MIDEAST MIRROR 29.10.18, SECTION B (THE ARAB WORLD)
1-Opening up to Israel
2-Beneficiaries and spectators
3-A major development in Istanbul
1-Opening up to Israel
By opening up to Israel, [Oman] would be strengthening its position with the U.S., thereby strengthening the safety net that surrounds it. But this seems totally unlikely in light of the past three weeks' developments, specifically the 'Khashoggi affair.' Oman has experienced more difficult, more complicated, and more threatening circumstances over the past four years, but did not commit this deed then, so why should it do this now, when its opponents are in a more difficult position than before, whether in Yemen or in their relations with the international community? I suspect – and to suspect is not always a sin – that the repercussions of Netanyahu's visit will not end soon, and that the Sultanate will pay from the credit and prestige that it has accumulated over the past years – unless it is embracing 'an initiative that matches the risk' either in Palestine, or in Iran, or on both tracks-- 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Jordanian ad-Dustour
What is happening is nothing more than an Omani gift to Israel in compliance with an American demand, in return for giving Muscat a green light to sponsor U.S./Iranian negotiations in light of the expected failure of the U.S. sanctions on Iran and the ongoing Saudi developments; and in return for another green light for Muscat to lead negotiations that will pave the way for a Yemeni settlement in light of Riyadh's current predicament. However, Israel remains as the main winner, even if has no plan to make use of this gain and even if Palestine is no longer an Arab priority and the calculations of pan-Arab interest have dropped off the agenda of [Arab] rulers and governments--Nasser Qandil in Lebanese al-Bina'
A number of different explanations have been offered as to why Oman agreed to receive Israeli PM Netanyahu last week, notes a leading Jordanian commentator. The Sultanate may be launching a new mediation between the U.S. and Iran and wishes to appease Israel; it may be mediating between Israel and the Palestinians; or it may be trying to protect itself against the background of a very difficult geopolitical situation. The view that Netanyahu's visit is a prelude to a U.S./Israeli war on Iran is totally misguided, especially in light of Riyadh's current predicament, argues the editor-in-chief of a pro-Damascus Lebanese daily. The visit was more likely to have been a gift to Israel in order to facilitate Muscat's mediation between Iran and the U.S., in light of the expected failure of Washington's impending sanctions on Tehran.
THREE EXPLANATIONS: "What impelled the Sultanate of Oman to receive the Israeli PM at this specific point in time?" asks 'Urayb ar-Rintawi in Monday's Jordanian daily ad-Dustour.
There have been three different explanations of this extraordinary step that runs counter to Oman's customary foreign policy:
- The first, most convincing, but least widespread explanation suggests that the Sultanate has launched a new mediation effort between the U.S. and Iran, thereby extending its earlier mediation under the Obama administration that paved the way for the nuclear agreement between Tehran and the '5 + 1' group. The advocates of this view believe that the Sultanate may have taken this step either at its own initiative or at the request of one of the two sides – Washington or Tehran. And because it believes that the 'Israeli knot' is the most important obstacle facing U.S./Iranian relations, it took the initiative, or was asked to help overcome it, which is why it complied with the Israeli PM's request to visit Muscat.
The advocates of this view also note what the Iranian foreign minister told the Japanese Kyodo News Agency regarding his country's readiness to resume negotiations with Washington without pre-conditions and on the basis of mutual respect. In this context, a certain Iranian 'tendency' (but not all its centers of power) may have decided to respond to Trump's call to launch new negotiations leading to a new nuclear agreement. This tendency or current may have found in the 'Omani channel' the means it is seeking to test the waters and begin indirect contacts with both Washington and Tel Aviv.
The advocates of this viewpoint add that this explains the Iranian Foreign Ministry's balanced and moderate reaction to Netanyahu's visit, compared to the revolutionary and conservative currents' violent campaign against both the visit and the Sultanate, whose echoes have reverberated in Lebanon. These same advocates recall what Trump has repeatedly said, namely, that the fate of the Iranian crisis will be determined at the negotiating table, albeit on terms that are unfavorable to Iran, and that he is totally confident that the Iranians will eventually return to negotiations over a 'new and comprehensive deal' with Washington. It is worth remembering that Iran and the U.S. are in a playground that Iranian diplomacy is very familiar with, and in which it has acquired great experience based on numerous precedents.
