MIDEAST MIRROR 06.07.15, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)
1-Iran and the Arabs: The day after
2-Defense and offense in Syria
3-Essebsi is right
1-Iran and the Arabs: The day after
The Americans are not so stupid as to believe that the agreement will prevent Iran from producing atomic weapons. The nuclear program will proceed, perhaps at a slower pace. But Washington is not bothered by Iran getting atomic bombs because they pose no threat to it and Iran's possession of the bomb is in no way different from India and Pakistan's. As for Israel, it has sufficient deterrence power to prevent Iran from engaging in any risky adventures. The coming Iranian bomb is not for use, but for imposing Iranian influence in the region. And if Egypt and Saudi Arabia are going to join the nuclear race, then the appropriate time for doing so is today, if not yesterday--Fahd al-Fanek in Jordanian al-Ra'i
Regardless of how the nuclear negotiations may end in an agreement as expected, or whether they are extended once again, the region's issues and files will witness important developments and possible changes. And the Arabs need to be aware that these developments will necessarily be linked to the result of the talks. In other words, Iran’s current inactivity will not last long. As soon as the 'zero-hour' is reached – today or soon – Tehran will emerge to address the region with a policy that will be even more vigorous, perhaps more aggressive. Unless the Arabs are politically and psychologically prepared for that moment, Iran’s gains from any agreement with the West will increase, perhaps even more than the Iranians themselves may hope for--Sameh Rashed on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk
The Iran nuclear deal now being negotiated in Vienna is inevitable, even though Washington recognizes that it will not prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability, maintains a veteran Jordanian commentator. But Iran's bomb poses no threat to the U.S. and will be used to extend Iran's influence on the area east of Suez with Washington’s compliance. Iran has kept a low profile in the region's crises over the past few months during its nuclear negotiations, notes an Egyptian commentator on a pan-Arab website. But this quiescence will end as soon as the negotiations have been concluded, and Tehran will adopt a more vigorous and aggressive policy towards the region for which the Arabs had better be prepared.
VIENNA MANEUVERS: "The maneuvers we are witnessing between Iran and the '5 + 1' in Vienna and what seems to be intransigence or inflexibility of one side or another, are actually no more than tactical moves by each side intended to improve their terms in the negotiations," writes Fahd al-Fanek in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ra'i.
This is also true of [Ayatollah Khamene’i] the Iranian supreme leader’s alleged red lines, who gave a green light to proceed towards signing a final agreement.
There will be such an agreement between Iran and the six states in fact. This goes without saying and the reason is simple: The Iranian and American sides are both yearning for it. Iran wants it to lift the economic sanctions and release its frozen assets; and the U.S. is seeking an achievement for President Obama whose second term in office is about to end with no historic achievement to his name.
The region's states that are likely to be affected by the repercussions of the nuclear agreement would do well to prepare for its results and consequences in advance. Foremost among them are those Arab states that lie east of Suez that are now candidates for becoming areas of Iranian influence.
After the agreement is signed, Iran will regain the role played by the Shah as the Gulf's policeman and as a tool of U.S. policy in the region. Iran's real enemies have no faith that the agreement will prevent it from producing an atomic bomb. On the contrary, they believe that Iran will be given a big push, allowing it to expand westward at the expense of the Arab Gulf and Fertile Crescent states.
As soon as the agreement is signed, a president will be elected for Lebanon and a peaceful solution will be found for the Yemen crisis. Iran will become the stick that the U.S. will use to strike at the governments that may seek to disobey it. It will also be used to strike at the terrorist movements, and Iran will cooperate with the U.S. in doing so, not because the organizations that will be struck are terrorist, in fact, but for sectarian [Shiite] motives.
The Americans are not so stupid as to believe that the agreement will prevent Iran from producing atomic weapons. The nuclear program will proceed, perhaps at a slower pace. But Washington is not bothered by Iran getting atomic bombs because they pose no threat to it and Iran's possession of the bomb is in no way different from India and Pakistan's. As for Israel, it has sufficient deterrence power to prevent Iran from engaging in any risky adventures.
"The coming Iranian bomb is not for use, but for imposing Iranian influence in the region. And if Egypt and Saudi Arabia are going to join the nuclear race, then the appropriate time for doing so is today, if not yesterday," concludes Fanek.
