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MIDEAST MIRROR 08.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)

 

1- A lesson in the art of negotiations

2-Syrian realities

3-Ankara’s threats

 

1- A lesson in the art of negotiations

 

Writing about Iran or anything having to do with it – particularly in light of its military intervention in favor of the Syrian regime and its support for the Houthi/Saleh coalition in Yemen – may seem to be a serious transgression in many people’s eyes. This is especially true for those who hate the followers of the Shiite creed for sectarian reasons, or those who are hostile to the Persians on nationalistic grounds. But this will not prevent us from saying that the Iranian negotiators who stood their ground throughout the past five years of difficult marathon negotiations with the five major powers plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program, deserve a different view from us as Arabs and Muslims. This is because they have provided us with a lesson in the art of negotiation, one that we need to learn, steep ourselves in and absorb the moral hidden between its lines--pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com

 

Relations between Washington and Tehran will not return to where they were before the February 1979 Iranian Revolution, immediately after a nuclear agreement. The process of normalizing relations between two nations and two political leaderships that have been intensely hostile to each other for many long decades in which harsh positions and measures were adopted, will take a long time. It will also require the presence of significant common interests that far outstrip the expressions of good will manifest in the two countries' foreign ministers current flexible attitude towards each other. Moreover, it is clear that Israel and other countries in the region will not only oppose the agreement between the '5 + 1' and Iran; they will do everything possible to obstruct its implementation in order to ensure that normalization between the two countries will take a long time before it is realized. --'Abdullah BouHabib in Lebanese as-Safir

 

Obama subscribes to an idea that derives from the realist school in international relations. According to this idea, the best way of dealing with aspiring and rising states consists of the great powers negotiating with them, trying to contain their demands and to convince them to accept the unequal status of international power. This should curtail their global aspirations and their rebellion against the international order. In return, they will secure some gains, but within containable limits. In other words, there will be a relative adjustment to their status, instead of going to battle with them. This is the exact opposite of what the Republicans want. They are advocates of the school of preemptive war, even if waged by the U.S. alone, in order to prevent any change in the international system that would threaten Washington's status as the world's leader--Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Jordanian al-Ghad

 

Whatever the outcome of the nuclear talks, Tehran’s negotiators have taught the Arabs a lesson in negotiation and steadfastness, which contrasts with the easy concessions made at the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel and the 1993 Oslo negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, maintains the editorial on a pan-Arab online daily.  A nuclear agreement with Iran, which now seems inevitable, will prove to be of greater benefit to Tehran and the Western European states than to the U.S., maintains a former Lebanese ambassador to Washington. But since the agreement's positive impact on the region's problems will not materialize in the short-term, no one – and especially not the Lebanese – should wager on it to resolve their current problems. The current disagreement over Iran's ballistic missile program will not prevent an agreement over its nuclear program, maintains a Palestinian commentator in a Jordanian daily. U.S. policy appears to be based on seeking to contain Iran and moderate its ambitions by negotiating with it and granting some of what it wants, but less than what it aspires to.

 

A SERIOUS TRANSGRESSION: "Writing about Iran or anything having to do with it – particularly in light of its military intervention in favor of the Syrian regime and its support for the Houthi/Saleh coalition in Yemen – may seem to be a serious transgression in many people’s eyes," writes Wednesday's editorial on the pan-Arab www.raialyoum.com.

This is especially true for those who hate the followers of the Shiite creed for sectarian reasons, or those who are hostile to the Persians on nationalistic grounds. But this will not prevent us from saying that the Iranian negotiators who stood their ground throughout the past five years of difficult marathon negotiations with the five major powers plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program, deserve a different view from us as Arabs and Muslims. This is because they have provided us with a lesson in the art of negotiation, one that we need to learn, steep ourselves in and absorb the moral hidden between its lines.

The cursing and insults that we encounter in most of our newspapers, websites and social media from many Arabs and their armies of electronic warriors will do us no good. It only reveals our utter ignorance and lack of understanding. After all, nations do not base their civilization and progress or lay the foundations for their revival via such methods that are at once excessively facile and naïve.