- The second and more widespread explanation says that the Sultanate is seeking to mediate between the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and the U.S. on the other. The supporters of this view link Netanyahu's visit to 'Abbas's three-day visit to Muscat that shortly preceded Netanyahu's. In this regard, it is worth noting that Abbas made a statement in an interview with Palestine TV that was impossible to understand except after Netanyahu's visit was revealed. Speaking from the Omani capital, he said: 'Everything that the Sultanate says and does stems from good intentions.' It was as if he had been informed about Netanyahu's visit beforehand and was offering the Palestinian reaction to it before it took place.
Advocates of this point of view suggest that 'Abbas may have asked for Omani intervention to overcome the difficult problems between him and Israel over Gaza, especially since the tahdi'a [lull or calming down] talks are drawing closer to achieving their aims, according to the Egyptian mediators. For 'Abbas fears that a tahdi'a may be achieved before [Fatah/Hamas] reconciliation. And he does not seem to be very happy with Egypt's behavior, while at the same time viewing Qatar's support for Hamas and the idea of a 'tahdi'a first' with suspicion. Moreover, he has no other Arab capital to resort to or whose help he can call to strengthen his position based on achieving reconciliation prior to any tahdi'a and empowering Rami al-Hamdallah's [PA] government before discussing any other issue.
Should this explanation prove to be true, Oman will pay a heavy price for taking the risky step of wagering its reputation and image on Netanyahu. For he is an untrustworthy liar. He hates the Palestinians and peace, and has never been known to honor any commitments or keep any promises. His visit to the Sultanate would have been a free-of-charge step that will benefit neither the Palestinians nor the Omanis. In other words, Netanyahu will be the sole winner from this risky venture.
- The third explanation suggests that the Sultanate is in a very difficult geopolitical position as the war in and on Yemen draws close to completing its fourth year, and in light of Muscat's tepid or cold relations with some weighty neighboring Gulf states [Saudi Arabia and the UAE]. By opening up to Israel, it would be strengthening its position with the U.S., thereby strengthening the safety net that surrounds it.
But this seems totally unlikely in light of the past three weeks' developments, specifically the 'Khashoggi affair.' Oman has experienced more difficult, more complicated, and more threatening circumstances over the past four years, but did not commit this deed then, so why should it do this now, when its opponents are in a more difficult position than before, whether in Yemen or in their relations with the international community?
"I suspect – and to suspect is not always a sin – that the repercussions of Netanyahu's visit will not end soon, and that the Sultanate will pay from the credit and prestige that it has accumulated over the past years – unless it is embracing 'an initiative that matches the risk' either in Palestine, or in Iran, or on both tracks," concludes Rintawi.
End…
AN ACT OF NORMALIZATION: "The Sultanate of Oman's reception of the [Israeli] occupation's PM represents an act of normalization that must be rejected and denounced, regardless of the pretexts and justifications," writes Editor-in-Chief Nasser Qandil in Monday's pro-Damascus Lebanese daily al-Bina'.
Israel is the sole winner from the Gulf states' 'normalization wave' in sports, culture, security, and politics. These are confirmed facts. But the political question concerns this visit's implications and significance: Is it paving the way for a military action against Iran, as some believe? Or is it meant to pave the way for a similar visit by Netanyahu to Saudi Arabia? Or is it merely the fruit of the relationship with Oman; one that has ripened and that Netanyahu has sought to pick at a moment when Saudi Arabia's image as a reliable ally has collapsed? Or is it all of these things?
What is certain is that in light of Saudi Arabia's current predicament, this is not the appropriate moment for the U.S. and Israel to consider waging war on Iran. After all, Saudi Arabia is the central Gulf state and in the official Arab order. It thus seems unlikely to play any strategic and fateful cards in the Gulf before it regains its health. Moreover, logic requires that when the goal is of a security and military nature, it should be kept secret, contrary to the public fanfare that has surrounded the visit and in which the [Israeli] occupation state's senior intelligence officials have joined in.
What is also certain is that normalization is a cumulative cultural and psychological process. Every step is a gain for Israel. But the qualitative step that American and Israeli efforts are focused on is that of normalization and an alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But the obstacles facing public normalization in this case are growing, despite the distance that the secret and half-public Saudi/Israeli cooperation has covered so far. Moreover, and after its latest and worsening predicament, Saudi Arabia seem to be in no condition to take a step of the sort that Israel requires. Talk of the [U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian] deal of the century that requires a significant Palestinian partner who will agree to relinquish Jerusalem, seems less and less plausible.
But Oman's step does not seem difficult to take, after having taken similar steps in the past, as did Qatar. Yitzhak Rabin visit to Muscat in 1994 and Shimon Peres's subsequent visit in 1996 are very significant. In fact, some believe that Muscat's moderate position regarding the regional conflicts stems from its greater ability to commit to refusing normalization than the rest of the Gulf states.
