the Berkin Elvan case took up his position at a time when there was an attempt to cover up Elvan’s murder, which was kept on the shelf for months, and no-one had any doubt that the police were to blame. If someone had to be punished, it was not him. However, a very important question should be answered by those who were behind this attack: Who will benefit from it? One does not have to be very smart to figure out that no matter how the matter is resolved, its outcome will be exploited by the AKP leaders." 

Nuh Albayrak detects a conspiracy in centre-right, pro-government Star: "This is no ordinary attack. Someone wants all prosecutors and judges in charge of sensitive cases to be intimidated through this sub-contractor organization [the extreme left Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front, DHKP-C]. The groups who have lost their faith in the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] have put the DHKP-C sub-contractors back on the market again."

Abdulkadir Selvi senses an electoral motive in moderate, pro-Islamic, pro-government Yeni Safak: “The DHKP-C's kidnapping of the prosecutor in the Berkin Elvan case is closely related to the elections. The security forces were recently warned about attacks that will be carried out before the election. Why June 7th? Because there will be no more elections in the next four years."

 

 

The Iranian press will not appear due to the extended New Year (Nowrooz) holiday. The coverage will continue after the Easter holiday.

 

 

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.04.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

  

1-Iran’s rise and response

2-Why bother?

3-The prospects for a ‘Joint Arab Force’

4-Between polarization and marginalization

 

1-Iran’s rise and response

 

What is indisputable is that Iran today has more influence than it has ever had in modern times, despite the international sanctions that have been exhausting its economy for over 12 years, and despite the fact that it has been under American sanctions for over 35 years.  But while the Arabs may not wish to cohabit with Iran’s rise, which they deem to be the greatest threat to their national security leading them to take direct military action to prevent the Houthis from controlling Yemen, we have to bear in mind that Iran’s influence today has been secured thanks to the strategic mistakes committed by the Arabs themselves--Samih Saab in Iraqi as-Sabah

 

[Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm, that aims to prevent a new Hizbollah from taking hold of the Gulf's soft underbelly, represents a blow to Iran's efforts to recruit local forces in the Arabian Peninsula. But it is only a limited setback to Iran's expansionist aspirations. For even though the Islamic Republic has been arming and backing the Houthis, it has invested heavily in Hizbollah, the Syrian regime and Iraq in recent decades. As its nuclear negotiations with the West reach a critical point, Tehran is likely to deploy its investments in order to respond to its Yemeni setback, leaving the Houthis and all of Yemen to wallow in a conflict to which it has significantly contributed-- Mona-Lisa Freiha in Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Iran's current unprecedented influence in the region is largely the result of the Arabs' own mistakes which created a regional vacuum that has been filled by Tehran, argues a Lebanese commentator in an Iraqi daily. But it is a mistake to present Iran as the main threat to Arab national security while ignoring the much greater existential threat posed by Israel. The Houthis in Yemen are clearly emulating Hizbollah in Lebanon, which is not strange given that both groups have the Islamic Republic of Iran as their mentor, maintains a Lebanese commentator. But Iran will most likely try to compensate for the setback it has suffered in Yemen as a result of Operation Decisive Storm by responding in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon

 

FORMED IN A RUSH: "Despite the fear of strategic changes in the region, especially in Yemen, and in light of the likely nuclear agreement between Iran and the West, there remains a central question concerning the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm regional coalition, which was formed in a hurry to confront the Houthis in Yemen and prevent them from controlling that country," writes Samih Saab in Wednesday's semi-official Iraqi daily as-Sabah.

The assertion that Arab security today is under greater threat than ever before is not an adequate explanation. Everyone knows that the occupation of Palestine by the Jews remains the greatest threat to Arab national security; but the Arabs have simply disregarded Palestine, leaving it to face its fate alone.

This leads us to the conclusion that after the developments in Yemen with the wind there ‘blowing in undesirable directions,' the Arab Gulf states that formed the 'Decisive Storm' coalition, feel that the disturbances that have been sweeping over the Arab world for the past four years have finally drawn close to their borders. Operation Decisive Storm was launched as a result.

There are those who have been claiming that, in itself Yemen represents no threat to Gulf security, but that the fact that Iran is behind what is happening there may extend Tehran’s influence and allow it to control the Bab al-Mandab Straits, just as it can control the Hormuz Straits. That would mean that it would be able to control the two most important arteries for trade between Asia and Europe, to say nothing of the possibility of reaching a nuclear agreement and lifting the sanctions, which would make Iran the most powerful regional state.

What is indisputable is that Iran today has more influence than it has ever had in modern times, despite the international sanctions that have been exhausting its economy for over 12 years, and despite the fact that it has been under American sanctions for over 35 years.  But while the Arabs may not wish to cohabit with Iran’s rise, which they deem to be the greatest threat to their national security leading them to take direct military action to prevent the Houthis from controlling Yemen, we have to bear in mind that Iran’s influence today has been secured thanks to the strategic mistakes committed by the Arabs themselves.

Iran crossed over into the Arab world via the Palestine gateway because it found a political vacuum that it could easily fill. Meanwhile, the Arabs were pursuing negotiations with Israel and proposing peace initiatives, to which Israel responded with more settlements, more Judaization of Jerusalem, and the creation of more facts on the ground, rendering the establishment of an independent Palestinian state impossible.

And when the war in Syria began four years ago, the Arabs rushed to expel Damascus from the Arab League. Together with Turkey, they have provided backing for the takfiri groups that have been destroying the Syrian state and most of the country, in the hope of toppling President Bashar al-Assad. In fact, some Arab leaders have turned their opposition to Assad into personal animosity, caring little if the result was the destruction of the Syrian state itself. It is this policy that convinced the Syrian government to strengthen its relations with Iran even more. After all, Iran became the sole source of economic support for Syria in the region, in light of the Arab boycott imposed on Damascus.

Nor is there need to recall the Arab states' attitude towards Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006 and the backing Iran provided to Hizbollah enabling it to confront Israel. Meanwhile, the Arabs were asking questions about who was responsible for the war [blaming Hizbollah]. And the same goes for Iran's support for Gaza in the repeated wars Israel has waged on it. With all this in mind, there is no need to ask how Iran developed its influence in the region. Quite simply, Iran has found a vacuum, and has advanced to fill it.