The Arab negotiators-- the Egyptian and Palestinians, the former at Camp David (that lasted for only two weeks) and the latter at Oslo (which lasted for two months)-- exposed how easy it is to deceive them, how quickly their patience runs out, how readily they surrender to American and Israeli pressures, and how willing they are to make huge strategic concessions whose price is paid by the Arab and Islamic nations later on.

The Iranian nuclear agreement with the six major powers is now facing its last quarter-hour difficulties in Vienna. Each side is trying to twist the other's arm and secure the maximum concessions. This is why one extension will be followed by another, as each side clings to its position till the very last moment. This is especially true of the Iranian side, which is supposed to be the weaker and besieged party.

Numerous problems remain as meetings are held behind the scenes between foreign ministers – whether those of the major powers or between them and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The main points of disagreement concern a total and immediate end to the military and economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and Iran’s refusal to accept an automatic ‘snapback’ of the sanctions without a new UN Security Council resolution, as Tehran is insisting.

The U.S. and its allies believe that what is more important than reaching an agreement is a total commitment to mechanisms that will ensure its immediate implementation. They insist that there should be an automatic snapback should Iran raise any obstacles to the implementation of the agreement. This is because, as their representatives say, the six major powers' trust in Iran is almost nil. For they have been deceived on more than one occasion and do not wish to be 'stung from the same snake-pit twice' and wake up one day to find Iran armed with nuclear warheads.

There is one Iran at the negotiating table represented by one negotiator, Mr. Zarif. But there are six negotiators and six foreign ministers on the other side. Some, like France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, are hard-liners, while others – like the Russian and Chinese  – support the Iranian side. And there are those trying to occupy center ground like the German negotiator.

Because of the number of negotiators on the other side, disagreements are rising to the surface over an automatic snapback of the sanctions as the U.S. and France are insisting on, and on the need to revert to the UN Security Council, as China and Russia are demanding, both of which have veto rights at the Council which can function as a safety net for their Iranian ally.

There are other technical disagreements over adjustments to Iran’s Fordo and Arak nuclear reactors so as to ensure that they cannot turn to the production of nuclear warheads. But these disagreements remain less difficult than the political dimensions that pertain to the mechanisms for lifting the sanctions, and possibly other mechanisms having to do with the Syrian, Yemeni, and Iraqi files as well.

The Iranians do not wish to commit the same mistakes as Iraq when it allowed the Americans unfettered inspection rights and to meet with Iraqi nuclear scientists and experts [after 1990]. That was a labyrinth that ultimately ended in denouncing Iraq as an outlaw state, the assassination of its scientists, and an invasion under the false pretext of weapons of mass destruction. And this is to say nothing of the Camp David deception that has shackled Egypt with agreements that put paid to its sovereignty over the Sinai Desert and removed it from Arab ranks. It is also to say nothing of the Oslo deception that gave the Israelis all the recognition and security they were seeking and left the Palestinians naked without so much as a fig leaf.

The coming round of last-minute meetings will be decisive. But what is certain is that all parties are in agreement on a single matter, namely, that these meetings should continue. This is because the alternative is war.

"And this is unacceptable because of its enormous cost, and because its outcome is not guaranteed," concludes the daily.

End…

 

THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT: "There will be an agreement on Iran's nuclear program," writes 'Abdullah BouHabib in Wednesday's left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

The Geneva and Vienna talks will continue until an agreement is reached, and until the disagreements between the Western states and Iran are resolved. This will provide the gateway for Iran's re-entry into the international system and its political, diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement with it.

Although the U.S. is not the main beneficiary of this agreement, it will reap many gains. The first is that Tehran will re-join the international community. Once that happens, the many outstanding problems with it will be addressed at meetings, discussions and contacts between the two countries' officials, and not by proxy or in the media. The pressure on Washington to keep Iran in international isolation or to prevent it from enriching uranium for peaceful purposes will also cease.

The U.S. will not benefit from an end to the sanctions as much as the other Western countries in economic terms. The numerous sanctions imposed by Congress on American companies, banning them from working in Iran, will take a long time to be removed thanks to the strong domestic opposition that is meant to prevent U.S./Iranian relations from being normalized at the pace that President Barack Obama desires.