For like Qatar, Oman would rather join the normalization process once the U.S. effort to achieve compromises regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict is close to achieving its aims, rather than stand at the starting line when there are likely to be many clashes. Moreover, after Qatar lost this role and risked its ability to play a more major role by leading the Arab Spring's phase, Oman's chances of occupying its seat in hosting agreements increased. But there is a constant American set of requirements that must be satisfied by those who want to assume this role, and this includes the precondition that Israel must receive a certain prize.
For its part, Israel finds itself in a strategic predicament, unable to go to war and unable to make compromises. Its wager on liquidating the Palestinian cause by forging a partnership with Saudi Arabia under the banner of forming a common alliance against Iran is becoming more difficult. It is vital for it to safeguard its position and prepare for what may happen once Saudi developments, which are still in their first stage, have unfolded. And Muscat offers a window for that. Moreover, it also necessary to keep all that is happening open-ended if Israel is to return to the old negotiating framework once the Saudi opportunity collapses.
But this is not what is happening today. What is happening is nothing more than an Omani gift to Israel in compliance with an American demand, in return for giving Muscat a green light to sponsor U.S./Iranian negotiations in light of the expected failure of the U.S. sanctions on Iran and the ongoing Saudi developments; and in return for another green light for Muscat to lead negotiations that will pave the way for a Yemeni settlement in light of Riyadh's current predicament.
"However, Israel remains as the main winner, even if has no plan to make use of this gain and even if Palestine is no longer an Arab priority and the calculations of pan-Arab interest have dropped off the agenda of [Arab] rulers and governments," concludes Qandil.
Ends…
2-Beneficiaries and spectators
Anyone following the statements made by the leaders of the free world would be very hard pressed to find a single one in favor of the Saudi crown-prince… no one knows exactly how to build [an anti-Iranian] alliance between a group of countries that are in competition, hostility, and perhaps cold war with each other. The idea that they all face a common source of threat is not enough to establish this alliance. After all, the member states must decide on a mechanism for confronting this threat; but how can Saudi Arabia assume this mission when its regional policies have earned it hostility and driven away those who may have sided with it against Iran? [U.S. Defense Secretary] Mattis's [Manama] statement warrants very careful scrutiny. The implicit references to Saudi Arabia's role in undermining security and stability in the region are worrisome. And the greatest beneficiary of what has happened in recent weeks is Iran, which Riyadh claims is threatening regional security--Hassan al-Barari in Qatari Asharq
Tehran's position today is consistent with the notion that 'a stupid enemy is better than a clever ally.' For Saudi Arabia has presented Iran with a reward it never expected, at a time when the U.S. was drawing close to implementing its sanctions. What happened pushed Tehran out of the limelight; with the result that Riyadh has come to head the list of targets for international anger instead. For the moment at least, Iran will continue to occupy the seat of a gloating spectator waiting to see how matters may develop. It expects that the affair and its repercussions will continue to unfold for some time to come, which would serve its interest. Russia is another spectator – a non-gloating one this time – one that also waited for a long time before taking a stance on Khashoggi's murder that ran contrary to all that is being said in Europe and the U.S. The Kremlin has set itself up as a defender of the Saudi ruling family, refusing to believe that it was responsible for the crime--Hussam Kanafani on pan-Arab www.alaraby.co.uk
U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis's statements in Manama regarding the Khashoggi affair should be read carefully because of their strong implicit criticism of Saudi Arabia, maintains a Jordanian commentator. Riyadh has lost much of its prestige after this affair, and it is difficult to see how it would be possible to create an anti-Iran 'Arab NATO' under its leadership in light of the hostility it has elicited from many potential members of that alliance. While most Western states have been gripped by the Khashoggi affair, other countries – primarily Iran, Russia, and China – have been occupying the spectators' seats preferring to wait and see what may happen next, notes a Lebanese commentator on a Qatari-owned news portal. Meanwhile, they are hoping to secure political and/or economic gains from Riyadh's plight.
UNDERMINING STABILITY: "In his speech to a security conference in Manama two days ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis said that Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder could undermine stability in the region," writes Hassan al-Barari in Monday's Qatari daily Asharq.
And he added that any country's failure to commit to international criteria and the rule of law could undermine regional stability at a time of growing need for it.