When the threat of terrorist takfiri groups – ISIS and others – grew in Iraq, and when they took control of Mosul last June [2014], Iran was the first state that rushed to offer help in protecting Baghdad and Irbil against these groups’ expansion. Meanwhile, certain Arab states were finding justifications and excuses for these groups’ emergence, and blaming former Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki's policies for what happened.

When the U.S. found that ISIS was posing a threat to its own interests, and was no longer a threat to Assad alone, it rushed to form an international coalition against this extremist organization. But it continues to calculate the effects of each of its strikes against ISIS, trying to ensure that it would not empower Iran or Syria. For the U.S. wants to weaken the takfiri groups to the extent necessary to ensure that they would pose no threat to its security and that of its allies; but it does not want to serve Syria's or Iran's interests as it attacks ISIS.

This is the background for the expansion of Iran's power and how it has come to enjoy unprecedented influence in the region. Most of this was based on mistakes committed by the Arabs, not the result of Iran's determination alone. Now, also, the Decisive Storm coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen will drive a considerable and significant part of the Yemeni nation into the Iranian lap.

Exaggerating the Iranian threat and presenting it as the sole threat to Arab national security also threatens to fan the flames of confessional conflict to unprecedented levels. It will lead the Middle East into the labyrinth of domestic wars and conflicts, which will pose the greatest threat to the future of all the region's states.

"Meanwhile, Israel remains the sole victor," concludes Saab.

End…

 

IN EMULATION OF HIZBOLLAH: "The Houthis have often emulated Hizbollah," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

They have raised this party's banner and carried pictures of its secretary-general [Hassan Nasrallah] in their demonstrations. Their young leader, 'Abdelmalik al-Houthi, is now referred to as 'Yemen's Nasrallah.' His speeches to the masses, his movements while delivering them, and manner in which he addresses his supporters via giant television screens seem to imitate Nasrallah's appearances to a large extent. Even the content of his speeches, which focus on hostility towards Israel and the West, seem inspired by Nasrallah's speeches.

The Houthis’ rapid rise, leading to their control of the capital Sana'a on September 21st 2014, clearly reflects their aspiration to go beyond their role as a religious/social movement in the country's northwest; it indicates that they want to establish a state-within-a-state.

But no one should be deluded into believing that Iran has had nothing to do with the rapid rise of the Houthis-- a movement that was until recently an unknown and relatively insignificant group. Iran’s Chief of Staff, Major-General Firouzabadi failed to convince anyone when he declared in September 2014 that Iran is 'only praying' for the [Houthis’ armed wing] Ansarullah. The Iranian supreme leader's political advisor Ali-Akbar Velayati was closer to the truth when he expressed his hope that Ansarullah would play a role in Yemen similar to that played by Hizbollah in Lebanon.

Observers are in disagreement over the extent to which the Houthis are linked to Iran. The roots of this group in Yemeni society are genuine and clear. They are members of the Zaidi Shiite sect that is close to Sunni thought. The followers of this sect constitute a majority in northern Yemen, and number some one-third of the country's total population. But they are accused of being ideologically close to the Twelver Shiite school that is widespread in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Moreover, their links to the Islamic Republic have clearly grown in recent years. This has secured them some major gains. Thus, after the Gulf, Arab, and international 'isolation' imposed on the Houthis in response to their invasion of Sana'a, they opened an air bridge to Iran, which promised to provide them with fuel for their areas and build electricity plants for them. The international news agencies’ reports on March 20th that an Iranian ship unloaded 185 tons of weapons for the Houthis in the Yemeni port of as-Salif clearly indicate that this is but one of the ways in which Tehran has been trying to transform this group into a new Hizbollah.

[Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm, that aims to prevent a new Hizbollah from taking hold of the Gulf's soft underbelly, represents a blow to Iran's efforts to recruit local forces in the Arabian Peninsula. But it is only a limited setback to Iran's expansionist aspirations. For even though the Islamic Republic has been arming and backing the Houthis, it has invested heavily in Hizbollah, the Syrian regime and Iraq, in recent decades.

"As its nuclear negotiations with the West reach a critical point, Tehran is likely to deploy its investments in order to respond to its Yemeni setback, leaving the Houthis and all of Yemen to wallow in a conflict to which it has significantly contributed," concludes Freiha.

Ends…

 

 

2-Why bother?

 

Tehran is suffering severely from the sanctions regime and is in no position to resort to a nuclear war, which calls into question the need to reach an agreement with it in the first place, says Tareq Masarwah in today's Jordanian al-Ra'i

 

Iran's economy is in shambles because of the sanctions that have been imposed on it, and its nuclear program is backward and ineffective, claims a Jordanian commentator. Moreover, it realizes that it cannot use a nuclear bomb even if it produces one, since Saudi Arabia can secure one from Pakistan in a matter of hours, and Israel has many and more powerful such bombs. This raises the question as to why the West is bothering to negotiate with Iran in the first place.

 

HAPPY CONCLUSION OR RETREAT: "The negotiations with the major powers (the '5 + 1' group) and Iran over the nuclear issue may come to a happy conclusion today; and they may retreat 13 years all the way back to the starting point," writes Tareq Masarwah in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.

But what is certain is that the major powers are not convinced that it is possible to freeze 'Iran’s nuclear research' for the next ten or fifteen years, while Iran is not convinced that the UN Security Council or Congress or the remaining major powers will lift the sanctions imposed on it as soon as a treaty is signed.

This is because the negotiators include an American secretary of state who knows that Congress will not lift the sanctions it has imposed whether by its own initiative or in compliance with the administration's decisions. For Congress has its own special stance on the Iranian nuclear file. Moreover, those who understand the sanctions mechanisms know that major and not-so-major states go along with the American sanctions because they are forced to do so. Their failure to uphold the sanctions would leave them subject to the same sanction regime. And they also know that these sanctions have exhausted the Iranian economy, reduced the Rial’s rate of exchange, and turned the Iranian state into one that survives by smuggling crude oil, and selling its agricultural produce by barter outside the global export/import system.

The Iranian state has burdened itself with the consequences of its direct financial support for its 'friends,' who receive a salary in return for their belief in the velayat-e-faqih doctrine. Lebanese Hizbollah’s political stance is not lacking in conviction. But its separation from the Lebanese state means that it requires monthly payments that are said to stand at around 100-million dollars. Most of us may not know that Hizbollah has its own private communications network because it does not trust the state employees who administer the official network!! Nor may they realize that the party has its own health and education administrations that are totally independent from government administrations. Moreover, the party has an army fighting in Syria, with some estimates putting the number of its fighters there at 10,000-- all of whom receive salaries. And there is the vast armament system, command posts, the maintenance of complex networks of radars, artillery, etc… as well as forty thousand rockets and missiles – all of which is run at an enormous monthly cost.