NO LOGICAL EXPLANATION: "There is no logical explanation for the stalemate that has afflicted most of the region's crises for a number of weeks now other than that everyone is waiting for the results of the nuclear negotiations whose final extension is supposed to end today [Monday]," writes Sameh Rashed on Monday's Qatari-owned pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk.
The ongoing conflicts in the region witnessed a notable and unexpected escalation as soon as the framework understanding between Iran and the West was announced at the end of March . The Syrian regime intensified its military operations, and succeeded in regaining areas that had been outside its control, and in slowing down the opposition forces' offensives against other strategically important areas.
In Yemen, the Houthis and [former president] Ali Saleh took the initiative and repeated their attacks on targets inside Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the pace of attack and retreat intensified between ISIS forces on the one hand, and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) militias and Kurdish forces, on the other.
Throughout this phase, the Iranian factor was present in all issues. Iran's desire to display its regional cards and pressure Barack Obama's administration was also evident. For his part, the U.S. president was unable to hide his intense desire to reach a nuclear agreement that would count in his favor before he leaves the White House.
At the same time, all parties were trying to precede the agreement by escalating the situation and driving Iran into a corner, making use of the awkward situation in which it found itself as a result of being in the midst of negotiations with the West. All wagers were on escalation and intransigence– even though the objective conditions were not sufficient for the situation to develop in such a manner.
As soon as the March framework agreement was reached, that upsurge receded simultaneously and on all files. The situation tended towards calm, with all files shelved at the same time, for the moment as well.
In Syria, the balance between Assad's forces and the opposition has remained the same. The Americans enthusiasm for the idea of training 'moderate' Islamist opposition forces has cooled. Ankara continues to explore the possible reactions to establishing a buffer zone. As a result, the Syrian scene has been deferred, while all parties are waiting to see how matters will develop.
In Yemen, the pace of military operations by both sides has also slowed down. Each side has entrenched itself behind its positions without displaying any real flexibility or willingness to budge, either on the battlefield or the political track. As a result, the Geneva [Yemen] conference was first postponed and then held without producing any result or change – as if it had never been held.
In Iraq, the focus has shifted to domestic disagreements between the various leaders ([former PM] Nuri al-Maliki's trial) and a reconsideration of the means to be used against ISIS.
Again, there seems to be a strong link between that simultaneous calm on the various fronts and the approaching end of the Iranian/Western negotiations. For Iran is both the common denominator between all these issues, and the main party to them. But since the nuclear agreement that will supposedly be final and include all outstanding points between Tehran and the West, and given Israel’s incitement against it and the doubts raised by some Western circles as to Iran’s future intentions regarding the region and the world, it was only logical for Tehran to directly or indirectly seek to calm down the region's files and crises. But it will no longer be logical for Iran to maintain this same situation, for it will no longer be forced to abide by it once the negotiations end.
Regardless of how the nuclear negotiations may end, in an agreement as expected, or whether they are extended once again, the region's issues and files will witness important developments and possible changes. And the Arabs need to be aware that these developments will necessarily be linked to the result of the talks.
In other words, Iran’s current inactivity will not last long. As soon as the 'zero-hour' is reached – today or soon – Tehran will emerge to address the region with a policy that will be even more vigorous, perhaps more aggressive.
"Unless the Arabs are politically and psychologically prepared for that moment, Iran’s gains from any agreement with the West will increase, perhaps even more than the Iranians themselves may hope for," concludes Rashed.