Secretary Mattis was speaking in the context of a strategic culture that was manifest at two levels:
- First, he was implicitly criticizing Saudi domestic policies when he said that a nation is more secure when it allows opposition voices to express themselves. A close scrutiny of his words allows us to decode the U.S.'s understanding of the situation that held Saudi Arabia responsible for certain terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 bombings. There is a common impression in the U.S. that had Saudi Arabia allowed for opposition and held elections, Osama bin Laden would have been no more than an extremist Saudi member of parliament and al-Qa'ida would not have attacked the U.S.
- Second, the U.S. is trying to build a broad regional alliance to confront and contain Iran. It ended with the view that Saudi Arabia will be at the forefront of this alliance. And the fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia is also eager to establish the so-called 'Arab NATO' that will include 'moderate' Arab countries in addition to Israel, which will be part of that alliance in one form or another. But if Saudi Arabia is going to lead this alliance and help the U.S. in its cold war with Iran, Riyadh should not implicate itself in disagreements with countries that are members of this same group – for example, the blockade on Qatar.
Against this background, Jamal Khashoggi's murder delivered a strong blow to the prestige of Saudi Arabia and its crown prince in whom the U.S. has invested much to polish up his image. For how can the U.S. proceed to justify its relationship with a state led by a man whom the international community has accused of being implicated in the murder of a Saudi citizen whose only fault was to express an opinion that the crown-prince does like to hear? I believe that the White House will find it difficult to maintain its relationship with the Saudi crown prince while at the same time preserving respect for the administration within the U.S.
Has Saudi Arabia turned into a burden on its allies? Anyone following what is being written in the Western press would say 'yes.' And anyone following the statements made by the leaders of the free world would be very hard pressed to find a single one in favor of the Saudi crown-prince. Moreover, respectable international voices are calling for the perpetrators of this crime to be brought before an international tribunal, clearly casting doubt on the Saudi judiciary's transparency and credibility, even though the issue has less to do with the judiciary, as much as it has to do with the credibility of the Saudi position in general.
It is worth noting that James Mattis spoke of the alliance planned for next year, but no one knows exactly how to build such an alliance between a group of countries that are in competition, hostility, and perhaps cold war with each other. The idea that they all face a common source of threat is not enough to establish this alliance. After all, the member states must decide on a mechanism for confronting this threat; but how can Saudi Arabia assume this mission when its regional policies have earned it hostility and driven away those who may have sided with it against Iran?
"In short, Mattis's statement warrants very careful scrutiny. The implicit references to Saudi Arabia's role in undermining security and stability in the region are worrisome. And the greatest beneficiary of what has happened in recent weeks is Iran, which Riyadh claims is threatening regional security," concludes Barari.
End…
CALCULATING THE BENEFIT: "As the Saudi journalist and writer Jamal Khashoggi's case grips the world, especially the Western countries, certain countries have occupied the spectators' seats observing the development of Saudi Arabia's crisis from afar, and calculating how they may benefit from it at some later time," writes Hussam Kanafani on the Qatari-owned, London-based, pan-Arab news portal www.alaraby.co.uk.
This has begun to gradually emerge on the ground; especially in light of the growing possibility that Riyadh may turn towards other alliances should the U.S. and the European escalation regarding this case continue.
Iran, for example, is sitting in the first row. There is no doubt that it is enjoying the statements, positions, and suggestions regarding possible sanctions on Saudi Arabia issuing daily from the Western countries. Tehran waited for more than 15 days after Khashoggi's death before it issued a statement denouncing the crime and holding Saudi Arabia and the U.S. responsible. It had previously confined itself to watching from afar, undoubtedly accompanied by a strong dose of schadenfreude regarding Saudi Arabia.
After all, Riyadh had led the campaign against Tehran's nuclear agreement with former U.S. president Barack Obama. It also succeeded in pushing current U.S. President, Donald Trump to withdraw from the agreement and place Iran under the sword of sanctions once more.
Now, however, Tehran can see that the situation may be reversed, with Saudi Arabia threatened with sanctions and international isolation due to Khashoggi's murder. This has reduced the U.S. pressure on Iran after Trump administration has found itself in an awkward position regarding its alliance with Riyadh due to Congressional and media pressure on the administration.
In other words, Tehran's position today is consistent with the notion that 'a stupid enemy is better than a clever ally.' For Saudi Arabia has presented Iran with a reward it never expected, at a time when the U.S. was drawing close to implementing its sanctions. What happened pushed Tehran out of the limelight with the result that Riyadh has come to head the list of targets for international anger instead.
For the moment at least, Iran will continue to occupy the seat of a gloating spectator waiting to see how matters may develop. It expects that the affair and its repercussions will continue to unfold for some time to come, which would serve its interest.