In addition to Lebanon, Iran's Syrian ally needs dollars to keep its war machine going. And the same goes for al-Houthis in Yemen, the [Shiite] militias in Iraq, and the sleeper cells all over the world.

These enormous responsibilities are exhausting Iran and its economy, and obstructing its development. Therefore, if Iran sticks to its nuclear intransigence, it will be close to collapse, at a moment when its enemies inside and outside are growing in numbers.

The current Iranian president has been a main negotiator on the nuclear issue. He knows that a costly nuclear bomb cannot be used against any enemy. If we set aside the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia – because their arsenals are bigger and more effective than Iran's – Iran cannot threaten the Arab Gulf states with a nuclear warhead. It knows that Saudi Arabia can secure a bomb from Pakistan within twenty-four hours. After all, Saudi Arabia finances the Pakistani Islamic bomb. And this backing is not for free; Saudi Arabia has a share in this bomb. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has ballistic missiles it bought from China that can be fitted with nuclear warheads, and that can reach as far as the Black Sea. Moreover, Iran cannot use the bomb against Israel, because Israel will respond with hundreds of bombs and can put the entire American arsenal into action.

The only reactor that Iran has is a Russian one that does not need highly-enriched uranium to produce electricity. The old reactor for educational purposes set up in Tehran University during the days of the Shah, is half-a-century older and more dated than the reactor at Jordan’s Science and Technology University.

"If that is so, what is exactly going on?" asks Masarwah.

Ends…

 

 

3-The prospects for a ‘Joint Arab Force’

 

The proposed Joint Arab Force cannot function under the umbrella of the Arab League and requires a clear strategy and vision to be effective, says Dawood ash-Shiryan in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

The Joint Arab Force advocated by the Arab League at the recent Sharm al-Sheikh Arab summit is unachievable under the League's auspices, argues a veteran Saudi commentator. This force is most likely to include Egypt and the Gulf states, but will require a political strategy and vision to determine its aims. Operation Decisive Storm may have suggested such a strategy.

 

CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES: "Arab leaders have agreed to form a Joint Arab Force to confront the challenges and to protect Arab national security," writes Dawood ash-Shiryan in Wednesday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The chiefs of staff of the Arab League's member states’ armed forces will meet to discuss all aspects of the establishment of such a force.  But what are its main features? What is its role? And which states will actively take part in it? Is it a rapid deployment force that will be disbanded as soon as its mission is accomplished? Or will it be a permanent force established to protect Arab national security against any outside intervention? And will it be confined to members of the Arab coalition that is conducting Operation Decisive Storm, or will it include other states?

It is clear that the proposal to form this Joint Arab Force came in response to the circumstance of the war in Yemen. It may end when that war ends. Important and influential Arab states are not included in the proposed force, the most prominent of which are Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. Moreover, there are those who believe that this force will not be in their interest.

A scrutiny of Lebanese PM Tamam Salam and his Foreign Minister Jubran Bassil’s differing attitudes towards this force clearly indicate that the formation of a Joint Arab Force whose role grows with time is a dream of the past. And what is true of Lebanon is also true of Iraq and other Arab states. Some Arabs view the war in Yemen as backing legitimacy and defending Arab national security, while others describe it as 'an aggression against Yemen and its people.'

The disagreements between the Arab regimes today are more intense than they were when the Joint Arab Defense Treaty was ratified in 1950. At the time, that treaty aimed at confronting Israel; an aim that was cast aside with the project for an Arab/Israeli peace. This means that the Joint Arab Force, if it is ever established, will not fall under the Arab League's umbrella. In fact, the League may change both its name and role in the future and become the League of Middle East States. Given this, we are dealing with a project that has nothing to do with the old Arab League's discourse. Therefore, the Joint Arab Force is most likely to be a defensive force that responds to the policies of certain Arab states, and not the policies of the Arab states as a whole.

The issue is not the force's size or deciding who will command it and where its headquarters will be. More important are its political horizon and the nature of the threats it will face. Some states view Iran as the threat to their national security, while others see matters differently. The disagreement between the Arab states over the issue of terrorism is thorny and complex. Some, for example, believe that the terrorism Egypt is confronting, is not really terrorism. It may be misleading to take the Yemen war as the measure or criterion, since this criterion does not apply in other cases.

For this reason, this project is facing political complications that are preventing it from being included as part of so-called 'joint Arab action.' Moreover, the fact that there are superpower interests in the region, and that Israel is also there, will not allow for the mere thought of creating a force that reunites the Arabs’ decision in a manner that threatens these states' interests.

Does all this mean that the Joint Arab Force is an unrealizable dream? Certainly not, for what cannot be achieved in full should not be abandoned in all its parts. The war in Yemen offers a model of the main features of this force and its aims. Operation Decisive Storm may provide the nucleus for an axis of power that includes Cairo and Riyadh, as well as the rest of the Gulf states, leaving the door open to other states. But this step will not see the light of day under the Arab League's umbrella.

There is no doubting the fact that relations between Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states now call for a project that ensures their permanence and that paves a clear path for implementing [Sissi's] strategy based on 'the time it takes us to cover the distance to the Gulf,' and replicating the 'Decisive Storm' coalition.

What is certain is that the awaited Egyptian-GCC Joint Arab Force needs a political vision before even thinking of its military structure.

"For military power without a long-term political strategy will not be useful, no matter how great and significant this power may be," concludes Shiryan.

Ends…

 

 

4-Between polarization and marginalization

 

The Palestinians need to overcome the current state of Arab polarization and the marginalization of their cause, says Hani al-Masri in Palestinian al-Ayyam

 

Amidst the intense polarization in the region, the Palestinian cause appears to have been marginalized and the Palestinians are under pressure to take sides, notes a leading Palestinian commentator. But their interests lie in playing the role of firemen who put out the fire, especially in the case of the Yemeni war, which threatens dire consequences for the entire region.

 

MARGINALIZING THE CAUSE: "Before anything else, we should admit without hesitation, that the war that has broken out in and over Yemen contributes to marginalizing the Palestinian cause," writes Hani al-Masri in the leading Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.

