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MIDEAST MIRROR 13.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- Learning from success, and the price of failure

2-Egypt’s zero-sum game

3-Iran cannot be trusted

4-Amman’s fraught dealings with Tehran 

 

1- Learning from success, and the price of failure

 

Developments have shown that Iran cannot expel the U.S. from the region. The most it can do is to aspire to be the U.S.'s number-one 'dancing' partner there. But dancing has its own requirements, and calls for some painful decisions; it requires that some of the old lexicon be retired. Developments in the region have also shown that Iran cannot be a normal part of the international community without an American certificate of good conduct. Here, Iran should scrutinize the march of Cuban/U.S. relations. Cuba, just like Vietnam, is now dreaming of receiving more American investors and tourists. The Middle East's nations wonder: What sort of Iran will we see after a nuclear agreement? Will it employ the returns it will reap from that agreement – and they are huge – to pursue its policy of conquest?--Ghassan Charbel in today's pan-Arab al-Hayat

 

It goes without saying that [the failure of the nuclear talks] would be a painful option and that its results will be disastrous, or at the very least, very costly to all parties concerned. And its results or consequences would be difficult to predict, as would the balance of power that may emerge at the end of this confrontation. Moreover, the international economic sanctions on Iran imposed within the UN Security Council's framework will not be resumed in the same manner as before the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and the West against the background of the Ukrainian crisis…All this means that the alternative to an agreement is war, anarchy, and attrition; but Iran will not be their sole arena. They will occur deep within the arenas that are part of the U.S.-led Western alliance and Iranian-led counter-alliance, and perhaps Russia as well. This would be akin to a new world war, but under a lower ceiling than that of the two previous wars, and less intense in military terms--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

Iran should alter its political discourse if a nuclear agreement is signed, counsels the editor-in-chief of a Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily. It needs to abandon its characterization of the U.S. as the 'Great Satan' and learn the lessons taught by the Vietnamese and Cuban leaders who are rushing to make peace with Washington driven by sound and popular economic concerns. Two main outcomes are likely should the Vienna negotiations between Iran and the six major powers fail, predicts a commentator in a pro-Syrian Lebanese daily: Iran will resume its nuclear program at an accelerated pace, and the current conflicts in the region will escalate to unprecedented levels, threatening a form of low-level world war.

 

THE SUPREME LEADER SPEAKS: "Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamene'i has urged a crowd of Iranian students to 'continue the fight against international arrogance,' emphasizing that 'the confrontation with the forces of arrogance will not cease even after the nuclear negotiations with the six major powers,' and stressing that this confrontation 'is one of the founding principles of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and shall never cease to be so'," notes Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

The supreme leader made his statement as his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was continuing the marathon negotiations in Vienna, and with the 'Great Satan's' Secretary of State John Kerry, in particular. And Khamenei's statements came only two days after hints from [former Iranian president and current Expediency Council Chairman] Hashemi Rafsanjani suggesting that the U.S. embassy in Tehran may be reopened, noting that his country has 'broken its taboos with the West and the U.S.'

The Middle East’s peoples’ preoccupation with their own earthquakes and torn societies often prevents them from attending to some very significant international events. These events should concern these nations, states, and policies, as well question their tendency to use a discourse that invites them to 'sleep on the silk sheets of alleged victories.' I am referring here to a scene that warrants the attention of those caught up in the conflicts in the region – including Khamenei', [Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander] General Qassem Soleimani, and [Lebanese Hizbollah leader] Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.

On July 7th, President Barack Obama received an exceptional visitor at the Oval Office with a mixture of interest and friendliness. His name was Nguyen Phu Trong, the leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The meeting was the first of its kind, twenty years after diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed, and forty years after the visitor's predecessors took control of Saigon, inflicting the harshest military defeat on the U.S. in modern times.

Had the visitor surrendered to the discourse of the past, he would not have ventured to visit the headquarters of those who were his country’s 'Great Satan' and enemy number-one. There is no need to remind anyone that a sea of blood and bitter years of fighting stands between the two countries. In Saigon, the U.S. army was forced to haul down its country's flag and withdraw in a humiliating manner. But the Vietnamese leader uses the lexicon of the present and not that of the past.