In other words, relations between Washington and Tehran will not return to where they were before the February 1979 Iranian Revolution, immediately after a nuclear agreement. The process of normalizing relations between two nations and two political leaderships that have been intensely hostile to each other for many long decades in which harsh positions and measures were adopted, will take a long time. It will also require the presence of significant common interests that far outstrip the expressions of good will manifest in the two countries’ foreign ministers’ current flexible attitude towards each other.

Moreover, it is clear that Israel and other countries in the region will not only oppose the agreement between the '5 + 1' and Iran; they will do everything possible to obstruct its implementation in order to ensure that normalization between the two countries will take a long time before it is realized.

On the other hand, the Western European states will not need that much time. Their relations with Tehran did not deteriorate to the same extent as relations between Tehran and Washington. In fact, most of these states have maintained some form of diplomatic relations with Iran. Consequently, most European companies, aided by their governments, are already contacting the Iranian government, and its trade and development companies so as to commence working in Iran after the relevant states’ institutions, the UN Security Council, and the EU endorse the agreement.

Iran will be the main beneficiary from the agreement in terms of its economy, diplomacy, and influence. First, it will free most of the frozen assets that the Shah had deposited in the U.S. Moreover, the financial and trade restrictions imposed on it will be cancelled, allowing it to regain its role in international trade and oil exports, which may reach three-million barrels a day--with the possibility of a major increase in production in the coming years.

Furthermore, Iran and Iraq's combined production of oil will equal that of Saudi Arabia’s before the end of the decade. In fact, Tehran's non-oil exports to Western markets may head the list of Iranian exports after being denied access to these markets for years. And in the absence of an OPEC agreement to control prices and export levels, an increase in Iran's oil exports could bring down oil prices. That would help the importing states, especially the EU countries that have been facing major economic problems for years.

Moreover, lifting the economic sanctions will provide Iran with the financial prosperity that will allow it to continue to bolster and expand its influence in the Arab world and elsewhere. That prospect angers its regional opponents, especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Israel.

In diplomatic terms, Iran which today is negotiating with the '5 + 1' will become the focal point for resolving the Middle East’s deep problems, starting with Yemen, and leading up to Syria and Lebanon. Naturally, Iran will not have exclusive monopoly over these issues; Saudi Arabia will be a significant party to the attempt to address the regional problems. The U.S. will not abandon its friendship with Saudi Arabia no matter how emotional the reaction of the Kingdom's rulers may be towards Washington and President Obama.

Here, it is worth noting that there will be no immediate resolution of the region's problems after reaching a nuclear agreement. The prospects of resolving these problems will improve as a result of the rapprochement between Washington and Tehran; but such a resolution depends above all on the regional states, especially on cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran. But these two countries' current respective attitude towards these problems is not amenable to finding a solution. The discrepancy between their positions is growing every day in fact. For example, Saudi Arabia still believes that Iran has no role to play in Arab issues, and that its intervention in these issues is the cause of most current problems.

For this reason, it would be advantageous for Lebanon and its stability, if its politicians, whatever their affiliations, did not wager on what the agreement may produce because its positive consequences for the region will not materialize in the short-term. In fact, the agreement may create greater disturbances in light of the differing regional attitudes towards it. Moreover, Lebanon's problems remain relatively simple compared to the other problems in the region.

"Thus, it is not just that the concerned states will not set up a workshop dedicated to resolving Lebanon's problems; they view our artificial disagreements as pathetic," concludes BouHabib.

End…

 

NO REAL DISAGREEMENT: "Practically speaking, there are no longer any real points of disagreement over the essence of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany (the '5 + 1' group)", writes Ahmad Jamil 'Azm in Wednesday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.

By the time this article is published, the time set for reaching an agreement would have passed and we would either have an agreement or another extension. But whatever happens, the Iranian/U.S. negotiations open a door that could lead to a new chapter in international relations, its theories and its history.

To understand the issues of the last quarter-hour of negotiations, we should remember that Iran has managed to develop its uranium-enrichment abilities over the past 15 years. Since 2012 at least, the CIA has publicly acknowledged that Tehran has acquired the necessary knowledge to produce nuclear weapons. But despite its importance, having the know-how is not the same as actually producing a nuclear warhead.