It all began with [the Arab Spring] changes and revolutions, and ended with conspiracies. The Palestinian cause turned from being the Arabs' central cause to one of the issues that has no special priority. What happened at the Arab summit [last week] confirms this, despite the [Palestinian leadership’s] obtuse refusal to recognize the facts by claiming that 'we got everything we asked for at the summit.' What we got were emotional phrases repeated at every conference and resolutions that are re-endorsed time after time, most of which are not implemented.

Our conflict is not a Palestinian/Israeli conflict but an Arab/Zionist conflict. In this conflict, Israel is in organic alliance with certain colonial states in order to implement a project that aims to maintain foreign hegemony and control over the Arab region so as to ensure it remains hostage to backwardness, poverty, submission, and fragmentation. But the existence of a colonial project to whose implementation Israel is contributing does not absolve the Arab rulers from their responsibility for what has happened and is still happening. For they have set up corrupt lackey states and conspire against all popular leaders and initiatives that seek to lift up the Arab nation. This has left the region and its peoples vulnerable to all sorts of interventions and conspiracies.

Moreover, the Palestinian situation calls for an Arab ‘Decisive Storm’ aimed at ending the Israeli occupation and enabling the Palestinian people to secure their rights of return and self-determination that includes the right to establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders as well as equality [for the Palestinian citizens of Israel] within the 1948 territories. This should constitute a step towards a radical historical resolution of the Palestinian issue via the establishment of a democratic state, after defeating and dismantling the colonial project and the regime of racial discrimination.

In light of the above, what is happening in Palestine is not in essence a struggle over power or legitimacy, even though it may sometimes appears to be so because of the manner in which the parties to the inter-Palestinian [Fateh/Hamas] split behave.

It is a struggle against a racist, settler-colonial project that aims to uproot one nation and replace it with another. Therefore, the inter-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved by one side defeating the other, either militarily and by its own power, or by relying on other Arab, regional, or Israeli forces. Consequently, there is no sense at all in calling for the implementation of the 'Decisive Storm' model in Palestine [as done by PA President Abbas at Sharm al-Sheikh] on the grounds that Hamas has staged a coup against legitimacy and there can be no reconciliation with putschists who must be defeated by force, that must also be used in reestablishing legitimacy.

In this regard, we need to make it clear that, despite its vicious nature, what Hamas did in the Gaza Strip was not a coup. Or, rather, it was a special kind of coup, carried out by a force that is part of legitimacy; a force that won the [2006] elections fair and square but that Israel and other regional and international parties prevented from ruling because it would not agree to the terms imposed by the International Quartet. Had what happened been a conventional coup, it would not have been dealt with via dialogue, reconciliation agreements, and the formation of a national accord government.

After the June 1967 defeat and the collapse of patriotic, nationalist, and leftist projects, the Arab region found itself with no project that is able to unite and lead it. It became an open land, violated by all regional and international parties. These parties dealt with the region on the assumption that it was a vacuum that needed to be filled, and a 'sick man' that recalled the last days of the Ottoman Empire whose legacy was divided up between the colonial states. The difference this time around is that this division is being not carried out or confined to the colonial states; regional states such as Iran, Turkey and Israel are trying to benefit from the colonial states' aversion to direct ground military intervention after their role – especially that of the U.S. – has ebbed in light of the enormous cost of intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Despite the sectarian dimensions of the conflict and the use of religious and confessional affiliations in the service of political aims, it is essentially over drawing a new map for the region. This conflict cannot end to the benefit of the region's nations unless they deal with it as confrontation with colonialism and the project to divide it up and impose hegemony on it. The conflict is not between Muslims, Christians, and Jews; nor is it a confessional conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. It is a struggle for liberation, independence, development, democracy, and social justice. This is evident from the fact that those who are fighting in Yemen are in alliance in Syria and Iraq.

But we should also distinguish between the regional states, and especially between Israel and the other states. Israel is a foreign entity implanted here to serve a settler/colonial project that targets the entire region. For those who do not believe this, we refer them to the recommendations issued by the March 2013[Israeli] Herzliya Conference that called for consolidating the Sunni/Shiite conflict and that between Turkey and Iran. These two latter states are neighbors of the Arab region, and good neighborly relations of cooperation should be established with them, steering clear of the intensifying [hostile] schemes because the Arab region and its peoples have become easy prey that can be swallowed up without much effort. And this is because of the absence of an Arab project and leadership able to defend Arab interests and security.

It is also right to distinguish between Turkey, which is a NATO member, and Iran, in which the anti-colonial tendency is mixed with an effort to expand, based on its own interests. Iran has been exhausted by the sanctions imposed on it, and it tends more towards preserving the Iranian state's interests than backing revolution and the anti-colonial causes. Thus we see that opposition to colonialism and support for the Palestinian cause have not prevented Tehran from being involved in endless agreements and understandings with the U.S. This emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is beginning to be realized in Syria, and in the in-principle agreement over Iran's nuclear file.

If we move on to what is now happening in Yemen, we would have to admit that a revolution broke out against Ali 'Abdullah Saleh's rule that ended in forcing him to step down in return for preserving his regime. This led to renewed disturbances and conflicts, especially since the agreement that removed Saleh did not satisfy the interests of the Yemeni people's various constituents, specifically, the Houthis. This led to a turnaround and a shift in alliances; the corrupt and tyrannical Saleh forged an alliance with the Houthis against the legitimate President Mansour – even though his legitimacy should be scrutinized since he is a president elected by accord for a two-year period that was extended and that expired last February.

The Houthis have no right to take power with Iranian support, and the Arab coalition backed by Pakistan, Turkey, the U.S., and Europe has no right to exclude the Houthis who have suffered much from the past regimes that ruled Yemen. There is no alternative to a political democratic solution in which all constituents of the Yemeni nation take part, excluding none of them.

In light of the above, and while recognizing the difficulty of remaining neutral given the sharp polarization and the fact that the conflicting parties are acting on the principle that those who are not with them are against them, the Palestinian cause's interest requires that we do not lose the Arab coalition, Iran, or Turkey.

We must play the role of firemen and put out this war before it stretches out for too long, and before its flames spread and burn all that has not been consumed by fire so far.

"Finally, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has no right to address the Palestinian president, who is recognized as such by the various factions inside and outside the PLO, in the manner that he did, telling him: 'Go sit in your home' – even though Nasrallah, naturally, has the right to oppose the president's positions and disagree with him." concludes Masri.

Ends…

 

 

Copyright: Mideast Mirror.