The successors to those who fought and humiliated the U.S. want to progress and flourish today; they want stability not victory. And they want victory against the humiliation of poverty and unemployment, and to build modern universities and join the march of scientific and technological progress. The visitor came with the aim of expanding trade and strengthening military cooperation. For the new 'Great Satan' for his country is the Chinese giant with its economic successes and expanding military machine.

Vietnam discovered that future considerations are more important than the past’s wounds, and that economic figures are more important than songs of glory. It has also discovered that it was Deng Xiaoping and not Mao Zedong who reconciled China with the modern age and development. They also discovered that had Mao's country clung to the literal text of the Little Red Book, hundreds of millions of Chinese would have remained without homes, degrees, schools, and cars.

Iran did not defeat the U.S. in the same manner as Vietnam. It humiliated it for a short while during the [1979] U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran; and it sponsored taking American hostages in Beirut. It subsequently sought to implicate the U.S. in an Arab and Islamic Vietnam in Iraq. It tried to encircle the U.S.'s allies in the region via infiltrations on the ground and an arsenal of missiles. But we have to bear in mind that it was the U.S. that prevented Iran from achieving victory against Iraq [during the 1980-88 war], thus forcing Khomeini to 'drink the poison' of the ceasefire with Saddam Hussein's regime. The U.S. has also more recently inflicted pain on Iran via economic sanctions, forcing Tehran to pursue the path of negotiations.

Developments have shown that Iran cannot expel the U.S. from the region. The most it can do is to aspire to be the U.S.'s number-one 'dancing' partner there. But dancing has its own requirements, and calls for some painful decisions; it requires that some of the old lexicon be retired. Developments in the region have also shown that Iran cannot be a normal part of the international community without an American certificate of good conduct. Here, Iran should scrutinize the march of Cuban/U.S. relations. Cuba, just like Vietnam, is now dreaming of receiving more American investors and tourists.

The Middle East's nations wonder: What sort of Iran will we see after a nuclear agreement? Will it employ the returns it will reap from that agreement – and they are huge – to pursue its policy of conquest?

There are those who believe that the current conflagration along the Sunni/Shiite frontlines threatens to transform Syria into Iran's Vietnam before that of Iran's enemies. The truth is that all the arenas where there is Iranian infiltration are on fire or suffering from rifts. Tehran will do well to read the recent statement by former CIA director Michael Hayden. He said: 'Let us face the truth: Iraq does not exist anymore, neither does Syria; Lebanon is a failed state and Libya is likely to be one as well.'

Iran cannot withstand a Sunni Vietnam in Syria. It cannot withstand the sort of large-scale commitments that brought the Soviet Union down. It should read the facts on the ground as well as Hayden's statement. It should look at the image of Obama receiving Ho Chi Minh's successor with interest.

"Most likely, and at the end of the day, the ordinary Iranian wants a normal, stable and flourishing state, which is exactly what the ordinary Chinese and ordinary Vietnamese wants," concludes Charbel.

End…

 

MORE TIME TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES: "The Vienna negotiations between Iran and the '5 + 1' group are facing obstacles that may require more time to overcome," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

But the problem does not stem from the obstacles and the need for more time. It stems from the fact that there are parties to the negotiations that refuse the very principle of the proposed solution and that insist on exploiting any opportunity to undermine the very foundations of any agreement. The calculations leading them to this are well known by now: they arise primarily from Tel Aviv’s pressures on the U.S. administration and the harmony between such pressures and the position of certain Western and regional governments, primarily France and Saudi Arabia, that believe that an agreement threatens their political and economic interests.

Against this background, the obstacles that are delaying an agreement are of a political nature and should not be discounted. But what if the Vienna talks, or any other subsequent negotiations in the coming weeks or months in some other world capital, were to fail?