Moreover, Iran claims that it has no plans to acquire such weapons. Producing a nuclear bomb is a political step that Tehran may take; but even more important is the fact that a nuclear bomb in itself may not constitute a major strategic threat in Tehran's hand. This is because the process of delivering and using such a bomb is complex. The situation would be different if Iran acquires the ability to place nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles that can reach U.S. bases, the West, and Israel. But apart from a political decision, that requires the possession of the required technology, equipment, and know-how. At the final stage of the current negotiations, lifting the ban on ballistic missiles and other conventional weapons was a disputed Iranian demand. Its threat stems from the fact that it may pave the way for Iranian nuclear-armed missiles.

If the White House presents a draft agreement to the U.S. Congress before Thursday [tomorrow] it will be subjected to review, and will be either endorsed or rejected within 30 days. If it is delayed beyond this date, then the review process may take 60 days according to Congressional procedures. Since rejecting the agreement requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and since the Republican majority has less than two-thirds of the seats, members of President Barack Obama's Democratic Party will have to join the Republicans to reject the agreement. The 60-day period will improve the chances of mobilizing public opinion and exerting pressure on the Democrats.

What is happening in effect is that the Republicans, together with the Israelis, want to totally dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. As for the Democrats, and specifically President Obama and his team, they want to restrict this program, monitor it and contain it beneath the point at which it may take on a military character. This is based on a principle that Obama subscribes to, namely, that the U.S. is strong enough to monitor, pursue, and punish Iran should it violate the agreement. As for the Iranians, they want a complete restoration of trade and a full return to the international arena, including an end on the ban on their conventional armament.

Obama subscribes to an idea that derives from the realist school in international relations. According to this idea, the best way of dealing with aspiring and rising states consists of the great powers negotiating with them, trying to contain their demands and to convince them to accept the unequal status of international power. This should curtail their global aspirations and their rebellion against the international order. In return, they will secure some gains, but within containable limits. In other words, there will be a relative adjustment to their status, instead of going to battle with them. This is the exact opposite of what the Republicans want. They are advocates of the school of preemptive war, even if waged by the U.S. alone, in order to prevent any change in the international system that would threaten Washington's status as the world's leader.

Obama wants to institutionalize the negotiation and monitoring process in dealing with aspiring rising powers. If an agreement is reached with Iran now, committees and monitoring units will be established to keep an eye on Tehran. That would set a precedent for dealing with other aspiring and mutinous states. But this manner of addressing the issue is not to the Israelis’ satisfaction; they prefer the neo-con approach that aims at the total destruction of aspiring rebellious forces.

At the Arab level, there is anxiety at the prospect that Iran will no longer be under siege. This is a totally justifiable concern in light of Iran's record of exporting revolution and sectarianism. But the solution also lies in coordinating positions and pressures, and in imposing them on the international negotiating agenda. This is especially necessary since the military option against Iran is not in these states' interest. In fact, maintaining the siege of Iran harms and annoys some of these Arab states, even if it is to the liking of others.

"Be that as it may, we do not expect the current disagreement over the issue of ballistic missiles to prevent a subsequent accord," concludes 'Azm.

Ends…

 

 

2-Syrian realities

 

The U.S. administration insists on avoiding the details of the bloody battles in Iraq and Syria. It insists that the war on ISIS and similar organizations will take a long time. In other words, the administration will continue to refrain from striking at both these organizations and at the Assad regime. The only thing that concerns President Obama is to implement the doctrine that bears his name based on pursuing a rapprochement with Tehran and that makes every effort not to block the road to it. The object is to create new balance that only the current U.S. administration has any faith in--Saudi al-Watan

 

Anyone observing the Syrian scene cannot ignore two facts:  The first is that the various institutions of the Syrian state– especially its military and security arms – are playing the main role in the war on terrorism. Had it not been for the Syrian state and its institutions, specifically the Syrian Arab Army, the terrorist organizations, ISIS and the Nusra Front in particular, would have shared control of the whole of Syria and expanded into other states. The second fact is that no person or party-political formation in Syria can replace President Bashar al-Assad, either in terms of popular support or the extent to which state institutions are ready to rally around them. Therefore, the [U.S.] demand to exclude President Bashar al-Assad entails an insistence on pursuing the military option and a rejection of a political solution--Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Lebanese al-Bina'

 

U.S. President Obama’s latest statements on the situation in Syria and Iraq are no more than an expression of Washington's commitment to the Obama Doctrine that insists on rapprochement with Iran, claims the editorial in a Saudi daily. This is the real context in which to understand the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The president's recent statements that exclude any role for Syrian President Assad in the war against terrorism indicate that Obama continues to insist on a military solution that would topple the Syrian regime, claims a Lebanese commentator in a pro-Damascus Beirut daily. That amounts to a slap in the face to the Russian leadership’s peace initiative to which it can only respond by increasing its military aid to Syria.