This email is intended for the recipient only.

Access to this message by any other person is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, distribute, copy, print or rely upon this email.

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MIDEAST MIRROR 01.04.15, SECTION A (ISRAEL)

 

One more day

 

 Israeli newspapers lead with news that the March 31 deadline for a framework agreement between Iran and the six world powers has come and gone – and that the Lausanne talks have been extended for another 24 hours.

All the delegates at the talks, it seems, have been briefing reporters there, but there is little solid news about where exactly the stumbling blocks are and what the chances of reaching a deal are. Britain's Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond confirmed Wednesday that in the past day there has been 'very significant progress' in the talks, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that negotiators had reached a general accord on 'all key aspects.' His Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, added that a draft of a deal could be ready Wednesday. However, another official close to the talks, Reuters reported, denied any such agreement. A French official said Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was leaving the talks to return only when it 'useful.'

Ahead of his planned meeting with House Speaker John Boehner in Jerusalem, meanwhile, Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed the ongoing nuclear negotiations, reiterating that a deal will endanger not only Israel, but also the Middle East, and the world. He accused the West of giving Iran an 'unconscionable path to the atomic bomb. Yesterday an Iranian official called Israel's destruction non-negotiable. However, giving Iran's murderous regime the bomb is negotiable. This is unconscionable,' he added.

Away from Lausanne, there was a low-key ceremony in The Hague on Wednesday, where the Palestinian Authority has officially become a member of the International Criminal Court two months after signing its treaty. Coverage of the event in the Israeli press has been even lower-key. Palestinians signed the court's founding treaty in January and it came into force Wednesday, an event welcomed by activists who see it as an opportunity to bring accountability to years of conflict between Palestinians and Israel.

Speaking to Maariv on Wednesday, a Palestinian official admitted that the ICC bid could backfire, noting that, 'Palestinians can make a claim against the settlements, but it's doubtful that a claim regarding the recent war in Gaza won't bring about a counter-suit from Israel, which is preparing for this. The Israelis have prepared stacks of paperwork on conduct during Operation Protective Edge, including claims of Hamas rocket fire and Palestinian groups shooting from schools and other civilian buildings. This could lead to a suit against Hamas leaders who control the Gaza Strip,' the source added. Indeed, Shurat HaDin Israel Law Center has already launched law suits against Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas and Hamas leaders at the ICC.

Elsewhere, Army Radio reports on the IDF's rather worrying 'worst-case scenarios' for the next possible war with Hizbollah. The Home Front Command will be sending local authorities its assessments of the numbers of casualties and the degree of damage they can expect in the next conflagration. This is the first time the assessment has been updated since 2007. IDF experts estimate that the number of missiles to hit northern Israel on a given day would be 1,000-1,500, and the number of people killed daily will be in double or even triple digits.

Army Radio reported that the relatively small Haifa suburb Kiryat Bialik can expect to be hit by dozens of missiles per day. Several people will be killed, thousands of homes will be hit, and hundreds of them will suffer medium to heavy damage. Strategic facilities will be targeted. At the same time, Israel will be striking disproportionately at Lebanon, including its civilian infrastructures.

Finally, Hamas leader Khaled Mish'al, in his first public comments since the Israeli election late last month, told NBC that Netanyahu's reelection further reduces the chances for peace. According to Mish'al, the Qatar-based political leader of Hamas, Netanyahu's reelection means 'more extremism.'

 

 

IRANIANS ON THE THRESHOLD: Writing in Globes, Or Heller says that Israeli defense officials know that this is not a perfect world and that it is impossible to prevent Iran from breaking through the nuclear threshold without going to war.

"Ever so quietly and far from the prying eyes of the cameras and the microphones, there are new voices emerging within the Israeli defense establishment regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran – which may or may not be about to be signed in Lausanne.

Some senior defense officials – those who are professionals, rather than political appointees – are starting to accept that this is not, as Voltaire's Candide learned, the best of all possible worlds. After all, it contains Iranians. And they, to our great regret, have made massive advances in their nuclear program, which they view as critical to the survival and success of the Shiite ayatollah regime. Could they have been halted earlier? Possibly, yes, but they weren't.

When one compares the most dramatic thing that Israel could do under these circumstances – sending fighter jets to bomb Natanz, Fordow and Arak, which would lead to a war that our previous defense minister said would not even claim 500 lives – to the deal which Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been so eloquently slamming of late, one gets a complex answer.

There are two things that an Israeli attack, which would almost certainly lead to war, cannot do anything about: the Iranian regime's motivation to resume its nuclear program in the immediate aftermath of airstrikes; and the knowhow that the Islamic Republic has accrued thus far. A laser-guided missile cannot take out expertise or ambition.

Moreover, even the most optimistic of the officials who are advocating military action say that an independent Israeli operation would only do enough damage to delay the Iranian nuclear program by four or five years. The more pessimistic ones say that it will only put the Iranians back two years. The deal that the six world powers are hammering out in Switzerland is supposed to delay Iran by 10 to 15 years; if this does not turn out to be a fantasy, it would be far more effective that any kinetic Israeli operation.

Is it conceivable that the Iranians are merely trying to hoodwink the international community and that they are just playing for time until they are ready for their big nuclear breakout? The short answer is yes. The challenge facing Israeli, American and European intelligence services will be to give adequate warning before the Iranians manage to obtain military capability.

Iran has become a regional superpower. Tehran currently runs the show in Lebanon, Syria and, to a large extent, in Iraq and Yemen as well. The warnings that the Israeli intelligence community sent to its American counterpart – that the radical Shiite axis (the Revolutionary Guards-Hizbollah-Assad) is more dangerous than the radical Sunni axis (ISIS-al-Qa’ida) – are currently falling on politely deaf ears, since the United States wants to halt the spread of ISIS without putting American boots on the ground.

If one looks with unbiased eyes at the deal being discussed in Lausanne, one can see how it mainly sets in stone a dire reality: Iran remains capable of making a nuclear breakthrough, possibly within a year or less; and it continues to interfere unhindered in the affairs of its weaker neighbors.

In the end, there will be an agreement, since all the main players want one. The Iranians are desperate for sanctions to be lifted and the Americans are desperate for some kind of foreign policy achievement, which will show the world that they staved off a war. It is possible that the agreement being negotiated will, indeed, do this – but it will not prevent war. It fixes Iran's position as a nation on the threshold of military nuclear capability.