Failure would mean the following: Iran would return to enriching uranium to 20% and perhaps higher levels, and it would add to the number of its centrifuges– which is the exact opposite of what any agreement between Iran and the '5 + 1' aims to reach.

A direct military option on the part of the U.S. and its allies (or Tel Aviv) may not be the anticipated response, given its enormous cost. But that the regional focal points of tension– specifically in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and perhaps Lebanon – are certain to witness an escalation. These conflicts will reach unprecedented levels and may turn into an all-out war as a result of developments in one arena or the other, especially the Yemeni/Saudi and Syrian arenas, and perhaps even Lebanon.

It goes without saying that this would be a painful option and that its results will be disastrous, or at the very least, very costly to all parties concerned. And its results or consequences would be difficult to predict, as would the balance of power that may emerge at the end of this confrontation.

Moreover, the international economic sanctions on Iran imposed within the UN Security Council's framework will not be resumed in the same manner as before the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and the West against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, this option that has been used by the U.S. and its allies will not have similar effect to that of the past few years, especially after the sanctions on Iran were tightened via UN Security Council resolutions.

All this means that the alternative to an agreement is war, anarchy, and attrition; but Iran will not be their sole arena. They will occur deep within the arenas that are part of the U.S.-led Western alliance and Iranian-led counter-alliance, and perhaps Russia as well.

"This would be akin to a new world war, but under a lower ceiling than that of the two previous wars, and less intense in military terms," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

2-Egypt’s zero-sum game

 

Egypt will reap nothing but further violence and a descent into chaos should former president Mursi and his colleagues be executed, warns 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in today's Jordanian ad-Dustour

 

Reports that the Egyptian authorities may carry out the death sentences that have been passed against former president Mohammad Mursi and senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders are alarming, since they suggest that Egypt may slide towards anarchy and a bloody confrontation that could last for decades to come, warns a leading Jordanian commentator.

 

RECALLING SADDAM: "There appears to be a growing tendency towards implementing the death sentences passed against deposed Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and a number of first-ranking leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood that is banned in Egypt," writes 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.

Some reports suggest that this may take place before the [end of Ramadan feast] 'Id al-Fitr or during its first three days, or possibly shortly afterwards, recalling the execution of the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on the first day of the Adha 'Id.

The issue here is not when or how president Mursi will be executed before, during or after the 'Id. The problem stems from the death sentence itself, especially if carried out. What would be its repercussions, and how would they affect Egypt's future, security and stability? And what impact would this have on the Brotherhood and the regime? And what messages would it send, and to whom?

Whatever the charges leveled at the deposed president, and whatever criticisms may be made of him and his Brotherhood during or after the period he ruled Egypt, it would be wise to pause and carefully consider the consequences of carrying out the death sentence. This is because the moment when the president and his comrades will be executed will draw a line separating between two phases of Egypt's current history: Before and after the execution.

After the execution, and perhaps for one or two decades to come, there will be no prospects for national reconciliation. The relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime will change from one of 'hostility that is difficult to resolve' to one of 'open war.' In that case, the Brotherhood's forces and popular bases will be automatically added to the armies of extremists and terrorists who are now wreaking havoc upon Egypt's security and stability. The country will enter a tunnel of 'uncreative chaos' until further notice.

The post-executions phase will also be different as far as the internal argument within the Brotherhood is concerned. In the pre-executions phase, Dr. Najeh Ibrahim, one of the leading experts on Egypt’s Brotherhood and Islamist movements, predicted that two-thirds of the Brotherhood members and cadres would be ready for national reconciliation. I do not know whether he would make the same assessment should Egypt’s decision-makers to come to the conclusion that it would be easy to carry out the death sentences and hang the country’s first elected president.

The Brotherhood would certainly not remain the same. Most of its popular base and cadres would move towards the extreme right and terrorism. They would move from warfare on the social media to that of actually fighting against the state, the army, and the state institutions. This is a rule of life.