 

UNDERSTANDING OBAMA: "The implications of President Barack Obama's recent statement regarding the situation in Syria can best be understood in the context of the nuclear talks between the '5 + 1' group and Iran," writes the editorial in Wednesday's Saudi daily al-Watan.

Obama repeated his commitment to supporting the moderate Syrian opposition. He said: 'At present, we continue to intensify our training and support for the local forces that are fighting ISIS on the ground.' This is the U.S. president’s customary message to Tehran, not to Damascus or to the moderate Syrian opposition. The main audience of this message is the Iranian regime, even though Tehran also realizes that Obama promises are no more than futile gestures.

Obama's statement regarding the situation in Iraq is another message to the Iranian regime. The U.S. president said: 'We are speeding up the training of the forces fighting the Islamic State, including volunteers from Sunni tribes in Anbar Province.'

The U.S. administration insists on avoiding the details of the bloody battles in Iraq and Syria. It insists that the war on ISIS and similar organizations will take a long time. In other words, the administration will continue to refrain from striking at both these organizations and at the Assad regime.

The only thing that concerns President Obama is to implement the doctrine that bears his name based on pursuing a rapprochement with Tehran and that makes every effort not to block the road to it. The object is to create new balance that only the current U.S. administration has any faith in.

Be that as it may, any U.S./Iranian agreement will come at the region's expense. At the very least, it will have consequences that will serve Iran's regional interests. This is the truth. For Iran will concede nothing, and all that is taking place is mere 'talk.' And if Tehran were to concede anything, it would only be in return for other opportunities and additional regional demands that the '5 + 1' will accept in favor of the velayat-e-faqih state.

The Syrian crisis and the situation in Iraq will be at the heart of the nuclear agreement's agenda. As for Yemen, it has – thank God – been removed from this equation thanks to [the Saudi-led] Operation Decisive Storm.

"That is to say, thanks to Saudi Arabia and the coalition’s member states that have blocked the path before any political haggling over this Arab country," concludes the daily.

End…

 

OBAMA’S SOLUTION: "In his latest statement on the situation in Syria, U.S. President Barack Obama said that the only solution for terrorism lies in forming an alliance that includes a Syrian government of which President Assad is not a member," writes Hamidi al-'Abdullah in Wednesday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.

This statement came from the highest level of decision-making in the U.S., and only a few days after President Putin launched his initiative for a regional and international coalition in which the U.S. and the Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, would take part.

It goes without saying that the fact that the U.S. president has insisted that any anti-terrorism coalition should include a Syrian government that President Assad neither heads nor is a member of, clearly means that Obama also insists on a military solution and refuses to adopt a realistic policy.

For anyone observing the Syrian scene cannot ignore two facts:  The first is that the various institutions of the Syrian state– especially its military and security arms – are playing the main role in the war on terrorism. Had it not been for the Syrian state and its institutions, specifically the Syrian Arab Army, the terrorist organizations, ISIS and the Nusra Front in particular, would have shared control of the whole of Syria and expanded into other states.

The second fact is that no person or party-political formation in Syria can replace President Bashar al-Assad, either in terms of popular support or the extent to which state institutions are ready to rally around them. Therefore, the demand to exclude President Bashar al-Assad entails an insistence on pursuing the military option and a rejection of a political solution.

The U.S.’s policy towards Syria – whether it heads towards a political solution or maintains the war of attrition – is one that the region's states and the Western states that turn in the U.S.'s orbit will abide by. No state in the region will diverge from this strategy if set by the U.S.