2-Defense and offense in Syria
Turkey will not permit the encirclement of the opposition and severing its lines of contact with the Turkish borders and crossing points. The concerned circles in Ankara have deemed the expulsion of opposition fighters from [Aleppo] or its complete fall into President Bashar al-Assad's regime's hands, as tantamount to the fall of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own regime! This is why Erdogan has showed no flexibility in consolidating the opposition's situation on the ground. But this commitment has not reached a point where the lines drawn by the U.S. administration for its Syrian crisis policy have been crossed. In other words, the Turkish president's position was and remains primarily defensive--George Sam’an in pan-Arab al-Hayat
Moving from a war of attrition to a decisive war, and from steadfastness and defense, to the offensive, is a political transition imposed by the developments that have accompanied the war on Syria. In this war, Syria's calculation was to allow the war, its fuel and timespan to run their course until they reached a point after which it would no longer be possible to await for the results of the deluded tests set by some of that war's obsessed parties. At that point, the war's human and political fodder would have all been consumed, which is what is happening now. The assumed time span of the war, which has been linked by the U.S. to the nuclear agreement with Iran, is reaching its end, and the supposed point where the fear stirred by the terrorist groups brought in to topple Syria takes deep root is also being approached --Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'
Having failed to reap any real political gains from the Islamist Syrian opposition’s capture of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour, Turkish President Erdogan may now believe that his only chance to secure a place for himself in the new Middle East is by capturing Aleppo, argues a Lebanese commentator in a Saudi owned daily. The question is whether he can achieve his goal. The battle for al-Zabadani represents a critical turning point in the Syrian war, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. It is the point at which Syria and its allies abandon the strategy of steadfastness and containment and move on to the offensive, with the aim of regaining control over the entire country by fall this year at the latest.
THE BATTLE FOR ALLEPO HAS BEGUN: "The battle for Aleppo has begun, and the coming days will show how it will end," writes George Sam’an in Monday's Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.
Will it achieve its aims? Will it be decided quickly like what happened in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour?
The fact that these two positions fell in the hands of the Islamist Jayshul Fateh represented a major battlefield development; but it was not translated into political terms in favor of the opposition or the [‘moderate’ Turkish-backed] Syrian National Coalition (SNC). That is to say, it did not shake the regime's foundations or revive the prospects of a political solution. Nor did it yield any results in favor of the opposition's regional sponsors, especially Turkey, as much as it raised the fears of Damascus's friends and enemies alike who did not like this move that almost changed the rules of engagement and the regional and international political game. Everyone expressed their concerns that such an operation should not be repeated. And this explains the noise that was raised some days ago, threatening a decisive battle to liquidate the regime's presence in Der'a in the south.
It is as if a green light has not been given. There will be no permission for any advance in the south, which has been the regime's Achilles' heel historically. A decision taken 'up high' has prevented the battle from being pursued there with the momentum required to achieve a breakthrough similar to that in the north. But this is not the first time that the major outside players have set limits to an uncalculated push that could force them to alter their calculations.
The Idlib battle was cause for great concern among many who have been asking about the 'day after' the regime falls from the very first days of the crisis in Syria: What is the alternative? And what fate awaits the minorities?
In fact, setting limits to the opposition factions' thrust on the southern front is not the only case in point. There have been previous similar precedents in the north of the country, where the opposition was prevented from pursuing the battle till the end. This was achieved via pressures and threats to sever aid, arms, and similar supplies.
There had been endless talk of the 'battle of the south' over the previous months, especially after the opposition fighters in that area received special training supervised by the Americans and others. A semi-regular military structure was established for them that met many of the required preconditions.
In fact, there are those who claim that the 'southern front,' which was being managed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was supposed to stop at the gateway to Damascus last April 7th, the official anniversary of the founding of the ruling Baath Party. The aim was to suggest to those who hold the keys to a political solution and those who insist on a decisive military victory, that the regime was just a stone's throw away and that urgent action should be to arrange for its departure and achieve the required change.
A few weeks before that date – that is at the beginning of the year – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard mobilized in force on that front so as to prevent such a major breach. Something similar occurred on the northern front, and the opposition was prevented from advancing beyond certain ‘impermissible’ lines and the coast or sensitive sites that could undermine the 'rules of the game' being played primarily by foreign powers.
Will the Aleppo battle be like what is happening on the southern front, or will it be a repetition of what happened in Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour but this time with repercussions that cannot be ignored?
Jayshul Fateh’s success in northern Syria was achieved with clear backing from Turkey, which itself intervened more than once to prevent the regime from tightening its encirclement around the northern capital. Turkey will not permit the encirclement of the opposition and severing its lines of contact with the Turkish borders and crossing points. The concerned circles in Ankara have deemed the expulsion of opposition fighters from the city or its complete fall into President Bashar al-Assad's regime's hands, as tantamount to the fall of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own regime!
This is why Erdogan has showed no flexibility in consolidating the opposition's situation on the ground. But this commitment has not reached a point where the lines drawn by the U.S. administration for its Syrian crisis policy have been crossed. In other words, the Turkish president's position was and remains primarily defensive. He has threatened and issued warnings on countless occasions; but he has not carried out any of his threats. This is exactly what he did in his battle with Israel over the siege of Gaza: Fiery rallies and speeches but with no practical translation on the ground.