Egypt will make no progress in its war on terrorism if the executions are carried out. And it is worth noting that it has achieved no significant breakthrough in this war so far. Attacks are continuing in Sinai and the Nile Valley. Terrorism is striking in the heart of Cairo. The past few days alone have added new names to the list of victims. This tendency is certain to escalate at an unprecedented and rapidly increasing pace. And Egypt itself will not remain off the list of victims if the current status quo were to continue.

Certain forces are lying in ambush for the country, waiting for it to fall into a quagmire similar to that we have witnessed in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, or – before them all – in Algeria during its [post-1991] 'black decade.' If it proceeds, the decision to carry out the death sentence will drive Egypt further in the wrong direction. It could be the proverbial 'straw' that breaks the back of security and stability. So what wisdom is there in pursuing policies of revenge and retribution rather than reconciliation, containment, and avoiding harm, if it is possible to pursue policies that may actually bring some benefit?

We used to believe that the excessive and strict collective sentences, including death sentences, were merely intended to pressure the Brotherhood into climbing down from the treetops and to lower the ceiling of its demands and expectations, speeding up its reintegration into the political process and the [government’s] ‘roadmap’, but on the appropriate terms.

Today, however, it seems that we may have been mistaken, and that those in charge were serious about these sentences, ready to proceed down the path of confrontation, exclusion, and ostracism till the very end. It may be that Egypt’s ruling elite that the world has begun to accept and deal with and back in its war on terrorism, in fact, has been seized by false and misleading sense of elation, believing that it has secured the international community’s mandate to wage a relentless war on all its enemies, under the guise of fighting terrorism.

If this is its reading, it is totally inaccurate. We have seen how Syria has paid a very high price for reading the situation in a similar manner. It has sought to ‘ISIS-ify’ the various opposition groups and to promote the notion that there is little difference between ISIS on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood and the other various Islamist (and non-Islamist) [opposition] movements on the other.

It is as if we have not learnt the lessons of our own experience and that of others. It is as if we have still not arrived at a situation whereby we acknowledge that no one can totally excise anyone else, and that the time will come when the gains that one camp is achieving at the expense of others will evaporate, and turn into mere 'bills' that must be settled. This is a zero-sum game that no side can win, as long as the price of what one gains today has to be paid many times over tomorrow, and as long as there is no universal conviction that what is necessary is to play a 'win/win' game.

We are still wagering on Egypt's reason and wisdom, and we pray to God that these reports and leaks will prove to be no more than malignant rumors. We do this not out of love for the Muslim Brotherhood or the current regime, or out of our concern for its survival, but out of concern for Egypt itself and fear of what may lie in wait for it. We do this out of hope that it will be able to reap the benefits of its sons and daughters' sacrifices during the two greatest 'hijacked' revolutions in the country's contemporary history.

Since Rabi'a [when Egyptian security forces stormed the Brotherhood's sit-in at Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya Square in 2013], we have been saying that Egypt is not marching in the right direction, and that it is witnessing successive coups against its two glorious revolutions. Today, more than any time before, we are very concerned about the developments unfolding in Egypt. We have lost our faith in the ruling elite’s ability to lead the country and bring it out of its wilderness and lean years.

"May God protect Egypt and its people," concludes Rintawi.

Ends…

 

 

3-Iran cannot be trusted

 

Moscow’s call to lift the ban imposed on arms exports to Iran disregards what Tehran is doing across the region by spreading chaos in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, says Saudi al-Watan

 

Russia's unconditional support for Iran and its regional policies simply ignores the consequences of Tehran's multiple interventions in the Arab affairs, argues the editorial in a Saudi daily. Moscow’s support for lifting the ban on weapons’ exports to Iran is an invitation to Tehran to continue arming its allies in an attempt to impose its hegemony upon all the states in the region.

 

NON-PEACEFUL INTERVENTION: "No matter how circumstances and conditions may change, Iran remains a state that cannot be trusted because of its persistent practices and threats, and because of its non-peaceful and illegitimate intervention in the affairs of the region's states," writes the editorial in the Saudi daily al-Watan.