First and foremost, the agreement – if signed – will present the Israeli intelligence services with a serious challenge. One day, they may have to present their political overlords with a smoking gun, proving that Iran is using the agreement to cross the nuclear threshold. That could be the moment that Israeli fighter jets are scrambled to attack, which will lead to war and, presumably, to international condemnation. One should not be jealous of the intelligence officials whose job it is to search high and low for that smoking gun.

In addition, in the immediate period after a deal is inked, Israel is supposed to focus on rebuilding its strategic ties with the United States and with forging new alliances in the Middle East with all of the anti-Iranian nations – including those that the Jewish state does not have direct ties with. That will obligate the Israeli government to pursue a more balanced national security strategy – one that does not bang the drums of war and does not appeal to the lowest common denominator, which is what we witnessed toward the end of last month's election campaign.

The official Israeli position will still be strong public disapproval of the agreement. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will continue to compare it to the Munich Agreement and will continue to reference the 'March of Folly.' Reality, as ever, is more complex."

Ends…

 

WINNERS AND LOSERS: Writing in Maariv, Yossi Melman says that the big winners from the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers are U.S. President Barack Obama and Israel.

"The war of nerves and the battle of spin between Iran and the six world powers are still ongoing. The deadline for reaching an agreement expired at midnight last night and the sides agreed to extend their discussions by another 24 hours. But even now it is clear that the Lausanne talks have not been a success story; in fact, some say they have been a downright failure. Even if, in the end, some kind of working paper is drafted, everyone knows that there are still wide gaps between the sides.

This most recent failure is not the end of the line. In fact, the sides decided long ago that the final deadline for reaching an agreement over Iran's nuclear program would be the end of June 2015. The contacts and the negotiations, in some form or other, will continue until then.

The various elements of the deal that have been discussed in minute detail over the past few days – the number of centrifuges, the amount of uranium, the length of the agreement and the research issue – are important, and there's no question that they are too big for the negotiators to overcome, but in the final analysis they have become less relevant.

It now seems that, because of the failure to formulate a comprehensive agreement, the biggest loser in this whole affair is actually Iran. Iran has lost because the international sanctions that it is toiling under will continue and its economy will continue to struggle. At the same time, and independently of the nuclear talks, the price of oil continues to fall. The Iranian regime has put all its eggs in the basket of a nuclear agreement; on the one hand, the deal would put strict limitations and restrictions on its nuclear program, but, on the other hand, it is supposed to lift the sanctions and give the Iranian economy some breathing space. At this stage, that does not appear to be on the cards. The Iranian leadership does not have any good news for its people, who are eagerly awaiting some economic relief.

The big winners so far are U.S. President Barack Obama and Israel. Obama is in a good position. He can now accuse Iran of responsibility for the failure of the talks. The American president can argue that, despite his willingness to be flexible and his desire to reach an agreement, he drew a line in the sand and refused Iran's more outlandish demands. In so doing, he can argue, he prevented a 'bad agreement,' which is what Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the Republicans accused him of pursuing.

The biggest winner of all thus far is Israel. The interim agreement that Iran signed with the six world powers a year and half ago is still in force. That agreement puts restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and obligates it to continue abiding by those limitations – and it also ensures that the crippling sanctions remain in place.

March 31 – which was set as the deadline for a framework agreement – is not written in stone. The date was selected by American officials, who wanted to ensure that Iran did not do what it always does by engaging in endless and pointless negotiations.

The main reason that an agreement has not been reached thus far is the Iranians' negotiating tactics, which resemble a Persian bazaar. More importantly, it is because there is a deep and profound divide within Iran, between the reformist moderates, lead by President Hassan Rowhani, who are desperate for sanctions to be lifted, and the more radical stream, led by the religious establishment and the Revolutionary Guards, who are digging in their heels and who see any compromise on the issue of the nuclear program as major blow to Iran's prestige and as capitulation to the 'great Satan' – the United States.

In any case, the talks will continue. What is happening in Lausanne is another chapter in this seemingly never-ending international effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. It's a saga that has been going on for a dozen years and it will not end any time soon."

Ends…

 

A RENEWED MIDDLE EAST: Writing in Israel Hayom, Eyal Zisser says that the emergence of Arab leaders who are willing to take the initiative against Iranian expansionism is a welcome development from an Israeli perspective.

"The establishment of a pan-Arab coalition, under the leadership of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to fight Iranian expansionism and prevent Yemen from becoming a forward outpost for Tehran in Cairo and Riyadh's backyard, is refreshing news, which indicates a kind of reawaking in the Arab world, the like of which we have not witnessed for many years.

At the same time, however, this does not herald the dawn of a 'new Middle East' and the region remains much as it has been thus far. After all, a civil war in Yemen involving Saudi Arabia and Egypt is old news; in fact, it's a throwback to the early 1960s, when a civil war raged in Yemen between exactly the same factions and tribes which are battling each other today. Then, however, it was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser who took advantage of the conflict to send his troops to Yemen and claim the country as part of Egypt's sphere of influence; opposing Egypt was Saudi Arabia and Pahlavi Iran, with the indirect and clandestine support of Israel. It was Nasser's embroilment in the Yemenite quagmire, coupled with his defeat in the Six-Day War that eventually led to the end of Nasserism in the Arab world. One can only assume that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has studied that period of Egyptian history well.

Still, despite that bitter memory, the Arabs decided to take actions. There are, it seems, three main reasons for this:

1-The Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have apparently decided to do what Israel was afraid to do on its own northern and southern borders – to prevent the establishment of an Iranian base on their doorsteps. Both these countries are convinced that Iran is planning to establish a Hizbollah or Hamas satellite in Yemen, which they would use to threaten Egypt and Saudi Arabia – just as they threaten Israel. Cairo and Riyadh are determined not to allow Tehran to carry out its plan and decided to act before it got too late.

2-The second reason is the deep disappointment felt toward the United States and the sense that Washington no longer sees Iran as the root cause of all problems in the Middle East. In fact, the U.S. probably now sees Tehran as part of the solution and a potential partner in the battle against ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Indeed, in the shadow of the nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers – notwithstanding the apparent last-minute hitches on the way to a nuclear agreement – is seems that Washington is willing to accept Iran's new roles in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, in order to halt the advance of what is seen by America as a greater threat: ISIS and al-Qa’ida. The Arab world, in contrast, sees these terror groups as a threat, but sees Iran as posing a greater existential threat. That is why Arab countries are terrified by the possibility that Washington will desert them when they need it most or will be willing to allow Iran to increase its regional influence at their expense.