Nothing has occurred on the political scene that would lead to the belief that Turkey has moved from its defensive position on the Syrian crisis towards a more offensive posture, or that it has rebelled against the U.S.-imposed rules. On the contrary, the latest developments have rendered President Erdogan's position even weaker. The June parliamentary elections did not grant his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) the absolute freedom of action it has enjoyed for over a decade. In addition, there is the rising threat that Syria's Kurds now pose in pursuit of their aim of achieving something resembling self-rule in their areas in eastern and northern Syria.
Despite the large-scale mobilization of Turkish forces along the country's southern borders, the Turkish president realizes that direct involvement in the Syrian war will produce a fatal threat to the Turkish interior in political, economic, social, and security terms. It would mark the beginning of Ankara's drowning in the Syrian quagmire. And, quite naturally, this is not what Erdogan wants. In fact, PM Ahmet Davutoglu has clearly stated that despite its major military preparations, his country does not intend to carry out a major military operation in Syria 'overnight.'
Turkey has been pursuing exactly the same method as Iran in its intervention in the region's affairs, relying on its local extensions in some country or another. Ankara is pursuing the same approach, relying on numerous Islamist factions in Syria. It has even turned a blind eye to the Nusra Front and ISIS's moves if they serve its aim of fighting President Assad's regime and containing Kurdish aspirations – provided that these two organizations do not get close to its borders beyond the limit set for them.
But Turkey, which was irked by the fact that the outcome of the Idlib battle was like 'striking water with a stick,' may still push the 'conquerors' of Jayshul Fateh to bring down the northern capital [Aleppo]. This time round, it would be using its stick to strike at two targets at once: Iran, which has already warned Turkey against any intervention on the ground; and the U.S., which has not forgiven Turkey for providing the conditions that have allowed the Islamist factions to secure some gains in the Syrian north, nor for trying to promote these factions as a readymade and strong alternative on the ground to fight both ISIS and the regime in Damascus.
Like the concerned Arab capitals, Ankara is worried at its marginalization and shrinking role as a result of the relationship that Washington is building with Tehran at the expense of all the region's nations – with the exception of Israel, of course. It cannot simply sit back and confine itself to watching. It does not want to lose all that it has dreamt of and worked to achieve over the past ten years – its attempts to achieve 'zero problems' with the region's peoples in order to return among them victorious and in their hearts.
For this reason, Ankara may try to achieve in the battle of Aleppo what it failed to achieve after the battles of Idlib and Jisr ash-Shughour – in fact, what it has failed to achieve ever since the international coalition was formed to fight 'the Caliphate State.' It joined that coalition but did not take part in its military operations. It set a number of preconditions, foremost among which, as is well known, was to strike at both the terrorist organization and President Assad's regime simultaneously and contain the Kurds' impetus and the Kurdish People's Protection Units' (YPG) push to establish a self-ruling entity that would add to the complexity of the Kurdish problem that has been troubling it for so long.
Ankara is trying hard to return to the heart of the political scene. The matter is not confined to its major competitors in the region, from Israel to Iran. It wants a share that equals its weight and political and geographical role and position; indeed, its Sunni religious position, especially since it seems impossible for the Arabs who are busy dealing with their crises and are drowning in a sweeping chaos, to secure a seat that corresponds to their demographic and economic weight.
Ankara is unhappy at being excluded from what Washington and some of its partners are scheming with Tehran. It wants to join the bazaar, which is drawing close to reaching its peak as the nuclear talks between Iran and the six major powers approach their end.
"It may be that President Erdogan is wagering on Aleppo as the 'Trojan Horse' he can use to enter the heart of the major political game. But will his [Jayshul Fateh] 'conquerors' succeed in opening the gates of Aleppo, thereby flinging open the gates of both Washington and Tehran?" asks Sam'an in conclusion.
A MODEL BATTLE: "One of the commanders taking part in the Zabadani operation told me that what the world will witness in this battle is a model of what it will see from now on on the various battlefronts involving the Syrian army and its allies [primarily Hizbollah]," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.