Russia is another spectator – a non-gloating one this time – one that also waited for a long time before taking a stance on Khashoggi's murder that ran contrary to all that is being said in Europe and the U.S. The Kremlin has set itself up as a defender of the Saudi ruling family, refusing to believe that it was responsible for the crime.
Russia's public position, which is different from the Kremlin's men's hidden beliefs, reflects a high degree of political cunning and economic opportunism. The Russians are cautiously watching how Saudi Arabia's relations with the West, especially with the U.S., are developing waiting to build a new regional political alliance that would give them greater influence at the U.S.'s expense. The echoes of [senior Saudi commentator] Turki ad-Dakhil's article [claiming that Riyadh would realign with Moscow-see Mideast Mirror 16.10.2018] reached Moscow, which is in no hurry to move towards political normalization with Saudi Arabia and prefers to wait for the scene to become clear instead.
But Russia has no objection to exploiting the situation economically, as emerged clearly from the agreements signed at last week's 'Davos in the Desert' forum when Moscow made use of the Western boycott to be at the forefront of the scene and secure gains from the crisis that Saudi Arabia is undergoing. For Riyadh wanted to ensure the forum's success, regardless of who attends, and the Russians and the Chinese were the most prominent attendees.
China also is sitting in the spectators' seats. But its basic interests seem to be less expansive than Russia's and appear to be restricted to securing economic gains and filling the vacuum created by the Western companies' boycott or the Western states' halting their weapons' sales to Saudi Arabia.
"Jamal Khashoggi's death has not turned into a crime carried out by mere individuals. On the contrary; it appears to be a turning-point that may change the region political scene, after which those in the spectators' seats may join the field and occupy the place currently occupied by the leading players," concludes Kanafani.
Ends…
3-A major development in Istanbul
The major European parties finally appear to have acknowledged the need to join the Astana process and to recognize Syria and its allies' achievements on the ground, says Ali Nasrallah in today's Syrian ath-Thawra
This weekend's four-way Istanbul summit may prove to be a major development in Europe's views of the Syrian crisis, maintains a commentator in a Syrian state-owned daily. France and Germany's participation in the summit suggests that these two major European countries have decided to join the Astana process despite their initial opposition to it – an achievement that would have been impossible had it not been for the Syrian army's victories on the battlefield.
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? "Does the four-way Russian/French/German/Turkish summit in Istanbul represent a step in the right direction?" asks Ali Nasrallah in Monday's state-run Syrian daily ath-Thawra.
In other words, did it point to a belated European attempt to mark its distance from the American position? Or did it take place with Washington's acquiescence, suggesting that it is no more than an attempt to test Russia's determination, at best?
The analyses of the four-way summit are sure to examine it from different angles and different vantage points and positions. These differences will also correspond to the different results expected by various parties' and the degree to which they agree or disagree over the subjects under discussion and their proposed visions.
One realistic understanding of France and Germany's attendance of the summit and joining the Astana track and agreement to work with it – as indicated in the summit's final communiqué that states that 'the more the number of countries taking part in the Astana formula, the greater its chances of success' – suggests that this amounts to a admission of the mistakes committed when these Western countries joined Washington blindly (or with eyes wide-open) and contributed to supporting or sustaining terrorism, either willingly or because they were forced to do so.
France and Germany's attendance could also lead to the conclusion that the West now appreciates the danger of remaining absent, at a time when Russia is making great advances. This compels the West to claim that it is participating in the achievements of the war on terrorism, even if this comes at the final quarter-hour. This would allow the West to preempt any accusations of having acted otherwise, or to try to reserve a seat for itself, or not lose its role as an international player.
Be that as it may, the Istanbul meeting appears to be significant. For one thing, it has wrested out of parties hostile to Syria – France, Germany, and Turkey – what conflicted with the essence of their agendas of aggression until recently. For another, the meeting displayed Moscow's firm and determined position to these parties, if the aim was to test it. And on a third level, the meeting gave a legitimacy that was previously denied to the Astana formula; the West cast doubt on the entire process, in fact. The result is that these countries are now moving towards expanding their participation in this process and recognizing its achievements as a platform for a political solution and for fighting and defeating terrorism.
But no matter which direction commentators, observers, and players may take in their analyses and inferences, the main and fixed aspect that no one can ignore is that it is the situation on the ground that is creating and determining the course of political change.
"For had it not been for what the Syrian Arab Army and its allies have achieved on the battlefield, the Astana formula would not have been born, the Sochi conference would not have been held, and the Geneva proposals would not have melted away and disappeared," concludes Nasrallah
Ends…