3-Finally, there is an awakening in the Arab world, thanks to the rise to power of a (relatively) young and active leadership in Saudi Arabia and a charismatic and energetic president in Egypt. They both replaced leaders who were very old and who barely functioned.

These, then, are the reasons for the pan-Arab effort. But, at the same time, it is more than likely that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia recognize the limitations of their power. Firstly, the operation is being spearheaded by the Saudis and the Egyptian, with the moral support of the other Arab countries – but they are not willing to send troops to actually fight in Yemen. Secondly, Riyadh and Cairo know that a war in a mountainous and inhospitable terrain against elusive targets – armed militias which are more like guerilla forces than regular armies – is an almost impossible mission.

Their offensive in Yemen is, therefore, a limited one, which focuses primarily on airstrikes. A military offensive, if there is one, will also be limited in scale and nature. The goals of the operation are to deter Iran and to sever the direct link – by air and sea – between Iran and its supporters in Yemen; to weaken the Houthi rebels and their supporters; and to provide support and assistance to the moderate forces in Yemen, who have the unenviable task of trying to wrest back control of their country.

This is what the renewed Middle East looks like: Arab leaders who are willing to take the initiative and stand up to the Iranian challenge – as well as the chaos that is engulfing our region. For a change, this is a welcome development from an Israeli perspective."

Ends…

 

TAXING ISSUES: Writing in Calcalist, Danny Rubinstein comments on the Israeli decision to unfreeze some of the Palestinian tax revenue it has been holding – much to the surprise of the Palestinian Authority itself.

"The Israeli government took the Palestinian leadership somewhat by surprise when it announced on Friday evening that it was unfreezing 1.5 million shekels of tax revenue that it would transfer to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. This is the amount of money that the Israeli tax authorities collected on behalf of the PA in the past three months; it is due to be transferred to the Palestinian coffers in early April and will be used to pay the salaries of Palestinian civil servants, as well as for public services in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The decision reverses a government decision in January, which froze tax revenues as punishment for the Palestinians' request to be admitted as members of the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Representatives of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and the Quartet all praised the Israeli decision, yet the Palestinian Authority was outraged by Israel's claim that the decision was based on 'humanitarian considerations' and 'the need for responsibility and measured decision-making.'

Senior officials in the Palestinian treasury argue that the Israeli government is not being generous and that the return of tax revenues is not charity; they insist that the Palestinians are fully entitled to these funds. In the Palestinian media, the decision to freeze tax revenues was portrayed as nothing short of robbery. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas even said that he was not dealing with a legitimate government, but a bunch of pirates. Palestinian officials said at the time that the main reason that Netanyahu froze the tax funds in the first place was to show the Israeli electorate how tough he was on the Palestinians, in an attempt to win votes for his Likud party in the election.

In response to the Israeli decision to freeze the transfer of tax revenue, the Palestinian government cut the salaries of 150,000 of its employees – most of them teachers and healthcare workers – by 60 percent, to a maximum of 2,000 shekels a month. The Palestinian Finance Minister was not prepared for the Israeli decision to unfreeze the funds and last week even published an announcement that it would be implementing an emergency budget, which would see salaries slashed even further and ministerial expenditure cut by up to 50 percent.

The tax revenue that Israel collects for the Palestinian Authority pays for more than half the PA's monthly expenditure, primarily salaries. Over the past four months, the PA has been funding its expenditure with donations from other countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The head of the Palestinian Monetary Authority, Jihad Al Wazir, said recently that, despite the donations, the Palestinians will only be able to pay salaries for another month, since it has accrued massive debts with banks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – almost a quarter of all the loans these banks have made.

It is still not clear exactly how much money will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority, since Israel wants to deduct Palestinian debts to Israel – mainly the massive debt to the Israel Electric Corp. The issue is due to be discussed at an upcoming meeting between representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian finance ministries."

Ends…

 

SISTER YEMEN: Writing in Haaretz, Zvi Bar'el says that anyone who demands that the international community bare its teeth against Iran's occupation of Yemen is inviting it to pounce on Israel as well.

"'One can't understand that when forces supported by Iran are taking more ground in Yemen, they're closing their eyes to this aggression in Lausanne,' marveled the prime minister as the international community continued to ignore his pleas against a nuclear agreement with Iran.

Binyamin Netanyahu is right, and his concerns about Yemen are sincere and even moving. But Yemen is not alone. The same international community headed by the U.S. president, which Netanyahu asserts is blindly walking into the Iranian trap, also avoided a head-on confrontation with Russia when Moscow annexed Crimea and its proxies took over eastern Ukraine.

This community is also ignoring the 230,000 dead in Syria and has done little to alleviate the plight of the millions of Syrian refugees. And it just clucks its tongue at the horrors perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Netanyahu will undoubtedly have something to say about all this one day too. After all, he’s very sensitive when it comes to occupations and terror.

But when it comes to Israel, the international community’s fecklessness is a blessing. Its indifference to the occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, to the blockade of Gaza and the settling of Jews in areas intended for a Palestinian state is what Netanyahu relies on.

So he should be careful. Anyone who demands that the international community bare its teeth against Iran's occupation of Yemen is inviting it to pounce on Israel as well, and anyone who scolds the major powers for not lifting a finger against the occupation of territory throughout the Middle East should remember that he’s living in a glass house.

Like our sister Yemen, Netanyahu feels protected by an Arab coalition that fears Iran's expanding influence in the region — as if from now on any Arab coalition against Iran is a coalition for Israel. The magic spell cast by the united Arab front fighting in Yemen against Iran has made Netanyahu forget his traditional fear of an Arab coalition. He’s sounding almost as if he’s part of the Sunni axis that's fighting the Shiites.

But think again. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states, commonly referred to as the 'pro-Western states,' are the same countries that view Israel as an occupier that must be ousted from the West Bank. Their hatred for Iran is not altering their attitude toward Israel.

Anyone who sees Saudi Arabia as an ally against Iran should remember that this is the same Saudi Arabia that put forth the Arab Peace Initiative that Netanyahu rejected. And this is the same anti-Iranian alliance calling on Israel to adopt the peace initiative as a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The truth is, Netanyahu’s Israel doesn't belong to any Arab or international coalition. It's an isolated country struggling to convince people about the threat at its doorstep. When it was invited to join the Arab coalition that sought to resolve the conflict, Netanyahu viewed this coalition as a threat and the intention to establish a Palestinian state as a mortal danger.