The fighting will take on a different pattern. The units will be fully and qualitatively equipped. The firepower at their disposal will be intense. The coordination and effectiveness between the various units will be well calculated and accurately and professionally calibrated. This is not because new elements are now present that were not there before. Many of the weapons and ammunition needed for this new phase were hidden and kept for this precise moment. Similarly, some units were also held back and prepared for this phase. The difference is in the timing. The war of attrition has ended, a war whose consequences Syria was bearing, resorting to retreats and advances and avoiding some confrontations so as to prevent its forces from being lured into confrontations whose timing had not come. Now, the battle to liberate Syria’s soil from terrorists has begun on all fronts.
The battle of Zabadani is the second part of the Qalamoun war, and the Qalamoun war meant to cleanse the Lebanese/Syrian borders from some 15,000 Nusra Front fighters. These represent that organization’s elite fighters equipped with the most advanced weapons. Their job is to protect the opposition’s lines of supplies to all the Damascus and Homs's countrysides, up to and reaching the Mediterranean. They are fighters who have been set aside by al-Qa’ida’s leadership for two strategic missions:
- First, to link al-Qunaitra to the Homs's countryside, and from there to the Mediterranean and the Lebanese/Syrian border crossing of al-'Arida; and to link the area to the Syrian/Jordanian borders so as to establish a security zone for Israel that would constitute the Nusra Front's mini-state under Israel’s banner. Zabadani would be this mini-state’s capital parallel to a similar project in the north to establish an emirate whose capital would be Idlib – to say nothing of ISIS's mini-state.
- Second, to undermine the balance of deterrence established by the resistance [Hizbollah] against Israel by severing Syria from Lebanon along the latter’s eastern and northern borders, thereby depriving the resistance from its Syrian depth and lines of supply. The ultimate aim is to hemorrhage the resistance and expand into the Lebanese geography by leaping into the northern Bika’a Valley, and from there to the Dinniyyeh area and the Lebanese coast. That has been al-Qa’ida’s primary project since 2000, linking Afghanistan to the Mediterranean via a line that extends via the Kurdish areas in Iran and Iraq, via al-Anbar, Tadmur [Palmyra], Qalamoun and to the Mediterranean.
Once the Qalamoun war ends in a victory for the Syrian army and the resistance, and once the armed groups are eliminated from the entire border line, once all its chances of expanding southward towards the foot of Mount Hermon to reach al-Qunaitra are undermined, a rolling military line will be established for the alliance between the army and the resistance. This is a line that extends from north of Homs to south of al-Qunaitra, and extends eastward to Tadmur and the Nasib border crossing with Jordan.
That means that, within a few and harsh months, all the Damascus countryside, its deserts and hills will be cleansed. A force estimated at 50,000 soldiers with all their equipment and firepower will be freed for deployment and dealing with more than a hundred military pockets of various sizes – from towns like Daraya to cities like Duma, to desert towns like Tadmur.
Part of this force will move to bolster lines in the north and the east, after which it will meet up in three advancing lines: One with the Iraqi army and the PMU towards the Syrian borders; one with the army forces from inside Deir az-Zour and al-Hasaka towards Homs; and a third for the army units deployed in Aleppo and its countryside, Idlib and its countryside, and Latakia. The ultimate aim would be to liberate Aleppo's neighborhoods, Idlib, and Jisr ash-Shughour. And by the end of the summer, or perhaps by mid-fall, the army, the resistance, and Popular Committees' lines of fire will converge and finish off the remaining pockets across the entire Syrian geography.
Moving from a war of attrition to a decisive war, and from steadfastness and defense, to the offensive, is a political transition imposed by the developments that have accompanied the war on Syria. In this war, Syria's calculation was to allow the war, its fuel and timespan to run their course until they reached a point after which it would no longer be possible to await for the results of the deluded tests set by some of that war's obsessed parties. At that point, the war's human and political fodder would have all been consumed, which is what is happening now.
The assumed time span of the war, which has been linked by the U.S. to the nuclear agreement with Iran, is reaching its end, and the supposed point where the fear stirred by the terrorist groups brought in to topple Syria takes deep root is also being approached. These groups have begun to turn into an organized network with their own special project in the Arab countries and Europe. Events have now gone beyond that assumed time span; in fact, the situation now is fully mature.
And as time and the war's fuel begin to run out, the offensive begins. The task of the war changes from that of standing ground to moving on to decisive victory. The escape routes before the armed elements are being shut down and their only option now is death or surrender.