It is exerting maximum efforts to take control of the centers of decision-making in neighboring countries. And it has no qualms arming and directing groups that are loyal to it for sectarian [Shiite] considerations in order to achieve this aim. It transforms these same groups into tools whose influence is extended in order to allow Tehran to expand its own influence through them. As a result, the entire state targeted by this intervention becomes subject to Iranian hegemony. And there are many examples of this, such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups as well.

In light of this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement during the BRICS summit in the Russian city of Ufa claiming 'that lifting the ban imposed on arms exports to Iran must be given priority after a permanent agreement regarding Tehran's nuclear program is reached' simply ignores the facts. It disregards what Iran is doing in the region by spreading chaos in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. For the nuclear agreement is one thing, and providing Iran with weapons is a different matter altogether. After all, a large proportion of these weapons will go to the Syrian regime and Hizbollah -God forbid- allowing them to continue repressing the Syrian people, and to the [Houthi] putschists in Yemen so as to back their stance against legitimacy there.

As he called for lifting the ban as soon as possible, declaring on behalf of his country that 'we will back the options proposed by Iran’s negotiators,' the Russian foreign minister seems to have forgotten that his country's political alliance with Iran should not harm other nations’ interests. If Lavrov believes that 'Iran is taking part in fighting ISIS, and lifting the weapons’ ban will allow it to enhance its ability to combat terrorism,' others believe that Iran is in collusion with this terrorist organization whose criminal actions indirectly serve the interests of the Syrian regime, in fact. Indeed, many articles have been written analyzing the links between Iran and the Syrian regime on the one hand, and ISIS on the other.

It is the right of any state to act in its own interests and forge the political alliances it believes are consistent with its policies at any stage. But at the very least, it should take into account the harm inflicted on others as a result, and try to avoid this and prevent it from happening. Its biases should not be blind with no attempt to calculate their effects.

"Russia has to understand that Iran's aggressive practices in the region are not welcome by the region's states and nations," concludes the daily.

Ends…

 

 

4-Amman’s fraught dealings with Tehran 

  

Amman’s dealings with Tehran remain susceptible to pressures and multiple interpretations, says Hazem Mubayidin in today's Iraqi as-Sabah

 

It is still not entirely clear what was behind Jordan's arrest of an alleged Iraqi member of Iran’s al-Qods Brigade who was reportedly preparing to carry out terrorist attacks, maintains a Jordanian commentator in a Baghdad daily. This may have been certain parties’ attempt to prevent any improvement in relations between Amman and Tehran; or it may have been a maneuver by the Jordanian authorities aimed at pressuring the Gulf states into providing more aid to Amman.

 

STATE OF TENSION: "It has become clear that certain forces are working on prolonging the state of tension between Amman and Tehran," writes Hazem Mubayidin in Monday's Iraqi daily as-Sabah.

The Jordanian authorities announced the arrest of an Iraqi member of Iran’s al-Qods Brigade along with 45 kilograms of explosives he was storing in a forested area north of the country with the aim of carrying out 'terrorist' attacks across the border in Israel. It goes without saying that such a report will add to the already tense climate ever since the Khomeini-led Iranian Revolution’s victory in 1979. Since that time, all attempts to reach common ground between the two countries have failed.

For its part, Tehran has denied any involvement in the operation, describing what was published as groundless allegations. It also stressed that Iranian policy is based on full respect for the security, stability, and territorial integrity of all states in the region.

What is noteworthy about the Jordanian account of what happened is that the accused had easily accessed the explosives buried in Wasfi at-Tal Forest years ago, and removed them to the al-'Asfour Gap where he personally hid them again. But when he returned to dig them out and use them months later, he failed to locate them. Yet when he was arrested, he succeeded in identifying that location immediately – all of which adds to the mystery surrounding this story. Moreover, the authorities have banned any further reports regarding what happened so as to mislead the parties behind it.