The above implies that President Vladimir Putin's proposal that he presented to Syrian Deputy-PM and Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu'allem is not based on any firm grounds; or on promises that were closer to deception than anything else. Mu'allem was thus right to say that a miracle was necessary for President Putin's efforts to be crowned with success, and that this is not the age of miracles.

President Obama's latest position regarding the solution of the crisis in Syria was a slap in the face to Russia and President Putin in particular. It resembles the successive slaps that the U.S. administration has been delivering to Moscow in the Ukraine by refusing to cooperate actively in finding a political solution for the war there. It has been insisting on sanctions instead, and on dealing with Russia as a minor player, showing contempt and disrespect for its international status instead of cooperating with it.

If Russia and the Russian leadership in particular wish to fight terrorism, it has now become incumbent upon them to raise the level of military support for Syria so as to enable it to put an end to the U.S.'s dreams of overthrowing the regime. For that is the shortest path to a situation that convinces the U.S. to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.

"Anything less would mean that Russia's policy was akin to ploughing the sea," concludes 'Abdullah.

Ends…

 

 

3-Ankara’s threats

 

Turkish President Erdogan’s constant threat to intervene in Syria seems to be aimed at enhancing his political position at home, says Mona-Lisa Freiha in today's Lebanese an-Nahar

 

Turkish President Erdogan's threats to intervene in Syria give the impression that Ankara has finally made up its mind to establish a buffer zone there, notes a Lebanese commentator. But these threats are more likely to be part of Erdogan's attempt to put his domestic political household in order after his party lost its absolute majority in last month’s parliamentary elections.

 

LONG STANDING CALL: "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been calling for the establishment of a buffer zone along the borders with Syria ever since 2011," notes Mona-Lisa Freiha in Wednesday's Lebanese daily an-Nahar.

He formally proposed his idea in the UN Security Council, only for Washington to shoot it down. After the formation of the international anti-terrorism coalition, he called for the same again, making his cooperation with the coalition dependent on a positive response to his demand. He has repeatedly threatened military intervention to establish such a zone by force, and the media has leaked reports that the Turkish Armed Forces are working with the concerned institutions on preparing for such a zone logistically, militarily, and legally.

Ever since Kurdish forces and Syrian opposition factions expelled ISIS from Tal Abyad, Erdogan's media machine has revived the same mantra. Turkish press reports have warned that the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) pose a greater threat to Turkey than ISIS; that they are engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Arabs and the Turcoman; and that they are trying to link the Kurdish areas in northern Syria to each other, thereby establishing a continuous corridor along the Turkish borders.  Erdogan himself has warned that Turkey would not permit the establishment of a Kurdish state to its south 'whatever the price.' And these warnings have been issued in tandem with reports that the government has asked the army to take the necessary measures to confront the threat from Syria.

The constant beat of war drums has created the impression that Ankara has finally made up its mind and decided to enter Syria. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) may have concluded that the time has come to weaken the Kurds, whom it has always feared would be the main beneficiaries of the war on ISIS after they have received advanced weapons and drawn close to establishing a Kurdish province in Syria that is geographically contiguous to Iraq and Turkey's Kurds.

But beating the war drums in this manner may have another aim--less to prepare for entering Syria as much as to deal with the Turkish domestic political scene that has radically changed since the June 7th elections in which the ruling party AKP lost its absolute majority after almost 13 years in power.

Erdogan is not the sort of person who can rule within a coalition government. He is too canny to risk early elections before he can ensure broader support for his party. This seasoned politician may have concluded that threatening to go to war offers a way out of this crisis. For the spectre of war causes panic in financial markets, and a few shells here or there would deepen the Turks' feelings of concern and instability. Such a situation would be in Erdogan's favor and add to the credibility of his claim that the country needs the iron fist of one-party rule.

The constant beat of war drums also sends a clear message to Washington and its new alliance with Syria's Kurds. By threatening to intervene in Syria, Ankara aims to pressure Washington into reconsidering its 'Kurdish policy’, which is inconsistent with Turkey's interests.

“Thus a Turkish intervention in Syria may theoretically appear to offer Erdogan many advantages. And in practical terms, the past four years have proven that Erdogan is willing to resort to anything, including using his country's foreign policy in order to put his domestic house in order," concludes Freiha.

Ends…

 

 

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