Syria now no longer awaits any [political] settlement despite its openness to every opportunity that allows those implicated in the war on it to back down, and despite clinging to the possibility of dialogue with those opposition parties that desire a democratic solution that accepts the verdict of the ballot box under the banner of continuing the war that unites all Syrians against terrorism.
"Al-Zabadani is a point of separation and connection between two geographies, two strategies, and two phases," concludes Qandil.
3-Essebsi is right
Tunisia’s President Essebsi was right to declare a limited state of emergency, since a return to authoritarian rule is precisely what the terrorist groups want, says Fahd al-Khitan in today's Jordanian al-Ghad
Tunisia’s President Essebsi was right to resist declaring a state of emergency since this is exactly what the terrorist groups want; agreeing to it only if limited to a single month, maintains a Jordanian commentator. For Tunisia has been the exception that vindicates the choice of a democratic path and that proves that coexistence between Islamist and secular currents is possible.
STRANGE OPPOSITION: "It seems very strange for an Arab leader to oppose declaring a state of emergency in his country," writes Fahd al-Khitan in Monday's Jordanian daily al-Ghad.
The custom has been for Arab leaders to exploit exceptional situations in order to impose their absolute power over the country. But according to press reports, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi initially opposed declaring a state of emergency, and only agreed to impose it for one month after the security and military commanders insisted that this was necessary for a limited period of time.
Essebsi's opposition stems from his concern that Tunisia may appear to have joined the ranks of the Arab states where anarchy rules supreme. These are states that besiege the Tunisian model that has proven the exception to the rule.
Tunisia has succeeded in neutralizing the role played by regional and Arab powers that sought hard to drag it into the quagmire of anarchy. The Tunisian democratic experiment stood its ground in confronting the consequences of the current desolation in neighboring Libya. But the terrorist groups would not leave Tunisia to deal with its own affairs. When they failed to abort the process of democratic change, they decided to punish the Tunisians for clinging to the option of democracy by undermining their security and livelihood, and struck at the tourist sector that is one of the country's main sources of revenue. They also tried to incite public opinion against the government and undermine the experiment in democratic coexistence between Islamist and secular currents.
The Tunisian experiment's success proved lethal to the terrorist groups. These groups were confused by the 'Arab Spring' that confronted their violent discourse and methods with a historical predicament. They succeeded in ruining the 'Arab Spring' states' experiments and in dragging them towards civil wars and religious and sectarian conflicts that provide them with an ideal environment. But they came up against the Tunisian model and came to fear its success. This is why they have tried very hard to foil it.
In Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and most recently Egypt, the terrorist groups hide behind a narrative of the general situation in these states as a means of justifying their presence and role. But in the Tunisian case, there is no genuine basis for the presence of ISIS, other than the desire to nip democracy in the bud as a choice for the Arab peoples.
In this sense, ISIS and other extremist groups are not a mere expression or reaction to sectarian persecution or the regimes of political tyranny; they are more than that. They are the ideological and cultural enemies of societies aspiring to freedom and democracy, and the other face of the tyranny that exists or was in place in more than one Arab country. All that these groups want is to replace the existing dictatorships with other religious dictatorships that engage in even worse forms of tyranny, but in the name of religion as interpreted by them. They are the logical antithesis of the people's right to live, choose, and enjoy the gains of world civilizations.
Tunisia today is more important to ISIS and its various clones than Syria, Iraq or Libya. In these states, ISIS has already achieved its mission, with much help from the evil regimes and forces in the region. But the Tunisians have proven to be more determined than their Arab brethren; they have resisted the Dark Ages model and offered a renewed hope of life to the Arab peoples. They have united in the face of the takfiri groups, despite the enormous sacrifices they have had to make.
It is this steadfastness on the Tunisians' part that has really angered the terrorists. As a result, they have wickedly and basely rushed to strike any easy target they could reach – foreign tourists, individual members of the security forces, and ordinary members of the public.
For these reasons, the Tunisian president was right to express his reservations regarding the option of a state of emergency, since that would send the signal to the terrorists that Tunisia is on its way to turning back. And that is exactly what the terrorists want.
"Let that emergency last for a month and be over, after which Tunisia can return to the future," concludes Khitan.
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