As Netanyahu sees it, Palestine and Iran are pretty much the same thing. To him, Mahmoud Abbas, Khaled Mish'al, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayatollah Khamenei are identical quadruplets, the devil’s spawn, relatives of Barack Obama. Meanwhile, an agreement with the Palestinians is no different than an agreement with Iran, because the establishment of a Palestinian state would mean Iranian forces at Israel’s border, just as is happening in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon.

And who wouldn’t be convinced by this bleak forecast that musters all the threats in the world to justify the perpetuation of the occupation? Just one small matter remains to complete the victory of this nonsense: to prevent an agreement with Iran, and if one is signed, to portray it as an ongoing threat.

After all, an Iran that possesses an international seal of approval that rebuilds its economy and maintains good relations with Western countries will no longer be able to serve Israel as a dangerous threat that precludes the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Ends…

 

RELAX: Writing on the Ynet News website, Ron Ben-Yishai says that, even without an agreement in Lausanne, nuclear war will not break out any time soon.

"Whether an agreement between the world powers and Iran is reached or not, the sky will not fall in and the danger of nuclear war in the Middle East will not increase. The sides will take a break and then continue negotiations with the aim of reaching an agreement by June 30.

The push to reach an agreement by the end of March was the result of President Obama's political difficulties with the Republican Congress – difficulties that Binyamin Netanyahu contributed to in no small way.

The Republicans are clamoring for a law that would permit another major package of economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iran; Obama wants to avoid this for fear that even the prospect of future legislation would induce the Iranians to halt the negotiations and perhaps even pick up the momentum at their military nuclear program. But even though no agreement was reached Tuesday, the American president can veto congressional legislation and the Iranians are unlikely to break the rules. So we should take a breath and try to understand what each side is trying to achieve – and whether an agreement is even possible, if not in the coming hours then by the end of June.

The U.S.-led world powers are trying to achieve a clear objective that can be defined quantitatively. Their goal is to reduce Iran's nuclear program to the point where it would take at least one calendar year to produce a single nuclear explosive device. At the moment the Iranians can produce fissile material for a bomb within 6-16 weeks. But to produce a nuclear bomb, the Iranians also have to be able to turn the explosive material into a nuclear warhead.

It is unclear how long it would take the Iranians to complete the weapon development, so the final assessment is that the Islamic Republic is currently a year away from a bomb. Putting it another way, Iran is already a nuclear threshold state, which could acquire a bomb within a year. The real goal of the world powers is to keep Iran in this situation, or return it to a situation in which it cannot produce enough fissile material for the core of a nuclear weapon for more than 10 years. No fissile material, no bomb.

What will 10 or 15 years give us? Like the old Jewish joke, either the nobleman will have died or the dog will have died, or both. The West is hoping that within the next 10-15 years, the ayatollahs will fall or be overthrown, or become more open and less militant. If, God forbid, the Iranians still decide to move towards a bomb as quickly as possible, it will be possible to spot, and launch a military attack on their nuclear facilities.

Iran is primarily interested in the removal of sanctions - those imposed by the UN Security Council and those imposed by the U.S. Congress. These sanctions are not only causing severe economic hardship in Iran, but they do not allow it to finance properly its nuclear program or support its proxies throughout the Middle East. Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthi all cost a lot of money that Iran does not have right now.

Iran's second objective is to protect the honor and prestige of the regime. Giving up uranium enrichment and the nuclear program would be interpreted by Iranian public opinion as an act of weakness on the part of the regime, and could lead to its collapse. There are tens of millions of people in Iran just waiting for the regime to stumble so that they can try to overthrow it. So honor is important not only emotionally but also in practical terms for the regime's survival.

The third Iranian objective is that by the end of the period to slow the pace of nuclear development, to be in a position to produce atomic weapons within three to four months.

These are the three goals that Iran has set itself for the negotiations, and it veers between concessions on certain issues and hardening its positions on others so as not to harm any of its supreme goals.

What does Israel want? Granted, Israel is not party to the negotiations, but its stances have importance and influence, as these are also precisely the positions of most countries in the moderate Sunni Arab states. Israel's aim is to completely prevent – in the present and in the future - the possibility of Iran developing and producing nuclear weapons. This can only be achieved in one way – by preventing Iran from acquiring fissile material, either by enriching uranium to a higher level or by producing plutonium in its nuclear reactor.

Israel also wants to keep the sanctions in place for as long as possible, as a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of Iranians, making them afraid to cheat or defraud the world powers as they have done in the past. This is also to guarantee that at the end of the 10-15 years, Iran is not better able to resume its military nuclear program. It is for precisely this reason that Israel so opposes the agreement the world powers are planning to sign with Iran - because it leaves the Iranians with the ability to produce fissile material from enriched uranium.

And if the talks implode? It is reasonable to assume that the parties will have a brief timeout and continue negotiations in an effort to reach a full agreement by the end of June. Meanwhile, Iran will continue to respect the interim agreement signed in Geneva in January 2013, as well as restrictions on uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. But one must consider the prospect that something will go wrong, leading to an escalation in the political conflict and the ongoing development of Iran's nuclear program.

That something is the tougher economic sanctions that the Republican Congress is trying to force on the Obama administration. If this law is passed, it is likely that the U.S. president would veto the law, and the Iranians, in such a situation, would not want to break the rules and could even be pushed into greater flexibility.

If Obama does not veto the new sanctions, the Iranians will likely retaliate by brushing off the restrictions currently placed upon them and even accelerate their nuclear program. In such an event, the West will face a difficult dilemma, especially given that Iran has not given up its efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East through proxy terrorist organizations.

For now, the military option does not seem to be on the table for either the world powers or the U.S. president, but processes of escalation have their own dynamic and can lead to unforeseen situations. Israel is prepared for a situation in which military action is required, but it is very likely that Jerusalem will display maximum restraint and act only when it is becomes clear to all, including the Americans and the world powers, that the Iranians have decided to produce a nuclear weapon - and are already working on one.

If an agreement is reached within the next three months, Israel would benefit as Iran will be out of the nuclear bomb business for at least 10 years – which could well be the same result as attacking Iran's nuclear facilities. It is always better to achieve through diplomacy what could also be achieved with military measures."

Ends…

 

 

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