The question now is this: Is the exposure of this operation intended to drive relations with Tehran back to their previous levels of tension? Or is merely intended as a message to ‘those concerned’ in the Gulf states?

The message to Iran, if there is one, has to do with what has been happening along the Syrian/Jordanian borders, and Damascus and its Iranian ally’s recent accusations that Amman has been helping the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in its battles against the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, there are those in Amman who believe that Jordan has been on Iran’s target list for years, especially as far as the Qods Brigade is concerned.

Some believe that Jordan will respond by striking at Iran’s interests and backing its opponents in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen despite the fact that what was expected was an announcement of a new alliance against ISIS that includes Iran after unconfirmed reports of General Soleimani’s secret visit to Amman where he allegedly met with the Director of Jordanian Intelligence General Faisal ash-Shoubaki.

The Iranians will not forget that the late King Hussein fired an artillery shell at their country from Iraqi territory during the [1980-88] war. But after the emergence of ISIS's threat they have put all this behind them. Tehran recently received the Jordanian foreign minister who was bearing many files concerning the regional situation. This was clearly a consequence of the interests that Iran expected to secure as result of destroying extremism, without securing much in return other than the hope of making use of Jordan's good regional relations in order to alleviate the isolation imposed on Tehran.

After Khomeini's death and signs that Iran was gradually abandoning its attempt to export its revolution, relations between Jordan and Iran began to improve. But that did not go beyond a certain point. Amman continued to restrict the Iranians' visits to the Prophet's companion Ja’far ibn Abu Talib’s [Shiite] shrine and was wary of Tehran's efforts to secure a regional foothold that would enable it to become a major factor in the Middle East conflict at the expense of Jordan's political and security interests.

These fears were crowned by the Jordanian monarch's warnings against Iran's efforts to establish a ‘Shiite Crescent’ that angered Tehran and its allies, but talk of which intensified after Iranian involvement in the sectarian war between the Shiites and the Sunnis in Iraq grew. Demonstrations took to the streets in Amman attacking Iran’s policies, and some Jordanian MPs demanded that their government should sever its relations with Tehran.

Jordanian/Iranian relations have been characterized by deep disagreements over most of regional issues and crises. For Jordan is part of the axis of moderation; it is an ally of Washington and has a formal peace treaty with Israel. It recognizes the PA and views it as the Palestinians' representative. For its part, Iran is the leader of the axis of resistance. It collides with the West and is hostile to Israel. It backs Hamas, while it firmly and forcefully stands with Hizbollah and its allies in Lebanon, whereas Jordan maintains strong relations with the March 14th [Saudi-backed anti-Hizbollah/Damascus] alliance. Moreover, Jordan backs the UAE's rights as regards the three islands occupied by Iran [in 1973] and strongly backs the political regime in Bahrain, while Tehran has offered strong support to the mostly Shiite Bahraini opposition. But while we have grown accustomed to describing relations between Jordan and Iran as lukewarm, they have always maintained a degree of warmth that is sufficient to inaugurate a new and different phase of relations between the two countries.

Despite all the differences, Tehran proposed to supply Jordan with oil free-of-charge for thirty years in return for trade exchanges between the two countries and facilitating religious tourism. This was after the [Arab] Gulf states ignored Amman's desperate calls for help, which raised questions on the Jordanian street regarding the need to diversify the country’s options after it became obvious that it is impossible to resolve Jordan's domestic crisis without success in its foreign policy; one that failed to secure the aid that Jordan needs.

Furthermore, the birth of ISIS has restructured Jordan's regional role via the gateway of the war on terrorism, which creates significant common ground for shared Jordanian/Iranian interests. In addition, we should attend to the fact that Jordan’s position towards Syria is that the solution does not lie in toppling the Syrian regime, and that Amman's relations with Iraq have improved notably and are witnessing major developments today.

"So, are there certain parties that are working to prevent the emergence of any practical common denominators between Amman and Tehran? Or is this a calculated Jordanian maneuver that confirms that the country’s options are open to all possibilities?" asks Mubayidin in conclusion.

Ends…

 

 

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